The World Trade Organization (WTO)

1.1-Introduction
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an organization that intends to
supervise and liberalize international trade. The organization officially
commenced on January 1, 1995 under the Marrakech Agreement, replacing the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which commenced in 1948.
The organization deals with regulation of trade between participating countries;
it provides a framework for negotiating and formalizing trade agreements, and
a dispute resolution process aimed at enforcing participants' adherence to WTO
agreements which are signed by representatives of member governments and
ratified by their parliaments. Most of the issues that the WTO focuses on derive
from previous trade negotiations, especially from the Uruguay Round (1986–
1994).

The organization is currently endeavoring to persist with a trade negotiation

called the Doha Development Agenda (or Doha Round), which was launched in
2001 to enhance equitable participation of poorer countries which represent a
majority of the world's population. However, the negotiation has been dogged
by "disagreement between exporters of agricultural bulk commodities and
countries with large numbers of subsistence farmers on the precise terms of a
'special safeguard measure' to protect farmers from surges in imports. At this
time, the future of the Doha Round is uncertain."

Subject to formal ratification of the three most recent members, the WTO has
157 members,[7] representing more than 97% of the world's population, [8] and
26 observers, most seeking membership. The WTO is governed by a ministerial
conference, meeting every two years; a general council, which implements the
conference's policy decisions and is responsible for day-to-day administration;
and a director-general, who is appointed by the ministerial conference. The
WTO's headquarters is at the Centre William Rappard, Geneva, Switzerland.
1.2- Function
Among the various functions of the WTO, these are regarded by analysts as the
most important:

It oversees the implementation, administration and operation of the
covered agreements.[28][29]

It provides a forum for negotiations and for settling disputes.
Additionally, it is the WTO duty to review and propagate the national trade
policies, and to ensure the coherence and transparency of trade policies through
surveillance in global economic policy-making. Another priority of the WTO is
the assistance of developing, least-developed and low-income countries in
transition to adjust to WTO rules and disciplines through technical cooperation
and training.
The WTO is also a center of economic research and analysis: regular
assessments of the global trade picture in its annual publications and research
reports on specific topics are produced by the organization. Finally, the WTO
cooperates closely with the two other components of the Breton Woods system,
the IMF and the World Bank.
More specifically, the WTO main activities are:
 Negotiating the reduction or elimination of obstacles to trade (import
tariffs, other barriers to trade) and agreeing on rules governing the conduct
of international trade (e.g. antidumping, subsidies, product standards, etc.)
 Administering and monitoring the application of the WTO agreed rules for
trade in goods, trade in services, and trade-related intellectual property
rights.
 Monitoring and reviewing the trade policies of our members, as well as
ensuring transparency of regional and bilateral trade agreements.
 Settling disputes among our members regarding the interpretation and
application of the agreements.
 Building capacity of developing country government officials in
international trade matters
 Assisting the process of accession of some 30 countries who are not yet
member of the organization.
 Conducting economic research and collecting and disseminating trade data
in support of the WTO other main activities.
 Explaining to and educating the public about the WTO, its mission and its
activities
2.1 Principles of the trading system
The WTO establishes a framework for trade policies; it does not define or
specify outcomes. That is, it is concerned with setting the rules of the trade
policy games. Five principles are of particular importance in understanding
both the pre-1994 GATT and the WTO:
2.2 Non-Discrimination. It has two major components: the most favored
nation (MFN) rule, and the national treatment policy. Both are embedded in the
main WTO rules on goods, services, and intellectual property, but their precise
scope and nature differ across these areas. The MFN rule requires that a WTO
member must apply the same conditions on all trade with other WTO members,
i.e. a WTO member has to grant the most favorable conditions under which it
allows trade in a certain product type to all other WTO members. "Grant
someone a special favor and you have to do the same for all other WTO
members. National treatment means that imported goods should be treated no
less favorably than domestically produced goods (at least after the foreign
goods have entered the market) and was introduced to tackle non-tariff barriers
to trade (e.g. technical standards, security standards et al. discriminating against
imported goods).
2.3 Reciprocity. It reflects both a desire to limit the scope of free-riding that
may arise because of the MFN rule, and a desire to obtain better access to
foreign markets. A related point is that for a nation to negotiate, it is necessary
that the gain from doing so be greater than the gain available from unilateral
liberalization; reciprocal concessions intend to ensure that such gains will
materialize.
2.4 Binding and enforceable commitments. The tariff commitments made by
WTO members in a multilateral trade negotiation and on accession are
enumerated in a schedule (list) of concessions. These schedules establish
"ceiling bindings": a country can change its bindings, but only after negotiating
with its trading partners, which could mean compensating them for loss of
trade. If satisfaction is not obtained, the complaining country may invoke the
WTO dispute settlement procedures.
2.5 Transparency. The WTO members are required to publish their trade
regulations, to maintain institutions allowing for the review of administrative
decisions affecting trade, to respond to requests for information by other
members, and to notify changes in trade policies to the WTO. These internal
transparency requirements are supplemented and facilitated by periodic
country-specific reports (trade policy reviews) through the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism (TPRM). The WTO system tries also to improve
predictability and stability, discouraging the use of quotas and other measures
used to set limits on quantities of imports.
1. Safety valves. In specific circumstances, governments are able to
restrict trade. There are three types of provisions in this direction:
articles allowing for the use of trade measures to attain non economic
objectives; articles aimed at ensuring "fair competition"; and provisions
permitting intervention in trade for economic reasons. Exceptions to the
MFN principle also allow for preferential treatment of developed
countries, regional free trade areas and customs unions.
Organizational structure
The General Council has multiple bodies which oversee committees in
different areas, re the following:
Council for Trade in Goods
There are 11 committees under the jurisdiction of the Goods Council
each with a specific task. All members of the WTO participate in the
committees. The Textiles Monitoring Body is separate from the other
committees but still under the jurisdiction of Goods Council. The body
has its own chairman and only 10 members. The body also has several
groups relating to textiles. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights
Information on intellectual property in the WTO, news and official
records of the activities of the TRIPS Council and details of the WTO
work with other international organizations in the field. Council for
Trade in Services
The Council for Trade in Services operates under the guidance of the
General Council and is responsible for overseeing the functioning of the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). It is open to all WTO
members, and can create subsidiary bodies as required. Trade
Negotiations Committee
The Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) is the committee that deals
with the current trade talks round. The chair is WTO director-general.
The committee is currently tasked with the Doha Development Round.
The Service Council has three subsidiary bodies: financial services, domestic
regulations, GATS rules and specific commitments. The General council has
several different committees, working groups, and working parties. [42] There are
committees on the following: Trade and Environment; Trade and Development
(Subcommittee on Least-Developed Countries); Regional Trade Agreements;
Balance of Payments Restrictions; and Budget, Finance and Administration.
There are working parties on the following: Accession. There are working
groups on the following: Trade, debt and finance; and Trade and technology
transfer.
Agreements
The WTO oversees about 60 different agreements which have the status of
international legal texts. Member countries must sign and ratify all WTO
agreements on accession. A discussion of some of the most important
agreements follows. The Agreement on Agriculture came into effect with the
establishment of the WTO at the beginning of 1995. The AoA has three central
concepts, or "pillars": domestic support, market access and export subsidies.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services was created to extend the
multilateral trading system to service sector, in the same way the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provides such a system for
merchandise trade. The Agreement entered into force in January 1995. The
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights sets down
minimum standards for many forms of intellectual property (IP) regulation. It
was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994.

The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures —

also known as the SPS Agreement was negotiated during the Uruguay Round
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and entered into force with the
establishment of the WTO at the beginning of 1995. Under the SPS agreement,
the WTO sets constraints on members' policies relating to food safety (bacterial
contaminants, pesticides, inspection and labeling) as well as animal and plant
health (imported pests and diseases). The Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade is an international treaty of the World Trade Organization. It was
negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, and entered into force with the establishment of the WTO at the end of
1994. The object ensures that technical negotiations and standards, as well as
testing and certification procedures, do not create unnecessary obstacles to
trade". The Agreement on Customs Valuation, formally known as the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT, prescribes methods of
customs valuation that Members are to follow. Chiefly, it adopts the
"transaction value" approach.

The WTO oversees about 60 different agreements which have the status of
international legal texts. Member countries must sign and ratify all WTO
agreements on accession. A discussion of some of the most important
agreements follows. The Agreement on Agriculture came into effect with the
establishment of the WTO at the beginning of 1995. The AoA has three central
concepts, or "pillars": domestic support, market access and export subsidies.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services was created to extend the
multilateral trading system to service sector, in the same way the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provides such a system for
merchandise trade. The Agreement entered into force in January 1995. The
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights sets down
minimum standards for many forms of intellectual property (IP) regulation. It
was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994.

The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures —

also known as the SPS Agreement was negotiated during the Uruguay Round
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and entered into force with the
establishment of the WTO at the beginning of 1995. Under the SPS agreement,
the WTO sets constraints on members' policies relating to food safety (bacterial
contaminants, pesticides, inspection and labelling) as well as animal and plant
health (imported pests and diseases). The Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade is an international treaty of the World Trade Organization. It was
negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, and entered into force with the establishment of the WTO at the end of
1994. The object ensures that technical negotiations and standards, as well as
testing and certification procedures, do not create unnecessary obstacles to
trade". The Agreement on Customs Valuation, formally known as the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT, prescribes methods of
customs valuation that Members are to follow. Chiefly, it adopts the
"transaction value" approach.

The WTO oversees about 60 different agreements which have the status of
international legal texts. Member countries must sign and ratify all WTO
agreements on accession. A discussion of some of the most important
agreements follows. The Agreement on Agriculture came into effect with the
establishment of the WTO at the beginning of 1995. The AoA has three central
concepts, or "pillars": domestic support, market access and export subsidies.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services was created to extend the
multilateral trading system to service sector, in the same way the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provides such a system for
merchandise trade. The Agreement entered into force in January 1995. The
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights sets down
minimum standards for many forms of intellectual property (IP) regulation. It
was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994.

The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures —

also known as the SPS Agreement was negotiated during the Uruguay Round
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and entered into force with the
establishment of the WTO at the beginning of 1995. Under the SPS agreement,
the WTO sets constraints on members' policies relating to food safety (bacterial
contaminants, pesticides, inspection and labeling) as well as animal and plant
health (imported pests and diseases). The Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade is an international treaty of the World Trade Organization. It was
negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, and entered into force with the establishment of the WTO at the end of
1994. The object ensures that technical negotiations and standards, as well as
testing and certification procedures, do not create unnecessary obstacles to
trade".[61] The Agreement on Customs Valuation, formally known as the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of GATT, prescribes methods of
customs valuation that Members are to follow. Chiefly, it adopts the
"transaction value" approach.
The WTO Dispute Settlement
Developing countries need access to foreign markets if they are to reap the
benefits of globalization. Multilateral negotiations under the World Trade
Organization (WTO) play a pivotal role in facilitating market access.2 yet,
throughout the global economy, pressures for protectionism abound,
threatening to roll back these gains. As a result, the Who’s dispute settlement
mechanism is widely seen as one of the most critical – and successful –
features of the trade regime. Using this mechanism, WTO member-states can
shine the spotlight of international legal scrutiny on the protectionist practices
of their trading partners. This rule-of-law system is especially important for
developing countries, which typically lack the market size to exert much
influence through more power-oriented trade diplomacy. Indeed, some poorer
countries have used the WTO dispute settlement system to great effect, proving
the system worth from a development perspective. 3 Nonetheless, the technical
and legal complexity of this regime makes it difficult for other developing
countries to effectively use the system, many of which have never filed a WTO
dispute, despite having repeated grounds to do so. In this issues brief, we
elaborate this point by describing:

a) How WTO dispute settlement works;

b) The prospective benefits and hurdles to effective use of the regime by
developing countries; and
c) Some potential directions for technical assistance and capacity- building,
focusing on WTO dispute settlement, in particular.
How WTO Dispute Settlement Works
A WTO dispute proceeds through three main stages: consultation; formal
litigation; and, if necessary, implementation (figure 1). All disputes start with a
request for consultations, in which the member government bringing the case to
the WTO (the complainant) sets out its objections to the trade measure(s) of
another member government (the defendant). The two

Sides are then required to consult for 60 days with the goal of negotiating a
mutually satisfactory solution to the dispute. Interestingly, a large proportion of
cases are successfully resolved during consultations; 46% of all disputes
brought to the WTO end at this stage, and three-quarters of those yield at least
partial concessions from the defendant. If consultations do not result in a
mutually satisfactory solution, the complainant can request a panel proceeding,
marking the start of the formal litigation stage. Panels are comprised of three to
five persons with a background in trade law, agreed to by the parties on a case-
by-case basis. There are typically two rounds of testimony, including from
other countries (third parties) that notify the WTO of a “substantial” interest in
the case. The panel then circulates an “interim report,” offering both sides an
opportunity to comment and seek clarification. The complainant and defendant
can still negotiate a settlement at this point. In fact, another 13% of all cases
end at this stage before a ruling is rendered. If not, the panel issues its final
report, which is then adopted by the WTO, unless one of two things happens.
First, the two sides can agree not to adopt the panel report for whatever reason,
although to date this has not happened. Second, one or both sides (but not third
parties) can appeal the panel’s report, which happens frequently The Appellate
Body (AB) handles these appeals. Unlike panels, the AB is a standing body of
jurists which is designed to ensure greater consistency across its rulings. The
AB is tasked with hearing testimony from the parties, and any third parties, on
how the panel may have erred in its legal reasoning. The AB can uphold or
overturn the panel in whole or in part, and its decision is final. If this verdict
favors the defendant, the case typically ends. If this verdict, instead, favors the
complainant, the dispute may proceed to the implementation stage. When a
defendant is ruled against, the panel and (or) AB calls for it to bring its
measures into accordance with its WTO obligations.

What this means in practice is, itself, often contested. If the complainant feels
that the defendant has not taken appropriate steps, it can subsequently request a
“compliance” panel. This panel, which is often comprised of the original panel
members, must determine whether the defendant’s efforts have, in fact, brought
its measure(s) into compliance. If not – A judgment the defendant can appeal to
the AB – the complainant can request a second panel to set the level at which it
can “retaliate” against the defendant. This typically involves imposing tariffs
on the defendant’s exports. It is essential to note two things about retaliation.
First, requests for authorization to retaliate are rare. Indeed, complainants have
asked for authorization to retaliate in just seven of the hundreds of cases
handled by the WTO. Second, it is up to the complainant, and not the WTO, to
follow through on this authorization to retaliate, and this is rarer still. Of the six
requests authorized to date (the seventh is pending at the time of this writing),
complainants have retaliated in only three cases. What is remarkable is that,
despite its blend of law and politics, the system works, and works quite well. In
fact, two-thirds of the disputes brought for adjudication in Geneva are resolved
to the full satisfaction of the complainant. But is this true for all members? In
particular, is the system useful for developing countries, most notably in
disputes against developed countries? The answer is clearly “yes,” although
more can be done to help developing countries make better use of the system.
WTO Dispute Settlement from a Development Perspective
Trade liberalization promises considerable returns, but comes with risks. One
such risk is the possibility that a foreign government will succumb to lobbying
by its own domestic producers and grant them protection. This can undermine a
developing country’s interest in reallocating resources to the affected export
sector, since poor countries tend to have fewer alternative export markets, and
fewer export goods. As a result, the mere anticipation of such protectionism can
deter or dilute much needed trade reform in developing countries. The WTO
dispute settlement system can help insure against this risk by maintaining
market access once it is won, thereby encouraging developing countries to
embark on an open trade growth strategy. The conventional wisdom, of course,
is that developing countries face substantial hurdles in using WTO dispute
settlement.5 Foremost among these is their lack of market size with which to
credibly threaten retaliation for noncompliance. In other words, the concern is
that even with a legal victory in hand, a developing country may not be able to
compel the defendant to liberalize, since it’s in the first place. A developing
country might also be reluctant to initiate a dispute because of fears of
reprisals, such as the suspension of foreign aid or unilateral trade preferences.
In addition to these difficulties, which in fact are true for small developed
countries as well, developing countries face a unique problem: the lack of legal
capacity. To take full advantage of WTO law, developing countries need the
facility to aggressively pursue their rights in the increasingly complex legal
trade regime. For such capacity, a country must have several things. It needs
experienced trade lawyers to litigate a case, but also seasoned politicians and
bureaucrats to decide whether it is worth litigating a case, which is arguably the
most critical stage of the process. It needs a staff to monitor trade practices
abroad, but also the domestic institutions necessary to participate in
international negotiations on complex issues, like health and safety standards,
which figure so prominently on the WTO agenda. The truth of the matter is that
many developing countries lack even a single full-time WTO representative, let
alone the necessary dedicated trade negotiation bureaucracy at home. With
these obstacles in mind, it might seem that developing countries stand to
benefit little from WTO dispute settlement. But this is far from true. Poorer
complainants have filed and won concessions from large industrialized states in
a wide variety of disputes, with millions of dollars at stake. These cases have
involved exports of underwear (Costa Rica v. US), shrimp (Thailand and
Pakistan v. US), wool shirts (India v. US), gasoline (Venezuela and Brazil v.
US), sardines (Peru v. European Communities) and poultry (Brazil v European
Communities), among other products. Why, despite their lack of a credible
threat to retaliate, have these developing countries succeeded in making
effective use of WTO dispute settlement? The reason is that these
complainants, like their wealthier counterparts, have benefited from the fact
that defendants worry about the normative condemnation that goes along with a
legal defeat, rather than threats of direct retaliation per se. In other words,
defendants prefer to avoid being found “noncompliant” because such a label
may damage their prospects of gaining compliance when they, in turn, file as
complainants. In this way, defendant governments may value the integrity of
the multilateral trade regime over the outcome of a single case. This means that
poor complainants can use legal victories at the WTO to weigh in on the
domestic political debates over free trade within defendant countries, as they
look to gain market access. In short, the effectiveness of WTO dispute
settlement derives more from these intangibles than from trade sanctions,
which are rare, and which could never have been a credible factor in the dozens
of cases in which wealthy defendants have conceded to poor complainants.
Viewed from this perspective, the emphasis on retaliation at the WTO is
misplaced. While it is true that larger countries can more credibly threaten to
retaliate, threats of retaliation are not the key to the system. As Robert Hudec
explained, other provisions of the WTO “make legal complaints without
retaliation quite a bit more effective than they were” under GATT. He further
observed that the inability of poor countries to retaliate “is a problem, but it is a
separate problem that has nothing to do with the utility of the dispute
settlement procedure for a developing country complainant.”6 The evidence, to
which we now turn, bears out Hudec’s discerning insight. In looking at the
evidence, the first thing to note is that most WTO disputes are among a few
members that account for the bulk of international trade, most notably the US
and Europe. By comparison, developing countries have had little experience
with dispute settlement. But, as Table 1 indicates, this disparity is largely
explained by differences in trade volumes. Consistent with this explanation, a
few developing countries, such as Brazil and India, have launched a relatively
large number of disputes, while others, like China, are increasingly active in
dispute settlement as third parties, seeking to gain experience with the system.
Importance of the WTO dispute settlement system
The best international agreement is not worth very much if its obligations
cannot be enforced when one of the signatories fails to comply with such
obligations. An effective mechanism to settle disputes thus increases the
practical value of the commitments the signatories undertake in an international
agreement. The fact that the Members of the (WTO) established the current
dispute settlement system during the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations underscores the high importance they attach to compliance by all
Members with their obligations under the WTO Agreement.
Settling disputes in a timely and structured manner is important. It helps to
prevent the detrimental effects of unresolved international trade conflicts and to
mitigate the imbalances between stronger and weaker players by having their
disputes settled on the basis of rules rather than having power determine the
outcome. Most people consider the WTO dispute settlement system to be one
of the major results of the Uruguay Round. After the entry into force of the
WTO Agreement in 1995, the dispute settlement system soon gained practical
importance as Members frequently resorted to using this system.
10 benefits of the WTO trading system

1. The system helps promote peace

2. Disputes are handled constructively
3. Rules make life easier for all
4. Freer trade cuts the costs of living
5. It provides more choice of products and qualities
6. Trade raises incomes
7. Trade stimulates economic growth
8. The basic principles make life more efficient
9. Governments are shielded from lobbying
10. The system encourages good government

Dispute settlement
This page is a gateway to material on:
 Disputes in general, and how they are handled in the WTO and its
Dispute Settlement Body
 New negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding
 Individual dispute cases: The disputes
The WTO’s procedure for resolving trade quarrels under the Dispute
Settlement Understanding is vital for enforcing the rules and therefore for
ensuring that trade flows smoothly.
A dispute arises when a member government believes another member
government is violating an agreement or a commitment that it has made in the
WTO. The authors of these agreements are the member governments
themselves — the agreements are the outcome of negotiations among
members. Ultimate responsibility for settling disputes also lies with member
governments, through the Dispute Settlement Body.
The objectives of the WTO
The preamble to the WTO Agreement (Box 1.1) describes its objectives as
including:
• raising standards of living
• ensuring full employment
• realizing these aims consistently with sustainable development and
environmental protection
• ensuring that developing countries, especially the least developed countries
(LDCs), secure a proper share in the growth of international trade.

However, since its creation the WTO’s emphasis has slipped from
concentrating on these public interest goals to seeing itself primarily as ‘an
organization for liberalizing trade,’ and declaring that ‘the system’s overriding
purpose is to help trade flow as freely as possible.’1 This has been the source of
one of the fundamental tensions surrounding the mandate and activities of the
organization. Some (such as developing countries and non-governmental
organizations) would like to see added emphasis on the public interest goals,
whilst others (private companies and some industrialized countries, for
instance) favour faster removal of obstacles to free trade.

Today, an increasing number of voices are being raised to underline that free trade
should not be an end in itself, but rather a tool to achieve equitable development and a
better world. That the WTO public interest objectives remain out of reach of many has
drawn criticism that the organization is dominated by rich countries, functions in a
secretive manner, and helps feed the greed of the rich in the name of trade
liberalization.
Conclusion
The WTO was born out of negotiations, and everything the WTO does is the
result of negotiations. The bulk of the WTO current work comes from the
1986–94 negotiations called the Uruguay Round and earlier negotiations under
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO is currently the
host to new negotiations, under the ‘Doha Development Agenda’ launched in
2001. Where countries have faced trade barriers and wanted them lowered, the
negotiations have helped to open markets for trade. But the WTO is not just
about opening markets, and in some circumstances its rules support
maintaining trade barriers — for example, to protect consumers or prevent the
spread of disease.

At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the
world’s trading nations. These documents provide the legal ground rules for
international commerce. They are essentially contracts, binding governments to
keep their trade policies within agreed limits. Although negotiated and signed
by governments, the goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters,
and importers conduct their business, while allowing governments to meet
social and environmental objectives. The system’s overriding purpose is to help
trade flow as freely as possible — so long as there are no undesirable side
effects — because this is important for economic development and well-being.
That partly means removing obstacles. It also means ensuring that individuals,
companies and governments know what the trade rules are around the world,
and giving them the confidence that there will be no sudden changes of policy.
In other words, the rules have to be ‘transparent’ and predictable.

Trade relations often involve conflicting interests. Agreements, including those

painstakingly negotiated in the WTO system, often need interpreting. The most
harmonious way to settle these differences is through some neutral procedure
based on an agreed legal foundation. That is the purpose behind the dispute
settlement process written into the WTO agreements