Professional Documents
Culture Documents
4, Autumn 19S)
THE BRECHT-LUKACS debate, which began in the 1930s with Lukacs's critique of
expressionism and continues today though the principal parties are no longer
living, has been referred to as the debate over modernism, over socialist realism,
as well as the great formalist/realist debate.1 It is in fact all of these and more;
encompassing several fundamental issues of aesthetics such as the nature of the
aesthetic effect, the definition of form and content, subjectivity vs. objectivity
and the question of art's social mission. An examination of the commentaries
and critical analyses by third parties to the debate2 reveals a lack of perception by
some of the contributors of changes in the positions of Brecht and Lukacs from
the 1930s to the 1950s and 1960s respectively, and a tendency towards the
polarization of views, implying that we must accept Lukacs or Brecht, not both.
Of course, the inclination towards dogmatism and categorical rejection in the
aesthetic system and the style of writing of both Brecht and Lukacs no doubt sets
the tone and even the groundwork for polarization. See, for example, Brecht's
position on the classics and Shakespeare in particular, which reveals consider-
able shallowness of reading and thought. See Lukacs's tendency to dismiss
artistic experimentation, or compare Brecht's categorical rejection of all of
'dramatic theatre' with a similar characteristic of Lukics in his essay, 'Franz
Kafka or Thomas Mann?'. The critical commentaries by third parties often seem
to reflect (even embrace) the weaknesses of Brecht and Lukacs rather than their
strengths.
Perhaps the most balanced analysis of the debate is by Werner Mittenzwei,3
who correctly addresses the most fundamental point in the entire debate, which
is that realism was not debated by Brecht and LukScs as a trend in style, but as a
methodological problem. This is frequently missed by critics, because they are
only able to see realism as one style among many. Mittenzwei also gives an
objective analysis of the attitudes of Brecht and Lukacs towards tradition and
literary heritage. His comments on their theories of representation, realistic
portrayal and on the effect of the art work fail, however, to perceive certain
hidden similarities between Lukacs and Brecht. Mittenzwei ultimately rebukes
Lukacs for such weaknesses as a lack of a workable definition of socialist realism
and a mechanistic concept of the realistic artist's working method. He also
endorses Brecht's clever but unsound assertion that Lukics is a formalist critic.
Mittenzwei's interpretation becomes amusingly ironic when he accepts Brecht's
'distancing' method, as aimed at changing the audience's view of social reality,
34°
have successfully and powerfully reflected the essential social changes of their
epoch. Still, though he points to a study by Dobrolyubov demonstrating the
revolutionary influence of Ostrovsky's Storm, Lukacs does not embrace
Brecht's view that it is the proper function of art to cause immediate change.
Without doubt his own view is that the function of art is to reflect great
evolutionary and revolutionary changes. That the artistic reflection of such
social changes also causes changes in the ethical makeup of individual recipients,
which may then contribute to revolutionary action, seems to be of secondary
importance to Lukacs. He is reluctant to encourage overtly political and
propagandist^ literature, stating clearly that poetic generalization is not the
portrayal of the world subordinate to a particular ideology.9 In this sense, art has
autonomy. For the realistic portrayal of sub-surface reality, it is not even a
necessary qualification for the artist to hold progressive political views. Overt
rhetoric and artistic reflection clearly do not mix in Lukacs's aesthetics.
Whether we look in his essays on realism written in the 1930s,10 or in his
definitive work on aesthetics done in the 1960s, Lukacs's emphasis on the
primacy of content in art is crystal clear. Primacy of content, of course, means
no more than that the raw content comes first in the creative process. It does not
mean that content is necessarily more important than form or that the ultimate
artistic content can be perceived or understood separately from its particular
artistic form. Brecht agrees with this and perhaps stresses the importance of
content even more: 'Our representations must take second place to what is
represented, men's life together in society'.11 Their disagreement has to do not
with content but with form, and it goes back to the origin of the debate when
Lukics attacked the formalism he saw manifested in the expressionistic
literature of the 1920s and 1930s. The debate continues after the Second World
War when Lukics rejects what he calls 'modernist' literature for, among other
things, extreme formalist tendencies.n Brecht cleverly turns the weapon Lukacs
uses to attack modernism against Lukacs by accusing him of formalist criticism.
Mittenzwei, in interpreting Brecht's remarks, goes so far as to say that 'Brecht is
quite right to point out the formalist character of Luklcs's conception of
realism'.13 This may be true if we believe that Lukacs defines realism chiefly by
example (Balzac, Tolstoy, Mann) and if we believe that his examples are offered
not as illustrations, but as models whose form is to be more or less copied (as if
working from blueprints). Brecht rejects all past examples to be used in this
sense, saying that 'in each individual case the picture given of life must be
compared, not with another picture, but with the actual life portrayed'. u Luk5cs
admits that to compare a work of art with other works (models) in order to
determine its aesthetic value would indeed be pure formalism, but he does not
admit to committing this error. The work must be compared, he says (just as
Brecht maintains) with 'actual life portrayed'.15 Later he emphasizes that in
every particular new art work the entire genre is reborn, meaning that though
there is a sense of permanancy to aesthetic form (it changes gradually but
creates different worlds for phenomenon and essence and allows the possibility
of access to the latter as if it existed separately from the former, a conceptual flaw
which gives rise to such modern artistic practices as symbolism and surrealism.
When a realist portrays things differently from the way they appear to be in
everyday life he is not creating another world, but rather, he is portraying
characteristics and relationships which are in the phenomena, but are hidden
beneath the surface. Brecht says clearly that when Marxists see things
differently, 'it is because the things themselves are different not our eyes'.19 To
both Brecht and Lukacs the 'things' that are different in reality from what
ordinary perception and reflection allow us to see are to be found in change: in
the interplay or dialectic of appearance and essence.
Where do Lukacs and Brecht differ then on the question of realism?
According to Mittenzwei they differ on the question of how artistic
representation is realized, because Lukacs has a 'mechanistic' concept of the
realistic working method. Let us briefly examine this thesis. Lukacs maintains
that the dialectic of appearance and essence in life is so rich and complex that if
we examine only the immediate surface of life, 'it remains opaque, fragmentary,
chaotic and uncomprehended'. Therefore, the goal of the realistic artist is to find
a way 'to penetrate the laws governing objective reality and to uncover the
deeper, hidden, mediated, not immediately perceivable network of rela-
tionships that go to make up society'.20 The 'immediacy of life' which Lukacs
speaks of as inadequate is very much the same as Brecht's idea of the 'familiar'. In
talking about the 'dramatic theatre' which he says portrays life as unchanging
and unchangeable, Brecht describes the spectator as having only one reaction: a
nodding, sympathetic agreement with everything that is presented.21 Such an
experience reveals nothing new about life to the spectator and it confirms all of
his prejudices and misconceptions. Yet, though the raw immediacy of life
presented as such is inadequate, some characteristics of everyday life's
immediacy, like concreteness, individuality and sensuousness in the final
presentation (as opposed to abstraction as such) are desirable. On this, too, they
arc in agreement.
Brecht wants to present the familiar as if it were strange, so that certain truths
about sub-surface reality may be revealed to the spectator. The spectator then
sees relationships in a completely familiar context but in an entirely new light.
This way the new experience can be related to life instantly. But the process of
how the artist discovers the 'truths' to be presented in this context is not
discussed by Brecht. Lukics, not speaking from personal experience, suggests
that there is a two-stage process for the realistic artist.22 In the first stage the artist
discovers 'these relationships' ('truths') intellectually and gives them artistic
shape, forming the raw contents of life. In the second stage (though the two
stages are usually overlapping) he 'artistically conceals the relationships' to
eliminate any sign of the abstraction necessary in the first stage, thus giving the
work a new immediacy which allows the 'underlying essence to shine through'.
talking about Brecht's notion of the alienation effect, however, Lukacs finds it
necessary to define empathy more specifically by distinguishing it from the
emotional experience he calls 'living through'.28 This is the middle ground for
him between the purely or excessively emotional experience of empathy and the
almost exclusively rational participation he believes Brecht wants to achieve
through the technique of the alienation effect. The wholly rational participation
sought through alienation necessitates making the language of a work too
generalized, thus placing it into the category of the abstract. For the artist with
predominantly didactic or rhetorical aims such language is desirable, but for the
realistic, sensuous portrayal of life it is hindrance.
The positive side of the alienation effect then, in Lukacs's view, is that it is
capable of destroying illusion, false hope, ingrained prejudice and misconcep-
tion, and the negative side, as far as aesthetics is concerned, is that it transforms
what would be art into naked didacticism and rhetoric. In examining Brecht's
late works, however, Luklcs calls him a great artist-moralist and concludes that
although Brecht distrusts the purely emotional aesthetic effect, he insists in his
art on retaining the core of catharsis.29 Lukics continues to dismiss the need for
special alienation effects in drama because the dramatic form, owing to its high
degree of abstraction, as compared with the novel, for example, is already
alienating in effect. Consequently, Brecht, in offering the alienation effect is
'banging on open doors'. As outstanding illustrations supporting his argument
Luklcs cites the work of such dramatists as Aeschylus, Shakespeare and
Chekhov.
We can see from this brief analysis that in the end there is not a gigantic chasm
between the theories of Brecht and Luklcs. It is not necessary to choose between
the positions of the two. They are essentially compatible. Partly this is so
because Brecht's ideas and artistic practices change considerably between the
1930s and the 1950s. He becomes less directly didactic and much more subtle in
portrayal and rhetoric. The differences are bridged significantly also because in
his latest work written in the 1960s Lukacs is able to evaluate Brecht in the full
perspective of his life-work. And Lukacs changes, too, if not in the substance of
his fundamental theories, certainly by way of a less dogmatic tone coming into
his criticism. But the most important point to note is that there never existed a
disagreement between them regarding the foundations of their epistemology
and the central importance they attach to realism. The disagreements always had
to do with the language of art and certain specific techniques used in artistic
reflection and expression. Regarding the aesthetic effect, Brecht's insistence that
the absence of excessive emotion in the audience during the taking in of the art
work is a necessary precondition for the rational part of the total aesthetic
experience is not at all distant from Lukics's ideas. But Lukacs does not see the
need for the special alienating devices offered by Brecht. The necessary
precondition, as exemplified by the best dramas in history, is already embedded
in the highly generalized nature of the dramatic language and form.
REFERENCES
1 8
Sue-Ellen Case, 'From Bertolt Brecht to Brecht, in Willett, p. 189.
9
Heiner Muller', Performing Arts Journal, PA) Gyorgy Lukics, Az esztttikum sajdtossdga II
19. P- 94- (Budapest: Akad£mui Kiad6, 1969), p. 173.
2
The long list o f participants in the debate •0 Lukics, A reallzmus problemdi (Budapest:
includes essays by Theodor Adorno, Walter Atheneum, 1948).
11
Benjamin, Ernst Bloch and Frederic Jameson Brecht, in Willett, p. 205.
collected in Aesthetics and Politics (London: 12 Lukics, Realism In Our Time ( N e w York:
NLB, 1977), Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology Harper and Row, 1964).
13
(New York: The Free Press, i960), Walter Mittenzwei, in LeRoy and Beitz, p. 212.
Benjamin, Understanding Brecht (London: 14
Brecht, in Willett, p. 112.
NLB, 1973), Enc Bentley, The Brecht Com- 15
Lukics, A realizmus problhnii, pp. 12—13.
mentaries (London: Eyre Methuen, 1981), 16
Lukics, Az cszrttikum sajitossiga I, p. 578.
Robert D'Amico in Telos 22 (Winter 1974— 17
Brecht, 'Against Georg Lukics', in Aesthetics
75), Albert William Levi, Humanism and and Politics, p. 74.
Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University 18
Lukics, 'Realism in the Balance', in Aesthetics
Press, 1969), and Werner Mittenzwei and and Politics, p. 30.
others in Preserve and Create (New York: 19
Brecht, 'On Abstract Painting', quoted by
Humanities Press, 1973). Mittenzwei in Preserve and Create, p. 214.
3 20
Werner Mittenzwei, 'The Brecht-Lukics D e - Lukics, in Aesthetics and Politics, pp. 38-39.
21
bate', in Gaylord C. LeRoy and Ursula Beitz, Brecht, in Willett, p. 71.
22
Preserve and Create ( N e w York: Humanities Lukics, in Aesthetics and Politics, pp. 38-39.
23
Press, 1973), pp. 199-230. Mittenzwei, in LeRoy and Beitz, p. 21 $.
4 24
Bertolt Brecht, 'A Short Organum for the Brecht, quoted by Lukics in Az eszt(tikum
Theatre', in John Willett (cd.), Brecht On sajdtossdga II, p. 172.
25
Theatre ( N e w York: Hill and Wang, 1964), Brecht, in Willett, p. 192.
26
p. 189. Lukics, Az eszUtikum sajdtossdga II, p. 717.
5 27
Bentley, The Brecht Commentaries,'p. 133. Brecht, in Willett, p. 187.
6 28
Brecht, in Willett, p. 179. Lukics, Az esztttikum sajdtossdga II, p. 173.
7 29
Brecht, 'The Popular and the Realistic', in Az esztitikum sajdtossdga I, p. 765.
Willett, p. i n .