RULE 2 CASE DIGEST

1. GOODLAND COMPANY INC VS ASIA UNITED BANK

Facts:
Sometime in July 1999, petitioner Goodland Company, Inc. (petitioner) mortgaged its two parcels of land situated
in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.

The Third Party Real Estate Mortgage (REM) secured the loans extended by respondent Asia United Bank
(“AUB”) to Radio Marine Network (Smartnet), Inc. (RMNSI), doing business as Smartnet Philippines, under the
latter’s P250,000,000.00 Omnibus Credit Line with AUB. In addition to the aforesaid collaterals, petitioner
executed a Third Party REM over its 5,801-square meter property located at Pasong Tamo St., Makati City.

The REMs, both signed by Gilbert G. Guy, President of Goodland Company, Inc., were duly registered by AUB
with the Registry of Deeds for Calamba, Laguna and Registry of Deeds for Makati City, and annotated on the said
titles. Subsequently, however, petitioner repudiated the REMs by claiming that AUB and its officers unlawfully
filled up the blank mortgage forms and falsified the entries therein.

The Laguna properties were the subject of two suits filed by petitioner to forestall their imminent foreclosure, and
similar actions were likewise instituted by petitioner involving the Makati property which is the subject of the
present case. However, the only subject of the present petition is the Makati Property. The Laguna Properties
were the subject of separate petitions.

Petitioner instituted two suits involving the Makati Property. The first suit filed by petitioner was an action for an
annulment of the REM covering the Makati Property on the ground of its fraudulent and irregular execution and
registration filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56 of Makati City. On the other hand, the second
suit filed by petitioner prayed for injunctive relief and/or nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale which
petitioner alleged to be procedurally and legally defective filed before the RTC, Branch 145 of Makati City.

The RTC (Branch 145) issued an Order denying petitioner’s application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, as well as respondents’ motion to dismiss based on forum shopping, non-payment of correct docket
fees and failure to state a cause of action. However, the court reserved the issuance of the corresponding order
requiring petitioner to pay the appropriate docket fees after respondents shall have submitted what they believed
should have been the correct computation thereof.

On motion of respondents, Civil Case No. 06-1032 was consolidated with Civil Case No. 03-045. Prior to the
consolidation, respondents moved to dismiss with prejudice the two cases on the grounds of forum shopping, and
that no jurisdiction was acquired by the RTC in Civil Case No. 03-045 for failure to pay the proper docket and
other legal fees.

In a Joint Order, the RTC (Branch 56) dismissed with prejudice the complaints in both cases. Petitioner filed two
separate motions for reconsideration, which the RTC likewise denied. Petitioner again filed separate appeals
before the Court of Appeals (CA), which were docketed under only one case (CA-G.R. CV No. 90418).

The appellate court sustained the dismissal made by trial court on the ground of forum shopping, but not on the
ground of improper docket and other legal fees.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner violated the rule against forum shopping.

Ruling:
Yes. For forum shopping can be said to exist, the following must concur: (1) identity of parties, or at least such
parties as represent the same interests in both actions, (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts, and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration.
The Court ruled that these elements are present in the instant case. There is identity of parties in the instant case
notwithstanding that in the first case (Civil Case No. 03- 045), only one bank officer (Co), the notary public
(Pelicano) and the Register of Deeds were impleaded along with AUB as defendants, whereas in the second case
(Civil Case No. 06-1032), AUB and its two officers (Chan and Del Mundo), along with the RTC Clerk of Court
(Escasinas, Jr.), Sheriff (Magsajo) and the Register of Deeds of Makati City (Ortile) were the named defendants.

The parties in both cases are substantially the same as they represent the same interests and offices/positions,
and who were impleaded in their respective capacities with corresponding liabilities/duties under the claims
asserted.

The prayer for relief in the two cases was based on the same attendant facts in the execution of REMs over
petitioner’s properties in favor of AUB. While the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, consolidation of ownership
in AUB and issuance of title in the latter’s name were set forth only in the second case (Civil Case No. 06-1032),
these were simply the expected consequences of the REM transaction in the first case (Civil Case No. 03-045).
These eventualities are precisely what petitioner sought to avert when it filed the first case. Undeniably then, the
injunctive relief sought against the extrajudicial foreclosure, as well as the cancellation of the new title in the name
of the creditor-mortgagee AUB, were all premised on the alleged nullity of the REM due to its allegedly fraudulent
and irregular execution and registration—the same facts set forth in the first case. In both cases, petitioner
asserted its right as owner of the property subject of the REM, while AUB invoked the rights of a foreclosing
creditor-mortgagee.

With respect to identity of cause of action, a cause of action is defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. The Court made reference to the
test in determining whether or not the causes of action in the first and second cases are identical, to wit: would
the same evidence support and establish both the present and former cause of action? If so, the former recovery
is a bar; if otherwise, it does not stand in the way of the former action.

In the first case, petitioner alleged the fraudulent and irregular execution and registration of the REM which
violated its right as owner who did not consent thereto, while in the second case petitioner cited further violation of
its right as owner when AUB foreclosed the property, consolidated its ownership and obtained a new TCT in its
name. Considering that the aforesaid violations of petitioner’s right as owner in the two cases both hinge on the
binding effect of the REM, i.e., both cases will rise or fall on the issue of the validity of the REM, it follows
that the same evidence will support and establish the first and second causes of action. The procedural
infirmities or non-compliance with legal requirements for extrajudicial foreclosure raised in the second case were
but additional grounds in support of the injunctive relief sought against the foreclosure which was, in the first
place, illegal on account of the mortgage contract’s nullity. Evidently, petitioner never relied solely on the alleged
procedural irregularities in the extrajudicial foreclosure when it sought the reliefs in the second case.

Lastly, Under Sec. 7, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court: The plaintiff is required under oath to certify, among others, his
undertaking to report to the court the fact of filing of a similar case, failing which shall be cause for the dismissal of
the case, to wit: “(c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed. …non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the
party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions.”

The Court ruled that petitioner’s act of forum shopping was deliberate and malicious considering that it
knowingly filed Civil Case No. 06-1032 despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 03-045. This being the case,
the act of petitioner is punishable by and results in the summary dismissal of the actions filed. Both Civil Case No.
03-045 and Civil Case No. 06-1032 are therefore correctly dismissed with prejudice.
2. RELUCIO VS LOPEZ
G.R. No. 138497. January 16, 2002

The Case
The case is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to set aside the decision2 of the Court of Appeals that
denied a petition for certiorari assailing the trial court’s order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss the case
against her inclusion as party defendant therein.

The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
“On September 15, 1993, herein private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez (plaintiff below) filed a petition for
“APPOINTMENT AS SOLE ADMINISTRATRIX OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF PROPERTIES,
FORFEITURE, ETC.,” against defendant Alberto Lopez and petitioner Imelda Relucio, docketed as Spec.
Proc. M3630, in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 141.

In the petition, private respondent alleged that sometime in 1968, defendant Lopez, who is legally married to the
private respondent, abandoned the latter and their four legitimate children; that he arrogated unto himself full and
exclusive control and administration of the conjugal properties, spending and using the same for his sole gain and
benefit to the total exclusion of the private respondent and their four children; that defendant Lopez, after
abandoning his family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner since 1976.

“It was further alleged that defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio, during their period of cohabitation since 1976,
have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez owned or controlled corporations, residential,
agricultural, commercial lots, houses, apartments and buildings, cars and other motor vehicles, bank accounts
and jewelry. These properties, which are in the names of defendant Lopez and petitioner Relucio singly or jointly
or their dummies and proxies, have been acquired principally if not solely through the actual contribution of
money, property and industry of defendant Lopez with minimal, if not nil, actual contribution from petitioner
Relucio.

“In order to avoid defendant Lopez obligations as a father and husband, he excluded the private respondent and
their four children from sharing or benefiting from the conjugal properties and the income or fruits there from. As
such, defendant Lopez either did not place them in his name or otherwise removed, transferred, stashed away or
concealed them from the private respondent.

He placed substantial portions of these conjugal properties in the name of petitioner Relucio.
“It was also averred that in the past twenty-five years since defendant Lopez abandoned the private respondent,
he has sold, disposed of, alienated, transferred, assigned, canceled, removed or stashed away properties, assets
and income belonging to the conjugal partnership with the private respondent and either spent the proceeds
thereof for his sole benefit and that of petitioner Relucio and their two illegitimate children or permanently and
fraudulently placed them beyond the reach of the private respondent and their four children.

“On December 8, 1993, a Motion, to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner on the ground that
private respondent has no cause of action against her.

“An Order dated February 10, 1994 was issued by herein respondent Judge denying petitioner Relucio’s
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because some of
the subject properties are registered in her name and defendant Lopez, or solely in her name.

“Subsequently thereafter, petitioner Relucio filed a Motion for Reconsideration to the Order of the respondent
Judge dated February 10, 1994 but the same was likewise denied in the Order dated May 31, 1994.”

On June 21, 1994, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari assailing the trial court’s denial
of her motion to dismiss.

On May 31, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision denying the petition.
On June 26, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.6 However, on April 6, 1999, the Court of Appeals
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this appeal.

The Issues
1. Whether respondent’s petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal property, accounting, etc.
against her husband Alberto J. Lopez established a cause of action against petitioner.
2. Whether petitioner’s inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for a complete adjudication of
the controversy.

The Court’s Ruling

We grant the petition. We resolve the issues in seriatim.

First issue: whether a cause of action exists against petitioner in the proceedings below. “A cause of action is an
act or omission of one party the defendant in violation of the legal right of the other.”
The elements of a cause of action are:
1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting
a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages.

A cause of action is sufficient if a valid judgment may be rendered thereon if the alleged facts were
admitted or proved. In order to sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint
must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been merely defectively
stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.

Hence, to determine the sufficiency of the cause of action alleged in Special Proceedings M3630, we assay its
allegations.

In Part Two on the “Nature of [the] Complaint,” respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez summarized the causes of
action alleged in the complaint below.
The complaint is by an aggrieved wife against her husband.
Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against petitioner. Respondent’s causes of action
were all against her husband.

The first cause of action is for judicial appointment of respondent as administratrix of the conjugal partnership or
absolute community property arising from her marriage to Alberto J. Lopez. Petitioner is a complete stranger to
this cause of action. Article 128 of the Family Code refers only to spouses, to wit:
“If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the
aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be
the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property
x x x”
The administration of the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion of all other persons.
Respondent alleges that Alberto J. Lopez is her husband.
Therefore, her first cause of action is against Alberto J. Lopez. There is no right duty relation between petitioner
and respondent that can possibly support a cause of action. In fact, none of the three elements of a cause of
action exists.

The second cause of action is for an accounting “by respondent husband.”14 The accounting of conjugal
partnership arises from or is an incident of marriage.
Petitioner has nothing to do with the marriage between respondent Alberto J. Lopez. Hence, no cause of action
can exist against petitioner on this ground.
Respondent’s alternative cause of action is for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez’ share in the coowned property
“acquired during his illicit relationship and cohabitation with [petitioner]”15 and for the “dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains between him [Alberto J. Lopez] and the [respondent].”
The third cause of action is essentially for forfeiture of Alberto J. Lopez’ share in property coowned by him and
petitioner. It does not involve the issue of validity of the coownership
between Alberto J. Lopez and petitioner. The issue is whether there is basis in law to forfeit Alberto J. Lopez’
share, if any there be, in property coowned by him with petitioner.
Respondent’s asserted right to forfeit extends to Alberto J. Lopez’ share alone. Failure of Alberto J. Lopez to
surrender such share, assuming the trial court finds in respondent’s favor, results in a breach of an obligation to
respondent and gives rise to a cause of action.16 Such cause of action, however, pertains to Alberto J. Lopez, not
petitioner.

The respondent also sought support. Support cannot be compelled from a stranger.
The action in Special Proceedings M3630 is, to use respondent Angelina M. Lopez’ own words, one by “an
aggrieved wife against her husband.”17 References to petitioner in the common and specific allegations of fact in
the complaint are merely incidental, to set forth facts and circumstances that prove the causes of
action alleged against Alberto J. Lopez.

Finally, as to the moral damages, respondent’s claim for moral damages is against Alberto J. Lopez, not
petitioner.
To sustain a cause of action for moral damages, the complaint must have the character of an action for
interference with marital or family relations under the Civil Code.

A real party in interest is one who stands “to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.”18 In this case,
petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in Special Proceedings M3630. If petitioner is not a real party in
interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final
determination of an action. Petitioner’s participation in Special Proceedings M3630 is not indispensable. Certainly,
the trial court can issue a judgment ordering Alberto J. Lopez to make an accounting of his conjugal partnership
with respondent, and give support to respondent and their children, and dissolve Alberto J. Lopez’ conjugal
partnership with respondent, and forfeit Alberto J. Lopez’ share in property coowned by him and petitioner. Such
judgment would be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto J. Lopez. Nor can petitioner be a necessary
party in Special Proceedings M3630.

A necessary party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if complete relief is to be
accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action.20
In the context of her petition in the lower court, respondent would be accorded complete relief if Alberto J. Lopez
were ordered to account for his alleged conjugal partnership property with respondent, give support to respondent
and her children, turn over his share in the coownership with petitioner and dissolve his conjugal partnership or
absolute community property with respondent.

The Judgment
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court
DISMISSES Special Proceedings M3630 of the Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 141 as against petitioner. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

Note.— A complaint is sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of the cause of action even though the
allegations may be vague or indefinite.
3. BAYANOS VS SUSANA Realty INC .

The Case:
This petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, the Court holds that on the basis of the
allegations of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7373, the aforesaid case could not be one of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer within the exclusive competence of the municipal court, but an accion publiciana which is for the
recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action within the jurisdictional competence of respondent court.

The Facts
The Susana Realty, Inc. (plaintiff in the court a quo as the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land situated at
Mandaluyong, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 28350 and 28351, sought the recovery of the
possession of its properties.

The DEFENDANTS, without the knowledge, much less the consent of herein PLAINTIFF, by means of strategy
and stealth, entered the aforesaid premises, built their respective houses thereon and occupied the said lots for at
least three (3) years prior to this date and are still occupying the same up to the present.

The PLAINTIFF, upon learning of DEFENDANTS' unlawful and illegal occupancy of its above-described lots,
immediately, thru letters sent to each and everyone of them demanded that they vacate the respective portions of
the lots they are occupying, and remove therefrom any and all structures which they may have built thereon, but
defendants have ignored plaintiff's demands and have failed and refused, and still fail and refuse to vacate the
premises they are occupying, up to the present.

The plaintiff intends to utilize these lots in the furtherance of its corporate purposes in order that they may yield a
fair income, however, due to the presence of the defendants thereon and their continued refusal to vacate the
premises, herein plaintiff has not been able to utilize said lots, to the great damage and prejudice of herein
plaintiff.

Consequently, plaintiff prayed for judgment ordering defendants (petitioners) to (1) vacate the premises and
remove therefrom whatever structures they may have built thereon, and, if they refuse to do so, ordering the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal to forcibly eject them and demolish the aforesaid structures, at the expense of
petitioners; (2) pay damages to respondent corporation, from the date of the filing of the complaint to the date the
land is completely vacated; and (3) pay the costs of suit.

For filing their answer with counterclaim several years out of time, petitioners were declared in default. Their
answer with counterclaim was stricken from the records on January 19, 1968. Respondent corporation was
ordered to present its evidence against the defendants.

On July 9, 1968, respondent court rendered judgment ordering defendants (petitioners) to vacate the premises
and remove whatever improvements they may have constructed thereon, and to pay back rentals.

In the instant petition, it is alleged:

That while it is true that whenever the allegations of a complaint fail to plead a complete case of forcible entry and
detainer, the same is under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance (Tenorio vs. Gomba, 81 Phil. 54), such
ruling is not controlling in this case because the complaint at bar alleges "stealth and strategy" as the causes of
dispossession but said complaint does not contain any specific allegation as to when was the precise date the
demand to vacate was made. * * *
and that "the allegations in the complaint to the effect that the defendants, thru strategy, and stealth, occupied the
premises for at least three (3) years before the filing of said complaint did not convert the case into an accion
publiciana inasmuch as mere occupation is not illegal per se for the same may be tolerated."

On the strength of the foregoing allegations, petitioners pray that this Court render judgment declaring respondent
court to be without jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 7373 and nullifying all the proceedings taken thereunder, and
in the interim to restrain the respondent court and the Provincial Sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution issued
therein.
On June 26, 1970, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining respondent court from issuing the
special order of demolition prayed for.

The Issue
Whether Civil Case No. 7373 is a forcible entry case, within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts, or an accion
publiciana, within the jurisdiction of respondent Court of First Instance.

The Court’s Ruling

Yes.
The general rule is that what determines the jurisdiction of a particular court is the nature of the action
pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character of
the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

The complaint in the court below alleges that defendants, by means of stealth and without the knowledge and
consent of plaintiff-corporation, took possession of the premises in question, built their houses thereon, and
occupied the same for a period of three (3) years prior to the filing of the complaint. It appears that the allegation
of stealth was what prompted petitioners to label the action as one for forcible entry and insist that jurisdiction
over the same property pertains to the inferior courts. There is however, no allegation of plaintiff's prior physical
possession.

We have consistently held that a complaint for forcible entry, as distinguished from that of unlawful detainer, in
order to vest jurisdiction upon the inferior court, must allege plaintiff's prior physical possession of the
property, as well as the fact that he was deprived of such possession by any of the means provided in Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, namely: force, intimidation, threats, strategy and stealth, "for if the dispossession
did not take place by any of these means, the courts of first instance, not the municipal courts, have jurisdiction."

We deem it advisable, at this point, to reiterate the essential differences between three kinds of actions for the
recovery of possession of real property, namely: (1) the summary action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer;
(2) the accion publiciana and (3) the accion de revindicacion.

This case, having been filed more than one (1) year after private respondent's deprivation of possession, is,
therefore, actually an accion publiciana.

In connection with the question raised by petitioners on the property of the writ of execution issued by respondent
court, it appears that there is a pending motion filed by petitioners for the reconsideration of the order granting the
same, and that execution had been stayed by respondent court. Inasmuch as the motion is still unresolved, the
same cannot be reviewed in this petition for certiorari. Moreover, whether or not petitioner shall be permitted to
appeal the decision in Civil Case No. 7373 is still under consideration by respondent court, as there is a pending
motion filed by respondent corporation to dismiss appeal for having been riled out of time.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court
on June 26, 1970 is hereby dissolved. No special pronouncement as to costs.
4. JUANA COMPLEX HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC. VS FIL-ESTATE LAND INC.

SUMMARY: Petitioners filed this class suit in representation of commuters and motorists who regularly use
the La Paz Road. They filed an action for damages against Fil-Estate, who excavated and rendered
impassable the said public road, which the petitioners and those similarly situated, have been using for more
than 10 years already. On the other hand, Fil-Estate questions the propriety of filing the complaint as a class
suit.

DOCTRINE: The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are:
1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons;
2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and
3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully
protect the interests of all concerned.

FACTS:
JCHA et.al. (Homeowners Association, individual residents of Juana Complex I and neighboring subdivisions)
instituted an action for damages, in its own behalf and as a class suit, against Fil-Estate.

The complaint alleged that plaintiffs are regular commuters and motorists who constantly travel along SLEX
through a public road known as La Paz Road for more than 10 years. However, Fil-Estate deliberately excavated,
ruined, and closed said road, which made it not passable to motorists and pedestrians. Despite complaints, Fil-
Estate failed to make repairs on the road, causing damage and inconvenience to motorists.

Fil-Estate filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the complaint failed to state a cause of action and that it was
improperly filed as a class suit. RTC denied the motion to dismiss. CA upheld the RTC.

PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT(S):

While they agree with the CA that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action, they disagree with the
pronouncement that full-blown trial on the merits was necessary. They claim that during the hearing on the
application of the writ of injunction, they had sufficiently proven that La Paz Road was a public road and that
commuters and motorists of their neighboring villages had used this road as their means of access to schools,
churches, etc.

They also point out that La Paz Road has attained the status and character of a public road or burdened by an
apparent easement of public right of way.

RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT(S):

JCHA, et al. failed to prove the existence of a right of way or a right to pass over La Paz Road and that the
closure of the said road constituted an injury to such right. According to them, La Paz Road is a torrens registered
private road and there is neither a voluntary nor legal easement constituted over it.

ISSUE(S): —Y/N

(1) WON the complaint states a cause of action; - Yes

(2) WON the complaint has been properly filed as a class suit; - Yes
(3) WON a writ of preliminary injunction is warranted - No

HELD: CA is affirmed.

1. The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or
not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of
said complaint.

In the present case, the Court finds the allegations in the complaint sufficient to establish a cause of action.
First, JCHA, et al.s averments in the complaint show a demandable right over La Paz Road. These are: (1) their
right to use the road on the basis of their allegation that they had been using the road for more than 10 years; and
(2) an easement of a right of way has been constituted over the said roads. There is no other road as wide as La
Paz Road existing in the vicinity and it is the shortest, convenient and safe route towards SLEX Halang that the
commuters and motorists may use. Second, there is an alleged violation of such right committed by Fil-Estate, et
al. when they excavated the road and prevented the commuters and motorists from using the same. Third, JCHA,
et al. consequently suffered injury and that a valid judgment could have been rendered in accordance with the
relief sought therein.

2. The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of
common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to
bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the
class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.

In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road.

The subject matter of the instant case, i.e., the closure and excavation of the La Paz Road, is initially shown to be
of common or general interest to many persons. The records reveal that numerous individuals have filed
manifestations with the lower court, conveying their intention to join private respondents in the suit and claiming
that they are similarly situated with private respondents for they were also prejudiced by the acts of petitioners in
closing and excavating the La Paz Road. Moreover, the individuals sought to be represented by private
respondents in the suit are so numerous that it is impracticable to join them all as parties and be named
individually as plaintiffs in the complaint. These individuals claim to be residents of various barangays in Bian,
Laguna and other barangays in San Pedro, Laguna.

3. A writ of preliminary injunction is available to prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to parties
before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. The requisites for its issuance are: (1) the
existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage. For the writ to issue, the right sought to be protected must be a present right,
a legal right which must be shown to be clear and positive. This means that the persons applying for the writ must
show that they have an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their complaint.

In the case at bench, JCHA, et al. failed to establish a prima facie proof of violation of their right to justify the
issuance of a WPI. Their right to the use of La Paz Road is disputable since they have no clear legal right therein.

Consequently, the case should be further heard by the RTC so that the parties can fully prove their respective
positions on the issues.