1
FIRST DIVISION the herein petitioners were likewise denied for various reasons including failure to
[G.R. No. 76371. January 20, 2000]
MARIANO TURQUESA, ABRAHAM LALUGAN and LAYAO, MANUEL MAGALA
substituted by his Heirs, OTILIO DAMASEN and SEGUNDINA DAMASEN, ANTONIO
ESCALANTE, METODIO TULLAS, FLORA LABUGUEN and JUANA LABUGUEN,
LOURDES SINDON BAYUBAY, MANUEL MEDRANO and JOSE
MEDRANO,** petitioners, vs., ROSARIO VALERA and the HONORABLE COURT of
APPEALS, respondents. Misj uris
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
[1]
More than half a century ago, private respondent applied for the registration of
two parcels of land located in Barrio Pulot, Laguyan, Abra described in Plan PSU-
119561 with a total land area of 232,908 square meters. The first lot (hereinafter
referred to as Lot 1) has an area of 210,767 square meters whereas the other lot
(Lot 2) has an area of 22,141 square meters. In support of her application, private
respondent presented documents showing that when she was still single, she
bought Lot 1 during the years 1929-1932 from Cristeta Trangued and the heirs of
Juan Valera Rufino who were allegedly in possession thereof since the Spanish
regime in the concept of owners and who declared it in their name for taxation
purposes. From 1929, she continued possession of said land in the concept of
owner and continued to pay the tax thereon in her name. Notices of the application
for registration were published in the Official Gazette, with copies thereof sent to
persons mentioned therein and posted in the proper places.
The Director of Lands together with petitioners and other persons[2] opposed the
application of private respondent. These oppositors were excluded from the order
of general default issued by the lower court on June 16, 1950.[3] In the course of the
hearing, the oppositors (except the Director of Lands) aver that their lands were
included in Lot 1 which private respondent sought to register in her name. In
support thereof, they contend that the land embraced by Lot 1 at the time it was
bought by private respondent is not the same land covered in her application for
registration. To avoid confusion, oppositors moved for an ocular inspection in order
to determine the correct boundary limits of the lands they respectively claim,
however, the same was not allowed by the court a quo. For his part, the Director of
Lands opposition was denied for failure to substantiate his claim that the subject
lands were part of the public domain. The opposition of the oppositors other than
present their evidence.
After trial, in a decision dated April 23, 1956, the lower court disposed of the
application for registration as follows: Jj lex
In view of all the foregoing, the applicant Rosario Valera married to Juan
Valera, a resident of Bangued, Abra, has proven that she has a registerable
title to Lot 1, Psu-119561, with an area of 210,767 square meters as her
exclusive property, subject to the encumbrance in favor of the Philippine
National Bank in the sum of P1,000.00; and to Lot 2 in the same plan, with
an area of 22,141 square meters, without liens or encumbrances, as
conjugal partnership property with her husband, Juan Valera.
After this decision has become final, let the corresponding decree be
entered and the corresponding title issue in accordance with law.[4]
Oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar only as Lot 1 is concerned,
arguing, among others, that the trial court erred in not granting their motion for
new trial and their demand for ocular inspection. On March 15, 1966, the Court of
Appeals set aside the appealed decision and remanded the case to the lower court
for further proceedings, and ordered the conduct of an ocular inspection. The
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside. This
case shall be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings which
shall include an ocular inspection of the land applied with a view to
determine its identity, location and boundary limits whether the latter
have been included in Lot 1 of the applicants plan to warrant their
exclusion from the plan, or their registration in the names of the
oppositors who have presented evidence in support of their claim.
Thereafter judgment shall be accordingly rendered.[5]
In accordance with the CA directive, three commissioners were appointed by the
trial court to conduct the ocular inspection. The commissioners found:
That the property sought to be registered under survey plan Psu-119561
was relocated and the extent and bounds of the portions claimed by the
oppositors were pointed to by them personally or by their supposed
representative, the results of which are clearly shown in the accompanying

sketch plan marked as Annex "A" of their report by the corresponding
names, area and dimensions.
That the survey of the claims was continued the following day, January 29,
1967.
OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS
1. The claims of Manuel Magala, Abraham Lalugan, and Layao, Juan Medrano and
Eugenio Medrano as shown now in the sketch plan Annex "A" are not shown in the
original survey plan Psu-119561; New miso
2. That claims of Otilio Damasen, Nicolas Bigornia, Ricardo Bersamira, Bonifacio
Brangan, Cristeta Medrano, Matias Turdil, Mariano Turqueza, Flora Labuguen,
Cornelio Bayubay, Ponce Talape, and Metodio Tullar, appeared in the original
survey plan Psu-119561 and likewise in sketch plan Annex "A" although three of
these claims bear different identifying names in the sketch Annex "A";
3. That out of the original area of 210,767 square meters in original survey plan Psu-
119561, the remaining portion not subject of opposition as appearing in sketch plan
Annex "A" is 69,683 square meters;
4. That the "Calle para Collago" which according to the decision of the Court of
Appeals and is stoutly maintained until the present by the oppositors to be the
extent or boundary of the property of the applicant on the South side is existing and
still is the boundary on the South and on the Southeast side, as shown in the Sketch
Plan, Exh. "A";
That the property of Francisco Santua abound also the applicants property
sought to be registered on the South sides, at present as was the case
during the original survey.[6]
The oppositors filed an opposition to the commissioners report, whereupon a
second ocular inspection was ordered by the trial court. After the second
inspection, the trial court, on August 28, 1967 again rendered judgment reiterating
its original decision ordering the registration of the aforesaid Lot 1 of PSU 119561
with an area of 210,767[7] square meters in the name of private respondent. The
judge made the following observations based on the ocular inspection:
2
The Commissioners and the Presiding Judge, upon their ocular inspection, found
out a visible boundary on the South-east side of Lot 1 known as "Calle para Collago"
which is represented in the relocation plan Exh. HH running from the intersection to
Lagayan between points 22 and 21 down to point 18. This, in the opinion of the
Court, is the extension of the "Calle para Collago" referred to by the applicant
Rosario Valera as boundary exactly on the South but which was converted into
ricefields by Francisco Santua. This circumstance now could explain the presence of
Francisco Santua as boundary owner on the South which the parties stoutly
maintained in the former proceedings that the "Calle para Collago" was on the
South but which oppositors now repudiate claiming that the "Calle para Collago" is
on the East. Taking a good view over Lot 1, it could safely be concluded that the
existing "Calle para Collago" is more to the South than to the East.
With respect to the claim of the Damasens over Lot A mentioned in Exh. D
which the Court inadvertently failed to pass upon, the Court has found that
it is within the property of the applicant.[8]
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court reiterates its former decision ordering the
registration of Lot 1 of Plan Psu-119561, Exh. D, with an area of 210,767
square meters in the name of applicant ROSARIO VALERA of Bangued,
Abra, and a conjugal property with her husband Juan Valera of the same
municipality. The encumbrance with the Philippine National Bank in the
amount of P1,000.00 having already been settled (Exh. JJ-1) same shall no
longer be annotated on the title henceforth to be issued.
Upon this decision becoming final, let the corresponding decree issue. Acct
mis
The applicant Rosario Valera is hereby directed to pay within seventy two
hours from notice hereof the sum of P182.00 as fees for the commissioner
Santiago Alejandre who made the relocation survey.[9]
The case was again appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR. 40796-R) by the
oppositors, some of whom are now the petitioners in this case. [10] They argue that
the lower court erred in not excluding the areas they claimed as their own which
were wrongfully included in Lot 1 but was ordered registered in private
respondents name. Disposing of the appeal, the CA ruled:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, with the modification that the
registration of Lot 1 of appellees (private respondent herein) should be
confined to the extent only as indicated in the sketch annexed to the
Commissioners report, Exhibit HH, and excluding therefrom the
landholding of the oppositors, as indicated in the same sketch, the
judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.[11]
This decision became final and executory for which a corresponding entry of
judgment was issued by the Court of Appeals.[12] Later, private respondent filed
with the trial court a motion for the issuance of writ of possession over two lots
respectively tenanted by Trium Donato and Rudy Donato which were likewise
respectively claimed by Santiago Partolan (not an oppositor in the land registration
case) and Crispin Baltar (one of the oppositors).[13] In an Order issued on September
14, 1981, the court a quo denied the motion.[14] When her subsequent motion for
reconsideration was also denied in another Order dated November 25,
1981,[15] private respondent appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC) which reversed the said two orders and forthwith issued a decision with the
following disposition:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES, CONSIDERED, the ORDERS appealed from are
hereby REVERSED and judgment is hereby entered ordering: Mis act
1. The issuance of a WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of applicant-appellant
covering the landholding claimed by oppositor Crispin Baltar and tenanted
by Rudy Donato;
2. Confirming the word "Landholding" in the dispositive portion of the
decision in CA-G.R. No. 40796-R as singular and referring only to the
landholding opposed by oppositors Segundina and Otilio Damasen as the
only landholding excluded from lot 1; and
3. Ordering the issuance of the WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of the
applicant-appellant covering the landholdings opposed by the other
oppositors who did not appeal the decision of the lower court dated
August 28, 1967.
Without any special pronouncement as to cost.
3
SO ORDERED.[16]
Oppositors filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the Court
of Appeals.[17] Hence this petition for review initiated by some of the oppositors in
the trial court. The petition was initially denied by the Court. On motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners, the case was reinstated and respondent was
required to submit her comment to the petition.[18]
After a painstaking review of the vintage records of this case and after deciphering
the ambiguous discussions in the petition,[19] the assailed ruling of the respondent
court cannot be sustained. The burden of proof in land registration cases is
incumbent on the applicant[20] who must show that he is the real and absolute
owner in fee simple of the land applied for.[21] On him also rests the burden to
overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain[22] considering that the inclusion in a title of a part of the public
domain nullifies the title.[23] Undoubtedly, a land registration proceeding is one
which is in rem in character, so that the default order issued by the court binds the
whole world and all persons whether known or unknown, [24] except those who have
appeared and filed their pleadings in the registration case.[25] In the case at bar,
those exempted from the order of general default are the petitioners and the other
oppositors mentioned in footnote number 2. S djad
There is no dispute that the lands occupied and claimed by oppositors-petitioners
Segundina and Otilio Damasen were already finally adjudged excluded from Lot 1
and cannot be registered in private respondents name. In other words, the
Damasens were declared to have a rightful and registrable right over their claims of
specific portions of Lot 1. What private respondent wants is that she be installed in
possession of the area claimed by Santiago Partolan and Crispin Baltar. Of these
two, only Baltar entered his opposition to private respondents application for land
registration. Being a proceeding in rem, Partolan is charged with knowledge of the
application of private respondent since the notice was published in accordance with
law.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, private respondent is not entitled to a
writ of possession of that portion of Lot I occupied by Partolan and Baltar. No
evidence was shown that private respondent had a rightful claim whether
possessory or proprietary with respect to those areas. Even if Partolan was
excluded by the order of general default and Baltar did not appeal from the trial
courts decision of April 23, 1956, the applicant must still prove and establish that
she has registrable rights over the land which must be grounded on incontrovertible
evidence and based on positive and absolute proof. The declaration by the

applicant that the land applied for has been in the possession of her predecessor-in-
interest for a certain period, does not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible"
and "conclusive" evidence required in land registration.[26] Allegations of her
predecessors ownership of the lot during the Spanish period is self-serving[27] and
the declaration of ownership for purposes of assessment on the payment of tax is
not sufficient evidence to prove ownership.[28] It should be noted that tax
declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of ownership in land
registration cases.[29] Private respondent should have substantiated her claim with
clear and convincing evidence specifically showing the nature of her claim. Her
description of the circumstances of her own possession in relation to that of her
predecessor-in-interest are mere conclusions of law which require further factual
support and substantiation. If an applicant does not have any rightful claim over
real property, the Torrens system of registration can confirm or record nothing. [30]
Private respondent, being the applicant for registration of land and one who relies
on some documents enforcing her alleged title thereto, must prove not only the
genuineness of said title but also the identityof the land therein referred
to,[31] inasmuch as this is required by law. The dispute in this case pertains to the
correctness of the survey of specific areas of lands. It must be borne in mind that
what defines a piece of land is not the size or area mentioned in its description, but
the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its
limits.[32] Considering that the writ of possession was sought by private respondent
against persons who were in "actual possession under claim of ownership," the
latters possession raises a disputable presumption of ownership. [33] This unrebutted
presumption militates against the claim of private respondent, especially
considering the evidentiary rule under Article 434 of the Civil Code that a claimant
of a parcel of land, such as private respondent, must rely on the strength of his title
and not on the weakness of the defendants claim.[34]
Private respondents contention that the dispositive portion of the CA decision on
April 30, 1979 in CA GR 40796-R which mentioned only "landholding" and not
"landholdings", thus referring only to that area claimed by the Damasen spouses, is
too trivial. A reading of the said decision and the foregoing discussions clearly
indicates that the land to be registered in private respondents name is limited to a
certain area stated in the sketch annexed to the Commissioners report. It
categorically excluded those portions pertaining to the oppositors. Since private
respondent failed to show that she has a proprietary right over the excluded areas,
such as the portions occupied by those against whom the writ of possession was
sought for, then the trial court was correct in refusing to grant the writ as the same
has no basis.Sppedsc
4
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the two orders of the trial court dated September 14,
1981 and November 25, 1981 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
"What defines a piece of land is not the size/area mentioned in its descriptions but
the boundaries laid down as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. "
Facts:
Respondent applied for registration of 2 parcels of land referred to as Lot 1
and Lot 2. She alleged to have bought Lot 1 and declared it in her name for taxation
purposes. Notice for the application for registration was published in the
Official Gazette. Oppositors were the Director of Bureau of Lands and herein
petitioners. The opposition of Bureau of Lands was denied for failure to
substantiate his claim that the land is part of the public domain. Other petitioners
claim that their lands were included in Lot 1 sought to be registered by the
respondent. The lower court decided in favor of the respondent and denied
petitioner’s motion for ocular inspection of the land in dispute. Oppositorsappealed
to CA regarding Lot 1. CA remanded the case to the lower court for ocular
inspection. 3 Commissioners were appointed for the ocular inspection but their
findings were opposed and a second ocular inspection was ordered. The trial court
reiterated its former judgment to register the whole are of Lot 1 to the respondent
with its encumbrance to PNB in the amount of P1,000 removed as it was already
paid and thus no longer annotated on the title. The oppositors appealed with the
argument that their properties were erroneously included in the respondent’s land
registration. CA modified the land registration on lot 1 excluding the landholdings of
the oppositors.
Respondent filed a suit for a writ of possession over 2 lots occupied by Santiago
Partolan and Crispin Baltar which the court denied. Upon appeal, the CA reversed
the court decision and granted the motion for writ of possession on the
landholdings of Partolan, Baltar and oppositors who did not appeal the decision of
the lower court while excluding the landholdings of Segundina and Damasen who
proved they have rightful and registrable rights over their claim on a specific
portion of land. Thus, the oppositors filed a motion for review.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is entitled for land registration of the entire area
of Lot 1 including those owned by the oppositors?
Ruling:
The court held that the burden of proof in land registration is encumbered upon
the applicant who must show he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple of the
land applied for. Because the land registration proceeding is an in rem proceeding,
a default order issued by the court binds the whole world except those appearing in
court to file their opposition or pleadings in the registration case. Thus, the
oppositors are exempted from the general default order by the court. On the
respondent’s motion for writ of possession on the lots occupied by Baltar and
Partolan, the court finds no merit in granting their motion. Respondent did not
provide evidence on her rightful claim over these land areas. Although Partolan was
excluded in the general default issued by the court while Baltar did not appeal on
the trial court’s decision, respondent is still required to prove and establish her
registrable rights over the land even in the absence of opposition. The payment of
tax by her predecessor-in-interest is not sufficient evidence to prove ownership.
Respondent should also prove not only the genuineness of her title but also to
identify the land in dispute with the boundaries comprising it.What defines a piece
of land is not the size/area mentioned in its descriptions but the boundaries laid
down as enclosing the land and indicating its limits. The writ of possesion sought
by the private respondent against persons who are in actual possession under claim
of ownership and their possession of the land raises a disputable presumption of
ownership. Therefore, the land areas to be registered to the respondent are limited
only to certain areas in the sketch that is annexed to the Commissioner’s report as
the respondent failed to establish proprietary right over the excluded areas.
FACTS:
More than half a century ago, private respondent applie
d f o r t h e registration of two parcels of land located in Abra. Rosario
Valera, private respondent, presented documents showing that when
she was still single, she bought lot 1 from Cristeta Trangued and heirs of Juan
Valera Rufino who w e r e a l l e g e d l y i n p o s s e s s i o n t h e r e o f s i n c e t h e
S p a n i s h i n t h e c o n c e p t o f owners and who declared it in their name for
taxation purposes. From 1929, she continued possession of said land in concept of
owner and continued to pay tax thereon in her
5
name. The Director of Lands, together with petitioners and other persons opposed
the application of private respondent. In the course of the hearing, the oppositors
(except the director of lands) averred that their lands were included in
lot 1 which private respondent sought to register in her name. Oppositors
moved for an ocular inspection in order to determine the correct
boundary limits of the lands they respectively claim, but the
s a m e w a s denied. On 23 April 1956, the trial court ruled that applicant
has a registrabletitle. Oppositors appealed. On 15 March 1966, the CA set aside
the appealed decision and remanded it to the lower court.
In accordance with the CA directive, three (3) commissioners
W e r e appointed by the Trial Court to conduct ocular inspection.
The observations and findings were the following:
(1) The claims of petitioners as shown in the sketch plan are not shown in the
original survey.
(2)The claims of other petitioners appeared in the
o r i g i n a l s u r v e y although three of these claims bear different identifying names.
(3) The “Calle para Collago” maintained by the oppositors to be
the extent or boundary of the property of the applicant on the
s o u t h s i d e i s existing and still is the existing boundary on the south and on the
southeastside as shown in the sketch plan.
However, the court just reiterated its former decision ordering
t h e registration of the lot in the name of applicant Rosario Valera.
ISSUE:
Does Rosario Valera have a rightful claim over the lot in question?
HELD:
No. She doesn’t have a rightful claim over the land.
The burden of proof in land registration cases is incumbent on the applicant who
must show that he is the real and absolute owner in fee simple
of the land applied for. On him also rests the burden to
overcome thepresumption that land sought to be register
e d f o r m s p a r t o f t h e p u b l i c domain.Even if petitioner/s (Partolan)
was excluded by the order of general default and (Baltar) did not appeal from
the trial court’s decision of April 23, 1956. The applicant must still prove and
establish that she has registrable rights over the land, which must be
grounded on incontrovertible evidence and based on positive and
absolute proof. The declaration of the applicant that the land applied
for has been in the possession of her predecessor-in-
interest for a certain period, does not constit
u t e t h e “ W E L L N I GH INCONTROVERTIBLE” and “CONC
 6

LUSIVE” evidence required in land

registration. If an applicant does not have any rightful cl
a i m o v e r r e a l property, the Torrens System of registration can confirm
or record nothing. It must be borne in mind that what defines a piece of
land is not the s i z e o r a r e a m e n t i o n e d i n i t s d e s c r i p t i o n , b u t t h e
b o u n d a r i e s t h e r e i n l a i d down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits.
The Damasens were declared to have a rightful claim over the specific portions of
Lot.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 77243 October 26, 1989
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
ASSOCIACION BENEVOLA de CEBU, ENGRACIA UROT, HIPOLITO BOLABOLA,
BASILIO BOLABOLA, HONORATO RUBEN BOLABOLA, PORFERIO BOLABOLA,
FILOMENA BOLABOLA GENTAPA, Spouses TORIBIO CARRACIO and JUANITA
LONDRES, Spouses BUENAVENTURA CABALLERO and ADORACION LONDRES,
CONSTANCIA BOLABOLA, CARLOS BOLABOLA, JUAN BOLABOLA, SULPICIO AVES,
VICTORINO Vda. de RAMOS, SEBASTIAN YAP, ANA DONDOYANO, OSMUNDO
NOVELA, PABLO ENOLPE, MELCHOR NOVELA, ALFONSO LONDRES, JUANITA
HERICO, CONCEPCION GUIVELONDO, EMILIA GUIVELONDO Vda. de PACADA,
TEODORICO RAMOS, CARLOTA RAMOS de MERCADO, JUANITA RAMOS de
SUESMITH, SIMON RAMOS, LYDIA RAMOS de ALQUITAS, JUANITA RAMOS,
CONCEPCION RAMOS and Honorable RAMON A.M. TORRES (In his capacity as the
Presiding Judge, Branch VI, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City), respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction, seeking to set aside as null and void the orders of the respondent judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch VI, dated September 16,1986 and
January 20, 1987, disallowing the appeal of the government, and enjoining the
respondent judge from executing the decisions dated October 29, 1973 and July 10,
1975 and/or from taking further proceedings in LRC Case N-633, LRC Record N-
29324, entitled Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Applicant v. Pablo Enolpe, et. al.,
Oppositors.
The pertinent facts of the case are as follows:
On October 8, 1965, a petition was filed by the Associacion Benevola de Cebu, Inc.
before the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Land Registration Case No. N-633)
praying that a parcel of land situated in Cebu City, specifically Lot 108 of the Banilad
Estate, be registered in its name.
On June 21, 1966, the court, entered an order of general default as against the
whole world, except for the several groups of oppositors who filed their opposition
to the petition.
7
On July 22, 1966, or more than one month after the order of general default was
entered, the court received a letter from the Solicitor General, accompanied by a
mimeographed opposition of the Director of Lands. There also appears in the
records of the case, a copy of the letter of the Solicitor General to the Provincial
Fiscal of Cebu requesting the latter to represent the Office of the Solicitor General
at the hearing of the registration case. However, it appears that the Provincial Fiscal
of Cebu never entered his appearance for the government.
On October 29, 1973, the court rendered a partial decision awarding to the
applicant Associacion Benevola de Cebu Lots 108-C and 108-D, and to oppositor
Engracia Urot the ownership of Lots-108-F, 108-I, 108-G, 108-H-I and 108-B-I.
On July 10, 1975, the court rendered a follow-up decision adjudicating to Bolabola
and company certain other specific portions of Lot 108, and to the heirs of Isidro
Guivelondo, the remaining portion of the land subject matter of the case. The court
further declared the other oppositors-claimants Victorino Vda. de Ramos, Sebastian
Yap, Ana Dondoyano, Osmundo Novela, Melchor Novela, Pablo Enolpe, Alfonso
Londres and Juanita Herico owners of their family houses erected on the respective
lots. The claims of the rest of the oppositors were ordered dismissed for lack of
merit.
Not satisfied with the decision of the land registration court, the oppositors-
appellants Pablo Enolpe, et. al., appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. On
March 30, 1984, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision which states, inter alia:
This may well explain the government's disinterest to pursue the case after
filing an initial opposition to the petition for registration. Be that as it may,
in the absence of any gross or patent error committed by the court a
quo in the appreciation of the evidence submitted, We can only uphold its
judgment.
WHEREFORE, finding the appealed decision supported by law and
evidence, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto with costs against the
appellants.
SO ORDERED (P. 62, Rollo).
The aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals was elevated on appeal to this Court
thru a Petition for Review oncertiorari by appellants Pablo Enolpe, et al. in G.R. No.
67692, entitled "Pablo Enolpe, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al." In a
Resolution dated June 27, 1984, in said case, this Court denied the petition for lack

of merit. The decision became final and executory as per entry of judgment dated
September 14, 1984.
On July 31, 1985, the court a quo granted the issuance of a writ of possession in
favor of the Guivelondo heirs, and ordered the Provincial Sheriff of Cebu on
October 23, 1985 to proceed with the writ of possessions.
In the meantime, other oppositors to the registration case in the trial court filed a
petition for certiorari andprohibition with this Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No.
72568, entitled, Monena Almendras, et al. v. Judge Ramon AM. Torres, etc., et
al. This Court required the respondent Guivelondo heirs, who were among the
awardees of the land in the trial court, to file their comment on the petition. On
January 22,1986, this Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit in view of the
previous denial of a similar petition in G.R. No. 67692.
On May 8,1986, the trial court ordered the Land Registration Commission to issue
the decrees of registration and the certificates of title to private respondents. It
appears, however, that such documents have not yet been issued to private
respondents at present.
On July 1, 1986, the Office of the Solicitor General was furnished by the Branch
Clerk of Court, Branch VI, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, copies of the decisions
in the registration case N-633 dated October 29,1973 and July 10, 1975.
On July 16, 1986, the Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal with the trial court.
This was opposed by private respondents and the Guivelondo heirs, who were
among the adjudicatees in the registration case.
On September 16, 1986, the respondent judge issued an Order denying the
government's appeal, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, finding that the decisions of the court sought to be appealed
from have long become final and executory, and in fact, have already been
executed, and, therefore, are no longer subject to any appeal, the court
hereby declares that the Notice of Appeal filed by the Solicitor General
cannot and should not be given due course. Accordingly, the same is
hereby ordered disregarded and stricken out from the records.
SO ORDERED (pp. 35-36, Rollo).
8
From these orders, the Solicitor General moved to reconsider. On January 20, 1987,
respondent judge denied the said motion for reconsideration.
On February 5, 1987, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed, assailing
respondent judge's Orders dated September 16, 1986 and January 20, 1987. On
February 18, 1987, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the
respondent judge from executing the said decisions and/or from taking further
proceedings thereon.
The only issue in this case is whether or not respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion in disallowing the appeal of the government.
The government thru the Solicitor General alleges that its appeal on July 16, 1986
was filed on time, which is within the prescribed period of fifteen (15) days from its
receipt of the copies of the decisions; and that insofar as the government is
concerned, the decisions have not yet become final and executory. The petition also
argues that the property in question is public land and therefore, substantial justice
requires that such appeal be allowed.
The foregoing contentions of the petitioner are impressed with merit.
Section 39 of BP Blg. 129 provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions,
awards, judgments or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15)
days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award,
judgment or decision appealed from; ... .(Italics ours)
There is no question that it was only on July 1, 1986 or more than ten (10) years
from the date of judgments that the Solicitor General became cognizant of the
decisions of the lower court when it was furnished by the Branch Clerk of Court
copies of the two decisions dated October 29, 1973 and July 10, 1975. This fact was
not denied nor refuted by respondents herein. Thus, when the Solicitor General
filed its notice of appeal on July 16, 1986, the appeal was perfected well within the
fifteen (15)-day mandatory period to file an appeal.
Moreover, Sec. 23 of the Interim Rules of Court provides that in "case where appeal
is taken, the perfection of the appeal shall be upon the expiration of the last day to
appeal by any party." As long as any of the parties may still file his, her, or its

appeal, the court does not lose jurisdiction over the case (Associated Bank v.
Gonong, G.R. No. 77353, July 30,1987,152 SCRA 478).
The respondents contend that appeal is no longer possible as the judgments
appealed from, having been rendered more than ten (10) years ago, are already
final and executory.
It has been held that a judgment becomes final and executory by operation of law
and not by judicial declaration. Thus, finality of judgment becomes a fact upon the
lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected (Munez v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. L-46010, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 197). If ever there was an
entry of judgment in this case dated September 14,1984, this had the effect of
finally disposing and putting an end to the controversy with regard to the private
respondents herein as among themselves and not insofar as the government's
interest on the land is concerned. As to it, the judgments have not yet attained
finality because its appeal was perfected on time, before the lapse of the period
within which to appeal.
It is also worthy to note at this point that the adjudication of the land in a
registration or cadastral case does not become final and incontrovertible until the
expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. As long as the final decree
is not issued, and the one year within which it may be revised has not elapsed, the
decision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering the
decree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree or
adjudicate the land to another party (Afalle v. Rosauro, G.R. No. L-42315, Sept. 19,
1934, 60 Phil. 622; Capio v. Capio, G.R. No. L-5761, December 21, 1953, 94 Phil. 113;
italics ours).
The argument of respondents that the appeal should not be allowed because the
judgments granting the registration have already been executed thru the writ of
possession and the order for the issuance of the title, has no legal basis. In the case
of Republic v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-49891, October 31, 1983, 125 SCRA 539, We
ordered the land registration court to give due course to the appeal of the
government notwithstanding the fact that a decree of registration was already
issued by the Land Registration Commission and a Certificate of Title was issued by
the Register of Deeds. Such circumstances were not considered to be a bar to the
government's right to appeal.
In his order denying the appeal, the respondent judge pointed out that an order of
general default which was issued in the initial hearing of the registration case,
barred all other persons including the government from pursuing their claims.
9
The rule is established that in land registration cases, the appellant must show that
his rights or interests have been prejudiced by the decision appealed from; and that
he challenged the application for registration, or participated in the proceedings
before his appeal may be properly entertained (Cabanas v. Director of Lands, G.R.
No. L- 4205, March 16, 1908, 10 Phil. 393). This has been complied with in this case.
Records disclose, and this is admitted by respondent judge in his order, that there
was a written opposition from the government thru the Solicitor General and the
Director of Lands (p. 33, Rollo). Although this was received by the trial court one
month after the order of general default was entered, there was no evidence
showing when the opposition by the government was filed. In the absence of such
evidence, it is presumed that the opposition was filed on time and was not covered
by the order of general default. It is clear that the government has challenged the
application for registration since the very start of the proceedings.
Assuming in gratia argumenti that the opposition was not filed on time,
nevertheless, an oppositor is still allowed to present evidence to prove ownership
of the disputed land despite the declaration of general default against him provided
that a decision has not been rendered or that a decree of registration has not been
issued in this case(Lee v. Punzalan, G.R. No. 50236, August 29, 1980, 99 SCRA 567;
italics ours).
Furthermore, the private respondents also argue in their Comment that the
Provincial Fiscal which represents the Office of the Solicitor General in land
registration cases, had official notice of the decisions as early as May 28, 1985 when
the Asst. Provincial Fiscal filed a "Manifestation/Omnibus Motion" in court whereby
she admitted the existence of said decisions; and that this fact should now bar the
Solicitor General from filing a late appeal.
We disagree. Section 1 (e) of PD 478, defining the powers and functions of the
Office of the Solicitor General provides:
Section 1. Functions and Organizations.
e) Represent the Government in all land registration and related
proceedings. Institute actions for the reversion to the Government of lands
of the public domain and improvements thereon as well as lands held in
violation of the Constitution.
In one case, it was held that, strictly speaking, the city fiscal did not directly
represent the Government. He was merely a surrogate of the Solicitor General
 10

whose office, "as the law office of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines", is the entity that is empowered to "represent the Government in all
land registration and related proceedings" (Republic v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-49891,
October 31, 1983, 125 SCRA 539; Republic v. Polo, G.R. No. L- 49247, March 13,
1979, 89 SCRA 33).

Thus, the request of the Solicitor General for the fiscal to represent the former and
to appeal did not make the fiscal counsel of the Republic. We have held in many
cases that the reglementary thirty-day period for appeal (now 15 days) should be
reckoned from the time the Solicitor General's Office was apprised of the decision
or order and not from the time the special counsel or fiscal was served with the
decision. These representatives of the Solicitor General had no power to decide
whether an appeal should be made. They should have referred the matter to the
Solicitor General (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56077, February 28, 1985,
135 SCRA 156; Republic v. Mendoza, G.R. No. L-49891, October 31, 1983,125 SCRA
539; Republic v. dela Cruz, G.R. No. L- 35718, November 19,1982,118 SCRA 409).

Lastly, the admission of petitioner government's appeal is more in keeping with the
ends of substantial justice. To dismiss the Republic's appeal merely on the alleged
ground of late filing is not proper considering the merits of the appeal. The Solicitor
General alleges the existence of indubitable evidence of official records showing
that the property subject of the registration is public land, which was covered by
decree 4666 previously issued in favor of the government on October 4, 1910. To
ignore the importance of this alleged document would defeat the time-honored
Constitutional precepts and the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony (Republic v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 71285, November 5, 1987,155 SCRA 412).

ACCORDINGLY, the writ of certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the assailed orders of
the respondent judge dated September 16, 1986 and January 20, 1987 disallowing
the petitioner's appeal is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent court is
directed to certify the appeal and transmit the records to the appellate court.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-55322 February 16, 1989
MOISES JOCSON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSON-VASQUEZ, ERNESTO
VASQUEZ, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. No. 63474, promulgated on April 30,
1980, entitled "MOISES JOCSON, plaintiff-appellee, versus AGUSTINA JOCSON-
VASQUEZ and ERNESTO VASQUEZ, defendant-appellants," upholding the validity of
three (3) documents questioned by Moises Jocson, in total reversal of the decision
of the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch I, which declared them as null
and void; and of its resolution, dated September 30, 1980, denying therein
appellee's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the only
surviving offsprings of the spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, while
respondent Ernesto Vasquez is the husband of Agustina. Alejandra Poblete
predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being settled. Subsequently,
Emilio Jocson also died intestate on April 1, 1972.
As adverted to above, the present controversy concerns the validity of three (3)
documents executed by Emilio Jocson during his lifetime. These documents
purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers
almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his
wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that they be
declared null and void and the properties subject matter therein be partitioned
between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.
The documents, which were presented as evidence not by Moises Jocson, as the
party assailing its validity, but rather by herein respondents, are the following:
1) "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa," marked as Exhibit 3 (pp. 12-13, Records)
for the defendant in the court a quo, dated July 27, 1968. By this document
Emilio Jocson sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez six (6) parcels of land, all
11
located at Naic, Cavite, for the sum of ten thousand P10,000.00 pesos. On
the same document Emilio Jocson acknowledged receipt of the purchase
price, thus:
Na ngayon, alang-alang sa halagang SAMPUNG LIBONG PISO (P10,000) salaping
Pilipino na aking tinanggap ng buong kasiyahan loob at ang pagkakatanggap ay
aking hayagang inaamin sa pamamagitan ng kasulatang ito, sa aking anak na si
Agustina Jocson, na may sapat na gulang, mamamayang Pilipino, asawa ni Ernesto
Vasquez, at naninirahan sa Poblacion, Naic, Cavite, ay aking ipinagbile ng lubusan at
kagyat at walang ano mang pasubali ang nabanggit na anim na pirasong lupa na
nasa unang dahon ng dokumentong ito, sa nabanggit na Agustina Jocson, at sa
kaniyang tagapagmana o makakahalili at gayon din nais kong banggitin na kahit na
may kamurahan ang ginawa kong pagbibile ay dahilan sa ang nakabile ay aking
anak na sa akin at mapaglingkod, madamayin at ma-alalahanin, na tulad din ng isa
ko pang anak na lalaki. Ang kuartang tinanggap ko na P10,000.00, ay gagamitin ko
sa aking katandaan at mga huling araw at sa aking mga ibang mahahalagang
pangangailangan. [Emphasis supplied]
Na nais ko ring banggitin na ang ginawa kong ito ay hindi labag sa ano mang batas o
kautusan, sapagkat ang aking pinagbile ay akin at nasa aking pangalan. Ang mga
lupang nasa pangalan ng aking nasirang asawa ay hindi ko ginagalaw ni
pinakikialaman at iyon ay dapat na hatiin ng dalawa kong anak alinsunod sa umiiral
na batas (p. 13, Records.)
2) "Kasulatan ng Ganap na Bilihan,"dated July 27,1968, marked as Exhibit 4
(p. 14, Records). On the face of this document, Emilio Jocson purportedly
sold to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, for the sum of FIVE THOUSAND
(P5,000.00) PESOS, two rice mills and a camarin (camalig) located at Naic,
Cavite. As in the first document, Moises Jocson acknowledged receipt of
the purchase price:
'Na alang-alang sa halagang LIMANG LIBONG PISO (P5,000.00) salaping Pilipino na
aking tinanggap ng buong kasiyahan loob sa aking anak na Agustina Jocson .... Na
ang halagang ibinayad sa akin ay may kamurahan ng kaunti ngunit dahil sa malaking
pagtingin ko sa kaniya ... kaya at pinagbile ko sa kaniya ang mga nabanggit na
pagaari kahit na hindi malaking halaga ... (p. 14, Records).
3) Lastly, the "Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Adjudication with Sale,
"dated March 9, 1969, marked as Exhibit 2 (p. 10-11, Records), whereby
Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, without the participation and
intervention of Moises Jocson, extrajudicially partitioned the unsettled

estate of Alejandra Poblete, dividing the same into three parts, one-third
(1/3) each for the heirs of Alejandra Poblete, namely: Emilio Jocson,
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez and Moises Jocson. By the same instrument,
Emilio sold his one- third (1/3) share to Agustin for the sum of EIGHT
THOUSAND (P8,000.00) PESOS. As in the preceding documents, Emilio
Jocson acknowledged receipt of the purchase price:
Now for and in consideration of the sum of only eight thousand (P8,000.00) pesos,
which I, the herein Emilio Jocson had received from my daughter Agustina Jocson,
do hereby sell, cede, convey and transfer, unto the said Agustina Jocson, her heirs
and assigns, administrators and successors in interests, in the nature of absolute
and irrevocable sale, all my rights, interest, shares and participation, which is
equivalent to one third (1/3) share in the properties herein mentioned and
described the one third being adjudicated unto Agustina Jocson and the other third
(1/3) portion being the share of Moises Jocson. (p. 11, Records).
These documents were executed before a notary public. Exhibits 3 and 4 were
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cavite on July 29, 1968 and
the transfer certificates of title covering the properties therein in the name of
Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," were cancelled and new certificates
of title were issued in the name of Agustina Jocson-Vasquez. Exhibit 2 was not
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds.
Herein petitioner filed his original complaint (Record on Appeal, p. 27, Rollo) on
June 20,1973 with the then Court of First Instance of Naic, Cavite (docketed as Civil
Case No. TM- 531), and which was twice amended. In his Second Amended
Complaint (pp. 47-58, Record on Appeal), herein petitioner assailed the above
documents, as aforementioned, for being null and void.
It is necessary to partly quote the allegation of petitioner in his complaint for the
reason that the nature of his causes of action is at issue, thus:
8. [With regard the first document, that] the defendants, through fraud,
deceit, undue pressure and influence and other illegal machinations, were
able to induce, led, and procured their father ... to sign [the] contract of
sale ..., for the simulated price of P10,000.00, which is a consideration that
is shocking to the conscience of ordinary man and despite the fact that said
defendants have no work or livelihood of their own ...; that the sale is null
and void, also, because it is fictitious, simulated and fabricated contract x x
x (pp. 52-53, Record on Appeal). [Emphasis supplied]
12
12. [With regards the second and third document, that they] are null and
void because the consent of the father, Emilio Jocson, was obtained with
fraud, deceit, undue pressure, misrepresentation and unlawful
machinations and trickeries committed by the defendant on him; and that
the said contracts are simulated, fabricated and fictitious, having been
made deliberately to exclude the plaintiff from participating and with the
dishonest and selfish motive on the part of the defendants to defraud him
of his legitimate share on said properties [subject matter thereof]; and
that without any other business or employment or any other source of
income, defendants who were just employed in the management and
administration of the business of their parents, would not have the
sufficient and ample means to purchase the said properties except by
getting the earnings of the business or by simulated consideration ... (pp.
54-55, Record on Appeal). [Emphasis supplied]
Petitioner explained that there could be no real sale between a father and daughter
who are living under the same roof, especially so when the father has no need of
money as the properties supposedly sold were all income-producing. Further,
petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the
unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the
former, therefore, cannot validly sell (pp. 53, 57, Record on Appeal). As far as
Exhibit 2 is concerned, petitioner questions not the extrajudicial partition but only
the sale by his father to Agustina of the former's 1/3 share (p. 13, Rollo).
The trial court sustained the foregoing contentions of petitioner (pp. 59-81, Record
on Appeal). It declared that the considerations mentioned in the documents were
merely simulated and fictitious because: 1) there was no showing that Agustina
Jocson-Vasquez paid for the properties; 2) the prices were grossly inadequate which
is tantamount to lack of consideration at all; and 3) the improbability of the sale
between Emilio Jocson and Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, taking into consideration the
circumstances obtaining between the parties; and that the real intention of the
parties were donations designed to exclude Moises Jocson from participating in the
estate of his parents. It further declared the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and
4 as conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because they were
registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" and
ordered that the properties subject matter of all the documents be registered in the
name of herein petitioners and private respondents.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 63474-R rendered a decision (pp.
29-42, Rollo) and reversed that of the trial court's and ruled that:

1. That insofar as Exhibits 3 and 4 are concerned the appellee's complaint
for annulment, which is indisputably based on fraud, and undue influence,
is now barred by prescription, pursuant to the settled rule that an action
for annulment of a contract based on fraud must be filed within four (4)
years, from the discovery of the fraud, ... which in legal contemplation is
deemed to be the date of the registration of said document with the
Register of Deeds ... and the records admittedly show that both Exhibits 3
and 4, were all registered on July 29, 1968, while on the other hand, the
appellee's complaint was filed on June 20, 1973, clearly beyond the
aforesaid four-year prescriptive period provided by law;
2. That the aforesaid contracts, Exhibits 2, 3, and 4, are decisively not
simulated or fictitious contracts, since Emilio Jocson actually and really
intended them to be effective and binding against him, as to divest him of
the full dominion and ownership over the properties subject of said
assailed contracts, as in fact all his titles over the same were all cancelled
and new ones issued to appellant Agustina Jocson-Vasquez ...;
3. That in regard to Exhibit 2, the same is valid and subsisting, and the
partition with sale therein made by and between Emilio Jocson and
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, affecting the 2/3 portion of the subject
properties described therein have all been made in accordance with Article
996 of the New Civil Code on intestate succession, and the appellee's
(herein petitioner) remaining 1/3 has not been prejudiced (pp. 41-42,
Rollo).
In this petition for review, Moises Jocson raised the following assignments of errors:
I. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE SUIT FOR THE ANNULMENT OF CONTRACTS FILED BY PETITIONERS
WITH THE TRIAL COURT IS "BASED ON FRAUD" AND NOT ON ITS
INEXISTENCE AND NULLITY BECAUSE OF IT'S BEING SIMULATED OR
FICTITIOUS OR WHOSE CAUSE IS CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND GOOD
CUSTOMS?
II. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED BY PETITIONER IN THE TRIAL COURT IS
BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION?
III. HAS THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
AS INEXISTENT AND NULL AND VOID THE CONTRACTS IN QUESTION AND
13
IN REVERSING THE DECLARING DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT? (p. 2,
Rollo)
I.
The first and second assignments of errors are related and shall be jointly discussed.
According to the Court of Appeals, herein petitioner's causes of action were based
on fraud. Under Article 1330 of the Civil Code, a contract tainted by vitiated
consent, as when consent was obtained through fraud, is voidable; and the action
for annulment must be brought within four years from the time of the discovery of
the fraud (Article 1391, par. 4, Civil Code), otherwise the contract may no longer be
contested. Under present jurisprudence, discovery of fraud is deemed to have
taken place at the time the convenant was registered with the Register of Deeds
(Gerona vs. De Guzman, No. L-19060, May 29,1964, 11 SCRA 153). Since Exhibits 3
and 4 were registered on July 29, 1968 but Moises Jocson filed his complaint only
on June 20, 1973, the Court of Appeals ruled that insofar as these documents were
concerned, petitioner's "annulment suit" had prescribed.
If fraud were the only ground relied upon by Moises Jocson in assailing the
questioned documents, We would have sustained the above pronouncement. But it
is not so. As pointed out by petitioner, he further assailed the deeds of conveyance
on the ground that they were without consideration since the amounts appearing
thereon as paid were in fact merely simulated.
According to Article 1352 of the Civil Code, contracts without cause produce no
effect whatsoever. A contract of sale with a simulated price is void (Article 1471;
also Article 1409 [3]]), and an action for the declaration of its nullity does not
prescribe (Article 1410, Civil Code; See also, Castillo v. Galvan, No. L-27841, October
20, l978, 85 SCRA 526). Moises Jocsons saction, therefore, being for the judicial
declaration of nullity of Exhibits 3 and 4 on the ground of simulated price, is
imprescriptible.
II.
For petitioner, however, the above discussion may be purely academic. The burden
of proof in showing that contracts lack consideration rests on he who alleged it. The
degree of proof becomes more stringent where the documents themselves show
that the vendor acknowledged receipt of the price, and more so where the
documents were notarized, as in the case at bar. Upon consideration of the records

of this case, We are of the opinion that petitioner has not sufficiently proven that
the questioned documents are without consideration.
Firstly, Moises Jocson's claim that Agustina Jocson-Vasquez had no other source of
income other than what she derives from helping in the management of the family
business (ricefields and ricemills), and which was insufficient to pay for the
purchase price, was contradicted by his own witness, Isaac Bagnas, who testified
that Agustina and her husband were engaged in the buy and sell of palay and rice
(p. 10, t.s.n., January 14, 1975). Amazingly, petitioner himself and his wife testified
that they did not know whether or not Agustina was involved in some other
business (p. 40, t.s.n., July 30, 1974; p. 36, t.s.n., May 24, 1974).
On the other hand, Agustina testified that she was engaged in the business of
buying and selling palay and rice even before her marriage to Ernesto Vasquez
sometime in 1948 and continued doing so thereafter (p. 4, t.s.n., March 15, 1976).
Considering the foregoing and the presumption that a contract is with a
consideration (Article 1354, Civil Code), it is clear that petitioner miserably failed to
prove his allegation.
Secondly, neither may the contract be declared void because of alleged inadequacy
of price. To begin with, there was no showing that the prices were grossly
inadequate. In fact, the total purchase price paid by Agustina Jocson-Vasquez is
above the total assessed value of the properties alleged by petitioner. In his Second
Amended Complaint, petitioner alleged that the total assessed value of the
properties mentioned in Exhibit 3 was P8,920; Exhibit 4, P3,500; and Exhibit 2, P
24,840, while the purchase price paid was P10,000, P5,000, and P8,000,
respectively, the latter for the 1/3 share of Emilio Jocson from the paraphernal
properties of his wife, Alejandra Poblete. And any difference between the market
value and the purchase price, which as admitted by Emilio Jocson was only slight,
may not be so shocking considering that the sales were effected by a father to her
daughter in which case filial love must be taken into consideration (Alsua-Betts vs.
Court of Appeals, No. L-46430-31, April 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 332).
Further, gross inadequacy of price alone does not affect a contract of sale, except
that it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a
donation or some other act or contract (Article 1470, Civil Code) and there is
nothing in the records at all to indicate any defect in Emilio Jocson's consent.
Thirdly, any discussion as to the improbability of a sale between a father and his
daughter is purely speculative which has no relevance to a contract where all the
essential requisites of consent, object and cause are clearly present.
14
There is another ground relied upon by petitioner in assailing Exhibits 3 and 4, that
the properties subject matter therein are conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and
Alejandra Poblete. It is the position of petitioner that since the properties sold to
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez under Exhibit 3 were registered in the name of "Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," the certificates of title he presented as
evidence (Exhibits "E', to "J', pp. 4-9, Records) were enough proof to show that the
properties covered therein were acquired during the marriage of their parents, and,
therefore, under Article 160 of the Civil Code, presumed to be conjugal properties.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife.
In Cobb-Perez vs. Hon. Gregorio Lantin, No. L-22320, May 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 637,
644, We held that:
Anent their claim that the shares in question are conjugal assets, the
spouses Perez adduced not a modicum of evidence, although they
repeatedly invoked article 160 of the New Civil Code which provides that ...
. As interpreted by this Court, the party who invokes this presumption
must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the
marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of
conjugal ownership. Thus in Camia de Reyes vs. Reyes de Ilano [62 Phil.
629, 639], it was held that "according to law and jurisprudence, it is
sufficient to prove that the Property was acquired during the marriage in
order that the same may be deemed conjugal property." In the recent case
ofMaramba vs. Lozano, et. al. [L-21533, June 29, 1967, 20 SCRA 474], this
Court, thru Mr. Justice Makalintal, reiterated that "the presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code refers to property acquired during the
marriage," and then concluded that since "there is no showing as to when
the property in question was acquired...the fact that the title is in the
wife's name alone is determinative." Similarly, in the case at bar, since
there is no evidence as to when the shares of stock were acquired, the fact
that they are registered in the name of the husband alone is an indication
that the shares belong exclusively to said spouse.'

This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Ponce de Leon vs. Rehabilitation
Finance Corporation, No. L-24571, December 18, 1970, 36 SCRA 289, and later in
Torela vs. Torela, No. 1,27843, October 11, 1979, 93 SCRA 391.
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under
Article 160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired
during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title,
however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the
properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete" is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses'
coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is
well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already
existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under dispute
were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered
only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described
in the certificates of title as married to the latter.
Contrary to petitioner's position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that
the properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson's, the registered owner. This is so
because the words "married to' preceding "Alejandra Poblete' are merely
descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson Litam v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 354; Stuart v.
Yatco, No. L-16467, April 27, 1962, 4 SCRA 1143; Magallon v. Montejo, G.R. No. L-
73733, December 16, 1986, 146 SCRA 282). In other words, the import from the
certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same
having been registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra
Poblete.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases We consistently held that registration
of the property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it
being conjugal (See Bucoy vs. Paulino, No. L-25775, April 26, 1968, 23 SCRA 248).
But this ruling is not inconsistent with the above pronouncement for in those cases
there was proof that the properties, though registered in the name of only one
spouse, were indeed conjugal properties, or that they have been acquired during
the marriage of the spouses, and therefore, presumed conjugal, without the
adverse party having presented proof to rebut the presumption (See Mendoza vs-
Reyes, No. L-31618, August 17, 1983, 124 SCRA 154).
In the instant case, had petitioner, Moises Jocson, presented sufficient proof to
show that the disputed properties were acquired during his parents' coverture. We
would have ruled that the properties, though registered in the name of Emilio
Jocson alone, are conjugal properties in view of the presumption under Article 160.
15
There being no such proof, the condition sine qua non for the application of the
presumption does not exist. Necessarily, We rule that the properties under Exhibit 3
are the exclusive properties of Emilio Jocson.
There being no showing also that the camarin and the two ricemills, which are the
subject of Exhibit 4, were conjugal properties of the spouses Emilio Jocson and
Alejandra Poblete, they should be considered, likewise, as the exclusive properties
of Emilio Jocson, the burden of proof being on petitioner.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Emilio Jocon and Alejandra Jocson were husband and wife. The wife died first
intestate then the husband followed. Moises and Agustina are their children.
Ernesto Vasquesz is the husband of Agustina.
The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by
Emilio Jocson during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale,
to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his properties,
including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson
assails these documents and prays that they be declared null and void and the
properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the
only heirs of their deceased parents.
Petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the
unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the
former, therefore, cannot validly sell. They say it is conjugal properties of Emilio
Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because they were registered in the name of “Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete”.
ISSUE:
 16

WON the property registered under the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to
Alejandra Poblete” is conjugal property or exclusive property.

HELD:
Exclusive. Article 60 of the CC proveides that All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The party who invokes this presumption
must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage.
In other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non
for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.

It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under
Article 160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired
during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title,
however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the
properties were registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete” is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses’
coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is
well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already
existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under dispute
were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered
only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described
in the certificates of title as married to the latter.

Contrary to petitioner’s position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that
the properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson’s, the registered owner. This is so
because the words “married to’ preceding “Alejandra Poblete’ are merely
descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson. In other words, the import from the
certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same
having been registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra
Poblete.