CUSA de Coniecturis (IN) (V. Hopkins. Minnesota. 1988) PDF

NICHOLAS OF CUSA:
METAPHYSICAL SPECULATIONS:
VOLUME TWO
by
JASPER HOPKINS
THE ARTHUR J. BANNING PRESS

MINNEAPOLIS
Library of Congress Control Number: 97-72945
ISBN 0-938060-48-1
Printed in the United States of America
Copyright © 2000 by The Arthur J. Banning Press, Minneapolis,

Minnesota 55402. All rights reserved.
161
DE CONIECTURIS
(On Surmises)
by
NICHOL AS OF CUSA
(Translated from Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia.

Vol. III: De Coniecturis.
Edited by Josef Koch, Karl Bormann, and Hans G. Senger.
Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1972)
1 ON SURMISES
(De Coniecturis, Part One)1
Nicholas of Cusa to his revered instructor, the divinely
loved, most reverend father, Lord Julian, most emi-
nent Cardinal of the Holy Apostolic See.2
Since a favorable moment of sorts has now presented itself, I will dis-
close my conception regarding surmises. Although I know this con-
ception to be partly unclear because of the usual shortcomings char-
acteristic of human inventions and because of the more particular ob-
scurities that result from my somewhat obtuse intellect, nevertheless
with confidence I have expounded it for you, most excellent Father,
most familiar with all literature. [I have done so] in order that [my
conception] may receive the clarification that is possible by means of
the almost divine light of the admirable resplendence of your most
expert intellect. For I know that this new method in the investigative
arts cannot perish because of its rough form if the man who is the
brightest of all will, by his refining correction, deign to make it wor-
thy of acceptance. Therefore, by means of your very illustrious au-
thority furnish [correction] to [the thoughts] entering my mind with re-
gard to [this] concise but very abundant way of pursuing whatsoever
lofty matters.
2 PROLOGUE
Now, in my previous books of Learned Ignorance you have seen—
more deeply and more clearly than have I myself by means of my en-
deavor—that precise truth is unattainable.3 Accordingly, it follows that
every human affirmation about what is true is a surmise. For the in-
crease in our apprehension of what is true is endless. Hence, since
without [the aid of] any comparative relation our actual [increase] is
directed toward this maximal, humanly unattainable knowledge, our
weak apprehension’s uncertain falling short of the pure truth implies
that our affirmations about the true are surmises.4 Therefore, the un-
attainable oneness-of-truth is known by means of a surmising other-
ness; and the surmising otherness is known in and through a most sim-
ple oneness-of-truth. Hereafter, we will come to understand this mat-
ter more clearly.
163
164 De Coniecturis I, Prologue
3 Created intellect, of finite actuality, is present in something other

[than itself] only in a way that is other [than the way it exists in it-
self], so that a difference remains among all those who are making sur-
mises. Therefore, it cannot but be most certain that the surmises of
the different individuals (as regards the same inapprehensible truth)
differ by degrees (and yet are disproportional to one another), so that
no individual ever perfectly grasps another’s meaning, although one
individual comes perhaps closer [to it] than does another. Thus, ac-
cept as being my surmises the new thoughts5 which I here append—
thoughts elicited (by no small reflective effort) in accordance with the
capability of my modest intellect. [These surmises are] perhaps far un-
equal to more ingenious intellectual ideas. Although I fear that they
will be spurned by many because of the inept way they are [now]
being presented, nevertheless I am administering them as food that is
not altogether unfit for being transubstantiated into clearer intellectu-
al expression by minds deeper [than mine]. For he who seeks to elic-
it here some spiritual nourishment by means of quite careful chewing
and by frequent rumination will obtain a sustaining repast, even if at
first my [views] seem, rather, to be uncooked and unpalatable because
of their newness.
4 By means of a certain hand-in-hand guidance I must lead younger
individuals, all of whom lack the light of experience, to a disclosure
of [these] concealed points, so that they may be elevated progressively
to things more unknown. Hence, in clarifying more suitably the hid-
den intent of my surmises, I will first—by means of a certain rational
progression very well known to all 6—fashion for my conception
demonstrative examples by means of which my line-of-thought can
proceed to the general art of surmising. Secondly, I will set forth cer-
tain embellishing remarks; and in adding illustrative diagrams7 that are
beneficial in regard to certain very pleasing analyses, I will solici-
tously endeavor to feed souls that are hungry for truth.
5 CHAPTER ONE
Whence the origin of surmises.
It must be the case that surmises originate from our minds, even as
the real world originates from Infinite Divine Reason.8 For when, as
best it can, the human mind (which is a lofty likeness of God) partakes
of the fruitfulness of the Creating Nature, it produces from itself, qua
image of the Omnipotent Form, rational entities, [which are made] in
De Coniecturis I, 1 165
the likeness of real entities.9 Consequently, the human mind is10 the
form of a surmised [rational] world, just as the Divine Mind is the
Form of the real world.11 Therefore, just as that Absolute Divine Being
is all that which there is [essentially] in each existing thing,12 so too
the oneness of the human mind is the being of its own surmises. Now,
God works all things for His own sake, so that He is both the Intel-
lectual Beginning and [Intellectual] End13 of all things. Similarly, the
unfolding of a rational world—an unfolding which proceeds from our
enfolding mind—exists for the sake of the producing mind.14 For the
more subtly the mind contemplates itself in and through the world un-
folded from itself, the more abundantly fruitful it is made within itself,
since its End is Infinite Reason. Only in Infinite Reason will the mind
behold itself as it is;15 and Infinite Reason alone is the Rational Mea-
sure for all things.16 We are elevated to a nearer likeness of this Rea-
son in proportion as we have deepened our mind, of which Infinite
Reason is the unique vital Center.17 This is why we aspire, by means
of a natural desire, unto the perfecting branches of knowledge.18
6 In order that you may be led to grasp what is meant and may rec-
ognize that the mind is the beginning of surmises, take note of [the
following]: just as the First Beginning of all things, including our
minds, is shown to be triune (so that of the multitude, the inequality,
and the division of things there is one Beginning, from whose Ab-
solute Oneness multitude flows forth, from whose Absolute Equality
inequality flows forth, and from whose Absolute Union division flows
forth),19 so our mind (which conceives only an intellectual nature to
be creative) makes itself to be a triune beginning of its own rational
products. For only reason is the measure of multitude, of magnitude,
and of composition. Thus, if reason is removed, none of these [three,
viz., multitude, magnitude, and composition, as conceptually mea-
sured,] will remain—even as, if Infinite Being is denied, it is evident
that, likewise, the [finite] being of all things is denied. Therefore, the
mind’s oneness enfolds within itself all multitude, and its equality en-
folds all magnitude, even as its union enfolds all composition. There-
fore, mind, which is a triune beginning, first of all unfolds multitude
from the power of its enfolding-oneness. But multitude begets in-
equality and magnitude. Therefore, in and through the primordial mul-
titude, as in and through a first exemplar-multitude, the mind seeks the
diverse and unequal magnitudes, or perfections, of each thing as a
whole; and thereafter it progresses to a combining of both [multitude
166 De Coniecturis I, 1 - 2
and magnitude]. Therefore, our mind is a distinguishing, a propor-

tioning, and a combining beginning.20
7 CHAPTER TWO
Number is a symbolic exemplar of things.21
Number is a certain natural, originated beginning that is of reason’s
making; for those [creatures] that lack a mind, e.g., brute animals, do
not number. Nor is number anything other than reason unfolded; for
number is proved to be the beginning of those things that are attained
by reason—proved to such an extent that if number is removed, then
reason shows that none of those things [attained by reason] would re-
main. Moreover, reason’s unfolding of number and its using number
to make surmises is nothing other than reason’s using itself and men-
tally fashioning all [surmised] things in a natural, supreme likeness
of itself—just as in and through His Co-eternal Word, God (who is
Infinite Mind) communicates being to things.
8 Furthermore, it is not the case that any [finite] thing can be prior
to number. For all things other than number attest, necessarily, that
there was already number. For all things deriving from most simple
oneness are composed in their own [distinctive] manner. But a com-
posite cannot be understood [to be a composite] in the absence of
number. For a plurality of parts and a diversity of parts, together with
the proportion of their compositeness, are from number. For substance,
quantity, whiteness, blackness, and so on, would not be distinct things
in the absence of otherness, which comes from number.
But number is composed of itself.22 For example, the number
three is to be conceived as composed of three [units] that are com-
bined; otherwise, the number three would be no more than if you en-
visioned separately a house’s wall, its roof, and its foundations and
wanted [therefrom] to conceive of the house’s form. So it is neces-
sary to imagine number not separately but combinedly at once; and,
in that case, the combination of the three [units] will be none other
than the number three. Therefore, the number three is composed of it-
self.
Moreover, the first contracted oppositeness must be contracted in
and of itself—something impossible apart from number. Therefore,
each number—being composed of opposites, which differ and which
are related proportionally to one another—exists in such a way that
these opposites are the number. Number that is even is opposed to
De Coniecturis I, 2 - 3 167
number that is odd; and every number, whether even or odd, exists
from the even and the odd,23 i.e., exists from itself. The number four
is composed of three, which is odd, and of four, which is even. The
fact that four seems to be combined from two twos is not to be at-
tributed to the essence of the number four but to its quantity.
9 How could anything be conceived to be more similar to mind than
is number? Isn’t a oneness of the number three trine? And isn’t an
equality of the number three trine? Likewise the union of the number
three is trine. Therefore, number’s essence is the mind’s first exem-
plar. For a triunity (or unitrinity) that is contracted in plurality is found
to be impressed antecedently on [every] number. Indeed, inferring
symbolically and surmisingly from the rational numbers of our mind
to the real, ineffable numbers of the Divine Mind,24 I say that in the
Mind of the Creator number is the first exemplar of things,25 just as
number that arises from our reason is the first exemplar of our corre-
sponding [mental] world.26
10 CHAPTER THREE
The natural progression [of number].
It is expedient that you contemplate the nature of number more keen-
ly the more deeply you are endeavoring to investigate other things by
means of a likeness to number. Turn your attention, first of all, to num-
ber’s progression, and you will ascertain that its progression is com-
pleted in the number four. For 1, 2, 3, and 4, added together, will make
10, which unfolds the numerical power of simple oneness. Indeed,
from the number ten, which is a second oneness, the squared unfold-
ing of the root [ten] is attained by means of a similar four-term pro-
gression: [for] 10, 20, 30, and 40, when added together, are 100, which
is the square of the root ten. Similarly, by means of a like movement,
centenary oneness, [i.e., the number 100], gives rise to 1000: [for] 100,
200, 300, and 400, when added together, are 1000. There is no con-
tinuing on in this way (as if there remained something further), al-
though there is no denying that after 10 (viz., with 11, where, after
10, a return is made to oneness)27 the process repeats itself, just as it
also does after 1000.
11 Therefore, in the natural series there are no more than ten num-
bers, which are ordered by a fourfold progression; not even beyond
the cube-of-the-root-ten, viz., 1000, is there a variation in the repeti-
tion. Since this [number, viz., 1000,] arises from the order ten by
means of a four-term progression that is repeated three times, you

know that the number 4, which is an unfolding of oneness, contains
the power of every number. For universal oneness is instantiated in the
four onenesses that are configured in a fitting order. The first [one-
ness is configured] altogether simply; the second [oneness] belonging
to the order has only the added figure of nullity,28 as befits a second
oneness; the third [oneness] adds two [figures] of this [same] nature;
the fourth [oneness] adds three [such figures]: [thus we have] 1, 10,
100, 1000. Although all these [facts] are known to everyone, I have
reduced them to a visual diagram that suits my purpose:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 10 100 1000
1 2 3 4 20 30 40 200 300 400
12 CHAPTER FOUR
Four onenesses.
Since mind supposes that it encompasses, surveys, and grasps all
things, it infers that it is so present in all things,29 and all things in it,30
that it asserts that there can be nothing which is beyond it itself and
which escapes its purview.31 And so, by means of a numerical like-
ness of itself that is elicited from it itself 32 the mind contemplates, as
by means of a natural and proper image [of itself], its own oneness,
33
13 which is its being. On the basis of number mind investigates one-
ness as being fourfold. For there is an altogether simple [oneness]; and
there is a second [oneness], which is a root; and a third oneness, which
is squared; and a fourth, which is cubed. Analogously, mind sees, in
the beginning of number, most simple oneness [viz., 1]; and after that
oneness it sees denary oneness [viz., 10], which is the root of the other
[two onenesses]; then it sees centenary oneness [viz., 100], which is
the square of denary oneness; and lastly, it sees millenary oneness

[viz., 1000], which is the cube of denary oneness. Between simple
oneness and cubic oneness, which are different and opposed, there
cannot be a unique and precise middle-term; rather, as is evident, at
least two middle-terms are required. One of these middle-terms, being
a root-oneness, tends toward simple oneness; the other middle-term,
being a squared-oneness tends toward a cube. (For it is impossible that
there be a simple union of things unequal; indeed, only the Union of
Infinite Oneness and Infinite Equality can be simple.)34 And so, the
mind contemplates its own universal being by means of these four-
foldly distinct onenesses. Thus, it sees that the First Oneness is a most
simple Mind which exists as Creator, antecedently to all other things;
it sees that the second oneness, originated as a very close likeness of
the First Oneness, is the root of the other [two onenesses]; and it sees
that the third oneness, originated from this root, tends toward the
fourth oneness, which, because of its very gross solidity, does not
allow further progression.
14 The mind represents these mental onenesses35 by means of vocal
signs. The first, most lofty, most simple Mind, it calls God; the root-
oneness, which has no earlier root of itself, it calls intelligence;36 the
third, squared-oneness, which is a contraction of intelligence, it calls
soul;37 but the final, gross unfolded-solidity, which enfolds nothing
further, it surmises to be body.38
15 Now, in God all things are God;39 in an intelligence all things are
intellect;40 in a soul all things are soul; in a body all things are body.
This claim is none other than the claim that mind embraces all things
either (1) divinely or (2) intellectually or (3) as does a soul or (4) as
does a body—“divinely,” i.e., according as [what is embraced] is truth;
“intellectually,” i.e., not insofar as [what is embraced] is truth itself
but insofar as it is present truly; “as does a soul,” i.e., insofar as [what
is embraced] is present as true-like; but “as does a body” [when what
is embraced] departs from being even a likeness of the true and falls
into confusion.
16 The First Oneness is 41 altogether absolute; but the last oneness,
escaping all absoluteness insofar as possible, is contracted. The sec-
ond oneness is in large degree absolute and in small degree contract-
ed; the third oneness is in small degree absolute and in large degree
contracted. Therefore, just as intelligence is not altogether divine or
absolute, so neither does the rational soul altogether escape partaking
of divinity. Thus, the mind both distinguishes all things and unites all
things, [doing so] by means of a marvelous two-way progression in
which (1) Divine and Absolute Oneness descends by stages in and
through intelligence and reason and (2) the perceptible-contracted one-
ness ascends through reason unto intelligence.
17 CHAPTER FIVE
The First Oneness, [viz., God].
Furthermore, let the usefulness of what is going to be said make you
more attentive; for I will endeavor to bring to light important and hid-
den matters. First of all, if number is conceived to be the exemplar of
things,42 then the Divine Oneness is seen to precede and enfold all
things. For in preceding all multitude, it also precedes all diversity,
otherness, oppositeness, inequality, division, and all other things that
accompany multitude. Indeed, oneness is neither the number two nor
the number three, etc., even though it is all the things that two, three,
four, and the remaining numbers are.43 If the species of things are dis-
tinguished as are numbers, then Absolute Oneness belongs to no
species and has no name and no configuration, although in all things
it is all things.44 Absolute Oneness is the Oneness of all plurality, the
Oneness, in particular, of the plurality of genera, species, substances,
accidents, and of all creatures; it is the one Measure of all measures,45
the one Equality of all things equal and of all things unequal, the [one]
Union of all things united and of all things separated46—just as one-
ness by means of its simplicity enfolds, unfolds, and unites every num-
ber,47 whether even or odd.
18 Behold with a depth of mind the infinite power of oneness,48 for
oneness is infinitely greater [in power] than is any positable number.
For there is no number, howsoever large, in which the power of one-
ness is inactive. Since, then, through the power of oneness there can
always be had a number greater than any [given] positable number, it
is evident from the inexhaustible power of the one alone that oneness
is omnipotent. In what has already been said you have heard many
things about this topic, and from those things you see that many more
things can still be said. In particular, the following are things that
could be said: Numbers are numbers of an inexplicable oneness and
are numerical figures of an invariable truth that will be seen the more
clearly the more absolutely and one-ly it is conceived to be. For he
who conceives oneness to be absolute, and absolute only, sees it to
be ineffable. For with respect to what could he select one name rather
than another? If you have [mentally] removed all other things and be-
hold oneness alone,49 if you understand that oneness never was any-
thing else or never is anything else or never can be made to be any-
thing else, and if you [mentally] remove all plurality and every respect
and enter only into most simple oneness, so that you confirm that it
is no more simple than not simple, no more one than not one,50 then
you will have penetrated all things secret. [For] there there is no un-
certainty and no hindrance.
19 Therefore, by means of this mental escape from all plurality, con-
template the oneness of your own mind. And you will see that the
mind’s life—in its Absolute Oneness,51 in which it is all things—is in-
corruptible.52 The certainty that relates to this Absolute Oneness is
most precise53—including [the certainty] that mind accomplishes all
things in and through this Oneness. Every searching and investigat-
ing mind inquires only in the light of Absolute Oneness. And there can
be no question which does not presuppose Absolute Oneness. Does-
n’t the question whether some thing exists presuppose being,54 the
question what a thing is presuppose quiddity, the question why it is
presuppose cause, and the question for what purpose it is presuppose
a goal? Therefore, that which is presupposed in every doubting must,
necessarily, be most certain. Therefore, because Absolute Oneness is
the Being of all beings, the Quiddity of all quiddities, the Cause of
all causes, the Goal of all goals, it cannot be called into doubt. But
subsequent to Absolute Oneness55 there is a plurality of doubts.
20 Notice, then, Father Julian, how clear and concise is the theology
that is inexpressible in words.56 For you see that with regard to every
question formable about God there can first be replied that every ques-
tion about Him is ill-formed. For every question allows that only one
of two opposites is truly predicable of what is being sought; or else,
of that which is being sought something must be affirmed or denied
other than what must be affirmed or denied of other things. Now, it
is most absurd to believe these [conditions to hold] in the case of Ab-
solute Oneness, regarding which neither of two opposites is affirmed
or regarding which it is not the case that one of the opposites is af-
firmed rather than the other. But if you were to choose to answer af-
firmatively the question asked, you would be repeating what is pre-
supposed as absolute, so that when it is asked whether God exists, the
answer would be given that God is Being itself, which is what is pre-
supposed. Similarly, in regard to the question “What is God?” you

would answer “Quiddity”—and so on. In regard to the question
whether God is a human being, being and humanity are presupposed;
accordingly, we can say that God is that Being through which there
is humanity. Likewise, in regard to the question whether God is an
angel, the answer would be given that He is the Absolute Being of
angelicness. And so on.
21 But since every affirmation is believed to be opposed to a nega-
tion, you notice that these just-mentioned responses cannot be alto-
gether precise. For the First—which anything that is not the First can-
not befit—infinitely precedes all oppositeness.57 Therefore, with re-
gard to the First there is no altogether true surmise (1) that allows af-
firmation, to which negation is opposed, or (2) that prefers negation
to affirmation on the ground that it is truer [than affirmation]. Al-
though the statement “God is none of whatever things can be either
conceived or spoken of ” does seem truer than the statement that He
is some of them,58 nevertheless negation, to which affirmation is op-
posed, does not attain precision. Therefore, the concept of truth that
rejects both opposites disjunctively as well as conjunctively is the
more absolute. For to the question whether God exists there can be
no more unrestricting response than that (1) it is not the case either
that He exists or that He does not exist and (2) it is not the case that
He both exists and does not exist. This is the one loftiest, simplest,
most absolute, and most appropriate response to every question re-
garding the Being which is first, most simple, and ineffable. Indeed,
this most subtle surmising-response is a sufficient answer to whatev-
er question is posed [about God].59 But it is a surmising-response,60
because an altogether precise response remains ineffable and unat-
tainable by either reason or intellect.61
22 CHAPTER SIX
The second oneness, [viz., intelligence].
This [second] oneness is intellectual. Since whatever is not the First
but derives from this most absolute First cannot be understood as pro-
ceeding otherwise than toward otherness, this [second] oneness will
not be most simple, as is the First Oneness, but will be an intellectu-
al composite. But reason teaches that compositeness is from one thing
and another—that is, is from opposites. Nevertheless, this [second]
oneness exists from opposites in no other way than as it is fitting that
a simple root exist. Therefore, the following is not the case: that op-
posites are prior to it, so that it exists from opposites that have pre-
ceded it. Rather, it originates together with opposites (even as num-
ber must be intellectually constructed62 ). Therefore, in this second
oneness’s root-simplicity the opposites are conjoined undividedly and
yet irreducibly.63 For [this] denary oneness has no root.64 For it is pre-
ceded by no other oneness (except the First Oneness) from the repli-
cation of which it arises; it takes its origin from the First Oneness
alone, which all oppositeness succeeds. And so, its beginning did not
involve any differences. Therefore, whatever becomes divided in sub-
sequent things is not distinguished in that root-oneness—just as op-
posing differences that are different in species are enfolded [without
difference] in the generic-root [i.e., in the genus] of [those] species.
And union is simpler and earlier than all disunion.
23 Therefore, questions which presuppose that one of two opposites
is deniable of this [second] being and that only the other opposite is
affirmable thereof are, as you see, improperly posed. For whatever is
in any way affirmable of intelligence has no incompatible opposite.
For intellectual being is loftier and simpler than is that mode-of-being
which is incompatible with not-being. Hence, that intellectual oneness
is a certain root that [compatibly] enfolds opposites that are incom-
patible when they are unfolded from it. For in that root are enfolded
those opposites which, in the unfolded square of the root’s rational
oneness, are incompatible. For example, at the rational level 65 move-
ment is incompatibly opposed to rest. But just as, in the First, infinite
movement coincides with rest,66 so also, in the very close likeness of
the First,67 movement and rest do not expel each other but are com-
patible. For rest is not so opposed to the movement of intelligence that
when intelligence is moved it is not also at rest; for this intellectual
movement is simpler than reason can measure.68 A similar point holds
regarding rest and all other things.
24 Therefore, as keenly as you can, conceive of the foregoing mat-
ters. For in points previously set forth regarding learned ignorance, I
remember that frequently I spoke of God in an intellectual way, by
means of conjoining contradictories in a simple oneness.69 But now,
in what was just set forth, I have explained my intent in a divine
way.70 The negation of opposites—disjunctively and conjunctively—
is disproportionally simpler than is the conjunction of opposites. But
the way in which we must speak divinely of God in accordance with
174 De Coniecturis I, 6
the concept of Absolute First Oneness differs from the way in which
we must speak of Him in accordance with this intellectual oneness and
differs from the still much lower way in which we must speak of Him
in accordance with reason. Now, intellectual oneness, which is dis-
proportional 71 to First Oneness, does not altogether escape composi-
tion from opposites; however, in intellectual oneness the opposites
have not yet gone out from a compatible concordance. Hence, since
from intelligence all questions that proceed from investigatory reason
are whatever they are: there can be formed about intelligence no ques-
tion in which intelligence does not shine forth in the manner of a pre-
supposition. For how could reason—in making its investigation of in-
telligence, which it grasps by means of no perceptible sign—begin this
inquiry without intelligence’s stimulating light illuminating it? There-
fore, intelligence is to reason as God is to intelligence.
Therefore, if you wish to respond surmisingly to the questions
posed about intelligence, turn to what is presupposed and give that
as your answer.72 Answer, then, in regard to the question whether in-
telligence exists, that intelligence is the being that is presupposed by
investigatory reason—from which being reason takes its being as
from its own root. In regard to the question “What is intelligence?”
answer, likewise, that it is the presupposed intellectual quiddity, on
which the quiddity of reason is dependent. And so on. Therefore, root-
oneness73 is certain, although it is not certainty itself, as is First One-
ness;74 and root-oneness is present in, and presupposed by, all rea-
son—as a root-number is present in, and presupposed by, its square
number.
25 But if you undertake to direct your inquiry toward intellectual
truth, you must avail yourself of intellectual terms; these have no in-
compatible opposite, since there can be no incompatibility as regards
the nature of that intellectual oneness. Hence, [the significations of]
ordinary terms—terms which are rational entities—do not apply to in-
telligence. For example, intelligence is neither stationary nor moved
nor at rest nor at a location—indeed, is neither form nor substance
nor accident in the manner in which these terms, imposed by reason,
signify. For just as intellect is the root of reason, so too the intellect’s
terms are the roots of reason’s terms. Hence, reason is intellect’s word,
in which word intellect shines forth as in an image. Therefore, intel-
lect’s word is the root of vocal terms.
But, as is evident to you, the oneness of simple reason enfolds
the rational conception of movement and rest, of curve and straight
line, and of other opposites. Therefore, if in the simplicity of the

somewhat absolute oneness-of-reason the rational conceptions of op-
posites exist compatibly with one another, and if reason is intelli-
gence’s word,75 then it will be evident to you that intellectual one-
ness’s enfolding-of-opposites shines forth not in the ordinary terms
of reason but rather in reason’s oneness.76 Therefore, if the question
is asked whether intelligence is quantitative, a close surmising-re-
sponse can be made by reference to rational conception, when one
replies that intelligence is quantitative only in the way in which the
rational conception of quantity indicates. (For here the term “quanti-
ty” is not intellectual but [indicates] the rational conception of quan-
tity.) Similarly, to the question whether intelligence has a location,
the answer must be given that it has a location in the way that the ra-
tional conception of location indicates. For the location of intelligence
is [location in the sense indicated by] the rational conception of lo-
cation,77 just as a square number contains its own root. Likewise, in-
telligence is, [in a sense,] substance; this is because from intelligence
there descends the rational conception of substance. The case is sim-
ilar as regards other things.
26 Therefore, intelligence is none of the things that can be spoken
of or named but is the beginning of the [respective] rational concep-
tion of all things,78 just as God is the Beginning of intelligence. Re-
flect on these matters with diligent persistence, and when you enter
into them with depth-of-mind, then things difficult for many others
will be manifest to you with the sweet-agreeableness of intellectual
sweetness, which surpasses incomparably all sensory delight.
27 CHAPTER SEVEN
The third oneness, [viz., the rational soul].
The soul, which intelligence unfolds quadratically,79 is not unsuitably
conceived as intelligence’s number—just as intelligence is Super-sim-
ple Oneness’s number. For intelligence’s oneness is numbered in the
soul when this oneness is contracted in multiple ways. But since in-
telligence’s oneness is unfolded in the soul, intelligence shines forth
in the soul as in its own image. God is intelligence’s light, because
He is intelligence’s Oneness; similarly, intelligence is the soul’s light,
because intelligence is the soul’s oneness. Pay quite close attention to
the following point: since, likewise, corporeal, [visible] form is one-
ness-of-soul’s number,80 we perceptibly behold the soul’s power, or
oneness, not in the soul itself but in the soul’s corporeal unfoldedness.
Likewise, too, we behold intelligence not in it itself but in the soul;
and we behold the first, most simple, and most absolute Oneness not
as it is in itself but in intelligence as in its number and sign. There-
fore, God is the Form of intelligence; intelligence is the form of the
soul; and the soul is the form of the body. Therefore, since every body
is, rightly, oneness-of-soul’s number,81 the soul’s power presents it-
self to you as great. Therefore, consider [the soul’s] reason, not inso-
far as it is the root of cubic body 82 but insofar as it is the intermedi-
ary through which the intellectual-root descends unto body. For [the
soul’s] reason, is the instrument of intellect; and, in this way, it is the
beginning, or the instrumental-root, of corporeal things. Centenary
oneness [viz., 100] symbolizes the soul; millenary oneness [viz., 1000]
symbolizes the corporeal. But 1000 arises from a multiplying of 10
by 100—i.e., from a replication of intelligence by way of soul.
28 Therefore, since in all things corporeal the soul shines forth as an
instrumental-root,83 you will have no difficulty investigating the soul
by means of all the perceptible signs for it; for soul is a form im-
pressed on bodies by intelligence—impressed as [the form] of a seal
is impressed on wax. Therefore, every [remark] perceived by hearing
bears the soul’s imprint.84 Therefore, whatever questions you hear to
be posed about the soul you may conceive to be signs of the soul.
Hence, all questions presuppose the soul’s reason.85 For example, the
question whether the soul exists comes from reason, and so do all
other questions. Therefore, there can be no doubt about whether the
soul exists, since without the soul doubts could not be raised. 86 If
someone asks whether the soul is quantitative, then answer that it is
not corporeally quantitative but is quantitative insofar as it is intelli-
gence’s number. For since the soul is the oneness of perceptible ob-
jects, whatever is perceptibly diverse is, in the soul, one.87 Therefore,
perceptible, or corporeal, quantity and quality (and likewise as regards
whatever else is perceptible) are such that the soul’s reason, from
whose oneness they come forth,88 is the oneness of them all. There-
fore, things that are perceptibly diverse, other, and opposed have one
rational ground, which, when variously contracted, produces the vari-
ety of perceptible things.89 Therefore, the soul’s judgments are as two
numbers, one of which is even and the other of which is odd but
which, together, are never both even or both odd. Therefore, by means
of its reason the soul does not judge opposites to be compatible, since
the soul’s judgment is its number.
29 If you consider the matter more keenly, [you will see that] each
[of the four] oneness’s [respective] number exists in a manner that is
conformed to its own oneness. For each oneness’s number is perfect-
ed in the number ten. The most simple Oneness’s number proceeds
unto ten by means of simple number. Therefore, the things which in
the First Oneness are that most simple Oneness are, in its numerical
unfolding, found to be diverse and to be other than one another. Like-
wise, intelligences—which are that most simple and absolute One-
ness’s number—partake of the nature of number in an intellectual way
and in ordered relation to the First. Therefore, there is found to be in-
tellectual difference, opposition, otherness, and whatever else may
befit number; but in Absolute Oneness these are Absolute Oneness.
Likewise, the quadratic differences, othernesses, and oppositions that
are in reason are, [in intelligence], intellectual oneness. And cubic, per-
ceptible, and corporeal oppositions and othernesses are, in [the soul’s]
reason, a oneness. Continue on in this way with your inquiries if you
wish to arrive at quite true surmises.
30 CHAPTER EIGHT
The last oneness, [viz., the corporeal].
Perceptible, or corporeal, oneness is oneness that is symbolized by
the number 1,000. It is the last oneness because it is the unfolding of
[the three preceding] onenesses. It does not enfold anything within it-
self and thus does not proceed to a further number90—even as the First
Oneness, which enfolds all things, does not succeed number. This per-
ceptible oneness is solid 91 and very composite, as is the number 1,000.
In order to understand better the concept of these [four] onenesses,
conceive them to differ as if in the following way: the First Oneness
is the oneness of a very simple point, the second oneness is the one-
ness of a simple line, the third oneness is that of a simple surface, and
the fourth oneness is that of a simple corporeal-object. Thereafter you
will come to know quite clearly that the oneness of a most simple
point is all that which there is in lineal oneness, surface-oneness, and
corporeal oneness; but the oneness of a line is all that which there is
in surface-oneness and corporeal oneness; and, likewise, surface-one-
ness is all that which there is in corporeal oneness. The first three one-
nesses are perceptible by, and distinguishable by, the mind alone,
which alone conceives separately of point, line, and surface; but the
senses attain only what is corporeal.
31 You will now be able clearly to consider our ineptitude when we

attempt to measure things mental by means of things perceptible—
when by means of corporeal grossness we try to portray surface-fine-
ness.92 Indeed, we act ineptly if we attempt to represent a line’s sim-
plicity by means of a corporeal-object. But we act most ineptly when
we clothe with corporeal form an indivisible, altogether absolute point.
Therefore, by means of these corporeal, perceptible forms, of what-
ever kind they are, or by means of these present perceptible written-
conveyances, we only ineptly and imperfectly represent subtle forms
that pertain to theology and to intelligences.
32 The soul’s senses perceive that which is perceptible; but [what is
perceptible] would not be perceivable in the absence of a [respective]
oneness of the senses. Rather, the perception, removed from all dis-
crimination, would be confused and gross. For the senses perceive but
do not discriminate. For every discrimination is from reason,93 for rea-
son is the oneness of perceptible number.94 Therefore, if by means of
the senses white is distinguished from black, heat from cold, the sharp
from the dull, and this perceptible-object from that perceptible-object:
this [distinguishing] is due to the property of reason. Therefore, the
senses as such do not negate; for negating is a feature of discriminat-
ing. The senses only affirm the existence of the perceptible but do not
affirm that the perceptible is this or that. Therefore, reason uses the
senses as instruments for discriminating between things perceptible;
but it is reason itself which discriminates between things that are per-
ceptible by the senses.
33 Notice, then, Father Julian, that all negation and not-being are rel-
egated from the region of things perceptible. But from the region of
Supreme Oneness all affirmation is far removed.95 In the regions of
the [two] intermediate onenesses both negation and affirmation are
permitted: in the second region [they exist] enfoldedly; in the third
region, unfoldedly.96 In regard to the lowest oneness, words are only
of present time;97 in regard to the first, supreme Oneness words are
of no time; in regard to the second oneness words are of present and
of not-present time enfoldedly; but in regard to the third oneness
words are of present or of not-present time unfoldedly.
34 Therefore, if you adapt your terms to the onenesses which are the
subject of your inquiry, you will make truer surmises. For example,
when about God the question is asked whether He existed yesterday,
then by virtue of the fact that in regard to God words are free of tem-
poral signification, you will readily see what is to be answered. For

since, [in the case of God,] has existed encompasses being and be-
coming and is non-temporal, it befits Eternity.98 Moreover, if this ques-
tion were posed about intelligence, and if has existed enfolds both pre-
sent and not-present, then has existed would be able to befit an eter-
nal thing that comes very close to Eternity and is derived from it.99 And
so on. So too, if you speak of one oneness as you would speak of an-
other oneness, then adapt to this [transference] your manner of speak-
ing. For example, when we rational human beings speak of God, we
subject God to the rules of reason, so that we affirm some things of God
and deny other things of Him and apply diametrical contradictories to
Him disjunctively. This is the method of almost all modern theologians,
who speak of God in terms of reason. For by this method we accept,
in the school-of-reason, many [propositions] that we know should be
denied [of Him] according to the region of simple Oneness.100
35 Reason analyzes all things in terms of multitude and magni-
tude.101 But oneness is the beginning of multitude, and trinity is the
beginning of magnitude—as, in the case of polygonal figures, a trigon
[is such a joint-beginning].102 Therefore, with respect to the method
of reason the Beginning of all things is one and trine—not insofar as
oneness and trinity are two things (for oneness is the beginning of plu-
rality) but insofar as they are a Oneness which is Trinity. But because
intelligence notices the unsuitableness of reason’s terms, it repudiates
them. It conceives of God, beyond those things signified, as those
things’ Enfolding Beginning. And because by means of that ray of
divinity intelligence sees that its conception is inadequate, it affirms
(1) that Oneness-which-is-Trinity is to be understood as above all en-
folding and unfolding and (2) that God cannot be conceived as He
is.103 (We proceed in a similar way as regards intelligence, when we
argue about it rationally.)
When by means of the foregoing method [of transference] we el-
evate what-is-perceptible to [the level of] reason or of intelligence or
of the first, most absolute Oneness, we must speak of it in accordance
with the rules of that region. For example, when we mentally free the
oneness of a stone from all perceptible, rational, or intellectual plu-
rality and reduce it to Infinite Simplicity,104 there is no longer any-
thing affirmable of it. For then it is not stone rather than not-stone;
rather, it is all things. (A similar point holds of things other [than a
stone].) You will understand this point without hesitation if you note
that the Absolute Oneness of a stone is no more the oneness of stone
than of not-stone and that of all things there is one Absolute Oneness,
which is God.105 Hence, just as the Absolute Oneness of that percep-
tible and nameable stone is God, so the intellectual oneness of the
stone is intelligence. Therefore, it is evident with respect to which
rules we are to make surmises about the stone.
36 I ask that you note one more thing: viz., how it is that percepti-
ble oneness, to which no further pathway of progressing is open, re-
turns upwardly. For whereas reason descends unto the senses, the sens-
es return unto reason. And in this regard notice the stages-of-return:
the senses return unto reason; reason returns unto intelligence; intel-
ligence returns unto God, where Beginning and Consummation exist
in perfect reciprocity. Therefore, perceptible number returns unto its
own beginning-of-oneness in order to be able, through this [its ratio-
nal] beginning, to arrive at intelligence and, through intelligence, to
arrive at God, the Goal of goals. Soul, or reason,106 is the goal of
things perceptible. Therefore, when perceptible life alienates itself
from the oneness of reason, it veers from the pathway of its return
and of its goal. Likewise, reason veers from [the pathway of return]
when it strays quite far from the oneness of intelligence, just as in-
telligence [veers from that pathway] if it deviates from Absolute One-
ness, which is Truth.
For the present, let the foregoing points be expressed in the fore-
going manner.
37 CHAPTER NINE
Oneness and otherness.
As far as the primitiveness of my meager talent has allowed, I have
expounded, from a consideration of the order of numbers, certain fun-
damental features of my surmises. I will now add a point always to
be kept in mind—a point contained among the same fundamental fea-
tures.
It is evident that every number is constituted from oneness and
otherness.107 Oneness goes out into otherness, and otherness returns
into oneness. Thus, by means of this two-directional progression num-
ber is defined and is actually as it is. But it cannot be the case that
the oneness of one number is completely equal to the oneness of an-
other number, since with regard to everything finite precise equality
is impossible.108 Therefore, oneness and otherness will be present in
different degrees in every number. For example, an uneven number is
seen to have more oneness than does an even number, (1) because of
the indivisibility of the uneven number into equal pairs and (2) be-
cause of the possibility [of such divisibility] in the case of the even
number. Therefore, since each number is a number [constituted] from
oneness and otherness, there will be numbers in which oneness pre-
vails over otherness and numbers in which otherness is seen to ab-
sorb oneness.
38 No one doubts that root-numbers are simpler than are square num-
bers and cubic numbers. For it is evident that simple root-numbers,
which proceed from no other pre-existing root than from simple one-
ness, have much oneness but little otherness. In comparison with all
the other numbers of which root-numbers are roots, there appears to
be in root-numbers no otherness. But if any otherness is in them be-
cause of their departure from the first, most simple oneness, then oth-
erness is rightly conceived to be [in them] only in comparison with the
infinite simplicity of what is first. But in square numbers there must
be more otherness, since they arise from a replicating of their root; and
replication is a departure from the simplicity of oneness. But you see
that square numbers nevertheless contain much oneness on account
of their enfolding a [respective] cubic number, which comes from
them. But a cubic number has little simple oneness but has much oth-
erness, divisibility, and multiplicity.
39 On the basis of the foregoing illustrative example, surmise that the
universe, all worlds, and whatever things are in them are constituted
from oneness’s and otherness’s passing into each other variously and
differently. For example, you have heard that the oneness and the oth-
erness of the uppermost heaven109 are quite simple and are intellec-
tual and root-like, whereas the oneness and the otherness of the mid-
dle heaven exist in a middle way, and the oneness and otherness of
the lowest heaven exist perceptibly and cubically.110 For intellectual
numbers111 are simple and are the simple essences of rational and of
perceptible numbers. From intellectual numbers arise rational numbers
(which are proportional, for only reason attains the nature of propor-
tions), and thereafter comes perceptible, more cubic number.
40 Now, the oneness of intellectual number, insofar as [that oneness]
is a threeness,112 is indivisible and unreplicable, for there cannot be
more than one threeness. But it is altogether evident that the ratios of
what-is-triple can be repeated and can be replicated by contraction to
what is perceptible.113 However, it is clear that [intellectual] three-
ness enfolds much more than does a triple proportion.114 For it enfolds
everything trine and everything trinely understandable or trinely nu-
merable, without which things there could not be a triple proportion.
Therefore, since triple proportion does not pertain to the essence of
[intellectual] threeness but, on the contrary, [intellectual] threeness en-
compasses everything trine (whether it be triple or not), [intellectual]
threeness’s enfolding is maximal. The triple also enfolds the many
triple numbers and enfolds everything at all capable of becoming
triple; but it does not at all enfold the number three. For example,
when I count a, b, c and call them three, I unfold the number
[three].115 By means of this illustration (or by means of another il-
lustration more acceptable to you) construct more suitable terms and
figures for understanding the different numbers of the different worlds.
However, you know that the numbers in the upper world are ineffa-
ble in terms of the senses, since you know that they are intellectual
numbers.
41 So since you have now come to the point that you see surmis-
ingly that all things are from oneness and otherness, conceive (1) that
oneness is a certain formal light and is a likeness of the First One-
ness but (2) that otherness is a shadow and is a withdrawing from the
most simple First and is material grossness. And conceive of a pyra-
mid-of-light as progressing into darkness and of a pyramid-of-dark-
ness as progressing into light; and reduce to [that] figurative concep-
tion everything that can be investigated, so that by guidance from what
is perceptible you can turn your surmise toward hidden [truths]. And
in order that you may be aided by means of an example, consider the
universe as reduced to the diagram here below.116
42 Notice that God, who is Oneness, is as the base-of-light; but the
base-of-darkness is as nothing.117 Every creature, we surmise, lies be-
tween God and nothing. Hence, the uppermost world abounds with
light, as you see visually [in the diagram]; yet, it is not free of dark-
ness, although because of the upper-world’s simplicity the darkness
is thought to be absorbed in light. By contrast, in the lowest world
darkness reigns, although it is not the case that in that darkness there
is no light at all. Yet, the diagram shows that the light is hidden in
the darkness rather than shining forth. In the middle world the rela-
tionship [between light and darkness] is also a relationship that is in-
between [the relationship of light to darkness in the other two worlds].
And if you want to know about the intervals that belong to the orders
unitas
basis pyramis lucis
suprem
tertium
us mu
caelum
ndus
secund
medius
um
caelum
mundu
s infi
primu
mus m
m cae
undus
lum
basis pyramis tenebrae

alteritas
and to the choirs, obtain this [knowledge] by means of subdivisions.
43 I want you always to be aware of these often-repeated statements
[of mine], lest by means of this symbolical diagram you are led to
false representations, since you ought not to surmise that either light
or darkness is present in the other worlds in the manner in which you
see it to be present in the perceptible world. With this admonition in
mind, use this diagram in all your investigations—a diagram which
subsequently I will call P, because it is paradigmatic.
44 CHAPTER TEN
An explanation [of the previous diagram].
The entire power of our mind ought to focus on refining the concept
of oneness, for the entire multitude of things knowable depends upon
the knowledge of oneness; and in all knowledge oneness is whatever
is known.118 Note that all of oneness’s many names are certain num-
bers of its name “oneness”. For the definition of “oneness” is “indi-
visibility in and of itself and separation from all else.” Hence, we say
that oneness is called by the names of the many characteristics of its

power. For whichever names indicate a certain indivisibility, distinct-
ness, and union befit oneness. Now, the [foregoing] diagram includes,
under [the label] “oneness,” all such [befitting] things; and under [the
label] “otherness” it includes their opposites. Hence, for indivisibility
to proceed into divisibility is nothing other than for oneness to descend
into otherness. The case is similar [regarding the descent] from in-
corruptibility into corruptibility, from immortality into mortality, from
immutability into mutability, from immobility into mobility, and so on.
And, by like reasoning, the case is similar [regarding the descent] from
form into what-is-formable (since form is distinct and, therefore, a
oneness). And distinctness [descends] into what-is-not-distinct, i.e.,
into what-is-a-continuum; what-is-discrete [descends] into what-is-
confused; light [descends] into darkness; the simple [descends into the
composite; the fine descends] into the gross; spirit [descends] into
body. And conceive [similarly] of things similar to these. Thus, actu-
ality [descends] into potentiality; whole [descends] into part; univer-
sal, into particular; species, into individual; love, into what-is-lovable;
art, into what-is-made-by-an-art; and so on as regards whatever unites
or enfolds, in relation to what is enfolded. Moreover, it is not possi-
ble that there be opposites [such that] one of them is not like a one-
ness in relation to the other [of them].
45 Therefore, if you look at Diagram P, you will see—by reference
to (1) the descent of oneness into otherness and (2) the return of oth-
erness into oneness—that in the uppermost heaven whatever things are
characterized by otherness return into oneness. For example, [you will
see that] divisibility [returns] into indivisibility; darkness [returns] into
light; the gross [returns] into the fine; the composite, into the simple;
the mortal, into immortality; the mutable, into the immutable; femi-
ninity, into masculinity; potentiality, into actuality; the imperfect (or
the part), into the whole; and so on. The contrary occurs in the low-
est world, where indivisibility degenerates into divisibility. (For ex-
ample, the oneness of the indivisible form accompanies the divisible
nature, so that each part of water is water, each part of earth is earth.)
In the lowest world stability is present in instability; immortality, in
mortality; actuality, in potentiality; masculinity, in femininity; and so
on. But in the middle world the relationship [between such opposites]
is a relationship that is in-between [the respective relationships with-
in the other two worlds].
46 But if you reflect on the foregoing with careful consideration, then

you will see, by means of very bright light, [truths] that are very im-
portant and that are completely hidden to many. You will be led even
to nature’s most hidden secrets—led also unto the variations of terms’
[meanings] as regards one world and another world.119 [You will see,
for example,] how it is that in the lowest world stability is present in
instability and how it is that, in general, oneness is present in other-
ness. For the lowest world’s oneness (which has passed into otherness)
is such that it is not oneness but otherness. The contrary holds true of
the uppermost world, whose otherness is such that it is not otherness
but oneness. But Diagram P [also] shows that all things positable in
a world are present there120 in different ways in the foregoing re-
spect.121 Indeed, in one thing oneness is absorbed by otherness—or
vice versa—to one degree, whereas in another thing it is absorbed to
another degree. Accordingly, an unqualifiedly maximum or an un-
qualifiedly minimum is never reached.
47 Hence, the less that a form’s oneness passes into otherness, the
more noble it is, because it is more one. The form of animal is more
one than is the form of vegetable. Therefore, the form of an animal
does not accompany the severing of the animal into parts,122 as the
form [of a vegetable] accompanies some sectionings of the vegetable
and as, even more, the form [of a mineral accompanies the splitting]
of the mineral and as, most of all, the form [of elements accompa-
nies] their [division]. You see, too, why in dividing a stone we can
come, of necessity, to not-a-stone; and this [moment comes] sooner
the more perfect the stone is. (A similar point holds true of all other
things.) And you see it to be necessary that we come to those things
that are called elements—unless there is to be an infinite progression
[of divisions]. I will add some points [later] about elements.123
48 But as regards the oneness of each single thing to be investigated
by means of Diagram P: you must conceive of it in its perfection; and
in accordance with that oneness you must imagine that the intensity
of light or the thickness of darkness is great or small. [You must do
this] so that you can have a more singular knowledge [of it] in rela-
tion to each of all other things, according as each [of them] is situat-
ed in the universe. But from what you have heard, make a surmise
about the degrees of onenesses, so that you may affirm to be greater
that oneness which is the more indivisible and which unites the more
things.124
49 Indeed, the oneness of a whole, which unites all its parts, is greater
than is the oneness of a uniteable part. For the less oneness a thing
actually has and the more oneness it potentially has, the more change-
able that thing is; for the oneness that unites is more perfect than is
the oneness that can be united. And the more conditions-of-oneness
you see to concur in something’s oneness, the more perfect [is that
oneness]. For “oneness” conveys the idea of a beginning and an end
(finis) that unite with each other. Therefore, oneness-of-soul is more
perfect than is oneness-of-body, because the purpose (finis) of one-
ness-of-body is oneness-of-soul. The corporeal depends upon oneness-
of-soul as upon a certain beginning of the corporeal. For if the soul
is removed, then the body’s oneness is dissolved and perishes.125
However, we see that some onenesses are more in a potential state
of being united, whereas others are more in a state of actual united-
ness. Thus, in the case of things that admit of more and less we do
not come to an unqualifiedly maximum or to an unqualifiedly mini-
mum. We do not even arrive at determinate and perceptible elemen-
tal onenesses that are actually lowest and actually minimal, although
reason believes there to be [such minimal elemental units] and be-
lieves them to be uniteable to one another and to exist only in con-
tinuous uniteability. In these [minimal elemental units, reason be-
lieves,] oneness is present amid continual change. Likewise, too, rea-
son believes, we arrive at actually maximal onenesses, where the po-
tential for uniteability is perfectly actualized and awaits no further
union.
50 Notice, then, that you must form a conception by intellect alone—
above reason126—in order [justifiably] to claim both that there can be
no progression 127 to the infinite and that we cannot come [by means
of a progression] to an actually maximum or to an actually mini-
mum.128 For example, we could not recognize which sample-of-earth
would be only elemental, since any givable sample-of-earth is distinct
[in some measure] from every other sample-of-earth and is not an el-
ement. The situation is similar concerning water. For there is no sam-
ple-of-water that does not distinctly differ, in its degree of elemen-
tariness, from [every] other sample-of-water. Therefore, an actually
minimum thing or an actually maximum thing is unknowable. Con-
sider [this issue] in regard to quantity. If than any given number a
greater number is positable, then we know both that there is no infi-
nite number and that no given number is maximal. Similarly, even if
every quantity were divisible into ever-further divisibles, we would
know that we could not arrive at an infinite number of parts or at a

minimal part.129 Hence, although the senses [lead us to] think that
some part is minimal, nevertheless reason tells us that that part is di-
visible and is not minimal. Similarly, too, that which reason thinks to
be a minimum, intellect apprehends to be divisible. Therefore, every-
thing positable is greater than the minimum and lesser than the max-
imum, without the progression [of greater and greater or of lesser and
lesser] continuing on to the infinite [i.e., to the infinitely large or to
51 the infinitely small]. Only this negative knowledge, viz., that precise-
ness is not attainable,130 teaches you these points. For although to our
reason it necessarily seems true that a maximum is reached there
where its gradual infinite ascent is impeded, nevertheless intelligence,
through the denial of preciseness, sees it to be more truly the case that
no givable thing—of the kind of things that admit of being greater—
is precisely a maximum.
52 Therefore, the power of the simple intellectual nature is so great
that it encompasses those things which reason separates as being op-
posites. For reason—which does not attain number that is without pro-
portion 131 and which allows that there is an actually maximum—sur-
mises that it itself has a pathway from the known to things unknown.
But intellect, noticing the frailty of reason, rejects these surmises and
affirms that those numbers are both proportional and disproportion-
al,132 so that each and every thing’s Preciseness (which is the Blessed
God) is concealed. Now, reason is the preciseness of the senses. For
reason, by means of its preciseness, unites perceptible numbers; and
things perceptible are measured by reason’s preciseness. But reason’s
preciseness is not an unqualifiedly true measure but is a true measure
[only] after the fashion of reason. Now, intellect, which is a true mea-
sure, is the preciseness of things rational. However, Truth itself, which
is God, is the Supreme Preciseness of the intellect.
53 Pay most careful attention to the foregoing points. But if you want
to behold, intellectually, oneness in otherness, then pay very careful
attention also to the following: viz., that for oneness to proceed into
otherness is, at the same time, for otherness to return into oneness. For
example, for the soul to be in the body is for the soul to proceed into
the body in such a way that the body’s oneness enters into the soul.
Likewise as regards form: the more one and the more perfect each
form is, the more its proceeding [into otherness] is otherness’s re-
turning [into its oneness]. For by means of a simple act of under-
standing, conceive of proceeding as conjoined with returning, if you

want to arrive at those hidden truths which are more truly attained
above reason (which separates progression from returning) by intellect
alone (which folds opposites into a single bond). Philosophers and ra-
tionalistic theologians have hitherto—in their affirming of a First Be-
ginning—foreclosed for themselves the way to entering into these
[hidden truths].133
54 CHAPTER ELEVEN
Participation.134
Since for oneness to be oneness is for it to exist precisely and as it
is, you see adequately and very clearly that oneness is identity 135 that
is unimpartible, inexplicable, and—as it is [in itself]—unattainable.
For just as in its own being every existent is present as it is, so in an-
other being it is present in a manner other [than as it is in itself].136
You will apprehend this fact readily, if you pay attention. A circle, for
example, insofar as it is an entity of reason is attained—with respect
to its own rational being—as it is.137 When you conceive of a figure
from whose center to whose circumference all lines are equal, then
by means of this rational conception you apprehend the circle insofar
as it is an entity of reason; but insofar as the circle is something per-
ceptible and exists outside of its own rational conception, then just as
it exists in something other [than in the rational conception of it], so
too it exists in a manner other than [as it is in the conception].138
Therefore, the circle cannot possibly exist outside of the rational con-
ception in the way that it exists in the rational conception. Therefore,
a perceptible circle partakes, with a degree of otherness, of the one-
ness of the conceptual circle. Therefore, the preciseness that consti-
tutes the [conceptual] circle remains unimpartible. For the [conceptu-
al] circle is replicated only in otherness. For there cannot be a per-
ceptible circle in which [all] the lines extending from the center to
the circumference are precisely equal;139 indeed, there cannot be any
[perceptible] line that in and of itself is in every respect equal to an-
other [perceptible] line. Therefore, a circle that is seen is not so pre-
cise that there could not always be one that is a more precise circle
than is it. And although the circle as it is [in itself] 140 does not im-
part itself otherwise than as it is, nevertheless it can be partaken of
by another only otherwise [than as it is in itself].141 Therefore, the fact
that it cannot be partaken of as it is [in itself] is not due to a defect
on its part but is due to the fact that it is partaken of by something

other and, hence, is partaken of otherwise.
55 Pay full attention, so that you may begin to understand the vari-
ety of surmises. If you admit that your intellect is something other than
is the thing that is intelligible, then you will see that you cannot un-
derstand any intelligible thing as it is. For what-is-intelligible is un-
derstood, as it is, only by its own intellect, from which it has being;
but by all other intellects it is understood in a manner other [than as
it is]. Therefore, a thing is attained, as it is, only in its own truth,
through which it exists. Therefore, by the Divine Intellect alone,
through which every being exists, is the truth of all things attained as
it is;142 but by other intellects [that truth] is attained variously and oth-
erwise [than as it is]. Moreover, the understanding of a thing as it is,
is unattainable by other intellects—just as a circle as it exists in this
perceptible floor cannot be reproduced elsewhere except otherwise
[than as it is here].143 Therefore, inexplicable identity is unfolded var-
iously and differently in otherness; and variety is enfolded concor-
dantly in oneness-of-identity. For example, sight is partaken of dif-
ferently by various acts-of-sight; and the variety of visible things is
enfolded concordantly in the oneness of sight,144 just as, also, the di-
versity of the acts-of-sight is contained concordantly in the oneness
of absolute sight.145 And since the Divine Mind is the most absolute
preciseness of all things, it happens that all created 146 minds partake
of the Divine Mind differently and in terms of otherness-of-varia-
tion.147 However, [in and of itself] the ineffable Divine Mind remains
unable to be partaken of, since the condition of the participants caus-
es this [varied] result.
56 Created minds do not receive into themselves the ray of Divine
Light as if by their nature they preceded their partaking [of the Di-
vine Light].148 Rather, the intellect’s partaking of that unimpartible,
most actual Light constitutes the [respective] quiddity of created
minds. Therefore, the actuality of our intelligence149 consists in its
partaking of the Divine Intellect. But since that most actual Power can
be received only with a variety-of-otherness (a variety, that is, which
is received somehow concurrently with the power), it happens that the
participant-minds partake of the most actual Intellect with a degree of
otherness—i.e., with that degree of actuality which (in relation to the
Divine Intellect) is otherness or potency. Therefore, it is rather the case
that our entire intelligence150 consists of participation in the Divine
Actuality with a degree of potency. For in this way the ability actual-
ly to understand truth, as it is, befits created minds—even as it is prop-
er to our God that the Divine Actuality be partaken of with various de-
grees of potency by created minds. Therefore, the more Godlike an
intelligence is, the nearer its potency is to Actuality as it is; but the
more obscure an intelligence is, the more distant [it is from Actuali-
ty]. Therefore, Actuality is partaken of differently and variously by
near, by remote, and by very remote potency. Moreover, that Inac-
cessible Loftiness is not to be approached as if there could be no ac-
cess at all to it. Nor, having been approached, is that Loftiness to be
supposed actually to have been [perfectly] apprehended. Rather, [we
are to believe] that it can always be approached more closely, while
it remains ever unattainable as it is [in itself]. By way of comparison,
time advances toward everlastingness, with which it can never attain
equality, even though it approaches continually.
57 You now see that the positive assertions of the wise are surmises.
For example, when with your very clear eyesight you, O Father, see
before you the face of the Supreme Pontiff, our most holy lord, Pope
Eugene IV, you form of it a positive assertion, which, in conformity
with your sight, you maintain to be precise. But when you turn to-
ward the root from whence the senses’ discrimination flows—when
you turn toward reason, I mean—you understand that the sense of
sight partakes of [reason's] discriminating power with a degree-of-oth-
erness that is contracted to the sense-organ. Consequently, you see the
defect that characterizes the falling away from preciseness; for you
contemplate151 the face not as it is [in itself] but in its otherness, ac-
cording to your eye’s angle, which differs from [that of] all the eyes
of other living beings. Therefore, a surmise is a positive assertion that
partakes—with a degree of otherness—of truth as it is [in itself].152
However, just as by means of the oneness-of-reason the senses expe-
rience their own otherness and make surmises by freeing from pre-
cise oneness assertions about perceptible objects, so reason, by means
of its root-oneness, viz., by means of the light of intelligence, dis-
covers its own otherness and its falling away from preciseness into
surmise. Similarly, intelligence, insofar as it is a power near [to God],
rejoices that by the aid of Divine Oneness it makes surmises in its own
very clear way.
58 Let one who keeps in mind these statements make a surmise about
participation in the following way. Since whatever can be partaken of
is partaken of only with a degree of otherness, it will have to be par-

taken of in fourfoldness; for oneness both goes forth from itself into
otherness and exists in a fourfold way.153 Whatever is partaken of by
something else cannot be received either maximally or minimally or
equally. Moreover, since oneness’s simplicity is not partaken of inso-
far as it is simple but is partaken of otherwise, it is partaken of with
a degree of compositeness, so to speak, or with a falling away from
that simplicity—i.e., with a degree of difference from simplicity.
Therefore, simplicity, since it is simplicity, is not partaken of in parts
but in the way in which what-is-simple can be partaken of according
to itself as a whole. However, since oneness’s simplicity is unimpart-
ible maximally, minimally, and equally (for it is partaken of, as it is,
[only] by means of a coincidence, as is shown in Learned Igno-
rance),154 it will have to be partaken of with a certain fourfoldness
that falls short of maximality, minimality, and equality. Therefore, one-
ness is partaken of not insofar as it is an enfolding simplicity or in-
sofar as it is unfolded in otherness but insofar as its changeable and
unfolding power-to-be-partaken-of is understood (by means of a cer-
tain coincidence) as a mode-of-power of the enfolding, unpartakeable
oneness.155
59 I will explain [the foregoing] in accordance with the diagram ap-
pended below:
b c
d e f
g h i k
Simple, enfolding oneness, viz., a, cannot be partaken of as it is. Fur-

thermore, it cannot be partaken of by mode b or by mode c—i.e., can-
not be partaken of maximally or minimally (nor according to a high-
er degree, or to a lower degree, of its power). Moreover, it cannot be
partaken of by modes d, e, and f—i.e., cannot be partaken of maxi-

mally or minimally or equally (nor according to a higher degree or to
a lower degree or to an intermediate degree). It also cannot be par-
taken of by modes g, h, i, and k, as if by four simple and differenti-
ated modes-of-being, viz., by a higher mode, by a lower mode, and
by two intermediate modes (i.e., it cannot be partaken of maximally
or minimally or more nearly maximally or more nearly minimally).
For if in this way a were partaken of discretely as if according to cer-
tain parts of its power, it would not be partaken of in the most per-
fect way in which the totality of its simple oneness could be partak-
en of but would be partaken of defectively. Therefore, a cannot be par-
taken of according to any discrete degree, since it is undifferentiable
simplicity. Moreover, a cannot be partaken of insofar as, in reverse
direction, these four things are three things—i.e., not insofar as g, h,
i, k are thought to be reduced from their quaternary otherness to the
trine otherness d, e, f, or insofar as g, h, i, k are thought of as still fur-
ther united in the binary otherness b, c. Rather, [there is participation
only] insofar as a, in its oneness, is considered as a fourfold power
that exists in a oneness-of-substance. For only there does oneness-that-
cannot-be-partaken-of so coincide with the power-to-be-partaken-of
that only in a fourfold otherness can all things whatsoever that in dif-
fering ways partake of [oneness] attain the oneness-that-cannot-be-par-
taken-of-otherwise-[than-in-fourfold-otherness]. (These points will be
60 made clearer in what is to be said below. In this way the great power
of the art of surmising will be disclosed to you, if you take note of
the denary unfolding 156 of the enfolding 157 [oneness]. For the art by
which truth is investigated is very concise. Although that art can be
depicted by three lines 158 present in the enfoldedness of its simple
oneness, nevertheless it cannot be either imparted or partaken of with-
out the otherness-of-modes. Hence, please excuse me for my repeat-
ed mention of the otherness-of-modes.
61 CHAPTER TWELVE
The three worlds.
Subsequently now to these considerations, which have been advanced
in the way that they have been, although rather ineptly, conceive that
a certain loftiest world is constituted both by a theophanic descent of
the Divine First Oneness into denary oneness 159 and by a return of
denary oneness into the First Oneness; let this world be called the third
heaven,160 if you please. And form the concept of another world, [con-
stituted] by a similar descent of the second [i.e., the denary] oneness
into a third oneness and by the ascent of the third oneness into the sec-
ond; this world can be called the second heaven.161 And conceive sur-
misingly of a third world,162 [constituted] by the descent of the third
oneness into a fourth oneness and by the return of the fourth into the
62 third. In this way, then, the universe will be composed of (1) a very
central, very immaterial world [viz., the third heaven, i.e., the intel-
lectual world, or the first world], (2) of a very circumferential, very
gross world [viz., the first heaven, i.e., the perceptible world, or the
third world], and (3) of an intermediate world [viz., the second heav-
en, i.e., the rational world]. The Center of the first world [i.e., of the
third heaven] is God; the center of the second world [i.e., of the sec-
ond heaven] is intelligence; the center of the third world [i.e., of the
first heaven] is reason. Perceptibility is as a very gross outer-layer of
the third world and is only circumferential. Perceptibility always oc-
cupies the outer region, whereas the First Center—which is of Indi-
visible Being that, in all things, holds together all things 163—is every-
where central.
63 All things are present in the first world; all things are present in
the second world; all things are present in the third world. In each
[world each thing is present] in its own manner. The [First] Center,
i.e., altogether absolute Oneness, is the Being of each thing.164 There-
fore, since Oneness is the truth of each and every thing, every true
thing is in the third heaven insofar as each thing flows forth immedi-
ately and unintermixedly from its own Truth—as a father is present
in his sons. Every true thing is in the second heaven, being present
there as in a quite remote likeness of what is true—as a father is pre-
sent in his grandsons. Every true thing is in the lowest heaven, being
present there as in a very remote shadowing, where [each true thing]
is concealed amid what are only very remote signs—as a father is pre-
sent in very distant blood-relatives who descend from him. Now, God
is our Father and our Beginning. We bear the image of true sonship165
with Him only in the third heaven, whose Central Oneness is Truth
itself. Only there will we be able to possess the kingdom of truth as
true sons. Hence, the [third] heaven is the intellectual heaven, where
truth, as it is [in itself], shines forth clearly. In the second, rational
heaven, the light-of-this-truth, made less bright by rational inferences,
is clothed with variation-of-opinion; and in the lowest heaven that
light is obscured by very thick grossness.
64 CHAPTER THIRTEEN
Three trine distinctions.166
By means of a surmise that is not without value, I reckon that each
of the aforementioned worlds of the universe contains within itself a
series of numbers, so that each world, in its own manner, is perfect.
Yet, all the numbers of the first [world], i.e., of the loftiest heaven,167
are, in comparative relation to [the numbers] of the other [worlds],
very simple and very formal—as if ten simple digits [viz., 1-10], were
extended progressively unto 1,000. However, the second heaven’s
numbers, retaining an intermediate status, are more gross and less
lucid and less formal—as if ten articular numbers168 were hastening
progressively unto 1,000. And the lowest heaven’s numbers are ob-
scured by much darkness and are more material, so that the compar-
ative relation of that heaven’s oneness (a) is to the first oneness169 as
100 is to 1 and (b) is to the second oneness 170 as 100 is to 10.171
65 If you consider this relationship for each of the previously shown
worlds,172 you will see that the orbit [of each of them] is distinguished
three times by means of three numerical progressions,173 so that in this
way there are in the universe nine graded onenesses that derive from
the first, most simple oneness.174 But to the end that the quaternary
distinction 175 be perfected—the distinction which, alone, is the ful-
fillment of our inquiries—we are forced to surmise that the progres-
sions by which176 one oneness passes into another oneness are to be
numbered fourfoldly and disjunctively. In this way, then, we note, last-
ly, that in each world there are three trine distinctions;177 and so, in
the universe we will arrive at the cube of three, as the diagram below
will show you.
66 If, as the subject-matter requires, you look at the diagram with
your mind’s eye, then mysteries that are surely important and that are
hidden to many will be made known to you.
Every number is included in the number 10,178 and every pro-
gression is completed in the number 4.179 Now, 4 times 10 is 40.
Hence, you will find, [in the diagram], 40 circles, all of them (the large
ones as well as the small ones) being gathered into a single circle.180
Hence, since the progression 1, 3, 9, 27 adds up to 40, it is not unfit-
tingly praised. For just as 1, 2, 3, 4 is the best-ordered progression of
all numbers, than which there can be exhibited no better-ordered pro-
circulus 1 u nivers
orum
2
ordinis
primi
3
4
10
ae regionis
supremae region
20
ordinis
medii
30
40
rem
100 i o
infim
200
rdi
sup
nis
is
300
1000
400
1 2 10
2
ordinis
primi
3
iae regionis
med
10
20
iae regioni
ordinis
medii
30
40
med
100 i or
infim
200
din
s
is
300
1000
400
1 3 100
2
primi
ordinis
3
infi
is
4
ae region
10
mae regionis
20
medii
ordinis
30
infim
40
o
100
mi 200
rdi
infi
nis
300
1000
400
4 1000
gression (for the replication of 2 makes 4, even as does the adding of

1 to 3; therefore, 4 proceeds from these [other numbers] in a best-or-
dered way; and in the case of any other four numbers no such [a best-
ordered progression] can be found), so too with respect to the tenfold
of 4, viz., 40, there can be exhibited no better-ordered progression than
the following: viz., 1, 3, 9, 27. You will be able to experience this fact
by virtue of the following consideration: through these four numbers’
being subtracted from one another and added to one another, all num-
bers up to 40 are attained individually,181 even as from the combina-
tions of the four numbers of the first progression all numbers up to
10 are obtained 182—as you can verify by yourself in both cases. More-
over, except for these [four numbers] there are exhibitable no four
numbers, of an ordered progression, that when added together make
a given sum and that through being added to one another or subtract-
ed from one another yield each number contained [in that sum].
67 Next, note that Simple Oneness, which here symbolizes God, has
contact with four circles:183 viz., the maximum circle of the universe,
the circle of the loftiest world, the circle of the loftiest order, and the
circle of the loftiest choir. Likewise, these four circles partake, by de-
grees, of God’s light and being: first the universe partakes; thereafter
the loftiest world partakes; then the loftiest order; and lastly, in fourth
place, the loftiest choir.184 You see that, successively, one choir im-
parts its received light to another choir, until the last choir is reached.
Moreover, you must note more particularly that what is found to be
present in the universe is also found to be present in each world and
in each order, though in modes that differ in degree of absoluteness
and contractedness. For example, denary oneness (which symbolizes
intelligence), centenary oneness (which symbolizes soul),185 and mil-
lenary oneness (which symbolizes body)186 are present in one way in
the loftiest world, in accordance with the lofty, simple, and noble na-
ture of that world; they are present in another way in the intermedi-
ate world and in still another way in the lowest, shadowy world. And
in that same loftiest world they are present differently in the loftiest
order and in the subsequent orders; but you see that in regard to all
[the orders] what is lowest in the higher [order] coincides with what
is highest in a lower [order].187 Now, the senses that belong to the
loftiest world are simpler than is intelligence that belongs to the in-
termediate world; and the senses that belong to the loftiest order are
more perfect than is intellect that belongs to a subsequent order.
Therefore, cause it to be the case that nine denary units and nine
centenary units and, in addition, nine millenary units (all of which you
will find in the twenty-seven smallest circles) are related to one an-
other according to the numbers of a progression, starting always from
absolute oneness; and then you will see how it is that in each world
the progression is perfected. If the first 10 of the loftiest world is as
2 and the second 10 is as 3 and the third 10 is as 4, the progression
is perfect. If in the second world the first 10 is as 20 and the second
10 is as 30 and the third 10 is as 40, the progression is perfect. Sim-
ilarly, if in the third, lowest world the first 10 is as 200 and the sec-
ond 10 is as 300 and the third 10 is as 400, the progression is perfect.
68 Hence, when you view other onenesses in a similar manner, you will
see that the oneness-of-intelligence in the lowest world is not of the
nature [of oneness-of-intelligence] in the highest world or in the in-
termediate world; rather, it falls short of their respective simplicity—
falls short in conformity with the proportion-of-numbers depicted [in
the diagram]. Just as by one standard the school of grammar judges
De Coniecturis I, 13 - II, Prologue 197
someone to be intelligent and the school of mathematics judges by

another standard and the school of theologians judges by still anoth-
er standard, so too in accordance with the various standards-of-judg-
ment of the different worlds we have to judge differently about these
worlds. Indeed, the judgment of the lowest world is one thing when
the lowest world considers itself in isolation and is another thing when
the relation of the lowest world to the higher worlds is considered.
69 Therefore, he who desires to distinguish suitably the limitations of
surmises must take account of the foregoing considerations, in order
to know how to make the distinctions and know how to consider the
distinct things now singularly, now in respective relation to one an-
other, so that in accordance with these relations he may at one time
deny and at another time affirm. For example, when the question is
asked as to whether the nature of the lowest world has intelligence,
you see that the reply must be: intelligence is found there as contracted
in conformity with that world but is not found there according to the
relation that characterizes a higher world. A similar point holds re-
garding other examples. For it is not the case that one world either
numbers or discourses or does anything else in the way that another
world does; rather, each world makes use of its own modes. For ex-
ample, intelligences are not numbered in the way that stones or ani-
mals are numbered; nor do intelligences speak in the way that men do.
PART TWO
70 PROLOGUE 188
I have now explained, more lengthily than is necessary for your very
acute genius, all the bases of my surmises. Nevertheless, because of
slower minds that perhaps will one day read these words, I see the
need to make my conception's simplicity and identity comprehensi-
ble in and through [the use of] a variety of many different illustrations.
Hence, I will endeavor to explain, partly with the help of practical ex-
amples,189 the points that I have made. When you see in and through
these practical examples that one and the same thing shines forth in
different ways, you will easily be guided unto all things by the art of
surmise. But since my entire effort is most fervent unto the following
end, viz., that we experience in ourselves a knowledge of truth, I will
set forth certain preliminary explanations of general items-of-knowl-
edge, in order that, at length, you may be able to arrive at the art of
198 De Coniecturis II, 1
pursuing a knowledge of yourself 190—the art of pursuing it surmis-

ingly, since all preciseness remains hidden from us.191
71 CHAPTER ONE
The deep root of all the sciences
that are to be investigated.192
By partaking of the One, all things are that which they are.193 Now,
the One—a partaking of which constitutes the being of each and every
thing—shines forth, in its own way, in each and every thing. There-
fore, you have need of no other consideration than that you seek out
the identity that is present in the diversity of the things which you are
to investigate, i.e., that you seek out the oneness that is present in the
otherness. For then you will see, in the otherness of contracted be-
ings, the “modes,” as it were, of Absolute Oneness.194 Moreover, all
the diagrams will serve, in the way indicated, for investigating all
things.
72 But let variation-of-mode, which results from the diversity of be-
ings, be conceived as if Absolute Oneness were a certain Mode of Ab-
solute Necessity—a Mode received variously in things’ [respective]
otherness, so that every being, or every oneness, is a certain mode of
Necessity. Just as perceptual sight is a certain mode-of-Necessity of that
[Absolute] Sight which is Absolute Necessity, so also rational sight is
a certain mode thereof, and intellectual sight is a certain mode thereof.
Now, the Divine Sight [i.e., the Absolute Sight] is the Mode that is par-
taken of variously—the Mode which is Absolute Necessity. But Ab-
solute Sight is related identically to all sight. Therefore, there is [one
and] the same Mode present in the investigatable true-nature [veritas]-
of-all sight.
73 But when you propose to give heed rationally to the difference be-
tween one thing and another—a difference that comes from the other-
ness of the mode-of-partaking—you do not doubt that you ought to use
the oneness-of-mode in different ways, so that by means of the dia-
grams you may investigate perceptual sight perceptibly, rational sight
rationally, and intellectual sight intellectually. For example, the Dia-
gram P will be of service to you for each and every [kind of] sight.195
It will be of service for perceptual sight if you make light [symbolize]
perceptible oneness and make shade [symbolize] perceptible otherness.
It will be of service for rational sight if you call light discursive light196
or rational oneness. Likewise, it will be of service for intellectual sight,
De Coniecturis II, 1 199
when you make light [symbolize] intellectual oneness. Moreover, if you

want to form a surmise about participation, do so in the same way, viz.,
by postulating [the diagrammatic figure] a as the sight that you want.197
74 Something similar holds true in regard to the diagram of the uni-
verse.198 If you postulate that the circle of the universe is the absolute
sight of all its participants,199 you will behold clearly all the varieties
of intellectual sight, of rational sight, and of perceptual sight. If you
care only about intellectual sight, then in making the largest circle to
be the circle of all intellectual acts-of-sight, you will see the things that
you are seeking. The case is similar as regards rational sight in a ra-
tional way and as regards perceptual sight in a perceptible way. Just
as by means of this [surmising] art [you investigate] sight, so, in gen-
eral, investigate all things by means of it, in such a way that in iden-
tity difference is observed and in difference identity is observed. Al-
ways be most alert to this [procedure], so that the deceitfulness of
words that signify imprecisely may not mislead you; rather, use these
suitable modes, as you have heard of them from the few things pre-
viously stated, and you will obtain no small benefit.
75 It is also necessary that again and again you reduce this funda-
mental doctrine-of-unattainable-preciseness 200 to the following con-
sideration: viz., that whenever there seems to you to be perceptible
or rational or intellectual preciseness, you admit that that preciseness
is indeed precise insofar as it is contracted in the way it is—whose
otherness you will behold only when you ascend unto the contrac-
tion’s more absolute oneness.201 For example, although reason tells
you that 2 + 3 is precisely 5 (because this fact cannot be denied by
reason’s judgment), nevertheless when you look unto reason’s one-
ness,202 viz., unto intellect, the claim that 2 + 3 is 5 will not be true
except within the domain of reason. (With regard to the intellect you
will find that the number 5 is not greater than the number 2 or the
number 3 and that one number is not even whereas another is odd and
that one number is not large whereas another is small. For in the do-
main of intellect you will view reason’s every number as resolved
into most simple oneness.) 203 Therefore, in the domain of reason pre-
ciseness is found to be present only contractedly, viz., in a rational
way—even as in the domain of the senses preciseness is present only
in a perceptible way. Similarly, when you assert of one thing that an-
other thing is maximally and diametrically opposed to it, you affirm
a truth that is precise by the measure of reason but that, intellectual-
ly speaking, lacks preciseness. So too, when you assert that an intel-

ligence’s act-of-understanding is one thing, its act-of-willing another
thing, and so on, you state what is true in the intellectual domain but
not what is true in God’s domain, where to understand and to will do
not differ. Therefore, preciseness is not attained except insofar as it is
other—as if all preciseness partook of Absolute Truth (which is God)
with a degree of otherness,204 just as every being partakes of Absolute
Being with a degree of otherness.205
76 Pay attention, I ask, to the deep root of all the sciences that are
to be investigated,206 since everything that is shown to be precise by
reason’s measure is precise because of the fact that it is of the domain
of reason. (A similar point holds as regards the senses and also as re-
gards the intellect.) For since reason is the alterity that derives from
intelligence’s enfolding-oneness, intelligence is present in reason only
with respect to an altered partaking [of it by reason].207 Therefore, rea-
son denies that there is an enfolding of opposites, and it affirms the
unattainability of enfolded opposites, even as the senses deny that
there is a generic,208 rational oneness of a plurality of perceptible ob-
jects. (For example, sight cannot affirm that a sound or that some-
thing sweet is of the nature of things perceptible.) Therefore, the root
of all rational assertions is the following: viz., that a coincidence of
opposites is not attainable. Hence, [as regards reason], every number
is either even or odd; hence, there is numerical order; hence, there is
numerical progression; hence, there is numerical proportion. Hence,
the proportion of the diameter [of a square] to the [square’s] side is
an irrational number,209 because that number would have to be the
coincidence of an even number and an odd number. Hence, too, the
diameter of a circle is disproportional to the circumference,210 because
reason does not attain the coincidence of such different things.
77 To state many points very briefly: nothing in mathematics can be
known by means of any other root [than the root-belief that a coinci-
dence of opposites is unattainable]. Whatever [in mathematics] is
demonstrated to be true is [shown to be] true from a consideration of
the fact that unless it were true a coincidence of opposites would be
implied, and this result would constitute a going beyond reason. Like-
wise, everything that is shown by reason to be unattainable is unat-
tainable on the basis of the fact that a knowledge of it would imply a
coincidence of opposites. And since in mathematics there shines forth
this principle [of unattainability], this principle’s manifestations are
most reasonable and, in conformity with reason, are most true; and in
these manifestations reason takes delight as in the unfolding of its own
power, wherein reason sees itself to partake of intelligence 211 with a
degree of otherness. Hence, these sciences 212 are readily accessible,
without a teacher, to certain individuals who have a rational capacity
that is neither excessively absorbed in intelligence nor excessively
contracted in perceptible shadows.
78 Since the otherness-of-reason is also the oneness-of-the-senses,213
it is evident that reason both enfolds and unfolds perceptible differ-
ences. Hence, reason makes inferences—logically, or reasonably—
from an enfolding to an unfolding, doing so by investigating one and
the same thing in terms of difference. For example, there is present
in the conclusion of a syllogism the same thing that is present in the
premises; but it is in the major premise in an enfolded way, is in the
conclusion in an unfolded way,214 and is in the minor premise in an
intermediate way. Hence, in a case where the conclusion enfolds, the
major premise unfolds.215 Therefore, in reason there is (1) an enfold-
ing power, inasmuch as reason is a oneness of perceptible differences,
and, likewise, (2) an unfolding power, inasmuch as reason is both the
otherness of intellectual oneness and the oneness of things percepti-
ble.216 Therefore, the rational domain encompasses the coincidence
of enfolding and unfolding. Consequently, this rational enfolding and
this rational unfolding are not enfoldings and unfoldings of those op-
posites which coincide only in intellectual oneness. (In the Divine En-
folding all things coincide without difference; in intellectual enfold-
ing contradictories are compatible; in rational enfolding contraries are
compatible, insofar as opposed differences are present in a [single]
genus.)217
79 Hence, note that when you number, reason advances unto a coin-
cidence of enfolding and unfolding; for in numbering you unfold one-
ness and you enfold a plurality into the oneness of some number. For
example, when you have numbered up to ten, you have unfolded—
ten times—the very well known enfolding-oneness and you have en-
folded an unknown plurality into a denary oneness. Therefore, in rea-
son there is a certain coincidence-of-opposites that cannot be attained
in the case of things perceptible. Since the senses cannot attain (1) this
coincidence of contraries and (2) this preciseness of reason, [then from
the senses’ viewpoint] all things, insofar as they exist, exist percepti-
bly. If they existed in some other way, their existence would imply [for
202 De Coniecturis II, 1 - 2
the senses] a coincidence of opposites.
80 CHAPTER TWO
The same topic continued, [viz., regarding
the deep root of all the sciences that are to be investigated].
He who considers attentively the preceding remarks will have rich sur-
mises. For when he discovers that reason is the sole cause operative
in the unfolding of rational inventions,218 he will [surmisingly] expand
upon reason’s powers of replicating [itself ] in the varied otherness of
its oneness. For example, when you apprehend, by means of reason,
that every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, and when
you see that the cause of the apprehending is none other than reason
itself, you will have a pathway to the profundity of reason. For that
[mathematical proposition] must be understood by you as follows: rea-
son, because it is reason, judges in the foregoing way; for in the ra-
tional domain the foregoing [mathematical fact] must be the case. For
if it be true that a triangle does not have three angles that are pre-
cisely equal to two right angles,219 then it is [true for one of two gen-
eral reasons]: either (1) because of a coincidence of oneness and plu-
rality, or a coincidence of trinity and oneness, or a coincidence of what
is straight and what is not straight, or a coincidence of other diamet-
rical opposites (and in that case, the claim belongs to the intellectual
world) 220 or (2) because there is not exhibitable a precisely right
angle, or because no two things are precisely equal,221 or because no
three things are precisely equal to two things (and so, the claim be-
longs to the perceptible world, which veers from rational equality into
perceptible otherness). Hence, from these considerations you see very
clearly that reason, in a rational way, enfolds within itself truths and
that the only cause of reason’s apprehension is that reason is reason
and is not intelligence or the senses.
81 Likewise, when it is said that every quantity [can] be divided,
through proportional parts, into ever-further divisibles, reason must
concede this. For if [this claim] were not true, reason would be con-
ceding a coincidence of contradictories—something which is judged
by reason to be impossible to occur. Therefore, consider that reason
alone is, by itself, the cause of all rational arts, and you will see that
the root-cause of all the things that are attained by reason is only rea-
son itself. Suppose, then, that you are asked why two sides of any tri-
angle, when joined together, are longer than the third side, or are asked
why the square of the diameter of a square is double the square of its
side,222 or why the square of the side opposite a right angle is equal
to [the sum of] the two squares of the other sides,223 and so on. You
will answer that this [judgment] is necessary by reason’s measure be-
cause if it were not necessary, then a coincidence of contradiction
would result. Similarly, if you224 happen to be asked why a portion
of a circle—a portion constituted by a chord smaller than the diame-
ter and by that chord’s arc—is disproportional to the circle, you will
reply that otherwise a coincidence of contradiction would result.
Therefore, knowing how to reduce all things to this principle of avoid-
ing a coincidence of contradiction suffices to constitute all the arts that
can be investigated by reason.
82 I once tried affirming that a comparative relation between the di-
ameter and the circumference of a circle is unattainable and inadmis-
sible because of the need to avoid the aforementioned coincidence [of
contradictories]; and immediately I saw what had to be affirmed geo-
metrically and what had to be denied. For in the [common] concep-
tions of our minds and in all the demonstrations of Euclid, or of
whomever else, I found this unique rationale 225 [to be applicable] in
regard to a variety of figures. Who is it who fails to see—if the two
sides of a triangle, when joined together, could be equal to the third
side—that the foregoing comparative relation [viz., between the di-
ameter and the circumference of a circle], could be attained? For if
every chord is smaller than the arc that it subtends, and if the chord
of a smaller arc is more like its own arc than the chord of a larger arc
[is like its arc], then if we were to admit that the two chords of the
half-arcs were equal to the chord of the whole arc, it would be evi-
dent that a coincidence of chord and arc would be implied.226 Like-
wise, if it were not the case that every exhibitable arc is divisible in
half, we would have to reach the same conclusion.227 So, then, if the
oft-mentioned coincidence is to be avoided: the two sides of every tri-
angle, when joined together, must be longer than the third side and
every quantity must always be divisible into proportional parts. You
will readily find the case to be similar as regards all geometrical
demonstrations. I will try to explain one day, if I live long enough, this
root of mathematics,228 in order by means of this explanation, to ren-
der the knowledge [of this root] more adequate.
83 Likewise, then, if you examine the causes of harmony, you will
find that otherness cannot exist otherwise than in relation to oneness.
But since otherness is a falling away from oneness, harmony is a bind-

ing together of oneness and otherness. However, it is necessary that
single oneness progress into a double [oneness] by means of replicat-
ing itself. Therefore, the binding together of a single and a double into
one thing—by means of a descent of the single and an ascent of the
double—is, necessarily, the first harmonic bond.229 Likewise, the
binding together of a double and a triple is the second harmonic
bond;230 and the binding together of a triple and a quadruple is the
third harmonic bond.231 And since oneness is unfolded in four
ways,232 so too is all harmony. Therefore, all harmony exists by means
of the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and their combinations. Therefore, the cause
of all harmony arises from the necessity of a rational progression. But
why the preciseness of a semi-tone is hidden to reason is because rea-
son cannot attain that preciseness apart from a coincidence of even
number and odd number.233 You see that perceptible combinations are
certain unfoldings of rational oneness. Hence, when rational, harmonic
oneness is closely contracted in a combination of things perceptible,
reason delights in that harmonic oneness as in its own work or as in
[its own] close likeness. But because precise harmonic oneness can-
not be unfolded, harmonic oneness is unfolded variously in a variety
of things perceptible. Thus, that which cannot, in any thing, be un-
folded precisely as it is, is unfolded variously in various things.
84 Likewise, the rational course of the science that is called dialec-
tic 234 arrives at a certain necessity of reasoning. For when enfolding-
oneness, which is also a universality, is unfolded in otherness, then
from that which is known-in-an-enfolded-way that which was [previ-
ously] unknown-in-an-unfolded-way is attained by means of rational
inference. Otherwise, intelligence would not be present in reason ra-
tionally, and oneness would not be present in number numerically or
be present in otherness alterably, and none of all things would exist.
Therefore, by the route of reason [the following] are necessary: (1) that
a plurality of things be present in one genus generically and be pre-
sent in one species specifically and be present in a lower species still
more specifically and (2) that a species be present in individuals in-
dividually and that individuals be present in a species universally. But
reason unfolds this unique, deductive art in and through a fourfold oth-
erness. For reason speaks of four quantities of propositions,235 four
modalities [of propositions],236 four syllogistic figures,237 and so on.
Moreover, logic is nothing other than an art in which the power of rea-
son is unfolded. Therefore, those who naturally excel in power-of-rea-
son are good at this art.

85 An orator uses reason to change the minds of his audience if he
wants to impress his conception upon them. For he knows it to besuit
[his idea’s] reception that his speech be adorned with a suitable pro-
portion. And in order that his speech be endowed with reason, he
makes a quaternary of causes, and he contracts it into an all-encom-
passing circle.238 He looks unto three regions [caeli]: in the loftiest re-
gion he pleads his cause in accordance with the necessity of justice;
in the second region he exhibits, for his audience’s similar consider-
ation, the usefulness of his proposal; in the third, and lowest, region
he demonstrates that honorableness concurs. And he finds argument-
strategies suitable for proceeding—clearly and in an organized man-
ner—from enfolding to unfolding.
86 If with the help of the aforementioned principles that govern sur-
mises you would like to compose treatises that are more explanatory,
then recur to the diagram of all things,239 and make the largest circle
to symbolize reason, and elicit (1) the very lucid, clear, and abstract
rational arts and (2) the lowest, more shadowy rational arts and (3)
the intermediate rational arts. Do the same thing if you investigate
mathematics, so that you make one kind of mathematics to be intel-
lectual mathematics, another kind to be perceptible mathematics, and
an intermediate kind to be rational mathematics. Do a similar thing
regarding arithmetic, geometry, music. If you wish to become more in-
structed in music by itself, conceive of the all-encompassing circle as
the concept of music, and you will behold one kind of music as in-
tellectual and very abstract music, another kind as perceptible music,
and another kind as rational music. In all these regions you will be
able to accomplish wonderful things if you focus on these regions with
diligent reflection. Do likewise, if you please, as regards perceptible
logic, rational logic, and intellectual logic; and do likewise, if you
please, regarding perceptible, rational, and intellectual rhetoric and re-
garding perceptible, rational, and intellectual grammar. You will see
wonderful things. For although the rational power is partaken of by
all the arts, nevertheless if you apply the higher part of reason to any
rational art whatsoever, that part of reason will be—in relation to this
same [partaking] art when the art is animated by the lower power of
reason 240—like an intellectual power.
Let it suffice for now that I have touched upon these topics in the
foregoing way. I will now go on to add, from out of the power of our
art, certain other general points that are suitable to my purpose.
87 CHAPTER THREE
Difference and agreement.
When the human mind investigates by means of reason, it casts out the
infinite from the entire circle of its apprehension. And it says (1) that
no positable thing differs infinitely from any other thing and (2) that
all positable difference is less than infinite and (3) that infinite dif-
ference is no more difference than it is agreement. And the human
mind conceives, in a similar way, of agreement. Therefore, each thing
both agrees with and differs from each other thing;241 but things can-
not agree or differ equally or precisely. For this preciseness exists
[only] apart from the universe.242
88 Therefore, if you understand the foregoing claims to hold true of
the perceptible world in accordance with the nature of that world, you
will see clearly that everything perceptible has a certain universal
agreement with every other perceptible thing—a greater agreement
with one thing than with another. Now, conceive of agreement as one-
ness, and conceive of difference as otherness; and in Diagram P note
the mutual progression of the one into the other.243 Thus, the greater
the agreement, the lesser the difference—and vice versa. But agree-
ment proceeds into difference in a fourfold way. (And if you wish to
extend these progressions all the way to the cube of 3, you will ap-
prehend the distinctions more clearly.) 244
Therefore, every perceptible thing has with every other percepti-
ble thing a certain very universal agreement and a certain very spe-
cific difference. And in-between that agreement and that difference
there are two other things, one of which, because of its generality, is
drawn toward the universal and the other of which is somewhat specif-
ically contracted to that which is most specific. Therefore, (1) a union
of all perceptible things is wholly common 245 to them all by means
of a certain universal nature; 246 (2) another union, which is not so uni-
versal, but which is general,247 is [common] to many perceptible
things; 248 (3) another union is somewhat specific; 249 and (4) the last
union is most specific.250 Therefore, every perceptible thing, inasmuch
as it is something uniquely particular, agrees with every other thing
and with no other thing, and differs from every other thing and from
no other thing.251
89 In order that this surmise of yours may be seen in terms of the
De Coniecturis II, 3 - 4 207
diagram of all things,252 imagine the center of any one of the small-
est circles to symbolize something singular. Insofar as this singular
thing is a center it differs from all the other centers. Insofar as it is a
point within the circumference of the universe (i.e., of the largest cir-
cle’s content), it has universal agreement with all the points included
within the universe’s orbit. And it has general agreement 253 with the
points which are enclosed within the next largest circle. And it has
somewhat specific agreement with the points which the third largest
circle includes; and it has very specific agreement with the points
which a smallest circle binds together. Therefore, singularity singu-
larizes all things; specificity specifies all things; generality generalizes
all things; universality universalizes all things. For example, in you,
O Julian, all things universal, all things general, and all things spe-
cific julianize 254 (even as in a lute the harmony lutinizes, in a cithara
the harmony citharizes, and so on). This [agreement] cannot be pre-
sent in someone else in the way it is present in you. But that which
julianizing is in you, O Julian, humanizing is in all men and animal-
izing is in all animals, and so on.255 But if you plan to proceed to
agreements that are more discrete, make a smallest circle into a uni-
versal circle,256 and in this way you will view yourself (1) as agree-
ing universally with all men and (2) as agreeing generally with those
men whom the fifth climatic zone singles out and (3) as agreeing
somewhat specifically with those men who are situated in the West
and (4) as agreeing most specifically with the Italians. Moreover, make
this last smallest circle into a universal circle, and you will see your-
self as agreeing (1) universally with the Italians, (2) generally with
the Latins, (3) somewhat specifically with the Romans, and (4) most
specifically with the Caesarini, from whom you originated.
Indeed, from the aforetaught principles you will obtain all these
[same] results with regard to any individual things whatsoever—ob-
tain them with a degree of difference and of agreement by means of
a quite true surmise.257 See to it that you use the given rules propor-
tionally—using them of perceptible things in a perceptible manner, of
rational things in a rational manner, of intellectual things in an intel-
lectual manner.
90 CHAPTER FOUR
Elements.
From the immediately foregoing considerations and from the things
learned earlier, you [can] form, clearly and evidently, a surmise about
elements. For if a certain universal agreement of all things indicates
that a common first and most universal nature is present in all things,
then we surmise that this nature is universally elemental. But if it is
shown that in the perceptible world all perceptible things come together
in community by means of a most general nature,258 we surmise that
that nature is a general element. Something similar holds true for
things that are somewhat specific and for things that are most specif-
ic.259 But—with the proper relationship being preserved as regards all
the domains that we are to discuss—I call an element [the following]:
a oneness (of whichever region) absorbed in a continuous otherness (of
the same region), so that that oneness cannot—because of the small-
ness of the oneness or of its actuality—exist simply in and of itself.260
Therefore, that which is composed of elements is not reducible into
simple elements, since reduction cannot arrive at what is simple 261 and
since a simple element lacks the power of existing actually.
91 Infer the distinction of elements from the divisions of the gener-
al diagram.262 The community 263 of elements is (1) trine, (2) qua-
dratically trine, and (3) cubically trine.264 For some elements are more
intellectual; others are more rational; but still others are perceptible.265
Those things which first the senses judge to be elements, reason shows
to be composed of elements; and those things which seem to reason
to be simple, intelligence understands 266 as composite. Therefore,
there is a difference between the gradations of elements, analogous to
the difference between points, lines, and surfaces. The perceptible
world arrives at nothing simpler than a surface. By contrast, the ra-
tional world posits a simple line prior to a surface, whereas the intel-
lectual world posits an indivisible point prior to a line. Likewise, we
view some elements as simple letters, others as syllables, still others
as words; but what is composed of elements is a sentence. Now, we
see that there are trinely distinctive differences between the letters;267
a similar thing holds true with regard to syllables and words. There-
fore, note that by reason’s judgment every positable perceptible thing
always remains composed of elements, even though one thing comes
closer to an element’s simplicity than does another thing. Likewise, by
intellect’s judgment reason does not arrive at a pure element; nor by
the judgment of most simple Divinity does intellect arrive there.
92 Reason conceives of four primary elements 268 as reciprocally
uniteable to one another and analyzable into one another. For since the
progression of oneness into otherness occurs in a fourfold way, there

will be a fourfold descent of oneness and a fourfold return on the part
of otherness. For if we conceive of the elements as certain points, be-
cause of their irreducibility to earlier things, then we will easily be
led to know, by means of an infallible ascent, that three elements 269
cannot suffice for constituting a solid.270 And we know that after the
number 4 the combination of any element with any other element is
not possible.271 We know this from the [analogous] fact (1) that each
line—whether it be long or short—[is able] to be divided into an ever-
further divisible line and (2) that the division cannot arrive at a point
and (3) that for this reason no more potential points are contained in
one line than in another. Therefore, it will be impossible for a point
to be disconnected from a line, since a point neither is a part of a line
nor does it contain a subsistent oneness. And for the same reason, a
simple line cannot exist separately from a surface, nor can a surface
be detached from a material object. For neither of these latter things
could happen without the separation of a point from a line.
Now, it is evident that a line is located between two points. There-
fore, two points are connected to each other by means of a line; and
three points are connected to one another by means of a very simple
surface that is enclosed by three lines.272 And by means of a three-
dimensional object four points are secured to one another in a mutu-
al bond.273 This union—such that each point is connected to each
point—cannot obtain with regard to the number 5. You can experi-
ence this fact 274 in the case of all [geometrical] figures.275 Therefore,
since a primary surface 276 requires three points (which surface, nev-
ertheless, cannot exist in and of itself) and since four points suffice
for the four surfaces necessary for a primary, three-dimensional ob-
ject,277 it is evident 278 that four elements are necessary for the com-
position of what is complete. For, as is evident, everything that ex-
ceeds a quaternary of points is not a primary, three-dimensional ob-
ject but is composed of primary, three-dimensional objects, even as a
quadrangular surface, which requires four points, is reducible to tri-
angular surfaces.279 But a triangular surface, which is primary and is
irreducible to a different and earlier surface, is the beginning of polyg-
onal figures.
93 Therefore, from the four elements,280 you will elicit no more than
six lines, from which you will elicit no more than four surfaces—even
as you will behold visually, if you wish to, all these facts in the case
of a triangular pyramid, which contains four points, six lines, and four
triangular surfaces.281 There are, then, four primary elements, from

which [you may elicit] six things and, by means of them, four things.
And you see that, necessarily, all these things come together for the
composition of an actually existing complete, or three-dimensional,
object—just as the [aforementioned] pyramid, which is the primary
figure among three-dimensional figures, makes evident. The progres-
sion of the four primary elements into a first composite-of-elements 282
constitutes such a very incomplete being (of its region) that that
being’s oneness is situated in a fluxible and continual mutability.
94 But since the [four] primary elements must be combinable with
one another (so that, clearly, they are for this reason unequal and dif-
ferent), one being comes into existence when one [element] unites the
other [three elements], and another being comes into existence when
in another [element the other three] are united. Therefore, each of the
[primary] elements can enfold within itself the three others (analo-
gously to [the enfolding] cone of a triangular pyramid),283 so that the
oneness of one of the elements is the actuality of the others and so that
in this way there arises each element’s own [united] composite-of-el-
ements. Therefore, there are four primary things that are “composites-
of-elements.” 284 In the simplest, brightest, and most unitary element
the three other elements combined therein have, in the perceptible re-
gion, the name “fire”. In the grossest and darkest element the other
elements contracted therein have, [in the perceptible region], the name
“earth”. In the intermediate [element] that approaches brightness [the
other three elements have the name] “air”. In the lower, more-dense
[intermediate element the other three elements] have the name
“water”. These [four] things, which are commonly called elements—
viz., these four very general things that are the [ontologically] first to
be composed of elements—enfold within themselves the somewhat
specific combinations.
95 CHAPTER FIVE
How an element is present
in that which is composed of elements.
In order to be helped to see, by means of a surmise, how it is that an
element is present in that which is composed of elements, look at the
previous diagram.285 If you imagine the entire largest circle to be fire
(or air or water or earth), you will see (1) how it is that in it are con-
tained the circles of the other three elements and also (2) how it is
that in the air [that is enfolded] in the fire the other three elements
are present; and so on. But this process does not continue beyond four
times. Therefore, there is advancement from the universal unto the
specific by means of a fourfold progression. Hence, one element uni-
versally enfolds within itself three elements; but the three elements
generally enfold within themselves nine elements; and the nine specif-
ically enfold within themselves twenty-seven elements.286 Therefore,
the cube of three is the specific unfolding of the oneness of each el-
ement. But the species enfolds its own specific elements, just as the
specific Latin language has its own specific elemental letters.287 Al-
though these specific letters are few, they are of inexhaustible power.
Hence, just as a Latin sentence consists of certain very universal let-
ters, of general letters, of somewhat specific letters, and, lastly, of very
specific letters 288—all contracted to the Latin 289 sentence—so too
every sensible-particular is like a complete sentence.
96 Therefore, the unfolding of individuals from any species is inex-
haustible and incompleteable. For the potency of the power of the spe-
cific oneness encompasses a never-endable number [of individuals],
(just as the oneness of the Latin language [encompasses an unendable]
number of words that are unmentionable [in advance]). Now, you have
heard that infinity coincides with oneness.290 Therefore, the [just-men-
tioned potential] infinity of individual things is a oneness of species.
Hence, everything that is less than infinite is also less than the infi-
nite’s power. Accordingly, no number can be as great as the power of
a species’ oneness. Therefore, the universality of elements ascends into
things that are most specific, as a point ascends into a material-object
by means of a line and a surface, or as letters ascend into a sentence
by means of syllables and words,291 [or] as potentiality ascends into
actuality. And that which is most specifically composed of elements
descends into the most universal elements—without which it cannot
exist—as actuality descends into potentiality. What is individual is as
the end of the outflow of elements and as the beginning of their re-
turn-flow; and what is most general is as the beginning of the outflow
of elements and as the end of their return-flow. But the most specific
power contracts the generality-of-elements within the scope of its own
region; and, it makes once-contracted elements flow away, so that they
return into generality. In accordance with that likeness the sea is called
the universal mother of rivers. For through general passages it is, after
a while, contracted very specifically in a spring, from which a stream
originates; and, at length,292 the stream is returned into the sea. By
means of a certain likeness we must think of universal elements as

we do of the sea and think of very specific elements as we do of a
spring.
97 It is evident enough to you that no knowledge arrives at the pre-
cise composition of elements,293 since it is impossible that two [ele-
ments] partake equally of the nature-of-elements.294 Nor is the pro-
portional difference between one [element] and another in any way
knowable.295 Therefore, since knowledge does not arrive at a [geo-
metrical] point, the knowledge of the gradations of elements is ac-
companied by ignorance,296 so that in more confused and more gen-
eral knowledge there is less ignorance, but in more singular presumed-
knowledge there is greater ignorance. In this way you see that the
knowledge of medicines cannot escape surmise—as also cannot any
other knowledge that relies on measurements.297
98 CHAPTER SIX
A clarification.
In order for you intellectually to apprehend what is true, you must not
neglect the assertions already made very often. Bear in mind that one-
ness both is not able to be partaken of and is able to be partaken of,298
and you will begin to understand the meaning of my assertions. One-
ness, in its precise simplicity, cannot be partaken of. But since there
is no plurality apart from a partaking of oneness, oneness can be par-
taken of—partaken of not, indeed, as it is [in and of itself] but in terms
of otherness. Therefore, reason sees that oneness can be partaken of
with a degree of otherness. But when oneness proceeds into other-
ness, it stops at the number four.299 Therefore, the number four is a
oneness that can be partaken of. Hence, everything that partakes of
oneness must partake of it by means of the number four. Therefore,
corporeal oneness cannot be partaken of otherwise than in quaternary
otherness; exemplar-oneness cannot be partaken of otherwise than in
quaternary exemplar-otherness; and color’s oneness cannot be partak-
en of otherwise than in quaternary otherness. The case is similar as
regards truth’s oneness, which can be partaken of only in its quater-
nary otherness, which can be called a likeness or an unfolding.
Actuality is a oneness that can be partaken of only in otherness.
Therefore, actuality is partaken of only with a degree of potentiality
(potentia), since potentiality is its otherness. Divinity is Absolute Ac-
tuality, which, by the loftiest creatures, is partaken of with the lofti-
est degree of power (potentia), viz., understanding; by intermediate

creatures Absolute Actuality is partaken of with an intermediate de-
gree of power, viz., living; by the lowest creatures it is partaken of
with the lowest degree of power, viz., existing.300 Moreover, the one-
ness of sound or of taste or of odor—or of any perceptible thing—
cannot be partaken of otherwise than fourfoldly, in the manner ex-
plained in Part One.301 Therefore, the unfolding of oneness is ana-
99 lyzed into a fourfold unfolding. And, hence, we surmise that, as re-
gards all the onenesses that are partaken of, there are four elements
which are present differently in each participant. For example, every
positable thing that partakes of color’s oneness partakes of it with a
fourfold otherness. The case is similar as regards taste, odor, and all
other [perceptible] things. Therefore, there can be no color except
color with a fourfold otherness.302 But since no color is exhibitable
in its simple oneness, every exhibitable color arises from a simple
color in a fourfold way. The case is similar as regards all elements,
since neither a simple mixture nor any of all things can be partaken
of in their simplicity.
100 Now, oneness is a certain preciseness that can be partaken of only
in terms of otherness. Hence, the preciseness of sight is unimpartible
apart from otherness. Therefore, the certainty which there is by means
of sight can in no way be partaken of apart from otherness. There-
fore, the simplicity-of-certainty, which occurs by means of sight, can-
not be partaken of by a diagram or by hearing or by another sense. For
example, the preciseness-of-color that is perceived by sight cannot be
communicated to a blind man303 by means of any words. Likewise, a
view of the city of Rome or of any form is not communicable, in its
preciseness, to him who has not seen it.
101 You recognize that the true cannot be partaken of otherwise than
with a degree of otherness. Therefore, it is necessary that the one true
name for each thing304 be [such as to be] unparticipable,305 and inef-
fable, as it is [in and of itself]. Therefore, effable names partake—with
a degree of otherness—of the true intellectual name only by means
of a rationale or a cause; for reason is the otherness of intellectual one-
ness.306 Therefore, in accordance with a cause or a rationale “homo”
signifies man—e.g., in accordance with a material cause, because man
comes from what is earthen [humus]. Yet, in this cause the three other
elemental causes307 must be present in their own way for constitut-
ing a quaternary; nevertheless this cause, [viz., earth], is seen to stand
out. You sufficiently recognize from your own self that the following
reason [or cause] is inadequate: “Because he comes from what is
earthen [humus], he is a man [homo].” Therefore, participation in one-
ness originates because of a fourfold otherness.
102 It is evident that every oneness that can be partaken of in the fore-
going way can be partaken of on this side of the infinite but beyond
[every] positable number. For example, the oneness of your face, O
Julian, can be partaken of in terms of the otherness of a likeness—
partaken of beyond every positable number but, indeed, on this side
of the infinite. For there is no givable number of [other people's] eyes
that cannot [all] partake [visually] of your face—partake of it with a
difference of respective likeness—although an [actually] infinite series
[of such viewings] is ruled out. The case is similar as regards the one-
ness-of-your-voice, which you recognize to be partaken of by innu-
merable ears; and the case is similar as regards all [perceptible] things.
Therefore, on the basis of the plurality of things that partake of
any oneness, we are investigating the general arrangement-of-elements
that belongs to that oneness’s fourfold otherness. Since we know that
a plurality of things partake of the one in different ways, we see that
difference originates from fourfoldness. Therefore, all colored things
must differ in color; but the differences are reducible to four elemen-
tal colors,308 which every [other] color partakes of in respectively dif-
ferent ways. The case is similar as regards all perceptible things and
all natural things and all things pertaining to an art. For example, a
partaking of the oneness of the art of grammar cannot occur without
elemental differences. For every grammatical sentence partakes of the
grammatical art’s oneness by means of that art’s elements. Therefore,
every art has its own elements. Moreover, the variety of the many arts
instructs us to investigate all the arts’ fourfold partaking [of oneness]
by means of elements. Likewise, the variety of the many things per-
ceptible, of the many things rational, and of the many things intelli-
gible shows there to be four elements of a perceptible nature, four el-
ements of a rational nature, and four of an intellectual nature.
Let the foregoing remarks together with my earlier ones, suffice
for the art-of-surmise’s generalizing about [the topic of] the root of
103 elements. But when you propose to enter into particular details about
the elements, use rules that are proportional to the regions. For ex-
ample, just as with regard to the perceptible world you surmise that
the perceptible elements are fire, air, water, and earth, so with regard
to rational nature conceive of rational elements [in such a way] that
reason is, as it were, fiery, aerial, aqueous, and earthen; and conceive
that every instance of reason partakes of the oneness of reason by
means of these rational elements. Likewise, as regards the intellectu-
al region, conceive symbolically of intellectual elements. And in order
that you may make surmises for yourself, conceive of the elements as
four onenesses, viz., 1, 10, 100, 1000; for the onenesses of the ele-
ments of the one309 must differ [from one another]. But in my earli-
er statements310 I have said enough about how it is that the one is
partaken of in fourfold oneness. For the oneness is partaken of dif-
ferently and varyingly by all things that are composed of elements—
partaken of as if with the simplicity (1) of simple oneness, (2) of
denary oneness, (3) of centenary oneness, and (4) of millenary one-
ness. Thus, in this way, the simple participable [one] is partaken of
as if by means of these [things composed of elements]. You now see,
on the basis of the illustration of the onenesses, that a subtle element,
a gross element, and two intermediate elements are to be surmised311
—surmised perceptibly in regard to the perceptible world, rationally
in regard to the rational world, and intellectually in regard to the in-
tellectual world.
104 Pay full attention, O Julian; for Absolute Oneness, which is also
Super-ineffable Truth, remains unable to be partaken of as it is [in and
of itself]. Now, the nature of intelligence is to understand, i.e., to par-
take of Truth. But Truth as it is [in and of itself] cannot be partaken
of [by intelligence]; rather, Truth remains eternal, and altogether ab-
solute, Infinity. Moreover, Truth [as it is in and of itself] cannot be par-
taken of by the otherness of our reason, since our reason is the oth-
erness of intelligence.312 Therefore, we partake of Truth [not as it is
in and of itself but] in terms of intellectual otherness, above all rea-
son. Therefore, in a certain ineffable manner, immaterial intelligences
partake differently and varyingly of Absolute Truth313—partake of it
in intellectual otherness by means of four intellectual elements. Like-
wise, the oneness of such a participating intelligence is partaken of
[differently] by a variety of rational minds [rationes] by means of
[four] rational elements; and the oneness of a rational ground [ratio]
is partaken of varyingly by the otherness of perceptible objects by
means of [four] perceptible elements, as, [by way of illustration], the
form (ratio) of a trigon is partaken of by different perceptible trian-
gles.
105 And since things that partake of oneness must partake of it vary-
ingly and in otherness, in such a way that some of them partake of it

more perfectly and more proximally, whereas others of them partake
of it less perfectly and less proximally, the following partaking will
be beautiful: viz., that partaking in which the power of the oneness
shines forth more unitedly and more concordantly in the otherness. By
way of illustration: visible color in which a variety of colors shines
forth in a oneness is the more pleasing to sight; and the sense of hear-
ing rejoices to hear a variety of voices in unison, or in concordance.
The case is similar as regards every sense, all reason, and all intelli-
gence. Therefore, ineffable is that joy which is present when some-
one attains, amid a variety of intelligible truths, the Oneness of Infi-
nite Truth. For in the otherness of intellectually visible things he sees
the Oneness of all beauty, he hears intellectually the Oneness of all
harmony, he tastes intellectually the Oneness of all delectable sweet-
ness, he apprehends the Oneness of all causes and rationales, and he
embraces, with intellectual joy, all things in Truth, which alone [is
what] he loves.
106 CHAPTER SEVEN

[The numbers] six, seven, and ten.
A progression that turns back on itself circularly is numbered by the
number six. But a progression that does not turn back on itself but pro-
ceeds unto something else that is similar is numbered after six and,
indeed, by seven. There are, then, two necessary progressions, which
are measured by the number ten. Consider these matters one by one.
You saw a little while ago314 that oneness coincides intellectual-
ly with infinity. Therefore, Absolute Oneness coincides with Absolute
Infinity;315 intellectual oneness coincides with intellectual infinity; ra-
tional oneness coincides with rational infinity, even as perceptible one-
ness coincides with perceptible infinity. All oneness is indivisible, in-
corruptible, and incapable of being partaken of [as it is in and of it-
self]. Therefore, Absolute Oneness can be partaken of only in intel-
lectual otherness;316 intellectual oneness can be partaken of only in ra-
tional otherness; and rational oneness can be partaken of only in per-
ceptible otherness. Therefore, God, who is Absolute Oneness, is at-
tained only intellectually;317 intelligence is attained only rationally;
and reason is attained only perceptibly. And so, Absolute Oneness de-
scends unto intellectual infinity; [intellectual oneness descends unto

rational infinity]; and rational oneness descends unto perceptible in-
finity. But perceptible oneness ascends unto rational infinity; rational
oneness ascends unto intellectual infinity; intellectual oneness ascends
unto Absolute, Super-divine Infinity.
107 With regard to this [descent and ascent] reason counts to six. For
(1) the beginning of the outflow and the end of the return-flow coin-
cide in Absolute Oneness, which is Absolute Infinity. And (2) the end
of the outflow and the beginning of the return-flow coincide in per-
ceptible oneness. And (3-6) the [two] intermediates are doubled.318 All
together this makes six. Consider this circular course by means of a
diagram.319
f b
e c
Let a be Absolute Oneness, b intellectual oneness, c rational oneness,

d perceptible oneness, e rational oneness, and f intellectual oneness.
Just as the six radial chords of the subtended circumference turn back
fully on themselves,320 so by means of the number six the descent
and the ascent form a circle.321 However, if you want to embrace the
truth, you must notice that light’s descending is nothing other than
darkness’s ascending. And God’s being in the world is nothing other
than the world’s being in God. And for actuality to proceed into po-
tentiality is nothing other than for potentiality to arrive at actuality.
And a point’s ascending into corporeality is nothing other than cor-
poreality's descending into a point. And for darkness to elevate itself
into light is nothing other than for light to descend into darkness. Like-
wise, for the potentiality of matter to proceed into the actuality-of-
form is nothing other than for form’s actuality to descend into matter’s
potentiality. Therefore, with intellectual acumen conjoin the ascent and
the descent, in order that you may surmise more truly. With this un-
derstanding, then, conceive of the perfection-like circularity of the
number six, so that you may be able to see that the measure of per-
petuity 322 is ascribed to the number six and that for what is most uni-
versal to proceed into what is most specific is for the most specific to
return into the most universal.
108 But a sevenfold number of progressions arises from a sixfold num-
ber of progressions, as time and succession arise from perpetuity. You
will experience this number of progressions in regard to things gen-
erable and corruptible. For example, when from a seed a tree arises,
and from a tree a seed, then a sevenfold [number of progressions] in-
cludes them both. For a seed ascends first into a sprout, then into a
bush, and afterwards into a tree; the tree descends into a branch, [then]
into a twig, and [afterwards] into a fruit, or a seed. This last seed is,
109 in number, other than the first seed. Therefore, since the end does not
coincide in number with the starting-point but the end of the outflow
does coincide with the beginning of the return-flow,323 a sevenfold
[number of progressions] rightly arises,324 and from it comes a ten-
fold [number of progressions].325
k
d
c e i
b f h
g
a
For if a is as the seed, d as the tree, g as another seed, and k as an-

other tree, then a arrives at d by way of b and c, and d arrives at g by
way of e and f, and the number seven is reached. But g ascends to k
by way of h and i; in this way the number ten is reached. The indi-
vidual contraction of the species—the contraction that is present in a,
the seed—is corruptible in and of itself but is incorruptible in the
species. Striving to preserve itself by means of the power-of-species
that is present contractedly in it,326 the individual contraction, while
seeking to reduce itself [for a time] to the species, casts aside the in-
dividuation of the seed, in order to be able to elicit from itself—
through the intermediary of the species—something similar [to itself].
110 Therefore, by means of a fourfold progression [the individual con-

traction, i.e., the seed], ascends into a tree; for without the interme-
diacy of a tree [the seed] cannot replicate itself in a likeness-of-
species. Therefore, a aims to produce g; and since it cannot accom-
plish this without an ascent unto d, it ascends unto d in order in this
way to arrive at its goal. But d, being a tree and seeing that it can
preserve itself only in a similar tree, aims at k. But d cannot arrive at
k without g. Therefore, d descends unto g in order by means of g to
be able to reach k. And so, in a two strivings are combined: a natur-
al striving, which comes to an end in g, and an accidental striving,
which comes to an end in d. But, likewise, two strivings are combined
in d: a natural striving, which comes to an end in k, and an acciden-
tal striving, which comes to an end in g. And so, in this way, in g there
is a natural striving that is communicated to g from a, and there is
an accidental striving that is impressed on g from d. In this way you
see (1) that one [kind of] striving stimulates and guides another [kind],
so that there is a continuation of generation and corruption, and (2)
that the generation of the one thing is the corruption of the other. But
you will notice that you can arrive at this knowledge only from [a
knowledge of] two seeds and two trees—which make four. Therefore,
in your intellect you must enfold both the progression a, d, g and the
progression d, g, k, in order to bring into an unfailing succession the
coincidences of the end of the one thing and the beginning of the other
thing.
111 Consequently, notice that, according to the aforesaid, the oneness-
of-the-seed, which, [as it is] in itself cannot be partaken of, puts on
participability in otherness, viz., in arboreal otherness. Moreover, the
tree’s oneness, which, [as it is in itself], cannot be partaken of, puts
on participability in the otherness of its seeds. Therefore, the oneness
of the oneness of this seed, [viz.,] the species, is contracted individu-
ally in this seed. This specific oneness—freed from its contractedness
in this seed and received in the tree—can be partaken of by many
seeds, since it is an indeterminate power. And so, the general nour-
ishment is determined specifically in accordance with the specific
power of the [original] seed; and the number of [produced] seeds, as
well as their perfection, is determined specifically according to the
nature of the tree, its location, and its circumstances.327
I have spoken about seeds and trees. But endeavor to elicit a uni-
versality, in order that in accordance with these examples you may
make surmises in regard to minerals, vegetables, animals, and all other
perceptible things. Moreover, use these examples symbolically in re-

gard to things rational and things intellectual. For example, from the
seed of wonderment there arises a rational tree, which bears fruit sim-
ilar to wonderment. And through the elicited wonderment the rational
tree erects a similar rational tree. Similarly, from the seed-like begin-
ning of demonstration there proceeds an intellectual tree that produces
from itself seminal beginnings through which an intellectual tree as-
cends again.
112 CHAPTER EIGHT

Difference of individuals.
It is evident enough to you that among perceptible things there are in-
dividual seeds and, likewise, [individual] trees. Moreover, you see that
among animals, which are as trees,328 some are male and others are
female. Similarly, it is necessary that some seeds be male and that oth-
ers be female.329 Therefore, if the Diagram P 330 is conceived of as a
species, in which the descending light symbolizes actuality and the
shadowy area symbolizes potentiality, it will be clear to you (1) that,
with respect to the species, the actuality absorbs the potentiality and
vice-versa and (2) that in accordance therewith individuals partake of
the nature of the species.331 Moreover, if the actuality, in order to be
determined more specifically, is analyzed as being the Diagram P, then
the light will be the actuality’s maleness and the darkness will be its
femaleness. The case is similar as regards potentiality.
113 Now, it is necessary both that things male differ from one anoth-
er and that things female differ from one another. For example, no in-
dividual male can be found to agree precisely in maleness with any
other male; nor is there positable a thing that is maximally male.
Therefore, femaleness is absorbed differently within every instance of
maleness. Hence, too, we see that in male animals there appear fe-
male traits, e.g., indications of breasts. Likewise, seeds are related [to
one another] as opposites.332 Therefore, everything individual absorbs
by its unique individuation other things, as femaleness is absorbed
within your individual maleness. Just as a seed from which there has
sprung forth into actuality that which comes from a male seed333 has
prevailed over femaleness, so in its own manner femaleness absorbs
maleness. The male seed also absorbs 334 within itself what is female,
and by its own power it encompasses both actual maleness and actu-
al femaleness. The opposite holds true of a female seed.335
114 We know that these individuals partake variously of the species.

Certain individuals partake of the species more perfectly in terms of
a seed; others partake of the species more perfectly in terms of a tree.
The more base the species is and the more it is in a state of poten-
tiality, the more the seeds partake of the nature of the species. But the
more noble, perfect, formal, and actual the species is, the more [per-
fectly] the trees partake of its nature. And where trees partake [more
perfectly of the species], those336 trees which are the more male par-
take the more perfectly; but where seeds partake more perfectly, those
seeds which are more female partake the more perfectly. Hence, a
pear-tree is more noble than is a pear,337 and the male lion is more
noble than is the lioness and than is leonine seed; but the opposite is
true in the case of wheat, where the seed is better than is the chaff.
And so on. For where a tree partakes more [perfectly] of the condi-
tion of the incorruptible species (viz., because it yields from itself fruit,
while retaining the power to yield more fruit), the tree partakes more
of the perfection of the species. But where a seed contracts more [per-
fectly] the nature of the incorruptible species and where the tree’s
power fails after its production [of the fruit]—fails because the entire
[power of the tree] proceeds into the [produced] seed (as, for exam-
ple, occurs in the case of grains of wheat, of winter wheat, of oats, and
of other similar things)—then the grain, or seed, is more perfect [than
is the “tree”], and in that case the seed that is more female is the more
noble. But no seed can be found that is so female and so in a state of
potentiality that there could not be a seed that is more in a state of
potentiality. Likewise, no tree [can be found] that is so in a state of
complete actuality that there could not be [a tree that is in a] greater
[state of actuality]. Therefore, every positable individual thing partakes
of these differences variously and differently. For in the sprout [from
which a tree comes] the tree partakes more [perfectly] of the nature
of the [original] seed, and in its trunk [it partakes of it] less [perfect-
ly]. And an infant [tree] during its infancy partakes more [perfectly]
of the nature of the seed than does [an adolescent tree] during its ado-
lescence. But a full-grown tree—which partakes more perfectly of the
nature of the species insofar as the tree has sprung forth into actuali-
ty from the potentiality of the seed and insofar as in this way it re-
tains the unfolded nature of the seed—produces fruit in the likeness
of the seed. And since the tree is as an unfolded conduit of the sem-
inal power, it distributes within itself the moistness and determines it
specifically according to the unfolded nature. Indeed, the tree perfectly
determines [the moistness] in a specific way if the power of the seed

is both perfect and perfectly unfolded and if the nourishment is per-
115 fect and perfectly determinable in a specific way. Therefore, as is nec-
essary, both [the nourishment and the power of the seed] should be
taken account of.
Hence, we see that in fertile soil and as a result of excellent nour-
ishment certain kinds of grain yield more perfect specimens than
themselves, although this [more perfect yielding] happens successive-
ly, because in the first year [the yield] is not as perfect as it is in the
subsequent years. And, conversely, we see that in a sterile field [even]
the best kinds of grain bear poor-quality fruit; however, their quality
is not as poor as is [that of] other, less excellent, specimens of grain.
Hence, an excellent specimen of grain becomes successively like a
poor quality of grain because of [its receiving] nourishment that is dis-
proportionate to its excellence. Therefore, because of a difference of
nourishment and of locations, individual [specimens of grain] must
differ.
116 Note, too, that although the nourishment is determined in a spe-
cific way and although its potency is absorbed by the formal power
of the species, nevertheless the nature of the nourishment cannot be
completely and fully absorbed in every respect—as you see when a
[branch of] a pear tree is grafted into an apple tree. The moistness
that in the trunk of the apple tree has received the form of the apple
tree (1) receives, in the ingrafted branch of the pear tree, the form of
a pear tree and (2) becomes individuated into a pear. However, this
pear is not free of the entire nature of the apple tree, although the na-
ture of the apple tree is hidden in the pear and although [the apple
tree’s power] is less great to the extent that the power of the [ingraft-
ed] pear-shoot is more great; and, in subsequent times, as the specif-
ic power of the pear-branch becomes successively weakened, more of
the nature of the apple tree is manifested. A similar phenomenon holds
true of location. For example, a German in Italy acts more like a Ger-
man during his first year than during his second year. For the loca-
tion progressively imposes its character upon him who is located there,
depending upon the strength of the location’s nature. We experience
these matters not only perceptibly in the perceptible world but also
rationally in the rational world—as in the case of mores and customs
and rational doctrines, which are certain kinds of [rational] food. You
ought also to take note of these matters intellectually in regard to the
intellectual nature.
117 CHAPTER NINE

The different modes of being.
From the aforesaid you will infer sufficiently well what I mean; and,
if you wish, you will conceive—by means of a certain general art—
of the differences among surmises and also among surmisers. For just
as some surmises are confused perceptible-surmises 338 and other sur-
mises are truthlike rational-surmises and still others are true intellec-
tual-surmises, so also there are different surmisers. Accordingly, cer-
tain surmisers operate in the domain of the confused world of the sens-
es; certain others make rational inferences from principles; and still
others give attention to intellectual absolutes.339 For the unitary sur-
mising that goes forth unto that which is surmised has its own four
elements: viz., subtlety, grossness, and two intermediates. (1) Surmise
goes forth, with very keen subtlety, upwardly as does fire; and it be-
holds things’ respective mode-of-being—beholds it in a certain Ab-
solute Oneness, or Absolute Necessity. (2) But when surmise surmis-
es grossly and in an earthly way, it conceives of a darkened mode-of-
being in terms of possibility. And it effects two other modes-of-being.
(3) One of these two modes approaches Absolute Necessity; and it is
the mode without which the true thing 340 cannot be understood; in-
deed, it is a mode of secondary necessity and secondary implication.
For example, when true humanity 341 is posited as existing necessari-
ly, then following upon this true humanity there come, necessarily,
those things without which it cannot exist.342 (4) But the second [in-
termediary] mode-of-being is closer to possibility and originates above
possibility but below that which was just spoken of, [viz., the mode
of secondary necessity]. Insofar as it is an actual mode-of-being, it
has little necessity but has much possibility.
118 You will see the foregoing points by means of the Diagram P, 343
in which oneness is necessity and in which otherness is possibility. All
things return into one and the same thing,344 in accordance with what
you have already heard. Therefore, one who is surmising pursues the
various modes-of-being most easily by means of the art of depiction,
so that he sees how it is that one mode is received and absorbed by
another mode. And he distinguishes, and makes inferences about, the
variety of partakers of these modes-of-being, so that in accordance
with one mode-of-being he conceives of a thing in its darkened pos-
sibility and in accordance with another mode-of-being he conceives
of this same thing in its actuality. Similarly, he attains both the modes-
of-surmising and the variety of surmisers who partake of these modes.

Moreover, [he attains] the modes of duration, so that there is one
mode of duration as regards the mode-of-being of Absolute Necessi-
ty and there is another mode [of duration] as regards [the mode-of-
being] of possibility. (1) For infinite duration is characteristic of Ab-
solute Necessity, for that which is unqualifiedly Necessary cannot
exist otherwise [than as it does exist]. Therefore, it does not go forth
into otherness. Hence, it is Absolute Eternity. (2) However, the mode
of possible being is present only in a state of otherness. (3) But [the
mode] of actual [being] has some stability and much possibility.345
(4) [And the mode] of secondary necessity has much stability and lit-
tle otherness.
Similarly, [a surmiser] distinguishes the modes-of-being of mo-
tion, and thereafter he contracts these and similar modes-of-being, so
that with regard to the perceptible world he surmises perceptibly about
them, with regard to the rational world he surmises rationally about
them, and with regard to the intellectual world he surmises intellec-
119 tually about them. He surmises that these modes-of-being of the three
regions are connected to one another, so that there is a single universe.
Hence, he acknowledges that supreme perceptible necessity is ratio-
nal possibility, and he affirms that supreme rational necessity is intel-
lectual possibility. In this way he sees that the four modes-of-being are
resolved into the number ten, which is the universal number.346
120 CHAPTER TEN

Differences among things composed of soul and body.
Examine the Diagram P,347 and construe oneness as soul but otherness
as body. Corporeality passes upward into immateriality; spirit passes
downward into corporeality. But since spirit’s descending is body’s as-
cending, you must combine them both, in order so to infer a difference
among bodies from a difference among souls that, likewise, you may
infer a difference among those souls from [a consideration of their re-
spective] body. That a human soul causes its body to differ from the
bodies of other [men and] animals occurs also because of the fact that
such a body348 demands a distinctive spirit.349 For example, Plato’s
being Plato makes him different from all other men, and this differ-
ence arises both because of the oneness of his soul and the otherness
of his body. Therefore, those such as the physiognomists,350 who by
means of perceptible objects investigate the disposition of souls, ob-
serve a body; and from the differences and the agreements of that body
with [the bodies of] other men and animals they seek to detect a dif-
ference of spirit. Hence, it is that we know from experience that those
who are supple in body are agile in mind.351
121 Moreover, animals’ movements from place to place—in accor-
dance with which movements animals differ from plants—ought to
be traced back not only to the body’s needs but also to the soul’s. For
an animal changes its location not only in order to gather required food
but also in order to perfect the operations of its soul. One animal ex-
cels another in swiftness, in hunting, in industriousness not only be-
cause it needs these traits for preserving its bodily constitution but also
because its spirit requires these traits. Likewise, man is endowed with
quite great power of reason not in order, on account of his body’s
needs, to know how to sow, to plant, to engage in commerce, to build,
to weave, to cook, and so on. Rather, the Supreme Artificer caused this
rational nature to descend unto the body in order for the body to as-
cend unto a rational nature; for the perceptible body is subject to rea-
son, and the body is made to engage in the foregoing tasks only for
the sake of its spirit. For just as the body because of its own needs is
seen to seek such a rational nature, so this subtle spirit 352 requires the
kind of noble body which has these needs.353 The spirit exists for the
sake of the body for no other reason than that the body exists for the
sake of the spirit. For the spirit turns back on itself. Therefore, each
perceptible animal differs from each [other perceptible animal] by
means of a joint-difference that proceeds from the difference between
its spirit and its body.
122 It is necessary that every spirit differ from every other spirit and
that every body differ from every other body. However, there is no
difference without agreement. Therefore, it is necessary that every
spirit both agree with and differ from every other spirit. But this
[agreement or disagreement] cannot occur in equal measure. [One
spirit] agrees more with a second spirit, less with a third; and with
no other spirit does it agree in any respect maximally or in any re-
spect minimally. Therefore, since a given spirit differs from any other
given spirit in such a way that it could always differ less (by means
of a difference that could always be lesser, but without this progres-
sion’s continuing on unto infinity), it differs by a disproportional
comparative relation, in such a way that the comparative relation be-
tween one spirit’s nature and another’s could always be closer, but
without there being a progression unto infinity. Therefore, a precise

difference of comparative relation is unattainable. Therefore, one spir-
it agrees with another spirit in terms of a concordant difference.
123 Hence, a more darkened spirit is related to a more illumined spir-
it in accordance with Diagram P. For oneness-of-spirit goes forth into
otherness, and otherness-of-spirit returns into oneness. However, in the
case of supreme, most noble spirits the perceptible but darkened oth-
erness is absorbed by the intellectual brightness, whereas in the case
of lower spirits the oneness-of-spirit (which can be called intellectu-
al oneness) is absorbed by the otherness-of-spirit. Hence, a vegeta-
tive spirit conceals in its darkenness an intellectual spirit;354 but cer-
tain signs of the intellectual spirit appear in the branches for support-
ing the fruit and in the leaves and coverings for protecting the fruit.
However, we experience more numerous intellectual signs in animals,
where the intellectual spirit is more visible. For we experience more
clearly and more closely signs of intellectual activity [first] in animals’
powers-of-sense, then to a greater degree in their power-of-imagina-
tion, and to a still greater degree in their power-of-reason.355 More-
over, among animals with reasoning powers there are more fully vis-
ible signs of foresight in the case of men than in the case of other an-
imals. From these signs we infer that, in the case of men, there is
brighter intelligence.356 Similarly, in the case of intelligences 357 we
affirm that the perceptible nature is concealed in, and absorbed by,
the intellectual light. But the [human] soul’s reason we conceive of
as intermediate between its lowest and its highest [operation] and,
therefore, as partaking more of the higher nature of intellectual one-
ness in the case of some men but as partaking more of the lower [spir-
it-of-]otherness in the case of other men.358
124 Hence, we say that in the lower world all things are present in ac-
cordance with the nature of that world, in the intermediate world they
are present in an intermediate way, and in the highest world they are
present in the highest way, i.e., in the manner of that world’s nature.
For example, the power-of-sense that is present in things that vege-
tate,359 by means of which power these things sense very intense cold
and extreme heat, is of a vegetative nature; the power-of-sense in an-
imals is of an animal nature; the power-of-sense in intelligences is of
an intellectual nature. A similar point holds true regarding the power-
of-reason and the power-of-intellect. For example, the intellectual sub-
tlety in things that vegetate, through which subtlety [a plant or a tree]
sends forth [supporting] branches on account of the heaviness that re-

sults from its suspended fruit,360 is of a vegetative nature. But the in-
tellectual subtlety in animals, by means of which animals hunt and
safeguard for future need that which is sought, is of an animal nature.
And in the highest beings the intellectual subtlety is wisdom, which
leads to truth. Therefore, in its own way each spirit partakes of the
elements of the nature of spirit, even as [in its own way each] body
[partakes of the elements] of corporeal [nature]. These [truths] are
most evident to you from what I have often said, since there is but a
single procedure for all the progressions.
125 But, as regards every animal: when you construe its soul as one-
ness and construe its body as otherness, then those things which you
behold as present in the body in a corporeal and unfolded way view361
as present in the soul (as in an enfolding power) in a soulish way, i.e.,
as present in the power-of-oneness of that same unfolded corporeal na-
ture.362 In regard to your body you see that your head, hands, and
feet differ in function according to their degree of nobility. Likewise,
in the case of your soul, make the intellect to be, metaphorically, the
head, reason to be the hands, and the senses to be the feet. For just as
the body walks and is conveyed in a bodily way by the feet, so also
the soul, by means of the senses, goes forth in a soulish way unto per-
ceptible objects; and the soul uses reason as its hands; and it uses in-
tellect as the power that unifies the senses, so that in the soul the in-
tellect is the head and is the more noble part. In the ambit of intel-
lectual power the intellect is analogous to the eye in the head.
126 By means of such symbolical pursuits ascend from the unfolded-
ness of corporeal nature unto the power-of-soul; and conceive of each
animal’s power-of-soul as contractedly enfolded in the way that you
surmise to be unfolded its variety of body. For example, conceive of
a lion’s soul as having, metaphorically, an intellectual head, perceptual
feet, and rational hands in accordance with the contraction of its one-
ness, viz., its leonineness—even as we affirm these things to be pre-
sent in a man in a human way. And so on.363
127 Now, by means of the reasoning by which [you have already in-
ferred] all [previous points] infer from our diagrams all the distinctions
between bodies. For if you construe corporeal subtlety as oneness of
light and construe corporeal grossness as otherness, then you will
readily behold the solutions that are being sought. Likewise, indeed,
if you propose to pursue [the issue of why there is] a variety of phys-
ical constitutions, conceive of a well-harmonized, perfectly compact,

and perfectly united oneness of light; but take otherness to be alter-
able and incompact and to be discordance rather than concordance.
128 So too, if you wish to investigate (a) the immaterial body or (b)
the corporeal spirit, you will notice that in between (1) the bright spir-
it that descends into the darkened body and (2) the returning corpo-
real grossness two means-of-union intervene—(3a) one that is more
immaterial and (3b) another that is more corporeal. Now, the one
which more approximates spirit does not escape the entire bodily do-
main; hence, it can be called an immaterial body. But let the other one,
being lower and closer to corporeal grossness 364 but not escaping the
entire domain of spirit, be called a corporeal spirit. In this way con-
sider there to be three gradations of the descending 365 spirit and three
gradations of the ascending body,366 from which gradations there
exist, in their own way, the universe and everything that is in it. For
(1) we experience that in animals there is a soul,367 or a certain im-
material nature. (2) We experience that a corporeal spirit, enclosed in
the arteries,368 is the soul’s means of union [with the body]. (3) We
experience that there is a certain light, or an immaterial body,369
through which the power of the soul operates on the body and on what
is perceptible. Consequently, in the foregoing [two] ways 370 the power
of the soul is united to the body by these [two] intermediaries—unit-
ed in order to exercise its operations. And this 371 descent of the soul’s
union [with the body] is also the ascent of the body’s union [with the
soul], since [the body] is made to be so subtle that it is united quite
suitably to the spirit, [or soul]. But in their own manner all percepti-
ble things partake of these [ascendings and descendings], which are
found in a perceptible thing more clearly or more obscurely, more cor-
ruptibly or more incorruptibly in accordance with general and specif-
ic differences and agreements.
129 CHAPTER ELEVEN

Life.
Moreover, if you wish to view in terms of its differences a life, for
example, of form or of spirit or of anything else, then first of all an-
alyze it in terms of the Diagram P 372 in accordance with the oneness
of light and the otherness of darkness. In this way you will behold that
noble life in the brightness of whose oneness all otherness is absorbed.
And, on the other hand, you will behold another life, whose oneness
is enveloped in the otherness of fleeting and inconstant darkness. And

if in the universal Diagram [U] 373 you construe life itself as the uni-
verse,374 then you will distinguish, quadratically and cubically, three
lives.375 Hence, by this procedure you will arrive, surmisingly, (1) at
incorruptible life and (2) at alterable life, as well as (3a) at more near-
ly incorruptible life and (3b) at more nearly alterable life376—and at
subdivisions of these.377 But in between the life [viz., 2] in which the
triumph of otherness brings corruptibility of the oneness (or destruc-
tion of the oneness) and the life [viz., 1] in which the triumph of the
oneness brings incorruptibility, there cannot be (as I have stated very
often) any exact middle-point such that [that exactly middle life] is
neither corruptible nor incorruptible and yet is of the nature of the
aforementioned differences [of life]. Hence, in order that lower life
be united to higher life within one single universe, higher life must
also be united to lower life. Therefore, [as regards] this one compos-
ite [of higher and lower life], a composite which exists both from life
wherein oneness triumphs and from life wherein otherness triumphs:
in accordance with the condition of lower life [this composite life]
advances toward otherness and is enveloped in corruptibility; but in
accordance with the nature of higher life it approaches the oneness of
incorruptibility.
Therefore, as is evident: such [a composite of higher and lower
life] is [a composite] of a corruptible and of an incorruptible life; and
this [combining] occurs in respectively different ways for those par-
taking of this union. Therefore, the death of such [composite] beings
is not different from the death of other mortal beings, for [such a com-
posite being] 378 tends toward dissolution because of its flux-of-oth-
erness. Therefore, the oneness of its incorruptible life remains stable,
although its alterable oneness veers away from the harmonic root of
its oneness. However, intellectual life, raised upward toward incor-
ruptible truth, cannot be moved toward corruptible otherness.
130 Therefore, the lowest specific gradation of this [incorruptible] na-
ture,379 being only slightly actual and being almost completely, as it
were, in potentiality, possesses a certain capability of union with tran-
sitory life. [It possesses this capability] not in order to furnish to its
transitory life the vigor of stability; rather, [it possesses it] in order that
by means also of this union it might be rationally moved through a
wondering at perceptible things and might, while in its state of drowsy
potentiality, be aroused unto, and awakened unto, a state of actuali-
ty.380 It is not possible that this specific gradation of the union of both
[kinds of] life, [viz., corruptible and incorruptible], be replicated 381 so

that there would be a plurality of species of this union, although it is
necessary that individuals partake in different ways of this species.
Therefore, (1) indissoluble life is intellectual life, whereas (2) dis-
solvable life is perceptual life. But (3a) that middle life which is near-
er to intellectual life is a rational, noble, and intellectual life—a life
which can also be called a life of intellectual perceiving. On the other
hand, (3b) that [middle life] which is nearer to the senses is rational,
is less than noble, and is imaginative—or can be called a life of per-
ceptual understanding. Therefore, in the human species, a higher
power-of-reason that partakes of intellect is joined with a lower power-
of-reason that is of a perceiving nature.
By means of such a surmise you will be able to attain those
[truths] which our discussion about life can investigate.
131 CHAPTER TWELVE

Nature and art.
Nature is oneness; art is otherness, because art is a likeness of nature.
In accordance with the intellectual mode of discourse God is both Ab-
solute Nature and Absolute Art, although the truth is that He is nei-
ther Art nor Nature nor both [Art and Nature]. Now, since preciseness
is unattainable, [its unattainability] cautions us that there is not to be
believed to be positable anything that is only nature or only art; for
everything, in its own way, partakes of them both. For it is easy to con-
ceive that intelligence, insofar as it emanates from Divine Reason, par-
takes of an art;382 but insofar as intelligence brings forth from itself
an art, we see intelligence to be a nature.383 For art is a certain imi-
tation of nature.384 It is evident that some perceptible things are nat-
ural, whereas others are products of an art. But it is not possible that
perceptible things that are natural be devoid of art; likewise, percep-
tible things that are products of an art cannot lack a nature. For ex-
ample, speech proceeds from an art, on which its nature is dependent.
Thus, one pattern of speech is more natural for one man, whereas an-
other pattern of speech is less natural for him. Moreover, it is natural
to man to make rational inferences, though not [to do so] without [the
help of] an art. Hence, it is certain that in the art of reasoning one
man is more able than is another man. For just as with regard to
speech (which cannot occur without an art) a natural oneness-of-rea-
son shines forth, so that from someone’s speech we know who he is
and what kind of man he is in regard to his reason and his nature, so
too the art of the one who is reasoning is manifested in his reason-
ing.
132 Therefore, if you wish to investigate the differences of nature and
of art and of their union, recur to the [already] oft-disclosed guidance
from diagrams. Masculine nature comes from oneness, whereas fem-
inine nature comes from otherness.385 Now, in intellectual masculin-
ity, femininity is absorbed; therefore, [the intellect] is impregnated uni-
tively 386 within itself. In vegetable femininity 387 otherness retains the
masculine nature within itself; therefore [plants and trees] bear fruit
outside themselves. But nature distinguishes the sex of animals: a man
begets in a woman; a woman gives birth by expelling. Now, in intel-
ligences nature bears intellectual fruit; in animals, animal fruit; in veg-
etables,388 vegetable fruit. Perceptible nature obeys rational nature; ra-
tional nature obeys intellectual nature; intellectual nature obeys the Di-
vine Nature. What is perceptibly makeable obeys a rational art; a ra-
tional art obeys an intellectual art; an intellectual art obeys the Divine
Art. Just as in what-is-perceptible every nature is contracted percep-
tibly,389 so also in what-is-perceptible makeability is contracted per-
ceptibly and in what-is-rational makeability is contracted rationally.
133 Reason is the oneness of perceptible nature and of perceptible art.
Through a oneness-of-rationale a perceptible multitude of individuals
is determined specifically.390 So too, through a oneness-of-rationale
that is in one art—for example, in the art of cobblery—numerous
shoes are made. Therefore, oneness-of-reason enfolds within itself the
multitude of all perceptible things, both things natural and things pro-
duced by an art. Therefore, it brings forth from itself the forms of
things natural and of things produced by an art. But the forms of things
produced by an art are ordered toward the goal of natural things. For
nature is the source and the goal of things produced by an art. There-
fore, a rational art—e.g., speaking, weaving, planting, or cooking, and
so on—is ordered toward the goal of perceptible nature, even as the
art of intelligence is ordered toward the goal of rational nature.
134 CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Intellectual nature.
Universal nature—like the circle of the universe [in Diagram U] 391—
enfolds within itself, first of all, the three spheres of (1) the intel-
lectual regions and natures, (2) the rational regions and natures, and
(3) the perceptible 392 regions and natures. The intellectual nature,
which absorbs into itself alterable areas of darkness, is masculine, sub-
tle, very highly unified, and very noble. Yet, the nature of intelligence
is not quantitative; and intellectual motion is only intellectually and
metaphorically of a quantitative sort—a sort that is not at odds with
simplicity, indivisibility, etc., which are characteristic of intellectual
oneness. For the movement of the intellect unto otherness occurs in no
other way than that otherness proceeds, quite absolutely, unto oneness.
For intellect’s oneness 393 descends unto the rational-intelligible, so
that the rational-intelligible ascends unto intellect’s oneness. For in-
tellect is the beginning and the end of the rational-intelligible, even
as intellect’s Beginning and End is Absolute Oneness.394 Intellect’s
proceeding toward union with Absolute Oneness is (1) its moving up-
wards, in accordance with its intellectual nature, and (2) its finding rest
in this movement—even as reason finds rest in intelligence, unto
which it can ascend only by means of (a) a descent of intelligence
and (b) a receiving, by way of participation, of intelligence’s light.
Likewise, do not conceive of [reason] as a rational quality of in-
tellect’s nature; but, rather, conceive of [reason] as a rational, altered
likeness [of intellect’s nature]. For intellect has no accident and is not
a subject for reason or the senses; nor does intelligible nature have
location otherwise than intellectually; indeed, it has [intellectual] lo-
cation in such a way that it is its location. And this [state of having
intellectual location] does not consist in intellect’s being in a place that
is observable by reason or by the senses. Nor does it follow that in-
tellect is absolutely everywhere and absolutely nowhere, as is God.
Rather, intellect is everywhere and nowhere in an intellectually con-
tracted way. Just as humanity,395 which is contracted as a species, is
present both everywhere and nowhere in that regional species, so too
our soul is present everywhere and nowhere in accordance with the
body’s contractedness. For our soul is both present in each part of that
region of its own and present nowhere. For in no part of the body is
it present as in one place rather than in another. For just as universals
are in the intellect 396 and just as their locus is said to be the intellect,
so this statement must be understood in accordance with our oft-men-
tioned rules, i.e., [must be understood as follows]: that the intellect is
in universals in such a way that they are in it—just as, for example,
a ruler is in his kingdom in such a way that his kingdom is in him.
135 Therefore, an intelligence is a nature that can move from place to
place only in the way that it can be present in a place. Therefore, in-
tellectual nature 397 is moved intellectually within its own prescribed
kingdom. And this moving is a moving with which rest concurs, since
[intellect’s moving] is a conforming to truth (as, for example, the mo-
tion of a ruler’s [issuing a] command is compatible with the ruler’s
remaining seated on his throne). For intelligences are moved qua be-
ings that stay at the center of their contractedness (i.e., of their king-
dom). And we conceive of this movement as the movement of one
who makes judgments. For intelligence is the judge of reasons and is
said to be moved when on the basis of what-is-truer it selects one rea-
son and rejects another and when it illumines and guides those who
engage in reasoning.
136 Therefore, intelligences ought to be conceived as universal pow-
ers and as powers governing over contracted rational-entities.398 It is
as if in their own regions they held the place of a sun, so that just as
in this present perceptible world the eyes proceed perceptually, with
the help of the brightness of the perceptible sun, to a judgment about
the beautiful and the ugly, so in the rational world an intelligence con-
tributes brightness for a knowledge of the true. But God Himself is the
“Infinite Sun” for intelligences, whereas intelligences are as various
more greatly contracted 399 lights for rational minds. But we see rea-
son as contracted in different ways in plants and in animals,400 ac-
cording to the different genera and species; and herefrom we surmise
that the intelligences are diverse governing powers.
137 Intelligences are not numerable by reason’s number, as are these
perceptible objects. Rather, intellectual number,401 which is undesig-
natable by reason and undepictable by reason serves as a light for rea-
son and for rational number. For just as oneness is not numerable by
any number, but itself numbers every number, so too intelligences are
not at all distinguishable [from one another] by reason but are distin-
guishable only by most absolute and most divine Oneness. For where
being numbered tends toward coincidence with numbering, and dis-
tinctness with indistinctness, access is denied to reason. Now, in the
likeness of the points already often made and on the basis of our di-
agrams, make a surmise about the variety of intelligences that par-
take—variously, theophantically, and with a difference of intermedia-
cy—of most singular Truth. For example, certain intelligences partake
more immediately qua intellectible spirits and are very highly elevat-
ed away from all potentiality unto actuality; other intelligences par-
take qua intelligible [spirits] 402 and are closer to having master-knowl-
edge; others partake qua [spirits] that more closely approximate ra-
tional powers, so that they need edifying instruction.
138 You may wish to make a surmise also about the intellectual re-
gion’s darker spirits, whose understanding is afflicted with the dulled
otherness of darkened 403 ignorance. These spirits succumb to abject
observances, and they convey to perceptibly submerged reason the de-
ceitful inducements of their own entangled understanding, so that that
which is perpetual 404 is absorbed by that which is corruptible and so
that light is absorbed by darkness. [If you wish to make the forego-
ing surmise and also a surmise] about the different natures of those
more demonic spirits, then on the basis of the aforesaid and with [the
making of corresponding] adjustments in the symbolism, you will
learn by yourself that in the intellectual region these spirits are like the
more perceptible spirits that live amid perceptible temptations and that
intermingle with lower things. [And you will learn] that still other spir-
its, in an in-between location, are as rational intelligences that are gov-
erning powers over orbits and movements and that do not deviate from
the command of their superiors, who are more highly motivated be-
cause of [their receiving] divine illuminations.
139 I want you always to be very careful not to suppose that only for
our sake have these spirits assumed their overseeing, spirit-related ad-
ministrations, which they (as legates from the supreme, maximal Em-
peror of all things) exercise skillfully with respect to species, nations,
language-groups, congregations, kingdoms, and churches. Rather, [you
should believe] that for our sake (and for the sake of others over whom
they have authority) they do this, [viz., assume these administrations],
in such a way as to constitute themselves as ends.405 Thus, angelic
spirits exist for our sake in such a way that we exist for their sakes.
For example, although to certain inhabitants of a kingdom it seems
that the king’s concern is [only] for them, nevertheless the king, turn-
ing his concern back on itself, constitutes himself as the end both of
his concern for himself and of his concern for the welfare of his peo-
ple. There would not be voluntary obedience of the people or volun-
tary efforts on the part of their ruler if it were not the case both that
the people presumed they would receive the rewards of their submis-
sion and that the ruler presumed he would receive the rewards of his
labors. Therefore, a natural ruler, who walks in the laws of truth, unites
together, as best he can, [both of] these interests, so that he deems his
own welfare to reside in the welfare of his people.

Let these statements—made briefly (to the extent permitted at this
time) regarding the nature of intellectual spirits—be sufficient.
140 CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Man.
By means of our usual procedure 406 conceive of man as constituted
both from the oneness of the light of human nature and from the oth-
erness of corporeal darkness. And analyze man in terms of our earli-
er Diagram,407 so that you may elucidate him more distinctly. You
will see plainly man’s three regions (viz., a lowest region, a middle
region, and a highest region);408 and you will see [each of] these re-
gions to be trinely distinct three times. (A) Make a surmise, in a gra-
dational way, (1) about the less noble corporeal parts and (2) about
other bodily parts that are continually transitory, and (3) about oth-
ers that are more stable and more form-related and very noble.409
(B) Thereafter, conceive—by means of a corresponding ascent—of
the more spirit-related natures of the body, with which the perceptu-
al power is intermingled;410 and divide these through gradations, so
that from the more obtuse natures you may arrive at the more subtle
natures. (C) Moreover, add the nine distinctions of the noble soul.411
Therefore, as regards the three [corporeal] orders (A) you see
man’s nine corporeal differences, which absorb into themselves the
perceptual light,412 so that they are content with causing growth.
(B) You see, as well, nine mixed differences, where perceptual power
flourishes, being mixed both with what is perceptual and with what
is corporeal. (C) Finally, [you see] nine nobler differences, where cor-
poreal shadows are absorbed by the spirit that discriminates.413
Now, corporeal nature advances progressively upward into per-
ceptual nature, in such a way that its highest order coincides closely
with the perceptual nature.414 Likewise, the perceptual nature becomes
refined into the nature that discriminates.415
141 Now, all perception arises as a result of encountering an obsta-
cle.416 Hence, just as certain perceptions are caused by resistance en-
countered on the part of those who are touching, so certain perceptions
are produced, in greater or lesser degree, from more distant objects.
Therefore, the sense of smell, which is perfected within its own [cor-
poreal] instrument, is (because of its quite noble nature) impeded even
by remote objects, so that a perception arises. Moreover, the sense of
hearing is impeded by more remote objects. But the sense of sight ex-
cels all the other senses, so that it is stimulated to perception by still
more distant objects. However, imagination proceeds, with a more ab-
solute 417 freedom, beyond the contractedness of the senses with re-
spect to quantity of mass, of times, of shape, and of place. And it em-
braces more and less than is apprehended by the senses; and it em-
braces what is nearer and what is farther and what is absent, although
it does not pass beyond the genus of perceptible objects. Reason, how-
ever, surpasses the imagination, so that it sees that people on the end
of the earth opposite to us cannot fall off, any more than can we, since
what is heavy is moved toward the center, which is in between them
and us. But imagination cannot arrive at these [conclusions]. Likewise,
it is evident that reason is conveyed above the imagination and pro-
ceeds more truly and less restrictedly unto all things. Now, the intel-
lect is to reason as the power of oneness is to finite number, so that
nothing at all can escape intellect’s power.
142 Marvelous is this work of God in which the discriminating power
is conducted, progressively, from the center of the senses upwards unto
the very lofty intellectual nature! 418 It is conducted by means of cer-
tain gradations and certain instrumental channels in which its ties with
the very refined corporeal spirit are continuously made clearer and
more simplified, on account of the triumph of the soul’s power; [these
ties are lucidified and simplified] until they arrive at the repository of
rational power. Afterwards, [the discriminating power] arrives at the
very lofty order of intellectual power (as if arriving at the boundless
sea by means of a stream), where there are surmised to be choirs of
learning, of intelligence, and of most simple intellectuality.419
143 Therefore, since the oneness of humanity 420 is contracted in a
human way, it is seen to enfold all things in accordance with the na-
ture of its contractedness. For the power of its oneness encompasses
all things, and it keeps them within the bounds of its own region to
such an extent that none of them escape its power. Since [man] sur-
mises that all things are attained by the senses or by reason or by in-
tellect,421 and since he sees that these powers of his are enfolded with-
in his oneness, he supposes that he can proceed unto all things in a
human way. For man is god, but not unqualifiedly, since he is man;
therefore, he is a human god.422 Man is also world but is not con-
tractedly all things, since he is man; therefore, man is a microcosm,423
or a human world. Therefore, the region of humanity encompasses,
by means of its human power, God and the entire world. Therefore,
man can be a human god; and just as he can be a god humanly, so he
can be a human angel, a human beast, a human lion, or a human bear,
or any other such thing. For within the power of humanity all things
144 exist in their own way. Therefore, just as in the universe all things are
unfolded after the fashion of the universe, so in humanity all things
are unfolded in a human way, since [man] is a human world. Finally,
in humanity all things are enfolded in a human way, since [man] is a
human god. For humanity is a oneness that is also a humanly con-
tracted infinity.424
But since it is a condition of oneness to unfold beings from itself
(for oneness is being, which enfolds beings within its simplicity),425
the power of humanity is such as to unfold all things from itself with-
in the circle of its own region and to bring forth all things from out
of the power of its center. But it is [also] a condition of oneness that
it constitute itself as the goal of its unfoldings, since oneness is in-
finity.426 Therefore, there is no other goal of humanity’s action of cre-
ating than humanity itself.427 For when humanity creates, it does not
pass beyond itself; rather, when it unfolds its power, it arrives at it-
self.428 Nor does humanity create anything new; rather, whatever it
creates in unfolding, it finds already to have been present within it-
self.429 For I stated already 430 that in humanity all things exist, in a
human way. For just as humanity’s power is able to proceed unto all
things in a human way, so all things are able to proceed unto human-
ity. Moreover, for humanity’s marvelous power to go forth unto all
the things that are to be surveyed is nothing other than for its power
to enfold all things within itself in a human way.
145 You have heard, Father Julian, the following about the triune Ab-
solute Beginning, the Creator of all things: viz., that (1) because He
is Absolute Oneness, or Absolute Being, in which are present Infinite
Equality and Infinite Union,431 He is the Omnipotent Creator; and (2)
because He is Infinite Equality in which are present [Infinite] One-
ness and [Infinite] Union, He is the Director, Ordainer, and Governor
of all things; and (3) because He is Infinite Union in which are pre-
sent [Infinite] Oneness and [Infinite] Equality, He is the Conserver of
all things.
Likewise, affirm to be true that which is to be surmised in a con-
tracted way about humanity. For humanity is the contracted beginning
of the creating, governing, and conserving of its own order; for it is
a oneness in which are present equality and union, it is an equality in
which are present oneness and union, and it is a union in which are
present oneness and equality—these terms being reduced to their sig-
nification within the contracted region of humanity.432 Therefore, by
means of humanity’s power, man in his higher perceptual part, viz.,
the imagination, creates likenesses or images of perceptible objects,
because he is a oneness in which there are equality and union. But he
orders and situates these created images, because he is an equality in
which there are oneness and union. Thereafter, he conserves them in
his memory, because he is a union in which there are oneness and
equality. Similarly, in the region of things intellectual, man acts by
intellectually creating, ordering, and conserving; and in the rational,
middle region he does likewise. However, he directs these actions
straight back toward himself, in order to be able to understand, gov-
ern, and conserve himself 433 And in this way man can approach a state
of likeness-to-God 434 where all things are at rest in eternal peace.
146 CHAPTER FIFTEEN

A continuation of the same topic [viz., on man].435
When you plan to take up, in your surmises, the topic of the agree-
ments and the differences among all men, you must take account of
the Diagram of all things 436 by construing the human species as con-
tracted within the largest circle. Thereupon you will see, as regards the
species of humanity, that (A) certain contemplative and more detached
men—being, as it were, in the supreme heaven of humanity—are prin-
cipally engaged in a certain conversance with intellectual and eternal
things. And being, as it were, the intellect of the species, they devote
themselves to contemplating truth. (B) There are others, too, who,
being the species’ reason, as it were, have authority over (C) men who
are lower down at the level of the senses, so to speak.437 The first
[group of these men]—being wise, as if they were very bright, and
very pure, lights—bear 438 the image of the incorruptible, immaterial
world. The last group, who are at the level of the senses, pursue con-
cupiscence and pleasure, as if they were brutes. The middle group of
men both partake of the bright influence of the higher group and ex-
ercise authority over the lower group. And so, it is fitting that these
three divisions of men, within the oneness of the [human] species, par-
take of multitude in a general way within their entire species.
147 Next, you will see, within the division of religion or contempla-
tion, three more-specific differences. For (A1) one divisional area has
to do with the multitude of men who partake of contemplation lofti-

ly and nobly, above all reason and all the senses; (A2) but another di-
visional area contracts contemplation into a kind of rationality; and
(A3) the lowest divisional area contracts contemplation into percep-
tuality, as it were. And as you see by means of our [diagrammatic] pro-
cedure, there is present in all men by means of their specific nature a
certain religion 439 that promises them a higher, immortal end and that
is partaken of variously (as you recognize in general) by the inhabi-
tants of this world. Consequently, (A1) the first and more detached
[group of men], who partake of religion more intellectually and be-
yond all reason and all the senses, look forward to a life that tran-
scends, in its excellence, the entire capability of both reason and the
senses. But (A2) other men, who reduce happiness to something with-
in the bounds of reason, place the [immortal] end in the knowledge and
enjoyment of things. (A3) The third group of men most absurdly place
the [immortal] end in the delights of the senses. In addition, the first
group is distinguished in a threefold way,440 as are also the second
group 441 and the third group.442
148 By means of this procedure [of ours] inspect, through gradations,
the most general agreements and differences among all men: in the
third heaven 443 [there are] agreements and differences with respect to
[men’s] religion; in the second heaven 444 [there are] agreements and
differences with respect to [men’s] nature as presiders; in the lowest
heaven 445 [there are] agreements and differences with respect to [men]
as presided-over. Now, although these divisions, which are derived
from the species, persist in their generality everywhere and unceas-
ingly, nevertheless in their specificity they admit of change, since pre-
ciseness of truth can be pursued by us only by way of surmise.446
Therefore, the intellectual oneness 447of that [third heaven’s] religion
is received with various degrees of otherness—and is received change-
ably with changeable multitude—on the part of the directors of the
second heaven. So too, presiding oneness, which is said to be one-
ness of rational species, dwells persistently—though inconstantly and
with various degrees of otherness-of-mode—in the changeable multi-
tude of subjects who are at the level of the senses.
149 Notice, too, that although either religion or governance be seen
to be stable for awhile in some nation or other of this world, never-
theless it is not stable in a precise way. For example, the Rhein river
is seen to flow constantly for awhile; but it never remains in one and
the same state, since it is now more turbulent, now more clear, now
rising, now receding. So too, it is the case that although it is true to
say that the Rhein was larger and smaller and that it passed gradual-
ly from largeness to smallness, nevertheless it is evident that the Rhein
was never before exactly as it now is. So too, religion fluctuates in-
constantly between spirituality and temporality. And the situation is
similar regarding governance: it persists while fluctuating between
greater and lesser obedience.
150 You can investigate, surmisingly, the variety of all the inhabitants
of our world with respect to their temperament, shapes, vices and
morals, subtlety and grossness. [You can do so] (1) by construing the
circle of all inhabitants 448 as the horizon that intercepts the North, the
South, the East, and the West and (2) by construing, in the diagram,449
the South as the upper circle, the North as the lower circle, and the
middle of the world as the middle circle.450 Therefore, the ascent of
the human species is from north to south; and the descent of the
human species is from south to north. Thus, all men who partake of
the horizon in the highest heaven 451 are more lively in intellect; those
of the middle heaven who partake thereof are more lively with regard
to reason; those of the lowest heaven who partake thereof are more
lively with regard to the senses. Therefore, in these northern regions
the intellect is more immersed in possibility and perceptibility, as if
the men were at the level of the senses; in the middle region the in-
tellect flourishes in and through reason; in the third region it flourishes
more detachedly. Hence, too, in the regions of India and of Egypt in-
tellectual religion and the abstract mathematical arts prevail. In Greece
and among the North Africans and the Romans dialectic, rhetoric, and
legal studies have flourished. In the other, more northern regions, the
mechanical arts, which have to do with the senses, have flourished.
Nevertheless, it is necessary that all regions have individuals who are
skilled, in their own way, in all these [disciplines].452 Consequently,
there is [but] a single nature of a single species—a nature partaken of
in different ways by all men.
151 Similarly, when you turn your investigation toward the corporeal
dispositions of men, pay attention to Diagram P.453 If you are inquir-
ing about the color of men, construe the northern point 454 as oneness
of light and the southern point as [otherness] 455 of darkness; and you
will see that the northerners are of the white region, that the south-
erners are of the black region, and that those in the middle have in-
between shades.
152 If by means of our [diagrammatic] procedure you inquire about
temperaments, you will see that inhabitants of the middle region are
better tempered, since in that region the extremes are more harmo-
niously and concordantly brought into a certain combination of one-
ness.456 But in the northern regions you see an excess of cold and of
disordered fluids. In the southern regions you see (1) a defect in those
respects and (2) an excess of dryness. And in the in-between regions
you see that in the colder [parts of these] regions heat thrives more
by being contracted toward the center, and in the warmer [parts of
153 these regions] it thrives more in the extremities. On the basis of these
factors you will be able to make surmises about food and clothing,
about dwellings and customs, about physical strengths, weaknesses,
and defects, about varieties of shapes and of heights—in accordance
with the difference of locations.
154 Similarly, if you inquire, surmisingly, about the vices and virtues
of the [different] peoples, you will see the same [phenomenon as men-
tioned above]. For humanity, making at the arctic pole a beginning of
its ascent toward the antarctic pole, reaches at the equator its altitude
and the end of its ascent. (Humanity has ascended from one world to
another.) Therefore, it proceeds like a man, who at first is in a period
of growth, then is in a stationary period, and next is in a period of de-
cline. Therefore, the relationship of men occupying the lower grade
(i.e., of those inhabiting the first third of the world’s ascent) is to other
men as is a man’s relation during the period when he still brings forth
the powers of his body from potentiality to actuality (viz., between
infancy and manhood). Therefore, the northern regions partake vari-
ously of the vices that are proper to that time-period and, likewise, par-
take differently of the virtues of that time-period. For some peoples
are nearer to manhood; others are nearer to infancy. In these respects
some people (e.g., those who are more eastern) are more somber, more
masculine, and more skillful; others (e.g., those who are more west-
ern) are more feminine, more talkative, more light-minded, more
pious, more fickle. Likewise, the middle peoples, who are in between
manhood and old age, partake—variously and differently, in an east-
ern manner an in a western manner—of the vices and virtues of that
age. But the more southern peoples, who are between old age and de-
crepitude, have [their own] vices and virtues.
It suffices that I have said this much about these comparisons. On
the basis of the things said you may, if you like, investigate particu-
lar points more individually.
155 CHAPTER SIXTEEN

The human soul.
In accordance with what has often already been said, conceive, first
of all, of the universe as constituted from oneness and otherness, and
analyze the one universe into three regions, according as the earlier di-
agram 457 shows you. Stipulate, then, that the simple intelligences be-
long to the first region, where the otherness of darkness is absorbed
by the splendor of light. And conceive of the natures that alter light
by their corporeality as belonging to the lowest region. And, if you
like, call the in-between natures souls, for souls occupy a middle po-
sition, so that through them there is a descent of intelligence unto
lower things and a return-flow of lower things unto higher things.
Now, the earlier paradigmatic diagram shows you that the extremes
come together as one—in particular, that the highest nature of the soul
coincides with the lowest nature of intellectual being and that the low-
est nature of the soul coincides with the highest nature of corporeal
being.458
156 Well, then, if you desire to inquire more individually about the dif-
ferences of souls, imagine right now a large circle of all souls;459 and,
within the whole of the circle, view there to be three divisions: root
divisions, square divisions, and cubic divisions.460 But conceive of in-
telligence 461 as a simple oneness of this universe, even as God is, in
a universal way, the Oneness of all things.462 You will see very clear-
ly that intelligence is united to all souls by means of a certain universal
union, which is symbolized by the largest circle. Next, intelligence is
united to the first region 463 of souls in a general way but is united to
the highest order 464 of souls in a more specific way and is united in
a most specific way to the highest choir 465 of souls, which is called
the human species.466 Therefore, every soul 467 partakes of the one-
ness of intelligence with a degree of otherness; some souls partake
more manifestly, others partake more obscurely, but only the highest
souls are united with intelligence by means of a very specific union.
And this is the partaking by means of which the highest of the lower
passes into a coincidence with the lowest of the higher.468
Now, through the intermediacy of the soul it happens that animals
partake more manifestly of intelligences than do plants. But, qua
genus, animal has a plurality of species that go forth—in an ordered

way as do numbers—from the oneness of the genus. Of these species,
that one is nobler and higher which is nearer to oneness. Therefore,
when the soul of the most perfect species of animal 469 passes into one-
ness with the intellectual nature, it enfolds within itself, potentially, the
other powers of all souls. By way of illustration: with regard to the
genus of metals the species of gold—the species most perfect in
value—encompasses all the other species of metals; and in the genus
of rulers the authority of the king unites within itself the authorities
of the other dukes, of the counts, and of the lower rulers. Therefore,
the respective species of all [non-human] animals unfold, in a nu-
merical way, the unified power of the human soul; and they contract
the human soul’s nature with varying degrees of difference: one
species contracts it with clearer reason, another with more darkened
reason. Nevertheless, no species is able to attain precise equality [ei-
ther with the human species or with another species].
157 Since the human soul is the lowest intellectual nature,470 it exists
intellectually as in potentiality. But intellectual potentiality is reason’s
light. Therefore, conceive of the human soul according to Diagram P,
[i.e., as constituted] from intellectual oneness and perceptual other-
ness. Therefore, when through three gradations the light of intelligence
descends unto perceptual shadows and when through three gradations
the senses ascend unto the intellect,471 then in the middle there arise
two things which I take to have the name “reason”. This reason’s su-
perior part, which is prior 472 to the intellect, is the apprehension; but
its inferior part is the imagination.473 (Let these parts be called by
these names or by other names, as you please.) These [powers] are,
as it were, the four “elements” of the human soul.474
Now, this intellect in our soul descends unto the senses because
what-is-perceptual ascends unto the intellect; and what-is-perceptual
ascends unto 475 the intellect because the intellect descends unto it. For
the intellect’s descending unto the perceptual is the perceptual’s as-
cending unto the intellect. For example, that which is visible is not
attained by the sense of sight in the absence of the intellectual power’s
endeavor. Indeed, we experience this fact when, being intent on other
matters, we do not distinctly notice a passerby.476 For the senses take-
in, confusedly, that-which-is-perceptible as it ascends unto them; but
that perception 477 is unformed and indistinct unless, in us, intellect de-
scends through the intermediacy of reason. Nor apart from the sens-
es do we attain that-which-is-perceptible as such. For example, a blind
man 478 does not attain perceptible color. However, the intellect, which
is in potentiality in accordance with the intellectual region, is more in
actuality in accordance with the lower regions. Hence, the intellect is
in actuality in the perceptual world; for example, in sight the intellect
actually apprehends that which is visible, and in hearing it actually ap-
prehends that which is audible. But in the senses the intellect is the
senses; in the imagination it is imagination; in reason it is reason.479
158 The soul is nothing other than a certain noble and simple unified-
power. Now, each part of a [unified-]power is predicated truly of the
whole. For example, since our soul’s perceptual power or imaginative
power is in the soul, it is the soul, just as the power of a duke or of
a count is, in the king, the regal power—even as the regal power is,
in a duke, the ducal power. Moreover, since the soul is the enliven-
ment of the body, the soul is, in the foot, the enlivenment of the foot;
in the hand it is the enlivenment of the hand. And since the enliven-
ment of the soul is the soul, the soul is the oneness of the living cor-
poreal-otherness; and, consequently, the soul is present in each part [of
the body] as oneness is present in a number. For just as the power of
someone who throws a stone upwards lifts the heavy stone in such a
way that when the power ceases, the stone hastens downward, so the
power of the soul moves the body, and dying is nothing other than
the enlivening power’s ceasing. Therefore, in sight, the soul is sight;
in hearing, it is hearing.
159 Therefore, because of the fact that in the senses the intellect is pre-
sent actually, somnolent reason is awakened 480 through wondering,
so that it hastens toward that which is a likeness of the true object. 481
Next, intelligence is stimulated, so that it is raised up more alertly and
more abstractly from a slumbering power to a knowledge of the true
object. For the intelligence makes representations, in the imagination,
of those things which are perceived; and when it inquires about their
form [ratio], it proceeds unto an act of understanding and unto a
knowledge of the true object. For it unites—in the imagination—the
differences of the things perceived. It unites—in reason—the variety
of differences among images. It unites—in its own simple intellectu-
al oneness—the various differences of forms.482 The oneness of the
intellect descends unto the otherness of reason; the oneness of rea-
son 483 descends unto the otherness of imagination; the oneness of
imagination descends unto the otherness of the senses. Therefore, en-
fold intellectually the ascent together with the descent, in order that
you may apprehend. The intellect’s aim is not to become the senses
but to become an intellect perfect even in actuality. But since the in-
tellect cannot be constituted in actuality in some other way, it does
become the senses, in order in this way and by this means to be able
to pass from potentiality into actuality. Likewise, the intellect turns
back on itself in a complete, circular return. The situation is as if a
nobleman—who was potentially engaged in warfare, which for lack of
funds, he could not actually wage—were to subject himself for a time,
in order in this way to acquire the wherewithal by which to consti-
tute himself actually at war.
160 The rich, very noble intelligences 484 do not need the senses, for
the intelligences are like blazing, unconsumable and ever-growing
fires: in order to blaze, the intelligences do not need an external, arous-
ing wind bellowing out from a perceptible bellows. For they exist in
actuality, although in differing ways. But since our intellectual part is
like a flickering fire concealed between kindle-wood that is green, it
has need of these aids. You do not think that we men, who flourish
by means of the senses, attain anything that is hidden from the intel-
ligences.485 Indeed, the intelligences attain intellectually that which
we, by means of the senses, attain perceptually. For example, when
someone speaks the French language,486 I, through hearing, attain the
voice 487 but you attain, by means of the voice, also the mind’s mean-
ing. By contrast, an intelligence views [that] mind without [the need
for] words. I [view that mind] non-rationally; you [view it] rational-
ly; an angel 488 [views it] intellectually. Therefore, what is sought is
attained more truly and more perfectly by means of intellectual insight
than by means of perceptual hearing.
161 Moreover, take account of the following: just as you have heard
that the intellect, for the sake of its perfection, descends and returns
unto itself by means of a complete return, conceive in a similar way
as regards the senses; for for the sake of the perfection of the per-
ceptual life, the senses proceed upward unto the intellect. Therefore,
two appetites—one natural and one accidental 489—are united; they are
filled up by way of a mutual circle of return. Now, since the perfec-
tion of the intellect is its actually understanding (for when the ability
to understand passes into actuality, it is perfected), the intellect is its
own fecundity: it makes intelligible (by means of its own resources)
that which comes into it. The intellect’s descending unto perceptual
images is the perceptual images’ ascending from the conditions of their
contractedness unto less contracted simplicities. Therefore, the more

deeply the intellect enters into these images, the more they are ab-
sorbed by its light, so that, at length, the intellectual otherness,490 hav-
ing been resolved into the intellect’s oneness,491 finds rest as in its
own goal. Therefore, the oneness of the intellect is made more per-
fect the more it proceeds from potentiality into actuality. And the more
powerful a fire is in actuality, the more quickly it causes what is ig-
niteable to pass from potentiality into actuality. Nor is causing the ig-
niteable to be on fire anything other than the fire’s deepening itself in
the igniteable.
The intellect is present in us as a seed of intellectual fire and is
placed in the rational-igniteable, its “material,” so to speak. Hence, just
as color is visible only by means of light’s oneness (because color is
otherness-of-light, and otherness is attainable only by means of one-
ness), so images are intelligible only by means of reason’s light;492 for
images are alterities of reason’s oneness.493 Therefore, the closer the
images are to reason’s oneness, the more intelligible they are—just as
a color that is closer to the light is more visible. Hence, just as a flame,
because it is absorbed by light, is visible through itself, and just as by
means of its light we see alterations-of-light, viz., colors: so, too, con-
cepts are absorbed by reason’s light, so that they are understood
through themselves and so that they make intelligible other, more ob-
scure, things—as is evident in the case of principles known through
themselves.494 Therefore, through itself reason betakes itself to the
intellect, just as through itself light presents itself to sight; and through
itself the intellect descends unto reason, just as sight goes forth unto
light. For reason’s being intelligible through itself is intellect’s de-
scending unto it. But just as through itself oneness goes forth unto
number, so through itself reason goes forth unto images; and just as
number is attained only by means of oneness, so the intellect appre-
hends images only by means of reason.
162 Note, then, that through itself oneness is unattainable. Otherwise,
preciseness (something infinite and unattainable) would be attained by
reason—a result that is impossible.495 Therefore, oneness is attained
only by way of otherness; for example, a oneness of species is attained
by way of the otherness of individuals, and a oneness of genus 496 is
attained by way of the difference of species. By the same basic con-
sideration,497 otherness, too, is not attained through itself; hence, oth-
erness is attained only by way of oneness. The individual is attained
only by way of its species, and its species is attained only by way of
its genus. Color is attained only by way of light; and sound is attained
only by way of air, since sound is the otherness of air-at-rest. More-
over, pain, which is otherness, is felt only by means of a oneness of
continuity or of temperament. For when the oneness of the continuity
is dissolved and altered, or when the harmonic oneness-of-tempera-
ment is affected by a certain otherness, then a disturbance in the [har-
monic] oneness is felt.
163 And since it is evident that the intellect is the oneness of reason
(with reason partaking of intellect with a degree of otherness), then in-
tellect, which precedes the otherness [of reason], is not subjected ei-
ther to time (which springs forth from reason) 498 or to corruptibility;
for intellect is the more absolute oneness 499 of the otherness that char-
acterizes reason. Therefore, the intellect’s nature is not corruptible,
since it precedes reason.500 Now, where oneness absorbs otherness,
there immortality is found. Therefore, the higher rational nature,501
which absorbs the otherness of images by the light of its oneness and
which is hidden in the light of the immortal intellect, is immortal, even
as light is undarkenable. For just as light as it is in itself cannot fail
to be visible, so pure reason 502 cannot fail to be understood. And its
being understood is pure reason’s life and perfection. And you can in-
vestigate the difference between human reason and a beast’s reason 503
with respect to human reason’s being absorbed by the immortality of
the intellectual life (which is always engaged in understanding)—ab-
sorbed because reason is always intelligible through itself, even as
light is always visible through itself.504 However, the alterities 505-of-
light, viz., colors, are not visible through themselves. Likewise, the
alterities-of-reason that are present in the other species of animals 506
are not [intelligible through themselves]. Therefore, they are alterable
and corruptible.
164 But when a man who has been blind 507 for a long time begins to
see, he is first aware of this fact while in the light. Consequently, light
is the otherness of the visual spirit;508 and sight does not apprehend
its own oneness except by means of otherness. Therefore, that light
which imposes itself on the eye—by means of which light the eye is
aware that it sees—is a light other than the light of the visual spir-
it.509 Therefore, when the power of the visual spirit’s light absorbs into
itself the visible light, the visible light passes into sight. But when the
otherness of the visible light absorbs, because of its power, the weak-
ness of the visual spirit, the oneness of the visual power passes into
the otherness and division [of the visible light].

165 We must make surmises in a similar way, it seems to me, regard-
ing intellectual power and the light of reason. For reason is the oth-
erness of intellectual oneness; and unless [the intellect’s] power is
strong, it is oftentimes absorbed by the otherness of reason, so that [a
man mistakenly] deems true opinion to be [true] understanding. Like-
wise, too, the otherness of images oftentimes absorbs reason, so that
that which a man [only] imagines, he [mistakenly] judges to be shown
by reason. Likewise, too, the otherness of the senses sometimes ab-
sorbs the oneness of imagination’s power, so that that which a man
attains by the senses he [mistakenly] judges to be that which he imag-
ines—as, for example, an infant, still having an unformed power of
imagination, judges the woman-whom-he-sees to be the mother whom
he imagines. Something similar is accustomed to happen also to oth-
ers who are weak in regard to this imaginative power.
166 Therefore, the intellect, which is the oneness of reason,510 is unit-
ed to the body by the intermediary of reason. For the corporeal na-
ture can partake of the intellectual nature only with a degree of oth-
erness. Since the corporeal nature is maximally different from the in-
tellectual nature, it has need of intermediate steps. Therefore, by
means of the otherness that belongs to reason’s light and by means of
a vegetative and a perceptual intermediate, the corporeal nature par-
takes of the intellectual nature. Now, the perceptual [intermediate] as-
cends, by means of the bodily instruments, all the way to reason,
which adheres to a very subtle and very immaterial spirit of the brain.
But the otherness that is received by reason is—by way of the one-
ness of reason, which is the otherness of the intellect—taken into the
intellect, which is free from all [bodily] instruments. And since rea-
son’s ascent here is intellect’s descent: when absolute intellect 511
searches amid reason’s otherness, it embraces truths insofar as they
have been elevated upward from images.512
167 Therefore, since, in the foregoing way, intellect takes its starting-
point from things perceptual,513 it cannot be unqualifiedly true but is
true in some respect. For example, in reason intellect is true in ac-
cordance with reason; in imagination intellect is true in accordance
with imagination; in the senses it is true in accordance with the sens-
es. But when the intellect views things more abstractly and apart from
all otherness-of-reason and in its own simple intellectual-nature, it em-
braces them apart from images and in the brightness of truth. For the
intellect is the otherness of Infinite Oneness.514 Therefore, the more

highly the intellect frees itself from its own otherness in order to be
able to ascend more highly unto Most Simple Oneness, the more per-
fect and more lofty it is. For since all otherness is attainable only by
means of oneness, the intellect (which is otherness, since it is not the
divine, most absolute Intellect but is a human intellect) can view it-
self, as it is, only in Most Divine Oneness.515 For only in that Truth
which is the Infinite Oneness of all things 516 can the intellect attain
either itself as it is or any other intelligible thing as it is.517 But the
intellect can view Infinite Oneness only in terms of intellectual oth-
erness.518 Therefore, within its own self the intellect beholds that One-
ness not as it is [in and of itself] but [only] as it is humanly under-
stood. And by means of the oneness that the intellect thus understands
in terms of otherness, the intellect elevates itself in order to proceed
more absolutely unto Oneness as it is [in and of itself]—elevates it-
self from the true unto Truth, Eternity, and Infinity. And this is the ul-
timate perfection of the intellect: viz., that by means of a theophany 519
that descends unto it, it continually ascends toward a nearer likeness
to divine and infinite Oneness, which is, for the intellect, Infinite Life,
Infinite Truth, and Infinite Rest.
168 The intellect is of so subtle a nature that it views a sphere as pre-
sent in the indivisible center-point.520 When the intellect is contract-
ed in reason, it views a sphere by means of that rational definition
which holds that all the lines from the center to the circumference are
equal. When the intellect views a sphere 521 by means of the imagi-
nation, it imagines it as round and corporeal. But the sense of sight
cannot view the [entire] sphere [at once] but can view only a part of
it; yet, by means of reason’s adding part to part, [the whole sphere] is
attained. Hence, just as intellectual truth,522 in its preciseness, is un-
attainable by reason, so also rational truth 523 is not contractible by
the senses. For in regard to otherness there must always be a defi-
ciency. For oneness is discoverable to be in otherness in no other way
than by means of a falling away from preciseness and equality. For
otherwise—i.e., if otherness were precise equality—otherness would
not be otherness.
Therefore, not even the rational definition of a circle describes a
true intellectual circle. For, intellectually speaking, a circle is not
judged to be a true circle by virtue of the fact that the lines from its
center to its circumference are equal. Rather, this rational definition
of an intellectual circle is to a true circle as a sign is to what is sig-

nified [by it] and as otherness is to its own oneness or as a compos-
ite is to what is simple or as an unfolding is to an enfolding or as
what is contracted is to what is absolute. For by means of the proce-
dures of reason a circle cannot [be conceived to] exist, in its contracted
being, otherwise [than in accordance with its rational definition]; but
in the circle’s own less-contracted oneness 524 the circle exists intelli-
gibly 525 without the otherness of lines and of circumference.526
But just as reason, in the oneness of intellect, makes inferences
demonstratively and a priori, so if [the following were the case], our
intellectual knowledge could not be any truer: in Absolute Oneness,
which is Truth, all otherness were viewed not as otherness but as One-
ness [and were viewed there] in as absolute and precise a way as this
viewing is granted [to us] by the gift of God.527 This [viewing of oth-
erness as oneness] can be done very precisely only by the Divine In-
tellect, which is Absolute Preciseness.528 For the Divine Intellect alone
is all that which understands in every act of understanding and is all
that which is understood in everything understandable.529
169 Therefore, with regard to its actual perfection the foregoing intel-
lectual knowledge is to the [perfection of] other [forms of knowledge]
as a solid is to a surface, to a line, and to a point;530 but with regard
to intellectual knowledge’s subtlety, intellectual knowledge is [to other
forms of knowledge] as a point is to a line, a surface, and a solid. In-
deed, intellectual knowledge embraces—at once perfectly, subtly, and
pointedly—that which is true. By contrast, rational knowledge is more
contracted; and it is fairly perfect, as is a surface, and is subtle as is
a line. But imaginative knowledge is more greatly contracted; and it
is perfect as is a line but is gross as is a surface. And perceptual knowl-
edge is individually the most contracted; and it is very imperfect, as
is a point, and is very gross, as is a solid.
170 The foregoing forms of knowledge vary in different ways de-
pending upon the variety of the [bodily] instruments, the power of the
conducting spirits, and the variety of the oneness through which oth-
erness is reached. For example, if the transparent medium through
which the otherness of light ascends unto sight is altered by the color
red or by some other color, then the thing seen appears to be of that
color. For the thing seen is attained not in a simple oneness (i.e., in
pure light) but in light that has been altered in the transparent medi-
um (e.g., altered by a beryl-stone 531 or by a piece of glass or by a
flame or by a colored, or an altered, ray). Likewise, the intellect does

not attain pure images unless reason is pure and free, for reason is the
oneness of the otherness of images. Now, in the case of corrupted and
altered reason, reason’s judgment is corrupted, as we recognize when
reason is bound to an authority. For in that case reason is altered and
contracted away from its purity, and its judgment is corrupted in ac-
cordance with the authority. Therefore, those who are filled with pas-
sion lack right judgment, since in them the light of reason is contracted
and altered—just as when the sense of taste is corrupted by a salivary
moistness, it corruptly makes a judgment about what is sweet, i.e.,
judges it to be bitter. And so on.
171 CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

Self-Knowledge.
From the aforesaid you will easily elicit a concise and surmising
knowledge 532 of yourself, as I will now show you from what remains
[to be said].
First of all, Father Julian, you do not doubt that you are a man,533
and you do not doubt that someone is called a man because of his hu-
manity, just as something is called white because of its whiteness.
Now, when you see that I too am a man and am another man than are
you and than is every other individual man, then you see clearly that
humanity is a certain oneness that can be partaken of with a degree
of otherness. But you notice that humanity, which is individually con-
tractible with a degree of otherness, is, in comparison with the other-
ness of lionness and of horseness, itself the otherness of a more ab-
solute oneness.
172 Therefore, you conceive the First Oneness, or First Being, to be
most absolute and to be altogether incontractible; it is partaken of in-
contractedly 534 with various degrees of otherness. In order that you
may be helped by means of a visible illustration, imagine light to be
the very simple incontractible oneness of our visible world; by means
of the otherness of participation in incontractible light all visible things
are that which they are. Therefore, color is an altered partaking of this
light.535 Therefore, let the circle of the universe [in Diagram U] be
the orbit of color. Now, color can exist only contractedly, since its one-
ness, which falls short of absolute oneness, is contracted with a degree
of otherness.536 Therefore, note the three regions of the contractedness
of color with their nine final differences. The contraction of the high-
est region’s color will be such that in it the partaking of quite absolute
light hides in its bright splendor the shadowy alterities. But the con-
dition of the lowest region will run counter to this, for [there] the ini-
tial partaking of light is absorbed by darkness. And the middle region
behaves in an in-between way. Look at these regions more particularly
by means of the three trine distinctions.537
173 Likewise, Julian—provided that in a corresponding way you make
light to symbolize divinity and make color to symbolize humanity and
make the visible world to symbolize humanity’s universe—investigate
yourself by means of the diagram,538 and see whether you are of the
highest region, the middle region, or the lowest region. For it seems
to me that you contract humanity in the highest region and in a noble
species of the highest region and by means of a partaking of the very
bright Divine Light. By means of our disclosed procedure, each man
can make a surmise about himself in comparison with other men. And
after you have found yourself to be situated in the order of those who
contract humanity by means of their partaking of Most Absolute One-
ness, note that your humanity encircles your entire being and that you
partake of Divinity 539 in and through the contractedness of your hu-
manity.540 But Divinity is Infinite Oneness, Infinite Equality, and In-
finite Union—in such a way that in the Oneness there are Equality
and Union, in the Equality there are Oneness and Union, and in the
Union there are Oneness and Equality.541
174 Conceive, then, of your contracted humanity (by means of which
you partake of the Divinity) as the circle of all things;542 and in an
ordered way take note—as regards the regions and the divisions of
regions—of how it is that by means of the highest nature of your hu-
manity 543 you partake most highly of the Divinity but that by means
of the lowest nature of your humanity you partake of the Divinity in
a most lowly way, and that by means of the middle nature of your hu-
manity you partake of the Divinity in an in-between way. For, indeed,
by means of your most noble nature you partake of the Divinity in
accordance with the condition of that region, viz., in an intellectual
way; by means of your middle nature you partake of the Divinity in
a rational way; by means of your lowest nature you partake of it in a
perceptual way—according as these regions are situated within the cir-
cle of your contracted humanity.544
Now, to partake intellectually of the Light of Divinity is to partake
of a oneness in which equality and union are present. But to be some-
thing intellectual is to understand. Therefore, you partake of Divinity

by means of the light of intelligence, so that you know (1) that by the
gift of God you have intelligence 545 and (2) that intelligence is intel-
lectually greater the more greatly it is one—indeed, one with respect
to a oneness such that in it equality and union are present. Therefore,
in oneness great intelligence is present, just as it is also present in
equality-of-oneness and in the union of both [oneness and equality-
of-oneness]. But in oneness itself, in which equality and union are pre-
sent, there maximal intelligence is present. You partake of Divinity
intellectually by means of an equality in which oneness and union are
present; and this [triune equality] is the light of justice. Therefore, the
more you partake intellectually of absolute equality, in which oneness
and union are present, the more Godlike you are. You also partake of
Divinity by means of a union in which oneness and equality are pre-
sent; and this [triune union] is the light of love. Therefore, the more
you partake intellectually of the love in which oneness and equality
are present, the more divine you will be, in accordance with the in-
tellectual and loftiest nature of your humanity.
175 In all these matters be attentive to using terms according to the
rules I have given. For example, after I have spoken about the Divin-
ity by means of words, apply their [meanings], in a transferred way,
to the Divinity’s nature. Likewise, after I have disclosed to you my
conception of the intellectual region, restrict [the meaning of] my con-
ception’s terms to the laws of that region. Thereafter, in like manner,
turn your attention to the other regions, in order to be able to see, with
respect to your rational part, how it is that your reason partakes of
Divinity in its own way.546 For those things of which the intellect par-
takes intellectually are partaken of also by reason in its own way, as
well as by the senses according to the conditions of their nature.
176 You see now, O Julian, how it is that in the three regions the one-
ness that is in your contracted humanity partakes variously of Triune
Light. And you see how it is that in the supreme nobility of your na-
ture you (1) partake supremely (i.e., partake intellectually) of Supreme
Oneness, or Supreme Being, which is Intellective Power, and (2) par-
take supremely of Supreme Equality, which is the Power of equaliz-
ing, or of justifying, and (3) also partake supremely of Supreme
Union, which is the Power of uniting, or of loving. Likewise, you par-
take of this Triune Power in an intermediate way in the middle re-
gion. Therefore, you see that you partake contractedly (1) of the power
of existing rationally, i.e., of discriminating, and (2) of the power of

equalizing, or justifying, rationally, and (3) of the power of uniting,
or loving, [rationally]. Similarly, in accordance with the lowest region,
you partake [contractedly] (1) of the power of existing at the level of
the senses, i.e., of perceiving, and (2) of the power of equalizing, or
justifying, at the level of the senses, and (3) of the power of uniting,
or loving, at the level of the senses.
The foregoing powers, which are powers by participation, are en-
folded in the power of your humanity. But in the partaking of one-
ness, or of being, there is at the same time a partaking of equality and
of union, which are present in oneness. Consequently, in your intel-
lect’s oneness-by-participation there is present a power of equality-
of-intellectual-being 547 (i.e., a power of understanding) as well as a
power of uniting (or of loving), which proceeds from the intellect and
its acts of understanding; for the intellect loves its own acts of un-
derstanding. For intellectual love presupposes both that-which-is-un-
derstood and that-which-understands. Something similar must be said,
in its own way, of reason and of the senses.
177 You know, then, Father Julian, that you partake of the power-[of-
oneness] (which carries within itself the nature of equality and of
union) in order that your intellect (which partakes in its own way of
Divine Being) can understand and embrace what-is-understood (doing
so by means of an equality with what-is-understood) in such a way
that your act of understanding is nothing other than an equality that
belongs to your intellect’s oneness-by-participation.548 Know, then,
that you have obtained the power-of-understanding by means of an
equality with, or a likeness to, the Divine Light [insofar as the Divine
Light has been] partaken of intellectually. A similar thing holds true
regarding the power of reasoning and the power of perceiving. But
since oneness is partaken of more perfectly in proportion to the greater
equality and greater union that are present in it, the act of under-
standing and the act of uniting cannot be increased apart from a per-
fecting of the intellect’s oneness. Therefore, the intellect is disposed
to understand and to love, in order that the nature of its oneness may
be perfected. Likewise, reason [is disposed] to make inferences, and
the senses [are disposed] to perceive, [in order that their respective na-
tures may be perfected].
178 From the foregoing it is evident that the intellect endeavors to de-
vise for itself—for the sake of its own nourishment, conservation, per-
fection, and adornment—intellectual arts (which are speculative en-

deavors) by which it can be aided. And just as the intellect brings forth
these [speculative arts or] speculative branches of knowledge from
Light that has been partaken of intellectually, so reason elicits the arts-
of-inferring from Light that has been partaken of rationally. And the
senses—for the sake of the nourishment, conservation, perfection, and
adornment of the perceptual nature—draw forth the perceptual arts
from Light that has been partaken of perceptually. Do not ignore these
points (which you have often heard), in order that, [by not neglecting
them], you may conceive of the partaking of the Divine Light by rea-
son as occurring subsequently to intellect and by means of intellect,
just as also [the partaking of the Divine Light] by the senses [occurs
subsequently to reason and] by means of reason.
179 Now, you see, Father Julian, that you are a likeness of God. For
humanity 549 as contracted in you is triune.550 For it is oneness, or
being, that has been contracted individually and in which equality and
union are present. Through the being of humanity you are a man in
such a way that in your being there are (1) equality-of-being and (2)
justice, or order, and (3) union, or love. Whatever is in you is, in ac-
cordance with equality of oneness,551 ordered most justly in oneness.
For example, it is evident that all your members have justice and have
an ordered-relation to the equality of your one being. In particular,
your bodily members [are ordered] to your body; your body is ordered
to your vital soul; your vital soul is ordered to your perceptive soul,
which is ordered to your rational soul, which is ordered to your in-
tellectual soul; and all of these are ordered to your humanity’s one-
ness. And in the way in which this just ordering is present in the one-
ness, so also is loving union present in the oneness. For union is pre-
sent in the oneness to the end that all the members be one man. For
after the union ceases to be present in the oneness, then your one
human being must, likewise, cease to exist.
180 Now, the following is known to you in your own instance: viz.,
that no contracted being whatsoever can exist otherwise than through
a oneness in which equality and union are present. Therefore, by [ob-
serving] your own case you come to a knowledge of all things, so that
you know that all things partake variously of Most Absolute Triunity.
Moreover, you infer from your own case that there is an ordering of
all things in a oneness, so that you behold justice only with respect
to that order which is present in oneness. For example, it is not un-
just—indeed, it is most equitable—(1) that your head is on top and

that in it are, in ordered fashion, a brain, eyes, ears, and other mem-
bers and (2) that your feet are at the bottom. For top and bottom and
this entire ordering of the members to a oneness can be analyzed only
as most equitable. Therefore, that ordering which exists in a oneness
is the most equitable and the most just; but that ordering which tends
toward division and otherness is most unjust and is contrary to the
Divine Nature.
181 You infer from your own case that that union of love which ex-
ists in oneness is the most steadfast. For you see that love and union
indicate oneness. For love unites the lover with the beloved. Howev-
er, the love, or natural union, by which your head is united to your
body is not a love other than the love that proceeds from oneness and
equality-[of-oneness]. Therefore, [head and body] are united by means
of the root of your being and by means of the equality of head and
body’s ordered-relation to oneness. You see, then, that a love which
exists apart from something one and apart from an ordered-relation
to something one is not a love which partakes of Divine Union. There-
fore, whatever belongs to the universe is to be loved only with re-
spect to the universe’s oneness and in an ordered-relation to the uni-
verse. No man is to be loved except with respect to humanity’s one-
ness and in an ordered-relation to humanity. Moreover, no man is to
be loved generically except with respect to animality’s oneness and
in ordered-relation to animality. And so on.
182 Therefore, you will be able to see, from a consideration of your-
self, that the elect 552 are Godlike. For you see that God, who is Infi-
nite Union, is to be loved not as some lovable contracted thing is to
be loved but as is infinite and most absolute Love.553 Therefore, in the
love by which God is loved there ought to be Most Simple Oneness
and Infinite Justice. Accordingly, and of necessity, all the [finite] love
by which God is loved is less than the love by which He is [infinite-
ly] lovable. You know, too, that to love God is to be loved by God,
since God is Love.554 Therefore, the more someone loves God, the
more he partakes of Divinity.
183 Likewise, too, because of your partaking of the Divine Light, you
see that that which contains within itself oneness and union is just and
equitable. Whenever the law departs from oneness and union, it can-
not be just. The law [that says] “that which you wish to be done unto
you, do unto others” 555 represents an equality-of-oneness. If you wish
to be just, you must do none other than not depart from that equality
in which there is oneness and union. Then you will bear—equally in
oneness and in love—things adverse and things propitious, poverty
and wealth, honors and calumnies; you will deviate neither toward the
right nor toward the left but will be most secure amidst equality.556
Nothing grave or adverse will be able to befall you, provided that
whatever seems to the senses to be adverse, you understand, and so
esteem, as something to be borne with an equality of the oneness of
being and of loving. For [to do] that is to partake of the Divinity in a
noble and happy way. But you see that all moral virtue is enfolded in
the just-mentioned equality 557 and that there cannot be any virtue un-
less it exists through partaking of this equality.
184 Much more fully than I, you will be able to contemplate in your-
self the Triune Light-of-Divinity that is partaken of [by you], who long
ago, by means of an equal life,558 transferred yourself from worldly
distractions to cherishing justice. I would not have presumed to show
you these naive surmisings of mine if I had not known that because
of the oft-mentioned law of equality 559 you would accept them in one-
ness-of-love.
ABBREVIATIONS
Ap Apologia Doctae Ignorantiae [Vol. II (edited by Raymond Klibansky)
of Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia (Leipzig/ Hamburg: F. Meiner Ver-
lag, 1932)].
CA Cribratio Alkorani [Vol. VIII (edited by Ludwig Hagemann) of Nicolai

de Cusa Opera Omnia (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1986)].
DB De Beryllo [Vol. XI, 1 (edited by Hans G. Senger and Karl Bormann)

of Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1988)].
DC De Coniecturis [Vol. III (edited by Josef Koch and Karl Bormann) of

Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1972)].
DI De Docta Ignorantia [Latin-German edition: Schriften des Nikolaus von

Kues in deutscher Übersetzung, published by F. Meiner Verlag. Book I
(Vol. 264a), edited and translated by Paul Wilpert; 3rd edition with minor
improvements by Hans G. Senger, 1979. Book II (Vol. 264b), edited and
translated by Paul Wilpert; 2nd edition with minor improvements by
Hans G. Senger, 1977. Book III (Vol. 264c); Latin text edited by Ray-
mond Klibansky; introduction and translation by Hans G. Senger, 1977].
DM Idiota de Mente [Latin text contained in J. Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa

on Wisdom and Knowledge (Minneapolis: Banning, 1996)].
DP De Possest [Latin text as contained in J. Hopkins, A Concise Introduc-

tion to the Philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa (Minneapolis: Banning, 3rd
ed. 1986)].
DVD De Visione Dei [Latin text as contained in J. Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa’s

Dialectical Mysticism: Text, Translation, and Interpretive Study of De Vi-
sione Dei (Minneapolis: Banning, 2nd ed. 1988)].
LG De Ludo Globi [Vol. IX (edited by Hans G. Senger) of Nicolai de Cusa

Opera Omnia (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1998)].
MFCG Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft, edited

by Klaus Kremer and Klaus Reinhardt. A continuing series. Volumes I-
XVII published in Mainz, Germany by Matthias-Grünewald Verlag. Vol-
umes XVIII and higher published in Trier by Paulinus-Verlag.
NA De Li Non Aliud [Latin text as contained in J. Hopkins, Nicholas of Cusa

on God as Not-other: A Translation and an Appraisal of De Li Non Aliud
(Minneapolis: Banning, 3rd ed. 1987)].
258
Abbreviations 259
p Nicolai Cusae Cardinalis Opera (Paris edition, 1514). [Reprinted Min-

erva Verlag (Frankfurt am Main, 1962)].
PF De Pace Fidei [Vol. VII (edited by Raymond Klibansky and Hildebrand

Bascour) of Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia (Hamburg: F. Meiner Ver-
lag, 1970)].
PL Patrologia Latina, edited by J.-P. Migne. Series published in Paris.
S F. S. Schmitt, editor. Sancti Anselmi Opera Omnia (Edinburgh: Thomas

Nelson and Sons). 6 Vols. (1946-1961). Vol. I first published in Seckau,
1938; Vol. II first published in Rome, 1940. All volumes reprinted by
Friedrich Fromann Verlag (Stuttgart, 1968). “S I, 237:7,” for example,
indicates Volume I, p. 237, line 7.
SCG Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles [in Vol. II, edited by R. Busa
(1980), of Index Thomisticus. Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia.
Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog Verlag].
ST Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae [in Vol. II (1980) of Index

Thomisticus, ibid.].
VS De Venatione Sapientiae [Vol. XII (edited by Raymond Klibansky and

Hans G. Senger) of Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia (Hamburg: F. Mein-
er Verlag, 1982)].
PRAENOTANDA
1. (a) In the English translations brackets are used to indicate words supplied by the
translator to complete the meaning of a Latin phrase, clause, or sentence. (b) When
a clarifying Latin word is inserted into the translation, brackets are used if the case
ending or the verb-form has been modified; otherwise, parentheses are used.
2. All references to Nicholas of Cusa’s works are to the Latin texts in the follow-
ing editions (unless explicitly indicated otherwise):
A. Heidelberg Academy edition of Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia (Felix
Meiner Verlag: Hamburg): De Concordantia Catholica; De Coniecturis;
De Deo Abscondito; De Quaerendo Deum; De Filiatione Dei; De Dato
Patris Luminum; Coniectura de Ultimis Diebus; De Genesi; Apologia
Doctae Ignorantiae; De Pace Fidei; De Theologicis Complementis; De
Beryllo (1988 edition); De Principio; Cribratio Alkorani; De Ludo
Globi; De Venatione Sapientiae; De Apice Theoriae; Sermones (Haub-
st’s numbering of the sermons is given in roman numerals; margin num-
ber and line numbers are given in parentheses.)
B. Texts authorized by the Heidelberg Academy and published in the Latin-
German editions of Felix Meiner Verlag’s series Philosophische Biblio-
thek: De Docta Ignorantia.
C. Editions by J. Hopkins: De Aequalitate [in Nicholas of Cusa: Meta-
physical Speculations: Volume One]; Idiotae de Sapientia, de Mente, de
Staticis Experimentis [in Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge];
De Visione Dei [in; Nicholas of Cusa’s Dialectical Mysticism (2nd ed.)];
De Possest [in A Concise Introduction to the Philosophy of Nicholas of
Cusa (3rd ed.)]; De Li Non Aliud [in Nicholas of Cusa on God as Not-
other (3rd ed.); Compendium [in Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and
Knowledge]. Except in the case of De Aequalitate, the left-hand mar-
gin numbers correspond to the margin numbers in the Heidelberg Acad-
emy editions; line numbers and some paragraph-breaks differ.
D. Paris edition (Nicolai Cusae Cardinalis Opera, 1514): some sermons.
The references given for some of these treatises indicate book and chapter,
for others margin number and line, and for still others page and line.
Readers should have no difficulty determining which is which when
they consult the particular Latin text. E.g., ‘DI II, 6 (125:19-20)’ indi-
cates De Docta Ignorantia, Book II, Chapter 6, margin number 125,
lines 19-20 of the edition in the series Philosophische Bibliothek (Ham-
burg: Felix Meiner Verlag).
3. References to the Bible are given in terms of the Douay version. References to
chapters and verses of the Psalms include, in parentheses, the King James’ locations.
4. Italics are used sparingly, so that, as a rule, foreign expressions are italicized only
when they are short. All translations are mine unless otherwise specifically indicated.
5. Citations of Nicholas’s sermons are given in terms of the sermon numbers as-
260
Praenotanda 261
signed by Rudolf Haubst in fascicle 0 [=zero], Vol. XVI of Nicolai de Cusa Opera
Omnia (Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1991), pp. XLVII-LV. These numbers revise
Josef Koch’s earlier numbers. Haubst’s dates are also used. [For Josef Koch’s earli-
er numbers and dates, see Koch, Cusanus-Texte. I. Predigten. 7. Untersuchungen
über Datierung, Form, Sprache und Quellen. Kritisches Verzeichnis sämtlicher
Predigten [Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Philosophisch-historische Klasse (1941-1942, Abhandlung 1)].
A reference such as “Sermo XX (6:26-29)” indicates Sermon XX [Haubst num-
ber], margin number 6, lines 26-29.
NOTES TO DE CONIECTURIS
1. Unlike in the case of DI Nicholas nowhere tells us either where or when he
completed the composition of DC. Rudolf Haubst agrees with Paul Wilpert that the
first recension of DC was completed around the end of 1441 or the beginning of 1442.
[See p. 235 of Haubst’s review in MFCG 10 (1973).] Wilpert [“Kontinuum oder
Quantensprung bei Nikolaus von Kues,” Wissenschaft und Weltbild, 16 (June 1963),
102-112] maintains, in addition, that Nicholas did not release this initial recension
for copying but, rather, kept it lying around in his desk as he thought further about
the problem of “squaring the circle.” Only after he concluded that such a geometri-
cal feat is possible and only after he explained—in De Geometricis Transmutation-
ibus how he thought it possible—did he revise his recension and release the revision
for for dissemination. Since De Geometricis Transmutationibus was finished by
Nicholas in Koblenz on September 25, 1445, Wilpert infers that the revision of DC
occured shortly thereafter, viz., during the last months of 1445. This revision is the
text that entered into the main manuscript-tradition, to which Codex Latinus Cusanus
218 belongs. Wilpert asserts that the 1445-revision was published by Nicholas with-
out Nicholas’s having altered the original dedication to Cardinal Julian Cesarini, who
was then dead, having been slain (by the Turks) in a military rout on October 11, 1444.
By contrast with Wilpert, Josef Koch [“Über eine aus nächsten Umgebung des Niko-
laus von Kues stammende Handschrift der Trierer Stadtbibliothek (1927/1426),” pp.
117-135 in Josef Engel and Hans M. Klinkenberg, editors, Aus Mittelalter und Neuzeit
(Festschrift for Gerhard Kallen). Bonn: Hanstein, 1957] argues that Nicholas’s revi-
sion of DC was completed before Cesarini’s death—indeed, was completed soon after
the composition of the initial version of DC, which Koch dates simply as 1441 or
1442. A copy of the initial recension is contained in Latin ms. 1927/1426 of the Stadt-
bibliothek in Trier. Although this ms. is a copy and not an autograph, it does contain
corrections by Nicholas’s own hand. (The autograph is not extant.)
2. DI is also addressed to Cardinal Julian Cesarini (1398-1444), whom Nicholas
calls his instructor. Cesarini may have been one of Nicholas’s instructors at the Uni-
versity of Padua. Nicholas also had contact with him at the Council of Basel, over
which Cesarini presided.
Note Josef Koch and Karl Bormann’s reminder that the title “praeceptor” (“in-
structor”) was sometimes used in a merely honorific way, as could also be the case
with Nicholas’s use of it here. [See p. 186 of Josef Koch and Karl Bormann’s edi-
tion of De Coniecturis, Vol. III in the series Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia (Ham-
262 Notes to De Coniecturis
burg: Meiner, 1972).]

3. Regarding the unattainability of preciseness by finite minds, see DI II, 1 and
I, 3 and the end of I, 2. See also DI III, 1 (189:14). DC I, 11 (54-55). DC II, Pro-
logue (70:12-13). DC II, 1 (75-77). DC II, 3 (87:9). DC II, 5 (97:1-3). DC II, 16
(162:1-3). DM 3 (69). De Staticis Experimentis 173:16. De Theologicis Complemen-
tis 4:28-30. DP 44. LG I (6:3). See, above, n. 115 of Notes to the Orienting Study.
Only God knows each and every thing precisely and is Absolute Preciseness.
DC I, 10 (52). De Sapientia II (29:1-4).
Just as Nicholas (here in the Prologue to DC I) refers to DI, so in DI he antici-
patorily refers to DC. See DI II, 1 (95:13-14). DI II, 6 (123:9). DI II, 6 (126:1-2). DI
II, 8 (140:11-13). DI II, 9 (150:25-26). DI III, 1 (187:8 and 188:20-21).
4. See Nicholas’s definition of “surmise” (“coniectura”) at DC I, 11 (57:10-11):
“Coniectura igitur est positiva assertio, in alteritate veritatem, uti est, participans.” For
an editorial summary of Nicholas’s statements on coniectura see pp. 187-190 of Vol.
III (De Coniecturis) of Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia, op. cit. (n. 2 above).
5. As in the Prologue of DI I, so here too Nicholas expresses awareness of the
novelty of his views. He also here uses the metaphor of intellectual food. Cf. DI III,
12 (258-259). De Sapientia I (18:17-19). DVD 16 (71:12-13). VS 12 (33:5-8). Sermo
VII (32:75-82).
6. “… a certain rational progression”: viz., the progression 1, 2, 3, 4. See DC
I, 3.
7. “… adding illustrative diagrams”: In the phrase “applicatoriam praxim … adi-
ciens,” the word “praxim” has the force of the English plural, as does also the phrase
“in praxi ” at II, Prologue (70:6).
8. “The Divine Mind creates by conceiving; our mind assimilates by conceiv-
ing—i.e., by making concepts, or intellectual viewings. The Divine Mind is a reify-
ing power; our mind is an assimilative power.” DM 7 (99:7-10).
9. “If all things are present in the Divine Mind as in their precise and proper
Truth, then all things are present in our mind as in an image, or a likeness, of their
proper Truth. That is, they are present conceptually, for knowledge comes about on
the basis of [conceptual] likeness. All things are present in God, but in God they are
exemplars of things; all things are present in our mind, but in our mind they are like-
nesses of things.” DM 3 (72:13 - 73:3).
10. Here at 5:7-8 I am reading “existit” (as does the Paris edition) in place of
“exstitit”.
11. God is the Form of forms, the Essence of essences. Individual substances
have their own respective essential form. God is the Form of substantial things in
that these things would not be what they are if God were not what He is. (See Ap. 8-
9 and 26. De Dato Patris Luminum 2 (98). De Genesi 1 (151:7-10). De Sapientia II
(30:9-10). DVD 9 (36). DVD 12 (50:15-16). Especially noteworthy is Sermo CCXVI
(16-18). Cf. De Filiatione Dei 6 (86:1-4). DM 2 (58). DP 13:7-8. NA 6 (22). VS 12
(31) and VS 12 (33:16-19).
The human mind is the form of a surmised world in that the human mind forms—
through abstracting from perceptual images—empirical concepts, which are “like-
nesses” of empirical objects.
12. As God is the Form of all forms, so He is the Being of all beings. That is,
He is the Ultimate Ground-of-Being of all beings. DI I, 8 (22). Ap. 17. DP 14. NA
Notes to De Coniecturis 263
14 (54:8-10). Proposition 5 at NA (115). LG II (79:17-18).

13. That is, all things tend toward God as toward their Ultimate Goal. DI III,
10 (240).
14. DC II, 14 (144:9-10). The human mind unfolds a rational world from itself
in the sense that it conceptualizes the world, forming concepts by way of comparison,
composition, differentiation, abstraction. See, below, n. 354 of Notes to De Ludo
Globi. Cf. DL I (28:5-6) and II (90:10-13). Regarding Nicholas’s view of empirical
knowledge, see also DI II, 6 (126:1-2). DC II, 16 (159-161 and 167:1). De Quaeren-
do Deum 1 (20). De Filiatione Dei 6 (85-87). DM 2 (64-65). DM 3 (72:13 - 73:3).
DM 4 (77-78). DM 7 (99:7-10 and 100 and 102:21-23 and 104). DM 15 (156:15-27).
DVD 20 (90:6-8). DVD 22 (97). DVD 23 (101). DVD 24 (107:14-15). De Theologicis
Complementis 4:28-30 and 4:36-37. De Beryllo 52 and 71:1-8. De Aequalitate 5:14 -
6:26. De Principio 21. DP 17:9-11. CA II, 3 (94). VS 17 (50). VS 29 (86-87). VS 36
(107). Compendium 4 (9:6-8) and 10 (32:6) and 13 (39:21). Sermo XXXVII A (4:4-
6). Sermo XLI (31:38 - 32:6). Sermo LII (4:18-23). Sermo CCIV (3:31-34). Sermones,
p, Vol. II, f. 89v, lines 6-1 from bottom; f. 93r, lines 17-7 from bottom; f. 94r, line 25;
f. 95v, lines 1-17; f. 104r, lines 4-3 from bottom; f. 112v, lines 6-3 from bottom; f. 146 v,
lines 12-10 from bottom.; f. 162v, lines 18-1 from bottom; f. 185r, lines 6-3 from bot-
tom. See my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One], n. 39 of
Notes to De Theologicis Complementis.
15. De Filiatione Dei 6 (86:6-9) and 3 (67:7-10).
16. See n. 26 below.
17. The human mind partakes of the Divine Mind, teaches Nicholas [DC I, 11
(55:16-18)]; and God is present in each thing as its ultimate Ground-of-Being. See
the qualifications that are stated in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations:
[Volume One]: viz., in n. 81 of Notes to De Beryllo and in n. 40 of Notes to De Ve-
natione Sapientiae. See also De Quaerendo Deum 2 (37:13-14).
Regarding God’s presence in all things, see DI II, 2 (102-103). DI II, 3 (105:14-
16 and 107 and 110:6-10 and 111:14-17). DI II, 4 (116:14-18). DI II, 5 (117:5-9).
DC I, 5 (17:12-13). Sermo XI (3:28-31). Sermo XVI (11:11-12). Sermo CXXXIV
(7:1-2). Sermo CCXVI (16:24-26 and 19:1-21). Sermones, p, Vol. II, f. 45r, lines 18-
20 and f. 184r, lines 27-28. See the references in n. 164 below. See also Klaus Kre-
mer, “Gott—in allem alles, in nichts nichts. Bedeutung und Herkunft dieser Lehre
des Nikolaus von Kues,” MFCG 17 (1986), 188-219.
To speak of God as “Divine Mind” is already to engage in metaphor, believes
Nicholas.
18. See n. 156 of Notes to De Beryllo in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical
Speculations: [Volume One]. See also PF 6 (16:7-8) and Sermones, p, Vol. II, f. 104r,
line 10 from bottom.
19. Oneness, Equality, and Union are frequently appealed to by Nicholas as sym-
bols of the Trinity. See DI I, 7 (21:10-12). DI I, 9 (26). PF 8 (22:6-9) and 8 (23). CA
II, 7 (104-105). VS 24. Sermo XXXVII (5:6-26). Sermo XL (6:4-17). Cf. DC I, 4
(13:9-11). DC II, 17 (173:11-13).
20. That is, our mind is a distinguishing, a proportioning, and a combining be-
ginning in accordance with multitude, magnitude, and composition. Cf. LG II (90:10-
13).
21. Among the other passages in which Nicholas discusses or mentions numbers
are the following: DI I, 1 (2). DI I, 5. DI I, 7 (20). DI I, 11 (32). DI II, 3 (108). DI III,

10 (240). DC I, 2-3. DC I, 5 (17-18). DC I, 9 (37-40). DC II, 1 (79). DC II, 2 (86:5-8).
De Dato 3 (105). De Sapientia I (5:14 - 6:15). DM 6-7 (88-98). DM 9 (116 and 125).
DM 15 (158:1-12). De Theologicis Complementis 9:27-28 & 33-34 and the whole of
12. DB 52. DB 55-56. De Aequalitate 36:9-24. De Principio 32 and 39:1-5. DP 43-46.
VS 13 (37). VS 23 (69). LG II (92). Sermones, p, Vol. II, f. 119v, lines 18-32.
22. See DM 6 (90): “Number is a composite and is composed of itself. For every
number is composed of even number and odd number. So number is composed of
number. If you say [merely] that the number three is a composite of three units, then
you are speaking as if someone were to say that the walls and the roof, separately,
make a house. For if the walls exist separately and so too does the roof, then a house
is not composed of them. Likewise, three separate units do not constitute the number
three. Therefore, if you consider the units according as they constitute the number
three, you consider them as united. And what, then, are three united units other than
the number three? And so, the number three is composed of itself, [that is, is com-
posed of numerical units]—and similarly regarding all [other] numbers.” Cf. LG II
(109) and Sermones, p, Vol. II, f. 119 r & v. See also DC I, 9 (37).
Note Boethius, De Institutione Arithmetica, edited by G. Friedlein (Leipzig:
Teubner, 1867), I, 2 (p. 12, line 25). Translated by Michael Masi: Boethian Number
Theory: A Translation of the De Institutione Arithmetica (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1983).
Although oneness (unitas) is not a number but is, rather, the source of all num-
bers [DI I, 5 (14). De Principio 32], nevertheless for purposes of calculation the unit
(unitas) is considered as belonging to the number series and as being a number. For
Nicholas, as for the ancients, number in the strict sense is always plural, because a
number (of things) is always more than one.
23. Boethius, De Institutione Arithmetica I, 2 (Friedlein edition, op. cit. [n. 22
above], p. 13, lines 4-5; Masi translation, op. cit., p. 76). See, below, especially n.
333 of Notes to De Ludo Globi.
Cf. Cusa, LG II, (109:6-8): “Quantitatem quaternarii esse ex duobus binariis non
nego, sed eius substantiam <dicojh> non nisi ex pari et impari.” See note 10 on pp.
192-193 of Vol. III (De Coniecturis) of Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia. See also VS
23 (69:9-12).
24. Nicholas does not here mean anything technical by “rational numbers” and
by “real numbers”. He is referring, respectively, to numbers insofar as they originate
in the human mind and insofar as they are present eternally in the Divine Mind. See
the first sentences of DC I, 1. Cf. DM 6 (88:19-22). DM 7 (98:12-15).
25. DM 6 (94:14-16) and 6 (95:11-13). See Boethius, De Institutione Arithmetica
I, 2 (Friedlein edition, op. cit. [n. 22 above], p. 12, line 16. Masi translation, p. 76).
Although Nicholas sometimes speaks plurally of exemplars in the Mind of God,
he holds that there is only one Exemplar of all things, viz., the Divine Word of God,
the second member of the Trinity. Nicholas also refers to God the Son as the true
Image of God the Father. In this sense the Exemplar is God the Father. See espe-
cially De Sapientia II (38:20 - 41:12). Cf. DI I, 11 (30:13-18). DI II, Prologue (90:9-
11). DI II, 9 (148:9-13 and 17-23). DM 2 (67:5-13). DM 3 (72:3-5 and 73:1-3). DM
6 (92:15-17). DVD 9 (36:7-10). See also De Principio 21:10-11. VS 17 (50). VS 27:81.
VS 28 (84). LG I (48). LG II (62:8-10). LG II (66:13-16). Cf. n. 234 of Notes to De
Venatione Sapientiae in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume
One].
Also note Hugo of Straßburg, Compendium Theologicae Veritatis I.25 (Straßburg
edition, 1489). Thomas Aquinas, SG I.76.8.
26. Both the Divine Mind and the human mind are measurers of reality. God
measures by determining the essence of every finite substance absolutely; the human
mind measures in relative ways by, for example, marking off time into millennia,
centuries, scores, decades, years, months, days, hours, minutes, seconds. Because God
is also a Measurer of reality, the plurality and multiplicity of things would not cease
to exist if all human minds ceased to exist. What would cease is only that multiplic-
ity as it appears to human measurers—as Nicholas indicates at DC I, 1 (6:8-9). See
DI I, 16 (45:10-18). DI I, 17 (50:14-17). DI I, 20 (61:20-23). DC I, 5 (17:15). DC I,
8 (32). De Sapientia I (23:10-12). DM 1 (57:5-7). DM 2 (58:7). DM 7 (100:21). DM
9 (116-117 and 123-125). DM 11 (133:1-3). DM 15 (158:15-20). PF 11 (29:5-6). DVD
2 (8:6-9). DVD 6 (19:13-14). DVD 13 (57 and 59). De Theologicis Complementis 3:71
and 13:16-18 and 14:8-9. DB 12:1-3. DB 71:17-18. De Aequalitate 13. DP 13:11-12.
NA 5 (16:1-6). VS 7 (18:4-7). VS 27 (82:13-18). VS 28 (83:10-14). VS 29 (87:11-12).
VS 34 (102:9-14). Sermones, p, Vol. II, f. 147r, lines 4-3 from bottom.
27. After the number 10, i.e., with the number 11, a reversion is made to one-
ness, because 11 is 10 and 1. Similarly, after 1000 comes 1000 and 1. The Latins had
no single word for numbers greater than 1000, just as English has no single word for
10,000 or for 100,000, although it does have single words for 1,000,000 (a million)
and for 1,000,000,000 (a billion), etc.
28. “… figure of nullity”: i.e., a zero.
29. See the discussion of “mens” and “mens ipsa” on pp. 97-99 of the Orient-
ing Study of this present book. In DC I, 4 (12-14) Nicholas is speaking primarily of
the human mind (and its reflections). Of course, that which is true of the human mind
qua mind also is true, eminently and metaphorically, of the Divine Mind and is true,
eminently and non-metaphorically, of celestial minds (i.e., of angels).
30. DC I, 1 (5:7-8). See especially VS 17 (49). Cf. De Filiatione Dei 6 (86-87).
DM 7 (105-106). DVD 8 (32). De Principio 21. VS 29 (87:15-20).
31. Although Nicholas holds that every finite mind’s knowledge of things in the
universe is imprecise (see n. 3 above), he nonetheless does not consider any finite
object (or finite mind) to be altogether unknowable by, and in principle inaccessible
to, each and every finite mind. Only God’s Quiddity, because it is infinite, is alto-
gether unknowable to finite minds (including angelic minds). Nicholas’s epistemolo-
gy must not be mistaken either for Locke’s or for Kant’s.
32. The human mind has recourse to numbers that it brings forth from its own
mind in the image of numbers in God’s Mind. See n. 21 above. According to Nicholas
“mind is a certain living divine-number ….” DM 7 (98:3-5). Cf. DM 15 (157:1-6).
33. Influenced by the metaphysics of Proclus, Nicholas constantly identifies one-
ness (unitas) and being (entitas) with each other. See DI I, 5 (14:24). DI I, 8 (22).
DC I, 12 (63:2-3). DC II, 14 (144:5-6). DC II, 17 (172:1-2 and 176:3-4 and179:2).
PF 8 (22). VS 21 (59:21-22). VS 24 (72:7). VS 25 (73:3). LG II (82:8 and 82:15).
Sermo XXII (11:1-3 and 13:1-2).
34. “Oneness,” “Equality of Oneness,” and “Union of Oneness and Equality-
of-Oneness” are names for the members of the Trinity. See n. 19 above.
35. “… these mental onenesses”: i.e., these concepts. A concept is itself a men-
tal oneness, or mental unity, that signifies the “object” of which it is a concept.
36. Throughout DC, as also elsewhere, Nicholas interchanges “intelligentia” and
“intellectus”. (See n. 471 below.) Although in DC I have usually translated them by
two different English words (viz., “intelligence” and “intellect”), the reader is cau-
tioned that they often mean the same thing. “Intellectus” does not always signify the
human intellect (as opposed to an angel’s intellect); nor does “intelligentia” always
signify an angelic mind (as opposed to a human mind). The word “intelligentia” usu-
ally does not convey the meaning that corresponds to the English expression “some-
one of great (or of little) intelligence.” To indicate intelligence in that sense, the Latins
often used “ingenium”, as does Nicholas in the Prologue to VS (1:13).
The domain of intelligentiae (intelligences) is constituted by the hierarchy of
angels [LG II (77-78)]. In a secondary way, the highest part of the human mind, viz.,
human intellect, partakes of the domain of the intelligences [DC II, 16 (157:1-2)].
See my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One], n. 90 of
Notes to De Aequalitate, as well as n. 15 and n. 16 of Notes to De Beryllo.
37. The domain of souls includes the rational soul, present only in man, as well
as souls of the non-rational animals and of plants. By virtue of possessing a rational
soul man is the highest of all beings that have a soul; yet, he is the lowest among
beings who have intellect [DC II, 16 (155:10-13)]. See n. 470 below. Nicholas dis-
tinguishes ratio (reason) from intellectus (intellect) by identifying the latter as a high-
er power than the former. Reason makes inferences in accordance with the principle
of non-contradiction, whereas intellect intuits in accordance with a coincidence of
opposites. See DC II, 16 (168). DC II, 2. See also my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphys-
ical Speculations: [Volume One], n. 37 of Notes to De Theologicis Complementis.
See also Sermo CXXX (5:12-42).
38. By “body” (“corpus”) Nicholas means to include not only the human body
but also the entire realm of corporeal objects.
39. De Quaerendo Deum 1 (31:6). De Sapientia II (35:3-4). De Principio 23:1-
2. DP 69:1-2. VS 7 (18:17-18). VS 17 (49). Sermo XXII (28:1-4). Sermo XXX (12:29-
32). Sermo CXXXV (3:4-6). See the further references in n. 48 of Notes to De Vena-
tione Sapientiae in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One].
40. “… in an intelligence”: i.e., in a mind or in an intellect. See n. 36 above.
41. Here at 16:1 I am reading (together with the Paris edition) “existit ” in place
of “exstitit”.
42. DM 6 (94:14-16).
43. DI I, 5 (14). De Sapientia I (5:14 - 6:15).
44. See the second paragraph of n. 17 above.
45. See n. 26 above.
47. DI I, 5 (14:1-8).
48. The more unified a power, the stronger the power. PF 8 (23:15-16). DVD
14 (64:4). De Theologicis Complementis 11:51. Compendium 10 (30:9). Sermo CCXII
(11:13-16). Meister Eckhart holds this same view. See his Expositio Libri Sapientiae
c. 7, v. 27a (margin-number 157) [p. 493, lines 5-6 of Vol. II, Fascicle 7-8 (edited by
Josef Koch and Heribert Fischer, 1966) of Meister Eckhart. Die lateinischen Werke
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer). Eckhart draws upon the anonymously written Liber de Cau-
sis. See also Eckhart’s Expositio Libri Genesis c. 1, v. 1 (margin-number 12) [p. 71,
lines 1-2 of Vol I, 2 (edited by Loris Sturlese, 1987) of Meister Eckhart. Die lateinis-
chen Werke, op. cit.
49. DI I, 17 (51). DC I, 8 (35:12-18). De Theologicis Complementis 4:42-56. NA
10 (39).
50. DI I, 24 (76-77). DI I, 26 (88:13-15). PF 7 (21:1-2). PF 8 (23:9-15). DVD
13 (58). De Aequalitate 36. De Principio 19. DP 41. DP 46:1 - 47:3. DP 50:4-5.
51. “… in its Absolute Oneness”: i.e., in God.
52. Cf. De Filiatione Dei 3 (70:3-7).
53. Cf. DC I, 6 (24:24-26). See also De Sapientia II (29:3-4).
54. DC I, 5 (20). De Sapientia II (30 and 32). De Apice 13. Cf. DC I, 6 (24:18-
24). See Klaus Kremer, “Nicolaus Cusanus: ‘Jede Frage über Gott setzt das Gefragte
voraus’ (Omnis quaestio de deo praesupponit quaesitum),” pp. 145-180 in Gregorio
Piaia, editor, Concordia discors. Studi su Niccolò Cusano e l’umanesimo europeo of-
ferti a Giovanni Santinello [Medioevo e umanesimo, 84]. Padua: Antenore, 1993.
55. Here at 19:12 I am reading (together with the Paris edition) “ipsam” in place
of “ipsum”.
56. “… the theology that is inexpressible in words”: as opposed to theologia ser-
mocinalis (locutional theology = affirmative theology). See De Sapientia II (33).
57. DI I, 4 (11). DI I, 6 (16:1-3). DVD 11 (47:18-20). DVD 13 (54:14-15). NA
6 (20). Sermo CCXVI (17:5-13). See n. 66 below.
58. Cf. DI I, 6 (16:8-12). De Deo Abscondito 10-15. De Principio 19. Although
Nicholas does hold that the via negativa is more reliable than is the via affirmativa
[see DI I, 26 (89:1-2). DP 62:7-8. Sermo XXII (10:25-31); cf. Sermo CCXVI (16)],
nonetheless he also maintains that the via negativa gives no knowledge of God’s
Quiddity. (See n. 103 below.) Nicholas wants to go beyond the via negativa insofar
as the via negativa accepts as true of God a statement that is opposed to an affirma-
tion. According to the via affirmativa, for example, God is powerful. Yet, Nicholas
prefers to say, by way of negation, that God is not powerless. But he prefers even
more pointing out that God is beyond the very distinction between powerful and not-
powerful, in any sense in which this distinction can be understood by us. Of course,
the transcending of this distinction is what many people always meant by the via
negativa.
59. The foregoing response suffices for all questions when “exists” is changed
to “is” and when a predicate is added. For example, to the question whether God is
good the answer may be given, according to Nicholas: ‘(1) it is not the case that He
either is good or is not good and (2) it is not the case that He both is good and is not
good.” For the sense in which God is good is altogether other than any sense of
“good” that finite minds can grasp.
60. Here again Nicholas shows that a surmise is to be contrasted with precise
knowledge (not with knowledge). Sometimes, as with our surmising knowledge of
God’s nature, a surmise is but a kind of learned ignorance. At other times a surmise
is knowledge in the more ordinary sense—e.g., knowledge of a perceptible object,
whose characteristics are always further specifiable by us. See n. 4 above.
62. DC I, 2 (7:3-4). De Sapientia I (5:20-21). DM 9 (116:11-14).
63. “… irreducibly”: i.e., the opposites, as they are present in intellect, are not
reducible to each other, even though in intellect they are harmoniously conjoined.
64. Nicholas here symbolizes God by Oneness; symbolizes intelligence, by the

number 10; the soul, by the number 100; and body, by the number 1000. The num-
ber 100 has the square-root of 10; but 10 [which Nicholas calls denary oneness and
the root-oneness of 100 and the second oneness (in the series 1, 10, 100, 1000)], has
no simple square-root.
65. “… at the rational level”: i.e., at the level of the third oneness, viz., cente-
nary oneness, or 100, which symbolizes the rational soul, i.e., the human soul. The
rational level is lower than the intellectual level: intellectual beings (angels) are on-
tologically more perfect beings than are rational beings. See n. 217 below.
66. In God, who is First Oneness, all opposites coincide. [DI III, Letter to Car-
dinal Julian (264:1-3). Thus, God ontologically precedes all oppositeness. See n. 57
above.
67. The “very close likeness of the First” is intelligence.
68. De Sapientia I (6:16-24).
69. E.g., at DI I, 22. Cf. what is said at DC I, 5 (21:9-15).
70. That is, Nicholas spoke of God in a divine way at DC I, 5 (21:9-15). Con-
trast DP 12:8-13 and DC I, 4 (15).
71. Nicholas rejects the Albertistic-Thomistic doctrine of analogia, according
to which the human mind knows analogically what God is like. See my Nicholas of
Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One], n. 114 of Notes to De Theologicis
Complementis.
72. Cf. DC I, 5 (19) and De Sapientia II (30).
73. “… root-oneness”: i.e., intelligence. See n. 64 above.
74. Cf. DC I, 5 (19:3-4).
75. A comparison of Nicholas’s words at 25:10 (“verbum intellectuale ratio est”)
with his words at 25:15 (“ratio sermo est intelligentiae”) shows the ease with which
Nicholas interchanges not only “intellectus” and “intelligentia” but also “verbum” and
“sermo”.
76. “… reason’s oneness”: Here Nicholas is referring to the oneness that is rea-
son itself. In another context “reason’s oneness” is said to be intelligence, or intel-
lect, from which reason is said ontologically to derive. See DC II, 1 (75:7).
77. An intelligence, Nicholas has stated at 25:5-6 above, does not have a loca-
tion. But as intelligence is spoken of by human reason, it is (and must be) conceived
as if it had a kind of location.
78. Intelligence is in many respects ineffable, though only God is absolutely in-
effable, according to Nicholas.
79. “… which intelligence unfolds quadratically”: i.e., intelligence, symbolized
by the number 10, unfolds the soul, symbolized by the number 100, which is the
square of 10.
80. Although intelligence is the soul’s oneness, or unity, the soul is the body’s
oneness, or unity. Corporeal forms (mentioned by Nicholas also at 31:6) are numer-
ical-unfoldings of the soul’s oneness. Cf. Nicholas’s tacit sanctioning of physiogno-
my at DC 120:14.
81. DC I, 10 (49:6-9). See n. 38 above. See also Nicholas’s discussion, below,
in the second half of the passage marked by margin number 28.
82. “… cubic body”: what is bodily, or corporeal, or three-dimensional, or solid,
is called cubic because it is symbolized by the number 1000, the cube of the root 10,
which itself symbolizes intelligences, or intellectual beings.

83. “… as an instrumental-root”: i.e., soul is the root and form of the corpore-
al; but soul is itself the instrument of intelligence, or intellect.
84. That is, every remark bears the imprint of the speaker’s soul.
85. “… presuppose the soul’s reason”: i.e., presuppose the rational soul.
86. Nicholas’s point about the indubitability of the rational soul’s existence par-
allels his earlier points about the indubitable existence of God (margin-number 19)
and of intelligence (margin-number 24).
87. In knowing perceptible objects the soul unifies them both in the act of per-
ceiving them and in the act of conceiving them. (Cf. n. 390 below.)
88. Quantity and quality come forth from the soul’s reason in the sense that the
rational soul has as its operation measuring, discriminating, comparing, and com-
pounding. See the references in n. 26 above.
89. See n. 88 above. Cf. DI II, 3 (108:1-6).
90. See DC I, 3 (10:end).
91. What is corporeal is solid, or cubic, i.e., three-dimensional—as the number
1000 is also cubic, viz., is 10 3.
92. See the reference in n. 68 above.
93. DI I, 24 (76). De Quaerendo Deum 2 (35) and 3 (38). Ap. 15. DM 5 (82).
Compendium 13 (42-43).
94. That is, a plurality of things come together in a rational conception. Through
concepts reason unifies, even though through discrimination, or discernment, reason
also divides.
95. DI I, 26.
96. That is, in the domain of intelligence a coincidence of opposites occurs—
whereas in reason’s conceptions only an enfolding of opposites occurs. See DC I, 6
(23 and 25). See also my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One],
n. 43 of Notes to De Theologicis Complementis.
97. That is, actually perceiving takes place only with regard to the present. Imag-
ining and conceiving go beyond the present.
98. Hebrews 13:8. Anselm of Canterbury, De Concordia I, 5.
99. Intelligences are said to come close to Eternity. Cf. DC I, 6 (23:10-12). LG
I (17-19). However, this “coming close” and “being like” is nonetheless dispropor-
tional [(DC I, 6 (24:9)] and metaphorical. For between the Infinite and the finite there
is an infinite distance. DI I, 3 (9:4-5). DI I, 16 (46). DI II, 8 (140:5-8). DI II, 9 (150:8-
10). Cf. DP 67:8 and NA 14 (68:15-16).
Intelligences are called eternal only in the reduced sense that they are perpetu-
al, i.e., have a created beginning but have no end. LG II (77:14-15).
100. DI I, 24 (76-77).
101. DM 10.
102. A triangle is the first polygonal figure. DI I, 20 (60). Nicholas borrows from
Proclus the doctrine that oneness is the beginning of multitude. Cf. VS 39 (120:7-8)
with VS 21 (59:10 and 61:1). See the references in n. 165 of Notes to De Venatione
Sapientiae, in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One].
103. See n. 58 and n. 71 above. See also my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical
Speculations: [Volume One], n. 114 of Notes to De Theologicis Complementis. Cf.
DI I, 24 (76:1-4). DI I, 26 (88:15-20). De Filiatione Dei 3 (63). CA II, 1 (88:8-19).
DP 41. Sermo IV (32:26-28). Sermones, p, Vol. II, f. 155v, lines 11-3 from bottom;
see especially f. 156v, lines 16-35. Regarding the knowledge of human nature and of
other quiddities, see DC I, 11 (55).
104. “… reduce it to Infinite Simplicity”: i.e., when we conceive of a stone as
in its ultimate Ground-of-Being, viz., God, we conceive of it no longer as a stone but
as God, since in God all things are God. See the references in n. 39 above. Cf. DI I,
17 (51:4-14) and NA 10 (39).
See also n. 49 above. God is present in all things as an original is present in an
image—a symbolical image—of itself. DI II, 3 (111:11-22). Cf. Sermo XI (3:21-31).
Sermo XVI (11:11-12). Sermo XXXVII (15:1-5). Sermo CXXXIV (7:1-2). See n. 81
of Notes to De Beryllo in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume
One].
105. DI II, 4 (115:5-7). Sermo CCXVI (16:24-26).
106. “Soul, or reason” (“anima seu ratio”): This passage attests that the third
oneness, or unity, of which Nicholas is speaking throughout this treatise is the ratio-
nal soul.
107. DC I, 2 (8:15-17). DC I, 8 (35:2). DM 6 (96:4-9). DM 15 (158:1-2). LG II
(109).
108. See the references in n. 3 above.
109. The uppermost heaven is the realm of intelligences, or intellects. The low-
est heaven is the realm of things perceptible, or corporeal. The middle heaven is the
realm of rational souls, which partake of intellect and which have sensory powers
that operate by means of a body.
110. “… exist … cubically”: see n. 82 above.
111. Intellectual numbers, as Nicholas calls them, include numbers such as the
pi and the square root of two, which escape proportionality. (We call them transcen-
dental numbers and irrational numbers, respectively.) See DC II, 1 (75 and 76:13-18)
and DC II, 2 (82). DM 6 (91). DP 42. Note what Nicholas says about the coinci-
dence, for intellect, of a circle’s center and circumference: DC II, 16 (168). Ap. 15.
Intellectual oneness is also threeness [DI I, 10 (27)].
At DC II, 2 (86:5-7) Nicholas distinguishes intellectual mathematics, rational
mathematics, and perceptible mathematics. The infinite number is an intellectual num-
ber. See, above, n. 556 of Notes to the Orienting Study.
112. See the reference in the second paragraph of n. 111 above.
113. What is triple can have many triple ratios (e.g., 3:1 or 9:3 or 27:9 or 81:27,
and so on), and these triple ratios can be applied to the perceptible world.
114. Intellectual threeness, which is also oneness, enfolds not only triple pro-
portion (which falls within the domain of rational number) but also the non-propor-
tionally trine. See n. 115 below.
115. That is, I am unfolding from the number 3 what is trine (but not what is
triple). If the number 3, which is here being unfolded, were only a triple number,
then from it there would be unfolded only that which is a triple. Yet, a, b, and c, which
are unfolded from it, are not a triple.
Note also De Aequalitate 36:14-15: “The things which we number by three we
call three, and the number by which we number three things we call three. The num-
ber does not depend on the things numbered.”
116. The following are translations of the Latin labels on the diagram (from top
to bottom and from left to right): unitas: oneness; basis pyramis lucis: base of the
pyramid of light; tertium caelum: third heaven; supremus mundus: uppermost world;
secundum caelum: second heaven; medius mundus: middle world; primum caelum:
first heaven; infimus mundus: lowest world; basis pyramis tenebrae: base of the pyra-
mid of darkness; alteritas: otherness.
In Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 the diagram is situated horizontally (as below)
rather than vertically; the label “unitas” is on the left, and the label “alteritas” is
on the right. And the other labeling is placed as indicated above. Moreover, the
suprem
us mun dus
dus s mun
infimu
basis pyramis tenebrae

medius us
basis pyramis lucis mund
unitas alteritas
um caelum
secund primu
lum m cae
cae lum
tertium
alteritas-triangle is shaded all the way to its tip, though it should not be. Herbert
Wackerzapp rightly sees that the correct orientation of the diagram is the vertical
orientation. See p. 59 of his Der Einfluss Meister Eckharts auf die ersten
philosophischen Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues (1440-1450) [Beiträge zur
Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Vol. 39, Heft 3 (Mün-
ster: Aschendorff, 1962)].
117. Cf. Pseudo-Hermes Trismegistus’ Book of the Twenty-four Philosophers,
Proposition 14: “Deus est oppositio nihil mediatione entis.” Cf. DI II, 2 (100:6). The
complete Latin text contained in Clemens Baeumker, editor, “Das pseudo-hermetis-
che ‘Buch der vierundzwanzig Meister’ (Liber XXIV philosophorum). Ein Beitrag zur
Geschichte des Neupythagoreismus und Neuplatonismus im Mittelalter” [pp. 194-214
in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Vol. 25,
Heft 1/2 (1928); the Latin text is on pp. 207-214.
Meister Eckhart also cites this same Pseudo-Hermetic text. See Eckhart’s Expo-
sitio Libri Sapientiae v. 7, c. 8 (margin-number 90) [p. 424, line 2 of Vol. II, Fasci-
cle 7-8 (op. cit., n. 48 above)]. Expositio Sancti Evangelii secundum Iohannem c. 1,
v.38 (margin-number 220) [p. 185, lines 5-6 of Vol. III, Fascicle 3 (edited by Karl
Christ and Josef Koch, 1940, in the series Meister Eckhart. Die lateinischen Werke
(Stuttgart: Kohlhammer)].
118. VS 21-22.
119. In translating these first two English sentences I have repunctuated the Latin
text, in accordance with Codex Latinus Cusanus 218.
120. Here, at 46:8, I am reading not “tibi” but“ibi”, the word which all the man-
uscripts have.
121. “… in the foregoing respect”: i.e., in respect to oneness and otherness.
122. That is, the severed limb of an animal is not an animal.
123. DC II, 4-6.
125. DC I, 7 (27:15-17).
127. In this sentence (viz., 50:1-3 of the Latin text) I am reading (together with
all the mss.) “progressionem” in place of “progressione”.
128. DI I, 5 (13). According to Cusa the only real actually Maximum is God,
who is Infinity itself and who is also the actually Minimum. Whatever is actually max-
imal or actually minimal does not admit of degrees. Accordingly, since an element is
supposed to be something that is actually a minimum, it could not differ from any-
thing else by some degree. Yet, any sample of earth (or water or air or fire) differs
in some degree from any other sample of earth. And so, no sample that we arrive at,
through perception, is elemental. See DC II, 4 (90).
129. A simple element is a minimal, unmixed corporeal entity that, in principle,
is not further reducible or further divisible. In this sense there are no actual simple-
elements, both because the four “elements” (fire, air, water, earth) are always actual-
ly intermixed and because any portion of any one of the four is always further divis-
ible in principle. Speaking more generally, we may note that Nicholas regards any
physical thing as always further divisible in principle, for any progression by degrees
never reaches either a maximum or a minimum. Conversely, that which is absolute-
ly maximal does not at all admit of degrees. (Only God is absolutely Maximal.)
Regarding Nicholas’s view of simple elements see especially DC II, 4 (90). What
the ancients usually called an element Nicholas considers to be something composed
of elements. His view is, at the level of the four elements, a variant of Anaxagoras’s
doctrine of homoiomeries. Cf. DI II, 5.
131. That is, reason does not comprehend (what we call) irrational or transcen-
dental numbers.
132. “… numbers [that] are both proportional and disproportional”: i.e., irra-
tional numbers, which Nicholas calls intellectual numbers (e.g., the square root of
two). See n. 111 above and n. 203 below, as well as DC II, 1 (75).
133. Regarding Nicholas’s view of faith and reason see J. Hopkins, Glaube und
Vernunft im Denken des Nikolaus von Kues. Prolegomena zu einem Umriß seiner Auf-
fassung (Trier: Paulinus-Verlag, 1996 (29 pp.)).
134. The title “De Participatione” is supplied by the editors of the printed Latin
text.
135. De Genesi 1 (150).
136. DC I, Prologue (3:1-2). De Filiatione Dei 1 (54:21-22) and 3 (62:4-5). De
Dato Patris Luminum 2 (99:9). DP 40:16 and 62:13. See also the references in n.
141 below.
137. DP 43:7-11 and 44:1-2. See n. 111 above.
139. DI II, 1 (92). DI II, 11 (157:17-19). De Sapientia II (38). DM 7 (103:5-
13). DP 60:2-6. VS 5 (11).
140. “… the circle as it is [in itself]”: i.e., the rational circle, the circle as an
entity of reason, the circle as defined by reason.
141. Cf. DI II, 2 (104). DC I, 11 (54:20-23). De Dato Patris Luminum 2 (99).
De Genesi 1 (150). De Theologicis Complementis 6:41-42. DP 40:16-17. Sermo XXII
(15:12-17). Sermo CXXXI (3:5-7). Sermo CXXXII (4:25-29). Sermo CXXXV (5:2-
3). Sermones, p, Vol. II, f. 82v, lines 14-15 and f. 146v, lines 18-34. Note also Thomas
Aquinas, ST I.75.5c. See also the references in n. 136 above. Aquinas, Expositio in
Libro de Causis [Vol. XXI (1949) of Sancti Thomae … Opera Omnia (New York:
Musurgia Publishers)], Lectio XXIV (p. 752b). Cf. The Book of Causes (Liber de Cau-
sis), translated by Dennis J. Brand [Marquette, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press,
1984 (revised edition)], XXIII (XXIV), 179.
142. DI II, 13 (179:5-11). De Filiatione Dei 3 (65-66). De Principio 21:9-11.
144. “… the variety of visible things is enfolded concordantly in the oneness
of sight”: i.e., a single act of vision unites many perceived objects into a single per-
ceptual image.
145. “… absolute sight”: i.e., sight considered in and of itself.
146. Here at 55:17 I am reading (together with the Paris edition) “creatas” in
place of “creatae”.
148. DI II, 2 (103:1-9).
149. “… of our intelligence”: i.e., of our [respective] intellect. See n. 36 above.
Re “partaking of that unimpartible, most actual Light” see the following: DC II, 6
(104). De Quaerendo Deum 2 (37:13-14). De Filiatione Dei 4 (78:5-6) and 5 (80:3-
4). NA 16 (79:4-6). VS 7 (16:3-7). VS 22 (65:23-24). Sermo “Verbum caro factum est,”
[as edited by Josef Koch in Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wis-
senschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse (Jahrgang 1936/37. Zweite Abhand-
lung)], p. 80, lines 22-25. (This sermon corresponds to Haubst number CXLI.)
151. Here at 57:10 I am reading (together with the Paris edition) “contemplaris”
in place of “contemplaras”.
152. This sentence is the closest that Nicholas comes to a definition of “coniec-
tura”. It indicates that truth as it is in and of itself cannot be partaken of precisely;
i.e., human beings cannot know the precise truth. Yet, the sentence also shows that
coniecturae contain some measure of truth. Nicholas emphasizes that all empirical
knowledge is perspectival. In this way, even the making of reliable empirical infer-
ences is but a form of “surmising”—as, in another way, is also the making of a pri-
ori and self-evident judgments. For example, reason judges that a whole is greater
than is any one of its parts and that the circumference of a circle is greater than is
the circle’s center. But intellect judges that the circle’s circumference and center co-
incide. Regarding all these assertions, see DC II, 16 (168). DC I, 11 (57:11-17). DC
II, 1 (75). DC II, 2 (80-81). Sermo CXXX (5).
153. DC I, 3 (11:5 - 13:16).
154. Nicholas is referring to his composite position in DI, not to a particular pas-
sage. But cf. DI II, 3 (107) with DI I, 17 (49) and DI II, 2 (104). No thing can par-
take of another thing as that other thing is in and of itself. For all partaking occurs
with a degree of otherness. Where there is no otherness the “partaking” is a coinci-
dence. See the last sentence of DC II, 1 (75).
155. Just as oneness is partaken of not per se but through its modes, so God is
partaken of not per se but only through likenesses. See the references in n. 17 above.
See also De Filiatione Dei 3 (63).
156. “… of the denary unfolding”: i.e., of the tenfold unfolding as it is illustrated
in the immediately preceding diagram.
157. Here at 60:2 I am surmising “complicatoriae” in place of “complicatorie”.
158. “… that art can be depicted by three lines”: viz., the three lines of the di-
agram: b c and d e f and g h i k.
159. “Denary oneness” refers to the realm of intellects, or intelligences. See n.
64 above.
160. The third heaven is the intellectual world, i.e., the first world, the realm of
intellects, or intelligences. (The expression “third heaven” is borrowed from II
Corinthians 12:2.) The intellectual world’s Center is said by Nicholas to be God.
161. The second heaven is the rational world, i.e., the second world, the realm
of the rational soul. Its center is said by Nicholas to be intellect.
162. The third world, or first heaven, is the world of perceptible objects, i.e.,
the visible world. Its center is said by Nicholas to be reason.
163. The First Center, viz., God, is the Center of the intellectual world. By Him
all things are held together. Colossians 1:17.
164. God is the Ultimate Ground-of-Being of each thing. See the references in
the second paragraph of n. 17 above. See also DI I, 4 (12:10-11). DI III, 9 (235:11).
Ap. 11. NA 6 (22:1-4).
165. See the treatise De Filiatione Dei.
166. I am following the Latin title in Codex Latinus Cusanus 218. Cf. DC I, 13
(65:7).
167. “… of the loftiest heaven”: i.e., of the third heaven.
168. “… as if ten articular numbers”: viz., 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100.
Johannes Micraelius, Lexicon Philosophicum Terminorum Philosophis Usitatorum
(Düsseldorf: Stern-Verlag Janssen, 1966 [reprint of the 2nd edition published in Stet-
tin in 1662), column 177: “Articulus in Arithmeticis opponitur digito. Digitus enim est
numerus simplex denario minor. Articulus est numerus rotundus, connexam habens
Zyphram…. Arithmeticus igitur pauciores habet digitos, quam homo; sed plures ar-
ticulos.” See also Rudolphus Goclenius, Lexicon Philosophicum (Hildesheim: Olms,
1964), p. 536 [reprint of the Frankfurt edition of 1613]. Nicholas himself regards the
number 10 as a digit or as an articular number, depending upon the series that con-
tains it; for 10 is, as it were, “another oneness.”
169. “… the first oneness”: i.e., the oneness of the uppermost, or first, world.
This is a “first oneness” only in the sense of being the first-mentioned oneness in this
passage. This first-mentioned oneness is really a second oneness (or a denary oneness),
viz., the intellectual world, or domain. See DC I, 13 (67). Cf. DC II, 16 (156:4-5).
170. “… the second oneness”: i.e., the oneness of the intermediate, or second,
world. This is a “second oneness” only in the sense of being the second-mentioned
oneness in the passage. This second-mentioned oneness is really a third oneness (or
a centenary oneness), viz., the rational world, or domain. See DC I, 13 (67).
171. The numbers of the uppermost heaven are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. The
numbers of the intermediate heaven are 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100. The
numbers of the lowest heaven are 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 900, 1000.
Thus, the oneness of the lowest heaven is 100; and the oneness of the intermediate
heaven is 10. Notice that apropos of the present diagram—which Nicholas will call
Diagram U—the number-symbolism differs from the number-symbolism used in DC
I, 4-8. For example, in the earlier section the number ten (which Nicholas refers to
as a denary oneness and as a second oneness) symbolizes the domain of intelligences.
But in the present diagram the uppermost world, which can be used to symbolize the
region of intelligences, is called a first oneness. [See DC I, 13 (64: end).] It is im-

portant to recognize that Diagram U can be used to symbolize different things, de-
pending upon what the largest circle is made to represent (e.g., the universe or intel-
lect or human nature or color, etc.).
172. “… each of the previously shown worlds”: i.e., each of the worlds, or heav-
ens, described in DC I, 12. The diagram that is referred to at the end of DC I, 13
(65)—which Nicholas later calls Diagram U—is a further specification of the diagram
that is implicit in the description (of the three worlds) in I, 12. (It is not a separate
diagram.) This fact means that the three worlds—as they are diagrammed in DC I,
13 of Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 (and as this diagram is reproduced in the present
translation)—are to be thought of as the intellectual world, the rational world, and
the perceptible world. God is the Center of the intellectual world; intellect is the cen-
ter of the rational world; reason is the center of the perceptible world. [DC I, 12
(62)]. Ultimately speaking, of course, God is the Ultimate Center of each of these
worlds, just as He is also their Ultimate Circumference [cf. DI II, 11 (157:23-26) and
DI III, 1 (185:1-3)]. However, speaking more immediately, He is more central to the
intellectual world, according to Nicholas. Diagram U does not illustrate either
Nicholas’s claim that the third world is very circumferential or his claim that the first
world is very central. By the former claim he means that the material world is some-
thing outward, at least insofar as it is accessible by means of the five outer senses;
by the latter claim he means that intellects are a close symbolical likenesses of the
invisible God and, for this reason, may be said to be close to the Center. It is impor-
tant to keep in mind that these three worlds exist on three different ontological levels
and that perceptibility exists on the periphery only of the third world, not of the uni-
verse as a whole. For the universe as a whole is constituted also by intelligences, or
angels, who are immaterial beings, i.e., who are minds, without peripheral “outer-lay-
ers.”
In sum, the one universe is constituted by three major domains, or dimensions,
or worlds, or heavens, or regions. These differ from one another in their degree of
ontological excellence, so that one world can be called ontologically higher than an-
other world. The most excellent world, or domain, is that of intellect; the least ex-
cellent domain is that of things visible. A further reason that the intellectual domain
is said by Nicholas to be very central is that the other two domains are thought of as
descending from it (i.e., as being derived through it). Similarly, a further reason that
the perceptible domain is said to be “outermost” is that no further domain descends,
or derives, from it or through it. Ontologically speaking, the metaphors “outermost”
and “lowest” amount to the same thing insofar as they signify a comparative degree
of excellence, just as the metaphors “innermost” and “highest” also amount to the
same thing. God, who escapes all comparative relation, also escapes all degrees. In
Him outermost and innermost, highest and lowest, maximum and minimum coincide.
See DC I, 7 (27); I, 8 (30:3-5); II, 1 (76:4-6). II, 13 (136:7-9).
We should not suppose that in DC I, 12 the three domains of the one universe
are to be diagramed as concentric circles and, accordingly, are to be diagrammed al-
together differently from Nicholas’s own diagram in I, 13. Thus, we ought not to ac-
cept Herbert Wackerzapp’s depiction on p. 150 of his Der Einfluss Meister Eckharts
auf die ersten philosophischen Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues (1440-1450) [Beiträge
zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Vol. 39, Heft 3 (Mün-
ster: Aschendorff, 1962)]. All things exist in each of the three worlds in the way that
Nicholas explains in DC II, 10 (124).
Finally, in Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 Diagram U is shaded as below. I have
not here included the lettering on the diagram, since it does not show-through well
on the shaded printed-surface (although it shows clearly on the manuscript). Similar-
circulus 1 u nivers
orum
400
ly, in the translation itself I have not reproduced the shading, since it obscures some
of the lettering. A translation of the lettering (from top to bottom and from outer to
inner) is as follows: circulus universorum: circle of all things; circulus supremae re-
gionis: circle of the uppermost region; circulus primi ordinis: circle of the first order;
circulus medii ordinis: circle of the middle order; circulus infimi ordinis; circle of the
lowest order; circulus mediae regionis: circle of the middle region; circulus primi or-
dinis: circle of the first order; circulus medii ordinis: circle of the middle order; cir-
culus infimi ordinis: circle of the lowest order; circulus infimae regionis: circle of the
lowest region; circulus primi ordinis: circle of the first order; circulum medii ordinis:
circle of the middle order; circulus infimi ordinis: circle of the lowest order. For prac-
tical reasons the smallest circles on the diagram have no labeling. They are, howev-
er, circles of the first, the middle, and the lowest choirs. See DC II, 16 (156), as well
as DC I, 13 (67:1-6).
173. “… is distinguished three times by means of three numerical progressions”:
i.e., each of the regions contains three orders within itself (primus ordo, medius ordo,
and infimus ordo), so that altogether there are nine orders in the universe (the single
largest circle symbolizing the universe).
174. “… the first, most simple oneness”: in the diagram the first oneness is rep-
resented by the largest circle; this largest circle, or first oneness, symbolizes the uni-
verse. We must not confuse the universe’s being a first oneness (in terms of this diagram,
where the largest circle represents the universe) with God’s being Absolute First One-
ness [DC I, 5. DC I, 13 (67:1)]. At times, Nicholas’s terminology can be confusing.
175. “… the quaternary distinction”: see DC I, 3 (10).
176. Here at 65:6 I am reading (together with the Paris edition) “quibus” in place
of “qua”.
177. “… in each world there are three trine distinctions”: i.e., in each of the three
worlds, or regions, there are three orders; and within each order there are three choirs
(as represented by the smallest circles). Thus, within the one largest circle there are
three sets of increasingly smaller circles: viz., the set of three regions; the set of three
orders within each region; the set of three choirs within each order. Accordingly, there
are three sizes of circles—each size repeated three times within the larger circle that
immediately contains it.
178. The names of all numbers are formed by an ordered-repeating of the nu-
merals 1 through 10. DC I, 3 (10:11-15).
179. The reason is given in DC I, 3 (10). Cf. LG II (79).
180. That is, there are 39 circles included within the one largest circle, making
40 circles.
181. Josef Koch and Winfried Happ have displayed these calculations on
pages 222-223 of the German translation Nikolaus von Kues. Mutmaßungen (Ham-
burg: Meiner, 1971):
1 21 = (27 - 9 + 3)
2 = 3 - 13 22 = (27 - 9 + 3 + 1)
3 23 = (27 - 3 - 1)
4 = (3 + 1) 24 = (27 - 3)
5 = (9 - 3 - 1) 25 = (27 - 3 + 1)
6 = (9 - 3) 26 = (27 - 1)
7 = (9 - 3 + 1) 27
8 = (9 - 1) 28 = (27 + 1)
9 29 = (27 + 3 - 1)
10 = (9 + 1) 30 = (27 + 3)
11 = (9 + 3 - 1) 31 = (27 + 3 + 1)
12 = (9 + 3) 32 = (27 + 9 - 3 -1)
13 = (9 + 3 + 1) 33 = (27 + 9 - 3)
14 = 27 - 9 - 3 - 1) 34 = (27 + 9 - 3 + 1)
15 = (27 - 9 - 3) 35 = (27 + 9 - 1)
16 = (27 - 9 - 3 + 1) 36 = (27 + 9)
17 = (27 - 9 - 1) 37 = (27 + 9 + 1)
18 = (27 - 9) 38 = (27 + 9 + 3 - 1)
19 = (27 - 9 + 1) 39 = (27 + 9 + 3)
20 = (27 - 9 + 3 - 1) 40 = (27 + 9 + 3 + 1)
182. For example,
1 6 = (4 + 2)
2 7 = (4 + 3)
3 8 = (4 + 3 + 1)
4 9 = (4 + 3 + 2)
5 = (4 + 1) 10 = (4 + 3 + 2 + 1)
183. Simple Oneness, or God, is not represented in the diagram, which sym-
bolizes everything-that-is-other-than-God, viz., the universe.
Although God, as Ground-of-Being, is equally near to all things [DI II, 11
(157:21-23)], Nicholas here at DC I, 13 (67) indicates that there is also a sense in

which He is closer to the intellectual region, to its first order, and to that order’s first
choir. His power and presence are mediated to the other 36 circles by means of these
3 circles plus the circle of the universe. As Nicholas says in DI II, 2 (103), the Infi-
nite Form, viz., God, is partaken of in different ways by different things—i.e., is par-
taken of by different things in different respective degrees. At DC I, 7 (27:15) God
is called the Form of intelligence.
184. The ordering here is ontological, not chronological.
185. “… which symbolizes soul”: i.e., which symbolizes the rational soul.
186. See the reminder in n. 38 above.
187. DI III, 1 (185-188).
188. The Latin word “Prologus” is not found in the manuscripts but is added
by the editors of the Heidelberg Academy’s printed Latin edition.
189. “… with the help of practical examples”: See n. 7 above. Some of these
examples and illustrations have already been given in Book I and will be enlarged
upon in Book II, which also furnishes additional examples and illustrations.
190. Other texts in which Nicholas alludes to self-knowledge are DI II, 2
(103:11-12). DI II, 13 (180). DC II, 17. VS 29 (87:16-24). LG II (93:1-9). Com-
pendium 10 (33:9-15). Sermo CXXX (5:32-33). Sermones, p, Vol. II, f. 95v, lines 1-
4 and f. 140v, lines 24-27. See, below, n. 8 of Notes to De Ludo Globi.
192. This chapter-title is supplied by the editors of the Heidelberg Academy’s
printed edition of the Latin text of DC. It is appropriated from 76:1-2.
193. DI I, 5 (14:5-25). De Principio 8 and 30 and 35-39. VS 21-22. Regarding
participation, see the references in n. 149 above.
194. Strictly speaking, Absolute Oneness (viz., God) admits of no modes, for
Absolute Oneness is beyond all affirmation and all negation. DI I, 4 (12:4-7). De
Filiatione Dei 4 (78) and 6 (84:14). PF 7 (lines 1-4 of section 21). See the trans-
lated text marked by, and the references included in, n. 40 of Notes to De Theo-
logicis Complementis, in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Vol-
ume One]. N. B. DC II, 7 (106:9): “Absolute Oneness coincides with Absolute In-
finity.…”
195. The Diagram P is the paradigmatic figure described at DC I, 9 (41).
196. At 73:7 I am reading (together with Codex Latinus Cusanus 218) “lucem
lucem” in place of “lucem” in the Heidelberg Academy’s printed edition.
197. “… [the diagrammatic figure] a”: viz., the diagram at DC I, 11 (59).
198. The diagram of the universe, or Diagram U, is the diagram in DC I, 13 (66).
199. “… the circle of the universe”: viz., the largest circle in Diagram U. In the
present sentence of the text, I am taking “absolute sight” to refer to ‘sight considered
in and of itself ’ and not to refer to God.
201. “… more absolute oneness”: i.e., less-contracted oneness.
202. “… reason’s oneness”: The reader is cautioned that although, as here, in-
tellect is said to be the rational soul’s oneness, or unity [cf. DC I, 7 (27:9)], Nicholas
also sometimes uses “reason’s oneness” to refer to reason’s own oneness, i.e., to the
oneness that reason is. See, for example, DC I, 6 (25:11-17). Cf. n. 393 below. See
also the passage, in the English translation, marked by n. 483.
203. At the level of intellect there is a coincidence of numbers, as well as a co-

incidence of a circle’s center and its circumference. See the references in n. 111 above.
205. DI I, 18 (52:18-30). Cf. n. 154 above.
206. “… that are to be investigated”: to be investigated, that is, by reason.
207. The senses partake of reason; reason partakes of intellect; intellect partakes
of God’s (symbolical) likeness. See the translated passage marked by n. 211 below.
See also DC II, 17 (178:7-10).
208. “… generic … oneness”: i.e., a oneness, or unity, such as belongs to a
genus. A concept, whether of the species or of the genus, unifies into a single repre-
sentation the manifold data from the senses. At a lower level, the communal sense
also unifies. Compendium 6 (17:10).
209. See the references in n. 111 above. See also n. 126 of Notes to De Theologi-
cis Complementis in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One].
210. DC II, 2 (81-82). See n. 33 of Notes to De Theologicis Complementis in
my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One].
212. “… these sciences”: viz., mathematics and the other disciplines that do not
imply a coincidence of opposites.
213. DC I, 7.
214. In a syllogism the major premise is the premise that contains the term found
in the predicate of the conclusion. For example, in the syllogism “(1) All men are mor-
tal; (2) Socrates is a man; therefore, (3) Socrates is mortal” the major premise is the
first premise. The concluding idea that Socrates is mortal is contained implicitly in
the idea (of the first premise) that all men are mortal—given that Socrates is a man
(minor premise).
215. Such a syllogism would not be valid.
216. DC I, 7.
217. Here Nicholas summarizes a crucial distinction between intellect and rea-
son. [See also De Theologicis Complementis 4:24-28 and DC I, 6 (23).] Human be-
ings are primarily creatures of reason, in that they have a rational soul. However,
Nicholas allows that the rational soul partakes in some degree of the domain-of-in-
tellect, to which, primarily, angelic minds belong [DC I, 7 (27)]. Thus, at DC I, 1 (6:6-
7) the allusion to intellectualis natura includes a reference to the human mind. [Re-
garding the expression “angelic minds,” note DM 14 (154:1), where Nicholas refers
to angels as heavenly minds (mentes caelestes). Angels of the lowest order have minds
that are primarily rational minds, though they partake of the intellectual domain more
fully than do human rational minds. (See DM 14 (154).]
218. “… the unfolding of rational inventions”: i.e., the producing of the arts and
the sciences and the other products of reason.
219. That is, although from reason’s viewpoint the sum of the angles of a tri-
angle sum up exactly to 1800, this fact is not the case from the viewpoint either of
intellect or of the senses. Cf. DC II, 1 (76).
220. DC II, 16 (168).
221. DI I, 17 (49). DI II, 1 (91-92).
222. The example of the diagonal of a square and of the hypotenuse of the tri-
angle illustrate the Pythagorean theorem.
223. “… [the sum of] the two squares of the other sides”: i.e., the sum of the
squares of the other two sides.
224. Here at 81:13 “a te” is to be understood. Cf. 81:7.
225. “… this unique rationale”: i.e., the principle which Nicholas at DC II, 1
(76:9-11) calls the root of all rational assertions: viz., the principle that a coincidence
of opposites is not attainable.
226. Here we may borrow Koch and Happ’s diagram [from p. 224 of the notes
to the German translation: Nikolaus von Kues. Mutmaßungen (Hamburg: Meiner,
1971)].
B
A C
227. “… the same conclusion”: viz., the conclusion that there would be a coin-
cidence of chord and arc.
228. “… this root of mathematics”: see n. 225 above.
229. “… the first harmonic bond”… viz., the musical interval called an octave.
230. “… the second harmonic bond”: viz., the musical interval called a fifth.
231. “the third harmonic bond” viz., the musical interval called a fourth.
232. DC I, 3.
233. At DM 6 (91:5-11) and at De Staticis Experimentis 192 Nicholas also uses
the example of harmonic relations.
234. The art of dialectic is the art of reasoning and of making inferences; it is
the art of logic.
235. According to Boethius and to Aristotle propositions may have one of four
quantities: they may be either universal or particular or indefinite or singular. Like-
wise, propositions may have one of two qualities: they may be either affirmative or
negative. Examples of such propositions are (1) “All men are mortal” (universal af-
firmative); “No men are mortal” (universal negative); (2) “Some men are mortal” (par-
ticular affirmative); “Some men are not mortal” (particular negative); (3) “Man is mor-
tal” (indefinite affirmative); “Man is not mortal” (indefinite negative); (4) “Socrates
is mortal” (singular affirmative); “Socrates is not mortal” (singular negative).
Indefinite propositions, as they appear in syllogisms, may be regarded as quan-
tified by “some” and, thus, as being particular propositions. As regards the medieval
doctrine of a term’s distribution, singular propositions may be treated as if they were
a sub-variety of universal propositions.
236. “… four modalities”: “quattuor modificationes”. Presumably, Nicholas here
means by “modificationes”the four modalities of a proposition (viz., to be, to be con-
tingent, to be possible, to be necessary) rather than the four modes, or kinds, of propo-
sition (viz., universal affirmative = A; universal negative = E; particular affirmative
= I; particular negative = O) or rather than the four valid moods of a syllogism of
the first figure (viz., the moods AAA, EAE, AII, and EIO). However, his main point
is compatible with any of these three understandings. Regarding the first interpreta-
tion, note Book V of Boethius’s second commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione

(PL 64:582D and 584 CD).
237. Here Nicholas speaks of four syllogistic figures, whereas in VS 4 he speaks
only of three. According to Boethius, influenced by Aristotle, the four syllogistic fig-
ures are distinguished from one another by the role of their respective middle term:
Figure I is defined as the syllogistic form in which the middle term serves as subject
in the one premise and as predicate in the other premise. Figure II is defined as the
syllogistic form in which the middle term is in the predicate position in each of the
two premises. Figure III is defined as the syllogistic form in which the middle term
is in the subject position in both premises. A fourth figure results from distinguish-
ing Figure I into two figures: a figure in which the middle term occurs as the subject
of the major premise and as the predicate of the minor premise (this now being called
Figure I) and another figure in which the middle term appears as the subject of the
minor premise and as the predicate of the major premise (this now being called Fig-
ure IV). See Boethius, De Syllogismo Categorico Book I (PL 64:798CD) and Book
II (PL 64:811-812).
238. Nicholas here refers again to Diagram U at I, 13 (66).
240. The lower intellectual power approximates the higher rational power. In
DM 14 (154) Nicholas calls the lower intellectual (angelic) power rational; and he
elsewhere calls the higher rational (human) power intellectual, if only because it par-
takes of the domain of intellectual power and understands. See DM 12 (142:15). Cf.
DM 11 (141:3-4).
241. DI II, 13 (175 and 178). VS 22 (67).
243. Diagram P is the diagram at DC I, 9 (41).
244. “… all the way to the cube of 3”: i.e., all the way to the singularity sym-
bolized by the 27 smallest circles in Diagram U at DC I, 13 (66).
245. Here at 88:15 I am reading “communis” (with all the mss.) in place of
“communi”.
246. This union is symbolized by the largest circle in Diagram U. Note the hi-
erarchy in DI III, 1 (184).
247. “… is general”… i.e., in the sense of generic and of a genus.
248. This union is symbolized by any one of the three regional circles in Dia-
gram U. (See n. 177 above.)
249. “… is somewhat more specific”: i.e., specific in the sense that relates to
species. This union is symbolized by any of the nine circles-of-order in Diagram U.
(See n. 177 above.)
250. This union of those things which are most specific is symbolized by any
one of the smallest circles in Diagram U.
251. Each individual thing agrees with each other individual thing insofar as
both it and the others are individual things. Each individual thing differs from each
other individual thing in that it is itself and is not that other thing. [See VS 22 (67).]
No two individual things differ in number alone. DI II, 1. Sermo XXII (24:4-6).
252. “… the diagram of all things”: i.e., Diagram U at DC I, 13 (66).
253. “… general agreement”: i.e., agreement in genus.
254. “… in you … all things … julianize”: i.e., they come together in such a
way as to constitute Julian as Julian, even as in a lute harmonic principles come to-
gether in such a way as to produce a harmony that is characteristic of the lute.
255. Humanizing is a making to be human; animalizing is a making to be ani-
mal, etc.
256. “… make a smallest circle into a universal circle:”: i.e., take what is sym-
bolized by a smallest circle in Diagram U and begin a new instance of Diagram U in
which what was symbolized by the smallest circle is now symbolized by the largest
circle.
257. “… of a quite true surmise”: This expression reminds us that what Nicholas
terms a surmise is often, in common parlance, termed knowledge. Yet, a surmise is
never precisely true, since only Infinite Mind knows precise truth. De Theologicis
Complementis 4:28-30.
258. Nicholas’s point can be re-expressed as follows: ‘But if it is shown that in
the perceptible world all perceptible things have in common a most general nature,
then we surmise that that nature is a general element.’
259. “Something similar holds true …”: viz., (1) that if things more specific have
in common a quite specific nature, then that nature is a quite specific element and
(2) that if things very specific have in common a very specific nature, then that na-
ture is a very specific element.
260. Regarding elements, see DC I, 10 (49:9-15) and I, 10 (50). LG I (15:6-9).
261. According to Nicholas, whatever admits of degrees will be such that, in
principle, it is infinitely divisible, so that through division of that thing one will never
arrive at a minimum, except in the practical sense that one does not have the techni-
cal means for further dividing the thing, so that to the senses that thing may seem
indivisible. [Cf. DC II, 4 (91); see n. 128 and n. 129 above.] Indeed, according to
Nicholas there are no actually existent simple (i.e., pure, or unmixed) elements. Only
God is absolutely Simple. Whatever is material is extended and is, therefore, in prin-
ciple, ever-further divisible. Fire, air, water, earth—the four “elements,” according to
the ancients and according to Nicholas—are regarded by Nicholas as composites. [See
DC II, 4 (94).] He calls them primary perceptible elements.
Cf. Hugo of Straßburg, Compendium Theologicae Veritatis II.2 (Straßburg edi-
tion, 1489). Regarding the transformation of elements into one another, see n. 341 of
Notes to De Venatione Sapientiae, in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Specula-
tions: [Volume One].
262. “… the general diagram”… i.e., Diagram U.
263. Here at 91:2 I am reading (together with Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 and
certain other mss.) “universalitas” in place of “universitas”.
264. “… trine, quadratically trine, and cubically trine”: These numbers corre-
spond to the number of different-sized circles in Diagram U: viz., 3 major circles, 9
smaller circles, and 27 smallest circles. See DC I, 13 (66) and II, 5 (95:5-15).
265. See n. 264 above. The three major circles are here used in order to sym-
bolize, from top to bottom, the domains of intellectual elementariness, rational ele-
mentariness, and perceptible elementariness, respectively. Each of these domains, or
regions, is further sub-dividable into 9 smaller circles and, then, 27 smallest circles.
Although, according to Nicholas, there are at the perceptual level only four pri-
mary, or basic, elements (viz., fire, air, water, earth), no one of these primary elements
is a pure or simple element; rather, each one is composed of itself and the other three.
That is, each primary element (at the perceptual level or at whatever level) contains
the other three (at the corresponding level) and is contained by the other three. See
DC II, 5 (95:5-13): “If you imagine the entire largest circle to be fire (or air or water
or earth), you will see (1) how it is that in it are contained the circles of the other three
elements and also (2) how it is that in the air [that is enfolded] in the fire the other
three elements are present; and so on. But this process does not continue beyond four
times. Therefore, there is an advancement from the universal unto the specific by
means of a fourfold progression. Hence, one element universally enfolds within it-
self three elements; but the three elements generally enfold within themselves nine
elements; and the nine specifically enfold within themselves twenty-seven elements.
Therefore, the cube of three is the specific unfolding of the oneness of each element.”
See also DC II, 4 (94).
certain other mss.) “comprehendit” in place of “apprehendit ”.
267. E.g., (1) some letters are vowels, (2) others are consonants, (3) others are
not pronounced.
268. The primary rational elements are not simple elements but are elements that
are composed of one another. See n. 261 and n. 265 above.
269. At DC 92:6 I am reading (together with Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 and
certain other mss.) “tria” in place of “trina”.
270. On the analogy between element and point: just as three points do not suf-
fice, geometrically, to determine a three-dimensional geometrical figure, so three el-
ements do not suffice for constituting a real three-dimensional object.
271. At each level—perceptual, rational, and intellectual—there are four primary
elements [DC II, 6 (103)]. At the perceptual level these are fire, air, water, and earth.
As indicated in n. 265 above, these elements are not simple, unmixed elements; rather,
each contains, and is contained by, the others several times over. Accordingly, the
world contains no simple elements. (Indeed, only God is absolutely Simple.) The four
perceptible elements seem to the senses to be simple and to be indivisible; but they
do not seem to reason to be simple and indivisible. The four rational elements seem
to reason to be simple and indivisible; but to intellect they do not seem so. The four
intellectual elements seem to intellect to be simple and indivisible; but the Divine
Mind knows that they are not so. Nicholas nowhere identifies for us either the four
rational elements or the four intellectual elements—except for what he says about the
rational soul. (See n. 474 below.)
All things perceptible by the senses are material objects. All material objects are
composed in differing proportions, of fire, air, water, and earth—each of which, as
was said, is a composite of itself and the other three.
Nicholas uses the analogy between a simple element and a geometrical point
(neither of which actually exists): elements are like points in that (on their own level,
whether perceptual, rational, or intellectual) they are simple and irreducible. Now,
from a geometrical point are generated a geometrical line, a geometrical surface, and
a geometrical solid. For a line is determined by two points; a surface (viz., a trian-
gular surface, which Nicholas calls the first geometrical surface) is determined by
three points; and a geometrical three-dimensional figure or geometrical solid (viz.,
a tetrahedron, which Nicholas calls the first geometrical solid) is determined by four
points. Just as any polygon is reducible to a triangle and, therefore, to three points,
so any polyhedron is reducible to a tetrahedron and, therefore, to four points. How-

ever, in generating, or drawing, a tetrahedron from four points, one uses six lines
and thereby creates four surfaces [DC II, 4 (93)]. Each of these six lines contains
an infinite number of points. According to the analogy between the geometrical do-
main and the perceptual domain: a material object is a real solid, as a tetrahedron
is a geometrical solid; and as the latter is determined by four points, so the former
consists of four elements (fire, air, water, earth), these four being regarded by the
senses as simple elements (though regarded by reason and intellect as composites).
In the passage presently under consideration Nicholas seems to be emphasizing
both (1) the comparison between a geometrical point and a primary physical element
and (2) the comparison between four geometrical points’ determining a geometrical
solid and four primary physical elements’ determining a material object. Furthermore,
he seems to be suggesting that if we were to commence speaking of a material ob-
ject as consisting of elements-within-elements beyond the number four (which cor-
responds to the number of different-sized circles in Diagram U), then the analogy
would have shifted—shifted from a comparison between the number of points that de-
termine a geometrical solid and the number of primary physical elements that deter-
mine a material object to an attempted comparison between the number of points in
a line and the number of actual elements-within-elements in a material object. But this
new comparison would not work. For a line does not contain just five points or just
six points or just ten thousand points, etc. Rather, a line can only rightly be said to
contain a potential infinity of points, no one of which is detachable from the line. Sim-
ilarly, by analogy, an existent material object would not consist of just five enfold-
ings of elements or of just six enfoldings of elements, or of just ten thousand en-
foldings of elements, etc. Rather, a material object would consist of an infinite num-
ber of simultaneous enfoldings of the four primary elements. Yet, no element would
be detachable from the material object of which it was a part, so that corruption and
substantial change would be impossible. (Here Nicholas is disagreeing with Anaxago-
ras, to whom he seemed closer in DI II, 5.)
272. Three points are connected to one another in a triangle, which is the min-
imal polygonal figure. All polygons, says Nicholas, are reducible to a triangle. DI I,
20 (60). Sermo XXII (19:15-16). Boethius, De Institutione Arithmetica II, 19 [p. 104,
lines 11-13 of G. Friedlein’s edition (Leipzig: Teubner, 1867) = M. Masi’s transla-
tion, op. cit. (n. 22 above), p. 142, lines 16-17]. For example, the diagonal of a rec-
tangle divides the rectangle into two triangles.
273. A tetrahedron, or triangular pyramid, is a solid figure determined by four
points. See Nicholas’s statements at DC II, 4 (93).
certain other mss.) “hoc” in place of “ut”.
275. That is, a solid geometrical figure cannot be drawn from exactly five points.
276. “… a primary surface”: viz., a triangular surface.
277. “… a primary, three-dimensional object”: viz., a tetrahedron.
278. That is, it is evident on the basis of the analogy between point and an el-
ement.
280. Just as Nicholas earlier likened elements to points, so he here refers to
points as elements.
281. A tetrahedron has four angles, six edges, and four triangular surfaces.
282. “… a first composite-of-elements:”: What this first material thing is that is
composed of primary elements is so incomplete that it is not identifiable.
283. Here at 94:5 I am reading “pyramidis” (together with the Paris edition), in
place of “pyramis”.
284. “… composites-of-elements”: These four primary things composed of ele-
ments are what were traditionally called elements: viz., fire, air, water, earth. (These
composites-of-elements, or elements, should not be confused with the first compos-
ite-of-elements alluded to in n. 282 above.) Cf. DI II, 13 (175:23-25). DI II, 13 (176).
285. The previous diagram is Diagram U at I, 13 (66).
286. Cf. n. 264 above.
287. “… has its own specific elemental letters”: i.e., has its own alphabet.
288. Nicholas may mean to call attention to something like the following fact:
The Latin alphabet consists of letters that are either vowels or consonants or double
consonants or diphthongs. Vowels are most universal in the sense (1) that every word
has to contain one or more of them and (2) that some of them can stand alone as
Latin words (viz., “a” and “e”). He does not seem to have in mind the phenomenon
that he mentions in DC II, 5 (96): viz., the fact that sentences are composed of groups
of words, of syllables, and of letters. Cf. Compendium 9 (25).
289. Here at 95:16 I am surmising “Latinae” in place of “Latine”.
290. DI I, 5 (14).
291. DI II, 10 (153:6-10). De Genesi 4 (165).
certain other mss.) “demum” in place of “deinde”.
293. Re no precise knowledge, see the references in n. 3 above.
294. “… since it is impossible that two [elements] partake equally of the na-
ture-of-elements”: i.e., since no two elements can be exactly alike in nature.
295. “… nor is the proportional difference … in any way knowable”: i.e., it is
not in any way knowable by us, although it is knowable to God.
296. Nicholas here draws, once again, on the analogy between physical elements
and geometrical points.
297. Nicholas discusses measurement-of-weights in his De Staticis Experimen-
tis.
298. VS 21 (61).
299. DC I, 3 (10).
300. Nicholas often refers to the hierarchy of things that exist, things that live,
and things that understand. VS 16 (48). VS 21 (60). VS 31 (93). VS 38 (112). See also
(in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]) n. 274 of Notes
to De Venatione Sapientiae.
301. DC I, 11 (58-59).
302. According to Leon Battista Alberti, in De Pictura Praestantissima I [Basel
edition, 1540, p. 20 (reprinted in Portland, Oregon: Collegium Graphicum, 1972, in
the series The Printed Sources of Western Art, edited by Theodore Besterman)], the
four basic, or general, colors are fiery color (red), aerial color (blue), aqueous color
(green), and earthen color (grey). From these basis colors innumerable others can
be made by means of mixing them with one another and with white or black.
Nicholas himself makes clear that these four basic colors are not simple colors, since
each one of them contains a (perceptually undetectable) mixture of the other three.
303. See n. 478 below.
304. De Genesi 4 (172). DM 2 (64). De Aequalitate 13. Compendium 3 (6). Ser-
mones, p, Vol. II, f. 142v, lines 14-12 from bottom.
305. “… unparticipatable”: i.e., incapable of being partaken of.
306. See n. 76 above. See also the passage (in the English translation) marked
by n. 312 below.
307. “… the three other elemental causes”: viz., efficient cause, formal cause,
final cause.
309. “… the onenesses of the elements of the one”: i.e., the onenesses of the
elements of the monad. De Principio 32.
310. DC I, 3.
311. The subtle element is fire; the gross element is earth; the intermediate el-
ements are air (which is closer to fire) and water (which is closer to earth).
312. See n. 76 above. See also the passage (in the English translation) marked
by n. 306 above.
313. See above [in DC I, 11 (55)] the passage marked by n. 147. See also (in
my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]) n. 40 of Notes to
De Venatione Sapientiae. Note also De Quaerendo Deum 2 (37:13-14).
314. DC II, 5 (96:4-5). DC II, 6 (104:1-5). See n. 290 above and the passage
marked by n. 426 below.
315. DI I, 5 (14:9-14).
318. The two intermediates—viz., intellectual oneness and rational oneness—are
doubled because each both ascends and descends.
319. In Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 the diagram is labeled as follows:
a c
f d
320. “… turn back fully on themselves”: i.e., return fully to their respective start-
ing-point.
321. “… the descent and the ascent form a circle”: i.e., they form a circle by
means of the six arcs.
322. Regarding perpetuity see (in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Specula-
tions: [Volume One]) n. 80 of Notes to De Venatione Sapientiae. See also the refer-
ences in n. 48 and n. 51 of Notes to De Aequalitate.
323. “… the end of the outflow does coincide with the beginning of the re-
turn-flow”: i.e., in the immediately preceding example and in the corresponding dia-
gram.
324. Viz., the sevenfold progression: seed, sprout, bush, tree, branch, twig, seed2.
325. Viz., the tenfold progression: seed, sprout, bush, tree, branch, twig, seed2,
sprout2, bush2, tree2. (In the corresponding diagram there is no letter ‘j’ because it is
not found in the Latin alphabet.)
326. Here at 109:11 I am reading, with all the mss., “ipsa” in place of the print-
ed edition’s “ipso”.
327. Regarding the translating of this English sentence, compare DC II, 8
(114:24 - 116:2). Note Albertus Magnus, De Vegetabilibus et Plantis, Book IV, Trac-
tate 2, Chap. 4 [pp. 114-117 of Vol. X of B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, edited by
August Borgnet (Paris: Vivès, 1891)]. See also Book I, Tractate 2, Chap. 6.
328. “… which are as trees”: i.e., animals are individual things, just as are also
trees; and they come from individual seeds, just as do trees.
329. The distinction between male seeds and female seeds applies to human
seeds, animal seeds, and plant seeds. Regarding the sex of plants, see Albertus Mag-
nus, De Vegetabilibus et Plantis, op. cit. [n. 327 above], Book I, Tractate I, Chap. 7.
330. DC I, 9 (41)
331. Regarding the translation of this passage cf. DC 114:1-4.
332. “… related [to one another] as opposites:”: i.e., are related to one another
as male and female.
333. Here at 113:9 I am reading (together with Codex Latinus Cusanus 218)
“masculini” in place of “masculum”.
certain other mss.) “absorbet” in place of “contrahit”.
335. That is, a female seed absorbs within itself what is male (and by its own
power it encompasses actual femaleness and actual maleness).
336. At 114:6 “illa” stands for “illa arbor,” which here is better rendered in Eng-
lish by the plural.
337. A pear is a [produced] seed or fruit. Regarding Nicholas’s example of graft-
ing [in DC II, 10 (116)], note also Albertus Magnus, De Vegetabilibus et Plantis, op.
cit. [n. 327 above], Book V, Tractate 1, Chap. 7 [p. 146A in Borgnet’s edition, op.
cit. (n. 327 above)].
338. “… perceptible-surmises”: i.e., surmises about perceptible things.
339. DC II, 15 (146).
340. “… the true thing”: i.e., the real thing.
341. “… true humanity”: i.e., the form of human nature, universal human na-
ture.
342. That is, if human nature is posited, then so too are, for example, reason,
will, the senses, and a body. For human nature consists of a rational soul and a body.
343. DC I, 9 (41).
344. DC I, 8 (36). DC I, 9 (41). Cf. DC I, 12 (61). DC II, 7 (106-107). All
things flow forth from God as Source-of-creation and return unto Him as End-of-cre-
ation—return by way of Christ. DI III, 3 (198-199). DI III, 11 (247:21-22).
345. Here Nicholas reverses his previous order-of-mentioning the two interme-
diate modes. Cf. the end of section 117.
346. DC I, 7 (29).
347. DC I, 9 (41).
348. “… such a body”: i.e., a human body.
349. “… a distinctive spirit”: i.e., a distinctive soul.

350. Physiognomists purport to be able to infer one’s character from one’s phys-
ical features.
351. Aquinas, ST I.76.5c. Aristotle, De Anima II.9 (421a25-26).
352. “… this subtle spirit”: viz., the rational spirit, or soul.
353. Nicholas emphasizes, here and elsewhere, the close union of body and soul.
Cf. DC II, 11 (128).
355. Nicholas ascribes to certain animals a low-level “power of reason” that en-
ables them to discriminate between perceptual objects, to remember what they have
perceived, and to make inferences that are based on their perceptual memories. In
short, what Augustine refers to as sensus interior Nicholas sometimes refers to as a
form of ratio. But at the perceptual level ratio—which Nicholas sometimes calls (at
the perceptual level) astutia—is much different from ratio at the rational level. See
also DI II, 3 (108:2-4). DC II, 16 (163). Ap. 14-15. De Sapientia I (5:9-11). DM 5
(82-83). Compendium 7 (20:9-11). Sermo CXXVII (4:6-10). Sermo CXXVIII (5:3-
8). Nicholas denies that animals have ratio insofar as it is conceived of as the oper-
ation of a mind (mens). For animals do not have minds, which Nicholas understands
to be rational minds. See, below, n. 87 of Notes to De Ludo Globi. See also DC II,
16 (163:11-12) and VS 1 (4:1-4).
356. “… there is brighter intelligence”: i.e., the intellects of men are stronger
than is the rational capability of non-human animals. (See the last two sentences in
the first paragraph of n. 36 above.)
357. The intelligences are the angels.
358. As concerns the order of perfection, the human soul’s rational operation lies
in between the intellectual operation and the perceptual operation.
359. “… in things that vegetate”: i.e., in plant and trees.
360. Cf. DC II, 10 (123:8-9). See both DC II, 13 (136:7-9) and n. 29 above.
certain other mss.) “conspice” in place of “concipe”.
362. The soul is the power-of-oneness of the body. See n. 80 above. All ani-
mals have sensitive souls; however, only the human being has a rational soul, i.e.,
has a mind. Note DC II, 10 (128:11-12).
363. That is, as regards each other kind of soul, each of which has “head,”
“feet,” and “hands”.
364. Together with the Paris edition, I am reading “grossitiei ” for “grossitie”
here at 128:7.
365. The three descending gradations are (1) from rational soul, or rational spir-
it, to the immaterial body, (2) from the immaterial body to the corporeal spirit, (3)
from the corporeal spirit to the body.
366. The three ascending gradations are (1) from the body to the corporeal spir-
it, (2) from the corporeal spirit to the immaterial body, (3) from the immaterial body
to the rational soul, or rational spirit.
367. See n. 362 and n. 355 above.
368. De Quaerendo Deum 1 (20). DM 8 (112-115).
369. Here at 128:14 I am reading “spirituale corpus” for “spiritum corporalem”,
as do the editors of the Heidelberg Academy’s printed Latin text on their p. 219.
370. “… in the foregoing [two] ways”… i.e., by the foregoing descent and as-
cent.
371. Here at 128:16 I am reading (together with the Paris edition) “hic” in place
of “haec”.
372. DC I, 9 (41).
373. DC I, 13 (66).
374. That is, if you construe the largest circle in Diagram U as symbolizing life.
375. The three lives will be symbolized by the three major circles within the
one largest circle. Further symbolisms will be quadric (32 = 9) or cubic (33 = 27) in
accordance with the symbolism of the twenty-seven smallest circles in the diagram
and in accordance with the nine next larger circles. See n. 244, n. 177, and n. 174
above.
376. These three lives are symbolized by the three major circles within the one
largest circle. The highest of these circles symbolizes incorruptible life (viz., the life
of the intellect); the lowest circle symbolizes corruptible life (viz., the life of the sens-
es); the middle circle symbolizes the composite life (viz., the life of the rational com-
ponent, which is sub-divided into a part that is closer to intellect and a part that is
closer to the senses).
In line 129:11 of the printed Latin text I am omitting “et corruptibilem”, as do
Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 and certain other mss.
377. “… at subdivisions of these”: i.e., at subdivisions of the three kinds of lives
(lives 1-3), not at subdivisions of lives 3a and 3b.
378. “… [such a composite being]”: viz. the human being, whose life is a com-
posite of intellect, reason, and the senses. DC II, 10 discussed the human being in-
sofar as he is a composite of body and soul. DC II, 11 deals only with the life of
spirit, as the opening sentence indicates.
379. “… of this [incorruptible] nature”: i.e., of the intellectual nature.
380. De Filiatione Dei 6 (87). DVD 22 (97:15-16).
certain other mss.) “multiplicari ” in place of “multiplicare”.
382. In partaking of the Divine Art, intelligence is Divine Reason’s art-product.
383. Intelligence is a nature insofar as its own products of art imitate the intel-
ligence.
384. DI II, 1 (94:11). Compendium 9 (27:16). Sermo XXXVIII (11:5). Sermo
CCXVI (27:5-6). Aristotle, Physics II.2 (194a21-22).
385. For example, a woman is a man manqué—i.e., is someone who has fallen
short of being a man and therefore is other. DI II, 2 (104:4).
386. “… is impregnated unitively”: i.e., is impregnated (within itself) by itself
alone.
387. DC II, 8 (112-113).
388. “… in vegetables”: i.e., in the case of plants and trees.
389. DI II, 5 (119:15-19).
390. Reason organizes a multiplicity of perceptions into a oneness-of-concept,
which captures the species. (Cf. n. 87 above.) Nicholas does not, however, deny that
there are natural kinds that correspond to thoughts or forms in the Mind of God. DM
6 (93-94). DM 9 (117:5-9). DM 11 (134-136). DM 12 (143:10-12).
391. DC I, 13 (66).
392. Here at 134:4-5 I am reading (together with Codex Latinus Cusanus 218
and certain other mss.) “sensibilium” in place of “sensitivarum”.
393. “… intellect’s oneness”: Here, as is clear, this expression has reference to
the intellect itself and not to God, who is also called the intellect’s Oneness. See DC
I, 7 (27:8). Cf. n. 202 above and n. 491 below.
394. DC I, 6 (26:1-2).
395. “… humanity”: i.e., human nature.
396. DI II, 6 (126). Cf. DI III, 10 (240). Although universals exist in the mind
as concepts, they correspond to specific natures, or species, which exist in particu-
lars. Nicholas is a moderate realist as regards the theory of universals. He does not
abandon this theory in DC.
397. Here at 135:3 Nicholas uses the expression “natura intelligentialis ” or
“natura intelligibilis” (depending upon which mss.-tradition one follows). In gener-
al, his terminology is very loose. (See n. 36 above.) I here (though not everywhere)
use the translation “intellectual nature”. The intelligences, or intellectual natures, are
the angels. See n. 488 below.
398. DC I, 6.
399. “… more greatly contracted”: i.e., more greatly contracted than is the In-
finite Sun. God, insofar as He is not considered metaphorically as Sun, is not con-
tracted. Infinite Sun qua Sun is considered as if contracted; but qua Infinite it is nei-
ther Sun nor contracted. See DVD 13 (58:9-12). See also DB 5.
402. A comparison with DM 14 (154) shows that for the second order of an-
gels, or intelligences, Nicholas there uses the expression “angelos intelligentiales,” al-
though here (at 137:12) he speaks of “intelligentiae intelligibiles” and at LG II (77:16)
he says simply “intelligentiae”. However, in LG II (104) he again refers to the sec-
ond order as that of intelligential powers. See the string of references that begin with
n. 397 above.
certain other mss.) “tenebrosae” in place of “tenebrosa”. Cf. DC II, 14 (140:3-4).
These “darker” spirits are demons.
405. Angels minister unto us for our sake but not for our sake only. We are guid-
ed by them and look unto them as ends.
406. DC II, 10 (125:1-2) and (120:3-4). DC II, 11 (129:3-8). As at the outset of
DC II, 11, so also here at the outset of DC II, 14 Nicholas begins with an allusion to
Diagram P but then immediately switches to Diagram U. He does the same thing in
DC II, 16 (155-156).
407. Diagram U, at DC I, 13 (66).
408. While not failing to emphasize that the human soul and body constitute a
unity, Nicholas here identifies man’s three regions as (1) the region of the corporeal
nature (a region that includes the vegetative power), (2) the region of the perceptual
nature, and (3) the region of the rational nature, the highest gradation of which coin-
cides with the lowest gradation of the intellectual nature. Each of these regions is
represented in Diagram U by one of the major circles inside the one largest circle,
which, in the present case, represents man. [Regarding the expression “rational-intel-
ligible,” see DC II, 13 (134:12-14).] The loftiest of the three major circles symbol-
izes the rational-intelligible component of the human being; the middle major circle
symbolizes the sensitive, or perceptual, component; the lowest major circle symbol-
izes the corporeal-vegetative component. Each of these regions is further subdivided
into three orders, each of which is subdivided into three choirs, so that there are nine
ultimate divisions in each region—viz., the nine subdivisions that are symbolized by
the nine smallest circles of that region. Nicholas does not tell us just what, in the pre-
sent instance, these nine respective smallest circles symbolize. Throughout this sec-
tion he makes no effort to articulate his analysis clearly. Indeed, in general it is fair
to ascribe to him a mind that is more speculative than analytic.
409. These three divisions correspond to the three next-to-smallest circles with-
in the lowest of the three major circles. (See n. 408 above.) Each of the three stands
for an order (within a region) and is subdividible into three more circles, so that alto-
gether there are nine smallest circles in this region of the corporeal-vegetative nature.
The continually transitory bodily parts are parts such as hair and nails; the more
stable and more fixed parts are parts such as arms and legs; the very noble parts are
the eyes and the ears, for example. All bodily parts are under the influence of the
vegetative power, which is not really a corporeal power but is a power of the soul.
In an extended sense, however, the vegetative power may be called a corporeal power
insofar as it operates on the body. [See the phrase “corporeal spirit” at DC II, 10
(128:8). See also Sermo I (14:1-6).]
410. That is, conceive of the major middle circle (symbolizing the perceptual na-
ture) as subdividible into three further circles, each of which contains three more cir-
cles, making a total of nine ultimate distinctions, which here symbolize nine grada-
tions from the more obtuse perceptual nature to the more subtle perceptual nature.
411. The noble soul is the rational-intelligible soul. The nine distinctions here
alluded-to correspond to the nine smallest circles contained in the loftiest major cir-
cle through the intermediary of the three in-between-size circles.
412. That is, the vegetative power partakes in some measure of the sensitive
power but prevails over it at this level. Cf. DC II, 10 (124:3-5).
413. The spirit that discriminates is the rational spirit. (See n. 411 above.) The
highest gradation of reason coincides with the lowest gradation of intellect.
414. Regarding Nicholas’s conception of a hierarchical universe, see both the
reference in n. 187 above and the passage (in DC ) that is marked by the note. See
also DC II, 16 (155:10-13).
415. “… the nature that discriminates”: see n. 413 above.
416. DM 4 (77:11-15). DM 7 (100:11-14). DM 8 (113:1-3).
417. “… with a more absolute freedom”: i.e., with a freedom less restricted than
is the freedom characteristic of the senses.
418. Man, by way of his rational human soul, partakes of the region of intel-
lectual spirits, and by way of that region he partakes of the Divine Mind. See n. 36
and n. 17 above. See also DC II, 16 (155:10-13).
419. These choirs are the three gradations of man’s intellectual power. In Dia-
gram U they correspond to the three uppermost of the twenty-seven smallest circles.
420. “… of humanity”: i.e., of human nature. VS 33 (99).
421. Man’s powers are enumerated by Nicholas, in threes, not only as vegeta-
tive, perceptual (i.e., sensitive), and rational but also as perceptual (i.e., sensitive),
rational, and intellectual. DC II, 10 (125) and II, 17 (174). See also De Concordan-
tia Catholica I.6.34, as well as VS 20 (56:17-18).
Diagram U can be used illustratively in many different ways, depending upon
what the unitary largest circle is made to symbolize.
422. At DI II, 2 (104) man is said to be a god manqué and a created god. At
De Dato Patris Luminum 2 (102) man is called a humanified god. And both in DB
7:1-2 and in Sermones, p, Vol. II, f. 89r, line 3 he is called a second god (secundus
deus; alius deus). See n. 424 below.
423. DI III, 3 (198:1-5). VS 20 (56:16-17). VS 32 (95:9-12). LG I (40:2-3).
Sermo XXII (32:7-10). Sermo XXX (8:1-2 and 9:4-5). Sermo XLV (5:1). Sermones,
p, Vol. II, f. 163r, lines 5-6. See, below, n. 100 of Notes to De Ludo Globi. See also
Hugo of Straßburg, Compendium Theologicae Veritatis II, 2 (beginning) [Straßburg
edition, 1489]. Meister Eckhart, Die lateinischen Werke, Vol. I, 2 [Expositio Libri Gen-
esi, c. 1, v. 26 (p. 155, lines 23-27), op. cit., n. 48 above]. Aquinas, ST I.91.1c.
424. Man, as also every creature, is a “finite infinity,” or a “finite god”. DI II,
2 (104:6). See n. 422 above.
425. DI I, 8 (22).
426. See the references in n. 314 and n. 315 above.
427. DC I, 1 (5:10-13). See n. 420 above.
428. DC II, 17 (177-178). VS 29 (87:17-20).
430. “… I state already”: viz., in the previous paragraph (in the English trans-
lation).
431. DI I, 7 (21). DI I, 9 (26). CA II, 8 (107). VS 24 (71).
432. Cf. VS 23 (70:10-15).
433. DM 9 (123:7).
434. This state is completed only in the future life, where believers arrive at the
perfection of their sonship-with-God. See De Filiatione Dei.
435. Here at 146:2 I am following the chapter-title in Codex Latinus Cusanus
218.
436. “… the Diagram of all things”: i.e., Diagram U at I, 13 (66).
437. See the passage marked by note 339 above.
certain other mss.) “ferentes” in place of “ferentia”.
439. DM 15 (159:7). VS 12 (32:10-13). In the Latin text of DC II, 15 (147:5-7)
“specifica” goes with “natura” and not with “religio”. Nicholas uses the expression
“natura … specifica” also in Sermo XLI (7:6-7).
440. That is, Group A1 is distinguished into A1a, A1b, and A1c, in accordance
with Diagram U.
with Diagram U.
with Diagram U.
443. The third heaven is symbolized by the upper circle, viz., circle A.
444. The second heaven is symbolized by the middle circle, viz. circle B.
445. The lowest, or first, heaven is symbolized by the lowest circle, viz. circle
C.

447. Here at 148:7 “intellectualis” goes with “unitas”, even though at 150:13 it
goes with “religio”.
448. “… the circle of all inhabitants”: i.e., the largest circle of Diagram U.
449. Here at 150:5 I am reading (together with all the mss.) “ipsa” [= “figura”]
in place of “ipso”.
450. Nicholas here reverses the usual order of making the upper circle repre-
sent the North and making the lower circle represent the South. A bit later, in section
151, he uses the upper portion of Diagram P to represent the North and uses the lower
portion to represent the South. Nicholas’s use of Diagram U and of Diagram P, like
his use of number-symbolisms, is extremely contrived. Cf. n. 237 above. When it
serves his purpose, Nicholas speaks of there being only three syllogistic figures; yet,
for other purposes he speaks of there being four syllogistic figures.
451. The highest heaven is the third heaven.
452. That is, it is necessary that all regions have some individuals each of whom
has one or more skills or powers, so that all skills and powers are represented in that
region.
453. DC I, 9 (41).
454. Here the northern point is represented by the upper portion of Diagram P.
See n. 450 above.
455. Here at 151:3-4 Cusa constructs his sentence in such a way that “tenebrae”
is governed by “unitas”. However, “alteritas” is the correct word to understand with
“tenebrae”, as Happ rightly sees in his German translation, op. cit. [n. 181 above].
456. Regarding the points made in this section and in the immediately preced-
ing ones, cf. Albertus Magnus, De Natura Loci I, 10 and I, 11 [in Vol. V, Part 2 (edit-
ed by Paul Hossfeld, 1980) of Alberti Magni Opera Omnia (Münster: Aschendorff).
See especially I, 11, lines 57-72.
457. “… the earlier diagram”… viz., Diagram P, alluded to in section 151 above
and sketched in I, 9 (41).
458. Cf. DC II, 14 (142) and DC I, 13 (67:15-16) and DC II, 16 (156:12-14).
459. Here Nicholas switches to Diagram U, sketched in DC I, 13 (66). [See n. 406
above.] The largest circle is made to symbolize the realm of the intelligences.
460. “… root divisions, square divisions, and cubic divisions”: i.e., three divi-
sions, nine divisions, and twenty-seven divisions—corresponding to the number of
circles in Diagram U [3, 32, and 33]. See both DC I, 13 (65) and n. 375 above.
461. See the last two sentences of the first paragraph of n. 36 above.
462. “…even as God is … the Oneness of all things”: See n. 81 of Notes to De
Beryllo (in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One]). Note
also DC II, 16 (167).
463. The first region is the loftiest region, symbolized here by the major circle
that is uppermost.
464. The highest order is symbolized by the uppermost circle that is contained
within the uppermost of the three major circles.
465. The highest choir is symbolized by the uppermost smallest circle.
466. The human soul, i.e., the rational soul, is the highest species of soul.
467. “… every soul”: viz., all rational or sensitive or vegetative souls.
468. See both the passage marked by n. 458 above and the references contained
in the note.
469. “… of the most perfect species of animal”: Nicholas uses the comparative
adjective “perfectior” (“perfectioris speciei animalis”) to express what we express
by the superlative. He uses the comparative as a way of indicating his view that no
species is so perfect that there could not be a species more perfect than it. DI III, 1
(188). Note Gerda F. von Bredow, “Der Sinn der Formel ‘meliori modo quo’…,”
MFCG 6 (1967), 21-30 [includes discussion].
470. The human soul (i.e., the rational soul) is not one of the intelligences. How-
ever, it partakes of the domain of the intelligences by means of its intellect, which is
a higher operation than is the soul’s rational operation. See n. 37 above.
471. Lines 4 to 6 of the Latin sentence here at 157:4-7 furnish a good example
of how Nicholas interchanges “intelligentia” and “intellectus” without a change of
meaning or of reference. The same interchange occurs at 157:12.
472. No part of reason is ontologically prior to the intellect. Yet, reason’s cog-
nitive activity is epistemically prior to the intellect’s activity, even as the activity of
the senses is prior to the activity of reason. See the beginning of section 159 below.
See also, below, the sentence marked by n. 500.
473. “… its inferior part is the imagination”: “portio … inferior … phantastica
seu imaginativa (157:8-9). Nicholas does not distinguish between imaginatio and
phantasia. See n. 46 of Notes to De Quaerendo Deum in my Miscellany on Nicholas
of Cusa. Regarding this distinction see Hugo of Straßburg, Compendium Theologi-
cae Veritatis II.37 and II.39 (Straßburg edition, 1489).
474. These “elements” of the human soul are (1) the power of understanding,
(2) the power of apprehending (or of discriminating and inferring), (3) the power of
imagining, and (4) the power of perceiving.
475. Nicholas makes no distinction between the expressions “ascendere ad” and
“ascendere in”—or between “descendere ad ” and “descendere in”. See, for exam-
ple, the Latin passage here at 157:10-13.
476. See, below, the cross-references in n. 311 of Notes to De Ludo Globi.
477. “… perception” (“sensatio”): Nicholas does not differentiate sensation from
perception; rather, he uses “sensatio” and “perceptio” interchangeably.
478. Nicholas frequently resorts to the example of a blind man. DC II, 6 (100).
DC II, 16 (164). Compendium 4 (9:7-8). Sermo CXXVII (11:9-10). Cf. Sermo CCXI
(15:4-10). Augustine, De Trinitate 11.8.14 (PL 42:995).
479. DI II, 5 (119:15-19). Contrast DC I, 8 (35:18-22).
480. De Filiatione Dei 6 (85). DM 5 (85). DM 7 (104:6-10). DVD 22 (97:15-
16).
481. From the likenesses, or images, of the material object reason abstracts a
concept, which is a universal. DI II, 6 (125-126). DI II, 9 (150). De Filiatione Dei 6
(86:4-5). DM 3 (72:13 - 73:3). DM 7 (102:21-28). DVD 20 (90). VS 36 (107:2). Com-
pendium 10 (32:6). Sermones, p, Vol. II, f. 162v, lines 14-6 from bottom. See pp. 29-
31 of the Introduction in my Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge. Finally,
see n. 512 below.
482. These successive unitings show the synthesized character of knowledge.
Note Nicholas’s phrase “componens ratio” (“synthesizing reason”) in De Genesi 2
(155:9).
483. See n. 202 and n. 393 above.
484. That is, the angels.

485. That is, whatever men know is also known by the angels.
486. “Lingua Romana” could also here be understood as indicating the Italian
dialect spoken at Rome in Nicholas’s day.
487. That is, Nicholas hears the sounds but is not able to distinguish the sounds
into words—a common problem with those who do not speak French or understand
it in its oral form.
488. Here Nicholas makes perfectly clear that the intelligences are angels. Cf.
LG II 977:2).
489. The natural appetite is the intellectual appetite, which, in section 159,
Nicholas says to aim at becoming an intellect perfect even in actuality, rather than
aiming at becoming the senses. “But since the intellect cannot in actuality be consti-
tuted in some other way, it does become the senses, in order in this way and by this
means to be able to pass from potentiality into actuality.” Regarding the intellect’s nat-
ural appetite, see also De Sapientia I (13). VS 12 (32:10-11).
The accidental appetite is the perceptual appetite. Cf. the different allusion to nat-
ural appetite and accidental appetite, in DC II, 7 (110).
490. “… the intellectual otherness…”: i.e., what is other than intellect.
491. “… the intellect’s oneness…”: Although Nicholas sometimes calls God the
intellect’s Oneness [DC I, 7 (27:8)], he here is referring to the intellect’s own unici-
ty. See n. 393 and n. 202 above.
492. “… reason’s light”: Although Nicholas sometimes thinks of intellect as rea-
son’s light [DC I, 7 (27:8-9). DC II, 16 (157:2-3)], he here means the light by which
reason “illumines” images.
493. See n. 202 above. See, below, the first line of the English translation of sec-
tion 163.
494. Examples of principles known per se are (1) that a whole is greater than
any one of its parts and (2) that each thing either is or is not the case. Cf. Compendium
11 (36:7-9).
496. Here at 162:4 I am surmising “generis” in place of “generum”.
497. That is, from the consideration that otherwise preciseness would be at-
tained.
498. See my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One], n. 19
of Notes to De Beryllo. See also Klaus Kremer’s “Philosophische Überlegungen des
Cusanus zur Unsterblichkeit der menschlichen Geistseele,” MFCG 23 (1996), 21-70.
499. “… is the more absolute oneness”: The intellect (whose otherness is rea-
son) is a oneness that is very much free from dependence upon the body—more free
therefrom than is reason. Note DC II, 16 (166:8-10).
500. See both n. 472 above and the passage marked by it in the English trans-
lation.
Here at 163:5 I am reading (together with Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 and cer-
tain other mss.) “cum rationem praeveniat” in place of “cum corruptibilis rationem
praeveniat ”.
501. The higher rational nature is the power-of-apprehending. DC II, 16 (157:7-
8). See n. 474 above.
502. “… pure reason” (“ratio pura”): See DC II, 16 (170:8-15). In De Filia-
tione Dei 3 (69:14) Nicholas also uses the expression “intellectus purus,” as he also
does at the end of De Aequalitate 44.
504. Here I have repunctuated the corresponding Latin sentence. Indirect ques-
tions are sometimes left in the indicative mood by Nicholas. The repunctuated Latin
(at 163:11-14) reads: “Et in hoc differentiam rationis humanae atque bestiarum ve-
nari poteris, cur ipsa humana in immortalitate vitae intellectualis, quae est semper in-
telligere, absorbetur quia semper per se est intelligibilis, uti lumen per se visibile.”
(Though “bestiarum” is plural, it comes over into English better in the singular.)
505. Here at 163:16 of the printed Latin text “alterita<tes>” is a misprint for
“alterita<te>s”.
506. “… in the other species of animals”: i.e., in non-human animals.
508. Regarding the visual spirit (spiritus visivus), note De Quaerendo Deum 2
(33).
509. Regarding Platonic optics, see n. 9 of Notes to De Theologicis Comple-
mentis, in my Nicholas of Cusa: Metaphysical Speculations: [Volume One].
511. “…absolute intellect” (“absolutus intellectus”): i.e., as Nicholas has just
said, intellect insofar as it is free from all bodily instruments.
512. “… elevated upward from images”: i.e., abstracted from images. Accord-
ing to Nicholas [DVD 24 (107:14-15)] “there cannot be in the intellect anything which
is such that it was not first in the senses.” Cf. DM 2 (64:12-13). NA 13 (51:14-21).
VS 36 (107:2). Compendium 4 (9:6-7) Sermo CXXVII (2:9-10). Sermones, p, Vol. II,
f. 104r, lines 4-3 from bottom. See n. 481 above. See also n. 51 of Notes to the In-
troduction, in my Nicholas of Cusa on Wisdom and Knowledge.
513. See the references not only in n. 512 above but also in n. 480 above.
514. DC I, 6 (22:3-6). DC I, 7 (27:3-5). DC II, 1 (75:19-21).
515. De Filiatione Dei 3 (67). Cf. DC I, 11 (55).
516. DI I, 5 (14). DI I, 10 (27). See n. 462 above.
517. De Filiatione Dei 6 (86:5-8).
518. DC I, 6 (24). De Filiatione Dei 3 (62) and 5 (80). Sermo IV (32:26-28).
519. “… by means of a theophany”: i.e., by means of a Divine Manifestation,
a manifestation of the Divine.
521. Here at 168:4 I am surmising “ipsam” for “ipsum”.
522. “… intellectual truth”: i.e., truth as apprehended by the intellect.
523. “… rational truth”: i.e., truth as apprehended by reason.
524. “… in the circle’s own less-contracted oneness”: i.e., in intellectual one-
ness.
525. “… exists intelligibly”: i.e., exists in the intelligible domain.
527. In the corresponding Latin sentence, I am discounting the editors’ inser-
tion of “quam” at 168:22.
528. At 168:26 of the corresponding Latin text I am reading (together with
Codex Latinus Cusanus 218 and certain other mss.) “qui” in place of “quae”, and I
am deleting “hoc” as redundant.
529. That is, God is the Ultimate Ground of all things intelligible, i.e., of all
things understandable. Cf. De Filiatione Dei 4 (72:14-16).
530. That is, intellectual knowledge is the most perfect kind of knowledge, as
a solid is more perfect than is a surface, a line, or a point.
531. DB 3.
532. Note the expression “surmising knowledge” (“coniecturalis cognitio”). Ac-
cording to Nicholas coniectura is a form of knowledge. See n. 4 above.
533. “… are a man” (“homo”): i.e., are a human being.
534. That is, Absolute Oneness, which is Infinity itself, is partaken of without
it itself’s becoming contracted, differentiated, restricted, qualified, or delimited. See
n. 17 above.
535. De Dato Patris Luminum 2 (100).
536. That is, colors partake of light and do so in different respective degrees.
537. These are the distinctions in Diagram U. See DC I, 13.
539. See n. 17 above. See also DC I, 4 (16:5-6).
540. “… the contractedness of your humanity”: One must be careful, here at
173:10, not to misconstrue “in eius contractione” as referring to contraction of the Di-
vinity. For, according to Nicholas, the Divine Nature is in every respect uncontracted.
541. DC I, 1 (6). See the references in n. 19 above.
542. That is, let the largest circle in Diagram U symbolize your human nature.
543. … the highest nature of your humanity”: i.e., the highest region of your
human nature, viz., the region of intellect.
544. Nicholas here again alludes to Diagram U—with its one largest circle (now
symbolizing a human nature) and its three larger circles (now symbolizing the high-
er, the middle, and the lower regions of human nature).
545. “… you have intelligence”: i.e., you have an intellect. See the last two sen-
tences of the first paragraph of n. 36 above.
547. This is the power of adequation. See Compendium 10 (34:18-24).
548. “… belongs to your intellect’s oneness-by-participation”: i.e., belongs to
your intellect’s oneness, which is a oneness by participation.
549. “… humanity”: i.e., human nature.
550. DI I, 20 (62). See the likeness between human nature and the Trinity as
this likeness is discussed in CA II, 3-4.
551. “Equality of oneness” is here used interchangeably with “equality of
being.”
552. The elect are those who love God.
553. DVD 17. CA II, 7 (104 and 106).
554. I John 4:8.
555. Matthew 7:12. De Aequalitate 38 (end). Compendium 10 (34:2-4).
556. “… amidst equality”: i.e., amidst equity and justice.
558. That is, by means of a just life.
559. See the references in n. 555 above. See also the translated passage marked
by that note.

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NICHOLAS OF CUSA:

THE ARTHUR J. BANNING PRESS

Printed in the United States of America

Copyright © 2000 by The Arthur J. Banning Press, Minneapolis,

(Translated from Nicolai de Cusa Opera Omnia.

3 Created intellect, of finite actuality, is present in something other

and magnitude]. Therefore, our mind is a distinguishing, a propor-

means of a four-term progression that is repeated three times, you

1 2 3 4 20 30 40 200 300 400

the square of denary oneness; and lastly, it sees millenary oneness

supposed. Similarly, in regard to the question “What is God?” you

line, and of other opposites. Therefore, if in the simplicity of the

31 You will now be able clearly to consider our ineptitude when we

poral signification, you will readily see what is to be answered. For

basis pyramis tenebrae

that oneness is called by the names of the many characteristics of its

46 But if you reflect on the foregoing with careful consideration, then

know that we could not arrive at an infinite number of parts or at a

standing, conceive of proceeding as conjoined with returning, if you

on its part but is due to the fact that it is partaken of by something

is partaken of only with a degree of otherness, it will have to be par-

Simple, enfolding oneness, viz., a, cannot be partaken of as it is. Fur-

partaken of by modes d, e, and f—i.e., cannot be partaken of maxi-

light is obscured by very thick grossness.

gression (for the replication of 2 makes 4, even as does the adding of

someone to be intelligent and the school of mathematics judges by

pursuing a knowledge of yourself 190—the art of pursuing it surmis-

when you make light [symbolize] intellectual oneness. Moreover, if you

ly speaking, lacks preciseness. So too, when you assert that an intel-

the senses] a coincidence of opposites.

But since otherness is a falling away from oneness, harmony is a bind-

son are good at this art.

art, certain other general points that are suitable to my purpose.

progression of oneness into otherness occurs in a fourfold way, there

triangular surfaces.281 There are, then, four primary elements, from

means of a certain likeness we must think of universal elements as

est degree of power (potentia), viz., understanding; by intermediate

ingly and in otherness, in such a way that some of them partake of it

106 CHAPTER SEVEN

scends unto intellectual infinity; [intellectual oneness descends unto

Let a be Absolute Oneness, b intellectual oneness, c rational oneness,

For if a is as the seed, d as the tree, g as another seed, and k as an-

110 Therefore, by means of a fourfold progression [the individual con-

perceptible things. Moreover, use these examples symbolically in re-

112 CHAPTER EIGHT

114 We know that these individuals partake variously of the species.

determines [the moistness] in a specific way if the power of the seed

117 CHAPTER NINE

of-surmising and the variety of surmisers who partake of these modes.

120 CHAPTER TEN

without there being a progression unto infinity. Therefore, a precise

sends forth [supporting] branches on account of the heaviness that re-

ical constitutions, conceive of a well-harmonized, perfectly compact,

129 CHAPTER ELEVEN

is enveloped in the otherness of fleeting and inconstant darkness. And

[kinds of] life, [viz., corruptible and incorruptible], be replicated 381 so

131 CHAPTER TWELVE

134 CHAPTER THIRTEEN

own welfare to reside in the welfare of his people.

140 CHAPTER FOURTEEN

146 CHAPTER FIFTEEN

to do with the multitude of men who partake of contemplation lofti-

155 CHAPTER SIXTEEN