1.
Programme contract read: WHEREAS, the lessor (BASECO) is the owner of
BASECO was the owner of Piazza Hotel and Mariveles
Lodge, both located in Mariveles, Bataan. BASECO granted
Programme a contract of lease over Piazza Hotel for 3
years .Programme was allowed to continue the lease . PCCGG
ordered sequestration against BASECO. The lot where Piazza
Hotel was provisionally seized and taken over. It was sold in
the public auction due to non payment of taxes by baseco It
was transferred under the Province of Bataan.
Programme filed a Preliminary Injunction and collection of
sum of money against Baseco. The Province of Bataan
Intervene and order Programme to vacate
Issue: WON province of Bataan legitimate owner of Piazza
and Mariveles Lodge
Ruling:
The evidence clearly established respondent’s ownership of
Piazza Hotel. 11 First, the title of the land on which Piazza 12
Hotel stands was in the name of respondent. 12 Second, Tax
Declaration No. 12782 was in the name of respondent as owner
of Piazza Hotel. A note at the back of the tax declaration read:
Transferred by virtue of a final bill of sale executed by the
Provincial [Treasurer] of Bataan in favor of the Provincial
Government. Third, petitioner was doubtlessly just a lessee. In
the lease contract annexed to the complaint, petitioner in fact
admitted BASECO’s (respondent’s predecessor-in-interest)
ownership then of the subject property. A stipulation in the
the building PIAZZA HOTEL and its outlet MARIVELES
LODGE located at BASECO, Mariveles, Bataan.
The Rules of Court states that “[a]n admission, verbal or
written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.” 16
[Such admissions] may be made in (a) the pleadings filed by
the parties, (b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or
written manifestations or stipulations, or (c) in other stages of
the judicial proceeding, as in the pre-trial of the case.
Admissions obtained through depositions, written
interrogatories or requests for admission are also considered
judicial admissions.
To be considered as a judicial admission, the same must be
made in the same case in which it is offered.” 18 In its own
complaint 19 for preliminary injunction and sum of money,
petitioner acknowledged that it was not the owner of the
property when it stated that “[BASECO] lease[d] to [petitioner]
the building Piazza Hotel and its outlet Mariveles Lodge x x x
for monthly rentals of P6,500.00.” 20 Petitioner could not
possibly be the owner of a building merely leased to it. 21
2. CUENCO
Facts Cuenco leased from talisay tourist sports
complex to be operated as cockpit. It was extended
for 4 years. Under the contract, petitioner like a
good father of the family maintain in good
condition the furnitures, chattels and other
equipments and keep the leased premises clean.
Supervisors of talisay tourist sports are allowed to
make inspection. Furthermore, petitioner would
give a deposit equivalent to six (6) months rental to
answer for whatever damages may be caused to the
premises during the period of the lease. Contract
expired , talisay conducted public bidding which the
petitioner participated but talisay awarded it to Mr.
Rex Salud. Cuenco wrote 4 demand letters to
Talisay , claiming for P500,000.00 deposit he made
which is answerable to all damages caused to
furnitures , chattels and other equipment. Demand
remain unheeded, Cuenco filed a complaint. He
maintained that respondents acted in bad faith in
withholding the amount of the deposit without any
justifiable reason. RTC admitted cuenco’s evidence
contract of lease and 4 demand letter and it also
admitted evidence for the respondent such as
inventory of leased property.
RTC: ruled in favor of cuenco- Basis: The court
also considered the admission of respondents’
counsel during the pre-trial that no inventory of the
property was conducted on the leased premises.
CA: ruled in favor of talisay – basis: (1)
Coronado’s testimony that petitioner continued to
hold cockfights two months after the expiration
of the lease contract which was not refuted by
petitioner; (2) the summary of repairs made on the
property showing that respondents spent the amount
of P573,710.17 immediately prior to the expiration
of the lease contract and shortly thereafter; and (3)
the new lessor incurred expenses amounting to
over P3 million when he shouldered the rest of the
repair and renovation of the subject property.25
Issue: whether petitioner is entitled to the return of
the amount deposited.
Ruling
Yes. Respondents failed to present sufficient proof
to warrant the retention of the full amount of the
deposit given by petitioner.
At the pre-trial conference, respondents’ counsel
made an admission that no inventory was made on
the leased premises, at least up to that time. This
admission was confirmed in the Pre-Trial Order
issued by the trial court. Obviously, it was on
Coronado’s testimony, as well as on the
documentary evidence29 of an alleged property
inventory conducted on June 4, 1998, that the CA
based its conclusion that the amount of damage
sustained by the leased premises while in the
possession of petitioner exceeded the amount of
petitioner’s deposit. This contradicts the judicial
admission made by respondents’ counsel which
should have been binding on the respondents.
The veracity of judicial admissions require no
further proof and may be controverted only upon a
clear showing that the admissions were made
through palpable mistake or that no admissions
were made. Thus, the admissions of parties during
the pretrial, as embodied in the pre-trial order, are
binding and conclusive upon them. Wherefore,
Talisay Sports Complex, Inc. is solely liable to
return the amount of the deposit after deducting the
amount of the two-months arrears in rentals.
5. Santos vs Lumbao
Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the
subject property which is a part of her share in the
estate of her deceased mother, Maria Catoc (Maria),
who died intestate, Rita sold 100 square meters of
her inchoate share in her mother’s estate through a
document denominated as “Bilihan ng Lupa,” dated
17 August 1979. Respondents Spouses Lumbao
claimed the execution of the aforesaid document
was witnessed by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo, as
shown by their signatures affixed therein. On the
second occasion, an additional seven square meters
was added to the land as evidenced by a document
also denominated as “Bilihan ng Lupa,” dated 9
January 1981. Spouses Lumbao took actual
possession thereof and erected thereon a house
which they have been occupying as exclusive
owners up to the present. Rita informed respondent
Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver the title to
the subject property because the entire property
inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had
not yet been partitioned. Failure to reconvey the
property, respondent filed Reconveyance with
Damages.
Issue : WON Bilihan ng Lupa,” dated 17 August
1979 and 9 January 1981 are null and void for being
falsified documents as it is made to appear that
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were present in the
execution of the said documents and that the
identities of the properties in those documents in
relation to the subject property has not been
established by the evidence of the respondents
Spouses Lumbao.
Ruling
Upon examination of the aforesaid documents, this
Court finds that in the “Bilihan ng Lupa,” dated 17
August 1979, the signatures of petitioners Virgilio
and Tadeo appeared thereon. Moreover, in
petitioners’ Answer and Amended Answer to the
Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages, both
petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo made an admission
that indeed they acted as witnesses in the execution
of the “Bilihan ng Lupa,” dated 17 August 1979. 19
However, in order to avoid their obligations in the
said “Bilihan ng Lupa,” petitioner Virgilio, in his
crossexamination, denied having knowledge of the
sale transaction and claimed that he could not
remember the same as well as his appearance before
the notary public due to the length of time that had
passed. Noticeably, petitioner Virgilio did not
categorically deny having signed the “Bilihan ng
Lupa,” dated 17 August 1979 and in support thereof,
his testimony in the cross-examination
Facts alleged in a party’s pleading are deemed
admissions of that party and are binding upon him,
but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An
answer is a mere statement of fact which the party
filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. And
in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a
party’s pleading, the trial court is still given leeway
to consider other evidence presented. However, in
the case at bar, as the Court of Appeals mentioned
in its Decision, “[herein petitioners] had not
adduced any other evidence to override the
admission made in their [A]nswer that [petitioners
Virgilio and Tadeo] actually signed the [Bilihan ng
Lupa dated 17 August 1979] except that they were
just misled as to the purpose of the document, x x x.”
Virgilio’s answers were unsure and quibbled. Hence,
the general rule that the admissions made by a party
in a pleading are binding and conclusive upon him
applies in this case. Wherefore,petition is denied
7. Republic Vs. Cojuangco
9. Equitable vs Josefa Borromeo Capistrano
Facts: Josefa Capistrano applied for membership at
the Manila Yacht Club (MYC) under the latter’s
widowmembership program. Since the MYC and
ECI had a credit card sponsorship agreement in
which the Club would solicit for ECI credit card
enrollment among its members and dependents, Mrs.
Capistrano alleged applied for and was granted a
Visa Credit Card by ECI.
Mrs. Capistrano authorized her daughter,
Valentina C. Redulla (Mrs. Redulla), to claim from
ECI her credit card and ATM application form.
After Mrs. Capistrano got hold of the card, she
supposedly started using it. Mrs. Redulla personally
issued a P45,000.00 check as partial payment of
Mrs. Capistrano’s account with ECI. But Mrs.
Redulla’s check bounced upon deposit.
Answering the complaint, Mrs. Capistrano
denied ever applying for MYC membership and
ECI credit card; that Mrs. Redulla was not her
daughter; and that she never authorized her or
anyone to claim a credit card for her. Assuming she
applied for such a card, she never used it. fter trial,
the RTC3 ruled that, having failed to deny under
oath the genuineness and due execution of ECI’s
actionable documents that were attached to the
complaint, Mrs. Capistrano impliedly admitted the
genuineness and due execution of those documents.
Issue ; Whether or not the CA correctly ruled
that, although Mrs. Capistrano failed to make an
effective specific denial of the actionable
documents attached to the complaint, she overcame
this omission by presenting parol evidence to which
ECI failed to object.
Ruling : But the rule that applies when the
defendant wants to contest the documents attached
to the claimant’s complaint which are essential to
his cause of action is found in Section 8, Rule 8 of
the Rules of Court, which provides: SECTION 8.
How to contest such documents.—When an action
or defense is founded upon a written instrument,
copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading
as provided in the preceding Section, the
genuineness and due execution of the instrument
shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party,
under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth
what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement
of an oath does not apply when the adverse party
does not appear to be a party to the instrument or
when compliance with an order for an inspection of
the original instrument is refused.
True, issues not raised by the pleadings may be
tried with the implied consent of the parties as when
one of them fails to object to the evidence adduced
by the other concerning such unimpleaded issues.
But the CA fails to reckon with the rule that a
party’s admissions in the course of the proceedings,
like an admission in the answer of the genuineness
and true execution of the plaintiff’s actionable
documents, can only be contradicted by showing
that defendant made such admission through
palpable mistake. Here, Mrs. Capistrano never
claimed palpable mistake in the answer she filed. It
is of no moment that plaintiff ECI failed to object to
Mrs. Capistrano’s evidence at the trial that the
subject documents were forgeries. As the Court
ruled in Elayda v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 349
(1991), the trial court may reject evidence that a
party adduces to contradict a judicial admission he
made in his pleading since such admission is
conclusive as to him. It does not matter that the
other party failed to object to the contradictory
evidence so adduced.
Implied admission
1. PNB vs refrigeration industries
PNB , an agency created by Pro. No. 5 that
takes title to or possession, conserves,
provisionally, manages, and disposes assets
which have been identified
for privatization or disposition, for the
benefit of the National Government.
Respondent Refrigeration Industries
Inc. (RII) is a manufacturer of refrigerators
and compressors.
RII occupied a portion of the assembly
plant of Deltra Motor Corp. RII installed
in the plant equipment, machinery and
other chattels. PNB foreclosed several
parcels of real estate and chattels of DMC
located at the DMC Compound. PNB was
the highesh bidder and took possession of
all the chattels inside the DMC
compound.RII demanded the release of
its properties. PNB required them to
show proof of ownership which RII failed
to do so. RII filed Recovery of Possession
with Damages. Six years later, RII alleged
that during the pre-trial conference, PNB
manifested to APT, in a letter dated May
11, 1989, that the machineries and
equipments of RII listed in Annex “C” of the
complaint were erroneously transferred to
APT, and that in a letter dated May 31, 1989,
APT acknowledged the mistakes and agreed
to release the properties to the authorized
representative of
RII. Summary Judgement was rendered by
RTC in favor of RII. PNB appealed.
Issue : WON there was no
admission made as to RII’s ownership of the
contested chattels, thus, there still exists a
genuine issue as to a real or genuine issue or question as to the
material fact that precludes the issuance of
summary
judgment
Ruling
After considering the records of this
case, we find that petitioners’ contention
could not be upheld. We agree that the Court
of Appeals correctly held that the summary
judgment was properly rendered by the trial
court. Firstly, it may
be noted that PNB admitted in its May 11,
1989 letter to APT that the contested
chattels belonged to RII, but were
erroneously taken during the foreclosure of
DMC’s properties; that these were
eventually transferred to APT. Secondly, we
also note that APT admitted that PNB wrote
the letter dated May 11, 1989; and that APT
wrote a letter dated May 29, 1989 to PNB.
With these admissions, there is no genuine
issue concerning RII’s ownership of the
chattels and their erroneous delivery to APT
had remained.
A “genuine issue” is an issue of fact which
requires the presentation of evidence. When
the facts as pleaded appear
uncontested or undisputed, then there is no
facts. Summary judgment, as prescribed by
the rules must then ensue as a matter of law,
to weed out sham
claims or defenses at an early stage of the
litigation, to avoid the expense and loss of
time involved in a trial, and to separate what
is formal or pretended in denial or averment
from what is genuine and substantial, so that
only the latter may subject a suitor to the
burden of trial
Contrary to petitioners’ claim that there was
no admission on their part that respondent
owned the chattels, our
review of the records shows that petitioners
failed to either specifically deny or directly
assail and raise as an issue, the validity of
the letter dated May 11, 1989 and the letter
dated May
29, 1989. Their failure to deny the
genuineness and due execution
of the said documents amounts to a judicial
admission pursuant
to Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.
Judicial admissions do not require proof and
may not be contradicted in the absence of a
prior showing that the admissions had been
made through
palpable mistake. These letters are deemed
admitted as evidence,
and they likewise supersede the defenses
interposed by petitioners in their respective
answers.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
DENIED
3. Municipality of Tiwi vs. Antonio
Betito, G.R. No. 171873, 09 July 2010
The National Power Corporation
(NPC) liable for unpaid real estate taxes
from June 11, 1984 to March 10, 1987 on its
properties located in the Province of Albay
(Albay). These properties consisted of
geothermal plants in the Municipality of
Tiwi (Tiwi) and substations in the
Municipality of Daraga. Previously, the said
properties were sold at an auction sale
conducted by Albay to satisfy NPCs tax
liabilities. As the sole bidder at the auction,
Albay acquired ownership over said
properties. NPC through Preseident Pablo
Malixi and Albay through
Gob.Salalima entered into MOA where the
former agreed to
settle its tax liabilities estimated at
P214,845,104.76. Mayor Naomi C. Corral
(Mayor Corral) of Tiwi formally requested
Governor Salalima to remit the rightful tax
shares of Tiwi and its barangays where the
NPCs properties were located relative to the
payments already made by NPC to Albay.
On even date, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Tiwi passed Resolution No. 12-92
requesting the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Albay to hold a joint session for the
purpose of discussing the distribution of the
NPC payments. Governor Salalima replied
that the request cannot be granted. Due to
the brewing misunderstanding between Tiwi
and the concerned barangays on the one
hand, and Albay on the other, and so as not
to be caught in the middle of the controversy,
NPC requested a clarification from the
Office of the
President as to the scope and extent of the
shares of the local government units in the
real estate tax collections.
On August 30, 1992, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Tiwi passed Resolution No. 15-
92authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer
to represent Tiwi and its barangays in
therecovery of their rightful share in the
aforesaid realty taxes. Thereafter, Mayor
Corral
sought the services of respondent Atty.
Antonio B. Betito (respondent) and Atty.
AlbertoLawenko (Atty. Lawenko). As a
result, on January 25, 1993, Mayor Corral,
representing
Tiwi, and respondent and Atty. Lawenko
entered into a Contract of Legal Services
(subject
contract). Office of the president opined that
sharing scheme and those entitled to the
payments to be made by NPC under the
MOA should be
that provided under the law, and since Tiwi
is entitled to share in said realty taxes, NPC
may remit such share directly to Tiwi. The
present controversy arose when respondent
sought to enforce the Contract of
Legal Services after rendering the
aforementioned legal services which
allegedly benefited Tiwi. In his Complaint,
respondent claims that he handled numerous
cases which resulted to the recovery of
Tiwi’s share in the realty taxes.
Petitioner’s Argument: petitioners argue
that respondent cannot capitalize on the
admission of the
genuineness and due execution of the
subject contract because this merely means
that the signature of the party is authentic
and the execution of the contract complied
with the formal solemnities. This does not
extend to the documents substantive validity
and
efficacy.
Respondent’s Argument: Respondent also party to the instrument. In the instant case,
argues that the Contract of Legal Services is the subject contract was executed between
valid and enforceable due to respondent and Atty. Lawenko, on the one
petitioners failure to specifically deny the hand, and Tiwi, represented by Mayor
same under oath in their Answer. Moreover, Corral,on the other. None of the petitioners,
the law does not require that the subject who are the incumbent elective and
contract be ratified by the Sangguniang appointive officials of Tiwi as of the filing
Bayan in order of the Complaint, were parties to said
to become enforceable. contract. Nonetheless,
in their subsequent pleadings, petitioners
Issue : WON the genuineness and admitted the genuineness and due execution
due execution of the Contract of Legal of
Services was impliedly admitted by the subject contract. We shall, thus, proceed
petitioners for from the premise that the genuineness and
failure to make a sworn specific denial due execution of the Contract of Legal
thereof as required by Section 8, Rule 8 of Services has already been established.
the Furthermore,
Rules of Court. both parties concede the contents and
Ruling: efficacy of Resolution 15-92. As a result of
It was erroneous for the trial court to rule these admissions, the issue, at least as to the
that the genuineness and coverage of the subject contract, may be
due execution of the Contract of Legal resolved
Services was impliedly admitted by based on the pleadings as it merely requires
petitioners for the interpretation and application of the
failure to make a sworn specific denial provisions of Resolution 15-92 vis--vis the
thereof as required by Section 8, Rule 8 of stipulations in the subject contract.
the Rules of Court. Thisrule is not applicable ADMISSION IN AMENDED,
when the adverse party does not appear to be SUPERSEDED, OR DISMISSED
a PLEADING
3. Ching vs. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA complaint was,
16 in effect, superseded.

Facts: Ching was charged with 4 counts RULING. YES. Under the Rules, pleadings
of estafa in relation to trust receipts law superseded or
before RTC Makati. petitioner Ching, amended disappear from the record, lose
together with their status as pleadings
Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc., filed a and cease to be judicial admissions. While
case before theRTC-Manila, Branch 53,for they may nonetheless be utilized against the
declaration of nullity of documents and for pleader as extrajudicial admissions,
damages,entitled “PhilippineBlooming Mills, theymust, in order to have such effect, be
Inc., et al. vs. Allied Banking Corporation. formally offered in evidence.
Ching filed a petition before the If not offered in evidence, the admission
RTC-Makati suspension of the criminal contained therein will not be considered.
proceedings on the ground of prejudicial Consequently, the original complaint,
question in a civil having been amended, lost its character as a
action. etitioner, in a complete turn judicial admission, which would
around, filed a motion to admit amended have required no proof, and became merely
complaint before an extrajudicial
the RTC-Manila. Among others, the admission, the admissibility of which, as
amended complaint alleged that the trust evidence, required its formal offer. In virtue
receipts stood as additional or side thereof, the amended complaint takes the
documents, the real transaction between the place of the original. The latter is regarded
parties being that of a pure loan without any as abandoned and
trust receipt agreement. RTC-Manila, ceases to perform any further function as a
admitted the amended complaint pleading. The original complaint no longer
ISSUE: WON amended complaint, forms part of the record. In the instant case,
the judicial admission made in the original the original complaint is deemed superseded
by the amended
complaint. Corollarily, the judicial
admissions in the original complaint are
considered abandoned. Nonetheless, we
must stress that the actuations of petitioner,
as sanctioned by the RTCManila, Branch 53
through its order admitting the amended
complaint, demands stern rebuke from this
Court. Certainly, this Court is not unwary of
the tactics employed by the petitioner
specifically in filing the amended complaint
only after the promulgation of the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals. It bears
noting that a lapse of almost eighteen
months (from March
1992 to September 1993), from the filing of
the original complaint to the filing of the
amended complaint, is too lengthy a time
sufficient to enkindle suspicion and enflame
doubts as to the true
intentions of petitioner regarding the early
disposition of the
pending cases. Wherefore petition is
dismissed.
Rule 130
BPI VS REYES
Jesusa Reyes and her daughter, Joan
Reyes went to BPI Zapote to open ATM
account, because of her interest with the
ongoing promotions of BPI. She was
accommodated by Cicero Capati. Plaintiff
informed Capati that they wanted to open an
ATM account for the amount of
P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which shall be
withdrawn from her exiting savings account
with BPI bank which is account no. 0233-
2433-88 and the other P100,000.00 will be
given by her in cash. wanted to effect the
transfer of P200,000.00 but the balance in
her account was not sufficient and could not
accommodate the same. Plaintiff thereafter
agreed to reduce the amount to be
withdrawn from P200,000.00 to
P100,000.00 with plaintiff’s signature
superimposed on said corrections; that the
original copy of the deposit slip was also
altered from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00,
however, instead of plaintiff signing the
same, the clerk-in-charge of the bank, in this
case Cicero Capati, signed the alteration
himself for Jesusa Reyes had already left
without signing the deposit slip. The
documents were subsequently machine
validated for the amount of P100,000.00.
Respondent filed a complaint to recover the
missing the alleged additional P100,000.00
cash deposit.
Issue : WON jesusa made an initial
deposit of P200,000.00
Ruling : No. The teller’s tape definitely
establishes the fact of respondent Jesusa’s
original intention to withdraw the amount of
P200,000.00, and not P100,000.00 as she
claims, from her savings account, to be
transferred as her initial deposit to her new
Express Teller account, the insufficiency of
her balance in her savings account, and
finally the fund transfer of the amount of
P100,000.00 from her savings account to her
new Express Teller account. We give great
evidentiary weight to the teller’s tape,
considering that it is inserted into the bank’s
computer terminal, which records the teller’s
daily transactions in the ordinary course of
business, and there is no showing that the
same had been purposely manipulated to
prove petitioner’s claim. Physical evidence
is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth,
and it ranks high in our hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence. We have, on many
occasions, relied principally upon physical
evidence in ascertaining the truth. Where the
physical evidence on record runs counter to
the testimonial evidence of the prosecution
witnesses, we consistently rule that the
physical evidence should prevail. In addition,
to uphold the declaration of the CA that it is
unlikely for respondent Jesusa and her
daughter to concoct a false story against a
banking institution is to give weight to
conjectures and surmises, which we cannot
countenance.
2. PP vs . cajumocan
Apolinario Mirabueno was sleeping with
Leo inside their house in Tanay Rizal. Leo
roused from his slumber . He saw a solitary
figure who walk toward their house. From
the light of the fluorescent lamp inside the
house, Leo recognized the man as Cornelio
Cajumocan, who drew a gun and shot
Apolinario. Apolinario died. Cajumocan was
subjected to paraffin test , but showed
negative result.
Issue : WON the negative result of paraffin
test is conclusive proof of his innocence
Ruling : No. Paraffin tests, in general,
have been rendered inconclusive by
this Court. Scientific experts concur in
the view that the paraffin test has
proved extremely unreliable
in use. It can only establish the
presence or absence of nitrates or
nitrites on the hand; still, the test
alone cannot determine whether the
source of the nitrates or nitrites
was the discharge of a firearm. The
presence of nitrates should be taken
only as an indication of a possibility or
even of a probability but not of
infallibility that a person has fired a
gun, since nitrates are also admittedly
found in substancesother than
gunpowder.
Appellant’s argument that the
negative result ofgunpowder nitrates
from the paraffin test conducted on
him the day after the crime was
committed, therebyshowing an
absence of physical evidence that he
fired agun, is untenable.
A paraffin test could establish the
presence or absence of nitrates on the
hand.However, it cannot establish that
the source of the nitrate was thedischarge
of firearms. Nitrates are also found in
substances other than gunpowder. A
person who tests positive may have
handledone or more substances with the
same positive reaction for nitrates such as
explosives, fireworks,
fertilizers,pharmaceuticals, tobacco, and
leguminous plants. Hence, the presence of
nitrates should only be taken as an
indication of apossibility that a person
has fired a gun. However, it must beborne
in mind that appellants were not
convicted on the sole basisof the paraffin
test.
In the case at bar, the positive, clear and
categorical testimony of the lone
eyewitness to the crime deserves full
merit in both probative weight and
credibility over the negative results of the
paraffin test conducted on the appellant.
Verily, establishing the
identity of the malefactor through the
testimony of the witness is
the heart and cause of the prosecution. All
other matters, such asthe paraffin test,
are of lesser consequence where there is
positive identification by the lone
eyewitness, Leo Mirabueno, of appellant
as the perpetrator of the crime. Hence, a
paraffin test cannot be considered as
conclusive proof of appellant’s innocence.
5. Revita vs. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 177564, 31 October 2008
FACTS: At around 8:00 o’clock in the
evening of 23 July 2002,Bryan and his
cousin, Manilyn Rangel (Manilyn), were
idlytalking at the yard of Flordeliza in
Sitio Bantog, BarangayRajal, Balungao,
Pangasinan, when Arturo arrived.
Bryanasked Arturo where he was going,
but the latter, wholooked infuriated, did
not reply.Arturo proceeded to thedirection
of Flordeliza who was coming out of her
housetowards the terrace. When Arturo
was already close toFlordeliza, at the
distance of two and a half meters, he shot
the latter with a baby armalite several
times. Flordeliza fell down . Bryan saw
he incident since the place was
illuminated by a lightcoming from his
aunt’s terrace. After witnessing the
shocking incident, Bryan and Manilyn
ran away from thescene to a cousin’s
house nearby. Arturo denied the
accusation against him. He claimed that
when the killing of Flordeliza occurred he
was at her sister’s house.
P/Insp. Emelda Besarra Roderos testified
that when she conducted a paraffin test
on Arturo, she found that the latter was
negative for the presence of gunpowder
nitrates. Arturo opines that it would run
counter to human experience that a felon
would exhibit hisattack weapon before
any possible witnesses to his criminal
act. He said that criminals would
normally hide any crimeinstrument to
avoid being suspected.
Issue : WON conviction is tainted by
reasonable doubt since the paraffin test
conducted on him resulted negative.
Ruling:
Arturo insists that his conviction is tainted by
reasonable doubt since the paraffin test
conducted on him resulted negative. Suffice
it to state that even negative findings of the
paraffin test do not conclusively show that a
person did not fire a gun. A paraffin test
has been held to be highly unreliable. The Court
thus once held: Scientific experts concur in the
view that the paraffin test has
“x x x proved extremely unreliable in use. The
only thing that it can definitely establish is the
presence or absence of nitrates or
nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established
from this test alonethat the source of the nitrates
or nitrites was the discharge of a
firearm. The person may have handled one or
more of a number ofsubstances which give the
same positive reaction for nitrates or
nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks,
fertilizers,pharmaceuticals, and leguminous
plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person
who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or
nitrite posits on his hands since these substances
are present in the products of combustion of
tobacco.” In numerous rulings, we have
also recognized several factors which may bring
about he absence of gunpowder nitrates on the
hands of a gunman, viz.:when the assailant
washes his hands after firing the gun, wears
gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the
direction of a strong wind is against the gunman
at the time of firing.