ART XI ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
SECTION 1. PUBLIC OFFICE IS A PUBLIC TRUST. PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES MUST AT ALL TIMES BE ACCOUNTABLE TO THE PEOPLE,
SERVE THEM WITH UTMOST RESPONSIBILITY, INTEGRITY, LOYALTY, AND
EFFICIENCY, ACT WITH PATRIOTISM AND JUSTICE, AND LEAD MODEST
LIVES.
Q. What is meant by "public office as a public trust?"
A. As expressed by Justice Malcolm in Cornejo v. Gabriel, 41 Phil.
188,194 (1920), the basic idea of government in the Philippines "is
that of a representative government, the officers being mere
agents and not
rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of men has a
proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where every officer
accepts office pursuant to the provisions of law and holds the office
as a
trust for the people whom he represents."
Q. What does the command to lead modest lives entail?
A. The point of the command is that, even if the public officer is
independently wealthy, he should not live in a manner that flaunts
his wealth.
SEC. 2. THE PRESIDENT, THE VICE-PRESIDENT, THE MEMBERS OF THE
SUPREME COURT, THE MEMBERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
OMMISSIONS AND THE OMBUDSMAN MAY BE REMOVED FROM
OFFICE ON IMPEACHMENT FOR, AND CONVICTION OF, CULPABLE
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, TREASON, BRIBERY, GRAFT AND
CORRUPTION, OTHER HIGH CRIMES, OR BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST.
1
ALL OTHER PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES MAY BE REMOVED
FROM OFFICE AS PROVIDED BY LAW, BUT NOT BY IMPEACHMENT.
SEC. 3. (1) THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SHALL HAVE THE
EXCLUSIVE POWER TO INITIATE ALL CASES OF IMPEACHMENT.
(2) A VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR IMPEACHMENT MAY BE FILED BY ANY
MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OR BY ANY CITIZEN
UPON A RESOLUTION OF ENDORSEMENT BY ANY MEMBER THEREOF,
WHICH SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE ORDER OF BUSINESS WITHIN TEN
SESSION DAYS, AND REFERRED TO THE PROPER COMMITTEE WITHIN
THREE SESSION DAYS THEREAFTER. THE COMMITTEE, AFTER HEARING,
AND BY A MAJORITY VOTE OF ALL ITS MEMBERS, SHALL SUBMIT ITS
REPORT TO THE HOUSE WITHIN SIXTY SESSION DAYS FROM SUCH
REFERRAL, TOGETHER WITH THE CORRESPONDING RESOLUTION. THE
RESOLUTION SHALL BE CALENDARED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE
HOUSE WITHIN TEN SESSION DAYS FROM RECEIPT THEREOF.
(3) A VOTI: OF AT LEAST ONE-THIRD OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE SHALL BE NECESSARY EITHER TO AFFIRM A FAVORABLE
RESOLUTION WITH THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT OF THE
COMMITTEE, OR OVERRIDE ITS CONTRARY RESOLUTION. THE VOTE OF
EACH MEMBER SHALL BE RECORDED.
(4) IN CASE THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT OR RESOLUTION OF
IMPEACHMENT IS FILED BY AT LEAST ONE-THIRD OF ALL THE MEMBERS
OF THE HOUSE, THE SAME SHALL CONSTITUTE THE ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL BY THE SENATE SHALL FORTHWITH
PROCEED.
ART XI ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
(5) No IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE INITIATED AGAINST
THE SAME OFFICIAL MORE THAN ONCE WITHIN A PERIOD OF ONE
YEAR.
(6) THE SENATE SHALL HAVE THE SOLE POWER TO TRY AND DECIDE ALL
CASES OF IMPEACHMENT. WHEN SITTING FOR THAT PURPOSE, THE
SENATORS SHALL BE ON OATH OR AFFIRMATION. WHEN THE RESIDENT
OF THE PHILIPPINES IS ON TRIAL, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT SHALL PRESIDE, BUT SHALL NOT VOTE.
NO PERSON SHALL BE CONVICTED WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF
TWO-THIRDS OF ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE SENATE.
(7) JUDGMENT IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT SHALL NOT EXTEND
FURTHER THAN REMOVAL FROM OFFICE AND DISQUALIFICATION TO
HOLD ANY OFFICE UNDER THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, BUT THE
PARTY CONVICTED SHALL NEVERTHELESS BE LIABLE AND SUBJECT TO
PROSECUTION, TRIAL, AND PUNISHMENT ACCORDING TO LAW.
(8) THE CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES ON IMPEACHMENT
TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE PURPOSE OF THIS SECTION.
Q. Is the list of officers subject to impeachment found in Section 2
exclusive?
A. As presently worded, yes.
2
Q. What are the grounds for "impeachment?"
A. See Section 2. Note that "graft and corruption" was first added by
the 1973 Constitution to the grounds found under the 1935
Constitution. The 1987 Constitution has added "betrayal of public
trust," which means any form of violation of the oath of office even if
such violation may not be a criminally punishable
offense.
Q. What is the purpose of impeachment?
A. The purpose of impeachment is not to punish but only to remove
an officer who does not deserve to hold office.
Q. What is the procedure for impeachment?
A. See Section 3.
Q. What penalty may be imposed upon conviction on
impeachment?
A. Because the only purpose of impeachment is to remove, the
penalty which may be imposed "shall not extend further than
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under
the Republic." This is broader than the old 1935 and 1973 formula of
disqualification "to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the
Republic of the Philippines." This
ART XI ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
penalty, moreover, is beyond the reach of the President's power of
executive clemency, but does not place the officer beyond liability
to criminal Prosecution. When criminally prosecuted, therefore, for
the offense which warranted his conviction on impeachment, the
officer cannot plead the defense of double jeopardy.
Q. How often may an officer be impeached?
A. The Constitution prohibits the initiation of more than one
"impeachment proceeding" within one year.
Q: When is an impeachment proceeding deemed to be initiated?
A: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the
complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the
end of the House proceeding and the beginning of another
proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment
proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution
passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that
has already been done. The action of the House is already a further
step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the
proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action.
This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
Francisco, et al. v. House Speaker, et al., G.R. No. 160261, November
10,2003.
SEC. 4. THE PRESENT ANTI-GRAFT COURT KNOWN AS THE
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SANDIGANBAYAN SHALL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AND EXERCISE ITS
JURISDICTION AS NOW OR HEREAFTER MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW.
Q. Is the Sandiganbayan a "constitutional court?"
A. No. It is a statutory court; that is, it is created not by the
Constitution but by statute, although its creation is mandated by
the Constitution.
Q. What is the rationale for this provision?
A. The 1971 Constitutional Convention was fully aware of the
continuing need to combat the evils of graft and corruption; hence,
this provision. In fact, as early as 1955 an anti-graft law, R.A. 1379,
was already thought necessary. This was followed in 1960 by the
Anti-Graft Act, R.A. 3019, whose validity was upheld in Morfe v.
Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (January 31, 1968); Nunez v. Sandiganbayan,
111 SCRA 433 (January 30,1982).
Q. Is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan limited to criminal and
civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices of public officers?
A. Section 5 of Article XHI (1973) gave to the legislature broad
discretion to grant jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan not only over
graft and corrupt practices but also over "such other offenses
committed by public officers and employees, including those in
government owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their
office as may be determined by law."
ART XI ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Pursuant to this, broad powers were given to the Sandiganbayan
through P.D. No. 1486. Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA
324 (March 22,1984).
Q. The Superintendent and Cashier of the Government-owned
Catanduanes Agricultural and Industrial College (CAIC) were
indebted to Jesus and Mila Balmadrid, suppliers of school
construction materials. The Superintendent and Cashier fraudulently
issued 4 CAIC checks to the Balmadrids. The Superintendent,
Cashier, and the Balmadrids were tried and found guilty by the
Sandiganbayan of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 (the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act). The Balmadrids allege that as private
citizens, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over them. Is their
contention correct?
A. No. "In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees
(Section 4, P.D. 1606) . . .
Private persons may be charged together with public officers to
avoid repeated and unnecessary presentation of witnesses and
exhibits against conspirators in different venues, especially if the
issues involved are the same. It follows therefore that if a private
person may be tried jointly with public officers, he may also be
convicted jointly with them, as in the case of the present
petitioners." Balmadrid v. The Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
58327, March 22,1991.
Q. Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a private
individual who is charged with malversation of public funds as a
principal after the said individual had been designated by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue as a custodian of distained property?
4
A. Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, in enunciating the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, "unequivocally specifies the only instances when
the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual,
i.e., when the complaint charges the private individual either as a
co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or
employee who has been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.
The Information does not charge petitioner of being a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory to a pub- He officer committing an
offense under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction. Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 116033,
February 26, 1997, 268 SCRA 747, 758.
Q. Did not the accused become a public officer and therefore
became subject to the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction when the BIR
designated him as custodian?
A. No. Although Section 206 of the National Internal Revenue Code
"authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring 'any
person' to preserve a distrained property," there is no provision in the
said statute "constituting such person a public officer by reason of
such requirement. The BIR's power authorizing a private individual to
act as depository cannot be stretched to include the power to
appoint him as a public officer. Id. at 761.
SEC. 5. THERE IS HEREBY CREATED THE INDEPENDENT OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, COMPOSED OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO BE KNOWN AS
TANODBAYAN, ONE OVER-ALL DEPUTY AND AT LEAST ONE DEPUTY
EACH FOR LUZON, VISAYAS, AND MINDANAO. A SEPARATE
DEPUTY FOR THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT MAY LIKEWISE BE
APPOINTED.
ART XI ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
SEC. 6. THE OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, OTHER THAN THE DEPUTIES, SHALL BE APPOINTED BY
THE OMBUDSMAN ACCORDING TO THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW.
Q. What is the power of the Ombudsman over his office?
A. Under the Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is an
independent body. As a guarantee of this independence, the
Ombudsman has the power to appoint all officials and employees
of the Office of the Ombudsman, except his deputies. This power
necessarily includes the power of setting, prescribing and
administering the standards for the officials and personnel of the
Office.
To further ensure its independence, the Ombudsman has been
vested with the power of administrative control and supervision of
the Office. This includes the authority to organize such directorates
for administration and allied services as may be necessary for the
effective discharge of the functions of the Office, as well as to
prescribe and approve its position structure and staffing pattern.
Necessarily, it also includes the authority to determine and establish
the qualifications, duties, functions and responsibilities of the various
directorates and allied services of the Office. This must be so if the
constitutional intent to establish an independent Office of the
Ombudsman is to remain meaningful and significant. The Civil
Service Commission has no power over this. Ombudsman v. CSC,
G.R. No. 162215, July 30, 2007.
SEC. 7. THE EXISTING TANODBAYAN SHALL HEREAFTER BE KNOWN
AS THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR. IT SHALL CONTINUE TO
5
FUNCTION AND EXERCISE ITS POWERS AS NOW OR HEREAFTER MAY BE
PROVIDED BY LAW, EXCEPT THOSE CONFERRED ON THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN CREATED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION.
Q. What two distinct offices are created in the above provisions?
A. The two offices are that of the Ombudsman or Tanodbayan and
that of the Special Prosecutor.
The Special Prosecutor inherits the prosecutorial responsibility of the
Tanodbayan of the 1973 Constitution but is no longer called
Tanodbayan.
The Ombudsman inherits the title Tanodbayan and acts as
champion of the people, independent of and not beholden to the
President, and functions according to the enumeration in Section
13.
Relying on the prestige of his office, he will have persuasive powers
plus the ability to require that proper legal steps are taken by the
officers concerned. But the final say as to whether to prosecute or
not will belong to the executive department, although the
Ombudsman or Tanodbayan may seek to compel the fiscal to
prosecute by mandamus in proper cases. What is envisioned is a
champion capable of lending assistance especially to those who
would normally not even know how to go about filing a complaint.
For these reasons, Sections 7, 8, 9,10,11,12, and 14 are intended to
strengthen his independence.
ART XI ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Q. Raul Gonzales was Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution and
continued as such even after the ratification of the new
Constitution.
May he conduct preliminary investigation and files cases against
government officials?
A. Section 7 makes the Tanodbayan the Special Prosecutor.
However, he may not exercise those powers "conferred on the
Ombudsman created under this Constitution." Hence, since the
power to investigate has been given to the Ombudsman by Section
13, par. 1, the Special Prosecutor may investigate and file cases only
when so authorized by the Ombudsman. Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan and Gonzales, 160 SCRA 843 (April 17,1988).
NOTE: Acop v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 120422, September 27,
1995, reaffirms the doctrine in Zaldivar that the power to investigate,
including preliminary investigation, belongs to the Ombudsman and
not to the Special Prosecutor. But, while the Ombudsman's power to
investigate is primary, it is not exclusive and, under the Ombudsman
Act of 1989, he may delegate it to others and take it back any time
he wants to. Natividad v. Felix, 229 SCRA 680, 688 (1994), which also
traces the statutory history of the powers of the Ombudsman.
Q. May the Military Deputy investigate civilian police?
6
A. Because the power of the Ombudsman is broad and because
the Deputy Ombudsman acts under the direction of the
Ombudsman, the power of the Military Deputy to investigate
members of the civilian police has also been affirmed. Acop v.
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 120422, September 27,1995.
Q. Does the power to investigate cover only acts related to the
performance of official function?
A. The power of the Ombudsman to investigate is very broad
especially as it has been expanded by the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
He can investigate "any illegal act or omission of any public official"
even if the offense committed by the official is not related to the
performance of his functions. Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545,550
(1990).
Q. May a claim of confidentiality bar the Ombudsman's power to
investigate?
A. Even the claim of confidentiality will not prevent the
Ombudsman from demanding the production of documents
needed for the investigation.
In Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, May 22, 1995, the Court said
that where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to
protect military, diplomatic or other national security secrets but on
general public interest in preserving confidentiality, the courts have
declined to find in the Constitution an absolute privilege even for
the President. Moreover, even in cases where matters are really
confidential, inspection can be done in camera.
ART XI ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Q. May the Ombudsman impose preventive suspension?
A- The power to investigate also includes the power to impose
preventive suspension. This is different from the suspension referred
to in Section13(3). This latter is suspension as a penalty; preventive
suspension is not a penalty. Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645
(1993).
SEC. 8. THE OMBUDSMAN AND HIS DEPUTIES SHALL BE NATURALBORN
CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND AT THE TIME OF THEIR APPOINTMENT,
AT LEAST FORTY YEARS OLD, OF RECOGNIZED PROBITY AND
INDEPENDENCE, AND MEMBERS OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR, AND MUST
NOT HAVE BEEN CANDIDATES FOR ANY ELECTIVE OFFICE IN THE
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTION. THE OMBUDSMAN MUST HAVE
FOR TEN YEARS OR MORE BEEN A JUDGE OR ENGAGED IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES.
DURING THEIR TENURE, THEY SHALL BE SUBJECT TO THE SAME
DISQUALIFICATIONS AND PROHIBITIONS AS PROVIDED FOR IN
SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE IX-A OF THIS CONSTITUTION.
SEC. 9. THE OMBUDSMAN AND HIS DEPUTIES SHALL BE APPOINTED BY
THE PRESIDENT FROM A LIST OF AT LEAST SIX NOMINEES PREPARED BY
THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, AND FROM A LIST OF THREE
NOMINEES FOR EVERY VACANCY THEREAFTER. SUCH APPOINTMENTS
SHALL REQUIRE NO CONFIRMATION.
ALL VACANCIES SHALL BE FILLED WITHIN THREE MONTHS AFTER THEY
OCCUR.
7
SEC. 10. THE OMBUDSMAN AND HIS DEPUTIES SHALL HAVE THE RANK
OF CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS, AND THEY SHALL RECEIVE THE SAME
SALARY, WHICH SHALL NOT BE DECREASED DURING THEIR TERM OF
OFFICE.
SEC. 11. THE OMBUDSMAN AND HIS DEPUTIES SHALL SERVE FOR
A TERM OF SEVEN YEARS WITHOUT REAPPOINTMENT. THEY SHALL NOT
BE QUALIFIED TO RUN FOR ANY OFFICE IN THE ELECTION IMMEDIATELY
SUCCEEDING THEIR CESSATION FROM OFFICE.
SEC. 12. THE OMBUDSMAN AND HIS DEPUTIES, AS PROTECTORS OF
THE PEOPLE, SHALL ACT PROMPTLY ON COMPLAINTS FILED IN ANY
FORM OR MANNER AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICIALS OR EMPLOYEES OF
THE GOVERNMENT, OR ANY SUBDIVISION, AGENCY OR
INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS, AND SHALL, IN APPROPRIATE CASES,
NOTIFY THE COMPLAINANTS OF THE ACTION TAKEN AND THE RESULT
THEREOF.
Q. How is the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over a person
determined?
A. For purposes of determining the scope of the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman, a public officer is one to whom some of the sovereign
functions of the government have been delegated. The
National Centennial Commission performs executive power which
"is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the
laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation
ART XI ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
and enforcing their due observance." The executive function,
therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth
by law. Laurel v. Desierto,G.R. No. 145368, April 12,2002
Q. Charged with murder, the Governor challenges the authority of
the office of the Ombudsman to conduct the investigation. He
argues that the authority of the Ombudsman is limited to "crimes
related to or connected with an official's discharge of his public
functions." Decide.
A. The Ombudsman has authority. Section 12 says that he may
"investigate… any act or omission of any public official... when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient."
This is set out in greater detail in Section 16 of R.A. 6770, the
Ombudsman Act. Murder is illegal. And since it was allegedly
committed by a public official it comes within the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman. Deloso v. Domingo, G.R. No. 90591, November
21,1990.
Q. The accused claims that the complaints against him were sworn
to before a notary public and the affidavits before a provincial
fiscal not deputized by the Ombudsman. Can the Ombudsman
entertain the complaint?
A. Section 12 ells the Ombudsman to act on complaints filed in any
manner. Raro v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108431, July 14, 2000; Uy
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 105965-70, March 20, 2001.
SEC. 13. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN SHALL HAVE THE
FOLLOWING POWERS, FUNCTIONS, AND DUTIES:
(1) INVESTIGATE ON ITS OWN, OR ON COMPLAINT BY ANY PERSON,
8
ANY ACT OR OMISSION OF ANY PUBLIC OFFICIAL, EMPLOYEE, OFFICE
OR AGENCY, WHEN SUCH ACT OR OMISSION APPEARS TO BE ILLEGAL,
UNJUST, IMPROPER, OR INEFFICIENT.
(2) DIRECT, UPON COMPLAINT OR AT ITS OWN INSTANCE, ANY PUBLIC
OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE OF THE GOVERNMENT, OR ANY SUBDIVISION,
AGENCY OR INSTRUMENTALITY THEREOF, AS WELL AS OF ANY
GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION WITH
ORIGINAL CHARTER, TO PERFORM AND EXPEDITE ANY ACT OR DUTY
REQUIRED BY LAW, OR TO STOP, PREVENT, AND CORRECT ANY
ABUSE OR IMPROPRIETY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES.
(3) DIRECT THE OFFICER CONCERNED TO TAKE APPROPRIATE
ACTION AGAINST A PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE AT FAULT, AND
RECOMMEND HIS REMOVAL, SUSPENSION, DEMOTION, FINE, CENSURE,
OR PROSECUTION, AND ENSURE COMPLIANCE THEREWITH.
(4) DIRECT THE OFFICER CONCERNED, IN ANY APPROPRIATE CASE,
AND SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW,
TO FURNISH IT WITH COPIES OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO
CONTRACTS OR TRANSACTIONS ENTERED INTO BY HIS OFFICE
INVOLVING THE DISBURSEMENT OR USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR
PROPERTIES, AND REPORT ANY IRREGULARITY TO THE COMMISSION
ON AUDIT FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION.
(5) REQUEST ANY GOVERNMENT AGENCY FOR ASSISTANCE AND
INFORMATION NECESSARY IN THE DISCHARGE OF ITS
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND TO EXAMINE, IF NECESSARY, PERTINENT
RECORDS AND DOCUMENTS.
ART XI ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
(6) PUBLICIZE MATTERS COVERED BY ITS INVESTIGATION WHEN
CIRCUMSTANCES SO WARRANT AND WITH DUE PRUDENCE.
(7) DETERMINE THE CAUSES OF INEFFICIENCY, RED TAPE,
MISMANAGEMENT, FRAUD, AND CORRUPTION IN THE GOVERNMENT,
AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THEIR ELIMINATION AND THE
OBSERVANCE OF HIGH STANDARDS OF ETHICS AND EFFICIENCY.
(8) PROMULGATE ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EXERCISE SUCH
OTHER POWERS OR PERFORM SUCH FUNCTIONS OR DUTIES AS MAY BE
PROVIDED BY LAW.
Q. What are the powers of the Ombudsman?
A. Over the years the scope of the powers of the Ombudsman
under Section 13 has been clarified thus settling various disputed
issues:
1. The Ombudsman can investigate only officers of government
owned corporations with original charter. PAL, even when still
owned by the government, did not have original charter. Khan, Jr. v.
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 125296, July 20, 2006.
2. The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over disciplinary cases
involving public school teachers has been modified by Section 9 of
R.A. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Cartafor Public School
Teachers, which says that such cases must first go to a committee
appointed by the Secretary of Education. Ombudsman v.
9
Estandarte, G.R. No. 168670, April 13, 2007.
It is erroneous, thus, to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an
exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS over public school
teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative
investigations involving them. R.A. No. 4670 was approved on June
18,1966. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution was ratified by
the people in a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No. 6770 was enacted
on November 17, 1989. It is basic that the 1987 Constitution should
not be restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier enactment. The
1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in conferring
authority on the Ombudsman to act on complaints against all
public officials and employees, with the exception of officials who
may be removed only by impeachment or over members of
Congress and the Judiciary. The Ombudsman Act authorizes the
Ombudsman to impose penalties in administrative cases.
Ombudsman v. CA, November 22, 2006; Ombudsman v. Lucero,
November 24, 2006.
Section 21 of R.A. 6770 vests in the Ombudsman "disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government," except impeachable officers, members of Congress,
and the Judiciary. And under Section 25 of R.A. 6770, the
Ombudsman may impose in administrative proceedings the
"penalty ranging from suspension without pay for one year to
dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed,
illegally taken or lost, or both at the discretion of the
Ombudsman x x x." Clearly, under R.A. 6770 the Ombudsman has
the power to impose directly administrative penalty on public
officials or employees. Ombudsman v. CA, G.R. No. 168079, July
17,2007.
ART XI ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Note, however, that according to the Local Government Code,
elective officials may be dismissed only by the proper court. "Where
the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend and not
the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the
law by usurping the power to remove." Sangguniang Barangay v.
Punong Barangay, G.R. No. 170626, March 3, 2008.
4. The Special Prosecutor may not file an information without
authority from the Ombudsman. Republic Act No. 6770, by
conferring upon the Ombudsman the power to prosecute, likewise
grants to the Ombudsman the power to authorize the filing of
information. A delegated authority to prosecute was also given to
the Deputy Ombudsman, but no such delegation exists to the
Special Prosecutor. Nor is there an implied delegation. The Special
Prosecutor prosecutes only when authorized by the Ombudsman.
Perez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166062, September 26,2006.
5. The Ombudsman has been conferred rule making power to
govern procedures under it. Buencamino v. CA, G.R. No. 175895,
April 4,2007. One who is answering an administrative complaint filed
before the Ombudsman may not appeal to the procedural rules
under the Civil Service Commission. Medina v. COA, G.R. No.
176478, February 4, 2008.
6. A preventive suspension will only last ninety (90) days, not
the entire duration of the criminal case like petitioners seem to think.
Indeed, it would be constitutionally proscribed if the suspension
were to be of an indefinite duration or for an unreasonable length
of time. The Court has thus laid down the rule that preventive
suspension may not exceed the maximum period of ninety (90)
days, in consonance with Presidential Decree No. 807, now Section
10
52 of the Administrative Code of 1987. Villas Nor v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 180700, March 4, 2008
.
Q. Are the powers of the Ombudsman delegable?
A. The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation
on any Ombudsman case may be exercised by an investigator or
prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or
City Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their regular capacities
or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. Honasan II v. Panel of
Investigators of the DOJ, G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004.
NOTE: The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate
any act or omission of a public officer or employee applies only in
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In cases cognizable by
regular courts, the Ombudsman has concurrentjurisdiction with
other investigative agencies of government. Republic
Act No. 8249, otherwise known as An Act Further Defining the
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, limits the cases that are
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan to public officials occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher. The
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over private respondent who, as
punong barangay, is occupying a position corresponding to salary
grade 14 under Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. Ombudsman
v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010.
Q. If the Ombudsman refers a case to the NBI for investigation and
the NBI recommends prosecution. Accused complains that the
Ombudsman abdicated its duty to investigate?
ART XI ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
A. No. Section 13(2) allows him to direct cases for investigation to
other officers. Besides, what was referred to the NBI was fact finding;
preliminary investigation would still be conducted by the
Ombudsman. Rare v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108431, July
14,2000.
SEC. 14. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN SHALL ENJOY FISCAL
AUTONOMY. ITS APPROVED ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS SHALL BE
AUTOMATICALLY AND REGULARLY RELEASED.
SEC. 15. THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO RECOVER PROPERTIES
UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS OR EMPLOYEES, FROM
THEM OR FROM THEIR NOMINEES OR TRANSFEREES, SHALL NOT BE
BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION, LACHES, OR ESTOPPEL.
Q. Does Section 15 prevent the prescription of the crime?
A. No. The right to prosecute criminally can prescribe.
SEC. 16. No LOAN, GUARANTY, OR OTHER FORM OF FINANCIAL
ACCOMMODATION FOR ANY BUSINESS PURPOSE MAY BE GRANTED,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY ANY GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR
CONTROLLED BANK OR FINANCIAL INSTITUTION TO THE
PRESIDENT, THE VICE-PRESIDENT, THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, THE
CONGRESS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSIONS, THE OMBUDSMAN, OR TO ANY FIRM OR ENTITY IN
WHICH THEY HAVE CONTROLLING INTEREST, DURING THEIR TENURE.
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SEC. 17. A PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE SHALL, UPON ASSUMPTION
OF OFFICE AND AS OFTEN THEREAFTER AS MAY BE REQUIRED BY
LAW,SUBMIT A DECLARATION UNDER OATH OF HIS ASSETS, LIABILITIES,
AND NET WORTH. IN THE CASE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE VICE-PRESIDENT,
THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, THE CONGRESS, THE SUPREME COURT,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL
OFFICES, AND OFFICERS OF THE ARMED FORCES WITH GENERAL OR
FLAG RANK, THE DECLARATION SHALL BE DISCLOSED TO THE PUBLIC IN
THE MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW.
Q. What is the objective of Sections 16 and 17?
A. They are intended to strengthen the concept of public office as
a public trust.
SEC. 18. PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OWE THE STATE AND THIS
CONSTITUTION ALLEGIANCE AT ALL TIMES, AND ANY PUBLIC OFFICER
OR EMPLOYEE WHO SEEKS TO CHANGE HIS CITIZENSHIP OR ACQUIRE
THE STATUS OF AN IMMIGRANT OF ANOTHER COUNTRY DURING HIS
TENURE SHALL BE DEALT WITH BY LAW.
Q. Miguel is a holder of a "green card" entitling him to be a resident
of the United States permanently. In his application for the card he
put down his intention to reside in the United States "permanently."
He actually immigrated to the United States in 1984 and thereby
assumed allegiance to the United States. He however returned to
the Philippines in 1987 to run for mayor of a municipality. Is Article XI,
Section 18 applicable to him? Does he have the necessary
residence requirement?
ART XI ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

A. Article XI, Section 18 is not applicable because it has reference to

"incumbents." What is applicable is Section 68 of the Omnibus

Election Code which bars "a permanent resident of or an immigrant
to a foreign country" unless he waives his status as a permanent
resident of the foreign country. The mere filing of a certificate of
candidacy is not the required waiver. It must be by a special act
done before filing a certificate of candidacy. Case v. Court of
Appeals and Miguel, G.R. No. 88831, November 8,1990.

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