Arctic Sphere DA

Arctic Sphere DA
1NC Arctic Sphere DA

Increased US arctic presence threatens Russia’s dominance and compels them
to counterbalance—turns the case.
Huebert 10 [“The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment”¶ Rob Huebert, PhD. (Fellow of the Canadian Defence & Foreign
Affairs Institute¶ and¶ Professor of Political Science¶ University of Calgary) Prepared for the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute]
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Newly%20Emerging%20Arctic%20Security%20Environment.pdf¶ March, 2010
Russia is perhaps the most difficult state to understand in terms of Arctic security. While in ¶ no way as secretive as it had been during the
Cold War, it tends to be more closed than the¶ other Arctic states. Consequently it is often difficult to fully understand Russian actions.
This¶ is further complicated by the reality that it sees itself as a recovering world power. The 1990s ¶ was a period of extreme economic
collapse for Russia. Its military was drastically slashed at¶ that time. Their economy began to recover in early 2002 due in large part to
the increasing¶ world price of oil and gas. This coincided with Boris Yeltsin’s retirement and Vladimir Putin’s ¶ rise. One of Putin’s main
actions was to consolidate the government’s control of the energy ¶ sector,74 and as a result, the Russian Government
was able to begin rebuilding its military¶ capabilities. Given its geopolitical location, as well as the
location of much of its oil and gas,¶ much of this recovery was Arctic centric. This was explicitly recognized by
Russian President¶ Dmitry Medvedev who proclaims the use of Arctic resources to be central to Russia's energy ¶ security and, in turn, to
Russia’s security in general.75¶ The Russian Government, as in the case of the other Arctic states, has also been¶ developing new policies
and issuing statements on their security concerns in the Arctic. On¶ September 18, 2008, the Russian Government approved the
Principles of State Policy in the¶ Arctic to 2020.76 As with all of the other Arctic states, this document calls for international ¶ cooperation
in the Arctic. It warns of the dangers of climate change and the need to address ¶ the problems that this is creating across the entire
Arctic.¶ The main focus of the document calls on the need to improve the socioeconomic conditions ¶ of Russian northerners. To this end,
the document bears some similarities to the Canadian¶ Northern Strategy and the Norwegian Foreign Policy of the High North. The
Russian¶ document makes it clear that Russia would prefer to develop its Arctic policies in a spirit of ¶ cooperation with its Arctic
neighbours; however, similar to both the Canadian and the ¶ Norwegian documents, the Russian document also talks about the
development of new¶ military forces to be deployed to the Arctic as outlined in section 8b. It is difficult to determine ¶ what this means.
The former head of the Russian Northern fleet, Vyacheslav Popov, has ¶ dismissed the idea of new forces being placed north,77 yet this
has been disputed by other¶ Russian news reports that suggest that Russian officials plan to build new forces for the ¶ north.78
Furthermore, one senior Russian official stated that Russia was already training its¶ forces
for conflict in the Arctic. Lt. Gen. Vladimir Shamanov, who heads the Defense¶ Ministry's combat training directorate
stated in June 2008 that:¶ After several countries contested Russia's rights for the
resource-rich¶ continental shelf in the Arctic, we have immediately started the
revision of our¶ combat training programs for military units that may be deployed in
the Arctic¶ in case of a potential conflict.79 He went on to state that the Russian northern fleet
was also extending its reach into northern¶ waters.¶ Thus it is hard to understand the direction in which
the Russian Government is headed.¶ Even when examining current Russian Arctic military construction and operations, the ¶ picture
remains confusing. Part of the problem lies in the fact that due to Russia’s ¶ geography, any effort that the Russians take to modernize
their navy is perceived as being¶ directed against the Arctic. Following the disintegration of the USSR, the Russian state was ¶ left with
ports in the north (the Kola Peninsula) and those in the Far East (Vladivostok). The¶
northern bases are more
important for the Russians; therefore, it becomes difficult to¶ separate the new naval
construction that is Arctic capable but really intended for global¶ operations from
those forces that are designed specifically for Arctic purposes. In addition, it¶ is difficult to verify
information on the Russian forces.¶ Nevertheless, the core of Russian rebuilding is based on their 2007-2015 rearmament¶ program,80
which calls for a general rebuilding of Russian military forces. The
Russian plan¶ to rebuild their submarine
force will have the most significant impact on the Arctic.81 They are¶ proposing to build five to eight
new SSBNs (project 995)82 and two new SSNs (project¶ 885).83 Currently they have completed one of the SSBNs, the Yuri Dolgoruky,
that should¶ soon be commissioned for service. The Russians are also building two others – Aleksandr¶ Nevskiy and Vladimir Monomakh.
A fourth – Saint Nicholas – will commence construction in¶ December 2010.84¶ Progress on these submarines has been hindered by
Russian problems with the missile that¶ is to be carried by these submarines. Their first missile, the “Bark” R-39M, was a failure. The¶
submarines then required a major redesign for the new missile; however the Bark’s¶
replacement, the Bulva SS-NX-30 missile, has also been failing many of its tests and now¶ there are fears that it may
also be a failure.85 The Russian navy has been modernizing its¶ fleet of older submarines, the Delta IVs.86 The belief is that this will
ensure that the Russian¶ navy maintains its SSBNs even if the new class is further delayed. ¶ The Russian Navy has also announced that it
will be building up its surface capability. At the¶ heart of this rebuilding are five to six carrier battle-groups.87 Admiral Vladimir
Visotskiy,¶ commander of the Russian Navy, confirmed the navy is planning to deploy six aircraft carrier ¶ groups with its Northern and
Pacific fleets by 2030. Very recently, the Russian Navy also ¶ announced that it will be re-commissioning two of its missile battle-cruisers
that had been laid up at the end of the Cold War.88 The Russians are the only Arctic state that has ¶ continued to build large icebreakers.
The icebreaker, 50 Years of Victory, was completed in¶ 2006.89 It is nuclear-powered and is the largest and most powerful icebreaker in
the world.¶ The Russian Air Force is also planning to update its strategic bomber fleet. A new TU ¶ strategic bomber to replace the Tu-
95MC Bear, Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-22M3 Backfire¶ should be designed by 2017 with production beginning in 2020.90¶ While the
Russians have announced substantial plans to redevelop forces that can be used ¶ in the Arctic; however, they are experiencing problems
with many of these new systems and¶ it remains uncertain as to when they will be available. At the same time, however, the¶
Russians have already shown an increased willingness to use their existing forces in
the¶ north. Following the end of the Cold War, their forces had seldom ventured outside their ¶ bases, let alone into the challenging
environment of the Arctic. In August 2007, the Russian¶ air force resumed long-range bomber patrols,91 in which they pass over the
Arctic and¶ proceed up to Canadian and American airspace.92 While they have been careful to remain in¶ international airspace, they
have not provided advance notice of these flights to the northern¶ NATO states. The head of Russian Strategic Aviation has recently
suggested that the¶ current deployments could be doubled.93 It is not clear if the Russians intend to do this, nor ¶ is it not clear why the
Russians would now engage in such actions. It is possible that they ¶ are only attempting to demonstrate that they have regained their
global reach. Nevertheless,¶ their geographic location still means that such demonstration will have an Arctic character.¶ At the very least
this is renewed Russian military activity in the region which has been¶ sustained for over three years. The Russians obviously feel it is
worthwhile to devote the¶ resources to this activity.¶ In summer 2008, the Russians resumed surface naval patrols in Arctic waters.94 On
one¶ occasion, two warships – the Severomosk and the Marshal Ustinov – sailed into the disputed¶ waters between Norway and Russia
on the rationale of “protecting” Russian fishermen in the ¶ region.95 While they did not break any international laws in this deployment,
they did send a¶ clear political message to Norway that they intended to defend Russian interests in the region with a very powerful
force.¶ In 2009 they sent two nuclear-missile carrying submarines (Delta -IVs) (SSBN) escorted by¶ nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSN) into Arctic waters, where they test-launched¶ several missiles.96 This demonstrated that they could re-enter ice-covered waters to
fire their¶ missiles. Of course the voyage of one submarine task force does not indicate a trend, but ¶ the fact that they announced this
voyage to the world suggests that they want to signal that ¶ their submarine force has regained an ability to go into Arctic waters. What is
interesting is¶ that during the Cold War, their Bastion strategy required them to keep their SSBNs close to ¶ port as to better protect them
from possible USN SSN attack. So the question arises as to ¶ why the Russians would now test fire from the high north rather than from
close to¶ Murmansk. This question remains unanswered. Finally, the Russians have also announced ¶ that they will land paratroopers at
the North Pole in 2010.97¶ Since 2007, the Russians have been increasing their military activity in the Arctic, and they ¶ have also
announced plans to substantially increase their forces based there. These actions ¶ have driven many in the West to accuse the Russians
of increasing tensions in the region;¶ but, Russian leaders have consistently taken the position that the use of military force would¶ not be
in anyone’s interest, Russia’s included.98 Furthermore many members of the Russian¶ media and
academic community suggest that the Russian Government is only responding to¶
the military actions of the Western Arctic states.99 There is no question that as they
increase¶ their actions in the north, the other Arctic states will respond in kind .¶ It
should be clear that the Russians have been according a growing importance to the Arctic ¶
region . They continually issue statements affirming their commitment to peaceful¶ cooperation in the Arctic, which show up in the
form of public statements by their leaders¶ and in their primary documents. These same leaders are also very quick to
condemn the¶ actions of the other Arctic states as being aggressive and a threat to
international peace and¶ security in the region whenever they engage in any form of
military related activity. It is clear,¶ however, that the Russians have embarked on a much more assertive use of military
force in¶ the region by taking various action – the missile test launches near the pole, the sudden and¶ substantial resumption of the long-
range bomber patrols, and the voyages of their surface¶ units into the disputed zones – which exceeds that of any of the other Arctic
states.¶ Furthermore,
the Russians’ proposed rearmament plans greatly exceed the plans of
any¶ other Arctic state. Thus, the Russians have excelled at portraying themselves as cooperative¶ while taking increasingly
assertive action. The question remains as to why? Are they merely¶ reasserting themselves as a global power, or, does this new action
point to an increasingly¶ assertive Russia? This is not known.
US/Russian war causes extinction – most probable

Bostrom ‘2 [Nick Bostrom, professor of philosophy - Oxford University, March, 2002, Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction
Scenarios and Related Hazards, Journal of Evolution and Technology, p. http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html]
A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and
the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with
consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those
best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might
annihilate our species or permanently
destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large
nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or
deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals.
Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or
thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted.
Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will
encounter in the 21st century.
2NC Impact Overview (W/O Arctic War impact)
They haven’t sufficiently answered our Arctic Awareness DA on case-- the plan
causes arctic war: Right now, Russia has sufficient control over the Arctic.
However, Russia will perceive increased US Arctic naval presence as an
attempt to limit their control of precious Arctic resources, forcing them to
grow their arctic forces to counterbalance our presence. This triggers an
arctic arms race and US-Russian war—that’s our 1NC Huebert evidence.
We control magnitude—our Bostrom evidence indicates that a US-Russia war
is the largest extinential threat.
We also control the best internal link to Arctic conflict—even if the plan solves
deterrence in the long-term, the perception of Arctic build-up triggers the DA
as Russia pre-emptively counterbalances. Russia counterbalancing uniquely
triggers the arctic arms race since European arctic nations will be forced to
follow suit—this means we turn the case before they have a chance to solve
the DA.
Independantly, we solve Cybersecurity
US-Russian cooperation key to solve Cybersecurity.
Gady and Austin 10 Russia, The United States,¶ And Cyber Diplomacy¶ Opening the Doors¶ By Franz-Stefan Gady and Greg
Austin (Franz-Stefan Gady is an associate at the EastWest Institute. He has previously worked as an adjunct research assistant at the
Institute for National Strategies Studies of the National Defense University ¶ in Washington, D.C., focusing on regional security issues. He
was also an analyst for the Project on¶ National Security Reform, a congressionally funded nonprofit organization founded to reform the ¶
national security structure of the United States. He holds an M.A. in Strategic Studies/International¶ Economics from the School of
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and has ¶ served in the Austrian Army and the Austrian Foreign Ministry,
working on various security issues.¶ To contact him, write to: fgady@ewi.info.¶ Greg Austin is Vice President of Program Development
and Rapid Response at the EastWest Institute.¶ Greg’s career in international affairs spans thirty years and includes senior posts in
academia and¶ government. He writes a weekly column in the newspaper New Europe. He has also held senior¶ posts at the International
Crisis Group and the Foreign Policy Centre in London. Greg is the author ¶ of several well-reviewed books on international security,
especially on Asia. His books include The¶ Armed Forces of Russia, co-authored with Alexei Muraviev. He has several postgraduate
qualifications¶ in international relations, including a Ph.D. His main specializations have included Soviet and ¶ Russian security policy.)
Published 2010.
There are compelling historical precedents to suggest that reservations in Russia and the United States that
are rooted¶ in national security sensitivities can be overcome. For example, in preparing for Y2K, there was a potential global
threat¶ and most countries cooperated despite national security sensitivities. Russia and the United States adopted very intrusive ¶
measures for joint monitoring of the most sensitive launch and warning procedures for ballistic missiles. More recently, ¶ the United
States and Russia agreed on new joint encryption arrangements for the forty-year-old hotline between the¶ Kremlin and the White
House. Moreover, American and Russian banks already cooperate in secure digital communications ¶ for international transfers of
staggeringly large sums of money.¶ The United States and Russia approach the problem of cybersecurity from two different angles: the
United States¶ focuses on a law enforcement approach at the domestic level with voluntary international collaboration, while Russia ¶
focuses on developing binding international regimes. There are also quite different philosophies at work: Russia favors ¶ social control of
the Internet as a medium, while the United States, for the most part, does not. ¶ Despite these differences,
the United
States and Russia agreed in December 2009 at a meeting of the U.N. Committee¶ on Disarmament and International
Security to begin talks on strengthening Internet security and limiting military use of ¶
cyberspace. After rejecting Russia’s cybersecurity overtures for a number of years, the United
States has clearly decided¶ on a major policy shift. In announcing its cybersecurity goals on May 29, 2009,
the Obama administration showed its¶ determination to elevate the issue of
cybersecurity to a new level. Consequently, new agreements between the United¶
States and Russia may be within reach.
15 minute extinction
Spillius 10 The Telegraph's Washington Correspondent (Alex, May 7, 2010, “Cyber attack 'could fell US within 15 minutes',”
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7691500/Cyber-attack-could-fell-US-within-15-minutes.html)//DR.
H
The US must prepare itself for a full-scale cyber attack which could cause death and
destruction across the country in less than 15 minutes, the former anti-terrorism Tsar to Bill Clinton and
George W Bush has warned. ¶ Richard Clarke claims that America's lack of preparation for the annexing of its
computer system by terrorists could lead to an "electronic Pearl Harbor".¶ In his warning, Mr Clarke
paints a doomsday scenario in which the problems start with the collapse of one of
Pentagon's computer networks.¶ Soon internet service providers are in meltdown. Reports come in
of large refinery fires and explosions in Philadelphia and Houston. Chemical plants malfunction, releasing lethal
clouds of chlorine. ¶ Air traffic controllers report several mid-air collisions, while subway
trains crash in New York, Washington and Los Angeles. More than 150 cities are suddenly
blacked out. Tens of thousands of Americans die in an attack comparable to a nuclear bomb
in its devastation.¶ Yet it would take no more than 15 minutes and involve not a single
terrorist or soldier setting foot in the United States. The scenario is contained the pages of his book, Cyber War:
The Next National Security Threat, written with Robert Knake. ¶ And Mr Clarke has been right before.¶ As anti-terrorism tsar under Mr
Clinton and then Mr Bush, he issued dire warnings of the need for better defences against al-Qaeda, and wrote about his futile campaign
in the 2004 book Against All Enemies.¶ Now he argues that a similar lack of preparation could exact a tragic price. ¶ "The
biggest
secret about cyber war may be that at the very same time the US prepares for offensive
cyber war, it is continuing policies that make it impossible to defend effectively from cyber
attack," says the book.¶ In part, the US has been hampered by the unforeseeable success of the internet and expansion of
computerised networks, which are now used in almost every aspect of industry but have led to a hazardous degree of over-
dependence.¶ The belief in the internet as the freewheeling, free-spirited epitome of American free speech has made government
intrusion politically difficult, leaving the private sector particularly vulnerable to well-trained hackers.¶ Successive administrations,
including President Barack Obama's, have failed to get to grips with the scale of the problem, believe Clarke and Knake, though they have
kindred spirits dotted around the establishment.¶ The military has yet to open its new Cyber Command centre, amid disagreements
about what role different agencies will play.¶ Meanwhile America may have invented the internet, but at
least 30 nations
have created offensive cyber-war capabilities, which aim to plant a variety of viruses and
bugs into key utility, military and financial systems of other states.¶ The authors are convinced that
there will at some point be a cyber-war between two nations and are concerned that such a
conflict would "lower the threshold" for a war with bombs and bullets.
2NC Impact Overview (W/Arctic War Impact)
They haven’t sufficiently answered our Arctic Awareness DA on case-- the plan
causes arctic war: Right now, Russia has sufficient control over the Arctic.
However, Russia will perceive increased US Arctic naval presence as an
attempt to limit their control of precious Arctic resources, forcing them to
grow their arctic forces to counterbalance our presence. This triggers an
arctic arms race and US-Russian war—that’s our 1NC Huebert evidence.
We control magnitude—our Bostrom evidence indicates that a US-Russia war
is the largest extinential threat.
We control probability—our impact threshold is low and linear—Arctic
conflict will quickly escalate into a full-scale war; Russian perceptions,
international distrust, and resource wars.
Hart et al. 12 [Managing Global Order: May 2012. “Chill Out¶ Why Cooperation is Balancing Conflict¶ Among Major Powers in
the New Arctic”. Foreign Policy at Brookings.] Andrew Hart, Bruce Jones and David Steven. Andrew, doctoral candidate at the University
of Colorado, Bruce, Senior Fellow and Director of the Managing Global Order Initiative (MGO) at Brookings and New York University’s
Center on International Cooperation, and David, Senior Fellow at NYU/CIC and leads MGO’s Geopolitics of Scarcity Project.
http://www.cic.nyu.edu/mgo/docs/jones_arctic.pdf
Territorial and transshipment disputes both create¶ potential for a classic security dilemma. While any¶
state must expect to lose from conflict in the Arctic ,¶ it is still rational for governments to re-arm¶ due to
uncertainty about the intentions of others¶ and to maintain the option of exerting unilateral¶
control over contested boundaries should this be come necessary.65 Furthermore, a military presence¶
tends to increase the value a country places¶ on its interests in the region. This
dynamic creates¶ a heightened risk of miscalculation and selffulfilling¶ prophesy, with the
potential to trigger¶ a crisis, low-level conflict, or even a war. Perceptions¶ of Russian
unpredictability are an important¶ accelerant. Its history of militarizing the Arctic¶ during the Cold War heightens
concerns about¶ its future intentions, as has its more recent use of¶ energy as a tool of political coercion.
Other states¶ have found it difficult to discern offensive or defensive¶ intentions from
Russia’s military capabilities.¶ For example, are conventional land-based¶ military units better at taking or defending territory¶ up
North? What about naval resources? Do ¶ ice-breaker fleets enable Russia’s navy a greater¶ advantage on offense, even if they are necessary¶ for search and
A¶ lack of consensus on such questions inevitably increases¶ the
rescue, and for transshipment?
potential for negative spirals.66¶ Tensions over resources are yet to multiply risk in¶ the way some
observers expect. Resources have the¶ greatest potential to drive conflict when they lie ¶ in contested territory. However, overlaying a map¶ of undiscovered
energy with a map of territorial¶ disputes reveals that the vast majority of undiscovered ¶ reserves (85-90% as a rough estimate) are¶ in the non-disputed
EEZs of Arctic nations. This¶ creates an important check on aggressive behavior.¶ 67 Uncertainty about the economic viability¶ of Arctic reserves has also
played a moderating¶ role, given technical obstacles and the high risk¶ premium of any investment in exploitation, and the incentives for states to
collaborate given the¶ financial and technological obstacles to operating ¶ in the region. Indeed, Russia’s heightened interest ¶ can be explained, in part, by
the fact that, alone¶ among the five Arctic coastal states, its investment ¶ decisions are primarily state rather than¶ market-controlled. A similar dynamic is at
play¶ for transshipment. Over the next twenty years,¶ and however fast the ice melts, Arctic navigation¶ will continue to be seasonal, hazardous, and
unpredictable—¶ all factors that mitigate the benefits¶ of faster routes to Asian markets. As a result, initial¶ excitement about Arctic navigation is giving¶
way to a more sober assessment of the commercial ¶ opportunities that the Northwest Passage and¶ Northern Sea Route will provide.
2NC Uniqueness
Our 1NC Hubert evidence indicates that Russian officials have admitted that
Russian arctic build-up is only in response to increased US arctic presence.
This is a double bind, either the aff isn’t inherent-- the SQ solves the aff
because we’re inevitably increasing our Arctic naval presence, OR naval
presence is declining and we win uniqueness.
Here’s more evidence—

a. Russian policy—they’re cooperating now, but promise to
counterbalance against increased Arctic activity.
Al-Achkar 8/7 “The Implications of a melting Arctic: Militarization, Security Concerns, Power and Policy”
Ziad Al-Achkar — August 7, 2012. http://www.theinternationalistathawk.com/the-implications-of-a-melting-arctic-militarization-
security-concerns-power-and-policy/
In a document released by Katarzyna Zysk entitled: “Russia’s Arctic strategy Ambitions and Constraints” she explained that Russia
has plans to create “a comprehensive security system by 2015, including early warning, prevention, and
crisis management capabilities“[26]she goes on to add that Russia believes in the importance of Cooperation with other Arctic. The 2008
Arctic document released highlighted a different approach that the previous one in 2001 where Russia
believed that “all
kinds of activity in the northern regions are in the highest degree connected to
providing of national security”[27] and emphasized the importance of “actively
counter strengthening of military infrastructure and enlargement of military
activities” in the region by other countries and actors”. The New Russian strategic documents reveals
Russia’s plan to boost their military capabilities, most notably naval capacities which include: Construction of eight fourth-generation
Borei-class ballistic missile submarines planned to be completed by 2015; , 5 to 6 aircraft carrier squadrons, 20 new multipurpose
corvettes (Steregushchii class), and 20 frigates (Admiral S. Gorshkov class)[28]. Russia’s plans in 2008 were mostly ambitions and in
press releases published by Agence France Press in 2010, Senior official in the Russian military are quoted as stating that: “The state
armaments program for 2011-2020 does not envision the construction of aircraft carriers”[29]; these reports were confirmed by Defense
Minister Anatoly Serdyukov as he stated that currently there are no construction plans for any aircraft carriers to be built by 2020 and he
explained that the resources that were allocated to the aircraft carriers building were for design purposes. ¶ Russia continues to have
yearly military exercises in the area, as do the other artic nations; however it seems as if Russia’s intent for military use in the artic are
based on Defense purposes and more in terms of search and rescue operation, quick response, anti-terrorism and piracy. Russia
looks to be heading towards a more peaceful and cooperative solution in regards to
the Arctic, as it is not in the Russian’s best interest to disturb the stability of the region; was highlighted earlier, Russia’s economy
has put a dent in the leadership’s hopes of modernizing and increasing the power potential of the Russian Military. Russia is
looking to benefit from the improvement of its territory; as global warming is turning parts of the
Russian territory once frozen and inaccessible, to manageable and accessible. In terms of power potential, and with Russia’s massive
territory, Russia will look into utilizing its newly open territory to boost its economy, with easier and cheaper access to gas and oil in
those areas, Agriculture. Russia’s massive land now becoming accessible means that Russia’s potential for this land will rely on effective
policies made by the Russian leadership. Global warming is working in favor of the Russians, however Russia will have to use this
opportunity to restore Russia’s lost power.
b. US Policy
Huebert et al. 12 Huebert, R. (University of Calgary), H. Exner-Pirot (University of Saskatchewan), A. Lajeunesse (University
of Calgary), J. Gulledge (2012) “Climate change & international security: The Arctic as a Bellwether.” Arlington, Virginia: Center for
Climate and Energy Sol (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions). Center for Climate and Energy Solutions.
http://www.c2es.org/publications/¶ climate-change-international-arctic-security/¶ May 2012
Despite the capability and stated willingness to act¶ unilaterally in defense of
American interests, U.S. policy¶ continues to consider multilateral cooperation as
the¶ preferred means of dealing with most Arctic issues. The¶ United States is a signatory of the
Ilulisaat Declaration,¶ pledged to resolve boundary difficulties within the¶ legal framework of UNCLOS, and government
policy¶ statements have emphasized this cooperative approach¶ (Ilulissat Declaration 2008).
American policy also recognizes¶ the utility of international cooperation in Arctic¶
research and environmental protection, and through the¶ Arctic Council. However, U.S. policy
emphasizes that the¶ council should stay “within its limited mandate of environmental¶ protection and sustainable development” and
not¶ become involved in matters of defense or state policy.
c. International cooperation—new political climate, decreasing arctic

capabilities, and multilateral agreements; this is functionally impact
defense to their arctic war scenario.
Beyers 11 “Cooling Things Down: The Legalization of Arctic Security¶ Conference Paper” Carnegic Council for Ethics in
International Affairs.] http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/0102.html ¶ Michael Byers¶ U.S. Global
Engagement¶ June 3, 2011
Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union squared off on opposite sides of the Arctic Ocean. Nuclear submarines
prowled the depths, while long-range bombers circled overhead. A more cooperative approach emerged after
1990, with Moscow and Washington negotiating a boundary in the Bering Strait, Bering Sea, and Chukchi Sea that year. In 1996, the
eight Arctic countries—Russia, United States, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland—created the Arctic
Council to provide an inter-governmental forum for the discussion of nonmilitary issues. On
the security front, the
Russian government allowed Soviet-era warships to rust-out, while the U.S. and
Canadian governments chose not to replace aging ice-breakers.¶ More recently, climate change
and rising oil prices have given rise to concerns about possible struggles for territory and resources. In August 2007, Artur Chilingarov,
the deputy speaker of the Russian Duma, caused a media frenzy by planting a titanium flag on the seabed at the North Pole and declaring
"the Arctic is Russian."1 Canadian foreign minister Peter MacKay responded: "Look, this isn't the fifteenth century. You can't go around
the world and just plant flags and say, 'We're claiming this territory.' Our claims over our Arctic are very well
established."2¶ In October 2008, the European Parliament stirred things up further by calling for a new multilateral convention
modeled on the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.3 In doing so, it was implicitly questioning the extensive rights of Arctic Ocean coastal states under
the law of the sea. That same year, Scott Borgerson wrote: "The combination of new shipping routes, trillions of dollars in possible oil and
gas resources, and a poorly defined picture of state ownership makes for a toxic brew."4¶ Cooler heads have since
prevailed. One of the Russian scientists involved in the North Pole flag plant admitted that it was a publicity stunt lacking in legal
relevance. Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig invited his counterparts from the other four Arctic Ocean coastal states (Canada, Norway,
Russia, and the U.S.) to Ilulissat, Greenland, where they reaffirmed their commitment to resolving disputes within an existing framework
of international law.5 The
European Union issued an Arctic policy that recognized the
primacy of the law of the sea in a region which, unlike the Antarctic, is centered on an ocean.6 U.S. Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton spoke of the need for Arctic countries to work together: "We need all hands on
deck because there is a huge amount to do, and not much time to do it."7 And in May 2011, the Arctic countries signed a multilateral
search-and-rescue treaty, the first legal instrument negotiated within the framework of the Arctic Council.8 They also created a
permanent secretariat for the Council, thus transforming it from an inter-governmental forum into a fully-fledged
international organization.¶ As the following review will demonstrate, all this cooperation is made easier by the fact that
most Arctic sovereignty disputes have either been resolved or are actively being negotiated. In short , there is no
competition for territory or resources in the Arctic, and no prospect of conflict
either.
d. Naval capabilities
Cropsey 12 Hudson Institute.: Security and Foreign Affairs Briefing Paper. “Defeat at Sea: The US Naval Implosion of 2050.” April
2012. Seth Cropsey (Senior Fellow, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense at the DoD, Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy in the Regan and
Bush Administrations) http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/SethCropsey--DefeatAtSea040312.pdf
The usual life expectancy of a naval combatant is upwards of 30 years. Knowing
how¶ many ships will be built
over the next three decades gives a rough idea of how large a¶ fleet to expect at the end of that period.
The Navy’s 2013 budget plans to spend $11.9¶ billion (constant 2012) dollars each year for the next five
years on shipbuilding. If this¶ level does not decrease because of possible sequestration or
budget cuts that a re-elected¶ President Obama might propose or reductions demanded by the expense of
servicing a¶ rising national debt; and if the cost of ships continues to average $2 billion dollars while¶ annual spending on shipbuilding
remains constant, the
Navy will be able to afford about¶ 180 ships over the next 30 years.
The size of the current fleet is 282 ships.¶
2NC Link
They’re not getting out of the link—their entire advantage is based off
increasing naval heg in the arctic. It’s gonna happen.
And Link controls the direction of uniqueness—this is the critical framing
question for this DA.
1. Uniqueness is inherently probabilistic—it’s snapshot of arctic relations right
now.
2. Only the link is unique to the plan: the link is the only thing that can change the
nature of the status quo.
Interference in Russia’s sphere would enrage Russians and result in military

confrontation
Sanz 8—Oxford University educated author, essayist, and financial analyst (Daniel, For U.S. Security, Next Administration Will Have
To Repair Relationship With Russia, 1 October 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-bruno-sanz/for-us-security-next-
admi_b_130894.html,)
The Obama administration will need to completely overhaul US foreign policy to
include de facto recognition of Russia's legitimate security needs and recognition of
Russia's sphere of influence, including South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Georgia. Only this way can
America's own security be assured. The profligate Bush administration has pledged $1 billion to help Georgia
recover from its ill-advised invasion of South Ossetia and consequent beating by the Russian army. This arrogant
interference of ours will only enrage the Russians and inflame anti-Americanism. It is not in our
interest to confront Russia and set off a new arms race costing billions of dollars that
we will have to borrow from abroad while increased geopolitical tensions keep
energy prices sky high. The only way to meet America's national security needs is to
work with Russia to create a neutral, demilitarized buffer zone around the Russian border. Enormous oceans to the east and
the west and docile neighbors to the north and south act as America's buffer zone. Helping Russia achieve peace of mind about its
security and true American intentions will reap untold benefits for the United States. ¶ The offensive missile batteries in Poland and the
Czech Republic need to be withdrawn immediately. The Russians will be more than amenable to a tit-for-tat withdraw of their armed
forces from the Western Hemisphere. We need Russian cooperation at the United Nations on a host of issues from nonproliferation to
global warming and terrorism. It is not in the interests of the United States to alienate this large and powerful country while sticking up
for every thorn in its side. Current American policies towards Russia betray a haughty ignorance of her history and contempt for her
people, who approve of Vladimir Putin and the Georgia war. ¶ The United States risks military confrontation with Russia at its peril. ¶
**UNIQUENESS***
Arctic Stable Now
Arctic Stable Now—EEZs and the economy ensure multilateralism.
Tensions over resources are yet to multiply risk in¶ the way some observers expect. Resources have the¶
greatest potential to drive conflict when they lie¶ in contested territory. However, overlaying a map¶ of
undiscovered energy with a map of territorial¶ disputes reveals that the vast majority of undiscovered¶ reserves (85-90% as a rough
estimate) are¶ in the non-disputed EEZs of Arctic nations. This¶ creates an important check
on aggressive behavior.¶ 67 Uncertainty about the economic viability¶ of Arctic
reserves has also played a moderating¶ role, given technical obstacles and the high risk¶ premium of any
investment in exploitation, and the incentives for states to collaborate given the ¶ financial and technological obstacles to operating¶ in
the region. Indeed, Russia’s heightened interest¶ can be explained, in part, by the fact that, alone¶ among the five Arctic coastal
states, its investment¶ decisions are primarily state rather than¶ market-controlled. A similar dynamic is at
play¶ for transshipment. Over the next twenty years, ¶ and however fast the ice melts, Arctic navigation¶ will continue to be seasonal,
hazardous, and unpredictable—¶ all factors that mitigate the benefits¶ of faster routes to Asian markets. As a result, initial¶ excitement
about Arctic navigation is giving¶ way to a more sober assessment of the commercial¶ opportunities that the Northwest Passage and¶
Northern Sea Route will provide.
Multilateralism growing—state cooperation.

As growing multilateral momentum demonstrates,¶ the Arctic is a zone neither of

pure¶ competition or cooperation, but is instead¶ a mix of both. On balance, however, nationalistic¶
pressures are being contained more effectively¶ than has been assumed in many popular accounts.¶ As climate change
has multiplied stakes¶ in the region, Arctic nations have tended to show¶ increased willingness to
work together, actively¶ seeking to quell fears about territory annexation,¶ unilateral
resources grabs, and domination of key¶ maritime chokepoints.¶ It is perhaps unsurprising that a
series of informal¶ and formal multilateral processes have emerged to¶ help states
address boundary issues in an orderly¶ way and to keep the commercial
environment¶ stable and accessible. States have a strong interest¶ in a stable Arctic.
Energy extraction and Arctic¶ navigation are already subject to substantial environmental, ¶ technological and economic uncertainties.¶
In contrast, geopolitical grandstanding is¶ a preventable source of distraction. There is little¶
reason for complacency, however. While some of¶ the new cooperative arrangements are imaginative¶ in conception, they remain
limited in scope¶ and contentious issues are yet to be tackled. In the ¶ future, the key risks are as follows:
Canada
Canada wants cooperation, but Arctic relations are on the brink.

Over the past decade, and particularly since 2005, the¶ Arctic has come to play an increasingly
prominent role¶ in Canadian policy, as the Prime Minister’s Office, the¶ Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs,
and a host¶ of other federal departments have moved the region to¶ the top of their agendas.
In large measure, this has been¶ a reaction to the improved accessibility of the North, the ¶ enhanced potential of hydrocarbon extraction,
and the¶ reemergence of traditional questions of sovereignty.¶
Canada has traditionally relied upon a
cooperative¶ rules-based approach to Arctic policy and continues to¶ emphasize the importance of the
Arctic Council, the¶ United Nations, and bi-national partnerships with other¶ circumpolar powers. Over the past decade, The Northern¶
Dimension of Canadian Foreign Policy, the International¶ Policy Statement, Canada’s Northern Strategy, Statement on¶ Canada’s Arctic
Foreign Policy, and other official Canadian¶ speeches and pronouncements have emphasized the¶ need to work cooperatively on issues of
common concern¶ such as environmental monitoring, local self-government,¶ transportation, and scientific research (Canada 2000,¶
2005, 2009, 2010).¶ In the past five years, however,
Canadian policy¶ increasingly emphasizes unilateral
action and force¶ projection into the Arctic. Canada’s principal Northern¶ security concern is the status of the
waters of the¶ Northwest Passage. The Canadian government considers¶ the passage to be internal
waters by virtue of the state’s¶ historic title and by baselines drawn around the entire¶ Arctic Archipelago in 1985 (Dufresne 2007).
Yet, this¶ claim is expressly challenged in the 2008 American¶ Arctic policy
statement, which characterizes the waters as straits used for international navigation (President of the¶ United States 2009).¶
Canada and the United States have been able to avoid¶ a serious dispute over this
issue through a 1988 bilateral¶ Arctic cooperation agreement, which suspends the question¶ of sovereignty while allowing
American icebreakers¶ to transit the Northwest Passage (Canada-United States¶ 1989). However, this agreement does not cover other ¶
vessel types and the consequences of a conventional¶ vessel passing through these waters without Canadian¶ permission remains a
serious concern. Canada also has a¶ maritime dispute with the United States in the Beaufort¶ Sea, an area potentially rich in oil and gas, as
well as¶ boundary disputes with Denmark in the Lincoln Sea and¶ over tiny Hans Island in the Nares Strait.¶ Ottawa’s
concern
over its position in the Arctic has¶ been demonstrated by a series of new projects,
begun¶ or announced since 2005, which aim to enhance the¶ capability of Canadian military and civilian authorities¶ to operate in the
region. The Royal Canadian Navy is¶ expected to receive its first armed Arctic patrol craft¶ in 2016 and the aging Coast Guard icebreaker
Louis¶ St. Laurent is scheduled to be replaced by the $720¶ million John G. Diefenbaker, which is being designed by a ¶ Canadian
shipbuilder and is expected to be operational¶ by 2017 (Prime Minister of Canada 2008). To supply¶ these vessels, a new military and
civilian deep-water¶ resupply facility is also being constructed at Nanisivik on¶ Baffin Island, with a projected operational date of 2016¶
(Prime Minister of Canada 2007).¶ Prime Minister Stephen Harper has also announced¶ an Arctic Training Centre in Resolute Bay for the
Army,¶ intended to support regional military and civilian¶ emergency operations, to increase capabilities, and¶ to quicken response times
(Prime Minister of Canada¶ 2007). The Canadian Ranger force is also being¶ augmented with better equipment and increased
recruitment.¶ Meanwhile, regular CF forces continue annual¶ joint-exercise in the region.¶ In addition, the
Canadian military
is actively seeking to increase its surveillance capability over the region with
manned and unmanned aircraft. It is also in the¶ process of establishing its ‘Northern
Watch’ system,¶ which uses both land-based and underwater sensors¶ to detect
vessels passing through choke points in¶ the Northwest Passage (MacLeod, McCallum and¶ Waller
2009). The Polar Epsilon satellite system has¶ also provided Canada with a new space-based surveillance¶ system designed in part to
monitor the ocean¶ approaches of the Arctic (National Defence Canada¶ 2009). At present this system is slated for expansion with ¶ a
constellation of three RADARSAT satellites planned¶ for near-continuous coverage of the North.¶ In a further attempt to increase
Canadian control¶ over Arctic waters, the government announced in August¶ 2008 that the Coast Guard’s Northern reporting system¶
(NORDREG) has been made mandatory for all vessels in¶ the Canadian Arctic (Prime Minister of Canada 2008b). ¶ At the same time,
Ottawa announced the extension of its¶ jurisdictional limit from 100 to 200 nautical miles under¶ the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention
Act (Department of¶ Justice Canada 2010).¶ Canada is also interested in developing its Northern¶ oil and gas reserves. Beginning in 2007,
oil companies¶ began investing heavily in exploration leases and the¶ Canadian government is on record supporting the¶ construction of
the $16 billion Mackenzie Valley pipeline.¶ In an effort to expand its Northern resource base,¶ Ottawa is actively engaged in hydrographic
mapping of¶ the Arctic shelf, a project which must be completed by ¶ 2013 to meet its U.N. deadline. It is working cooperatively ¶ with both
Denmark and the United States on this effort¶ (Natural Resources Canada 2009).¶ Canadian
policy remains based
upon the assumption¶ that Arctic territorial and legal disputes can be solved¶ by
diplomatic means and with respect for international¶ law. However it has taken serious measures to
ensure¶ that, in the future, it will have the physical capabilities¶ to project and
sustain a government presence in the¶ region, enforce Canadian law, and ensure
respect for its¶ national sovereignty.
The potential for Canadian conflict building—environmental changes and

counterbalancing.
Throughout the 1990s, the main thrust of the Canadian position was that the Arctic needed¶ to be developed in a cooperative fashion. All
official documentation specifically stated that¶ the need for military security in the region had ended with the fall of the USSR.31 There
were¶ no official publications that raised concerns regarding traditional security issues. Instead, the¶ focus was clearly on issues of
environmental security, but this began to change in the early¶ 2000s. Canada was one of the first Arctic states to publicly discuss
rebuilding its Arctic¶ security capability. Back in the mid-2000s the short-lived Martin Liberal Government¶ launched two key initiatives
to examine Canada’s Arctic needs from both a domestic and an¶ international perspective. The Martin Government launched a defence
and foreign policy¶ review, which ultimately led to a set of policy papers on defence, diplomacy, development¶ and international trade.
While not quite White Papers, these documents made it clear that¶ Canada needed to improve its ability to protect its Arctic region. On
the basis of an¶ anticipated increase in international activity in the region due to climate change and resource¶ development, the
document stated, “(t)he demands of sovereignty and security for the¶ Government could
become even more pressing as activity in the North continues to rise.”32¶ This
anticipated increase in foreign interest in the region corresponds with the need to
act.¶ The Martin Government also began to develop a domestic Arctic policy that would provide a¶ Government of Canada position on
the north. Called the Northern Strategy, it was to be built¶ on seven pillars. One of the pillars was “Reinforcing Sovereignty, National
Security and¶ Circumpolar Cooperation,”33 that focussed on improving Canada’s ability to defend both its¶ Arctic sovereignty and
security; however, the policy was not finalized before the Martin¶ Government was defeated in the 2006 federal election.¶ Under
Stephen Harper, the Conservatives also raised the issue of building up Canadian¶ capability. During his 2005-2006 campaign, Harper
surprised many observers when he¶ made this a campaign issue by issuing a policy promise to rebuild Canadian Arctic forces.¶ This
included a commitment to build three armed icebreakers to be operated by the navy.34¶ Following their election victory, the new
Conservative Government continued to develop¶ plans to improve Canadian Arctic forces. From 2006 to the present, the Harper
Government¶ has continued to develop its plan to strengthen Canada’s northern security capabilities.¶ In May 2008, with the release of
their defence policy Canada First Defence Strategy, the¶ Conservative Government stated its concern about Canada’s ability to protect its
north.¶ In Canada’s Arctic region, changing
weather patterns are altering the¶ environment,
making it more accessible to sea traffic and economic activity.¶ Retreating ice cover
has opened the way for increased shipping, tourism and resource exploration, and
new transportation routes are being considered,¶ including through the Northwest Passage. While this
promises substantial¶ economic benefits for Canada, it has also brought new challenges from other ¶ shores. These changes in the Arctic
could also spark an increase in illegal¶ activity, with important implications for Canadian sovereignty and security and ¶ a potential
requirement for additional military support.35¶ On July 26, 2009, they released their Northern Strategy.36 This document was based on
four¶ “pillars,” one of which was “exercising” Canada’s sovereignty. This document went on to list ¶ the Canadian plan: build six to eight
Arctic Offshore vessels; build a large icebreaker;¶ develop an indigenous surveillance capability (Northern Watch and RadarSat II; Polar ¶
Epsilon); expand the Rangers; create a Northern Reserve Unit based in the Arctic; develop ¶ an army Arctic training base in Resolute; and
develop a deepwater resupply port in¶ Nanisivik.37¶ While the government has remained vocal in its support for each of the projects, its
progress¶ has been somewhat slow. The Harper administration first announced that it was going to ¶ build armed Arctic vessels in
December 2005.38 In the ensuing time, this idea morphed from¶ three armed navy icebreakers into six to eight navy Arctic Offshore
Patrol Ships (AOPS)¶ capable of travelling through first-year ice and a separate Polar Class icebreaker for the¶ Coast Guard. While navy
officials are still hopeful that the first ship can be delivered by¶ 2014, as of January 2010, the request to industry for proposals has still
not gone out.39 It¶ seems increasingly unlikely that the government will be able to request industry bids, make a ¶ decision, and build the
vessel within a four-year bracket. Nevertheless, the 2014 date is still¶ the official position. The vessels are being designed to show
presence and to provide¶ constabulatory duties. They will be fitted for a gun, but the navy has not released the type or ¶ size or even if the
vessels will have them when they are built; however, if the Canadian¶ Forces do proceed with building these vessels, it will represent one
of the few instances¶ where they have acquired a new capability. In the post-Cold War era (and even in the period¶ since the 1960s) the
Canadian Forces have only replaced or updated (or eliminated) existing¶ military capabilities. The one example of acquiring a new
capability is the strategic heavy-lift¶ capability provided by the purchase of the CC-177 Globemasters (aka C-17). These were¶ bought to
address the immediate need of the Afghanistan war. Thus, the AOPS will¶ represent an important element of transformation for the
Canadian Forces.¶ On August 28, 2008, the Harper Government announced that at a cost of $720 million, it will¶ also build an icebreaker,
the John G. Diefenbaker, to replace the Louis St. Laurent when it ¶ is retired.40 The government stated that it expects to have the vessel
operational by 2017; however, to date little information has been provided as to the project’s progress. There is no¶ information on the
status of the project’s parameters and there is no indication as to when¶ the government will put out calls to industry. Given how long the
process has taken with¶ other large-scale building projects such as the one to replace the navy’s replenishment ¶ vessels, it seems unlikely
that the icebreaker will be designed, ordered and built in seven¶ years.¶ In fact, the Canadian Government has taken a step back from one
of its promised renewals¶ of Arctic capabilities. The replacement for Canada’s aging naval replenishment vessels, the ¶ Joint Support
Vessel, was to have the capability to travel in first-year ice up to one metre¶ thick.41 These vessels were also to be double-hulled and
therefore compliant with the Arctic¶ Waters Pollution Prevention Act. However, in August 2008, the government announced that ¶ the
bids received from industry were significantly over budget and that the government was ¶ re-examining the design.42 To date the
government has issued no further statements on the¶ status of the project.¶ The Canadian Government has yet to discuss modernizing its
air capabilities for northern¶ use, but, the current needs in Afghanistan have enabled the air force to purchase new ¶ assets that can also
be used in the north. The newly purchased CC-177s can use only a¶ few of the northern airfields because they are too short or do not
have an adequate surface¶ on them for the aircraft.43 In 2009 the air force was asked what improvements would be ¶ required in order
for a number of airfields to be used. The seventeen new CC-130Js are¶ expected to arrive in mid-2010 and will be able to use many of the
existing airfields since¶ they can land on short/rough airfields. Likewise, the fifteen new heavy lift Chinook CH-147D¶ helicopters will
also be useful in northern operations; however, the air force is still¶ determining what it needs to replace its long-range patrol Aircraft
CP-140/CP-140A Auroras¶ and Arcturus, its CF-18 fighter aircraft, and its one northern-based aircraft: the CC-138 Twin¶ Otter utility
aircraft.44 The Canada First Strategy did “promise” that both the CF-18s and CP-¶ 140s will be replaced,45 but it is unlikely that the
replacements for any of these aircraft will be¶ announced soon. The Canadian Forces are also examining the use of UAVs in the Arctic,¶
but they are currently experiencing some challenges in making them work in the high north. ¶ Given the high latitudes involved, there is a
problem with getting adequate satellite “locks” on¶ the UAVs to allow them to be controlled. The extreme conditions of the climate are
also¶ undermining their operations in the high north.¶ On a more positive note, the Canadian Government is proceeding with the
Rangers¶ expansion. This is a militia style unit that allows local northern communities to act as the¶ “eyes and ears” of the forces. Given
that many Rangers are northern aboriginals, their¶ knowledge of the land proves useful to the regular forces operating in the Arctic. They
are now in the process of expanding from 4,100 members to 5,000.46 A reserve company of 41¶ Canadian Brigade Loyal Edmonton
Regiment is also being recruited to be stationed in¶ Yellowknife. It is anticipated to have 100 personnel by 2019.47¶ The Canadian Space
Agency successfully launched RadarSat II into orbit and it was¶ operational as of July 2009.48 Officials have expressed “delight” at how
well it is functioning¶ and the replacement system is now being developed. While planning is still in the early ¶ phases, it is hoped that
RadarSat II will be replaced by a number (3-5) of smaller satellites.¶ The Northern Watch program is also back on track despite having
some difficulties in 2008¶ and another set of field tests on new sensor capabilities is expected to be conducted in the ¶ summer of 2010.
Both systems will give Canada vastly improved indigenously built ¶ surveillance systems. RadarSat II provides outstanding satellite
imagery from space, and the¶ Northern Watch program is developing a sub-surveillance system for detecting submarines.¶ The
Canadian Government had ceased conducting Arctic military exercises at the end of
the¶ Cold War in 1989; however, in 2002, the Canadian Government was one of the first
Arctic¶ states to recommend these exercises amidst a growing concern led by a
succession of¶ Canadian Forces Northern commanders.49 Conducted in August, these have focussed
in¶ and around the eastern Arctic and include all three branches of the Canadian Forces. The ¶ scope of these exercises now includes
submarines, frigates, coastal patrol vessels,¶ icebreakers, F-18s and CP-140s, as well as land units. The Forces are now planning to¶
develop an exercise that will take place outside of the summer months, but the date has not ¶ yet been announced.¶ As of 2010, the
Canadian Government has devoted considerable effort to drawing up plans¶ to improve its ability to know and act in the Arctic. This
planning clearly exceeds any efforts¶ prior to this period, but it is uncertain whether the promises of the government will be fulfilled.
***LINK***
A2: Plan not Perceived
Everyone’s focused on Arctic Policy
FINDING 1: UNPRECEDENTED NATIONAL¶ ATTENTION TO ARCTIC POLICY¶ There can be no doubt that the Arctic has
emerged as¶ a major focus for both the circumpolar states and an¶ increasing number of non-Arctic states and non-state¶
actors. Foreign and defense ministries began to focus¶ intently on the changing Arctic in
the mid-2000s. While¶ both Canada and the EU issued northern dimensions¶ of their foreign policies in 2000, and Norway issued its¶
Soria Moria Declaration in November 2005, it was the¶ Russian flag-planting at the North Pole in August 2007¶ and the Ilulissat meeting
of the five coastal Arctic states¶ in May 2008 that led to a virtual blizzard of new policy ¶ statements and initiatives from Arctic
stakeholders,¶ including Canada, Iceland, Norway, Russia, the United¶ States, Finland, Denmark and Sweden, the EU, NATO,¶ and the
Nordic countries jointly (NORDSUP).¶ To
have so many major policy announcements from¶ so many
major players in so short a time frame appears¶ is unusual in international affairs,
and there is no¶ precedent for such intense interest in the Arctic. While¶ each declaration was
different, some common themes¶ emerged, including an emphasis on environmental¶ security, a desire for international cooperation,
and¶ resolve to protect national interests. These new priorities¶ have led to the remilitarization of the Arctic.
A2: We’re Not Military
Even if the plan isn’t spun as military, the distinction has been blurred and
will trigger buildup.
Before even considering what this study needs to examine, there are three limiting factors ¶ that need to be acknowledged. First, the
modern Arctic will contain both elements of conflict¶ and cooperation at the same time. The challenge is isolating any trends that may
be¶ developing regarding either cooperation or conflict.¶ Secondly, the location of both
Russia and the United States
as Arctic states will blur the¶ distinction between security developments that are
Arctic specific and those that are¶ occurring because these two Arctic states have
global interests. The geography of Russia¶ means that as that state recovers from its economic collapse of the late 1980s and
1990s, it¶ will build new forces that must be located in the Arctic. This is particularly true for its naval ¶ forces. It is only to be expected
that the United States will likewise respond; however, it does¶ not really matter. Even
if a build-up is occurring
because of other global issues, the fact¶ remains that the Russian geopolitical reality
means that the Arctic region will be involved.¶ Third, it is very difficult to get specific
numbers on the new activities in the Arctic. This means¶ that much of the evidence presented in this study is
currently incomplete. Operations in the¶ Arctic are by its nature hidden from view. To a large degree, the evidence that can be found ¶ is
mainly information that the various governments release. What is not known is activity that¶ remains both
out of site and classified. This remains a significant limiting factor facing this¶ study.
---Link Ext.
Tensions in the Arctic are rising—resource development, melting ice, and

sovereignty disputes, plan would push it over the brink.
As the Cold War receded, so too did the strategic ¶ significance of the Arctic, once a zone¶ of U.S.-Soviet contestation. In recent
years,¶ tensions have once again been rising. From the¶ infamous planting of the Russian flag on the floor¶ of the
Arctic Ocean in 2007 to Secretary Clinton’s¶ appearance at the May 2011 Arctic Council ministerial,¶ states have turned
their attention to the¶ North. The drivers of this shift are rapidly melting¶ ice and the
consequent prospects for the development¶ of energy resources; its facilitators have¶ been
innovating in extraction technologies and¶ marine transportation systems to move cargoes of¶ hydrocarbons and hard minerals along
previously¶ inaccessible sea routes. Rising oil prices in 2004-¶ 2008 generated investment resources.¶ These
changes have
created a complex and, to¶ some, worrying political picture. Many fear the¶ Arctic will see an
intensifying battle for sovereign¶ control and commercial advantage.1 While such¶ a view may
be “more alarmist than alarming,”¶ insecurity in the far North has increased risks¶ of political and
military conflict and highlighted¶ the need for a stable maritime security system to¶
manage disputes and other security concerns.2¶ The bleakest forecasts have overlooked positive developments¶ in the region.
Despite the Arctic’s dangerous¶ mix of great power competition, unresolved¶
territorial disputes, and increasingly accessible oil¶ and gas reserves, there has to
date been little actual¶ discord. Unlike in the South China Seas, which faces a similar mix of uncharted energy
resources¶ and contested boundaries, Arctic states have¶ pledged to solve disputes in an orderly process,¶ managed the peaceful
resolution of a major territorial¶ conflict, and concluded a binding agreement¶ to cooperate on search and rescue.
Icebreakers/Coast Guard Link
Icebreakers sparks conflict and guts cooperation
Sergunin and Konyshev, ’12 [July 6, 2012, Alexander Sergunin Doctor of Political Science, Professor, St. Petersburg
State University, and Valery Konyshev Doctor of Political Science, Professor, St. Petersburg State University, “U.S. Arctic Strategy,”
Russian International Affairs Council, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=584]
With increased competition for resources in the Arctic, it is urgent for Russia to build
a policy of cooperation with such influential countries as the United States. Is there any
potential for such cooperation? Or is the US focused on a unilateral course of action in this region? ¶ What the Arctic means for the USA¶
The Arctic coast of the United States is in Alaska, whose continental shelf, according to the National Geological Survey, has about 31% of
undiscovered oil reserves of the entire Arctic, which amounts to 27 billion barrels. Gas is also expected to be found there but in much
smaller quantities.¶ The Arctic remains a strategically important region for the U.S. nuclear submarine fleet. From the north-east of the
Barents Sea, the US can strike most important targets because here lies the shortest path for ballistic missiles aimed from the eastern to
the western hemisphere.¶ NORAD infrastructure covering the USA and Canada with northern strategic direction is located in Alaska.¶
Photo: Missile Defense Agency¶ The Sea-based X-band Radar, shown here¶ in its current location near the Aleutian¶ Island of Adak¶ Many
experts are noting a change in Washington’s motivation in the Far North. Military and strategic confrontation with the Soviet Union was
the main activity during the Cold War, whereas now, economic interests – access to oil and gas resources in the Arctic – are the primary
goal. Such companies as Chevron, ExxonMobil, and ConocoPhillips are the most active in the Arctic.¶ A review
of the U.S.
policy and interests in the Arctic began after 2004 due to the revival of Russia’s
activities in the Far North.¶ Components of the U.S. Arctic strategy¶ The U.S. Arctic Policy Directive was published on
January 12, 2009.¶ It states that “the United States has broad and fundamental national security interests in the Arctic region and was
prepared to operate either independently or in conjunction with other states to safeguard these interests”. In
the Arctic,
maximum implementation of the principle of freedom of navigation and economic
activity is beneficial for Washington because the US is not a signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,
which makes it possible to make a claim in disputed cases on a section of the shelf. The American interests, formally stated, can be
grouped into several categories:¶ Military and strategic interests – missile defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems
for strategic redeployment of forces in the Arctic; strategic deterrence, maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of navigation
and over-flight. The US is prepared to act unilaterally if necessary to protect these interests. ¶ Homeland security interests – prevention of
terrorist attacks or other criminal or hostile acts that could increase the United States vulnerability to terrorism in the Arctic region. ¶
Political and economic interests – expansion of American economic presence under simultaneous demonstration of naval power. The
US is ready not only to defend its rights in the exclusive economic zone (200 nautical miles
from the shore), but also to ensure “adequate” control of adjoining water areas . Freedom of
transarctic over-flights and freedom of navigation for the entire Arctic, including the Northern Sea Route which runs along Russia’s
territory, were named as top national priority.¶ In this way, the
U.S. Arctic strategy reserves the right to act
not just unilaterally, but also to control Arctic spaces outside legally valid
boundaries.¶ In furtherance of the provisions of this Directive, the U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap was published in October 2009, it
contained a five-year plan of expanding maritime operations in the Arctic. Equipping the armed forces with weapons, detection,
communication and control systems, as well as other objects of military and civilian infrastructure, adapted to the conditions of the
Arctic, was named as one of the goals of this Roadmap. The Roadmap includes improvement of sea-based systems to protect against
ballistic and cruise missiles, forces and means to fight submarines and control the coastal zone. ¶ ¶ Photo: Reuters¶ ICESCAPE scientist
Karen Frey takes ¶ optical measurements in a melt pond in the ¶ Arctic Ocean, with the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Healy ¶ on the background,
June 11, 2012¶ The Roadmap provides for the creation of a strategic unit to study the effects of climate change for strategic objectives
and the nature of maritime operations in the Arctic. Constant monitoring of security threats to U.S. interests, exploring the capabilities of
closest rivals in the Arctic, analysis of actions and motivations of all governmental and non-governmental members of the Arctic Policy
are all under the focus of attention of this Roadmap. Military research is an important part of the Roadmap.¶ The provisions of the Arctic
strategy are consecutively being implemented in practical politics. This is indicated by the plans on increasing the U.S. military satellite
systems, aimed at the Arctic.¶ Under Barack Obama, the US has stepped up the activities of air defense systems designed to intercept
Russian strategic air forces patrolling the Arctic and North Atlantic. There is plan to increase the presence of the U.S. nuclear submarine
fleet in the Barents Sea, which is working out operational activities in the Arctic. Exercises involving the Naval and Air Forces are held in
the Chukchi Sea near Russian territorial waters.
Discussions are continuing in the USA on the
construction of nuclear icebreakers to support maritime operations in the Arctic. An
accompanying report to a bill adopted by the Congress says that one of the missions
of the Coast Guard is to “provide the United States with the capability to support
national interests in the Polar Regions...The United States will need a maritime surface and air presence in the
Arctic sufficient to support appropriate prevention and response regimes as well as diplomatic objectives ”.¶
The U.S. Arctic
strategy reserves the right to act not just unilaterally, but also to control Arctic
spaces outside legally valid boundaries.¶ In recent years, the United States has actively participated in NATO
exercises in the Arctic region. It is obvious that the United States, along with other Western countries, plans to increase multilateral
military cooperation in the Arctic.¶ To implement the Arctic strategy, the Obama administration made efforts for the U.S. Senate to fast-
track ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982. This will not only include the United States in the legal
mechanism of coordinating policies with other Arctic states, but will also give it the opportunity to expand extraction of mineral
resources beyond the 200-mile radius. However, the principle of freedom of navigation for American ships is in conflict with restrictions
that are imposed by this Convention. The U.S. Congress maintains strong opposition to the US accession to the Convention, as the
consequences of such a move are fraught with financial losses for some American companies that are already developing various
resources on the shelves of other countries. Many conservative republicans are against the accession. ¶ Between rivalry and cooperation¶
The United States strongly supports the strengthening of NATO’s presence in the Arctic, actually pushing out other international
organizations. Given
the current nature of relations between Russia and NATO, such steps
would have negative consequences for Russia with no reliable allies in the Arctic.¶ Obvious and
hidden differences between the United States and Russia on Arctic issues are in
several directions. Like many other countries, the United States seeks to ensure that the status of the Northern Sea Route,
running along the Arctic coast of Russia, becomes international. In the case these plans are implemented, Russia would not only lose
significant revenues for the use of the route by other countries, but this
will objectively increase Russia’s
military and strategic vulnerability from the north. Moscow and Washington see the leading regional
organization – Arctic Council – in different ways. Russia is interested in expanding the powers of this Council, while the 2009 Directive
explicitly states that the United States considers the Council only as a forum for discussion and is opposed to giving it the status of an
international organization that makes binding decisions. ¶ Photo: Reuters¶ On the other hand, the United States strongly supports the
strengthening of NATO’s presence in the Arctic, actually pushing out other international organizations (the Arctic Council and the
Barents Euro-Arctic Council in which the US.A. is not a member). Given the current nature of relations between Russia and NATO, such
steps would have negative consequences for Russia with no reliable allies in the Arctic. ¶ Until the USA ratifies the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea, there remains the possibility of worsening of disputes with Russia on borders in the Arctic seas and on the continental
shelf boundary. It should be remembered that the United States negatively views Russia’s attempts to expand its zone of the shelf to the
Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges. Russia’s application was rejected in 2001 due to the pressure on the UN Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf from the State Department. Russia has not ratified its treaty with the USA on the Bering Sea boundary line. ¶
Cooperation will only be in those areas where the USA. cannot do without Russian participation. ¶ However, relations between the United
States and Russia have significant potential for cooperation in the Arctic. According to experts, such relations are based on the Ilulissat
Declaration signed by the “Arctic five” in May 2008, which states that the Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 was recognized as the
legal basis for drawing borders, and that the parties intended to resolve problems through negotiations. In keeping with the general
aspirations of Barack Obama to restart relations with Russia, there were statements including that of the U.S. President himself and
Secretary of State on U.S. intentions to cooperate with Russia in the Arctic. However, it is likely that cooperation will only be in those
areas where the USA. cannot do without Russian participation. ¶ In particular, this concerns measures on ensuring the safety of water and
air transportation in the Arctic, on which Member States of the Arctic Council signed an Agreement in May 2011. Each of the signatories
undertook to build forces and resources to ensure safety in its segment and rapid exchange of information. ¶ There is plan for a large-
scale cooperation in the development of the resources of the Arctic zone of Russia. Rosneft and Exxon-Mobil – Russian and American
companies, respectively – in April 2012 signed an agreement on cooperation in the exploration and development of oil and gas deposits
in the Kara Sea.¶ Russia benefits from attracting the needed financial resources (Exxon-Mobil has capitalization of $400 billion) and
modern technologies for exploration and drilling in the northern latitudes. Rosneft and ConocoPhillips, an American multinational
energy corporation, are implementing another joint project at Nenets Autonomous District where they are developing the promising
Ardalinskoye field. The American party is expected to increase investments. ¶ Photo: U.S. Navy / Nathanael Miller¶ The Military Sealift
Command ¶ fast combat support ship USNS Arctic (T-AOE 8)¶ Another direction of bilateral cooperation is the development of
transantarctic routes for flights, involving development of communications infrastructure and maintenance, upgrade and construction of
new airports in Russia. This airline market segment is the fastest growing. ¶ Cooperation between the United States and Russia in the
scientific study and nature conservation activities in the Arctic was and remains mutually beneficial. It is obvious that any decisions
relating to the economic development of the Far North should be based on scientific analysis of the vulnerability of the northern nature
and difficult weather, social, domestic and other conditions. In this respect, Russia can offer icebreaking fleet and its rich experience in
Arctic expeditions.¶ In the military and political aspect of relations between Washington and Moscow, it is overdue for the two parties to
strengthen measures on mutual military and political trust in the Arctic. Such measures should include mutual warning about plans for
the movement of naval forces in “sensitive” zones, and limiting military presence in the Arctic. ¶ At present, it is difficult to predict how
relations between the United States and Russia in the Arctic will develop. This will depend, first, on the general mood in Russian-
American relations, which may change if Republicans come to power in the USA. Secondly, it will depend on the effectiveness of Russia’s
economic policy in the Arctic on attracting foreign investments and technology. Some positive steps have already been taken in this
regard. Thirdly, it will depend on whether the US will maintain its present course of predominantly unilateral action in the region, or
whether it will opt for multilateral cooperation.
***IMPACT***
Impact Multiplier
Rearming the Arctic triggers an arms race and unpredictable militarism—
makes the region more valuable, making chances of Arctic more likely and
means none of their impact defense applies.
Yet it is hard to conceptualise what that conflict would look like. From a rational perspective, ¶ any
conflict over
resources would not provide the “winner” with meaningful gains. A conflict¶ over
resources or boundaries in the region would undoubtedly result in huge environmental¶ damage to the
region. Such a conflict would never be profitable to any side from a rational¶ perspective. It is highly unlikely
that any side would attempt to pursue such a policy as an¶ aggressor. Here is the real problem: because each of the Arctic
states is in the process of¶ rearming “just in case,” they are all contributing to the growing
strategic value of the region. As this value grows, each state will attach a greater
value to their own national interests in the region. In this way, an arms race may be
beginning. And once the weapons systems are¶ in place, states can behave in strange
ways. Denmark’s escalation of the Hans Island issue¶ is a prime example. The island has little value to either Canada or Denmark. The
ongoing¶ exchange of alcohol prior to 2002 seemed the best way that both sides could pretend that¶ they cared, but really did not. Only
when the Danes obtained a new military capability did the¶ issue suddenly escalate. If this can happen for an insignificant issue between
allies, what are¶ the risks for issues that are of significant importance?
Russia/China Alliance Impact
2NC Russia-China War
Russian influence is essential to prevent a nuclear war with Russia or China

Newsweek 1995 (Michael Elliott, “Why Russia still matters to America,” May 15)
"Russia," says Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, "is a big AND If you lived in Moscow, you'd think May was nice, too.)
Extinction
Sharavin, 01 (Alexander, Director of the Institute for Military and Political Analysis, What the Papers Say, Oct 3)
Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China AND both, and even against
the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.
A2: International Cooperation Checks
International cooperation will fall apart under pressure—competing
organizations.
International governance in the Arctic is far from¶ settled, with various overlapping
groupings and¶ legal frameworks vying for influence (figure 1).¶ The pace of change has
accelerated as states make¶ greater demands on the multilateral system. To¶ date, at least,
the fear of conflict has tended to push¶ states towards cooperation, rather than away from¶ it. With the hardest
challenges yet to be addressed,¶ however, the jury is still out on the long-term potential¶
of the multilateral system to manage heightened¶ risk in the Arctic over coming
decades.
No mechanisms for Arctic crisis management--- guarantees escalation.

The lack of a crisis management mechanism. The¶ Arctic Five grouping is willing to tackle resource¶ and
boundary issues, but is untested in a crisis.¶ There is no mechanism to bring together ministers¶ at
short notice, for instance. Indeed, it is unclear¶ when, and whether, ministers will next meet.¶ The Arctic Council is
formally constituted and¶ will soon have a secretariat, but it does not have ¶ a mandate in areas most likely to trigger a crisis.¶ Bilateral diplomacy
could provide a solution, perhaps¶ with the mediating intervention of a third ¶ power. Alternatively, an independent task force ¶ could be
convened, as happened after the Cheonan¶ incident off the coast of the Korean peninsula.¶ These mechanisms are untested, however,
and it remains unclear how states would limit cycles of¶ mutual recrimination in the case of a major environmental¶
disaster (an Arctic Deepwater), an aggressive¶ attempt to protect commercial interests,¶ or a serious naval incident.
It’s all talk –under the table, it’ll cause militarism.

The Arctic is changing and, as a result, is garnering unprecedented international interest.¶ With warming temperatures, melting ice and
greater accessibility to resources in the region,¶ concerns for security in the region are at the forefront of the Arctic states’ attempts to ¶
maintain their foothold in the Arctic. Allof the Arctic states – Canada, Russia, Denmark,¶ Norway and the United States –
have downplayed concerns about conflict sparked by a¶ “race for resources” in the Arctic
by issuing policy statements. The core of these statements¶ is that the Arctic states will work together to maintain
peaceful cooperation in the region.¶ However, the Arctic states are seemingly contradicting the intent
of their statements as¶ evidenced by their current actions. All of the Arctic states
have begun rebuilding their military¶ forces and capabilities in order to operate in
the region. Personnel are undertaking Arctic¶ training exercises; submarines that can operate in ice are being developed or
enhanced;¶ icebreakers are being built; and so forth. The catalyst for the Arctic states’ efforts appears to¶ be a recognition
that the Arctic is critically vital to their interests and they will take the steps¶
necessary to defend these interests. The consequence of these efforts is that¶
notwithstanding the public statements of peace and cooperation in the Arctic issued
by the¶ Arctic states, the strategic value of the Arctic is growing. As this value grows,
each state will¶ attach a greater value to their own national interests in the region.
The Arctic states may be¶ talking cooperation, but they are preparing for conflict.
Arctic Ice- Warming
Turns Warming/Methane
Opening the Arctic causes rampant warming.
Huebert et al. 12 Huebert, R. (University of Calgary), H. Exner-Pirot (University of Saskatchewan), A. Lajeunesse
(University of Calgary), J. Gulledge (2012) “Climate change & international security: The Arctic as a Bellwether.” Arlington,
Virginia: Center for Climate and Energy Sol (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions). Center for Climate and Energy
Solutions. http://www.c2es.org/publications/¶ climate-change-international-arctic-security/¶ May 2012
An ice-free Arctic Ocean will absorb more sunlight¶ and convert it to heat, thus
amplifying warming.¶ • The Arctic currently removes CO2 from the¶ atmosphere, but sea
ice loss would likely cause it to¶ switch to releasing CO2 and methane (a very
potent¶ greenhouse gas) to the atmosphere, further amplifying¶ global warming.¶ • Mid-latitude
atmospheric circulation, and therefore¶ precipitation and storm patterns may have
already¶ been altered by sea ice loss.¶ • A warmer, ice-free Arctic Ocean with more¶ freshwater
from snow and ice melt may slow key¶ heat-transporting currents in the North Atlantic¶ Ocean, thus
cooling Europe and further warming¶ other parts of the world. These changes would
alter¶ marine ecosystems (i.e. fisheries) and precipitation¶ and storm patterns, on a broad scale.¶ •
Amplified warming will accelerate melting of¶ land-based ice, thus accelerating sea
level rise. The¶ Greenland Ice Sheet could become destabilized,¶ leading to abrupt
and massive sea level rise beyond¶ the 21st century.¶ Because the potential economic benefits of the¶ opening of the
Arctic are large, there is a substantial¶ need for more concerted effort to resolve the risks so that¶ they can be weighed against the
benefits. At this stage, however, it
is not safe to assume that the opening of the¶ Arctic will
necessarily yield net benefits for all interested¶ states or to humanity as a whole.¶ It is
precisely this uncertainty combined with the¶ realization that the Arctic is on the verge of a dramatic¶ and drastic transformation that
has led the states of¶ the circumpolar north to pay much greater attention to¶ their northern regions. On one hand there is substantial¶
effort to develop a cooperative governance regime based¶ on goodwill and shared interests. On the other hand,¶ the same Arctic
states have begun to strengthen and¶ expand their military and security capabilities
in the¶ Arctic. Further complicating this environment are the¶ increasing number of non-Arctic states
and actors that¶ are increasing both their interests and capabilities to¶ operate in the region.
Uncontrolled climate change causes extinction

Morgan 9 – Professor of Current Affairs @ Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, South Korea (Dennis
Ray, “World on fire: two scenarios of the destruction of human civilization and possible extinction of the
human race”, Futures, Volume 41, Issue 10, December 2009, Pages 683-693, ScienceDirect)
As horrifying as the scenario of human extinction by sudden, fast-burning nuclear fire may seem, the
one consolation is that this future can be avoided within a relatively short period of time if responsible
world leaders change Cold War thinking to move away from aggressive wars over natural resources and
towards the eventual dismantlement of most if not all nuclear weapons. On the other hand, another
scenario of human extinction by fire is one that may not so easily be reversed within a short period of
time because it is not a fast-burning fire; rather, a slow burning fire is gradually heating up the planet as
industrial civilization progresses and develops globally. This gradual process and course is long-lasting;
thus it cannot easily be changed, even if responsible world leaders change their thinking about
‘‘progress’’ and industrial development based on the burning of fossil fuels. The way that global
warming will impact humanity in the future has often been depicted through the analogy
of the proverbial frog in a pot of water who does not realize that the temperature of the
water is gradually rising. Instead of trying to escape, the frog tries to adjust to the gradual temperature
change; finally, the heat of the water sneaks up on it until it is debilitated. Though it finally realizes its
predicament and attempts to escape, it is too late; its feeble attempt is to no avail— and the frog dies.
Whether this fable can actually be applied to frogs in heated water or not is irrelevant; it still serves as a
comparable scenario of how the slow burning fire of global warming may eventually lead to a runaway
condition and take humanity by surprise. Unfortunately, by the time the politicians finally all agree with
the scientific consensus that global warming is indeed human caused, its development could be too
advanced to arrest; the poor frog has become too weak and enfeebled to get himself out of hot water.
The Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 by the
WorldMeteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environmental Programme to
‘‘assess on a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the scientific, technical and socio-
economic information relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of humaninduced climate
change, its potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation.’’[16]. Since then, it has given
assessments and reports every six or seven years. Thus far, it has given four assessments.13 With all
prior assessments came attacks fromsome parts of the scientific community, especially by industry
scientists, to attempt to prove that the theory had no basis in planetary history and present-day reality;
nevertheless, as more andmore research continually provided concrete and empirical evidence to
confirm the global warming hypothesis, that it is indeed human-caused, mostly due to the burning of
fossil fuels, the scientific consensus grew stronger that human induced global warming is verifiable. As a
matter of fact, according to Bill McKibben [17], 12 years of ‘‘impressive scientific
research’’ strongly confirms the 1995 report ‘‘that humans had grown so large in numbers and
especially in appetite for energy that they were now damaging the most basic of the earth’s systems—
the balance between incoming and outgoing solar energy’’; ‘‘. . . their findings have essentially been
complementary to the 1995 report – a constant strengthening of the simple basic truth that humans
were burning too much fossil fuel.’’ [17]. Indeed, 12 years later, the 2007 report not only confirms global
warming, with a stronger scientific consensus that the slow burn is ‘‘very likely’’ human caused, but it
also finds that the ‘‘amount of carbon in the atmosphere is now increasing at a faster rate even than
before’’ and the temperature increases would be ‘‘considerably higher than they have been so far were
it not for the blanket of soot and other pollution that is temporarily helping to cool the planet.’’ [17].
Furthermore, almost ‘‘everything frozen on earth is melting. Heavy rainfalls are
becoming more common since the air is warmer and therefore holds more water than cold air, and
‘cold days, cold nights and frost have become less frequent, while hot days, hot nights, and heat
waves have become more frequent.’’ [17]. Unless drastic action is taken soon, the average
global temperature is predicted to rise about 5 degrees this century, but it could rise as much as 8
degrees. As has already been evidenced in recent years, the rise in global temperature is melting the
Arctic sheets. This runaway polar melting will inflict great damage upon coastal areas, which could be
much greater than what has been previously forecasted. However, what is missing in the IPCC report, as
dire as it may seem, is sufficient emphasis on the less likely but still plausible worst case scenarios, which
could prove to have the most devastating, catastrophic consequences for the long-term future of human
civilization. In other words, the IPCC report places too much emphasis on a linear progression that does
not take sufficient account of the dynamics of systems theory, which leads to a fundamentally different
premise regarding the relationship between industrial civilization and nature. As a matter of fact, as
early as the 1950s, Hannah Arendt [18] observed this radical shift of emphasis in the human-nature
relationship, which starkly contrasts with previous times because the very distinction between nature
and man as ‘‘Homo faber’’ has become blurred, as man no longer merely takes from nature what is
needed for fabrication; instead, he now acts into nature to augment and transform natural processes,
which are then directed into the evolution of human civilization itself such that we become a part of the
very processes that we make. The more human civilization becomes an integral part of this dynamic
system, the more difficult it becomes to extricate ourselves from it. As Arendt pointed out, this
dynamism is dangerous because of its unpredictability. Acting into nature to transform natural
processes brings about an . . . endless new change of happenings whose eventual outcome the actor is
entirely incapable of knowing or controlling beforehand. The moment we started natural processes of
our own - and the splitting of the atom is precisely such a man-made natural process -we not only
increased our power over nature, or became more aggressive in our dealings with the given forces of
the earth, but for the first time have taken nature into the human world as such and obliterated the
defensive boundaries between natural elements and the human artifice by which all previous
civilizations were hedged in’’ [18]. So, in as much as we act into nature, we carry our own
unpredictability into our world; thus, Nature can no longer be thought of as having absolute or iron-clad
laws. We no longer know what the laws of nature are because the unpredictability of Nature increases
in proportion to the degree by which industrial civilization injects its own processes into it; through
selfcreated, dynamic, transformative processes, we carry human unpredictability into the future with a
precarious recklessness that may indeed end in human catastrophe or extinction, for elemental forces
that we have yet to understand may be unleashed upon us by the very environment that we experiment
with. Nature may yet have her revenge and the last word, as the Earth and its delicate ecosystems,
environment, and atmosphere reach a tipping point, which could turn out to be a point of no return.
This is exactly the conclusion reached by the scientist, inventor, and author, James Lovelock. The creator
of the wellknown yet controversial Gaia Theory, Lovelock has recently written that it may be already too
late for humanity to change course since climate centers around the world, . . . which are the equivalent
of the pathology lab of a hospital, have reported the Earth’s physical condition, and the climate
specialists see it as seriously ill, and soon to pass into a morbid fever that may last as long as 100,000
years. I have to tell you, as members of the Earth’s family and an intimate part of it, that you and
especially civilisation are in grave danger. It was ill luck that we started polluting at a time when the sun
is too hot for comfort. We have given Gaia a fever and soon her condition will worsen to a state like a
coma. She has been there before and recovered, but it took more than 100,000 years. We are
responsible and will suffer the consequences: as the century progresses, the temperature will rise 8
degrees centigrade in temperate regions and 5 degrees in the tropics. Much of the tropical land mass
will become scrub and desert, and will no longer serve for regulation; this adds to the 40 per cent of the
Earth’s surface we have depleted to feed ourselves. . . . Curiously, aerosol pollution of the northern
hemisphere reduces global warming by reflecting sunlight back to space. This ‘global dimming’ is
transient and could disappear in a few days like the smoke that it is, leaving us fully exposed to the
heat of the global greenhouse. We are in a fool’s climate, accidentally kept cool by smoke, and before
this century is over billions of us will die and the few breeding pairs of people that survive will be in
the Arctic where the climate remains tolerable. [19] Moreover, Lovelock states that the task of trying to
correct our course is hopelessly impossible, for we are not in charge. It is foolish and arrogant to think
that we can regulate the atmosphere, oceans and land surface in order to maintain the conditions right
for life. It is as impossible as trying to regulate your own temperature and the composition of your
blood, for those with ‘‘failing kidneys know the never-ending daily difficulty of adjusting water, salt and
protein intake. The technological fix of dialysis helps, but is no replacement for living healthy kidneys’’
[19]. Lovelock concludes his analysis on the fate of human civilization and Gaia by saying that we will do
‘‘our best to survive, but sadly I cannot see the United States or the emerging economies of China and
India cutting back in time, and they are the main source of emissions. The worst will happen and
survivors will have to adapt to a hell of a climate’’ [19]. Lovelock’s forecast for climate change is based
on a systems dynamics analysis of the interaction between humancreated processes and natural
processes. It is a multidimensional model that appropriately reflects the dynamism of industrial
civilization responsible for climate change. For one thing, it takes into account positive feedback
loops that lead to ‘‘runaway’’ conditions. This mode of analysis is consistent with recent research on
how ecosystems suddenly disappear. A 2001 article in Nature, based on a scientific study by an
international consortium, reported that changes in ecosystems are not just gradual but are often sudden
and catastrophic [20]. Thus, a scientific consensus is emerging (after repeated studies of ecological
change) that ‘‘stressed ecosystems, given the right nudge, are capable of slipping rapidly from a
seemingly steady state to something entirely different,’’ according to Stephen Carpenter, a limnologist
at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (who is also a co-author of the report). Carpenter continues,
‘‘We realize that there is a common pattern we’re seeing in ecosystems around the world, . . .
Gradual changes in vulnerability accumulate and eventually you get a shock to the system - a flood or a
drought - and, boom, you’re over into another regime. It becomes a self-sustaining collapse.’’ [20]. If
ecosystems are in fact mini-models of the system of the Earth, as Lovelock maintains, then we can
expect the same kind of behavior. As Jonathon Foley, a UW-Madison climatologist and another co-
author of the Nature report, puts it, ‘‘Nature isn’t linear. Sometimes you can push on a system and push
on a system and, finally, you have the straw that breaks the camel’s back.’’ Also, once the ‘‘flip’’ occurs,
as Foley maintains, then the catastrophic change is ‘‘irreversible.’’ [20]. When we expand this analysis
of ecosystems to the Earth itself, it’s frightening. What could be the final push on a stressed system that
could ‘‘break the camel’s back?’’ Recently, another factor has been discovered in some areas of the
arctic regions, which will surely compound the problem of global ‘‘heating’’ (as Lovelock calls it) in
unpredictable and perhaps catastrophic ways. This disturbing development, also reported in Nature,
concerns the permafrost that has locked up who knows how many tons of the greenhouse gasses,
methane and carbon dioxide. Scientists are particularly worried about permafrost because, as it thaws,
it releases these gases into the atmosphere, thus, contributing and accelerating global heating. It is a
vicious positive feedback loop that compounds the prognosis of global warming in ways that could very
well prove to be the tipping point of no return. Seth Borenstein of the Associated Press describes this
disturbing positive feedback loop of permafrost greenhouse gasses, as when warming ‘‘. already under
way thaws permafrost, soil that has been continuously frozen for thousands of years.
Thawed permafrost releases methane and carbon dioxide. Those gases reach the atmosphere and help
trap heat on Earth in the greenhouse effect. The trapped heat thaws more permafrost and so on.’’ [21].
The significance and severity of this problem cannot be understated since scientists have discovered
that ‘‘the amount of carbon trapped in this type of permafrost called ‘‘yedoma’’ is much more prevalent
than originally thought and may be 100 times [my emphasis] the amount of carbon released into the air
each year by the burning of fossil fuels’’ [21]. Of course, it won’t come out all at once, at least by time as
we commonly reckon it, but in terms of geological time, the ‘‘several decades’’ that scientists say it will
probably take to come out can just as well be considered ‘‘all at once.’’ Surely, within the next 100 years,
much of the world we live in will be quite hot and may be unlivable, as Lovelock has predicted.
Professor Ted Schuur, a professor of ecosystem ecology at the University of Florida and co-author of the
study that appeared in Science, describes it as a ‘‘slow motion time bomb.’’ [21]. Permafrost under lakes
will be released as methane while that which is under dry ground will be released as carbon dioxide.
Scientists aren’t sure which is worse. Whereas methane is a much more powerful agent to trap heat, it
only lasts for about 10 years before it dissipates into carbon dioxide or other chemicals. The less
powerful heat-trapping agent, carbon dioxide, lasts for 100 years [21]. Both of the greenhouse gasses
present in permafrost represent a global dilemma and challenge that compounds the effects of global
warming and runaway climate change. The scary thing about it, as one researcher put it, is that there
are ‘‘lots of mechanisms that tend to be self-perpetuating and relatively few that tend to shut it off’’
[21].14 In an accompanying AP article, Katey Walters of the University of Alaska at Fairbanks describes
the effects as ‘‘huge’’ and, unless we have a ‘‘major cooling,’’ - unstoppable [22]. Also, there’s so much
more that has not even been discovered yet, she writes: ‘‘It’s coming out a lot and there’s a lot more to
come out.’’ [22]. 4. Is it the end of human civilization and possible extinction of humankind? What
Jonathon Schell wrote concerning death by the fire of nuclear holocaust also applies to the slow burning
death of global warming: Once we learn that a holocaust might lead to extinction, we have no right to
gamble, because if we lose, the game will be over, and neither we nor anyone else will ever get another
chance. Therefore, although, scientifically speaking, there is all the difference in the world between the
mere possibility that a holocaust will bring about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the
same, and we have no choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a
certainty that their use would put an end to our species [23].15 When we consider that beyond the
horror of nuclear war, another horror is set into motion to interact with the subsequent nuclear winter
to produce a poisonous and super heated planet, the chances of human survival seem even smaller.
Who knows, even if some small remnant does manage to survive, what the poisonous environmental
conditions would have on human evolution in the future. A remnant of mutated, sub-human creatures
might survive such harsh conditions, but for all purposes, human civilization has been destroyed, and
the question concerning human extinction becomes moot. Thus, we have no other choice but to
consider the finality of it all, as Schell does: ‘‘Death lies at the core of each person’s private existence,
but part of death’s meaning is to be found in the fact that it occurs in a biological and social world that
survives.’’ [23].16 But what if the world itself were to perish, Schell asks. Would not it bring about a sort
of ‘‘second death’’ – the death of the species – a possibility that the vast majority of the human race is in
denial about? Talbot writes in the review of Schell’s book that it isnot only the ‘‘death of the species,
not just of the earth’s population on doomsday, but of countless unborn generations. They would be
spared literal death but would nonetheless be victims . . .’’ [23]. That is the ‘‘second death’’ of humanity
– the horrifying, unthinkable prospect that there are no prospects – that there will be no future. In the
second chapter of Schell’s book, he writes that since we have not made a positive decision to
exterminate ourselves but instead have ‘‘chosen to live on the edge of extinction, periodically lunging
toward the abyss only to draw back at the last second, our situation is one of uncertainty and nervous
insecurity rather than of absolute hopelessness.’’ [23].17 In other words, the fate of the Earth and its
inhabitants has not yet been determined. Yet time is not on our side. Will we relinquish the fire and our
use of it to dominate the Earth and each other, or will we continue to gamble with our future at this
game of Russian roulette while time increasingly stacks the cards against our chances of survival?
Warming collapses ocean biodiversity – two internal links

First, it releases non-decomposing toxic disease carrying goo into the world’s oceans
Christine Dell'Amore National Geographic News. 10/08/2009 “Giant, Mucus-Like Sea Blobs on the
Rise, Pose Danger.” http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2009/10/091008-giant-sea-mucus-
blobs.html [mrl]
As sea temperatures have risen in recent decades, enormous sheets of a mucus-like material have
begun forming more often, oozing into new regions, and lasting longer, a new Mediterranean Sea study says (sea
"mucus" blob pictures). And the blobs may be more than just unpleasant. Up to 124 miles (200 kilometers) long, the mucilages appear
naturally, usually near Mediterranean coasts in summer. The season's warm
weather makes seawater more stable, which
facilitates the bonding of the organic matter that makes up the blobs (Mediterranean map). Now, due to
warmer temperatures, the mucilages are forming in winter too—and lasting for months. Until now, the
light-brown "mucus" was seen as mostly a nuisance, clogging fishing nets and covering swimmers with a sticky gel—newspapers from
the 1800s show beach-goers holding their noses, according to study leader Roberto Danovaro, director of the marine science department at the
Polytechnic University of Marche in Italy. But the new study found that Mediterranean mucilages harbor bacteria and
viruses, including potentially deadly E. coli, Danovaro said. Those pathogens threaten human swimmers as well as fish and other sea
creatures, according to the report, published September 16 in the journal PloS One. (Watch video of the mucus-like sea blobs.) Blobs Born of
"Marine Snow" A mucilage begins as "marine snow": clusters of mostly microscopic dead and living organic matter, including some life-forms
visible to the naked eye—small crustaceans such as shrimp and copepods (copepod picture), for example. Over time, the snow picks up other
tiny hitchhikers, looking for a meal or safety in numbers, and may grow into a mucilage. The blobs were first identified in 1729 in the
Mediterranean, where they're most often seen. The sea's relative stillness and shallowness make the water column more stable, providing ideal
conditions for mucilage formation. In 1991, Italian marine biologist Serena Fonda Umani swam alongside a mucilage—the mass is too dense to
swim inside—in the Adriatic Sea, an arm of the Mediterranean (Adriatic Sea map). She remembers diving about 50 feet (15 meters) down
when she got the sensation of a ghost floating over her—"sort of an alien experience." Umani, a co-author of the new study with Danovaro and
Antonio Pusceddu, of the Polytechnic University of Marche, has also dived into marine snow—the mucilage's precursor. She described it like
swimming through a sugar solution. Out of the water, the dried "sugar" stiffened her hair and stuck to her wetsuit. "The suit was impossible to
wash totally, because it was covered by a layer of greenish slime," said Umani, of Italy's University of Trieste. "It was a nightmare." Few people
would purposely swim into a mucilage, said Farooq Azam, a marine microbiologist at the University of California's Scripps Institution of
Oceanography. "If you were not familiar with this—and especially if you were familiar—you wouldn't want to go near it," said Azam, who was
not involved in the new study. A giant odiferous blob drifting offshore is "certainly not the seascape that one goes to the beach [for]," Azam
added. Public Health Hazard Eager to see if the blobs' side effects extend beyond ruined wetsuits, Umani and colleagues sampled coastal
waters and mucilage from the Adriatic in 2007. The warm, shallow sea is like a "big bathtub," Scripps's Azam said—an ideal natural laboratory
for studying the blobs. The study team discovered that the blobs are hot spots for viruses and bacteria,
including the deadly E. coli. Coastal communities regularly test for E. coli, and its presence is enough to close beaches to swimming.
Study leader Donavaro said, "Now we see that … the release of pathogens from the mucilage can be potentially
problematic" for human health. (Related: "Beach Bacteria Warning: That Sand May Be Contaminated.") People who swim through
mucilage can also develop skin conditions such as dermatitis, he added. Suffocated by Blobs Fish and other marine animals that
have no choice but to swim with mucilages are most vulnerable to their disease-carrying bacteria,
which can kill even large fish, the study says. The noxious masses can also trap animals, coating their gills
and suffocating them, Danovaro said. And the biggest blobs can sink to the bottom, acting like a huge
blanket that smothers life on the seafloor. Mucilages Going Global? Mucilages aren't a concern for just the Mediterranean,
Danovaro added. Recent studies tentatively suggest that mucus may be spreading throughout oceans from the North Sea
(map) to Australia, perhaps because of rising temperatures, he said. "It's a good example [of what will happen if]
we don't do something to stop climate warming," Danovaro said. "There are consequences [if] we continue
to deny the scientific evidence." Beyond warm temperatures, it's still not exactly clear what drives the blobs' formation, Scripps'
Azam pointed out. For instance, no one knows why the dead marine matter in the blobs doesn't decompose. "It's
important we do find out" what's driving the rise of the blobs, Azam said, "for the sake of the rest of the worlds' oceans."
Second, carbon dioxide raises ocean acidity which independently causes ecosystem
collapse and extinction
David Gutierrez, staff writer for Natural News, April 27, 2009 “Ocean Acidification Risks Mass Extinction
of Sea Life” [mrl]
(NaturalNews) Increasing acidity of the oceans due to rising carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions pose a major threat
to aquatic life, scientists are warning. "I am very worried for ocean ecosystems which are currently productive and
diverse," said Carol Turley of Plymouth Marine Laboratory. "I believe we may be heading for a mass extinction,
as the [current] rate of change in the oceans hasn't been seen since the dinosaurs. It may have a
major impact on food security. It really is imperative that we cut emissions of CO2." A full 50 percent of the
carbon dioxide emitted by the burning of fossil fuels or other substances is absorbed by the ocean, but this does not mean that the substance is
rendered harmless. Carbon dioxide reacts with water to form carbonic acid, thus increasing the overall acidity of ocean water. This has led to a
lowering of the ocean's pH by 0.1 since the Industrial Revolution -- a 30 percent increase in acidity. PH is a measure of relative acidity; pH 7
indicates neutral (water), higher numbers are more alkaline and lower numbers are more acidic. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, the ocean's pH is expected to drop "between 0.14 and 0.35 units over the 21st Century." Because life in the oceans has
evolved to the pre-Industrial acidity levels, this change will likely change the makeup of ocean life, possibly driving a
number of species extinct. Laboratory studies have suggested that shelled creatures, in particular, may be unable to cope with the
expected pH changes. Even more alarming, a study of naturally acidic waters in the Bay of Naples, Italy, finds that even shellfish that are able to
tolerate higher acid levels in a short-term laboratory setting simply do not live in such environments in the wild. "We are very worried," said
researcher Jason Hall-Spencer of Plymouth University. "The
changes here have clearly made life impossible for shell-
forming creatures. When you start messing around with a complex ecosystem it is impossible to tell
what will happen." "One thing is certain," Turley said. "Things will change. We just don't know yet exactly how they will change. It is
not a very wise experiment to be making."
Biodiversity collapse causes extinction

Loreau 7 - Full Professor and Tier 1 Canada Research Chair in theoretical ecology at McGill University,
Ph.D. from the Free University of Brussels (Michel, “Why should we care about biodiversity? The
meeting of ecology and ethics”, Making Peace with the Earth)
We know the factors responsible for the loss of biodiversity in qualitative terms, and sometimes in quantitative
terms: changes of habitat (particularly habitat destruction), climate change (which is starting to become a
serious problem), so-called invasive species (i.e. exotic species introduced into new regions), the over-exploitation of
resources, and finally pollution. Obviously, none of these factors is of natural origin. There is still some discussion, where climate
is concerned, of whether the current variability of climate is really due to human beings, or whether it is a natural variability. Where the
erosion of biodiversity is concerned, however, there is no debate since everyone agrees that it
is of human origin. The main problem is that a large-scale loss of biodiversity is essentially
irreversible—even more so than climate change, which is reversible over very long time spans.
First, each species is the product of a unique history that is not reproducible—Jurassic Park is not yet a reality. Next, looking beyond
the fate of a particular species, in the case of a mass extinction episode, the palaeontological
data show that some ten million years were necessary to return to levels of diversity equivalent
to those pre-dating the catastrophes; and this new biodiversity is necessarily quite different from the earlier one. This
means that in our timescales any reversal of the situation is impossible once a major part of
biodiversity is lost. But why should this be a matter of concern? This is the most important question, and there are several kinds of
approaches and different answers to it: (1) the ethical approach that holds that the other species have a right
to exist, are of intrinsic value and should be respected as such. (2) The cultural or aesthetic
approach that sees biodiversity as a natural heritage equivalent to the artistic heritage of
humanity. A great deal of money is spent on preserving artistic heritage. Why, then, should we not equally preserve
our natural heritage? (3) The more utilitarian—not to say economic—viewpoint that stresses that
biodiversity provides us with a whole range of products with a direct utility value (e.g.
pharmaceutical products, food and textiles.) A host of examples show us that we depend on a large number of species—
many more indeed than is usually thought. Biodiversity is also an important source of innovation, notably in
the pharmaceutical field. The discovery of new pharmaceutical substances, particularly in the
tropical zones, represents an important economic asset. (4) The more ecological approach—
which is the one I shall develop here—that sees biodiversity as underpinning the ecological
processes upon which human societies indirectly depend.
Russian Relations/ Cybersecurity
Arctic relations are on the brink; increased Arctic naval presence kills Russian
and Canadian relations.
The US has begun to increase the visibility of its¶ submarine forces’ Arctic voyages.
Initially, its newest¶ attack submarines (SSN), the Virginia class, were¶ not have capabilities to operate in ice-covered waters¶
(Federation of American Scientists 2010). However,¶ photographs have been released to the public showing¶ two Virginia Class
submarines—the USS Texas and the¶ USS New Hampshire—surfaced through thick Arctic ice¶ (COMSUBPAC 2009, COMSUBFOR 2011,
IBT 2011).¶ Hence, either the U.S. Navy is operating these vessels at ¶ high risk, a very unlikely scenario, or the initial decision¶ to forego
ice capabilities was reversed at some point. The¶ stated reasons for their Arctic voyages are to assist in the¶ conduct of scientific research
and to provide military¶ training opportunities for operating in the region. ¶ Increased
U.S. operations in the
region run the risk¶ of political conflict with both Canada and Russia, which¶
consider large sections of the Arctic to be their internal¶ waters. The United States
has never recognized these¶ claims and continues to regard the Canadian
Northwest¶ Passage, as well as the Russian Dmitrii, Vilkiskiy, Laptev¶ and Sannikov straits, as international. Moreover, the¶
United States has challenged these claims in the past. In¶ the case of the Northwest Passage, it refused to request ¶ permission for transit
of the SS Manhattan in 1969 and¶ the Polar Sea in 1985. In the case of Russia (then the ¶ USSR), this challenge came from the deployment
of the¶ icebreakers Edesto and Eastwind in 1967 to transit the¶ Vilkiskiy Straits without permission. The United States ¶ does, however,
have an Arctic cooperation agreement with¶ Canada which states: “The Government of the United¶ States pledges that all navigation by
U.S. icebreakers¶ within waters claimed by Canada to be internal will¶ be undertaken with the consent of the Government of¶ Canada.”
This agreement does not provide for the passage¶ of conventional surface ships, however.
Increased US Arctic presence tanks US-Russian relations

Frolov 07“The Coming Conflict in the Arctic”¶ Vladimir Frolov. (Vladimir Frolov, the former director of the National Laboratory for
Foreign Policy, a Moscow-based think tank, now serves as President of LEFF GROUP, his own government and public communications
company. He received his first degree from the Moscow Defense Institute of Foreign Languages and earned a Ph.D. in political science
from the Moscow Diplomatic Academy. Mr. Frolov had a distinguished career in the Foreign Service, including postings at the Russian
Embassy in Washington D.C. before serving as the Deputy Staff Director of the State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs and Counsel to
the Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration for Foreign Policy. He is married with two children. Mr. Frolov coordinates the Russia
Profile Experts’ Panel as well as contributing comments and articles about Russia’s foreign policy.)
http://russiaprofile.org/international/a1184076124.html¶ 07/10/2007
The United States has been jealous of Russia’s attempts to project its dominance in
the energy sector and has sought to limit opportunities for Russia to control export
routes and energy deposits outside Russia’s territory. But the Arctic shelf is
something that Russia has traditionally regarded as its own. For decades, international powers have
pressed no claims to Russia’s Arctic sector for obvious reasons of remoteness and inhospitability, but no longer. ¶ ¶ Now, as the world’s
major economic powers brace for the battle for the last barrel of oil, it is not surprising that the
United States would
seek to intrude on Russia’s home turf. It is obvious that Moscow would try to resist
this U.S. intrusion and would view any U.S. efforts to block Russia’s claim to its Arctic
sector as unfriendly and overtly provocative. Furthermore, such a policy would actually
help the Kremlin justify its hardline position. It would certainly prove right
Moscow’s assertion that U.S. policy towards Russia is really driven by the desire to
get guaranteed and privileged access to Russia’s energy resources. ¶ ¶ It promises to
be a tough fight.
US/Russian war causes extinction – most probable
Bostrom ‘2 [Nick Bostrom, professor of philosophy - Oxford University, March, 2002, Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction
Scenarios and Related Hazards, Journal of Evolution and Technology, p. http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html]
A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and
the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with
consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those
best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might
annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization .[4] Russia and the US retain large
nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or
deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals.
Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or
thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted.
Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will
encounter in the 21st century.
Russian Counterbalancing
Any unilateral Arctic action would crush Russian leadership on international
Arctic cooperation on climate change and Arctic war.
Morozov 09 [“The Arctic: The Next "Hot Spot" of International Relations or a Region of Cooperation?”. The Carnegie Council for
Ethics in International Affairs. ]. Yuri Morozov¶ U.S. Global Engagement¶ December 16, 2009
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/0039.html
Russia considers that a prerequisite for mutual cooperation in the Arctic is an objective
account of the interests of all actors operating there and the development of non-
contentious methods of engagement on the basis of agreements already reached and with due consideration for
the future development of the situation in the region. Russian experts believe that the basis for the development of
integration processes in the Arctic should lie with the common interests of the
subarctic nations, including improvement of the ability to counter various kinds of
threats by responding to them jointly. The fundamental tasks in the sphere of international
cooperation in the Arctic could be the following:¶ International legal formalization of the boundaries of possessions in the
region in accordance with the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;¶ Maintenance of regional peace and
stability and the solution of environmental and other challenges in the Arctic zone
through joint efforts;¶ Transit flights in the Arctic and the use of the Russian NSR for international navigation; and the
establishment of a unified regional system for search and rescue, as well as for prevention of man-made disasters and the elimination of
their effects, including the coordination of rescue forces. In order to accomplish these tasks, it appears necessary to:¶ Strengthen good
neighbor relations between nations on both a bilateral basis and within the framework of regional organizations; practice mutually
beneficial economic, scientific and technical, and other types of cooperation in areas of common interest; and
resolve
disputes through negotiation to prevent hotbeds of tension and confrontation from
emerging in the Arctic;¶ When drafting international documents on the Arctic, pursue a line of assigning the subarctic
countries a leading role in the region and granting them special rights over the non-arctic states while making them responsible for the
development and prosperity of the region;¶ Refrain from broad internationalization in decision-making on Arctic issues and prevent
attempts to revise the existing international legal framework for the Arctic; ¶ Facilitate transit flights in the Arctic, as well as the use of
NSR for international navigation on the condition that it be done in accordance with the regulations of the subarctic countries;¶ Create
conditions needed for expansion of transfrontier cooperation. ¶ Accomplishment
of these tasks necessitates a
study of forms and methods for non-confrontational cooperation by international
actors operating in the region, as well as a sound rationale for their mutual
structural augmentation. In general, the countries in the region can interact in a number
of different ways, but it seems appropriate in this article to place special emphasis
on cooperation in the field of ecology.¶ The reality of climate change as a result of
global warming has a significant impact on the outlook of many countries that are actively
developing this circumpolar region of the Earth. The movement of ice masses is a risk factor for maritime shipping, oil recovery, and
fisheries. All this proves once again that many Arctic issues can only be resolved on the basis of broad international cooperation. The
International Arctic Research Council was established in 1990 with the goal of promoting dialogue and developing programs for
cooperation between countries with interests in the Arctic. Shortly afterwards in 1991, the Northern Forum was founded. In 1996 the
United States, Russia, Canada, Norway, Finland, and Sweden formed the Arctic Council. Its main focus was on protection of the Arctic
environment and support for the sustainable development of the region. These organizations have collected a variety of materials and
advanced many sound pro-posals, the approval and immediate implementation of which should be a priority for the practical activities
of, primarily, the subarctic countries.¶ In Place of a Conclusion¶ Concerned by the increased tension in the Arctic, Russian experts from
several institutes, i.e., the United States and Canada institute, the Europe institute, and the Far East institute, intend to perform studies
from 2009 to 2011 under the auspices of the project "Outlook for Northern Dimension in the Context of International Relations in the
Arctic Region." To obtain the most complete and objective information on issues of the Arctic region, the Russian scientists believe it is
vital for them to take part in a joint project with research centers of the subarctic countries. The Russian side has already nominated a
group of its experts (including specialists on the issues to be addressed in the project) and has invited American, Canadian, Norwegian,
and Danish experts from appropriate national centers and universities to join the group.¶ The following goals have been proposed for the
project:¶ Assess the situation in the Arctic region and the place and role of the subarctic countries and the external actors operating in the
region in shaping the situation;¶ Develop recommendations regarding a development strategy for the Arctic region and the areas of
concern for Northern Dimension in order to ensure global stability. ¶ The research is planned to yield the following results: draw
conclusions from the analysis regarding trends for development of the situation in the Arctic region during the near and mid term; assess
existing and potential challenges and threats to national and regional security in the Arctic; and develop proposals for an Arctic
development strategy and for areas of international cooperation within the Northern Dimension framework, including recommendations
to national authorities and international bodies to improve the forms and methods of cooperation adapted to conditions in the Arctic
region. ¶ The research plan includes an evaluation of the prospects for improving the work of Northern Dimension and the formulation of
proposals for improving its potential as a factor in strengthening international cooperation in the world economy and politics, and a
study of alternative models for how the situation in the Arctic region will develop. And in the event of disparity between the positions of
the national research centers participating in the project on some issues, proposals should be developed based on unconditional
congruence of interests, while those on which consensus is lacking should be put on the list of possibilities that can be put off until a
more opportune time. ¶ Thus
on the international level, Russia is taking the lead in providing
a rationale for the main fields of joint activities in the Arctic and developing long-
term projects aimed at transforming the region into a zone of peace and stability. And if
the subarctic countries have the same desire to act and not just engage in rhetoric, it will be worthwhile for their scientific centers to join
this research project, as the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs has already done. The
importance of this
activity stems from the fact that the evolution of international relations in the Arctic
compels the subarctic countries to take a fresh look at the situation in and around
the region and rethink their foreign policy priorities by taking into account existing
realities and taking more responsibility for events occurring there.
Norwegian Counterbalancing
Russian armament causes Norwegian Counterbalancing.
There is one final twist to all of this. Some of the

states are developing their forces because¶ they fear
their neighbours. Norway’s military build-up is directed against Russia. While they¶ would
clearly prefer to cooperate with Russia, recent statements by their leaders suggest ¶ that they do not believe this may always be possible.
Thus,
the Norwegian build-up is to¶ prepare for a future that contains a much more
aggressive Russia. This leads to a¶ fundamental catch-22: will the build-up of Norwegian and others
inevitably push Russia to¶ become even more assertive? Yet it could be dangerous for the Norwegians
to not build up¶ their forces if the Russians are moving to a more aggressive position regardless of ¶ Norwegian action. Move too late and
they place themselves at the mercy of an aggressive¶ Russia; move too soon and they risk creating a threat where none exists. Ultimately
the¶ issue comes down to intent. What is the intent of the Russians and the Norwegians? This is ¶ something that this paper is not able to
address, but what is clear is that subsequent studies¶ must examine the intent of the Arctic states as they continue to develop their Arctic
security¶ capabilities.
Other cards
While both politicians and many analysts have been stressing cooperation in the Arctic, two
developments began to surface during 2005 that suggest that the circumpolar states are
also beginning to think again about increasing their ability to strengthen their military
capabilities to act in the region. First, most of the Arctic states have recently developed and
issued a series of foreign and defence policy statements regarding Arctic security. This in
itself was a deviation from the previous decade and did not even occur during the Cold War.
At that time, the Arctic states did not issue distinct Arctic security policies. Now, while
reaffirming the commitment to support cooperative behaviour in the Arctic, most of the Arctic
states’ policy statements clearly indicate that they view the Arctic as a critically vital region
for their own national interests. All have stated that they will take the steps necessary to
defend their interests in this region.
The second emerging trend was the redevelopment of northern military capabilities. Canada,
Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States have all either begun to rebuild their Arctic
capabilities, or have indicated their plans to do so in the near future. Some countries, such
as Denmark and Norway, have already spent considerable resources rebuilding their military
forces. Other states, such as Canada, have drawn up significant plans to do so in the near
future. Taking together the policy statements and the rebuilding of military capabilities (planned or
actual), it is clear that while publicly stating that the Arctic of the 2000s remains as
cooperative and peaceful as the Arctic of the 1990s, the Arctic states’ actions and
expenditures suggest otherwise. They are increasingly becoming concerned about
maintaining their ability to protect and defend their interests, unilaterally if need be. While
there is no immediate danger of conflict in the region, there is a re-emergence of a combat
capability, which had originally dissipated at the end of the Cold War. This begs the question
why? Are the Arctic states simply developing the means to protect their Arctic interests as
climate change makes the region more accessible? Or is it possible that they are beginning
to see the need to develop capabilities for a future Arctic that faces less cooperation and
more conflict? In order to understand this process, this paper will examine the security policy
and actions of each of the main Arctic states: Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the
United States.

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1NC Arctic Sphere DA

US/Russian war causes extinction – most probable

Here’s more evidence—

c. International cooperation—new political climate, decreasing arctic

Interference in Russia’s sphere would enrage Russians and result in military

Multilateralism growing—state cooperation.

As growing multilateral momentum demonstrates,¶ the Arctic is a zone neither of

Canada wants cooperation, but Arctic relations are on the brink.

The potential for Canadian conflict building—environmental changes and

Tensions in the Arctic are rising—resource development, melting ice, and

Russian influence is essential to prevent a nuclear war with Russia or China

No mechanisms for Arctic crisis management--- guarantees escalation.

It’s all talk –under the table, it’ll cause militarism.

Uncontrolled climate change causes extinction

Warming collapses ocean biodiversity – two internal links

Biodiversity collapse causes extinction

Increased US Arctic presence tanks US-Russian relations

There is one final twist to all of this. Some of the

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