No legitimate expectation when policies of public interests are brought into force

To a like effect are the observations are Lord Diplock in Hughes v. Deptt. of Health
and Social Security1: “Administrative policies may change with changing circumstances,
including changes in the political complexion of Governments. The liberty to make such
changes is something that is inherent in our constitutional form of Government.” If there
is a change in policy or in public interest the position is altered by a rule or legislation,
no question of legitimate expectation would arise.2 It is too late in a day for this Court to
propound theories of promissory estoppels3 and legitimate expectation.4 The
substantive legitimate expectation is rooted in the theory of legal certainty and the
Government should honour it but exception is overriding public interest and if the public
interest suffers, then the individual interest can be sacrificed.5

Right to livelihood is subject to reasonable restrictions

Article 21 guarantees right to life which includes the right to livelihood, the deprivation
thereof must be in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. 6 Right to life
under Article 21 does prohibit does protect livelihood, but its deprivation cannot be
extended too far or projected or stressed to the avocation, business or trade injurious to
public interest or has insidious effect on public morale or public order. 7 In respect of
public projects and policies which are initiated by the Government the courts should not
become an approval authority. The policy of the State in permitting diversion of
foodgrains for manufacture of alcohol affect the right of livelihood of the citizens
inasmuch as they are denied access to these foodgrains and consequently the right to
life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India does not violate the right to livelihood.8
“The State may not, by affirmative action, be compellable to provide adequate means of
livelihood or work to the citizens.9”

The country has so far not found it feasible to incorporate the right to livelihood as a
fundamental right in the Constitution. This is because the country has so far not attained the

1
(1985) 2 WLR 866 : 1985 AC 776.
2
Madras City Wine Merchants' Assn. v. State of T.N, (1994) 5 SCC 509.
3
Romeo Sam Arambhan v. Union of India, 2003 SCC OnLine Bom 678.
4
Sharma Transport v. Govt. of A.P, (2002) 2 SCC 188.
5
State of W.B v. Niranjan Singha, (2001) 2 SCC 326.
6
DTC v. DTC Mazdoor Congress, 1991 Supp ( 1 ) SCC 600.
7
M.J Sivani v. State of Karnataka, (1995) 6 SCC 289.
8
Bhimshakti Vichar Manch v. State of Maharashtra, 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 372.
9
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn., (1985) 3 SCC 545.
capacity to guarantee it, and not because it considers any less fundamental to life. Thus, even
while giving the direction to the State to ensure the right to work, the Constitution-makers
thought it prudent not to do so without qualifying it.10 The violation of the right to livelihood is
required to be remedied. But the right to livelihood as contemplated under Article 21 cannot be
so widely construed which may result in defeating the purpose sought to be achieved by the
aforesaid article.11

10
Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union v. Delhi Admn., (1992) 4 SCC 99.
11
State of H.P v. Mahendra Pal, (1999) 4 SCC 43.