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Applied Spatial Modelling: Spatial Econometrics

Review Essay

To raise the question of the suitability of statistical methods for understanding and explaining
the social world is to enter into an enduring and often antagonistic debate (Kwan and
Schwanen, 2009). While many have been prepared to write off statistical methods as
epistemologically flawed and fatally limited in scope (Harvey, 1972; Cosgrove, 1989; Cloke
et al, 2004), others have been equally dismissive of the capabilities of alternative qualitative
methodologies (Fotheringham, 2006; Openshaw, 1998). Although this essay will address
issues pertaining to the social sciences in general, I will focus primarily on the use of
statistical methods within human geography, thus paying attention to the role of specific
disciplinary histories in shaping contemporary debates (Barnes, 2009). Statistical spatial
analysis, predominantly in the form of regression and correlation based on the general linear
model (Johnston, 2009) came to the fore within geography as part of the “quantitative
revolution” of the mid-twentieth century, which aimed to institute a rigorous scientific
geography, closely aligned with neoclassical economics, in place of a descriptive regional
approach (Livingstone, 1992; Kitchin, 2006). However, since the 1970s, this “spatial science”
paradigm has been subject to stringent critiques from Marxist, humanist, and later feminist
and poststructuralist approaches (Harvey, 1972; Cosgrove, 1989; Lawson, 1995; Dixon and
Jones, 1998) for its epistemological, ethical and practical flaws. As such, it has been argued
that “the pendulum...within human geography has swung firmly from quantitative to
qualitative methods” (Winchester, 2005: p10).

While some practitioners argue that statistical analysis is “alive and well” (Johnston et al,
2003: p160), others perceive a “widespread antipathy” (Kwan and Schwanen, 2009: p284)
towards quantitative approaches within human geography. This essay aims to question this
disregard for statistical methods by examining whether or not they are able to contribute to a
critical approach to human geography, and social science more generally. In order to do this, I
will first consider the criticisms of the positivist philosophy that has been seen to underpin
much quantitative work, arguing that while these criticisms are valid, it is erroneous to
automatically conflate a quantitative approach with positivism, and as such statistical
methods can be approached from a diverse epistemological basis. Second, I will suggest that
while the argument that statistical methods fail to capture fully the complexity of the social
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world also has merit, this does not preclude their use alongside other methodologies, nor their
ability to aid understanding of critical social issues. Third, I will argue that when statistical
methods are employed, care must be taken to recognise their socially constructed and
subjective nature. Finally, I will suggest that statistical methods have a key role to play in the
dissemination of social scientific knowledge to a wider audience, thus ensuring policy
relevance. Thus in conclusion I offer support for the argument that a “respectful engagement”
(Barnes and Hannah, 2001: p380) with statistical methods is required to advance the critical
possibilities of social science research, whilst rejecting a crude binary separating qualitative
and quantitative approaches.

Many critical social scientists have disavowed statistical approaches on the basis that “any
practice of quantitative methods is associated with logical positivism” (Poon, 2005: p766,
emphasis in original). Although positivism is not a fixed nor singular philosophy (Wyly,
2009), it can be described most simply as the application of scientific principles and methods
to the study of social phenomena (Kitchin, 2006). Central tenets of this approach include a
belief in objective, neutral data collection through direct observation of an external reality;
formation of law like, testable theories; an avoidance of metaphysical or normative questions;
and a belief that reality is best represented through unambiguously factual languages such as
mathematics (Kitchin, 2006; Wyly, 2009, Fotheringham, 2006). Positivism can be seen as a
logocentric philosophy reliant upon upon a stable, stratified and hierarchical social ontology
of discrete objects, and a grid epistemology that works to segment social life (Dixon and
Jones, 1998). Since the 1970s, positivism has been strongly critiqued from a number of
angles. Feminist scholarship has argued that the assumed objectivity of the positivist
approach resembles a masculinist “god-trick” that denies the partial and situated nature of
knowledge (Lawson, 1995). Radical and humanist approaches have questioned the inability
of positivism to address questions of social justice or morality, whilst also essentialising
human agency (Harvey, 1972; Cosgrove 1989). Recently poststructuralist approaches have
questioned the strict division of representation and reality that positivism affords, as well as
the denial of intersectionality arising from the use of fixed categories (Dixon and Jones, 1998,
Doel 2001). Ultimately for many, positivism is a flawed epistemology that fails to meet the
requirements of a critical social science.
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However, the deficiencies of positivism do not represent a foundation for the rejection of
statistical methods. While there remain a number of “unreconstructed positivists engaging in
‘god trick’ quantification exercises” (Ellis, 2009: p303) who are willing to advocate a
positivist approach (see Flowerdew, 1998), the use of statistical methods is compatible with a
multiplicity of epistemological positions. As Kwan (2004: p758) argues, there is “no
necessary connection between positivism and the use of quantitative methods”, rather, in the
case of human geography, the assumption of an inherent link between positivist
epistemology, statistical methods and conservative politics has its origins in the specific
context of disciplinary debates in the 1970s (Wyly, 2009). Therefore statistical methods
should be treated as just that: a set of methods, which have a “fluid” relationship with
epistemology (Philip, 1998). As Ellis (2009) suggests, there is now a body of postpostivist
quantitative work that is reflexive, aware of political context, informed by social theory and
focussed on social justice. To take the example of feminist research, often assumed to be the
most antithetical to statistical methods (see Falconer al-Hindi, 2001), a number of researchers
have argued that quantitative techniques can be compatible with a feminist epistemology if
used appropriately (Lawson, 1995, Hubbard, 1999). It is therefore clear that however strongly
one might object to positivism, the use of statistical methods cannot be easily rejected on an
epistemological basis.

While statistical methods may be compatible with a range of critical epistemologies, this does
absolve them of the criticism that they are “not capable of representing complex human
experiences or social realities” (Kwan and Schwanen, 2009: p285); a statistical approach may
be acceptable, but to what extent is it genuinely useful for aiding understanding and
explanation? Cloke et al (2004: p283) succinctly describe quantitative methods as “thin
description”, “capable of identifying certain characteristics and patterns of data, but incapable
of describing or explicating the meaningful nature of social life”. However, to ignore the use
of statistical methods because of these evident limitations would be an error; numbers and
statistics are “a critical component in the construction of social reality” (Barnes and Hannah,
2001: p379). Indeed, the use of statistics is necessary for a comprehensive critical
engagement with many pertinent social issues, in order to “show the incidence/prevalence of
particular phenomena and force these onto the public agenda” (WGSG, 1997: p95), be that
changes in regional unemployment (Johnston et al, 2003), structural racial inequalities (Ellis
2009), or undermining oppressive gender relations (Hubbard, 1999). However, it is vital that
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researchers do not lapse into a positivistic assumption that statistical methods are the only
way in which useful knowledge can be generated. A recognition of the role that statistics can
play in critical social research (Dorling and Simpson, 1999) must be balanced with an
understanding that they are not suitable for addressing all types of problem; statistical
knowledge is “conspicuously imperfect” (Poon, 2004: p810) and will only ever offer a partial
understanding that must be complemented by “critical thinking about causal mechanisms”
(Ellis, 2009: p306; see also Driscoll Derickson, 2009: p899).

Having accepted that the use of statistical methods is amenable to a variety of

epistemological positions, and that statistics can contribute to our understanding of critical
social issues, it is necessary to direct our attention towards the internal validity of commonly
used statistical methods. Mathematics cannot be assumed to be a universal vocabulary
(Barnes, 1994), and as such statistical theory must be viewed as a social and historical
product (Mackenzie, 1999; Barnes, 1998; Hepple, 1998). Therefore statistical methods must
not be understood as objective, unquestionable procedures. Inferential statistical techniques
commonly used in the social sciences such as correlation and regression have their origins in
nineteenth century eugenics, and consequently key principles of these methods such as a
preoccupation with normal distribution, and the assumption of independent sampling, are
problematic when transferred to social, and particularly spatial phenomena (Barnes, 1994;
1998). This recognition of the partial and subjective origins of statistical methods necessitates
a critical approach to their use. While disciplinary conventions may inculcate a particular
manner of working with statistics, this should not be seen as the only approach. For example,
geography has not traditionally engaged with Bayesian statistics (Dorling and Keylock 2004,
Hepple, 2009), yet the emphasis within this method on researcher involvement and
subjectivity could partially address postpositivist criticisms of statistical methods. Most
importantly, it is vital that researchers do not merely apply statistical methods unthinkingly,
but engage with postpositivist ideas of reflexivity and subjective interpretation even when
working with statistical methods.

As demonstrated above, the use of statistical methods in a critical manner, when appropriate,
and in conjunction with a wide range of epistemologies has much to contribute to a critical
understanding of the social world. Therefore at a time when it has been argued that much
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research in human geography in particular is of little practical relevance (Martin, 2001), but
rather has retreated to a “theoretical playground” (Hamnett, 2003: p1), some have suggested
that researchers have “risked losing sight of the practical effects of quantifying power”
(Demerrit, 2001: p456, own emphasis). The acceptance of statistical methods as an integral
aspect of critical social scientific research has the potential to partially address these flaws. A
critical use of statistical methods enables research to be presented in a manner that is more
easily communicable to relevant policy communities (Dorling and Shaw, 2002), and as such,
presents the possibility of the use of “insurgent quantitative practices” (Sheppard, 2001:
p549) through which researchers are able to constructively critique the actions of the state or
capital by addressing them on their own terms. While we must not assume that quantitative
data is the only form assimilable to a non-academic audience (Hubbard, 1999), the weight
that the results of statistical methods are afforded in an ever more quantified world (Johnston
et al , 2003) should not be underestimated.

This essay has argued that statistical methods are not tied to a positivist epistemology, and
therefore are compatible with a variety of philosophical positions; that they are crucial to
understanding a number of important social issues when used in conjunction with other
methods; and can facilitate communication beyond the academy, thus enhancing the policy
relevance of critical social science. However, at the same time, it has been recognised that
statistical methods are still often used by “unreconstructed positivists” (Ellis, 2009); that
statistical knowledge only offers a partial understanding and cannot address deeper issues of
causality and meaning; and that statistical methods are socially constructed and as such are
open to critical reflection and interpretation. I would therefore support Barnes and Hannah’s
(2001: p380) call for a “respectful engagement” with statistics. To completely abandon
statistical methods, as many have done, because of their historical association with a
discredited positivist approach is to engage in a wilful misrepresentation of current statistical
work in the social sciences. Rather, it is apparent that an approach recognising the limitations
of all methodologies forms of knowledge production is essential; researchers must “think
beyond the myopic quantitative-qualitative divide” (Philip, 1998: p273) and work to break
down the artificial binary opposing statistical and critical methodologies. However, given the
circularity of debates proclaiming a renewed desire to overcome this dualism (Philo et al,
1998; Kwan and Schwanen, 2009), the prospects for a substantial rapprochement between
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statistical and cultural approaches and their practitioners, within human geography at least,
currently appear slim.

1994 words.

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