Professional Documents
Culture Documents
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers),
Respondent.
AANGAT TAYO,
Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS
OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR
CITIZENS),
Intervenor.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR G.R. No. 179295
TEACHER EMPOWERMENT
THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION Present:
AND HARMONY TOWARDS
EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., PUNO, C.J.,
and ABONO, QUISUMBING,
Petitioners, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
x---------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) in a petition for certiorari and mandamus,[1] assails the
Resolution[2]promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041 (PL). The COMELECs resolution in NBC No. 07-041
(PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National
Board of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being
moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to
Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science
Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens
in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher
Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational
Reforms (A Teacher) in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition,[3] assails
NBC Resolution No. 07-60[4] promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial
proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of
the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon
completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of
seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans
Federation Party v. COMELEC[5] (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans
Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The
COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.[6]
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before
the NBC.BANAT filed its petition because [t]he Chairman and the Members of the
[COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is
duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the
Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats.[7] There were no intervenors in
BANATs petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No.
07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the
party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens
Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela), Association of
Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action Party
(AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network
Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and
Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National
Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July
2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total
of fifteen million two hundred eighty three thousand six hundred
fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of
Representation, in connection with the National and Local Elections
conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of
the National Board of Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum
total party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven
hundred twenty three thousand one hundred twenty-one
(16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far
garnered at least three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred
sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated
NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the
appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELECs interpretation of
the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution No. 07-72:
1,178,747
- - - - - - - - = 0.07248 or 7.2%
16,261,369
No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional
Additional seats for = ------------------- x seats allocated to
a concerned party No. of votes of first party
first party
SO ORDERED.[9]
Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3
August 2007, which reads as follows:
RECOMMENDATION:
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC
Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC
Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as
NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of
Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied
reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.[11]
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the
COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to
one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the
Philippines, Inc. (AGAP),[12] Anak Mindanao (AMIN),[13] and An Waray.[14] Per the
certification[15] by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations have been
proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:
Issues
3. Is the two percent threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same
Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?[16]
Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in
their petition:
1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional
seats for the First Party violates the principle of proportional
representation under RA 7941.
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the
First Party and another for the qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of
RA 7941.
3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different
from those required under RA 7941;
Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these
cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22
April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election
has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference,
these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of
the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum
of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are
qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of
votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is,
one qualifying and two additional seats;
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of
the term proportional representation, this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the
allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of representatives including those under the party-list. For
three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half
of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as
provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law. The House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and
party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of
the members of the House of Representatives.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list
representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats
available to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this
point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
Number of seats available Number of seats available to
to legislative districts x .20 = party-list representatives
.80
This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for
party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the
14th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats
available to party-list representatives.
220 x .20 = 55
.80
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number
of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to
party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved
under the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats
to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes.
However, there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the
allocation of additional seatsunder the Party-List System. Veterans produced the First
Party Rule,[20] and Justice Vicente V. Mendozas dissent in Veterans presented Germanys
Niemeyer formula[21] as an alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats
for party-list representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of
Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,[22] the following
procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the
highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during
the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%)
of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or
coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to
allocate party-list representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2%
requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as
follows:
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every
two per centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they obtained; provided,
that no party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11,
RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the
party-list groups under the immediately preceding paragraph and after
deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those seats, the
remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups
which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2%
threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.[23]
Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is
declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by
following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a
nationwide basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to
the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization or coalition as
against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.[24]
BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional
percentage of the votes received by each party as against the total nationwide party-list
votes, and the other is by making the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of
votes as the divisor in computing the allocation of seats.[25] Thirty-four (34) party-list
seats will be awarded under BANATs second interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELECs
original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for systematically preventing all the
party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the
total number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A
Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the
qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified
party by the total votes of all qualified parties only. The number of seats allocated to a
qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the
second percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the
whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-
list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation
is conducted. The fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from
highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are allocated until
all the seats are filled up.[26]
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes garnered during the elections.[27]
Votes Votes
Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered Garnered
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868
2 BAYAN 979,039 49 APOI 79,386
MUNA
3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541
4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424
5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327
6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686
8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544
9 COOP- 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220
NATCCO
10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993
11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717
12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012
14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846
15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751
16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522
17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722
18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837
19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612
21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624
22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062
23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512
25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835
26 SENIOR 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098
CITIZENS
27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938
28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA 33,903
ILONGGO
29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691
30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896
31 ANG 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255
KASANGGA
32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA 29,130
PILIPINO
33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271
34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781
35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946
36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744
37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916
38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729
39 ABANSE! 130,356 86 APO 16,421
PINAY
40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG 16,241
BUKID
41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161
42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445
43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD 8,915
FILIPINA
44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471
45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406
46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221
47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900
The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each. This clause guarantees a seat to the two-
percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration
purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the
number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for
all party-list candidates.
Votes Garnered
Votes over Total Guaranteed
Rank Party
Garnered Votes for Party- Seat
List, in %
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1
6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
11 BATAS[29] 385,810 2.42% 1
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
Total 17
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0
From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from
the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list
candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are entitled to one seat
each, or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17
guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that those garnering more
than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes. This is where petitioners and intervenors problem with the
formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause in proportion to their total number
of votes to be in proportion to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is
contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of
the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the
second clause ofSection 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds
that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list
seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution
of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes
cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the
votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first
50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of
55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat
itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase
the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two
percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied
party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of
the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The
two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.[30]
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
each.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus,
the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered
by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by
each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There
are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by
the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats
reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-
percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining
available seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we
assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are
completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round
of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats
each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:
Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats
(B)
Votes Addition Applyin
Guarantee plus
Garnere al g the
d Seat (C), in
d over Seats three
whole
Total seat
integer
Votes cap
Votes s
Ran for Party
Party Garnere
k List, in
d
%
(First
(Second
Round)
Round)
(B)
(A) (C) (E)
(D)
1 BUHAY 1,169,23 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.
4
2 BAYAN 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
MUNA
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.
9[31] COOP- 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
NATCCO
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.
13 ANAKPAWI 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.
S
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.
21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.
22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.
23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
26 SENIOR 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
CITIZENS
27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.
28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.
31 ANG 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
KASANGG
A
32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.
33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.
35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.
36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.
Tota 17 55
l
Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55
party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available
party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient
number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each
party, are shown in column (D).
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political
parties to participate in the party-list elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission clearly bear this out, thus:
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not
limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we going to classify
for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political
parties? Can they run under the party list concept or must they be under
the district legislation side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the
Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the Senate as well as for
the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral
candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of
the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district
candidates and can also participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list
system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates
who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list
system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he
is a farmer or not?
MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO
na isang political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang
saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party
list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang reserve. Hindi ito reserve
seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats,
reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But
my question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to
Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned
from running under the party list system?
xxxx
MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for
political parties and mass organizations to seek common ground. For
example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why
they should not be able to make common goals with mass organizations so
that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through the
participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of the
administration parties, this will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan
which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be
attractive to many mass organizations. In the opposition parties to which
we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations so
that with their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically
transformed because this amendment will create conditions that will
challenge both the mass organizations and the political parties to come
together. And the party list system is certainly available, although it is
open to all the parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll
of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass organizations
affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop this excellent
system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and
cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves either in the Social
Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and
their very presence there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies
and the leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO
always vote with the Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of
them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no
reason at all why political parties and mass organizations should not
combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other so that the very
objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral representation are
achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized way.
Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs
sectoral representation as a constitutional gift, but at the same time, it
challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives
later on through a party list system; and even beyond that, to become
actual political parties capable of contesting political power in the wider
constitutional arena for major political parties.
x x x [32] (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional
Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from
dominating the party-list elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution
clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through
their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down,
19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list
system to the sectoral groups.[33] In defining a party that participates in party-list elections
as either a political party or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that
major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major
political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of
the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-
political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from
the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral
organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for
example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang
Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties
can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the
Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election,
and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino
(KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in
paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members
of the House of Representatives to Congress: The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list
representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the
law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of
seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device
that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list
representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3
above.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 86-87. Signed by Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos,
Sr., Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., Romeo A.
Brawner, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Nicodemo T. Ferrer.
[3]
Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[4]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 103-108. Signed by Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos,
Sr., Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., Romeo A.
Brawner, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Nicodemo T. Ferrer.
[5]
396 Phil. 419 (2000).
[6]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 969-986; rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 798-815. Party-
List Canvass Report No. 32, as of 31 August 2007, 6:00 p.m.
[7]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 70.
[8]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 88-92.
[9]
Id. at 150-153.
[10]
Id. at 86-87.
[11]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), p. 112.
[12]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 158-159. NBC Resolution No. 07-74, 24 July 2007.
[13]
Id. at 160-161. NBC Resolution No. 07-87, 3 August 2007.
[14]
NBC Resolution No. 07-97, 4 September 2007.
[15]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 816-817. This COMELEC certification should have
included An Waray, which was proclaimed on 4 September 2007 under NBC
Resolution No. 07-97.
[16]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 14.
[17]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 21-22.
[18]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 553; rollo (G. R. No. 179295), p. 341.
[19]
Supra note 5 at 424.
[20]
Id. at 446-451. We quote below the discussion in Veterans explaining the First Party
Rule:
Number of votes
of first party Proportion of votes of
-------------------- = first party relative to
Total votes for total votes for party-list system
party -list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal
to at least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then
the first party shall be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats
overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater
than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one
additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent,
then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled
to the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the
allotment of more than the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme
case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are thus entitled to
three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are
entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the
House of Representatives.
xxx
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of
additional seats the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the
number of additional seats of the other qualified parties. As explained earlier, the
use of the same formula for all would contravene the proportional representation
parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total number of
votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to
two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party
received a significantly higher amount of votes say, twenty percent to grant it the
same number of seats as the second party would violate the statutory mandate of
proportional representation, since a party getting only six percent of the votes will
have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty percent. The
proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the
party receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first
party.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number
of additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional
seat, an exact whole number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical
proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for the reasons
explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number
of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute
proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a
maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of
additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more
accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two
additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.
[21]
Id. at 475-481.
[22]
The second vote cast by a registered voter is for the party-list candidates as provided
in Section 10 of R.A. No. 7941.
[23]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), p. 47.
[24]
Id. at 48.
[25]
Id. at 1076.
[26]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 66-81.
[27]
Rollo (G.R. No. 179271), pp. 969-974; rollo (G.R. No. 179295), pp. 798-803. Party-
List Canvass Report No. 32, as of 31 August 2007, 6:00 p.m.
[28]
Id.
[29]
Proclamation deferred by COMELEC.
[30]
Section 2, R.A. No. 7941.
[31]
The product of the percentage and the remaining available seats of all parties ranked
nine and below is less than one.
[32]
II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 256-257 (25 July 1986), 568 (1
August 1986).
[33]
Id. at 584 (1 August 1986). Dissenting opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug in Ang
Bagong Bayani- OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, 412 Phil. 308, 350 (2001).
[34]
Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, 412 Phil. 308, 336 (2001).
[35]
Section 2, R.A. No. 7941.