ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.

vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This
ONG, JR., respondents. was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.

G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991 Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner, We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE
ONG, JR., respondents. ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION

Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co. The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.

Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr. The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a
decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen
and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before
us is whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse
of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern
Samar was held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio
Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second
district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the
following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The
use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated
that under the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original
and exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of
the jurisdiction conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at
p. 162). The exercise of power by the Electoral Commission under
the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the
legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant of power to the
legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and
complete; (Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39
Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power
was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it
remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the
Legislature and the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25
SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution. (p.
401)
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the
power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by
the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this
Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and
excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise
restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." (pp. 403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our
constitutional grants of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court
stated that the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in
the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a
determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero,
upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its
power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a
very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the
power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any
event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will
constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not venture into the perilous area
of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the Government, It
comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of
discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial
action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded
jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies
of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of
the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that
the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a
matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v.
Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is
apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals,
although not powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of
their functions independent organs — independent of Congress and the Supreme
Court. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. (Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the
balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain
where the Sovereign authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of
Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the
situation may exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political
composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution,
however, that makes the HRET because of its composition any less independent from
the Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive. The degree of judicial
intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative members of the
HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the same-manifest grave
abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due
process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of
judicial review by the Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong
Te, arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the
municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the
then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He
was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was
able to establish an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy
assimilation into the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he
absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As
the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two
fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and
practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born
in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put
up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-
up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure
of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and
family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization
on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino
citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the
decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may
already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly,
a certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of
nine years was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is
nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs
and practices of the local populace were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang,
Samar was burned to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another
one in place of their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang
was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better
education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire
gutted their second house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still
another house, this time a 16-door apartment building, two doors of which were
reserved for the family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the
CPA Board Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for
work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner.
Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971,
his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the
Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to
derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly
declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The
Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship
since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up
and spent his childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of
Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of
their family business decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for
public office. Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for
representative in the second district of Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their
representative in Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are
combined, Ong would still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who
elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been
born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which
discriminates against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of
section 4, would this refer only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution or would it also cover those
who elected it under the 1973 Constitution?
 Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who
elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the
provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the
election was done before or after January 17,
1973. (Records of the Constitutional Commission,
Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of
Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and
Human Rights has more or less decided to
extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born
citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973
Constitution by adding that persons who have
elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935
Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr.
Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the
Reverend Father Bernas' well written book, he
said that the decision was designed merely to
accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and
that the definition on natural-born has no
retroactive effect. Now it seems that the
Reverend Father Bernas is going against this
intention by supporting the amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there
has been an evolution in my thinking. (Records of
the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very
important because his election of Philippine
citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen
but a natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to
run for Congress. . .
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that
and for that reason we will leave it to the body to
approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the
provision because it strikes me as unfair that the
Filipino citizen who was born a day before
January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a
natural-born citizen. (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 231)
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to
remedy an inequitable situation. Between 1935
and 1973 when we were under the 1935
Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but
alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos.
However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien
fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do
elect, they become Filipino citizens but not
natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision
prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an
inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged
in by the literal meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must
prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter would result in
absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and
suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which
should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution,
any constitution is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically for
the prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes,
are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form
but are organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital
not formal. . . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one
born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a
natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still
have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws,
conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino
mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered
as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on
the fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially
the same similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this
accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity
of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The
enactment was meant to correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then
prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at the time had
it not been for the curative provisions. (See Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the
time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent
elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords
natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if
they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he
came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He
was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father
had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not
have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be
amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship
inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a
sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one
who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal
process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the
exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the
Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age,
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52;
emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have
elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien
enclaves and no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino
since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the child was still a small boy.
He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government agency. His
profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a license. He
has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself
a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace
Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to
show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern
Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any
member of this Court will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to
have him represent them in Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have
considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still
have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up,
there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a
profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other
categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for
these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien.
Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt
in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in
an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship.
It observed that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong
Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act
squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country.
Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for
protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized
citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his
citizenship after his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach.
This can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only
be done through a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52
[1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as
null and void would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has
already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A
dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have
long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he could not use beyond
where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be made a
central issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong
Chuan. Our function is to determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of
authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural
born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The
citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent
"chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both
mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other
citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a
foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was
no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed
manifest grave abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has
already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang
Pambansa convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil
Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural
born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the
Batasang Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be
characterized as error. There would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary
and whimsical as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural
born citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their
children born subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish
Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they
were born out of Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in
any town in the Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile,
once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new
one is established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v.
Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around
1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of
his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests
and Credentials of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even
went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up
his business and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of
sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the
Philippines. The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said country, was
of no moment. This will not change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in
the Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish
subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a
town under the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the
Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed residence
in a place; one who has a domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) A
priori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified as a
Filipino citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private
respondent was a natural-born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove
it were not in compliance with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that
the private respondent failed to present the original of the documentary evidence,
testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the proceedings of the body which the
aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the
exceptions to the best evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the
Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional
Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by
Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in their respective
testimonies given before the HRET to the effect that there is no governmental agency
which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
(TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN,
February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the
Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party to
testify to such execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as
aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability
to produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it
is enough that it be shown that after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be
found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately
established, the contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy
thereof or by the recollection of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited
in the Committee Report, the former member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented as a witness in the hearing of the protest
against the private respondent, categorically stated that he saw the disputed
documents presented during the hearing of the election protest against the brother of
the private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional
Convention, states that he was presiding officer of the plenary session which
deliberated on the report on the election protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites
a long list of names of delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan,
and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have presented any one of the long
list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a natural-born citizen. They
did not do so. Nor did they demur to the contents of the documents presented by the
private respondent. They merely relied on the procedural objections respecting the
admissibility of the evidence presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to
be a member of that body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the
sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both
bodies deliberated at length on the controversies over which they were sole judges.
Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation of all relevant factors which the
parties wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with their conclusions, we
cannot declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to
keep clear the line between error and grave abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The
term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under
the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of
residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain
the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I
remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the elections.
So my question is: What is the Committee's
concept of residence of a candidate for the
legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the
concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the
regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, and a resident thereof,
that is, in the district, for a period of not less than
one year preceding the day of the election. This
was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records
of the 1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11,
July 22, 1986. p. 87)
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on
Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo
has raised the same point that "resident" has
been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
 Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen
consider at the proper time to go back to actual
residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some
difficulty especially considering that a provision in
the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says
that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted
by law. So, we have to stick to the original
concept that it should be by domicile and not
physical and actual residence. (Records of the
1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22,
1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word
"residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966
[1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long,
notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words,
domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147
[1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his
parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong,
Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established
that after the fire that gutted their house in 1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-
door apartment was built by their family, two doors of which were reserved as their
family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in
Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's
parents. Upon the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private respondent,
pursuant to the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir),
notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the
Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that
it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence
and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house
or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for
Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only
requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence
requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should
also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412
[1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does
not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of
finishing his studies and later to practice his profession, There was no intention to
abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys
made to his home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an
interracial evolution. Throughout our history, there has been a continuing influx of
Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial
diversity gives strength to our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a
person, for there is none. To mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese,
the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own
President, Corazon Aquino is also part Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we
are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the private respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special
privilege which one must forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis
of too harsh an interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to
share in its richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws
only the very affluent backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the
indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of
clearances by minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to overcome so many
technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire citizenship. It is time for the
naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful
examination of an applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more
indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong,
Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu), petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEÑA,
respondents.
Rufino B. Requina for petitioner.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which dismissed the petition for the
disqualification of private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña as candidate for Provincial
Governor of Cebu Province.
The facts of the case are briefly as follows:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate
of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu
Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for
short), as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent
Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of
private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a
citizen of the United States of America.
On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate
issued by the then Immigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor
Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien
Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence
(ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex
"B-1").
The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board of
Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondent
and proclaiming him until the final resolution of the main petition.
Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to
continue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.
At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the
following exhibits tending to show that private respondent is an American citizen:
Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed by
private respondent dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "B"); Alien Certificate of
Registration No. 015356 in the name of private respondent dated November 21, 1979
(Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-enter the Philippines dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "D");
Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980 (Exh. "E"). (pp. 117-118,
Rollo)
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen,
alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmeña, a Filipino and son of
the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting
Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been
continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country
for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines
since 1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to
proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the highest number of votes,
private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for
disqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that
private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
Hence, the present petition.
The petition is not meritorious.
There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered
candidate to run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be
raised under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides
that:
'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to
cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after the notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.
and
(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:
 'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the
election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional,
provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo
warranto with the Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election.
The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on
November 19, 1987 and that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification of said
private respondent on January 22, 1988. Since the petition for disqualification was
filed beyond the twenty five-day period required in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, it is clear that said petition was filed out of time.
The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treated as a
petition for quo warranto under Section 253 of the same Code as it is unquestionably
premature, considering that private respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor
of Cebu only on March 3, 1988.
However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's
citizenship and qualification to hold the public office to which he has been proclaimed
elected. There is enough basis for us to rule directly on the merits of the case, as the
COMELEC did below.
Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore,
disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of
Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof
that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided
for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign
country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath
of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the
evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine
citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing
Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United
States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was
issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter
the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner
assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an
American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance
required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81, Rollo)
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are
not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the laws of the United
States does not concern Us here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private
respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that
private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the
petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June 21,
1989) and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are
not applicable to the case at bar.
In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the
United States in 1983 per certification from the United States District Court, Northern
District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the
Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United States
but claimed that he was forced to embrace American citizenship to protect himself
from the persecution of the Marcos government. The Court, however, found this
suggestion of involuntariness unacceptable, pointing out that there were many other
Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo who did not find it
necessary to abandon their status as Filipinos.
Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was married to an Australian
citizen and that he was naturalized as an Australian citizen in 1976, per certification
from the Australian Government through its Consul in the Philippines. This was later
affirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs.
The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo. In fact, in a number
of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia.
In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines, therefore,
disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon and Mayor of
Baguio City, respectively, the Court considered the fact that by their own admissions,
they are indubitably aliens, no longer owing any allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines since they have sworn their total allegiance to a foreign state.
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of
allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting
Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this
country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-
108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine
citizenship cannot be presumed.
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that
because Osmeña obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen,
the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmeña
should be regarded as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our
mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the fact that
admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a
Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. Thus,
by way of analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or
certifies that he has a brother named Jose, this does not mean that he does not have
a brother named Mario; or if a person is enrolled as student simultaneously in two
universities, namely University X and University Y, presents a Certification that he is a
student of University X, this does not necessarily mean that he is not still a student of
University Y. In the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship;
truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be
"express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship
when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".

Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of citizens
is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has
no retroactive effect. And while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our
country had already frowned upon the concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the
fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further that under the aforecited proviso, the
effect of such dual citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said
law has not yet been enacted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of
the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
HON. MARTINIANO P. VIVO, as (Acting) Commissioner of Immigration, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch VI, CHUA PIC LUAN, UY KOC SIONG and UY TIAN SIONG, respondents.
Assistant Solicitor General Isidro C. Borromeo and Solicitor General P. Pardo for
petitioner.
Jose S. Zafra and Tomas B. Torrefranca for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is another case involving Chinese nationals who came to the Philippines
allegedly for a visit but thereafter refuse to leave. And one where the improvident
issuance of an ex-parte preliminary injunction, followed by judicial inaction, actually
extended the stay of aliens beyond the period authorized by law, and even beyond
what the visitors had asked for.
The private respondents herein, Chua Pic Luan, a Chinese mother, and her minor
children, Uy Koc Siong and Uy Tian Siong, arrived from Hongkong and were admitted
in the Philippines as temporary visitors on 16 October 1960, with an initial authorized
stay of three (3) months. The husband and father of these aliens, Uy Pick Tuy had
applied for naturalization, and the Court of First Instance of Manila (in its Civil Case
No. 43163) granted his petition therefor only on 11 April 1961. Meanwhile, said
temporary visitors petitioned for an indefinite extension of their stay. Acting thereon,
and purportedly in accordance with a Cabinet Resolution on 29 February 1956
granting them concurrent jurisdiction to act on petitions for extension of stay of
temporary visitors, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, on 16 May
1961, authorized the change in category from temporary visitors to that of special
non-immigrants under Section 47(a) (2) of the Immigration Law for a period of stay
extending up to 11 April 1963; and the Secretary of Justice, Alejo Mabanag, on 8
June 1961, approved the extension thus authorized, subject to the condition that
Chua Pic Luan, Uy Koc Siong, and Uy Tian Siong shall secure reentry permits to
Hongkong valid at least two months over and beyond their extended stay, and that
they shall maintain their cash bonds filed with the Bureau of Immigration and to pay
the corresponding fees. But the herein petitioner, Commissioner of Immigration,
refused to recognize the said extension further than 16 June 1962, and denied
acceptance of payment of the extension fees.
Thereupon, the respondents, on 4 June 1962, requested the Office of the President of
the Philippines to extend their stay up to 11 April 1963 in order to coincide with their
hope — for and forthcoming oath-taking of allegiance of Uy Pick Tuy. The request
was referred to the Immigration Commissioner. The latter, on 11 June 1962, informed
the respondents, through counsel, that the new Secretary of Justice, Jose Diokno,
had ruled in January, 1962 that the Cabinet Resolution of 29 February 1956 had no
force and effect, and forthwith denied the request for extension of stay of the
respondents and advised them to leave the country voluntarily not later than 16 June
1962; otherwise, they would be proceeded against, in accordance with law.
The respondents did not leave the country on the date specified, but instead filed a
petition for mandamus with injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 50671, in the Court
of First Instance of Manila, to restrain the Commissioner of Immigration from issuing a
warrant for their arrest and from confiscating their bond for their temporary stay and to
order the Commissioner to implement the extension previously authorized and
approved by Secretaries Serrano and Mabanag.
His Honor, Judge Federico Alikpala, to whose sala the case was assigned, denied the
prayer for preliminary injunction for lack of a prima facie showing and set the case for
hearing on 13 July 1962. On the said date, which was pre-selected with the
conformity of petitioner's counsel, said counsel did not appear but another lawyer
appeared to ask for postponement. Judge Alikpala denied the postponement and
dismissed the case without prejudice.
On 19 July 1962, the herein respondents re-filed the same petition with the same
court, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 50993. The petition alleged three
grounds therefor, namely: (1) the extension of the stay of the petitioners (herein
respondents) up to 11 April 1963 was authorized and approved by the Secretaries of
Foreign Affairs and of Justice; (2) they were due for eventual conversion into Filipino
citizens by virtue of the granting of Uy Pick Tuy's petition for naturalization, which had
not been appealed, and he was due to take his oath of allegiance on 11 April 1963;
and (3) their departure from the Philippines would work great injury and injustice to
themselves. As before, the petition prayed for a preliminary injunction. This time, the
case was assigned to the sala of herein co-respondent Judge Gaudencio Cloribel.
On 21 July 1962, respondent judge, ex-parte and without hearing, issued an order
granting preliminary injunction, and, on a bond of P3,000.00, issued the writ on 24
July 1962.
On 3 August 1962, the Immigration Commissioner filed his answer (as respondent
therein) stating, in defense, inter alia, that the visitors' authorized stay expired on 16
June 1962; that their change in category from temporary visitors to special non-
immigrants and the extension of their stay up to 11 April 1963 by the Secretaries of
Foreign Affairs and of Justice was invalid, as subsequently ruled by their successors
in office, and that it is the Commissioner of Immigration who is vested by law with
power to grant extensions of stay; that the petition filed was not the proper remedy;
that the Solicitor General will oppose the oath-taking of Uy Pick Tuy and that, even if
Tuy will become a Filipino citizen, his wife would not automatically become a Filipino
citizen, as she has yet to show that she, herself, can be lawfully naturalized.
Three (3) years passed without the case having been heard.
Then, on 14 September 1965, the Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss the case
for the unreasonable length of time that the petitioners had failed to prosecute their
case, and that even the final relief that they sought, which was to implement the
extension up to 11 April 1963, had already expired. But, on opposition of herein
respondents, the court, on 26 October 1965, denied the motion to dismiss for being
"not well taken."
On 9 December 1965, the Immigration Commissioner filed with the Supreme Court
the present original action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction,
contesting the respondent court's order of 21 July 1962 granting preliminary injunction
ex-parte, the writ of preliminary injunction of 24 July 1962, and the order of 26
October 1965 denying the motion to dismiss.
This Court required the respondents to answer, and on 16 December 1966, on motion
of the petitioning Commissioner, it restrained the private respondents from
representing themselves to be Filipinos and from exercising any of the rights and
privileges of Filipino citizens, until further orders from the Court.
The conclusions derivable from the foregoing chain of uncontested facts are: that
herein private respondents secured admission to the Philippines as temporary visitors
by falsely pretending to come for a visit but, actually, with the intent to stay
permanently; that, knowing that their authorized stay would expire on 16 June 1962,
private respondents filed their petition in court for injunction, then delayed its
adjudication, the better to prolong their stay, and that private respondents have thus
succeeded in prolonging their stay in the country even beyond the date that they had
originally sought and asked for, which was 11 April 1963, upon the respondent court's
compounded abuse of discretion, inaction and excess of jurisdiction.
Which was, in law, the expiry date of the respondents' stay: the 16th of June 1962, as
fixed by the Immigration Commissioner, or 11 April 1963, as authorized and approved
by the Serrano-Mabanag indorsements? This question, as well as the question of
whether temporary visitors may change their status to special non-immigrants without
first departing from the country, were specifically answered by this Court in Lim Chiok,
et al., vs. Vivo, L-20513, 26 December 1963, in the following manner:
... The so-called Cabinet Resolution of February 29, 1956 did not specifically
authorize the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and of Justice to extend the stay
of temporary visitors. It could not legally do so because under the express
provisions of the Immigration Law, it is the Commissioner of Immigration who
is vested with the power and authority to grant such extensions. And, the
Cabinet has no power to amend or modify the law. We so declared in Ang
1
Liong vs. Commissioner of Immigration (51 O.G. 2893) when we said: "The
Secretary of Foreign Affairs is not authorized to admit into the Philippines
aliens for temporary stay, or extend the period authorized by the
Commissioner of Immigration for their stay in the Philippines."
Neither can the two Secretaries authorize the change of status from
temporary visitors to special non-immigrants. The law and our decisions on
the matter are clear on this point: temporary visitors could not have their
status changed to special non-immigrants without first departing from the
country. (citing authorities)
As early as 1956, in fact, this Court had already ruled that the period of stay of alien
temporary visitors could not be extended without first departing from the Islands; and
in Chiong Tiao Bing vs. Commissioner of Immigration (28 September 1956), 99 Phil.
1021, 1023, we ruled:
No officer can relieve him of the departure requirements of Section 9 of the
Immigration Act, under the guise of "change" or "correction"', for the law
makes no distinctions, and no officer is above the law. Any other ruling
would, as stated in our previous decision, encourage aliens to enter the
Islands on false pretenses; every alien, so permitted to enter for a limited
time, might then claim a right to permanent admission, however flimsy such
claim should be, and thereby compel our government to spend time, money
and effort to examining and verifying whether or not every such alien really
has a right to take up permanent residence here. In the meanwhile, the alien
would be able to prolong his stay and evade his return to the port whence he
came, contrary to what he promised to do when he entered. The damages
inherent in such ruling are self-evident.
That the Cabinet Secretaries acted as alter egos of the President, as now claimed by
the respondents, is not true; because the President, when a request for extension
was made directly to him, did not affirm the acts of the Secretaries but referred the
matter to the Commissioner. The respondents knew that said Secretaries did not act
as alter egos of the President; otherwise, they would not have written the President
after they received the Secretaries' indorsements. And when the Immigration
Commissioner insisted upon private respondents departing from the Islands, they did
not dare ask the President for relief.
The other reason given by the respondents to support their petition filed with the court
below is their expectation to follow the citizenship of Uy Pick Tuy when he should take
2
his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen. Such expectation is legally baseless.
As to the wife, Chua Pic Luan, she does not, under Section 15 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, automatically become a Filipino citizen on account of her
marriage to a naturalized Filipino citizen, since she must first prove that she
3
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalization.
By having misrepresented before Philippine consular and administrative authorities
that she came to the country for only a temporary visit when, in fact, her intention was
to stay permanently; and for having intentionally delayed court processes the better to
prolong her stay, respondent Chua Pic Luan demonstrated her incapacity to satisfy
the qualifications exacted by the third paragraph of Section 2 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, that she must be of good moral character and must have
conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of
her residence in the Philippines in her relation with the constituted government.
And, having lawfully resided in the Philippines only from her arrival on 16 October
1960 to 16 June 1962, she (Chua Pick Luan) also failed to meet the required
qualification of continuous residence in the Philippines for ten (10) years, her stay
beyond 16 June 1962 being illegal. As to the foreign born minors, Uy Koc Siong and
Uy Tian Siong, our pronouncement in Vivo vs. Cloribel, L-23239, 23 November 1966,
18 SCRA 713, applies to them:
As to foreign born minor children, they are extended citizenship "if dwelling
in the Philippines at the time of the naturalzation of the parent." "Dwelling"
means lawful residence. Since prior to the time the father of respondents
 visitors was supposed to have taken his oath of citizenship ... their lawful
period of stay had already expired and they had already been required to
leave, they were no longer lawfully residing here (Kua Suy et al. v. The
Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790, Oct. 31, 1963).
Nor can these temporary visitors claim any right to a stay coterminous with the result
of the naturalization proceeding of their husband and father, Uy Pick Tuy, because
their authorized stay was for a definite period, up to a fixed day, a circumstance
incompatible with the termination of the naturalization proceeding, which is uncertain
4
and can not be set at a definite date.
Civil Case No. 50993 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, are all hereby set aside,
and the respondent judge is hereby permanently restrained from taking cognizance
and assuming jurisdiction over said Civil Case No. 50993, except to dismiss it as
moot and academic. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court is
hereby made permanent. Costs against private respondents.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, Fernando and
Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.

It is contended for the respondents that two-year old respondent Uy Tian Siong
cannot, under Article 363 of the Civil Code, be separated from his mother; that
husband Uy Pick Tuy has the right to fix the residence of the family (Article 110), to
the company of his wife (Article 109) and those of his minor children (Article 316), and
said wife and chidren are obliged to obey and live with him (Articles 109, 311, 357);
and that to make said wife and children depart from the Philippines is destructive of
family solidarity (Articles 218-221). These arguments are beside the point. Said laws
5
govern the relations between husband and wife inter se or between private persons,
not the relations between visiting alien and the sovereign host country. Respondents
seem to have forgotten that they came here for a visit, and, as visitors, they have no
right to impose upon their host a period of stay of their own choosing. Furthermore,
6
being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are
governed by their personal law, i.e., the laws of the nation to which they belong even
when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).

The date insisted upon by the Commissioner as the terminal date of stay of the
respondents (16 June 1962) had already passed when respondent judge issued his
writ of preliminary injunction (24 July 1962). This fact should have cautioned him to
issue notice to the Immigration Commissioner and hold a hearing before issuing the
writ. But respondent judge never did hold a hearing, either on the preliminary
injunction or on the merits, so that it is mild to say that his ex-parte preliminary
injunction was improvidently issued. The date insisted on by the repondents as their
terminal date of stay (11 April 1963) had, likewise, long expired when the
Commissioner filed his motion to dismiss (14 September 1965) in the court below.
7
Plainly, the case had by then become moot and academic, and the court was left
with no further controversy to adjudicate. Hence, the respondent, Judge Cloribel,
whimsically and arbitrarily denied the motion, in open disregard of the public interest
and of the national policy expressed in the Immigration Act.

Thus, the respondent judge, by refusing to dismiss the case, allowed these alien
visitors to remain in the country for as long as the case remained pending in his
docket; in effect, he abusively arrogated unto himself the power to grant extensions of
stay to temporary visitors, a faculty that, under the law, belongs to the Commissioner.
Thus, respondent judge, instead of applying and interpreting the law, has effectively
disregarded the same and violated its policy.

WHEREFORE, the order granting preliminary injunction on 21 July 1962, the writ of
preliminary injunction on 24 July 1962, and the order of 26 October 1965, all issued in
MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG,
petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.
Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Frine' C.
Zaballero and Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo for respondent-appellee.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil
Case No. 49705 entitled Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of
Immigration which, brief as it is, sufficiently depicts the factual setting of and the
fundamental issues involved in this case thus:
In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of
injunction against the Commissioner of Immigration, "restraining the
latter and/or his authorized representative from ordering plaintiff
Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines and causing her arrest
and deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon her failure
to do so."
The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the complaint,
having been denied, the case was heard on the merits and the
parties submitted their respective evidence.
The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by the
Solicitor General are these:
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied
for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a
non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in
connection with her application for a temporary
visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated
that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon,
Hongkong, and that she desired to take a
pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great
(grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one
month (Exhibits "l," "1-a," and "2"). She was
permitted to come into the Philippines on March
13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period
of one month which would expire on April 13,
1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng
filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to
undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen
Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines
on or before the expiration of her authorized
period of stay in this country or within the period
as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration or his authorized representative
might properly allow. After repeated extensions,
petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in
the Philippines up to February 13, 1962 (Exhibit
"4"). On January 25, 1962, she contracted
marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen.
Because of the contemplated action of
respondent to confiscate her bond and order her
arrest and immediate deportation, after the
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this
action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At
the hearing which took place one and a half years
after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner
Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or
Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not
speak either English or Tagalog. She could not
name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name
except one, Rosa. She did not know the names
of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered
opinion, and so holds, that the instant petition for injunction cannot
be sustained for the same reason as set forth in the Order of this
Court, dated March 19, 1962, the pertinent portions of which read:
First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:
Effect of the naturalization on wife and children.
— Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal and
hence it should be held to mean what it plainly and explicitly
expresses in unmistakable terms. The clause "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" incontestably implies that an alien woman may
be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a
Filipino citizen only if she possesses all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications specified in the law, because these are the
explicit requisites provided by law for an alien to be naturalized.
(Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang, etc.,
G. R. No. L-11855). However, from the allegation of paragraph 3 of
the complaint, to wit:
 3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by
birth, who might herself be lawfully naturalized as
a Filipino citizen (not being disqualified to
become such by naturalization), is a Filipino
citizen by virtue of her marriage on January 25,
1962 to plaintiff MOY YA LIM YAO alias
EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM, under the
Naturalization Laws of the Philippines.
it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung
while claiming not to be disqualified, does not and cannot allege
that she possesses all the qualifications to be naturalized, naturally
because, having been admitted as a temporary visitor only on
March 13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks at least, the
requisite length of residence in the Philippines (Revised
Naturalization Law, Sec. 2, Case No. 2, Sec. 3, Case No. 3).
Were if the intention of the law that the alien
woman, to be deemed a citizen of the Philippines
by virtue of marriage to a Filipino citizen, need
only be not disqualified under the Naturalization
Law, it would have been worded "and who herself
is not disqualified to become a citizen of the
Philippines."
Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor,
whose authorized stay in the Philippines, after repeated extensions
thereof, was to expire last February 28, 1962, having married her
co-plaintiff only on January 25, 1962, or just a little over one month
before the expiry date of her stay, it is evident that said marriage
was effected merely for convenience to defeat or avoid her then
impending compulsory departure, not to say deportation. This
cannot be permitted.
Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:
5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been
admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the
strength of a deliberate and voluntary
representation that she will enter and stay only
for a period of one month and thereby secured a
visa, cannot go back on her representation to
stay permanently without first departing from the
Philippines as she had promised. (Chung Tiao
Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.
R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun
vs. Board of Commissioners, G. R. No. L-6017,
September 16, 1954; Sec. 9, last par., Phil.
Immigration Law).
The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well
buttressed not only by the decided cases of the Supreme Court on
the point mentioned above, but also on the very provisions of
Section 9, sub-paragraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940 which reads:
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant
cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To
obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant
alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign
country and procure from the appropriate
Philippine Consul the proper visa and thereafter
undergo examination by the Officers of the
Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry
for determination of his admissibility in
accordance with the requirements of this Act.
(This paragraph is added by Republic Act 503).
(Sec. 9, subparagraph (g) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940).
And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged
with the administration of all laws relating to immigration (Sec. 3,
Com. Act No. 613) and in the performance of his duties in relation
to alien immigrants, the law gives the Commissioner of Immigration
a wide discretion, a quasi-judicial function in determining cases
presented to him (Pedro Uy So vs. Commissioner of Immigration
CA-G. R. No. 23336-R, Dec. 15, 1960), so that his decision thereon
may not be disturbed unless he acted with abuse of discretion or in
excess of his jurisdiction.
It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung, while
she barely and insufficiently talk in broken Tagalog and English,
she admitted that she cannot write either language.
The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which could have some
bearing in the resolution of this appeal is the allegation in the brief of petitioners-
appellants, not denied in the governments brief, that "in the hearing ..., it was shown
thru the testimony of the plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung that she does not possess any of
the disqualifications for naturalization." Of course, as an additional somehow relevant
factual matter, it is also emphasized by said appellants that during the hearing in the
lower court, held almost ten months after the alleged marriage of petitioners, "Lau
Yuen Yeung was already carrying in her womb for seven months a child by her
husband."
Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, thus:
I
 THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE
"WHO MIGHT HERSELF BE LAWFULLY NATURALIZED" (OF
SECTION 15, REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW)
INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN ALIEN WOMAN MAY BE
DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF HER
MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE POSSESSES
ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE
DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN
FOREIGNER WHO DOES NOT POSSESS ANY OF THE
DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP AND WHO MARRIED A
FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN
AFTER SUCH MARRIAGE AS TO FALL WITHIN THE
REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9, SUB-PARAGRAPH (9) OF THE
PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940.
III
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN
YEUNG'S MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR
CONVENIENCE, MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME WAS
CELEBRATED JUST OVER A MONTH BEFORE THE EXPIRY
DATE OF HER AUTHORIZED STAY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION ACTED WITH ABUSE OF
DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN
SAID OFFICER THREATENED TO SEND OUT OF THE
COUNTRY PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH WARNING
THAT HER FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD MEAN CONFISCATION
OF HER BOND, ARREST AND IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION, IN
SPITE OF THE FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW A
FILIPINO CITIZEN.
V visa and thereafter undergo examination by officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT AND IN REFUSING TO
PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE COMMISSIONER FROM
ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG TO LEAVE THE
PHILIPPINES AS A TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS NOT.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN THEIR COMPLAINT, IN AN ORDER
DATED MARCH 19, 1962. (PAGES 36-41, RECORD ON APPEAL)
.
We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the above decision
upheld the two main grounds of objection of the Solicitor General to the petition in the
court below, viz:
That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a
temporary alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary
representation that she will enter and stay only for a period of one
month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her
representation to stay permanently without first departing from the
Philippines as she had promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-9966, September 29,
1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G.R. No. L-6017,
Sept. 16, 1954, Sec. 9, last par. Phil. Immigration Law);
That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not
automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship. The alien
wife must possess all the qualifications required by law to become a
Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the disqualifications.
(Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Galang, etc., G. R.
No. L-11855, Dec. 25, 1959)
It is obvious from the nature of these objection that their proper resolution would
necessarily cover all the points raised in appellants' assignments of error, hence, We
will base our discussions, more or less, on said objections.
I
The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters dealt with in
appellants' second and fourth assignments of error does not require any lengthy
discussion. As a matter of fact, it seem evident that the Solicitor General's pose that
an alien who has been admitted into the Philippines as a non-immigrant cannot
remain here permanently unless he voluntarily leaves the country first and goes to a
foreign country to secure thereat from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper
Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the
requirements of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act
503, is premised on the assumption that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is not a Filipino
citizen. We note the same line of reasoning in the appealed decision of the court a
quo. Accordingly, it is but safe to assume that were the Solicitor General and His
Honor of the view that said petitioner had become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her
marriage to her Filipino husband, they would have held her as entitled to assume the
status of a permanent resident without having to depart as required of aliens by
Section 9 (g) of the law.
In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of Section 9 (g) of
the Immigration Act providing:
An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the
Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-
immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and
procure from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and
thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of
Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his
admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act.
does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors,
legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of
nationality naturally bestows upon their the right to stay in the Philippines permanently
or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration
authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds. True it is that this
Court has vehemently expressed disapproval of convenient ruses employed by alien
to convert their status from temporary visitors to permanent residents in circumvention
of the procedure prescribed by the legal provision already mentioned, such as in
Chiong Tiao Bing vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020, wherein, thru Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court, reiterating the ruling in Ong Se Lun vs. Board of
Immigration Commissioners, 95 PMI. 785, said:
... It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the
strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that he will
enter only for a limited time, and thereby secures the benefit of a
temporary visa, the law will not allow him subsequently to go back
on his representation and stay permanently, without first departing
from the Philippines as he had promised. No officer can relieve him
of the departure requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act,
under the guise of "change" or "correction", for the law makes no
distinctions, and no officer is above the law. Any other ruling would,
as stated in our previous decision, encourage aliens to enter the
Islands on false pretences; every alien so permitted to enter for a
limited time, might then claim a right to permanent admission,
however flimsy such claim should be, and thereby compel our
government to spend time, money and effort to examining and
verifying whether or not every such alien really has a right to take
up permanent residence here. In the meanwhile, the alien would be
able to prolong his stay and evade his return to the port whence he
came, contrary to what he promised to do when he entered. The
damages inherent in such ruling are self-evident.
On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has been
here as a temporary visitor but who has in the meanwhile become a Filipino should be
required to still leave the Philippines for a foreign country, only to apply thereat for a
re-entry here and undergo the process of showing that he is entitled to come back,
when after all, such right has become incontestible as a necessary concomitant of his
assumption of our nationality by whatever legal means this has been conferred upon
him. Consider for example, precisely the case of the minor children of an alien who is
naturalized. It is indubitable that they become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines.
Could it be the law that before they can be allowed permanent residence, they still
have to be taken abroad so that they may be processed to determine whether or not
they have a right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties and hardships
which such a requirement entails and its seeming unreasonableness argue against
such a rather absurd construction. Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs.
Galang, 101 Phil. 459, Mr. Justice Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, already
ruled thus:
... (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok
Ha became also a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this
conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her
marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence the
decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c)
of Commonwealth Act 613 provides that "in the event of the
naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on whose behalf
the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum
deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal
representative." (At. pp. 462-463)
In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of
an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon
him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being entitled to
permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner
of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its very nature and express
provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens
of the Philippines. In the sense thus discussed therefore, appellants' second and
fourth assignments of error are well taken.
II
Precisely, the second objection, of the Solicitor General sustained by the trial judge is
that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung's marriage to appellant Moya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo whose Filipino citizenship is not denied did not have the effect of making
her a Filipino, since it has not been shown that she "might herself be lawfully
naturalized," it appearing clearly in the record that she does not possess all the
qualifications required of applicants for naturalization by the Revised Naturalization
Law, Commonwealth Act 473, even if she has proven that she does not suffer from
any of the disqualifications thereunder. In other words, the Solicitor General implicitly
concedes that had it been established in the proceedings below that appellant Lau
Yuen Yeung possesses all the qualifications required by the law of applicants for
naturalization, she would have been recognized by the respondent as a Filipino
citizen in the instant case, without requiring her to submit to the usual proceedings for
naturalization.
To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what used to be the
view of this Court since Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Emilio Galang, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-
1
11855, promulgated December 23, 1959, 106 Phil., 706,713, for it was only in Zita
Ngo Burca vs. Republic, G.R. NO. L-24252 which was promulgated on January 30,
1967 (19 SCRA 186), that over the pen of Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez, this Court
held that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to be deemed a Filipina, she has
to apply for naturalization in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Revised
Naturalization Law and prove in said naturalization proceeding not only that she has
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the law but also that
she has complied with all the formalities required thereby like any other applicant for
2
naturalization, albeit said decision is not yet part of our jurisprudence inasmuch as
the motion for its reconsideration is still pending resolution. Appellants are in effect
urging Us, however, in their first and second assignments of error, not only to
reconsider Burca but to even reexamine Lee Suan Ay which, as a matter of fact, is
the prevailing rule, having been reiterated in all subsequent decisions up to Go Im Ty.
3
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest
Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she "herself may be
lawfully naturalized." As correctly held in an opinion of the
Secretary of Justice (Op. No. 52, series of 1950),* this limitation of
section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage,
those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the
Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473,
namely:

Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth (a) Persons opposed to organized government or
4
Act 473, underwent judicial construction was in the first Ly Giok Ha case, one almost affiliated with any association or group of persons
identical to the one at bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman of Chinese nationality, was a who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
temporary visitor here whose authority to stay was to expire on March 14, 1956. She organized governments;
filed a bond to guaranty her timely departure. On March 8, 1956, eight days before
the expiration of her authority to stay, she married a Filipino by the name of Restituto
Lacasta. On March 9, 1956, her husband notified the Commissioner of Immigration of (b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity
said marriage and, contending that his wife had become a Filipina by reason of said or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
marriage, demanded for the cancellation of her bond, but instead of acceding to such assassination for the success and predominance
request, the Commissioner required her to leave, and upon her failure to do so, on of their ideas;
March 16, 1956, the Commissioner confiscated her bond; a suit was filed for the
recovery of the bond; the lower court sustained her contention that she had no (c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of
obligation to leave, because she had become Filipina by marriage, hence her bond polygamy;
should be returned. The Commissioner appealed to this Court. In the said appeal, Mr.
Justice Roberto Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, spoke for the Court, thus: (d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude;
The next and most important question for determination is whether
her marriage to a Filipino justified or, at least, excused the aforesaid (e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or
failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from the Philippines on or before incurable contagious diseases;
March 14, 1956. In maintaining the affirmative view, petitioners
alleged that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became,
also, a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were (f) Persons who, during the period of their
correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her marriage, she residence in the Philippines, have not mingled
had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence, the decision socially with the Filipinos, or who have not
appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
Commonwealth Act No. 613 provides that "in the event of the the customs, traditions, and ideals of the
naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on whose behalf Filipinos;
the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum
deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal (g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the
representative." Thus the issue boils down to whether an alien ... Philippines are at war, during the period of
female who marries a male citizen of the Philippines follows ipso such war;
facto his political status.
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other
The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, than the United States, whose laws does not
upon which petitioners rely, reads: grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized
citizens or subjects thereof.
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who
 In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the
pleadings that Ly Giok Ha does not fall under any of the classes
disqualified by law. Moreover, as the parties who claim that, despite
her failure to depart from the Philippines within the period specified
in the bond in question, there has been no breach thereof,
petitioners have the burden of proving her alleged change of
political status, from alien to citizen. Strictly speaking, petitioners
have not made out, therefore a case against the respondents-
appellants.
Considering, however, that neither in the administrative
proceedings, nor in the lower court, had the parties seemingly felt
that there was an issue on whether Ly Giok Ha may "be lawfully
naturalized," and this being a case of first impression in our courts,
we are of the opinion that, in the interest of equity and justice, the
parties herein should be given an opportunity to introduce evidence,
if they have any, on said issue. (At pp. 462-464.) .
As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no doubt was left in the
above decision as regards the following propositions: .
1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law,
the marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino makes her a Filipina, if she "herself might
be lawfully naturalized";
2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that the
limitation of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law excludes from the benefits of
naturalization by marriage, only those disqualified from being naturalized under
Section 4 of the law qouted in the decision;
3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be presented in the
action to recover her bond confiscated by the Commissioner of Immigration;
4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina; and
5. That in referring to the disqualification enumerated in the law, the Court somehow
5
left the impression that no inquiry need be made as to qualifications, specially
considering that the decision cited and footnotes several opinions of the Secretary of
Justice, the immediate superior of the Commissioner of Immigration, the most
important of which are the following:
Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now
section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473), provided that "any woman
who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines." A similar provision in the
naturalization law of the United States has been construed as not
requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good
character, etc., as in the case of naturalization by judicial
proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons who may
be naturalized. (Kelly v. Owen [Dist. Col. 1868] 7 Wall 496, 5F, 11,
12; ex parte Tryason [D. C. Wash. 1914] 215 F. 449, 27 Op. Atty.
Gen. 507). (Op. No. 168, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad
Santos.)
In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the
clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", should be
construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of
residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by
judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons
who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the
Revised Naturalization Law, it results that any woman who married
a citizen of the Philippines prior to or after June 17, 1939, and the
marriage not having been dissolved, and on the assumption that
she possesses none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4
of Commonwealth Act No. 473, follows the citizenship of her
husband. (Op. No. 176, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)
From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the only
material point of inquiry is as to the citizenship of Arce Machura. If
he shall be found to be a citizen of the Philippines, his wife, Mrs.
Lily James Machura, shall likewise be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines pursuant to the provision of Section 15, Commonwealth
Act No. 473, which reads in part as follows:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who
might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
The phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", as
contained in the above provision, means that the woman who is
married to a Filipino citizen must not belong to any of the
disqualified classes enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization
Law (Ops., Sec. of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948, No. 95, s.
1941; Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940). Under the facts stated in the
within papers, Mrs. Machura does not appear to be among the
disqualified classes mentioned in the law.
It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara was
born as an illegitimate of a Filipino mother, he should be considered
as a citizen of the Philippines in consonance with the well-settled
rule that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of his only
legally recognized parent, the mother (Op., Sec. of Jus., Nos. 58,
98 & 281, s. 1948; No. 96, s. 1949). Her husband being a Filipino,
Mrs. Machura must necessarily be deemed as a citizen of the
 Philippines by marriage (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 473.) (Op. No. 52,
s. 1950 of Justice Sec. Ricardo Nepomuceno.)
The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are, must have so
appealed to this Court that five days later, on May 22, 1957, in Ricardo Cua v. The
Board of Commissioners, 101 Phil. 521, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, reiterated the same
ruling on the basis of the following facts:
Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1, 1952, but it turned
out that her passport was forged. On December 10, 1953, a warrant was issued for
her arrest for purpose of deportation. Later, on December 20, 1953, she married
Ricardo Cua, a Filipino, and because of said marriage, the Board of Special Inquiry
considered her a Filipina. Upon a review of the case, however, the Board of
Immigration Commissioners insisted on continuing with the deportation proceedings
and so, the husband filed prohibition and mandamus proceedings. The lower court
denied the petition. Although this Court affirmed said decision, it held, on the other
hand, that:
Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the recent
case of Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra, p. 459, that the bare fact of a
valid marriage to a citizen does not suffice to confer his citizenship
upon the wife. Section 15 of the Naturalization Law requires that the
alien woman who marries a Filipino must show, in addition, that she
"might herself be lawfully naturalized" as a Filipino citizen. As
construed in the decision cited, this last condition requires proof
that the woman who married a Filipino is herself not disqualified
under section 4 of the Naturalization Law.
No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of
Filipino citizenship by Tjioe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to
petitioner, is untenable. The lower court, therefore, committed no
error in refusing to interfere with the deportation proceedings,
where she can anyway establish the requisites indispensable for
her acquisition of Filipino citizenship, as well as the alleged validity
of her Indonesian passport. (Ricardo Cua v. The Board of
Immigration Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997, May 22, 1957, 101
Phil. 521, 523.) [Emphasis supplied] .
For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this Court expressly gave
the parties concerned opportunity to prove the fact that they were not suffering from
any of the disqualifications of the law without the need of undergoing any judicial
naturalization proceeding. It may be stated, therefore, that according to the above
decisions, the law in this country, on the matter of the effect of marriage of an alien
woman to a Filipino is that she thereby becomes a Filipina, if it can be proven that at
the time of such marriage, she does not possess any of the disqualifications
enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law, without the need of submitting to
any naturalization proceedings under said law.
It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no reference to
qualifications, that is, as to whether or not they need also to be proved, but, in any
event, it is a fact that the Secretary of Justice understood them to mean that such
qualifications need not be possessed nor proven. Then Secretary of Justice Jesus
6
Barrera, who later became a distinguished member of this Court, so ruled in
opinions rendered by him subsequent to Ly Giok Ha, the most illustrative of which
held: .
At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman married to a
Filipino citizen needs only to show that she "might herself be
lawfully naturalized" in order to acquire Philippine citizenship.
Compliance with other conditions of the statute, such as those
relating to the qualifications of an applicant for naturalization
through judicial proceedings, is not necessary. (See: Leonard v.
Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27 Ops. Atty. Gen [U.S.] 507; Ops. Sec. of
Justice, No. 776, s. 1940, and No. 111, s. 1953.
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v. Galang et
al., G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957, where the
Supreme Court, construing the abovequoted section of the
Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male Filipino does not
vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife," unless she "herself
may be lawfully naturalized," and that "this limitation of Section 15
excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those
disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines
under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other
words, disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in Section
4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of the foreign
wife of a Philippine citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship.
xxx xxx xxx
Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups The
Commissioner of Immigration does not say so but merely
predicates his negative action on the ground that a warrant of
deportation for "overstaying" is pending against the petitioner.
We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds for
disqualification for naturalization are expressly enumerated in the
law, a warrant of deportation not based on a finding of unfitness to
become naturalized for any of those specified causes may not be
invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine citizenship by a foreign
wife of a Philippine citizen under Section 15 of the Naturalization
Law. (Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius) (Op. No. 12, s. 1958 of
Justice Undersec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman
married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is
as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation
of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things,
that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not
 disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to
section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the
filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by
the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the
effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups
disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino
citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of
Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates
its order or decision granting or denying the petition. (Op. No. 38, s.
19058 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v. Galang et
al. (G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957), where the
Supreme Court, construing the above-quoted section in the
Revised Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male Filipino
does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she
herself may be lawfully naturalized," and that "this limitation of
Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by
marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of
the Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No.
473." In other words, disqualification for any of the causes
enumerated in section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats
the right of an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen to acquire
Philippine citizenship. (Op. 57, s. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G.
Barrera.)
The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly Giok
Ha case is not a new one. In that case, the Supreme Court held
that under paragraph I of Section 15 Of Commonwealth Act No.
473, 'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship
to his foreign wife unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized"',
and, quoting several earlier opinions of the Secretary of Justice,
namely: No. 52, s. 1950; No. 168, s. 1940; No. 95, s. 1941; No. 63,
s. 1948; No. 28. s. 1950, "this limitation of section 15 excludes from
the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from
being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of
said Commonwealth Act No. 473." (Op. 134, s. 1962 of Justice
Undersec. Magno S. Gatmaitan.)
It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the above construction
of the law was importantly modified by this Court in Lee Suan Ay, supra, in which the
facts were as follows:
Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay's authorized period of
temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955), on 26 March
1955 the Commissioner of Immigration asked the bondsman to
present her to the Bureau of Immigration within 24 hours from
receipt of notice, otherwise the bond will be confiscated(Annex 1).
For failure of the bondsman to comply with the foregoing order, on
1 April 1955. the Commissioner of Immigration ordered the cash
bond confiscated (Annex E). Therefore, there was an order issued
by the Commissioner of Immigration confiscating or forfeiting the
cash bond. Unlike in forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal proceedings,
where the Court must enter an order forfeiting the bail bond and the
bondsman must be given an opportunity to present his principal or
give a satisfactory reason for his inability to do so, before final
judgment may be entered against the bondsman,(section 15, Rule
110; U.S. v. Bonoan, 22 Phil. 1.) in forfeiture of bonds posted for
the temporary stay of an alien in the Philippines, no court
proceeding is necessary. Once a breach of the terms and
conditions of the undertaking in the bond is committed, the
Commissioner of Immigration may, under the terms and conditions
thereof, declare it forfeited in favor of the Government. (In the
meanwhile, on April 1, 1955, Lee Suan Ay and Alberto Tan, a
Filipino, were joined in marriage by the Justice of the Peace of Las
Piñas, Rizal.)
Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which included Justices
Concepcion and Reyes who had penned Ly Giok Ha, and Ricardo Cua, ruled thus:
The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a Filipino
citizen does not relieve the bondsman from his liability on the bond.
The marriage took place on 1 April 1955, and the violation of the
terms and conditions of the undertaking in the bond — failure to
depart from the Philippines upon expiration of her authorized period
of temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955) and failure to
report to the Commissioner of Immigration within 24 hours from
receipt of notice — were committed before the marriage. Moreover,
the marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically
confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must possess the
qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by
naturalization.* There is no showing that the appellant Lee Suan Ay
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided for by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.
Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the one relied upon
in the appealed decision now before Us, is the fact that the footnote of the statement
therein that the alien wife "must possess the qualifications required by law to become
a Filipino citizen by naturalization" makes reference to Section 15, Commonwealth
Act 473 and precisely, also to Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra. As will be recalled, on the
other hand, in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice explicitly adopted by the Court
in Ly Giok Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176, Series of 1940, above-quoted, it was
clearly held that "(I)n a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the
clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", should be construed as not
requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as
in cases of naturalization by judicial proceedings but merely that she is of the race by
persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)
Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously significant modification of
the construction of the law, it could be said that there was need for clarification of the
seemingly new posture of the Court. The occasion for such clarification should have
been in Kua Suy, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790,
October 31, 1963, penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who had rendered the opinion
in Ricardo Cua, supra, which followed that in Ly Giok Ha, supra, but apparently
seeing no immediate relevancy in the case on hand then of the particular point in
issue now, since it was not squarely raised therein similarly as in Lee Suan Ay,
hence, anything said on the said matter would at best be no more than obiter dictum,
Justice Reyes limited himself to holding that "Under Section 15 of the Naturalization
Act, the wife is deemed a citizen of the Philippines only if she "might herself be
lawfully naturalized," so that the fact of marriage to a citizen, by itself alone, does not
suffice to confer citizenship, as this Court has previously ruled in Ly Giok Ha v.
Galang, 54 O.G. 356, and in Cua v. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G.
8567; and there is here no evidence of record as to the qualifications or absence of
disqualifications of appellee Kua Suy", without explaining the apparent departure
already pointed out from Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua. Even Justice Makalintal, who
wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion merely lumped together Ly Giok
Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee Suan Ay and opined that both qualifications and non-
disqualifications have to be shown without elucidating on what seemed to be
departure from the said first two decisions.
It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto Regala fell the task of
rationalizing the Court's position. In Lo San Tuang v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18775,
November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638, the facts were simply these: Lo San Tuang, a
Chinese woman, arrived in the Philippines on July 1, 1960 as a temporary visitor with
authority to stay up to June 30, 1961. She married a Filipino on January 7, 1961,
almost six months before the expiry date of her permit, and when she was requested
to leave after her authority to stay had expired, she refused to do so, claiming she had
become a Filipina by marriage, and to bolster her position, she submitted an affidavit
stating explicitly that she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in
the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473. When the case reached the court,
the trial judge held for the government that in addition to not having any of the
disqualifications referred to, there was need that Lo San Tuang should have also
possessed all the qualifications of residence, moral character, knowledge of a native
principal dialect, etc., provided by the law. Recognizing that the issue squarely to be
passed upon was whether or not the possession of all the qualifications were indeed
needed to be shown apart from non-disqualification, Justice Regala held affirmatively
for the Court, reasoning out thus: .
It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim for
citizenship on the basis of the decision laid down in the case of
Leonard v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11, where the Circuit Court of
Oregon held that it was only necessary that the woman "should be
a person of the class or race permitted to be naturalized by existing
laws, and that in respect of the qualifications arising out of her
conduct or opinions, being the wife of a citizen, she is to be
regarded as qualified for citizenship, and therefore considered a
citizen." (In explanation of its conclusion, the Court said: "If,
whenever during the life of the woman or afterwards, the question
of her citizenship arises in a legal proceeding, the party asserting
her citizenship by reason of her marriage with a citizen must not
only prove such marriage, but also that the woman then possessed
all the further qualifications necessary to her becoming naturalized
under existing laws, the statute will be practically nugatory, if not a
delusion and a share. The proof of the facts may have existed at
the time of the marriage, but years after, when a controversy arises
upon the subject, it may be lost or difficult to find.")
In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she was
a free white woman or a woman of African descent or nativity, in
order to be deemed an American citizen, because, with respect to
the rest of the qualifications on residence, moral character, etc., she
was presumed to be qualified.
Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law (Act
No. 2927, as amended by Act No. 3448) specified the classes of
persons who alone might become citizens of the Philippines, even
as it provided who were disqualified. Thus, the pertinent provisions
of that law provided:
Section 1. Who may become Philippine citizens
— Philippine citizenship may be acquired by (a)
natives of the Philippines who are not citizens
thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the
Insular possessions of the United States; (c)
citizens of the United States, or foreigners who
under the laws of the United States may become
citizens of said country if residing therein.
Section 2. Who are disqualified. — The following
cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens: (a)
Persons opposed to organized government or
affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized government; (b) persons defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault or assassination for the success
and predominance of their ideas; (c) polygamists
or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d)
persons convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude; (e) persons suffering from mental
alienation or incurable contagious diseases; (f)
citizens or subjects of nations with whom the
United States and the Philippines are at war,
during the period of such war.
Section 3. Qualifications. — The persons
comprised in subsection (a) of section one of this
Act, in order to be able to acquire Philippine
citizenship, must be not less than twenty-one
years of age on the day of the hearing of their
petition.
 The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c)
of said section one shall, in addition to being not
less than twenty-one years of age on the day of
the hearing of the petition, have all and each of
the following qualifications:
First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a
continuous period of not less than five years,
except as provided in the next following section;
Second. To have conducted themselves in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of their residence in the Philippine
Islands, in their relation with the constituted
government as well as with the community in
which they are living;
Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate
worth not less than one thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or have some known trade or
profession; and
Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or
some native tongue.
In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he
shall, besides, declare in writing and under oath
his intention of renouncing absolutely and
perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign
authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a
native, citizen or subject.
Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant supra, to our
law as it then stood, alien women married to citizens of the
Philippines must, in order to be deemed citizens of the Philippines,
be either (1) natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof
under the Jones Law, or (2) natives of other Insular possessions of
the United States, or (3) citizens of the United States or foreigners
who under the laws of the United States might become citizens of
that country if residing therein. With respect to the qualifications set
forth in Section 3 of the former law, they were deemed to have the
same for all intents and purposes.
But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law
(Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939, Congress has
since discarded class or racial consideration from the qualifications
of applicants for naturalization (according to its proponent, the
purpose in eliminating this consideration was, first, to remove the
features of the existing naturalization act which discriminated in
favor of the Caucasians and against Asiatics who are our
neighbors, and are related to us by racial affinity and, second, to
foster amity with all nations [Sinco, Phil. Political Law 502 — 11
ed.]), even as it retained in Section 15 the phrase in question. The
result is that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized"
must be understood in the context in which it is now found, in a
setting so different from that in which it was found by the Court in
Leonard v. Grant.
The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial
consideration is that, as the Solicitor General points out, the phrase
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be understood
as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to
become citizens of the Philippines.
There is simply no support for the view that the phrase "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as
requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class
of disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid
down in Leonard v. Grant. A person who is not disqualified is not
necessarily qualified to become a citizen of the Philippines,
because the law treats "qualifications" and "disqualifications" in
separate sections. And then it must not be lost sight of that even
under the interpretation given to the former law, it was to be
understood that the alien woman was not disqualified under Section
2 of that law. Leonard v. Grant did not rule that it was enough if the
alien woman does not belong to the class of disqualified persons in
order that she may be deemed to follow the citizenship of her
husband: What that case held was that the phrase "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized, merely means that she belongs to
the class or race of persons qualified to become citizens by
naturalization — the assumption being always that she is not
otherwise disqualified.
We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law, an alien woman, who is married to a citizen of
the Philippines, acquires the citizenship of her husband only if she
has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided
by law. Since there is no proof in this case that petitioner has all the
qualifications and is not in any way disqualified, her marriage to a
Filipino citizen does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen.
Her affidavit to the effect that she is not in any way disqualified to
become a citizen of this country was correctly disregarded by the
trial court, the same being self-serving.
Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration,
G.R. No. L-20784, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 875, wherein the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs reversed a previous resolution of the preceding administration to allow
Sun Peck Yong and her minor son to await the taking of the oath of Filipino
citizenship of her husband two years after the decision granting him nationalization
and required her to leave and this order was contested in court, Justice Barrera held:
In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of Immigration (G.R.
No. L-18775, promulgated November 30, 1963; Kua Suy vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790, promulgated October 31,
1963), we held that the fact that the husband became a naturalized
citizen does not automatically make the wife a citizen of the
Philippines. It must also be shown that she herself possesses all
the qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, to become a
citizen. In this case, there is no allegation, much less showing, that
petitioner-wife is qualified to become a Filipino citizen herself.
Furthermore, the fact that a decision was favorably made on the
naturalization petition of her husband is no assurance that he (the
husband) would become a citizen, as to make a basis for the
extension of her temporary stay.
On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, December 27, 1963, 9
SCRA 876, Justice Barrera reiterated the same ruling and citing particularly Lo San
Tuang and Kua Suy, held that the marriage of Tong Siok Sy to a Filipino on
November 12, 1960 at Taichung, Taiwan and her taking oath of Filipino citizenship
before the Philippine Vice-Consul at Taipeh, Taiwan on January 6, 1961 did not make
her a Filipino citizen, since she came here only in 1961 and obviously, she had not
had the necessary ten-year residence in the Philippines required by the law.
Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter under discussion
when Justice Makalintal sought a reexamination thereof in Choy King Tee v. Galang,
G.R. No. L-18351, March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy King Tee's husband was
granted Philippine citizenship on January 13, 1959 and took the oath on January 31
of the same year. Choy King Tee first came to the Philippines in 1955 and kept
commuting between Manila and Hongkong since then, her last visa before the case
being due to expire on February 14, 1961. On January 27, 1961, her husband asked
the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her alien certificate of registration, as well
as their child's, for the reason that they were Filipinos, and when the request was
denied as to the wife, a mandamus was sought, which the trial court granted.
Discussing anew the issue of the need for qualifications, Justice Makalintal not only
reiterated the arguments of Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang but added further that the
ruling is believed to be in line with the national policy of selective admission to
7
Philippine citizenship.
No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716, June 22,
1965, 14 SCRA 336, Justice J.P. Bengzon readily reversed the decision of the lower
court granting the writs of mandamus and prohibition against the Commissioner of
Immigration, considering that Austria's wife, while admitting she did not possess all
the qualifications for naturalization, had submitted only an affidavit that she had none
of the disqualifications therefor. So also did Justice Dizon similarly hold eight days
later in Brito v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 539.
8
Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case wherein Justice J. B. L. Reyes took
occasion to expand on the reasoning of Choy King Tee by illustrating with examples
"the danger of relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without taking
9
into account the other affirmative requirements of the law."
10
Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July 30, 1966,
Justice Zaldivar held for the Court that an alien woman who is widowed during the
dependency of the naturalization proceedings of her husband, in order that she may
be allowed to take the oath as Filipino, must, aside from proving compliance with the
requirements of Republic Act 530, show that she possesses all the qualifications and
does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under the Naturalization Law, citing in
11
the process the decision to such effect discussed above, even as he impliedly
reversed pro tanto the ruling in Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13786, May 31, 1961,
2 SCRA 383.
Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the assumption that
the point now under discussion is settled law.
In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on the same issue.
Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, providing that:
SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any
woman, who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been
born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time
of the naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a
Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born child, who is not in the
Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a
Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to
reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which
case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming
of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his
parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen unless within one
year after reaching the age of majority he fails to register himself as
a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country where
he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.
is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is married
to a man who subsequently becomes a Filipino, may become a Filipino citizen herself,
that, aside from not suffering from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the law,
she must also possess all the qualifications required by said law? if nothing but the
unbroken line from Lee Suan Ay to Go Im Ty, as recounted above, were to be
considered, it is obvious that an affirmative answer to the question would be
inevitable, specially, if it is noted that the present case was actually submitted for
decision on January 21, 1964 yet, shortly after Lo San Tuang, Tong Siok Sy and Sun
Peck Yong, all supra, and even before Choy King Tee, supra, were decided. There
are other circumstances, however, which make it desirable, if not necessary, that the
Court take up the matter anew. There has been a substantial change in the
membership of the Court since Go Im Ty, and of those who were in the Court already
when Burca was decided, two members, Justice Makalintal and Castro concurred
only in the result, precisely, according to them, because (they wanted to leave the
12
point now under discussion open in so far as they are concerned. Truth to tell, the
views and arguments discussed at length with copious relevant authorities, in the
13
motion for reconsideration as well as in the memorandum of the amici curae in the
Burca case cannot just be taken lightly and summarily ignored, since they project in
the most forceful manner, not only the legal and logical angles of the issue, but also
the imperative practical aspects thereof in the light of the actual situation of the
thousands of alien wives of Filipinos who have so long, even decades, considered
themselves as Filipinas and have always lived and acted as such, officially or
otherwise, relying on the long standing continuous recognition of their status as such
by the administrative authorities in charge of the matter, as well as by the courts.
Under these circumstances, and if only to afford the Court an opportunity to consider
the views of the five justices who took no part in Go Im Ty (including the writer of this
opinion), the Court decided to further reexamine the matter. After all, the ruling first
laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee stand the second
(1966) Ly Giok Ha, did not categorically repudiate the opinions of the Secretary of
Justice relied upon by the first (1959) Ly Giok Ha. Besides, some points brought to
light during the deliberations in this case would seem to indicate that the premises of
the later cases can still bear further consideration.
Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal provision We are
construing, Section 15, aforequoted, of the Naturalization Law has been taken
directly, copied and adopted from its American counterpart. To be more accurate,
said provision is nothing less than a reenactment of the American provision. A brief
review of its history proves this beyond per adventure of doubt.
The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the Philippine Legislature
under American sovereignty was that of March 26, 1920, Act No. 2927. Before then,
as a consequence of the Treaty of Paris, our citizenship laws were found only in the
Organic Laws, the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Act of the United States Congress of
March 23, 1912 and later the Jones Law of 1916. In fact, Act No. 2927 was enacted
pursuant to express authority granted by the Jones Law. For obvious reasons, the
Philippines gained autonomy on the subjects of citizenship and immigration only after
the effectivity of the Philippine Independence Act. This made it practically impossible
for our laws on said subject to have any perspective or orientation of our own;
everything was American.
The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently: .
SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing
to reside herein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as
such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of
Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of Congress of
March 23, 1912, by adding a provision as follows:
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the
laws of the United States, if residing therein.
The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially: .
SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred
and ninety-nine, and then resided in said islands, and their children
born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens
of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with
the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and
Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens
of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions,
the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and
such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are
citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if
residing therein.
For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic laws regarding
the effect of marriage to a Filipino upon the nationality of an alien woman, albeit under
the Spanish Civil Code provisions on citizenship, Articles 17 to 27, which were,
however, abrogated upon the change of sovereignty, it was unquestionable that the
citizenship of the wife always followed that of the husband. Not even Act 2927
contained any provision regarding the effect of naturalization of an alien, upon the
citizenship of his alien wife, nor of the marriage of such alien woman with a native
born Filipino or one who had become a Filipino before the marriage, although Section
13 thereof provided thus: .
SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died.
— In case a petitioner should die before the final decision has been
rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the
 proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the
widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal
effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner.
It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448, amending Act
2977, that the following provisions were added to the above Section 13:
SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted
between sections thirteen and fourteen of Act Numbered Twenty-
nine hundred and Twenty-seven:
SEC. 13(a). Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippine
Islands and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippine Islands.
SEC. 13(b). Children of persons who have been
duly naturalized under this law, being under the
age of twenty-one years at the time of the
naturalization of their parents, shall, if dwelling in
the Philippine Islands, be considered citizens
thereof.
SEC. 13(c). Children of persons naturalized
under this law who have been born in the
Philippine Islands after the naturalization of their
parents shall be considered citizens thereof.
When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was enacted on June
17, 1939, the above Section 13 became its Section 15 which has already been
quoted earlier in this decision. As can be seen, Section 13 (a) abovequoted was re-
enacted practically word for word in the first paragraph of this Section 15 except for
the change of Philippine Islands to Philippines. And it could not have been on any
other basis than this legislative history of our naturalization law that each and
everyone of the decisions of this Court from the first Ly Giok Ha to Go Im Ty,
discussed above, were rendered.
As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the first Ly Giok Ha, it
was quite clear that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to become herself a
Filipino citizen, there is no need for any naturalization proceeding because she
becomes a Filipina ipso facto from the time of such marriage, provided she does not
suffer any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473,
with no mention being made of whether or not the qualifications enumerated in
Section 2 thereof need be shown. It was only in Lee Suan Ay in 1959 that the
possession of qualifications were specifically required, but it was not until 1963, in Lo
San Tuang, that Justice Regala reasoned out why the possession of the qualifications
provided by the law should also be shown to be possessed by the alien wife of a
Filipino, for her to become a Filipina by marriage.
As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice Regala was briefly as
follows: That "like the law in the United States, our Naturalization Law specified the
classes of persons who alone might become citizens, even as it provided who were
disqualified," and inasmuch as Commonwealth Act 473, our Naturalization Law since
1939 did not reenact the section providing who might become citizens, allegedly in
order to remove racial discrimination in favor of Caucasians and against Asiatics, "the
only logical deduction ... is that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized"
must now be understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are
qualified to become citizens of the Philippines" and "there is simply no support for the
view that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be
understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of
14
disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law."
A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which for ready reference
may be qouted:
The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this Court in
a number of cases. The alien wife of a Filipino citizen must first
prove that she has all the qualifications required by Section 2 and
none of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the
Naturalization Law before she may be deemed a Philippine citizen
(Lao Chay v. Galang, L-190977, Oct. 30, 1964, citing Lo San Tuang
v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v.
Commissioner of Immigration, L-20784, December 27, 1963; Tong
Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, December 27, 1963). The writer of this
opinion has submitted the question anew to the court for a possible
reexamination of the said ruling in the light of the interpretation of a
similar law in the United States after which Section 15 of our
Naturalization Law was patterned. That law was section 2 of the Act
of February 10, 1855 (Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the
U.S.). The local law, Act No. 3448, was passed on November 30,
1928 as an amendment to the former Philippine Naturalization Law,
Act No. 2927, which was approved on March 26, 1920. Under this
Naturalization Law, acquisition of Philippine citizenship was limited
to three classes of persons, (a) Natives of the Philippines who were
not citizens thereof; (b) natives of the other insular possessions of
the United States; and (c) citizens of the United States, or
foreigners who, under the laws of the United States, may become
citizens of the latter country if residing therein. The reference in
subdivision (c) to foreigners who may become American Citizens is
restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races
were qualified thereunder. In other words, in so far as racial
restrictions were concerned there was at the time a similarity
between the naturalization laws of the two countries and hence
there was reason to accord here persuasive force to the
interpretation given in the United States to the statutory provision
concerning the citizenship of alien women marrying American
citizens.
This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to exist
since the enactment of the Revised Naturalization Law,
 (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939. The racial
restrictions have been eliminated in this Act, but the provision found
in Act No. 3448 has been maintained. It is logical to presume that
when Congress chose to retain the said provision — that to be
deemed a Philippine citizen upon marriage the alien wife must be
one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized," the reference is no
longer to the class or race to which the woman belongs, for class or
race has become immaterial, but to the qualifications and
disqualifications for naturalization as enumerated in Sections 2 and
4 of the statute. Otherwise the requirement that the woman "might
herself be lawfully naturalized" would be meaningless surplusage,
contrary to settled norms of statutory construction.
The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases
heretofore decided is believed to be in line with the national policy
of selective admission to Philippine citizenship, which after all is a
privilege granted only to those who are found worthy thereof, and
not indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis alone of marriage
to a man who is a citizen of the Philippines, irrespective of moral
character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals,
customs and traditions.
Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the
qualifications for naturalization, even, indeed, that she has none of
the disqualifications, she is not entitled to recognition as a
Philippine citizen.
In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the arguments in favor of the
same conclusion thus:
On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish that: (1)
she has been residing in the Philippines for a continuous period of
at least (10) years (p. 27, t.s.n., id.); (2) she has a lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation (p. 13, t.s.n., id.); and (3) she can
speak and write English, or any of the principal Philippine
languages (pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.).
While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that the
words emphasized indicate that the present Naturalization Law
requires that an alien woman who marries a Filipino husband must
possess the qualifications prescribed by section 2 in addition to not
being disqualified under any of the eight ("a" to "h") subheadings of
section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, in order to claim our
citizenship by marriage, both the appellee and the court below (in
its second decision) sustain the view that all that the law demands
is that the woman be not disqualified under section 4.
At the time the present case was remanded to the court of origin
(1960) the question at issue could be regarded as not conclusively
settled, there being only the concise pronouncement in Lee Suan
Ay, et al. v. Galang, G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 23, 1959, to the effect
that:
The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does
not automatically confer Philippine citizenship
upon the latter. She must possess the
qualifications required by law to become a
Filipino citizen by naturalization.
Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court has
firmly established the rule that the requirement of section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473 (the Naturalization Act), that an alien
woman married to a citizen should be one who "might herself be
lawfully naturalized," means not only woman free from the
disqualifications enumerated in section 4 of the Act but also one
who possesses the qualifications prescribed by section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473 (San Tuan v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30,
1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Com. of Immigration, L-20784, Dee. 27,
1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, Dec. 27, 1963; Austria v.
Conchu, L-20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-
18351, March 26, 1965; Brito v. Com. of Immigration, L-16829,
June 30, 1965).
Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications
prescribed under section 2 of the Naturalization Act, and the
disqualifications enumerated in its section 4 are not mutually
exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife of a
Filipino be not disqualified under section 4, the result might well be
that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in violation of the
policy of the statute. For example, section 4 disqualifies only —
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude,
so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses,
not previously convicted by a competent court would not be thereby
disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not intend such person
to be admitted as a citizen in view of the requirement of section 2
that an applicant for citizenship "must be of good moral character."
Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial
supremacy, in government by certain selected classes, in the right
to vote exclusively by certain "herrenvolk", and thus disbelieve in
the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; yet she would
not be disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not "opposed
to organized government," nor affiliated to groups "upholding or
teaching doctrines opposing all organized governments", nor
"defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
 personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance
of their ideas." Et sic de caeteris.
The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger of
relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without
taking into account the other affirmative requirements of the law,
which, in the case at bar, the appellee Ly Giok Ha admittedly does
not possess.
As to the argument that the phrase "might herself be lawfully
naturalized" was derived from the U.S. Revised Statutes (section
1994) and should be given the same territorial and racial
significance given to it by American courts, this Court has rejected
the same in Lon San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, November 30,
1963; and in Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965.
It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing rationalizations, but a
closer study thereof cannot bat reveal certain relevant considerations which adversely
affect the premises on which they are predicated, thus rendering the conclusions
arrived thereby not entirely unassailable.
1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1 of Act 2927
providing who are eligible for Philippine citizenship, the purpose of Commonwealth
Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, was to remove the racial requirements for
naturalization, thereby opening the door of Filipino nationality to Asiatics instead of
allowing the admission thereto of Caucasians only, suffers from lack of exact
accuracy. It is important to note, to start with, that Commonwealth Act 473 did away
with the whole Section 1 of Act 2927 which reads, thus:
SECTION 1. Who may become Philippine citizens. — Philippine
citizenship may be acquired by: (a) natives of the Philippines who
are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the
other Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the
United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United
States may become citizens of said country if residing therein.
and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole provision was there any
mention of race or color of the persons who were then eligible for Philippine
citizenship. What is more evident from said provision is that it reflected the inevitable
subordination of our legislation during the pre-Commonwealth American regime to the
understandable stations flowing from our staffs as a territory of the United States by
virtue of the Treaty of Paris. In fact, Section 1 of Act 2927 was precisely approved
pursuant to express authority without which it could not have been done, granted by
an amendment to Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by the Act of the
United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and which was reenacted as part of the
Jones Law of 1916, the pertinent provisions of which have already been footed
earlier. In truth, therefore, it was because of the establishment of the Philippine
Commonwealth and in the exercise of our legislative autonomy on citizenship matters
15
under the Philippine Independence Act that Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated,
and not purposely to eliminate any racial discrimination contained in our
Naturalization Law. The Philippine Legislature naturally wished to free our
Naturalization Law from the impositions of American legislation. In other words, the
fact that such discrimination was removed was one of the effects rather than the
intended purpose of the amendment.
2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that "the reference in
subdivision (c) (of Section 1 of Act 2927) to foreigners who may become American
citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were
qualified thereunder" fails to consider the exact import of the said subdivision.
Explicitly, the thrust of the said subdivision was to confine the grant under it of
Philippine citizenship only to the three classes of persons therein mentioned, the third
of which were citizens of the United States and, corollarily, persons who could be
American citizens under her laws. The words used in the provision do not convey any
idea of favoring aliens of any particular race or color and of excluding others, but
more accurately, they refer to all the disqualifications of foreigners for American
citizenship under the laws of the United States. The fact is that even as of 1906, or
long before 1920, when our Act 2927 became a law, the naturalization, laws of the
United States already provided for the following disqualifications in the Act of the
Congress of June 29, 1906:
SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to
organized government, or who is a member of or affiliated with any
organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or
opposition to organized government, or who advocates or teaches
the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing
of any officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of officers
generally, of the Government of the United States, or of any other
organized government, because of his or their official character, or
who is a polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the
United States.
and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for Philippine citizenship
under Section 1 of Act 2927 even if they happened to be Caucasians. More
importantly, as a matter of fact, said American law, which was the first "Act to
Establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and to provide for a Uniform
Rule for Naturalization of Aliens throughout the United States" contained no racial
disqualification requirement, except as to Chinese, the Act of May 6, 1882 not being
among the expressly repealed by this law, hence it is clear that when Act 2927 was
enacted, subdivision (e) of its Section 1 could not have had any connotation of racial
exclusion necessarily, even if it were traced back to its origin in the Act of the United
16
States Congress of 1912 already mentioned above. Thus, it would seem that the
rationalization in the qouted decisions predicated on the theory that the elimination of
Section 1 of Act 2927 by Commonwealth Act 473 was purposely for no other end than
the abolition of racial discrimination in our naturalization law has no clear factual
17
basis.
3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent reason why the
construction adopted in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice referred to in the first
Ly Giok Ha decision of the Chief Justice should not prevail. It is beyond dispute that
the first paragraph of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 is a reenactment of
Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, and that the latter is nothing but
an exact copy, deliberately made, of Section 1994 of the Raised Statutes of the
18
United States as it stood before its repeal in 1922. Before such repeal, the phrase
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized" found in said Section 15 had a definite
unmistakable construction uniformly foIlowed in all courts of the United States that
had occasion to apply the same and which, therefore, must be considered, as if it
were written in the statute itself. It is almost trite to say that when our legislators
enacted said section, they knew of its unvarying construction in the United States and
that, therefore, in adopting verbatim the American statute, they have in effect
incorporated into the provision, as thus enacted, the construction given to it by the
American courts as well as the Attorney General of the United States and all
administrative authorities, charged with the implementation of the naturalization and
immigration laws of that country. (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil., 635 [1946];
Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32 [1952]; Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 79
L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct. 756 [19353; Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S
Ct. 45 [1938]; Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed. 536,
59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p. 32, Memo of Amicus Curiae]).
A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the American courts and
administrative authorities is contained in United States of America ex rel. Dora
Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod, Commissioner of Immigration, Appt., 295 Fed. 523,
decided November 14, 1922, 26 A. L. R. 1316 as follows:
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 3948, 2 Fed.
Sta. Anno. 2d ed. p. 117) provides as follows: "Any woman who is
now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States,
and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a
citizen."
Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the Act of
Congress of February 10, 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, chap. 71), which
in its second section provided "that any woman, who might lawfully
be naturalized under the existing laws, married, or who shall be
married to a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and
taken to be a citizen."
And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the
earlier British Statute 7 & 8 Vict. chap. 66, s 16, 1844, which
provided that "any woman married, or who shall be married, to a
natural-born subject or person naturalized, shall be deemed and
taken to be herself naturalized, and have all the rights and
privileges of a natural born subject."
The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021,
chap. 411, Comp. Stat. 4358b, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1922, p.
255), being "An Act Relative to the Naturalization and Citizenship of
Married Women," in 2, provides "that any woman who marries a
citizen of the United States after the passage of this Act, ... shall not
become a citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage
..."
Section 6 of the act also provides "that 1994 of the Revised
Statutes ... are repealed."
Section 6 also provides that `such repeal shall not terminate
citizenship acquired or retained under either of such sections, ..."
meaning 2 and 6. So that this Act of September 22, 1922, has no
application to the facts of the present case, as the marriage of the
relator took place prior to its passage. This case, therefore,
depends upon the meaning to be attached to 1994 of the Revised
Statutes.
In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498, 19
L. ed. 283, 284, construed this provision as found in the Act of 1855
as follows: "The term, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the
existing laws," only limits the application of the law to free white
women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, only
required that the person applying for its benefits should be "a free
white person," and not an alien enemy."
This construction limited the effect of the statute to those aliens who
belonged to the class or race which might be lawfully naturalized,
and did not refer to any of the other provisions of the naturalization
laws as to residence or moral character, or to any of the provisions
of the immigration laws relating to the exclusion or deportation of
aliens.
In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District Judge Deady
also construed the Act of 1855, declaring that "any woman who is
now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States,
and might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a
citizen." He held that "upon the authorities, and the reason, if not
the necessity, of the case," the statute must be construed as in
effect declaring that an alien woman, who is of the class or race
that may be lawfully naturalized under the existing laws, and who
marries a citizen of the United States, is such a citizen also, and it
was not necessary that it should appear affirmatively that she
possessed the other qualifications at the time of her marriage to
entitle her to naturalization.
In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting in
the circuit court, in United States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. 82. An alien
woman, a subject of Prussia came to the United States and married
here a naturalized citizen. Mr. Justice Harlan, with the concurrence
of Judge Treat, held that upon her marriage she became ipso facto
a citizen of the United States as fully as if she had complied with all
of the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of naturalization.
He added: "There can be no doubt of this, in view of the decision of
the Supreme Court of the United, States in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall.
496, 19 L. ed. 283." The alien "belonged to the class of persons"
who might be lawfully naturalized.
In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, an
alien woman came to the United States from France and entered
the country contrary to the immigration laws. The immigration
authorities took her into custody at the port of New York, with the
view of deporting her. She applied for her release under a writ of
habeas corpus, and pending the disposition of the matter she
married a naturalized American citizen. The circuit court of appeals
for the ninth Circuit held, affirming the court below, that she was
entitled to be discharged from custody. The court declared: "The
rule is well settled that her marriage to a naturalized citizen of the
United States entitled her to be discharged. The status of the wife
follows that of her husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage her
husband's domicil became her domicil." .
In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in Re
Rustigian, 165. Fed. 980, had before it the application of a husband
for his final decree of naturalization. It appeared that at that time his
wife was held by the immigration authorities at New York on the
ground that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious
disease. Counsel on both sides agreed that the effect of the
husband's naturalization would be to confer citizenship upon the
wife. In view of that contingency District Judge Brown declined to
pass upon the husband's application for naturalization, and thought
it best to wait until it was determined whether the wife's disease
was curable. He placed his failure to act on the express ground that
the effect of naturalizing the husband might naturalize her. At the
same time he express his opinion that the husband's naturalization
would not effect her naturalization, as she was not one who could
become lawfully naturalized. "Her own capacity (to become
naturalized)," the court stated "is a prerequisite to her attaining
citizenship. If herself lacking in that capacity, the married status
cannot confer it upon her." Nothing, however, was actually decided
in that case, and the views expressed therein are really nothing
more than mere dicta. But, if they can be regarded as something
more than that, we find ourselves, with all due respect for the
learned judge, unable to accept them.
In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed. 626,
District Judge Learned Hand held that an alien woman, a subject of
the Turkish Empire, who married an American citizen while visiting
Turkey, and then came to the United States, could not be excluded,
although she had, at the time of her entry, a disease which under
the immigration laws would have been sufficient ground for her
exclusion, if she bad not had the status of a citizen. The case was
brought into this court on appeal, and in 1911 was affirmed, in 106
C. C. A. 464, 184 Fed. 322. In that case, however at the time the
relators married, they might have been lawfully naturalized, and we
said: "Even if we assume the contention of the district attorney to
be correct that marriage will not make a citizen of a woman who
would be excluded under our immigration laws, it does not affect
these relators."
We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as aliens;
and it was also said to be inconsistent with the policy of our law that
the husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien. The
distinction between that case and the one now before the court is
that, in the former case, the marriage took place before any order of
exclusion had been made, while in this the marriage was celebrated
after such an order was made. But such an order is a mere
administrative provision, and has not the force of a judgment of a
court, and works no estoppel. The administrative order is based on
the circumstances that existed at the time the order of exclusion
was made. If the circumstances change prior to the order being
carried into effect, it cannot be executed. For example, if an order of
exclusion should be based on the ground that the alien was at the
time afflicted with a contagious disease, and it should be made
satisfactorily to appear, prior to actual deportation, that the alien
had entirely recovered from the disease, we think it plain that the
order could not be carried into effect. So, in this case, if, after the
making of the order of exclusion and while she is permitted
temporarily to remain, she in good faith marries an American
citizen, we cannot doubt the validity of her marriage, and that she
thereby acquired, under international law and under 1994 of the
Revised Statutes, American citizenship, and ceased to be an alien.
There upon, the immigration authorities lost their jurisdiction over
her, as that jurisdiction applies only to aliens, and not to citizens.
In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed. 694,
sustained the right of the officials to deport a woman under the
following circumstances: She entered this country in July, 1910,
being an alien and having been born in Turkey. She was taken into
custody by the immigration authorities in the following September,
and in October a warrant for her deportation was issued. Pending
hearings as to the validity of that order, she was paroled in the
custody of her counsel. The ground alleged for her deportation was
that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease at
the time of her entry. One of the reasons assigned to defeat
deportation was that the woman had married a citizen of the United
States pending the proceedings for her deportation. Judge Dodge
declared himself unable to believe that a marriage under such
circumstances "is capable of having the effect claimed, in view of
the facts shown." He held that it was no part of the intended policy
of 1994 to annul or override the immigration laws, so as to
authorize the admission into the country of the wife of a naturalized
alien not otherwise entitled to enter, and that an alien woman, who
is of a class of persons excluded by law from admission to the
United States does not come within the provisions of that section.
The court relied wholly upon the dicta contained in the Rustigian
Case. No other authorities were cited.
In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed. 449,
construed 1994 and held that where, pending proceedings to deport
an alien native of France as an alien prostitute, she was married to
a citizen of the United States, she thereby became a citizen, and
was not subject to deportation until her citizenship was revoked by
due process of law. It was his opinion that if, as was contended, her
marriage was conceived in fraud, and was entered into for the
purpose of evading the immigration laws and preventing her
deportation, such fact should be established in a court of competent
jurisdiction in an action commenced for the purpose. The case was
appealed and the appeal was dismissed. 134 C. C. A. 666, 219
Fed. 1022.
It is interesting also to observe the construction placed upon the
language of the statute by the Department of Justice. In 1874,
Attorney General Williams, 14 Ops. Atty. Gen. 402, passing upon
the Act of February 10, 1855, held that residence within the United
States for the period required by the naturalization laws was riot
necessary in order to constitute an alien woman a citizen, she
having married a citizen of the United States abroad, although she
never resided in the United States, she and her husband having
continued to reside abroad after the marriage.
In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration Act of
May 5, 1907, in an opinion rendered by Attorney General
Wickersham. It appeared an unmarried woman, twenty-eight years
of age and a native of Belgium, arrived in New York and went at
once to a town in Nebraska, where she continued to reside. About
fifteen months after her arrival she was taken before a United
States commissioner by way of instituting proceedings under the
Immigration Act (34 Stat. at L. 898, chap. 1134, Comp. Stat. 4242,
3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 637) for her deportation, on the ground
that she had entered this country for the purpose of prostitution,
and had been found an inmate of a house of prostitution and
practicing the same within three years after landing. It appeared,
however, that after she was taken before the United States
commissioner, but prior to her arrest under a warrant by the
Department of Justice, she was lawfully married to a native-born
citizen of the United States. The woman professed at the time of
her marriage an intention to abandon her previous mode of life and
to remove with her husband to his home in Pennsylvania. He knew
what her mode of life had been, but professed to believe in her
good intentions. The question was raised as to the right to deport
her, the claim being advance that by her marriage she bad become
an American citizen and therefore could not be deported. The
Attorney General ruled against the right to deport her as she had
become an American citizen. He held that the words, "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized," refer to a class or race who might
be lawfully naturalized, and that compliance with the other
conditions of the naturalization laws was not required. 27 Ops. Atty.
Gen. 507.
Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not escaped
our observation that Congress, in enacting the Immigration Act of
1917, so as to provide, in 19, "that the marriage to an American
citizen of a female of the sexually immoral classes ... shall not
invest such female with United States citizenship if the marriage of
such alien female shall be solemnized after her arrest or after the
commission of acts which make her liable to deportation under this
act."
Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above change
in the law:
(1) Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent women of the
immoral class avoiding deportation through the device of marrying
an American citizen.
(2) If Congress intended that the marriage of an American citizen
with an alien woman of any other of the excluded classes, either
before or after her detention, should not confer upon her American
citizenship, thereby entitling her to enter the country, its intention
would have been expressed, and 19 would not have been confined
solely to women of the immoral class.
Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on the subject and We
have found no warrant for the proposition that the phrase "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized" in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes was meant solely as a
racial bar, even if loose statements in some decisions and other treaties and other
writings on the subject would seem to give such impression. The case of Kelley v.
19
Owen, supra, which appears to be the most cited among the first of the decisions
simply held:
As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of citizenship upon
women married to citizens of the United States, if they are of the
class of persons for whose naturalization the previous Acts of
Congress provide. The terms "married" or "who shall be married,"
do not refer in our judgment, to the time when the ceremony of
marriage is celebrated, but to a state of marriage. They mean that,
whenever a woman, who under previous Acts might be naturalized,
is in a state of marriage to a citizen, whether his citizenship existed
at the passage of the Act or subsequently, or before or after the
marriage, she becomes, by that fact, a citizen also. His citizenship,
whenever it exists, confers, under the Act, citizenship upon her. The
construction which would restrict the Act to women whose
husbands, at the time of marriage, are citizens, would exclude far
the greater number, for whose benefit, as we think, the Act was
intended. Its object, in our opinion, was to allow her citizenship to
follow that of her husband, without the necessity of any application
for naturalization on her part; and, if this was the object, there is no
reason for the restriction suggested.
The terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing
laws," only limit the application of the law to free white women. The
 previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time only required that
the person applying for its benefits should be "a free white person,"
and not an alien enemy. Act of April 14th, 1802, 2 Stat. at L. 153.
A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of Appeals
of New York, in Burton v. Burton, 40 N. Y. 373; and is the one
which gives the widest extension to its provisions.
Note that write the court did say that "the terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized
20
under existing laws" only limit the application to free white women" it hastened to
add that "the previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, ... required that the
person applying for its benefits should be (not only) a "free white person" (but also) ...
not an alien enemy." This is simply because under the Naturalization Law of the
United States at the time the case was decided, the disqualification of enemy aliens
had already been removed by the Act of July 30, 1813, as may be seen in the
corresponding footnote hereof anon. In other words, if in the case of Kelly v. Owen
only the race requirement was mentioned, the reason was that there was no other
non-racial requirement or no more alien enemy disqualification at the time; and this is
demonstrated by the fact that the court took care to make it clear that under the
previous naturalization law, there was also such requirement in addition to race. This
is impotent, since as stated in re Rustigian, 165 Fed. Rep. 980, "The expression used
by Mr. Justice Field, (in Kelly v. Owen) the terms "who might lawfully be naturalized
under existing laws" only limit the application of the law to free white women, must be
interpreted in the application to the special facts and to the incapacities under the
then existing laws," (at p. 982) meaning that whether or not an alien wife marrying a
citizen would be a citizen was dependent, not only on her race and nothing more
necessarily, but on whether or not there were other disqualifications under the law in
force at the time of her marriage or the naturalization of her husband.
4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha,
the Court drew the evidence that because Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated by
Commonwealth Act 473, it follows that in place of the said eliminated section
particularly its subdivision (c), being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may
be lawfully naturalized," what should be required is not only that she must not be
disqualified under Section 4 but that she must also possess the qualifications
enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good moral character,
adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable
conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of real estate, capacity to speak and
write English or Spanish and one of the principal local languages, education of
children in certain schools, etc., thereby implying that, in effect, sails Section 2 has
been purposely intended to take the place of Section 1 of Act 2927. Upon further
consideration of the proper premises, We have come, to the conclusion that such
inference is not sufficiently justified.
To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We have already
explained above of the mentioned provisions has been shown or can be shown to
indicate that such was the clear intent of the legislature. Rather, what is definite is that
Section 15 is, an exact copy of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States, which, at the time of the approval of Commonwealth Act 473 had already a
settled construction by American courts and administrative authorities.
Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent American decisions
quoted above, there can be no doubt that in the construction of the identically worded
provision in the Revised Statutes of the United States, (Section 1994, which was
taken, from the Act of February 10, 1855) all authorities in the United States are
unanimously agreed that the qualifications of residence, good moral character,
adherence to the Constitution, etc. are not supposed to be considered, and that the
only eligibility to be taken into account is that of the race or class to which the subject
21
belongs, the conceptual scope of which, We have just discussed. In the very case
of Leonard v. Grant, supra, discussed by Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang, the
explanation for such posture of the American authorities was made thus:
The phrase, "shall be deemed a citizen" in section 1994 Rev. St., or
as it was in the Act of 1855, supra, "shall be deemed and taken to
be a citizen" while it may imply that the person to whom it relates
has not actually become a citizen by ordinary means or in the usual
way, as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a proper
application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on
that account practically any the less a citizen. The word "deemed"
is the equivalent of "considered" or "judged"; and, therefore,
whatever an act of Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as
true of any person or thing, must, in law, be considered as having
been duly adjudged or established concerning "such person or
thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When, therefore,
Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain
circumstances, be "deemed' an American citizen, the effect when
the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized
directly by an act of Congress, or in the usual mode thereby
prescribed.
Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory construction that in
a situation like this wherein our legislature has copied an American statute word for
word, it is understood that the construction already given to such statute before its
being copied constitute part of our own law, there seems to be no reason how We can
give a different connotation or meaning to the provision in question. At least, We have
already seen that the views sustaining the contrary conclusion appear to be based on
in accurate factual premises related to the real legislative background of the framing
of our naturalization law in its present form.
Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473 with the eligibility requirements of Section 1 of Act 2927
cannot bear close scrutiny from any point of view. There is no question that Section 2
of Commonwealth Act 473 is more or less substantially the same as Section 3 of Act
2927. In other words, Section 1 of Act 2927 co-existed already with practically the
same provision as Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. If it were true that the phrase
"who may be lawfully naturalized" in Section 13 (a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act
3448, referred to the so-called racial requirement in Section 1 of the same Act,
without regard to the provisions of Section 3 thereof, how could the elimination of
Section 1 have the effect of shifting the reference to Section 3, when precisely,
according to the American jurisprudence, which was prevailing at the time
Commonwealth Act 473 was approved, such qualifications as were embodied in said
Section 3, which had their counterpart in the corresponding American statutes, are
not supposed to be taken into account and that what should be considered only are
the requirements similar to those provided for in said Section 1 together with the
disqualifications enumerated in Section 4?
Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who might be lawfully naturalized"
in Section 15 could have been intended to convey a meaning different than that given
to it by the American courts and administrative authorities. As already stated, Act
3448 which contained said phrase and from which it was taken by Commonwealth Act
473, was enacted in 1928. By that, time, Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States was no longer in force because it had been repealed expressly the Act
of September 22, 1922 which did away with the automatic naturalization of alien
wives of American citizens and required, instead, that they submit to regular
naturalization proceedings, albeit under more liberal terms than those of other
applicants. In other words, when our legislature adopted the phrase in question,
which, as already demonstrated, had a definite construction in American law, the
Americans had already abandoned said phraseology in favor of a categorical
compulsion for alien wives to be natural judicially. Simple logic would seem to dictate
that, since our lawmakers, at the time of the approval of Act 3448, had two choices,
one to adopt the phraseology of Section 1994 with its settled construction and the
other to follow the new posture of the Americans of requiring judicial naturalization
and it appears that they have opted for the first, We have no alternative but to
conclude that our law still follows the old or previous American Law On the subject.
Indeed, when Commonwealth Act 473 was approved in 1939, the Philippine
Legislature, already autonomous then from the American Congress, had a clearer
chance to disregard the old American law and make one of our own, or, at least,
follow the trend of the Act of the U.S. Congress of 1922, but still, our legislators chose
to maintain the language of the old law. What then is significantly important is not that
the legislature maintained said phraseology after Section 1 of Act 2927 was
eliminated, but that it continued insisting on using it even after the Americans had
amended their law in order to provide for what is now contended to be the
construction that should be given to the phrase in question. Stated differently, had our
legislature adopted a phrase from an American statute before the American courts
had given it a construction which was acquiesced to by those given upon to apply the
same, it would be possible for Us to adopt a construction here different from that of
the Americans, but as things stand, the fact is that our legislature borrowed the
phrase when there was already a settled construction thereof, and what is more, it
appears that our legislators even ignored the modification of the American law and
persisted in maintaining the old phraseology. Under these circumstances, it would be
in defiance of reason and the principles of Statutory construction to say that Section
15 has a nationalistic and selective orientation and that it should be construed
independently of the previous American posture because of the difference of
circumstances here and in the United States. It is always safe to say that in the
construction of a statute, We cannot fall on possible judicial fiat or perspective when
the demonstrated legislative point of view seems to indicate otherwise.
5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to emphasize that in reality
and in effect, the so called racial requirements, whether under the American laws or
the Philippine laws, have hardly been considered as qualifications in the same sense
as those enumerated in Section 3 of Act 2927 and later in Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473. More accurately, they have always been considered as
disqualifications, in the sense that those who did not possess them were the ones
who could not "be lawfully naturalized," just as if they were suffering from any of the
disqualifications under Section 2 of Act 2927 and later those under Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act 473, which, incidentally, are practically identical to those in the
22
former law, except those in paragraphs (f) and (h) of the latter. Indeed, such is the
clear impression anyone will surely get after going over all the American decisions
and opinions quoted and/or cited in the latest USCA (1970), Title 8, section 1430, pp.
598-602, and the first decisions of this Court on the matter, Ly Giok Ha (1959) and
23
Ricardo Cua, citing with approval the opinions of the secretary of Justice. Such
being the case, that is, that the so-called racial requirements were always treated as
disqualifications in the same light as the other disqualifications under the law, why
should their elimination not be viewed or understood as a subtraction from or a
lessening of the disqualifications? Why should such elimination have instead the
meaning that what were previously considered as irrelevant qualifications have
become disqualifications, as seems to be the import of the holding in Choy King Tee
to the effect that the retention in Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 of the same
language of what used to be Section 13 (a) of Act 2927 (as amended by Act 3448),
notwithstanding the elimination of Section 1 of the latter, necessarily indicates that the
legislature had in mind making the phrase in question "who may be lawfully
naturalized" refer no longer to any racial disqualification but to the qualification under
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473? Otherwise stated, under Act 2927, there were
two groups of persons that could not be naturalized, namely, those falling under
Section 1 and those falling under Section 2, and surely, the elimination of one group,
i.e. those belonging to Section 1, could not have had, by any process of reasoning,
the effect of increasing, rather than decreasing, the disqualifications that used to be
before such elimination. We cannot see by what alchemy of logic such elimination
could have convicted qualifications into disqualifications specially in the light of the
fact that, after all, these are disqualifications clearly set out as such in the law
distinctly and separately from qualifications and, as already demonstrated, in
American jurisprudence, qualifications had never been considered to be of any
relevance in determining "who might be lawfully naturalized," as such phrase is used
in the statute governing the status of alien wives of American citizens, and our law on
the matter was merely copied verbatim from the American statutes.
6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable legal provisions and judicial
opinions, whether here or in the United States, there are practical considerations that
militate towards the same conclusions. As aptly stated in the motion for
reconsideration of counsel for petitioner-appellee dated February 23, 1967, filed in the
case of Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, supra:
Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove "qualifications" —
There is one practical consideration that strongly militates against a
construction that Section 15 of the law requires that an alien wife of
a Filipino must affirmatively prove that she possesses the
qualifications prescribed under Section 2, before she may be
deemed a citizen. Such condition, if imposed upon an alien wife,
becomes unreasonably onerous and compliance therewith
manifestly difficult. The unreasonableness of such requirement is
shown by the following:
1. One of the qualifications required of an
Applicant for naturalization under Section 2 of the
law is that the applicant "must have resided in the
Philippines for a continuous period of not less
than ten years." If this requirement is applied to
an alien wife married to a Filipino citizen, this
means that for a period of ten years at least, she
cannot hope to acquire the citizenship of her
husband. If the wife happens to be a citizen of a
country whose law declares that upon her
marriage to a foreigner she automatically loses
her citizenship and acquires the citizenship of her
husband, this could mean that for a period of ten
years at least, she would be stateless. And even
after having acquired continuous residence in the
Philippines for ten years, there is no guarantee
that her petition for naturalization will be granted,
in which case she would remain stateless for an
indefinite period of time.
2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the
applicant for naturalization that he "must own real
estate in the Philippines worth not less than five
thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must
have some known lucrative trade, profession, or
lawful occupation." Considering the constitutional
prohibition against acquisition by an alien of real
estate except in cases of hereditary succession
(Art. XIII, Sec. 5, Constitution), an alien wife
desiring to acquire the citizenship of her husband
must have to prove that she has a lucrative
income derived from a lawful trade, profession or
occupation. The income requirement has been
interpreted to mean that the petitioner herself
must be the one to possess the said income. (Uy
v. Republic, L-19578, Oct. 27, 1964; Tanpa Ong
vs. Republic, L-20605, June 30, 1965; Li Tong
Pek v. Republic, L-20912, November 29, 1965).
In other words, the wife must prove that she has
a lucrative income derived from sources other
than her husband's trade, profession or calling. It
is of common knowledge, and judicial notice may
be taken of the fact that most wives in the
Philippines do not have gainful occupations of
their own. Indeed, Philippine law, recognizing the
dependence of the wife upon the husband,
imposes upon the latter the duty of supporting the
former. (Art. 291, Civil Code). It should be borne
in mind that universally, it is an accepted concept
that when a woman marries, her primary duty is
to be a wife, mother and housekeeper. If an alien
wife is not to be remiss in this duty, how can she
hope to acquire a lucrative income of her own to
qualify her for citizenship?
3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for
naturalization "must have enrolled his minor
children of school age, in any of the public
schools or private schools recognized by the
Office of the Private Education of the Philippines,
where Philippine history, government and civics
are taught or prescribed as part of the school
curriculum during the entire period of residence in
the Philippines required of him prior to the
hearing of his petition for naturalization as
Philippine citizen." If an alien woman has minor
children by a previous marriage to another alien
before she marries a Filipino, and such minor
children had not been enrolled in Philippine
schools during her period of residence in the
country, she cannot qualify for naturalization
under the interpretation of this Court. The reason
behind the requirement that children should be
enrolled in recognized educational institutions is
that they follow the citizenship of their father.
(Chan Ho Lay v. Republic, L-5666, March 30,
1954; Tan Hi v. Republic, 88 Phil. 117 [1951];
Hao Lian Chu v. Republic, 87 Phil. 668 [1950];
Yap Chin v. Republic, L-4177, May 29, 1953; Lim
Lian Hong v. Republic, L-3575, Dec. 26, 1950).
Considering that said minor children by her first
husband generally follow the citizenship of their
alien father, the basis for such requirement as
applied to her does not exist. Cessante ratione
legis cessat ipsa lex.
4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year
continuous residence prescribed by Section 2
"shall be understood as reduced to five years for
any petitioner (who is) married to a Filipino
woman." It is absurd that an alien male married to
a Filipino wife should be required to reside only
for five years in the Philippines to qualify for
citizenship, whereas an alien woman married to a
Filipino husband must reside for ten years.
Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more difficult
for an alien wife related by marriage to a Filipino citizen to become
such citizen, than for a foreigner who is not so related. And yet, it
seems more than clear that the general purpose of the first
paragraph of Section 15 was obviously to accord to an alien
woman, by reason of her marriage to a Filipino, a privilege not
similarly granted to other aliens. It will be recalled that prior to the
enactment of Act No. 3448 in 1928, amending Act No. 2927 (the old
Naturalization Law), there was no law granting any special privilege
to alien wives of Filipinos. They were treated as any other foreigner.
It was precisely to remedy this situation that the Philippine
legislature enacted Act No. 3448. On this point, the observation
made by the Secretary of Justice in 1941 is enlightening:
It is true that under, Article 22 of the (Spanish)
Civil Code, the wife follows the nationality of the
husband; but the Department of State of the
United States on October 31, 1921, ruled that the
alien wife of a Filipino citizen is not a Filipino
citizen, pointing out that our Supreme Court in the
leading case of Roa v. Collector of Customs (23
Phil. 315) held that Articles 17 to 27 of the Civil
Code being political have been abrogated upon
the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United
States. Accordingly, the stated taken by the
Attorney-General prior to the envictment of Act
No. 3448, was that marriage of alien women to
Philippine citizens did not make the former
citizens of this counting. (Op. Atty. Gen., March
16, 1928) .
To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No.
3448 was enacted in 1928 adding section 13(a)
to Act No. 2927 which provides that "any woman
who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippine Islands, and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippine Islands. (Op. No. 22, s.
1941; emphasis ours).
If Section 15 of the, Revised Naturalization Law were to be
interpreted, as this Court did, in such a way as to require that the
alien wife must prove the qualifications prescribed in Section 2, the
privilege granted to alien wives would become illusory. It is
submitted that such a construction, being contrary to the manifested
object of the statute must be rejected.
A statute is to be construed with reference to its
manifest object, and if the language is
susceptible of two constructions, one which will
carry out and the other defeat such manifest
object, it should receive the former construction.
(In re National Guard, 71 Vt. 493, 45 A. 1051;
Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 89 L. ed.
285. See also, U.S. v. Navarro, 19 Phil. 134
[1911]; U. S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 [1910).
... A construction which will cause objectionable
results should be avoided and the court will, if
possible, place on the statute a construction
which will not result in injustice, and in
accordance with the decisions construing
statutes, a construction which will result in
oppression, hardship, or inconveniences will also
be avoided, as will a construction which will
prejudice public interest, or construction resulting
in unreasonableness, as well as a construction
which will result in absurd consequences.
So a construction should, if possible, be avoided
if the result would be an apparent inconsistency
in legislative intent, as has been determined by
the judicial decisions, or which would result in
futility, redundancy, or a conclusion not
contemplated by the legislature; and the court
should adopt that construction which will be the
least likely to produce mischief. Unless plainly
shown to have been the intention of the
legislature, an interpretation which would render
the requirements of the statute uncertain and
vague is to be avoided, and the court will not
ascribe to the legislature an intent to confer an
illusory right. ... (82 C.J.S., Statutes, sec. 326, pp.
623-632).
7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was laid on the need for
aligning the construction of Section 15 with "the national policy of selective admission
to Philippine citizenship." But the question may be asked, is it reasonable to suppose
that in the pursuit of such policy, the legislature contemplated to make it more difficult
if not practically impossible in some instances, for an alien woman marrying a Filipino
to become a Filipina than any ordinary applicant for naturalization, as has just been
demonstrated above? It seems but natural and logical to assume that Section 15 was
intended to extend special treatment to alien women who by marrying a Filipino
irrevocably deliver themselves, their possessions, their fate and fortunes and all that
marriage implies to a citizen of this country, "for better or for worse." Perhaps there
can and will be cases wherein the personal conveniences and benefits arising from
Philippine citizenship may motivate such marriage, but must the minority, as such
cases are bound to be, serve as the criterion for the construction of law? Moreover, it
is not farfetched to believe that in joining a Filipino family the alien woman is
somehow disposed to assimilate the customs, beliefs and ideals of Filipinos among
whom, after all, she has to live and associate, but surely, no one should expect her to
do so even before marriage. Besides, it may be considered that in reality the
extension of citizenship to her is made by the law not so much for her sake as for the
husband. Indeed, We find the following observations anent the national policy
rationalization in Choy King Tee and Ly Giok Ha (the second) to be quite persuasive:
We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national policy
begs the question. The avowed policy of "selectives admission"
more particularly refers to a case where citizenship is sought to be
acquired in a judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a case,
the courts should no doubt apply the national policy of selecting
only those who are worthy to become citizens. There is here a
choice between accepting or rejecting the application for
citizenship. But this policy finds no application in cases where
citizenship is conferred by operation of law. In such cases, the
courts have no choice to accept or reject. If the individual claiming
citizenship by operation of law proves in legal proceedings that he
satisfies the statutory requirements, the courts cannot do otherwise
than to declare that he is a citizen of the Philippines. Thus, an
individual who is able to prove that his father is a Philippine citizen,
is a citizen of the Philippines, "irrespective of his moral character,
ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs,
and traditions." A minor child of a person naturalized under the law,
who is able to prove the fact of his birth in the Philippines, is
likewise a citizen, regardless of whether he has lucrative income, or
he adheres to the principles of the Constitution. So it is with an alien
wife of a Philippine citizen. She is required to prove only that she
may herself be lawfully naturalized, i.e., that she is not one of the
disqualified persons enumerated in Section 4 of the law, in order to
establish her citizenship status as a fact.
A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not be
overlooked in this regard, for it explains and justifies the obviously
deliberate choice of words. It is universally accepted that a State, in
extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of its
citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity
of allegiance among the members of the family. (Nelson v. Nelson,
113 Neb. 453, 203 N. W. 640 [1925]; see also "Convention on the
Nationality of Married Women: Historical Background and
Commentary." UNITED NATIONS, Department of Economic and
Social Affairs E/CN, 6/399, pp. 8 et seq.). Such objective can only
be satisfactorily achieved by allowing the wife to acquire citizenship
derivatively through the husband. This is particularly true in the
Philippines where tradition and law has placed the husband as
head of the family, whose personal status and decisions govern the
life of the family group. Corollary to this, our laws look with favor on
the unity and solidarity of the family (Art. 220, Civil Code), in whose
preservation of State as a vital and enduring interest. (See Art. 216,
Civil Code). Thus, it has been said that by tradition in our country,
there is a theoretic identity of person and interest between husband
and wife, and from the nature of the relation, the home of one is
that of the other. (See De la Viña v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13). It should
likewise be said that because of the theoretic identity of husband
and wife, and the primacy of the husband, the nationality of
husband should be the nationality of the wife, and the laws upon
one should be the law upon the other. For as the court, in Hopkins
v. Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65 C.C.A., 1, 130 Fed. 839, held: "The
status of the wife follows that of the husband, ... and by virtue of her
marriage her husband's domicile became her domicile." And the
presumption under Philippine law being that the property relations
of husband and wife are under the regime of conjugal partnership
(Art. 119, Civil Code), the income of one is also that of the other.
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family
unity and identity that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an
alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different
from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband's
interests in property and business activities reserved by law to
citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership and be
denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own
efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests.
Only in rare instances should the identity of husband and wife be
refused recognition, and we submit that in respect of our citizenship
laws, it should only be in the instances where the wife suffers from
the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. (Motion for Reconsideration, Burca vs.
Republic, supra.)
With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best interest
of all concerned that Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given effect in the same
way as it was understood and construed when the phrase "who may be lawfully
naturalized," found in the American statute from which it was borrowed and copied
verbatim, was applied by the American courts and administrative authorities. There is
merit, of course in the view that Philippine statutes should be construed in the light of
Philippine circumstances, and with particular reference to our naturalization laws. We
should realize the disparity in the circumstances between the United States, as the
so-called "melting pot" of peoples from all over the world, and the Philippines as a
developing country whose Constitution is nationalistic almost in the come. Certainly,
the writer of this opinion cannot be the last in rather passionately insisting that our
jurisprudence should speak our own concepts and resort to American authorities, to
be sure, entitled to admiration, and respect, should not be regarded as source of pride
and indisputable authority. Still, We cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that
the provision of law now under scrutiny has no local origin and orientation; it is purely
American, factually taken bodily from American law when the Philippines was under
the dominating influence of statutes of the United States Congress. It is indeed a sad
commentary on the work of our own legislature of the late 1920's and 1930's that
given the opportunity to break away from the old American pattern, it took no step in
that direction. Indeed, even after America made it patently clear in the Act of
Congress of September 22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans cannot be
citizens of the United States without undergoing naturalization proceedings, our
legislators still chose to adopt the previous American law of August 10, 1855 as
embodied later in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, Which, it is worth
reiterating, was consistently and uniformly understood as conferring American
citizenship to alien women marrying Americans ipso facto, without having to submit to
any naturalization proceeding and without having to prove that they possess the
special qualifications of residence, moral character, adherence to American ideals
and American constitution, provided they show they did not suffer from any of the
disqualifications enumerated in the American Naturalization Law. Accordingly, We
now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding,
that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino,
native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here
follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there will
be instances where unscrupulous persons will attempt to take advantage of this
provision of law by entering into fake and fictitious marriages or mala fide
matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of law hold that just because of these
possibilities, the construction of the provision should be otherwise than as dictated
inexorably by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical and practical.
There can always be means of discovering such undesirable practice and every case
can be dealt with accordingly as it arises.
III.
The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a re-examination of the ruling of this
Court in Burca, supra, regarding the need of judicial naturalization proceedings before
the alien wife of a Filipino may herself be considered or deemed a Filipino. If this case
which, as already noted, was submitted for decision in 1964 yet, had only been
decided earlier, before Go Im Ty, the foregoing discussions would have been
sufficient to dispose of it. The Court could have held that despite her apparent lack of
qualifications, her marriage to her co-petitioner made her a Filipina, without her
undergoing any naturalization proceedings, provided she could sustain, her claim that
she is not disqualified under Section 4 of the law. But as things stand now, with the
Burca ruling, the question We have still to decide is, may she be deemed a Filipina
without submitting to a naturalization proceeding?
Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to this question must
necessarily be in the affirmative. As already stated, however, the decision in Burca
has not yet become final because there is still pending with Us a motion for its
reconsideration which vigorously submits grounds worthy of serious consideration by
this Court. On this account, and for the reasons expounded earlier in this opinion, this
case is as good an occasion as any other to re-examine the issue.
In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:
We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino
who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply therefore by
filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the
qualifications set forth in Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said
petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner
has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the
petition; and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or
official, administrative or otherwise — other than the judgment of a
competent court of justice — certifying or declaring that an alien
wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby
declared null and void.
3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the
words of law, a "petition for citizenship". This is as it should be.
Because a reading of the petition will reveal at once that efforts
were made to set forth therein, and to prove afterwards, compliance
with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised Naturalization law. The trial
court itself apparently considered the petition as one for
naturalization, and, in fact, declared petitioner "a citizen of the
Philippines."
In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to
be vested with Filipino citizenship, it is not enough that she possesses the
qualifications prescribed by Section 2 of the law and none of the disqualifications
enumerated in its Section 4. Over and above all these, she has to pass thru the whole
process of judicial naturalization apparently from declaration of intention to oathtaking,
before she can become a Filipina. In plain words, her marriage to a Filipino is
absolutely of no consequence to her nationality vis-a-vis that of her Filipino husband;
she remains to be the national of the country to which she owed allegiance before her
marriage, and if she desires to be of one nationality with her husband, she has to wait
for the same time that any other applicant for naturalization needs to complete, the
required period of ten year residence, gain the knowledge of English or Spanish and
one of the principle local languages, make her children study in Filipino schools,
acquire real property or engage in some lawful occupation of her own independently
of her husband, file her declaration of intention and after one year her application for
naturalization, with the affidavits of two credible witnesses of her good moral
character and other qualifications, etc., etc., until a decision is ordered in her favor,
after which, she has to undergo the two years of probation, and only then, but not
before she takes her oath as citizen, will she begin to be considered and deemed to
be a citizen of the Philippines. Briefly, she can become a Filipino citizen only by
judicial declaration.
Such being the import of the Court's ruling, and it being quite obvious, on the other
hand, upon a cursory reading of the provision, in question, that the law intends by it to
spell out what is the "effect of naturalization on (the) wife and children" of an alien, as
plainly indicated by its title, and inasmuch as the language of the provision itself
clearly conveys the thought that some effect beneficial to the wife is intended by it,
rather than that she is not in any manner to be benefited thereby, it behooves Us to
take a second hard look at the ruling, if only to see whether or not the Court might
have overlooked any relevant consideration warranting a conclusion different from
that complained therein. It is undeniable that the issue before Us is of grave
importance, considering its consequences upon tens of thousands of persons
affected by the ruling therein made by the Court, and surely, it is for Us to avoid,
whenever possible, that Our decision in any case should produce any adverse effect
upon them not contemplated either by the law or by the national policy it seeks to
endorse.
AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by their number and
standing in the Bar and well known for their reputation for intellectual integrity, legal
acumen and incisive and comprehensive resourcefulness in research, truly evident in
the quality of the memorandum they have submitted in said case, invite Our attention
to the impact of the decision therein thus:
The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the first time in
the present case -- that an alien woman who marries a Philippine
citizen not only does not ipso facto herself become a citizen but can
acquire such citizenship only through ordinary naturalization
proceedings under the Revised Naturalization Law, and that all
administrative actions "certifying or declaring such woman to be a
Philippine citizen are null and void" — has consequences that
reach far beyond the confines of the present case. Considerably
more people are affected, and affected deeply, than simply Mrs.
Zita N. Burca. The newspapers report that as many as 15 thousand
women married to Philippine citizens are affected by this decision of
the Court. These are women of many and diverse nationalities,
including Chinese, Spanish, British, American, Columbian, Finnish,
Japanese, Chilean, and so on. These members of the community,
some of whom have been married to citizens for two or three
decades, have all exercised rights and privileges reserved by law to
Philippine citizens. They will have acquired, separately or in
conjugal partnership with their citizen husbands, real property, and
they will have sold and transferred such property. Many of these
women may be in professions membership in which is limited to
citizens. Others are doubtless stockholders or officers or employees
in companies engaged in business activities for which a certain
percentage of Filipino equity content is prescribed by law. All these
married women are now faced with possible divestment of personal
status and of rights acquired and privileges exercised in reliance, in
complete good faith, upon a reading of the law that has been
accepted as correct for more than two decades by the very
agencies of government charged with the administration of that law.
We must respectfully suggest that judicial doctrines which would
visit such comprehensive and far-reaching injury upon the wives
and mothers of Philippine citizens deserve intensive scrutiny and
reexamination.
To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court attended to in Gan
Tsitung vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20819, Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA 401 — when Chief
Justice Concepcion observed:
The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto and
Delgado cases — although referring to situations the equities of
which are not identical to those obtaining in the case at bar — may
have contributed materially to the irregularities committed therein
and in other analogous cases, and induced the parties concerned
to believe, although erroneously, that the procedure followed was
valid under the law.
Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue under
consideration, the Solicitor General was required, not only, to
comment thereon, but, also, to state "how many cases there are,
like the one at bar, in which certificates of naturalization have been
issued after notice of the filing of the petition for naturalization had
been published in the Official Gazette only once, within the periods
(a) from January 28, 1950" (when the decision in Delgado v.
Republic was promulgated) "to May 29, 1957" (when the Ong Son
Cui was decided) "and (b) from May 29, 1957 to November 29,
1965" (when the decision in the present case was rendered).
After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons adduced in
appellant's motion for reconsideration and in the reply thereto of the
Government, as well as of the data contained in the latter, the Court
holds that the doctrine laid down in the Ong Son Cui case shall
apply and affect the validity of certificates of naturalization issued
after, not on or before May 29, 1957.
Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the Court had to
expressly enjoin the prospective application of its construction of the law made in a
24
previous decision, which had already become final, to serve the ends of justice and
equity. In the case at bar, We do not have to go that far. As already observed, the
decision in Burca still under reconsideration, while the ruling in Lee Suan Ay, Lo San
Tuang, Choy King Tee and others that followed them have at the most become the
law of the case only for the parties thereto. If there are good grounds therefor, all We
have to do now is to reexamine the said rulings and clarify or modify them.
For ready reference, We requote Section 15:
Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been
born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time
of naturalization of the parents, shall automatically become a
Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the
Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a
Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to
reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which
case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming
of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his
parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one
year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself
 as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country
where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.
It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the statute, the Revised
Naturalization Law or Commonwealth Act 473, as a whole, is to establish a complete
procedure for the judicial conferment of the status of citizenship upon qualified aliens.
After laying out such a procedure, remarkable for its elaborate and careful inclusion of
all safeguards against the possibility of any undesirable persons becoming a part of
our citizenry, it carefully but categorically states the consequence of the naturalization
of an alien undergoing such procedure it prescribes upon the members of his
25
immediate family, his wife and children, and, to that end, in no uncertain terms it
ordains that: (a) all his minor children who have been born in the Philippines shall be
"considered citizens" also; (b) all such minor children, if born outside the Philippines
but dwelling here at the time of such naturalization "shall automatically become"
Filipinos also, but those not born in the Philippines and not in the Philippines at the
time of such naturalization, are also redeemed citizens of this country provided that
they shall lose said status if they transfer their permanent residence to a foreign
country before becoming of age; (c) all such minor children, if born outside of the
Philippines after such naturalization, shall also be "considered" Filipino citizens,
unless they expatriate themselves by failing to register as Filipinos at the Philippine
(American) Consulate of the country where they reside and take the necessary oath
of allegiance; and (d) as to the wife, she "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines"
26
if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized".
No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly, as to the point that
the minor children, falling within the conditions of place and time of birth and
residence prescribed in the provision, are vested with Philippine citizenship directly by
legislative fiat or by force of the law itself and without the need for any judicial
proceeding or declaration. (At p. 192, 19 SCRA). Indeed, the language of the
provision, is not susceptible of any other interpretation. But it is claimed that the same
expression "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" in reference to the wife,
does not necessarily connote the vesting of citizenship status upon her by legislative
fiat because the antecedent phrase requiring that she must be one "who might herself
be lawfully naturalized" implies that such status is intended to attach only after she
has undergone the whole process of judicial naturalization required of any person
desiring to become a Filipino. Stated otherwise, the ruling in Burca is that while
Section 15 envisages and intends legislative naturalization as to the minor children,
the same section deliberately treats the wife differently and leaves her out for the
ordinary judicial naturalization.
Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the constitutional authority
of the Congress of the Philippines to confer or vest citizenship status by legislative
fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L ed. 890 [1898]; See, 1 Tañada &
Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) In fact, it has done so for
27
particular individuals, like two foreign religious prelates, hence there is no reason it
cannot do it for classes or groups of persons under general conditions applicable to
all of the members of such class or group, like women who marry Filipinos, whether
native-born or naturalized. The issue before Us in this case is whether or not the
legislature hag done so in the disputed provisions of Section 15 of the Naturalization
Law. And Dr. Vicente G. Sinco, one of the most respect authorities on political law in
28
the Philippines observes in this connection thus: "A special form of naturalization is
often observed by some states with respect to women. Thus in the Philippines a
foreign woman married to a Filipino citizen becomes ipso facto naturalized, if she
belongs to any of the classes who may apply for naturalization under the Philippine
Laws." (Sinco, Phil. Political Law 498-499 [10th ed. 1954]; emphasis ours; this
comment is substantially reiterated in the 1962 edition, citing Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo
Cua, supra.)
More importantly, it may be stated, at this juncture, that in construing the provision of
28
the United States statutes from which our law has been copied, a the American
courts have held that the alien wife does not acquire American citizenship by choice
but by operation of law. "In the Revised Statutes the words "and taken" are omitted.
The effect of this statute is that every alien woman who marries a citizen of the United
States becomes perforce a citizen herself, without the formality of naturalization, and
regardless of her wish in that respect." (USCA 8, p. 601 [1970 ed.], citing Mackenzie
v. Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713, 165 Cal. 766, affirmed 36 S. Ct. 106, 239 U.S. 299, 60 L
ed. 297.) .
We need not recount here again how this provision in question was first enacted as
paragraph (a) of Section 13, by way of an insertion into Act 2927 by Act 3448 of
November 30, 1928, and that, in turn, and paragraph was copied verbatim from
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which by that time already
had a long accepted construction among the courts and administrative authorities in
that country holding that under such provision an alien woman who married a citizen
became, upon such marriage, likewise a citizen by force of law and as a consequence
of the marriage itself without having to undergo any naturalization proceedings,
provided that, it could be shown that at the time of such marriage, she was not
disqualified to be naturalized under the laws then in force. To repeat the discussion
We already made of these undeniable facts would unnecessarily make this decision
doubly extensive. The only point which might be reiterated for emphasis at this
juncture is that whereas in the United States, the American Congress, recognizing the
construction, of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes to be as stated above, and
finding it desirable to avoid the effects of such construction, approved the Act of
September 22, 1922 Explicitly requiring all such alien wives to submit to judicial
naturalization albeit under more liberal terms than those for other applicants for
citizenship, on the other hand, the Philippine Legislature, instead of following suit and
adopting such a requirement, enacted Act 3448 on November 30, 1928 which copied
verbatim the aforementioned Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes, thereby indicating
its preference to adopt the latter law and its settled construction rather than the reform
introduced by the Act of 1922.
Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this Court may feel that
as the United States herself has evidently found it to be an improvement of her
national policy vis-a-vis the alien wives of her citizens to discontinue their automatic
incorporation into the body of her citizenry without passing through the judicial
scrutiny of a naturalization proceeding, as it used to be before 1922, it seems but
proper, without evidencing any bit of colonial mentality, that as a developing country,
the Philippines adopt a similar policy, unfortunately, the manner in which our own
legislature has enacted our laws on the subject, as recounted above, provides no
basis for Us to construe said law along the line of the 1922 modification of the
American Law. For Us to do so would be to indulge in judicial legislation which it is not
institutionally permissible for this Court to do. Worse, this court would be going
precisely against the grain of the implicit Legislative intent.
There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it seems it is quite
clearly implied that this Court is of the view that under Section 16 of the Naturalization
Law, the widow and children of an applicant for naturalization who dies during the
proceedings do not have to submit themselves to another naturalization proceeding in
order to avail of the benefits of the proceedings involving the husband. Section 16
provides: .
SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died.
— In case a petitioner should die before the final decision has been
rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the
proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the
widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal
effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner.
In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383, this Court
held:
Invoking the above provisions in their favor, petitioners-appellants
argue (1) that under said Sec. 16, the widow and minor children are
allowed to continue the same proceedings and are not substituted
for the original petitioner; (2) that the qualifications of the original
petitioner remain to be in issue and not those of the widow and
minor children, and (3) that said Section 16 applies whether the
petitioner dies before or after final decision is rendered, but before
the judgment becomes executory.
There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the second
sentence of said Section 16 contemplate the fact that the
qualifications of the original petitioner remains the subject of inquiry,
for the simple reason that it states that "The decision rendered in
the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are
concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered
during the life of the petitioner." This phraseology emphasizes the
intent of the law to continue the proceedings with the deceased as
the theoretical petitioner, for if it were otherwise, it would have been
unnecessary to consider the decision rendered, as far as it affected
the widow and the minor children.
xxx xxx xxx
The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee, declared that a
dead person can not be bound to do things stipulated in the oath of
allegiance, because an oath is a personal matter. Therein, the
widow prayed that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance for
the deceased. In the case at bar, petitioner Tan Lin merely asked
that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance and the proper
certificate of naturalization, once the naturalization proceedings of
her deceased husband, shall have been completed, not on behalf
of the deceased but on her own behalf and of her children, as
recipients of the benefits of his naturalization. In other words, the
herein petitioner proposed to take the oath of allegiance, as a
citizen of the Philippines, by virtue of the legal provision that "any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Minor children of persons
naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines
shall be considered citizens thereof." (Section 15, Commonwealth
Act No. 473). The decision granting citizenship to Lee Pa and the
record of the case at bar, do not show that the petitioning widow
could not have been lawfully naturalized, at the time Lee Pa filed
his petition, apart from the fact that his 9 minor children were all
born in the Philippines. (Decision, In the Matter of the Petition of
Lee Pa to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines, Civil Case No.
16287, CFI, Manila, Annex A; Record on Appeal, pp. 8-11). The
reference to Chua Chian case is, therefore, premature.
Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an
applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not
required to go through a naturalization preceeding, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be
denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no
evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.
Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments advanced in the motion for
reconsideration in Burca, and We see no reason to disagree with the following views
of counsel: .
It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative declaration of
who may be considered citizens of the Philippines. It is a
proposition too plain to be disputed that Congress has the power
not only to prescribe the mode or manner under which foreigners
may acquire citizenship, but also the very power of conferring
citizenship by legislative fiat. (U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S.
649, 42 L. Ed. 890 [1898] ; see 1 Tañada and Carreon, Political
Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) The Constitution itself
recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law" (Section 1[5], Article IV, Philippine
Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under this provision,
include not only those who are naturalized in accordance with legal
proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also those who
acquire citizenship by "derivative naturalization" or by operation of
law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of an alien wife through
the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien woman
to a citizen. (See Tañada & Carreon, op. cit. supra, at 152, 172;
Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 2 [1965 ed.]; 1
Paras, Civil Code 186 [1967 ed.]; see also 3 Hackworth, Digest of
International Law 3).
 The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" found in
Section 14 of the Revised Naturalization Law clearly manifests an
intent to confer citizenship. Construing a similar phrase found in the
old U.S. naturalization law (Revised Statutes, 1994), American
courts have uniformly taken it to mean that upon her marriage, the
alien woman becomes by operation of law a citizen of the United
States as fully as if she had complied with all the provisions of the
statutes upon the subject of naturalization. (U.S. v. Keller, 13 F. 82;
U.S. Opinions of the US Attorney General dated June 4, 1874 [14
Op. 4021, July 20, 1909 [27 Op. 507], December 1, 1910 [28 Op.
508], Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op. 2091 and Jan. 12, 1923 [23 398]).
The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen," in
Section 1994 Revised Statute (U.S. Comp. Stat.
1091, 1268) or as it was in the Act of 1855 (10
Stat. at L. 604, Chapt. 71, Sec. 2), "shall be
deemed and taken to be a citizens" while it may
imply that the person to whom it relates has not
actually become a citizen by the ordinary means
or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a
competent court, upon a proper application and
proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on
that account practically any the less a citizen. The
word "deemed" is the equivalent of "considered"
or "judged," and therefore, whatever an Act of
Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as
true of any person or thing must, in law, be
considered as having been duly adjudged or
established concerning such person or thing, and
have force and effect accordingly. When,
therefore, Congress declares that an alien
woman shall, under certain circumstances, be
"deemed" an American citizen, the effect when
the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being
naturalized directly by an Act of Congress or in
the usual mode thereby prescribed. (Van Dyne,
Citizenship of the United States 239, cited in
Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization
146-147 [1965 ed.]; emphasis ours).
That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine legislature when it
enacted the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Revised
Naturalization Law is shown by a textual analysis of the entire
statutory provision. In its entirety, Section 15 reads:
(See supra).
The phrases "shall be deemed" "shall be considered," and "shall
automatically become" as used in the above provision, are
undoubtedly synonymous. The leading idea or purpose of the
provision was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law
upon certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their
relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons who are already
citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the fact of relationship of the
persons enumerated in the provision concurs with the fact of
citizenship of the person to whom they are related, the effect is for
said persons to become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. "Ipso
facto" as here used does not mean that all alien wives and all minor
children of Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of relationship,
necessarily become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the
statutory requirements do not ipso facto become citizens; they must
apply for naturalization in order to acquire such status. What it does
mean, however, is that in respect of those persons enumerated in
Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the Philippines is the
operative fact which establishes the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also determines the point of time
at which such citizenship commences. Thus, under the second
paragraph of Section 15, a minor child of a Filipino naturalized
under the law, who was born in the Philippines, becomes ipso facto
a citizen of the Philippines from the time the fact of relationship
concurs with the fact of citizenship of his parent, and the time when
the child became a citizen does not depend upon the time that he is
able to prove that he was born in the Philippines. The child may
prove some 25 years after the naturalization of his father that he
was born in the Philippines and should, therefore, be "considered" a
citizen thereof. It does not mean that he became a Philippine citizen
only at that later time. Similarly, an alien woman who married a
Philippine citizen may be able to prove only some 25 years after her
marriage (perhaps, because it was only 25 years after the marriage
that her citizenship status became in question), that she is one who
might herself be lawfully naturalized." It is not reasonable to
conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship only after she had
proven that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized." It is not
reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship only
after she had proven that she "might herself be lawfully
naturalized."
The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the
very phraseology of the law, the legislature could not have intended
that an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless
and until she proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized.
Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines if she is one "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who might herself
be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting
or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact
necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e.,
as a fact established and proved in evidence. The word "might," as
used in that phrase, precisely replies that at the time of her
marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had (the) power"
to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force.
(Owen v. Kelly, 6 DC 191 [1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen, 76 US 496,
19 L ed 283 [1869). That she establishes such power long after her
marriage does not alter the fact that at her marriage, she became a
citizen.
(This Court has held) that "an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not
acquire the status of a citizen of the Philippines unless there is
proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized" (Decision, pp. 3-
4). Under this view, the "acquisition" of citizenship by the alien wife
depends on her having proven her qualifications for citizenship, that
is, she is not a citizen unless and until she proves that she may
herself be lawfully naturalized. It is clear from the words of the law
that the proviso does not mean that she must first prove that she
"might herself be lawfully naturalized" before she shall be deemed
(by Congress, not by the courts) a citizen. Even the "uniform"
decisions cited by this Court (at fn. 2) to support its holding did not
rule that the alien wife becomes a citizen only after she has proven
her qualifications for citizenship. What those decisions ruled was
that the alien wives in those cases failed to prove their qualifications
and therefore they failed to establish their claim to citizenship. Thus
in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 101 Phil. 459 [l957], the case was
remanded to the lower court for determination of whether petitioner,
whose claim to citizenship by marriage to a Filipino was disputed by
the Government, "might herself be lawfully naturalized," for the
purpose of " proving her alleged change of political status from
alien to citizen" (at 464). In Cua v. Board, 101 Phil. 521 [1957], the
alien wife who was being deported, claimed she was a Philippine
citizen by marriage to a Filipino. This Court finding that there was
no proof that she was not disqualified under Section 4 of the
Revised Naturalization Law, ruled that: "No such evidence
appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Philippine
citizenship by Tijoe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is
untenable." (at 523) It will be observed that in these decisions cited
by this Court, the lack of proof that the alien wives "might
(themselves) be lawfully naturalized" did not necessarily imply that
they did not become, in truth and in fact, citizens upon their
marriage to Filipinos. What the decisions merely held was that
these wives failed to establish their claim to that status as a proven
fact.
In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law,
the time when citizenship is conferred should not be confused with
the time when citizenship status is established as a proven fact.
Thus, even a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, whose
citizenship status is put in issue in any proceeding would be
required to prove, for instance, that his father is a citizen of the
Philippines in order to factually establish his claim to citizenship.*
His citizenship status commences from the time of birth, although
his claim thereto is established as a fact only at a subsequent time.
Likewise, an alien woman who might herself be lawfully naturalized
becomes a Philippine citizen at the time of her marriage to a Filipino
husband, not at the time she is able to establish that status as a
proven fact by showing that she might herself be lawfully
naturalized. Indeed, there is no difference between a statutory
declaration that a person is deemed a citizen of the Philippines
provided his father is such citizen from a declaration that an alien
woman married to a Filipino citizen of the Philippines provided she
might herself be lawfully naturalized. Both become citizens by
operation of law; the former becomes a citizen ipso facto upon birth;
the later ipso facto upon marriage.
It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she might
herself be lawfully naturalized, it cannot be said that she has
established her status as a proven fact. But neither can it be said
that on that account, she did not become a citizen of the
Philippines. If her citizenship status is not questioned in any legal
proceeding, she obviously has no obligation to establish her status
as a fact. In such a case, the presumption of law should be that she
is what she claims to be. (U.S. v. Roxas, 5 Phil. 375 [1905]; Hilado
v. Assad, 51 O.G. 4527 [1955]). There is a presumption that a
representation shown to have been made is true. (Aetna Indemnity
Co. v. George A. Fuller, Co., 73 A. 738, 74 A. 369, 111 ME. 321).
The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views is,
what substitute is them for naturalization proceedings to enable the alien wife of a
Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so
that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an
act or enter in to a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to
Filipinos? The ready answer to such question is that as the laws of our country, both
substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure, but such paucity
is no proof that the citizenship under discussion is not vested as of the date of
marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth
is that the same situation objections even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the
citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to
such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. This, as We view it, is
the sense in which Justice Dizon referred to "appropriate proceeding" in Brito v.
Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good sense and judgment of those
subsequently inquiring into the matter may make the effort easier or simpler for the
persons concerned by relying somehow on the antecedent official findings, even if
these are not really binding.
It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a good starting point
and so that the most immediate relevant public records may be kept in order, the
following observations in Opinion No. 38, series of 1958, of then Acting Secretary of
Justice Jesus G. Barrera, may be considered as the most appropriate initial step by
the interested parties:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman
married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine
 citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is
as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation
of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things,
that she is married to a Filipino, citizen and that she is not
disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to
section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the
filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by
the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the
effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups
disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino
citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of
Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates
its order or decision granting or denying the petition.

Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as an alien,

there will probably be less difficulty in establishing her Filipino citizenship in any other
proceeding, depending naturally on the substance and vigor of the opposition.

Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue We have passed upon
was not touched by the trial court, but as the point is decisive in this case, the Court
prefers that the matter be settled once and for all now.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing
appellants' petition for injunction is hereby reversed and the Commissioner of
Immigration and/or his authorized representative is permanently enjoined from
causing the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau
Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by
virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo
Lim, a Filipino citizen on January 25, 1962. No costs.

Dizon, Castro, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G.
BALUA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
THE CASE
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court to review the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The
1
Resolution in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October
201 0 is being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local Government Code while
2
the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being
questioned for finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco (respondent
Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen qualified to run for public office despite his
continued use of a U.S. passport.
FACTS
3 filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of
his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his
Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took
4
the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the
same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was
issued in his favor.
5 of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-
The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
6
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and
executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship, which states:
I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I absolutely and perpetually
renounce all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I
am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all civil and political rights and
privileges of the United States of America.
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true and correct to the best of my
7
knowledge and belief.
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, which contains, among others, the following
statements:
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino citizen.
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a foreign country.
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to.
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose
8
of evasion.
On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate,
municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010
local and national elections.
9
Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau
10
American." To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented
11
in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record dated 03 December 2009
indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering
and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on
14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009,
arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April
2010, certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available
Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with
the following pertinent travel records:
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
PASSPORT : 057782700
DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
 NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
12
PASSPORT : 057782700
13
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order requiring the
respondent to personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from
receipt thereof.
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default and
to present evidence ex-parte.
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where
Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as
the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his verified answer, submitting the
following documents as evidence:
14
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines dated 03 April 2009;
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil Seno, Virginia Branzuela,
Leoncio Daligdig, and Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting that
Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan and that he has been
conspicuously and continuously residing in his family’s ancestral house in
Kauswagan;
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao
del Norte dated 03 June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide resident of
his barangay and that Arnado went to the United States in 1985 to work and
returned to the Philippines in 2009;
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the Municipal Local Government
Operations Office of Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr.
served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January 1964 to June 1974 and from
15 February 1979 to 15 April 1986; and
5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer of Kauswagan certifying
that Arnado has been a registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of
15
candidacy based on misrepresentation, the COMELEC First Division considered it
as one for disqualification. Balua’s contention that Arnado is a resident of the United
States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence to
16
support his contention," whereas the First Division still could "not conclude that
Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local
17
Government Code."
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First Division disagreed with
18
Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino citizen.
We find that although Arnado appears to have substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport
after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009 effectively negated his Affidavit
of Renunciation.
xxxx
Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no
real intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot turn a blind eye to the glaring
inconsistency between Arnado’s unexplained use of a US passport six times and his
claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and renounced his US citizenship.
As noted by the Supreme Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official
document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn
in foreign countries." Surely, one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would
19
not continue to avail of privileges reserved solely for US nationals.
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the COMELEC
First Division reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for disqualification and/or to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED.
Rommel C. Arnado’s proclamation as the winning candidate for Municipal Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession under
20
Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991 take effect.
The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc on
the ground that "the evidence is insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said
21 22
Resolution is contrary to law." He raised the following contentions:
1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not supported by the
evidence consisting of his Oath of Allegiance and the Affidavit of
Renunciation, which show that he has substantially complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his renunciation of his
American citizenship is not tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino
 citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear allegiance to a country
other than the Philippines;
3. He used his US passport only because he was not informed of the
issuance of his Philippine passport, and that he used his Philippine passport
after he obtained it;
4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Arnado was filed
out of time, and the First Division’s treatment of the petition as one for
disqualification constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of
23
jurisdiction;
5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as indicated by his winning the
elections;
6. His proclamation as the winning candidate ousted the COMELEC from
jurisdiction over the case; and
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo
warranto, which should have been filed within ten days from his
proclamation.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of
Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010
elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for
Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified
Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is
not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s
candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate
candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as
the winner.
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his Motion for Intervention and
his Motion for Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by Maquiling,
claiming that intervention is prohibited after a decision has already been rendered,
and that as a second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections and thus does
not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by the final adjudication of the case.
RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC
In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En Banc held that under
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Commission "shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation of the candidate
whose qualifications for office is questioned."
As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc also cited Section 6 of R.A.
No. 6646 which allows intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after
elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went on further to say that
Maquiling, as the second placer, would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case
as it agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the First Division allowing
the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take
effect.
The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the First Division of the petition
as one for disqualification, and ruled that the petition was filed well within the period
24
prescribed by law, having been filed on 28 April 2010, which is not later than 11 May
2010, the date of proclamation.
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside the ruling of the First
Division and granted Arnado’s Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:
First:
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. 9225, the respondent
embraced his Philippine citizenship as though he never became a citizen of another
country. It was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent became a pure
Philippine Citizen again.
xxxx
The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert back his status as a dual
citizen prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the
use of a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he has earlier on
renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas
Corpus of Willy Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in the said
case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his oath as a naturalized Filipino,
applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the
conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who acquire their citizenship by choice,
thus discarding their original citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of
allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the present case, respondent is
not a naturalized citizen but a natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by
working abroad and then decided to repatriate to supposedly help in the progress of
Kauswagan. He did not apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the
mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.
xxxx
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to the use of his US passport.
Although he applied for a Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June
18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport so
that he was actually able to get it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was
in possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his
subsequent travels abroad. This fact is proven by the respondent’s submission of a
certified true copy of his passport showing that he used the same for his travels on
the following dates: January 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12,
2010, March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that the use of the US
passport was because to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to
him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be undertaken, the respondent
25
used whatever is within his control during that time.
In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman Sixto Brillantes cited that
the use of foreign passport is not one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
"The application of the more assimilative principle of continuity of citizenship is more
appropriate in this case. Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen, either
by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he desires to continue to be a citizen, and
this assumption stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates himself. Thus,
in the instant case respondent after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be
presumed to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his American passport in the
absence of clear, unequivocal and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all
26
doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of citizenship."
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented, thus:
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and wholeheartedly abandoned his
allegiance to the United States. The latter’s continued use of his US passport and
enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his previous renunciation of the
afore-mentioned citizenship runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain
only his Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s submission with the twin requirements
was obviously only for the purpose of complying with the requirements for running for
the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated National and
Local Elections.
Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are continuing requirements;
once any of them is lost during his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed
forfeited. If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office or if he lost his
citizenship after his election to office, he is disqualified to serve as such. Neither does
the fact that respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the mayoralty post cure the
latter’s failure to comply with the qualification requirements regarding his citizenship.
Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law, his having
received the highest number of votes does not validate his election. It has been held
that where a petition for disqualification was filed before election against a candidate
but was adversely resolved against him after election, his having obtained the highest
number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster from office does not
violate the principle of vox populi suprema est lex because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.
To apply it is to breath[e] life to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it
when they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their representatives who
27
enacted the law.
THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado
qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and
praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible error on the part of the
COMELEC En Banc for ruling that Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued
use of a US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding of the COMELEC
En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run for public office.
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the
First Division’s disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review of the
applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government Code, claiming that the
COMELEC committed reversible error in ruling that "the succession of the vice mayor
in case the respondent is disqualified is in order."
There are three questions posed by the parties before this Court which will be
addressed seriatim as the subsequent questions hinge on the result of the first.
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case.
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing
foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
A better framing of the question though should be whether or not the use of a foreign
passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for
public office.
The third question is whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government
Code is applicable to this case.
OUR RULING
Intervention of a rival candidate in a
disqualification case is proper when
there has not yet been any
proclamation of the winner.
Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the
COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who garnered the second highest number of
votes, Maquiling contends that he has an interest in the disqualification case filed
against Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is disqualified, the votes cast
for him should be considered stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as
the winner in the elections.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition before the COMELEC is one for
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the COMELEC
First Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for
disqualification.
The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
28
Mercado v. Manzano
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said:
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in
proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final
29
judgment rendered.
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the
COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the
requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v.
30
COMELEC are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the
case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this Court.
Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and
respondents therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc,
cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from
attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this
instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Arnado
will attain finality.
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive
and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not
divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath.
xxx
31
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public office. He
took the Oath of Allegiance and renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no
question that after performing these twin requirements required under Section 5(2) of
R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he
became eligible to run for public office.
Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only once but twice: first, on 10
July 2008 when he applied for repatriation before the Consulate General of the
Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April 2009 simultaneous with the
execution of his Affidavit of Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At the time, however, he
likewise possessed American citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual
citizen.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American
citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the
requirements for eligibility to run for public office.
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen,
32
regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.
However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack
when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts
33
showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing
his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the
country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009. The pivotal
question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for
public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30
November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four times,
actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. By
using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as
an American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that
he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the
United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and
political rights granted by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.
34
Mercado v. Manzano already hinted at this situation when the Court declared:
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made
under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the
loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In
Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied
for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken
against anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
35
citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be
qualified to run for a local elective position.
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he
36
renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation that he
"absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED
37
STATES OF AMERICA" and that he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil
and political rights and privileges of the United States of America."
38
We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does
not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation.
However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and
effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not
retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American
citizen by using his US passport.
This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal
to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to
run for an elective local position.
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired
through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those
considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the
oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries
39
with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by naturalization,
on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify
as a candidate for public office.
By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a
dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He
was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the
40
Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.
In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of
eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his
American passport after renouncing his American citizenship.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed
not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the
officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged. x x x.
41
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must be
possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but
continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship
issue to attack.
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that "Arnado’s act
of consistently using his US passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of
42
Renunciation." This does not mean, that he failed to comply with the twin
requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did.
It was after complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which
effectively disqualified him from running for an elective public office pursuant to
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The purpose of the Local Government Code in disqualifying dual citizens from running
for any elective public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a person who has
earlier renounced his foreign citizenship, but who subsequently represents himself as
a foreign citizen, to hold any public office.
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with the explanation that he was
not notified of the issuance of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of
43
which he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport three (3) months later.
The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy Yu, the Portuguese national
who sought naturalization as a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his
Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US passport after his
renunciation does not make his use of a US passport less of an act that violated the
Oath of Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of representation as a US
citizen before the immigration officials of this country.
The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated "Yet, as soon as he was in
possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent already used the same in his
44
subsequent travels abroad." We cannot agree with the COMELEC. Three months
from June is September. If indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as he
was in possession of it, he would not have used his US passport on 24 November
2009.
Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine passport does not correct the fact
that after he renounced his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of
candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that the use of his foreign
passport does not undo his Oath of Renunciation, his subsequent use of his
Philippine passport does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that comes with
attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise
demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While
those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those
who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their
foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands
full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his
American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section
40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is disqualified not
only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May
2010 elections.
We now resolve the next issue.
45
Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v. Paredes which is the
jurisprudential spring of the principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as
the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be re-examined and its
soundness once again put to the test to address the ever-recurring issue that a
second-placer who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed as the
winner in the elections.
The Facts of the case are as follows:
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town of Imus, Province of Cavite,
to fill the office of municipal president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the
respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for that office. Topacio
received 430 votes, and Abad 281. Abad contested the election upon the sole ground
that Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second time to the office of
the municipal president on June 4, 1912, without the four years required by Act No.
46
2045 having intervened.
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the basis of a statutory
prohibition for seeking a second re-election absent the four year interruption.
The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the wreath of victory cannot
be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots."
47
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere obiter dictum. The Court was
comparing "the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office
because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with that produced by declaring
a person ineligible to hold such an office."
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part of a comparison and
contrast between the two situations, thus:
Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of
fraud or irregularities in the elections is quite different from that produced by declaring
a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the former case the court, after an
examination of the ballots may find that some other person than the candidate
declared to have received a plurality by the board of canvassers actually received the
greater number of votes, in which case the court issues its mandamus to the board of
canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may find that the manner of
holding the election and the returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot
be determined who received a plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the latter case, no
question as to the correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and counting
the ballots is before the deciding power, and generally the only result can be that the
election fails entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict sense of the word,
because of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy. If it be found that the
successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an
illegal manner, and that another candidate was the real victor, the former must retire
in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, as the
wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other
candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots. In the one case the question is as to who received a plurality of
the legally cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the personal character
48
and circumstances of a single individual. (Emphasis supplied)
Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts with "In the other case, there
is not, strictly speaking, a contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former,
we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are
striving for supremacy."
The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have held that "the wreath of
victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when
the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
ballots."
A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein is that since the Court of
First Instance is without jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the
eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number of votes in the election, its
jurisdiction being confined "to determine which of the contestants has been duly
elected" the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that no one had been
legally elected president of the municipality of Imus at the general election held in that
town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised was whether or not Topacio
was eligible to be elected and to hold the office of municipal president."
The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and that Abad as the second
placer cannot be proclaimed in his stead. The Court therein ruled:
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so hold that the respondent
judge exceeded his jurisdiction in declaring in those proceedings that no one was
elected municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last general election;
and that said order and all subsequent proceedings based thereon are null and void
and of no effect; and, although this decision is rendered on respondents' answer to
the order to show cause, unless respondents raised some new and additional issues,
49
let judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. So ordered.
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of decisions does not even have
a legal basis to stand on. It was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one
process with another and explaining the effects thereof. As an independent
statement, it is even illogical.
Let us examine the statement:
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any
other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality
of the legally cast ballots."
What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from the ineligible candidate to
another candidate?
When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the eligibility of the one receiving
a plurality of the legally cast ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what
stops the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate who received the next
highest number of votes as the winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"
An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number of votes is a wrongful
winner. By express legal mandate, he could not even have been a candidate in the
first place, but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other intervening
circumstances, his ineligibility might not have been passed upon prior to election date.
Consequently, he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the electorate
as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate. However, notwithstanding the outcome of
the elections, his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged. Ineligibility does not
only pertain to his qualifications as a candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold
public office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure the defect of failure
to qualify with the substantive legal requirements of eligibility to run for public office.
The popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.
The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain
qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by
persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met
before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted
for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the
candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that
sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write
off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who
should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.
50
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in Frivaldo v. COMELEC
when we pronounced:
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this
patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the
citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be
erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate
was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is
lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he
must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and
51
fidelity to any other state. (Emphasis supplied)
52
This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in Velasco v. COMELEC where
the Court ruled that the ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted without
qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes a magic formula to bypass election
53
eligibility requirements."
We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the election may be considered
a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main
issue involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of candidacy. We said that while
provisions relating to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an
established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions
requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory after the
elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in Quizon v. COMELEC
and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity to fine-tune our
above ruling. We say this with the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading
and application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of
law and the integrity of our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may
provide a way around the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at
providing the electorate with the basic information to make an informed choice about
a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is made is Section 39
of the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of local government officials.
Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out
what should be stated in a COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere
delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can
render a Section 78 petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state
the obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they know that
an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory
then becomes a magic formula to bypass election eligibility requirements. (Citations
omitted)
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from filing a seemingly valid COC,
concealing any disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any
disqualification case filed against him so he can submit himself to the electorate and
win, if winning the election will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of candidates?
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the sovereign voice through the ballot
by ensuring that its exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign voice
spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and statutory provisions on
qualifications and disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It
is electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and only the electorate’s voice
spoken through the ballot is made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open
invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1âwphi1
Maquiling is not a second-placer as
he obtained the highest number of
votes from among the qualified
candidates.
With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as
he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
54
We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC and Jalosjos v.
55
COMELEC that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect.
Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election.
Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the
electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible
candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The
votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and
must also be respected.
As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications
and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there
are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is
awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor
lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
56
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC that when the voters
are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and still
cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next
higher number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere obiter that
further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates who placed second to
ineligible ones.
The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for
the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying
circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed
second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in
the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.
That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office
is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that
existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but
also the proclamation.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be suspended under this rule
because Arnado failed to file his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification.
Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after the elections and after he
was already proclaimed as the winner.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s candidacy involves his
citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election offenses as provided for in
the first sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to
disqualify the individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been
elected, from holding the office.

The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier

discussed, Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his
certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified to run for public office
based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

Section 40 starts with the statement "The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the
individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from participating as candidates in
the election.

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of
candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not have produced any
other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when
the elections were conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the
disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification, although made long after the
elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared
to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been
counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government
Code will not apply.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of

the COMELEC En Bane dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is disqualified from running for
any local elective position. CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the
duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the 10 May 2010 elections.

This Decision is immediately executory.

Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the parties and the Commission
on Elections.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES,
SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT,
SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.
J.L. Misa & Associates for petitioner.
Lladoc, Huab & Associates for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of
Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27,
1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League),
represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal
capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen,
having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer
dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as
alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American
citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he
said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting
persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had
returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of
democracy. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed, being
in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within ten days from his
proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
League, moreover, was not a proper party because it was not a voter and so could
not sue under the said section.
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the
respondent Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20,
1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was
denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a
petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the said orders be set aside on the
ground that they had been rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Pending
resolution of the petition, we issued a temporary order against the hearing on the
merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at the same time required comments from
the respondents.
In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was
a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the
day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and
be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on
Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his
candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Even if
their petition were to be considered as one for quo warranto, it could not have been
filed within ten days from Frivaldo's proclamation because it was only in September
1988 that they received proof of his naturalization. And assuming that the League
itself was not a proper party, Estuye himself, who was suing not only for the League
but also in his personal capacity, could nevertheless institute the suit by himself
alone.
Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention
that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after
his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public
office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of
Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the
Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the
League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and
election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of
Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a
Filipino.
In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because his
naturalization as an American citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness." In
support he cited the Nottebohm Case, [(1955 I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)] where a
German national's naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized because it had
been obtained for reasons of convenience only. He said he could not have repatriated
himself before the 1988 elections because the Special Committee on Naturalization
created for the purpose by LOI No. 27C had not yet been organized then. His oath in
his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act
of repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional
elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the United
States, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship. He ended by reiterating his prayer for
the rejection of the move to disqualify him for being time-barred under Section 253 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
Considering the importance and urgency of the question herein raised, the Court has
decided to resolve it directly instead of allowing the normal circuitous route that will
after all eventually end with this Court, albeit only after a, long delay. We cannot
permit this delay. Such delay will be inimical to the public interest and the vital
principles of public office to be here applied.
It is true that the Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this
question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the Congress and elective provincial and city
officials. However, the decision on Frivaldo's citizenship has already been made by
the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims
that Frivaldo is a foreigner. We assume this stance was taken by him after
consultation with the public respondent and with its approval. It therefore represents
the decision of the COMELEC itself that we may now review. Exercising our
discretion to interpret the Rules of Court and the Constitution, we shall consider the
present petition as having been filed in accordance with Article IX-A Section 7, of the
Constitution, to challenge the aforementioned Orders of the COMELEC.
The basic question we must resolve is whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen
of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial
governor of Sorsogon. All the other issues raised in this petition are merely secondary
to this basic question.
The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution
that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance
at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code
that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines
and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the
Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for
suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described
himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any
subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was
naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from
the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated
by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A.
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 23, 1988
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Our records show that JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, born on
October 20, 1915, was naturalized in this Court on January 20,
1983, and issued Certificate of Naturalization No. 11690178.
Petition No. 280225.
Alien Registration No. A23 079 270.
Very truly yours,
WILLIAM L. WHITTAKER
Clerk
by:
(Sgd.)
ARACELI V. BAREN
Deputy Clerk
This evidence is not denied by the petitioner. In fact, he expressly
admitted it in his answer. Nevertheless, as earlier noted, he claims
it was "forced" on him as a measure of protection from the
persecution of the Marcos government through his agents in the
United States.
The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one
of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree
that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing
American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization
was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally
unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly
situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than
he, who did not find it necessary — nor do they claim to have been
coerced — to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. They did
not take the oath of allegiance to the United States, unlike the
petitioner who solemnly declared "on oath, that I absolutely and
entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or which I
have heretofore been a subject or citizen," meaning in his case the
Republic of the Philippines. The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the
impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner,
held fast to their Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their
resistance to the Marcos regime.
The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the
international law principle of effective nationality which is clearly not
applicable to the case at bar. This principle is expressed in Article 5
of the Hague Convention of 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws
as follows:
Art. 5. Within a third State a person having more
than one nationality shall be treated as if he had
only one. Without prejudice to the application of
 its law in matters of personal status and of any
convention in force, a third State shall, of the
nationalities which any such person possesses,
recognize exclusively in its territory either the
nationality of the country in which he is habitually
and principally resident or the nationality of the
country with which in the circumstances he
appears to be in fact most closely connected.
Nottebohm was a German by birth but a resident of Guatemala for
34 years when he applied for and acquired naturalization in
Liechtenstein one month before the outbreak of World War II. Many
members of his family and his business interests were in Germany.
In 1943, Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany, arrested
Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the ground that he
was a German national. Liechtenstein thereupon filed suit on his
behalf, as its citizen, against Guatemala. The International Court of
Justice held Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which
he was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.
That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt
with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states as decided
by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at bar; in fact,
even the United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its
national. The sole question presented to us is whether or not
Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our own laws,
regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide this question
alone as sovereign of our own territory, conformably to Section 1 of
the said Convention providing that "it is for each State to determine
under its law who are its nationals."
It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his
naturalization in Liechtenstein whereas in the present case Frivaldo
is rejecting his naturalization in the United States.
If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and
reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so
in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as
amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or
by repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he
nevertheless claims he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by
virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating
in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not
concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the
United States as his adopted country. It should be obvious that
even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such
forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically
restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier
renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the
loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless
individual.
Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself
under LOI 270 because the Special Committee provided for therein
had not yet been constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that
body rendered his repatriation unnecessary. That is far-fetched if
not specious Such a conclusion would open the floodgates, as it
were. It would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to
claim back their abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting
their adoptedstate and reaffirming their allegiance to the
Philippines.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts.
He contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had,
without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship.
But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely,
Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply
recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened,
what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this
was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial
proceedings.
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on
Elections should be dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The
herein private respondents are seeking to prevent Frivaldo from
continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is
disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public
office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only
at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but
during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say,
a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her term and by
her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have a right
to remain in office simply because the challenge to her title may no
longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been
established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo's
naturalization was discovered only eight months after his
proclamation and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as
provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance
to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of
Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule
limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this
country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be
erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed
through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if
they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was
qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the
Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this
country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any
other state.

It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-
born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all
the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great
price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone
and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its
difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother.
Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its
prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show,
by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and
love.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G.

FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and
therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the Province
of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and
surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said
province once this decision becomes final and executory. The
temporary restraining order dated March 9, 1989, is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.
RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS L.
LARDIZABAL, respondents
Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.
Rillera and Quintana for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from looking
into the question of his citizenship as a qualification for his office as Mayor of Baguio
City. The allegation that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is
whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this
matter, considering that the petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on
time.
It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged tardiness not of the petition
itself but of the payment of the filing fee, which the petitioner contends was an
indispensable requirement. The fee is, curiously enough, all of P300.00 only. This
brings to mind the popular verse that for want of a horse the kingdom was lost. Still, if
it is shown that the petition was indeed filed beyond the reglementary period, there is
no question that this petition must be granted and the challenge abated.
The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City, on
January 20, 1988. The petition for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent
on January 26, 1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was finally paid
on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his proclamation. As the petition by
itself alone was ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only when
the fee was paid. This was done beyond the reglementary period provided for under
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code reading as follows:
SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the
election of a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional,
provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo
warranto with the Commission within ten days after the
proclamation of the result of the election.
The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required under Rule 36,
Section 5, of the Procedural Rules of the COMELEC providing that —
Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due course
without the payment of a filing fee in the amount of Three Hundred
Pesos (P300.00) and the legal research fee as required by law.
and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the payment of the
filing fee is essential to the timeliness of the filling of the petition itself. He cites many
1
rulings of the Court to this effect, specifically Manchester v. Court of Appeals.
For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out of time. In
fact he says, it was flied ahead of time. His point is that when he filed his "Petition for
Quo Warranto with Prayer for Immediate Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining
Order or Injunction" on January 26, 1988, the COMELEC treated it as a pre-
proclamation controversy and docketed it as SPC Case No. 88-288. No docket fee
was collected although it was offered. It was only on February 8, 1988, that the
COMELEC decided to treat his petition as solely for quo warranto and re-docketed it
as EPC Case No. 88-19, serving him notice on February 10, 1988. He immediately
paid the filing fee on that date.
The private respondent argues further that during the period when the COMELEC
regarded his petition as a pre-proclamation controversy, the time for filing an election
protest or quo warranto proceeding was deemed suspended under Section 248 of the
2
Omnibus Election Code. At any rate, he says, Rule 36, Section 5, of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure cited by the petitioner, became effective only on November 15,
1988, seven days after publication of the said Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant to
3
Section 4, Rule 44 thereof. These rules could not retroact to January 26,1988, when
he filed his petition with the COMELEC.
In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus Election Code did not
require it, the payment of filing fees was still necessary under Res. No. 1996 and,
before that, Res. No. 1450 of the respondent COMELEC, promulgated on January 12,
1988, and February 26, 1980, respectively. To this, the private respondent counters
that the latter resolution was intended for the local elections held on January 30,
1980, and did not apply to the 1988 local elections, which were supposed to be
governed by the first-mentioned resolution. However, Res. No. 1996 took effect only
on March 3, 1988, following the lapse of seven days after its publication as required
by RA No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which
became effective on January 5, 1988. Its Section 30 provides in part:
Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the Commission.
— The rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission shall
take effect on the seventh day after their publication in the Official
Gazette or in at least (2) daily newspapers of general circulation in
the Philippines.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for
quo warranto was filed on time. We agree with the respondents that the fee was paid
during the ten-day period as extended by the pendency of the petition when it was
treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the
payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this conclusion only on the assumption that
the requirement for the payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was already
effective. There is no record that Res. No. 1450 was even published; and as for Res.
No. 1996, this took effect only on March 3, 1988, seven days after its publication in
the February 25, 1988 issues of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, or after the petition was filed.
 4
The petitioner forgets Tañ;ada v. Tuvera when he argues that the resolutions
became effective "immediately upon approval" simply because it was so provided
therein. We held in that case that publication was still necessary under the due
process clause despite such effectivity clause.
In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay
there may have been is not imputable to the private respondent's fault or neglect. It is
true that in the Manchester Case, we required the timely payment of the filing fee as a
precondition for the timeliness of the filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office,
5
Ltd. v. Asuncion, however this Court, taking into account the special circumstances
of that case, declared:
This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction
over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filing fee.
However, the court may allow the payment of the said fee within a
reasonable time. In the event of non-compliance therewith, the case
shall be dismissed.
The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure adopted on June 20, 1988, thus:
Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. — If the fees above
prescribed are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action
thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or the
proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the petition for quo
warranto should be dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee on time, the petitioner
would at the same time minimize his alleged lack of citizenship as "a futile
technicality," It is regrettable, to say the least, that the requirement of citizenship as a
qualification for public office can be so demeaned. What is worse is that it is regarded
as an even less important consideration than the reglementary period the petitioner
insists upon.
This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by the
petitioner is the timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against him. However, as
his citizenship is the subject of that proceeding, and considering the necessity for an
early resolution of that more important question clearly and urgently affecting the
public interest, we shall directly address it now in this same action.
The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus:
From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the instant case,
it would appear that our sole function in this proceeding should be
to resolve the single issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that the motion for new trial of the GSIS in question
should indeed be deemed pro forma. But going over the extended
pleadings of both parties, the Court is immediately impressed that
substantial justice may not be timely achieved, if we should decide
this case upon such a technical ground alone. We have carefully
read all the allegations and arguments of the parties, very ably and
comprehensively expounded by evidently knowledgeable and
unusually competent counsel, and we feel we can better serve the
interests of justice by broadening the scope of our inquiry, for as the
record before us stands, we see that there is enough basis for us to
end the basic controversy between the parties here and now,
dispensing, however, with procedural steps which would not
6
anyway affect substantially the merits of their respective claims.
xxx
While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the wrong court
and thereby allowing the period for appeal to lapse, the more
correct procedure was for the respondent court to forward the case
to the proper court which was the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action. Considering, however, the length of time that this case has
been pending, we apply the rule in the case of Del Castillo v.
Jaymalin, (112 SCRA 629) and follow the principle enunciated in
Alger Electric, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (135 SCRA 37) which
states:
... it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court
to always strive to settle the entire controversy in
a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to
bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful
purpose will be served if this case is remanded to
the trial court only to have its decision raised
again to the Intermediate Appellate Court and
from there to this Court. (p. 43)
Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 50141, January 29, 1988), we stated that:
... But all those relevant facts are now before this Court. And those
facts dictate the rendition of a verdict in the petitioner's favor. There
is therefore no point in referring the case back to the Court of
Appeals. The facts and the legal propositions involved will not
change, nor should the ultimate judgment. Considerable time has
already elapsed and, to serve the ends of justice, it is time that the
controversy is finally laid to rest. (See Sotto v. Samson, 5 SCRA
733; Republic v. Paredes, 108 Phil. 57; Lianga Lumber Co. v.
Lianga Timber Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of Chigas, 98
SCRA 575; Francisco v. City of Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia v.
Mabilangan, 105 Phil. 162).lâwphî1.ñèt Sound practice seeks to
accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and
expense, both to the parties and the government, not to speak of
delay in the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez v. Garcia, 92 Phil.
592, 597). A marked characteristic of our judicial set-up is that
where the dictates of justice so demand ... the Supreme Court
 should act, and act with finality.' (Li Siu Liat v. Republic, 21 SCRA
1039, 1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez,
34 Phil. 74). In this case, the dictates of justice do demand that this
7
Court act, and act with finality.
xxx
Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of
evidence is not necessary where the court is in a position to resolve
the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the
Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of
justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding
them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the
ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case
or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case or
where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the
8
parties.
This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present case where, to
repeat for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public office.
We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:
In adopting private respondent's comment, respondent COMELEC
implicitly adopted as "its own" private respondent's repeated
assertion that petitioner is no longer a Filipino citizen. In so doing,
has not respondent COMELEC effectively disqualified itself, by
reason of prejudgment, from resolving the petition for quo warranto
filed by private respondent still pending before it?
9 requirements for the grant of citizenship and was granted Australian
This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule directly on the merits of
this case.
Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative decisions on the
question of the petitioner's citizenship. The first was rendered by the Commission on
Elections on May 12, 1982, and found the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines.
10
The second was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation on
September 13, 1988, and held that the petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines.
11
The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas, Vicente Santiago, Jr., with
Commissioners Pabalate Savellano and Opinion concurring in full and Commissioner
Bacungan concurring in the dismissal of the petition "without prejudice to the issue of
the respondent's citizenship being raised anew in a proper case." Commissioner
Sagadraca reserved his vote, while Commissioner Felipe was for deferring decision
until representations shall have been made with the Australian Embassy for official
verification of the petitioner's alleged naturalization as an Australian.
The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam Defensor-
Santiago and Commissioners Alano and Geraldez of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation. It is important to observe that in the proceeding before the
COMELEC, there was no direct proof that the herein petitioner had been formally
naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This conjecture, which was eventually rejected,
was merely inferred from the fact that he had married an Australian citizen, obtained
an Australian passport, and registered as an alien with the CID upon his return to this
country in 1980.
On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the official statement of
the Australian Government dated August 12, 1984, through its Consul in the
Philippines, that the petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of that date by reason
12
of his naturalization in 1976. That statement is reproduced in full as follows:
I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by virtue of a
certificate of appointment signed and sealed by the Australian Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs on 19 October 1983, and recognized as such by Letter of Patent
signed and sealed by the Philippines Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23
November 1983, do hereby provide the following statement in response to the
subpoena Testificandum dated 9 April 1984 in regard to the Petition for
disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73), and do
hereby certify that the statement is true and correct.
STATEMENT
A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23 December
1934, was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. As the
spouse of an Australian citizen, he was not required to meet normal
citizenship by Sydney on 28 July 1976.
B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian
citizenship must take an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation
of allegiance. The wording of the oath of affirmation is: "I ...,
renouncing all other allegiance ..." etc. This need not necessarily
have any effect on his former nationality as this would depend on
the citizenship laws of his former country.
C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court
in Sydney on 27 June 1980 on the ground that the marriage had
been bigamous.
D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian citizen.
E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court action in
respect of Section 50 of Australian Citizenship Act 1948 which
relates to the giving of false or misleading information of a material
nature in respect of an application for Australian citizenship. If such
 a prosecution was successful, he could be deprived of Australian
citizenship under Section 21 of the Act.
F) There are two further ways in which LABO could divest himself
of Australian citizenship:
(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of Australian
citizenship under Section 18 of the Australian Citizenship Act, or
(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example, Filipino) by a
formal and voluntary act other than marriage, then he would
automatically lose as Australian citizenship under Section 17 of the
Act.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND
AND SEAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS 12th
DAY OF APRIL 1984. DONE AT MANILA IN THE PHILIPPINES.
(Signed) GRAHAM C. WEST Consul
This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988, addressed
to the private respondent by the Department of Foreign Affairs
13
reading as follows:
Sir:
With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish to inform
you that inquiry made with the Australian Government through the
Embassy of the Philippines in Canberra has elicited the following
information:
1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian citizenship on
28 July 1976.
2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian citizenship
had to either swear an oath of allegiance or make an affirmation of
allegiance which carries a renunciation of "all other allegiance.
Very truly yours, For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs: (SGD)
RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR. Assistant Secretary
The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every naturalized Australian
reading as follows:
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by Almighty God that
I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth
the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors
according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the laws of
14
Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen.
and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:
AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE
I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and sincerely
promise and declare that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to
Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs
and successors according to law, and that I will faithfully observe
15
the Laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen.
The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above evidence. Neither does
he deny that he obtained Australian Passport No. 754705, which he used in coming
back to the Philippines in 1980, when he declared before the immigration authorities
that he was an alien and registered as such under Alien Certificate of Registration No.
16
B-323985. He later asked for the change of his status from immigrant to a returning
former Philippine citizen and was granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence No.
223809.
17
He also categorically declared that he was a citizen of Australia in a
number of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the
18
jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner.
The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts as "mistakes"
that did not divest the petitioner of his citizenship, although, as earlier noted, not all
the members joined in this finding. We reject this ruling as totally baseless. The
petitioner is not an unlettered person who was not aware of the consequences of his
acts, let alone the fact that he was assisted by counsel when he performed these
acts.
The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at that time and
stresses Labo's political affiliation with the party in power then, but we need not go
into that now.
There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of the
doctrine of res judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply
19
to questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases. Moreover, it
does not appear that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss
20
or in the answer, having been invoked only when the petitioner filed his reply to the
private respondent's comment. Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata, to wit,
identity of parties, is not present in this case.
The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not
automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or
finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He
became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal
and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian
citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance
and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other
allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth
the Second, Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen."
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a
dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious
argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates
the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1)
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3)
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign
country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this
connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was
annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous,
that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His
divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter
between him and his adopted country. What we must consider is the fact that he
voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly
embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been
subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been
automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not
appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of
naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him.
Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725, providing that:
... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation
by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created
by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are
approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration
and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of
registration. (Emphasis supplied.)
That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his application
for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And that is also the reason
we must deny his present claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18,
1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter under the
21
Constitution itself because of his alienage. He was therefore ineligible as a
candidate for mayor of Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local Government Code
providing in material part as follows:
Sec. 42. Qualifications. — An elective local official must be a citizen
of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on election
day, a qualified voter registered as such in the barangay,
municipality, city or province where he proposes to be elected, a
resident therein for at least one year at the time of the filing of his
certificate of candidacy, and able to read and write English, Filipino,
or any other local language or dialect.
The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that
should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio City, who elected him by a
"resonant and thunderous majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for
his lead over the second-placer was only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people
of that locality could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the
Local Government Code and the Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit
a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at least a stateless
individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them
as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their
countrymen.
The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in
the belief that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the
election cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These
qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during
incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the
citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but were not
possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was
disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve
as such.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the
quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple
reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election,
he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio city.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections
22
decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed
elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and
considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second
placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court
23 24 25
then with three dissenting and another two reserving their vote. One was on
26
official leave.
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed
27
in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, Which represents the more
logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced
28 29
in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes was supported by ten members of the Court
 30 31
without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, another took no part and Mayor of Baguio City, once this decision becomes final and executory. The temporary
32
two others were on leave. There the Court held: restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.

... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griñ;o-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of
which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not
choose him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election
for that office, and it is a fundamental Idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and no measure
can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or
plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd,
S 243, p. 676.)

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office
to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate
who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared
the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead,
disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the
winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of
a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative
policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that
the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be
treated as stray, void or meaningless.

It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as
such and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred other
nationalities, God has seen fit to grant him. Having been so endowed, he must not
lightly yield this precious advantage, rejecting it for another land that may offer him
material and other attractions that he may not find in his own country. To be sure, he
has the right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit and transfer his allegiance to a
33
state with more allurements for him. But having done so, he cannot expect to be
welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his adopted country turns sour or
he is himself disowned by it as an undesirable alien.

Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its
renunciation. It may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act
of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his
total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be
accomplished by election to public office.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of
Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the same to the Vice-
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, movant-appellee, WHEREFORE, it appearing that the petitioner has complied, within
vs. the two year probation period, with the provisions of Republic Act
WILLIAM LI YAO, petitioner-appellant. No. 530, he is hereby allowed to take his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen, and Clerk of Court is directed to issue in his favor to
3
the corresponding certificate of naturalization.

ROMERO, J.: About fifteen years later, or on January 5, 1968, the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Solicitor General, filed a motion to cancel William Li Yao's certificate of
naturalization on the ground that it was fraudulently and illegally obtained for the
This is an appeal from the order of the then Court of First Instance of Manila over following reasons:
twenty years ago, or on July 22, 1971, cancelling the certificate of naturalization of
William Li Yao as well as from the ordered dated December 29, 1971 denying Li
Yao's motion for reconsiderations. 1. At the time of the filing of the petition, the applicant was not
qualified to acquire Filipino citizenship by naturalization because:
William Li Yao, a Chinese national, filed a petition for naturalization on June 3, 1949
with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, which petition was docketed as Case a. He was not a person of good moral character,
No. 8225.
1 having had illicit amorous relationship (sic) with
several women other than his lawfully wedded
wife, by whom he fathered illegitimate children (Li
After several hearings on the petition were held wherein the Office of the Solicitor Siu Liat vs. Republic, L-25356, November 25,
General, in the representation of the Republic of the Philippines appeared, the lower 1967).
court rendered a decision dated October 25, 1950, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
b. Nor had he conducted himself in an
irreproachable manner in his dealings with the
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares duly constituted authorities:
William Li Yao, for all intents and purposes a naturalized Filipino
citizen, it appearing that he possesses all the qualifications to
become a naturalized Filipino and none of the disqualifications (i) In contracting marriage, he
provided for by the law. However, in view of the provisions of used the name Fransisco Li
Republic Act No. 530, this decision shall not become final and Yao (Exh. "J," p. 31, rec.)
executory until after two (2) years from its promulgation and after without prior judicial authority to
this Court, on proper hearing, with the attendance of the Solicitor use the aforesaid first name
General or his representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that during Fransisco, the same not
the intervening time the applicant herein has (1) not left the appearing to be his baptismal
Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful name (Cosme Co Tian An vs.
calling or profession, (3) has not been convicted of any offense and Republic, L-1983, August 31,
violation of the government promulgated rules, (4) or committed any 1966).
act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any
Government announce policies. After the finding mentioned herein, (ii) He was also known and had
this decision granting Philippine citizenship to the applicant herein used the name and/or alias LI
shall be registered and the oath provided by existing law shall be CHAY TOO, JR. before the last
taken by said applicant, whereupon, and not before, he will be World War, and under which
entitled to all the privileges of the Filipino citizen and the certificate name, a trust fund was created
of naturalization shall forthwith issue in his favor by the Clerk of this for him (see Decision, Court of
2
Court. Tax Appeals, CTA Case No.
30, dated July 31, 1956; also
On November 20, 1952, acting on the petition of William Li Yao praying for the Decision, Supreme Court, G.R.
execution of the foregoing decision and that he be allowed to take his oath of No. L-11861, Dec. 28, 1963).
allegiance as a Filipino citizen, the lower court issued an order, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows: (iii) He evaded the payment of
lawful taxes due to the
 government by
underdeclaration of income as
reflected in his income tax
returns for the years 1946-1951
(see Decision, Supreme Court,
William Li Yao v. Collector of
Internal Revenue, L-11875,
December 28, 1963).
(iv) He committed violations of
the Constitution and Anti-
Dummy laws prohibiting aliens
from acquiring real properties
by employing dummies in the
formation of a private domestic
corporation, which acquired the
real properties.
(v) He made it appear, falsely,
in the baptismal certificate of
an illegitimate son he fathered,
named William Jose Antonio,
that the latter's mother is
Juanita Tan Ho Ti, his law-
mother is another woman (sic).
4 on the ground of illegal or fraudulent procurement thereof.
William Li Yao opposed the forgoing motion on July 22, 1971. The lower court,
however, without touching on all the grounds upon which the said motion was based,
relied solely on ground (iii) that William Li Yao evaded the payment of lawful taxes
due the government by underdeclaration of income as reflected in his income tax
returns for the years 1946-1951. It issued an order, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the motion of the Republic of the Philippines to
cancel Certificate of Naturalization No. 1139 dated November 20,
1952 issued to the petitioner is hereby granted, and the said
Certificate of Naturalization should be, as it is hereby cancelled.
5
Without pronouncement as to cost.
William Li Yao filed a motion for reconsideration on December 29, 1971, which the
lower court denied.
6 of any civil, criminal or administrative liability on the part of the taxpayer, only insofar
On January 7, 1972, William LI Yao filed a notice of appeal to this Court, manifesting
that he was appealing from the order of the lower court dated July 22, 1971, and from
the order dated December 29, 1971.
7 taxpayer shall be free of any civil, criminal or administrative liability
After the parties had filed their respective briefs, petitioner-appellant Li Yao died. 8
The case has not, however, become moot and academic since its disposition, either
way, will have grave implications for the late petitioner-appellant's wife and children.
The issue in this case is whether or not the cancellation of the certificate of
naturalization of the deceased petitioner-appellant William Li Yao made by the
government through the Office of the Solicitor General is valid.
The appeal is without merit.
In his motion filed on January 5, 1968, the Solicitor General asked for the cancellation
of the naturalization certificate of appellant on the ground that it was "fraudelently and
illegally obtained." This based on Section 18(a) of Com. Act No. 473, known as the
Revised Naturalization Act, which provides that a naturalization certificate may be
cancelled "[i]f it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudelently
and illegally."
It is indisputable that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is
subsequently discovered that the applicant therefore obtained it by misleading the
9
court upon any material fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation
of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds had conditions arising subsequent to
10
the granting of the certificate. Moreover, a naturalization proceeding is not a judicial
adversary proceeding, the decision rendered therein, not constituting res judicata as
to any matter that would support a judgment cancelling a certificate of naturalization
11
In ordering the cancellation of the naturalization certificate previously issued to
appellant, the lower court sustained the government's motion for cancellation on the
sole finding that Li Yao had committed underdeclaration of income and underpayment
of income tax.
In the case entitled In the Matter of the Petition for Naturalization as Citizen of the
12
Philippines, Lim Eng Yu vs. Republic, It was held that the concealment of
applicant's income to evade payment of lawful taxes shows that his moral character is
not irreproachable, thus disqualifying him for naturalization.
Assuming arguendo, that appellant, as alleged, has fully paid or settled his tax liability
under P.D. No. 68 which granted a tax amnesty, such payment is not a sufficient
ground for lifting the order of the lower court of July 22, 1971 cancelling his certificate
of naturalization. The legal effect of payment under the decree is merely the removal
as his tax case is concerned. Thus, paragraph 4 of the decree provides;
4. That after full settlement of the accounts mentioned herein, the
insofar as his tax case is involved (Emphasis supplied)
 In other words, the tax amnesty does not have the effect of obliterating his
lack of good moral character and irreproachable conduct which are grounds
for denaturalization.

The lower court based its order of cancellation of citizenship on the finding of evasion
of payment of lawful taxes which is sufficient ground, under Sec. 2 of the Revised
Naturalization Law requiring, among others, that applicant conduct himself "in a
proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the
Philippines in his relation with constituted government as well as with the community
13
in which he is living," to strip him of his citizenship without going into the other
grounds for cancellation presented by the Solicitor General.

Finally, taking into account the fact that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced
in favor of the Government and against the applicant, this Court has repeatedly
maintained the view that where the applicant failed to meet the qualifications required
14
for naturalization, the latter is not entitled to Filipino citizenship. More specifically,
the Court has had occasion to state: "Admission to citizenship is one of the highest
privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a
privilege that should not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and
15
upon strict compliance with the law." Philippine citizenship is a pearl of great price
which should be cherished and not taken for granted. Once acquired, its sheen must
be burnished and not stained by any wrongdoing which could constitute ample ground
for divesting one of said citizenship. Hence, compliance with all the requirements of
16
the law must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
The Nottebohm Case
(Liechtenstein v. Guatemala)
International Court of Justice
April 6, 1955
1955 I.C.J. 4
By the Application filed on December 17th, 1951, the Government of Liechtenstein
instituted proceedings before the Court in which it claimed restitution and
compensation on the ground that the Government of Guatemala had “acted towards
the person and property of Mr. Friedrich Nottebohm, a citizen of Liechtenstein, in a
manner contrary to international law.” In its Counter-Memorial, the Government of
Guatemala contended that this claim was inadmissible because of the nationality of
the person for whose protection Liechtenstein had seised the Court.
Guatemala has referred to a well-established principle of international law, which it
expressed in Counter-
Memorial, that “the bond of nationality between the State and the individual alone
confers upon the State the right of diplomatic protection.” This sentence is taken from
a Judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice (Series A/B, No. 76, p.
16), which relates to the form of diplomatic protection constituted by international
judicial proceedings.
Liechtenstein considers itself to be acting in conformity with this principle and
contends that Nottebohm is its national by virtue of the naturalization conferred upon
him.
Nottebohm was born at Hamburg on September 16th, 1881. He was German by birth,
and still possessed German nationality when, in October 1939, he applied for
naturalization in Liechtenstein. In 1905 he went to Guatemala. He took up residence
there and made that country the headquarters of his business activities, which
increased and prospered; these activities developed in the field of commerce, banking
and plantations. Having been an employee in the firm of Nottebohm Hermanos, which
had been founded by his brothers Juan and Arturo, he became their partner in 1912
and later, in 1937, he was made head of the firm. After 1905 he sometimes went to
Germany on business and to other countries for holidays. He continued to have
business connections in Germany. He paid a few visits to a brother who had lived in
Liechtenstein since 1931. Some of his other brothers, relatives and friends were in
Germany, others in Guatemala. He himself continued to have his fixed abode in
Guatemala until 1943, that is to say, until the occurrence of the events which
constitute the basis of the present dispute.
In 1939, after having provided for the safeguarding of his interests in Guatemala by a
power of attorney given to the firm of Nottebohm Hermanos on March 22nd, he left
that country at a date fixed by Counsel for Liechtenstein as at approximately the end
of March or the beginning of April, when he seems to have gone to Hamburg, and
later to have paid a few brief visits to Vaduz [the capital city of Liechtenstein] where
he was at the beginning of October 1939. It was then, a little more than a month after
the opening of the second World War marked by Germany's attack on Poland, that
his attorney, Dr. Marxer, submitted an application for naturalization on behalf of
Nottebohm.
On October 9th, 1939, Nottebohm, “resident in Guatemala since 1905 (at present
residing as a visitor with his brother, Hermann Nottebohm, in Vaduz),” applied for
admission as a national of Liechtenstein and, at the same time, for the previous
conferment of citizenship in the Commune of Mauren. He sought dispensation from
the condition of three years’ residence as prescribed by law, without indicating the
special circumstances warranting such waiver. He submitted a statement of the Credit
Suisse in Zurich concerning his assets, and undertook to pay 25,000 Swiss francs to
the Commune of Mauren, 12,500 Swiss francs to the State, to which was to be added
the payment of dues in connection with the proceedings. He further stated that he had
made “arrangements with the Revenue Authorities of the Government of
Liechtenstein for the conclusion of a formal agreement to the effect that he will pay an
annual tax of naturalization amounting to Swiss francs 1,000, of which Swiss francs
600 are payable to the Commune of Mauren and Swiss francs 400 are payable to the
Principality of Liechtenstein, subject to the proviso that the payments of these taxes
will be set off against ordinary taxes which will fall due if the applicant takes up
residence in one of the Communes of the Principality.” He further undertook to
deposit as security a sum of 30,000 Swiss francs. He also gave certain general
information as to his financial position and indicated that he would never become a
burden to the Commune whose citizenship he was seeking. Lastly, he requested "that
naturalization proceedings be initiated and concluded before the Government of the
Principality and before the Commune of Mauren without delay, that the application be
then placed before the Diet with a favorable recommendation and, finally, that it be
submitted with all necessary expedition to His Highness the Reigning Prince.''
A document dated October 15th, 1939, certifies that on that date the Commune of
Mauren conferred the privilege of its citizenship upon Mr. Nottebohm and requested
the Government to transmit it to the Diet for approval. A certificate of October 17th,
1939, evidences the payment of the taxes required to be paid by Mr. Nottebohm. On
October 20th, 1939, Mr. Nottebohm took the oath of allegiance and a final
arrangement concerning liability to taxation was concluded on October 23rd.
A certificate of nationality has also been produced, signed on behalf of the
Government of the Principality and dated October 20th, 1939, to the effect that
Nottebohm was naturalized by Supreme Resolution of the Reigning Prince dated
October 13th, 1939.
Having obtained a Liechtenstein passport, Nottebohm had it visa-ed by the Consul
General of Guatemala in Zurich on December 1st, 1939, and returned to Guatemala
at the beginning of 1940, where he resumed his former business activities and in
particular the management of the firm of Nottebohm Hermanos.
The real issue before the Court is the admissibility of the claim of Liechtenstein in
respect of Nottebohm. In order to decide upon the admissibility of the Application, the
Court must ascertain whether the nationality conferred on Nottebohm by
Liechtenstein by means of a naturalization which took place in the circumstances
which have been described, can be validly invoked as against Guatemala, whether it
bestows upon Liechtenstein a sufficient title to the exercise of protection in respect of
Nottebohm as against Guatemala and therefore entitles it to seise the Court of a claim
relating to him. In this connection, Counsel for Liechtenstein said: “the essential
question is whether Mr. Nottebohm, having acquired the nationality of Liechtenstein,
that acquisition of nationality is one which must be recognized by other States.” This
formulation is accurate, subject to the twofold reservation that, in the first place, what
is involved is not recognition for all purposes but merely for the purposes of the
admissibility of the Application, and, secondly, that what is involved is not recognition
by all States but only by Guatemala.
The Court does not propose to go beyond the limited scope of the question which it
has to decide, namely whether the nationality conferred on Nottebohm can be relied
upon as against Guatemala in justification of the proceedings instituted before the
Court. It must decide this question on the basis of international law; to do so is
consistent with the nature of the question and with the nature of the Court's own
function.
In order to establish that the Application must be held to be admissible, Liechtenstein
has argued that Guatemala formerly recognized the naturalization which it now
challenges and cannot therefore be heard to put forward a contention which is
inconsistent with its former attitude.
Reliance has been placed on the fact that, on December 1st, 1939, the Consul
General of Guatemala in Zurich entered a visa in the Liechtenstein passport of Mr.
Nottebohm for his return to Guatemala; that on January 29th, 1940, Nottebohm
informed the Ministry of External Affairs in Guatemala that he had adopted the
nationality of Liechtenstein and therefore requested that the entry relating to him in
the Register of Aliens should be altered accordingly, a request which was granted on
January 31st; that on February 9th, 1940, a similar amendment was made to his
identity document, and lastly, that a certificate to the same effect was issued to him by
the Civil Registry of Guatemala on July 1st, 1940.
The acts of the Guatemalan authorities just referred to proceeded on the basis of the
statements made to them by the person concerned. The one led to the other. The
only purpose of the first, as appears from Article 9 of the Guatemalan law relating to
passports, was to make possible or facilitate entry into Guatemala, and nothing more.
According to the Aliens Act of January 25th, 1936, Article 49, entry in the Register
"constitutes a legal presumption that the alien possesses the nationality there
attributed to him, but evidence to the contrary is admissible.'' All of these acts have
reference to the control of aliens in Guatemala and not to the exercise of diplomatic
protection. When Nottebohm thus presented himself before the Guatemalan
authorities, the latter had before them a private individual: there did not thus come
into being any relationship between governments. There was nothing in all this to
show that Guatemala then recognized that the naturalization conferred upon
Nottebohm gave Liechtenstein any title to the exercise of protection.
Since no proof has been adduced that Guatemala has recognized the title to the
exercise of protection relied upon by Liechtenstein as being derived from the
naturalization which it granted to Nottebohm, the Court must consider whether such
an act of granting nationality by Liechtenstein directly entails an obligation on the part
of Guatemala to recognize its effect, namely, Liechtenstein's right to exercise its
protection. In other words, it must be determined whether that unilateral act by
Liechtenstein is one which can be relied upon against Guatemala in regard to the
exercise of protection. The Court will deal with this question without considering that
of the validity of Nottebohm's naturalization according to the law of Liechtenstein.
It is for Liechtenstein, as it is for every sovereign State, to settle by its own legislation
the rules relating to the acquisition of its nationality, and to confer that nationality by
naturalization granted by its own organs in accordance with that legislation. It is not
necessary to determine whether international law imposes any limitations on its
freedom of decision in this domain. Furthermore, nationality has its most immediate,
its most far-reaching and, for most people, its only effects within the legal system of
the State conferring it. Nationality serves above all to determine that the person upon
whom it is conferred enjoys the rights and is bound by the obligations which the law of
the State in question grants to or imposes on its nationals. This is implied in the wider
concept that nationality is within the domestic jurisdiction of the State.
But the issue which the Court must decide is not one which pertains to the legal
system of Liechtenstein. It does not depend on the law or on the decision of
Liechtenstein whether that State is entitled to exercise its protection, in the case
under consideration. To exercise protection, to apply to the Court, is to place oneself
on the plane of international law. It is international law which determines whether a
State is entitled to exercise protection and to seise the Court.
The naturalization of Nottebohm was an act performed by Liechtenstein in the
exercise of its domestic jurisdiction. The question to be decided is whether that act
has the international effect here under consideration.
International practice provides many examples of acts performed by States in the
exercise of their domestic jurisdiction which do not necessarily or automatically have
international effect, which are not necessarily and automatically binding on other
States or which are binding on them only subject to certain conditions: this is the
case, for instance, of a judgment given by the competent court of a State which it is
sought to invoke in another State.
In the present case it is necessary to determine whether the naturalization conferred
on Nottebohm can be successfully invoked against Guatemala, whether, as has
already been stated, it can be relied upon as against that State, so that Liechtenstein
is thereby entitled to exercise its protection in favor of Nottebohm against Guatemala.
When one State has conferred its nationality upon an individual and another State
has conferred its own nationality on the same person, it may occur that each of these
States, considering itself to have acted in the exercise of its domestic jurisdiction,
adheres to its own view and bases itself thereon in so far as its own actions are
concerned. In so doing, each State remains within the limits of its domestic
jurisdiction.
The courts of third States, when they have before them an individual whom two other
States hold to be their national, seek to resolve the conflict by having recourse to
international criteria and their prevailing tendency is to prefer the real and effective
nationality.
The same tendency prevails in the writings of publicists and in practice. This notion is
inherent in the provisions of Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court.
National laws reflect this tendency when, inter alia, they make naturalization
dependent on conditions indicating the existence of a link, which may vary in their
purpose or in their nature but which are essentially concerned with this idea. The
Liechtenstein Law of January 4th, 1934, is a good example.
The practice of certain States which refrain from exercising protection in favor of a
naturalized person when the latter has in fact, by his prolonged absence, severed his
links with what is no longer for him anything but his nominal country, manifests the
view of these States that, in order to be capable of being invoked against another
State, nationality must correspond with the factual situation. A similar view is
manifested in the relevant provisions of the bilateral nationality treaties concluded
between the United States of America and other States since 1868, such as those
sometimes referred to as the Bancroft Treaties, and in the Pan-American Convention,
signed at Rio de Janeiro on August 13th, 1906, on the status of naturalized citizens
who resume residence in their country of origin.
The character thus recognized on the international level as pertaining to nationality is
in no way inconsistent with the fact that international law leaves it to each State to lay
down the rules governing the grant of its own nationality. The reason for this is that
the diversity of demographic conditions has thus far made it impossible for any
general agreement to be reached on the rules relating to nationality, although the
latter by its very nature affects international relations. It has been considered that the
best way of making such rules accord with the varying demographic conditions in
different countries is to leave the fixing of such rules to the competence of each State.
On the other hand, a State cannot claim that the rules it has thus laid down are
entitled to recognition by another State unless it has acted in conformity with this
general aim of making the legal bond of nationality accord with the individual's
genuine connection with the State which assumes the defense of its citizens by
means of protection as against other States.
According to the practice of States, to arbitral and judicial decisions and to the
opinions of writers, nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of
attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together
with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute the
juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either
directly by the law or as the result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely
connected with the population of the State conferring nationality than with that of any
other State. Conferred by a State, it only entitles that State to exercise protection vis -
a-vis another State, if it constitutes a translation into juridical terms of the individual's
connection with the State which has made him its national.
Diplomatic protection and protection by means of international judicial proceedings
constitute measures for the defense of the rights of the State. As the Permanent
Court of International Justice has said and has repeated, “by taking up the case of
one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial
proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights—its right to
ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.”
P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, at 12, and Series A/B, Nos. 20-21, at 17.
Since this is the character which nationality must present when it is invoked to furnish
the State which has granted it with a title to the exercise of protection and to the
institution of international judicial proceedings, the Court must ascertain whether the
nationality granted to Nottebohm by means of naturalization is of this character or, in
other words, whether the factual connection between Nottebohm and Liechtenstein in
the period preceding, contemporaneous with and following his naturalization appears
to be sufficiently close, so preponderant in relation to any connection which may have
existed between him and any other State, that it is possible to regard the nationality
conferred upon him as real and effective, as the exact juridical expression of a social
fact of a connection which existed previously or came into existence thereafter.
Naturalization is not a matter to be taken lightly. To seek and to obtain it is not
something that happens frequently in the life of a human being. It involves his
breaking of a bond of allegiance and his establishment of a new bond of allegiance. It
may have far reaching consequences and involve profound changes in the destiny of
the individual who obtains it. It concerns him personally, and to consider it only from
the point of view of its repercussions with regard to his property would be to
misunderstand its profound significance. In order to appraise its international effect, it
is impossible to disregard the circumstances in which it was conferred, the serious
character which attaches to it, the real and effective, and not merely the verbal
preference of the individual seeking it for the country which grants it to him.
At the time of his naturalization does Nottebohm appear to have been more closely
attached by his tradition, his establishment, his interests, his activities, his family ties,
his intentions for the near future to Liechtenstein than to any other State? The
essential facts appear with sufficient clarity from the record. They are as follows:
At the date when he applied for naturalization, Nottebohm had been a German
national from the time of his birth. He had always retained his connections with
members of his family who had remained in Germany and he had always had
business connections with that country. His country had been at war for more than a
month, and there is nothing to indicate that the application for naturalization then
made by Nottebohm was motivated by any desire to dissociate himself from the
Government of his country.
He had been settled in Guatemala for 34 years. He had carried on his activities there.
It was the main seat of his interests. He returned there shortly after his naturalization,
and it remained the center of his interests and of his business activities. He stayed
there until his removal as a result of war measures in 1943. He subsequently
attempted to return there, and he now complains of Guatemala's refusal to admit him.
There, too, were several members of his family who sought to safeguard his interests.
In contrast, his actual connections with Liechtenstein were extremely tenuous. No
settled abode, no prolonged residence in that country at the time of his application for
naturalization: the application indicates that he was paying a visit there and confirms
the transient character of this visit by its request that the naturalization proceedings
should be initiated and concluded without delay. No intention of settling there was
shown at that time or realized in the ensuing weeks, months or years—on the
contrary, he returned to Guatemala very shortly after his naturalization and showed
every intention of remaining there. If Nottebohm went to Liechtenstein in 1946, this
was because of the refusal of Guatemala to admit him. No indication is given of the
grounds warranting the waiver of the condition of residence, required by the 1934
Nationality Law, which waiver was implicitly granted to him. There is no allegation of
any economic interests or of any activities exercised or to be exercised in
Liechtenstein, and no manifestation of any intention whatsoever to transfer all or
some of his interests and his business activities to Liechtenstein. It is unnecessary in
this connection to attribute much importance to the promise to pay the taxes levied at
the time of his naturalization.
The only links to be discovered between the Principality and Nottebohm are the short
sojourns already referred to and the presence in Vaduz of one of his brothers: but his
brother's presence is referred to in his application for naturalization only as a
reference to his good conduct.
These facts clearly establish, on the one hand, the absence of any bond of
attachment between Nottebohm and Liechtenstein and, on the other hand, the
existence of a long-standing and close connection between him and Guatemala, a
link which his naturalization in no way weakened. That naturalization was not based
on any real prior connection with Liechtenstein, nor did it in any way alter the manner
of life of the person upon whom it was conferred in exceptional circumstances of
speed and accommodation. In both respects, it was lacking in the genuineness
requisite to an act of such importance, if it is to be entitled to be respected by a State
in the position of Guatemala. It was granted without regard to the concept of
nationality adopted in international relations.
Naturalization was asked for not so much for the purpose of obtaining a legal
recognition of Nottebohm’s membership in fact in the population of Liechtenstein, as it
was to enable him to substitute for his status as a national of a belligerent State that
of a national of a neutral State, with the sole aim of thus coming within the protection
of Liechtenstein but not of becoming wedded to its traditions, its interests, its way of
life or of assuming the obligations—other than fiscal obligations—and exercising the
rights pertaining to the status thus acquired.
Guatemala is under no obligation to recognize a nationality granted in such
circumstances. Liechtenstein consequently is not entitled to extend its protection to
Nottebohm vis -a-vis Guatemala and its claim must, for this reason, be held to be
inadmissible.
The Court is not therefore called upon to deal with the other pleas in bar put forward
by Guatemala or the Conclusions of the Parties other than those on which it is
adjudicating in accordance with the reasons indicated above.
For these reasons,
THE COURT, by eleven votes to three,
Holds that the claim submitted by the Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein
is inadmissible.
Done in French and English, the French text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace,
The Hague, this sixth day of April, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-five, in three
copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court and the others will be
transmitted to the Government of the Principality of Liechtenstein and to the
Government of the Republic of Guatemala, respectively.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE READ
Mr. Nottebohm was arrested on October 19th, 1943, by the Guatemalan authorities,
who were acting not for reasons of their own but at the instance of the United States
Government. He was turned over to the armed forces of the United States on the
same day. Three days later he was deported to the United States and interned there
for two years and three months. There was no trial or inquiry in either country and he
was not given the opportunity of confronting his accusers or defending himself, or
giving evidence on his own behalf.
In 1944 a series of fifty-seven legal proceedings was commenced against Mr.
Nottebohm, designed to expropriate, without compensation to him, all of his
properties, whether movable or immovable. The proceedings involved more than one
hundred and seventy one appeals of various kinds. Counsel for Guatemala has
demonstrated, in a fair and competent manner, the existence of a network of litigation,
which could not be dealt with effectively in the absence of the principally interested
party. Further, all of the cases involved, as a central and vital issue, the charge
against Mr. Nottebohm of treasonable conduct.
Mr. Nottebohm was not permitted to return to Guatemala. He was thus prevented
from assuming the personal direction of the complex network of litigation. He was
allowed no opportunity to give evidence of the charges made against him, or to
confront his accusers in open court. In such circumstances I am bound to proceed on
the assumption that Liechtenstein might be entitled to a finding of denial of justice, if
the case should be considered on the merits.
In view of this situation, I cannot overlook the fact that the allowance of the plea in bar
would ensure that justice would not be done on any plane, national or international. I
do not think that a plea in bar, which would have such an effect, should be granted,
unless the grounds on which it is based are beyond doubt.
With these considerations in mind, it is necessary to examine the single issue that the
Court must decide in order to reject or allow the plea in bar based on the ground of
nationality. The issue for decision is: whether, in the circumstances of this case and
vis -a-vis Guatemala, Liechtenstein is entitled, under the rules of international law, to
afford diplomatic protection to Mr. Nottebohm.
The Judgment of the Court is based upon the ground that the naturalization of Mr.
Nottebohm was not a genuine transaction. It is pointed out that it did not lead to any
alteration in his manner of life; and that it was acquired, not for the purpose of
obtaining legal recognition of his membership in fact of the population of
Liechtenstein, but for the purpose of obtaining neutral status and the diplomatic
protection of a neutral State. I shall refer to this ground as the link theory.
Article 1 of The Hague Draft Convention of 1930 reads as follows:
It is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall
be recognized by other States in so far as it is consistent with international
conventions, international custom, and the principles of law generally recognized with
regard to nationality.
Applying this rule to the case, it would result that Liechtenstein had the right to
determine under its own law that Mr. Nottebohm was its own national, and that
Guatemala must recognize the Liechtenstein law in this regard in so far as it is
consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principles of
law generally recognized with regard to nationality. I shall refer to this quality, the
binding character of naturalization, as opposability.
No ‘international conventions’ are involved and no ‘international custom’ has been
proved. There remain ‘the principles of law generally recognized with regard to
nationality.’ Yet Guatemala concedes that there are no firm principles of law generally
recognized with regard to nationality, but that the right of Liechtenstein to determine
under its own law that Mr. Nottebohm was its own national, and the correlative
obligation of Guatemala to recognize the Liechtenstein law in this regard—
opposability—are limited not by rigid rules of international law, but only by the rules
regarding abuse of right and fraud.
A difficulty presented by the link theory is that it relies upon a finding of fact that there
is nothing to indicate that Mr. Nottebohm's application for naturalization abroad was
motivated by any desire to break his ties with the Government of Germany. I am
unable to concur in making this finding at the present stage in the case.
In the first place, I do not think that international law, apart from abuse of right and
fraud, permits the consideration of the motives which led to naturalization as
determining its effects.
In the second place, the finding depends upon the examination of issues which are
part of the merits and which cannot be decided when dealing with the plea in bar.
In the third place, the breaking of ties with the country of origin is not essential to valid
and opposable naturalization. International law recognizes double nationality and the
present trend in State practice is towards double nationality, which necessarily
involves maintenance of the ties with the country of origin. It is noteworthy that in the
United Kingdom the policy of recognizing the automatic loss of British nationality on
naturalization abroad, which had been adopted in 1870, was abandoned in 1948.
Under the new British legislation, on naturalization abroad, a British citizen normally
maintains his ties with his country of origin.
In the fourth place, I am unable to agree that there is nothing to indicate that Mr.
Nottebohm's naturalization was motivated by a desire to break his ties with Germany.
There are three facts which prove that he was determined to break his ties with
Germany. The first is the fact of his application for naturalization, the second is the
taking of his oath of allegiance to Liechtenstein, and the third is his obtaining a
certificate of naturalization and a Liechtenstein passport.
The link theory is based, in part, on the fact that Liechtenstein waived the requirement
of three years' residence. At the time of the naturalization, Mr. Nottebohm was
temporarily resident in Liechtenstein; but he had not established domicile, and had no
immediate intention to do so. But I have difficulty in regarding lack of residence as a
decisive factor in the case.
It has been conceded by Counsel for Guatemala that "the majority of States, in one
form or another, either by their law or in their practice, allow for exceptional cases in
which they exempt the applicant for naturalization from the requirement of proof of
long-continued prior residence.'' This is another point on which both Parties are in
agreement, and the position has been fully established in the case.

I am of the opinion that the parties were right, and that, under the rules of positive
international law, Liechtenstein had the discretionary right to dispense with the
residential requirement. That being so, I cannot—in the absence of fraud or injury—
review the factors which may have influenced Liechtenstein in the exercise of a
discretionary power. It is not surprising that no precedent has been cited to the Court
in which—in the absence of fraud or injury to an adverse party—the exercise of a
discretionary power, possessed by a State under the principles of positive
international law, has been successfully questioned. If there had been such
precedent, it would certainly have been brought to the attention of the Court.
It is also suggested that the naturalization of Mr. Nottebohm was lacking in
genuineness, and did not give rise to a right of protection, because of his subsequent
conduct: that he did not abandon his residence and his business activities in
Guatemala, establish a business in Liechtenstein, and take up permanent residence.
Along the same lines, it is suggested that he did not incorporate himself in the body
politic which constitutes the Liechtenstein State.
In considering this point, it is necessary to bear in mind that there is no rule of
international law which would justify me in taking into account subsequent conduct as
relevant to the validity and opposability of naturalization.
Nevertheless I am unable to avoid consideration of his conduct since October 1939.
I have difficulty in accepting the position taken with regard to the nature of the State
and the incorporation of an individual in the State by naturalization. To my mind the
State is a concept broad enough to include not merely the territory and its inhabitants
but also those of its citizens who are resident abroad but linked to it by allegiance.
Most States regard non-resident citizens as a part of the body politic. In the case of
many countries such as China, France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the
non-resident citizens form an important part of the body politic and are numbered in
their hundreds of thousands or millions. Many of these non-resident citizens have
never been within the confines of the home State. I can see no reason why the
pattern of the body politic of Liechtenstein should or must be different from that of
other States.
In my opinion Mr. Nottebohm incorporated himself in the nonresident part of the body
politic of Liechtenstein. From the instant of his naturalization to the date of the
Judgment of this Court, he has not departed in his conduct from the position of a
member of the Liechtenstein State. He began by obtaining a passport in October
1939 and a visa from the Consulate of Guatemala. On his arrival in Guatemala in
January 1940, he immediately informed the Guatemalan Government and had himself
registered as a citizen of Liechtenstein. Upon his arrest in October 1943, he obtained
the diplomatic protection of Liechtenstein through the medium of the Swiss Consul.
On the commencement of the confiscation of his properties, he obtained diplomatic
protection from the same source and channel. After his release from internment he
was accorded full civil rights by the Government of the United States of America and
instituted and successfully maintained proceedings and negotiations in Washington
with a view to obtaining the release of assets which had been blocked, upon the
ground that he was a national of Liechtenstein. During the last nine years he has
been an active and resident member of the body politic of that State.
As regards residence and business, there is no rule of international law requiring a
naturalized person to undertake business activities and to reside in the country of his
allegiance. However, considering the question of subsequent conduct, I am unable to
disregard what really did happen.
To begin with, Mr. Nottebohm was 58 years of age at the time--or within two years of
the normal retirement age in the type of business activity in which he was engaged.
The evidence shows that he was actually contemplating retirement. In October 1939
he was largely occupied with plans to save the business, but I find it hard to believe
that he was not also thinking in terms of retirement and that Vaduz was in his mind.
Out of the 15½ years which have elapsed since naturalization, Mr. Nottebohm has
spent less than four in Guatemala, more than two in the United States, and nine years
in Vaduz.
It is true that, in the applications which were made in 1945 on his behalf with a view to
his return to Guatemala, it was stated that he intended to resume his domicile in that
country. But I am unable to overlook the fact that his return was absolutely essential
in order to conduct the 57 law suits to which I have referred above and to clear his
own good name from the charges of disloyalty which had been made against him. I
do not think that too much weight can be given to the statements made by his kinsfolk
in Guatemala with a view to obtaining the right of re-admission to that country.
The essential fact is that when, in 1946, he was released in midwinter in North
Dakota, deprived of all that he possessed in Guatemala and with all of his assets in
the United States blocked, he went back to the country of his allegiance. In my
opinion, the fact of his return to Liechtenstein and of his admission to Liechtenstein is
convincing evidence of the real and effective character of his link with Liechtenstein. It
was an unequivocal assertion by him through his conduct of the fact of his
Liechtenstein nationality, and an unequivocal recognition of that fact by Liechtenstein.
Further, I have difficulty in accepting two closely related findings of fact. The first is
that the naturalization did not alter the manner of life of Mr. Nottebohm. In my opinion,
a naturalization which led ultimately to his permanent residence in the country of his
allegiance altered the manner of life of a merchant who had hitherto been residing in
and conducting his business activities in Guatemala.
The second finding is that the naturalization was conferred in exceptional
circumstances of speed and accommodation. There are many countries, besides
Liechtenstein, in which expedition and good will are regarded as administrative
virtues. I do not think that these qualities impair the effectiveness or genuineness of
their administrative acts.
The link theory has been based on the view that the essential character of
naturalization and the relation between a State and its national justify the conclusion
that the naturalization of Mr. Nottebohm, though valid, was unreal and incapable of
giving rise to the right of diplomatic protection. I have difficulty in adopting this view
and it becomes necessary to consider the nature of naturalization and diplomatic
protection and the juridical character of the relationships which arose between
Guatemala and Liechtenstein on Mr. Nottebohm's return in 1940.
Nationality, and the relation between a citizen and the State to which he owes
allegiance, are of such a character that they demand certainty. When one considers
the occasions for invoking the relationship—emigration and immigration; travel;
treason; exercise of political rights and functions; military service and the like--it
becomes evident that certainty is essential.
There must be objective tests, readily established, for the existence and recognition of
the status. That is why the practice of States has steadfastly rejected vague and
subjective tests for the right to confer nationality—sincerity, fidelity, durability, lack of
substantial connection--and has clung to the rule of the almost unfettered
discretionary power of the State, as embodied in Article 1 of The Hague Draft
Convention of 1930.
Nationality and diplomatic protection are closely inter-related. The general rule of
international law is that
nationality gives rise to a right of diplomatic protection. Fundamentally the obligation
of a State to accord reasonable treatment to resident aliens and the correlative right
of protection are based on the consent of the States concerned. When an alien
comes to the frontier, seeking admission, either as a settler or on a visit, the State has
an unfettered right to refuse admission. That does not mean that it can deny the
alien's national status or refuse to recognize it. But by refusing admission, the State
prevents the establishment of legal relationships involving rights and obligations, as
regards the alien, between the two countries. On the other hand, by admitting the
alien, the State, by its voluntary act, brings into being a series of legal relationships
with the State of which he is a national.
As a result of the admission of an alien, whether as a permanent settler or as a visitor,
a whole series of legal relationships come into being. There are two States
concerned, to which I shall refer as the receiving State and the protecting State. The
receiving State becomes subject to a series of legal duties vis -a-vis the protecting
State, particularly the duty of reasonable and fair treatment. It acquires rights vis-a-vis
the protecting State and the individual, particularly the rights incident to local
allegiance and the right of deportation to the protecting State. At the same time the
protecting State acquires correlative rights and obligations vis-a-vis the receiving
State, particularly a diminution of its rights as against the individual resulting from the
local allegiance, the right to assert diplomatic protection and the obligation to receive
the individual on deportation. This network of rights and obligations is fundamentally
conventional in its origin—it begins with a voluntary act of the protecting State in
permitting the individual to take up residence in the other country, and the voluntary
act of admission by the receiving State. The scope and content of the rights are,
however, largely defined by positive international law. Nevertheless, the receiving
State has control at all stages because it can bring the situation to an end by
deportation.
The position is illustrated by what actually happened in the present case. Mr.
Nottebohm went to Guatemala 50 years ago as a German national and as a
permanent settler. Upon his admission as an immigrant, the whole series of legal
relationships came into being between Guatemala and Germany. Guatemala was
under a legal obligation vis-a-vis Germany to accord reasonable and fair treatment.
Guatemala had the right to deport Mr. Nottebohm to Ge rmany and to no other place.
Germany had the right of diplomatic protection and was under the legal obligation to
receive him on deportation. As a result of the naturalization in October 1939, the
whole network of legal relationships between Guatemala and Germany as regards
Mr. Nottebohm came to an end. Mr. Nottebohm returned to Guatemala in January
1940, having brought about a fundamental change in his legal relationships in that
country. He no longer had the status of a permanently settled alien of German
nationality. He was entering with a Liechtenstein passport and with Liechtenstein
protection.

The first step taken by him was the obtaining of a visa from the Guatemalan Consul
before departure. On arrival in Guatemala he immediately brought his new national
status to the attention of the Guatemalan Government on the highest level. His
registration under the Aliens’ Act as a German national was canceled and he was
registered as a Liechtenstein national. From the end of January 1940 he was treated
as such in Guatemala.
In my opinion, as a result of Mr. Nottebohm's admission to Guatemala and
establishment under the Guatemalan law as a resident of Liechtenstein nationality, a
series of legal relationships arose between Guatemala and Liechtenstein, the nature
of which has been sufficiently indicated above. From that time on Guatemala had the
right to deport Mr. Nottebohm to Liechtenstein, and Liechtenstein was under the
correlative obligation to receive him on deportation. Liechtenstein was entitled as of
right to furnish diplomatic protection to Mr. Nottebohm in Guatemala, and when that
right was exercised in October 1943, it was not questioned by Guatemala.
I am unable to concur in the view that the acceptance of Mr. Nottebohm by the
Guatemalan authorities as a settler of Liechtenstein nationality did not bring into being
a relationship between the two Governments. I do not think that the position of
Guatemala is in any way different from that of other States and I do not think that it
was possible for Guatemala to prevent the coming into being of the same kind of legal
relationships which would have taken place if Mr. Nottebohm had landed as a settler
in any other country.
When a series of legal relationships, rights and duties exists between two States, it is
not open to one of the States to bring the situation to an end by its unilateral action. In
my opinion such relationships came into being between Guatemala and Liechtenstein
when the former State accepted Mr. Nottebohm in 1940. It was open to Guatemala to
terminate the position by deportation but not to extinguish the right of Liechtenstein
under international law to protect its own national without the consent of that country.
There is one more aspect of this question to which I must refer. It is suggested that
Mr. Nottebohm obtained his naturalization with the sole motive of avoiding the legal
consequences of his nationality of origin. He was a German and Germany was at war,
but not with Guatemala. There can be little doubt that this was one of his motives, but
whether it was his sole motive is a matter of speculation.
There is apparently abundant evidence on this aspect of the case to which I have not
had access; evidence which would prove or disprove the contention that the
naturalization was part of a fraudulent scheme. But it is not permissible for me to look
at that evidence in dealing with a plea in bar. I must proceed at this stage on the
assumption that the naturalization was obtained in good faith and without fraud.
It has been complained that the purpose of the naturalization was to avoid the
operation of wartime measures in the event that Guatemala ultimately became
involved in war with Germany. In October 1939, if Mr. Nottebohm read the
newspapers—which is highly probable—he knew that Guatemala, in concert with the
other Pan-American States, was making every effort to maintain neutrality.
It is far more likely that, remembering the experience of Nottebohm Hermanos during
the first World War, he was seeking to protect his assets in the United States. The
suggestion that he foresaw Guatemalan belligerency is not supported by any
evidence and I cannot accept it.
Further, even if his main purpose had been to protect his property and business in the
event of Guatemalan belligerency, I do not think that it affected the validity or
opposability of the naturalization. There was no rule of international law and no rule in
the laws of Guatemala at the time forbidding such a course of action. Mr. Nottebohm
did not conceal the naturalization and informed the Government of Guatemala on the
highest level on his return to the country.
I do not think that I am justified in taking Mr. Nottebohm's motives into consideration—
in the absence of fraud or injury to Guatemala—but even if this particular motive is
considered, it cannot be regarded as preventing the existence of the right of
diplomatic protection.
In view of the foregoing circumstances it is necessary for me to reach the conclusion
that the two Parties before the Court were right in adopting the position that the right
of Liechtenstein to determine under its own law that Mr. Nottebohm was its own
national, and the correlative obligation of Guatemala to recognize the Liechtenstein
law in this regard are limited not by rigid rules of international law, but only by the
rules regarding abuse of right and fraud.
Accordingly I am of the opinion that the Court should have proceeded to examine the
merits of the case.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ADMISSION AS CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
OH HEK HOW, petitioner appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Eliezer M. Echavez for petitioner-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General
Felicisimo R. Rosete and Solicitor Santiago M. Kapunan for oppositor-appellant.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
A decision granting his petition for naturalization as citizen of the Philippines having
been rendered on January 16, 1964, petitioner Oh Hek How filed, on January 17,
1966, a motion alleging that he had complied with the requirements of Republic Act
No. 530 and praying that he be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as such citizen
and issued the corresponding certificate of naturalization. Upon petitioner's testimony,
taken on February 9, 1966, the date set for the hearing of said motion, the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte issued forthwith an order authorizing the
taking of said oath. On that same date, petitioner took it and the certificate of
naturalization was issued to him.
The Government seasonably gave notice of its intention to appeal from said order of
February 9, 1966 and filed its record on appeal. Before the same was approved, it
also moved to cancel petitioner's certificate of naturalization, upon the ground, among
others, that it was issued and the oath taken before said order of February 9, 1966,
had become final and executory. Acting upon this motion and petitioner's opposition
thereto, the court issued, on October 3, 1966, an order granting the motion, but, at the
same time, authorizing the taking of a new oath by the petitioner and the issuance in
his favor of another certificate of naturalization, after thirty (30) days from notice to the
Solicitor General. Thereafter, or on November 26, 1966, the court approved the
record on appeal and, once more, authorized the petitioner to "take a new or proper
oath to validate the first one made on February 9, 1966." The case is now before us
on said record on appeal filed by the Government.
At the outset, it is obvious that the oath of allegiance taken by petitioner on November
28, 1966, and the certificate of naturalization issued to him in pursuance thereof, as
well as the authority given therefor by the lower court, are null and void. Indeed, the
order of February 9, had not — and up to the present has not — become final and
executory in view of the appeal duly taken by the Government. What is more,
petitioner's second oath was taken, not only after the filing of the notice of appeal
1 costs against said petitioner, who is, moreover, directed to surrender the
and the submission of the record on appeal, but also after the approval thereof. In
other words, the lower court had already lost its jurisdiction over the case.
2 of Zamboanga del Norte, within ten (10) days after this decision shall have become
Again, petitioner's net income in 1960 and 1961 was P3,945.65 and P5,105.79,
respectively, or from about P330 to P425 a month. His income tax return for 1962,
filed subsequently to the institution of this case, showed a net income of P6,485.50 for
that year, or about P540 a month. Considering that petitioner has a wife and three (3)
children, one of them of school age, at the time of the filing of his application for
naturalization, his aforementioned income is not a lucrative one. Indeed, it has been
held that the following incomes are not lucrative, from the viewpoint of our
3 4
naturalization laws, namely: (1) P4,200 or P5,000 a year for one married, with five
5
(5) children; 5 (2) P6,000 a year for one married, with two (2) minor children; and (3)
6 7
P6,000 or P6,300 a year for one married, with only one (1) child.
Lastly, it is conceded that petitioner has not required from the Minister of the Interior
of Nationalist China the permission required by the laws thereof for a valid
8
renunciation of his Chinese citizenship. In Go A. Leng v. Republic, a decision
granting the application for naturalization of a Chinese national was reversed by this
Court, upon the ground, among others, of "his failure to secure" the aforementioned
permission.
It is argued that the same is not required by our laws and that the naturalization of an
alien, as a citizen of the Philippines, is governed exclusively by such laws and cannot
be controlled by any foreign law. Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 provides,
however, that before the naturalization certificate is issued, the petitioner shall
"solemnly swear," inter alia, that he renounces "absolutely and forever all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate" and particularly to the state "of which" he
is "a subject or citizen." The obvious purpose of this requirement is to divest him of his
former nationality, before acquiring Philippine citizenship, because, otherwise, he
would have two nationalities and owe allegiance to two (2) distinct sovereignties,
which our laws do not permit, except that, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2639, "the
acquisition of citizenship by a natural-born Filipino citizen from one of the Iberian and
any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries shall not produce loss or forfeiture
of his Philippine citizenship, if the law of that country grants the same privilege to its
citizens and such had been agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the
foreign country from which citizenship is acquired." The question of how a Chinese
citizen may strip himself of that status is necessarily governed — pursuant to Articles
15 and 16 of our Civil Code — by the laws of China, not by those of the Philippines.
9
As a consequence, a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of the
Philippines, unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist China requiring
previous permission of its Minister of the Interior for the renunciation of nationality.
10
The view to the contrary, adhered to in Parado v. Republic, Chausintek v. Republic,
11 12
and Lim So v. Republic has been superseded by our ruling in the subsequent
13
case of Go A. Leng v. Republic which we hereby reiterate.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and the oath of allegiance taken,
on November 28, 1966, by petitioner Oh Hek How, as well as the certificate of
naturalization issued in pursuance thereto, are hereby declared null and void, with
aforementioned certificate of naturalization to the Clerk of the Court of First Instance
final. It is so ordered.
EREMES KOOKOORITCHKIN, petitioner,
vs.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, oppositor.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Florencio Villamor
for appellant.
L. D. Lockwood and Manuel O. Chan for appellee.
PERFECTO, J.:
In August, 1941, appellee filed with the lower court a petition for naturalization,
accompanied with supporting affidavits of two citizens, copy of a declaration of
intention sworn in July, 1940, and proper notice of the hearing. The petition was finally
set for hearing on December 18, 1941, but it was held on that date because the
province was invaded by the Japanese forces on December 14, and the case
remained pending until the records were destroyed during the military operations for
liberation in March, 1945. The case was declared reconstituted on May 10, 1947, and
the evidence was presented on August 28 and September 30, 1947. On the same
day resolution was issued granting the petition.
Although appellant was represented at the hearing and cross-examined the witnesses
for the petitioner, he did not file an opposition or presented any evidence.
The lower court made the findings of fact in the following paragraphs of its resolution:
Eremes Kookooritchkin applies for Philippine citizenship naturalization under
the provisions of Commonwealth Act 473, as amended by Act 535.
The records shows that in August, 1941, he filed his petition for
naturalization supported by the affidavits of ex-Judge Jaime M. Reyes and
Dr. Salvador Mariano, both residents of Camarines Sur. In the preceding
year, in July, 1940 to be precise, he filed his declaration of intention to
become a citizen of this country. Notice of the hearing was published as
required by law.
It was established at the hearing that the petitioner is a native-born Russian,
having first seen the light of day on November 4, 1897 in the old City of St.
Petersburg, Russia. He grew up as a citizen of the defunct Imperial Russian
Government under the Czars. World War I found him in the military service
of this Government. In 1915 he volunteered for the Imperial Russian navy
and was sent to the Navy Aviation School. He fought with the Allies in the
Baltic Sea, was later transferred to the eastern front in Poland, and much
later was sent as a navy flier to Asia Minor. In the latter part of the war, but
before the Russian capitulation, he was transferred to the British Air Force
under which he served for fourteen months. When the revolution broke out in
Russia in 1917, he joined the White Russian Army at Vladivostok and fought
against the Bolsheviks until 1922 when the White Russian Army was
overwhelmed by the Bolsheviks. As he refused to join the Bolshevik regime,
he fled by sea from Vladivostok to Shanghai and from this Chinese port he
found his way to Manila, arriving at this port as a member of a group of
White Russians under Admiral Stark in March, 1923. He stayed in Manila for
about seven months, then moved to Olongapo, Zambales, where he resided
for about a year, and from this place he went to Iriga, Camarines Sur, where
he established his permanent residence since May, 1925. He has remained
a resident of this municipality, except for a brief period from 1942 to July,
1945, when by reason of his underground activities he roamed mountains of
Caramoan as a guerrilla officer. After liberation he returned to Iriga where
again he resides up to the present time.
The applicant is married to a Filipino by the name of Concepcion Segovia,
with whom he has one son named Ronald Kookooritchkin. He is at present
studying in Saint Agnes Academy, at Legaspi, Albay, a school duly
recognized by the Government.
The applicant is shop superintendent of A. L. Ammen Transportation
Company, with about eighty Filipino employees working under him. He
receives an annual salary of P13,200 with free quarters and house
allowance. He also owns stocks and bonds of this and other companies.
The applicant speaks and writes English and the Bicol dialect. Socially he
intermingles with the Filipinos, attending parties, dances and other social
functions with his wife. He has a good moral character and believes in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution. He has never been accused
of any crime. On the other hand, he has always conducted himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during his entire period of residence in
Camarines Sur, in his relations with the constituted authorities as well as
with the community.
Although he could have lived in ease by maintaining good relations with the
enemy by reason of his being Russian-born during the years preceding the
declaration of war by Russia against Japan, the applicant of his own volition
chose to cast his lot with the guerrilla movement and fought the enemy in
several encounters in the Province of Camarines Sur. He belonged to the
guerrilla outfit of Colonel Padua with rank of major. Upon the arrival of the
forces of liberation he was attached to the American Army from April to June,
1945.
Although a Russian by birth he is not a citizen of Soviet Russia. He disclaims
allegiance to the present Communist Government of Russia. He is,
therefore, a stateless refugee in this country, belonging to no State, much
less to the present Government of the land of his birth to which he is
uncompromisingly opposed. He is not against organized government or
affiliated with any association which upholds and teaches doctrine opposing
all organized governments. He does not believe in the necessity or propriety
of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or
predominance of his ideas. Neither is he a polygamist or a believer in the
practice of polygamy. He is not suffering from any mental alienation or
incurable contagious disease.
Appellant assigns four errors in the appealed resolution. We will consider them
separately.
I petitioner if his residence is illegal, as rightly contended by appellee, can be taken as
Appellant claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the declaration of
intention to become a Filipino citizen filed by appellee is invalid and insufficient as a
basis for the petition of naturalization. The question calls for the application of the
following provision of section 5 of the Revised Naturalization Law:
No declaration shall be valid until entry for permanent residence has been
established and a certificate showing the date, place and manner of his
arrival has been issued.
Appellant alleges that no documentary or testimonial evidence was introduced to
establish the fact that appellee had lawfully been admitted into the Philippines for
permanent residence.
In the reconstituted declaration (page 11, record on appeal) the following can be read:
I arrived at the Port of Manila on or about the first day of March, 1923, as
shown by the attached certificate of arrival or landing certificate of residence.
The records of the Bureau of Justice, where the declarations of intention to become a
Filipino citizen were filed, had been lost or destroyed during the battle for the
liberation of Manila, and the certificate alluded to has not been reconstituted.
Appellant's contention that attachment of the certificate of arrival is essential to the
validity of a declaration finds no support in the wordings of the law, as the above-
quoted section 5 of Commonwealth Act no. 473 uses the words "has been issued.
Appellee suggests that we would not consider the question here raised by appellant,
the latter having failed to raise it in lower court and points out that there is testimonial
evidence showing appellee's arrival March, 1923, and that he was lawfully admitted
for permanent residence, and the testimony of petitioner has not been refuted.
Appellee's alleges that the office of the President has certified that it is a matter of
record that petitioner was one of the Russian refugees who entered the Philippines
under the command of Admiral Stark, the facts regarding arrival of the latter fleet
being a matter of common knowledge, widely publicized in the newspapers at the
time, of which this Court may properly take judicial notice under section 5 of Rule 123.
When the fleet entered the Philippine waters, it was met by a Governor General Wood
who, later, took the matter up with the authorities in Washington in lengthy
correspondence, and the 1,200 persons manning the fleet were allowed to land and
to remain in the Philippines or proceed to other countries, except about 800 who were
allowed to go to the United States and given free transportation on the naval transport
"Merritt." The ships of the fleet were sold in the Philippines.
The undisputed fact that the petitioner has been continuously residing in the
Philippines for about 25 years, without having been molested by the authorities, who
are presumed to have been regularly performing their duties and would have arrested
evidence that he is enjoying permanent residence legally. That a certificate of arrival
has been issued is a fact that should be accepted upon the petitioner's undisputed
statement in his declaration of July, 1940, that the certificate cannot be supposed that
the receiving official would have accepted the declaration without the certificate
mentioned therein as attached thereto.
We conclude that petitioner's declaration is valid under section 5 of the Naturalization
Law, failure to reconstitute the certificate of arrival notwithstanding. What an
unreconstituted document intended to prove may be shown by other competent
evidence.
II
The second assignment of error touches upon two questions, that the lower court
erred (1) in not finding that appellee has not established a legal residence in the
Philippines, and (2) in not finding that he cannot speak and write any of the principal
Philippine languages.
The first question has already been disposed of in the above discussion. Perusal of
the testimonies on record leads to the conclusion that petitioner has shown legal
residence in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years as
required by section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 473.
As to the next question, appellant alleges that in the oral test at the hearing, it was
demonstrated that petitioner has only a smattering of Bicol, the Filipino language that
petitioner alleges to know, and he cannot speak it as he was not able to translate from
English to Bicol questions asked by the court and the provincial fiscal, although, in the
continuation of the hearing on September 30, 1947, "surprisingly enough, he
succeeded answering correctly in Bicol the questions propounded by his counsel,
however, he fumbled and failed to give the translation of such a common word as
'love' which the fiscal asked of him.
The lower court made the finding of fact that applicant speaks and writes English and
Bicol and there seems to be no question about the competency of the judge who
made the pronouncement, because he has shown by the appealed resolution and by
his questions propounded to appellee, that he has command of both English and
Bicol.
The law has not set a specific standard of the principal Philippine languages. A great
number of standards can be set. There are experts in English who say that
Shakespeare has used in his works 15,000 different English words, and the King's
Bible about 10,000, while about 5,000 are used by the better educated persons and
about 3,000 by the average individual. While there may be persons ambitious enough
to have a command of the about 600,000 words recorded in the Webster's
International Dictionary, there are authorities who would reduce basic English to a few
hundred words. Perhaps less than one hundred well selected words will be enough
for the ordinary purposes of daily life.
There is a reason to believe that the lower court's pronouncement is well taken
considering the fact that, after he was liberated in 1942 from the Japanese in the
Naga prison, petitioner joined the guerrilla in the Bicol region, took part in encounters
and skirmishes against the Japanese, and remained with the guerrilla until the
Americans liberated the Bicol provinces. If appellee with his smattering of Bicol was
able to get along with his Bicol comrades in the hazardous life of the resistance
movement, we believe that his knowledge of the language satisfies the requirement of
the law.
But appellant contends that there is no piece of positive evidence to support
petitioner's allegation that he can write too in the Bicol language. There, is, however,
on record circumstantial evidence from which it can be concluded that petitioner ought
to know also how to write Bicol. We know that Bicol, as all the important Philippine
languages, uses the same alphabet used in English, and it is much easier to write
Bicol than English, because it is phonetic. Vowels and consonants have in them
single and not interchangeable phonetic values, while English words deviate very
often from the basic sounds of the alphabet. The ability to write cannot be denied to a
person like petitioner, who has undergone the exacting technical training to be able to
render services as flier in the Russian Naval Squadron in the Baltic Sea and in the
British Air Forces during the first World War. The difference between the Cyrillic
alphabet, as now used by Russians, and our Roman alphabet, cannot weigh much to
deny petitioner the ability to use the latter. A person who has shown the command of
English which can be seen in his testimony on record can easily make use of an
alphabet of twenty or more letters universally used in this country where he has been
residing continuously for 25 years.
III
Appellant contends that the lower court erred in finding appellee stateless and not a
Russian citizen and in not finding that he has failed to establish that he is not
disqualified for Philippine citizenship under section 4 (h) of the Revised Naturalization
Law.
It is contended that petitioner failed to show that under the laws of Russia, appellee
has lost his Russian citizenship and failed to show that Russia grants to Filipinos the
right to become a naturalized citizens or subjects thereof. The controversy centers on
the question as to whether petitioner is a Russian citizen or is stateless.
Petitioner testified categorically that he is not a Russian citizen and that he has no
citizenship. His testimony supports the lower court's pronouncement that petitioner is
a stateless refugee in this country.
Appellant points out that petitioner stated in his petition for naturalization that he is
citizen or subject of the Empire of Russia, but the Empire of Russia has ceased to
exist since the Czars were overthrown in 1917 by the Bolshevists, and the petitioner
disclaims allegiance or connection with the Soviet Government established after the
overthrow of the Czarist Government.
We do not believe that the lower court erred in pronouncing appellee stateless.
Appellee's testimony, besides being uncontradicted, is supported by the well-known
fact that the ruthlessness of modern dictatorship has scattered throughout the world a
large number of stateless refugees or displaced persons, without country and without
flag. The tyrannical intolerance of said dictatorships toward all opposition induced
them to resort to beastly oppression, concentration camps and blood purges, and it is
only natural that the not-so-fortunate ones who were able to escape to foreign
countries should feel the loss of all bonds of attachment to the hells which were
formerly their fatherland's. Petitioner belongs to that group of stateless refugees.
Knowing, as all cultured persons all over the world ought to know, the history, nature
and character of the Soviet dictatorship, presently the greatest menace to humanity
and civilization, it would be technically fastidious to require further evidence of
petitioner's claim that he is stateless than his testimony that he owes no allegiance to
the Russian Communist Government and, is because he has been at war with it, he
fled from Russia to permanently reside in the Philippines. After finding in this country
economic security in a remunerative job, establishing a family by marrying a Filipina
with whom he has a son, and enjoying for 25 years the freedoms and blessings of our
democratic way of life, and after showing his resolution to retain the happiness he
found in our political system to the extent of refusing to claim Russian citizenship
even to secure his release from the Japanese and of casting his lot with that of our
people by joining the fortunes and misfortunes of our guerrillas, it would be beyond
comprehension to support that the petitioner could feel any bond of attachment to the
Soviet dictatorship.
IV
The fourth and last assignment of error need not be discussed, it being only a sequel
of the other assignments and has necessarily been disposed of in their discussion.
The appealed resolution is affirmed.
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were
candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The
other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
1 remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition
for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private
respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
2 On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted
the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of
private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under §40(d) of the
Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running
for any elective position. The COMELEC's Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for
disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the
office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections.
The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an
American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration
and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent
admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and
alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of
a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United
States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is
considered in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding
his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino
citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent
Manzano is born a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he
holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is
disqualified from the position for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding
dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local
position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent
Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-
Mayor of Makati City.
3
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the
COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati
City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.
4
Petitioner's motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc
rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the
COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private
respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
5
elections. The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by
operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the
principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935
Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at
the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to
the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His
parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau
of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration.
This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship,
as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an
oath of allegiance to the United States.
 It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of
majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections
of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US
citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer
had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the
Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final.
Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among
the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one
hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes
over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one
hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a
margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes.
Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two
hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it
would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be
embroiled in complex legal issues involving private international law
which may well be settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs.
Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the
resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998,
ordering the cancellation of the respondent's certificate of
candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be
QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati
City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of
Canvassers, upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and
proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the
winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the
evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City
of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the
COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of
vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that —
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen
when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he
attained the age of majority when he was already
37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he
(merely) registered himself as a voter and voted
in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of
Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the
Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that,
effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even
assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the
elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent
Manzano — whether petitioner Mercado his personality to bring this suit considering
that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto
Mamaril nor was petitioner's motion for leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure
of the COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and,
therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for
intervention:
Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. —
Any person allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before
or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted by the
Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action or
proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or
when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or
proceeding.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission. — In allowing or disallowing a
motion for intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the
exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenor's
rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.
 Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the
matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is "a defeated
candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be
proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City if the private respondent be
ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment."
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene
in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of
the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis
of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is
that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still
has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to
6 7
intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, reiterated in several cases, only applies
to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is
whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the
winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File
Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and
petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from
running for [an] elective local position" under §40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto
Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter
of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter
was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion
for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to
have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor.
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which provides:
Any candidate who his been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification
even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for intervention
was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant
petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the
case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioner's motion
for intervention but also with the substantive issues respecting private respondent's
alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano
possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a
candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under §40 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as "disqualified
from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship." This
provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati.
8
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who
sides with him in this case, contends that through §40(d) of the Local Government
Code, Congress has "command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons
possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office."
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises
when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
9
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows
the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his
part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship
clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of
the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign
countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien
fathers if by the laws of their father's' country such children are
citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the
former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they
are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without
performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly
possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, §5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner
10
Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows:
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not
dual citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas
Committee according to which a dual allegiance — and I reiterate a
dual allegiance — is larger and more threatening than that of mere
double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never
insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed
marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question
double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take
constitutional cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For
example, we all know what happens in the triennial elections of the
Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which
consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a
Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact
chat the Filipino-Chinese community is represented in the
Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until
recently, sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the People's
Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for
overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some
European and Latin countries were represented, which was
dissolved after several years because of diplomatic friction. At that
time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas
Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this
unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already
Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a
second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close
note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday,
including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the
lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially
Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about
minority claims on our natural resources.
Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to
Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is already
happening. Some of the great commercial places in downtown
Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese — it is of
common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow
when we have to endure a capital famine which also means
economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask — that the Committee kindly
consider incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the
article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL
ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE
DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens
11
with dual allegiance, thus:
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern
about dual citizenship in the sense that it implies a double
allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us who spoke
then in a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to the
sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself
which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the
Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to
that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the
defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this,
Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national
security. In the course of those debates, I think some noted the fact
that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the decision to
establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China
was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos
still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that
some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign
government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when
the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated.
And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double
citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is
repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate
what the Committee said that this could be left to the determination
of a future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the
real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say,
potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double
allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed amendment at
the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate double
citizenship?
Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854,
§20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons with
mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if,
upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition
is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G.
Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission,
pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no
control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino
mother. But whether she is considered a citizen of another country is something
12
completely beyond our control."
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate
their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state
and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on §40(d) between
13
Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification
of line 41, page 17: "Any person with dual citizenship" is disqualified
to run for any elective local position. Under the present Constitution,
Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines
but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic.
There is no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon
reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine
citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one
belonging to the country of his or her father and one belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the
person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means
that at the moment when he would want to run for public office, he
has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport
but the country of origin or the country of the father claims that
person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There
are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for
public office would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to
be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution
does not require an election. Under the Constitution, a person
whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen
without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is:
Under the Gentleman's example, if he does not renounce his other
citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really
interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the
Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I have
only one citizenship."
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of
Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one citizenship,
and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the
Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he
exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges other
citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce
14
"all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty" of
which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of
15
naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic, it was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an
oath that he renounce, his loyalty to any other country or
government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is
satisfied and compiled with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive
prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly
enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign
law may or should interfere with its operation and application. If the
requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into
our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our
legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a
foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of
course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It
would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and
power of the people of this Republic.
III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on
September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties
agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United
States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine
elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent "effectively renounced his U.S.
citizenship under American law," so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine
elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the
alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it
was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his
American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind §349 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that "A person who is a national
of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . .
. (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or
plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." To be sure this
provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk
16
as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations.
However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American
citizenship. Private respondent's certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998,
contained the following statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF
"NATURAL-BORN" OR "NATURALIZED")
NATURAL-BORN
xxx xxx xxx
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A,
BARANGAY SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI,
PROVINCE OF NCR.
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT
TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I
WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND
ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL
ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY
CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON
MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR
PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS
STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
17
Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held:
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an
American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively
give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local
Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any
elective local position?" We answer this question in the negative, as
there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS
at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that,
when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote
that he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenship — long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was
stateless in the interim — when he abandoned and renounced his
US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino
citizenship."
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated
December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner
Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he
took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government when he ran for Governor in 1988,
in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of
candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality
long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted
by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the
Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of
capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance
contained in private respondent's certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute
renunciation that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been made upon
private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of
Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered
as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he
holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on
April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy
on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be
considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination
18
of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC applies
mutatis mundatis to private respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino
and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate staring he
is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he
Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not
still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of
Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied
renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the
renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be
"express," it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either
"express" or "implied."
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen;
that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will
defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent
has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made
under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the
loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In
19
Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied
for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken
against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign
nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January
15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336,
dismissing the petition for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R.
Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 elections
for governor of Davao Oriental.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome,
Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of
Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of
fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.
On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the
Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in the
electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as
Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In
1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was
contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as
EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship.
However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine
citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition, ratiocinating
thus:
"A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution shows
that respondent was able to produce documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of
her late father... and consequently, prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue of
the Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner to the contrary
notwithstanding.
On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no other
evidence substantial in nature surfaced to confirm the allegations of petitioner that
respondent is an Australian citizen and not a Filipino. Express renunciation of
citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an
equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its significance and consequence.
The evidence adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that
respondent contemplated renunciation of her Filipino citizenship".
1 Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian
In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as
governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for
disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the COMELEC, First Division,
contesting her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the
COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC 92-54.
The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she
ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her
candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.
On July 17, 1998, the COMELEC’s First Division came out with a Resolution
dismissing the petition, and disposing as follows:
"Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose the
instant case on the merits trying it de novo, the above table definitely shows that
petitioner herein has presented no new evidence to disturb the Resolution of this
Commission in SPA No. 95-066. The present petition merely restates the same
matters and incidents already passed upon by this Commission not just in 1995
Resolution but likewise in the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth any
new evidence and matter substantial in nature, persuasive in character or sufficiently
provocative to compel reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the present
petition follows as a matter of course.
xxx xxx xxx
"WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and issues
tendered, We find no convincing reason or impressive explanation to disturb and
reverse the Resolutions promulgated by this Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-
066. This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the present
petition.
SO ORDERED."
2
Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution but to
no avail. The same was denied by the COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of
January 15, 1999.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition; questioning
the citizenship of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is
a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her
father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus
sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she
was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under
citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic
Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified
to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC
Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino
citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian
citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of
Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of
Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR), and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private
respondent had renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in her application
for alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private
respondent expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or subject of
Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and operated to
disqualify her to run for elective office.
As regards the COMELEC’s finding that private respondent had renounced her
Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian passport cancelled on February 11,
1992, as certified to by the Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that
the said acts did not automatically restore the status of private respondent as a
Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire
Philippine citizenship she must comply with the mandatory requirements for
repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to public
office did not mean the restoration of her Filipino citizenship since the private
respondent was not legally repatriated. Coupled with her alleged renunciation of
Australian citizenship, private respondent has effectively become a stateless person
and as such, is disqualified to run for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner
concluded.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the
principle of res judicata to the case under consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya
3
Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration, that:
"xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority
decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. xxx"
The petition is unmeritorious.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of
the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines
nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier
Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino
citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian.
Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that
time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic
acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill
of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as
the Jones Law.
Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine
islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:
SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who
were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-
nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such
entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December
tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of
peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become
citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein
provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and
such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United
States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the
United States if residing therein. (underscoring ours)
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects
on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be
Philippine citizens. Private respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on
January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true
copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and
the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of
the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforo’s
daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of
the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle
of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wit:
 (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood
4 5
relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen,
having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not
tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of
jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship
resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a
Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress
this contention, petitioner cited private respondent’s application for an Alien Certificate
of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September
19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws
of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign
country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the
Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary
pardon or amnesty has been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the
laws in force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be
express. Petitioner’s contention that the application of private respondent for an alien
certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue
6
was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC and in the more recent case of
7
Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was
a holder of a certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no
longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration was not
tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that
respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport on April 22,
1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati,
were just assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of
an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts
constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her
claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of
8
citizenship, the same must be express. As held by this court in the aforecited case of
Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an
express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application of the herein
private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an
Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of
assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same.
Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian
and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was
born in another country has not been included as a ground for losing one’s Philippine
citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine
citizenship, petitioner’s claim that respondent must go through the process of
repatriation does not hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had
dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing
Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, which states:
"SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
xxx xxx xxx
 13
(d) Those with dual citizenship; However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic, an exception to this general rule was
recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata
xxx xxx xxx may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:

Again, petitioner’s contention is untenable. 1) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy
where said person is a party;
In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified "dual citizenship"
as used in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, 2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in
9
Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. Recognizing situations in the resolution thereof, and
which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as an involuntary
consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another 3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to
citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced: Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did
not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may
"xxx the phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to
14
xxx 20 must be understood as referring to ‘dual allegiance’. Consequently, persons make the effort easier or simpler. Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on
with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification." the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54
which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically evidence adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these
disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or supervening event to
candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue
upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.
10
with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce
11
foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions,
so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336
citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and AFFIRMED.
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath,
operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for
herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs.
terminated her Australian citizenship.
SO ORDERED.
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent
executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in
the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And,
as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was
cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of
Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were
enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez.
Since her renunciation was effective, petitioner’s claim that private respondent must
go through the whole process of repatriation holds no water.

Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or

administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not
considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing
12
the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration. He insists that the
same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.

Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res
judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship.
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang
vs. Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents. stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20
August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
x-----------------------------x
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier,
G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004 Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition
docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon
vs. the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent. by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
x-----------------------------x father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004 could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate
birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if
vs. no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO after the birth of respondent.
KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004,
DECISION petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy
of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in
VITUG, J.: Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and
concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his
bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are
aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a
deserving of the privilege. It is a "precious heritage, as well as an inestimable
1 certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office,
acquisition," that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or
attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo
by those who dispute it.
Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a
certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the
profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our
people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe,
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the
Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency,
more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the
a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos,
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division
colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F.
traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe,
less than distinctly Filipino. d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844,
Antecedent Case Settings No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the
certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract
between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando
Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the
Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during
World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit.
Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration.
The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10
February 2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court
conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary
restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would
stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No.
161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. ‘Fernando Poe, Jr.’), and
Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both
challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII,
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original
and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC
deny due course to or cancel FPJ’s certificate of candidacy for alleged
misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before
the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code –
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as required under Section
74 hereof is false" –
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the
Omnibus Election Code -
"Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In
addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution,
the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose
of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections" -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would
authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the
2 3
Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads –
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any
case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its
submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted
for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial
power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law which power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government."
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly
elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view
could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed,
and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the
highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634,
invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in
assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-
003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly
instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and
the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential
and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs.
4
Roxas, as "not (being) justiciable" controversies or disputes involving contests on the
elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The
constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No.
1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear
and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-
President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same."
Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption
of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have
implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would
now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election
scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto
which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to
dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12,
Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,"
promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this
premise -
"Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President of the Philippines.
"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-
President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A
petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or
for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the
Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the
proclamation of the winner."
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps,
5
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. In such context, the
election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest
number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-
election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before
it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency
before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs.
Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez
vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for
want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background
on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who,
sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in
6
the administration of justice and in the holding of an office. Aristotle saw its
significance if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as
being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a
7
self-sufficient existence. The concept grew to include one who would both govern
and be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could
be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one
8
hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other. In its ideal setting, a citizen
was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the
general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th
century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established
the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty
9
and justice. Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political
citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political
10
power. The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social
citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and
11
social security. The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare
state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of
development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the
12
internationalization of citizenship.
The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but
13
"subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects." In church records, the natives were called
'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on
citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number
made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of
Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those
14
explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion,
promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the
15
Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts; however,
three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the
16
Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841, the Royal Decree of 23
August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine
 17
Islands, and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was
18
expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands
because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of
the Ultramar among which this country was included, would be governed by special
19
laws.
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December
1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish
citizens. -
"(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of
Spain,
"(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled
20
inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy."
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of
decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to
an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international
law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all
political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain
virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the
21
United States. Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the
native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by
its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over
which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may
remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all
their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property
or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their
industry, commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to
such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory
they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before
a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications
of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in
default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to
have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.
Thus –
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
22
hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress."
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States
Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be
Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however,
also ceased to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports
describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United
States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the
Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of
1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the
Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein,
who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided
in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
23
signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight."
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of
th
the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11 day of April 1899. The term
"inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was
a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or
24
before 11 April 1899.
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April
1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the
Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the
time, that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle
of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed those born in the
25
Philippine Archipelago within that period. More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment
to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by
law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the
United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."
26
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens"
had for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the
first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in
his slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act,
also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of
1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -
"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as
shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United
States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some
other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for,
is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and
such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the
United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the
laws of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a
citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April
1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen
of some other country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a
mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such
link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood
relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the
Philippines -
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil
law provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their
Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in
discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting
their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of
Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of
Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the
provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -
"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that –
"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her
Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under
the law to have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution,
except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation
generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years
of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
27
Philippine citizenship."
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the
regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring
28
citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in
vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a
29
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs
(1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal
30
of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood
relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou,
married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of
Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however,
identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old
at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of
FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Español father,
Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Español mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner
was an "uncertified" copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F.
Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the
same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and
a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an
American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20
August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly,
an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the
entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his
parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from
the documents would be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16
September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84
years old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a
natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie
Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are
documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have
been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before
the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for
respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted
as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by
respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in
evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts
which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of
marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the
death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all
admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his argument. All
three documents were certified true copies of the originals.
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
"Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
"x x x xxx xxx
"(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is
recorded in a public office."
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate
of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima
facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated."
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made
therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the
statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the
routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record
31
which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September
1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed
that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still
a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines
during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing
record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner,
however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the
same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be
San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be
sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at
the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely
doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete
records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status
of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the
father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son
according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08
December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the
Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or
paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or
compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the
putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a
32
will, or a public document. Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the
Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -
"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn
to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father
refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the
document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to
give therein any information by which such father could be identified."
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or
sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as
33 34
being an authoritative document of recognition. In Mendoza vs. Mella, the Court
ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the
question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is
merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as
sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance,
in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both
parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to
its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have
happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to
be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth
certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition
of a natural child may also be made, according to the same Article 131. True
enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the document
that the parent recognizes the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the
document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently
executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the
only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public
35
document." In Pareja vs. Pareja, this Court defined what could constitute such a
document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents,
those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by
notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their
office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means
by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be
expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in
any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers
and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as
natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when
the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim
legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass
exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however,
could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic
writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply
as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a
public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other competent
official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article
175 provide:
 "Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
"(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or
"(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
"Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during
his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die
during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a
period of five years within which to institute the action.
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding
the death of either or both of the parties.
"x x x xxx x x x.
"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent."
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code
reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws."
36
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals, the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should
be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article
2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child
shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the
effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278
may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea
of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in
favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to
merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to
indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect
his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions
on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the
context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the
organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been]
defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations
of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and
those which exist among members of a society for the protection of private
37
interests."
38
In Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster, the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign
country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those
dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the
husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their
properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of
conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for
divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general, the
civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of the
spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of
the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article
15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional
provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found
39
in different parts of the Civil Code, such as on successional rights and family
40
relations. In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child
of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such
41
legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law and not his political
status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory
attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining
proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in
the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain,
the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to
bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood
was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish
Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code
became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains
and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on
the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status
should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that
prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof
of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters
alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and
should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded
from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
`pedigree’ includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of
the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected
with pedigree."
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already
dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the
declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d)
declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the
relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question
must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie
Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove
the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living
together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house,
and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing
in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do
hereby declare that:
"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe,
more popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr.,’ or `FPJ’.
"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ’ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's
Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
"x x x xxx xxx
"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while
they were students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also
introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
"8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children,
Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our
mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate
until the liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months between 1943-
1944.
"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4)
more children after Ronald Allan Poe.
"x x x xxx xxx
"18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew,
Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child
of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or
would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from
body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent
could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs.
42
Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of
the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat
(STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has
two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage.
Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not
hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts
should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations
presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioner’s Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on
July 5, 1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his
subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate
child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence
introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of
respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20
August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each
other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make
FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so
followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his
43 44
stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo, citing Chiongbian vs. de Leo
and Serra vs. Republic.
45
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is
most convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of
them. If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis
mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under
the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis
mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum
which did not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely
into these cases.
"First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a
Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the
child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the
stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus
sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized
stepfather.
"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate
son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had
become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution
pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was
illegitimate here.
"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a
Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino
because of his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing
there about invidious jus sanguinis.
46
"Finally, Paa vs. Chan. This is a more complicated case. The case was
about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan.
Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got
his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that
there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother.
The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was
not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a
natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
"The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter
dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were
Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This
statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was
absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and
simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual
foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child,
and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate
child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long
47
ago by People vs. Cayat. I would grant that the distinction between
legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x
But real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences
may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.
"x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public
service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an
illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the
child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness
of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child
 from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of
his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is
neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction
transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated."
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court),
Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed
similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter
dicta, should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its
mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the
illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had
custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate
child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant consideration – is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of
respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor
distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are
"those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no cogent
justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none
provided.
In Sum –
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses
jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No.
161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003
which has prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for
th
the position of President in the 10 May 2004 national elections on the
contention that FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate
of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the
petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly
elevated to this Court in the latter’s capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a
presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution.
Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only
after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion
has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter
of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would
have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the
alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino
citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year
1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence
of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe,
father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before
the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to
present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has
been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos
48
vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS –
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier,
Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part
of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No.
04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M. BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and
WILMA P. PAGADUAN, Respondents.
* 8
SERENO,
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ
* RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of Section
5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and
thus hold any elective public office.
The Case
1
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
2
seeking to nullify Resolution dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-44-2010. The assailed resolution
3
(a) reversed the Order dated November 30, 2010 of COMELEC Second Division
4
dismissing petitioner’s appeal; and (b) affirmed the consolidated Decision dated
October 22, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bauang, La Union, Branch 33,
declaring petitioner Teodora Sobejana-Condon (petitioner) disqualified and ineligible
to her position as Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union.
The Undisputed Facts
The petitioner is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on
August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen
owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship
before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
5
2003." The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005.
On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation
of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous
Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006
6
certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen.
The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007
elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10,
2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest
numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of
office on May 13, 2010.
7
Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan and Luis
M. Bautista, (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed
separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the
elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a
"personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006,
she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied
with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear
abandonment of her Australian citizenship.
Ruling of the RTC
In its consolidated Decision dated October 22, 2010, the trial court held that the
petitioner’s failure to comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible
to run and hold public office. As admitted by the petitioner herself during trial, the
personal declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was not under oath. The law
clearly mandates that the document containing the renunciation of foreign citizenship
must be sworn before any public officer authorized to administer oath. Consequently,
the RTC’s decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment in FAVOR of
[private respondents] and AGAINST (petitioner):
1) DECLARING [petitioner] TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, disqualified and
ineligible to hold the office of Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union;
2) NULLIFYING her proclamation as the winning candidate for Vice-Mayor of said
municipality; and
3) DECLARING the position of Vice-Mayor in said municipality vacant.
9
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the COMELEC
The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the appeal was dismissed by the
10
Second Division in its Order dated November 30, 2010 for failure to pay the docket
fees within the prescribed period. On motion for reconsideration, the appeal was
11
reinstated by the COMELEC en banc in its Resolution dated September 6, 2011. In
the same issuance, the substantive merits of the appeal were given due course. The
COMELEC en banc concurred with the findings and conclusions of the RTC; it also an election case; III) Whether the private respondents are barred from questioning the
granted the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by the private respondents. qualifications of the petitioner; and IV) For purposes of determining the petitioner’s
eligibility to run for public office, whether the "sworn renunciation of foreign
The decretal portion of the resolution reads: citizenship" in Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma requirement.

WHEREFORE, premises considered the Commission RESOLVED as it hereby The Court’s Ruling
RESOLVES as follows:
I. An appeal may be simultaneously
1. To DISMISS the instant appeal for lack of merit; reinstated and definitively resolved
by the COMELEC en banc in a
resolution disposing of a motion for
2. To AFFIRM the DECISION dated 22 October 2010 of the court a quo; and reconsideration.

3. To GRANT the Motion for Execution filed on November 12, 2010. The power to decide motions for reconsideration in election cases is arrogated unto
the COMELEC en banc by Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, viz:
12
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
Hence, the present petition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC en promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
banc. including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
The Petitioner’s Arguments decided by the Commission en banc.

The petitioner contends that since she ceased to be an Australian citizen on
September 27, 2006, she no longer held dual citizenship and was only a Filipino
citizen when she filed her certificate of candidacy as early as the 2007 elections.
Hence, the "personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship" imposed by
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not apply to
her.
A complementary provision is present in Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, to wit:
Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be
resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory orders of the
division which shall be resolved by the division which issued the order.

She further argues that a sworn renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory
requirement. In support thereof, she cites portions of the Journal of the House of
Representatives dated June 2 to 5, 2003 containing the sponsorship speech for
House Bill (H.B.) No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225.
She claims that the private respondents are estopped from questioning her eligibility
since they failed to do so when she filed certificates of candidacy for the 2007 and
2010 elections.
Lastly, she disputes the power of the COMELEC en banc to: (a) take cognizance of
the substantive merits of her appeal instead of remanding the same to the COMELEC
Second Division for the continuation of the appeal proceedings; and (b) allow the
execution pending appeal of the RTC’s judgment.
The Issues
Posed for resolution are the following issues: I) Whether the COMELEC en banc may
resolve the merits of an appeal after ruling on its reinstatement; II) Whether the
COMELEC en banc may order the execution of a judgment rendered by a trial court in
Considering that the above cited provisos do not set any limits to the COMELEC en
banc’s prerogative in resolving a motion for reconsideration, there is nothing to
prevent the body from directly adjudicating the substantive merits of an appeal after
ruling for its reinstatement instead of remanding the same to the division that initially
dismissed it.
We thus see no impropriety much more grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
COMELEC en banc when it proceeded to decide the substantive merits of the
petitioner’s appeal after ruling for its reinstatement.
Further, records show that, in her motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en
banc, the petitioner not only proffered arguments on the issue on docket fees but also
on the issue of her eligibility. She even filed a supplemental motion for
13
reconsideration attaching therewith supporting documents to her contention that she
is no longer an Australian citizen. The petitioner, after obtaining an unfavorable
decision, cannot be permitted to disavow the en banc’s exercise of discretion on the
substantial merits of her appeal when she herself invoked the same in the first place.
The fact that the COMELEC en banc had remanded similar appeals to the Division
that initially dismissed them cannot serve as a precedent to the disposition of the
petitioner’s appeal. A decision or resolution of any adjudicating body can be disposed
in several ways. To sustain petitioner’s argument would be virtually putting a
straightjacket on the COMELEC en banc’s adjudicatory powers.
may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election; and

More significantly, the remand of the appeal to the COMELEC Second Division would (2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:
be unnecessarily circuitous and repugnant to the rule on preferential disposition of
quo warranto cases espoused in Rule 36, Section 15 of the COMELEC Rules of Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. – Any voter contesting the election of any
14
Procedure. Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground
of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
II. The COMELEC en banc has the petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation
power to order discretionary of the results of the election. (Emphasis ours)
execution of judgment.
Hence, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to
We cannot subscribe to petitioner’s submission that the COMELEC en banc has no file the petition within the twenty-five (25)-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the
power to order the issuance of a writ of execution and that such function belongs only Omnibus Election Code for whatever reasons, the elections laws do not leave him
to the court of origin. completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the
candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the
There is no reason to dispute the COMELEC’s authority to order discretionary proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the
17
execution of judgment in view of the fact that the suppletory application of the Rules Omnibus Election Code.
of Court is expressly sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of
15
Procedure. The above remedies were both available to the private respondents and their failure
to utilize Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code cannot serve to bar them should
Under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal may be they opt to file, as they did so file, a quo warranto petition under Section 253.
issued by an appellate court after the trial court has lost jurisdiction. In Batul v.
16
Bayron, we stressed the import of the provision vis-à-vis election cases when we IV. Petitioner is disqualified from
held that judgments in election cases which may be executed pending appeal running for elective office for
includes those decided by trial courts and those rendered by the COMELEC whether failure to renounce her Australian
in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction. citizenship in accordance with
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225.
III. Private respondents are not
estopped from questioning R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-
18
petitioner’s eligibility to hold public born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
office. allegiance to the Republic, thus:

The fact that the petitioner’s qualifications were not questioned when she filed
certificates of candidacy for 2007 and 2010 elections cannot operate as an estoppel
to the petition for quo warranto before the RTC.
Under the Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code), there are two
instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to
run for the office for which his certificate of candidacy was filed can be raised, to wit:
(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. – A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
"I, _____________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support
and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the
laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion."
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino citizenship
and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to
certain conditions imposed in Section 5, viz:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be
subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements
under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise
known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification
for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior
to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to
the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines
cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they
are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed
forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphasis ours)
Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired
her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e.,
Australian and Philippine.
On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office,
she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly,
however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2)
that the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized
to administer oath.
To obviate the fatal consequence of her inutile renunciation, the petitioner pleads the
Court to interpret the "sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship" in Section
5(2) to be a mere pro forma requirement in conformity with the intent of the
Legislature. She anchors her submission on the statement made by Representative
Javier during the floor deliberations on H.B. No. 4720, the precursor of R.A. No. 9225.
At the outset, it bears stressing that the Court’s duty to interpret the law according to
its true intent is exercised only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning.
The first and fundamental duty of the Court is to apply the law. As such, when the law
is clear and free from any doubt, there is no occasion for construction or
19
interpretation; there is only room for application. Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is
one such instance.
Ambiguity is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in
more than one way, or of referring to two or more things at the same time. For a
statute to be considered ambiguous, it must admit of two or more possible
20
meanings.
21
The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC, we
declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen
cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she
personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the
certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held
that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed
before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear
and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.
22
The same meaning was emphasized in Jacot v. Dal, when we held that Filipinos re-
acquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 must explicitly
renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the
Philippines, thus:
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either
retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer
authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the
certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who
have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained
their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the
Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing
themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other than
that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of
the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No.
4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act
No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative Arthur
Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance
is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship;
xxxx
The intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship
if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in
Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine
23
citizenship. (Citation omitted and italics and underlining ours)
24
Hence, in De Guzman v. COMELEC, we declared petitioner therein to be
disqualified from running for the position of vice-mayor for his failure to make a
personal and sworn renunciation of his American citizenship.
We find no reason to depart from the mandatory nature infused by the above rulings
to the phrase "sworn renunciation". The language of the provision is plain and
unambiguous. It expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning and must thus be
25
read literally. The foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit
duly sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath.
It is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to
26
convey. Even a resort to the Journal of the House of Representatives invoked by
the petitioner leads to the same inference, viz:
INTERPELLATION OF REP. JAVIER
Rep. Javier initially inquired whether under the Bill, dual citizenship is only limited to
natural-born Filipinos and not to naturalized Filipinos.
Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative.
Rep. Javier subsequently adverted to Section 5 of the Bill which provides that natural-
born Filipinos who have dual citizenship shall continue to enjoy full civil and political
rights. This being the case, he sought clarification as to whether they can indeed run
for public office provided that they renounce their foreign citizenship.
Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that these citizens will only have to
make a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship before any authorized
public officer.
Rep. Javier sought further clarification on this matter, citing that while the Bill provides
them with full civil and political rights as Filipino citizens, the measure also
discriminates against them since they are required to make a sworn renunciation of
their other foreign citizenship if and when they run for public office. He thereafter
proposed to delete this particular provision.
In his rejoinder, Rep. Libanan explained that this serves to erase all doubts regarding
any issues that might be raised pertaining to the citizenship of any candidate. He
subsequently cited the case of Afroyim vs. Rusk, wherein the United States
considered a naturalized American still as an American citizen even when he cast his
vote in Israel during one of its elections.
Rep. Javier however pointed out that the matter of voting is different because in
voting, one is not required to renounce his foreign citizenship. He pointed out that
under the Bill, Filipinos who run for public office must renounce their foreign
citizenship. He pointed out further that this is a contradiction in the Bill.
Thereafter, Rep. Javier inquired whether Filipino citizens who had acquired foreign
citizenship and are now entitled to reacquire their Filipino citizenship will be
considered as natural-born citizens. As such, he likewise inquired whether they will
also be considered qualified to run for the highest elective positions in the country.
Rep. Libanan replied in the affirmative, citing that the only requirement is that they
make a sworn renunciation of their foreign citizenship and that they comply with the
residency and registration requirements as provided for in the Constitution.
Whereupon, Rep. Javier noted that under the Constitution, natural-born citizens are
those who are citizens at the time of birth without having to perform an act to
complete or perfect his/her citizenship.
Rep. Libanan agreed therewith, citing that this is the reason why the Bill seeks the
repeal of CA No. 63. The repeal, he said, would help Filipino citizens who acquired
foreign citizenship to retain their citizenship. With regard then to Section 5 of the Bill,
he explained that the Committee had decided to include this provision because
Section 18, Article XI of the Constitution provides for the accountability of public
officers.
In his rejoinder, Rep. Javier maintained that in this case, the sworn renunciation of a
foreign citizenship will only become a pro forma requirement.
On further queries of Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan affirmed that natural-born Filipino
citizens who became foreign citizens and who have reacquired their Filipino
citizenship under the Bill will be considered as natural-born citizens, and therefore
qualified to run for the presidency, the vice-presidency or for a seat in Congress. He
also agreed with the observation of Rep. Javier that a natural-born citizen is one who
is a citizen of the country at the time of birth. He also explained that the Bill will, in
effect, return to a Filipino citizen who has acquired foreign citizenship, the status of
being a natural-born citizen effective at the time he lost his Filipino citizenship.
As a rejoinder, Rep. Javier opined that doing so would be discriminating against
naturalized Filipino citizens and Filipino citizens by election who are all disqualified to
run for certain public offices. He then suggested that the Bill be amended by not
considering as natural-born citizens those Filipinos who had renounced their Filipino
citizenship and acquired foreign citizenship. He said that they should be considered
as repatriated citizens.
In reply, Rep. Libanan assured Rep. Javier that the Committee will take note of the
latter’s comments on the matter. He however stressed that after a lengthy deliberation
on the subject, the Committees on Justice, and Foreign Affairs had decided to revert
back to the status of being natural-born citizens those natural-born Filipino citizens
who had acquired foreign citizenship but now wished to reacquire their Filipino
citizenship.
Rep. Javier then explained that a Filipina who loses her Filipino citizenship by virtue
of her marriage to a foreigner can regain her repatriated Filipino citizenship, upon the
death of her husband, by simply taking her oath before the Department of Justice
(DOJ).
Rep. Javier said that he does not oppose the Bill but only wants to be fair to other
Filipino citizens who are not considered natural-born. He reiterated that natural-born
Filipino citizens who had renounced their citizenship by pledging allegiance to another
sovereignty should not be allowed to revert back to their status of being natural-born
citizens once they decide to regain their Filipino citizenship. He underscored that this
will in a way allow such Filipinos to enjoy dual citizenship.
On whether the Sponsors will agree to an amendment incorporating the position of
Rep. Javier, Rep. Libanan stated that this will defeat the purpose of the Bill.
Rep. Javier disagreed therewith, adding that natural-born Filipino citizens who
acquired foreign citizenships and later decided to regain their Filipino citizenship, will
be considered as repatriated citizens.
Rep. Libanan cited the case of Bengzon vs. HRET wherein the Supreme Court had
ruled that only naturalized Filipino citizens are not considered as natural-born citizens.
In reaction, Rep. Javier clarified that only citizens by election or those whose mothers
are Filipino citizens under the 1935 Constitution and who elected Filipino citizenship
upon reaching the age of maturity, are not deemed as natural-born citizens.
In response, Rep. Libanan maintained that in the Bengzon case, repatriation results in
the recovery of one’s original nationality and only naturalized citizens are not
considered as natural-born citizens.
On whether the Sponsors would agree to not giving back the status of being natural-
born citizens to natural-born Filipino citizens who acquired foreign citizenship, Rep.
27
Libanan remarked that the Body in plenary session will decide on the matter.
The petitioner obviously espouses an isolated reading of Representative Javier’s
statement; she conveniently disregards the preceding and succeeding discussions in
the records.
The above-quoted excerpts of the legislative record show that Representative Javier’s
statement ought to be understood within the context of the issue then being
discussed, that is – whether former natural-born citizens who re-acquire their Filipino
citizenship under the proposed law will revert to their original status as natural-born
citizens and thus be qualified to run for government positions reserved only to natural-
born Filipinos, i.e. President, Vice-President and Members of the Congress.
It was Representative Javier’s position that they should be considered as repatriated
Filipinos and not as natural-born citizens since they will have to execute a personal
and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Natural-born citizens are those who
need not perform an act to perfect their citizenship. Representative Libanan, however,
maintained that they will revert to their original status as natural-born citizens. To
reconcile the renunciation imposed by Section 5(2) with the principle that natural-born
citizens are those who need not perform any act to perfect their citizenship,
Representative Javier suggested that the sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship be
considered as a mere pro forma requirement.
Petitioner’s argument, therefore, loses its point. The "sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship" must be deemed a formal requirement only with respect to the re-
acquisition of one’s status as a natural-born Filipino so as to override the effect of the
principle that natural-born citizens need not perform any act to perfect their
citizenship. Never was it mentioned or even alluded to that, as the petitioner wants
this Court to believe, those who re-acquire their Filipino citizenship and thereafter run
for public office has the option of executing an unsworn affidavit of renunciation.
It is also palpable in the above records that Section 5 was intended to complement
Section 18, Article XI of the Constitution on public officers’ primary accountability of
allegiance and loyalty, which provides:
Sec. 18. – Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution
allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his
citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure
shall be dealt with by law.
An oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a revered
person or thing, that one’s statement is true or that one will be bound to a promise.
The person making the oath implicitly invites punishment if the statement is untrue or
the promise is broken. The legal effect of an oath is to subject the person to penalties
for perjury if the testimony is false.
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Indeed, the solemn promise, and the risk of punishment attached to an oath ensures
truthfulness to the prospective public officer’s abandonment of his adopted state and
promise of absolute allegiance and loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.
To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to say that it is only for
ceremonial purposes; it would also accommodate a mere qualified or temporary
allegiance from government officers when the Constitution and the legislature clearly
demand otherwise.
Petitioner contends that the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948, under which she is
already deemed to have lost her citizenship, is entitled to judicial notice. We disagree.
Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be
29
alleged and proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a
copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court which reads:
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. – The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice- consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
(Emphasis ours)
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. – Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as
the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of
such court.
The Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the
existence of a foreign law may also be established through: (1) a testimony under
oath of an expert witness such as an attorney-at-law in the country where the foreign
law operates wherein he quotes verbatim a section of the law and states that the
same was in force at the time material to the facts at hand; and (2) likewise, in several
naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign
country on reciprocity regarding the acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting
the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for favorable
action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is "satisfied of the authenticity
of the written proof offered." Thus, in a number of decisions, mere authentication of
the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was held
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to be a competent proof of that law.
The petitioner failed to prove the Australian Citizenship Act of 1948 through any of the
above methods. As uniformly observed by the RTC and COMELEC, the petitioner
failed to show proof of the existence of the law during trial. Also, the letter issued by
the Australian government showing that petitioner already renounced her Australian
citizenship was unauthenticated hence, the courts a quo acted judiciously in
disregarding the same.
We are bound to arrive at a similar conclusion even if we were to admit as competent
evidence the said letter in view of the photocopy of a Certificate of Authentication
issued by Consular Section of the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia attached
to the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
We have stressed in Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers
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and Allied Workers (AASJS) Member v. Datumanong that the framers of R.A. No.
9225 did not intend the law to concern itself with the actual status of the other
citizenship.
This Court as the government branch tasked to apply the enactments of the
legislature must do so conformably with the wisdom of the latter sans the interference
of any foreign law. If we were to read the Australian Citizen Act of 1948 into the
application and operation of R.A. No. 9225, we would be applying not what our
legislative department has deemed wise to require. To do so would be a brazen
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encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.
The petitioner’s act of running for public office does not suffice to serve as an effective
renunciation of her Australian citizenship. While this Court has previously declared
that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy is already
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considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship, such ruling was already adjudged
superseded by the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 on August 29, 2003 which provides
for the additional condition of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
34
citizenship.
The fact that petitioner won the elections can not cure the defect of her candidacy.
Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the election of a disqualified
candidate because the application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on
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disqualification is not a matter of popularity.
In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire
their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer
prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as
36
candidates in Philippine elections. The rule applies to all those who have re-
acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner, without regard as to whether they are
still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run
for public office.
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific only to
Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. It is
the operative act that restores their right to run for public office. The petitioner's failure
to comply therewith in accordance with the exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual
the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed on September
18, 2006. As such, she is yet to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless
she executes a sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to
run for and hold any elective office in the Philippines.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
Resolution dated September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Elections en bane in EAC
(AE) No. A-44-2010 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.