SHERWIN DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, Upon reaching the 25th Floor of the same building, a security guard manning
Upon reaching the 25th Floor of the same building, a security guard manning the entrance once again
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CARLOS ALBERTO L. GONZALES, in behalf of his deceased
brother, JEFFREY WERNHER L. GONZALES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set
aside the May 7, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 89257, finding petitioner
Sherwin Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, and its August 19, 2009
Resolution2 denying his motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information3 dated March 2, 2005, which
alleged:
That on or about the 1st day of January 2005, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill and with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
JEFFREY WERNHER GONZALES Y LIM on the head, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious and
moral gunshot wound which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
According to the prosecution, on January 1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, petitioner went to the
office of Sykes Asia Inc. located at the 25th Floor of Robinson’s Summit Center,Ayala Avenue, Makati
City. When petitioner was already inside the building, he went to the work station of the deceased
victim, Jeffrey Wernher L. Gonzales (Jeffrey), who, by the configuration of the eye witness Antonette
Managbanag’s sketch, was seated fronting his computer terminal, with his back towards the aisle. As
petitioner approached Jeffrey from the back, petitioner was already holding a gun pointed at the back of
Jeffrey’s head. At the last second, Jeffrey managed to deflect the hand of petitioner holding the gun,
and a short struggle for the possession of the gun ensued thereafter. Petitioner won the struggle and
remained in possession of the said gun. Petitioner then pointed the gun at Jeffrey’s face, pulled the
trigger four (4) times, the fourth shot finally discharging the bullet that hit Jeffrey in the forehead,
eventually killing him. Finally, after shooting Jeffrey, petitioner fled the office.
The defense recounted a different version of the facts.
Petitioner claimed that on January1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, more or less, petitioner,
together with his children, went to Sykes Asia, the workplace of his wife, Darlene Dela Cruz (Darlene),
located at the 25th Floor of Robinson’s Summit Building in Makati City, to fetch the latter so that their
family could spend time and celebrate together the New Year’s Day. Before entering the Robinson’s
Summit Building, petitioner underwent the regular security check-up/procedures. He was frisked by the
guards-on-duty manning the main entrance of said building and no firearm was found in his possession.
He registered his name at the security logbook and surrendered a valid I.D.
frisked petitioner and, likewise, found no gun in his possession; hence, he was allowed to enter the
premises of Sykes Asia. The security guard also pointed to him the direction towards his wife’s table.
However, as Darlene was then not on her table, petitioner approached a certain man and asked the
latter as to the possible whereabouts of Darlene. The person whom petitioner had talked towas the
deceased-victim, Jeffrey. After casually introducing himself as the husband of Darlene, Jeffrey curtly
told him, "Bakit mo hinahanap si Darlene?"to which he answered, "Nagpapasundo kasi sa akin."The
response given by Jeffrey shocked and appalled petitioner: "Ayaw na nga ng asawa mo sayo sinusundo
mo pa!"
Shocked by the words and reaction of Jeffrey, petitioner tried to inquire from Jeffrey who he was. But
Jeffrey suddenly cursed petitioner. Then, Jeffrey suddenly picked up something in his chair which
happened to be a gun and pointed the same at petitioner’s face followed by a clicking sound. The gun,
however, did not fire.
Seeing imminent danger to his life,petitioner grappled with Jeffrey for the possession of the gun.While
grappling, the gunclicked for two (2) to three (3) more times. Again, the gun did not fire.
Petitioner was able to wrest away the gun from Jeffrey and tried to run away to avoid any further
confrontation with the latter.However, Jeffrey immediately blocked petitioner’s path and shouted,
"Guard! Guard!" Immediately then, Jeffrey took hold ofa big fire extinguisher, aimed and was about to
smash the same on petitioner’s head.
Acting instinctively, petitioner parried the attack while still holding the gun. While in the act of parrying,
the gun accidentally fired due to the reasonable force and contact that his parrying hand had made with
the fire extinguisher and the single bullet discharged hit the forehead of Jeffrey, which caused the latter
to fall on the floor and die.
Petitioner left the gun and went out ofthe premises of Sykes Asia and proceeded towards the elevator.
On his way to the elevator, he heard Darlene shout, "Sherwin anong nangyari?", but he was not able to
answer.
After said incident, Darlene abandoned petitioner and brought with her their two (2) young children.
Petitioner later learned that Darlene and Jeffrey had an illicit relationship when he received a copy of the
blog of Darlene, dated January 30, 2005, sent by his friend.
During his arraignment, on August 22, 2005, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "Not
Guilty" to the charge. Thereafter, pretrial conference was conducted on even date and trial on the merits
ensued thereafter.
During the trial of the case, the prosecution presented the oral testimonies of Marie Antonette
Managbanag (Managbanag), Maria Angelina Pelaez (Pelaez) and Carlos Alberto Lim Gonzales
(Gonzales), respectively. The prosecution likewise formally offered several pieces of documentary
evidence to support its claim.
1
For its part, the defense presented aswitnesses, petitioner himself; his brother, Simeon Sander Dela
Cruz III (Cruz), Greg Lasmarias Elbanvuena (Elbanvuena) and Managbanag, who was recalled to the
witness stand as witness for the defense.
On February 26, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)of Makati City, Branch 147, rendered a Decision5
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, as defined and penalized
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the fallo thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is rendered finding herein accused Sherwin Dela Cruz y Gloria Guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised
Penal Code, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years and One (1) day
of prision mayor medium as Minimum to Fourteen (14) years eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal medium as Maximum; to indemnify the Heirs of Jeffrey Wernher Gonzales y Lim in
the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus moral damages in the amount of ₱1 Million, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.6
On March 28, 2007, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, while private respondent, through the private
prosecutor, filed a Notice of Appeal on April 11, 2007 insofar as the sentence rendered against
petitioner is concerned and the civil damages awarded.
After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
(CA). However, the latter denied their appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with modification on the
civil liability of petitioner. The decretal portion of the Decision7 reads: WHEREFORE, we hereby
AFFIRM the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 147 dated 26 February 2007 finding
accused-appellant Sherwin Dela Cruz y Gloria GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
ofHomicide with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) the amount of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages;
(4) the amount of ₱3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning capacity.
(5) to pay the costs of the litigation.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition.
Raised are the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER ALL THE REQUISITES OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-
DEFENSE, AS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, ARE
PRESENT IN THIS CASE.
2. WHETHER THE FIRING OF THE GUN WHEREIN ONLY A SINGLE BULLET WAS
DISCHARGED THEREFROM WAS MERELY ACCIDENTAL WHICH OCCURRED DURING
THE TIME THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT WAS STILL IN THE ACT OF DEFENDING
HIMSELF FROM THE CONTINUOUS UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION OF THE DECEASED
VICTIM.
3. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE ALL THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.
4. WHETHER THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE IS
APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.
5. WHETHER PETITIONER-APPELLANT MAY BE HELD CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE DEATH
OF THE VICTIM ARISING FROM THE ACCIDENT THAT TRANSPIRED.9
There is no question that petitioner authored the death of the deceased-victim, Jeffrey. What is leftfor
determination by this Court is whether the elements of self-defenseexist to exculpate petitioner from the
criminal liability for Homicide.
The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3)
lackof sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.10 In other words, there
must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was
then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the
attack.11
Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused from any criminal liability, it is well settled
thatwhen he invokes the same, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself.12 The burden of proving that the killing was
justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor shifts upon him.13 As such, he must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution for, even if the prosecution
evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused himself has admitted the killing.14
Measured against this criteria, wefind that petitioner's defense is sorely wanting. Hence, his petition
must be denied.
First. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's contention that unlawful aggression was
employed by the deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against him.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden,
unexpected or imminent danger — not merely threatening and intimidating action.15 There is
aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to his life.16 The peril sought
to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely speculative.17 In the case at bar, other than
2
petitioner’s testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey condescendingly Q: And then what happened?
responded to petitioner’s questions or initiated the confrontation before the shooting incident; that
Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but failed — an assault which may have A: And then Jeff parried the gun and they started struggling for the possession of the gun.
caused petitioner to fear for his life.
Q: How far were you from this struggle when you witnessed it?
Even assuming arguendothat the gun originated from Jeffrey and an altercation transpired, and
therefore, danger may have in fact existed, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the
moment petitioner disarmed Jeffrey by wresting the gun from the latter. After petitioner had successfully A: Probably 10 to 12 feet.
seized it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the
need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly observed by the RTC, petitioner had every opportunity to run away from the Q: Going back to your story, Ms. Witness, you mentioned that after Jeffrey warded off the gun, they
scene and seek help but refused to do so, thus: started to struggle, what happened after that, if any?

In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun.1avvphi1 Accused admitted that A: After they struggled, the gun clicked three times and then after that Jeff tried to get hold of the fire
he wrested the gun from the victim. From that point in time until the victim shouted "guard, guard", then extinguisher and the fourth shot went off and then Jeffrey fell down.
took the fire extinguisher, there was no unlawful aggression coming from the victim. Accused had the
opportunity to run away. Therefore, even assuming that the aggression with use of the gun initially came Q: And who was holding the gun?
from the victim, the fact remains that it ceased when the gun was wrested away by the accused from
the victim. It is settled that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill
or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed (Peo Vs. A: Sherwin was holding the gun. (TSN, Oct. 17, 2005, pp. 12-14) CROSS-EXAMINATION: Atty. Agoot:
Tagana, 424 SCRA 620). A person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when
the unlawful aggression has ceased (PeoVs. Pateo, 430 SCRA 609). Q: So you did not see when Sherwin approached Jeffrey because he came from the other side? Atty.
Mariano:
Accused alleged that the victimwas about to smash the fire extinguisher on his (accused’s) headbut he
parried it with his hand holding the gun. This is doubtful as nothing in the records is or would be Objection, your Honor, witness already answered that.
corroborative of it.In contrast, the two (2) Prosecution witnesses whose credibility was not impeached,
both gave the impression that the victim got the fire extinguisher to shieldhimself from the accused who
Atty. Agoot:
was then already in possession of the gun.18

I am on cross examination, your Honor.

Thus, when an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense
has no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.19 To be sure, when the present victim no
longer persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his attack was no longer in peril, COURT
there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on the part of the
offender.20 Undoubtedly, petitioner went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to You didn’t not see when he approached Jeffrey? A: No, as I said, I saw him point the gun at the back of
inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on Jeffrey, even when the allegedly unlawful aggression Jeff and he did not come from my side so that means…
had already ceased.
COURT
More, a review of the testimony of the prosecution witness, Pelaez, will show that if there was unlawful
aggression in the instant case, the same rather emanated from petitioner, thus: DIRECT
No, the question is, You did not actually see Sherwin approached Jeffrey?
EXAMINATION

A: I saw him already at the back of Jeffrey.

Atty. Mariano:

Atty. Agoot
Q: Can you relate to the Court, Ms. Witness, how did this incident happen?

He was already at the back of Jeffrey when you saw him?

A: We were still at work, we were expecting calls but there were no calls at the moment and I was
standing at my work station and then Sherwin approached Jeff and he pointed a gun at the back of the
head of Jeff. A: Yes, Sir.

3
(TSN, Oct. 17, 2005, pp. 26-27)21 A: Yes, sir.

Clearly, petitioner's allegation that when he approached Jeffrey, the latter pulled a gun from his chair Atty. Agoot
and tried to shoot him, is not corroborated by separate competent evidence. Pitted against the
testimony of prosecution witnesses, Managbanag and Pelaez, it pales incomparison and loses Q: And then after that there was again a grappling?
probative value. We have, on more thanone occasion, ruled that the plea of self-defense cannot be
justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but also
extremely doubtful in itself.22 Witness

In addition, other than petitioner’s testimony, there is dearth of evidence showing that the alleged A: No more grappling for possession. Because Jeffrey was still holding the fire extinguisher at thattime.
unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey continued when he blocked the path of petitioner while the And then he fell holding on to the fire extinguisher.
latter tried to run away to avoid further confrontation with Jeffrey. We also agree with the findings of the
RTC that there was no proof evincing that Jeffrey aimed and intended to smash the big fire extinguisher Atty. Agoot
on petitioner’s head. Alternatively, the prosecution witnesses maintained an impression that Jeffrey
used the same to shield himself from petitioner who was then in possession of the gun, a deadly Q: You said here which I quote "binaril siya ng lalaki ng sunod-sunod pero hindi pumutok" Do you
weapon. An excerpt of the testimony of Managbanag bares just that, to wit: affirmand confirm this statement?

Atty. Agoot Witness

Q: And then after pulling the fire extinguisher from the wall Jeffrey again faced the person who was A: Yes, sir. They were pushing each other. The other person was trying to point the gun at Jeffrey and
holding the gun already? Jeffrey was trying to cover himself with the fire extinguisher so nagkakatulakan sila at the same time.

Witness: Atty. Agoot

A: He was holding the fire extinguisher like this. Q: You said that the gun clicked, how many times did the gun click without firing?

COURT Witness

For the record. A: Three (3) times, sir.

Atty. Mariano: Atty. Agoot

Witness demonstrating how the victim Jeffrey Gonzales was holding the fire extinguisher upright with Q: And what did the late Jeffrey do when the gun clicked but did not fire?
his right hand above the fire extinguisher and his left hand below the fire extinguisher.

Witness
Witness:

A: They were still pushing each other at that time.

The left hand would support the weight basically.

Atty. Agoot
Atty. Agoot

Q: Using the fire extinguisher, heused that to push against the person…
Q: And then he used that fire extinguisher to protect himself from the slapping of that person who was in
possession of the gun?
Witness
Witness

4
A: Basically trying to cover himself and trying to push away the person who was pointing the gun at him.
Atty. Agoot
Q: And why do you know that Jeffrey was trying hard to push the fire extinguisher?
Witness
A: Because I was seated roughly about 5 to 6 feet away from them. So I clearly saw what was going on
at that time.
(Direct Examination of Marie Antonette Managbanag for the Defense, TSN dated 04 September 2006,
pp. 12-17, emphasis supplied)23
Petitioner’s contention that Jeffrey’s unlawful aggression was continuous and imminent is, therefore,
devoid of merit.
Given that the criteria of unlawful aggression is indubitably absent in the instant case, the severe
wounds inflicted by petitioner upon Jeffrey was unwarranted and, therefore, cannot be considered a
justifying circumstance under pertinent laws and jurisprudence.
Second. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from the deceased victim, Jeffrey, the
means employed by petitioner was not reasonably commensurate to the nature and extent of the
alleged attack, which he sought to avert. As held by the Court in People v. Obordo:24
Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, accused-
appellant likewise failed to prove that the means he employed to repel Homer's punch was reasonable.
The means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between
the means of attack and the defense. Accused appellant claimed that the victim punched him and was
trying to get something from his waist, so he (accused-appellant) stabbed the victim with his hunting
knife. His act of immediately stabbing Homer and inflicting a wound on a vital part ofthe victim's body
was unreasonable and unnecessary considering that, as alleged by accused-appellant himself, the
victim used his bare fist in throwing a punch at him.25
Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be rationally necessary to
prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. The opposite was, however, employed by petitioner, as
correctly pointed out by the RTC, thus:
The victim was holding the fire extinguisher while the second was holding the gun. The gun and the
discharge thereof was unnecessary and disproportionate to repel the alleged aggression with the use of
fire extinguisher. The rule is that the means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates
a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense (Peo vs. Obordo, 382 SCRA 98).
It was the accused who was in a vantage position as he was armed with a gun, as against the victim
who was armed, so to speak, with a fire extinguisher, which is not a deadly weapon. Under the
circumstances, accused’s alleged fear was unfounded. The Supreme Court has ruled that neither an
imagined impending attack nor an impending or threatening attitude is sufficient to constitute unlawful
aggression (Catalina Security Agency Vs. Gonzales-Decano, 429 SCRA 628). It is a settled rule that to
constitute aggression, the person attacked must be confronted by a real threat on his lifeand limb; and
the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not merely imaginary (Senoja v. Peo., 440 SCRA
695).26
If petitioner had honestly believed that Jeffrey was trying to kill him, he should have just run, despite any
obstruction, considering that he was already in possession of the gun. He could have also immediately
sought help from the people around him, specifically the guard stationed at the floor where the shooting
incident happened. In fact, he could have reported the incident to the authorities as soon as he had
opportunity to do so, if it was indeed an accident or a cry of self-preservation. Yet, petitioner never did
any of that.
We find it highly specious for petitioner to go through the process of tussling and hassling with Jeffrey,
and inthe end, shooting the latter on the forehead, not only once, but four times, the last shot finally
killing him, if he had no intention to hurt Jeffrey. Thus:
Moreover, the Prosecution’s eyewitnesses were consistent in declaring that while there was prior
struggle for the possession of the gun, it was nevertheless accused who was holding the gun at the time
of the actual firing thereof (TSN, p. 30, October 10, 2005; TSN, p. 14, October 17, 2005). Witness
Managbanag even alleged that while the victim (Jeffrey), who was in possession of the fire extinguisher,
and the accused were pushing each other, accused pointed the gun at the victim. She heard three (3)
clicks and on the 4th , the gun fired (TSN, p. 12, October 10, 2005). Under the circumstances, it cannot
be safely said that the gun was or could have been fired accidentally. The discharge of the gun which
led to the victim’s death was no longer made in the course of the grapple and/or struggle for the
possession of the gun.27
The observation of the RTC dispels any doubt that the gun may have been shot accidentally to the
detriment of Jeffrey. The fire was neither a disaster nor a misfortune of sorts. While petitioner may
nothave intended to kill Jeffrey at the onset, at the time he clicked the trigger thrice consecutively, his
intent to hurt (or even kill) Jeffrey was too plain to be disregarded. We have held in the pastthat the
nature and number of wounds are constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia which
disprove a plea of self-defense.28 Thus, petitioner’s contention that an accident simultaneously
occurred while hewas in the act of self-defense is simply absurd and preposterous at best. There could
nothave been an accident because the victim herein suffered a gunshot wound on his head, a vital part
of the body and, thus, demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victim.
Besides, petitioner’s failure to inform the police of the unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey and to
surrender the gun that he used to kill the victim militates against his claim of self-defense.29
In view of the foregoing, we find it illogical to discuss further the third element of self-defense since it is
recognized that unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua nonfor upholding the justifying circumstance
of self-defense.30 If there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of self-defense will
have no basis.31 Hence, there is no basis to entertain petitioner’s argument that a privileged mitigating
circumstance of selfdefense is applicable in this case, because unless the victim has committed
unlawful aggression against the other, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, on the part
of the latter.32
5
Anent petitioner’s argument thatthe RTC erred when it failed to consider as suppression of evidence the
prosecution’s alleged deliberate omission to present the testimonies of the security guards-on-duty at
the time of the shooting incident, the same fails to persuade. We concur with the decision of the CA on
this point, to wit:
Having admitted the killing of the victim, the burden of evidence that he acted in self-defense, shifted to
accused-appellant Dela Cruz. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution’s evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved
after his open admission of responsibility for the killing.
The security guards on duty at the time of the subject incident were at the disposal of both the
prosecution and the defense. The defense did not proffer proof that the prosecution prevented the
security guards from testifying. There is therefore no basis for it to conclude that the prosecution is guilty
of suppression of evidence.
The defense could have easily presented the security guards if it is of the opinion that their [the security
guards] testimonies were vital and material to the case of the defense. It could have compelled the
security guards on duty to appear before the court. xxx.33
It is worthy to note that the question of whether petitioner acted in self-defense is essentially a question
of fact.34 It is the peculiar province of the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses and related
questions of fact because of its superior advantage in observing the conduct and demeanor of
witnesses while testifying.35 This being so and in the absence of a showing that the CA and the RTC
failed to appreciate facts or circumstances of such weight and substance that would have merited
petitioner's acquittal, this Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the ruling of the CA that petitioner
did not act in self-defense.36
In this regard, we do not subscribe to petitioner’s contention that since the incident transpired in
Jeffrey’s office, and the witnesses presented by the prosecution are known officemates of Jeffrey, the
witnesses are expected to testify in favor of Jeffrey and against petitioner. Ascorrectly pointed out by
respondent, there appears no motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against
petitioner.37 The fact that they are officemates of Jeffrey does not justify a conclusion that Managbanag
and Pelaez would concoct or fabricate stories in favorof Jeffrey for the mere purpose of implicating
petitioner with such a serious crime, especially since they are testifying under oath.
All told, we find no basis to doubt ordispute, much less overturn, the findings of the RTC and the CA that
the elements of homicide are present in the instant case as amply shown by the testimonies of the
prosecution eyewitnesses, and they constitute sufficient proof of the guilt of petitioner beyond cavil or
doubt.
Nevertheless, with regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed
firearm, we deviate from the findings of the CA. A perusal of the Information will show that the use of
unlicensed firearm was expressly alleged in the killing of Jeffrey. This allegation was further proved
during trial by the presentation of the Certification from the PNP Firearms and Explosives Division,
dated November 11, 2005, certifying that petitioner is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any
kind and calibre, per verification from the records of the said Division. Accordingly, under Paragraph 3 of
Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, amending Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866,
such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance, to wit:
xxxx
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
x x x x.
Under Article 249 of the RPC, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being an
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, the penalty imposable on petitioner should be in
its maximum period.38 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the petitioner shall be sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as the
minimum penalty, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
maximum, as the maximum penalty.
As to the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and damages for loss of earning capacity in favor
ofprivate respondent, we sustain the findings of the CA in so far as they are in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence. In addition, we find the grant of exemplary damages in the present case in
order, since the presence of special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm has been
established.39 Based on current jurisprudence, the award of exemplary damages for homicide is
₱30,000.00.40
Finally, pursuant to this Court’s ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,41 an interest of six percent (6%) per
annum on the aggregate amount awarded for civil indemnity and damages for loss of earning capacity
shall be imposed, computed from the time of finality of this Decision until full payment thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 7, 2009 Decision and August 19, 2009 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89257, finding petitioner Sherwin Dela Cruz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, to wit:
(1) Petitioner shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor maximum, as the minimum penalty, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal maximum, as the maximum penalty;
(2) Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim the following:
a. the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
b. the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
c. the amount of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages;
d. the amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
e. the amount of ₱3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning capacity;
6
 f. for the civil indemnity and the damages for loss of earning capacity, an interest of six percent The prosecution presented as its witnesses Edgar Bendillo, Rolando Jamarolin, Dr. Bernardo Palma
(6%) per annum, computed from the time of finality of this Decision until full payment thereof; and Renelio Jamarolin.
and
Edgar Bendillo testified that at about 7:30 in the evening of January 22, 1997, he, the victim Homer
g. the costs of the litigation. Jamarolin and their companions Roy Adrias, Rene Adrias, and Inting Jamlod went to Antipolo, Dapitan
City to attend a benefit dance. On their way to the dance, they stopped by the store of Mimie Valladares
SO ORDERED. and engaged in a drinking spree.2

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NORMAN OBORDO y BULALAKAW, accused-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga
del Norte, Branch 11, dated July 2, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 7659 finding accused-appellant Norman
Obordo y Bulalakaw guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On January 28, 1997, accused-appellant was charged with murder in an information which alleged:
That at dawn, on or about January 23, 1997 in Barangay Antipolo, City of Dapitan, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a hunting knife,
with intent to kill by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the use of said hunting knife one,
HOMER JAMAROLIN, thereby resulting to his instantaneous death.1âwphi1.nêt
That as a result of the criminal acts of the accused heirs of the deceased suffered the following
damages to wit:
At about 1:00 a.m. of the following day, January 23, 1997, Rolando Jamarolin, Homer’s brother, arrived
at Valladares’ store and asked the victim for some money to buy a bottle of softdrinks. Rolando
persuaded Homer and his companions to proceed to the benefit dance and the ground acceded. 3
While Homer and his companions were on their way to the benefit dance, they met the group of Ronald
Alap-ap, which included accused-appellant Norman Obordo.4
When Bendillo saw Alap-ap, with whom he previously had a first fight, he approached Alap-ap and
boxed the latter. Alap-ap staggered from the blow then pulled out a hunting knife from his waist,
prompting Bendillo to retreat towards Homer and the rest of their group. 5
In the meantime, accused-appellant called Homer, who was then holding a lighted cigarette, and asked
him if he could light accused-appellant’s cigarette. Homer obliged and extended his lighted cigarette to
accused-appellant.6 At this time, Bendillo was walking back towards his companions and was about one
fathom7 away from Homer when he saw accused-appellant approach the latter to reach for the lighted
cigarette. Accused-appellant’s right hand was at the right side of his hip as if concealing something.
Accused-appellant took Homer’s cigarette with his left hand and with his right hand suddenly stabbed
Homer on the left side of the abdomen near the navel with what seemed to be a small bolo. After he
was stabbed, Homer retaliated by punching accused-appellant in the face. Accused-appellant fell to the
ground, then got up on his feet and ran away. Bendillo said that although Homer and accused-appellant
were facing each other then, Homer had no chance to defend himself because he was busy lighting
accused-appellant’s cigarette. Bendillo further stated that he was able to see the stabbing because the
place was well-lighted because there was a fluorescent lamp from the electric post and the moon was
shining brightly.8

Rolando Jamarolin ("Rolando"), the brother of the victim, corroborated Bendillo’s statements. Rolando
1. Moral damages - - - - - - P 30,000.00 testified he left the house on January 22, 1997 at around 8:00 p.m. to attend a benefit dance in a disco
house in Antipolo, Dapitan City. At about 1:00 a.m. of January 23, 1997, he went outside the disco
house to look for his brother Homer. Rolando eventually found Homer with Bendillo, Rene Adrias and
2. Exemplary damages - - 30,000.00
Roy Adrias at Valladeres’ store. He asked Homer for money to buy a bottle of cola. After finishing his
drink, Rolando suggested to Homer and his group that they proceed to the benefit dance before going
3. Death Indemnity - - - - - 40,000.00 home. However, they were not able to attend the dance because they met the group of accused-
appellant, Alap-ap and their other companions along the way.9
Total - - - - - - - - P100,000.00
Rolando explained that when Bendillo saw Alap-ap, Bendillo approached the latter and boxed him.
Rolando heard accused-appellant call Homer and say "Pagdakota ko, Bay." Accused-appellant was
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Viol. of Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, amended by R.A. 7659) 1 asking Homer to light his cigarette. Rolando then saw Homer go near accused-appellant to light the
unlighted cigarette with Homer’s cigarette which was already lighted. While Homer was lighting
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. accused-appellant’s cigarette, the latter suddenly thrust his hunting knife towards the left side of

7
Homer’s abdomen. Homer was unable to prevent himself from being stabbed because the act took
place all of a sudden.10
After Homer was stabbed, he retaliated by punching accused-appellant. The latter fell out but he stood
up at once, and then he and his companions ran away from the scene. Thereafter, Rolando Jamarolin
and their other companions rushed Homer to the hospital, but the victim died before they could reach
the same.11
Rolando was able to ascertain that it was accused-appellant who stabbed his brother because the place
was illuminated by a fluorescent bulb.12
Dr. Bernardo Palma, the City Health Officer who examined Homer’s body at about 9:10 a.m. on January
23, 1997, found that the victim sustained a wound on the left side of the navel and that his stomach and
liver were also injured.13 His postmortem report indicated the following:
FINDINGS:
STABBED WOUND 1 inch left hypochondriac region with injuries to stomach liver.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Acute anemia secondary to stabbed wound with injuries to stomach and liver. 14
Dr. Palma opined that the a sharp-edged pointed blade instrument which could be a small bolo or a
hunting knife must have been used by the assailant in stabbing the victim.15
The prosecution’s last witness was the victim’s father, Renelio Jamarolin ("Renelio"). He testified that at
the time of his death, Homer was physically fit and gainfully employed by a certain Atty. Cainta as a
fishpond watcher. Homer was earning Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) a month, excluding his
commission from the bangus and the lukon. Renelio said that he suffered great pain and anguish as a
result of Homer’s death. He claimed Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages and Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) as
indemnity for his son’s death.16
The defense presented the testimonies of Vidal Calalang and the accused-appellant.
Vidal Calalang, a Barangay Tanod of Antipolo, Dapitan City at the time of Homer’s killing, testified that
on January 23, 1997 from about 1:00 to 2:00 a.m., he was patrolling the area near the disco where the
benefit dance was being held. While patrolling near the bridge, he saw Homer punch accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant thereafter stabbed Homer and ran away. Calalang said that he saw what happened
because the incident occurred in a well-lighted place. He stated further that he only saw Homer and the
accused-appellant and that he did not see their companions.17
Accused-appellant admitted before the trial court that he stabbed Homer with a hunting knife, but
interposed self-defense. He stated that he attended the benefit dance held in Antipolo, Dapitan City on
January 22, 1997. He and his companions Ronald Alap-ap, Richard Alap-ap, Walter Alajos and Ricky
Esmade left the affair at about 2:00 a.m. the following day, January 23, 1997. On their way home to
Tamion, Dapitan City, Ronald Alap-ap was boxed by Edgar Bendillo. Accused-appellant claimed that he
was subsequently punched by Homer and he fell to the ground. He saw Homer trying to get something
from his waist, so accused-appellant pulled out his hunting knife and stabbed Homer before the latter
could harm him further.18
On July 2, 1999, the trial court promulgated its Decision finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for having killed Homer. The dispositive portion thereof states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused NORMAN OBORDO, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, as
amended under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659, and is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION
PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Homer Jamarolin in the amount of
P50,000.00 and to pay P15,000.00 by way of moral damages.1âwphi1.nêt
COST DE OFICIO.
SO ORDERED.19
Accused-appellant filed the instant appeal, assigning the following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING SELF-DEFENSE IN THE CASE AT
BAR.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPRECIATING TREACHERY IN THE CASE AT BAR.20
Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in disregarding his claim of self-defense on the
ground that he was not able to establish the existence of all the elements thereof. He insists that it was
the victim’s group which started the trouble, as in fact Edgar Bendillo, a friend of Homer, punched
Ronald Alap-ap who was with accused-appellant on the day of the killing. Accused-appellant maintains
that he was only defending himself when he stabbed Homer. He reiterated witness Vicente Calalang’s
statement that Homer punched him before he stabbed the victim. This he says was clearly an act of
unlawful aggression on Homer’s part. Moreover, he asserts that the means by which he defended
himself was reasonable since Homer was about to get something from his waist and accused-appellant
believed at that time that the victim was about to pull out a weapon and use it to harm him. 21
Accused-appellant argues further that the trial court erred in holding that Homer’s killing was attended
by treachery, since it was Homer’s group which initiated the attack on accused-appellant’s group. This
shows that Homer’s group was really looking for and expecting trouble. Hence, it can not be said that
the victim was not expecting an attack from accused-appellant’s group.22
The Court is not convinced by accused-appellant’s arguments.
8
When an accused invokes self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove by clear and Witness demonstrated the length of the bolo which is approximately 1 foot.
convincing evidence the elements of his defense.23 In effect, he admits that he committed the killing and
the burden is shifted to him to prove that the killing was justified. He must therefore establish the PROSECUTOR LIGORIO:
presence of the following requisites of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such unlawful aggression; and (3) lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 24 Q: Was Homer Jamarolin hit when he was stabbed by Norman Obordo?

Accused-appellant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was unlawful aggression A: Yes sir, he was hit.
on the part of the victim, a condition sine qua non for the successful invocation of self-defense.25 He
failed to show that his life was threatened and that the threat was imminent and actual, not imaginary. 26 Q: By the way, when you saw Norma[n] Obordo stabbed Homer Jamarolin where, was he
It was established during trial that prior to the stabbing, the victim merely extended his lighted cigarette situated at that time. Was he at the side or in front of Homer Jamarolin or where?
to accused-appellant. This cannot by any stretch of imagination be construed as an unlawful aggression
on the part of Homer. A: He was facing Jomer (sic).

Accused-appellant’s claim that Homer punched him first before he stabbed the victim was not given Q: But not so frontal, I mean it was somewhat side view on the part of Homer Jamarolin?
credence by the trial court, which found the testimonies of Bendillo and Rolando Jamarolin to be more
credible.
A: Yes sir.
Bendillo narrated in detail the incidents that led to the killing of Homer in the early morning of January
23, 1997 as follows: Q: And did you see what part of the body was Homer Jamarolin hit when he was stabbed?

xxx A: I saw.

Q: Then what did you see when you see when you were there already at the place where Q: Where? Can you point what part of the body?
Homer Jamarolin was situated?
A: At the left rib at the side.
[A]: I immediately saw Homer Jamarolin at that time that Norman Obordo was about to light
a cigarette and I saw him stabbed Homer Jamarolin. Q: Are you sure that Norman Obordo stabbed Homer Jamarolin at that time?

Q: How far were you when you saw Norman Obordo stabbed Homer Jamarolin? A: Yes sir.

A: One (1) fathom. Q: It was night time, how could you tell us that you saw Norman Obordo stabbed Homer
Jamarolin?
Q: Did you see what weapon did Norman Obordo use in stabbing Homer Jamarolin?
A: Because there was a light nearby.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of lamp?
Q: What was that?
A: Fluorescent lamp.
A: A small bolo.
Q: Electric lamp?
Q: Could you show to the Honorable Court by way of measuring with your hand what is the
height of that bolo? A: Yes sir.

INTERPRETER:

9
 Q: When Homer Jamarolin was hit with that instrument a small bolo directed to him by A: After I boxed Alap-ap, I went back to the place of Homer Jamarolin.
Norman Obordo, what happened to Homer Jamarolin?
Q: And after that you went home together with your companions?
A: He retaliated by boxing?
A: When I went back I saw Norman Obordo called upon to lit his cigarette.
Q: You mean he was able to box Norman Obordo despite the fact that he was hit?
Q: Who called Homer Jamarolin?
A: Yes sir.
A: Norman Obordo.
Q: Was Norman Obordo hit?
Q: How was Homer Jamarolin being called by Norman Obordo?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Norman Obordo make (sic) a sign of calling to someone to go near him because he
Q: Where? wanted to light his cigarette.

A: In his face. Q: So, it was Homer Jamarolin who approached Norman Obordo?

Q: And what happened to Norman Obordo when he was hit? A: Yes, Sir because there was a sign making a signal of calling Homer Jamarolin because
he wanted to lit his cigarette.
A: He fall (sic) down.
Q: Is it not a fact that you testified during the last meeting that it was Norman Obordo who
Q: And what did he do when he fall (sic) down? approached Homer Jamarolin?

A: He ran away. A: No, Sir.

Q: By the way, when he stabbed Homer Jamarolin and according to you you saw that he xxx
was hit with a small bolo, was he able to pull back the bolo or the bolo was (sic) just remain in
the body of Homer Jamarolin? Q: Since you said that it was Homer Jamarolin who approached Norman Obordo, did you
not try to advise him not to approach Norman Obordo considering that Norman Obordo is the
A: The bolo was being pulled. companion of Rolando Alap-ap of whom you have boxed just a moment ago?

Q: You said that after he was hit with the fist of Homer Jamarolin he fall (sic) down and you A: No Sir, because I know for a fact that the purpose of approaching is to light the cigarette.
said further that after he stood up and ran away, did Norman Obordo bring the bolo?
Q: How far [was] your position from Norman Obordo?
A: He was bringing the bolo.
A: About one fathom.
xxx27
Q: Was he together with some other companions, this Norman Obordo?
His testimony during cross-examination, quoted hereunder, shows the consistency of his statements
regarding the pertinent circumstances of the stabbing incident: A: He was at a distance with the group.

Q: And after that boxing incident, you immediately go (sic) home together with your Q: Is it not a fact that this Norman Obordo was being boxed by Homer Jamarolin right after
companions? you boxed Rolando Alap-ap?

10
 A: That is not true. Q: How far were you from your brother Homer and Norman Obordo that time?

xxx A: Only 1 fathom.

COURT: (Clarificatory questions) Q: And at that distance of one fathom you heard what then the words uttered by Norman
Obordo which called the attention of your brother Homer?
Q: In other words you were present when Norman Obordo stabbed to death Homer
Jamarolin? A: Yes, Sir.

A: Yes Sir. I was nearby. Q: Will you please narrate or give the exact words uttered by Norman Obordo which called
the attention of your brother Homer Jamarolin?
Q: So, you were able to positively identify the person who stabbed Homer Jamarolin?
A: Norman Obordo stated that "Bay" let me light my cigarette.
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: You mean to say your brother is smoking?
Q: Because at that time it was a moon light (sic) and the place where the stabbing incident
took place was well illuminated from the electric light from the dancing, am I right? A: Yes, Sir.

A: Yes, Your Honor. Q: Is he at that time bringing a cigarette lighter or match?

Q: And considering that Homer Jamarolin is your companion, you are very aware that at A: Cigarette.
that time during the stabbing incident he was unarmed?
Q: So, at that time your brother Homer Jamarolin was smoking?
A: Yes, Sir.
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: As a result of the stabbing incident Homer Jamarolin died?
Q: How do you know that he is smoking?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
A: Because we were together in going to the disco place.
xxx28
Q: At that time he is holding [a] cigarette stick or placed it between his lip?
The trial court also gave credence to the testimony of Rolando Jamarolin, which corroborated Bendillo’s
statements. Rolando testified on direct examination in this manner: A: In his hand.

xxx Q: What is the distance of Homer Jamarolin to Norman Obordo at that time?

Q: Do you mean to say after Edgar Bendillo boxed without any reason Ronald Alap-ap, this A: Very near.
Norman Obordo called your elder brother Homer Jamarolin?
INTERPRETER:
A: Yes, Sir.
The witness demonstrated the distance from the witness stand up to the Interpreter of
Q: You witnessed then you heard Norman Obordo called your brother Homer Jamarolin? this Court approximately a meter.

A: Yes, Sir.
11
Q: When Norman Obordo told your brother "pagdakota ko Bay," what was the reaction of Q: So, in a lightning speed you noticed that something stocked (sic) to the left portion of the
your brother? abdomen of your brother?

A: He handed his cigarette to him. A: That’s the time when the hunting knife was already embedded at the left side.

Q: In that position he tried to extend his hand with lighted cigarette, what have you noticed Q: On that action, there was no time your brother could defend himself?
the action of Norman Obordo?
A: Yes, Your Honor he has no time to defend himself at that time because he was handling
A: He received the cigarette and simultaneously stabbed my brother. his cigarette.

Q: You mean to say when your brother extended his lighted cigarette to Norman Obordo, Q: When you noticed that something stock (sic) at the vital part of the body of your brother,
Norman Obordo reached for the cigarette? Was he able to receive the cigarette of your brother what happened next?
to light his cigarette?
A: After that Norman Obordo pulled his hunting knife and my brother was able to box and
A: He was able to reach the cigarette. hit Norman Obordo and Norman Obordo fell down and also my brother fell down.

Q: Was Norman Obordo then able to light his cigarette? Q: When both of them feel (sic) down, what happen (sic) next?

A: He was able to light his cigarette but simultaneously stabbed my brother. A: Norman Obordo immediately ran away and I extended help to my brother.

Q: Do you mean to say, what hand of Norman Obordo was holding the cigarette? xxx

A: Left hand. Q: And as you said a while ago in spite of the fact that it happened about dawn of Januanry
23, 1997 you were able to positively identify Norman Obordo as the person who stabbed your
Q: How about the right hand of Norman Obordo at that time? brother because as you said there was light, am I right?

A: His right hand was at his side. A: Yes, Sir.

Q: What have you noticed when his right hand was placed at the hip? Q: The place was illuminated by moon light night and electric bulb?

A: I do not know what he was holding because he is concealing. A: Moon and electric light.

Q: Do you mean to say that you noticed the right hand of Obordo was concealing xxx29
something at that time?
Rolando’s narration of the events surrounding the killing of Homer on cross-examination affirms his
A: I saw he was hiding his hand. earlier testimony:

Q: While in the act of lighting cigarette, what have you notice[d]? Q: After Edgar Bendillo boxed Ronald Alap-ap, what happened next?

A: I saw that the hunting knife was already embedded at the side of my brother. A: Homer was called by Norman Obordo.

Q: You mean to say at that time your brother was not on guard of what will happen to him? Q: Aside from Norman Obordo and Ronald Alap-ap, who are the other companions of
Ronald Alap-ap and Norman Obordo if you know?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
12
A: I do not know the identity of the other companions of Norman Obordo because the place Q: But according to you in your direct testimony Mr. Witness, your brother was able to box
is not very clear to me. Norman Obordo?

Q: In other words you could not see or identify the faces of the companions of Norman A: Yes, Sir.
Obordo?
Q: What about you, what did you do at that time?
A: I can identify.
A: I aided my brother so that he will be brought to the hospital.
Q: You said that after boxing, after Edgar Bendillo boxed Ronald Alap-ap your brother
approached Norman Obordo, is that correct? Q: How about your other companions, what did they do?

A: It was Norman Obordo who called him. A: We were helping one another in order that he will be brought to the hospital.

Q: Why? What was the purpose of Norman Obordo in calling your brother? Q: How about the companions of Norman Obordo, what did they do?

A: For the purpose of lighting his cigarette. A: They ran away.

Q: So in other words your brother is smoking? xxx

A: Yes, Sir. While Norman Obordo was holding/carrying cigarette. COURT: (Clarificatory questions)

Q: And according to your testimony in the direct examination when your brother Homer Q: So, during the stabbing incident you were actually present, am I right?
Jamarolin approached Norman Obordo, Norman Obordo allegedly stabbed your brother, is that
correct?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
A: At that time that he handed his cigarette to Norman Obordo he was was immediately
stabbed. Q: The stabbing incident occurred on January 23, 1997 at about 1:00 o’clock dawn, am I
right?
Q: How far were you from them?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
A: About 1 fathom.
Q: Considering that it was 1:00 o’clock dawn, may I know whether the place where the
incident happened was well lighted?
Q: Aside from you, who was the other person near to the place of them?
A: It was lighted.
A: Edgar Bendillo.
Q: Why can you say that it was lighted, what kind of light which illuminated the place?
xxx
A: Fluorescent.
Q: When you said that Norman Obordo allegedly stabbed your brother what happened to
your brother?
Q: So there was a fluorescent lamp?
A: He felt pain.
A: Yes, Your Honor.

13
Q: Coming from what place? A: Yes, Sir.

A: At the back where we were standing. Q: While in that position extending his hand holding a lighted cigarette in order that Norman
Obordo would light the cigarette, you mean to say without any warning this Norman Obordo
xxx thrust his hunting knife to Homer Jamarolin?

Q: So, at the time of the stabbing incident, you were actually present? A: He was unaware.

A: Yes, Your Honor. Q: At that time may I know whether Homer Jamarolin was armed with a deadly weapon?

Q: Were you able to identify positively the person of Norman Obordo who stab your brother A: No, Sir.
Homer Jamarolin?
xxx30
A: Yes, Your Honor.
After a circumspect examination of the records, the Court finds no reason to disturb the lower court’s
Q: Please look around. Is Norman Obordo present in this Court? finding and to depart from the rule that factual findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of
witnesses considering that it is in a better position to determine the same, having heard the witnesses
themselves and having observed their deportment and manner of testifying during trial. 31
A: Yes, Your Honor.
The incident between Bendillo and Alap-ap cannot be considered as an unlawful aggression on the part
Q: Will you please come down and touch the shoulder of the person of Norman Obordo? of the victim since that incident was apparently just between the two of them and did not involve either
Homer or accused-appellant. In fact, none of Bendillo’s friends or Alap-ap’s companions that early
INTERPRETER: morning joined in the fight involving the two. Hence, accused-appellant’s attempts at justifying his act of
stabbing Homer as having been made in defense of an attack from the victim’s group must fail.
As approached and pointed to by the witness, this person when ask[ed] his name
answered that he is Norman Obordo. Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, accused-
appellant likewise failed to prove that the means he employed to repel Homer’s punch was reasonable.
COURT: The means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between
the means of attack and the defense.32 Accused-appellant claimed that the victim punched him and was
trying to get something from his waist, so he (accused-appellant) stabbed the victim with his hunting
Q: You want to impress this Court that before the stabbing incident, you were very near to knife.33 His act of immediately stabbing Homer and inflicting a wound on a vital part of the victim’s body
Norman Obordo, am I right? was unreasonable and unnecessary considering that, as alleged by accused-appellant himself, the
victim used his bare fist in throwing a punch at him.
A: At a distance of one fathom.
There was thus no error on the part of the trial court in rejecting accused-appellant’s claim of self-
Q: What was the relative position of Homer Jamarolin when you said Norman Obordo defense.1âwphi1.nêt
suddenly thrust his hunting knife considering that they were facing each other?
The trial court was also correct in ruling that the killing of Homer was attended by the qualifying
A: He was extending his hand with a cigarette on it. circumstance of treachery. Treachery is present when the offender employs means, methods or forms
in the execution of an offense which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to
himself arising from the challenge that the offended party might make. 34 It has two elements, to wit: (1)
Q: In other words when Norman Obordo called your brother Homer Jamarolin, your brother
the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
went nearer to Norman Obordo. He extended his hand with cigarette?
or to retaliate; and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution. 35 The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor against the unsuspecting victim
A: He extended his hand with cigarette. without the slightest provocation on the latter’s part, depriving the latter of any real chance of defending
himself.36
Q: To light the cigarette of Norman Obordo?
14
The Court agrees with the finding of the lower court that —
xxx [Homer] Jamarolin was completely unaware of the murderous design of accused Norman
Obordo. Jamarolin was in the act of lighting the cigarette of Norman Obordo, when he was
suddenly, without warning stabbed by Norman Obordo. While it may be true that a sudden and
unexpected attack is not always treacherous, in the case at bar, however, there was treachery
because this type of assault was deliberately adopted by Norman Obordo. Jamarolin was
afforded no opportunity to put up any defense whatsoever, while Obordo was exposed to no
risk at all, and that form of attack, evidently, was consciously adopted by him. xxx37
That the killing of Homer by accused-appellant was attended by treachery is not negated by the fact that
they were face-to-face when accused stabbed the victim, for there can be treachery even if the attack is
frontal, so long as the same was sudden and unexpected, leaving the victim without any opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate.38
In view of the existence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery in the case at bar, accused-appellant
was correctly convicted of the crime of murder, as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
for the killing of Homer Jamarolin.39 There being no aggravating circumstance, the imposition of the
penalty of reclusion perpetua is proper.
However, it is necessary to increase the award of damages granted by the trial court to the heirs of the
victim. Although the trial court was correct in granting civil indemnity in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00), its award of moral damages in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000.00) to compensate the victim’s heirs for injuries to their feelings must be increased to Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. 40
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 11
in Criminal Case No. 7659, finding accused-appellant Norman Obordo y Bulalakaw guilty of murder and
imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of Homer Jamarolin the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity for the death of Homer Jamarolin and Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FEDERICO ABRAZALDO @ "PEDING," accused-appellant.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision1 dated November 15, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44,
Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 95-01052-D, finding accused-appellant Federico Abrazaldo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of
death and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Delfin Guban the amount of ₱50,000.00 as indemnity
and ₱27,000.00 as actual damages, plus costs.
In the Information dated August 3, 1995 filed with the trial court, accused-appellant was charged with
the crime of murder committed as follows:
"That on or about July 15, 1995 in the evening at barangay Pogo, Municipality of Mangaldan, province
of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused armed with a bolo, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stabbed DELFIN GUBAN Y GUINTO inflicting upon him a stab wound
which caused his death to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
"CONTRARY to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659."2
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.3 Forthwith, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented as its witnesses Rosendo Fajardo, SPO1 Ramie Petrache, SP02 Roberto
Fernandez, Dr. Alberto Gonzales and Gregorio Guban. Accused-appellant and his sister, Marites
Abrazaldo, took the witness stand for the defense.
The facts of the case as presented by the prosecution witnesses are as follows:
On July 15, 1995, at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, at Barangay Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan,
accused-appellant, then intoxicated,4 attempted to hack his uncle, Bernabe Quinto, but instead, hit the
post of the latter’s house.5 The incident was reported to the barangay authorities, prompting Delfin
Guban, Rosendo Fajardo, Sr., Alejandro Loceste (all are members of the barangay tanod), and Cesar
Manaois to rush to the scene. Upon reaching the place, Fajardo heard accused-appellant shouting at
his uncle, "I will kill you!" Thereafter, he saw accused-appellant coming out of Quinto’s house with blood
oozing from his forehead.6 At that time, the place was well lighted by a flourescent lamp. Guban tried to
assist accused-appellant. However, for unknown reason, accused-apellant and Guban shouted at each
other and grappled "face to face." Accused-appellant pulled out his knife, stabbed Guban at the
abdomen7 and ran away. When Fajardo got hold of Guban, the latter said, "I was stabbed by Feding
Abrazaldo."8 Fajardo, together with the other barangay tanod, rushed Guban to the Gov. Teofilo Sison
Memorial Hospital where he was operated by Dr. Alberto Gonzales, a Medical Officer III. But after a few
hours, Guban died. Dr. Gonzales issued a Medico-Legal Certificate stating that the cause of death was
"stab wound, epigastrium, massive hemothorax right."9
Gregorio Guban, the victim’s father, testified that he was the one who spent for his son’s funeral
expenses. For the burial, he spent ₱10,000.00;10 for the 10-day funeral wake, ₱10,000.00;11 for the
9th day novena, ₱3,000.00;12 and for the hospitalization, ₱4,000.00,13 or a total of ₱27,000.00.
On July 16, 1995, Fajardo learned that the knife used by accused-appellant in stabbing Guban was in
Salay, Pangasinan. Together with SPO2 Roberto Fernandez, Fajardo went to the house of Francisca
Velasquez, accused-appellant’s aunt, and recovered the knife. 14
15
Invoking self-defense, accused-appellant presented a different version. On July 15, 1995 at about 10:00
in the evening, he was making fans inside his house at Barangay Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan.15 His
wife Lydia and children Mary Jane, Melvin and Christelle were with him. Suddenly, Delfin Guban, who
was then drunk, went to his house and shouted at him, saying, "Get out Feding I will kill you!"16 When
accused-appellant went out, Guban hit him with an iron pipe. Accused-appellant ran towards his house
and got his two children. Guban, now armed with a knife, followed him and they grappled for its
possession. In the course thereof, both fell down.17 It was then that the knife held by Guban
accidentally hit him. Accused-appellant did not know which part of Guban’s body was hit. Thereafter, he
got the knife in order to surrender it to the police.18
Marites Abrazaldo testified that accused-appellant is his brother.19 On July 15, 1992, at about 6:00 in
the evening, accused-appellant, Guban and Juan Quinto were engaged in a "drinking spree."20 At
about 10:00 o’clock in that evening, accused-appellant caused trouble at the house of his uncle,
Bernabe Quinto.21 He attempted to hack his uncle, but instead hit the post of the latter’s house.22
While running away from his uncle’s place, he bumped an artesian well, causing a wound on his
forehead.23 Afterwards, accused-appellant killed Guban.24
On November 15, 1995, the trial court rendered a Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Federico Abrazaldo @ Peding guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic 7659, and in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstances that the
crime was committed while the public authorities were engaged in the discharge of their duties and that
the crime was committed at nighttime, which aggravating circumstances are not offset by any mitigating
circumstance, accused Federico Abrazaldo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death.
"Accused Federico Abrazaldo is ordered to pay an indemnity of ₱50,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased
Delfin Guban. Accused is also ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Delfin Guban the total sum of
₱27,000.00 as actual expenses, plus costs.
"SO ORDERED."
In appreciating treachery and the aggravating circumstances under paragraphs (5) and (6) of Article
14,25 Revised Penal Code, the trial court held:
"We now come to the issue of whether or not evident premeditation was present. The prosecution’s
evidence is wanting on this point. However, there is no question that there was treachery as the
accused embraced Delfin Guban and suddenly stabbed him with a knife. The victim was not in a
position to defend himself at the time of the attack. The deceased was stabbed without any
warning. He was given no chance to defend himself. Treachery, therefore, qualifies the killing of
the victim and raises it to the category of murder.
"The prosecution has established thru the testimony of Gregorio Guban that at the time of the incident
on July 15, 1995, the members of the barangay tanod, namely: Rosendo Fajardo, Sr., Delfin Guban and
Alfredo Laceste were performing their duties as members of the barangay tanod. (See p. 6 tsn
September 18, 1995). This is an aggravating circumstance under paragraph 5, Article 14 of the
Revised Penal Code. The members of the barangay tanod who are public authorities were
engaged in the discharge of their duties at the time of the stabbing incident. Besides, the incident
was committed during nighttime, that was 10:00 in the evening. Accused took advantage of the
darkness of the night for the successful consummation of his plan to kill Delfin Guban."
Accused-appellant, in his Appellant’s Brief, ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
"I
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE
BY THE ACCUSED TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE CIRCUMSTANCE OF THE CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE RECOVERY OF THE ALLEGED
WEAPON USED IN STABBING VICTIM AT THE HOUSE OF THE AUNT OF ACCUSED BOLSTERED
THE CASE AGAINST HIM DESPITE LACK OF SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE ITS VERACITY.
III
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE TESTIMONY EXTRACTED BY
THE PROSECUTION FROM DEFENSE WITNESS MARITESS ABRAZALDO WHICH HAD NO
SUFFICIENT BASIS AT ALL.
IV
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT TREACHERY ATTENDED THE
STABBING OF THE VICTIM WITHOUT SUFFICIENT BASIS TO PROVE THE SAME.
V
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT TOOK
ADVANTAGE OF NIGHTTIME IN CONSUMING THE ACT.
VI
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CHARGE AGAINST ACCUSED-
APPELLANT IS AGGRAVATED BY THE FACT THAT THE VICTIM WAS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
HIS DUTY."
The Solicitor General, in the Appellee’s Brief, asserts that in pleading self-defense, accused-appellant
admitted he killed the victim and, therefore, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on
the weakness of that of the prosecution. Moreover, accused-appellant’s version of the incident is
completely contradicted by the testimony of his sister. Also, the aggravating circumstance, under par.
(5) of Article 14, Revised Penal Code, was clearly established because during the incident, Guban, as
the Assistant Chief Tanod, was on duty and engaged in the maintenance of peace and order.
16
The Solicitor General though agrees with accused-appellant that there was no treachery. Evidence
shows that he and Guban shouted at each other and struggled "face to face" before the stabbing
incident. Thus, the assault was not sudden. Likewise, the Solicitor General is convinced that accused-
appellant did not purposely and deliberately seek nighttime to perpetrate the commission of the crime.
Consistent is the jurisprudence that where self-defense is invoked, it is incumbent upon the accused to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of
sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent and repel an
aggression. On appeal, the burden becomes even more difficult as the accused must show that the
court below committed reversible error in appreciating the evidence.26
Accused-appellant miserably failed to discharge the burden. To show that he was not the unlawful
aggressor, he testified that it was Guban who went to his house, threatened to kill him,27 hit him with an
iron pipe,28 and attacked him with a knife.29 We quote accused-appellant’s testimony, thus:
"ATTY. CAMPOS:
xxxxxx
Q You said a while ago that on July 15, 1995 at about 10:00 in the evening you were in your
house engaging in fan making, do you know of any unusual incident that happened during that
time?
A Delfin Guban came to my house and he was under the influence of liquor and he
shouted at me, sir.
Q And what did Delfin Guban shout at you?
A He said, "Get out Feding I will kill you."
Q After this Delfin Guban shouted at you, what happened next?
A When I went out of the house, I was already there infront of the house then he hit me, sir.
Q You said Delfin Guban hit you, what instrument did he use in hitting you?
A He hit me with a pipe , sir.
xxxxxx
Q After Delfin Guban hit you with that pipe, what happened next?
A I ran towards my house inside, then got my two children while Delfin Guban followed me
inside my house, sir.
Q When Delfin Guban followed you inside your house, what happened again?
A He was holding a knife and we grappled and during that time both of us fell down, sir.
Q When you grappled with Delfin Guban, who was holding a knife, what again
happened?
A We grappled for the possession of the knife then we fell down and the knife he was
then holding pointed towards him and hit him. x x x.30 " (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing testimony bears not only the vice of falsity but also isolation. It is uncorroborated and
even opposed by Marites, accused-appellant’s own sister and lone witness. Contrary to his testimony
that Guban hit him on his forehead with a pipe, Marites declared that accused-appellant sustained the
wound on his forehead when he accidentally bumped an artesian well. Instead of fortifying her brother’s
defense, she virtually affirmed the prosecution’s story by testifying that he created trouble in their
compound, attempted to kill his uncle Bernabe Quinto and killed Guban. 31
Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that the plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably
entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but in itself is
extremely doubtful.32 In the present case, accused-appellant’s tendency to invoke a melange of
defenses renders his testimony dubious. While he admitted the commission of the crime in order to
preserve his own life, he maintained that Guban accidentally stabbed himself. This shows ambivalence.
Accident presupposes lack of intention to stab the victim, while self-defense presumes voluntariness,
induced only by necessity.33 Indeed, if there is truth to either of his claim, his natural course of action
was to assist the victim, or at the very least, report the incident to the authorities. Certainly, the justifying
circumstance of self-defense34 or the exempting circumstance of accident cannot be appreciated
considering accused-appellant’s flight from the crime scene and his failure to inform the authorities of
the incident. Furthermore, that he did not surrender the knife to the authorities is inconsistent with a
clean conscience and, instead, indicates his culpability of the crime charged.35
In a last-ditch effort to exculpate himself, accused-appellant assails Fajardo’s testimony as tainted with
inconsistencies and is "contrary to the normal course." Accused-appellant cannot invoke these alleged
weaknesses in view of the principle that one who pleads self-defense must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. Even if the prosecution’s evidence is
weak, it is still credible considering accused-appellant’s admission that he killed the victim. It bears
emphasis that Fajardo’s testimony clearly points to him as the culprit. Not only did he pull out his knife,
stabbed Guban36 and ran away.37 Fajardo also reiterated what Guban uttered to him, i.e., "I was
stabbed by Feding Abrazaldo."38
As Guban had succumbed to death and his opportunity to divulge the truth on his demise had been lost,
we cannot but cast a quizzical glance on accused-appellant’s uncorroborated testimony. More so, when
such testimony was contradicted by his own witness who happened to be his sister. Standing alone
against the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, accused-appellant’s own account of the killing
must necessarily fail. We hold that his guilt has been established to a degree of moral certainty. The trial
court did not err in relying on the testimony of Fajardo, an eyewitness. Time and again, we have said
that we will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses
unless there appears on record some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been
17
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. This is so because the trial court has
the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood.39
However, we find that the trial court erred in concluding that treachery attended the commission of the
crime. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from defense which the offended party might make. Treachery
cannot be presumed, it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the
killing itself. Fajardo testified that accused-appellant and Guban were "grappling with each other" and
that prior to the stabbing, they were shouting at each other. In this scenario, it cannot be said that
Guban was unprepared to put up a defense, such as hitting accused-appellant, or that the latter’s
assault was sudden. We quote in verbatim the testimony of Fajardo, thus:
"ATTY. CAMPOS:
Q They were not then fighting?
A They were grappling with each other and then he stabbed Delfin Guban.
xxxxxx
Q In fact, they were shouting each other?
A Yes, sir.
Q What were they shouting against another?
A I could no longer understand because it was already night.
Q But they were shouting loudly, am I correct?
A Yes and there were many people."40 (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court likewise erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity or nighttime. For
nocturnity to be properly appreciated, it must be shown that it facilitated the commission of the crime
and that it was purposely sought for by the offender. By and itself, nighttime is not an aggravating
circumstance.41 In the instant case, no sufficient evidence was offered to prove that accused-appellant
deliberately sought the cover of darkness to accomplish his criminal design. In fact, Fajardo testified that
there was a fluorescent lamp sufficiently illuminating the scene of the crime.42
Neither can we sustain the trial court’s finding that the aggravating circumstance under paragraph (5) of
Article 14, Revised Penal Code, i.e., that the crime was committed in a place where public authorities
were engaged in the discharge of their duties, is present. It must be pointed out that this aggravating
circumstance is based on the greater perversity of the offender, as shown by the place of the
commission of the crime, which must be respected.43 In this case, the crime was committed at the
compound of the accused-appellant where no public function was being held. The arrival of the
barangay authorities was precisely due to the trouble that had commenced prior to the stabbing
incident. Clearly, the said aggravating circumstance cannot be considered. Moreover, under the present
Rules,44 aggravating circumstances must be alleged, otherwise, they cannot be appreciated. Being
favorable to the accused, this new procedure may be given retroactive effect.45 Except treachery, the
other aggravating circumstances mentioned have not been alleged in the Information.
In the absence of any circumstance that would qualify the crime at bar to murder, accused-appellant
can only be held liable for homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
The prescribed penalty is reclusion temporal. Considering that there was neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime, the penalty has to be imposed in
its medium period, ranging from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. Applying the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the
minimum of which is within the range of prision mayor, or 6 years and 1 day to 12 years. The maximum
thereof is within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period, which is 14 years, 8 months and 1
day to 17 years and 4 months. 46
On the trial court’s award of actual damages in the amount of ₱27,000.00, we find the same to be
unsubstantiated. To be entitled to such damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with
a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable
to the injured party.47 In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to present any receipt to prove the claim
for expenses incurred.48 Gregorio Guban, the father of the victim, who shouldered the expenses for the
wake and burial failed to submit receipts to show the amount of such expenses.49 However, as the
heirs of Guban did actually incur funeral expenses, we are justified in awarding ₱25,000.00, not for
purposes of indemnification, but by way of temperate damages.50
Thus, we now hold that where the amount of the actual damages cannot be determined because of the
absence of receipts to prove the same, but it is shown that the heirs are entitled thereto, temperate
damages may be awarded. Such temperate damages, taking into account the current jurisprudence
fixing the indemnity for death at ₱ 50,000.00, should be one-half thereof, or ₱25,000.00. This makes
temperate damages equal to the award of exemplary damages, which is likewise fixed at ₱25,000.00 in
cases where its award is justified.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment in Criminal Case No. 95-01052-D is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Federico Abrazaldo is declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. He is
ordered to pay the heirs of the late Delfin Guban ₱50,000.00 as indemnity and ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
18
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAMERTO NARVAEZ, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Gonzalo B. Callanta (counsel de oficio) for defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 1815 and 1816 for murder which, after a joint trial, resulted in the conviction of the
accused in a decision rendered on September 8, 1970, with the following pronouncement:
Thus, we have a crime of MURDER qualified by treachery with the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. The proper penalty imposable, therefore, is RECLUSION
PERPETUA (Arts. 248 and 64, Revised Penal Code).
Accordingly, finding Mamerto Narvaez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder,
(a) In Criminal Case No. 1815, he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA,
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Davis Q. Fleischer in the sum of P 12,000.00
as compensatory damages, P 10,000.00 as moral damages, P 2,000.00 as attorney's
fees, the offended party having been represented by a private prosecutor, and to pay
the costs;
(b) In Criminal Case No. 1816, he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA,
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Flaviano Rubia in the sum of P12,000.00 as
compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as attorney's
fees, the offended party having been represent by a private prosecutor, and to pay
the costs (p. 48, rec.).
The facts are summarized in the People's brief, as follows:
At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and
Cesar Ibanez together with the two deceased Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia,
were fencing the land of George Fleischer, father of deceased Davis Fleischer. The
place was in the boundary of the highway and the hacienda owned by George
Fleischer. This is located in the municipality of Maitum, South Cotabato. At the place
of the fencing is the house and rice drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez (pp. 179-182,
t.s.n., Pieza II). At that time, appellant was taking his rest, but when he heard that the
walls of his house were being chiselled, he arose and there he saw the fencing going
on. If the fencing would go on, appellant would be prevented from getting into his
house and the bodega of his ricemill. So he addressed the group, saying 'Pare, if
possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over what is
good,' addressing the deceased Rubia, who is appellant's compadre. The deceased
Fleischer, however, answered: 'No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.' Appellant
apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot Fleischer, hitting him. As
Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing there is a gun on the
jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him (pp. 127-133, t.s.n., Defense
transcript). Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of the shotting' (pp. 9-14, t.s.n.,
Pieza I, pp. 8-9, Appellant's Brief, p.161, rec.).
It appears, however, that this incident is intertwined with the long drawn out legal battle between the
Fleischer and Co., Inc. of which deceased Fleischer was the secretary-treasurer and deceased Rubia
the assistant manager, on the one hand, and the land settlers of Cotabato, among whom was appellant.
From the available records of the related cases which had been brought to the Court of Appeals (CA-
G.R. Nos. 28858-R and 50583-R) and to this Court on certiorari (G.R. No. L-26757 and L-45504), WE
take judicial notice of the following antecedent facts:
Appellant was among those persons from northern and central Luzon who went to Mindanao in 1937
and settled in Maitum, a former sitio of Kiamba and now a separate municipality of South Cotabato. He
established his residence therein, built his house, cultivated the area, and was among those who
petitioned then President Manuel L. Quezon to order the subdivision of the defunct Celebes Plantation
and nearby Kalaong Plantation totalling about 2,000 hectares, for distribution among the settlers.
Shortly thereafter, Fleischer and Company, headed by George W. Fleischer, an American landowner in
Negros Oriental, filed sales application No. 21983 on June 3, 1937 over the same area formerly leased
and later abandoned by Celebes Plantation Company, covering 1,017.2234 hectares.
Meanwhile, the subdivision was ordered and a public land surveyor did the actual survey in 1941 but the
survey report was not submitted until 1946 because of the outbreak of the second world war. According
to the survey, only 300 hectares Identified as Lots Nos. 22, 26 and 38, Ps. 176 Kiamba, were set aside
for Sales Application No. 21983, while the rest were subdivided into sublots of 5 to 6 hectares each to
be distributed among the settlers (pp. 32-33, G.R. No. L-45504).
The 300 hectares set aside for the sales application of Fleischer and Company was declared open for
disposition, appraised and advertised for public auction. At the public auction held in Manila on August
14, 1948, Fleischer and Company was the only bidder for P6,000.00. But because of protests from the
settlers the corresponding award in its favor was held in abeyance, while an investigator was sent by
the Director of Lands to Kiamba in the person of Atty. Jose T. Gozon Atty. Gozon came back after ten
days with an amicable settlement signed by the representative of the settlers. This amicable settlement
was later repudiated by the settlers, but the Director of Lands, acting upon the report of Atty. Gozon,
approved the same and ordered the formal award of the land in question to Fleischer and Company.
The settlers appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who, however, affirmed
the decision in favor of the company.
On May 29, 1950, the settlers filed Civil Case No. 240 in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato which
then consisted only of one sala, for the purpose of annulling the order of the Secretary of Agriculture
19
and Natural Resources which affirmed the order of the Director of Lands awarding the contested land to
the company. The settlers as plaintiffs, lost that case in view of the amicable settlement which they had
repudiated as resulting from threats and intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation and fraudulent
machination on the part of the company. They appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 28858-R)
which likewise affirmed on August 16, 1965 the decision of the Court of First Instance in favor of the
company.
This resulted in the ouster of the settlers by an order of the Court of First Instance dated September 24,
1966, from the land which they had been occupying for about 30 years. Among those ejected was the
appellant who, to avoid trouble, voluntarily dismantled his house, built in 1947 at a cost of around
P20,000.00, and transferred to his other house which he built in 1962 or 1963 near the highway. The
second house is not far from the site of the dismantled house. Its ground floor has a store operated by
Mrs. June Talens who was renting a portion thereof. He also transferred his store from his former
residence to the house near the highway. Aside from the store, he also had a rice mill located about 15
meters east of the house and a concrete pavement between the rice mill and the house, which is used
for drying grains and copra.
On November 14, 1966, appellant was among the settlers on whose behalf Jose V. Gamboa and other
leaders filed Civil Case No. 755 in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I. to obtain an
injunction or annulment of the order of award with prayer for preliminary injunction. During the pendency
of this case, appellant on February 21, 1967 entered into a contract of lease with the company whereby
he agreed to lease an area of approximately 100 to 140 square meters of Lot No. 38 from the company
(Exh. 9, p. 1, Folder of Exhibits for Defense) for a consideration of P16.00 monthly. According to him, he
signed the contract although the ownership of the land was still uncertain, in order to avoid trouble, until
the question of ownership could be decided. He never paid the agreed rental, although he alleges that
the milling job they did for Rubia was considered payment. On June 25, 1968, deceased Fleischer wrote
him a letter with the following tenor:
You have not paid six months rental to Fleischers & Co., Inc. for that portion of land in
which your house and ricemill are located as per agreement executed on February
21, 1967. You have not paid as as even after repeated attempts of collection made by
Mr. Flaviano Rubia and myself.
In view of the obvious fact that you do not comply with the agreement, I have no
alternative but to terminate our agreement on this date.
I am giving you six months to remove your house, ricemill, bodega, and water pitcher
pumps from the land of Fleischers & Co., Inc. This six- month period shall expire on
December 31, 1966.
In the event the above constructions have not been removed within the six- month
period, the company shall cause their immediate demolition (Exhibit 10, p. 2, supra).
On August 21, 1968, both deceased, together with their laborers, commenced fencing Lot 38 by putting
bamboo posts along the property line parallel to the highway. Some posts were planted right on the
concrete drier of appellant, thereby cutting diagonally across its center (pp. 227-228, t.s.n., Vol. 2), with
the last post just adjacent to appellant's house (p. 231, t.s.n., supra). The fence, when finished, would
have the effect of shutting off the accessibility to appellant's house and rice mill from the highway, since
the door of the same opens to the Fleischers' side. The fencing continued on that fateful day of August
22, 1968, with the installation of four strands of barbed wire to the posts.
At about 2:30 p.m. on the said day, appellant who was taking a nap after working on his farm all
morning, was awakened by some noise as if the wall of his house was being chiselled. Getting up and
looking out of the window, he found that one of the laborers of Fleischer was indeed chiselling the wall
of his house with a crowbar (p. 129, t.s.n., Vol. 6), while deceased Rubia was nailing the barbed wire
and deceased Fleischer was commanding his laborers. The jeep used by the deceased was parked on
the highway. The rest of the incident is narrated in the People's Brief as above-quoted. Appellant
surrendered to the police thereafter, bringing with him shotgun No. 1119576 and claiming he shot two
persons (Exh. Pp. 31, Defense Exhibits).
Appellant now questions the propriety of his conviction, assigning the following errors:
First Assignment of Error: That the lower court erred in convicting defendant-appellant
despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person; and
Second Assignment of Error: That the court a quo also erred in convicting defendant-
appellant although he acted in defense of his rights (p. 20 of Appellant's Brief, p. 145,
rec.).
The act of killing of the two deceased by appellant is not disputed. Appellant admitted having shot them
from the window of his house with the shotgun which he surrendered to the police authorities. He
claims, however, that he did so in defense of his person and of his rights, and therefore he should be
exempt from criminal liability.
Defense of one's person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance under Art. 11, par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, but in order for it to be appreciated, the following requisites must occur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself (Art.
11, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, as amended).
The aggression referred to by appellant is the angry utterance by deceased Fleischer of the following
words: "Hindi, sigue, gademit, avante", in answer to his request addressed to his compadre, the
deceased Rubia, when he said, "Pare, hinto mona ninyo at pag-usapan natin kung ano ang mabuti" (pp.
227-229, t.s.n., Vol. 6). This was in reaction to his having been awakened to see the wall of his house
being chiselled. The verbal exchange took place while the two deceased were on the ground doing the
fencing and the appellant was up in his house looking out of his window (pp. 225-227, supra). According
to appellant, Fleischer's remarks caused this reaction in him: "As if, I lost my senses and unknowingly I
took the gun on the bed and unknowingly also I shot Mr. Fleischer, without realizing it, I shot Mr.
Fleischer" (p. 132, supra). As for the shooting of Rubia, appellant testified:
20
 When I shot Davis Fleischer, Flaviano Rubia was nailing and upon hearing the shot,
Mr. Rubia looked at Mr. Fleischer and when Mr. Fleischer fell down, Mr. Rubia ran
towards the jeep and knowing that there was a firearm in the jeep and thinking that if
he will take that firearm he will kill me, I shot at him (p. 132, supra, Emphasis
supplied).
The foregoing statements of appellant were never controverted by the prosecution. They claim,
however, that the deceased were in lawful exercise of their rights of ownership over the land in
question, when they did the fencing that sealed off appellant's access to the highway.
A review of the circumstances prior to the shooting as borne by the evidence reveals that five persons,
consisting of the deceased and their three laborers, were doing the fencing and chiselling of the walls of
appellant's house. The fence they were putting up was made of bamboo posts to which were being
nailed strands of barbed wire in several layers. Obviously, they were using tools which could be lethal
weapons, such as nail and hammer, bolo or bamboo cutter, pliers, crowbar, and other necessary
gadgets. Besides, it was not disputed that the jeep which they used in going to the place was parked
just a few steps away, and in it there was a gun leaning near the steering wheel. When the appellant
woke up to the sound of the chiselling on his walls, his first reaction was to look out of the window. Then
he saw the damage being done to his house, compounded by the fact that his house and rice mill will be
shut off from the highway by the fence once it is finished. He therefore appealed to his compadre, the
deceased Rubia, to stop what they were doing and to talk things over with him. But deceased Fleischer
answered angrily with 'gademit' and directed his men to proceed with what they were doing.
The actuation of deceased Fleischer in angrily ordering the continuance of the fencing would have
resulted in the further chiselling of the walls of appellant's house as well as the closure of the access to
and from his house and rice mill-which were not only imminent but were actually in progress. There is
no question, therefore, that there was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleischer was ordering, and
Rubia was actually participating in the fencing. This was indeed aggression, not on the person of
appellant, but on his property rights.
The question is, was the aggression unlawful or lawful? Did the victims have a right to fence off the
contested property, to destroy appellant's house and to shut off his ingress and egress to his residence
and the highway?
Article 30 of the Civil Code recognizes the right of every owner to enclose or fence his land or
tenements.
However, at the time of the incident on August 22, 1968, Civil Case no. 755 for annulment of the order
of award to Fleischer and Company was still pending in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. The
parties could not have known that the case would be dismissed over a year after the incident on August
22, 1968, as it was dismissed on January 23, 1970 on ground of res judicata, in view of the dismissal in
1965 (by the Court of Appeals) of Civil Case No. 240 filed in 1950 for the annulment of the award to the
company, between the same parties, which the company won by virtue of the compromise agreement in
spite of the subsequent repudiation by the settlers of said compromise agreement; and that such 1970
dismissal also carried the dismissal of the supplemental petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines
on November 28, 1968 to annul the sales patent and to cancel the corresponding certificate of title
issued to the company, on the ground that the Director of Lands had no authority to conduct the sale
due to his failure to comply with the mandatory requirements for publication. The dismissal of the
government's supplemental petition was premised on the ground that after its filing on November 28,
1968, nothing more was done by the petitioner Republic of the Philippines except to adopt all the
evidence and arguments of plaintiffs with whom it joined as parties-plaintiffs.
Hence, it is reasonable to believe that appellant was indeed hoping for a favorable judgment in Civil
Case No. 755 filed on November 14, 1966 and his execution of the contract of lease on February 21,
1967 was just to avoid trouble. This was explained by him during cross-examination on January 21,
1970, thus:
It happened this way: we talked it over with my Mrs. that we better rent the place
because even though we do not know who really owns this portion to avoid trouble.
To avoid trouble we better pay while waiting for the case because at that time, it was
not known who is the right owner of the place. So we decided until things will clear up
and determine who is really the owner, we decided to pay rentals (p. 169, t.s.n.,
Vol.6).
In any case, Fleischer had given him up to December 31, 1968 (Exh.10, p. 2, Defense Exhibits) within
which to vacate the land. He should have allowed appellant the peaceful enjoyment of his properties up
to that time, instead of chiselling the walls of his house and closing appellant's entrance and exit to the
highway.
The following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines are in point:
Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long
as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or
a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the
competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should
he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the
means established by the laws and the Rules of Court (Articles 536 and 539, Civil
Code of the Philippines).
Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had no right to destroy or cause damage to
appellant's house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway while he was pleading with them to stop
and talk things over with him. The assault on appellant's property, therefore, amounts to unlawful
aggression as contemplated by law.
Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of immediate
and imminent kind (People vs. Encomiendas, 46 SCRA 522).
In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of appellant's property which he had the right
to resist, pursuant to Art. 429 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person
from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as
21
 may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful
physical invasion or usurpation of his property (Emphasis supplied).
The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance of self-
defense or defense of one's rights under paragraph 1 of Article 11, Revised Penal Code. When the
appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was disproportionate
to the attack.
WE find, however, that the third element of defense of property is present, i.e., lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of appellant who was defending his property. As a matter of fact, there was no
provocation at all on his part, since he was asleep at first and was only awakened by the noise
produced by the victims and their laborers. His plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk
things over with him was no provocation at all.
Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since not all the elements for
justification are present. He should therefore be held responsible for the death of his victims, but he
could be credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to paragraph
6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
The crime committed is homicide on two counts. The qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be
appreciated in this case because of the presence of provocation on the part of the deceased. As WE
held earlier in People vs. Manlapaz (55 SCRA 598), the element of a sudden unprovoked attack is
therefore lacking.
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, "it must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by
the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a special view to the accomplishment of the act without risk
to the assailant from any defense that the party assailed might have made. This cannot be said of a
situation where the slayer acted instantaneously ..." (People vs. Cañete, 44 Phil. 481).
WE likewise find the aggravating (qualifying) circumstance of evident premeditation not sufficiently
established. The only evidence presented to prove this circumstance was the testimony of Crisanto
Ibañez, 37 years old, married, resident of Maitum, South Cotabato, and a laborer of Fleischer and
Company, which may be summarized as follows:
On August 20, 1968 (two days before the incident) at about 7:00 A.M., he was drying
corn near the house of Mr. and Mrs. Mamerto Narvaez at the crossing, Maitum, South
Cotabato, when the accused and his wife talked to him. Mrs. Narvaez asked him to
help them, as he was working in the hacienda. She further told him that if they fenced
their house, there is a head that will be broken. Mamerto Narvaez added 'Noy, it is
better that you will tell Mr. Fleischer because there will be nobody who will break his
head but I will be the one.' He relayed this to Mr. Flaviano Rubia, but the latter told
him not to believe as they were only Idle threats designed to get him out of the
hacienda (pp. 297-303, t.s.n., Vol. 2).
This single evidence is not sufficient to warrant appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation. As WE have consistently held, there must be "direct evidence of the planning or
preparation to kill the victim, .... it is not enough that premeditation be suspected or surmised, but the
criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing the determination to commit the
crime" (People vs. Ordioles, 42 SCRA 238). Besides, there must be a "showing" that the accused
premeditated the killing; that the culprit clung to their (his) premeditated act; and that there was
sufficient interval between the premeditation and the execution of the crime to allow them (him) to reflect
upon the consequences of the act" (People vs. Gida, 102 SCRA 70).
Moreover, the obvious bias of witness Crisanto Ibañez, as a laborer of the deceased Davis Fleischer,
neutralizes his credibility.
Since in the case at bar, there was no direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victims
nor that the accused premeditated the killing, and clung to his premeditated act, the trial court's
conclusion as to the presence of such circumstance may not be endorsed.
Evident premeditation is further negated by appellant pleading with the victims to stop the fencing and
destroying his house and to talk things over just before the shooting.
But the trial court has properly appreciated the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, it appearing that appellant surrendered to the authorities soon after the shooting.
Likewise, We find that passion and obfuscation attended the commission of the crime. The appellant
awoke to find his house being damaged and its accessibility to the highway as well as of his rice mill
bodega being closed. Not only was his house being unlawfully violated; his business was also in danger
of closing down for lack of access to the highway. These circumstances, coming so near to the time
when his first house was dismantled, thus forcing him to transfer to his only remaining house, must have
so aggravated his obfuscation that he lost momentarily all reason causing him to reach for his shotgun
and fire at the victims in defense of his rights. Considering the antecedent facts of this case, where
appellant had thirty years earlier migrated to this so-called "land of promise" with dreams and hopes of
relative prosperity and tranquility, only to find his castle crumbling at the hands of the deceased, his
dispassionate plea going unheeded-all these could be too much for any man-he should be credited with
this mitigating circumstance.
Consequently, appellant is guilty of two crimes of homicide only, the killing not being attended by any
qualifying nor aggravating circumstance, but extenuated by the privileged mitigating circumstance of
incomplete defense-in view of the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victims and lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the appellant-and by two generic mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation.
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty for homicide as reclusion temporal.
Pursuant to Article 69, supra, the penalty lower by one or two degrees shall be imposed if the deed is
not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same.
Considering that the majority of the requirements for defense of property are present, the penalty may
be lowered by two degrees, i.e., to prision correccional And under paragraph 5 of Article 64, the same
may further be reduced by one degree, i.e., arresto mayor, because of the presence of two mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance.
The civil liability of the appellant should be modified. In the case of Zulueta vs. Pan American World
Airways (43 SCRA 397), the award for moral damages was reduced because the plaintiff contributed to
the gravity of defendant's reaction. In the case at bar, the victims not only contributed but they actually
provoked the attack by damaging appellant's properties and business. Considering appellant's standing
22
in the community, being married to a municipal councilor, the victims' actuations were apparently
designed to humiliate him and destroy his reputation. The records disclose that his wife, councilor Feliza
Narvaez, was also charged in these two cases and detained without bail despite the absence of
evidence linking her to the killings. She was dropped as a defendant only upon motion of the
prosecution dated October 31, 1968. (p. 14, CFI rec. of Crim. Case No. 1816), but acted upon on
November 4, 1968 (p. 58, CFI rec. of Criminal Case No. 1815).
Moreover, these cases arose out of an inordinate desire on the part of Fleischer and Company, despite
its extensive landholdings in a Central Visayan province, to extend its accumulation of public lands to
the resettlement areas of Cotabato. Since it had the capability-financial and otherwise-to carry out its
land accumulation scheme, the lowly settlers, who uprooted their families from their native soil in Luzon
to take advantage of the government's resettlement program, but had no sufficient means to fight the
big landowners, were the ones prejudiced. Thus, the moral and material suffering of appellant and his
family deserves leniency as to his civil liability.
Furthermore, Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code requires a person convicted of prision correccional
or arrests mayor and fine who has no property with which to meet his civil liabilities to serve a subsidiary
imprisonment at the rate of one (1) day for each P 2.50. However, the amendment introduced by
Republic Act No. 5465 on April 21, 1969 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not
to reparation of the damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs of
proceedings. Considering that Republic Act 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a habitual
delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ONLY TWO (2)
HOMICIDES, MITIGATED BY THE PRIVILEGED EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE
SELF-DEFENSE AS WELL AS BY TWO (2) GENERIC MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND OBFUSCATION, WITHOUT ANY AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE, APPELLANT IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT OF
FOUR (4) MONTHS OF ARRESTO MAYOR, TO INDEMNIFY EACH GROUP OF HEIRS OF DAVIS
FLEISCHER AND OF FLAVIANO RUBIA IN THE SUM OF FOUR THOUSAND (P 4,000.00) PESOS,
WITHOUT SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT AND WITHOUT ANY AWARD FOR MORAL DAMAGES
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.
CONSIDERING THAT APPELLANT HAS BEEN UNDER DETENTION FOR ALMOST FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS NOW SINCE HIS VOLUNTARY SURRENDER ON AUGUST 22,1968, HIS IMMEDIATE
RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a novel theory -- the
"battered woman syndrome" (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-defense. Under the proven facts,
however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration because there was no unlawful aggression -- no
immediate and unexpected attack on her by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of cumulative
provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-control. This "psychological
paralysis" she suffered diminished her will power, thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor under
paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon
an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. The acute battering she
suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight
months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental
state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn child's.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS, as well as the
benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be released from custody on
parole, because she has already served the minimum period of her penalty while under detention during
the pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0, finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused,
Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as
provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659,
and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating
circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
"The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages."2
The Information3 charged appellant with parricide as follows:
23
 "That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel,
Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her
legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided
herself for the purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:
'Cadaveric spasm.
'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
'Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from
its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.
'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting
[in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior
surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal vessels producing severe
intracranial hemorrhage.
'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the
epidermis.
'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'
which caused his death."4
With the assistance of her counsel,5 appellant pleaded not guilty during her arraignment on March 3,
1997.6 In due course, she was tried for and convicted of parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecution's version of the facts in this wise:
"Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City.
Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time, Ben's
younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995, however, appellant
and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang, Isabel, Leyte where they
lived with their two children, namely: John Marben and Earl Pierre.
"On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their
salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass Ben's
house before reaching his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out that appellant
had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his house, while Arturo went to a
store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiao runner to place a bet. Arturo did
not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of the Genosas' rented house,
he heard her say 'I won't hesitate to kill you' to which Ben replied 'Why kill me when I am
innocent?' That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive. Arturo also noticed that since then, the
Genosas' rented house appeared uninhabited and was always closed.
"On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and neighbor living
about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig because she was going to Cebu for
a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her motorcycle to their neighbor
Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money to buy it.
"That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going to
Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each one
carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he was.
Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas' rented house. Joseph, appellant and
her children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as Joseph noticed that
appellant did not want to talk to him.
"On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor
emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find out the
cause of the stench but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not have a
duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel saw. He was
able to get inside through the kitchen door but only after destroying a window to reach a hook
that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom where the offensive smell was
coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying on his side on the bed covered with
a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban
went out of the house and sent word to the mother of Ben about his son's misfortune. Later
that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother of Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her] son.
"Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the police
station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas' rented
house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3 Acodesin
proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom where they found the dead body of Ben
lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape of Ben who only had
his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of an aparador a metal pipe
about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a wall. The metal pipe measured
three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an
open end without a stop valve with a red stain at one end. The bedroom was not in disarray.
"About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be taken
outside at the back of the house before the postmortem examination was conducted by Dr.
Cerillo in the presence of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel, Leyte responsible for
medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for two to three days and his
body was already decomposing. The postmortem examination of Dr. Cerillo yielded the
findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed against appellant. She concluded that
the cause of Ben's death was 'cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial
hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital [bone].'
24
 "Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on November 15,
1995, she got worried that her husband who was not home yet might have gone gambling
since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Araño, appellant went to look for Ben at the
marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him there. They found Ben drunk
upon their return at the Genosas' house. Ecel went home despite appellant's request for her to
sleep in their house.
"Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a fight. She
allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing their homework.
Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light and, with the use of a
chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from watching television.
According to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the bedroom, but he got hold
of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the bed and screamed for help.
Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because she wanted him to leave. Seeing
his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly flew into a rage, dragged appellant
outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her by the neck, and told her 'You might as
well be killed so nobody would nag me.' Appellant testified that she was aware that there was a
gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not have the key to it, he got a three-inch long blade
cutter from his wallet. She however, 'smashed' the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop
the blade and his wallet. Appellant then 'smashed' Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was
about to pick up the blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
"Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She
supposedly 'distorted' the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the spot,
though, but in the bedroom."7 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
"1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to her
marriage, Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of Bachelor
of Science in Business Administration, and was working, at the time of her husband's death, as
a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three (3) children: John
Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.
"2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were neighbors in
Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of parents were
against their relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop other suitors from courting
her. Their closeness developed as he was her constant partner at fiestas.
"3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Ben's parents, together with Ben's
brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben 'lived happily'. But
apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would become
violent.
"4. Ben's brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when Ben and
Marivic married. He said that when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben would
come home drunk, Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he
saw Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand was covered
with blood. Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned apparently having asked for
Ben's forgiveness. In another incident in May 22, 1994, early morning, Alex and his father
apparently rushed to Ben's aid again and saw blood from Ben's forehead and Marivic holding
an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic reconciled after Marivic had apparently again asked for Ben's
forgiveness.
"Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivic's mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and Marivic
married in '1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City.' She said as the marriage
went along, Marivic became 'already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa said that after
the birth of Marivic's two sons, there were 'three (3) misunderstandings.' The first was when
Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife through his left arm; the second incident was on
November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck Ben on the forehead 'using a sharp instrument until
the eye was also affected. It was wounded and also the ear' and her husband went to Ben to
help; and the third incident was in 1995 when the couple had already transferred to the house
in Bilwang and she saw that Ben's hand was plastered as 'the bone cracked.'
"Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical intervention.
"5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 'After we
collected our salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO.' They stayed there for three
(3) hours, after which they went to 'Uniloks' and drank beer – allegedly only two (2) bottles
each. After drinking they bought barbeque and went to the Genosa residence. Marivic was not
there. He stayed a while talking with Ben, after which he went across the road to wait 'for the
runner and the usher of the masiao game because during that time, the hearing on masiao
numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and runners so that I can place my bet.' On
his way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he heard the Genosas arguing. They were
quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one 'Fredo' who is used by Ben to feed his fighting
cocks. Basobas' testimony on the root of the quarrel, conveniently overheard by him was
Marivic saying 'I will never hesitate to kill you', whilst Ben replied 'Why kill me when I am
innocent.' Basobas thought they were joking.
"He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa residence.
Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every Saturday and Sunday.
He claims that he once told Ben 'before when he was stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa'
that he should leave her and that Ben would always take her back after she would leave him
'so many times'.
"Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time that they had
been quarreling. He said Ben 'even had a wound' on the right forehead. He had known the
couple for only one (1) year.
"6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was a
habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin her
down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
25
"These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents, but
Ben would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and would ask for her forgiveness.
She said after she would be beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr. Dino Caing, Dr.
Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would enter the injuries inflicted upon her by Ben into
their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her every time he was drunk, at
least three times a week.
"7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to the
abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben.
'7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified that on
November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was shouting
for help and through the open jalousies, he saw the spouses 'grappling with each other'. Ben
had Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do anything, but had come voluntarily to testify. (Please
note this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos.8 )
'7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos, testified
that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15, 1995. He peeped
through the window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa house and saw 'the spouses
grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both hands the neck of the
accused, Marivic Genosa'. He said after a while, Marivic was able to extricate he[r]self and
enter the room of the children. After that, he went back to work as he was to go fishing that
evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again, please note that this was the same
night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).
'7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living in
Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his niece
and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was always
quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then would use the money
to gamble. One time, he went to their house and they were quarreling. Ben was so angry, but
would be pacified 'if somebody would come.' He testified that while Ben was alive 'he used to
gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to our house and he will say, 'Teody'
because that was what he used to call me, 'mokimas ta,' which means 'let's go and look for a
whore.' Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben 'would box his wife and I would see bruises and
one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness pointed to his right breast) as according
to her a knife was stricken to her.' Mr. Sarabia also said that once he saw Ben had been
injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only that morning.
'7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that in the
afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help to look for
Ben. They searched in the market place, several taverns and some other places, but could not
find him. She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with her in the Genosa
house 'because she might be battered by her husband.' When they got to the Genosa house at
about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that 'her husband was already there and was
drunk.' Miss Arano knew he was drunk 'because of his staggering walking and I can also
detect his face.' Marivic entered the house and she heard them quarrel noisily. (Again, please
note that this is the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified that
this was not the first time Marivic had asked her to sleep in the house as Marivic would be
afraid every time her husband would come home drunk. At one time when she did sleep over,
she was awakened at 10:00 in the evening when Ben arrived because the couple 'were very
noisy in the sala and I had heard something was broken like a vase.' She said Marivic ran into
her room and they locked the door. When Ben couldn't get in he got a chair and a knife and
'showed us the knife through the window grill and he scared us.' She said that Marivic shouted
for help, but no one came. On cross-examination, she said that when she left Marivic's house
on November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.
'7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at
PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient 'many times' and had also received
treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until November 9, 1995,
there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These injuries were
reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The prosecution admitted the
qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an expert witness.'
xxx xxx xxx
'Dr. Caing's clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on twenty-three
(23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits '2' and '2-B.' The OPD Chart of Marivic at the
Philphos Clinic which reflected all the consultations made by Marivic and the six (6) incidents
of physical injuries reported was marked as Exhibit '3.'
"On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say whether
the injuries were directly related to the crime committed. He said it is only a psychiatrist who is
qualified to examine the psychological make-up of the patient, 'whether she is capable of
committing a crime or not.'
'7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided, testified
that about two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00 in the evening.
She sought his help to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were experiencing 'family
troubles'. He told Marivic to return in the morning, but he did not hear from her again and
assumed 'that they might have settled with each other or they might have forgiven with each
other.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her
husband who began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her husband would
hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to
be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and
hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
"Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5)
times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said that the
reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because 'he was crazy
about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.'
26
"On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he died in the
bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing their house; that Basobas lied
in his testimony; that she left for Manila the next day, November 16, 1995; that she did not
bother anyone in Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself a job as a field researcher
under the alias 'Marvelous Isidro'; she did not tell anyone that she was leaving Leyte, she just
wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and that she was arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.
'Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away; that she did
not know what happened to the pipe she used to 'smash him once'; that she was wounded by
Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was 'whirled' by Ben, he kicked
her 'ass' and dragged her towards the drawer when he saw that she had packed his things.'
"9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation was
made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified to by all the
prosecution witnesses and some defense witnesses during the trial.
"10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte at
the time of the incident, and among her responsibilities as such was to take charge of all
medico-legal cases, such as the examination of cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra.
Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She merely took the medical board exams and passed in
1986. She was called by the police to go to the Genosa residence and when she got there, she
saw 'some police officer and neighbor around.' She saw Ben Genosa, covered by a blanket,
lying in a semi-prone position with his back to the door. He was wearing only a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
"Dra. Cerillo said that 'there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the skeletal area of
the head' which she described as a 'fracture'. And that based on her examination, Ben had
been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as to what caused his death.
"Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
"11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa charged her with
the crime of PARRICIDE committed 'with intent to kill, with treachery and evidence
premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her
legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.'
"12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23
September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6
August 1998.
"13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date, the Hon.
Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT
finding Marivic guilty 'beyond reasonable doubt' of the crime of parricide, and further found
treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of
DEATH.
"14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and, under date of
24 January 2000, Marivic's trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to
Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of
Appellant's Briefs he had prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not
conformed to by her.
"The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the entry of
appearance of undersigned counsel.
"15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20 January 2000,
to the Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of
Court of Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein she submitted her 'Brief without counsels' to
the Court.
"This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
"16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the Honorable
Court on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION
praying that the Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination
of the cause of his death; allow the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists
and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally,
to allow a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and
psychiatrists.
"Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the only
qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that the description of the death
wound (as culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit 'A') is more akin to a gunshot wound
than a beating with a lead pipe.
"17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly granted
Marivic's URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case 'to the trial court for the
reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the 'battered woman syndrome'
plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the
proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary evidence, if
any, submitted.'
"18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before the Hon.
Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had interviewed
Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done at the Penal
Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and psychological assessment were done at
her clinic.
"Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years with her
own private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle University as a professor. Before
this, she was the Head of the Psychology Department of the Assumption College; a member of
27
the faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila University and St. Joseph's College; and
was the counseling psychologist of the National Defense College. She has an AB in
Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a Master of Arts in Clinical [Counseling],
Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the U.P. She was the past president of the
Psychological Association of the Philippines and is a member of the American Psychological
Association. She is the secretary of the International Council of Psychologists from about 68
countries; a member of the Forensic Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN
[Counseling] Association. She is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial Academy,
recently lecturing on the socio-demographic and psychological profile of families involved in
domestic violence and nullity cases. She was with the Davide Commission doing research
about Military Psychology. She has written a book entitled 'Energy Global Psychology'
(together with Drs. Allan Tan and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has
testified as an expert on battered women as this is the first case of that nature.
"Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-demographic and
psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence, and nullity cases, she looked at
about 500 cases over a period of ten (10) years and discovered that 'there are lots of variables
that cause all of this marital conflicts, from domestic violence to infidelity, to psychiatric
disorder.'
"Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of 'a lot of incidents of psychological
abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, 'the battered woman usually has a very low opinion of
herself. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x they usually think
very lowly of themselves and so when the violence would happen, they usually think that they
provoke it, that they were the one who precipitated the violence, they provoke their spouse to
be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them.' Dra. Dayan said that usually a
battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional family or from 'broken homes.'
"Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, 'also has a very low opinion of
himself. But then emerges to have superiority complex and it comes out as being very
arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic) a very low tolerance
for frustrations. A lot of times they are involved in vices like gambling, drinking and drugs. And
they become violent.' The batterer also usually comes from a dysfunctional family which over-
pampers them and makes them feel entitled to do anything. Also, they see often how their
parents abused each other so 'there is a lot of modeling of aggression in the family.'
"Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not leave her
husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked the violence, the cycle itself which
makes her hope her husband will change, the belief in her obligations to keep the family intact
at all costs for the sake of the children.
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the house, or
lock themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering 'physical violence on
both of them.' She said that in a 'normal marital relationship,' abuses also happen, but these
are 'not consistent, not chronic, are not happening day in [and] day out.' In an 'abnormal
marital relationship,' the abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting and 'even would
cause hospitalization on the victim and even death on the victim.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she administered, it was
her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman because 'inspite of her feeling of
self-confidence which we can see at times there are really feeling (sic) of loss, such feelings of
humiliation which she sees herself as damaged and as a broken person. And at the same time
she still has the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced in the past.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider filing for
nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy that Marivic
then thought of herself as a victim.
xxx xxx xxx
"19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed away,
appeared and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
"Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the Philippine
Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He was in the
practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in private practice, he was
connected with the Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where he gained his training on
psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was called to active duty in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty six (26) years. Prior to his
retirement from government service, he obtained the rank of Brigadier General. He obtained
his medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas. He was also a member of the World
Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical
Society; and the Philippine Association of Military Surgeons.
"He authored 'The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine Military
Academy from the Period 1954 – 1978' which was presented twice in international congresses.
He also authored 'The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 2000', which was
likewise published internationally and locally. He had a medical textbook published on the use
of Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R.
Squibb grant; and he published the use of the drug Zopiclom in 1985-86.
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind and
neurology deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology, on the
28
other hand, is a bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while one has to finish medicine to
become a specialist in psychiatry.
"Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already
encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and testified in a case in 1964. In the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and he has seen probably ten
to twenty thousand cases. In those days, the primordial intention of therapy was reconciliation.
As a result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the
Battered Woman Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
"As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, where
there is physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and boxing a
woman even to an unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes confined. The
affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 'depends on the vulnerability of the victim.' Dr.
Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very healthy, perhaps one episode of violence may induce
the disorder; if the psychological stamina and physiologic constitutional stamina of the victim is
stronger, 'it will take more repetitive trauma to precipitate the post-traumatic stress disorder
and this x x x is very dangerous.'
"In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the 'anxiety neurosis or
neurologic anxcietism.' It is produced by 'overwhelming brutality, trauma.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo explained that with 'neurotic anxiety', the victim relives the beating or trauma as if
it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at that time. She thinks 'of nothing but
the suffering.'
xxx xxx xxx
"A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional tone is
unstable, and she is irritable and restless. She tends to become hard-headed and persistent.
She has higher sensitivity and her 'self-world' is damaged.
"Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individual's illness, such as
the deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents. As to the batterer, he normally
'internalizes what is around him within the environment.' And it becomes his own personality.
He is very competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows his strong
façade 'but in it there are doubts in himself and prone to act without thinking.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that 'even though without the presence of the precipator (sic) or the
one who administered the battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic) because
the individual cannot control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his mind.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend
themselves, and 'primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is
available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that abound in the
household.' He said a victim resorts to weapons when she has 'reached the lowest rock bottom
of her life and there is no other recourse left on her but to act decisively.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he conducted for
two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological evaluation and social
case studies as a help in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated
22 January 2001.
xxx xxx xxx
"On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she killed
her husband Marivic'c mental condition was that she was 're-experiencing the trauma.' He said
'that we are trying to explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of the trauma is not
controlled by Marivic. It will just come in flashes and probably at that point in time that things
happened when the re-experiencing of the trauma flashed in her mind.' At the time he
interviewed Marivic 'she was more subdued, she was not super alert anymore x x x she is
mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.'
xxx xxx xxx
"20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the public
prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of the
partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated."9
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution
evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court
appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly
defenseless when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the
back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this Court allow (1) the
exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of
appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she had
29
killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts' reports in the records of the case for
purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower court
to admit the experts' testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellant's Motion, remanding
the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the
"battered woman syndrome" plea; and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to this Court the
proceedings taken as well as to submit copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.
Acting on the Court's Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of Marivic by two clinical
psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan10 and Alfredo Pajarillo,11 supposedly experts on domestic
violence. Their testimonies, along with their documentary evidence, were then presented to and
admitted by the lower court before finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of the
case.12
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Court's consideration:
"1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without reflecting
on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
"2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were legally
married and that she was therefore liable for parricide.
"3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe.
"4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from impartial
and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-
beater; and further gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered husband.
"5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of Marivic Genosa.
"6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivic's flight to Manila and her subsequent
apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of her unborn child.
"7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating circumstance of
treachery.
"8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in
determining the existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby
erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide and condemning her to the
ultimate penalty of death."13
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted in self-defense and
in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the resolution of
the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion or overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could affect
the outcome of the case.14
In appellant's first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion, reversible error or
misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the trial court's disposition of the case. In
any event, we will now briefly dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated "an obviously hasty decision without reflecting
on the evidence adduced as to self-defense." We note that in his 17-page Decision, Judge Fortunito L.
Madrona summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense witnesses and -- on the
basis of those and of the documentary evidence on record -- made his evaluation, findings and
conclusions. He wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and the self-defense theory of the
accused. While she, or even this Court, may not agree with the trial judge's conclusions, we cannot
peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he failed to reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an "obviously hasty" manner. The
Information had been filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at
least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the trial judge about two months from the conclusion
of trial to promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial and resolved the case with dispatch
should not be taken against him, much less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the
dispatch with which he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find his actions in
substantial compliance with his constitutional obligation.15
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and appellant had been legally
married, despite the non-presentation of their marriage contract. In People v. Malabago,16 this Court
held:
"The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of
parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and the
deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral
evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if such proof is not
objected to."
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of appellant's deceased spouse
-- attested in court that Ben had been married to Marivic.17 The defense raised no objection to these
testimonies. Moreover, during her direct examination, appellant herself made a judicial admission of her
marriage to Ben.18 Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it,
30
except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made through a palpable mistake, or (2)
no admission was in fact made.19 Other than merely attacking the non-presentation of the marriage
contract, the defense offered no proof that the admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her
marriage to the deceased was made through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Ben's death -- whether by a
gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As the Court elucidated in its September
29, 2000 Resolution, "[c]onsidering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and
the acts of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court
believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually
caused the victim's death." Determining which of these admitted acts caused the death is not dispositive
of the guilt or defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a drunk, gambler,
womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic review, appellant had not raised
the novel defense of "battered woman syndrome," for which such evidence may have been relevant.
Her theory of self-defense was then the crucial issue before the trial court. As will be discussed shortly,
the legal requisites of self-defense under prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with
the surrounding facts that led to the death of the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his
past behavior, did not constitute vital evidence at the time.
Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from appellant's children. As
correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies the discretion to determine which witnesses and evidence
are necessary to present.20 As the former further points out, neither the trial court nor the prosecution
prevented appellant from presenting her children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the lower
court for not requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of Marivic to Manila and her
subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her guilt or are attempts to save the life of her
unborn child. Any reversible error as to the trial court's appreciation of these circumstances has little
bearing on the final resolution of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-defense and/or defense
of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any
claimed justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.21 Well-settled is the rule that in
criminal cases, self-defense (and similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the burden of
proof from the prosecution to the defense.22
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman syndrome. While new
in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-
defense or, at the least, incomplete self-defense.23 By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant
is afflicted with the syndrome, foreign courts convey their "understanding of the justifiably fearful state of
mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time."24
A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical
or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without
concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with
men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the
battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If
it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman."25
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem, traditional beliefs about the
home, the family and the female sex role; emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency
to accept responsibility for the batterer's actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve.26
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called "cycle of violence,"27
which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the
tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.28
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight physical abuse
or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of
kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that she allows
herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the
escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged,
because her "placatory" and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in
the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not usually successful,
and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of control and
the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon
withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer
becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence "spirals out of
control" and leads to an acute battering incident.29
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes,
death. The battered woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase,
she has no control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable
as the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes
that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain, although she may
later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face of acute violence may be
rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her past
painful experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of
control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.30
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During this
tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a
31
tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand,
the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
partner will change for the better; and that this "good, gentle and caring man" is the real person whom
she loves.
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional stability of the batterer.
Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after that I go to him
chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she and he said 'sorry'.
remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of
getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive behavior by your
tormented psychologically. husband, were you able to see a doctor?

The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered woman's psyche. In this A Yes, sir.
phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant
behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of "tension, violence and forgiveness," Q Who are these doctors?
each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be separated. Neither one may really feel
independent, capable of functioning without the other.31
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
History of Abuse
in the Present Case xxx xxx xxx

To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented several witnesses. She Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries?
herself described her heart-rending experience as follows:
A Yes, sir.
"ATTY. TABUCANON
Q Who inflicted these injuries?
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa?
A Of course my husband.
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was cruel to me and a
behavior of habitual drinker. Q You mean Ben Genosa?

Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was abusive to you A Yes, sir.
and cruel. In what way was this abusive and cruelty manifested to you?
xxx xxx xxx
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he pinned me down
on the bed and sometimes beat me.
[Court] /to the witness

Q How many times did this happen?

Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?

A Several times already.

A Everytime he got drunk.

Q What did you do when these things happen to you?

Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury inflicted on your occurred,
after your marriage, from that time on, how frequent was the occurrence?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each other.

32
 A Everytime he got drunk. A Yes, sir.

Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week? Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?

A Three times a week. A Yes, sir.

Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel me." 32
Referring to his "Out-Patient Chart"33 on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital, Dr. Dino D. Caing
bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner:
"Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the chart of your
clinic?
Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the patient. What do
you mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla?
A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something rough substance if
force is applied.
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.

A Yes, sir. Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?

Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor? A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left breast. So, [pain]
meaning there is tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, there is tenderness pain.
A I did.
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the record.
xxx xxx xxx
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower eyelid and redness
of eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero; Q Were you able to talk with the patient?

2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain and contusion A Yes, sir.
(R) breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
Q What did she tell you?
3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these injuries. And she told
4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma. Attending physician: Dr. me that it was done to her by her husband.
Caing;
Q You mean, Ben Genosa?
5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
and A Yes, sir.

6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion Pregnancy. Attending xxx xxx xxx
physician: Dr. Canora.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the attending physician,
is that correct?
Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused sometime in the month
of November, 1995 when this incident happened?
33
A As per record, yes. What is this all about?

Q What was the date? A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to hypertension and I think I
have a record here, also the same period from 1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for
A It was on November 6, 1995. twenty-three (23) times.

Q So, did you actually see the accused physically? Q For what?

A Yes, sir. A Tension headache.

Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the patient pregnant? Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had hypertension?

A Yes, sir. A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment. She does not
response when the medication was given to her, because tension headache is more or less
stress related and emotional in nature.
Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she?
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in nature?
A Eight (8) months pregnant.
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is the family history in
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy? line of giving the root cause of what is causing this disease. So, from the moment you ask to
the patient all comes from the domestic problem.
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean problem in her household?
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination about her pregnancy
or for some other findings? A Probably.

A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her pregnancy. Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?

Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined? A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in hypertension which is
unfortunately does not response to the medication.
A Yes, sir.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood pressure of the
Q For how many days? accused?

A One day. A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.

Q Where? Q Is this considered hypertension?

A At PHILPHOS Hospital. A Yes, sir, severe.

xxx xxx xxx Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous level of blood
pressure?
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you were able to
examine her personally on November 6, 1995 and she was 8 months pregnant. A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus." 34

34
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in Isabel, Leyte, testified Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
that he had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that on some occasions Marivic would run to
him with bruises, confiding that the injuries were inflicted upon her by Ben.35 A Bilwang.

Ecel Arano also testified36 that for a number of times she had been asked by Marivic to sleep at the Q Is this your house or you are renting?
Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would come home drunk and hurt her. On one
occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened about ten o'clock at night, because the couple
"were very noisy … and I heard something was broken like a vase." Then Marivic came running into A Renting.
Ecel's room and locked the door. Ben showed up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them with a
knife. Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?

On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time to find Ben -- but they A I went back around almost 8:00 o'clock.
were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they found him already drunk. Again afraid
that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep at their house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
hesitated; and when she heard the couple start arguing, she decided to leave.

A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with me at that time
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other witnesses saw or because I had fears that he was again drunk and I was worried that he would again beat me so
heard the couple quarreling.37 Marivic relates in detail the following backdrop of the fateful night when I requested my cousin to sleep with me, but she resisted because she had fears that the same
life was snuffed out of him, showing in the process a vivid picture of his cruelty towards her: thing will happen again last year.

"ATTY. TABUCANON: Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?

Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in the evening? A Ecel Araño, the one who testified.

A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after office hours, I Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
boarded the service bus and went to Bilwang. When I reached Bilwang, I immediately asked
my son, where was his father, then my second child said, 'he was not home yet'. I was worried
because that was payday, I was anticipating that he was gambling. So while waiting for him, A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her because of Ben.
my eldest son arrived from school, I prepared dinner for my children.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, 8 months.
A Yes, sir.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A Eight (8) months.
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q What's the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Marie Bianca.
A Yes, sir.

35
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband? Q How do you described this bolo?

A Yes, sir. A 1 1/2 feet.

Q What time? Q What was the bolo used for usually?

A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior. A For chopping meat.

Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition? Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying that bolo?

A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior. A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.

Q What was he yelling all about? Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?

A His usual attitude when he got drunk. A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the bedside.

Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else did he do if Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
any?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?
A Yes, sir.
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was just worried he
might be overly drunk and he would beat me again. Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?

Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any? A Outside perhaps to drink more.

A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to avoid trouble for Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was disappointed because I just ignore him of his
provocation and he switch off the light and I said to him, 'why did you switch off the light when
the children were there.' At that time I was also attending to my children who were doing their A I packed all his clothes.
assignments. He was angry with me for not answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen
and [got] a bolo and cut the antenna wire to stop me from watching television. Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?

Q What did he do with the bolo? A I wanted him to leave us.

A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V. Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?

Q What else happened after he cut the wire? A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for packing his
clothes, then he dragged me again of the bedroom holding my neck.
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were scared and he was
already holding the bolo. Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?

36
COURT INTERPRETER: (The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).

The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her xxx xxx xxx
front neck)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
ATTY. TABUCANON:
A Outside.
Q Where did he bring you?
Q In what part of the house?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me
that 'you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me.' A Dining.

Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer? Q Where were the children during that time?

A Yes, sir. A My children were already asleep.

Q What is there in the drawer? Q You mean they were inside the room?

A I was aware that it was a gun. A Yes, sir.

COURT INTERPRETER: Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade about
3 inches long, how does it look like?
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Is it a flexible blade?
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A It's a cutter.
A Yes, sir.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not
open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade Q How did he do it?
about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and
then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe
about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him A He wanted to cut my throat.
then I ran to the other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on
myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in Q With the same blade?
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me." 38
COURT INTERPRETER:

37
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert witness to assist it in Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband that were fond of
understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met with Marivic Genosa for five sessions battering their wives?
totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the former briefly related the latter's ordeal to the
court a quo as follows: A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also battering their wives.

"Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in layman's term Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel in Ormoc where
describe to this Court what her life was like as said to you? her husband followed her and battered [her] several times in that room?

A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she was suffering A She told me about that.
emotional anguish. There were a lot of instances of abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal
abuse and to physical abuse. The husband had a very meager income, she was the one who
was practically the bread earner of the family. The husband was involved in a lot of vices, Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
going out with barkadas, drinking, even womanizing being involved in cockfight and going
home very angry and which will trigger a lot of physical abuse. She also had the experience a A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.
lot of taunting from the husband for the reason that the husband even accused her of infidelity,
the husband was saying that the child she was carrying was not his own. So she was very Q Several times in that room?
angry, she was at the same time very depressed because she was also aware, almost like
living in purgatory or even hell when it was happening day in and day out." 39
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being battered, it really
happened.
In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but wittingly or unwittingly put
forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this matter. I think that
is the first time that we have this in the Philippines, what is your opinion?
"Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you talked to her about
three hours, what was the most relevant information did you gather?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it was really a self-
defense. I also believe that there had been provocation and I also believe that she became a
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most important disordered person. She had to suffer anxiety reaction because of all the battering that
information were escalating abuses that she had experienced during her marital life. happened and so she became an abnormal person who had lost she's not during the time and
that is why it happened because of all the physical battering, emotional battering, all the
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already knew of the facts psychological abuses that she had experienced from her husband.
of the case or at least you have substantial knowledge of the facts of the case?
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider them as
substantial. A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.40

xxx xxx xxx Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:

Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband they were fond of "Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test, what x x x [is this]
battering their wives? all about?

A I also heard that from her? A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory. The purpose of that
test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the person.
Q You heard that from her?
Q What do you mean by that?
A Yes, sir.
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she someone who can
exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
38
 Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that I can trust.
That the data that I'm gathering from her are the truth."41
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified on his Psychiatric
Report,42 which was based on his interview and examination of Marivic Genosa. The Report said that
during the first three years of her marriage to Ben, everything looked good -- the atmosphere was fine,
normal and happy -- until "Ben started to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed in[to]
gambling[,] especially cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking
sprees."
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his family, particularly to his
wife. The Report continued: "At first, it was verbal and emotional abuses but as time passed, he
became physically abusive. Marivic claimed that the viciousness of her husband was progressive every
time he got drunk. It was a painful ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected that her
husband went for a drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;] and practically more
than eight years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her husband
whenever he was drunk."
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further quoting from the
Report, "[s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives and well-meaning friends in spite of her
feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But incessant battering became more and more
frequent and more severe. x x x."43
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Court's mind that Appellant
Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her state of mind
metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely on the judgment of an
ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident. A
Canadian court has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on
wives and common law partners are both relevant and necessary. "How can the mental state of the
appellant be appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why would a woman
put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How could she
love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to
pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for
herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called 'battered wife
syndrome.'"44
To understand the syndrome properly, however, one's viewpoint should not be drawn from that of an
ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person who has been subjected to
repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not
been through a similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common myths and
misconceptions about battered women.45
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on domestic violence, has
had a significant impact in the United States and the United Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution
of cases, in which a battered woman is charged with the killing of her violent partner. The psychologist
explains that the cyclical nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman immobilizes the
latter's "ability to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in the relationship with no
means of escape."46 In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that "the abuse often escalates at the
point of separation and battered women are in greater danger of dying then."47
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that "the battered woman usually has a very low
opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x [W]hen the
violence would happen, they usually think that they provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who
precipitated the violence[; that] they provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually
abusive to them."48
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not readily leave an
abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latter's belief that she provoked the
violence, that she has an obligation to keep the family intact at all cost for the sake of their children, and
that she is the only hope for her spouse to change.49
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had previously testified in suits
involving violent family relations, having evaluated "probably ten to twenty thousand" violent family
disputes within the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his
experience with domestic violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in
Quezon City. As such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, in which
the physical abuse on the woman would sometimes even lead to her loss of consciousness.50
Dr. Pajarillo explained that "overwhelming brutality, trauma" could result in posttraumatic stress
disorder, a form of "anxiety neurosis or neurologic anxietism."51 After being repeatedly and severely
abused, battered persons "may believe that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change their
situation. x x x [A]cute battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of coping
responses to the trauma at the expense of the victim's ability to muster an active response to try to
escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe that anything she can do will
have a predictable positive effect."52
A study53 conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of Pennsylvania, found that
"even if a person has control over a situation, but believes that she does not, she will be more likely to
respond to that situation with coping responses rather than trying to escape." He said that it was the
cognitive aspect -- the individual's thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred to this phenomenon
as "learned helplessness." "[T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less important than the
individual's set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered women don't attempt to leave
the battering situation, even when it may seem to outsiders that escape is possible, because they
cannot predict their own safety; they believe that nothing they or anyone else does will alter their terrible
circumstances."54
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the violent behavior of
her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and that there is no escape.55 Battered
women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the relationship.56 Unless a
39
shelter is available, she stays with her husband, not only because she typically lacks a means of self-
support, but also because she fears that if she leaves she would be found and hurt even more.57
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing that
appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long period of time,
became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence that
would support such a conclusion. More specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would confirm
the presence of the essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the "cycle of violence" supposedly characterizing
the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating to
the court a quo how the fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the
tension-building phase of the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical
characteristics of this stage. However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the
syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she
had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering? How did
Marivic normally respond to Ben's relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try to
prevent the situation from developing into the next (more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She simply
mentioned that she would usually run away to her mother's or father's house;58 that Ben would seek
her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words, she would return
to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did she believe
that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of his emotional
stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and
trapped in their relationship? Did both of them regard death as preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts that
would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they
were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality of the
battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted
upon her by her partner or spouse. They corroborated each other's testimonies, which were culled from
their numerous studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual
experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded
that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be proven in
order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that would establish all the
essentials of the battered woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of
the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-
defense.59
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial to the BWS defense is
the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the offense60 -- she must have actually feared
imminent harm from her batterer and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a
real threat on one's life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely
imaginary.61 Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites and effect of self-
defense:62
"Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:
"1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself."
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.63 It presupposes actual, sudden and
unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person.64 In the present
case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval
between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to
withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he
apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he
posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life
or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their children's bedroom -- and based on past
violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver
harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the
brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time
of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require
the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount to
sentencing her to 'murder by installment.'"65 Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim
in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening
behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger.66 Considering such
circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense.67 In the
absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the
victim.68 Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was not completely justified under the circumstances.
40
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other modifying circumstances that
would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and appreciate in her favor circumstances that
mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly
for review on any issue, including that which has not been raised by the parties.69
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in her Psychological
Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
"This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic
experienced with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which broke down
her psychological resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that she developed
heightened sensitivity to sight of impending danger her husband posed continuously. Marivic
truly experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state of psychological paralysis which
can only be ended by an act of violence on her part." 70
Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of "repetitious pain
taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment" as well as the severity and the prolonged
administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress disorder.71 Expounding thereon, he said:
"Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the severity of the
battering. Third, the prolonged administration of battering or the prolonged commission of the
battering and the psychological and constitutional stamina of the victim and another one is the
public and social support available to the victim. If nobody is interceding, the more she will go
to that disorder....
xxx xxx xxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of severity of the
postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this post[t]raumatic stress disorder is
injury to the head, banging of the head like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus that
precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are suffocating the victim like holding a
pillow on the face, strangulating the individual, suffocating the individual, and boxing the
individual. In this situation therefore, the victim is heightened to painful stimulus, like for
example she is pregnant, she is very susceptible because the woman will not only protect
herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the anxiety is heightened to the end [sic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or [atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the individual will manifest
now a severe emotional instability, higher irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and
probably in most [acute] cases the first thing will be happened to the individual will be thinking
of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment, any prolonged, it is
longer than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the first day to six (6) months. After this six (6)
months you become chronic. It is stated in the book specifically that after six (6) months is
chronic. The [a]typical one is the repetitious battering but the individual who is abnormal and
then become normal. This is how you get neurosis from neurotic personality of these cases of
post[t]raumatic stress disorder." 72
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified further:
"Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x affects x x x his
or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated."73
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant resulted in
"cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control,"
"psychological paralysis," and "difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory."
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were analogous to an illness
that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without, however, depriving her of
consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence
or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 974 and 1075 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this
circumstance should be taken in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor. 76
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held that this
state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion
provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome
reason.77 To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act,
both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from
the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover
her normal equanimity.78
41
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor, preceded his being
killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet
in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at the time.
The attempt on her life was likewise on that of her fetus.79 His abusive and violent acts, an aggression
which was directed at the lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced passion and
obfuscation overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her
emotional and mental state continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise; she was filled
with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to die. In a fit of indignation, she
pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then she took the weapon and used it to shoot
him.
to exactly how and when he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution failed to establish
indubitably. Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to the events surrounding his death:
"Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did he drag you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly in her
front neck)

The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no considerable period of A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillo's
testimony80 that with "neurotic anxiety" -- a psychological effect on a victim of "overwhelming brutality ATTY. TABUCANON:
[or] trauma" -- the victim relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually
being beaten at the time. She cannot control "re-experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious and the
trauma that she suffered." She thinks "of nothing but the suffering." Such reliving which is beyond the Q Where did he bring you?
control of a person under similar circumstances, must have been what Marivic experienced during the
brief time interval and prevented her from recovering her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on shouting at me
further be credited with the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. that 'you might as well be killed so there will be nobody to nag me'

It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
A Yes, sir.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery
inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time
Q What is there in the drawer?
resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of
her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
A I was aware that it was a gun.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression he had inflicted on
her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight months pregnant with their child COURT INTERPRETER
was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life, but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such
perception naturally produced passion and obfuscation on her part. (At this juncture the witness started crying)

Second Legal Issue: ATTY. TABUCANON:

Treachery Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?

There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods A Yes, sir.
or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the offended party
might make.81 In order to qualify an act as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which
have no place in the appreciation of evidence.82 Because of the gravity of the resulting offense,
treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.83 A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer but he could not
open it because he did not have the key then he pulled his wallet which contained a blade
about 3 inches long and I was aware that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the penalty of death upon
then the wallet and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a pipe
appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had
about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I smashed him
been found lying in bed with an "open, depressed, circular" fracture located at the back of his head. As
42
then I ran to the other room, and on that very moment everything on my mind was to pity on
myself, then the feeling I had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened before when I was
admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I know my blood pressure was raised. I
was frightened I was about to die because of my blood pressure.

(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely). COURT INTERPRETER:

xxx xxx xxx (Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the witness at the
same time pointed at the back of her neck or the nape).
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe this blade about
3 inches long, how does it look like? ATTY. TABUCANON:

A Three (3) inches long and ½ inch wide. Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?

Q It is a flexible blade? A Considering all the physical sufferings that I've been through with him, I took pity on myself
and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood pressure and the baby, so I got that gun
A It's a cutter. and I shot him.

Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges? COURT

A Yes, because he once used it to me. /to Atty. Tabucanon

Q How did he do it? Q You shot him?

A He wanted to cut my throat. A Yes, I distorted the drawer."84

Q With the same blade? The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is no showing of the
victim's position relative to appellant's at the time of the shooting. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule
that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me. qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have
anticipated aggression from the assailant.85
xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have
ATTY. TABUCANON: been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act
without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.86 There is no showing,
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct? though, that the present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her
husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it
appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she
A Yes, because I smashed him. decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she consciously and
deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to ensure its execution,
Q What happened? this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.87

A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I smashed him and I ran Proper Penalty
to the other room.

43
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to
death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance have been found to have
attended the commission of the offense, the penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to
Article 64 of paragraph 588 of the same Code.89 The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period
is imposable, considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing the
penalty by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were shown to have attended the
commission of the offense.90 Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty shall
be within the range of that which is next lower in degree -- prision mayor -- and the maximum shall be
within the range of the medium period of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to impose the penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1) day in prison as minimum; to
reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8 months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that
appellant has already served the minimum period, she may now apply for and be released from
detention on parole.91
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was neither easy nor simple
to analyze and recognize vis-à-vis the given set of facts in the present case. The Court agonized on
how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It took great effort beyond the normal manner in which
decisions are made -- on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To
give a just and proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look at studies conducted
here and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct personality of
the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned much. And definitely, the solicitor
general and appellant's counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have helped it in such learning process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work within the limits of law,
jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent them. Neither can we amend the Revised
Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman
syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be
proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate
partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have
produced in the battered person's mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an
honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the
batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the
accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether,
these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present
case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However,
there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her
commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon
her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due
determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. Costs
de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
VICKY C. TY, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Vicky C. Ty ("Ty") filed the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45, seeking to set aside the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals Eighth Division in CA-G.R. CR No. 20995, promulgated on 31 July
2001. The Decision affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 19, dated 21 April 1997, finding her guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 222 (B.P. 22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against Ty before the
RTC of Manila. The Informations were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 93-130459 to No. 93-130465.
The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. 93-130465 reads as follows:
That on or about May 30, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Manila Doctors’
Hospital to apply on account or for value to Editha L. Vecino Check No. Metrobank 487712
dated May 30, 1993 payable to Manila Doctors Hospital in the amount of ₱30,000.00, said
accused well knowing that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date hereof, was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for "Account Closed" and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Manila Doctors Hospital the amount of the check or
to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving
said notice.
Contrary to law.3
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the number of the checks and dates of issue.
The data are hereunder itemized as follows:
Criminal Case No. Check No. Postdated Amount
44
 seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. 22 and sentencing her to a prison term. The dispositive part of the
93-130459 487710 30 March 1993 ₱30,000.00 Decision reads:
93-130460 487711 30 April 1993 ₱30,000.00
CONSEQUENTLY, the accused Vicky C. Ty, for her acts of issuing seven (7) checks in
93-130461 487709 01 March 1993 ₱30,000.00 payment of a valid obligation, which turned unfounded on their respective dates of maturity, is
found guilty of seven (7) counts of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX MONTHS per count or a total of forty-
93-130462 487707 30 December 1992 ₱30,000.00
two (42) months.
93-130463 487706 30 November 1992 ₱30,000.00
SO ORDERED.13
93-130464 487708 30 January 1993 ₱30,000.00
Ty interposed an appeal from the Decision of the trial court. Before the Court of Appeals, Ty reiterated
93-130465 487712 30 May 1993 ₱30,000.004 her defense that she issued the checks "under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury
or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury." She also argued that the trial court erred in finding her guilty
when evidence showed there was absence of valuable consideration for the issuance of the checks and
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At her arraignment, Ty pleaded not guilty. 5 the payee had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds in the account. She protested that the trial court
should not have applied the law mechanically, without due regard to the principles of justice and
equity.14
The evidence for the prosecution shows that Ty’s mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila
Doctors’ Hospital (hospital) from 30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992. Being the patient’s daughter, Ty
signed the "Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment" in the Contract of Admission dated 30 In its Decision dated 31 July 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with
October 1990.6 As of 4 June 1992, the Statement of Account7 shows the total liability of the mother in modification. It set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty "to pay a fine of sixty
the amount of ₱657,182.40. Ty’s sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the hospital from 13 May 1991 thousand pesos (₱60,000.00) equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each case." 15
until 2 May 1992, incurring hospital bills in the amount of ₱418,410.55. 8 The total hospital bills of the two
patients amounted to ₱1,075,592.95. On 5 June 1992, Ty executed a promissory note wherein she In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Ty’s defenses of involuntariness in the issuance
assumed payment of the obligation in installments. 9 To assure payment of the obligation, she drew of the checks and the hospital’s knowledge of her checking account’s lack of funds. It held that B.P. 22
several postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital. The seven (7) checks, each makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check punishable as a special offense, it being a malum
covering the amount of ₱30,000.00, were all deposited on their due dates. But they were all dishonored prohibitum. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it
by the drawee bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the "Account was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. 16
Closed" advice. Soon thereafter, the complainant hospital sent demand letters to Ty by registered mail.
As the demand letters were not heeded, complainant filed the seven (7) Informations subject of the
instant case.10 Neither was the Court of Appeals convinced that there was no valuable consideration for the issuance
of the checks as they were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Ty’s mother.17

For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of "an uncontrollable fear of a greater
In sentencing Ty to pay a fine instead of a prison term, the appellate court applied the case of Vaca v.
injury." She averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the
Court of Appeals18 wherein this Court declared that in determining the penalty imposed for violation of
hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. She
B.P. 22, the philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law should be observed, i.e., redeeming
alleged that her mother was deprived of room facilities, such as the air-condition unit, refrigerator and
valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic
television set, and subject to inconveniences such as the cutting off of the telephone line, late delivery of
usefulness, with due regard to the protection of the social order. 19
her mother’s food and refusal to change the latter’s gown and bedsheets. She also bewailed the
hospital’s suspending medical treatment of her mother. The "debasing treatment," she pointed out, so
affected her mother’s mental, psychological and physical health that the latter contemplated suicide if Petitioner now comes to this Court basically alleging the same issues raised before the Court of
she would not be discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and to comply with the Appeals. More specifically, she ascribed errors to the appellate court based on the following grounds:
demands of the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a promissory note, open an account with Metrobank
and issue the checks to effect her mother’s immediate discharge. 11 A. THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONER WAS FORCED TO
OR COMPELLED IN THE OPENING OF THE ACCOUNT AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE
Giving full faith and credence to the evidence offered by the prosecution, the trial court found that Ty SUBJECT CHECKS.
issued the checks subject of the case in payment of the hospital bills of her mother and rejected the
theory of the defense.12 Thus, on 21 April 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision finding Ty guilty of B. THE CHECKS WERE ISSUED UNDER THE IMPULSE OF AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR
OF A GREATER INJURY OR IN AVOIDANCE OF A GREATER EVIL OR INJURY.
45
 C. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD PATENTLY SHOW[S] ABSENCE OF VALUABLE
CONSIDERATION IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS.
D. IT IS AN UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE PAYEE OF THE CHECKS WAS FULLY AWARE
OF THE LACK OF FUNDS IN THE ACCOUNT.
E. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE HONORABLE TRIAL
COURT [,] SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED CRIMINAL LAW MECHANICALLY, WITHOUT
DUE REGARD TO THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
In its Memorandum,20 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), citing jurisprudence, contends that a
check issued as an evidence of debt, though not intended to be presented for payment, has the same
effect as an ordinary check; hence, it falls within the ambit of B.P. 22. And when a check is presented
for payment, the drawee bank will generally accept the same, regardless of whether it was issued in
payment of an obligation or merely to guarantee said obligation. What the law punishes is the issuance
of a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum.21
We find the petition to be without merit and accordingly sustain Ty’s conviction.
Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of
any clear showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would
substantially affect the disposition of the case. 22 Jurisdiction of this Court over cases elevated from the
Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law ascribed to the Court of Appeals whose
factual findings are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the
trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the record or that they
are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. 23
In the instant case, the Court discerns no compelling reason to reverse the factual findings arrived at by
the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Ty does not deny having issued the seven (7) checks subject of this case. She, however, claims that the
issuance of the checks was under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in
avoidance of a greater evil or injury. She would also have the Court believe that there was no valuable
consideration in the issuance of the checks.
However, except for the defense’s claim of uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or avoidance of a
greater evil or injury, all the grounds raised involve factual issues which are best determined by the trial
court. And, as previously intimated, the trial court had in fact discarded the theory of the defense and
rendered judgment accordingly.
Moreover, these arguments are a mere rehash of arguments unsuccessfully raised before the trial court
and the Court of Appeals. They likewise put to issue factual questions already passed upon twice
below, rather than questions of law appropriate for review under a Rule 45 petition.
The only question of law raised--whether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her
exemption from criminal liability--has to be resolved in the negative. For this exempting circumstance to
be invoked successfully, the following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2)
the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that
committed.24
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that
the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. 25 It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable
fear for one’s life or limb.26 A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative,
fanciful, or remote.27 A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion
was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as
well.28 It must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape. 29
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she
was compelled to issue the checks--a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her
mother could be discharged--for fear that her mother’s health might deteriorate further due to the
inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear;
it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mother’s illness was so life-threatening such that her
continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded
apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the law’s intent to say that any fear exempts one from
criminal liability much less petitioner’s flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide. In other words,
the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a
mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospital’s threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit a crime. She did
not take advantage of the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. By her very own
words, she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her
mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry. 30 And if indeed she was coerced to open an
account with the bank and issue the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the scene to avoid
involvement.
Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without funds may result in a
violation of B.P. 22. She even testified that her counsel advised her not to open a current account nor
issue postdated checks "because the moment I will not have funds it will be a big problem." 31 Besides,
apart from petitioner’s bare assertion, the record is bereft of any evidence to corroborate and bolster her
claim that she was compelled or coerced to cooperate with and give in to the hospital’s demands.
Ty likewise suggests in the prefatory statement of her Petition and Memorandum that the justifying
circumstance of state of necessity under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may find application
in this case.
We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the actor from liability
under this paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be
greater than the one done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of
preventing it.32
46
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to
be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not
applicable.33 Ty could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her
own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead of postdated
checks to secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have
been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor.34 In this
case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Ty’s own failure to pay her mother’s
hospital bills.
The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable
fear and the justifying circumstance of state of necessity to absolve her of liability. It would not have
been half as bizarre had Ty been able to prove that the issuance of the bounced checks was done
without her full volition. Under the circumstances, however, it is quite clear that neither uncontrollable
fear nor avoidance of a greater evil or injury prompted the issuance of the bounced checks.
Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Decision of the trial court in the Civil Case35 for damages filed
by Ty’s mother against the hospital is wholly irrelevant for purposes of disposing the case at bench.
While the findings therein may establish a claim for damages which, we may add, need only be
supported by a preponderance of evidence, it does not necessarily engender reasonable doubt as to
free Ty from liability.
As to the issue of consideration, it is presumed, upon issuance of the checks, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that the same was issued for valuable consideration. 36 Section 2437 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law creates a presumption that every party to an instrument acquired the same
for a consideration38 or for value.39 In alleging otherwise, Ty has the onus to prove that the checks were
issued without consideration. She must present convincing evidence to overthrow the presumption.
A scrutiny of the records reveals that petitioner failed to discharge her burden of proof. "Valuable
consideration may in general terms, be said to consist either in some right, interest, profit, or benefit
accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some
responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other aide. Simply defined,
valuable consideration means an obligation to give, to do, or not to do in favor of the party who makes
the contract, such as the maker or indorser."40
In this case, Ty’s mother and sister availed of the services and the facilities of the hospital. For the care
given to her kin, Ty had a legitimate obligation to pay the hospital by virtue of her relationship with them
and by force of her signature on her mother’s Contract of Admission acknowledging responsibility for
payment, and on the promissory note she executed in favor of the hospital.
Anent Ty’s claim that the obligation to pay the hospital bills was not her personal obligation because she
was not the patient, and therefore there was no consideration for the checks, the case of Bridges v.
Vann, et al.41 tells us that "it is no defense to an action on a promissory note for the maker to say that
there was no consideration which was beneficial to him personally; it is sufficient if the consideration
was a benefit conferred upon a third person, or a detriment suffered by the promisee, at the instance of
the promissor. It is enough if the obligee foregoes some right or privilege or suffers some detriment and
the release and extinguishment of the original obligation of George Vann, Sr., for that of appellants
meets the requirement. Appellee accepted one debtor in place of another and gave up a valid,
subsisting obligation for the note executed by the appellants. This, of itself, is sufficient consideration for
the new notes."
At any rate, the law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for which it was
issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.42 B.P. 22 does not make any distinction as
to whether the checks within its contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or to merely
guarantee the obligation.43 The thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and
putting them into circulation.44 As this Court held in Lim v. People of the Philippines,45 "what is
primordial is that such issued checks were worthless and the fact of its worthlessness is known to the
appellant at the time of their issuance, a required element under B.P. Blg. 22."
The law itself creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. Section 2 of B.P.
22 provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. - The making, drawing and issuance of
a check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank because of insufficient funds in or
credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall
be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such
maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for
payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice
that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
Such knowledge is legally presumed from the dishonor of the checks for insufficiency of funds. 46 If not
rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction.47
Petitioner likewise opines that the payee was aware of the fact that she did not have sufficient funds
with the drawee bank and such knowledge necessarily exonerates her liability.
The knowledge of the payee of the insufficiency or lack of funds of the drawer with the drawee bank is
immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of an offense penalized by B.P. 22. The gravamen of
the offense is the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice and intent in the issuance thereof is
inconsequential.48
In addition, Ty invokes our ruling in Magno v. Court of Appeals49 wherein this Court inquired into the
true nature of transaction between the drawer and the payee and finally acquitted the accused, to
persuade the Court that the circumstances surrounding her case deserve special attention and do not
warrant a strict and mechanical application of the law.
Petitioner’s reliance on the case is misplaced. The material operative facts therein obtaining are
different from those established in the instant petition. In the 1992 case, the bounced checks were
issued to cover a "warranty deposit" in a lease contract, where the lessor-supplier was also the financier
of the deposit. It was a modus operandi whereby the supplier was able to sell or lease the goods while
privately financing those in desperate need so they may be accommodated. The maker of the check
thus became an unwilling victim of a lease agreement under the guise of a lease-purchase agreement.
The maker did not benefit at all from the deposit, since the checks were used as collateral for an
accommodation and not to cover the receipt of an actual account or credit for value.
47
In the case at bar, the checks were issued to cover the receipt of an actual "account or for value."
Substantial evidence, as found by the trial court and Court of Appeals, has established that the checks
were issued in payment of the hospital bills of Ty’s mother.
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals in deleting the penalty of imprisonment, absent any proof
that petitioner was not a first-time offender nor that she acted in bad faith. Administrative Circular 12-
2000,50 adopting the rulings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals51 and Lim v. People,52 authorizes the non-
imposition of the penalty of imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases subject to certain conditions. However, the
Court resolves to modify the penalty in view of Administrative Circular 13-200153 which clarified
Administrative 12-2000. It is stated therein:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application
of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
Thus, Administrative Circular 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the
penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the
offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the
imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to
say, the determination of whether circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests
solely upon the Judge. Should the judge decide that imprisonment is the more appropriate
penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.
It is therefore understood that: (1) Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. 22; (2) the judges concerned may,
in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of
each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of
justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the
offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of
justice; (3) should only a fine be imposed and the accused unable to pay the fine, there is no
legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment.54
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
31 July 2001, finding petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C. Ty is ORDERED to pay a FINE equivalent to
double the amount of each dishonored check subject of the seven cases at bar with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. She is
also ordered to pay private complainant, Manila Doctors’ Hospital, the amount of Two Hundred Ten
Thousand Pesos (₱210,000.00) representing the total amount of the dishonored checks. Costs against
the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PIO RICOHERMOSO, SEVERO PADERNAL, JUAN PADERNAL, ROSENDO PERPEÑAN,
MACARIO MONTEREY and RITO MONTEREY, defendants, JUAN PADERNAL and SEVERO
PADERNAL, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Trial
Attorney Lolita C. Dumlao for plaintiff-appellee.
Rogerio S. T. Cadag for defendants-appellants.
AQUINO, J.:p
Severo Padernal and Juan Padernal appealed from the decision of the Circuit Criminal Court at Lucena
City, convicting them of murder, sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and ordering them to
pay solidarily the sum of twelve thousand pesos to the heirs of Geminiano de Leon and to pay the costs
(Criminal Case No. CCC-IX-37-Quezon or 1922-CFI-Gumaca).
In the same decision they were convicted of lesiones leves. Each one was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of fifteen (15) days of arresto menor and to pay the costs. Rosendo Perpeñan, Rito Monterey
and Macario Monterey were acquitted (Criminal Case No. CCC-IX-38-Quezon or 1923-CFI-Gumaca).
The facts disclosed in the prosecution's evidence, on which the judgment of conviction was based, are
as follows:
At about nine o'clock in the morning of January 30, 1965 Geminiano de Leon, together with his thirty-
three-year old common-law wife Fabiana Rosales, his twenty-four-year old son Marianito de Leon and
one Rizal Rosales, encountered Pio Ricohermoso in Barrio Tagbacan Silangan, Catanauan, Quezon.
Geminiano owned a parcel of land in that barrio which Ricohermoso cultivated as kaingin. Geminiano
asked Ricohermoso about his share of the palay harvest. He added that he should at least be allowed
to taste the palay harvested from his land. Ricohermoso answered that Geminiano could go to his
house anytime and he would give the latter palay. Geminiano rejoined that he could not get the palay
that morning because he was on his way to Barrio Bagobasin but, on his return, he would stop at
Ricohermoso's house and get the palay.
When Geminiano returned to Barrio Tagbacan Silangan, he stopped at Ricohermoso's place. It was
about two o'clock in the afternoon. Geminiano sat on a sack beside Fabiana Rosales in front of the
house while Marianito stood about three meters behind his father. A .22 caliber rifle was slung on
Marianito's right shoulder. Ricohermoso stood near the door of his house while Severo Padernal was
stationed near the eaves of the house.
Geminiano asked Ricohermoso about the palay. The latter, no longer conciliatory and evidently hostile,
answered in a defiant tone: "Whatever happens, I will not give you palay." Geminiano remonstrated:
"Why did you tell us to pass by your house, if you were not willing to give the palay?"
48
At that juncture, as if by pre-arrangement, Ricohermoso unsheathed his bolo and approached
Geminiano from the left, while Severo Padernal (Ricohermoso's father-in-law) got an axe and
approached Geminiano from the right. The latter looked up to the sexagenarian Severo Padernal, with
both hands raised and pleaded: "Mamay (Grandpa), why will you do this to us. We will not fight you."
While Geminiano was still looking up to Severo Padernal on his right, Ricohermoso walked to
Geminiano's left, and, when about one meter from him, stabbed him on the neck with his bolo.
Geminiano fell face downward on the ground. While in that helpless position, he was hacked on the
back with an axe by Severo Padernal.
At that same place and time, while Severo Padernal and Ricohermoso were assaulting Geminiano de
Leon, another episode was taking place. Juan Padernal (Ricohermoso's brother-in-law and the son of
Severo) suddenly embraced Marianito de Leon from behind, with his right arm locked around
Marianito's neck and his left hand pressing Marianito's left forearm. They grappled and rolled downhill
towards a camote patch. Marianito passed out. When he regained consciousness, his rifle was gone.
He walked uphill, saw his mortally wounded father Geminiano in his death throes, and embraced him.
He carried Geminiano for a short distance. The fifty-one year old Geminiano died at two o'clock on that
same day.
Doctor Isabela A. Matundan certified that Geminiano de Leon sustained the following wounds:
1. Wound, incised, neck, lateral aspect, left, cutting the carotid artery and jugular vein,
4 inches in length crosswise with fracture of the cervical vertebra.
2. Wound, incised, back lumbar region, left, 4 ½ inches, directed anteriorly, 3 inches
deep.
3. Wound, incised, waist, dorsal, 1 ½ inches, skin only.
4. Hematoma, forearm, upper third, left. (Exh. B).
Doctor Matundan said that the first wound was fatal. It could have caused instantaneous death because
it was a deep wound which pierced the carotid artery and jugular vein (Exh. C). The second wound on
the back could likewise have caused the victim's death if it had penetrated the kidney.
Doctor Matundan found that Marianito de Leon sustained multiple abrasions on the neck and abdomen
and a lacerated wound on the left foot which would heal from one to nine days even without medical
treatment.
Appellants' version is that in the afternoon of January 30, 1965, when Ricohermoso refused to give any
palay to Geminiano de Leon, because the land tilled by the former was allegedly a public land,
Geminiano approached Ricohermoso. When Geminiano unsheathed his bolo, Ricohermoso met him,
drew his bolo and struck Geminiano on the left side of the neck. The latter tried to parry the blow. He
was wounded in the wrist. As Geminiano turned right to flee, Ricohermoso struck him again on the left
side of his body, causing him to fall on the ground. Geminiano died on the spot due to the bleeding from
the wound on his neck.
While Geminiano was being assaulted, his son Marianito tried to shoot with his rifle but Juan Padernal
disabled him and wrested the gun. Marianito suffered abrasions on the neck and other parts of the body
(Pages 1 to 3, appellants' brief).
It is manifest that the defendants fashioned their version in such a way as to shift the responsibility for
the killing to Ricohermoso, a fugitive from justice who has not been tried. They also tried to exculpate
Severo Padernal and to prove that Ricohermoso acted in self-defense.
The appellants filed their brief on February 6, 1970. Later, Severo Padernal withdrew his appeal. The
withdrawal was granted in the resolution dated November 3, 1970 (Page 206, Rollo). That withdrawal
strengthened the case for the prosecution or the appellee and rendered inoperative appellants' version
of the case. Severo Padernal in effect accepted as correct the prosecution's version of the tragic
incident and the trial court's finding that he conspired with Ricohermoso and his son, Juan, to kill
Geminiano de Leon.
The only issue in this appeal, which concerns Juan Padernal, is whether he conspired with
Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal to kill Geminiano de Leon.
The trial court rationalized its conclusion that there was conspiracy by stating that their conduct revealed
unity of purpose and a concerted effort to encompass Geminiano's death.
Appellant Juan Padernal invokes the justifying circumstance of avoidance of a greater evil or injury (par.
4, Art. 11, Revised Penal Code) in explaining his act of preventing Marianito de Leon from shooting
Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal. His reliance on that justifying circumstance is erroneous. The act of
Juan Padernal in preventing Marianito de Leon from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, who
were the aggressors, was designed to insure the killing of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to his
assailants.
Juan Padernal was not avoiding any evil when he sought to disable Marianito. Padernal's malicious
intention was to forestall any interference in the felonious assault made by his father and brother-in-law
on Geminiano. That situation is unarguably not the case envisaged in paragraph 4 of article 11.
Juan Padernal contends that he was not a co-principal because he did not take any direct part in the
killing of Geminiano, that he did not force or induce Ricohermoso to stab Geminiano and that he
allegedly did not cooperate in its commission. That contention is not well-taken.
It should be recalled that, in the morning, Geminiano had an understanding with Ricohermoso that he
(Geminiano) would return in the afternoon to get his share of the palay harvest. Ricohermoso gave
Geminiano the impression that he (Ricohermoso) was amenable to giving Geminiano his share of the
harvest. However, during the interval, Ricohermoso changed his mind. Instead of remaining steadfast to
his original intention to give Geminiano palay, Ricohermoso planned with his father-in-law, Severo
Padernal, and his brother-in-law, appellant Juan Padernal, the manner of liquidating Geminiano as to
stop him from pestering Ricohermoso with demands for a share in the harvest.
So, when Geminiano reappeared at Ricohermoso's place in the afternoon, Severo Padernal,
Ricohermoso Juan Padernal, like actors in a well-rehearsed play, performed their assigned roles with
dramatic precision. Severo Padernal and Ricohermoso, one armed with an axe and the other with a
49
bolo, in a pincer movement, confronted Geminiano de Leon. Simultaneously with that maneuver, the
thirty-five-year old Juan Padernal embraced Marianito de Leon and prevented him from firing at Severo
Padernal and Ricohermoso or from helping his father.
Considering the trio's behavior and appellant Juan Padernal's close relationship to Ricohermoso and
Severo Padernal, the ineluctable conclusion is that he acted in conspiracy with them. He coordinated
and timed his seizure of Marianito with the assault of Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal on Geminiano.
It is doubtful if the assailants could have consummated the killing of Geminiano, without their suffering
any injury, if Marianito had not been rendered helpless by appellant Juan Padernal.
The circumstances surrounding the killing of Geminiano de Leon alevosia or treachery. His hands were
raised and he was pleading for mercy with Severo Padernal, when Ricohermoso struck him on the neck
with a bolo. The fact that an exchange of words preceded the assault would not negate the treacherous
character of the attack. Geminiano did not expect that Ricohermoso would renege on his promise to
give him palay and that he would adopt a bellicose attitude. Juan Padernal's role of weakening the
defense, by disabling Marianito de Leon, was part and parcel of the means of execution deliberately
resorted to by the assailants to insure the assassination of Geminiano de Leon without any risk to
themselves (Par. 16, Article 14, Revised Penal Code).
Treachery was appreciated in a case where the accused fired at the victim who, with hands upraised,
pleaded in a loud voice: "Do not shoot me; investigate first what was my fault" (People vs. Barba, 97
Phil. 991. See People vs. Dagundong, 108 Phil. 682, 684, 693).
As to the other case, L-30528, the charge against the appellants was attempted murder with respect to
Marianito de Leon. The trial court convicted them lesiones leves. The case was included in this appeal
apparently pursuant to the provision in section 17(1) of the Judiciary Law that a case arising out of the
same occurrence, as that in which reclusion perpetua was imposed, is appealable to this Court.
Inasmuch as Juan Padernal did not touch upon the lesiones leves case in his brief, he, like his father
Severo, seems to have acquiesced in the correctness of the trial court's decision.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court as to appellant Juan Padernal is affirmed with costs
against him.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto
Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were,
after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were
sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and two
months of prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector
at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information
received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or
alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men.
Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez,
upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a
copy of the above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They
were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the
telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the
Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he
answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial
Inspector, the chief of police tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in
ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the
party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta,
and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly
living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then
stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon
further inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately
returned to her own room which was very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants
Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards
the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber
revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the
door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene.
Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo
Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial
Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the
deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was
thereafter brought to the provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple
gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which
caused his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the
testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. According to
Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida
where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of
Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus
indicated and upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand up."
Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis
fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is
Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.
50
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after
having said, "if you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas,
while the latter was still lying on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was
only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then
apparently watching and picking up something from the floor, he fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only
because they are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they
are materially contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently
watching somebody in an attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta
testified that Oasis shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was
awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter
was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed.
It is apparent from these contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of the
crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their mutual incriminating averments dovetail with
and corroborate substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to
Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a
certain extent, is confirmed by both appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to
Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he was awakened
by a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying in bed. Thus
corroborated, and considering that the trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on the
stand, we believe and so hold that no error was committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting
the exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's
testimony will show not only that her version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all
indicia of veracity. In her cross-examination, even misleading questions had been put which were
unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under these
circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards
the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be
Anselmo Balagtas but without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the
question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to
Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance
of their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability.
Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide
through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances of the
case, the crime committed by appellants is murder through specially mitigated by circumstances to be
mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case
of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the
mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after
having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is
there," but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and
called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a
chair which had been placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized
a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A
common illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a footpad at
night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his
money or life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the
pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the
hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any
fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and
being pressed by circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then
appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the
accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to
immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity
to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any
reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea.
This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really
Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or
alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary
to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he
escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified
in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means
when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the
new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and
the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention."
(Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses
unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It
may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a
menace to the peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him
when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he
is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3
Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to
life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct
where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent
attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the
life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for
redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life.
Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no
circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man,
condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a premium to crime
in the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and
not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being
simply the incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the
words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el
malicia ni intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que
ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad
como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held
by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless
imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such
51
unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as
reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the
incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to
such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken
as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due
performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first
requisite is present — appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is
wanting for the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of
their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him
and they are overpowered. But through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances,
they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be
Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity.
According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with
the mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
from five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories
of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of
P2,000, with costs.
Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur.
NORBERTO MASIPEQUINA and JOVENCIO ALAMPAYAN, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Paulino G. Clarin for petitioners.
CORTES, J.:
The extent to which responding peace officers may defend themselves in the face of an attack by the
person sought to be apprehended is the subject of this petition for review.
Petitioners Patrolmen Norberto Mesipequina and Jovencio Alampayan, who were members of the
Integrated National Police (INP) of San Isidro, Bohol, were charged with the crime of homicide for the
death of Leopoldo Potane. They were convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer imprisonment
of from seven (7) years and one (1) day of prison mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to jointly and severally indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Leopoldo Potane in the amount of twelve thousand pesos (P12,000.00).
On appeal, the Solicitor General joined the petitioners in their prayer for acquittal on the theory that
petitioners are exempt from liability because they had acted in self-defense when they shot and killed
Leopoldo Potane. But, just the same, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but
modified the penalty of imprisonment to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prison mayor as minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Before this Court both the petitioners and the Solicitor General reassert that petitioners should be
acquitted because they acted in lawful self-defense.
There is no dispute about the following facts, which were quoted by the Court of Appeals from the
Solicitor General's presentation.
xxx
In the afternoon of December 21, 1976, Barangay Capt. Nicolas Potane of Barrio
Abehilan San Isidro, Bohol and his father, Pedro Potane requested assistance from
the Police Sub-station Commander of San Isidro in apprehending Leopoldo Potane,
son of Pedro Potane and elder brother of Nicolas, who has begun to show signs of
recurring insanity. Since his arrival from Mindanao in 1974, Leopoldo had been acting
queerly and at times violent. On December 18, 1975, Leopoldo chased the wife of
Nicolas with a bolo and almost hacked her. He always carried a bolo, and had
threatened his own wife, daughter, brothers, and even his parents with death. Fearing
for their safety, they transferred temporarily to the Home Economics building of the
barrio school and left Leopoldo alone in the house of his father. Nicolas Potane and
his immediate relatives wanted Leopoldo to be examined and treated by the
Provincial Health Officer for his mental ailment (pp. 19-22, 26-32. t.s.n., Nov. 15,
1976; Exhs. C, C-1 to C-5-A, Folder of Exhibits).lâwphî1.ñèt
Patrolmen Norberto Masipequina and Jovencio Alampayan, the former armed with a
38 cal. revolver and the latter with the Thompson submachine gun, were ordered by
the sub-station commander to arrest Leopoldo. Before proceeding to the house where
Leopoldo was, the policemen passed the store of a certain Ismael Balumia where
they had a conference with Barrio Captain Nicolas Potane; his father, Pedro Potane;
his mother, Marganta Potane and others. In said store a joint affidavit (Exhs. D, D-1
and D-2, Folder of Exhibits), was prepared and signed by Nicolas Potane, Pedro
Potane, Margarita Potane, Clara Potane, Francisca Potane, and Emilia Potane, wife
of Leopoldo, authorizing the 'peace officer of the San Isidro Police Dept. 'to
apprehend Leopoldo Potane who was about to run amok.' The document further
stated that if Leopoldo would resist as he is armed with a weapon, the policemen
'have the right to shoot him but not to kill him ... but if such does not permit, if he
resist(s) arrest they have the right to resort to any manner to prevent the fearful
outcome from his running amok' and 'if he would be killed by the police officers on
account of his resistance, we, the parents, brother and sisters, and wife would take no
action if something untoward would occur. (pp. 4-8, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1976).
Thereafter, the two policemen, accompanied by several persons, among whom was
Nicolas Potane, went to the house of Pedro Potane where Leopoldo was. Upon
arrival thereat, Pat. Masipequina, a childhood friend of Leopoldo, called Leopoldo and
52
 urged him to come out. He also asked Leopoldo for a drink, but Leopoldo refused to
go down the house. Pat. Masipequina then informed Leopoldo that his father and
brother had reported that he (Leopoldo) had chased his sister-in-law with a bolo and
their officer-in-charge sent him to investigate the report. He told Leopoldo to come
down so that they could talk. Leopoldo instead told him to come up (pp. 10-11, t.s.n.,
Ibid).lâwphî1.ñèt
Pat. Masipequina went up the house followed by Nicolas Potane with a petromax
lamp. Patrolman Jovencio Alampayan and the rest stayed in the yard Although in the
yard, Patrolman Alampayan could see what was going on inside the house because it
was a single storey house and had an elevation of only 4 feet (p. 56, t.s.n., Dec. 6,
1976). Nicolas stayed on the door landing while Masipequina entered the sala and
was about to sit down on a rocking chair when Leopoldo suddenly emerged from an
adjacent room and rushed at him swinging a bolo. Masipequina pushed the rocking
chair towards Leopoldo. Leopoldo hit Masipequina on the bridge of the nose (p. 23,
t.s.n., Ibid). As the latter retracted, he lost his balance and was hit on the right side of
his face. At this juncture, Masipequina drew his revolver and fired three shots. One
shot misfired but the other two hit Leopoldo on the chest. Leopoldo continued to
advance towards him. He pushed the rocking chair at Leopoldo and ran out of the
house shouting for help. Leopoldo ran after him. Pat. Masipequina jumped from the
house and landed on the ground. In the process he hit his shin on a piece of stone.
Leopoldo also jumped to the ground and continued to pursue Masipequina. As
Leopoldo poised to hack Pat. Masipequina, Pat. Alampayan fired his gun hitting
Leopoldo once at the thigh (pp. 25-26, Id., pp. 40, 71, t.s.n., Dec. 6, 1976).
xxx
[CA Decision, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 9-11].
Leopoldo Potane died some thirty (30) minutes later while being brought to the health center for
treatment.
The issue is readily apparent: whether or not, given the undisputed facts, petitioner Masipequina had
acted in lawful self-defense. (Petitioner Alampayan's conviction for the crime charged hinges on that of
Masipequina as the trial court had found that the two conspired to kill Leopoldo Potane, as alleged in
the information.).
The trial court, however, rejected the defense raised by petitioner. The following reasons, which were
cited by the trial court, were adopted and quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals:
. . . (1) the fact that the accused persisted in their attempts to arrest and/or pick up the
victim for almost two (2) hours, culminating in the tragedy at around nine o'clock that
evening; (2) the fact that the victim suffered three gunshot wounds, two of which were
over the heart and admittedly fatal, and the third on the left thigh which was not fatal
but sufficient to cripple him; (3) the fact that all three gunshot wounds bore evidence
of gunpowder signs, which is indicative and conclusive of having been inflicted at
close range; (4) the fact that the victim had a 2-inch lacerated wound on his forehead
and another lacerated wound on his right leg which have not been sufficiently
explained but are also indicative of having been inflicted by blunt instruments, like a
flashlight or the butts of a revolver or a submachine gun; and (5) the fact that the
alleged injuries of accused Masipequina could not, by any stretch of imagination, be
inflicted by a bolo allegedly wielded by the victim, since they are quite superficial in
degree, located in the most improbable places and may even have been self-inflicted
to justify a subsequent claim of self-defense.
xxx
[Rollo, p. 20.]
"The law on self-defense embodied in any penal system in the civilized world finds justification in man's
natural instinct to protect, repel, and save his person and rights from impending danger and peril; it is
based on that impulse of self-preservation born to man and part of his nature as a human being."
[People v. Boholst-Caballero, G.R. No. L-23249 November 25,1974,61 SCRA 180, 1 85.] In our
jurisdiction it is found in Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided the following
circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
xxx
It is settled jurisprudence that he who invokes the exempting circumstance of self-defense must prove it
during the trial [U.S. v. Coronel, 30 Phil. 112 (1915)]. He must prove the elements enumerated in Article
11 by clear and convincing evidence, the reason being that since he had admitted having killed or
wounded another, which is an act punishable by law, he shall be liable thereof unless he establishes a
lawful defense [People v. Boholst-Caballero, supra]. Thus, the determination of whether or not all the
three elements are present in the case.
1. That there was unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased Leopoldo Potane
is evident from the established facts. Leopoldo Potane, who had showed signs of
mental illness and had threatened his immediate relatives with a bolo, suddenly and
without provocation attacked with a bolo Masipequina, whom he (Leopoldo Potane)
has asked to go inside the house.
2. That there was reasonable necessity of the means employed by Masipequina to
prevent or repel Leopoldo Potane's attack is also supported by the evidence.
53
In the leading case of U.S. v. Mojica, 42 Phil. 784 (1922), where a policeman trying to quell a
disturbance shot with his revolver and fatally wounded a man who attacked him with a knife, the Court
laid down the following rule:
A police officer, in the performance of his duty, must stand his ground and cannot, like
a private individual, take refuge in flight; his duty requires him to overcome his
opponent. The force which he may exert therefore differs somewhat from that which
may ordinarily be offered in self-defense. Bearing this in mind, we do not think that the
appellant in using his revolver against the deceased can be said to have employed
unnecessary force. The deceased attacked him with a deadly weapon; he might,
perhaps, have saved himself by running away, but this his duty forbade. Was he to
allow himself to be stabbed before using his arms? It may, perhaps, be argued that
the appellant might have used his club, but a policeman's club is not a very effective
weapon as against a drawn knife and a police officer is not required to afford a person
attacking him the opportunity for a fair and equal struggle. (State vs. Phillips, 119
Iowa, 652; 67 L.R.A. 292; North Carolina vs. Gosnell, 74 Fed., 734; Boykin vs.
People, 22 Colo., 496; 45 Pac., 419; Adams vs. State, 72 Ga., 85.) And if it was
necessary for the appellant to use his revolver, he could hardly, under the
circumstances, be expected to take deliberate and careful aim so as to strike a point
less vulnerable than the body of his adversary. (U.S. vs. Mack 8 Phil., 701; U.S. v.
Domen 37 Phil., 57.) [Id., p. 787].
Tested by this standard, the means employed by Masipequina in repelling the attack were, under the
circumstances, both reasonable and necessary. He initially tried to defend himself by pushing the
rocking chair toward Leopoldo Potane but when that proved futile and he (Masipequina) was caught in a
very precarious position, i.e., his back was on the floor and Leopoldo Potane kept flailing at him with the
bolo, he had no other choice but to use his revolver to defend himself against the attack. Under the
circumstances, there was no opportunity for Masipequina to carefully take aim. He just discharged his
weapon at the deceased in the hope that such would save him from any further injury or death.
It must also be borne in mind that the rule is that the reasonable necessity of the means employed to
repel or prevent the attack depends upon the imminent danger of injury, not on the harm actually done
to the accused [U.S. v. Paras, 9 Phil. 367 (1907)]. Thus, that Masipequina escaped serious injuries
does not necessarily imply that the means he used to repel the attack were unreasonable and
excessive. The fact remains that the act of Leopoldo Potane of attacking Masipequina with a bolo was a
very real danger to his life that the latter had to repel the best way he can. That the gunshot wounds he
inflicted on Leopoldo Potane proved to be fatal does not make the means he employed any less
reasonable under the circumstances.
3. Then, the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of Masipequina is too plain to even doubt. He,
together with Patrolman Alampayan had been tasked by his superior to apprehend Leopoldo Potane
upon complaint of his own father and brother. Thus, petitioners herein, when they went to apprehend
the deceased, were in the performance of their official duties as peace officers. And when they reached
the house where Leopoldo Potane was hiding, Masipequina tried to coax Leopoldo Potane into coming
out of the house, but the latter would not. It was only when Leopoldo Potane asked Masipequina, who
was his childhood friend, to enter the house that he did, followed by Nicolas Potane. Masipequina was
about to take a seat, definitely a non-provocative act, when he was suddenly attacked by Leopoldo
Potane with a bolo.
As consistently argued by the Solicitor General before the Court of Appeals and this Court, all the
elements of self defense are present in the instant case:
... (a) [T]here was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim which was a real and
imminent threat to the life of Pat. Masipequina. The victim was brandishing a bolo
which he did use in fact to hit the latter; (b) The use of his revolver to repel the
aggression was a reasonable necessity. His life already exposed to danger in the face
of a continuous assault, it is likely that had he not shot the victim, he would have been
killed, considering the deranged mind of the aggressor. Moreover, after he shot the
victim, he ran away to avoid being hit farther (sic), an act obviously inconsistent with a
deliberate intent to kill; (c) Pat. Masipequina did not provoke the victim into attacking
him. In fact, before he went inside the house, he asked Leopoldo to come out to talk
things over. He even asked for a drink. It was only when the victim himself asked Pat.
Masipequina to go up the house that the latter entered the sala.
xxx
[Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Respondent People's Brief, p. 12; Rollo, p. 115].
We also hasten to add that, as in the case of People v. Boholst-Caballero, supra, we accord special
significance to the wounds inflicted on the deceased in finding that the elements of self-defense had
been established.
According to Dr. Julieta Melicor, who conducted the postmortem examination on the body of the
deceased, the trajectory of the two chest wounds indicate that the person who fired the shots was in a
lying and lower position while the deceased was then standing [TSN, September 2, 1976, pp. 5-6, 10].
This corroborates petitioner Masipequina's testimony that he had his back to the floor when he fired at
the victim who was attacking him with a bolo. The fact that the wounds bore traces of gunpowder,
indicating the proximity between the person who fired the shot and the deceased, also support
Masipequina's testimony.
After the elements of self-defense had been established to exculpate petitioners from the charge of
homicide, the next question that arises, albeit only incidentally, is whether or not Alampayan could be
separately convicted of the lesser offense of less serious or slight physical injuries for the gunshot
wound he inflicted on Leopoldo Potane's thigh.
Again, we refer to Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability:
xxx
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the
first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are
present and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or
other evil motive.
54
 xxx
Thus, the elements of defense of stranger are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending be not induced by revenge,
resentment, or other evil motive.
1. In the instant case, that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Leopoldo
Potane had been adequately established, as discussed earlier with regard to the
circumstance of self-defense.
2. Then, that the means employed by Alampayan in trying to prevent Leopoldo
Potane from further attacking Masipequina with a bolo were reasonable is clearly
evident, as Alampayan only shot at Leopoldo Potane's thigh to prevent him from
further pursuing Masipequina who was trying to escape Leopoldo Potane's attack.
3. Finally, that Alampayan was not motivated by any evil motive is shown by the fact
that he, together with Masipequina, only proceeded to the place where the incident
happened to look for Leopoldo Potane because they had been ordered by their
substation commander to apprehend Leopoldo Potane who had shown signs of
mental derangement and had threatened his relatives with a bolo. In short, the two
policemen were in the performance of their official and lawful duties.
This, the performance of duties, brings to fore another circumstance that would justify Alampayan's
wounding of Leopoldo Potane, for the same Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code exempts from liability
[a]ny person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office" [Art. 11, par.
5]. Thus, in one case, the Court acquitted the accused police officers even if their acts constituted the
crimes of discharge of firearm and lesiones graves and menos graves, inflicted upon persons facing
criminal charges who were trying to resist arrest, because the accused officers were in the performance
of their official duties [U.S. v. Resaba, 1 Phil. 311 (1902)].
Finally, the small lacerated wounds on Leopoldo Potane's forehead and right leg, which the trial court
and the Court of Appeals found suspicious, can be explained by the fact that Leopoldo Potane dropped
to the ground after he was shot on the thigh by Alampayan. There is nothing on the record to support
the conclusion that the wounds were inflicted by a flashlight or gun butt.
In fine, this Court, on the basis of the same facts found by the Court of Appeals, has arrived at a
different conclusion. Principally, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision after concluding
that one of the elements of self-defense, i.e., reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel the attack, was lacking. However, after a careful consideration of the undisputed facts and the rule
on self-defense by police officers enunciated in Mojica, this Court is convinced that said element had
been established and that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it rejected petitioners'
defense and affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED. Petitioners Patrolmen Norberto Masipequina and Jovencio Alampayan are ACQUITTED
of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JESUS DOMINGO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Appellant Jesus Domingo assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 30 April 2008 in CA-G.R.
CR No. 30511, modifying the Decision2 dated 13 November 2006 of Branch 13 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The Court of Appeals found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murder in Criminal Cases No. 1496-M-2000 and No. 1497-M-2000, attempted murder in Criminal
Cases No. 1498-M-2000 and No. 1501-M-2000, frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000,
and frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000.
On 7 March 2003, six Informations3 were filed before the RTC charging appellant with the following
offenses:
Criminal Case No. 1496-M-2000 for Murder
"That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
kitchen knife and screw driver and with intent to kill one Marvin G. Indon, with evident premeditation,
treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stab and hit with the kitchen knife and screw driver said Marvin G. Indon,
hitting him on his body thereby inflicting thereon mortal wounds which directly caused his death."
Criminal Case No. 1497-M-2000 for Murder
"That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
kitchen knife and screw driver and with intent to kill one Melissa G. Indon, with evident premeditation,
treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stab and hit with the kitchen knife and screw driver said Melissa G. Indon,
hitting her on different parts of her body thereby inflicting thereon mortal wounds which directly caused
her death."
Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2000 for Frustrated Murder
"That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with
kitchen knife and screw driver, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
55
premeditation and treachery attack, assault and hit with the said screw driver one Michelle G. Indon, a
minor of 9 years old, hitting her on her back and buttocks, thereby inflicting on her serious physical
injuries which ordinarily would have caused the death of the said Michelle G. Indon, thus performing all
the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, this is, by the timely and
able medical assistance rendered to said Michelle G. Indon."
Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000 for Frustrated Murder
"That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
kitchen knife and screw driver, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation and treachery, attack, assault, stab and hit with the said kitchen knife and screw driver
one Ronaldo Galvez, hitting him on different part of his body, thereby inflicting on him serious physical
injuries which ordinarily would have caused the death of Ronaldo Galvez, thus performing all the acts of
execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to said Ronaldo Galvez."
Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000 for Frustrated Murder
"That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
kitchen knife and screw driver, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation and treachery, attack, assault, stab and hit with the said kitchen knife and screw driver
one Raquel Gatpandan Indon, hitting her on the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting on her
serious physical injuries which ordinarily would have caused the death of the said Raquel Gatpandan
Indon, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by
the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Raquel Gatpandan Indon."
Criminal Case No. 1501-M-2000 for Attempted Murder
"That on or about the 29th day of March 2000, in the municipality of San Rafael, Province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a
kettle and with intent to kill one Jeffer G. Indon, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with evident premeditation and treachery, commence the commission of murder directly by overt acts,
that is by attacking, assaulting, and hitting the said Jeffer G. Indon, a 2 year old boy, with the kettle,
hitting the latter on his head, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries and if the accused was not
able to accomplish his purpose, that is to kill the said Jeffer G. Indon, it was not because of his voluntary
desistance but due to the timely intervention of third persons."
On 7 September 2000, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, was arraigned and he entered
separate pleas of "Not Guilty" to the crimes charged. Thereafter, pre-trial conference was held, and trial
ensued accordingly.4
Evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of complainants Raquel Indon, Jeffer Indon,
and Michelle Indon; Dr. Jacinto Caluag; Police Officer (PO) 3 Asher Villegas and PO2 Rogelio Santos.
Complainant Raquel Indon testified that between 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. of 29 March 2000, she and
her minor children Melissa, Michelle, Marvin and Jeffer were sleeping inside their house in Caingin, San
Rafael, Bulacan, when she was awakened by the sound of appellant kicking their door open. Raquel
narrated that she immediately recognized the accused, since the kitchen light illuminated his face.
Armed with a screwdriver and a kitchen knife, appellant cut the cord of the mosquito net and repeatedly
stabbed her, using the six-inch screwdriver, and hit her right arm three times. She screamed and was
heard by her sister-in-law, whose house was contiguous to theirs. When her sister-in-law asked her for
the identity of the assailant, she immediately identified herein appellant as "Doser," a name by which he
is known in the community. Appellant was angered by her reply and said, "Anong Doser?" and
thereafter pulled a kitchen knife from his right side and stabbed her on the stomach. When she tried to
escape from the room, four-year-old Marvin rushed towards her. She then grabbed him and ran towards
the gate. However, before reaching the gate, she fell down and appellant stabbed her right leg. The
appellant then proceeded to stab Marvin, hitting the latter twice on the arm and twice on his left chest.
Marvin died on 3 April 2000 as a result of these injuries. After stabbing Marvin, appellant returned back
to the house, towards Raquel’s two daughters Michelle and Melissa. When Raquel pleaded that the
appellant spare her daughters’ lives, he retorted: "Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na." Melissa died because of
the stab wounds that the appellant inflicted on her; while Michelle, who was able to hide under the
papag merely sustained serious physical injuries. The appellant also attacked two-year-old Jeffer by
striking him on the head with the screwdriver, but the latter managed to run to the house of Raquel’s
sister-in-law. Raquel got up and ran for help, but the appellant followed her. Their neighbor, Ronaldo
Galvez, came to their rescue and tried to subdue the appellant. Raquel, thereafter, lost consciousness.
She also relayed that she was later informed that a struggle ensued between appellant and Galvez.
Appellant inflicted wounds on Galvez’s upper left chest and arms, after which Galvez was able to hit
appellant with a piece of wood, which rendered the latter unconscious. Raquel, Melissa, Marvin, Jeffer,
Galvez and the appellant were taken to the hospital. 5
Raquel also testified that she spent ₱15,000.00 for the casket of Melissa Indon, ₱27,000.00 for the
burial expenses of Melissa Indon and Marvin Indon, and approximately ₱30,000.00 for the food served
during their wake. She also stated that because of her stab wounds, she spent ₱90,000.00 for
hospitalization expenses and medicines. However, the receipts were lost except those issued by
Sagrada Familia Hospital and Bulacan Provincial Hospital. 6
Jeffer Indon, who was five years old at the time he testified, stated that the scar on his forehead was the
result of the stab wound inflicted by Doser. However, on cross-examination, he admitted that he did not
know who stabbed him.7
Michelle Indon identified the appellant as the man who stabbed her mother, her brother Marvin and her
sister Melissa. She testified that the appellant stabbed her in the back once. Thereafter, she hid under
the papag. She related that she did not go to the hospital anymore, because a certain Nanang Ella had
already seen to her stab wound.8
Dr. Jacinto Caluag stated under oath that he treated Raquel Indon for multiple stab wounds. He testified
that he also assisted in the operation on Raquel to repair her liver and gallbladder, which were
damaged. He also disclosed that Raquel would have gone into shock and died had she not been given
medical attention.9
Police officers Asher Villegas and Rogelio Santos testified that they proceeded to the scene of the crime
after the neighbors of the complainant reported the incident. When they arrived at the crime scene,
appellant was already tied up. They took pictures of the victims, while the kitchen knife and the
56
screwdriver allegedly used by the appellant were turned over to Police Officer Villegas. The
complainants and the appellant were then brought to the hospital. They recorded the incident in the
Police Blotter and prepared the statements of the witnesses. After the accused was treated for injuries,
he was brought to the police station and detained. When asked why he committed the crime, accused
denied knowledge of what happened.101avvphi1.zw+
In an Order dated 10 July 2003, the trial court ordered that Ronaldo Galvez’s testimony during his direct
examination be stricken off the records due to his absences on the days he was scheduled to be cross-
examined.11
The documentary evidence offered by the prosecution included the following: (1) the sketches of Raquel
Indon’s house, to prove that the light from the kitchen allowed her to identify the appellant, marked as
Exhibits "A to A-6;" (2) the Death Certificate of Marvin Indon marked as Exhibit "D;" (3) the Medico-
Legal Certificates of Raquel Indon, Marvin Indon, Jeffer Indon, and Ronaldo Galvez marked as Exhibits
"E," "F," "H," and "L," respectively; (4) the Birth Certificates of Marvin Indon and Michelle Indon marked
as Exhibits "B" and "N;" (5) pictures of Melissa Indon’s lifeless body marked as Exhibits "G" and "O;" (6)
Sworn Statements of Ronaldo Galvez and Michelle Indon marked as Exhibits "K" and "M;" (7)
Statement of Account of the Medical Expenses incurred by Raquel Indon, issued by Sagrada Familia
Hospital in the amount of ₱38,500.00, marked as Exhibit "I;" and (8) Statement of Account of the
Medical Expenses incurred by Raquel Indon, issued by the Bulacan Provincial Hospital, in the amount
of ₱7,843.00, marked as Exhibit "J."12
In his defense, appellant testified that prior to the incident, he was in good terms with the Indon family
and that he had no record of mental illness. However on 20 March 2000, he went to East Avenue
Medical Center for a medical check-up, and he was advised to have an operation. He suffered from
sleeplessness, lack of appetite, and nervousness. Occasionally, a voice would tell him to kill. He
averred that when he regained his memory, one week had already passed since the incidents, and he
was already detained. He only came to know of the incidents from his sister and his children who visited
him. On cross-examination he admitted that when he regained his memory, he did not even ask the
police officers why he was incarcerated.13
Dr. Regienald Afroilan, a witness for the defense, also testified that appellant was first brought to the
National Center for Mental Health (Center) in August 2004 for a psychiatric evaluation, psychological
examination and final testing to determine if he could stand trial. Dr. Afroilan stated that based on his
evaluation, appellant suffered from Schizophrenia, a mental disorder characterized by the presence of
delusions and or hallucinations, disorganized speech and behavior, poor impulse control and low
frustration tolerance. He could not find out when the appellant started to suffer this illness, but the
symptoms of Schizophrenia which were manifested by the patient indicated that he suffered from the
illness six months before the Center examined the appellant. On cross-examination, he clarified that the
evaluation finding that appellant suffered from Schizophrenia covered the period when the appellant
submitted himself to examination.14
In a Decision dated 13 November 2006, the RTC decreed that the appellant was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide in Criminal Cases No. 1496-M-00 and No. 1497-M-00, frustrated
homicide in Criminal Cases No. 1499-M-00 and No. 1500-M-00, and attempted homicide in Criminal
Cases No. 1498-M-00 and No. 1501-M-00. The RTC gave credence to the principal eyewitness, Raquel
Indon, whose testimony was corroborated by Michelle Indon, regarding appellant’s attack on 29 March
2000. The trial court found the appellant’s defense of insanity unmeritorious, since what was presented
was proof of appellant’s mental disorder that existed five years after the incident, but not at the time the
crimes were committed. The RTC also considered it crucial that appellant had the presence of mind to
respond to Raquel Indon’s pleas that her daughters be spared by saying, "Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na." It
also noted that based on the psychiatrist’s findings, the appellant was competent to stand trial.
However, the trial court declared that there were no qualifying circumstances to support the charges of
Murder, Frustrated Murder or Attempted Murder.15 The dispositive part of the Decision dated 13
November 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of:
a) In Crim. Case No. 1496-M-00, Homicide, for the death of Marvin G. Indon, minor and hereby
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of seven (7) years of prision mayor as
minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased in the amount of ₱75,000.00.
b) In Crim. Case No. 1497-M-00, Homicide, for the death of Melissa Indon, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of seven (7) years of prision mayor as
minimum to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased in the amount of ₱75,000.00.
c) In Crim. Case No. 1498-M-00, Attempted Homicide, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of aresto mayor as minimum to five (5) years of prision
correccional as maximum; and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
₱10,000.00.
d) In Crim. Case No. 1499-M-00, Frustrated Homicide, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of
prision correccional as maximum; and to indemnify the private complainant Ronaldo Galvez in
the amount of ₱30,000.00.
e) In Crim. Case No. 1500-M-00, Frustrated Homicide, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of
prision correccional as maximum; and to indemnify the private complainant Raquel Gatpandan
Indon in the amount of ₱30,000.00. Likewise, accused is further directed to pay to the private
complainant herein the sum of ₱90,000.00 to cover hospitalization and medical expenses;
₱42,000.00 to cover the casket and burial expenses for Melissa and Marvin, and ₱30,000.00
for food expenses, all by way of actual damages.
f) In Crim. Case No. 1501-M-00, Attempted Homicide, and hereby sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of aresto mayor as minimum to five (5) years of prision
correccional as maximum, and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
₱10,000.00.16
The appellant filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 30511, wherein
he faulted the RTC for not taking note of the inconsistencies in Raquel Indon’s testimony and for not
giving due weight to his defense of insanity. 17 In a Decision dated 30 April 2008, the appellate court
adjudged that Raquel Indon’s testimony was credible, and that the inconsistency pointed out by
appellant—whether or not Raquel was standing up or lying down when appellant stabbed her legs—
57
referred to minor details. Moreover, insanity exempts the accused only when the finding of mental
disorder refers to appellant’s state of mind immediately before or at the very moment of the commission
of the crime. This was not the case when appellant was first medically examined more than four years
after the commission of the crimes. Appellant’s response to Raquel Indon’s pleas also proved that his
faculties of reasoning were unimpaired at the time of the attack against Raquel’s children. 18
The Court of Appeals nevertheless modified the RTC’s Decision dated 13 November 2006 and declared
that the qualifying circumstance of treachery, which was alleged in the six Informations along with
evident pre-meditation, was adequately proven by the prosecution. Raquel Indon, Michelle Indon,
Melissa Indon, Marvin Indon, and Jeffer Indon were merely sleeping inside their bedroom and had not
even given the slightest provocation when appellant attacked them without warning. Furthermore, the
killing of Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon, both minors who could not be expected to defend themselves
against an adult, was considered treacherous, and would sustain a conviction for murder. The penalties
imposed were adjusted accordingly. Appellant’s conviction for frustrated homicide in Criminal Case No.
1499-M-2000 was affirmed, since prosecution failed to prove appellant’s treachery or evident
premeditation in his assault against Rolando Galvez, who came to the scene of the crime to subdue the
appellant.19
The Court of Appeals also modified the trial court’s award of damages. It reduced the civil indemnity of
₱75,000.00 awarded by the trial court, occasioned by the deaths of Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon, to
₱50,000.00 and awarded the heirs of each murder victim moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00.
The awards for funeral expenses of ₱42,000.00 and food expenses of ₱30,000.00 were deleted by the
appellate court for lack of sufficient evidence to support the same. The appellate court awarded Raquel
Indon civil indemnity of ₱30,000.00 and moral damages of ₱25,000.00, but reduced the actual damages
of ₱90,000.00 awarded by the RTC to ₱46,343.00, in accordance with the Statement of Accounts from
Sagrada Familia Hospital and Bulacan Provincial Hospital. It affirmed the trial court’s award for moral
damages of ₱10,000.00 in favor of Michelle Indon and ₱10,000.00 in favor of Jeffer Indon. Moral
damages of ₱25,000.00 were also awarded by the appellate court in favor of Ronaldo Galvez. 20
In the Decision dated 30 April 2008, the fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated November 13, 2006 of the trial court is modified as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. 1496-M-2000, accused-appellant Jesus Domingo is convicted of the
crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Marvin Indon the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱50,000.00 as moral damages. The trial court’s award of funeral and food expenses of
₱42,000.00 and ₱30,000.00 respectively, are hereby deleted.
2) In Criminal Case No. 1497-M-2000, accused-appellant Jesus Domingo is convicted of the
crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased Melissa Indon the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
3) In Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2000, accused-appellant Jose Domingo is convicted of the
crime of attempted murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of
prision correccional maximum, as the minimum penalty, to ten (10) years of prision mayor
medium, as the maximum penalty and to pay Michelle Indon ₱10,000.00 as moral damages.
4) In Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000, accused-appellant Jose Domingo is convicted of the
crime of frustrated homicide and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of
prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum and to pay
Ronaldo Galvez ₱25,000.00 as moral damages.
5) In Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000, accused-appellant Jose Domingo is convicted of the
crime of frustrated murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of
prision mayor maximum, as the minimum penalty, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal medium, as the maximum penalty and to pay Raquel Indon the amount
of ₱30,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱46, 343.00 as actual damages and ₱25,000.00 as moral
damages.
6) In Criminal Case No. 1501-M-2000, accused-appellant Jose Domingo is convicted of the
crime of attempted murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of
prision correccional maximum, as the minimum penalty, to ten (10) years of prision mayor
medium, as the maximum penalty and to pay Jefferson (sic) Indon ₱10,000.00 as moral
damages.21
Hence, the present petition where the appellant reiterates the assignment of errors that were raised
before the Court of Appeals, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR THE CRIMES CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;
and
II
ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT COMMITTED THE CRIMES CHARGED, THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT EXEMPTING HIM FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN VIEW OF HIS
INSANITY AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE SAME.22
This Court affirms the judgment of conviction.
The testimony of the principal witness of the prosecution, Raquel Indon, is assailed by appellant for not
being credible due to an inconsistency in her testimony and a lack of conformity with the experience of
ordinary men.
Appellant refers to Raquel’s testimony during cross-examination wherein she narrated that after the
appellant entered her bedroom, she screamed. Her sister-in-law, who lived next door, responded by
asking Raquel who her assailant was, and the latter identified the appellant. Appellant claims that the
conversation between Raquel and her sister-in-law was contrary to the ordinary course of things, and
that the initial reaction of people in such a situation would be to ask for help from other people in order
to save those who are in danger. Secondly, Raquel also testified during cross-examination that the
appellant stabbed the front of her legs when she fell down. It is also argued that the appellant could not
have stabbed the front of her legs, since she would be lying on front of her legs when she fell down.
58
This Court finds no merit in these arguments. To begin with, there was nothing out of the ordinary as
regards Raquel’s testimony on these two matters. First, there was nothing unusual about the sister-in-
law’s query as to who was attacking Raquel. Considering that the exchange merely consisted of this
question and the reply to it, it would not even be accurate to refer to it as a "conversation." Secondly, it
was not impossible for the appellant to stab the front of Raquel’s legs, had her legs been positioned
sideways when she fell. But more importantly, these are peripheral details that do not affect the
substantial aspects of the incident. Raquel clearly and positively testified that she was carrying her son
Marvin when she rushed to the gate and fell down, and the appellant stabbed her legs and thereafter
proceeded to stab Marvin who later died from the stab wounds. Her testimony was supported by the
Medico-Legal Reports marked as Exhibits "E" and "F." Any inconsistencies in such peripheral details
would not exculpate the appellant.
Appellant also asserts that he was insane or completely deprived of intelligence during the commission
of the alleged crimes, and therefore should be exempted from criminal liability in accordance with Article
12, Chapter 2 of the Revised Penal Code.23 However, this claim is not supported by evidence.
Appellant offers his uncorroborated testimony as the only proof that he was insane at the time he
committed the crime. He testified that nine days before he committed the crime, he suffered from lack of
appetite, sleeplessness, and anxiety. In addition, he allegedly heard voices ordering him to kill bad
people. He claims that he does not remember anything that happened on 29 March 2000, when the
crimes were committed, and that he was already detained when he became conscious of his
surroundings.
The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes that all acts are
voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts are done unconsciously. Thus, a person accused
of a crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving beyond
reasonable doubt that he or she was insane immediately before or at the moment the crime was
committed.24
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence while committing the act; i.e., when
the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because there is a complete
absence of power to discern, or there is total deprivation of freedom of the will. Mere abnormality of the
mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender has not lost consciousness of his acts. Insanity
is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties and is manifested in language
and conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and consequences of
his or her acts.25
Even assuming that appellant’s testimony is credible, his sleeplessness, lack of appetite, nervousness
and his hearing imaginary voices, while suggestive of an abnormal mental condition, cannot be equated
with a total deprivation of will or an absence of the power to discern. Mere abnormality of mental
faculties will not exclude imputability. The popular conception of the word "crazy" is used to describe a
person or an act unnatural or out of ordinary. Testimony that a person acted in a crazy or deranged
manner days before the commission of the crime does not conclusively prove that he is legally insane
and will not grant him or her absolution.26
Raquel Indon’s narration of the events presents evidence that is more revealing of appellant’s mental
state at the time the crime was committed. Appellant’s reply to her pleas that her daughters’ lives be
spared, "Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na," was a positive sign that he was aware of what he was doing, and
that his reasoning faculties were unimpaired.
The trial court found the testimony of Raquel Indon more credible than that of the accused, and its
findings were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It is settled that when the trial court’s findings have been
affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. This
Court does not generally disturb the findings of fact of the trial court because it is in a better position to
examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of witnesses while testifying on the stand.
Unless there is a clear showing that it overlooked certain facts and circumstances that might alter the
result of the case, the findings of fact made by the trial court will be respected and even accorded
finality by this Court.27
It is also remarkable that appellant’s testimony is not supported by his family’s or intimate friends’
accounts of his purported insanity. Appellant testified that he had been suffering from symptoms of
insanity nine days before the incident. Insanity may be shown by the surrounding circumstances fairly
throwing light on the subject, such as evidence of the allegedly deranged person’s general conduct and
appearance, his conduct consistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and
beliefs, as well as his improvident bargains.28 It is difficult to believe that appellant’s behavior, conduct
and appearance, which would denote mental disturbance, escaped the notice of his family and friends.
Appellant draws attention to the results of the medical examination conducted by Dr. Regienald Afroilan
in 2004, showing that he was suffering from Schizophrenia. It should be noted however that the
examination was taken four years after the crimes were committed, and that Dr. Afroilan admitted that
his findings did not include the mental state of petitioner four years before. The alleged insanity of an
accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed,
not at any time thereafter. Medical findings of mental disorder, referring to a period after the time the
crime was committed, will not exempt him from criminal liability. 29
Appellant emphasizes the fact that he was a friend of the Indon family and would not have committed
such atrocities against them, unless he was totally deprived of reason. In People v. Madarang, 30 this
Court ruled that the fact that the accused had no quarrel with his victim prior to the killing does not prove
the unstable mental condition of the accused. Jurisprudence is replete with cases in which lives have
been terminated for the flimsiest reasons.
This Court will now discuss the imposition of penalties and modify those imposed by the Court of
Appeals. Appellant is guilty of Murder in Criminal Cases No. 1496-M-2000 and No. 1497-M-2000. The
penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances, the penalty for murder should be imposed in its medium period, or reclusion perpetua. 31
Thus, for the murder of Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon, the penalty imposed on appellant is two
sentences of reclusion perpetua.
When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.32
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime.33 Under prevailing jurisprudence, the award of ₱50,000.00 to the heirs of the
59
victim as civil indemnity is in order.34 Thus, ₱50,000.00 is awarded to the heirs of Marvin Indon and
₱50,000.00 to the heirs of Melissa Indon.
The heirs of Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon are not entitled to actual damages, because said damages
were not adequately proved. The party seeking actual damages must produce competent proof or the
best evidence obtainable, such as receipts, to justify an award therefor. 35 The funeral expenses, to
which Raquel Indon referred in her testimony, were not supported by receipts. Nevertheless, the award
of ₱25,000.00 in temperate damages for homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial
or funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. 36 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate
damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss
although the exact amount was not proved.37 Thus, the heirs of Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon are
entitled to temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 for each death.
In cases of murder and homicide, the award of moral damages is mandatory, without need of allegation
and proof other than the death of the victim.38 The award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages is in order
for the death for Marvin Indon, and likewise for that of Melissa Indon.
Exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00 should also be awarded, since the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was firmly established.39 Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon were both minors when they were
killed by the appellant. The killing by an adult of a minor child is treacherous. 40 Moreover, the victims in
this case were asleep when appellant barged into their house and attacked their family. The attack was
clearly unprovoked, and they were defenseless against him.
In Criminal Cases No. 1498-M-2000 and No. 1501-M-2000, appellant is guilty of the Attempted Murder
of Michelle Indon and Jeffer Indon. The penalty for Attempted Murder is prision correccional maximum
to prision mayor medium. Thus, the penalty imposed on the appellant is two sentences of six years of
prision correccional, as minimum, to ten years of prision mayor medium, as maximum, for the attempted
murder of Michelle Indon and Jeffer Indon. In addition to the moral damages of ₱10,000.00 for each
victim, which the Court of Appeals imposed, appellant is also ordered to pay civil indemnity of
₱20,000.0041 and exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00.42
victim no chance to resist or escape.45 At the time Raquel was attacked, she was in her home, unarmed
and sleeping with her children. She was undoubtedly unprepared and defenseless to resist appellant’s
attack on her and her young children.
All the sums of money awarded to the victims and their heirs will accrue a 6% interest from the time of
this Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 April 2008
in CA-G.R. CR No. 30511 is MODIFIED in accordance with the hereinabove discussion on penalties
and award of damages, to wit:
1. In Criminal Case No. 1496-M-2000, this Court additionally awards ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of Marvin Indon.
2. In Criminal Case No. 1497-M-2000, this Court additionally awards ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages to the heirs of Melissa Indon.
3. In Criminal Case No. 1498-M-2000, the Court additionally awards civil indemnity of
₱20,000.00 and exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00 to Michelle Indon.
4. In Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000, the appellant is sentenced to serve an indeterminate
penalty of five years of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and one day of prision
mayor as maximum.
5. In Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000, this Court additionally awards exemplary damages of
₱25,000.00 to Raquel Indon.
6. In Criminal Case No. 1501-M-2000, this Court additionally awards civil indemnity of
₱20,000.00 and exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00 to Jeffer Indon.

In Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000, appellant is convicted of the crime of frustrated homicide of No costs.
Ronaldo Galvez. The penalty for frustrated homicide, there being no other mitigating or aggravating
circumstances attending the same, is five years of prision correccional as minimum to eight years and
one day of prision mayor as maximum. Moral damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00, awarded by the SO ORDERED.
Court of Appeals, are affirmed.

Appellant is guilty of Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 1500-M-2000. The penalty for Frustrated
Murder is reclusion temporal, which must be imposed in its medium period, considering that there were THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances that were proven in this case. Applying the vs.
Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve years of ABELARDO FORMIGONES, defendant-appellant.
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal medium, as the
maximum penalty. This Court affirms the award by the Court of Appeals of (1) Civil Indemnity in the
Luis Contreras for appellant.
amount of ₱30,000.00;43 (2) actual damages of ₱46,343.00 for medical expenses, which are supported
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for appellee.
by receipts marked as Exhibits "I" and "J"; and (3) moral damages of ₱25,000.00. Appellant is also
ordered to pay exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00 based on the finding that the assault against Raquel
Indon was attended by treachery.44 The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without MONTEMAYOR, J.:
warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner of execution, affording the hapless and unsuspecting

60
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur finding the appellant
guilty of parricide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P2,000, and to pay the costs. The following facts are not disputed.
In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao,
Libmanan, municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife, Julia Agricola, and his five children.
From there they went to live in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the barrio of
Binahian of the same municipality of Sipocot, to find employment as harvesters of palay. After about a
month's stay or rather on December 28, 1946, late in the afternoon, Julia was sitting at the head of the
stairs of the house. The accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo
from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung
and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia
toppling down the stairs to the ground, immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her
up in his arms, carried her up the house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down
beside her. In this position he was found by the people who came in response to the shouts for help
made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed and testified to the stabbing of her
mother by her father.
Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a written statement, Exhibit D, wherein he
admitted that he killed The motive was admittedly of jealousy because according to his statement he
used to have quarrels with his wife for the reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother
Zacarias; that he suspected that the two were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed that his
had become indifferent to him (defendant).
During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace of Sipocot, the accused
pleaded guilty, as shown by Exhibit E. At the trial of the case in the Court of First Instance, the
defendant entered a plea of not guilty, but did not testify. His counsel presented the testimony of two
guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct there was rather
strange and that he behaved like an insane person; that sometimes he would remove his clothes and go
stark naked in the presence of his fellow prisoners; that at times he would remain silent and indifferent
to his surroundings; that he would refused to take a bath and wash his clothes until forced by the prison
authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in chorus with his fellow prisoners, or even alone by
himself without being asked; and that once when the door of his cell was opened, he suddenly darted
from inside into the prison compound apparently in an attempt to regain his liberty.
The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from
criminal liability under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court rejected this same theory
and we are inclined to agree with the lower court. According to the very witness of the defendant, Dr.
Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was his opinion that Abelardo was suffering only from
feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or
discernment and freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. The provisions of article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code are copied from and based on paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal Code of
Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and applying said
provisions are pertinent and applicable. We quote Judge Guillermo Guevara on his Commentaries on
the Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to 43:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be
taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no
responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment; 1 that there be a
complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the
will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of
the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere
abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. 2
The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equaled to imbecility
or insanity.
The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that
the defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or
during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts
penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a
person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental
condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved.
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to
stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid
mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife. From the case of United States vs.
Vaquilar (27 Phil. 88), we quote the following syllabus:
Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no further than to indicate that the
accused was moved by a wayward or hysterical burst of anger or passion, and other testimony
to the effect that, while in confinement awaiting trial, defendant acted absentmindedly at times,
is not sufficient to establish the defense of insanity. The conduct of the defendant while in
confinement appears to have been due to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse.
After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According to
the evidence, during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in
anyway so as to warrant an opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated
his farm, raised five children, and supported his family and even maintained in school his children of
school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he made copra. And a man who
could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the extent of killing his wife whom he
suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could
hardly be regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import.
The fact is that he believed her faithless.
But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and was not a mere product of
hallucination and aberrations of a disordered mind as that an imbecile or a lunatic, there is evidence to
the following effect. In addition to the observations made by appellant in his written statement Exhibit D,
it is said that when he and his wife first went to live in the house of his half brother, Zacarias
Formigones, the latter was living with his grandmother, and his house was vacant. However, after the
family of Abelardo was settled in the house, Zacarias not only frequented said house but also used to
sleep there nights. All this may have aroused and even partly confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at
least to his way of thinking.
61
The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those unfortunate beings,
simple, and even feebleminded, whose faculties have not been fully developed. His action in picking up
the body of his wife after she fell down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on the floor,
and lying beside her for hours, shows his feeling of remorse at having killed his loved one though he
thought that she has betrayed him. Although he did not exactly surrender to the authorities, still he
made no effort to flee and compel the police to hunt him down and arrest him. In his written statement
he readily admitted that he killed his wife, and at the trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate said
written statement, thus saving the government all the trouble and expense of catching him, and insuring
his conviction.
Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared to find that the aggravating
circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime. It seems that the prosecution was not
intent or proving it. At least said aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the complaint either in the
justice of the peace court or in the Court of First Instance. We are inclined to give him the benefit of the
doubt and we therefore declined to find the existence of this aggravating circumstance. On the other
hand, the fact that the accused is feebleminded warrants the finding in his favor of the mitigating
circumstance provided for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code,
namely that the accused is "suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action,
defense, or communication with his fellow beings," or such illness "as would diminish the exercise of his
will power." To this we may add the mitigating circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article, — that
of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. The
accused evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy.
With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance to offset them,
at first we thought of the possible applicability of the provisions of article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised
Penal Code for the purpose of imposing the penalty next lower to that prescribed by article 246 for
parricide, which is reclusion perpetua to death. It will be observed however, that article 64 refers to the
application of penalties which contain three periods whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed
of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of
articles 76 and 77, which is not true in the present case where the penalty applicable for parricide is
composed only of two indivisible penalties. On the other hand, article 63 of the same Code refers to the
application of indivisible penalties whether it be a single divisible penalty, or two indivisible penalties like
that of reclusion perpetua to death. It is therefore clear that article 63 is the one applicable in the present
case.
Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the commission of the act is attended by some
mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
Interpreting a similar legal provision the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Guevara (10
Phil. 37), involving the crime of parricide, in applying article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the old Penal
Code) which corresponds to article 63, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the present Revised Penal Code), thru
Chief Justice Arellano said the following:
And even though the court should take into consideration the presence of two mitigating
circumstances of a qualifying nature, which it can not afford to overlook, without any
aggravating one, the penalty could not be reduced to the next lower to that imposed by law,
because, according to a ruling of the court of Spain, article 80 above-mentioned does not
contain a precept similar to that contained in Rule 5 of article 81 (now Rule 5, art. 64 of the
Rev. Penal Code.) (Decision of September 30, 1879.)
Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict application of which is inevitable and
which, under the law, must be sustained, this court now resorts to the discretional power
conferred by paragraph 2 of article 2 of the Penal Code; and.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs, and hereby order that a proper
petition be filed with the executive branch of the Government in order that the latter, if it be
deemed proper in the exercise of the prerogative vested in it by the sovereign power, may
reduce the penalty to that of the next lower.
Then, in the case of People vs. Castañeda (60 Phil. 604), another parricide case, the Supreme Court in
affirming the judgment of conviction sentencing defendant to reclusion perpetua, said that
notwithstanding the numerous mitigating circumstances found to exist, inasmuch as the penalty for
parricide as fixed by article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is composed of two indivisible penalties,
namely, reclusion perpetua to death, paragraph 3 of article 63 of the said Code must be applied. The
Court further observed:
We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that malice nor has exhibited such moral
turpitude as requires life imprisonment, and therefore under the provisions of article 5 of the
Revised Penal Code, we respectfully invite the attention of the Chief Executive to the case with
a view to executive clemency after appellant has served an appreciable amount of
confinement.
In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby affirm the judgment of the lower
court with the modification that the appellant will be credited with one-half of any preventive
imprisonment he has undergone. Appellant will pay costs.
Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court in the two cases above cited,
and believing that the appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty, this case should be brought to the
attention of the Chief Executive who, in his discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to
reclusion perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive clemency in the manner he sees fit.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ANACITO OPURAN, appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Appellant Anacito Opuran was charged with two counts of murder before the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, for the death of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., and Allan Dacles under
separate informations, the accusatory portions of which respectively read:
Criminal Case No. 4693
62
That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Km. 1, South Road, Municipality of Catbalogan,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with
deliberate intent to kill and treachery, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault and stab Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., with the use of a bladed weapon (5" long from tip to handle
with scabbard), thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the back of his body, which
wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery. 1
Criminal Case No. 4703
That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Purok 3, Barangay 7, Municipality of Catbalogan,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with
deliberate intent to kill, with treachery, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab one Allan Dacles, who was lying on the bench, with the use of a bladed weapon,
locally known as ‘pisao,’ thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab wounds on the different parts of his
body, which wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.
All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery.2
After Anacito entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment, trial ensued. 3
The evidence for the prosecution discloses that on 19 November 1998, at about 6:30 p.m., prosecution
witness Bambi Herrera was studying his lessons inside his house. His brother and a certain Jason
Masbang were outside sitting side by side with each other on a plastic chair; opposite them was Allan
Dacles, who was lying on a bench.4
Moments later, Jason barged into Bambi’s house, shouting: "There’s a long-haired man!" Bambi stood
up and looked through the open door. He saw appellant Anacito Opuran stab Allan on the chest with a
knife while the latter appeared to be trying to stand up from the bench. Although Allan had several stab
wounds on different parts of his body, he managed to stand up and run inside Bambi’s house, with
Anacito chasing him. Bambi immediately locked the door from the inside to prevent Anacito from
entering. But the latter tried to force the door open by thrusting a knife at the door shutter. He also threw
stones at the door. After a short while, Anacito left.5
With Anacito gone, Bambi went out to ask the aid of his neighbors so he could bring Allan to the
hospital. He saw Anacito’s two brothers and asked for their assistance. But one of them merely said:
"Never mind because he [referring to Anacito] is mentally imbalanced." 6 As nobody from among his
neighbors responded to his plea for help, Bambi carried Allan on his shoulders and dragged him to the
lower portion of the neighborhood. Several persons, who were having a drinking session, helped Bambi
bring Allan to the hospital. Allan, however, died about fifteen minutes later.7
At about 7:45 p.m. of the same day, prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr., of Barangay San Pablo,
Catbalogan, Samar, was in the house of Demetrio Patrimonio, Sr., seeking medical advice from the
latter’s wife. While there, Tomas heard a commotion outside. He looked out from the balcony and saw
people running. He learned that Anacito had stabbed somebody. 8
After about fifteen minutes, while Tomas was on his way home, he saw Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr. He
likewise noticed Anacito hiding in a dark place. When Demetrio Jr. reached the national highway, near
the so-called "lover’s lane," Anacito emerged from his hiding place and stabbed Demetrio Jr. with a
knife about three to four times.9
Tomas immediately ran to the house of the Demetrios to inform them of what he had just witnessed. He
then saw Demetrio Jr. running towards his parents’ house, but the latter did not make it because he
collapsed near the fence. Tomas also caught sight of Anacito running towards the direction of the house
of the Opurans. Meanwhile, Demetrio Jr. was brought by his parents to the Samar Provincial Hospital,
where he died the following day.10
Dr. Angel Tan, Medical Specialist II of the Samar Provincial Hospital, conducted an autopsy on the
cadavers of Allan and Demetrio Jr. He found five stab wounds on Allan’s body, one of which was fatal
because it affected the upper lobe of the right lung and bronchial vessel. 11 Demetrio Jr. sustained four
stab wounds and died of pulmonary failure due to hypovolemia from external and internal
hemorrhage.12
For its part, the defense presented, as its first witness, the appellant himself, Anacito Opuran. He
declared that on the evening of 19 November 1998, he was resting in their house in Canlapwas, another
barangay in Catbalogan, Samar. He never went out that night. While he was sleeping at about 8:30
p.m., eight policemen entered his house, pointed their guns at him, and arrested him. He was brought to
the police station and detained there until the following morning. He denied being present at the place
and time of the stabbing incidents. He admitted knowing Demetrio Jr. as a distant relative and friend
whom he had not quarreled with. As for Allan, he never knew him. He had no misunderstanding with
prosecution witness Bambi Herrera. He asserted that the accusations against him were fabricated
because he was envied and lowly regarded by his accusers. 13
Subsequent hearings were postponed owing principally to the failure of the defense to present
witnesses. Then on 16 February 2000, the defense moved for the suspension of the hearing on the
following grounds: (1) on 10 January 2000, upon motion of the defense, the trial court issued an Order
authorizing the psychiatric examination of Anacito; (2) in consonance with that Order, Anacito
underwent a psychiatric examination on 26 January 2000 conducted by Dr. Angel P. Tan; (3) Dr. Tan
issued a Medical Certificate dated 26 January 2000 stating that Anacito had a "normal" mental status on
that date but was "suffering from some degree of Mental Aberration," which required further psychiatric
evaluation at Tacloban City.14
The trial court thus ordered a deferment of the hearing and granted the motion for the psychiatric
examination of Anacito at the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center (EVRMC), Tacloban City.15
On 3 August 2000, the trial court received the Medical Report of Dr. Lyn Verona, physician-psychiatrist
of the EVRMC, on the psychiatric examination she conducted on Anacito. At the resumption of the
hearings on 20 November 2000, Dr. Verona testified that she examined Anacito three times through
interviews. From her interview with Anacito’s sister, Remedios Opuran Manjeron, she learned of
Anacito’s psychiatric history of "inability to sleep and talking irrelevantly." She found that Anacito had a
psychotic disorder characterized by flight of ideas and auditory hallucinations. She confirmed her
medical findings that Anacito was psychotic before and during the commission of the crime and even up
to the present so that he could not stand trial and would need treatment and monthly check-up. Her
diagnosis was that Anacito was suffering from schizophrenia.16
63
Remedios Opuran Manjeron testified that she brought his brother Anacito to the National Center for
Mental Health (NCMH), Mandaluyong, in 1986 because Anacito had difficulty sleeping and was talking
"irrelevantly."17 Anacito was treated as an out-patient, and was prescribed thorazine and evadyne. 18
They stayed in Manila for one month. In 1989, they returned to the NCMH, and Anacito was prescribed
the same medicine. Since they could not afford to stay long in Manila for follow-up treatments,
Remedios requested that her brother be treated in Catbalogan. Dr. Belmonte of the NCMH, however,
referred them to the EVRMC. Sometime in 1990, Remedios accompanied Anacito to the EVRMC for
examination. A certain Dra. Peregrino prescribed an injectable medicine. But it was a certain Dr.
Estrada of the NCMH who came to Catbalogan to administer the medicine in that same year. Since then
until the year 2000, Anacito did not take any medicine, nor was he subjected to examination or
treatment.19
Anacito’s other sibling, Francisco Opuran, testified that at about 6:00 p.m. of 19 November 1998, he
heard a loud voice outside their house. Anacito heard also the loud voices and then went out. When
Francisco went out to verify, he did not see anything. A few minutes later he saw Anacito at the corner
of the street carrying a knife. He surmised that Anacito had committed a crime, and so he hugged him.
Anacito struggled to free himself, but Francisco brought him to Remedios’ house. Before the incident,
he observed Anacito to be "sometimes laughing, shouting, and uttering bad words, and sometimes
silent."20
In its decision21 of 23 January 2001, the trial court found Anacito guilty of murder for the death of
Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., and homicide for the death of Allan Dacles. It decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court Finds Anacito Opuran y Balibalita GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes specified hereunder, to wit:
Murder, in Criminal Case No. 4693, and sentences him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr. in the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus ₱43,500.00 by way of
actual damages, and to pay the costs; and
Homicide, in Criminal Case No. 4703, and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, sentences him to
suffer an imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum to indemnify the heirs of Allan Dacles in
the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus ₱10,000.00 for burial expenses and to pay the costs.
Anacito seasonably appealed to us from the decision attributing to the trial court grave error in
disregarding the exempting circumstance of insanity.22 He contends that he was suffering from a
psychotic disorder and was, therefore, completely deprived of intelligence when he stabbed the victims.
Even assuming in gratis argumenti that he is criminally liable, he is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance under paragraph 9, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, which is "illness as would
diminish the exercise of the willpower of the offender without however depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts." He likewise maintains that since treachery was not specifically alleged in the
Information as a qualifying circumstance, he cannot be convicted of murder for the death of Demetrio Jr.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagrees and avers that Anacito failed to establish with the
required proof his defense of insanity or his claim of the mitigating circumstance of diminished
willpower. The mental state of Anacito, as testified to by Dr. Verona, corresponds to the period after the
stabbing incidents. Further, Dr. Verona was certain that Anacito was not grossly insane, but she was
uncertain that Anacito was "unconscious" at the time he stabbed the two victims. The OSG also argues
that treachery was duly alleged and proved by the prosecution and should, therefore, be treated as a
qualifying circumstance in the killing of Demetrio Jr.
We agree with the OSG and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
In the determination of the culpability of every criminal actor, voluntariness is an essential element.
Without it, the imputation of criminal responsibility and the imposition of the corresponding penalty
cannot be legally sanctioned. The human mind is an entity, and understanding it is not purely an
intellectual process but is dependent to a large degree upon emotional and psychological appreciation.
A man’s act is presumed voluntary.23 It is improper to assume the contrary, i.e. that acts were done
unconsciously,24 for the moral and legal presumption is that every person is presumed to be of sound
mind,25 or that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person.26 Thus, the
presumption under Article 800 of the Civil Code is that everyone is sane. This presumption, however,
may be overthrown by evidence of insanity, which under Article 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code
exempts a person from criminal liability.27
He who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it, 28 for insanity as a
defense is in the nature of confession and avoidance.29 An accused invoking insanity admits to have
committed the crime but claims that he is not guilty because he is insane. The testimony or proof of an
accused's insanity must, however, relate to the time immediately preceding or coetaneous with the
commission of the offense with which he is charged. 30 It is, therefore, incumbent upon accused’s
counsel to prove that his client was not in his right mind or was under the influence of a sudden attack of
insanity immediately before or at the time he executed the act attributed to him. 31
Since insanity is a condition of the mind, it is not susceptible of the usual means of proof. As no man
can know what is going on in the mind of another, the state or condition of a person's mind can only be
measured and judged by his behavior.32 Thus, the vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward
acts, by means of which we read the thoughts, motives, and emotions of a person, and then determine
whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. 33
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in
language and conduct.34 However, not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes
insanity.35 As consistently held by us, "A man may act crazy, but it does not necessarily and
conclusively prove that he is legally so."36 Thus, we had previously decreed as insufficient or
inconclusive proof of insanity certain strange behavior, such as, taking 120 cubic centimeters of cough
syrup and consuming three sticks of marijuana before raping the victim; 37 slurping the victim’s blood and
attempting to commit suicide after stabbing him; 38 crying, swimming in the river with clothes on, and
jumping off a jeepney.39
The stringent standard established in People v. Formigones40 requires that there be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused acted without the least discernment
because of a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of the will.
In People v. Rafanan, Jr.,41 we analyzed the Formigones standard into two distinguishable tests: (a) the
test of cognition – whether there was a "complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal
act" and (b) the test of volition – whether there was a "total deprivation of freedom of the will." We
observed that our case law shows common reliance on the test of cognition, rather than on the test of
64
volition, and has failed to turn up any case where an accused is exempted on the sole ground that he
was totally deprived of the freedom of the will, i.e., without an accompanying "complete deprivation of
intelligence." This is expected, since a person’s volition naturally reaches out only towards that which is
represented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy. 42
Establishing the insanity of an accused often requires opinion testimony which may be given by a
witness who is intimately acquainted with the accused; has rational basis to conclude that the accused
was insane based on his own perception; or is qualified as an expert, such as a psychiatrist.43
Let us examine the evidence offered to support Anacito’s defense of insanity. The appellant points to
the testimony of prosecution witness Bambi Herrera that Anacito was a silent man who would sharply
stare at the lady boarders a few days before the stabbing incident, and would wear Barong Tagalog and
long pants when there was no occasion requiring a formal attire. The appellant also highlights that the
testimony of prosecution witness Tomas Bacsal, Jr., that there was a 15-minute time interval between
the two stabbing incidents shows that the stabbing spree was without any known motive. 44
The testimonial evidence of the defense also attempted to prove the alleged behavioral oddity of
Anacito two to three days prior to the killing. His sister Remedios noticed that his eyes were reddish and
that he was angry with her.45 His brother Francisco also observed that he (Anacito) would sometimes
talk to himself, laugh, shout, and utter bad words, and , at times, he was just quiet.46 Also relied upon by
the appellant are the testimony of Remedios on his psychiatric history and the expert testimony of the
EVRMC psychiatrist, Dr. Verona.
A careful scrutiny of the records, however, indicates that Anacito failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the defense of insanity. For one thing, it was only Bambi’s personal perception that there was
no reason or occasion for Anacito to wear Barong Tagalog. Tested against the stringent criterion for
insanity to be exempting, such deportment of Anacito, his occasional silence, and his acts of laughing,
talking to himself, staring sharply, and stabbing his victims within a 15-minute interval are not sufficient
proof that he was insane immediately before or at the time he committed the crimes. Such unusual
behavior may be considered as mere abnormality of the mental faculties, which will not exclude
imputability.47
Anacito’s psychiatric history likewise fails to meet the stringent yardstick established by case law. What
it shows is that Anacito was prescribed thorazine and evadyne, and later an injectable medicine to
remedy "his lack of sleep and noisiness." As the trial court noted, it was never shown that these drugs
were for a mental illness that deprived Anacito of reason. Further, Anacito was just an out-patient at the
NCMH, EVRMC, and Samar Provincial Hospital. While Remedios claimed that she requested the
confinement of Anacito and that the doctors did not refuse her, the fact remains that Anacito was never
confined in a mental institution. Although Dr. Verona testified that there was a recommendation for
Anacito’s confinement, there was no indication in the records as to when the recommendation was
made, who made the recommendation, and the reason for the recommendation. 48
At any rate, in People v. Legaspi,49 we discarded the confinement of the accused at the NCMH prior to
the incident in question to be by itself proof of his insanity, there being no proof that he was adjudged
insane by the institute. Applying this principle to Anacito’s case, we find another cogent reason to reject
his plea of insanity.
The records are likewise clear that Anacito was not subjected to treatment from 1991 until 1999. While
Remedios insisted that the medicine prescribed for Anacito ran out of stock allegedly in 1990, there was
no proof that Anacito needed the medicine during that period. In fact, there was no intimation that he
needed the medicine prior to the stabbing incident. She bought medicine for Anacito only in April 2000
because he was "again noisy in the jail."50 It seems that it was only after the stabbing incident, when he
was in jail, that his symptoms reappeared.
Moreover, as found by the trial court, the results of Dr. Verona’s examinations on Anacito were based
on incomplete or insufficient facts.51 For one thing, she admitted to have examined Anacito for only
three sessions lasting one to two hours each.52 Her one-page medical report53 reads in part:
Patient came in accompanied by policemen and sister. He was fairly kempt in appearance, wearing blue
shirt and pants. Mesomorphic, dark complexion with earring on the left ear. Had flight of ideas, with
auditory hallucination, "kabastosan," "kanan yawa." He further said his sleep was "minanok" and
complained of occasional headache. He had no delusion. Judgment and insight fair. Fair impulse
control.
Comments:
From the foregoing interviews and examinations, it is determined that the patient has a psychiatric
disorder. It is most likely that the patient is psychotic before and during the commission of the crime. He
is presently psychotic and cannot stand trial. He would need treatment and monthly check-up.
We observe that Dr. Verona’s conclusions have no supporting medical bases or data. She failed to
demonstrate how she arrived at her conclusions. She failed to show her method of testing.54 Further,
she did not have Anacito’s complete behavioral and psychiatric history. On the witness stand, she
mentioned that Anacito could not distinguish right from wrong, but she was not certain that he was not
conscious of killing his victims in 1998. She also declared that Anacito had a diagnostic case of
schizophrenia, but stated in the next breath that Anacito was not grossly insane. 55
Truly, there is nothing that can be discerned from Dr. Verona’s short psychiatric evaluation report and
her testimony that Anacito’s judgment and mental faculties were totally impaired as to warrant a
conclusion that his mental condition in 1998 when he killed his victims was the same in 2000 when he
was psychiatrically examined. The most that we can conclude is that her findings refer to the period
after the stabbing accident and, hence, would prove Anacito’s mental condition only for said time. It
could be that Anacito was insane at the time he was examined by Dr. Verona. But, in all probability,
insanity could have been contracted during the period of his detention pending trial. He was without
contact with friends and relatives most of the time. He was perhaps troubled by his conscience, by the
realization of the gravity of his offenses, or by the thought of a bleak future for him. The confluence of
these circumstances may have conspired to disrupt his mental equilibrium.
It must be stressed that an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period
immediately before or at the precise moment of the commission of the act which is the subject of the
inquiry.56 His mental condition after that crucial period or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes
of determining his criminal liability.57
Interestingly, Anacito failed to raise insanity at the earliest opportunity. He invoked it for the first time in
the year 2000 and only after he had already testified on his defenses of alibi and denial. It has been
65
held that the invocation of denial and alibi as defenses indicates that the accused was in full control of
his mental faculties.58 Additionally, the trial judge observed that, during the hearings, Anacito was
attentive, well-behaved, and responsive to the questions propounded to him. Thus, the shift in theory
from denial and alibi to a plea of insanity, made apparently after the appellant realized the futility of his
earlier defenses, is a clear indication that insanity is a mere concoction 59 or an afterthought.60 In any
event, Anacito failed to establish by convincing evidence his alleged insanity at the time he killed
Demetrio Jr. and Allan Dacles. He is thus presumed sane, and we are constrained to affirm his
conviction.61
We likewise reject the alternative plea of Anacito that he be credited with the mitigating circumstance of
diminished willpower. In the cases where we credited this mitigating circumstance after rejecting a plea
of insanity, it was clear from the records that the accused had been suffering from a chronic mental
disease that affected his intelligence and willpower for quite a number of years prior to the commission
of the act he was being held for.62 The situation does not exist in the cases at bar. It was only in 2000
that Anacito was diagnosed as "psychotic" with flight of ideas and auditory hallucinations and was found
to be schizophrenic. There is nothing on record that he had these symptoms the previous years or at
the time he stabbed the victim. Curiously, Dr. Verona did not make a diagnosis of schizophrenia in her
report, only at the witness stand.
We agree with the trial court that treachery cannot be appreciated as far as the killing of Allan is
concerned because the sole eyewitness did not see the commencement of the assault. 63 For treachery
to be considered, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack. Where
no particulars are known as to how the killing began, the perpetration with treachery cannot be
supposed.64
Treachery was correctly appreciated in the killing of Demetrio Jr. Anacito was lying in wait for his victim
in a dark place at the national highway. When Demetrio Jr. reached the "lover’s lane," Anacito emerged
from his hiding place and stabbed the former several times. Anacito’s attack came without warning; it
was deliberate and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no opportunity
to resist or defend himself.65
We do not find merit in appellant’s contention that he cannot be convicted of murder for the death of
Demetrio Jr. because treachery was not alleged with "specificity" as a qualifying circumstance in the
information. Such contention is belied by the information itself, which alleged: "All contrary to law, and
with the attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery." In any event, even after the recent
amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not be preceded by
descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by to properly qualify an offense. 66
We, therefore, sustain the penalty imposed by the trial court on Anacito. For the crime of murder, which
is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, he was correctly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua,
the lower of the two indivisible penalties, since there was no other aggravating circumstance attending
the commission of the crime. For the crime of homicide, which is punishable by reclusion temporal, he
may be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty whose minimum is within the range of prision mayor and
whose maximum is within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period, there being no
modifying circumstances.
Coming now to the matter of damages. While Demetrio Sr. testified that he spent ₱43,500 for the wake
and burial of his son, only ₱11,945 67 is substantiated by receipts. Hence, in lieu of actual damages we
shall award to Demetrio Jr.’s heirs temperate damages 68 of ₱25,00069 conformably with current
jurisprudence.70
As to the burial expenses for Allan, his father Alfredo Dacles testified that he spent ₱10,000. However,
he failed to present receipts to substantiate his claim. Nevertheless, we also grant temperate damages
in the amount of ₱10,000 on the ground that it was reasonable to expect that the family of the victim
incurred expenses for the coffin, wake, and burial.
The award of civil indemnity of ₱50,000 for the respective heirs of Demetrio Jr. and Allan is affirmed in
line with recent jurisprudence.71 Civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim
without need of proof other than the commission of the crime.72
Apart from the civil indemnity, we shall award in favor of the heirs of each victim moral damages in the
amount of ₱50,000 consistent with controlling case law. 73 Moral damages are awarded despite the
absence of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs. As borne out by human nature
and experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on
the part of the victim’s family.74
We shall also award in favor of the heirs of Demetrio Jr. exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000
in view of the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery. 75
Thus, Anacito shall indemnify the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., damages in the total amount of
₱161,945 and the heirs of Allan damages in the total amount of ₱110,000.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM, with modifications as to the damages, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 29, finding appellant Anacito Opuran guilty of the crimes of murder
in Criminal Case No. 4693 and homicide in Criminal Case No. 4703, and sentencing him to suffer
reclusion perpetua and an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, respectively. Apart from
the ₱50,000 civil indemnity, he is ordered to pay (1) the heirs of Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., in the
amounts of (a) ₱50,000 as moral damages; (b) ₱25,000 as temperate damages; and (c) ₱25,000 as
exemplary damages, or a total of ₱150,000; and (2) the heirs of Allan Dacles in the amounts of (a)
₱50,000 as moral damages; and (b) ₱10,000 as temperate damages, or a total of ₱110,000.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Paulino Sevilla, Fernando Arce and Gaudencio Garcia for appellant.
Undersecretary of Justice for appellee.
66
LAUREL, J.:
On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed an information charging
Celestino Bonoan, the defendant-appellant herein, with the crime of murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the
said accused, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, without any justifiable motive and with the decided purpose to kill one Carlos
Guison, attack, assault and stab the said Carlos Guison on the different parts of his body with
a knife, thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit:
"One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating one cm. into the superior surace of
the right lobe of the liver; and three non-penetrating stab wounds located respectively at the
posterior and lateral lumbar region, and left elbow", which directly caused the death of the said
Carlos Guison three days afterwards.
On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the accused. The defense counsel
forthwith objected to the arraignment on the ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and was
at the time confined in the Psychopatic Hospital. The court thereupon issued an order requiring the
Director of the Hospital to render a report on the mental condition of the accused. Accordingly, Dr.
Toribio Joson, assistant alientist, rendered his report,Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated. On March 23,
1935, the case was again called for the arraignment of the accused, but in view of the objection of the
fiscal, the court issued another order requiring the doctor of the Psyhopatic Hospital who examined the
defendant to appear and produce the complete record pertaining to the mental condition of the said
defendant. Pursuant to this order, Dr. Toribio Joson appeared before the court on March 26, 1935 for
the necessary inquiry. Thereafter, the prosecution and the defense asked the court to summon the other
doctors of the hospital for questioning as to the mental condition of the accused, or to place the latter
under a competent doctor for a closer observation. The trial court then issued an order directing that the
accused be placed under the chief alienist or an assistant alienist of the Psychopatic Hospital for his
personal observation and the subsequent submission of a report as to the true mental condition of the
patient. Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, assistant alienist of the Psychopathic Hospital, rendered his report,
Exhibit 5, on June 11, 1935. On June 28, 1935, the case was called again. Dr. Fernandez appeared
before the court and ratified his report, Exhibit 5, stating that the accused was not in a condition to
defend himself. In view thereof, the case was suspended indefinitely.
On January 21, 1936, Dr. Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the defendant could be discharged
from the hospital and appear for trial, as he was "considered a recovered case." Summoned by the
court, Dr. Fernandez, appeared and testified that the accused "had recovered from the disease." On
February 27, 1936, the accused was arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and trial was had.
After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the information above-
quoted and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P1,000, and to pay the costs.
The defendant now appeals to this court and his counsel makes the following assignment of errors:
A. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence establishes that the accused has had
dementia only occasionally and intermittently and has not had it immediately prior to the
commission of the defense.
B. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence in this case further shows that during and
immediately after the commission of the offense, the accused did not show any kind of
abnormality either in behavior, language and appearance, or any kind of action showing that
he was mentally deranged.
C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the circumstances that burden was on the
defense to show hat the accused was mentally deranged at the time of the commission of the
offense, and that the defense did not establish any evidence to this effect.
D. The court a quo in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and in not acquitting
him thereof.
It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the defendant Celestino Bonoan met the now
deceased Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a barbershop close to Tom's Dixie Kitchen. Francisco
Beech, who was at the time in the barbershop, heard the defendant say in Tagalog, "I will kill you."
Beech turned around and saw the accused withdrawing his right hand, which held a knife, from the side
of Guison who said, also in Tagalog, "I will pay you", but Bonoan replied saying that he would kill him
and then stabbed Guison thrice on the left side. The assaultt was witnessed by policeman Damaso
Arnoco who rushed to the scene and arrested Bonoan and took possession of the knife, Exhibit A.
Guison was taken to the Philippine General Hospital where he died two days later. Exhibit C is the
report of the autopsy performed on December 15, 1934, by Dr. Sixto de los Angeles.
As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is admitted, it does not seem necessary to
indulge in any extended analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. The defense set
up being that of insanity, the only question to be determined in this appeal is whether or not the
defendant-appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime charged.
On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and the incidental corollaries as to the legal
presumption and the kind and quantum of evidence required, theories abound and authorities are in
sharp conflict. Stated generally, courts in the United States proceed upon three different theories. (See
Herzog, Alfred W., Medical Jurisprudence [1931], sec. 655 et seq., p. 479 et seq.; also Lawson, Insanity
in Criminal Cases, p. 11 et seq.) The first view is that insanity as a defense in a confession and
avoidance and as must be proved beyond reasonable doubt when the commission of a crime is
established, and the defense of insanity is not made out beyond a reasonable doubt, conviction follows.
In other words, proof of insanity at the time of committing the criminal act should be clear and
satisfactory in order to acquit the accused on the ground of insanity (Hornblower, C. J., in State vs.
Spencer, 21 N. J. L., 196). The second view is that an affirmative verdict of insanity is to be governed by
a preponderance of evidence, and in this view, insanity is not to be established beyond a reasonable
doubt. According to Wharton in his "Criminal Evidence" (10th ed.,vol. I, sec. 338), this is the rule in
England (Reg. vs. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C., 149; Reg. vs. Higginson, 1 Car. & K., 130), and in Alabama,
Arkansas, California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. The third view is that the prosecution must prove sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt (Dais vs. United States, 160 U. S. 496; 40 Law. ed., 499; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
67
353; Hotema vs. United States, 186 U. S., 413; 46 Law. ed., 1225; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895; United States
vs. Lancaster, 7 Biss., 440; Fed. Cas. No. 15,555; United States vs. Faulkner, 35 Fed., 730). This liberal
view is premised on the proposition that while it is true that the presumption of sanity exists at the
outset, the prosecution affirms every essential ingredients of the crime charged, and hence affirms
sanity as one essential ingredients, and that a fortiori where the accused introduces evidence to prove
insanity it becomes the duty of the State to prove the sanity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter view (People vs. Bacos [1922], 44 Phil.,
204). The burden, to be sure, is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime, but insanity is presumed, and ". . . when a defendant in a criminal case
interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests upon him. . . ." (U.
S. vs. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil., 305, 308, 309; U. S. vs. Bascos, supra.) We affirm and reiterate this
doctrine.
In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that the defendant was insane at the time he killed the
deceased, the obligation of proving that affirmative allegation rests on the defense. Without indulging in
fine distinctions as to the character and degree of evidence that must be presented sufficiently
convincing evidence, direct or circumstantial, to a degree that satisfies the judicial mind that the
accused was insane at the time of the perpetration of the offense? In order to ascertain a person's
mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind a
reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony is not required (Wharton, Criminal
Evidence, p. 684; State vs. Wright, 134 Mo., 404; 35 S. W., 1145; State vs. Simms, 68 Mo., 305;
Rinkard vs. State, 157 Ind., 534; 62 N. E., 14; People vs. Tripler, I Wheeler, Crim. Cas., 48), nor are
specific acts of derangement essential (People vs. Tripler, supra) to established insanity as a defense.
Mind can only be known by outward acts. Thereby, we read the thoughts, the motives and emotions of a
person and come to determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. To
prove insanity, therefore, cicumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, suffice (People vs. Bascos
[1922], 44 Phil., 204).
The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendantwas not insane at the time of the commission
of the act for which he was prosecuted on the theory that the insanity was only occassional or
intermittent and not permanentor continuous (32 C. J., sec. 561, p. 757). We are appraised of the
danger of indulging in the preseumption ofcontinuity in cases of temporary or spasmodic insanity.We
appreciate the reason forthe contrary rule. To be sure, courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in
law from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or mere depression resulting from physical ailment.
The State should guard against sane murderers escaping punishment through a general plea of
insanity. In the case at bar, however, we are not cconcerned with connecting two or more attacks of
insanity to show the continuance thereof during the intervening period or periods but with the continuity
of a particular and isolated attack prior to the commission of the crime charged, and ending with a
positive diagnosis of insanity immediately following the commission of the act complained of. Upon the
other hand, there are facts and circumstances of record which can not be overlooked.The following
considerations have weighed heavily upon the minds of the majority of this court in arriving at a
conclusion different from that reached by the court below:.
(a) From the evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by the prosecution, it appears
that the herein defendant-appellant, during the periods from April 11 to April 26, 1922, and
from January 6 to January 10, 1926, was confined in the insane department of the San Lazaro
Hospital suffering from a disease diagnosed as dementia præcox. His confinement during
these periods, it is true, was long before the commission of the offense on December 12, 1934,
but this is a circumstance which tends to show that the recurrence of the ailment at the time of
the occurence of the crime is not entirely lacking of any rational or scientific foundation.
(b) All persons suffering from dementia præcox are clearly to be regarded as having mental
disease to a degree that disqualifies them for legal responsibility for their actions (Mental
Disorder in Medico-Legal Relations by Dr. Albert M. Barrett in Peterson, Haines and Webster,
Legal Medicine and Toxology, vol. I, p. 613). According to Dr. Elias Domingo, chief alienist of
the Insular Psychopathic Hospital, the symptoms of dementia præcox, in certain peeriods of
excitement, are similar to those of manic depresive psychosis (p. 19, t. s. n.) and, in either
case, the mind appears "deteriorated" because, "when a person becomes affected by this kind
of disease, either dementia præcox or manic depresive psychosis, during the period of
excitement, he has no control whatever of his acts." (P. 21, t. s. n.) Even if viewed under the
general medico-legal classification of manic-depressive insanity, "it is largely in relation with
the question of irrestible impulse that forensic relations of manic actions will have to be
considered. There is in this disorder a pathologic lessening or normal inhibitions and the case
with which impulses may lead to actions impairs deliberations and the use of normal checks to
motor impulses" (Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology [2d ed., 1926],
vol, I, p. 617).
(c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, at one time an
interne at San LazaroHospital, for four (4) days immediately preceding December 12, 1934 —
the date when the crime was committed — the defendant and appellant had "an attack of
insomnia", which is one of the symptoms of, and may lead to, dementia præcox (Exhibit 3,
defense testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.).
(d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and taken to the police station on
the very same day of the perpetration of the crime, and although attempted were made by
detectives to secure a statement from him (see Exhibit B and D and testimony of Charles
Strabel, t. s. n. pp. 9, 10) he was sent by the police department to the Psychopathic Hospital
the day following the commission of the crime. This is an indication that the police authorities
themselves doubted the mental normalcy of the acused, which doubt found confirmation in the
official reports submitted by the specialists of the San Lazaro Hospital.
(e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in charge, Dr. Toribio Joson, which report
was made within the first month of treatment, the defendant was suffering from a form of
psychosis, called manic depressive psychosis.We quote the report in full:
INSULAR PSYCHOPATIC HOSPITAL
MANDALUYONG, RIZAL
January 15, 1935.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The chief Alienist, Insular Psychopatic
Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
SUBJECT: Patient Celestino Bonoan, male,
Filipino, 30 years old, sent by the
68

Secret Service of the City of Manila
for mental examinition.
1. MENTAL STATUS:
(a) General behavior. — The patient is undetective, staying most of the time in his
bed with his eyes closed and practically totally motionless. At other times, however,
but on very rare occassions and at short intervals he apparently wakes up and then
he walks around, and makes signs and ritualistic movements with the extremities and
other parts of the body. Ordinarily he takes his meal but at times he refuses to take
even the food offered by his mother or sister, so that there have been days in the
hospital when he did not take any nourishment. On several occassions he refused to
have the bath, or to have his hair cut and beard shaved, and thus appear untidy. He
would also sometimes refuse his medicine, and during some of the intervals he
displayed impulsive acts, such as stricking his chest or other parts of the body with his
fists and at one time after a short interview, he struck strongly with his fist the door of
the nurse's office without apparent motivation. He also sometimes laughs, or smiles,
or claps his hands strongly without provocation.
(b) Stream of talk. — Usually the patient is speechless, can't be persuaded to speak,
and would not answer in any form the questions propounded to him. Very often he is
seen with his eyes closed apparently praying as he was mumbling words but would
not answer at all when talked to. At one time he was seen in this condition with a
cross made of small pieces of strick in his hand. He at times during the interviews
recited passages in the literature as for example the following.
"La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la verdadera nobleza del hombre.
(Truthfulness, honesty and loyalty are among the attributes of a dependable
character.)"
At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very loud voice in the hospital.
(c) Mood. — Patient is usually apathetic and indifferent but at times he looks anxious
and rather irritable. He himself states that the often feels said in the hospital.
(d) Orientation. — During the periods that he was acccessible he was found oriented
as to place and person but he did not know the day or the date.
(e) Illusion and hallucination. — The patient states that during the nights that he could
not sleep he could hear voices telling him many things. Voices, for example, told that
he should escape. That he was going to be killed because he was benevolet. That he
could sometimes see the shadow of his former sweetheart in the hospital. There are
times however when he could not hear or see at all anything.
(f ) Delusion and misinterpretation. — On one occassion he told the examiner that he
could not talk in his first day in the hospital because of a mass he felt he had in his
throat. He sometimes thinks that he is already dead and already buried in the La
Loma Cemetery.
(g) Compulsive phenomena. — None.
(h) Memory. — The patient has a fairly good memory for remote events, but his
memory for recent events or for example, for events that took place during his stay in
the hospital he has no recollection at all.
(i) Grasp of general informartion. — He has a fairly good grasp of general information.
He could not, however, do simple numerial tests as the 100-7 test.
( j) Insight and judgment. — At his fairly clear periods he stated that he might have
been insane during his first days in the hospital, but just during the interview on
January 14, 1935, he felt fairly well. Insight and judgment were, of course, nil during
his stuporous condition. During the last two days he has shown marked improvement
in his behavior as to be cooperative, and coherent in his speech.
2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:
The patient during his confinement in the hospital has been found suffering from a
form of physchosis, called Manic depressive psychosis.
(Sgd.) TORIBIO JOSON, M. D.
Assistant Alienist
In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935 (Exhibit 5), filed by Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, another
assistant alienist in the Insular Pshychopatic Hospital, the following conclusion was reached:
I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick. He is suffering from the Manic
Depressive form of psychosis. It might be premature to state before the court has
decided this case, but I believe it a duty to state, that this person is not safe to be at
large. He has a peculiar personality make-up, a personality lacking in control, overtly
serious in his dealings with the every day events of this earthly world, taking justice
with his own hands and many times executing it in an impulsive manner as to make
his action over proportionate — beyond normal acceptance. He is sensitive, overtly
religious, too idealistic has taste and desires as to make him queer before the
average conception of an earthly man.
He will always have troubles and difficulaties with this world of realities.
(Sgd.) J. A. Fernandez, M. D.
Assistant Alienist
To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normlacy of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime, the prosecution called on policeman Damaso Arnoco. Arnoco testified that
69
upon arresting the defendant-appellant he inquired from the latter for the reason for the assault and the
defendant-appellant replied that the deceased Guison owed him P55 and would pay; that appellant
bought the knife, Exhibit A, for 55 centavos in Tabora Street and that for two days he had been
watching for Guison in order to kill him (pp. 5, 6, t. s. n.). Benjamin Cruz, a detective, was also called
and corroborated the testimony of policeman Arnoco. That such kind of evidence is not necessarily
proof of the sanity of the accused during the commission of the offense, is clear from what Dr. Sydney
Smith, Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine, University of Edinburg, said in his work on Forensic
Medicine (3d ed. [London], p. 382), that in the type of dementia præcox, "the crime is ussually preceded
by much complaining and planning. In these people, homicidal attcks are common, because of
delusions that they are being interfered with sexually or that their property is being taken."
In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was demented at the time he
perpetrated the serious offense charged in the information and that conseuently he is exempt from
criminal liability. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, and the defendant-
appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio in both instances. In conforminty with paragraph 1 of article 12
of the Revised Penal Code, the defendant shall kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital or such
other hospital for the insane as may be desiganted by the Director of the Philippine Health Service,
there to remain confined until the Court of First Instance of Manila shall otherwise order or decree. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee
vs.
OLIVER AREVALO JR. y ABANILLA, and HERMINIGILDO ORGANISTA y ANDRES, appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Appellant is accused of multiple rape "by two or more persons," for which Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code prescribes the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death." Since the Information did not allege
any aggravating circumstance, the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua, not death.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the October 26, 2001 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City (Branch 62) in Criminal Case Nos. 01-419 to 01-464, finding Oliver Arevalo Jr. and
Herminigildo Organista guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 42 and 32 counts of rape, respectively. The
decretal portion of the Decision is worded as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Oliver A. Arevalo in Criminal Cases Nos.
01-419 to 01-423, 01-425 to 01-428, 01-430 to 01-441, 01-442 to 01-446, 01-448 to 01-451, 01-453 to
01-464, and accused Herminigildo A. Organista in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-419 to 01-422, 01-442 to 01-
445, and 01-441 and 01-464 GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined under Art.
266-A, par. 1(a) in relation to Art. 266-B, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act 8353, and imposes upon them the maximum penalty of death in each case. Each of the two
accused is hereby ordered to pay complainants Regina G. Acu[ñ]a and Ruth F. Acosta P75,000.00
each as civil indemnity.
"Considering the outrage, humiliation, distress and trauma suffered by the two complainants from the
dastardly act of the two accused, the Court orders the accused Arevalo to pay Regina Acu[ñ]a and Ruth
Acosta P200,000.00 each and accused Organista to pay the two complainants P50,000.00 each as
moral damages pursuant to Article 2219(3) in relation to Article 2217 of the Civil Code.
"Accused Arevalo is further ordered to pay exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to each
of the two complainants to deter others with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behaviors from
committing the act.
"For failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of accused Oliver A.
Arevalo in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-424 and 01-447, and 01-429 and 01-452, and accused Herminigildo
A. Organista in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-423 to 01-440 and 01-446 to 01-463, they are hereby
ACQUITTED in said cases."2
A total of forty-six (46) separate Informations3 were filed against appellants. For the rape of Regina
Acuña, they were charged as follows:
Criminal Case No. 01-419
"That on or about the 23rd day of January, 2001, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with John Does and mutually helping and aiding with one another, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully [and] feloniously have carnal knowledge of
the complainant REGINA ACU[Ñ]A y GUTIERREZ, without her consent and against her will."4
The Informations5 in Criminal Case Nos. 01-420 to 01-441 contain allegations identical to the above
Information, differing only with respect to the dates of the commission of the alleged rapes.
For the rape of Ruth Acosta, appellants were charged as follows:
Criminal Case No. 01-442
"That on or about the 23rd day of January, 2001, in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with John Does and mutually helping and aiding with one another, by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
the complainant RUTH ACOSTA y FILLAS, without her consent and against her will."6
Again, the Informations7 in Criminal Case Nos. 01-443 to 01-464 contain allegations identical to the
above Information, differing only with respect to the dates of the commission of the alleged rapes.
70
Upon their arraignment on March 19, 2001,8 appellants, with the assistance of their counsel, 9 pleaded
not guilty to all charges. After trial in due course, the court a quo rendered the assailed Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecution’s version of the facts in
the following manner:
"Regina G. Acu[ñ]a was a jobless 22-year old married woman residing in Payatas, Quezon City. On
January 23, 2001, between three o’clock and four o’clock in the afternoon, she was walking down
Manggahan St. in Fairview, Quezon City, looking for a job. As she went along, appellant Arevalo, a
stranger, approached and asked her what her problem was. She replied that she was looking for a job.
Appellant Arevalo told Regina that he could get her a job as saleslady. Regina said that if the place of
work was far, she was not interested. Appellant Arevalo told her not to worry, as the workplace was not
far, and that nothing wrong would happen to her. Regina did not believe him.
"While they were talking, a car stopped in front of them. Suddenly, appellant Arevalo placed a white
handkerchief on Regina’s face and boarded her on the vehicle. Regina could not remember what
happened next. She could not even recall whether she slept or lost consciousness. All she knew was
that when she woke up, she was already lying on a bed inside a room. It was nighttime.
"In the room, Regina saw appellant Arevalo and a fat lady whom he identified as Rose, his ‘atsay’ or
helper. Regina later learned that Rose’s real name was Ruth Acosta. Ruth looked like she was in a
state of shock, or, ‘tulala’.
"Appellant Arevalo left momentarily. When he came back, he forcibly took off Regina’s clothes. Regina
asked him what he was doing, and he replied that what he would do would only take a while. Appellant
Arevalo then undressed himself. When Regina saw this, she pleaded with him to take pity on her and to
release her, as her husband may have been worrying for her already. Appellant Arevalo repeated that it
would not take long. Regina shouted for help. But nobody heard her, as appellant Arevalo had closed
the door and windows. While she was shouting, appellant Arevalo raised her feet and forcibly inserted
his penis into her vagina.
"As Regina lay on the bed, she kept on shouting and resisting appellant Arevalo’s sexual assault. At
one point, she was able to free herself from him and run. But he caught up with her, grabbed her hair,
banged her head against the wall and threw her back to the bed, where he continued to ravish her.
Rose, or Ruth Acosta, was looking on helplessly, crying while Regina was being violated.
"From that night onward until February 14, 2001, Regina would be wearing nothing almost all the time,
for she would be ravished for what seemed like ‘almost every day and every hour.’
"On January 24, 2001, an unidentified man raped Regina in the same room. Before raping her[,]
however, the man paid appellant Arevalo a sum of money. Regina could not see the man’s face, as
appellant Arevalo had blindfolded her. But she heard the man tell appellant Arevalo, ‘Pare, itong bayad.’
"The unidentified man made Regina take different sexual positions even as she resisted. At one time,
he inserted his penis into her anus; at another, he inserted his finger and later, his penis, into her
vagina. Thereafter, appellant Arevalo made her eat the man’s penis. Regina struggled hard to free
herself from the man’s clutches, but she was no match for him.
"When the man had left, appellant Arevalo took off Regina’s blindfold. Regina saw him counting the
money the man had paid him. Thereafter, appellant Arevalo ravished Regina himself. When he was
finished, appellant Arevalo again sold Regina to another unidentified man, who proceeded to have sex
with her. By this time, Regina was no longer shouting for help because no one could hear or help her
anyway.
"On January 25, 2001, appellant Arevalo again blindfolded Regina and let other men ravish her for a fee
while he stood guard outside the door of his house. The first man who had sex with Regina inserted his
penis into her vagina while he was on top of her, covering her mouth with his hand because she was
noisy. Regina kept shouting for help, but nobody heard her. So she just cried and cried and threw
punches at the man, but he would not stop ravishing her. To keep her from resisting, the man pointed a
knife at her neck and threatened to kill her. When the man was through, another man followed. By then,
Regina was no longer putting up any resistance because she was ‘afraid and at the same time, already
very weak.’ Around six (6) men raped her in succession that day, but she could only recognize appellant
Arevalo among them.
"On January 26, 2001, appellant Arevalo forced the two (2) women to take drugs. Appellant Arevalo
made Regina sniff the smoke of a powdered substance or ‘tawas’ wrapped in a foil. When she refused,
he threatened to slash her neck. He also made the girls take tablets which Regina later discovered to be
birth control pills.
"Thereafter, appellant Arevalo inserted his penis into Regina’s vagina. While he was raping her, he ran
the point of his knife up and down her body, from her breasts to her vagina. Regina was very afraid.
"After appellant Arevalo had reached a climax, he blindfolded Ruth and made her have sex with many
other men.
"On January 27, 2001, appellant Arevalo ravished Regina again in a similar manner as the previous
days. By then, Regina was very weak.
"On many occasions during her first five (5) days in captivity, and even thereafter, Regina tried to
escape, but appellant Arevalo would always catch up with her and hurt her. He would tie up her hands
and hang her while having sex with her. Whenever he left the house, he would lock it from the outside to
prevent Regina and Ruth from leaving. Although appellant Arevalo would buy the girls food, Regina
oftentimes refused to eat, because she knew that the food was bought with the money appellant
Arevalo earned from peddling their bodies.
"On January 28, 2001, appellant Arevalo brought Regina to another place. She did not know where the
place was because she was dizzy with the drugs he had made her use.
71
"On January 29, 2001, appellant Arevalo drugged Regina again. Thereafter, he had sexual intercourse
with her. Regina begged him to let her go home because her husband was waiting for her, but her plea
fell on deaf ears. Many other men ravished Regina that day.
"On January 30, 2001, appellant Arevalo forced Regina to make a choice between marijuana and
‘tawas.’ When Regina refused to choose, he threatened to slash her throat. Afraid, Regina finally chose
‘tawas.’ Appellant Arevalo told her to take it so that she would not feel the pain in her vagina, which was
already bleeding. Thereafter, appellant Arevalo raped her.
"On January 31, 2001, appellant Arevalo had forcible sexual intercourse with Regina again. Thereafter,
not content with putting his fingers into her private part, appellant Arevalo inserted a lighted cigarette
inside. Although Regina was taking the drug appellant Arevalo forced her to use, she still felt the pain in
her vagina caused by the hot cigarette.
"On February 1, 2001, after forcibly copulating with Regina yet another time, appellant Arevalo sold her
again to other men.
"On the night of February 2, 2001, appellant Arevalo again moved Regina to another place which she
could not remember, because she was dizzy then. Although there were other passengers on the public
utility jeepney that they took on the way to the place, Regina could not ask for help, as appellant Arevalo
was poking a knife at her back inside her t-shirt the whole time and had earlier warned her that he would
kill her if she shouted. They arrived at a concrete house which had a vulcanizing shop at the ground
floor. When they were inside the building, appellant Arevalo blindfolded Regina and hanged her by the
hands. Regina heard women’s voices, but she was not sure whether they were real or came from the
television set in the room. That night, Regina was again raped by unidentified persons. Appellant
Arevalo and Regina left the place at half past midnight.
"From February 3 up to February 5, 2001, appellant Arevalo continued to subject [her] to his bestial
designs. Each time, he succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina and in consummating the
intercourse. Regina no longer put up any resistance because her body had been rendered very weak
from her days of endless ravishment.
"On February 6, 2001, Regina fell ill with fever, and Ruth took care of her. Regina’s illness did not stop
appellant Arevalo from molesting her that day. Before she was raped, Regina begged appellant Arevalo
to allow her to call her parents and even offered him any sum of money as he desired, but he slapped
her, saying that he needed her body and not her money. He also told Ruth to slap her, and so Ruth
slapped her.
"On February 7, 2001, Regina could only beg appellant Arevalo to take pity on her. She was chilling and
she tried to push him away, to no avail, for once again, appellant Arevalo successfully penetrated her
private organ.
"On February 8, 2001, Regina discovered that she had a venereal disease, or ‘tulo.’ But this did not
spare her from appellant Arevalo’s carnal greed. She stopped resisting him, for her body had long been
worn down by ceaseless abuse.
"Regina’s ordeal continued from February 9 up to February 14, 2001. Every single day, appellant
Arevalo would ravish her without letup.
"On February 14, 2001, appellant Organista, a friend and neighbor of appellant Arevalo, also had a
taste of Regina’s flesh. After appellant Arevalo stripped her naked, appellant Organista made his move.
Regina pushed him away as he approached her, but appellant Arevalo teased him, saying, ‘kaya mo
yan pre.’ Appellant Organista proceeded to insert his penis into Regina’s vagina while she lay down on
the floor, with appellant Arevalo looking on. After appellant Organista was finished, appellant Arevalo
took over in ravishing Regina and succeeded in penetrating her as well.
"Ruth F. Acosta, a native of Bukidnon, left her family for Manila when she was about eighteen (18)
years old. Her highest educational attainment was the third grade of primary school. Unable to find any
relatives in Manila, she ended up loitering and sleeping on the streets of Luneta.
"On January 23, 2001, about a year she had left the province, Ruth Acosta met appellant Oliver Arevalo
at the Luneta park. It was around six o’clock in the evening. Appellant Arevalo told Ruth that he could
help her find a job and invited her to go with him. Ruth went with appellant Arevalo and they boarded a
jeepney. They arrived at (what turned out to be) appellant Arevalo’s house in Pembo, Makati, a few
hours later.
"Upon entering the house, appellant Arevalo pushed Ruth Acosta to the bed and stripped off her
clothes. Thereafter, appellant Arevalo removed his own clothes and forcibly inserted his penis into her
vagina. Ruth could not recall what happened immediately thereafter, except that she felt pain in her
private part. She was also bleeding badly, for she had just lost her virginity to her assailant.
"That same evening, after she was ravished by appellant Arevalo, Ruth was raped by appellant
Arevalo’s friend and neighbor, herein appellant Organista, in the same room.
"The following day, January 24, 2001, appellant Arevalo raped Ruth Acosta again. He took off his
clothes, undressed Ruth, and inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her to feel pain. While she was
being raped, Ruth attempted to resist appellant Arevalo by ‘pulling backwards her two hands with
clenched fists’, but her resistance was futile.
"On January 25, 2001, appellant Arevalo forcibly had sexual intercourse with Ruth again on his bed. He
inserted his organ into her private part, and once more, she felt pain. Many other men raped Ruth in the
same room that night after paying a fee to appellant Arevalo, but she could not identify said men
because she was blindfolded by him. She recognized appellant Organista, though, as one of those who
raped her while she was blindfolded because she was able to hold his beard while he was ravishing her
and she was already familiar with his face.
"On January 26, 2001, appellants Organista and Arevalo took turns in raping Ruth. Appellant Organista
removed Ruth’s clothes, after which, appellant Arevalo had forcible sexual intercourse with her. Try as
she might to resist the two (2) men, she was easily overpowered by them. After appellant Arevalo was
through with Ruth, he left the room. Appellant Organista then proceeded to defile her, inserting his penis
into her vagina. As a result of her ravishment by the two (2) men, Ruth experienced pain whenever she
urinated.
72
"The next day, January 27, 2001, appellant Arevalo blindfolded Ruth. Thereafter, she was raped
successively by several unidentified men.
"On January 28, 2001, appellants Arevalo and Organista forced Ruth to take drugs. Next, appellant
Arevalo blindfolded Ruth. Thereafter, several unidentified men raped Ruth, one after the other, in
appellant Arevalo’s room. Before sexually abusing her, each of these men paid a fee to appellant
Arevalo. Ruth knew this, because she would hear the men say to him, ‘Pare bayad’ or ‘Pare ito na ang
pambayad.’
"On January 29, 2001, appellant Arevalo vented his carnal desire on Ruth again. After undressing Ruth,
he had forcible sexual intercourse with her on his bed.
"On January 30, 2001, appellant Arevalo forced himself upon Ruth once more. While appellant Arevalo
was raping her, appellant Organista, who was visiting, merely looked on and did nothing to stop his
friend and neighbor. After appellant Arevalo had ejaculated, appellant Organista took over, ravishing
Ruth until he, too, succeeded in discharging his semen on her. While this was going on, appellant
Arevalo merely stood by, laughing.
"On January 31, 2001, appellant Arevalo sexually abused Ruth yet another time, piercing her
womanhood and bringing himself to a climax. Other men followed in raping her that night in appellant
Arevalo’s room, but she could not see them because appellant Arevalo had covered her eyes.
"The following day, February 1, 2001, five (5) men raped Ruth in succession in the same room after
paying a sum to appellant Arevalo. Once again, she could not see their faces because appellant
Arevalo had blindfolded her.
"On February 2, 2001, appellants Arevalo and Organista took turns in raping Ruth in appellant Arevalo’s
room. Ruth knew that both men had reached a climax after forcibly copulating with her, for her vagina
was very wet with their semen.
"On February 3, 2001, appellant Arevalo slapped Ruth, pulled her hair, inserted his penis into her
vagina and ravished her until he ejaculated. Appellant Organista followed, similarly unleashing his
seminal fluid on the hapless woman upon reaching a climax, while appellant Arevalo looked on and held
her down. Ruth’s ordeal did not end at this point, for she was subsequently raped by several other men
after paying appellant Arevalo one hundred pesos (P100.00) each.
"On February 4, 2001, appellants Arevalo and Organista again raped Ruth in the same room. Appellant
Organista had forcible sexual intercourse with Ruth until he ejaculated; he also forced her to eat his
penis. Appellant Arevalo followed, inserting his penis into her private part, causing it to hurt. He also
ejaculated his semen on her.
"In addition, appellant Arevalo, as with previous dates, sold Ruth to many other men that day. All of
them sexually abused her after each paying appellant Arevalo one hundred pesos (P100.00).
"On February 5, 2001, appellant Arevalo once more peddled Ruth and Regina to unidentified persons
who each paid him one hundred pesos (P100.00). Appellant Arevalo also forcibly copulated with the two
(2) women that day. Additionally, appellant Organista ravished Ruth to the point of ejaculation while
appellant Arevalo watched. Ruth could only lie helpless while she was being raped by appellants, as
they were too strong for her.
"On February 6, 2001, appellants Arevalo and Organista raped Ruth again. Appellant Organista
ravished Ruth first, undressing her, inserting his manhood into her as she lay on appellant Arevalo’s
bed, and helping himself to an orgasm while leaving Ruth in pain. Appellant Arevalo then took over,
defiling her as well. Thereafter, he blindfolded her and sold her for sex to other unidentified men.
"On February 7 and 8, 2001, appellant Arevalo repeated his ravishment of the helpless woman until he
ejaculated on her.
"Thereafter, appellant Arevalo blindfolded Ruth and sold her flesh to many other men. Again, Ruth knew
this, for she heard them say to him, ‘Pare bayad’ and she also heard him talking to them.
"On February 9, 2001, appellant Arevalo blindfolded the two (2) women and sold their sexual services to
several men. Appellant Arevalo warned Ruth that he had already killed a man before, and she believed
him; hence, she did not dare remove her blindfold because she was afraid of him.
"On February 10, 2001, appellant Arevalo forcibly consummated his lust on Ruth once more. He also let
other men ravish her for a fee.
"On February 11, 2001, several men paid appellant Arevalo to have sex with the two (2) women.
Appellant Arevalo himself did not spare Ruth, penetrating her maidenhood yet another time until he was
satisfied.
"On February 12, 13, and 14, 2001, appellant Arevalo again peddled the women to other men for sex.
Appellants Arevalo and Organista were not to be outdone, for they, too, ravished Ruth on February 12
and 13, 2001.
"On the night of February 14, 2001, after they had fulfilled their lustful designs on the two (2) women
and prostituted them to other men, appellants Arevalo and Organista had a drinking spree in the
former’s room. Thereafter, they fell asleep. Regina Acu[ñ]a got the key to the door from appellant
Arevalo’s pocket, dragged Ruth Acosta with her, and together they escaped. Regina and Ruth then
reported their horrifying ordeal to the Makati police. It was around 9:30 in the evening.
"That same evening, a team of Makati policemen and barangay tanods went to appellant Arevalo’s
house accompanied by the Regina and Ruth. They knocked on the door. When appellant Arevalo
opened the door, he was immediately identified by the women as their ravisher. Appellant Arevalo tried
to escape, but he was quickly arrested by the police. Thereafter, the police and the two (2) women
proceeded to appellant Organista’s residence which appellant Arevalo had readily pinpointed to them.
The police knocked on the door and appellant Organista opened it. Again, the two (2) women quickly
identified him as their other rapist. The moment he saw the policemen and the women, appellant
Organista also tried to escape, but the police immediately apprehended him.
"The following day, the private complainants were physically examined by Dr. Miriam S. Guialani, the
deputy chief of the Women’s Crisis and Child Protection Center of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
in Camp Crame, Quezon City.
73
"Dr. Guialani found infected erosions or abrasions at the 8 and 9 o’clock positions in the labial fold of
Regina’s external genitalia, most likely caused by constant friction. She also noted hematoma, infection
and fresh lacerations in the hymen at the 2 and 4 o’clock positions. In addition, the hymen was very very
red and swollen, indicating that it had been subjected to force and violence. There was also a foul-
smelling yellowish vaginal discharge strongly indicative of a sexually transmitted disease. On the whole,
Dr. Guialani noted that the ‘genital findings show clear evidence of previous penetrating trauma.’
"On the other hand, Dr. Guialani found healed lacerations at the 4, 7 and 8 o’clock positions in Ruth’s
hymen. She also noted edema and swelling at the hymenal rim and its mucosal tissues. Dr. Guialani
similarly reported that Ruth’s ‘genital findings show clear evidence of previous trauma.’" 10 (Citations
omitted)
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, the defense presented the following version of the facts:
"OLIVER AREVALO testified that since December 27, 2000, he was in Ormoc, Leyte with his wife and
two (2) children. On February 10, 2001, he went back to Manila to borrow money from his brother Tony
to put up a sari-sari store but he was asked by his brother’s secretary to come back on February 13,
2001 so he went back to his brother’s house but his brother referred him to their elder brother at Project
6, Quezon City. He was only given P500.00. At around 4:00 o’clock p.m., he proceeded to Luneta
where policemen were arresting vagrants at that time. The two (2) women, Ruth and Apple, referring to
complainants Acosta and Acu[ñ]a, were arrested. He helped them by giving them food and clothing.
They went with him to Makati and arrived at their house at around 11:30 p.m. The next day, February
12, 2001, the two (2) women were hungry again and Acosta was asking for transportation fare. He
brought them to Organista’s house and the latter gave P10.00 to Acosta. The two (2) women left at
around 1:30 in the afternoon. He had a drinking spree with Organista at his house. At around 1:00 in the
morning, he saw policemen together with the two (2) women and one of the policemen boxed him, so
he pointed Organista’s house to them.
"HERMINIGILDO ORGANISTA could not remember where he was from January 23, to 26, 2001
because he was treated with ECI for about five (5) times at the National Mental Health Hospital since
1983. He claimed that said treatment has the tendency of weakening or affecting one’s memory. He
corroborated the testimony of accused Arevalo that he only gave P10.00 for the food of Acosta.
"AVELINA ORGANISTA testified that her son was treated at the National Mental Health in 1983. His
last examination was in 1997. After said examination, her son could no longer work because they have
to bind him because he was uncontrollable. He even threatened her that he would kill her when she
opposed what he was doing. On the dates of the alleged rapes, her son was at home with her.
"DR. PIA ALMA DE JESUS of the National Center for Mental Health testified that she first saw accused
Organista for treatment on April 11, 2001. She learned from the hospital records that said accused had
been mentally ill since 1982 or 1983 and had 23 admissions at the mental hospital. During his last
admission, he was given oral medication to control his psychotic symptoms like illusions and
hallucination. Failure to regularly take said medication could cause a relapse that would render him
[unfit] for trial.
"JESUS OCAMPO, driver and all around helper of accused Arevalo’s brother, Tony, testified that he
usually see Arevalo on Tuesdays as the latter used to ask money from Tony." 11 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC found Arevalo and Organista guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 42 and 32 counts of rape,
respectively -- committed from January 23, 2001 to February 14, 2001.
The positive and straightforward testimonies of the victims, corroborated by medical reports, sufficiently
proved the guilt of appellants. Having closely observed the demeanor of the victims during trial, the
lower court found them credible. It found evidence that they had suffered extreme trauma, pain,
humiliation and distress. It held that there was no ill motivation on their part to impute such serious
offenses to appellants.
The RTC found many inconsistencies in the defenses of denial and alibi resorted to by Arevalo. First, he
could not state with certainty whether he and his family had left for Ormoc City or for Valencia, Leyte,
when the rapes were committed. He failed to present bus tickets to support his claim, notwithstanding
his manifestation during the trial that he would present them before the court. Second, the trial court
was puzzled by his testimony that, because his brother came home early from work on Tuesdays, on
those days he had to go to the latter’s house, which served as both office and residence. Third, on
cross-examination, the brother’s helper contradicted Arevalo by testifying that the former had not seen
the latter in the house on February 10, 2001, the date on which one of the rapes had supposedly taken
place. Fourth, the residence of the brother of Arevalo turned out to be located in Project 2, Quezon City,
not in Project 3 as the latter repeatedly testified to.
The defense of insanity proffered by Organista likewise failed to convince the trial court. He presented
his mother who testified that he was not of sound mind, and that he had never left her side ever since
he was a young boy. He contradicted her, however, when he declared on the stand that he was an
electrician and a mason by vocation. According to him, during the period 1999 to March 2001 when he
engaged in his vocation, he never received any complaints on his behavior from the people he
constantly worked or associated with.
Although Organista was indeed confined at the National Center for Mental Health, the period of his
confinement did not include the period of the commission of the rapes, as he was last discharged from
the Center in 1997. Moreover, he failed to prove his claimed insanity during or near the time of the
commission thereof.
On the contrary, when the arresting policemen, together with the victims, proceeded to his house,
Organista tried to escape. His reaction was indicative of guilt and awareness of the wrong he had
inflicted on the victims.
Hence, this automatic review before us.12
The Issues
Appellants raise the following errors for our consideration:
74
I The contentions of appellants are partly meritorious. While their respective defenses of denial, alibi and
"The lower court erred in not appreciating the exempting circumstance of insanity interposed by
Accused-appellant Herminigildo Organista despite strong and convincing evidence presented to prove
the same.
II
"The lower court erred in finding that conspiracy existed between the Accused-appellants.
III
"The lower court erred in imposing upon x x x Accused-appellant Herminigildo Organista the supreme
penalty of death notwithstanding the presence of a mitigating circumstance.
IV
"The lower court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon Accused-appellants on the
assumption that they are guilty of the crime charged." 13
Simply put, appellants’ arguments hinge on the following: (1) the trial court failed to appreciate
Organista’s defense of insanity; (2) no conspiracy existed between appellants; and (3) they should have
been found guilty of simple, not qualified, rape.
For clarity, we shall discuss in reverse order the issues raised by appellants.
The Court’s Ruling
Appellants are guilty of simple, not qualified, rape; hence, the penalty for each count should be reduced
from death to reclusion perpetua.
First Issue:
Proper Crime and Penalty
Appellants maintain that the evidence of the prosecution is weak, and that their defense of alibi and
denial should have entitled them to an acquittal. Organista adds that, assuming they were guilty, he
should have been entitled to the mitigating circumstance of illness that diminishes an offender’s
exercise of will power, pursuant to Article 13(9)14 of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellants contend that the Informations did not allege with specificity that two persons had
raped the victims. Therefore, they argue, the rapes should not have been qualified and they should not
have been sentenced to death, which is the higher penalty provided under Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code. Accordingly, the penalty for each conviction of rape should have been reclusion perpetua.
insanity must fail, we find them guilty only of simple, not qualified, rape.
Alibi and Denial
The positive, consistent and straightforward testimonies of the victims sufficiently established
appellants’ culpability. Well-settled is the rule that denial and alibi, being weak defenses, cannot
overcome the positive testimonies of the offended parties. 15
In order to merit credibility, denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability,16 which
herein appellants failed to show. And in order for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that
they were at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically
impossible for them to be at the locus delicti or its immediate vicinity.17
In the present case, appellants failed to demonstrate this fact. Without presenting any evidence to
support his bare assertion,18 Arevalo merely testified that he was in Ormoc, Leyte, from December 27,
2000, to February 10, 2001. He said that the bus ticket evidencing his trip to Leyte on December 27,
2000, was with his wife, while the return ticket to Manila on February 10, 2001, was with his brother. To
corroborate his testimony, he manifested that he would present the tickets in court after retrieving
them,19 but he failed to do so.
On the other hand, the mother of Organista averred that her son had stayed with her during the entire
period of the commission of the rapes. But since their house was near Arevalo’s, or the place where the
rapes were committed, then it would not have been unlikely for him to be in the vicinity at the time of the
rapes.
The victims’ testimonies, corroborated by the results of the medical examination, convincingly proved
that appellants were the perpetrators. It is a time-tested rule that the evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court, because it had the opportunity to
observe them firsthand and to note their demeanor and conduct on the witness stand. 20 For this reason,
its findings on such matters, absent any arbitrariness or oversight of facts or circumstances of weight
and substance, are final and conclusive upon this Court. 21 It is likewise well-settled that when a woman
declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been
committed; and when her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the
basis thereof.22
On the rapes committed against her on January 23 and 24, 2001, Acuña testified as follows:
"Q: You said you were raped on January 23, 2001 and it was Oliver Arevalo who raped you.
Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court how this was done?
A: During that night when Oliver came back, he forcibly took off my clothes including my short
pants.
Q: And after Oliver took off your clothes and short pants, what else did he do, if he did
anything?
75
A: I asked him ‘Kuya, what will you do? Why are you taking off my clothes?’ A: Opo."23

xxx xxx xxx On the rapes that occurred from January 25 to 27, 2001, she testified thus:

Q: After that, what did he do when you shouted for help? "Q: So on January 25, 2001, you are saying that it was not Oliver Arevalo who raped you but
somebody else only that person whom you could not identify gave payment to Oliver to have
A: He approached me and he forcibly raised my feet and inserted his penis into my vagina. I sexual intercourse with you? Is that what you are saying?
shouted, pleaded for help.
A: Yes, sir. But after that person, he was the one who would follow in raping me, sir.
Q: Was Oliver successful in having his penis penetrate your female organ?
xxx xxx xxx
A: Yes, sir. x x x.
Q: Who sexually assaulted you on January 26, 2001?
xxx xxx xxx
A: Oliver Arevalo, sir.
Q: So do you recall how long you were raped by Oliver?
INTERPRETER:
A: It started January 23 up to February 14, 2001, sir.
Witness pointing to accused Oliver Arevalo.
Q: And where did these other sexual assaults after January 23, 2001 meaning January 23, 24,
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, February 1 up to Feb[ruary] 14, 2001 happened? FISCAL NAÑOLA:

A: In the house of Oliver. Q: And how did he sexually assault you on January 26, 2001?

xxx xxx xxx A: I was naked at that time and he was poking the knife on me.

Q: At noon, ikaw ay walang damit mula ulo hanggang paa? INTERPRETER:

A: Opo. Witness demonstrating pointing from her breast down to her private part.

Q: Iyon din ang gumahasa sa iyo? FISCAL NAÑOLA:

A: Si Oliver po. Q: At that time that Oliver Arevalo, Jr. was poking a knife from your breast down to your private
organ, were you wearing anything?
Q: Paano mo nalaman, nakapiring ka?
A: None, sir.
A: Noong tina[n]ggalan niya ako ng piring ay si Oliver naman po ang sumunod.
Q: So what else happened after that poking of a bladed weapon?
Court:
A: After that, he raped me.
Q: Ang ibig mong sabihin ay matapos yung ibang tao na gahasain ka ay sumunod naman si
Oliver noong January 24? Q: When you said [he] raped you, you mean he inserted his penis into your female organ?

76
A: Yes, sir. Q: And when you said you were used, are you referring [to] being abused sexually?

Q: And was he able to reach climax? Meaning, was he able to complete the copulation? A: Yes, sir.

A: Yes, sir. Q: Was Oliver Arevalo successful in having sexual intercourse with you?

xxx xxx xxx A: Yes, sir.

Q: Let’s go now to the incident on January 27, 2001 which is the 5th day. Tell us, was any rape xxx xxx xxx
committed on you on January 27, 2001?
Q: And was Oliver Arevalo successful in having sexual intercourse with you on January 30,
A: Yes, sir, everyday. I do not know what’s happening already because ‘patang-pata na ang 2001?
katawan ko.’
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And could you recall if Oliver Arevalo, Jr. raped you on January 27, 2001, the 5th day of
your being in his house? Q: Did he finish having sexual intercourse with you?

A: Yes, sir. A: Yes, sir.

Q: And could you recall how did this happen? Q: Let’s now go to January 31, 2001. Now, what happened to you on January 31, 2001?

A: I could recall that everyday he was raping me. A: He also used me during that day, sir, x x x.

Q: At what time was this rape being committed? xxx xxx xxx

A: I do not know because from what I could recall, everytime somebody would use me, he Q: Let’s now go to February 1, 2001, what happened to you on February 1, 2001?
would follow.
A: He again raped me and then sold me again to other male persons.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And was Oliver Arevalo, Jr. successful in having sexual intercourse with you on February 1,
Q: So you are positively certain that on January 27, 2001, the 5th day of your being in the 2001?
house of Oliver Arevalo that accused Oliver Arevalo raped you?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir."24
Q: And did he finish?
On the rapes from January 29 to February 14, 2001, she narrated the events as follows:
A: Yes, sir.
"Q: Mrs. Witness, you stopped last time on the date January 29, 2001 which is the 7th day of
your being in the house of accused Oliver Arevalo, Jr., the question is, please tell the
Honorable Court what happened to you on January 29, 2001 in the house of Oliver Arevalo, Jr. xxx xxx xxx
in Makati City?
Q: What happened to you on February 3 at the house of Oliver Arevalo in Makati City?
A: Oliver Arevalo forced me to take drugs and then he used me, they were plenty, sir.
A: I was also raped, sir, by Oliver Arevalo.

77
Q: Was he successful in raping you? Q: Did he finish?

A: Yes, sir. A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did he finish? Q: On February 5, 2001, what happened to you?

A: Yes, sir. A: The same with February 4, sir.

Q: What were you wearing at the time you [were] being raped? Q: Meaning, Oliver Arevalo raped you also?

A: None, sir, nothing. A: Yes, sir.

Q: What about Oliver Arevalo, what was he wearing? Q: What were you wearing at the time that you [were] being raped?

A: Nothing also, sir. A: Nothing also, sir.

Q: Were you lying down when you were being raped? Q: How about Oliver Arevalo, what was he wearing?

A: Yes, sir. A: Nothing also, sir.

Q: Did you resist him when you were being raped? Q: Did he finish and fulfilled raping you on February 5, 2001?

A: I did not resist him already, sir, because I was ‘patampata na po ang katawan ko.’ A: Yes, sir.

Q: How about on February 4, 2001, what happened to you? Q: Meaning he was able to insert and penetrate his penis to your private parts, is that what you
mean?
A: Also the same, sir, I am not resisting already I am just crying.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were you raped on February 4, 2001?
Q: On February 6, 2001, what happened to you, Mrs. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
A: I was sick last February 6, sir.
Q: Who raped you?
Q: February 6, you got sick. Do you recall what illness or sickness is this?
A: Oliver Arevalo, sir.
A: I had fever during that time and it was Rose who was taking care of me.
Q: What were you wearing at the time that you [were] being raped?
Q: Were you raped on February 6, 2001?
A: Nothing, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about Oliver Arevalo, what was he wearing?
Q: Who raped you?
A: Nothing also, sir.

78
A: Oliver, sir. Q: Did you resist him on February 7, 2001?

Q: What were you wearing when you [were] raped? A: Yes, sir.

A: Nothing, sir. Q: What did you do to him on February 7, 2001?

Q: What about Oliver Arevalo, what was he wearing? A: I told him to pity me ‘parang awa mo na.’

A: Nothing also, sir. INTERPRETER:

Q: Before you were raped, did you tell him that you were sick? Witness demonstrating that she was chilling and she was pushing the accused.

A: No, sir. FISCAL NAÑOLA:

xxx xxx xxx Q: Were you successful in pushing him?

Q: How about on February 7, 2001, what happened to you? A: No, sir.

A: I was also raped by Oliver. Q: And Oliver Arevalo was able to have his penis penetrate you private parts?

Q: Was he successful? A: Yes, sir.

A: Yes, sir. Q: How about on February 8, 2001, what happened to you?

Q: Did he finish? A: I had a disease, sir, ‘tulo.’

A: Yes, sir. Q: Aside from having that vaginal disease on February 8, 2001, what else if any happened to
you if you recall?
Q: What were you wearing at the time that he raped you?
A: I was used again by Oliver, sir.
A: Nothing, sir.
Q: Did he finish?
Q: How about Oliver Arevalo, what was he wearing?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Nothing also, sir.
Q: What were you wearing at the time that he raped you?
Q: What position were you at the time that you [were] being raped, were you lying down?
A: Nothing, sir.
A: Lying down, sir.
Q: How about Oliver Arevalo, what was he wearing?
Q: On the floor or on the bed?
A: Nothing also, sir.
A: On the bed, sir.

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Q: Did you resist him? xxx xxx xxx

A: No, sir. Q: Who first raped you on February 14, 2001, Valentine’s Day?

Q: Why, why not? A: Herminigildo, sir.

A: ‘Patampata na po ang katawan ko nanghihina na po ako.’ Q: He was the first one?

Q: How about on February 9, 2001, what happened to you if any did happen to you? A: Yes, sir.

A: Also like that, sir, up to February 14, I was being raped everyday. Q: Who were present if any when he raped you?

Q: So, from words you are saying the remaining days February 9 to February 14 you were not A: Oliver Arevalo, sir.
allowed to leave the house of Oliver Arevalo, Jr.?
Q: The two (2) of them were there?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And during those days aside from you and Rose, were there any other person who were
able to enter that house? Q: And how did Herminigildo Organista raped you on February 14, 2001?

A: Yes, sir. A: He inserted his private parts to my vagina, sir.

Q: Who? Q: Before that, did you resist him?

COURT: A: Yes, sir.

Witness pointing to a man also in yellow shirt and when asked he identified himself as Q: How did you resist Herminigildo Organista?
Herminigildo Organista.
A: I pushed him, sir.
FISCAL NAÑOLA:
Q: Were you successful in pushing him?
Q: Could you recall, Mrs. Witness, on what date did Herminigildo Organista enter the house of
Oliver Arevalo, Jr. in Makati City?
A: Yes, sir.
A: On February 14, sir.
Q: And after pushing him, what happened next if anything else happened?
Q: Do you know that February 14 is Valentine’s Day?
A: Oliver said kaya mo yan pre, then what he did was he inserted his private parts to my
private parts, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now tell us, what were you wearing at the time that Herminigildo Organista inserted his
Q: So what happened to you on February 14, 2001 in the house of Oliver Arevalo, Jr. [on] penis to your private parts?
Valentine’s Day?
A: Nothing, sir.
A: I was raped by two (2) persons, Oliver and Herminigildo.
80
Q: Who removed your clothing before Herminigildo Organista was able to have his penis x x x A: Yes, sir.
insert[ed] to your private parts?
Q: Did he finish?
A: Oliver Arevalo, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Oliver Arevalo removed your clothing?
Q: At the time that you [were] being raped, were you blindfolded?
A: Yes, sir.
A: No, sir.
Q: Were you wearing bra and panty at that time before you [were] raped?
Q: How about Oliver Arevalo, where was he at the time that you [were] being raped by
A: None, sir. Herminigildo Organista?

Q: Only your clothes? A: At the bed, sir.

A: Yes, sir. Q: And what was he doing?

Q: What kind of clothes is this, duster or pants and blouse? A: He [was] just looking, sir.

A: T-shirt only, sir. Q: Looking at the both of you?

Q: How about your lower portion, what were you wearing? A: Yes, sir.

A: Nothing, sir. Q: And he did not do anything to prevent Herminigildo Organista from completing and
successfully penetrating his penis to your private parts?
Q: Only T-shirt?
A: Nothing, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So, after Herminigildo Organista finished and successfully completed having intercourse
Q: And after Oliver Arevalo, Jr. removed your T-shirt, what happened to you? with you, what else happened if anything happened on February 14, 2001?

A: I was raped by Herminigildo Organista. A: It was followed by Oliver Arevalo, Jr.

Q: In what position were you at the time that you [were] being raped by Herminigildo Q: Was he successful in having you raped on February 14, 2001?
Organista?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Lying down on the floor, sir.
Q: Was his penis able to penetrate your private parts?
Q: Not on the bed?
A: Yes, sir."25
A: Yes, sir.
On the other hand, on the rapes committed against her from January 23 to February 13, 2001,
Q: Was Herminigildo Organista successful in having you raped on February 14, 2001? Acosta testified as follows:

81
"COURT: Q Ikaw ba nung makasalubong mo si Oliver sa Luneta ay gabi rin?

Sabihin mo nga sa hukuman kung papano ka o bakit nandoon sa bahay ni Oliver nuong 23 ng A Opo.
Enero taong kasalukuyan?
Q Proceed.
A Naglalakad po ako sa Luneta nakasalubong ko siya. Ang sabi po niya sa akin ipapasok niya
ako sa trabaho. FISCAL NAÑOLA:

Q Ano ang sumunod na pangyayari ng sabihin sa iyo ni Oliver na ipapasok ka niya ng trabaho Q Pagkatapos kang itulak ni Oliver sa kama, ano pa ang sumunod na nangyari kung meron
samantalang ikaw ay nasa Luneta? pa?

A Ihahanap daw po niya ako ng trabaho. A Hinubad po yung t-shirt ko, shorts, panty at bra.

Q Proceed. Q Ikaw ba’y lumaban sa kanya habang hinuhubad ang iyong shorts, panty at bra?

FISCAL NAÑOLA: A Malakas po siya.

Q Nung sabihin niya sa iyo na ihahanap ka niya ng trabaho, ano pa ang sumunod na Q Ano pa ang sumunod na pangyayari matapos kang hubaran ni Oliver ng iyong shorts, panty
pangyayari? at bra?

A Sinakay po niya ako sa jeep. A Pinasok po niya yung titi niya sa ano ko.

Q Nung nakasakay na kayo sa jeep, saan kayo nagtungo? Saan kayo pumunta? Q Yung sinasabi mong ano mo, ito ba yung iyong ari?

A Sa bahay po ni Oliver. A Opo.

Q Sabihin mo sa [kagalang-galang] na Hukom kung alam mo kung saan yung bahay ni Oliver. Q At matapos ipasok ni Oliver ang kanyang titi sa iyong ari, ano pa ang sumunod na nangyari?

A Sa Makati, Cembo. A Hindi ko po matandaan.

Q Nung dumating kayo sa bahay ni Oliver doon sa Makati, ano ang nangyari kung meron Q Ano ang iyong naramdaman nung ipinasok ni Oliver ang kanyang titi sa iyong ari?
man?
A Masakit, po.
A Tinulak po ako sa kama.
Q Si Oliver naman, naaalala mo pa ba kung ano ang suot ni Oliver, kung meron man nuong
COURT: pinagsasamantalahan ka niya?

Q Anong oras ka dumating sa bahay ni Oliver? A Wala po.

A Hindi ko na po maalala. Q Ibig mong sabihin siya ay hubo at hubad?

Q Maari mo bang sabihin kung gabi o araw? A Opo.

A Gabi, po.
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Q Pagkatapos nitong Enero 23 taong kasalukuyan 2001, meron pa bang ibang pagkakataon Q Itong si Herminigildo Organista, naroon ba sa bahay ni Oliver nang dumating ka noong
na ikaw ay ginahasa ni Oliver? January 23, 2001?

A Opo. A Opo.

Q Ilang beses kung natatandaan mo? Q May kinalaman ba siya, kung meron man, sa ginawang panggagahasa sa iyo ni Oliver
nuong January 23, 2001?
A Maraming beses, po.
A Ni-rape rin po niya ako.
Q Pagkatapos nitong Enero 23 taong kasalukuyan, kinabukasan January 24, 2001, masasabi
mo ba sa kagalang-galang na Hukom kung nanatili ka roon sa bahay ni Oliver? Q Kailan?

A Opo. A Nuon pong January 23.

Q Puede bang sabihin mo sa kagalang-galang na Hukom kung mayroong nangyari sa iyo Q Sinong naunang mang-rape sa iyo, si Oliver o si Herminigildo noong January 23, 2001?
kinabukasan January 24, 2001?
A Si Oliver po.
A Opo.
Q Pagkatapos ni Oliver sinong sumunod?
Q Ano ang nangyari sa iyo?
A Si Lito po.
A Ni-rape po ako.
Q Itong sinasabi mong Lito, nandirito ba sa loob ng hukuman?
Q Nino?
A Opo.
A Oliver po.
Q Puede bang ituro mo yung sinasabi mong taong nang-rape sa iyo na ang ngalan ay Lito?
Q Itong Oliver na sinasabi mo, ito rin ba yung Oliver na itinuro mo kanina?
A (Witness pointing to accused Herminigildo Organista again.)
A Opo.
Q Ibig mong sabihin ay dalawang beses kang ginahasa nuong January 23, 2001. Una ni Oliver
Q Nung ni-rape ka ni Oliver sino ang nandoon sa bahay niya kung natatandaan mo? Arevalo at pangalawa Herminigildo Organista, tama ba yon?

A Wala po. A Opo.

Q Kilala mo ba itong isang taong nagngangalang Herminigildo Organista? Q Sinabi mo rin na nung sumunod na araw January 24, ginahasa ka rin ni Oliver, tama ba?

A Opo. A Opo.

Q Kung narito siya sa loob, puede bang ituro mo siya? xxx xxx xxx

A (Witness pointing to accused Organista.) Q Pagkatapos nuong January 24, 2001, meron pa bang nangyari kung meron man nuong
January 25?

83
A Opo. A Nahawakan ko lang po ang balbas niya.

Q Sabihin mo sa kagalang-galang na Hukom kung ano ang nangyari sa iyo? Q Oo nahawakan mo nga pero nakita mo ba siya nuong January 25, 2001, itong sinasabi
mong Lito?
A Ni-rape po niya ako.
A Opo.
Q Sinong nang-rape sa iyo?
Q Bukod kay Lito meron pa bang gumahasa sa iyo nuong January 25, 2001?
A Si Lito po.
A Binebenta po kami.
Q Ito rin yung Litong itinuro mo kanina?
Q Si Oliver Arevalo, Jr., ginahasa ka rin ba niya nuong January 25, 2001?
A Opo.
A Opo.
COURT:
Q Sinong nauna, si Lito o Herminigildo Organista o si Oliver Arevalo?
Q Paano mo nalaman na Lito ang palayaw niya?
A Si Oliver po.
A Nung nahuli na po sila.
Q At ang sumunod si Lito o si Herminigildo Organista?
Q Continue.
A Opo.
FISCAL NAÑOLA:
Q Nung sinabi mong si Oliver ang naunang nanggahasa, nagtagumpay ba siya sa kanyang
Q Pero ang mukha niya natatandaan mo? panggagahasa?

A Opo may balbas po siya. A Opo.

Q Nung ni-rape ka ni Lito o ni Herminigildo Organista nuong January 25, 2001, meron bang Q Anong naramdaman mo nuong ginagahasa ka ni Oliver?
ibang tao doon sa bahay?
A Masakit po ang ari ko.
A Meron po.
Q Nasaan ka nung ginagahasa ka niya, sa kama ba o nasa sahig?
Q Sabihin mo sa Hukom kung sino?
A Nasa kama po.
A Hindi ko po kilala kasi po nakapiring ang mga mata ko.
Q Ilan kayo sa kama nung ginagahasa ka ni Oliver?
Q Papaano mo nasabi na si Lito ang gumahasa sa iyo kung nakapiring ang mga mata mo?
A Isa po.
A May balbas po siya.
Q Ibig mong sabihin ikaw lang at si Oliver?
Q Nakita mo ba siya nitong January 25, 2001?
A Opo.

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Q Nung sumunod na araw January 26, puede bang sabihin mo sa kagalang-galang na Hukom A Si Lito po.
kung may nangyari sa iyo?
Q Nagtagumpay ba si Lito sa panggagahasa sa iyo?
A Opo.
A Opo.
Q Anong nangyari sa iyo?
Q Ibig mong sabihin naipasok niya ang ari niya sa ari mo ganoon ba?
A Ni-rape po.
A Opo.
Q Sinong nang-rape sa iyo?
Q Ano ang naramdaman mo nung ipasok ang ari niya sa ari mo?
A Si Oliver po.
A Masakit po ang pag-ihi ko.
Q Bukod kay Oliver, bukod sa pangre-rape ni Oliver, meron pa bang nangyari sa iyo?
xxx xxx xxx
A Opo.
Q Nuong January 29, may naaalala ka ba kung may nangyari sa iyo?
Q Ano yon, pakisabi mo sa hukuman?
A Rape din po.
A Si Lito po.
Q Sino ang nang-rape sa iyo nung January 29, 2001?
Q Anong ginawa niya sa iyo?
A Oliver po.
A Rape din po.
Q Bukod kay Oliver meron pa bang ibang nang-rape sa iyo nuong January 29?
Q Ikaw ba’y nakahubad noon nang ni-rape ka ni Oliver?
A Hindi ko po nakilala.
A Opo.
Q Nagtagumpay ba si Oliver sa panggagahasa sa iyo nung January 29?
Q Sino ang naghubad sa iyo?
A Opo.
A Si Lito po.
Q Ikaw ba’y hubad nung nangyari yon?
Q Matapos kang hubaran ni Lito ni-rape ka ni Oliver, yon ba ang ibig mong sabihin?
A Opo.
A Opo.
Q Sino ang naghubad ng iyong damit nuong January 29?
Q Ikaw ba ay lumaban kay Lito o kay Oliver?
A Si Oliver po.
A Malakas po silang dalawa.
Q Nung ginahasa ka ni Oliver nung January 29, ano naman ang suot mo, kung meron man?
Q Matapos kang gahasain ni Oliver sino ang sumunod?
A Wala po.

85
Q Sino ang nag-alis ng iyong kasuotan nung January 29? A Opo.

A Si Oliver po. Q Nasaan siya?

Q Lumaban ka ba kay Oliver nung ginagahasa ka niya nung January 29? A Pumunta po siya sa bahay ni Oliver?

A Malakas po siya. Q Habang nire-rape ka ni Oliver sa kama, nasaan si Lito?

Q Bukod kay Oliver meron pa bang ibang gumahasa sa iyo nung January 29? A Nanonood po.

A Hindi ko po kilala kasi may takip po ang mga mata ko. Q Bakit mo nasabing nanonood siya, nakita mo ba siya?

Q Ang nakilala mo lang ay si Oliver? A Opo.

A Opo. Q Pinigilan ba niya si Oliver habang ginagahasa ka niya?

Q Saan ka ginahasa ni Oliver, sa sahig ba, sa kama o saan? A Hindi po.

A Sa kama po. Q Ikaw, hinawakan ka ba ni Lito habang nire-rape ka ni Oliver?

Q Dumako tayo sa January 30. Natatandaan mo ba kung may gumahasa sa iyo nuong A Opo.
January 30?
Q Saan ka hinawakan ni Lito habang ginagahasa ka ni Oliver?
A Opo.
A Sa kamay po.
Q Sabihin mo nga sa kagalang-galang na Hukom kung ano nangyari sa iyo nuong January 30,
2001? Q Ilang kamay ang hinawakan sa iyo ni Lito?

A Rape po. A Dalawa po.

Q Sino ang nang-rape sa iyo? Q At nakatapos ba si Oliver ng panggagahasa sa iyo nung January 30?

A Oliver po. A Opo.

Q Sino pa bukod kay Oliver, kung meron man? Q Papano mo nasabing nakatapos si Oliver?

A Si Lito po. A Basa na po.

Q Sino ang naunang nang-rape sa iyo nung January 30, si Lito o si Oliver? Q Alin ang basa na?

A Si Oliver po. A Ang ari ko po.

Q Nung nire-rape ka ni Oliver nung January 30, natatandaan mo ba kung nasaan si Lito?

86
Q Matapos kang gahasain ni Oliver at naramdaman mong basa na ang ari mo, ang sumunod Q Ano ang nangyari sa iyo nung January 31, 2001?
namang gumahasa sa iyo ay si Lito, ganon ba?
A Rape din po.
A Opo.
Q Sinong nang-rape sa iyo?
Q Nagtagumpay ba si Lito sa panggagahasa sa iyo?
A Oliver po.
A Opo.
Q Nagtagumpay ba siya sa panggagahasa sa iyo nung January 31, 2001?
Q Nakatapos ba siya?
A Opo.
A Opo.
Q Nakatapos ba siya?
Q Papano mo nalaman na nakatapos si Lito ng panggagahasa sa iyo?
A Opo.
A Nilabasan din po.
Q Papano mo nasabi na natapos si Oliver ng panggagahasa sa iyo?
Q Si Lito?
A Basa na po ang ari ko.
A Opo.
Q Bukod kay Oliver Arevalo, meron pa bang nanggahasa sa iyo nung January 31, 2001?
Q Habang ginagahasa ka ni Lito nandon din ba si Oliver?
A Opo.
A Opo.
Q Sino ang nanggagahasa sa iyo bukod kay Oliver?
Q Anong ginawa sa iyo ni Oliver habang ginagahasa ka ni Lito?
A Hindi ko po makilala kasi may takip ang mga mata ko.
A Tumatawa po.
Q So ang natatandaan mo lang ay si Oliver?
Q Bukod sa tumatawa si Oliver habang ginagahasa ka ni Lito, hinawakan ka ba niya sa kamay
o sa ibang bahagi ng iyong katawan kung natatandaan mo? A Opo.

A Kamay po at paa. Q Nung sinabi mong nagtagumpay at natapos si Oliver sa panggagahasa sa iyo, puede bang
sabihin mo sa Hukom kung ang ari niya ay naipasok niya sa ari mo?
Q Hinawakan ni Oliver?
A Opo.
A Opo.
Q Naramdaman mo ba nang ipasok ni Oliver yung ari niya sa ari mo?
Q Matapos kang gahasain ni Lito nong January 30, 2001, natatandaan mo ba kung may
nangyari sa iyo nung sumunod na araw nung January 31, 2001? A Opo.

A Opo. Q Itinulak mo ba siya habang ginagahasa ka niya?

87
A Malakas po siya. Q Natatandaan mo ba kung nandoon si Herminigildo Organista noong February 2, 2001,
habang ginagahasa ka ni Oliver Arevalo?
Q Hindi mo siya naitulak?
A Opo.
A Hindi po.
Q Anong ginagawa niya habang ginagahasa ka ni Oliver?
Q Meron ka bang damit noon o hubo’t hubad ka habang ginagahasa ka nung January 31,
2001. A Wala po.

A Wala na po. Q Nanonood siya?

Q Sinong nag-alis sa iyo ng damit mo nung January 31, 2001? A Opo.

A Si Oliver po. Q Hinawakan ba niya ang kamay mo o paa, ni Herminigildo?

Q Si Oliver naman ano ang damit niya, siya ba ay may damit o wala nung January 31, 2001. A Opo.

A Wala po. Q Noong February 2, 2001?

Q So ibig mong sabihin ikaw at si Oliver ay parehong hubo’t hubad nung ginagahasa ka niya[?] A Opo.

A Opo. Q Meron ka ba noong piring o takip sa mata?

Q Saan ka niya ginahasa, sa kama ba o sa sahig, o sa anong lugar ng bahay? A Opo.

A Sa kama po. Q Papano mo nalaman na hinawakan ang kamay mo o paa ni Herminigildo gayong may takip
ang iyong mga mata?
xxx xxx xxx
A Naramdaman ko po.
Q Sino ang nanggahasa sa iyo noong February 2, 2001?
Q Ikaw ba’y may suot na damit habang ginagahasa ka ni Oliver nung February 2, 2001?
A Si Oliver at si Lito po.
A Wala po.
Q Nagtagumpay ba si Oliver ng panggagahasa sa iyo?
Q Sinong nag-alis ng damit mo?
A Opo kaming dalawa po ni Regina.
A Si Oliver po.
Q Matapos kang gahasain ni Oliver, at nagtagumpay siya, sino pa ang gumahasa sa iyo, kung
meron man? Q Lumaban ka ba sa kanya habang inalisan ka ng damit?

A Hindi ko po kilala kasi may takip ang mga mata ko. A Malakas po siya.

Q Ano naman ang suot ni Oliver nung ginahasa ka niya nung February 2?

88
A Wala po. Q Bukod sa panonood, meron ba siyang ginawa kung meron man habang ginagahasa ka ni
Lito?
Q Nakatapos ba si Oliver sa panggagahasa sa iyo nung February 2?
A Hinawakan po ang kamay ko.
A Opo.
Q Dumako tayo sa sumunod na araw February 3, 2001. Natatandaan mo ba kung may
Q Papano mo nalaman na nakatapos si Oliver? nangyari sa iyo nuong February 3, 2001?

A Basa na po ang ari ko. A Opo.

Q Ano naman ang nararamdaman mo habang pinapasok ni Oliver ang ari niya sa ari mo? Q Ano ang nangyari sa iyo?

A Masakit po. A Ni-rape po kami ni Regina.

Q Bukod kay Oliver meron pa bang gumahasa sa iyo nuong February 2, 2001? Q Sino ang nang-rape sa inyo?

A Opo. Si Lito po. A Si Oliver at si Lito po.

Q Pagkatapos ni Oliver ginahasa ka ni Lito? Q Nuong February 3, 2001, sino ang unang nang-rape sa iyo?

A Opo. A Oliver po.

Q Nagtagumpay ba si Lito o Herminigildo Organista sa panggagahasa sa iyo nung February 2, Q Saang lugar ka niya ni-rape?
2001?
A Sa bahay po niya.
A Opo.
Q Saang parte ng bahay?
Q Nakatapos ba siya?
A Cembo, Makati.
A Opo.
Q Oo, pero saan ba sa kama, sa sahig….?
Q Bakit mo nasabi na nakatapos si Lito ng panggagahasa sa iyo?
A Sa kama po.
A Naramdaman ko pong basa.
Q Lumaban ka ba kay Oliver bago ka niya ginahasa nuong February 3?
Q Ang ano?
A Malakas po siya.
A Ang ari ko po.
Q Sinasaktan ka ba niya?
Q Nasaan si Oliver habang ginagahasa ka ni Herminigildo?
A Opo.
A Nanonood po.
Q Sa papanong paraan?

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A Sampal po. Q Nino?

Q Ano pa kung meron? A Lito, po.

A Sabunot po. Q Meron ba siyang suot na damit nuong ni-rape ka ni Lito?

Q Ano pa kung meron? A Wala na po.

A Wala na po. Q Nakita mo ba ng maghubad si Lito?

Q Pagkatapos kang sampalin at sabunutan ano ang ginagawa sa iyo ni Oliver? A Opo.

A Ni-rape po niya ako. Q Nakatapos ba si Lito ng panggagahasa sa iyo?

Q Sigurado ka ba diyan? A Opo.

A Opo. Q Papano mo nalaman na nakatapos si Lito ng panggagahasa sa iyo?

Q Si Oliver naman, meron ba siyang damit nung ginagahasa ka niya? A Basa na po ang ari ko.

A Wala na po. Q Nasaan naman si Oliver habang ginagahasa ka ni Lito?

Q Nakita mo ba nung nag-alis siya ng damit? A Nanonood po.

A Nakita ko po wala na siyang damit. Q Hinawakan ba niya ang kamay mo o paa mo?

Q Matapos kang hubaran at nakita mo siyang wala ng damit, ano naman ang sumunod na A Opo.
nangyari?
xxx xxx xxx
A Pinasok po ang ari niya sa akin.
Q Sino ang nang-rape sa iyo nuong February 4, 2001?
Q Nakatapos ba siya?
A Si Oliver po.
A Opo.
Q Nagtagumpay ba si Oliver nuong February 4?
Q Papano mo nasabi na nakatapos si Oliver sa panggagahasa sa iyo nung February 3, 2001?
A Opo.
A Basa na po ang ari ko.
Q Saang lugar ka ng bahay niya ni-rape?
Q Pagkatapos na naramdaman mo na basa na ang ari mo ano ang sumunod na nangyari?
A Sa kama po.
A Ni-rape po ako.
Q May damit ka ba ng gahasain ka ni Oliver?

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A Wala na po. Q Hindi ka ginahasa ni Herminigildo nung February 4?

Q Sino ang nag-alis sa iyo ng iyong damit? A Opo.

A Si Oliver po. Q Opo ginahasa o opo hindi?

Q Si Oliver, meron ba siyang damit nang gahasain ka noong February 4? A Opo ginahasa po.

A Wala na po. Q Ginahasa din?

Q Nagtagumpay ba siya ng panggagahasa sa iyo nung February 4? A Opo.

A Opo. Q Sinong nauna, si Oliver o si Herminigildo?

Q Nakatapos ba siya? A Si Lito po ang nauna.

A Opo. Q Pagkatapos ni Lito si Oliver?

Q Papano mo nasabi na nakatapos siya sa panggagahasa sa iyo nuong February 4? A Opo.

A Basa na po ang ari ko. xxx xxx xxx

Q Papano mo nasabi na basa na ang ari mo? Q Si Lito o Herminigildo, ni-rape ka ba niya nung February 5, 2001?

A Naramdaman ko po. A Opo.

Q Naipasok ba ni Oliver ang ari niya sa ari mo nuong February 4? Q Nagtagumpay ba si Oliver sa pag-rape sa iyo nung February 5, 2001?

A Opo. A Opo.

Q Papano mo nasabi na napasok niya yung ari niya sa ari mo? Q Paano mo nalaman na nakatapos ng panggagahasa sa iyo?

A Masakit na po. A Basa na po ang ari ko.

Q Masakit ang alin? Q Sinabi mo na ni-rape ka ni Lito nung February 5, 2001, nagtagumpay ba si Lito?

A Ang ari ko po. A Opo.

Q Lumaban ka ba sa kaniya habang ginagahasa ka niya? Q Nakatapos ba siya ng panggagahasa sa iyo?

A Malakas po siya. A Opo.

xxx xxx xxx Q Pano mo nalaman na nakatapos siya nung February 5, 2001?

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A Basa na po ang ari ko. A Malakas po siya.

Q Pano mo nalaman na basa na ang ari mo? Q Matapos kang tanggalan ng damit ni Lito nung February 6, ano ang ginawa niya sa iyo?

A Naramdaman ko po. A Pinasok po ang ari niya sa ari ko.

xxx xxx xxx Q Ikaw ba’y nasa kama o sa sahig, o sang lugar ka ng bahay nandon?

Q Dumako tayo sa February 6, 2001. Natatandaan mo ba kung may nangyari sa iyo nung A Sa kama po.
araw na iyon?
Q Matapos maipasok ni Lito ang ari niya sa ari mo ano ang naramdaman mo?
A Dalawa po kami ni Regina.
A Masakit po.
Q Ano ang nangyari sa iyo at kay Regina?
Q Nakatapos ba si Lito sa panggagahasa nung February 6, 2001?
A Rape po.
A Opo.
Q Sino ang nang-rape sa iyo at kay Regina?
Q Bakit mo nasabing nakatapos siya?
A Si Oliver at si Lito po.
A Basa po ang ari ko.
Q Sino ang naunang nang-rape sa iyo nung February 6 si Oliver o si Herminigildo?
Q Sino ang sumunod na gumahasa sa iyo nung February 6 pagkatapos ni Lito, kung meron
A Si Lito po. man?

Q Nagtagumpay ba si Herminigildo sa panggagahasa sa iyo nung February 6, 2001? A Si Regina na po.

A Opo. Q Ang ginahasa?

Q Nakatapos ba siya? A Opo.

A Opo. Q Nino?

Q May damit ka ba o hubad ka nung ginagahasa ka nung February 6, 2001? A Ni Lito.

A Wala na po. Q Doon muna tayo sa panggagahasa sa iyo. Nung pagkatapos ni Lito na gahasain ka, meron
pa bang ibang gumahasa sa iyo?
Q Sinong nagtanggal sa iyo ng damit?
A Opo.
A Lito po.
Q Sinong gumahasa sa iyo matapos kang gahasain ni Lito?
Q Lumaban ka ba sa kaniya habang tinatanggalan ka niya ng damit?
A Oliver po.

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Q Nagtagumpay ba si Oliver ng panggagahasa sa iyo? Q Ang alin?

A Opo. A Ang ari ko po.

Q Nakatapos ba siya? xxx xxx xxx

A Opo. Q Dumako tayo sa February 8. Natatandaan mo ba kung may nangyari sa iyo nuong February
8?
Q Papano mo nalaman na nakatapos si Oliver ng panggagahasa sa iyo?
A Kami po ni Regina.
A Nabasa po ang ari ko.
Q Anong nangyari sa inyong dalawa ni Regina[?]
Q Lumaban ka ba kay Oliver?
A Magdamag po.
A Malakas po sila.
Q Magdamag na ano ang nangyari?
xxx xxx xxx
A Rape po.
Q Dumako tayo sa February 7. Natatandaan mo ba kung may nangyari sa iyo nuong February
7, 2001? Q Sinong nang-rape?

A Opo. A Si Oliver at si Lito po.

Q Ano ang nangyari sa iyo nuong February 7, 2001? Q Sinong naunang mang-rape sa iyo noong February 8, 2001?

A Ni-rape po kami ni Regina. A Si Oliver po.

Q Sinong nang-rape sa inyo? Q Nagtagumpay ba si Oliver ng pangre-rape sa iyo noong February 8, 2001?

A Oliver at Lito po. A Opo.

Q Sino ang naunang nang-rape sa iyo nuong February 7, 2001, si Oliver o si Herminigildo? Q Nakatapos ba siya?

A Oliver po. A Opo.

Q Nakatapos ba siya? Q Papano mo nalaman na nakatapos siya?

A Opo. A Basa na po ang ari ko.

Q Paano mo nalaman na nakatapos siya nuong February 7, 2001? xxx xxx xxx

A Basa na po. Q Dumako tayo sa February 10, 2001. Natatandaan mo ba kung may nangyari sa iyo?

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A Ginagahasa kami ni Regina gabi-gabi. Q Nakatapos ba siya?

Q Nino? A Opo.

A Yung mga nagbayad po. Q Saan ka niya ginahasa, sa sahig, sa kama, saan?

Q Ginahasa ka ba ni Oliver nuong February 10, 2001? A Sa kama po.

A Opo. xxx xxx xxx

Q Nagtagumpay ba si Oliver sa panggagahasa sa iyo noong February 10? Q Anong natatandaan mong nangyari sa iyo noong February 12?

A Opo. A Ginagahasa kami ni Regina.

Q Nakatapos ba siya? COURT:

A Opo. Q Ilan ang nang-rape sa inyo nong February 12?

Q Saan ka niya ginahasa, sa sahig, sa kama, saan? A Marami po.

A Sa kama. Q Noong February 11, 13.

Q May damit ka ba nung ginahasa ka ni Oliver? A Marami po.

A Wala po. Q Noong February 14?

Q Sinong nag-alis sa iyo ng damit nuong February 10? A Marami rin po.

A Oliver po. Q Samakatuwid, yung ginawa sa inyo nuong February 11 ay ginawa rin sa inyo noong
February 12, 13 and 14?
Q Lumaban ka ba sa kaniya habang inaalisan ka ng damit noong February 10?
A Opo.
A Malakas po siya.
Q Proceed.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL NAÑOLA:
Q Ginahasa ka ba ni Oliver nuong February 11, 2001?
Q Nitong February 12, natatandaan mo ba kung doon sa maraming iyon ay kasama si Oliver
A Opo. Arevalo?

Q Nagtagumpay ba si Oliver sa panggagahasa sa iyo noong February 11? A Opo.

A Opo. Q Si Herminigildo o si Lito, kasama ba si Lito sa marami?

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 A Opo. From January 23 to 26, 2001,28 only Arevalo, not Organista, should be held liable for the rapes of
Acuña. A careful review of the records29 shows that she identified only Arevalo as her rapist on those
xxx xxx xxx dates.

Q Noong February 13, 2001, natatandaan mo ba kung merong nangyari sa iyo? For the rapes committed against Acosta on January 23, 25 and 26, 2001, 30 her testimony confirmed that
both appellants had raped her separately.31 It was not established, however, that Organista had raped
her on January 24, 2001;32 therefore, only Arevalo should have been convicted for the rape on that
A Opo. date.

Q Sabihin mo nga sa kagalang-galang na Hukom kung ano ang nangyari sa iyo nuong Acuña, on the other hand, clearly testified33 that Organista had raped her only on February 14, 2001. 34
February 13, 2001? She further testified that after raping her, Organista had subsequently raped Acosta. 35 But Acosta was
silent on whether she was raped by Organista on that date. 36 Because she was the best person to say
A Binenta po kami ni Regina. whether he had raped her on that date, and she was silent on the matter, we resolve the doubt in his
favor and acquit him of the offense that he allegedly committed on that date.
Q Sino ang nagbenta sa inyo?
Regarding the other counts of rape, we find no reason to disturb the trial court’s findings. For the rape of
A Si Oliver po. Acuña, Arevalo is found guilty of simple rape under Criminal Case Nos. 01-419 to 423, 01-425 to 01-
428 and 01-430 to 01-441. He is likewise found guilty of the rape of Acosta in Criminal Case Nos. 01-
442 to 01-446, 01-448 to 01-451 and 01-0453 to 01-464.
Q Pero ginahasa ka ba ni Oliver bukod sa taong pinagbentahan niya?
On the other hand, for the rape of Acuña, Organista is found guilty of simple rape under Criminal Case
A Opo. Nos. 01-441. He is also found guilty of the rape of Acosta in Criminal Case Nos. 01-442, 01-444 to 01-
445 and 01-464.
Q Nagtagumpay ba si Oliver sa panggagahasa sa iyo noong February 13?
Criminal Liability
A Opo.
The trial court erred, however, in imposing the penalty of death upon appellants when it appreciated the
Q Si Lito ginahasa ka ba noong February 13? circumstance of rape by two or more persons twice -- once as a qualifying, then as an aggravating,
circumstance.
A Opo.
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Q Nung matapos kang gahasain ni Oliver, noong February 13, 2001, ang ibig mong sabihin
binenta ka? "ART. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
A Opo."26
"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
After a painstaking review of the records of the case, we find no cogent reason to disturb the trial court’s
findings on the credibility of the witnesses. When in open court they positively identified appellants as
their rapists, the trial court rightly declared: xxx xxx x x x."

"The Court has closely observed the demeanor of the two complainants and did not find any ill-motive From the above, whenever the crime committed is simple rape, the penalty to be imposed is the single
on their part to impute a serious offense against the two accused. Clearly evident were the trauma, pain, penalty of reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, whenever the rape is committed with the use of a
humiliation and distress on the part of Acu[ñ]a and the state of daze or shock Acosta was in. x x x."27 deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

Nevertheless, though appellants are guilty of raping the victims, modifications have to be made We must note, however, that the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December
regarding the counts of rape for which each of them should be held liable. 1, 2000, requires that the complaint or information should state the qualifying and the aggravating

95
circumstances with specificity.37 In the present case, no aggravating circumstance was alleged in the
Informations. Hence, the lesser penalty should be applied, as the Court held in People v. Sabredo:38
"The imposable penalty for rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7659, is reclusion perpetua. But where the rape is committed with the use of deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion perpetua to death. The use of the bladed
weapon already qualified the rape. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the crucial factor in
determining whether appellant should be meted the death penalty is the presence of an aggravating
circumstance which attended the commission of the crime. A perusal of the records shows that none of
the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code was alleged and
proven by the prosecution. Where there is no aggravating circumstance proved in the commission of the
offense, the lesser penalty shall be applied."39
Second Issue:
Conspiracy
Appellants contend that conspiracy did not attend the rapes committed from January 23 to 26 and on
February 14, 2001.
This contention is partly meritorious.
Without specifying whether it was referring to Acuña or Acosta, the trial court declared that appellants
were in conspiracy in the rapes committed from January 23 to 26 and on February 14, 2001. From the
records, however, it seems that no such conspiracy took place when appellants separately raped
Acosta on those dates. To be appreciated, conspiracy must be shown to have been committed as
clearly and convincingly as the offense itself.40
The Rape of Regina Acuña
As regards Acuña, there was conspiracy only during the rape that occurred on February 14, 2001. We
reiterate that, from the records,41 her account of the rapes that happened from January 23 to 26, 2001
shows that only Arevalo, not Organista, raped her. Furthermore, no conspiracy attended the rapes on
those dates.
On February 14, 2001, both appellants raped her. 42 It was Arevalo who removed her clothes before
Organista raped her.43 Moreover, when the latter advanced towards her and she pushed him away,
Arevalo -- who was standing inside the same room all the while -- kept egging him on by saying, "Kaya
mo yan pre." The latter continued until he consummated his bestial attack upon the victim.
We have held that an overt act in furtherance of conspiracy may consist of lending moral assistance to
the co-conspirators even through one’s mere presence at the scene of the crime. 44 In the present case
(Criminal Case No. 01-441), Arevalo’s presence and words encouraged Organista to pursue his savage
designs.
The Rape of Ruth Acosta
The records of the rape of Acosta from January 23 to 26 and on February 14, 2001, do not support the
finding of conspiracy.
On January 23, 2001,45 appellants separately raped her one after the other, but only Arevalo raped her
on January 24, 2001.46 On January 2547 and 26,48 appellants again separately raped her one after the
other, but it was only Arevalo who raped her on February 14, 2001. 49
Third Issue:
Insanity
Organista argues that the trial court erred in not exempting him from criminal liability, even though he
was insane or completely deprived of intelligence during the commission of the rapes. He avers that his
insanity may be deduced from the following:
First, he cannot remember the events that transpired from January 23 to February 14, 2001,
because the treatments he has been undergoing at the National Center for Mental Health since
1983 have weakened his memory.
Second, Dr. Pia Alma de Jesus of the National Center for Mental Health testified that he had
displayed psychotic symptoms like hallucinations and delusions. She opined that his failure to
take his medications regularly could have caused his relapse.
Third, the behavior and actuations he exhibited before and after the rapes were manifestations
of mental instability. As testified to by his mother, he was violent and destructive to the extent
of habitually setting their home furniture on fire. He even threatened to kill her when she
confronted him on his behavior.
Fourth, the New Bilibid Prison, where he is presently locked up, certified that he still suffers
from chronic schizophrenia.
We are not persuaded.
The law presumes everyone to be sane.50 The accused who pleads the exempting circumstance of
insanity incurs the burden of proving it.51 To be adjudged insane under Article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code, he or she must have been completely deprived of reason or discernment and freedom of the will
at the time the crime was committed.52 For such deprivation to be ascertained, it is but proper to receive
evidence during a reasonable period before or after the commission of the crime, for the mind -- its
thoughts, motives and emotions -- may be fathomed only by examining whether the external acts
conform with those of people of sound minds.53
In the present case, while Organista had indeed been confined at the National Center for Mental Health
for treatment, it does not necessarily follow that he still suffered from schizophrenia during the period of
the rapes. No convincing evidence was presented by the defense to show that he had not been in his
right mind, or that he had acted under the influence of a sudden attack of insanity, or that he had
generally been regarded as insane around the time of the commission of the acts attributed to him.
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Well-settled is the rule that an inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period
immediately before or at the very moment the act under prosecution was committed. 54 Mere prior
confinement in a mental institution does not prove that the perpetrator was deprived of reason at the
time the crimes were committed.55
It must be noted that Organista had been discharged from the mental hospital well before the period of
the rapes. We have held that if the insanity is only occasional or intermittent, the presumption of its
continuance does not arise.56 One who relies on insanity proved at another time must prove its
existence also at the time of the commission of the offense.57
To prove his claimed insanity, Organista presented, as an expert witness on his mental condition, Dr.
Pia Alma S. de Jesus of the National Center for Mental Health. It is important to note that she only
began treating him beginning April 2001, or two months after the rape incidents,58 upon orders of the
trial court. Referring to hospital records, she narrated that he had been mentally ill since 1982 or 1983
and had been admitted to the Center a total of 23 times.59 Prior to the rapes, his last confinement had
been from October 27 to December 1, 1997,60 again for schizophrenia. Likewise noteworthy is the fact
that this period covering his last admission and discharge prior to the rapes was outside that of the
commission thereof -- January 23 to February 14, 2001. Dr. De Jesus further testified that Organista
had already been considered treated on the date of his discharge in 1997. 61 Though she opined that a
patient who did not continue to take medications could suffer a relapse, she did not categorically state
whether Organista had suffered such a relapse before the commissions of the rape.
On the other hand, the prosecution has sufficiently established that Organista knew exactly what he was
doing. His going to the house of Arevalo and either directly or indispensably cooperating with him -- day
after day to ravish the victims -- could not have been the act of one so insane as to be incapable of
entertaining a criminal intent. On February 14, 2001, specifically, Organista continued to ravish Acuña
after being coaxed by Arevalo, "Kaya mo yan pre."62 That Organista persisted in the act all the way to its
consummation leaves no doubt that it was voluntary, conscious and deliberate. Moreover, his attempt to
flee when the police officers came to arrest him shows that he knew that what he had done was
condemnable.
Furthermore, Organista’s claimed amnesia does not preclude culpability. This charade is evidently a
desperate ploy for exculpation. Failure to remember does not in itself prove the existence of such
mental condition at the time the crime was committed.63
The testimony of Organista himself militates against his credibility and puts his purported amnesia into
serious question. During trial, he said that he could not remember where he had been from January 23
to 26, 2001. Surprisingly, he could remember perfectly well the number of times he had been treated at
the National Center for Mental Health since 1983, what procedure he had gone through each time he
was treated, the kind of medicine he had been given, the number of times Appellant Arevalo had
borrowed money from him without paying, the total amount of money he had lent the former, and the
resentment the latter had often felt whenever his friend would not repay him. Moreover, he could narrate
in complete detail his fabricated story of how he had allegedly met the victims on February 14, 2001,
and lent them money only to be later arrested for rape. 64 The prosecution aptly point out that his
selective amnesia and mental dishonesty speak eloquently of his total lack of credibility on the witness
stand.
Finally, Organista is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal
Code, because it was not shown that his mental illness at the time immediately preceding or at the very
moment of the commission of the crime diminished his will power.
Civil Liability
The trial court’s award of damages should be modified. Prevailing jurisprudence holds that for each
count of simple rape, the victim should be awarded P50,000 as civil indemnity and another P50,000 as
moral damages for the injury evidently suffered. 65 This Court has granted moral damages to victims of
rape without need of proof other than the fact of rape, which by itself shows the factual basis for the
award.66 The award of P100,000 to each of the victims by way of exemplary damages should be
deleted, because no aggravating circumstance was proven.
WHEREFORE, the October 26, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (Branch 62),
finding appellants guilty of qualified rape, is MODIFIED.
The Court finds Oliver Arevalo y Abanilla Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of SIMPLE RAPE. He is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 01-
419 to 01-423, 01-425 to 01-428, 01-430 to 01-446, 01-448 to 01-451 and 01-453 to 01-464.
Furthermore, he is hereby ordered to pay the following:
1. To Regina Acuña, the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages
for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 01-419 to 01-423, 01-425 to 01-428, and 01-430
to 01-441
2. To Ruth Acosta, the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages
for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 01-442 to 01-446, 01-448 to 01-451 and 01-453
to 01-464
Herminigildo Organista y Andres is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of SIMPLE RAPE and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 01-
441 to 01-442 and 01-444 to 01-445. He is likewise ordered to pay the following:
1. To Regina Acuña the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages
for each count of rape in Criminal Case No. 01-441
2. To Ruth Acosta, the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 by way of moral
damages for each count of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 01-442, 01-444 and 01-445
With respect to Criminal Case No. 01-441, both appellants are found guilty of two (2) counts of rape, for
which the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count is meted out to them.
Finally, Herminigildo Organista y Andres is ACQUITTED in Criminal Case Nos. 01-419 to 01-422 and
01-443 and 01-464.
SO ORDERED.
97

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CRISPINO MANCAO and CIRIACO AGUILAR, defendants-appellants.
Jakosalem, Gullas & Briones for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is an appeal taken by Crispino Mancao and Ciriaco Aguilar from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu convicting them, in accordance with the complaint, of the crime of homicide, and
sentencing each of them to fourteen years, eight months and one day reclusion temporal, with
accesories of the law, to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased Roberto Villela in the
sum of P1,000, and each to pay one-half of the costs.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following alleged errors as committed by the trial
court in its judgment, to wit: (1) The lower court erred in giving too much weight to the testimony of
Baldomero Villela and Eusebio Villela, aged 15 and 14 years, respectively, and in basing its judgment
upon said testimony; (2) the lower court also erred in not holding that the evidence for the defense
preponderates and is more worthy of credit than that for the prosecution; (3) the lower court likewise
erred in not finding that, in view of the evidence presented by both parties, the accused are at least
entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt; (4) the lower court erred in not holding that the accused
Ciriaco Aguilar is mentally deficient and is, therefore, not criminally liable, and, (5) the lower court erred
in sentencing the accused instead of acquitting them as it should have done in view of the absence of
incriminating evidence.
The prosecution and the defense are agreed that Hilaria Dejan, upon her death, left personal property,
cattle and real property, the latter consisting of corn fields, some of which were in the possession of
Roberto Villela who had leased them. The probate of the will of said deceased Hilaria Dejan, wherein
she bequeathed one-half of her property to her nephew Roberto Villela and her niece Josefa Billones,
having been denied and proceedings for the administration of the property left by her having been
instituted, Crispino Mancao was appointed administrator thereof on June 26, 1916. Roberto Villela
refused to deliver the lands in his possession to the administrator, alleging that the products of the same
were to go to the deceased's creditors. On January 31, 1918, Crispino Mancao, as administrator of the
property of the intestate estate of Hilaria Dejan, was cited to appear before the Court of First Instance to
explain why almost all the deceased's property did not appear in the inventory.
As to the disputed facts, the prosecution tried to prove the following: In the afternoon of August 10,
1925, Crispino Mancao, accompanied by three men and several women, approached Graciana Sedimo,
Roberto Villela's tenant, and inquired if there was still corn to be harvested and divided between her and
Roberto Villela by virtue of the lease. The unharvested and undivided portion of the corn field having
been pointed out to them, the accused Crispino Mancao ordered the persons with him to begin
harvesting said corn. In view of Crispino Mancao's actions, Graciana Sedimo ordered her nephew
Baldomero Villela to notify Roberto Villela of the matter. Upon arriving at the corn field Roberto Villela
asked the harvesters who ordered them to harvest the corn. Crispino Mancao, who was in the corn field,
replied that he was the one who ordered them to do so and started towards Roberto Villela. The latter
then asked the former if he had an order from the court to harvest the products. Crispino Mancao struck
him with a bamboo stick and said: "This is the order." Roberto Villela dodged the blow and snatched the
cane. Having been deprived of his bamboo stick, Crispino Mancao took hold of his bolo and attempted
to strike Roberto Villela which the latter warded off with a stick he had in his hand. Crispino Mancao
continued to strike Roberto Villela inflicting but slight wounds. Upon being attacked, Roberto Villela
rushed at Crispino Mancao and a hand to hand fight ensued, in the course of which they fell down and
the former succeeded in disarming the latter. After getting up, they continued to fight, Crispino Mancao
receiving a wound on his right hand and another on the right calf, and seeing that he was getting the
worst of it, shouted for help. A men dressed in khaki immediately appeared upon the scene and struck
Roberto Villela a blow on the thigh as a result of which he fell to his knees. While in this position another
man, wearing an undershirt, approached and, after striking him twice on the thigh, ran away. Crispino
Mancao then took hold of Roberto Villela by the hands and while thus held, the accused Ciriaco Aguilar
struck him with his sickle in the back as a result of which Roberto Villela fell to the ground unconscious.
Upon Graciana Sedimo and the boy Baldomero Villela shouting for help, Crispino Mancao left the place
and at about 6:30 in the evening presented himself to the councilman of the barrio, Victor Bienvenido,
carrying a bolo in his belt, and informed the latter what had happened. The justice of the peace of
Alonguisan, Cebu, accompanied by the chief of police, upon investigation at the scene of the combat,
found the stick Exhibit A, and Roberto Villela's belt which had been slit with a sharp instrument. Upon
examination of Roberto Villela's body which had been taken to Graciana Sedimo's house, he found a
wound caused by a sharp instrument on the right side of the forehead; a small wound on the right side
of the throat just below the Adam's apple; a large wound above the left knee; two wounds below the left
knee, one over the other; a deep wound on the spine which almost completely severed the lumbar
region; five deep wounds in about the same place and a wound in the palm of the left hand. Conscious
of the seriousness of his condition and the hopelessness of living, Roberto Villela made a declaration
which is contained in Exhibit C. The wounded man died on August 26, 1925 as a result of said wounds.
The defense tried to prove that while the accused and his companions were harvesting the corn on
Hilaria Dejan's land on the afternoon of August 10, 1925, Roberto Villela approached and inquired:
"Who ordered the harvesting of the corn?" that the accused Crispino Mancao replied: "I did it by order of
the court and not of my own accord," and at the same time Roberto Villela drew his bolo and attempted
to strike Crispino Mancao a blow on the neck which the latter succeeded in warding off, only striking the
brim of his hat; that Roberto Villela continued to strike him and he defended himself by means of the
stick which he had, but in spite of it he received a wound on the left hand, the stick falling from his hand;
that once unarmed Crispino Mancao rushed at Roberto Villela and grasped him in order to take the bolo
from him; that in doing so Crispino Mancao took hold of the blade of Roberto Villela's bolo, wounding
the first and second fingers of his right hand; that in the course of the fight both fell to the ground, and
as Roberto Villela was the taller and stronger of the two, he succeeded in pinning Crispino Mancao to
the ground, who shouted for help; that the other accused Ciriaco Aguilar approached and said: "What
have you done to him, he has done you no wrong;" that as Roberto Villela did not pay any attention to
him the accused Ciriaco Aguilar struck him on the back with a sickle which he carried; that as Roberto
Villela still did not mind him notwithstanding the wounds he had received on his back, the accused put
the sickle around the former's left thigh and pulled it, forcing him to incline and free Crispino Mancao;
that while Roberto Villela was on top of Crispino Mancao he continued kicking Ciriaco Aguilar who
wounded him on the right thigh with his sickle; that one of the bolo blows of Ciriaco Aguilar aimed at
Roberto Villela hit Crispino Mancao wounding him below the right knee; that Crispino Mancao had no
bolo at the time; that the accused Ciriaco Aguilar is an epileptic and as such is susceptible to fits which
deprive him of his reason and attempt to commit suicide or homicide without being aware of it; that, at
times, due to his affliction, the accused Ciriaco Aguilar speaks at random, particularly when talking for
any length of time.
98
Of the five assignments of error, four relate to findings of fact made by the trial court, and the fifth to the
conclusion of law based upon said findings of fact.
A careful and detailed examination of the oral and documentary evidence presented by both parties,
and the consideration given the antecedents of the case and the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the criminal act, convince us that the accused Crispino Mancao was the instigator and
aggressor, Roberto Villela having done nothing but to defendant himself, first disarming the former of his
stick with which he was assaulted, and later of his bolo which he used after having been assaulted, and
later of his bolo which he used after having been deprived of his stick. Roberto Villela might have had
the advantage in the fight had not one of Crispino Mancao's laborers, dressed in khaki, come to his
rescue, upon his cry for help, and struck Roberto Villela on the thigh; then, another man wearing an
undershirt who stuck Roberto Villela several times on the left knee; and, lastly, the accused Ciriaco
Aguilar who struck Roberto Villela several blows on the back with his sickle, one of which nearly
severed his spine in the lumbar region which later caused his death.
The allegation of self-defense made by the accused Crispino Mancao is groundless. The evidence
sufficiently proves that he carried a stick and a bolo while Roberto Villela was unarmed. The latter
refused to surrender the lands belonging to the intestate estate of the deceased Hilaria Dejan which
were in his possession. And in view of this and of the fact that it did not appear in the inventory
presented by Crispino Mancao, as administrator, that he was in possession of said lands, the court cited
him to appear and explain his side of the matter, and ordered him to take the necessary steps to obtain
possession of said lands. Crispino Mancao ordered the harvesting of the corn on said lands without any
judicial order that effect, knowing full well that Roberto Villela would object to his doing so. Crispino
Mancao's behaviour showed that he was ready to face the consequences of his act. In this state of mind
he undoubtedly became annoyed upon being asked by Roberto Villela, on the afternoon in question , if
he had an order from the court to harvest the corn, and he replied by striking said Roberto Villela with a
stick, saying that was the order of the court.
While it is true that the wounds which caused Roberto Villela's death were not inflicted by Crispino
Mancao but by his coaccused Ciriaco Aguilar, yet said Crispino Mancao having been the instigator and
aggressor, and having called his harvesters to his aid, among them the said Ciriaco Aguilar, he wanted
them to carry out, as in fact they did, the criminal act started by him and, therefore, he is liable not only
for his own acts, but also for the acts of those who aided him.
Neither can the defense of lack of free will of the accused Ciriaco Aguilar, who is an epileptic, be
sustained. While Ciriaco Aguilar, as an epileptic, was susceptible to nervous attacks that may
momentarily deprive him of his mental faculties and lead him to unconsciously attempt to take his own
life and the lives of others, nevertheless, it has not been shown that he was under the influence of an
epileptic fit before, during, and immediately after the aggression.
For the foregoing, we arrive at the conclusion that the said accused are guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the crime imputed to them, each being criminally liable as principal for having taken direct part
in the commission of the crime.
Wherefore, and no error being found in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all
its parts, with the costs against the appellants. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.
Carlos S. Tan for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of Dolores, municipality of Ormoc,
Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and visitors were
entertained in the house. Among them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon,
Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand
and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo
attacked Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after which he wounded himself.
Potenciano's wife who was then seven months pregnant, died five days later as a result of her wound,
and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in the mother's womb.
An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon conviction he was sentenced
by the trial court to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties, to indemnity the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay the costs. From this sentence, the defendant appealed.
It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the defendant had a
quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to come
down to fight, and when he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On the
day of the commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early in the
afternoon he had a severe stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It was then
when he fell asleep. The defendant states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes was
trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it
seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come down, he armed himself with a bolo and left
the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him that she was wounded. Then he
fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to
multiply around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.
The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his wife, but that he loved
her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao, or have any motive for assaulting
them.
Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he is charged,
were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.
In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the fact that the apparent lack of a motive
for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply they are not
known to us, for we cannot probe into depths of one's conscience where they may be found, hidden
away and inaccessible to our observation. We are also conscious of the fact that an extreme moral
99
perversion may lead a man commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake of committing it.
But under the special circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the defendant's own wife
whom he dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that the defendant tried to attack also his
father, in whose house and under whose protection he lived, besides attacking Tanner and Malinao, his
guests, whom he himself invited as may be inferred from the evidence presented, we find not only a
lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the acts complained of, but also motives for not
committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor stated that
considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the influence of
an hallucination and not in his right mind.
We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the wound of the deceased was direct
result of the defendant's act performed in order to inflict it. Nevertheless we may say further that the
evidence does not clearly show this to have been the case, but that it may have been caused
accidentally. Nobody saw how the wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he wounded
his wife. He only seemed to have heard her say that she was wounded. What the evidence shows is
that the deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the defendant at the door of the room as he was
coming out. The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his wife but he was defending himself
from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife was really wounded, in desperation, he stabbed
himself.
Se ha probado que, el dia del suceso, atacada de fiebre alta, la apelante deliraba y acometia a
cualquiera de los que vivian con ella en la casa. En el analisis de su sangre, verificado el 12 de octubre
de 1938, se hallo que padecia de plasmodium falcifarum o malaria maligna, enfermedad que produce
perturbacion en el sistema nervioso, causando entre otras complicaciones mania aguda, melacolia y
locura excepcional, a veces, porque su comun secuela es la neuralgia.
Las circunstancias en que la apelante asesto y dio el tijeratazo a su marido, revelan que ejecuto tal acto
en momentos que padecia de locura a consecuencia de su enfermidad, y por tanto, de acuerdo con lo
dispuesto en el articulo 12, parrafo 1.º del Codigo Penal Revisado, no ha incurrido en responsabilidad
criminal. El testimonio del Juez de Paz, Sr. Jose Y. Baldos, al efecto de que Marciano Dante le dijo que
su esposa, probablemente se habia regañado porque no se le habia podido dar de comer, por haberse
el quedado dormido, creemos que carece de valor, por estar basado en una simple conjetura del
occiso, y por no constar semejante extremo en la declaracion ante mortem prestada por el mismo.
Se revoca la sentencia apelada y se absuelve a la acusada de la querella, con las costas de oficio. Asi
se ordena.
Avanceña, Pres., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, y Laurel, MM., estan conformes.

In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment appealed from, the courts finds that the PEOPLE v. BERNARDO CORTEZANO +
defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with which he is charged, and it is ordered that he be
confined in the Government insane asylum, whence he shall not be released until the director thereof DECISION
finds that his liberty would no longer constitute a menace, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
458 Phil. 304
Street, Ostrand, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur, Libmanan, Branch
EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS, querellante-apelado, 56, in Criminal Cases Nos. L-1679 and L-1680, convicting appellants Bernardo Cortezano and Joel
vs. Cortezano with four counts of rape and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
ANASTACIA LACENA, acusado-apelante. each count; and ordering each of them to pay damages to the victim as follows: P200,000 as moral
damages and P200,000 as exemplary damages in all the cases.
D. Eliseo Ymzon en representacion de la apelante.
El Procurador General Sr. Ozaeta y el Auxiliar del Procurador General Sr. The Indictments
Cuyugan en representacion del Gobierno.
On November 22, 1994, two separate Informations for rape were filed against the appellants. The first
Information docketed as Criminal Case No. L-1679 reads:
CONCEPCION, J.:
That on or about the 6th day of May, 1990, in the afternoon at Bgy. (sic) Azucena, Municipality of
Sipocot, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
Hacia las 3 de la madrugada del 16 de agosto de 1938, Marciano Dante se desperto sobresaltado above-named accused, with lewd design, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
porque su mujer, la acusado apelante, que estaba enferma de unas calenturas, le dijo: "Patay ka another, taking advantage of their superior strength with force, intimidation and with grave abuse of
ñgayon" (Vas a morir ahora), clavandole en el abdomen un par de tijeras. La herida producida fue la confidence, did then and there wilfully (sic), feloniously and unlawfully have carnal knowledge one after
causa de la peritonitis aguda de que mas tarde fallecio el lesionado. the other with Leah C. Cortizano (sic), 7 years old, minor, against her will and the offended party
suffered damages.

100
 happened to her. Joel, Bernardo and Boyet left the room together. Leah went out of the room and
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[2] washed her vagina.
The second Information docketed as Criminal Case No. L-1680 reads:
That on or about the 10th day of June, 1990, in the afternoon at Bgy. (sic) Azucena, Municipality of Petrified, Leah did not reveal to her grandparents what happened to her. After that first harrowing
Sipocot, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the incident, Joel and Bernardo subjected her to sexual abuse daily. After every sexual intercourse they
above-named accused, with lewd design, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one had with Leah, Joel and Bernardo would threaten to kill her and her family if she told anyone what they
another, taking advantage of their superior strength with force, intimidation and with grave abuse of had been doing to her.
confidence, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge one after
the other with Leah C. Cortezano, 7 years old, minor, against her will and the offended party suffered On June 10, 1990, Joel and Bernardo again ordered Leah to go to her grandparents' room. She did as
damages. she was told. Joel and Bernardo undressed her. Leah was told to lie down, and Joel and Bernardo
again wet her vagina with their saliva. Joel then laid on top of her, holding her hands and pinning her
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[3] legs with his, as he inserted his penis into her vagina. Bernardo stood by the window as a lookout. Leah
On arraignment, the accused entered their plea of not guilty. A consolidated trial of the two criminal tried to fight Joel, but the latter was enraged. She was about to shout, but Joel told her that it would be
cases then ensued. futile to do so because their neighbors were far away. Joel dismounted and Bernardo had his turn, with
Joel standing by the window to see if anyone was coming. Joel and Bernardo again threatened to kill
The Case for the Prosecution Leah if she told anyone about the incident.

Sometime in March 1990, Lourney Cortezano decided to take a leave of absence from her part-time job The next day, June 11, 1990, was Lionel's birthday. Lourney arrived at Brgy. Azucena and brought her
in Cubao, Quezon City, to spend her vacation with her three children: eight-year-old Leah, three-year- children back to Caloocan City, in time for Leah's enrollment at the Kalayaan Elementary School in
old Leah Lou, and Lionel, who was barely a year old. Lourney decided to stay in the house of her Brgy. Silang, Caloocan City. Because of the sexual abuse she suffered at the hands of her uncles,
parents-in-law, Santiago and Nita Cortezano, located at Barangay Azucena, Sipocot, Camarines Leah felt pain in her lower abdomen (puson). Every now and then, she would feel numbness on the left
Sur. Lionel was also sick with asthma so Lourney could rely on her mother-in-law to take care of him side of her body.
while she was at work. Lourney's husband, Elmer, remained in their residence in Caloocan City.
Sometime in March 1993, Lionel and Leah Lou once again stayed with their grandparents in Brgy.
The Cortezano residence was located at an isolated patch of land. Nita and Santiago slept in a room Azucena. On May 21, 1993, Elmer arrived in Sipocot and stayed with his parents. Lourney followed her
separated from the sala by a curtain. Their children, the accused Bernardo (Butchoy) Cortezano, who family to Sipocot on June 20, 1993. Leah remained in Caloocan City to continue her schooling. Her
was then twelve years old; the accused Joel Cortezano, who was then only thirteen; Tinggang, who was studies were financed by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
six years old, and Boyet Orcine, their six-year-old nephew, also lived with the couple. At night, Lourney
and her children, as well as Joel, Bernardo and Tinggang, slept beside each other in a room near the On August 23, 1993, Elmer had a quarrel with his parents and left Brgy. Azucena. Since then, Lourney
kitchen, beside the couple's room. By mid-April of 1990, Lourney returned to Caloocan City, leaving her did not hear from her husband and did not know where he was. On September 20, 1993, Lourney left
children in the care of her parents-in-law. Brgy. Azucena and brought her children to Pili, Camarines Sur.

Early in the afternoon of May 6, 1990, Joel and Bernardo ordered their niece Leah to sleep in their
parents' room. Leah protested because it was hot in that room. Joel threatened to whip her if she
refused. Leah had no choice; she went to the room and slept. Leah suddenly awoke when she sensed
pressure on her arms and legs. When she opened her eyes, she saw her uncles Joel and Bernardo;
they were holding her hands and feet as she was being undressed. Leah struggled but was easily
overpowered by her uncles. She threatened to shout, but she was told that nobody would hear her.
Joel and Bernardo wet her vagina with their saliva. Bernardo then held her hands as Joel mounted
her. Joel inserted his penis into her vagina, while Bernardo stood by the window to serve as a
lookout. Leah felt something slippery inside her vagina. After Joel dismounted, Bernardo went on top
of Leah and inserted his penis into her vagina. It was Joel's turn to stand by the window as a lookout.
Leah once more felt something slippery in her vagina. Bernardo then stood up.
Momentarily, Boyet Orcine arrived and inquired what Joel and Bernardo were doing to Leah. Joel and
Bernardo ordered Boyet to rape Leah and threatened to box him if he refused. Joel and Bernardo
laughed as Boyet was having his turn with Leah. Joel and Bernardo then called Leah Lou and Lionel
into the room, letting them see their sister naked.
Joel and Bernardo threatened to kill her and the members of the family if she told anyone about what
On May 27, 1994, Lourney learned from Boyet Orcine that her daughter Leah had been sexually
abused by Joel and Bernardo way back in 1990. Boyet told Lourney that Leah Lou had suffered the
same fate as Leah.[4] Lourney immediately contacted a certain Mrs. Monares, a social worker at the
DSWD of Pili, Camarines Sur, and inquired whether the information relayed to her by Boyet Orcine
could be true. Mrs. Monares advised Lourney to ask Leah herself. Lourney left Pili and arrived in
Caloocan City on June 1, 1994. She asked Leah if she recalled anything that happened to her while on
vacation in Sipocot in 1990. Leah told her mother that Joel and Bernardo had whipped her and she did
not want to return to Sipocot. When Lourney asked her daughter, the latter replied that Joel and
Bernardo had raped her.
Lourney brought Leah to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Dr. Ma. Cristina B.
Freyra examined Leah and submitted Medico-Legal Report No. M-0807-94, with the following findings:
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child. Breasts are conical with pale brown areola
and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft.

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GENITAL: June 1990. Aside from this, his daughters Melanie and Teresita, who were 16 years old and 10 years
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with the pinkish brown labia old, respectively, and his grandson Boyet (Bulilit) stayed in his house. His son Elmer also arrived in
minora presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with Sipocot during this time.
deep healed lacerations at 3, 7 and 9 o'clock. External vaginal orifice offers strong resistance to the
introduction of the examining index finger.[5] Sancho Cortezano testified that he went to the house of his older brother Elmer in Caloocan City on
On June 16, 1994, Lourney and Leah arrived in the Criminal Investigation Field Office in Naga City May 10, 1990 to inform the latter of his marriage. Elmer was not in his house but Lourney and her
where they gave their respective sworn statements to PO3 Elmer V. Caceres.[6] children, including Leah, were there. Sancho left on May 11, 1990 for Cebu where he got married
seven days later. On June 3, 1990, Sancho returned to Manila and when he went to visit Elmer at his
The Case for the Accused house, only Lourney and the children were there.

Bernardo was born on January 22, 1978. He denied the charges. He admitted that he was charged Boyet Orcine testified that on May 6, 1990, he was in the hills with his mother Emerlina Cortezano in
with raping Leah Lou on April 21, 1994 in People v. Bernardo Cortezano,[7] filed with the Regional Trial Barangay Tulay, which was very far from the house of the Cortezanos in Barangay Azucena,
Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, and that he pleaded guilty on his arraignment. He testified that on March Sipocot. He returned from the hills only in 1993. He testified that he "did nothing" while he was away.
28, 1990, he arrived in Bagadiong, Libmanan, Camarines Sur, to help his cousin, Alvin Reoval, to plow
and harrow his rice field and plant palay. He had lost his school bag, and his father, Santiago, had On rebuttal, the prosecution presented two letters from Mrs. Fe B. Baes, Chief of the Medical Records
punished him for it. He had nowhere to go except to his cousin's house. Barangay Bagadiong was Division of the PGH, that as an outpatient, Joel consulted the hospital on August 16, 1989, November 2,
adjacent to Barangay Busak, and one would take four and half-hours by carabao to traverse Busak from 1989 and April 6, 1990, and that he was never confined at the PGH in 1990. The said letters read as
Bagadiong. There were, however, many passenger jeepneys and buses plying the Busak-Sipocot follows:
route. When Bernardo thought that his parents were no longer mad at him, he returned to Sipocot on In connection with the letter received by this office requesting for a record of a certain Joel Cortezano,
April 5, 1993. He received P3,150 for his services. He met his sister-in-law Lourney only in 1994, when whether or not he was hospitalized in this hospital way back 1989, please be informed that as per
she charged him with the rape of Leah Lou. hospital records, a certain Joel Cortezano consulted on an outpatient basis sometime on August 16,
1989, November 2, 1989 and April 6, 1990.[8]
Joel Cortezano testified that he was born on November 1, 1976. He and his mother arrived in Manila on
May 6, 1990 and stayed in the house of his aunt Concordia Hernandez in San Andres, Manila. On May ...
9, 1990, he went to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) for treatment of leukemia and stayed there
for three days. Thereafter, he was advised by the doctor not to leave the hospital, as he needed blood In reply to your letter dated August 15, 1995 re: JOEL CORTEZANO, may I inform you that he was
transfusion. Joel stayed in the hospital for one week. Joel was discharged from the hospital and stayed never confined in this hospital anytime in 1990. He only consulted on April 6, 1990 on an outpatient
in the house of his aunt, Concordia Hernandez, in San Andres, Manila, for about a month and helped basis.[9]
the latter manage her store. Every now and then, he returned to the hospital for check-ups. After trial, the court rendered a decision convicting the appellants of four counts of rape, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
In August 1990, Joel's mother fetched him from San Andres and brought him to Novaliches for two WHEREFORE, in view of the aforecited considerations, this Court finds the accused, JOEL
days. Thereafter, he returned to Sipocot, Camarines Sur. CORTEZANO and BERNARDO CORTEZANO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the two crimes of
Rape as defined and punished under Article 335, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. They are
When asked about his medical certificate regarding his treatment at the PGH during the period stated, sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR RECLUSION PERPETUA each, in both criminal cases,
Joel testified that he lost the same during a typhoon. He claimed that efforts to secure copies of the considering that they acted in conspiracy in the commission of the act, and to indemnify the offended
said medical certificates proved futile, as the employees who released the certificates were busy. Joel party Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each, as moral damages in each criminal case, and another
denied raping his niece Leah. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each in each case, as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs of
this suit. The period of their respective preventive detention is considered in the service of their
Nita Cortezano testified that she left Sipocot on May 6, 1990 for Manila to accompany her son Joel to sentence.
the PGH, as the latter was suffering from leukemia and needed blood transfusion. They stayed in the
hospital for about two weeks. They did not immediately return to Sipocot as they were ordered by the SO ORDERED.[10]
attending physician to stay in Manila. On May 28, 1990, she and Joel went to Elmer's house in Hence, this appeal.
Caloocan City where they saw Leah. It would have thus been impossible for Leah to be in Sipocot on
May 6, 1990 to June 10, 1990. Nita further testified that it was only in 1991 when Leah and her siblings Joel and Bernardo, now the appellants, note, citing People v. Batis,[11] that there are three (3) settled
were first brought to Sipocot by Lourney. The second instance was in 1992, but it was their father principles to warrant a conviction for rape, namely: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility;
Elmer who was with the children at the time. it is difficult to prove, but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view
of the intrinsic nature of the crime where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
Santiago Cortezano corroborated in part his wife's testimony. He testified that between May 6 and June complainant must be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand
10, 1990, Leah and her siblings indeed spent their vacation in Sipocot. However, during that time, Joel or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of
was brought to Manila for a check-up at the PGH. Bernardo, on the other hand, left the household in the defense.

102
 "hindi ko kailangan ang pera, ang
The appellants assert that Leah's testimony is incredible; hence, barren of probative weight. In her kailangan ko ay katarungan!"
sworn statement to the police authorities, she claimed that she was raped thirty-six times, but her (p. 9, TSN dated January 27, 1995)[15]
testimony in the trial court tends to show that she claimed to have been raped only on May 6 and June This Court ruled in People v. Dy[16] that the victim's act of crying during her testimony bolsters the
10, 1990. Boyet's denial that he had sexual intercourse with Leah belied the latter's testimony that she credibility of the rape charge with the verity born out of human nature and experience.
was likewise raped by him. If Leah's claim that her sister Leah Lou and her brother Lionel saw her
naked had any ring of truth to it, the two would surely have immediately reported the matter to their Indeed, as can be gleaned from Leah's testimony, she recounted, with tears cascading from her eyes,
parents. The fact that they did not do so raises serious doubts as to the veracity of Leah's testimony. the sordid details on how the appellants ravished her and satiated their bestial proclivities, thus:
On May 6, 1990 to June 10, 1990, do you know any unusual incident that took place involving
Q:
The appellants also claim that although their defense of alibi is inherently weak, it is incumbent upon the that person?
prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt before a judgment of conviction could be A: Yes, Sir.
rendered against them. Considering the prosecution's evidence, tattered as it is, their defense assumes
importance and is even decisive of the outcome of the case. Q: Tell the Honorable Court, what is that all about?
A: That occur[r]ence was done to me by my two Titos.
The Court finds the appeal without merit.
Q: What specific occur[r]ence?
This Court in People v. Guanson,[12] ruled: A: The raped (sic) that they did to me, Sir. ("Pagsasamantala")
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that assessment of the credibility of witnesses lies
within the province and competence of trial courts. The matter of assigning values to declarations on the Q: They, to whom are you referring to?
witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate A: My two uncles, Sir, Joel and Bernardo.
magistrates, could weigh such testimony in light of the declarant's demeanor, conduct and attitude at
the trial and is thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate the truth against Q: What is the surname?
falsehood. Thus, appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court A: Cortezano, Sir.
to the testimonies of witnesses, unless it be clearly shown that the latter court had overlooked or
disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstance of significance. [13] Q: Can you possibly tell the Honorable Court, how this raping incident was done to you?
In this case, the trial court gave credence and full probative weight to the testimony of the victim, in A: Yes, Sir.
tandem with those of the other witnesses of the prosecution:
Whatever inconsistencies or lapses there were, the same relate to trivial matters and do not in any Q: Feel free to tell the Court.
manner affect her credibility and the veracity of her statements. Furthermore, such "minor lapses are (Witness crying) That vacation mama left us at Sipocot, because she was to go back to work
to be expected when a person is recounting details of humiliating experience which are painful in Manila. She told me, that she is to leave on May 5, 1990. The next day, after lunch, Joel
to recall." (Pp. V. Olivar, 215 SCRA 759) In fact, though how lengthy and rigid the cross-examination and Bernardo did something bad to me. After lunch, he told me to go inside the room, when I
was, Leah's declarations remained consistent, firm and undisturbed. Leah's categorical, spontaneous, refused, he held the broom attempting to whip me. Because of fear, I went inside the room,
emphatic, and straightforward answers during the cross-examination strengthened and explained while complaining to them "why ask me to sleep in that room, when it is too hot in that room."
whatever missing facts there were on direct examination. The medico-legal findings, moreover, He told me to obey otherwise, he will whip me. I slept, and when I woke up I noticed that they
corroborated Leah's testimony that she was indeed raped. Although there are no fresh hymenal were doing something bad to me. The first thing I saw was Tito Joel was (sic) doing to me. I
lacerations, the incident having happened three (3) years before the examination, yet there are healed was crying the (sic), I was strangling (sic), my two hands were being held and my legs pinned
lacerations evidencing the sexual attack. "A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of down. I could not move because they (sic) were two of them, one was watching outside.
rape." (Pp. V. Cura, GR 112529, January 18, 1995)[14] They told me that if I shout it will be useless because no one will hear me because the house
was really far from neighbors. Our house is situated in a secluded place. Then, after that my
A:
... grandmother arrive (sic), and she asked if there was something bad happened. I told her
there was none. I was about to relay to her the incident, but I just could not because the two
The bestial defloration was mirrored in Leah's being, as she cringed and trembled whenever she sees of them were watching me. They stopped doing this to me when my mother arrive[d] on June
the accused. During the trial, the Interpreter had to shield Leah's line of vision upon advice of the 10, 1990.
Presiding Judge, as she was uncontrollably shaking and crying, when the accused would come within
her view. Her tears and statements were not contrived but borne out of a genuine feeling of When we were about to leave, they were planning to do something bad to me. They said,
bitterness. She sobbed bitterly as she narrated her nauseating experience in the hands of her uncles "let's do it in the grass land." They kicked me from where I was standing, and I was thrown
and even eloquently declared in a loud voice: with my bottoms (sic) hitting the mud first, I told them I don't like it anymore, and I run (sic)
and when they overtook me, they stripped off my panties. They placed saliva in my vagina
and inserted their penis in my vagina. When my mama asked me, what was the abrasions in
my arms all about, I told her that my arms was (sic) strucked (sic) by wire. (The witness

103
 showed the scratches that were already healed) When we reached Manila my father asked A: I felt something slippery was left inside my vagina.
me about what happened and we told him, that they were whipping us.
Q: And so, after the accused Joel Cortezano did this to you, what happened next?
(The witness cried.)[17] A: They left the house and were at the sampaloc tree.

... Q: How old are (sic) you then during that incident as related on May 6, 1990?
A: I was seven years old.
Q: Ms. Witness, as far as you can recall when was (sic) this incident happened?
A: On May 6, 1990 until June 10, 1990. What else happened, if any, with regards to Bernardo Cortezano besides his watching in the
Q:
window as you say?
Q: How many times were you forced to lie with the accused in this case from that period? After Tito Joel did that to me, Bernardo Cortezano also did it to me and after that, Boyet, a
A: Thirty six times. cousin of mine when inside the room and ask what they were doing and Tito Joel answered,
A:
you also have to do what we are doing, otherwise we will hurt you, so Boyet did the same
Q: What time did this incident on May 6, 1990 took place? thing to me.
A: After lunchtime.
You testify (sic) that one of the accused's (sic), Bernardo Cortezano, after Joel Cortezano did
Tell the Honorable Court what was the participation of the accused Joel and Bernardo Q: the same thing to (sic), tell the Honorable Court what is this thing that Bernardo Cortezano
Q: did to you, if any?
Cortezano in this incident of May 6, 1990?
I was ordered to get inside the room together with my brother and sister, and I was ordered to Tito Joel went beside the window and watch while Bernardo Cortezano also inserted his
A: A:
get inside the room of my "lola." penis to my vagina.

Q: On the basis of that instruction, what did you do, if any? Q: When Bernardo Cortezano inserted his penis into your vagina, what did you feel, if any?
A: I obeyed even if the room was hot. A: I feel that there was something slippery again was left inside my vagina.

Q: What was the answer of Joel in relation to your complain[t] that the room was hot? Q: And so, after Bernardo Cortezano did this to you, what happened next, if any?
A: I better obey, otherwise he will whip me with the broom (walis-tingting). Boyet went inside the room followed by Tito Joel who went inside again and told Boyet to do
A: what they were doing otherwise he will hurt Boyet and since Boyet was frightened, he also
Q: And so what happened next? did the same thing to me.
A: I slept and when I woke up they were doing something bad on (sic) me already.
Q: What is that same thing Boyet did to you, if any?
Q: When you said they, to whom are you referring to? A: He also held my arms and inserted his penis into my vagina.
A: Joel Cortezano and Bernardo Cortezano.
Q: And so after that, what happened next?
What is that bad you are referring to when you say that the accused's (sic) in this case were They laughed at me and then they called by brother and sister and told them to peep at me
Q: A:
doing bad things to you when you woke up? and they saw me naked.
A: I was being raped, they undress me.
At the time when these accused Joel and Bernardo Cortezano started making advances, did
Q:
Q: There are two accused in this case, who was the first one to rape you? you not resist their advances?
A: Joel Cortezano. I fought back but they were too strong for me, one held my arms and the other was on top of
A: me while he inserted his penis, I want to shout but Joel told me not to because nobody can
When you say rape, just what do you mean, can you possibly explain further to the Honorable hear me.
Q:
Court how was it done?
Now we come to the incident of June 10, 1990, as far as you can recall, where were you on
Q:
When I woke up they were already undressing me, they held my hand and my legs and I June 10, 1990.
could not move and Tito Joey[18] inserted his penis to my vagina and Tito Butchoy[19] was A: I was at the house of my "lola."
A:
standing by the window and watching.
Q: While you were at the house of your "Lola," what incident took place, if any?
(Witness is crying). A: On June 10, 1990 it was the last time they did it to me.

Q: And so, what did you feel, if any? Q: What time was that already?

104
 It was after lunchtime, they warned me not to tell anybody otherwise they will kill me and my
A:
family.
Q: When you say they, to whom are you referring to?
A: Joel and Bernardo Cortezano.
Q: If they are inside the courtroom, will you please point to them?
(Witness pointing to a man wearing stripe[d] polo who identify (sic) himself as Bernardo
A:
Cortezano and the man wearing a gray polo who identify (sic) himself as Joel Cortezano).
Please tell the Honorable Court what is that same thing you are referring to which was done
Q:
to you by the accused's in this case on June 10, 1990?
They remove (sic) my panty and they place saliva in my vagina and then they held my arms
A:
and pinned my legs and then kiss me on the lips.
Q: Who kissed you on the lips?
A: Joel Cortezano.
Q: And after kissing you on the lips, what happened next, if any?
They left the room and went to the sampaloc tree and they laughed at me, then I went out of
A:
the room and wash my lips.[20]
Leah was brought by her mother to Sipocot to spend her vacation with her grandparents, only to be
waylaid and enslaved by the appellants, her own uncles. Well-settled is the rule that the testimonies of
young victims deserve full credence and should not be so easily dismissed as a mere fabrication. [21] As
emphasized by this Court in People v. Quezada:[22]
No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of
her private parts and thereafter permit herself to be subjected to a public trial, unless she is motivated
solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished. Considering that the young victim
had not been exposed to the ways of the world, it is most improbable that she would impute a crime so
serious as rape to any man, if the charge were not true.[23]
In People v. De Guzman,[24] we held:
Well-established is the rule that testimonies of rape victims, especially child victims, are given full weight
and credit. It bears emphasis that the victim was barely seven years old when she was raped. In a
litany of cases, we have applied the well settled rule that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says
she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Courts
usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, especially a minor
particularly in cases of incestuous rape, because no woman would be willing to undergo a public trial
and put up with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own degradation were it not to
condemn an injustice and to have the offender apprehended and punished. [25]
The barefaced fact that the public prosecutor opted to charge the appellants with only four counts of
rape on May 6 and June 10, 1990, but Leah, in her sworn statement to the police authorities, stated that
she had been raped by the appellants on a daily basis and testified thereon, does not render her
testimony implausible. Even the municipal trial court which conducted the preliminary investigation of
the cases found probable cause against the appellants for thirty-six counts of rape:
From the evidence of the prosecution, it is clear that statutory rape was committed to victim Leah
Cedilla Cortezano for thirty six (36) times by accused Joel Cortezano and Bernardo Cortezano, and the
rapes were committed in the house of the paternal grandparents of victim Leah Cedilla Cortezano
located in Barangay Azucena, Sipocot, Camarines Sur, from May 6, 1990, until June 10, 1990.
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing considerations, it is respectfully recommended that THIRTY-SIX
(36) complaints for rape should be filed in the Regional Trial Court against accused JOEL CORTEZANO
and BERNARDO CORTEZANO.
Forward this case and its entire records to the Honorable Senen C. Lirag, the Provincial Prosecutor of
Camarines Sur, Camarines Sur Hall of Justice, Naga City, for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.[26]
The provincial prosecutor may have opted to file only four counts of rape instead of thirty-six counts of
rape for reasons other than the implausibility of Leah's testimony. Neither is Leah's testimony enfeebled
by her siblings' failure to report to their parents or grandparents that they saw her naked on May 6,
1990. At the time, Leah Lou was barely three, while Lionel was only a year old. The children were too
young to realize the importance of reporting such an incident to their parents or grandparents.
In the present recourse, the appellants' defense of alibi deserves scant consideration. As consistently
held by this Court:
[A]libi is the weakest of all defenses. It is a settled rule that for an alibi to prevail, the defense must
establish by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely the accused was
somewhere else.[27]
For alibi to prosper, the following must be established with clear and convincing evidence: (a) the
presence of the appellant in another place at the time of the commission of the offense; and, (b)
physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime. [28] Alibi cannot prevail over the positive,
straightforward and spontaneous testimony of the victim identifying the appellants as the malefactors
and how they consummated the crimes charged.
Bernardo failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to have been in Sipocot on May 6 and
June 10, 1990. Bernardo even testified that it was possible for him to have returned to Sipocot if he
wanted to, as there were passenger jeepneys and buses plying the route four times a day. [29] There is
no evidence that his running away from their house was even reported to the police authorities. The
appellant merely relied on his testimony and that of his father to prove his defense. He even failed to
present his cousin Alvin Reoval to corroborate his testimony.
Appellant Joel Cortezano likewise failed to substantiate his alibi. He failed to prove that he was treated
at the PGH and was confined thereat on May 6 and June 10, 1990. When asked to produce any
certification to prove his claim, he failed to produce any, on his incredible claim that the person releasing
the certification was very busy and could not issue a certification. This was belied by the certifications
issued by the PGH that the appellant had consulted the PGH as an outpatient only on August 16, 1989,
November 2, 1989 and April 6, 1990, but was never confined in the said hospital.[30]
Boyet Orcine's bare denial that he was forced by the appellants to have sexual intercourse with Leah
cannot prevail over Leah's positive and categorical testimony. The appellants failed to adduce a morsel
of evidence to prove that Leah had any ill motive to implicate her cousin Boyet.
The appellants' claim that the charges against them were instigated by Lourney to hit back at her
husband and his family deserves scant consideration. No mother in her right mind would subject her
child, who is of tender age, to go through the rigors of undergoing a rape case just to exact revenge. In
this light, this Court had the occasion to say:
Indeed, it is accused-appellant's claim that the rape charge against him was merely fabricated by
complainant's mother in order to get back at him, which we find to be implausible. As the trial court well-
105
observed, it would be contrary to human nature for a mother like Lucita to expose her daughter of six
years to the rigors of a trial of rape which may leave her stigmatized for life, and, in addition, involve
another daughter as corroborative witness, just so she could exact her pound of flesh against accused-
appellant. In several rape cases, this Court has uniformly rejected similar defenses on the ground that it
is unbelievable.[31]
This Court also held in People v. De Guzman[32] that:
All told, the proffered alibi of accused-appellant cannot stand against the positive identification by the
complainant that he is the defiler of her womanhood. Indeed, the revelation of an innocent girl not even
into her teens whose chastity has been abused deserves full credit, as the willingness of complainant to
face police investigation and to undergo the trouble and humiliation of a public trial is eloquent testimony
of the truth of her complaint. In short, it is most improbable for an innocent and guileless girl of seven
years as herein-offended party, to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any man, let alone her
uncle, if it were not true.[33]
The Court notes that the appellants were still minors when they committed the offense. At the time, Joel
was 13 years and 6 months old, while Bernardo was 12 years and 4 months old. Nevertheless, they are
not exempt from criminal liability.
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 12. Circumstances, which exempt from liability. The following are exempt from criminal liability:
...
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he acted with discernment, in which
case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Article 80 of
this Code.
A minor who is over nine years old and under fifteen years old at the time of the commission of the
crimes is exempt from criminal liability only when the said minor acted without discernment. It is the
burden of the prosecution to prove that a minor acted with discernment when he committed the crime
charged. In determining if such a minor acted with discernment, the Court's pronouncement in Valentin
v. Duqueña[34] is instructive:
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under
fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each
case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and behavior of said minor, not only
before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial.
In this case, the evidence on record shows beyond cavil that the appellants acted with discernment
when they raped the victim, thus: (a) they wetted the victim's vagina before they raped her; (b) one of
them acted as a lookout while the other was raping the victim; (c) they threatened to kill the victim if she
divulged to her parents what they did to her; (d) they forced Boyet to rape the victim; (e) they laughed as
Boyet was raping the victim; (f) they ordered Leah Lou and Lionel to look at their sister naked after the
appellants had raped her.
The Proper Penalties
The imposable penalty for rape committed by two or more persons under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code was reclusion perpetua to death.[35] Since the appellants were both minors at the time they
committed the offenses, they are entitled to the benefits of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority under Article 68(1) of the Revised Penal Code which reads:
Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. When the offender is a
minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to
the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by
reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty
shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the
crime which he committed.
Two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua to death is prision mayor, which has a range of 6 years and
1 day to 12 years. The maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the proper period of
the said penalty, depending upon the presence or absence of modifying circumstances. The minimum
of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of the penalty, one degree lower than
prision mayor, prision correccional, which has a range of 6 months and 1 day to 6 years.
In these cases, the crimes were not aggravated by abuse of superior strength because the said
circumstance is already considered in the penalty imposed by the law for the crimes. However, the
crimes were aggravated by relationship, pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 15 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.[36] The appellants are the uncles of the victim. The crime charged in Criminal
Case No. L-1679 was aggravated by the appellants, adding ignominy to the natural effects of the
crime.[37] In People v. Fuertes,[38] this Court ruled:
Ignominy is a circumstance pertaining to the moral order which adds disgrace and obloquy to the
material injury caused by the crime. The clause "Which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act"
contemplates a situation where the means employed or the circumstances tend to make the effects of
the crime more humiliating or to put the offended party to shame. ...
Ignominy was attendant when the appellants forced Boyet Orcine to rape the victim, and laughed as the
latter was being raped by Boyet, and when they ordered Leah Lou and Lionel to look at their naked
sister after the appellants had raped her. However, the aforementioned modifying circumstances
cannot aggravate the crimes and the penalties therefor because the same were not alleged in the
Information as mandated by Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although
the crimes were committed before the effectivity of the said Rule, it shall be applied retroactively
because it is favorable to the appellants.[39]
Civil Liabilities of the Appellants
The trial court awarded P50,000 as moral damages and P50,000 as exemplary damages to the victim in
each case. The court did not award civil indemnity in both cases. The decision of the trial court shall
thus be modified.
The trial court convicted the appellants of two counts of rape in each case. However, Leah is entitled to
civil indemnity of P50,000 and moral damages of P50,000 for every crime committed by the
appellants.[40] The appellants are also liable to the said victim for exemplary damages for each count of
rape in the amount of P25,000.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Libmanan, Camarines
Sur, Branch 56, in Criminal Cases Nos. L-1679 and L-1680, finding the appellants Bernardo Cortezano
and Joel Cortezano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of rape is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS.
In Criminal Case No. L-1679, the appellants are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of
106
imprisonment (two counts) of nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as the Japanese army as a guard of a Japanese garrison. To the same effect, the witness Placer Canada
maximum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium period, as testified.
minimum. Each of the appellants is ordered to pay the offended party Leah Cortezano P50,000 as civil
indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; and P25,000 as exemplary damages for each count of rape. The defendant argued at the trial court that there was no evidence showing that he had been appointed
Thus, each of the appellants shall pay the offended party the total amount of P100,000 as civil a Yoin or that he was a Makapili. While no written formal appointment was introduced in evidence, yet it
indemnity; P100,000 as moral damages; and P50,000 as exemplary damages. is clear that he was engaged in the work of guarding the Japanese garrison, armed with a gun and
wearing a Japanese uniform and taking part in the military drills of the Japanese army.
In Criminal Case No. L-1680, the appellants are sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence (two
counts) of nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum, to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum. Each of the Count No. II
appellants is ordered to pay the offended party Leah Cortezano P50,000 as civil indemnity; P50,000 as
moral damages; and P25,000 as exemplary damages for each count of rape. Thus, each of the At about 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 8, 1945, the defendant with other Filipino members of
appellants shall pay the offended party the total amount of P100,000 as civil indemnity; P100,000 as the Yoin and several Japanese soldiers, all armed, arrived near the house of Carmen Verdera in Barrio
moral damages; and P50,000 as exemplary damages. Malay, Municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas (now Quezon), and ordered the inmates therein to
open the door. The appellant and his companions entered the house, raised the mosquito nets and
SO ORDERED. ordered the inmates to rise. The appellant and his companions tied Graciano Fortuna, Carmen Verdera,
Alejo Enriquez Wong, Rufino Rivera, Maria Canada, Brisilio Canada, Remedios Anastacio, Dolores
Enriquez, Teodora Zamora, Presentacion Anastacio, and Placer Canada with a rope which was used as
a clothesline. The intruders then searched the premises and seized from Alejo Enriquez Wong $1,000,
G.R. No. L-4549 October 22, 1952 U.S. currency, and P4,000, Philippine currency. They took Graciano Fortuna and other inmates to the
Japanese garrison at Lopez, Tayabas (Quezon) and then to the Yoin garrison in the same town. The
motive for the raid was that Pedro Canada, a brother of Placer, was a guerrilla lieutenant in Lopez and
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Salvador Fortuna, son of Graciano, was a soldier in the said organization. One night during the
vs. detention of Placer and her companions in the Yoin garrison, the appellant attempted to sexually abuse
BIENVENIDO CAPISTRANO, defendant-appellant. Placer and her companions, but when the women cried and the Japanese came, the defendant
escaped. Placer and her companions were released after one month when they paid to the chief of the
Miguel F. Trias for appellant. Yoin and the appellant the sum of P2,500 Japanese war notes. The charge was testified to by several
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Esmeraldo Umali for appellee. victims.

JUGO, J.:
Bienvenido Capistrano was charged before the Court of First Instance of Quezon province with the
crime of treason on four (4) counts. He was found guilty by said court and sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs.
The attorney de oficio of the appellant states in a petition filed with this Court that after having read,
reread, and studied the evidence, he finds no substantial error committed by the trial court and prays for
the affirmance of the judgment.
The accused was more than nine (9) but less than fifteen (15) years of age at the time that he
committed the crime. However, the court which had the opportunity to see and hear the accused at the
trial found that he acted with discernment. It should be noted, furthermore, that he appeared as the
leader or commander of the raiding party. Although his minority does not exempt him from criminal
responsibility for the reason that he acted with discernment, yet it may be considered as a special
mitigating circumstance lowering the penalty by two (2) degrees.
Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied to the accused because he was over eighteen
(18) years old at the time of the trial (People vs. Estefa, 47 Off Gaz. No. 11, 5652; 86 Phil. 104).

The evidence of the record establishes the following: In view of the above special mitigating circumstances of minority, the penalty imposed upon the
accused is hereby modified by imposing upon him four (4) years of prision correccional, to pay a fine of
P10,000 and to indemnify Alejo Enriquez Wong in the sum of P6,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in
The accused Bienvenido Capistrano admitted being a Filipino citizen. case of insolvency in the payment of the fine and the indemnity, with costs.

Count No. I It is so ordered.

Alejo Enriquez Wong and Carmen Verdera testified that the defendant was a so-called Yoin, which
means an armed soldier of the Japanese. Wearing a Japanese military uniform, he rendered services to

107
RAYMUND MADALI and RODEL MADALI, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners Raymund Madali
(Raymund) and Rodel Madali (Rodel) seek the reversal of the 29 August 2007 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27757; and its 23 October 2007 Resolution, 2 affirming with modifications
the 28 July 2003 Decision3 of the Romblon, Romblon, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81, in
Criminal Case No. 2179, finding petitioners guilty of homicide.
For the death of AAA,4 Raymund, Rodel and a certain Bernardino "Jojo" Maestro (Bernardino) were
charged before the RTC with the crime of Murder. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 13th day of April 1999, at around 11:00 o’clock in the evening, in the Barangay
XXX, Municipality of Romblon, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
each other, did then and there by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, strike with a coconut frond and "llave inglesa" and strangle with a dog
chain, one AAA, inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds in different parts of his body which caused his
untimely death.5
During the arraignment on 31 May 2000, the three accused, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not
guilty.6
On trial, the prosecution presented eight witnesses, namely: (1) Jovencio Musa (Jovencio), 16 years
old, the victim’s cousin and the alleged lone eyewitness to the killing; (2) Senior Police Officer (SPO) 3
Rogelio Madali, the designated Deputy Chief of Police of the Romblon Police Station; (3) Police Officer
(PO) 3 Nicolas Molo, the police investigator assigned to the case; (4) BBB, the mother of the deceased
victim; (5) Dr. Carmen Lita P. Calsado, Chief of the Romblon District Hospital, the physician who issued
the death certificate of AAA; (6) Emerson de Asis, the alleged companion of witness Jovencio on the
night in question, who later became a hostile witness; (7) Michael Manasan, also a companion of
witness Jovencio before the killing of the victim occurred; (8) Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr., a forensic expert
from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Manila, who conducted the examination of the corpse of
the victim after the same was exhumed.
As documentary and object evidence, the prosecution offered the following: (1) Exhibit "A" – Affidavit of
Jovencio executed on 22 April 1999, detailing the circumstances prior to, during and after the killing of
the victim perpetrated by Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino; (2) Exhibit "B" – Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Jovencio dated 8 May 1999, a recantation of the 22 April 1999 Affidavit; (3) Exhibit "C" – Amended
Affidavit of Jovencio dated 28 May 1999, which was substantially the same on material points as the 22
April 1999 Affidavit; (4) Exhibit "D" – Undated Reply Affidavit of Jovencio insisting that the death of the
victim was authored by Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino; (5) Exhibit "E" – Joint Affidavit of prosecution
witnesses SPO3 Rogelio Madali and a certain SPO2 Teresito M. Sumadsad; (6) Exhibit "F" – the
coconut frond recovered by the police officers from the scene of the incident; (7) Exhibit "G" – a dog
chain used as part of a strap that was tied to the victim’s neck while he was hanging from a tree; (8)
Exhibit "H" – the handkerchief that was tied around the victim’s neck; (9) Exhibit "I" – empty bottles of
gin; (10) Exhibit "J" – cellophanes with rugby; (10) Exhibit "K" – pictures taken from the crime scene
including the picture of the body of the victim tied to a tree; (11) Exhibit "L" – Letter of Request for the
NBI to conduct an examination of the body of the victim; (12) Exhibits "M" to "O" – NBI routing slips; (14)
Exhibit "P" – Death Certificate issued by Dr. Carmen Lita P. Calsado; (15) Exhibit "Q" – Exhumation
Report issued by Dr. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr.; (16) Exhibit "R" – the Autopsy Report submitted by Dr.
Floresto P. Arizala, Jr.; (17) Exhibit "S" – Sketch of the head of the victim showing the injuries thereon;
and (18) Exhibit "T" – handwritten draft of the exhumation report.
Taken together, the evidence offered by the prosecution shows that at around 5:30 in the afternoon of
13 April 1999, BBB, who made a living by selling goods aboard ships docked at the Romblon Pier, and
who was constantly assisted by her 15-year-old son AAA, was on a ship plying her wares. AAA,
together with Jovencio and Raymund, was there helping his mother. 7 Sometime later, Raymund and
AAA left the ship. Jovencio stayed a little longer.8
At about 9:00 p.m. of the same day, Jovencio and another friend named Michael Manasan sat beside
the Rizal monument in the Poblacion of Romblon, located between the Roman Catholic Church and
Lover’s Inn. Michael had just left Jovencio when Raymund, Rodel, Bernardino and the victim AAA
arrived. After meandering around, the group proceeded to climb the stairs, atop of which was the
reservoir just beside the Romblon National High School. The victim, AAA, ascended first; behind him
were Rodel, Raymund, Bernardino and witness Jovencio. As soon as they reached the reservoir,
Bernardino blindfolded AAA with the handkerchief of Raymund. Bernardino at once blurted out, "Join
the rugby boys." AAA replied, "That’s enough." Bernardino then struck AAA thrice with a fresh and hard
coconut frond. AAA lost his balance and was made to stand up by Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino.
Raymund took his turn clobbering AAA at the back of his thighs with the same coconut frond. AAA
wobbled. Before he could recover, he received punches to his head and body from Rodel, who was
wearing brass knuckles. The punishments proved too much, as AAA lost consciousness.
Not satisfied, Raymund placed his handkerchief around the neck of AAA, with its ends tied to a dog
chain. With the contraption, the three malefactors pulled the body up a tree.
Stunned at the sight of his cousin being ill-treated, Jovencio could only muster a faint voice saying
"Enough" every single-time AAA received the painful blows. Bernardino, who seemed to suggest
finishing off the victim, remarked, "Since we’re all here, let’s get on with it." Before leaving the scene,
the three assailants warned Jovencio not to reveal the incident to anyone, or he would be next.
Tormented and torn between the desire to come clean and the fear for his life, Jovencio hardly slept that
night. He did not divulge the incident to anyone for the next few days. BBB, the victim’s mother, was
worried when her son did not come home. She started asking relatives whether they had seen her son,
but their reply was always in the negative.
It was three days later that a certain Eugenio Murchanto reported to the police authorities about a dead
man found in Barangay ZZZ near the Romblon National High School. When the policemen went there,
they found the cadaver emitting a foul odor, with maggots crawling all over, hanging from a tree with a
handkerchief tied around the neck and a dog chain fastened to the handkerchief. Also found in the area
were paraphernalia for inhaling rugby, as well as empty bottles of gin and a coconut frond.
108
The provincial hospital refused to conduct an autopsy, since AAA’s corpse was already decomposing
and stank so badly. It was through the intercession of the NBI that the body was eventually exhumed
and examined by medico-legal experts. Dr. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr., who conducted the examination,
opined that the victim died due to head injuries and not to asphyxiation by hanging. He declared that the
victim was already dead when he was tied to the tree, and that the variety of injuries sustained by the
victim could be attributed to more than one assailant.
Upon investigation, Jovencio narrated the incident and pointed to Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino as
the perpetrators of the crime. Thereafter, Jovencio executed his first affidavit, which was dated 22 April
1999. Because of the threat made on him by a certain Wilson, an uncle of Raymund and Rodel,
Jovencio executed a second affidavit dated 8 May 1999, repudiating his first affidavit. On 28 May 1999,
Jovencio made his third sworn statement substantially reverting to his first affidavit.
The accused, on the other hand, advanced the defense of denial and alibi. They claimed they had
nothing to do with the death of AAA, and that they were nowhere near the locus criminis when the killing
occurred.
According to Rodel, 16 years old, he was with his father Rodolfo Madali in the house of a friend named
Noel Mindoro, located more or less 14 kilometers from the place where the victim was slain where they
spent the whole evening until the following morning. Rodel’s testimony was corroborated by his father
and Noel Mindoro.
On their part, Raymund, 14 years of age, and Bernardino declared that they were in their respective
houses on the night in question. Raymund’s place was allegedly five kilometers away from the scene of
the crime, while Bernardino’s was one kilometer away. Bernardino’s testimony was supported by his
father Bernardino Maestro, Sr. and by his neighbor Diana Mendez. Raymund’s friend, Pastor Mario
Fajiculay backed up the former’s alibi.
Convinced by the version of the prosecution, the RTC rendered a guilty verdict against the three
accused. On account of the prosecution’s failure to prove the qualifying circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation, they were only convicted of homicide. The RTC observed that the incident was a
sort of initiation, in which the victim voluntarily went along with the perpetrators, not totally unaware that
he would be beaten. The RTC also appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in
favor of the three accused. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused BERNARDO (sic) Jojo MAESTRO, JR., RODEL MADALI AND
RAYMUND MADALI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, they are hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years and to indemnify the heirs of AAA jointly and severally the amount of PhP 50,000.00. 9
On 6 August 2003, Bernardino applied for probation. Thus, only Raymund and Rodel elevated their
convictions to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC that Rodel
and Raymund killed the victim. However, pursuant to Section 64 of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise
known as the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," which exempts from criminal liability a minor
fifteen (15) years or below at the time of the commission of the offense, Raymund’s case was
dismissed. Rodel’s conviction was sustained, and he was sentenced to six months and one day of
prision correccional to eight years and one day of prision mayor, but the imposition of said penalty was
suspended pursuant to Republic Act No. 9344. The judgment provides:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 28, 2003, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Romblon,
Romblon (Branch 81) is Criminal Case No. 2179, is affirmed with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1) Appellant Raymund Madali is declared EXEMPT from criminal liability and the case, insofar
as he is concerned is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to R.A. No. 9344.
2) Appellant Rodel Madali is found guilty of homicide, the proper penalty for which is fixed at
six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor. Imposition of this penalty should, however, be SUSPENDED, also pursuant to
R.A. No. 9344.
3) In addition to the civil indemnity imposed by the trial court in the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (₱50,000.00), moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) is
hereby awarded in favor of the heirs of the victim, AAA.
4) x x x x
5) Finally, this case is referred to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DWSD)
for further proceedings in accordance with R.A. No. 9344. 10
Hence, the instant case.
Petitioners Raymund and Rodel assail both the RTC and the Court of Appeals’ findings, which gave
weight and credence to the account of the incident given by prosecution witness Jovencio, whose
testimony according to them was replete with patent and substantial inconsistencies. First, petitioners
set their sights on the conflicting affidavits executed by Jovencio. The first affidavit implicated the three
accused in the death of AAA, which was controverted by the second affidavit where Jovencio denied
having seen the three accused butcher the victim, while the third affidavit restated the material points in
the first affidavit. Petitioners also pointed out the discrepancy between the first and the third affidavits,
as the former stated that Jovencio was not seen by the three accused when they executed the victim;
whereas in the latter affidavit, Jovencio stated he was with the three when the killing took place.
Second, petitioners assert that the testimony of Jovencio relating to the alleged fact that his
companions, Michael Manasan and Emerson de Asis, saw the three accused and the deceased during
the night in question was debunked by the very testimonies of Michael Manasan and Emerson de Asis
wherein they declared otherwise.
Moreover, petitioners contend that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in disbelieving the
defense of alibi they interposed, considering that the prosecution failed to muster the required quantum
of proof, and that said defense was corroborated by testimonies of the other defense witnesses.
The elemental question in this case is the credibility of the parties and their witnesses.
109
Well-entrenched is the rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is Q: And what happened when they arrived?
best and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh
such testimonies in light of the declarant’s demeanor, conduct and position to discriminate between A: They were also standing by there.
truth and falsehood.11 This is especially true when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the
appellate court, because said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court, unless it be
manifestly shown that the lower courts had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and Q: How long did they stand by in that place?
circumstances of significance in the case.12
A: I do not know how many hours?
The RTC and the Court of Appeals did not overlook any significant facts in the case.
Q: Then, what happened next?
This Court itself, in its effort to ferret out the truth based on the evidence on records has diligently pored
over the transcripts of stenographic notes of this case and, like the RTC, finds the testimony of Jovencio A: Around 10:30 o’clock we went there.
credible. Subjected to the grueling examinations on the witness stand, Jovencio steadfastly pointed to
Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino as the persons who slaughtered the victim. He testified as follows: Q: When you said we, to whom you are referring as your companions?

Q: Mr. Witness, will you tell us where were you on April 13, 1999? A: Jojo [Bernardino], Rodel, Raymund and AAA.

xxxx Q: What happened to Michael?

A: I was at the Rizal standing by. A: He went home.

xxxx Q: When you said you went there, to which place are you referring?

PROS. BENEDICTO continuing: A: Near the high school at hagdan-hagdan.

Q: While you were at Rizal on April 13, 1999 in the evening, [who was your companion]? Q: There are three (3) main streets in the Poblacion of Romblon, which street did you take in
going to hagdan-hagdan near the high school?
A: Only Michael.
A: In the middle.
Q: And what were you doing with Michael?
Q: Did you climb the stairs?
A: Only standing by there.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did anything happen while you were standing by with Michael?
Q: Who was ahead?
A: None, sir.
A: AAA.
Q: Did anyone arrive while you were there?
Q: And who came next?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Rodel.
Q: Who?
Q: Then, after Rodel, who?
A: Jojo [Bernardino] followed by Raymund then AAA, then Rodel.

110
A: Raymund. A: AAA was struck by a coconut frond three (3) times.

Q: Then? Q: Who struck him with the coconut frond?

A: [Bernardino]. A: [Bernardino].

Q: [Bernardino] who? Q: What happened to AAA when he was struck three (3) times with the coconut fronds?

A: Maestro. A: He was made to stand.

Q: What is the relation of this Jojo Maestro to Bernardino Maestro you pointed a while ago? Q: After standing, what happened next?

A: That Jojo is his alias. A: AAA was again struck with the coconut frond byRaymund.

Q: Did you reach the top of the stairs? Q: Was AAA hit?

A: Yes, sir. A: Yes, sir.

Q: Upon reaching the top of the stairs, what did you do, if any? Q: Where?

A: [Bernardino] blindfolded AAA. A: Here (witness is pointing to the posterior aspect of his right thigh).

Q: With what? Q: What happened to AAA when he was hit by the coconut frond?

A: Handkerchief. A: As if he became weak.

Q: Where did he get that handkerchief? Q: How about Rodel, what did Rodel do, if any?

A: From Raymund. A: He boxed the body and the head.

Q: After AAA, what is the family name of this AAA? Q: Of whom?

A: AAA. A: Of Rodel.

Q: After AAA was blindfolded, what happened next? Q: Who was boxed by Rodel?

A: Then [Bernardino] told him "Join the rugby boys!" A: AAA.

Q: Did AAA make any reply? Q: In Exhibit C you mentioned about llave inglesa, what is this llave inglesa?

A: AAA said "That’s enough." A: Lead llave inglesa.

Q: What happened after Jojo Maestro said you join the rugby boys? Q: And how does it look like?

111
A: I forgot already but it was a brass knuckle. A: The chain.

Q: Did Exh. C mention that Rodel punched him in different parts of his body with a llave inglesa Q: Referring to the dog chain?
causing him to fall to the ground, how did Rodel use this llave inglesa?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Worn in his hand (witness raising his right hand and motioning the left as if wearing
something in his right hand), then punched him. Q: While all these things were happening, what was Jovencio Musa doing who is a cousin of
AAA?
Q: When he was punched on different parts of his body by Rodel using llave inglesa, what
happened to AAA? A: I got shock upon seeing it.

A: He lost consciousness. Q: Did Jovencio Musa utter anything or do something?

Q: When AAA lost consciousness, what did Bernardino Maestro, Raymund Madali and Rodel A: Everytime AAA was being struck I said "Enough!"
Madali do, if any?
(Tama na!).
A: Raymund used his handkerchief in tying the neck of my cousin.
Q: How many times did you say that is enough?
Q: Who is this cousin of yours?
A: Twice.
A: AAA.
Q: How did the three (3) react to your saying "Tama na, tama na!"?
Q: What is the family name?
A: "It is already here so we will proceed."
A: AAA.
COURT:
COURT:
Translate that.
How about Bernardino as part of the question?
A: "Yari na ini, idiretso na."
PROS. BENEDICTO continuing:
xxxx
Q: Bernardino, what did he do, if any?
Q: After tying the dog chain to the tree, what happened next?
A: The chain for the dog was tied to the handkerchief.
A: I was told by the three (3) that if I would reveal I would be the next to be killed.
COURT:
Q: After that, what happened?
How about Rodel?
A: No more, we went home already.13
A: They helped in lifting him and making him stand and hooked the tie to the tree.
Jovencio saw at close range the incident as it was unfolding before his very eyes as he was there when
Q: What is this tie which was hooked to the tree made of? it happened. He was in the company of the perpetrators and the victim. Thus, the incident could not

112
have escaped his attention. The prosecution adequately established in graphic detail, through the
eyewitness, the circumstances that transpired before, during and after the killing of AAA. At around
11:30 p.m. of 13 April 1999, Jovencio, together with the victim, as well as with Rodel, Raymund and
Bernardino, went to a place near the Romblon National High School. Jovencio’s earlier companion,
Michael Manasan, did not go with the group, as he had already left a little earlier. As they reached their
destination, the group ascended the stairs leading to a reservoir near the said school. AAA was ahead,
followed by Rodel, Raymund, Bernardino and Jovencio. Upon reaching the top, Bernardino blindfolded
the victim with a handkerchief and told the latter, "Join the rugby boys!" The victim responded, "That’s
enough!" Bernardino then hit the victim thrice, using a green and hard coconut frond. Unable to
withstand the beatings, the victim hit the ground and was lifted to his feet by Bernardino, Raymund and
Rodel. With the same coconut frond, Raymund hit the victim on his right thigh. Rodel followed by
punching the body and the head of the victim with a brass knuckle (llave inglesa) wrapped around the
former’s right fist. Feeling for his cousin, Jovencio shouted "Tama na! Tama na!" Bernardino responded,
"Yari na ini, ideretso na," (We have come this far, we have to finish it.) The victim’s strength was no
match to the injuries he received. He passed out. Raymund then tied a handkerchief around the victim’s
neck, fastened a dog chain to the ends of the said handkerchief and, with the aid of Raymund and
Rodel, hoisted the victim’s body to and hanged it from a nearby tree. Shocked at what was happening,
Jovencio just watched the whole incident, failing to muster enough courage to help his dying cousin.
The perpetrators warned Jovencio not to divulge to anyone what he saw, or he would be the next victim.
Then they all left the place, leaving the victim’s body hanging from a tree.
The testimony of Jovencio was substantiated by the medical findings indicating that the victim was hit in
the head by hard blows, causing his death. Other pieces of evidence such as the coconut frond, the dog
chain and the handkerchief found in the scene also supported Jovencio’s account.
Against the damning evidence adduced by the prosecution, petitioners Raymund and Rodel could only
muster mere denial. Unfortunately for them, their defense was much too flaccid to stay firm against the
weighty evidence for the prosecution. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a
negative and self-serving evidence that deserves no weight in law. It cannot be given greater
evidentiary value than the testimony of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters. 14
Between the self-serving testimonies of petitioners and the positive identification by the eyewitness, the
latter deserves greater credence.15
Petitioners’ alibi, which was supported by the testimonies of close relatives and friends, cannot
overcome the convincing evidence adduced by the prosecution. Such corroborative testimonies of
relatives and friends are viewed with suspicion and skepticism by the Court.16
Furthermore, for alibi to prosper, two elements must concur: (a) the accused was in another place at the
time the crime was committed; and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime at the time it was committed. In the case under consideration, Raymund was within a 5-kilometer
distance from the scene, while Rodel was within a 14-kilometer distance. Even assuming arguendo that
Raymund and Rodel’s defense were true, still, it was not physically impossible for them to be at the
crime scene and to be participants in the gruesome crime. It was not difficult for them to travel from
where they allegedly were and arrive at the scene during the killing episode.
Petitioners made an issue of the affidavit of recantation repudiating the earlier one laying the blame on
them. The affidavit of recantation executed by a witness prior to the trial cannot prevail over the
testimony made during the trial.17 Jovencio effectively repudiated the contents of the affidavit of
recantation. The recantation would hardly suffice to overturn the trial court’s finding of guilt, which was
based on a clear and convincing testimony given during a full-blown trial. As held by this Court, an
affidavit of recantation, being usually taken ex parte, would be considered inferior to the testimony given
in open court.18 A recantation is exceedingly unreliable, inasmuch as it is easily secured from a poor
and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary consideration.19 Considering the age,
the social standing and the economic status of witness Jovencio, it is not far-fetched that the
combination of these factors impelled him to affix his signature to the recanting affidavit. Besides,
Jovencio explained why he executed the second affidavit or the affidavit of recantation, which
supposedly exonerated petitioners. He had been threatened by a certain Wilson, who was a relative of
petitioners. Jovencio testified:
Q: Alright, in Exh. C specifically C-1, you mentioned that, you said that somebody fetched me
in the evening of May 7, 1999 who told me that Rey Andrade wanted to talk to me regarding
the incident, who was that somebody who fetched you in the house?
A: I do not know but he is known as Andrade.
xxxx
Q: What was the subject of your conversation with Andrade?
A: About the Nephew of Wilson.
xxxx
Q: How about this Wilson you were referring to?
A: Wilson all of a sudden arrived there.
Q: Did Wilson say anything?
A: Wilson said, if we will lose, all our expenses will be paid and if he wins I will be the next. 20
Petitioners also place much premium on the alleged contradiction between Jovencio’s narrative -- which
claimed that Emerson de Asis and Michael Manasan saw the victim in the company of the malefactors
immediately prior to the killing -- and the testimonies of these two witnesses denying such allegation.
Unfortunately, this is just a minor inconsistency. The common narration of Emerson de Asis and Michael
Manasan that they did not see the perpetrators with the victim prior to the killing are too insignificant,
since their narration did not directly relate to the act of killing itself. Said inconsistency does not dilute
the declarations of Jovencio. Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its incapacity to
assimilate all material details of a given incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations
of a witness hardly weaken their probative value. It is well settled that immaterial and insignificant
details do not discredit a testimony on the very material and significant point bearing on the very act of
accused-appellants.21 As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another on material
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points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details do
not undermine the integrity of a prosecution witness. 22 The minor inconsistencies and contradictions
only serve to attest to the truthfulness of the witnesses and the fact that they had not been coached or
rehearsed.23
The declaration of Michael Manasan -- that he did not see the petitioners together with Jovencio and the
victim immediately prior the incident -- does not help a bit the cause of petitioners. As the Court of
Appeals correctly pointed out, Michael could not have seen the malefactors in the company of the victim
because according to Jovencio, Michael had gone home earlier that evening.
In fine, this Court defers to the findings of the trial court, which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
there being no cogent reason to veer away from such findings.
As to the criminal liability, Raymond is exempt. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Raymund,
who was only 14 years of age at the time he committed the crime, should be exempt from criminal
liability and should be released to the custody of his parents or guardian pursuant to Sections 6 and 20
of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time
of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
xxxx
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility. — If it has been determined that the child
taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the authority which will have an initial contact with
the child has the duty to immediately release the child to the custody of his/her parents or guardian, or
in the absence thereof, the child's nearest relative. Said authority shall give notice to the local social
welfare and development officer who will determine the appropriate programs in consultation with the
child and to the person having custody over the child. If the parents, guardians or nearest relatives
cannot be located, or if they refuse to take custody, the child may be released to any of the following: a
duly registered nongovernmental or religious organization; a barangay official or a member of the
Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC); a local social welfare and development officer;
or, when and where appropriate, the DSWD. If the child referred to herein has been found by the Local
Social Welfare and Development Office to be abandoned, neglected or abused by his parents, or in the
event that the parents will not comply with the prevention program, the proper petition for involuntary
commitment shall be filed by the DSWD or the Local Social Welfare and Development Office pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as "The Child and Youth Welfare Code."
Although the crime was committed on 13 April 1999 and Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only on 20
May 2006, the said law should be given retroactive effect in favor of Raymund who was not shown to be
a habitual criminal. This is based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of
this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced
and the convict is serving the same.
While Raymund is exempt from criminal liability, his civil liability is not extinguished pursuant to the
second paragraph of Section 6, Republic Act No. 9344.
As to Rodel’s situation, it must be borne in mind that he was 16 years old at the time of the commission
of the crime. A determination of whether he acted with or without discernment is necessary pursuant to
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344, viz:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. – x x x.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment,
in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful
act.24 Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts
and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.
The Court of Appeals could not have been more accurate when it opined that Rodel acted with
discernment. Rodel, together with his cohorts, warned Jovencio not to reveal their hideous act to
anyone; otherwise, they would kill him. Rodel knew, therefore, that killing AAA was a condemnable act
and should be kept in secrecy. He fully appreciated the consequences of his unlawful act.
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed upon a person under 18 but
above 15 shall be the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, but always in the proper period.
The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Pursuant
to Article 68, the maximum penalty should be within prision mayor, which is a degree lower than
reclusion temporal. Absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the maximum penalty should be
in the medium period of prision mayor or 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum should be anywhere within the penalty next lower in degree, that is, prision
correccional. Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, which is 6 months and one day of
prision correccional to 8 years and one day of prision mayor, is in order. However, the sentence to be
imposed against Rodel should be suspended pursuant to Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which
states:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age
at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict
with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application. Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
114
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court
shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles
in Conflict with the Law.
The Court of Appeals awarded ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages in favor of the heirs of the victim. In addition, Rodel and Raymund are ordered to pay
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of the actual damages for funeral expenses, which the
prosecution claimed to have incurred but failed to support by receipts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29 August 2007 in
CA-G.R. No. 27757, exempting Raymund Madali from criminal liability is hereby AFFIRMED. With
respect to Rodel Madali, being a child in conflict with the law, this Court suspends the pronouncement of
his sentence and REMANDS his case to the court a quo for further proceedings in accordance with
Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344. However, with respect to the civil liabilities, Rodel Madali and
Raymund Madali are solidarily liable to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HERMIE M. JACINTO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Once again, we recite the time-honored principle that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
victim’s positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. 1 For it to prosper, the court
must be convinced that there was physical impossibility on the part of the accused to have been at the
locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.2
Nevertheless, a child in conflict with the law, whose judgment of conviction has become final and
executory only after his disqualification from availing of the benefits of suspended sentence on the
ground that he/she has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, shall still be entitled to the right
to restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise
known as "An Act Establishing a Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System, Creating the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council under the Department of Justice, Appropriating Funds Therefor
and for Other Purposes."
Convicted for the rape of five-year-old AAA,3 appellant Hermie M. Jacinto seeks before this Court the
reversal of the judgment of his conviction.4
The Facts
In an Information dated 20 March 20035 filed with the Regional Trial Court and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 1679-13-141[1],6 appellant was accused of the crime of RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of January, 2003 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening more or less, at
barangay xxx, municipality of xxx, province of xxx and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
[Hermie M. Jacinto], with lewd design did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal
knowledge with one AAA, a five-year old minor child.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying/aggravating circumstance of minority, the victim being only
five years old.7
On 15 July 2003, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. 8 During pre-trial,9 the defense admitted the
existence of the following documents: (1) birth certificate of AAA, showing that she was born on 3
December 1997; (2) police blotter entry on the rape incident; and (3) medical certificate, upon
presentation of the original or upon identification thereof by the physician.
Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting witnesses to prove their respective
versions of the story.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The testimonies of AAA,10 her father FFF,11 and rebuttal witness Julito Apiki [Julito]12 may be
summarized in the following manner:
FFF and appellant have been neighbors since they were born. FFF’s house is along the road. That of
appellant lies at the back approximately 80 meters from FFF. To access the road, appellant has to pass
by FFF’s house, the frequency of which the latter describes to be "every minute [and] every hour." Also,
appellant often visits FFF because they were close friends. He bore no grudge against appellant prior to
the incident.13
AAA likewise knows appellant well. She usually calls him kuya. She sees him all the time – playing at
the basketball court near her house, fetching water, and passing by her house on his way to the road.
She and appellant used to be friends until the incident. 14
At about past 6 o’clock in the evening of 28 January 2003, FFF sent his eight-year-old daughter CCC to
the store of Rudy Hatague to buy cigarettes. AAA followed CCC. When CCC returned without AAA, FFF
was not alarmed. He thought she was watching television at the house of her aunt Rita Lingcay [Rita]. 15
Julito went to the same store at around 6:20 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay Rum.16 At the
store, he saw appellant place AAA on his lap. 17 He was wearing sleeveless shirt and a pair of short
pants.18 All of them left the store at the same time. 19 Julito proceeded to the house of Rita to watch
television, while appellant, who held the hand of AAA, went towards the direction of the "lower area or
place."20
AAA recalled that appellant was wearing a chaleko (sando) and a pair of short pants21 when he held her
hand while on the road near the store. 22 They walked towards the rice field near the house of spouses
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Alejandro and Gloria Perocho [the Perochos].23 There he made her lie down on harrowed ground,
removed her panty and boxed her on the chest. 24 Already half-naked from waist down,25 he mounted
her, and, while her legs were pushed apart, pushed his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull
movement.26 She felt pain and cried.27 Afterwards, appellant left and proceeded to the Perochos. 28 She,
in turn, went straight home crying.29
FFF heard AAA crying and calling his name from downstairs.30 She was without slippers.31 He found her
face greasy.32 There was mud on her head and blood was oozing from the back of her head. 33 He
checked for any injury and found on her neck a contusion that was already turning black.34 She had no
underwear on and he saw white substance and mud on her vagina. 35 AAA told him that appellant
brought her from the store36 to the grassy area at the back of the house of the Perochos; 37 that he threw
away her pair of slippers, removed her panty, choked her and boxed her breast; 38 and that he
proceeded thereafter to the Perochos.39
True enough, FFF found appellant at the house of the Perochos. 40 He asked the appellant what he did
to AAA.41 Appellant replied that he was asked to buy rum at the store and that AAA followed him.42 FFF
went home to check on his daughter,43 afterwhich, he went back to appellant, asked again, 44 and boxed
him.45
Meanwhile, at around 7:45 in the evening of even date, Julito was still watching television at the house
of Rita.46 AAA and her mother MMM arrived.47 AAA was crying.48 Julito pitied her, embraced her, and
asked what happened to her, to which she replied that appellant raped her. 49 Julito left and found
appellant at the Perochos.50 Julito asked appellant, "Bads, did you really rape the child, the daughter of
[MMM]?" but the latter ignored his question.51 Appellant’s aunt, Gloria, told appellant that the policemen
were coming to which the appellant responded, "Wait a minute because I will wash the dirt of my elbow
(sic) and my knees."52 Julito did found the elbows and knees of appellant with dirt. 53
On that same evening, FFF and AAA proceeded to the police station to have the incident blottered. 54
FFF also had AAA undergo a physical check up at the municipal health center. 55 Dr. Bernardita M.
Gaspar, M.D., Rural Health Physician, issued a medical certificate 56 dated 29 January 2003. It reads:
Injuries seen are as follows:
1. Multiple abrasions with erythema along the neck area.
2. Petechial hemorrhages on both per-orbital areas.
3. Hematoma over the left upper arm, lateral area
4. Hematoma over the upper anterior chest wall, midclavicular line
5. Abrasion over the posterior trunk, paravertebral area
6. Genital and peri-anal area soiled with debris and whitish mucoid-like material
7. Introitus is erythematous with minimal bleeding
8. Hymenal lacerations at the 5 o’clock and 9 o’clock position
Impression
MULTIPLE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES
HYMENAL LACERATIONS
Upon the recommendation of Dr. Gaspar,57 AAA submitted herself to another examination at the
provincial hospital on the following day. Dr. Christine Ruth B. Micabalo, Medical Officer III of the
provincial hospital, attended to her and issued a medico-legal certificate dated 29 January 2003,58 the
pertinent portion of which reads:
P.E. = Findings is consistent with Dr. Bernardita M. Gaspar findings except No. 6 and 7 there is no
bleeding in this time of examination. (sic)59
Evidence for the Defense
Interposing the defense of alibi, appellant gave a different version of the story. To corroborate his
testimony, Luzvilla Balucan [Luzvilla] and his aunt Gloria took the witness stand to affirm that he was at
the Perochos at the time of the commission of the crime. 60 Luzvilla even went further to state that she
actually saw Julito, not appellant, pick up AAA on the road. 61 In addition, Antonia Perocho [Antonia],
sister-in-law of appellant’s aunt, Gloria,62 testified on the behavior of Julito after the rape incident was
revealed.63
Appellant claimed that he lives with his aunt, not with his parents whose house stands at the back of
FFF’s house.64 He denied that there was a need to pass by the house of FFF in order to access the
road or to fetch water.65 He, however, admitted that he occasionally worked for FFF,66 and whenever he
was asked to buy something from the store, AAA always approached him.67
At about 8 o’clock in the morning of 28 January 2003, appellant went to the Perochos to attend a
birthday party. At 6:08 in the evening, while the visitors, including appellant and his uncle Alejandro
Perocho [Alejandro], were gathered together in a drinking session, appellant’s uncle sent him to the
store to buy Tanduay Rum. Since the store is only about 20 meters from the house, he was able to
return after three (3) minutes. He was certain of the time because he had a watch .68
Appellant’s aunt, Gloria, the lady of the house, confirmed that he was in her house attending the
birthday party; and that appellant went out between 6 and 7 in the evening to buy a bottle of Tanduay
from the store. She recalled that appellant was back around five (5) minutes later. She also observed
that appellant’s white shorts and white sleeveless shirt were clean. 69
At 6:30 in the evening,70 Luzvilla, who was also at the party, saw appellant at the kitchen having a drink
with his uncle Alejandro and the rest of the visitors.71 She went out to relieve herself at the side of the
tree beside the road next to the house of the Perochos.72 From where she was, she saw Julito, who was
wearing black short pants and black T-shirt, carry AAA.73 AAA’s face was covered and she was
wiggling.74 This did not alarm her because she thought it was just a game. 75 Meanwhile, appellant was
116
still in the kitchen when she returned.76 Around three (3) minutes later, Luzvilla saw Julito, now in a
white T-shirt,77 running towards the house of Rita.78 AAA was slowly following behind.79 Luzvilla
followed them.80 Just outside the house, Julito embraced AAA and asked what the appellant did to
her.81 The child did not answer.82
Luzvilla also followed FFF to the Perochos. She witnessed the punching incident and testified that
appellant was twice boxed by FFF. According to her, FFF tapped the left shoulder of the appellant,
boxed him, and left. FFF came in the second time and again boxed appellant. This time, he had a bolo
pointed at appellant. Appellant’s uncle Alejandro, a barangay councilor, and another Civilian Voluntary
Organization (CVO) member admonished FFF.83
On sur-rebuttal, Antonia testified that, at 7 o’clock in the evening, she was watching the television along
with other people at the house of Rita. Around 7:10, Julito, who was wearing only a pair of black short
pants without a shirt on, entered the house drunk. He paced back and forth. After 10 minutes, AAA
came in crying. Julito tightly embraced AAA and asked her what happened. AAA did not answer. Upon
Antonia’s advice, Julito released her and went out of the house. 84
Appellant further testified that at past 7 o’clock in the evening, FFF arrived, pointed a finger at him,
brandished a bolo, and accused him of molesting AAA. FFF left but returned at around 8 o’clock in the
evening. This time, he boxed appellant and asked again why he molested his daughter. 85
On 26 March 2004, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision,86 the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape committed
upon a 5-year old girl, the court sentences him to death and orders him to pay [AAA] P75,000.000 as
rape indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs 87
The defense moved to reopen trial for reception of newly discovered evidence stating that appellant was
apparently born on 1 March 1985 and that he was only seventeen (17) years old when the crime was
committed on 28 January 2003.88 The trial court appreciated the evidence and reduced the penalty from
death to reclusion perpetua.89 Thus:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court imposing the death penalty upon the accused is amended in
order to consider the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. The penalty impos[a]ble upon the
accused, therefore[,] is reduced to reclusion perpetua. xxx
Appealed to this Court, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for its disposition in view of the
ruling in People v. Mateo and the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allowing an intermediate review
by the Court of Appeals of cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment.90
On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the trial court with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
xxx that Hermie M. Jacinto should suffer the Indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and one (1) day
to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. Appellant Hermie M. Jacinto is ordered to indemnify the victim in the sum of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
and to pay the costs.91
On 19 November 2007, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellant’s Notice of Appeal. 92
This Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental briefs. 93 Both parties
manifested that they have exhaustively discussed their positions in their respective briefs and would no
longer file any supplement.94
Before the Court of Appeals, appellant argued that "THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
RAPE"95 by invoking the principle that "if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or
more reasonable explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other with his guilt, then the evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty and will not suffice to
support a conviction."96
Our Ruling
We sustain the judgment of conviction.
In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape, we consider the three well-
entrenched principles:
(1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in which
only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 97
Necessarily, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim may be sufficient to convict the
accused.98 More so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of the examining
physician.99
Further, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the victim’s positive identification of the perpetrator of
the crime,100 except when it is established that it was physically impossible for the accused to have
been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.101
I
A man commits rape by having carnal knowledge of a child under twelve (12) years of age even in the
absence of any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat or intimidation; (b) when the
offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) by means of fraudulent
machination or grave abuse of authority.102
117
That the crime of rape has been committed is certain. The vivid narration of the acts culminating in the Q Was it painful?
insertion of appellant’s organ into the vagina of five-year-old AAA and the medical findings of the
physicians sufficiently proved such fact. A Yes.

AAA testified: Q What was painful?

PROS. OMANDAM: A My vagina.

xxxx Q Did you cry?

Q You said Hermie laid you on the ground, removed your panty and boxed you, what else did A Yes.103
he do to you?
The straightforward and consistent answers to the questions, which were phrased and re-phrased in
A He mounted me. order to test that AAA well understood the information elicited from her, said it all – she had been raped.
When a woman, more so a minor, says so, she says in effect all that is essential to show that rape was
Q When Hermie mounted you, was he facing you? committed.104 Significantly, youth and immaturity are normally badges of truth and honesty.105

A Yes. Further, the medical findings and the testimony of Dr. Micabalo 106 revealed that the hymenal lacerations
at 5 o’clock and 9 o’clock positions could have been caused by the penetration of an object; that the
Q When he mounted you what did he do, did he move? redness of the introitus could have been "the result of the repeated battering of the object;" and that
such object could have been an erect male organ.107
A He moved his ass, he made a push and pull movement.
The credible testimony of AAA corroborated by the physician’s finding of penetration conclusively
established the essential requisite of carnal knowledge.108
Q When he made a push and pull movement, how were your legs positioned?
II
A They were apart.
The real identity of the assailant and the whereabouts of the appellant at the time of the commission of
Q Who pushed them apart? the crime are now in dispute.

A Hermie. The defense would want us to believe that it was Julito who defiled AAA, and that appellant was
elsewhere when the crime was committed.109
Q Did Hermie push anything at you?
We should not, however, overlook the fact that a victim of rape could readily identify her assailant,
A Yes. especially when he is not a stranger to her, considering that she could have a good look at him during
the commission of the crime.110 AAA had known appellant all her life. Moreover, appellant and AAA
Q What was that? even walked together from the road near the store to the situs criminus111 that it would be impossible for
the child not to recognize the man who held her hand and led her all the way to the rice field.

A His penis.
We see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on the unwavering testimony of AAA.

Q Where did he push his penis?

The certainty of the child, unusually intelligent for one so young, that it was accused, whom she called
"kuya" and who used to play basketball and fetch water near their house, and who was wearing a
A To my vagina. sleeveless shirt and shorts at the time he raped her, was convincing and persuasive. The defense
attempted to impute the crime to someone else – one Julito Apiki, but the child, on rebuttal, was

118
steadfast and did not equivocate, asserting that it was accused who is younger, and not Julito, who is
older, who molested her.112
In a long line of cases, this Court has consistently ruled that the determination by the trial court of the
credibility of the witnesses deserves full weight and respect considering that it has "the opportunity to
observe the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their furtive glances, calmness, sighs and the scant or full
realization of their oath,"113 unless it is shown that material facts and circumstances have been "ignored,
overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted." 114
Further, as correctly observed by the trial court:
xxx His and his witness’ attempt to throw the court off the track by imputing the crime to someone else
is xxx a vain exercise in view of the private complainant’s positive identification of accused and other
corroborative circumstances. Accused also admitted that on the same evening, Julito Apiki, the
supposed real culprit, asked him "What is this incident, Pare?", thus corroborating the latter’s testimony
that he confronted accused after hearing of the incident from the child."115
On the other hand, we cannot agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in finding his denial and
alibi weak despite the presentation of witnesses to corroborate his testimony. Glaring inconsistencies
were all over their respective testimonies that even destroyed the credibility of the appellant’s very
testimony.
Appellant testified that it was his uncle Alejandro Perocho who sent him to store to buy Tanduay; that he
gave the bottle to his uncle; and that they had already been drinking long before he bought Tanduay at
the store.
This was contradicted by the testimony of his aunt Gloria, wife of his uncle Alejandro. On cross-
examination, she revealed that her husband was not around before, during, and after the rape incident
because he was then at work.116 He arrived from work only after FFF came to their house for the
second time and boxed appellant.117 It was actually the fish vendor, not her husband, who asked
appellant to buy Tanduay.118 Further, the drinking session started only after the appellant’s errand to the
store.119
Neither was the testimony of Luzvilla credible enough to deserve consideration.
Just like appellant, Luzvilla testified that Alejandro joined the drinking session. This is contrary to
Gloria’s statement that her husband was at work.
Luzvilla’s testimony is likewise inconsistent with that of sur-rebuttal witness Antonia Perocho. Antonia
recalled that Julito arrived without a shirt on. This belied Luzvilla’s claim that Julito wore a white shirt on
his way to the house of Rita. In addition, while both the prosecution, as testified to by AAA and Julito,
and the defense, as testified to by Gloria, were consistent in saying that appellant wore a sleeveless
shirt, Luzvilla’s recollection differ in that Julito wore a T-shirt (colored black and later changed to white),
and, thus, a short-sleeved shirt.
Also, contrary to Luzvilla’s story that she saw AAA walking towards Rita’s house three (3) minutes after
she returned to the Perochos at 6:38 in the evening, Antonia recalled that AAA arrived at the house of
Rita at 7:30. In this respect, we find the trial court’s appreciation in order. Thus:
xxx. The child declared that after being raped, she went straight home, crying, to tell her father that
Hermie had raped her. She did not first drop into the house of Lita Lingkay to cry among strangers who
were watching TV, as Luzvilla Balucan would have the court believe. When the child was seen at the
house of Lita Lingkay by Julito Apiki and Luzvilla Balucan, it was only later, after she had been brought
there by her mother Brenda so that Lita Lingkay could take a look at her ˗ just as Julito Apiki said. 120
Above all, for alibi to prosper, it is necessary that the corroboration is credible, the same having been
offered preferably by disinterested witnesses. The defense failed thuswise. Its witnesses cannot qualify
as such, "they being related or were one way or another linked to each other." 121
Even assuming for the sake of argument that we consider the corroborations on his whereabouts, still,
the defense of alibi cannot prosper.
We reiterate, time and again, that the court must be convinced that it would be physically impossible for
the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.122
Physical impossibility refers to distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and the
location of the accused when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he was so far away
and could not have been physically present at the scene of the crime and its immediate vicinity when
the crime was committed.123
In People v. Paraiso,124 the distance of two thousand meters from the place of the commission of the
crime was considered not physically impossible to reach in less than an hour even by foot. 125 Inasmuch
as it would take the accused not more than five minutes to rape the victim, this Court disregarded the
testimony of the defense witness attesting that the accused was fast asleep when she left to gather
bamboo trees and returned several hours after. She could have merely presumed that the accused
slept all throughout.126
In People v. Antivola,127 the testimonies of relatives and friends corroborating that of the appellant that
he was in their company at the time of the commission of the crime were likewise disregarded by this
Court in the following manner:
Ruben Nicolas, the appellant’s part-time employer, and Marites Capalad, the appellant’s sister-in-law
and co-worker, in unison, vouched for the appellant’s physical presence in the fishpond at the time
Rachel was raped. It is, however, an established fact that the appellant’s house where the rape
occurred, was a stone’s throw away from the fishpond. Their claim that the appellant never left
their sight the entire afternoon of December 4, 1997 is unacceptable. It was impossible for Marites
to have kept an eye on the appellant for almost four hours, since she testified that she, too, was very
much occupied with her task of counting and recording the fishes being harvested. Likewise, Mr.
Nicolas, who, admittedly was 50 meters away from the fishpond, could not have focused his entire
attention solely on the appellant. It is, therefore, not farfetched that the appellant easily sneaked
out unnoticed, and along the way inveigled the victim, brought her inside his house and
ravished her, then returned to the fishpond as if he never left.128 (Emphasis supplied.)1avvphi1
119
As in the cases above cited, the claim of the defense witnesses that appellant never left their sight, save
from the 5-minute errand to the store, is contrary to ordinary human experience. Moreover, considering
that the farmland where the crime was committed is just behind the house of the Perochos, it would take
appellant only a few minutes to bring AAA from the road near the store next to the Perochos down the
farmland and consummate the crime. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, appellant could
have committed the rape after buying the bottle of Tanduay and immediately returned to his uncle’s
house.129 Unfortunately, the testimonies of his corroborating witnesses even bolstered the fact that he
was within the immediate vicinity of the scene of the crime. 130
Clearly, the defense failed to prove that it was physically impossible for appellant to have been at the
time and place of the commission of the crime.
All considered, we find that the prosecution has sufficiently established the guilt of the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt.
III
In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals correctly considered Republic Act
No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the commission of the crime three (3)
years before it was enacted on 28 April 2006.
We recognize its retroactive application following the rationale elucidated in People v. Sarcia:131
[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344]132 allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were
below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act
should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review. 133
(Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Liability; Imposable Penalty
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years
of age from criminal liability, unless the child is found to have acted with discernment, in which case,
"the appropriate proceedings" in accordance with the Act shall be observed. 134
We determine discernment in this wise:
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful
act.135 Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts
and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.136
xxx The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that
it was wrong.137 Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s cunning
and shrewdness.138
In the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that: "(1) choosing an isolated and dark place
to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the victim xxx, to weaken her defense" are
indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old appellant’s mental capacity to fully understand the
consequences of his unlawful action.139
Nonetheless, the corresponding imposable penalty should be modified.
The birth certificate of AAA140 shows that she was born on 3 December 1997. Considering that she was
only five (5) years old when appellant defiled her on 28 January 2003, the law prescribing the death
penalty when rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years old 141 applies.
The following, however, calls for the reduction of the penalty: (1) the prohibition against the imposition of
the penalty of death in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346; 142 and (2) the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority of the appellant, which has the effect of reducing the penalty one degree lower
than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.143
Relying on People v. Bon,144 the Court of Appeals excluded death from the graduation of penalties
provided in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code. 145 Consequently, in its appreciation of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority of appellant, it lowered the penalty one degree from reclusion
perpetua and sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum.146
We differ.
In a more recent case,147 the Court En Banc, through the Honorable Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de
Castro, clarified:
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for
purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, the proper imposable
penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.148 (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Civil Liability
We have consistently ruled that:
The litmus test xxx in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime
committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the
penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.149
120
Likewise, the fact that the offender was still a minor at the time he committed the crime has no bearing
on the gravity and extent of injury suffered by the victim and her family. 150 The respective awards of civil
indemnity and moral damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00 each are, therefore, proper. 151
Accordingly, despite the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which effectively
lowered the penalty by one degree, we affirm the damages awarded by the Court of Appeals in the
amount of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱75,000.00 as moral damages. And, consistent with
prevailing jurisprudence,152 the amount of exemplary damages should be increased from ₱25,000.00 to
₱30,000.00.
Automatic Suspension of Sentence; Duration; Appropriate Disposition after the Lapse of the Period of
Suspension of Sentence
Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law
notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the judgment of conviction is
pronounced. Thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age
at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict
with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of
age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
Applying Declarador v. Gubaton,153 which was promulgated on 18 August 2006, the Court of Appeals
held that, consistent with Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, 154 the aforestated
provision does not apply to one who has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.155
Meanwhile, on 10 September 2009, this Court promulgated the decision in Sarcia,156 overturning the
ruling in Gubaton. Thus:
The xxx provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child in conflict
with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC)
Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if,
among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of
statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No.
9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another
who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the
automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a
heinous crime.157
The legislative intent reflected in the Senate deliberations 158 on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005) further strengthened the new position of this Court to cover
heinous crimes in the application of the provision on the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in
conflict with the law. The pertinent portion of the deliberation reads:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have
committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be
recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council for
the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by [Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s] proposed Office of
Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests,
and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes,
the intention should still be the child’s restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied in
Sarcia.)159
On 24 November 2009, the Court En Banc promulgated the Revised Rule on Children in Conflict with
the Law, which reflected the same position.160
These developments notwithstanding, we find that the benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer
apply to appellant. The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflict with the law reaches
the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.161 Section 40162 of the law and Section 48163 of the Rule are
clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is now twenty-five (25) years old.
Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a
child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one
(21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be
entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that
he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community.
The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of conviction
is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of tender
age.
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with
Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.164
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. – A
child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training
facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination
with the DSWD.
Following the pronouncement in Sarcia,165 the case shall be remanded to the court of origin to effect
appellant’s confinement in an agricultrual camp or other training facility.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
00213 finding appellant Hermie M. Jacinto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the death penalty imposed on the appellant is
reduced to reclusion perpetua; and (2) appellant is ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The case is hereby
121
REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic
Act No. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
ALVIN JOSE, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 22289 affirming with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna,
Branch 36, convicting the accused therein of violation of Section 21(b), Article IV in relation to Section
29, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
The records show that Alvin Jose and Sonny Zarraga were charged with the said crime in an
Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about November 14, 1995, in the municipality of Calamba, Province of Laguna, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, not being licensed or authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to other person METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE
(or shabu) weighing 98.40 grams, a regulated drug, and in violation of the aforestated law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge.
As culled by the trial court, the evidence of the prosecution established the following:
… [O]n November 14, 1995, P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro of the Fourth Regional Narcotics Unit received
an information from an unnamed informant. Said unnamed informant was introduced to him by former
Narcom P/Senior Inspector Recomono. The information was that a big time group of drug pushers from
Greenhills will deliver 100 grams of shabu at Chowking Restaurant located at Brgy. Real, Calamba,
Laguna.
Acting on such report, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra was assigned to act as the poseur-buyer. SPO2
William Manglo and SPO2 Wilfredo Luna were the other members of the team. SPO1 Guevarra was
provided with marked money consisting of a ₱1,000.00 bill on top of a bundle of make-believe "money
bills" supposedly amounting to ₱100,000.00. P/Supt. Joseph R. Castro, SPO2 William Manglo and
Wilfredo Luna went to the place on a Mitsubishi Lancer while SPO1 Guevarra and the informant
boarded an L-300 van. They arrived at the Chowking Restaurant at about 11:00 in the morning. They
positioned their cars at the parking area where they had a commanding view of people going in and out
(TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 2-8 and TSN, July 11, 1996, pp. 4-7).
It was about 4 o’clock in the afternoon when a Toyota Corolla with Plate No. UBV-389 arrived. Sonny
Zarraga was the driver with Alvin Jose. The unnamed informant approached and talked to Sonny
Zarraga. Then, the informant called SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra and informed the latter that Sonny
Zarraga had with him 100 grams of shabu. SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra offered to buy the shabu. Sonny
Zarraga asked SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra if he had the money to buy 100 grams of shabu. Guevarra
responded in the affirmative. He showed the aforecited bundle of "money bills." Sonny Zarraga then
asked Alvin Jose to bring out the shabu and handover (sic) to Bonifacio Guevarra. SPO1 Bonifacio
Guevarra, in turn, handed the bundle of "money bills."
Guevarra scratched his head, the pre-arranged signal to signify that the transaction was consummated
(TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 3-8). Immediately thereafter, William Manglo and Wilfredo Luna approached
and introduced themselves as Narcom Operatives. They arrested Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose. The
buy-bust bundle of "money bills" and the shabu were recovered. The two were brought to Camp Vicente
Lim for investigation. Edgar Groyon conducted the investigation. The shabu was brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination (TSN, July 30, 1996, pp. 9-10 and TSN, October 3, 1996, pp. 9-13).
P/Senior Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo examined the shabu. She reported and testified that the
specimen, indeed, was a second or low grade methamphetamine hydrochloride (TSN, July 30, 1996,
pp. 31-36).4
On the other hand, the accused therein were able to establish the following facts:
Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose claimed that, on November 13, 1995, they were at SM Mega Mall (sic),
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, to change money. Suddenly, a person with a hand bag appeared and
ordered them to handcuff themselves. They were later able to identify three of these people as Police
Supt. Joseph Roxas Castro, SPO3 Noel Seno and a certain Corpuz. They were all in civilian clothes.
They proceeded to where Sonny Zarraga’s car was parked. Sonny Zarraga was forced to board another
car while another person drove Sonny Zarraga’s car with Alvin Jose as passenger. They drove towards
Greenhills. They were eventually blindfolded. On the way to Greenhills, one of the men opened the
gloves compartment of Sonny Zarraga’s car. One of the men saw a substance inside the said
compartment. He tasted it. Said person asked Sonny Zarraga if he could come up with ₱1.5 Million
peso (sic). Col. Castro even showed the picture of Sonny Zarraga’s mother-in-law who was supposed to
be a rich drug pusher.
They ended up inside a room with a lavatory. While inside the said room, Sonny Zarraga’s cellular
phone rung. It was a call from Sonny Zarraga’s wife. Col. Castro talked to Pinky Zarraga and asked her
if she could pay ₱1.5 Million as ransom for the release of Sonny Zarraga. Sonny Zarraga instead
offered to withdraw money from the bank in the amount of ₱75,000.00. The agreement was that in the
bank, Pinky Zarraga would withdraw the money and deliver it to Col. Castro in exchange for Sonny
Zarraga’s release. The agreement did not materialize. Col. Castro and Pinky Zarraga met inside the
bank but Pinky Zarraga refused to withdraw the money as Sonny Zarraga was nowhere to be seen.
There was a commotion inside the bank which prompted the bank manager to call the police.
122
Col. Castro left the bank in a hurry, passed by for Alvin Jose who was left at the room and brought them
to Camp Vicente Lim. There, they were investigated.1awphi1.nét
The defense claimed that SPO3 Noel Seno got Sonny Zarraga’s jewelry, ₱85,000.00 in cash and Sonny
Zarraga’s car spare tire, jack and accessories. Noel Seno was even able to withdraw the ₱2,000.00
using Sonny Zarraga’s ATM card.5
On June 10, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment convicting both accused of the crime charged and
sentencing each of them to an indeterminate penalty. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both the accused Sonny Zarraga and Alvin Jose guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, for violation of R.A. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, six (6) years and one (1) day to ten
(10) years.
Both accused are hereby ordered to pay the fine of ₱2 million each and to pay the cost of suit.
In the service of sentence, the preventive imprisonment undergone both by the accused shall be
credited in their favor.
Atty. Christopher R. Serrano, Branch Clerk of Court, is hereby ordered to deliver and surrender the
confiscated Methamphetamine Hydrochloride to the Dangerous Drugs Board.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellants averred that the trial court erred as follows:
I provided for in Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code. He avers that the prosecution was burdened to
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MERE PRESENTATION
OF THE SHABU IN COURT IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO FIND, WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY, THAT
THE APPELLANTS COMMITTED THE CRIME OF SELLING PROHIBITED DRUGS, ESPECIALLY
WHEN THE IDENTITY OF THE DRUG WAS NOT PARTICULARLY SET OUT IN THE TESTIMONY
OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
III
EVEN GRANTING THAT THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THE APPELLANTS GUILTY OF
THE CRIME CHARGED AGAINST THEM:
(a) THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT IMPOSE THE PROPER PENALTY AGAINST
THEM.
(b) EACH OF THE APPELLANTS CANNOT BE MADE TO PAY A FINE IN THE
AMOUNT OF ₱2 MILLION PESOS (SIC) AND THE COST OF THE SUIT.7
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision appealed from with modification. The appellate court
reduced the penalty imposed on appellant Alvin Jose, on its finding that he was only thirteen (13) years
old when he committed the crime; hence, he was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority and to a reduction of the penalty by two degrees. The appellant filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging that since the Information failed to allege that he acted with discernment when
the crime was committed and that the prosecution failed to prove the same, he should be acquitted. The
appellate court denied the motion.
Appellant Jose, now the petitioner, filed his petition for review on certiorari, alleging that –
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER DESPITE (1) THE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT PETITIONER,
WHO WAS ONLY 13 YEARS OLD WHEN THE CRIME WAS ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY HIM IN
CONSPIRACY WITH CO-ACCUSED SONNY ZARRAGA, ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT, AND (2)
THE ABSENCE OF A DECLARATION BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT PETITIONER SO ACTED WITH
DISCERNMENT, PURSUANT TO THE APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
AND THE ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.8
The petitioner asserts that, under paragraph 3, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine
(9) and under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime is exempt from
criminal liability unless he acted with discernment, in which case he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, as amended by P.D. No. 1179, as
allege in the Information and prove beyond reasonable doubt that he acted with discernment, but that
the prosecution failed to do so. The petitioner insists that the court is mandated to make a finding that
he acted with discernment under paragraph 1, Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code and since the CA
made no such finding, he is entitled to an acquittal.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that the allegation in the Information that
the petitioner and his co-accused conspired and confederated to sell the shabu subject of the
Information sufficiently avers that the petitioner acted with discernment; hence, there was no need for
the public prosecutor to allege specifically in the Information that the petitioner so acted. It contends that
it is not necessary for the trial and appellate courts to make an express finding that the petitioner acted
with discernment. It is enough that the very acts of the petitioner show that he acted knowingly and was
sufficiently possessed with judgment to know that the acts he committed were wrong.
The petition is meritorious.
Under Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code, a minor over nine years of age and under fifteen is
exempt from criminal liability if charged with a felony. The law applies even if such minor is charged with
a crime defined and penalized by a special penal law. In such case, it is the burden of the minor to
prove his age in order for him to be exempt from criminal liability. The reason for the exemption is that a
123
minor of such age is presumed lacking the mental element of a crime – the capacity to know what is Q Did his companion bring out the shabu?
wrong as distinguished from what is right or to determine the morality of human acts; wrong in the sense
in which the term is used in moral wrong.9 However, such presumption is rebuttable.10 For a minor at A Yes, Sir.
such an age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened 11 to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by
direct or circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what he was
doing and that it was wrong.12 Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the minor; Q What happened to the shabu?
his overt acts before, during and after the commission of the crime relative thereto; the nature of the
weapon used in the commission of the crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence A Alvin Jose handed the shabu to his companion Sonny Zarraga.
or his hiding the corpus delicti.
Q After that, what did Sonny Zarraga do with the shabu?
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner, who
was thirteen (13) years of age when the crime charged was committed, acted with discernment relative A He handed it to me, Sir.
to the sale of shabu to the poseur-buyer. The only evidence of the prosecution against the petitioner is
that he was in a car with his cousin, co-accused Sonny Zarraga, when the latter inquired from the
poseur-buyer, SPO1 Bonifacio Guevarra, if he could afford to buy shabu. SPO1 Guevarra replied in the Q After this shabu was handed to you, what happened next?
affirmative, after which the accused Zarraga called the petitioner to bring out and hand over the shabu
wrapped in plastic and white soft paper. The petitioner handed over the plastic containing the shabu to A After examining the shabu, I put it in my pocket and then I handed to him the money, Sir.
accused Zarraga, who handed the same to the poseur-buyer:
Q When you say money, which money are you referring to?
Q Whom did you approach to buy the shabu?
A The ₱1,000.00 bill with the bundle of boodle money, Sir.
A The two of them, Sir.
Q Now, after you handed the money to the accused, what happened next?
Q While the two of them was (sic) sitting inside the car, what did you tell them?
A I made signs to my companions, Sir.
A They asked me if I can afford to buy the 100 grams, Sir.
Q What signs did you give?
Q And what was your response?
A I acted upon our agreement by scratching my head, Sir.
A I answer in (sic) affirmative, Sir.
Q And how did your companions respond to your signal?
Q And what happened next?
A After scratching my head, my companions approached us and arrested them.
A After that I showed my money, Sir.
Q Now, tell us, do you know, in particular, who arrested Sonny Zarraga?
Q Now, tell us when you said they reply (sic) in the affirmative specifically…. I withdraw that.
A Yes, Sir.
Q When you said they asked you whether you can afford to buy 100 grams tell us who asked
you that question?
Q Tell us.

A Sonny Zarraga, Sir.

A SPO1 William Manglo and PO3 Wilfredo Luna, Sir.

Q And after you answer (sic) in the affirmative, what was his response?
Q Can you describe to us the manner by which Sonny Zarraga was arrested by these police
officers?
A He let his companion to (sic) bring out the shabu, Sir.

124
A Yes, Sir. A No, Sir.

Q Please tell us. Q Did you find out also the age of this Mr. Alvin Yamson?

A They introduced themselves as NARCOM operatives, Sir. A I don’t know the exact age, what I know is that he is a minor, Sir.

Q And after that, what happened? Q Eventually, you find (sic) out how old he is (sic)?

A They recovered the money from Sonny Zarraga, Sir. 13 A I don’t know, Sir.

… Q Mr. Guevarra, may I remind you that, in your affidavit, you stated the age of the boy?

Q What happened to the shabu which was handed to you by the accused? A I cannot recall anymore, Sir.

A It was brought by our office to the crime laboratory, Sir. Q Were you not surprised from just looking at the boy at his age, were you not surprised that a
young boy like that would be in a group selling drugs?
Q Who made the request for its examination?
FISCAL:
A SPO3 Edgar Groyon, Sir.
It calls for an opinion, Your Honor.
Q Earlier, you said that the shabu was handed to you. What did you do with the shabu?
ATTY. VERANO:
A While we were at the area, I handed it to SPO1 William Manglo, Sir.
May I ask, Your Honor, if he did not further interrogate why or how this very young boy (sic)
Q Tell us, when this shabu was handed to you by the accused, in what container was it selling 100 grams of shabu.
contained?
COURT:
A When it was handed to me by Sonny Zarraga it was wrapped in a plastic and white soft
paper, Sir.14 The witness may answer.

It was accused Zarraga who drove the car and transacted with the poseur-buyer relative to the WITNESS:
sale of shabu. It was also accused Zarraga who received the buy-money from the poseur-
buyer. Aside from bringing out and handing over the plastic bag to accused Zarraga, the A No more, Sir, because I know that young boys are being used by pushers.15
petitioner merely sat inside the car and had no other participation whatsoever in the transaction
between the accused Zarraga and the poseur-buyer. There is no evidence that the petitioner
knew what was inside the plastic and soft white paper before and at the time he handed over Even on cross-examination, the public prosecutor failed to elicit from the petitioner facts and
the same to his cousin. Indeed, the poseur-buyer did not bother to ask the petitioner his age circumstances showing his capacity to discern right from wrong. We quote the questions of the
because he knew that pushers used young boys in their transactions for illegal drugs. We public prosecutor on cross-examination and the petitioner’s answers thereto:
quote the testimony of the poseur-buyer:
FISCAL:
ATTY. VERANO:
Cross, Your Honor. May I proceed.
Q Did you try to find out if they were friends of your informant?
COURT:

125
Please proceed. A No, Sir.

FISCAL: Q And your cousin told him that your car was parked at the third level parking area of SM
Megamall, is that correct?
Q Mr. Witness, you started your narration that it started on November 13, 1995 and did I hear it
right that you went to Manuela at 5 o’clock in the afternoon? A Yes, Sir.

WITNESS: Q And at that time, that man did not make any radio call to anybody?

A Yes, Sir. A No, Sir.

Q Now, when you went to Manuela, you came from Filinvest, Quezon City? You left Filinvest, Q Until the time that you reached the third level parking of Megamall, he had not made any
Quezon City, at 12 o’clock? call?

A No, Sir. A No, Sir.

Q What time did you leave? Q And yet when you reach (sic) the third level parking of the Megamall, you claimed that there
was already this group which met you?
A After lunch, Sir.
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, on the second day which you claimed that you were in the custody of the police, you
said that at one occasion on that day, you have (sic) a chance to be with your cousin in a Q And this group were the policemen who are the companions of the male person who
[L]ancer car and it was inside that [L]ancer car when your cousin saw his own cellular phone arrested you?
on one of the seats of the car, is that correct?
A Yes, Sir.
A Yes, Sir.
Q Do you know the reason why they were there at that time?
Q Did your cousin tell you that that was his first opportunity to make a call to anybody since the
day that you were arrested? A No, Sir.

A He did not say anything, he just get (sic) the cellular phone.1a\^/phi1.net Q These people do not know your car?

Q Did you come to know the reason how that cellular phone appeared inside that [L]ancer car? A No, Sir.

A No, Sir. FISCAL:

Q Now, going back to the first day of your arrest. You said that you were accosted by a male No further question, Your Honor.
person at the workshop and then you went out of Megamall and when you went outside, this
man saw the key of the car dangling at the waist. At whose waist?
ATTY. VERANO:
A From my cousin.
No re-direct, Your Honor.
Q And at that time, that person did not have any knowledge where your car was?
COURT:

126
 Q Mr. Witness, earlier you stated that you are not a drug user nor have you seen any shabu. In
support of your claim, are you willing to submit yourself to an examination?
WITNESS:
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Are you willing to submit a sample of your urine to this Court?
A Yes, Sir.
COURT:
The witness is discharged.16
The claim of the OSG that the prosecution was able to prove that the petitioner conspired with his co-
accused to sell shabu to the poseur-buyer, and thereby proved the capacity of the petitioner to discern
right from wrong, is untenable. Conspiracy is defined as an agreement between two or more persons to
commit a crime and decide to commit it. Conspiracy presupposes capacity of the parties to such
conspiracy to discern what is right from what is wrong. Since the prosecution failed to prove that the
petitioner acted with discernment, it cannot thereby be concluded that he conspired with his co-accused.
Indeed, in People v. Estepano ,17 we held that:
Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish Rene’s mental capacity to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act. Moreover, its cross-examination of Rene did not, in any way, attempt
to show his discernment. He was merely asked about what he knew of the incident that transpired on 16
April 1991 and whether he participated therein. Accordingly, even if he was, indeed, a co-conspirator,
he would still be exempt from criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of non-
discernment on his part by virtue of his age. The cross-examination of Rene could have provided the
prosecution a good occasion to extract from him positive indicators of his capacity to discern. But, in this
regard, the government miserably squandered the opportunity to incriminate him. 181awphi1.nét
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 22289 which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna,
Branch 36, is SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for insufficiency of
evidence.19
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
JOERY DELIOLA Y BARRIDO, A.K.A. "JAKE DELIOLA", Accused-Appellant
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
On appeal is the 29 June 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC NO. 00435,
affirming the 22 December 2005 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Silay City, Negros
Occidental, in Criminal Case Nos. 5214-69 and 5215-69, which found accused-appellant Joery Deliola y
Barrido guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Statutory Rape, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in both cases.
Accused-appellant was charged with two (2) counts of Statutory Rape. The accusatory portions of the
Informations narrate:
Criminal Case No. 5214-69
That sometime in the month of June, 2002, in the Municipality of Manapla, Province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
15 years old, with the use of a bladed weapon, through force, threat and intimidation, with the attendant
qualifying aggravating circumstances of relationship and minority, the accused being the uncle of herein
victim who was less than eighteen (18) years of age, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of one [MMM],3 a minor, 11 years old, against her will, to the
damage and prejudice.4
Criminal Case No. 5215-69
That on or about the 1st day of July, 2002, in the Municipality of Manapla, Province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
15 years old, with the use of a bladed weapon, through force, threat and intimidation, with the attendant
qualifying aggravating circumstances of relationship and minority, the accused being the uncle of herein
victim who was less than eighteen (18) years of age, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of one [MMM], a minor, 11 years old, against her will, to the damage
and prejudice. 5
On arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of NOT GUILTY. 6 At the joint pre-trial 7 of the
cases, the following stipulation of facts were admitted: (1) that the court has jurisdiction over the case
(2) the identity of accused-appellant as the accused in the two criminal cases; (3) that accusedappellant
is the uncle of MMM; (4) that MMM, was 11 years old when the incidents giving rise to the present
criminal actions were allegedly committed; (5) that at the time of the incidents on June and 1 July 2002,
accused-appellant and Ml\1M were neighbors; (6) that MMM was then a grade school pupil; and (7) that
accused-appellant was not attending school at the time of the submitted incidents giving rise to these
criminal actions. Trial on the merits ensued afterwards.
The Facts
The facts culled from the records and as summarized by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
127
When the crime was committed, MMM was 11 years old,8 while the accused-appellant, MMM's uncle,9
was 15 years old. 10 The prosecution submits that sometime in the first week of June 2002, at about
three o'clock in the afternoon, MMM went to the nipa plantation to defecate but before she was able to
do so, accused-appellant, armed with a knife, suddenly appeared. He approached MMM, poked a knife
at her neck, ordered her to bend over, and took off her shorts and underwear. Fearing for her life, MMM
obeyed the orders of accused-appellant. MMM tried to resist but accused-appellant was still able to
force his penis inside MMM' s vagina. MMM felt pain and cried. After satisfying his lust, accused-
appellant put on his briefs and shorts then left. When she got home, MMM immediately took a bath and
noticed bloodstain on her underwear. Afraid of accusedappellant's threats of killing her, MMM kept mum
and did not disclose to anyone the tragedy that happened to her that day. 11
On or about the 1st day of July 2002, MMM was at the nipa plantation again when accused-appellant
suddenly arrived. He poked MMM's back with a knife and threatened to stab her unless she followed
accusedappellant' s orders. MMM was fearful and was left with no choice but to submit to accused-
appellant's commands. She was directed to bend over and to lower down her shorts and underwear.
While MMM was bending over and half naked, accused-appellant held the victim's waist and inserted
his penis into MMM's private part. MMM could not do anything but cry. Before leaving, he again
threatened to kill MMM if she would reveal what happened between them. 12
MMM still remained silent about her ordeal. However, about two. weeks after the second rape, MMM' s
grandmother noticed that there was something unusual in the way MMM was walking. This prompted
her to confront MMM. 13 Upon learning of what happened to MMM, the victim's aunt, brought the former
to the Municipal Health Office of Manapla, Negros Occidental for examination, 14 and thereafter to the
police authorities, before whom the victim executed her sworn statement. 15
Dr. Edbert Jayme (Dr. Jayme), the Municipal Health Officer who conducted a physical and internal
examination upon MMM, testified as an expert witness for the prosecution. Dr. Jayme's internal findings
showed that the victim had positive hyperemia of the vulva or congestion, redness, and swelling around
the area, which may have been caused by a blunt object such as the finger of the human being or an
erect penis. The victim was also found to have a positive incomplete hymenal laceration at 3:00 and
7:00 positions, which was similarly caused by a blunt object such as the finger of the human being or an
erect penis. 16 According to Dr. Jayme, the lacerations may have been inflicted within two weeks prior
to the examination since the lacerations were fresh. 17 Dr. Jayme also found that the victim's vagina
could admit two (2) fingers with ease, which is unusual for an 11-year old. 18 A Medical Certificate 19
dated 12 July 2002 was issued by the Municipal Health Center of Manapla.
As lone witness for the defense, accused-appellant denied raping the victim and claimed that he was
fishing with his grandfather during the times MMM was raped. 20 He testified that he is MMM's uncle
and that he was only fifteen years old when the alleged crime occurred.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On 22 December 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision finding accused-appellant guilty of two counts of
Statutory Rape. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Cases Nos. 5214-69 and 5215-69, this Court
finds accused, JOERY DELIOLA Y BARRIDO, AK.A. "JAKE DELIOLA", Guilty of the crimes of Rape, as
defined in A1iicle 266-A in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph 5, subparagraph 1, of Republic Act No.
8353, as his guilts had been established by the prosecution beyond any reasonable doubt.
Taking into consideration the privilege mitigating circumstance of minority, this Court, in Criminal Case
No. 5214-69, sentences accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, the same to be served by him at the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City,
Province of Rizal, Philippines. Accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, is, further, ordered
by this Court to pay minor, [MMM], the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as Moral
Damages, and the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), all in Philippine Currency, as
Exemplary Damages.
In Criminal Case No. 5215-69, this Court likewise sentences accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a.
Jake Deliola, to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, the same to be served by him at the National
Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City, Province of Rizal, Philippines. Accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a.
Jake Deliola, is, likewise, ordered by this Court to pay minor, [MMM], the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (₱50,000.00) as Moral Damages, and the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), all
in Philippine Currency, as Exemplary Damages.
Accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, is remanded to the custody of the Jail Warden of
the Provincial Jail of Negros Occidental, until he is finally committed to the National Penitentiary at
Muntinlupa City, Rizal.
In the service of the sentences imposed on him by this Court, accused named shall be given full credit
for the entire period of his detention pending trial. 21
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision dated 29 June 2011, affirmed the judgment of conviction
of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision insofar as the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of
accused-appellant Joery B. Deliola of the two crimes of rape in Criminal Cases No. 5214-69 and 5215-
69 is AFFIRMED. However, as accused-appellant Joery Deliola y Barrido is a child in conflict with the
law, the pronouncement of his sentence is hereby SUSPENDED and the case is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court,6th Judicial Region, Branch 69, Silay City, Negros Occidental, for appropriate
disposition in accordance with Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344. Accused-appellant is
CONDEMNED to pay the victim MMM: 1) In Criminal Case No. 5214-69, the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 for moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 for exemplary damages; and 2) In
Criminal Case No. 5215-69, the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000 for moral damages
and P30,000.00 for exemplary damages. 22
Accused-appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal. In a Resolution23 dated 27 February 2012, we
required the parties to submit their respective supplemental briefs. However, both parties manifested24
that they are dispensing with the filing of supplemental briefs and, instead, adopting their respective
briefs as supplemental briefs in this case.
Our Ruling
128
We find no reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the trial court, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. His defenses of denial and alibi are bereft of merit.
Statutory Rape
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Cod, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.25
define and punish Statutory Rape as follows:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed.- Rape is committed-
1) by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman x x x:
xxxx
d) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
Art. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim;
xxxx
Statutory rape is committed when the prosecution proves that: (l) the offended party is under 12 years of
age and (2) the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim, regardless of whether there was force,
threat or intimidation; whether the offended party was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether
it was done through fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the
victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse.26
The two elements were proven in the present case. The age of MMM was uncontested. In her Birth
Certificate,27 presented and admitted in open court, 28 it was indicated that she was born on 5 March
1991 and, thus, only eleven years old when the crime was committed. The only controversy left qefore
us is whether or not accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim.
Credibility of Witness
Accused-appellant tried to dispute MMM' s credibility by pointing out several inconsistencies in her
testimony. He argued that the victim testified that on the alleged second incident of rape, on 1 July
2002, she felt no pain and her vagina did not bleed. Accused-appellant maintains that such statement is
inconsistent with MMM's grandmother's claim that MMM was walking with great difficulty and pain.
Accused-appellant likewise argues that given the tender age of the victim, she could have felt pain, if
not suffered bleeding, even on the second incident of rape.
We disagree. It is carnal knowledge, not pain nor bleeding, which is essential to consummate rape. 29 It
is also possible for physiological manifestations of rape, such as pain, to appear only after the incident.
More importantly, the testimony of MMM's grandmother was just an observation on the victim's manner
of walking. It is baseless and unreasonable to put the victim's and the grandmother's testimonies side
by side and claim them to be inconsistent. Moreover, as consistently held by this Court, discrepancies
and inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching
upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair her credibility. If at all, they serve as proof that the
witness is not coached or rehearsed. 30
Accused-appellant also points out that Dr. Jayme's findings are not conclusive and that the non-intact
hymen of the victim could be congenita This argument is bereft of merit. The prime consideration in the
prosecution of rape is the victim's testimony, not necessarily the medical findings. Assuming arguendo
that the non-intact hymen of the victim is congenital, this Court has consistently held that the absence of
laceration in the hymen does not negate rape. 31 Apart from the findings of Dr. Jayme, MMM was
steadfast in testifying that accused-appellant raped her twice. When a rape victim's testimony is
straightforward and consistent despite grueling examination, it deserves full faith and confidence.32 The
victim's testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict.33
Accused-appellant likewise argues that the victim's claim that she was penetrated from behind is
contrary to human experience. We are not persuaded.1âwphi1 As correctly cited by the Court of
Appeals, the animal in man may come out when he commits rape such that it is not unlikely that in the
process of his immersion and transformation into another character, he would prefer to mate in the way
lower creatures do. 34
Accused-appellant further questions the fact that the v1ctnn did not attempt to escape from her captor
or even shout or call for help, and that she did not report the alleged rape to anyone after its occurrence.
However, as held in the case of People v. Rosales: 35
At any rate, it is an oft-repeated principle that not every witness to or victim of a crime can be expected
to act reasonably and conformably to the usual expectations of everyone. People may react differently
to the same situation. One person's spontaneous, or unthinking or even instinctive, response to a
horrible and repulsive stimulus may be aggression, while another's may be cold indifference. Yet, it can
never be successfully argued that the latter are any less sexual victims than the former. 36
Given the nature of the crime of rape, the credible, natural, and convincing testimony of the victim alone
may be sufficient to convict the accused, more so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal
findings of the examining physician. 37
MMM's testimony, positively identifying accused-appellant as the person who raped her is believable.
We uphold the ruling of the trial court on the credibility of MMM and the truthfulness of her testimonies,
to wit:
129
[MMM], though a minor, thirteen (13) years old at the time she took the stand, demonstrated to this
Court her capacity of observation, recollection, and communication. She showed that she can perceive,
and perceiving, can make known her perception to this Court as she clearly and capably related the
details of her sad and horrible experiences at the hands of the accused. She withstood a thorough and
exhaustive examination. There is no doubt that she is a competent witness. (Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 349 SCRA 451, G.R. No. 116372 January 18, 2001; People vs. Rama, 350 SCRA 266, G.R.
No. 136304, January 25, 2001). [MMM] gave a clear, straightforward, spontaneous, frank and
consistent narrative. It was a positive and credible account she presented before this Court. There was
not a motive ascribed or, in the very least, suggested by the defense that might have raised doubt on
her credibility and on the credibility of the statements she made before this Court.38
We find no reason to disturb the trial court's appreciation of MMM's testimony. Deeply entrenched in our
jurisprudence is the rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the
trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the
witness stand, a vantage point denied appellate courts; and when his findings have been affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.39
Furthermore, testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a woman or a girl-
child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
indeed committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.40 No young
woman would admit that she was raped, make public the offense and allow the examination of her
private parts undergo the troubles and humiliation of a public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to
all gory details, if she had not in fact been raped.41
Denial and Alibi as Inherently Weak Defenses
In contrast to MMM's direct, positive and categorical testimony and identification of her assailant,
accused-appellant's bare denial and alibi could not prevail. This Court has consistently held that: "denial
is an intrinsically weak defense which must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit
credibility. No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses,
for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove and for which reason it is generally rejected. For the alibi
to prosper, it is imperative that the accused establishes two elements: (1) he was not at the locus delicti
at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene at
the time of its commission.42 "Accused-appellant failed to establish these elements. His claim that at
the time of the alleged crime, he was at sea fishing with his grandfather was uncorroborated. For some
reason, he did not even present his grandfather Clemente Gabayeron to testify in court. As opposed to
MMM' s convincing recital of facts, accused-appellant's denial and alibi will not stand.
Time of commission
not an essential element
to establish rape
Lastly, accused-appellant argues that the Information43 stating that the first crime of rape was
committed "sometime in the month of June 2002" is not sufficiently explicit and certain as to inform him
of the date on which the criminal act was alleged to have been committed.
Accused-appellant is mistaken. This Court has repeatedly held that it is not incumbent upon the victim
to establish the date when she was raped for purposes of convicting the perpetrator.44 The date of
commission is not an essential element of the crime of rape; what is material is its occurrence. Thus,
there is no need to prove the exact date of comm1ss1on; an approximation thereof will suffice.45
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that accused-appellant's belated objection to the
Information cannot prosper, to wit:
Moreover, accused-appellant's counsel took active part in the trial by cross-examining the prosecution
witnesses on the particular dates and circumstances of the two offenses of rape as alleged in the
informations without prior objection to the validity or propriety of the informations. It is now too late in the
day for the accused-appellant to claim that any of the Informations was defective. Objections relating to
the form of the complaint or information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. If the appellant had
found the Information insufficient, he should have moved before arraignment either for a bill of
particulars, for him to be properly informed of the exact date of the alleged rape, or for the quashal of
the Information, on the ground that it did not conform with the prescribed form. 46
Penalty and Damages
To determine the appropriate penalty, we refer to the pertinent law on the matter. According to R.A. No.
9344,47 as amended:48
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - x x x
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her
birthdate.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment,
in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
To reiterate, the law says that a minor is fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary
of his/her birth date. In A.M. No. 02-l-18- SC49 dated November 24, 2009, the Supreme Court likewise
defined the age of criminal responsibility as the age when a child, fifteen (15) years and one (1) day old
or above but below eighteen (18) years of age, commits an offense with discernment.
Accused-appellant testified that he was born on 14 April 1987, 50 making him 15 years and 2 months
old when the crime was committed. We are now left with the question of whether or not accused-
appellant acted with discernment. In People v. Jacinto, 51 we explained that discernment is the mental
capacity of a minor to fully grasp the consequences of his act, known and determined by taking into
account all the facts and circumstances presented by the records in each case.
That the accused-appellant acted with discernment when he raped the victim is demonstrated by the
following surrounding circumstances: (1) the victim was a helpless minor; (2) accused-appellant secured
the consummation of the offense with a weapon; (3) he satisfied his lust by penetrating the victim from
130
behind; and (4) he threatened the victim not to report what happened. Taking all these facts into ROBERT REMIENDO y SIBLAWAN, Petitioner,
consideration, accusedappellant clearly knew that what he did was wrong. vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Considering that the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were alleged and proven
during trial, 52 accused-appellant shall be criminally liable for the crime of Qualified Statutory Rape. DECISION
However, given that accused-appellant was only 15 years old and 2 months when the crime was
committed, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should be appreciated; thus, the penalty NACHURA, J.:
next lower in degree than that prescribed by law shall be imposed. 53 In accordance with the controlling
jurisprudence on the matter,54 for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 2
we affirm the ruling of the lower courts and impose upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion dated November 16, 2007 and the Resolution 3 dated October 3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
perpetua. CA-G.R. CR No. 29316 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Robert Remiendo y Siblawan."

Although it is acknowleged that accused-appellant was qualified for suspension of sentence when he The case arose from the filing of two criminal informations, both dated March 10, 2008, against
committed the crime, Section 40 of R.A. 934455 provides that the same extends only until the child in petitioner Robert Remiendo y Siblawan (Remiendo), that read—
conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years old. Nevertheless, in extending
the application of RA No. 9344 to give meaning to the legislative intent of the said law, we ruled in Criminal Case No. 98-CR-2999
People v. Jacinto, 56 as cited in People v. Ancajas,57 that the promotion of the welfare of a child in
conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) That in or about the month of March 1997, at Badiwan, Municipality of Tuba, Benguet Province,
years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in order that he/she may be given the there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one [AAA], a girl below 12 years of
chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the community. 58 Thus, accused- age.
appellant is ordered to serve his sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities, in accordance with Section 51 59 of R.A. 9344.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,60 we modify the award of damages of the lower courts.1âwphi1
Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to indemnify MMM, the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity Criminal Case No. 98-CR-3000
for each count of rape, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape, and ₱75,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count of rape. The damages awarded shall earn interest at the legal rate That in or about the month of May 1997, at Badiwan, Municipality of Tuba, Benguet Province,
of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. 61 Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one [AAA], a girl below 12 years of
WHEREFORE, the 29 June 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC NO. 00435 age.
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.· Appellant JOERY DELIOLA Y BARRIDO, A.K.A. "JAKE
DELIOLA," is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Qualified Statutory Rape CONTRARY TO LAW.5
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape. Appellant is
ORDERED to indemnify MMM the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of rape,
Upon arraignment, Remiendo pled "not guilty" to both charges. After pretrial, a joint trial ensued before
₱75,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages for each
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet. Both the prosecution and the defense
count of rape. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%)
presented their respective evidence, summarized by the CA in its Decision, to wit:
per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

The prosecution presented the following version of facts:

The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Silay City, Branch 69 for its appropriate
action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
The complainant [AAA] was born on 16 February 1986. At the time of the commission of the offense,
she was a minor below 12 years of age. She knew accused-appellant Robert Remiendo as he was
SO ORDERED.
residing near the house where her family used to stay. Sometime in March 1997, she was sexually
assaulted by accused-appellant inside said house. On that day, her parents and brother left for work
after breakfast, and she was left alone in the house. Accused-appellant came in, pushed her into the
room, and threatened to kill her if she reported what happened. He undressed himself and the
complainant. The latter was standing and refused to remove her panty but she obliged when accused-
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appellant insisted. Then he made her lie on the bed and placed his penis in her vagina. The
complainant struggled, moved, and pushed accused-appellant. She felt pain when accused-appellant
inserted his penis into her vagina. She cried until accused-appellant left, but she did not shout because
accused-appellant warned her not to, or else he would kick her. She put on her clothes after accused-
appellant left. Her parents arrived in the afternoon but she did not tell them what happened to her
because her mother might whip her.
Sometime in May 1997, [AAA] was again sexually assaulted by accused-appellant, which took place in
the house of the latter. At that time, she was on her way to see her mother at her workplace after she
had lunch. When she passed by the house of accused-appellant, the latter pulled her into his house and
brought her into his room. She cried and shouted but accused-appellant told her to keep quiet. She
struggled but was helpless because accused-appellant was stronger. They were alone in the room.
Accused-appellant removed his clothes and told her to remove her panty. Afraid, she removed her
panty and was made to lie on the bed. Accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt
pain. She kept on moving but she could not push away accused-appellant. She moved her shoulders
and pushed accused-appellant with both hands but he was stronger. Afterwards, accused-appellant
moved away and threatened to kill her if she told anyone what happened. She responded that she
would not tell anyone. Later, she executed a sworn statement and identified accused-appellant as the
person who raped her.
Dr. Ronald R. Bandonill, Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)-Cordillera
Administrative Region, physically examined the complainant on 2 January 1998. Said medico-legal
officer testified that [AAA] was thirteen (13) years old and a Grade III pupil at Badiwan Tuba, Benguet at
the time of the examination. She was four feet and eleven inches (4’11") tall, weighed 78 pounds, fairly
nourished, and fairly developed. She was conscious, coherent, and cooperative. She was ambulatory
and had no extra-genital injuries. Upon examination of her genital area, he found old lacerations of the
hymen at 5:00 and 7:00 o’clock positions, which meant that her hymen was altered by a hard rigid
instrument. The lacerations were done more than three (3) months prior to the examination. To
determine the approximate size of the object that the hymenal opening could accommodate, he inserted
a test tube. The 2.5-centimeter diameter of said tube was admitted with ease by the hymenal orifice. He
noted that the vaginal walls were lax and the ridges inside were smothered. The complainant told him
that accused-appellant raped her. He presented a written report of his findings.
On 12 July 1998, psychiatrist Dr. Elsie I. Caducoy conducted an examination of the mental condition of
the complainant. The latter was also scheduled for psychological examination to be conducted by Elma
Buadken. The result of the examination showed that [AAA] is suffering from psychosis and organicity.
She has a below average intelligence quotient of 88, but not on the level of mental retardation. She can
perform simple tasks but needs guidance. As to her studies, she can hardly comprehend what is being
taught to her. Having psychosis means that her brain is afflicted with a disease. Her medical history
showed that she suffered head and body injuries brought about by being sideswiped by a motor vehicle
sometime in 1996. She was confined in the hospital for twelve (12) days. Said injuries substantially
contributed to her present condition. Organicity, on the other hand, means that the complainant suffers
from a cloud of memory, upward rolling of the eyeballs, stiffening of the extremities, loss of
consciousness, and epileptic seizures. Her psychosis occurs after seizure. She is not, however, insane.
During a seizure, she does not know what is going on, but afterwards she returns to her level of
consciousness. With regular medication, her seizures will be greatly minimized. During her interview,
the complainant had a seizure and the psychiatrist had to wait until her consciousness level returned.
The complainant then revealed that accused-appellant and a certain Reynoso Cera raped her. The
psychiatrist opined that during the rape, she did not have a seizure because if she had, she would not
have remembered what had happened. The fact that she was able to narrate what happened and who
raped her suggested that she was on her conscious level at such time. A written report of the foregoing
findings was submitted in court.
The defense presented the following version of facts:
Lea F. Chiwayan, thirteen (13) years old, testified that she was a friend, playmate, and neighbor of the
complainant. She testified that she and [AAA] played together and talked about their "crushes." The
complainant told Lea Chiwayan that she had a crush on accused-appellant. Sometime in April or May
1997, the complainant said that her brother had molested her, and that he and his father had sexual
intercourse with her in their house in Poyopoy, Tuba. Sometime in August 1997, the complainant
confided that Reynoso Cera raped her in his house. She told Lea Chiwayan that she did not feel
anything because she was used to having sexual intercourse with brother and father. One Saturday
afternoon, Lea Chiwayan and the complainant were playing when they saw accused-appellant going to
the basketball court near the church. They followed him and watched a basketball game. After the
game, Lea Chiwayan went home with the others while the complainant stayed behind. A few seconds
after they left, the complainant ran after them and told them that something happened between her and
accused-appellant. She said that accused-appellant pulled her towards the back of the church and had
sexual intercourse with her. The complainant later took back what she said because she was only
joking. She then asked Lea Chiwayan not to tell the accused-appellant. However, Lea Chiwayan told
accused-appellant what the complainant told them. Accused-appellant confronted the complainant. He
flicked a finger on her head, kicked and spanked her. He said, "what are you saying, why did I do that, if
I like and I do it, I’ll not do it with you, you should be ashamed of yourself." He then borrowed the vehicle
of a certain Junie, started the engine, and stepped on the gas such that the fumes from the exhaust
pipe were directed at the complainant. Later, Lea Chiwayan learned that [AAA] filed a case against
accused-appellant.
Dolores L. Daniel, Grade II teacher of [AAA] for the school year 1997-1998, testified that the latter was
unruly and a liar. The complainant would pick fights and steal money from her classmates. However, the
witness admitted that there was no written record in school that she reprimanded complainant for her
behavior. She knew that the complainant had an accident before.
Victor Daniel, a jitney operator, testified that accused-appellant was one of his drivers. He described
accused-appellant as a hardworking and industrious person. When he learned that Robert Remiendo
was accused of rape, he was outraged because he knew the daily activities of accused-appellant. The
latter could not have done such act under his strict supervision.
Accused-appellant testified that he knew the complainant, as she was a townmate of his mother. In
September 1996, he and his parents were then residing in Badiwan. When the complainant figured in
an accident at that time, he was the one who informed her parents. The first time he saw the
complainant was during the time when he was doing some repairs on his jitney. He saw the complainant
and her playmates go inside the jitney. He told them to alight from the vehicle. Sometime in June 1997,
he again saw the complainant and her sister playing inside the jitney. He told them to alight as they
were disturbing him. On the day he was playing basketball at the church grounds in Badiwan, Lea and
Emma Chiwayan approached him and asked him if it was true that he raped [AAA]. He asked where the
latter was and went to see her. Out of anger, he borrowed the vehicle of Junie, started the engine,
directed the exhaust pipe at the complainant, and revved the engine so the smoke would go straight to
her. He slapped her and said "if I would like someone, it would not be you because there are a lot of
girls better than you." During the Christmas party in Badiwan, he again saw the complainant roaming
132
around the dance area. He told her to get out as she irritated the people dancing. The complainant said
nothing and left the dance floor. Thereafter, he saw the complainant laughing and smiling. He learned
that he was charged with two (2) counts of rape when he received a subpoena issued by the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor in January 1998.61avvph!1
In its Joint Judgment7 dated October 27, 2004, the RTC found Remiendo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of statutory rape. The RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds ROBERT REMIENDO y SIBLAWAN guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape as charged in the Information docketed as Criminal
Case No. 98-CR-2999 and in the Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-CR-3000, and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum for each count of rape.
He shall further indemnify the offended party [AAA] the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) by
way of civil indemnity, the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) by way of moral damages, and
the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) by way of exemplary damages.
Pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 4-92-A of the Court Administrator, the Provincial Jail Warden of
Benguet Province is directed to immediately transfer the said accused, Robert Remiendo, to the
custody of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila after the expiration of fifteen (15)
days from date of promulgation unless otherwise ordered by this Court.
Let a copy of this Judgment be furnished the Provincial Jail Warden of Benguet Province for his
information, guidance and compliance.
SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, Remiendo interposed his appeal before the CA. In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the
RTC, modifying only the civil liability imposed upon Remiendo. The fallo of the CA Decision reads—
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Joint Judgment dated 27
October 2004 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet, is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION on the civil liability of accused-appellant. He is ordered to pay the complainant, for
each count of rape, the sum of (a) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, (b) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
and (c) ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.9
Remiendo moved to reconsider the November 16, 2007 Decision, but the CA denied the motion in its
October 3, 2008 Resolution; hence, this petition alleging that—
(a) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
COURT A QUO CONVICTING PETITIONER OF STATUTORY RAPE DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE TRUE AND REAL AGE OF THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.
(b) THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING PETITIONER THE
BENEFIT ACCORDED TO HIM BY REPUBLIC ACT 9344 KNOWN AS THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006 INCREASING THE AGE OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY.10
Remiendo questions his conviction for statutory rape despite the purported absence of competent proof
that AAA was below 12 years old at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes. According to him,
the Certificate of Live Birth of AAA offered by the prosecution during its formal offer of exhibits was not
admitted by the RTC in its Order11 dated September 14, 1999 because "it was neither identified by any
witness, nor marked as exhibit during the trial though reserved for marking during the pretrial." He
further posits that, on the basis of the testimonies of the defense witnesses and the Elementary School
Permanent Record,12 AAA was more than 12 years old in March and May 1997.
Considering that AAA was more than 12 years of age, Remiendo then questions her credibility as a
witness, claiming that she was smiling during her testimony; and that her failure to flee from the
situation, even taking off her panties herself, belies her charges of statutory rape against him.
We disagree.
As provided in Article 266-A (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, sexual intercourse with a girl below 12
years old is statutory rape. Its two elements are: (1) that the accused has carnal knowledge of a woman;
and (2) that the woman is below 12 years of age. Sexual congress with a girl under 12 years old is
always rape.13
As regards the appreciation of the age of a rape victim, the Court, in People v. Pruna,14 laid down the
following guidelines:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy
of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove
age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed
or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a
member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 12 years old;
133
 c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure
of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against
him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim. 15
In this case, the prosecution offered in evidence a certified true copy of AAA’s Certificate of Live Birth 16
as part of the testimonies of AAA and her mother that AAA was born on February 21, 1986. It was
reserved for marking as part of the exhibits for the prosecution, as shown in the Pretrial Order 17 dated
November 16, 1998. During the trial, in order to abbreviate the proceedings, the parties agreed to
stipulate on the testimony of AAA’s mother, specifically on the following facts:
1. That she is [BBB], the natural mother of [AAA], the victim in these two (2) Criminal Cases
Nos. 98-CR-2999 and 98-CR-3000;
2. That on January 5, 1998[,] she executed an affidavit-complaint for and on behalf of her
daughter which she subscribed before NBI agent Atty. Dave Alunan; and
3. That the subject matter of her sworn statement against Reynoso Cera and Robert Remiendo
is the alleged statutory rape against [AAA].18
And part of the affidavit-complaint of BBB is the statement that AAA was born on February 21, 1986. 19
A certificate of live birth is a public document that consists of entries (regarding the facts of birth) in
public records (Civil Registry) made in the performance of a duty by a public officer (Civil Registrar). As
such, it is prima facie evidence of the fact of birth of a child, 20 and it does not need authentication. It can
only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, despite the September 14,
1999 Order, the RTC correctly appreciated the same in its Joint Judgment.
Nevertheless, even assuming that the Certificate of Live Birth was not appreciated by the RTC, the
prosecution was able to establish that AAA was below 12 years old during the two occasions of rape per
the guidelines laid down in Pruna. It is significant to note that both AAA and BBB testified that AAA was
born on February 21, 1986. This fact was neither denied nor objected to by the defense. The argument
of Remiendo that the prosecution admitted in the course of trial that AAA’s birthday was February 21,
1984 cannot stand. As quoted by Remiendo in his petition—
Court:
Anyway, it is stated in that document that the birth date of [AAA] was February 21, 1983. Do you agree
that that is an entry there?
Pros. Suanding:
Yes, your honor. We agree, your honor.21
This statement cannot qualify as a judicial admission on the birth date of AAA. A judicial admission is an
admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case and it
dispenses with proof with respect to the matter or fact admitted. It may be contradicted only by showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. 22 In this case, what
was only admitted was that the entry of AAA’s date of birth appearing in her school record is February
21, 1983. There was no such admission that the said date was the correct birthday of AAA. And as
between the school record and the testimonies of AAA and her mother BBB, the latter must prevail.
As to the credibility of AAA as a witness, jurisprudence instructs us that the trial court’s assessment
deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight
of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity
to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better
position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.23
Testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence, inasmuch as no young
woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her
private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being the subject of a public trial, if she was not
motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet
exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she
claims is not true.24
What is more, AAA’s testimony of rape was corroborated by the NBI medico-legal examination showing
healed lacerations on her hymen. Hymenal lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best evidence
of forcible defloration. When the consistent and forthright testimony of a rape victim is consistent with
medical findings, there is sufficient basis to warrant a conclusion that the essential requisites of carnal
knowledge have been established. When there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part
of the rape victim to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a
crime, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.25 In this case,
Remiendo failed to convince us to rule otherwise.
Remiendo also posits that he should benefit from the mandate of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,
otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006.
The pertinent provision of R.A. No. 9344 reads –
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. – A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time
of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
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A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall be likewise exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.26
Remiendo argues that the prosecution failed to establish that he acted with discernment in the
commission of the crimes charged. Thus, he claims that he should be exempt from criminal liability.
We differ. Discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong.
The prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by evidence of physical
appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission of the act, but also after
and during the trial. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was
doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the
minor’s cunning and shrewdness.27
Culled from the records of this case, it is manifest that Remiendo acted with discernment, being able to
distinguish between right and wrong and knowing fully well the consequences of his acts against AAA.
During the rape that occurred in March 1997, Remiendo waited for AAA to be left alone at her house
before he came, and, while doing his dastardly act, threatened to kick her should she shout for help. In
May 1997, Remiendo again ravished AAA in the room of his house when the latter passed by and,
thereafter, threatened to kill her if she told anybody about what had just happened. Per his own
testimony, he knew that committing rape was wrong because he claimed to have been enraged when
he was asked by AAA’s playmates if he indeed raped AAA, to the point of slapping her and revving up
the engine of a jitney and directing the smoke from the exhaust pipe towards her.
Remiendo, being above 15 and under 18 years of age at the time of the rape, 28 and having acted with
discernment, but having already reached 21 years of age at the time of the imposition of his sentence
by the trial court, his claim for the benefits of R.A. No. 9344 is rendered moot and academic in view of
Section 4029 thereof which provides –
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. – If the court finds that the objective of
the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the
child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or
rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of
judgment.
If the child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order
execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain period or until the child
reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.30
Remiendo was born on January 21, 1982. The Joint Judgment was promulgated on October 27, 2004.
Thus, at the time of the imposition of his sentence, Remiendo was already 22 years old and could no
longer be considered a child for the purposes of the application of R.A. No. 9344.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the Decision dated November 16, 2007 and the Resolution
dated October 3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAXIMO MARALIT, defendant-appellant.
Claro M. Recto for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The appellant was convicted of homicide and sentenced to five (5) years of prision correccional, to the
accessories provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay
the costs:
We are satisfied that the defendant below, without justification, stabbed Florentino Luistro in the said
with a knife and caused his death.
Counsel for appellant vigorously and ably attacks the findings of fact of the trial court and attempts to
show that he should have accepted the testimony of the defense rather than that of the prosecution as a
basis for his conclusions. A careful examination of the evidence, however, fails to furnish sufficient
reasons to reverse the trial court on the facts. Two witnesses testified to the occurrence on behalf of the
prosecution and stated that they, with the deceased Florentino, were walking along in single file each
with a bundle of zacate on his head, Florentino bringing up the rear, when they met the defendant and a
companion. As they were passing each other they heard a sound similar to that made by the dropping
of one of the bundles of zacate. They instantly turned and saw Florentino and the defendant fighting
with their fists. They soon separated and Florentino, returning to his bundle of zacate, stooped to pick it
up when the defendant ran to him quickly and stabbed him in the left side with a knife. The defendant
and his companion then ran away. The witnesses and Florentino went home. Florentino died a few days
later as a result of the wound thus received.
The accused and his witness tell a different story, in which it is claimed that Florentino made an attack
upon the accused, after some sharp words had passed between them, and struck him several times
with a club; whereupon the accused, in self-defense, made use of his dagger with the effect already
noted.
Upon this evidence the trial court found with the witnesses for the prosecution. In spite of the insistent
argument of counsel for the appellant we must conclude on the record that there is no reason for a
reversal of the trial court with regard to its findings of fact.
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Counsel for appellant strenuously contends that the accused should be acquitted on the ground that the
prosecution did not prove that the accused, in stabbing the deceased, acted with discernment, that is,
with a full understanding of the nature and consequences of his act. This argument is based upon the
age of the accused and paragraph 3 of article 8 of the Penal Code.
The accused was less than 15 years of age at the time the crime was committed. The deceased was
less than 16, the certificate of death stating that his age was fifteen. The paragraph of article 8 referred
to provides that a person over 9 years of age and under 15 is exempt from criminal liability "unless he
has acted with discernment." That paragraph also provides that "in order to impose a penalty upon such
a person, . . . the court shall make an express finding upon this fact," that is, the fact that he acted with
discernment.
While counsel admits that the trial court found that the accused acted, in the commission of the crime,
with complete discernment, he contends that there is no evidence in the record upon which that finding
can be based, he alleging that it was the duty of the prosecution to prove that fact by affirmative
evidence.
We are satisfied that the contention of counsel is not well grounded in this particular case. It is true, as
counsel asserts, that it must appear from the evidence that the accused acted with knowledge of the
nature of his acts and of the results which would naturally follow therefrom; but to establish that fact it is
not necessary that some witness declare directly and in words that he acted with such knowledge. It is
sufficient that, from the evidence as a whole, it is a necessary inference that he so acted. The trial court
taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstance presented by the record, together with the
appearance of the accused as he stood and testified in court, drew the conclusion that he was of
sufficient intelligence and was sufficiently endowed with judgment to know that the act which he
committed was wrong and that it was likely to produce death. In pursuance of that conclusion the court
made the finding that the accused in committing the act complained of acted with discernment.
We are of the opinion, however, that the penalty imposed is not correct. Article 85 of the Penal Code
provides that —
In the case of minor of less than fifteen and over nine years of age, who is found by the court
to have acted with discernment, and, therefore, not being exempt from criminal liability, a
discretional penalty shall be imposed, provided that the same shall always be less by two
degrees, at least, than that prescribed by the law for the offense committed.
Following the provisions of this article the penalty imposed should have been two (2) years of prision
correccional instead of five years. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. So ordered.
Torres, Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAXIMO MARALIT, defendant-appellant.
Claro M. Recto for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
The appellant was convicted of homicide and sentenced to five (5) years of prision correccional, to the
accessories provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay
the costs:
We are satisfied that the defendant below, without justification, stabbed Florentino Luistro in the said
with a knife and caused his death.
Counsel for appellant vigorously and ably attacks the findings of fact of the trial court and attempts to
show that he should have accepted the testimony of the defense rather than that of the prosecution as a
basis for his conclusions. A careful examination of the evidence, however, fails to furnish sufficient
reasons to reverse the trial court on the facts. Two witnesses testified to the occurrence on behalf of the
prosecution and stated that they, with the deceased Florentino, were walking along in single file each
with a bundle of zacate on his head, Florentino bringing up the rear, when they met the defendant and a
companion. As they were passing each other they heard a sound similar to that made by the dropping
of one of the bundles of zacate. They instantly turned and saw Florentino and the defendant fighting
with their fists. They soon separated and Florentino, returning to his bundle of zacate, stooped to pick it
up when the defendant ran to him quickly and stabbed him in the left side with a knife. The defendant
and his companion then ran away. The witnesses and Florentino went home. Florentino died a few days
later as a result of the wound thus received.
The accused and his witness tell a different story, in which it is claimed that Florentino made an attack
upon the accused, after some sharp words had passed between them, and struck him several times
with a club; whereupon the accused, in self-defense, made use of his dagger with the effect already
noted.
Upon this evidence the trial court found with the witnesses for the prosecution. In spite of the insistent
argument of counsel for the appellant we must conclude on the record that there is no reason for a
reversal of the trial court with regard to its findings of fact.
Counsel for appellant strenuously contends that the accused should be acquitted on the ground that the
prosecution did not prove that the accused, in stabbing the deceased, acted with discernment, that is,
with a full understanding of the nature and consequences of his act. This argument is based upon the
age of the accused and paragraph 3 of article 8 of the Penal Code.
The accused was less than 15 years of age at the time the crime was committed. The deceased was
less than 16, the certificate of death stating that his age was fifteen. The paragraph of article 8 referred
to provides that a person over 9 years of age and under 15 is exempt from criminal liability "unless he
has acted with discernment." That paragraph also provides that "in order to impose a penalty upon such
a person, . . . the court shall make an express finding upon this fact," that is, the fact that he acted with
discernment.
136
While counsel admits that the trial court found that the accused acted, in the commission of the crime,
with complete discernment, he contends that there is no evidence in the record upon which that finding
can be based, he alleging that it was the duty of the prosecution to prove that fact by affirmative
evidence.
We are satisfied that the contention of counsel is not well grounded in this particular case. It is true, as
counsel asserts, that it must appear from the evidence that the accused acted with knowledge of the
nature of his acts and of the results which would naturally follow therefrom; but to establish that fact it is
not necessary that some witness declare directly and in words that he acted with such knowledge. It is
sufficient that, from the evidence as a whole, it is a necessary inference that he so acted. The trial court
taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstance presented by the record, together with the
appearance of the accused as he stood and testified in court, drew the conclusion that he was of
sufficient intelligence and was sufficiently endowed with judgment to know that the act which he
committed was wrong and that it was likely to produce death. In pursuance of that conclusion the court
made the finding that the accused in committing the act complained of acted with discernment.
We are of the opinion, however, that the penalty imposed is not correct. Article 85 of the Penal Code
provides that —
In the case of minor of less than fifteen and over nine years of age, who is found by the court
to have acted with discernment, and, therefore, not being exempt from criminal liability, a
discretional penalty shall be imposed, provided that the same shall always be less by two
degrees, at least, than that prescribed by the law for the offense committed.
Following the provisions of this article the penalty imposed should have been two (2) years of prision
correccional instead of five years. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. So ordered.
Torres, Carson, Trent and Araullo, JJ., concur.
VALCESAR ESTIOCA y MACAMAY, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,1 petitioner Valcesar Estioca
y Macamay prays for the reversal of the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00036
dated 30 June 2006, affirming with modification the Decision 3 and Order4 dated 5 April 2004 and 17
August 2004, respectively, of the Ozamiz City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, in Criminal Case
No. 3054, finding him guilty of robbery under Article 299, subdivision (a), number (2) of the Revised
Penal Code.
Culled from the records are the following facts:
On 31 July 2001, an Information5 was filed before the RTC charging petitioner, Marksale Bacus
(Bacus), Kevin Boniao (Boniao) and Emiliano Handoc (Handoc) with robbery, thus:
That on July 28, 2001, at about 8:00 o’clock in the morning, in the City of Ozamiz, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of
gain, did then and there helping one another, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously break,
destroy, and destroyed the padlock of the main door of the classroom of MS. SELINA M.
PANAL and once inside, the accused took, stole and carried away the following:
A. One (1) Panasonic Colored TV 14 worth P6,000.00;
B. One (1) Sharp Karaoke Tower Single Player color black worth P6,000.00; and
C. One (1) 3D Rota Aire Stand Fan color brown worth P3,000.00;
belonging to the Ozamiz City Central School represented herein by MS. SELINA M. PANAL, all
valued at P15,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of the said school thereof, in the
aforementioned sum of P15,000.00, Philippine Currency.
When arraigned on separate dates with the assistance of their counsels de oficio, petitioner, Bacus,
Boniao and Handoc pleaded "Not guilty" to the charge. 6 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Nico Alforque (Nico) and Mrs. Celina M. Panal (Mrs. Panal).
Their testimonies, woven together, bear the following:
On 28 July 2001 (Saturday), at about 8:00 in the morning, Nico, then eleven years old and a Grade VI
student of Ozamiz City Central School (OCCS), and his cousin, Mark Alforque (Mark), went to the
OCCS and cleaned the classroom of a teacher named Mrs. Myrna Pactolin (Mrs. Pactolin). They
received P30.00 each from Mrs. Pactolin for the chore. Afterwards, Mark went home while Nico stayed
inside the OCCS because Mrs. Pactolin requested him to get some "waya-waya" and "dapna" inside the
OCCS’s canal to be used as fish food.7
While catching waya-waya and dapna inside the OCCS’s canal, Nico saw petitioner and Bacus enter
the OCCS’s premises by climbing over the OCCS’s gate. Petitioner and Bacus then proceeded to the
classroom of another teacher, Mrs. Panal, which was located near the OCCS’s canal. Thereupon,
petitioner and Bacus destroyed the padlock of the classroom’s door using an iron bar and entered
therein. Subsequently, petitioner and Bacus walked out of the classroom carrying a television, a
karaoke and an electric fan, and thereafter brought them to the school gate. They went over the gate
with the items and handed them over to Boniao and Handoc who were positioned just outside the
OCCS’s gate. The items were placed inside a tricycle. After petitioner, Bacus and Boniao boarded the
tricycle, Handoc drove the same and they sped away.8
On the following day, 29 July 2001, Mrs. Panal went to the OCCS for a dance practice with her
students. She proceeded to her classroom and discovered that it was forcibly opened, and that the
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karaoke, television and electric fan therein were missing. She immediately reported the incident to the
police. The OCCS principal informed her that Nico witnessed the incident. Thereafter, petitioner, Bacus,
Boniao and Handoc were charged with robbery.9
The prosecution also submitted object evidence to buttress the testimonies of its witnesses, to wit: (1) a
T-shaped slightly curved iron bar, which is 10 mm. by 12 inches in size, used in destroying the padlock
of Mrs. Panal’s classroom and marked as Exhibit A; and (2) a Yeti brand, colored yellow, padlock used
in Mrs. Panal’s classroom, marked as Exhibit B.
For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of petitioner, Bacus, Rolly Agapay (Agapay), Boniao
and Handoc to refute the foregoing accusations. Petitioner and his co-accused denied any involvement
in the incident and interposed the defense of alibi.
Petitioner Estioca testified that on 28 July 2001, he cleaned his house located at Laurel Street, Ozamiz
City, from 8:00 in the morning up to 10:00 in the morning. After cleaning the house, he ate lunch and
rested. At around 3:00 in the afternoon of the same day, he went to the house of his neighbor/friend,
Junjun Ho (Junjun), to help the latter in cleaning his houseyard. However, Junjun’s father arrived, and
since the father and son had to discuss important things, he decided to go home which was about past
3:00 in the afternoon. Upon arriving home, his aunt, Myrna Macamay, told him that some people had
gone to the house looking for him. Later, two unidentified persons, accompanied by Boniao, came to his
house and brought him to the City Hall Police Station for investigation as regards the incident. 10
During the interrogation inside the police station, a certain Michael approached him and inquired as to
where he sold the television stolen from the OCCS. He told Michael not to accuse him of stealing as it is
not a good joke. Michael called Bacus and Boniao who were then standing nearby, and the two pointed
to him as the one who sold the television. Afterwards, one of the police officers therein told him to
approach a certain Colonel Bation who was also inside the police station. Upon approaching Colonel
Bation, the latter punched him in the stomach causing him to kneel down in pain. Colonel Bation asked
him where he sold the television but he told him he had nothing to do with it. Colonel Bation took a whip
and smacked him with it several times on the body. An emergency hospital worker named Dennis
Fuentes, who was also present, stripped him naked and burned his scrotum, chest and palm with
lighter, cigarette butts and matchsticks. Thereafter, he was jailed.11
Bacus, a resident of Barangay Lam-an, Ozamiz City, declared that on the night of 27 July 2001, he
slept at the guardhouse of the Ozamiz City National High School (OCNHS) which is located in front of
the OCCS. On the following day, 28 July 2001, at about 7:00 in the morning, he woke up and helped his
mother in selling bananas beside their house which is situated in front of the OCNHS. At about 11:00 in
the morning of the same day, while on his way to Barangay Tinago, Ozamiz City, to buy chicken feed, a
certain Michael Panal and an unidentified companion blocked his path and asked him if he was the one
who robbed the OCCS. He told the two that he had nothing to do with the incident. The two then
brought him to the nearby seashore where they were met by a group of persons headed by a certain
Maning. Thereupon, they tortured and beat him for refusing to admit involvement in the incident.
Subsequently, he was taken to the Ozamiz City Hall for investigation.12
Agapay, an OCNHS working student and a resident of the said school, narrated that he knows Bacus
because the latter resided in a house located just in front of the OCNHS; that he and Bacus usually
slept at the guardhouse of the OCNHS; that on the night of 27 July 2001, he and Bacus slept at the
guardhouse of the OCNHS; and that Bacus woke up on the following day, 28 July 2001, at about 8:30 in
the morning.13
Boniao, 14 years old and resident of Barangay Tinago, Ozamiz City, testified that on 28 July 2001, at
8:00 in the morning, he cleaned his parents’ house and thereafter watched television. On 30 July 2001,
at 7:00 in the morning, he and Bacus went to the OCCS to pick up plastic bottles scattered therein. After
gathering some plastic bottles, he and Bacus left the OCCS. While on their way home, a certain Leoncio
apprehended him and brought him to his parents’ house. Upon arriving home, his mother beat him and
forbade him to go out of the house. Subsequently, several persons went to his parents’ house and
arrested him. He was taken to a nearby port where he was asked to identify the persons involved in the
robbery of the OCCS. When he could not say anything about the incident, he was brought to the City
Hall Police Station where he was jailed.14
Handoc, a pedicab driver residing at Barangay Tinago, Ozamiz City, stated that he helped his brother-
in-law in quarrying gravel at Panay-ay Diot, Clarin, Misamis Occidental, on the whole morning of 28 July
2001; that he went back to Barangay Tinago, Ozamiz City, at about 4:00 in the afternoon of 28 July
2001; that Tomas Medina, the former barangay captain, arrested him and took him to the City Hall; that
police officers in the City Hall inquired as to where he sold the television stolen from the OCCS but he
replied that he had nothing to do with it; that he was repeatedly beaten by police officers for denying any
involvement in the incident; and that he was detained at the City Hall Jail. 15
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision on 5 April 2004 convicting petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and
Handoc of robbery under Article 299, subdivision (a), number (2), paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code. The trial court imposed on petitioner, Bacus and Handoc an indeterminate penalty ranging from
six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of
reclusion temporal as maximum. Since Boniao was a minor (14 years old) when he participated in the
heist, he was sentenced to a lower prison term of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years
and two months of prision correccional as maximum. They were also ordered to pay P15,000.00 as civil
liability. Nonetheless, the sentence meted out to Boniao was suspended and his commitment to the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) was ordered pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 603.16 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Valcesar Estioca y Macamay alias "Bango," Marksale Bacus
alias "Macoy," Emeliano Handoc y Bullares alias "Eming" and minor Kevin Boniao guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery defined and penalized under Article 299,
subsection (a), paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code and upon applying Art. 64, paragraph 1
of the Revised Penal Code and Indeterminate Sentence Law and Privileged Mitigating
Circumstance of two (2) degrees lower than that prescribed for by law (Art. 68, par. 1) unto
Kevin Boniao, a minor, who was 14 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, this
court hereby sentences them (a) Valcesar Estioca, Marksale Bacus, Emeliano Handoc to
suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as
minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as
maximum and (b) Kevin Boniao (minor) to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of Arresto Mayor
as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of Prision Correccional as maximum and all
of the accused to suffer the accessory penalty provided for by law, to indemnify the civil liability
of P15,000.00 and to pay the costs.
With respect to Kevin Boniao, the sentence imposed upon him is hereby suspended pursuant
to PD 603 as amended and he is therefore committed to the Department of Social Welfare and
138
 Development (DSWD) for reformation, otherwise if he is incorrigible, then the sentence shall be
imposed upon him by the court. The DSWD is hereby ordered to have close surveillance and
supervision upon him and to constantly observe the development of his behavior and to submit
to the court a report/recommendation on the matter as prescribed for by law.
The Order of this court dated August 20, 2001 is hereby cancelled and revoked.
The accused are entitled 4/5 of the time they were placed under preventive imprisonment.
The cash bond in the amount of P24,000 posted by accused Valcesar Estioca is hereby
cancelled and the same is ordered released and returned to the bondsman concerned. 17
Petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and Handoc filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Decision arguing
that there was no conspiracy among them and that the penalty imposed was erroneous. 18 On 17 August
2004, the RTC issued an Order partially granting the motion. 19 The trial court lowered the penalty
imposed on them but affirmed its earlier finding of conspiracy and conviction. It also ordered the DSWD
to release and turn over Boniao to his parents. It concluded:
WHEREFORE, as herein modified, the imposable indeterminate penalty meted to accused
Valcesar Estioca, Marksale Bacus and Emeliano Handoc being guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of he crime of Robbery, defined and penalized under paragraph 4 of Art. 299 of the
Revised Penal Code upon applying Indeterminate Sentence Law with paragraph 1 of Art. 64,
Revised Penal Code, ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum with
accessory penalty provided for by law; and for minor accused Kevin Boniao, the penalty of four
(4) months of arresto mayor upon applying the privileged mitigating circumstance in Art. 68,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code with Art. 64, paragraph 1 of the same Code. All of the
accused shall indemnify jointly the civil liability of P15,000.00 and to pay the costs.
As aforestated, minor accuser Kevin Boniao is hereby ordered released from DSWD and
returned to the custody of his parents.20
Unsatisfied, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision and Order before the Court of Appeals. 21 Bacus,
Boniao and Handoc did not appeal their conviction anymore. On 30 June 2006, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision affirming with modification the RTC Decision and Order. The appellate court
held that Boniao is exempt from criminal liability but his civil liability remains pursuant to Republic Act
No. 9344 otherwise known as The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, thus:
On a final note, considering that it is axiomatic that an appeal opens the entire case for review
and considering further that any decision rendered in the appeal does not bind those who did
not appeal except if beneficial to them, We hold that herein accused Kevin Boniao should be
acquitted and his criminal liability extinguished pursuant to Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise
known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, which took effect on May 22, 2006.
The pertinent provision thereof provides, thus:
"Sec. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. – A child fifteen (15) years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to Section 20 of this Act.
xxxx
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws."
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
Decision and the August 17, 2004 Order are hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification
that accused KEVIN BONIAO is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged pursuant to Section
6 of R.A. No. 9344, without prejudice to his civil liability.22
On 21 August 2006, petitioner filed the instant petition on the following grounds:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ALLEGED
ROBBERY WHICH HAPPENED ON BROAD DAY LIGHT AND IN THE PRESENCE OF
ALLEGED TWO (2) EYEWITNESSES UNDER HUMAN EXPERIENCE CAN POSSIBLY BE
PERPETUATED BY THE ACCUSED;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT ALLEGED LONE WITNESS NICO ALFORQUE COULD HAVE
POSSIBLY WITNESS[ED] THE ALLEGED ROBBERY INCIDENT.23
Simply put, the Court is called upon to determine whether the testimony of Nico is credible given the
surrounding circumstances of the incident.
Petitioner maintains that the testimony of Nico regarding the fact that the robbery was committed in
broad daylight (8:00 in the morning) and in full view of Nico is against human nature. He asserts that no
person would dare commit robbery in broad daylight and in the presence of other people because they
would be easily identified.24
Petitioner further claims that it was impossible for Nico to see petitioner and Bacus destroy the door of
Mrs. Panal’s classroom because, according to Nico’s own Affidavit, Nico was inside the classroom of
Mrs. Pactolin during the incident. He insists that the walls of Mrs. Pactolin’s classroom prevented Nico
from witnessing the incident.25
In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is guided by the following
well-settled principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the lower court, unless there
is a showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance that may affect the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the opportunity to examine their
139
demeanor when they testified on the witness stand; and (3) a witness who testifies in a clear, positive A: My cousin went home and I was left in the classroom because I was requested by my
and convincing manner is a credible witness.26 teacher to get fish food.

After carefully reviewing the evidence on record and applying the foregoing parameters to this case, we Q: What fish food are you talking about Mr. Witness?
find no cogent reason to overturn the factual finding of the RTC that Nico’s testimony is credible. As an
eyewitness to the incident, Nico positively identified petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and Handoc as those who A: Wayawaya and Dapna sir.
robbed the OCCS of an electric fan, television and karaoke on the morning of 28 July 2001. His direct
account of how petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and Handoc helped one another in robbing the OCCS is
candid and convincing, thus: Q: While getting the fishfood for your teacher, did you observed (sic) anything unusual that
happened?
Q: Now, on July 28, 2001 at about 8:00 o’clock in the morning, could you be kind enough to
tell us where were you at that time? A: Yes, sir.

A: We were cleaning the room of the school, sir. Q: Would you be kind enough to tell this Court now what did you observed (sic) that time
when you were getting the fishfood?
Q: What particular school are you referring to?
A: I saw somebody climbed the gate sir.
A: At Ozamis Central School, sir.
xxxx
Q: Would you be able to tell us the name of the teacher of that particular classroom you
were cleaning? Q: Where were you at that time Mr. Nico Alforque?

A: The classroom of Mrs. Pactolin, sir. A: I was inside the school sir.

Q: Why did you clean the classroom of Mrs. Pactolin, were you being paid? Q: What particular place are you referring?

A: Yes sir. A: Near the canal sir.

Q: How much? Q: And would you be able to tell us also how far were you when you saw these persons
climbing the gate?
A: P30.00 sir.
A: I was a little bit farther sir.
Q: Were you alone in cleaning the classroom of Mts. Pactolin at that time?
Q: After you saw the two persons climbing the gate, what happened after that?
A: We were two sir.
A: I saw that the padlock was opened.
Q: Would you be kind enough to tell this honorable court who was your companion at that
time? Q: What particular padlock are you referring to?

A: My cousin Mark Alforque sir. A: I saw a padlock made of iron.

Q: Now, after cleaning the classroom of Mrs. Pactolin together with Mark Alforque, what did Q: And what particular classroom or place were these persons you saw that they were
you do next? opening the padlock?

A: The classroom of Mrs. Celina Panal sir.

140
Q: Who is this Mrs. Celina Panal? COURT:

A: A teacher sir. Mark it.

Q: Would you be able to tell us whose classroom these persons you saw opening the TO WITNESS:
padlock?
Q: Now Mr. Nico Alforque, you said that there were two persons who opened the classroom
A: The classroom of Mrs. Panal sir. of Mrs. Celina Panal, would you kindly identify these persons if you can see them now in
court?
Q: Would you be able to tell us how did they opened (sic) the classroom of Mrs. Celina
Panal? A: Yes sir.

A: The room was opened with the used (sic) of an iron bar sir. Q: Would you kindly point to them if they are now here in court?

Q: I am showing to you this iron bar, what relation has this iron bar to the one you said a The witness is pointing to a person whom when asked of his name declared that he is Valcesar
while ago? Estioca.

A: That is the one used by the persons to open the classroom sir. A: And would you kindly tell us also the companion of Valcesar Estioca?

TO COURT: The witness is pointing to a person whose name is Marksale Bacus.

We would like to request your honor that this iron bar be marked as our Exh. "A." Q: These are the persons who destroyed the padlock of the classroom of Mrs. Celina
Panal?
COURT:
A: Yes sir.
Mark it.
Q: After destroying the padlock Mr. Nico Alforque, what did you observed?
TO WITNESS:
A: I saw that they brought out the colored TV, the Karaoke and the Electric Fan.
Q: And what about the padlock, would you be able to identify the padlock that was used (sic)
by these persons? Q: You said that these persons after destroying the padlock, took the colored TV, the
Karaoke and the Electric Fan, where did they go?
A: Yes sir.
A: After taking these things, they went out of the classroom sir.
Q: I am showing to you this padlock, would you kindly tell this Court what relation this
padlock to the one you stated a while ago? Q: And after going out of the classroom where did they go?

A: That is the padlock used (sic) by them sir. A: They went to the gate sir.

TO COURT: Q: And at the gate, what did you observed (sic) if any?

For identification purposes your honor, May I respectfully request that this padlock be A: I saw that there was another person sir.
marked as Exh. "B."
Q: And what was this person doing at the gate?
141
A: They passed on the things through the person at the gate sir. COURT:

Q: To whom did these persons passed these things at the gate? Q: Whose tricycle?

The witness is pointing to a man whose name is Kevin Boniao. The witness is pointing to Emeliano Handoc.27

Q: What else did you observed (sic) at the gate? Mrs. Panal corroborated the foregoing testimony of Nico on relevant points.28

A: I saw that there is another person. The foregoing testimonies are consistent with the object evidence submitted by the prosecution. The
RTC and the Court of Appeals found the testimonies of Nico and Mrs. Panal to be truthful and
Q: Who was that person? unequivocal and, as such, prevailed over the denial and alibi of petitioner and his cohorts. Both courts
also found no ill motive on the part of Nico and Mrs. Panal.
The witness is pointing to accused Emeliano Handoc.
It is not incredible or against human nature for petitioner and his companions to have committed the
robbery in broad daylight and in full view of Nico. There is no standard behavior of criminals before,
Q: And what was Emeliano Handoc doing at the gate Mr. Nico Alforque? during and after the commission of a crime.29 Some may be so bold and daring in committing a crime in
broad daylight and in full view of other persons. Others may be so cunning such that they commit crime
A: He was waiting at the gate sir. in the darkness of the night to avoid detection and arrest by peace officers.30

Q: Now after you saw these persons, what were the two accused doing at the gate when In People v. Toledo, Sr.,31 we sustained the credibility of the eyewitness and upheld the conviction of
they passed the things to Kevin Boniao? the accused for homicide despite the circumstances existing at the crime scene -- broad daylight, full
view of many persons inside the school compound, and presence of inhabited houses. It was also ruled
A: They were riding the tricycle sir. that crimes may be committed in broad daylight and that criminals are not expected to be logical or to
act normally in executing their felonious designs because committing a crime itself is not logical or
reasonable, viz:
Q: Could you be able to tell us who was driving the tricycle?
Appellant [accused] also asserts that the testimony of Ronnie [eyewitness] was inherently
The witness is pointing to Emeliano Handoc. improbable. He insists that the circumstances existing at the crime scene -- broad
daylight, full view of many persons inside the school compound, presence of inhabited
Q: And after seeing these persons what did you observed (sic) after that? houses around the purok -- were such that a crime could not be committed.

A: I did not see anything because I went away sir. For a number of reasons, we find no merit in this contention. First, appellant’s premise that
there were many persons in the school compound is not supported by the evidence on record.
Second, crimes are known to have been committed in broad daylight within the vicinity
Q: You mean to say that all those persons went away when you went away?
of inhabited houses. Third, although it would be illogical and unreasonable for normal
persons in full control of their faculties to commit a crime under such circumstances,
A: Yes sir. the same does not hold true for all, especially those under the grip of criminal impulses.
We cannot expect the mind of such persons to work within the parameters of what is
Q: They went together, is that what you mean? normal, logical or reasonable, as the commission of a crime is not normal, logical or
reasonable. Hence, the circumstances present in this case do not rule out appellant’s
commission of the crime.32
A: Yes sir.

Besides, as aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General,33 it is not improbable for petitioner and
Q: Are they walking or riding?
his cohorts to have committed the robbery as narrated by Nico because it happened on a Saturday, a
non-school day in the OCCS. Apparently, petitioner and his companions expected that none or only few
A: They were riding in a tricycle sir. persons would go to the OCCS on said date.

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A perusal of the transcript of stenographic notes shows that Nico was in a canal located inside the A: Yes sir.
OCCS catching waya-waya and dapna when he saw the incident, and was not inside the enclosed
classroom of Mrs. Pactolin as alleged by petitioner.34 Nico declared that he clearly saw the incident and Q: What about those two persons you saw entering the room of Mrs. Panal where did they
that nothing blocked his vision.35 Nico remained steadfast and consistent in his foregoing testimony go?
even on cross examination, thus:
A: They went out sir.36
Q: From the place where you were gathering fishfood at that time you cannot clearly see the
room of Mrs. Panal, am I right?
The alleged inconsistency between the affidavit of Nico and his court testimony is inconsequential.
Inconsistencies between the sworn statement or affidavit and direct testimony given in open court do
A: I can see it clearly sir. not necessarily discredit the witness since an affidavit, being taken ex parte, is oftentimes incomplete
and is generally regarded as inferior to the testimony of the witness in open court. Judicial notice can be
Q: You have not seen what were those persons doing inside the room of Mrs. Panal? taken of the fact that testimonies given during trial are much more exact and elaborate than those stated
in sworn statements, usually being incomplete and inaccurate for a variety of reasons, at times because
A: I saw them sir. of partial and innocent suggestions or for want of specific inquiries. Additionally, an extrajudicial
statement or affidavit is generally not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiant’s statement; hence, omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are
Q: You saw them taking away the Colored TV, Karaoke and the Electric Fan? not infrequent. Indeed, the prosecution witnesses’ direct and categorical declarations on the witness
stand are superior to their extrajudicial statements.37
A: Yes sir.
Since we find no error in the factual finding of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the
Q: Who among them took with him the TV? testimony of eyewitness Nico is credible, then the judgment of conviction against petitioner, Bacus,
Boniao, and Handoc should be affirmed. The positive and credible testimony of a lone eyewitness, such
The witness is pointing to Valcesar Estioca. as Nico, is sufficient to support a conviction.38

Q: Aside from the TV he also carry away with him the Electric Fan and Karaoke? We shall now determine the propriety of the penalties imposed on petitioner, Bacus, Boniao and
Handoc.

A: It was his companion sir.

Article 299, subdivision (a), number (2), paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
penalty for robbery with use of force upon things where the value of the property taken exceeds
xxxx P250.00 and the offender does not carry arms, as in this case, is prision mayor. Since no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance was alleged and proven in this case, the penalty becomes prision mayor in its
Q: Now at the gate you saw how many persons aside from that two who entered the room of medium period in accordance with Article 64, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Applying the
Mrs. Panal? Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of the penalty now is prision correccional in any of its periods as
minimum to prision mayor medium as its maximum. Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were
correct in imposing on petitioner, Bacus and Handoc, a prison term of four years, two months, and one
A: I saw three persons sir.
day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum,
because it is within the aforesaid range of penalty.
Q: Was these three persons outside the gate or inside the gate?
With regard to Boniao, who was a minor (14 years old) at the time he committed the robbery, Article 68,
A: They were inside the gate sir. paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code instructs that the penalty imposable on him, which is prision
mayor, shall be lowered by two degrees. The RTC, therefore, acted accordingly in sentencing him to
Q: And that was the time you saw the TV, Karaoke and Electric Fan turned over to those four months of arresto mayor.
persons at the gate?
Nonetheless, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Boniao, who was barely 14 years of age at the
A: Yes sir. time he committed the crime, should be exempt from criminal liability and should be released to the
custody of his parents or guardian pursuant to Sections 6 and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise
known as The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, to wit:
Q: After that, those three persons left the place?

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 SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. – A child fifteen years of age or under at
the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However,
the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
xxxx
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
Sec. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility. – If it has been determined that the
child taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the authority which will have an initial
contact with the child has the duty to immediately release the child to the custody of his/her
parents or guardian, or in the absence thereof, the child’s nearest relative. Said authority shall
give notice to the local social welfare and development officer who will determine the
appropriate programs in consultation with the child and to the person having custody over the
child. If the parents, guardians or nearest relatives cannot be located, or if they refuse to take
custody, the child may be released to any of the following: a duly registered nongovernmental
or religious organization; a barangay official or a member of the Barangay Council for the
Protection of Children (BCPC); a local social welfare and development officer; or, when and
where appropriate, the DSWD. If the child referred to herein has been found by the Local
Social Welfare and Development Office to be abandoned, neglected or abused by his parents,
or in the event that the parents will not comply with the prevention program, the proper petition
for involuntary commitment shall be filed by the DSWD or the Local Social Welfare and
Development Office pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as "The Child
and Youth Welfare Code."
Although the crime was committed on 28 July 2001 and Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only on 20
May 2006, the said law should be given retroactive effect in favor of Boniao who was not shown to be a
habitual criminal.39 This is based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Retroactive effect of penal laws. – Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule
5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence
has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
However, as Boniao’s civil liability is not extinguished pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 6,
Republic Act No. 9344, Boniao should be held jointly liable with petitioner, Bacus, and Handoc for the
payment of civil liability in the amount of P15,000.00 representing the stolen items.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 June 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 00036 is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition of Robert Sierra y Caneda (petitioner) for the review on certiorari1 of the
Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals4 (CA) that affirmed with modification his conviction for
the crime of qualified rape rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 159, Pasig City, in its
decision of April 5, 2006.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA5 was playing with her friend BBB in the second floor of her
family’s house in Palatiw, Pasig. The petitioner arrived holding a knife and told AAA and BBB that he
wanted to play with them. The petitioner then undressed BBB and had sexual intercourse with her.
Afterwards, he turned to AAA, undressed her, and also had sexual intercourse with her by inserting his
male organ into hers. The petitioner warned AAA not to tell anybody of what they did.
AAA subsequently disclosed the incident to Elena Gallano (her teacher) and to Dolores Mangantula (the
parent of a classmate), who both accompanied AAA to the barangay office. AAA was later subjected to
physical examination that revealed a laceration on her hymen consistent with her claim of sexual abuse.
On the basis of the complaint and the physical findings, the petitioner was charged with rape under the
following Information:
On or about August 5, 2000, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, a minor, 15 years old, with lewd designs and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his (accused) sister,
AAA, thirteen years of age, against the latter’s will and consent.
Contrary to law.6
The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge and raised the defenses of denial and alibi. He claimed
that he was selling cigarettes at the time of the alleged rape. He also claimed that AAA only invented
her story because she bore him a grudge for the beatings he gave her. The parties’ mother (CCC)
supported the petitioner’s story; she also stated that AAA was a troublemaker. Both CCC and son
testified that the petitioner was fifteen (15) years old when the alleged incident happened. 7
The defense also presented BBB who denied that the petitioner raped her; she confirmed the
petitioner’s claim that AAA bore her brother a grudge.
On April 5, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified rape as follows:
144
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape (Violation of R.A. 8353 in relation to SC A.M. 99-
1-13) and hereby sentences the said juvenile in conflict with law to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the victim the amount of ₱75,000 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000 as
moral damages, and ₱25,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.8
The petitioner elevated this RTC decision to the CA by attacking AAA’s credibility. He also invoked
paragraph 1, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) 9 to exempt him from
criminal liability considering that he was only 15 years old at the time the crime was committed.
The CA nevertheless affirmed the petitioner’s conviction with modification as to penalty as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that the trial court did not err in convicting Robert Sierra, the assailed Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Robert Sierra has to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
RECLUSION TEMPORAL MAXIMUM. The award of damages are likewise affirmed.
SO ORDERED.10
In ruling that the petitioner was not exempt from criminal liability, the CA held:
As to the penalty, We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that Robert is not exempt from
liability. First, it was not clearly established and proved by the defense that Robert was 15 years old or
below at the time of the commission of the crime. It was incumbent for the defense to present Robert’s
birth certificate if it was to invoke Section 64 of Republic Act No. 9344. Neither is the suspension of
sentence available to Robert as the Supreme Court, in one case, clarified that:
We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006. Section 38 of the law
reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age
at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict
with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court
shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law.
The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the
suspension of sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is already 18 years of age or more at
the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. The other disqualifications in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603,
as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not been deleted from Section 38 of
Republic Act No. 9344. Evidently, the intention of Congress was to maintain the other disqualifications
as provided in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.
Hence, juveniles who have been convicted of a crime the imposable penalty for which is reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death or death, are disqualified from having their
sentences suspended.11
The CA denied the petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration; hence, the present petition.
THE ISSUES
The petitioner no longer assails the prosecution’s evidence on his guilt of the crime charged; what he
now assails is the failure of the CA to apply paragraph 1, Section 612 of R.A. No. 9344 under the
following issues:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the provisions of R.A. No. 9344 on the
petitioner’s exemption from criminal liability;
(2) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that it was incumbent for the defense to present the
petitioner’s birth certificate to invoke Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 when the burden of proving
his age lies with the prosecution by express provisions of R.A. No. 9344; and
(3) Whether or not the CA erred in applying the ruling in Declarador v. Hon. Gubaton 13 thereby
denying the petitioner the benefit of exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344.
The threshold issue in this case is the determination of who bears the burden of proof for purposes of
determining exemption from criminal liability based on the age of the petitioner at the time the crime was
committed.
The petitioner posits that the burden of proof should be on the prosecution as the party who stands to
lose the case if no evidence is presented to show that the petitioner was not a 15-year old minor entitled
to the exempting benefit provided under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344. 14 He additionally claims that
Sections 3,15 7,16 and 6817 of the law also provide a presumption of minority in favor of a child in conflict
with the law, so that any doubt regarding his age should be resolved in his favor.
The petitioner further submits that the undisputed facts and evidence on record – specifically: the
allegation of the Information, the testimonies of the petitioner and CCC that the prosecution never
objected to, and the findings of the RTC – established that he was not more than 15 years old at the
time of the commission of the crime.
The People’s Comment, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), counters that the burden
belongs to the petitioner who should have presented his birth certificate or other documentary evidence
proving that his age was 15 years or below. The OSG also stressed that while petitioner is presumed to
be a minor, he is disqualified to have his sentence suspended following the ruling in Declarador v. Hon.
Gubaton.18
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THE COURT’S RULING
We grant the petition.
We examine at the outset the prosecution’s evidence and the findings of the lower courts on the
petitioner’s guilt, since the petition opens the whole case for review and the issues before us are
predicated on the petitioner’s guilt of the crime charged. A determination of guilt is likewise relevant
under the terms of R.A. No. 9344 since its exempting effect is only on the criminal, not on the civil,
liability.
We see no compelling reason, after examination of the CA decision and the records of the case, to
deviate from the lower courts’ findings of guilt. The records show that the prosecution established all the
elements of the crime charged through the credible testimony of AAA and the other corroborating
evidence; sexual intercourse did indeed take place as the information charged. 19 As against AAA’s
testimony, the petitioner could only raise the defenses of denial and alibi – defenses that, in a long line
of cases, we have held to be inherently weak unless supported by clear and convincing evidence; the
petitioner failed to present this required evidentiary support.20 We have held, too, that as negative
defenses, denial and alibi cannot prevail over the credible and positive testimony of the complainant.21
We sustain the lower courts on the issue of credibility, as we see no compelling reason to doubt the
validity of their conclusions in this regard.
While the defense, on appeal, raises a new ground – i.e., exemption from criminal liability under R.A.
No. 9344 – that implies an admission of guilt, this consideration in no way swayed the conclusion we
made above, as the defense is entitled to present all alternative defenses available to it, even
inconsistent ones. We note, too, that the defense’s claim of exemption from liability was made for the
first time in its appeal to the CA. While this may initially imply an essential change of theory that is
usually disallowed on appeal for reasons of fairness, 22 no essential change is really involved as the
claim for exemption from liability is not incompatible with the evidence submitted below and with the
lower courts’ conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. An exempting circumstance,
by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the accused is freed from criminal liability;
in other words, the accused committed a crime, but he cannot be held criminally liable therefor because
of an exemption granted by law. In admitting this type of defense on appeal, we are not unmindful, too,
that the appeal of a criminal case (even one made under Rule 45) opens the whole case for review,
even on questions that the parties did not raise. 23 By mandate of the Constitution, no less, we are
bound to look into every circumstance and resolve every doubt in favor of the accused. 24 It is with these
considerations in mind and in obedience to the direct and more specific commands of R.A. No. 9344 on
how the cases of children in conflict with the law should be handled that we rule in this Rule 45 petition.
We find a review of the facts of the present case and of the applicable law on exemption from liability
compelling because of the patent errors the CA committed in these regards. Specifically, the CA’s
findings of fact on the issues of age and minority, premised on the supposed absence of evidence, are
contradicted by the evidence on record; it also manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 25
In tackling the issues of age and minority, we stress at the outset that the ages of both the petitioner and
the complaining victim are material and are at issue. The age of the petitioner is critical for purposes of
his entitlement to exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344, while the age of the latter is
material in characterizing the crime committed and in considering the resulting civil liability that R.A. No.
9344 does not remove.
Minority as an Exempting Circumstance
R.A. No. 9344 was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and took effect on May 20, 2006. Its intent is to
promote and protect the rights of a child in conflict with the law or a child at risk by providing a system
that would ensure that children are dealt with in a manner appropriate to their well-being through a
variety of disposition measures such as care, guidance and supervision orders, counseling, probation,
foster care, education and vocational training programs and other alternatives to institutional care.26
More importantly in the context of this case, this law modifies as well the minimum age limit of criminal
irresponsibility for minor offenders; it changed what paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended, previously provided – i.e., from "under nine years of age" and "above
nine years of age and under fifteen" (who acted without discernment) – to "fifteen years old or under"
and "above fifteen but below 18" (who acted without discernment) in determining exemption from
criminal liability. In providing exemption, the new law – as the old paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 12 of the
RPC did – presumes that the minor offenders completely lack the intelligence to distinguish right from
wrong, so that their acts are deemed involuntary ones for which they cannot be held accountable. 27 The
current law also drew its changes from the principle of restorative justice that it espouses; it considers
the ages 9 to 15 years as formative years and gives minors of these ages a chance to right their wrong
through diversion and intervention measures.28
In the present case, the petitioner claims total exemption from criminal liability because he was not more
than 15 years old at the time the rape took place. The CA disbelieved this claim for the petitioner’s
failure to present his birth certificate as required by Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344. 29 The CA also found
him disqualified to avail of a suspension of sentence because the imposable penalty for the crime of
rape is reclusion perpetua to death.
Burden of Proof
Burden of proof, under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence, refers to the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue in order to establish his or her claim or defense. In a criminal
case, the burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused falls upon the prosecution which has the
duty to prove all the essential ingredients of the crime. The prosecution completes its case as soon as it
has presented the evidence it believes is sufficient to prove the required elements. At this point, the
burden of evidence shifts to the defense to disprove what the prosecution has shown by evidence, or to
prove by evidence the circumstances showing that the accused did not commit the crime charged or
cannot otherwise be held liable therefor. In the present case, the prosecution completed its evidence
and had done everything that the law requires it to do. The burden of evidence has now shifted to the
defense which now claims, by an affirmative defense, that the accused, even if guilty, should be exempt
from criminal liability because of his age when he committed the crime. The defense, therefore, not the
prosecution, has the burden of showing by evidence that the petitioner was 15 years old or less when
he committed the rape charged.30
This conclusion can also be reached by considering that minority and age are not elements of the crime
of rape; the prosecution therefore has no duty to prove these circumstances. To impose the burden of
proof on the prosecution would make minority and age integral elements of the crime when clearly they
146
are not. 31 If the prosecution has a burden related to age, this burden relates to proof of the age of the
victim as a circumstance that qualifies the crime of rape.32
Testimonial Evidence is Competent Evidence
to Prove the Accused’s Minority and Age
The CA seriously erred when it rejected testimonial evidence showing that the petitioner was only 15
years old at the time he committed the crime. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 expressly states how the age
of a child in conflict with the law may be determined:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents,
age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the
physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child,
it shall be resolved in his/her favor. [Emphasis supplied]
Rule 30-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 9344 provides the implementing details
of this provision by enumerating the measures that may be undertaken by a law enforcement officer to
ascertain the child’s age:
(1) Obtain documents that show proof of the child’s age, such as
(a) Child’s birth certificate;
(b) Child’s baptismal certificate ;or
(c) Any other pertinent documents such as but not limited to the child’s school
records, dental records, or travel papers.
(2) x x x
(3) When the above documents cannot be obtained or pending receipt of such documents, the
law enforcement officer shall exhaust other measures to determine age by:
(a) Interviewing the child and obtaining information that indicate age (e.g. date of
birthday, grade level in school);
(b) Interviewing persons who may have knowledge that indicate[s] age of the child
(e.g. relatives, neighbors, teachers, classmates);
(c) Evaluating the physical appearance (e.g. height, built) of the child; and
(d) Obtaining other relevant evidence of age.
xxx
Section 7, R.A. No. 9344, while a relatively new law (having been passed only in 2006), does not depart
from the jurisprudence existing at that time on the evidence that may be admitted as satisfactory proof
of the accused’s minority and age.
In the 1903 case of U.S. v. Bergantino,33 we accepted testimonial evidence to prove the minority and
age of the accused in the absence of any document or other satisfactory evidence showing the date of
birth. This was followed by U.S. v. Roxas34 where the defendant’s statement about his age was
considered sufficient, even without corroborative evidence, to establish that he was a minor of 16 years
at the time he committed the offense charged. Subsequently, in People v. Tismo, 35 the Court
appreciated the minority and age of the accused on the basis of his claim that he was 17 years old at
the time of the commission of the offense in the absence of any contradictory evidence or objection on
the part of the prosecution. Then, in People v. Villagracia, 36 we found the testimony of the accused that
he was less than 15 years old sufficient to establish his minority. We reiterated these dicta in the cases
of People v. Morial37 and David v. Court of Appeals,38 and ruled that the allegations of minority and age
by the accused will be accepted as facts upon the prosecution’s failure to disprove the claim by contrary
evidence.
In these cases, we gave evidentiary weight to testimonial evidence on the accused’s minority and age
upon the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the absence of any other satisfactory evidence
such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar documents that would prove the date of birth
of the accused; (2) the presence of testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and minority of
the accused at the time of the complained incident without any objection on the part of the prosecution;
and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that the accused’s and/or his relatives’ testimonies are
untrue.
All these conditions are present in this case. First, the petitioner and CCC both testified regarding his
minority and age when the rape was committed.39 Second, the records before us show that these
pieces of testimonial evidence were never objected to by the prosecution. And lastly, the prosecution
did not present any contrary evidence to prove that the petitioner was above 15 years old when the
crime was committed.
We also stress that the last paragraph of Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that any doubt on the age
of the child must be resolved in his favor.40 Hence, any doubt in this case regarding the petitioner’s age
at the time he committed the rape should be resolved in his favor. In other words, the testimony that the
petitioner as 15 years old when the crime took place should be read to mean that he was not more than
15 years old as this is the more favorable reading that R.A. No. 9344 directs.
Given the express mandate of R.A. No. 9344, its implementing rules, and established jurisprudence in
accord with the latest statutory developments, the CA therefore cannot but be in error in not
appreciating and giving evidentiary value to the petitioner’s and CCC’s testimonies relating to the
former’s age.
Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 9344
That the petitioner committed the rape before R.A. No. 9344 took effect and that he is no longer a minor
(he was already 20 years old when he took the stand) will not bar him from enjoying the benefit of total
exemption that Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 grants. 41 As we explained in discussing Sections 64 and 68
of R.A. No. 934442 in the recent case of Ortega v. People:43
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Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below, at the time of
the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the
appropriate local social welfare and development officers (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with
respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL’s age at the time of the
promulgation of judgment but the CICL’s age at the time of the commission of the offense. In short, by
virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.
[Emphasis supplied]
The retroactive application of R.A. No. 9344 is also justified under Article 22 of the RPC, as amended,
which provides that penal laws are to be given retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused who
is not found to be a habitual criminal. Nothing in the records of this case indicates that the petitioner is a
habitual criminal.
Civil Liability
The last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that the accused shall continue to be civilly
liable despite his exemption from criminal liability; hence, the petitioner is civilly liable to AAA despite his
exemption from criminal liability. The extent of his civil liability depends on the crime he would have
been liable for had he not been found to be exempt from criminal liability.
The RTC and CA found, based on item (1) of Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended, that the petitioner
is guilty of qualified rape because of his relationship with AAA within the second civil degree of
consanguinity and the latter’s minority.44 Both courts accordingly imposed the civil liability corresponding
to qualified rape.
The relationship between the petitioner and AAA, as siblings, does not appear to be a disputed matter.
Their mother, CCC, declared in her testimony that AAA and the petitioner are her children. The
prosecution and the defense likewise stipulated in the proceedings below that the relationship exists.
We find, however, that AAA’s minority, though alleged in the Information, had not been sufficiently
proven.45 People v. Pruna46 laid down these guidelines in appreciating the age of the complainant:
In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the foregoing cases, we hereby set the
following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy
of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove
age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed
or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a
member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to
Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved
is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure
of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against
him. [Emphasis supplied]
The records fail to show any evidence proving the age of AAA. They do not likewise show that the
petitioner ever expressly and clearly admitted AAA’s age at the time of the rape. Pursuant to Pruna,
neither can his failure to object to AAA’s testimony be taken against him.
Thus, the required concurrence of circumstances that would upgrade the crime to qualified rape – i.e.,
relationship within the third degree of consanguinity and minority of the victim – does not exist. The
crime for which the petitioner should have been found criminally liable should therefore only be simple
rape pursuant to par. 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, not qualified rape. The civil liability that can be
imposed on the petitioner follows the characterization of the crime and the attendant circumstances.
Accordingly, we uphold the grant of moral damages of ₱50,000.00 but increase the awarded exemplary
damages ₱30,000.00, both pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. 47 Moral damages are automatically
awarded to rape victims without the necessity of proof; the law assumes that the victim suffered moral
injuries entitling her to this award.48 Article 2230 of the Civil Code justifies the award of exemplary
damages because of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of relationship between AAA and
petitioner and dwelling.49 As discussed above, the relationship (between the parties) is not disputed. We
appreciate dwelling as an aggravating circumstance based on AAA’s testimony that the rape was
committed in their house.50 While dwelling as an aggravating circumstance was not alleged in the
Information, established jurisprudence holds that it may nevertheless be appreciated as basis for the
award of exemplary damages.51lavvphi1
We modify the awarded civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 to ₱50,000.00, the latter being the civil indemnity
appropriate for simple rape52 on the finding that rape had been committed.53
In light of the above discussion and our conclusions, we see no need to discuss the petition’s third
assignment of error.
148
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February
29, 2008 and Resolution dated May 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR.-H.C. No. 02218
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Pursuant to Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344, Criminal Case No. 120292-H for rape filed against petitioner
Robert Sierra y Caneda is hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is REFERRED to the appropriate local social
welfare and development officer who shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9344.
Petitioner is ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Unless there are other valid causes for petitioner’s continued detention, we hereby ORDER his
IMMEDIATE RELEASE under the above terms.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City for
its immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this
Court within five days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.
Let a copy of this Decision be likewise furnished the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council.
SO ORDERED.
JOEMAR ORTEGA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition1for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated October 26, 2000 which affirmed in
toto the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 50, dated May 13, 1999,
convicting petitioner Joemar Ortega4 (petitioner) of the crime of Rape.
The Facts
Petitioner, then about 14 years old,5 was charged with the crime of Rape in two separate informations
both dated April 20, 1998, for allegedly raping AAA, 6 then about eight (8) years of age. The accusatory
portions thereof respectively state:
Criminal Case No. 98-19083
That sometime in August, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously (sic) had
carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a minor, then about 6 years
old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Criminal Case No. 98-19084
That on or about the 1st day of December, 1996, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of YYY,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, (sic) willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously (sic) had carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the said AAA, a minor,
then about 6 years old, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
Upon arraignment on September 10, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. 9 Thus,
trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.
Version of the Prosecution
On February 27, 1990, AAA was born to spouses FFF and MMM. 10 Among her siblings CCC, BBB,
DDD, EEE and GGG, AAA is the only girl in the family. Before these disturbing events, AAA's family
members were close friends of petitioner's family, aside from the fact that they were good neighbors.
However, BBB caught petitioner raping his younger sister AAA inside their own home. BBB then
informed their mother MMM who in turn asked AAA.11 There, AAA confessed that petitioner raped her
three (3) times on three (3) different occasions.
The first occasion happened sometime in August 1996. MMM left her daughter AAA, then 6 years old
and son BBB, then 10 years old, in the care of Luzviminda Ortega 12 (Luzviminda), mother of petitioner,
for two (2) nights because MMM had to stay in a hospital to attend to her other son who was sick. 13
During the first night at petitioner's residence, petitioner entered the room where AAA slept together with
Luzviminda and her daughter. Petitioner woke AAA up and led her to the sala. There petitioner raped
AAA. The second occasion occurred the following day, again at the petitioner's residence. Observing
that nobody was around, petitioner brought AAA to their comfort room and raped her there. AAA
testified that petitioner inserted his penis into her vagina and she felt pain. In all of these instances,
petitioner warned AAA not to tell her parents, otherwise, he would spank her.14 AAA did not tell her
parents about her ordeal.
The third and last occasion happened in the evening of December 1, 1996. Petitioner went to the house
of AAA and joined her and her siblings in watching a battery-powered television. At that time,
Luzviminda was conversing with MMM. While AAA's siblings were busy watching, petitioner called AAA
to come to the room of CCC and BBB. AAA obeyed. While inside the said room which was lighted by a
kerosene lamp, petitioner pulled AAA behind the door, removed his pants and brief, removed AAA's
shorts and panty, and in a standing position inserted his penis into the vagina of AAA.15 AAA described
149
petitioner's penis as about five (5) inches long and the size of two (2) ballpens. She, likewise, narrated
that she saw pubic hair on the base of his penis.16
This last incident was corroborated by BBB in his testimony. When BBB was about to drink water in
their kitchen, as he was passing by his room, BBB was shocked to see petitioner and AAA both naked
from their waist down in the act of sexual intercourse. BBB saw petitioner holding AAA and making a
pumping motion. Immediately, BBB told petitioner to stop; the latter, in turn, hurriedly left. Thereafter,
BBB reported the incident to his mother, MMM.17
MMM testified that when she asked AAA about what BBB saw, AAA told her that petitioner inserted his
fingers and his penis into her vagina. MMM learned that this was not the only incident that petitioner
molested AAA as there were two previous occasions. MMM also learned that AAA did not report her
ordeal to them out of fear that petitioner would spank her. MMM testified that when BBB reported the
matter to her, petitioner and Luzviminda already left her house. After waiting for AAA's brothers to go to
sleep, MMM, with a heavy heart, examined AAA's vagina and she noticed that the same was reddish
and a whitish fluid was coming out from it. Spouses FFF and MMM were not able to sleep that night.
The following morning, at about four o'clock, MMM called Luzviminda and petitioner to come to their
house. MMM confronted Luzviminda about what petitioner did to her daughter, and consequently, she
demanded that AAA should be brought to a doctor for examination. 18
MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr. Lucifree Katalbas19 (Dr. Katalbas), the Rural
Health Officer of the locality who examined AAA and found no indication that she was molested. 20
Refusing to accept such findings, on December 12, 1996, MMM went to Dr. Joy Ann Jocson (Dr.
Jocson), Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Office. Dr. Jocson made an unofficial written
report21 showing that there were "abrasions on both right and left of the labia minora and a small
laceration at the posterior fourchette." She also found that the minor injuries she saw on AAA's genitals
were relatively fresh; and that such abrasions were superficial and could disappear after a period of 3 to
4 days. Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in her certification that her findings required the confirmation of
the Municipal Health Officer of the locality.
Subsequently, an amicable settlement22 was reached between the two families through the DAWN
Foundation, an organization that helps abused women and children. Part of the settlement required
petitioner to depart from their house to avoid contact with AAA. 23 As such, petitioner stayed with a
certain priest in the locality. However, a few months later, petitioner went home for brief visits and in
order to bring his dirty clothes for laundry. At the sight of petitioner, AAA's father FFF was infuriated and
confrontations occurred. At this instance, AAA's parents went to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) which assisted them in filing the three (3) counts of rape. However, the prosecutor's office only
filed the two (2) instant cases.
Version of the Defense
Petitioner was born on August 8, 1983 to spouses Loreto (Loreto) and Luzviminda Ortega. 24 He is the
second child of three siblings ― an elder brother and a younger sister. Petitioner denied the
accusations made against him. He testified that: his parents and AAA's parents were good friends;
when MMM left AAA and her brothers to the care of his mother, petitioner slept in a separate room
together with BBB and CCC while AAA slept together with Luzviminda and his younger sister; he never
touched or raped AAA or showed his private parts to her; petitioner did not threaten AAA in any
instance; he did not rape AAA in the former's comfort room, but he merely accompanied and helped
AAA clean up as she defecated and feared the toilet bowl; in the process of washing, he may have
accidentally touched AAA's anus; on December 1, 1996, petitioner together with his parents, went to
AAA's house;25 they were dancing and playing together with all the other children at the time; while they
were dancing, petitioner hugged and lifted AAA up in a playful act, at the instance of which BBB ran and
reported the matter to MMM, who at the time was with Luzviminda, saying that petitioner and AAA were
having sexual intercourse;26 petitioner explained to MMM that they were only playing, and that he could
not have done to AAA what he was accused of doing, as they were together with her brothers, and he
treated AAA like a younger sister;27 BBB was lying; AAA's parents and his parents did not get angry at
him nor did they quarrel with each other; petitioner and his parents peacefully left AAA's house at about
nine o'clock in the evening; however, at about four o'clock in the morning, petitioner and his parents
were summoned by MMM to go to the latter's house; upon arriving there they saw BBB being
maltreated by his father as AAA pointed to BBB as the one who molested her; and MMM and
Luzviminda agreed to bring AAA to a doctor for examination .28
Luzviminda corroborated the testimony of her son. She testified that: her son was a minor at the time of
the incident; CCC and BBB were the children of MMM in her first marriage, while AAA and the rest of
her siblings were of the second marriage; CCC and BBB are half-brothers of AAA; when MMM
entrusted AAA and her brothers to her sometime in August of 1996, she slept with AAA and her
youngest daughter in a separate room from petitioner; on December 1, 1996, she was at AAA's house
watching television and conversing with MMM, while FFF and Loreto were having a drinking spree in
the kitchen; from where they were seated, she could clearly see all the children, including petitioner and
AAA, playing and dancing in the dining area; she did not hear any unusual cry or noise at the time; while
they were conversing, BBB came to MMM saying that petitioner and AAA were having sexual
intercourse; upon hearing such statement, Luzviminda and MMM immediately stood up and looked for
them, but both mothers did not find anything unusual as all the children were playing and dancing in the
dining area; Luzviminda and MMM just laughed at BBB's statement; the parents of AAA, at that time,
did not examine her in order to verify BBB's statement nor did they get angry at petitioner or at them;
and they peacefully left AAA's house. However, the following day, MMM woke Luzviminda up, saying
that FFF was spanking BBB with a belt as AAA was pointing to BBB nor to petitioner as the one who
molested her. At this instance, Luzviminda intervened, telling FFF not to spank BBB but instead, to bring
AAA to a doctor for examination. Luzviminda accompanied MMM to Dr. Katalbas who found no
indication that AAA was molested. She also accompanied her to Dr. Jocson. After getting the results of
the examination conducted by Dr. Jocson, they went to the police and at this instance only did
Luzviminda learn that MMM accused petitioner of raping AAA. Petitioner vehemently denied to
Luzviminda that he raped AAA. Thereafter, MMM and Luzviminda went to their employer who
recommended that they should seek advice from the Women's Center. At the said Center, both agreed
on an amicable settlement wherein petitioner would stay away from AAA. Thus, petitioner stayed with a
certain priest in the locality for almost two (2) years. But almost every Saturday, petitioner would come
home to visit his parents and to bring his dirty clothes for laundry. Every time petitioner came home,
FFF bad-mouthed petitioner, calling him a rapist. Confrontations occurred until an altercation erupted
wherein FFF allegedly slapped Luzviminda. Subsequently, AAA's parents filed the instant cases.29
The RTC's Ruling
On May 13, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial cannot prevail over the positive
identification of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by AAA and BBB, who testified with honesty
and credibility. Moreover, the RTC opined that it could not perceive any motive for AAA's family to
impute a serious crime of Rape to petitioner, considering the close relations of both families. Thus, the
RTC disposed of this case in this wise:
150
 FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as Principal by Direct Participation of the crime of RAPE as charged
in Criminal Cases Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Two (2) Reclusion Temporal in its
medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall be imprisoned for
each case for a period of Six (6) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to
Fifteen (15) years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. The accused is condemned to pay the
offended party AAA, the sum of P100,000.00 as indemnification for the two (2) rapes (sic).
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.30
Taking into consideration the age of petitioner and upon posting of the corresponding bail bond for his
provisional liberty in the amount of P40,000.00, the RTC ordered the petitioner's release pending
appeal.31
The CA's Ruling
On October 26, 2000, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, holding that the petitioner's defense
of denial could not prevail over the positive identification of the petitioner by the victim AAA and her
brother BBB, which were categorical, consistent and without any showing of ill motive. The CA also held
that the respective medical examinations conducted by the two doctors were irrelevant, as it is
established that the slightest penetration of the lips of the female organ consummates rape; thus,
hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. Moreover, the CA opined that petitioner acted with
discernment as shown by his covert acts. Finally, the CA accorded great weight and respect to the
factual findings of the RTC, particularly in the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses.
Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration32 of the assailed Decision which the CA denied in its
Resolution33 dated November 7, 2001.
Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS OVERLOOKED CERTAIN FACTS OF
SUBSTANCE AND VALUE WHICH IF CONSIDERED MIGHT AFFECT THE RESULT OF THE
CASE.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED
TO APPRECIATE THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF DR. LUCIFREE KATALBAS.
III.
THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT, AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURT, THAT
PETITIONER-APPELLANT IN FACT COMMITTED AND IS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING THE
ALLEGED RAPE WITHIN THE RESIDENCE OF THE VICTIM WHERE SEVERAL OF THE
ALLEGED VICTIM'S FAMILY MEMBERS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE MOTHERS WERE
PRESENT IS IMPROBABLE AND CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE.
IV.
THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE FACTS SET FORTH
BY THE ALLEGED VICTIM REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING THE
COMMISSION OF RAPE SOMETIME IN AUGUST 1996.34
Petitioner argues that, while it is true that the factual findings of the CA are conclusive on this Court, we
are not prevented from overturning such findings if the CA had manifestly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value which if considered might affect the result of the case. Petitioner stresses that from
the testimonies of AAA and BBB, it can be deduced that penetration was achieved; thus, AAA felt pain.
Petitioner contends that assuming the allegations of AAA are true that petitioner inserted his fingers and
his penis into her vagina, certainly such acts would leave certain abrasions, wounds and/or lacerations
on the genitalia of AAA, taking into consideration her age at the time and the alleged size of petitioner's
penis. However, such allegation is completely belied by the medical report of Dr. Katalbas who, one day
after the alleged rape, conducted a medical examination on AAA and found that there were no signs or
indications that AAA was raped or molested. Petitioner submits that the CA committed a grave error
when it disregarded such medical report since it disproves the allegation of the existence of rape and,
consequently, the prosecution failed to prove its case; thus, the presumption of innocence in favor of the
petitioner subsists. Moreover, petitioner opines that like AAA, petitioner is also a child of the barrio who
is innocent, unsophisticated and lacks sexual experience. As such, it is incredible and contrary to
human reason that a 13- year-old boy would commit such act in the very dwelling of AAA, whose
reaction to pain, at the age of six, could not be controlled or subdued. Petitioner claims that poverty was
MMM's motive in filing the instant case, as she wanted to extort money from the parents of the
petitioner. Petitioner points out that the medical report of Dr. Jocson indicated that the abrasions that
were inflicted on the genitalia of AAA were relatively fresh and the same could disappear within a period
of 3 to 4 days. Considering that Dr. Jocson conducted the medical examination on December 12, 1996,
or after the lapse of eleven (11) days after the alleged incident of rape, and that AAA's parents only filed
the instant case after almost a year, in order to deter Luzviminda from filing a case of slander by deed
against FFF, it is not inconceivable that MMM inflicted said abrasions on AAA to prove their case and to
depart from the initial confession of AAA that it was actually BBB who raped her. Finally, petitioner
submits that AAA and BBB were merely coached by MMM to fabricate these stories. 35
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) contends that: the arguments raised by the petitioner are mere reiterations of his disquisitions
before the CA; the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, did not rely on the testimonies of both doctors since
despite the absence of abrasions, rape is consummated even with the slightest penetration of the lips of
the female organ; what is relevant in this case is the reliable testimony of AAA that petitioner raped her
in August and December of 1996; even in the absence of force, rape was committed considering AAA's
age at that time; as such, AAA did not have any ill motive in accusing petitioner; and it is established
that the crime of rape could be committed even in the presence of other people nearby. Moreover, the
OSG relies on the doctrine that the evaluation made by a trial court is accorded the highest respect as it
had the opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness and to determine whether said
witness was telling the truth or not. Lastly, the OSG claims that petitioner acted with discernment when
he committed the said crime, as manifested in his covert acts. 36
151
However, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344,37 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, was enacted
into law on April 28, 2006 and it took effect on May 20, 2006.38 The law establishes a comprehensive
system to manage children in conflict with the law39 (CICL) and children at risk40 with child-appropriate
procedures and comprehensive programs and services such as prevention, intervention, diversion,
rehabilitation, re-integration and after-care programs geared towards their development. In order to
ensure its implementation, the law, particularly Section 841 thereof, has created the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Council (JJWC) and vested it with certain duties and functions 42 such as the formulation of
policies and strategies to prevent juvenile delinquency and to enhance the administration of juvenile
justice as well as the treatment and rehabilitation of the CICL. The law also
provides for the immediate dismissal of cases of CICL, specifically Sections 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 of
R.A. No. 9344's Transitory Provisions.43
The said Transitory Provisions expressly provide:
Title VIII
Transitory Provisions
SECTION 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen (15) Years Old and Below. — Upon
effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of the
commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the
appropriate local social welfare and development officer. Such officer, upon thorough
assessment of the child, shall determine whether to release the child to the custody of his/her
parents, or refer the child to prevention programs, as provided under this Act. Those with
suspended sentences and undergoing rehabilitation at the youth rehabilitation center shall
likewise be released, unless it is contrary to the best interest of the child.
SECTION 65. Children Detained Pending Trial. — If the child is detained pending trial, the
Family Court shall also determine whether or not continued detention is necessary and, if not,
determine appropriate alternatives for detention. If detention is necessary and he/she is
detained with adults, the court shall immediately order the transfer of the child to a youth
detention home.
SECTION 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained Children in Conflict with the Law. — The
PNP, the BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to the JJWC, within ninety (90)
days from the effectivity of this Act, an inventory of all children in conflict with the law under
their custody.
SECTION 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen (18) Years Pending Diversion and
Court Proceedings. — If a child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years pending diversion and
court proceedings, the appropriate diversion authority in consultation with the local social
welfare and development officer or the Family Court in consultation with the Social Services
and Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme Court, as the case may be, shall determine
the appropriate disposition. In case the appropriate court executes the judgment of conviction,
and unless the child in conflict with the law has already availed of probation under Presidential
Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, the child may apply for probation if qualified under the
provisions of the Probation Law.
SECTION 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentences. — Persons
who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and
who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for
which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
application of this Act. They shall be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act
and their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be immediately released if they
are so qualified under this Act or other applicable laws.
Ostensibly, the only issue that requires resolution in this case is whether or not petitioner is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as found by both the RTC and the CA. However, with the
advent of R.A. No. 9344 while petitioner's case is pending before this Court, a new issue arises,
namely, whether the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9344 apply to petitioner's case, considering that at
the time he committed the alleged rape, he was merely 13 years old.
In sum, we are convinced that petitioner committed the crime of rape against AAA. In a prosecution for
rape, the complainant's candor is the single most important factor. If the complainant's testimony meets
the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted solely on that basis. 44 The RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, did not doubt AAA's credibility, and found no ill motive for her to charge petitioner of the heinous
crime of rape and to positively identify him as the malefactor. Both courts also accorded respect to
BBB's testimony that he saw petitioner having sexual intercourse with his younger sister. While
petitioner asserts that AAA's poverty is enough motive for the imputation of the crime, we discard such
assertion for no mother or father like MMM and FFF would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to
the tribulations and the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would
damage their daughter's psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true. 45 We find petitioner's claim
that MMM inflicted the abrasions found by Dr. Jocson in the genitalia of AAA, in order to extort money
from petitioner’s parents, highly incredible. Lastly, it must be noted that in most cases of rape committed
against young girls like AAA who was only 6 years old then, total penetration of the victim's organ is
improbable due to the small vaginal opening. Thus, it has been held that actual penetration of the
victim's organ or rupture of the hymen is not required. 46 Therefore, it is not necessary for conviction that
the petitioner succeeded in having full penetration, because the slightest touching of the lips of the
female organ or of the labia of the pudendum constitutes rape.47
However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he commits a
crime, by the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the
act, no criminal liability arises.48 Therefore, while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability
attaches. Thus, in Guevarra v. Almodovar,49 we held:
[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances
embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of
action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. In
expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert has stated:
"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to
determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime
can exist, and because . . . the infant (has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him)
from criminal liability."
152
 It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of
performing a criminal act.
In its Comment50 dated April 24, 2008, the OSG posited that petitioner is no longer covered by the
provisions of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 since as early as 1999, petitioner was convicted by the RTC
and the conviction was affirmed by the CA in 2001. R.A. No. 9344 was passed into law in 2006, and
with the petitioner now approximately 25 years old, he no longer qualifies as a child as defined by R.A.
No. 9344. Moreover, the OSG claimed that the retroactive effect of Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344 is
applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old as explained under Sections 67 and 68
thereof. The OSG also asserted that petitioner may avail himself of the provisions of Section 38 51 of
R.A. No. 9344 providing for automatic suspension of sentence if finally found guilty. Lastly, the OSG
argued that while it is a recognized principle that laws favorable to the accused may be given retroactive
application, such principle does not apply if the law itself provides for conditions for its application.
We are not persuaded.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 clearly and explicitly provides:
SECTION 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.
However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this
Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt
from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted
with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings
in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
Likewise, Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below, at
the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred
to the appropriate local social welfare and development officer (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore,
with respect to the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at the time of the
promulgation of judgment but the CICL's age at the time of the commission of the offense. In short, by
virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.52
Given this precise statutory declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord retroactive application to
the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law -
favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given
retroactive effect.53 This principle is embodied in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as
they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined
in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
We also have extant jurisprudence that the principle has been given expanded application in certain
instances involving special laws.54 R.A. No. 9344 should be no exception.
In fact, the legislative intent for R.A. No. 9344's retroactivity is even patent from the deliberations on the
bill in the Senate, quoted as follows:
Sections 67-69 On Transitory Provisions
Senator Santiago. In Sections 67 to 69 on Transitory Provisions, pages 34 to 35, may I humbly
propose that we should insert, after Sections 67 to 69, the following provision:
ALL CHILDREN WHO DO NOT HAVE CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER THIS LAW PENDING
THE CREATION OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE WELFARE AND RESTORATION (OJWR)
AND THE LOCAL COUNCIL FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN (LCPC) WITHIN A
YEAR, SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED TO DSWD INSTITUTIONS, AND DSWD
SHALL UNDERTAKE DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR THEM, PRIORITIZING THE YOUNGER
CHILDREN BELOW 15 YEARS OF AGE AND THE LIGHTER OFFENSES.
The only question will be: Will the DSWD have enough facilities for these adult offenders?
Senator Pangilinan, Mr. President, according to the CWC, the DSWD does not have the
capability at the moment. It will take time to develop the capacity.
Senator Santiago. Well, we can say that they shall be transferred whenever the facilities are
ready.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes. Mr. President, just a clarification. When we speak here of children
who do not have criminal liability under this law, we are referring here to those who currently
have criminal liability, but because of the retroactive effect of this measure, will now be
exempt. It is quite confusing.
Senator Santiago. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. In other words, they should be released either to their parents or through a
diversion program, Mr. President. That is my understanding.
Senator Santiago. Yes, that is correct. But there will have to be a process of sifting before that.
That is why I was proposing that they should be given to the DSWD, which will conduct the
sifting process, except that apparently, the DSWD does not have the physical facilities.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, conceptually, we have no argument. We will now have to
just craft it to ensure that the input raised earlier by the good Senator is included and the
capacity of the DSWD to be able to absorb these individuals. Likewise, the issue should also
be incorporated in the amendment.
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The President. Just a question from the Chair. The moment this law becomes effective, all
those children in conflict with the law, who were convicted in the present Penal Code,
for example, who will now not be subject to incarceration under this law, will be
immediately released. Is that the understanding?
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. They would immediately fall under . . . .
Senator Pangilinan. The diversion requirements, Mr. President.
Senator Santiago. Yes.
The President. But since the facilities are not yet available, what will happen to them?
Senator Santiago. Well, depending on their age, which has not yet been settled . . . . .
provides, for example, for conferencing family mediation, negotiation, apologies, censure, et
cetera. These methodologies will apply. They do not necessarily have to remain in detention.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, that is correct, Mr. President. But it will still require some sort of
infrastructure, meaning, manpower. The personnel from the DSWD will have to address the
counseling. So, there must be a transition in terms of building the capacity and absorbing those
who will benefit from this measure.
The President. Therefore, that should be specifically provided for as an amendment.
Senator Pangilinan. That is correct, Mr. President.
The President. All right. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the Santiago
amendment is accepted.55
xxxx
PIMENTEL AMENDMENTS
xxxx
Senator Pimentel.
xxxx
Now, considering that laws are normally prospective, Mr. President, in their application, I would
like to suggest to the Sponsor if he could incorporate some kind of a transitory
provision that would make this law apply also to those who might already have been
convicted but are awaiting, let us say, execution of their penalties as adults when, in
fact, they are juveniles.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We do have a provision under the Transitory
Provisions wherein we address the issue raised by the good Senator, specifically,
Section 67. For example, "Upon effectivity of this Act, cases of children fifteen (15) years
old and below at the time of the commission of the crime shall immediately be
dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officer." So that would be giving retroactive effect.
Senator Pimentel. Of cases that are still to be prosecuted.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes.
Senator Pimentel. What about those that have already been prosecuted? I was trying to cite
the instance of juvenile offenders erroneously convicted as adults awaiting execution.
Senator Pangilinan. Mr. President, we are willing to include that as an additional amendment,
subject to style.
Senator Pimentel. I would certainly appreciate that because that is a reality that we have to
address, otherwise injustice will really be . . .
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President, we would also include that as a separate provision.
The President. In other words, even after final conviction if, in fact, the offender is able to prove
that at the time of the commission of the offense he is a minor under this law, he should be
given the benefit of the law.
Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President. That is correct.
Senator Pangilinan. Yes, Mr. President. We accept that proposed amendment. 56
The Court is bound to enforce this legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in interpreting a
statute. Significantly, this Court has declared in a number of cases, that intent is the soul of the law, viz.:
The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose
and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary
rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature
in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not
be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute
when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to
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a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent is inevitable because of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not subject to review by
of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the this Court.61 Any perception that the result reached herein appears unjust or unwise should be
fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature. 57 addressed to Congress. Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from
the manifest intendment and language of the law. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. 58 In this case, the plain meaning of the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we have done so in this case. 62
R.A. No. 9344's unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to
herein petitioner. No other interpretation is justified, for the simple language of the new law itself WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Criminal Case Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 filed against
demonstrates the legislative intent to favor the CICL. petitioner Joemar F. Ortega are hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the local social
welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate intervention program. Nevertheless,
It bears stressing that the petitioner was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged the petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private complainant AAA, civil indemnity in the amount of One
rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand
testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioner’s age was never assailed in any of the proceedings Pesos (P100,000.00). No costs.
before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the commission of the crime, was
below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal liability. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the two Houses of Congress and the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Council (JJWC).
However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two (2) counts of rape committed
against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption from civil SO ORDERED.
liability. Accordingly, this Court sustains the ruling of the RTC, duly affirmed by the CA, that petitioner
and/or his parents are liable to pay AAA P100,000.00 as civil indemnity. This award is in the nature of
actual or compensatory damages, and is mandatory upon a conviction for rape.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from the civil indemnity vs.
awarded to the rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each DONATO BINDOY, defendant-appellant.
count of rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, without the necessity of additional pleading or
proof other than the fact of rape. Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape.59 Florentino Saguin for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact that a law intended to protect our
children from the harshness of life and to alleviate, if not cure, the ills of the growing number of CICL VILLAMOR, J.:
and children at risk in our country, has been enacted by Congress. However, it has not escaped us that
major concerns have been raised on the effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the Rationale The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Misamis to the penalty of
for the Proposed Rule on Children Charged under R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify the heirs of
Drugs Act of 2002, it was found that: the deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The crime charged against the accused is
homicide, according to the following information:
The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 raising
the age of criminal irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15 years old has compounded the That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao,
problem of employment of children in the drug trade several times over. Law enforcement Province of Occidental Misamis, the accused Donato Bindoy willfully, unlawfully, and
authorities, Barangay Kagawads and the police, most particularly, complain that drug feloniously attacked and with his bolo wounded Emigdio Omamdam, inflicting upon the latter a
syndicates have become more aggressive in using children 15 years old or below as couriers serious wound in the chest which caused his instant death, in violation of article 404 of the
or foot soldiers in the drug trade. They claim that Republic Act No. 9344 has rendered them Penal Code.
ineffective in the faithful discharge of their duties in that they are proscribed from taking into
custody children 15 years old or below who openly flaunt possession, use and delivery or The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and his counsel in this instance contends
distribution of illicit drugs, simply because their age exempts them from criminal liability under that the court erred in finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and in convicting him of the crime
the new law. 60 of homicide.

The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively exonerates petitioner of rape, The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop in the
a heinous crime committed against AAA who was only a child at the tender age of six (6) when she was barrio market of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, started by some of
raped by the petitioner, and one who deserves the law’s greater protection. However, this consequence
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the tuba drinkers. There were Faustino Pacas (alias Agaton), and his wife called Tibay. One Donato
Bindoy, who was also there, offered some tuba to Pacas' wife; and as she refused to drink having
already done so, Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. There ensued an interchange of
words between Tibay and Bindoy, and Pacas stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away
from Bindoy the bolo he carried. This occasioned a disturbance which attracted the attention of Emigdio
Omamdam, who, with his family, lived near the market. Emigdio left his house to see what was
happening, while Bindoy and Pacas were struggling for the bolo. In the course of this struggle, Bindoy
succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards the left
behind the accused, with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's chest,
who was then behind Bindoy.
There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas. Neither is there any
indication that the accused was aware of Emigdio Omamdam's presence in the place, for, according to
the testimony of the witnesses, the latter passed behind the combatants when he left his house to
satisfy his curiosity. There was no disagreement or ill feeling between Bindoy and Omamdam, on the
contrary, it appears they were nephew and uncle, respectively, and were on good terms with each
other. Bindoy did not try to wound Pacas, and instead of wounding him, he hit Omamdam; he was only
defending his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him, and his
conduct was perfectly lawful.
Donato did not aim at me, nor I at him: It was a mishap." The testimony of this witness was not
contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.
We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind, which, had it existed, would have
greatly facilitated the solution of this case. And we deem it well to repeat what this court said in United
States vs. Carlos (15 Phil., 47), to wit:
The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of provincial fiscals, directed to the
importance of definitely ascertaining and proving, when possible, the motives which actuated
the commission of a crime under investigation.
In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in completing the proof of the
commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motives
which tempted the mind of the guilty person to indulge the criminal act.
In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold, that the appellant is entitled to
acquittal according to article 8, No. 8, Penal Code. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed,
and the accused Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio. So ordered.

The wound which Omamdam received in the chest, judging by the description given by the sanitary
inspector who attended him as he lay dying, tallies with the size of the point of Bindoy's bolo.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which produced Emigdio Omamdam's death, but the vs.
defendant alleges that it was caused accidentally and without malicious intent. JOSEFINA BANDIAN, defendant-appellant.

Pacas and the widow of the deceased, Carmen Angot, testified having seen the accused stab Jose Rivera Yap for appellant.
Omamdam with his bolo. Such testimony is not incompatible with that of the accused, to the effect that Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
he wounded Omamdam by accident. The widow testified that she knew of her husband's wound being
caused by Bindoy from his statement to her before his death. DIAZ, J.:

The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show that the accused stabbed Omamdam
in the chest with his bolo on that occasion. The defendant, indeed, in his effort to free himself of Pacas,
who was endeavoring to wrench his bolo from him, hit Omamdam in the chest; but, as we have stated,
there is no evidence to show that he did so deliberately and with the intention of committing a crime. If,
in his struggle with Pacas, the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of doing
so, had wounded Omamdam, he would have had to answer for his act, since whoever willfully commits
a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended. (Art. 1 of the Penal Code.) But, as we have said, this is not the case.
The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and
Bindoy were actually struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former
had pulled so violently that it flew towards his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam
came up, who was therefore hit in the chest, without Donato's seeing him, because Emigdio had passed
behind him. The same witness adds that he went to see Omamdam at his home later, and asked him
about his wound when he replied: "I think I shall die of this wound." And then continued: "Please look
after my wife when I die: See that she doesn't starve," adding further: "This wound was an accident.
Charged with the crime of infanticide, convicted thereof and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and the
corresponding accessory penalties, with the costs of the suit, Josefina Bandian appealed from said
sentence alleging that the trial court erred:
I. In taking into consideration, to convict her, her alleged admission to Dr. Nepomuceno that
she had thrown away her newborn babe, and
II. In holding her guilty of infanticide, beyond reasonable doubt, and in sentencing her to
reclusion perpetua, with costs.
The facts of record ma be summarized as follows:
At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the appellant's neighbor, saw
the appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her house, apparently to respond to a call of
nature because it was there that the people of the place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes
later, he again saw her emerge from the thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and
156
back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and,
having noted that she was very weak and dizzy, he supported and helped her go up to her house and
placed her in her own bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to her house, what happened
to her, the appellant merely answered that she was very dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the
appellant in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help
them, and later requested him to take bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon the
appellant. Comcom had scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the body of a newborn babe near
a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments before. Comcom informed
Aguilar of it and latter told him to bring the body to the appellant's house. Upon being asked whether the
baby which had just been shown to her was hers or not, the appellant answered in the affirmative.
Upon being notified of the incident at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of said day, Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno,
president of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis, went to the appellant's house and
found her lying in bed still bleeding. Her bed, the floor of her house and beneath it, directly under the
bed, were full of blood. Basing his opinion upon said facts, the physician in question declared that the
appellant gave birth in her house and in her own bed; that after giving birth she threw her child into the
thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had
theretofore been living maritally, because the child was not his but of another man with whom she had
previously had amorous relations. To give force to his conclusions, he testified that the appellant had
admitted to him that she had killed her child, when he went to her house at the time and on the date
above-stated.
The prosecuting attorney and the lower court giving absolute credit to Dr. Nepomuceno whose
testimony was not corroborated but, on the contrary, was contradicted by the very witnesses for the
prosecution and by the appellant, as will be stated later, they were of the opinion and the lower court
furthermore held, that the appellant was an infanticide. The Solicitor-General, however, does not agree
with both. On the contrary, he maintains that the appellant may be guilty only of abandoning a minor
under subsection 2 of article 276 of the Revised Penal Code, the abandonment having resulted in the
death of the minor allegedly abandoned.
By the way, it should be stated that there is no evidence showing how the child in question died. Dr.
Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds found in the body of the child were not caused by the
hand of man but by bites animals, the pigs that usually roamed through the thicket where it was found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed wilfully or consciously, or
at least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said
crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under said
circumstances, must be in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in
order that he may be held liable.
The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's death in one way or
another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause
to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not
unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with
Kirol — she considers him her husband as he considers her his wife — began a year ago; as he so
testified at the trial, he knew that the appellant was pregnant and he believed from the beginning,
affirming such belief when he testified at the trial, that the child carried by the appellant in her womb was
his, and he testified that he and she had been eagerly waiting for the birth of the child. The appellant,
therefore, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.
If to the foregoing facts is added the testimony of the witnesses Valentin Aguilar and Adriano Comcom
that the child was taken from the thicket and carried already dead to the appellant's house after the
appellant had left the place, staggering, without strength to remain on her feet and very dizzy, to the
extent of having to be as in fact she was helped to go up to her house and to lie in bed, it will clearly
appear how far from the truth were Dr. Nepomuceno's affirmation and conclusions. Also add to all these
the fact that the appellant denied having made any admission to said physician and that from the time
she became pregnant she continuously had fever. This illness and her extreme debility undoubtedly
caused by her long illness as well as the hemorrhage which she had upon giving birth, coupled with the
circumstances that she is a primipara, being then only 23 years of age, and therefore inexperienced as
to childbirth and as to the inconvenience or difficulties usually attending such event; and the fact that
she, like her lover Luis Kirol — a mere laborer earning only twenty-five centavos a day — is uneducated
and could supplant with what she had read or learned from books what experience itself could teach
her, undoubtedly were the reasons why she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not
occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness, which causes may be considered lawful
or insuperable to constitute the seventh exempting circumstance (art. 12, Revised Penal Code), to take
her child from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to
the danger of losing its life.
The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the thicket, according to
her, to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long time, was
perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place
and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by
strong dizziness and extreme debility, she should not be blamed therefor because it all happened by
mere accident, from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (art. 12,
subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).
In conclusion, taking into account the foregoing facts and considerations, and granting that the appellant
was aware of her involuntary childbirth in the thicket and that she later failed to take her child therefrom,
having been so prevented by reason of causes entirely independent of her will, it should be held that the
alleged errors attributed to the lower court by the appellant are true; and it appearing that under such
circumstances said appellant has the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, is
hereby acquitted of the crime of which she had bee accused and convicted, with costs de oficio, and
she is actually confined in jail in connection with this case, it is ordered that she be released
immediately. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., and Abad Santos, J., concur.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CECILIO TAÑEDO, defendant-appellant.
O'Brien & De Witt, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
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The defendant in this case was accused of the crime of murder committed, as alleged in the
information, as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of January of this year, the said accused, with the intention of
killing Feliciano Sanchez, invited him to hunt wild chickens, and, upon reaching the forest, with
premeditation shot him in the breast with a shotgun which destroyed the heart and killed the
said Sanchez, and afterwards, in order to hide the crime, buried the body of the deceased in a
well. The motive is unknown. The premeditation consists in that the accused had prepared his
plans to take the deceased to the forest, there to kill him, so that no one could see it, and to
bury him afterwards secretly in order that the crime should remain unpunished.
The defendant was found guilty of homicide by the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac and
sentenced to fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, accessories,
indemnification and costs. The defendant appealed.
There is very little dispute about the facts in this case, in fact no dispute at all as to the important facts.
The accused was a landowner. On the morning of the 26th of January, 1909, he, with Bernardino
Tagampa, Casimiro Pascual, Valeriano Paulillo, and Juan Arellano, went to work on a malecon or dam
on his land. The defendant took with him a shotgun and a few shells, with the intention to hunt wild
chickens after he had set his laborers at work. He remained with his laborers an hour or so and then
went a short distance away across a stream to see how the alteration which he had made in the
malecon affected the flow of water from the rice filed on the other side of the stream. He carried his
shotgun with him across the stream. On the other side of the stream he met the deceased, who, with his
mother and uncle, had been living in a small shack for a month or so during the rice-harvesting season.
The accused asked the uncle of the deceased where he could find a good place in which to hunt wild
chickens. The uncle was lying on the floor in the interior of the shack sick of fever. The deceased, a
young man about 20 years of age, was working at something under a manga tree a short distance from
the shack. Although the accused directed his question to the uncle inside of the shack, the deceased
answered the question and pointed out in a general way a portion of the forest near the edge of which
stood the shack. There is some contradiction between the testimony of the accused and the
Government witnesses just at this point. The uncle of the deceased testified that the boy and the
accused invited each other mutually to hunt wild chickens and that the accused accepted the invitation.
The accused, however, testified that he did not invite the deceased to go hunting with him, neither did
the deceased go with him, but that he remained under the manga tree "trying something." At any rate
the accused went into the forest with his gun. What took place there is unknown to anybody except the
accused. Upon that subject he testified as follows:
And after Feliciano Sanchez pointed out that place to me, that place where the wild chickens
were to be found, I proceeded to hunt, because, in the first place, if I could kill some wild
chickens we would have something to eat on that day. So when I arrived at that place I saw a
wild chickens and I shot him. And after I shot that chicken I heard a human cry. I picked up the
chicken and went near the place where I heard the noise, and after I saw that I had wounded a
man I went back toward the malecon, where my companions were working, running back, and
when I arrived there I left my shotgun behind or by a tree not far from where my companions
were working; and I called Bernardino Tagampa to tell him about the occurrence, and to him I
told of that occurence because he is my friend and besides that he was a relative of the
deceased, and when Tagampa heard of this he and myself went together to see the dead
body.
Only one shot was heard that morning and a chicken was killed by gunshot wound. Chicken feathers
were found in considerable qualities at the point where the chicken was shot and where the accident
occurred. The defendant within a few minutes after the accident went out of the woods to the malecon
where he had left his laborers at work, carrying the dead chicken with him. The accused called
Bernardino Tagampa, on of the laborers, to go with him and they disappeared for some time. Tagampa
says that they went a little way toward the woods and came back. The accused says that they went to
the place where the body of the deceased lay and removed it to a place in the cogon grass where it
would not be easily observed. It is certain, however, that the body was concealed in the cogon grass.
During the afternoon Tagampa left the malecon, where his fellow laborers were working, probably to
hunt for a place in which to hide the body. The rest of the laborers saw the witness Yumul take the
chicken which had been killed by the accused. He delivered it to the wife of the accused, who testified
that she received the chicken from Yumul and that it had been killed by a gunshot wound. That evening
the accused and Tagampa went together to dispose of the body finally. They took it from the cogon
grass where it lay concealed and carried it about seventeen or eighteen hundred meters from the place
where it had originally fallen, and buried it in an old well, covering it with straw and earth and burning
straw on top of the well for the purpose of concealing it. Tagampa said that he helped the accused
dispose of the body because he was afraid of him, although he admits that the accused in no way
threatened or sought to compel him to do so. The defendant prior to the trial denied all knowledge of the
death of the deceased or the whereabouts of the body. On the trial, however, he confessed his
participation in the death of the deceased and told the story substantially as above.
So far as can be ascertained from the evidence the prior relations between the accused and the
deceased had been normal. The deceased was a tenant on land belonging to a relative of the accused.
There was no enmity and no unpleasant relations between them. No attempt was made to show any.
There appears to have been no motive whatever for the commission of the crime. The Government has
not attempted to show any. The only possible reason that the accused could have for killing the
deceased would be found in the fact of a sudden quarrel between them during the hunt. That idea is
wholly negative by the fact that the chicken and the man were shot at the same time, there having been
only one shot fired.
Article 1 of the Penal Code says:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary unless the contrary
shall appear.
Article 8, subdivision 8, reads as follows:
He who, while performing a legal act with due care, causes some injury by mere accident
without liability or intention of causing it.
Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is as follows:
A defendant in a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved,
and in case of a reasonable doubt that his guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an
acquittal.
158
The American doctrine is substantially the same. It is uniformly held that if life is taken by misfortune or
accident while in the performance of a lawful act executed with due care and without intention of doing
harm, there is no criminal liability. (Tidwell vs. State, 70 Ala., 33; State vs. Benham, 23 Ia., 154, 92 Am.
Dec., 417; Bertrong vs. State, 2 Tex. Ap., 160; Williamson vs. State, 2 Ohio C. C., 292; U. S. vs.
Meagher, 37 Fed. Rep., 875; U. S. vs. Castro, Fed. Cas., 14752; State vs. Legg, 3 L. R. A., N. S.,
1152.)
In this case there is absolutely no evidence of negligence upon the part of the accused. Neither is there
any question that he was engaged in the commission of a lawful act when the accident occurred.
Neither is there any evidence of the intention of the accused to cause the death of the deceased. The
only thing in the case at all suspicious upon the part of the defendant are his concealment and denial.
In the case of the State vs. Legg, above referred to, it is said (p.1165):
Where accidental killing is relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required to prove such
a defense by a preponderance of the evidence, because there is a denial of intentional killing,
and the burden is upon the State to show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration of
all the evidence, both that for the State and the prisoner, there is a reasonable doubt as to
whether or not the killing was accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit. . . . But where
accidental killing is relied upon, the prisoner admits the killing but denies that it was intentional.
Therefore, the State must show that it was intentional, and it is clearly error to instruct the jury
that the defendant must show that it was an accident by a preponderance of the testimony, and
instruction B in the Cross case was properly held to be erroneous.
In 3 L. R. A., N. S., page 1163, it is said:
Evidence of misadventure gives rise to an important issue in a prosecution for homicide, which
must be submitted to the jury. And since a plea of misadventure is a denial of criminal intent (or
its equivalent) which constitutes an essential element in criminal homicide, to warrant a
conviction it must be negative by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
In support of such contention the author cites a number of cases.
We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment of conviction.
The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed, the defendant acquitted, and his discharge from
custody ordered, costs de oficio. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
PO3 FERDINAND FALLORINA Y FERNANDO, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
For automatic review is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, convicting
appellant PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando of murder for the killing of eleven-year-old Vincent
Jorojoro, Jr. while the latter was flying his kite on top of a roof. The court a quo sentenced the appellant
to suffer the death penalty.
The accusatory portion of the Information charging the appellant with murder reads:
That on or about the 26th day of September 1998, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, with intent to kill, by means of treachery and taking advantage of superior strength,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon the person of VINCENT JOROJORO, JR. y MORADAS, a minor, eleven (11)
years of age, by then and there, shooting him with a gun, hitting him on the head, thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said offended party.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment on October 20, 1998, the appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Case for the Prosecution3
Eleven-year-old Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. was the third child of Vicente and Felicisima Jorojoro. The family
lived at Sitio Militar, Barangay Bahay Toro, Project 8, Quezon City. Vincent, nicknamed "Hataw," was a
grade three pupil whose education was sponsored by the Spouses Petinato, an American couple,
through an educational foundation.4
The appellant was an officer of the Philippine National Police detailed in the Traffic Management Group
(TMG) based in Camp Crame, Quezon City, but was on detached service with the Motorcycle Unit of
the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA).
At about 2:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998, Vincent asked permission from his mother Felicisima if he
could play outside. She agreed.5 Together with his playmate Whilcon "Buddha" Rodriguez, Vincent
played with his kite on top of the roof of an abandoned carinderia beside the road in Sitio Militar,
Barangay Bahay Toro. Beside this carinderia was a basketball court, where fourteen-year-old Ricardo
Salvo and his three friends, nicknamed L.A., Nono and Puti, were playing backan, a game of basketball.
159
Ricardo heard the familiar sound of a motorcycle coming from the main road across the basketball
court. He was nonplussed when he looked at the person driving the motorcycle and recognized the
appellant. Ricardo knew that the appellant abhorred children playing on the roof of the carinderia and
berated them for it. His friend Ong-ong had previously been scolded by the appellant for playing on the
roof.
Ricardo called on Vincent and Whilcon to come down from the roof. When the appellant saw Vincent
and Whilcon, the former stopped his motorcycle and shouted at them, "Putang inang mga batang ito,
hindi kayo magsibaba d'yan!" After hearing the shouts of the appellant, Whilcon immediately jumped
down from the roof.6 Vincent, meanwhile, was lying on his stomach on the roof flying his kite. When he
heard the appellant's shouts, Vincent stood up and looked at the latter. Vincent turned his back, ready
to get down from the roof. Suddenly, the appellant pointed his .45 caliber pistol7 towards the direction of
Vincent and fired a shot. Vincent was hit on the left parietal area. He fell from the roof, lying prostrate
near the canal beside the abandoned carinderia and the basketball court.8
Whilcon rushed to help Vincent up but was shocked when he saw blood on the latter's head. Whilcon
retreated and left his friend.9 The appellant approached Vincent and carried the latter's hapless body in
a waiting tricycle and brought him to the Quezon City General Hospital. Vincent was pronounced dead
on arrival.
Meantime, word reached Vincent's parents that their son was shot and brought to the hospital. They
rushed to the hospital, only to see their son's already lifeless body. The appellant was nowhere to be
found.
Dr. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyot of the Medico-Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
conducted an autopsy where he made the following findings:
Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds.
Abrasion, 7.0 x 2.0 cms., right arm, middle third, postero-lateral aspect.
Contused-abrasion, 14.5 x 2.5 cms., postero-lateral chest wall, right side.
Gunshot Wound, Entrance, 3.0 x 0.8 cms., roughly ovaloid, with irregular edges, abrasion
collar widest postero-inferiorly, located at the head, left parietal area, 9.0 cms. above and 8.0
cms. behind the left external auditory meatus, directed forward upward and from left to right,
involving the scalp, fracturing the left parietal bone (punched-in), lacerating the left and right
cerebral hemispheres of the brain, fracturing the right parietal bone (punched-out), lacerating
the scalp, making an Exit wound, 3.3 x 1.0 cms., stellate with everted and irregular edges, 12.0
cms. above and 2.0 cms. in front of the right external auditory meatus.
Intracranial hemorrhage, subdural and subarachnoid, extensive, bilateral.
Scalp hematoma, fronto-parietal areas, bilateral.
Visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, one-fourth (1/4) filled with partially digested food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: GUNSHOT WOUND, HEAD.10
Dr. Baluyot testified that the victim died from a single gunshot wound in the head. The bullet entered the
left upper back portion of the head (above the level of the left ear)11 and exited to the right side.12 Dr.
Baluyot signed Vincent's certificate of death.13
At about 3:00 p.m., SPO2 Felix Pajarillo and Police Inspector Abelardo P. Aquino proceeded to the
scene of the shooting but failed to find the victim and the appellant. They proceeded to the Quezon City
General Hospital where they heard that the victim had died. They returned to the crime scene and
recovered an empty shell from a .45 caliber gun.14
On September 28, 1998, Major Isidro Suyo, the Chief of the MMDA Motorcycle Unit to which the
appellant was assigned on detached service, reported to the Sangandaan Police Station that the
appellant had not reported for duty.15 At 2:10 p.m. of September 29, 1998, Police Senior
Superintendent Alfonso Nalangan, the Regional Director of the PNP-TMG, NCR, surrendered the
appellant to the Sangandaan Police Station together with his .45 caliber pistol bearing Serial No. AOC-
38701.16
Meantime, upon the urging of Vicente Jorojoro, Ricardo was brought to the Department of Justice where
he was enrolled under its Witness Protection Program. He gave his sworn statement to NBI Special
Agent Roberto Divinagracia on September 29, 1998.17 On the same date, P/Insp. Abelardo Aquino
wrote the Chief of the PNP Crime Laboratory Examination Unit requesting for the ballistic examination
of the .45 caliber pistol with Serial No. AOC-38701 and the empty shell of a .45 caliber gun found at the
scene of the shooting.18 Before noon on September 30, 1998, Divinagracia arrived at the station and
turned over two witnesses, Raymond Castro and Ricardo Salvo. He also turned over the witnesses'
sworn statements.19 On October 2, 1998, on orders of the police station commander,20 Pajarillo took
pictures of the crime scene, including the carinderia and the roof with a bullet hole as part of the office
filing.21 He did not inform the prosecution that he took such pictures, nor did he furnish it with copies
thereof. However, the appellant's counsel learned of the existence of the said pictures.
On October 5, 1998, P/Insp. Mario Prado signed Firearms Identification Report No. FAIB-124-98 stating
that:
FINDINGS:
Microscopic examination and comparison of the specimen marked "FAP" revealed the
same individual characteristics with cartridge cases fired from the above-mentioned
firearm.
CONCLUSION:
The specimen marked "FAP" was fired from the above-mentioned caliber .45
Thompson Auto Ordnance pistol with serial number AOC-38701.22
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Vincent's family suffered mental anguish as a result of his death. As evidenced by receipts, they spent
P49,174 for the funeral.23
Case for the Appellant
The appellant denied shooting Vincent. He testified that at about 1:30 p.m. of September 26, 1998,
Macario Ortiz, a resident of Sitio San Jose, Quezon City, asked for police assistance; Macario's brother-
in-law was drunk and armed with a knife, and was creating trouble in their house. The appellant's house
was located along a narrow alley (eskinita) perpendicular to the main road. It was 200 meters away from
Macario's house.24 Responding to the call, the appellant took his .45 service revolver, cocked it, put the
safety lock in place and tucked the gun at his right waistline. He brought out his motorcycle from the
garage and slowly negotiated the bumpy alley leading to the main road. Macario, who was waiting for
him at the main road, called his attention to his revolver which was about to fall off from his waist. The
appellant got distracted and brought his motorcycle to the right side of the road, near the abandoned
carinderia where he stopped. As he stepped his right foot on the ground to keep himself from falling, the
appellant lost his balance and slipped to the right. At this point, the revolver fell to the ground near his
foot and suddenly went off. Bystanders shouted, "Ano yon, ano yon, mukhang may tinamaan." He
picked up his gun and examined it. He put the safety latch back on and tucked it at his right waistline.
He then told Macario to wait for a while to check if somebody was really hit. He went near the
abandoned carinderia and saw Vincent sprawled to the ground. He picked up the bloodied child,
boarded him on a tricycle on queue and instructed its driver, Boy Candaje, to bring the boy to the
hospital.25 On board the tricycle were Jeffrey Dalansay and Milbert Doring.
The appellant rode his motorcycle and proceeded to his mother's house in Caloocan City but did not
inform her of the incident. He then called his superior officer, Major Isidro Suyo, at the Base 103,
located at Roces Avenue, Quezon City. The appellant informed Major Suyo that he met an accident;
that his gun fell and fired; and, that the bullet accidentally hit a child. He also told his superior that he
might not be able to report for work that day and the following day. He assured his superior that he
would surrender later. He then went to Valenzuela City to the house of his friend PO3 Angelito Lam,
who was a motorcycle unit cop. The appellant stayed there for three days. He also visited friends during
that time.
On September 29, 1998, he went to the office of Major Suyo and surrendered his .45 caliber pistol.
Major Suyo accompanied and turned over the appellant to the commanding officer at Camp Crame,
Quezon City. The appellant was subjected to a neuro and drug test. He stated that the results of the
drug test were negative. The appellant was then referred to the Sangandaan Police Station for
investigation.26 The pictures27 of the crime scene were given to him by Barangay Tanod Johnny Yaket,
shown in one of the pictures pointing to a bullet hole. The appellant's testimony was corroborated in pari
materia by Macario Ortiz.
Leonel Angelo Balaoro, Vincent's thirteen-year-old playmate, testified that at 1:30 p.m. of September
26, 1998, he was playing basketball at Barangay Bahay Toro, at the basketball court along the road
beside the chapel. With him were Ricardo, Puti and Nono. Vincent was on the rooftop of the carinderia
with Whilcon. While Puti was shooting the ball, an explosion ensued. He and Ricardo ran beside the
chapel near the basketball court. He looked back towards the basketball court and saw the appellant,
about 15 meters away from the canal, holding the prostrate and bloodied Vincent. He did not see the
appellant shoot Vincent. He did not report what he saw to the police authorities. He was ordered by his
father to testify for the appellant. He also testified that his mother was related to Daniel, the appellant's
brother.
On January 19, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of murder, qualified by
treachery and aggravated by abuse of public position. The trial court did not appreciate in favor of the
appellant the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y
Fernando GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined in and penalized
by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and in view
of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage by the accused of his
public position (par. 1, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code), is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of DEATH.
The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the late Vincent Jorojoro, Jr. the
amounts of P49,174.00, as actual damages; P50,000.00, as moral damages; P25,000.00, as
exemplary damages; and, P50,000.00, as death indemnity.
The accused is to pay the costs.
The .45 caliber pistol, service firearm (Exh. "R") of the accused, shall remain under the custody
of the Court and shall be disposed of in accordance with the existing rules and regulations
upon the finality of this decision.28
The appellant assigned the following errors for resolution:
1. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE CREDENCE TO
RELEVANT PHYSICAL EVIDENCE, WHICH IF CONSIDERED COULD HAVE ALTERED THE
CONCLUSIONS ARRIVED AT BY THE COURT AND THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
2. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED BY OVERSTEPPING THE LINE OF JUDGING
AND ADVOCACY, AND GOING INTO THE REALM OF SPECULATION, PATENTLY
DEMONSTRATING BIAS AND PARTIALITY.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
RICARDO SALVO, ALLEGED PROSECUTION EYEWITNESS, WHOSE TESTIMONY IS
WANTING IN PROBABILITY, AS IT IS CONTRARY TO THE COMMON EXPERIENCE OF
MANKIND.
4. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN INEQUITABLY APPRECIATING
EXCULPATORY AND INCULPATORY FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH SHOULD
HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED.
5. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED.
6. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TAKING ADVANTAGE OF HIS POSITION BY ACCUSED.29
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The appellant asserts that the trial court failed to appreciate in his favor the physical evidence, viz., the
hole found on the rooftop of the carinderia where Vincent was when he was shot. The appellant
contends that the picture30 taken on October 2, 1998 by no less than SPO2 Felix Pajarillo, one of the
principal witnesses of the prosecution, and the pictures31 showing Barangay Tanod Yaket pointing to a
hole on the roof buttress the defense of the appellant that the shooting was accidental. The appellant
maintains that his service revolver fell to the ground, hit a hard object, and as the barrel of the gun was
pointed to an oblique direction, it fired, hitting the victim who was on the rooftop. The bullet hit the back
portion of the victim's head, before exiting and hitting the rooftop. The appellant posits that the pictures
belie Ricardo's testimony that he deliberately shot the victim, and, instead, complements Dr. Baluyot's
testimony that the gunshot wound came from somewhere behind the victim, somewhere lower than the
point of entrance. The appellant invokes P/Insp. Mario Prado's testimony that if a gun hits the ground in
an oblique position, the gun will fire and the bullet will exit in the same position as the gun, that is, also
in an oblique position.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, asserts that the contention of the appellant is based on
speculations and surmises, the factual basis for his conclusion not having been proven by competent
and credible evidence. There is no evidence on record that the hole shown in the pictures32 was
caused by a bullet from a .45 caliber pistol. The appellant did not present Barangay Tanod Johnny
Yaket, who was shown in the pictures, to testify on the matter. The appellant failed to prove that any
slug was found on the rooftop or under the roof which came from the appellant's .45 caliber pistol.
According to the Solicitor General, the pictures relied upon by the appellant cannot overcome the
positive and straightforward testimony of the young eyewitness Ricardo Salvo.
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General. Whether or not the appellant is exempt from criminal
liability is a factual issue. The appellant was burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, his
affirmative defense that the victim's death was caused by his gun accidentally going off, the bullet hitting
the victim without his fault or intention of causing it; hence, is exempt from criminal liability under Article
12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which reads –
The following are exempt from criminal liability:
… trigger, the gun would not fire:
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it.
The basis for the exemption is the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the
accused. For the accused to be guilty of a felony, it must be committed either with criminal intent or with
fault or negligence.33
The elements of this exempting circumstance are (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due
care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without any fault or intention of
causing it.34 An accident is an occurrence that "happens outside the sway of our will, and although it
comes about through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable
consequences." If the consequences are plainly foreseeable, it will be a case of negligence.
In Jarco Marketing Corporation v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court held that an accident is a fortuitive
circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening
wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstance is unusual or
unexpected by the person to whom it happens. Negligence, on the other hand, is the failure to observe,
for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand without which such other person suffers injury. Accident and
negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other.36 In criminal negligence, the
injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed
without malice.37 The appellant must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of
that of the prosecution because by admitting having caused the death of the victim, he can no longer be
acquitted.
In this case, the appellant failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, his defense.
First. The appellant appended to his counter-affidavit in the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor the
pictures showing the hole on the roof of the carinderia38 to prove that he shot the victim accidentally.
However, when the investigating prosecutor propounded clarificatory questions on the appellant relating
to the pictures, the latter refused to answer. This can be gleaned from the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor, thus:
Classificatory questions were propounded on the respondent but were refused to be answered.
This certainly led the undersigned to cast doubt on respondent's allegations. The defenses set
forth by the respondent are evidentiary in character and best appreciated in a full-blown trial;
and that the same is not sufficient to overcome probable cause.39
Second. The appellant did not see what part of the gun hit the victim.40 There is no evidence showing
that the gun hit a hard object when it fell to the ground, what part of the gun hit the ground and the
position of the gun when it fell from the appellant's waist.
Third. In answer to the clarificatory questions of the court, the appellant testified that the chamber of his
pistol was loaded with bullets and was cocked when he placed it on his right waistline.41 He also
testified that the gun's safety lock was on. He was asked if the gun would fire if the hammer is moved
backward with the safety lock in place, and the appellant admitted that even if he pulled hard on the
Q Is this your service firearm?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q So the chamber might have been loaded when you went out of the house?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What about the hammer, how was the hammer at that time when you tucked the gun in
your waistline?
A The hammer was cocked like this.
162
COURT: A It will not, Your Honor.

Can you not stipulate that the hammer is moved backwards near the safety grip. COURT: (to the parties)

ATTY. AND PROS. SINTAY: Q Can you not admit that at this position, the accused pulled the trigger, the hammer did
not move forward?
Admitted, Your Honor.
PROS. SINTAY AND ATTY. PRINCIPE:
ATTY. PEREZ:
Admitted, Your Honor.
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: (to the witness)
COURT: (to the witness)
Q And therefore at this position, even if I pull the trigger many times, a bullet will not come
Q You are a policeman, if there is a bullet inside the barrel of the gun and then the hammer out from the muzzle of the gun because the hammer is on a safety locked (sic)?
is moved backwards and therefore it is open, that means that if you pull the trigger, the bullet
will fire because the hammer will move forward and then hit the base of the bullet? A Yes, Your Honor.

A Yes, Your Honor. Q Even if I pushed it very hard, it will not fire the gun?

Q Therefore, the gun was cocked when you came out? A Yes, Your Honor.

A Yes, Your Honor. Q Alright, I will ask you again a question. If the hammer of the gun is like this and therefore
it is open but it is on a safety lock, there is space between the safety grip which is found below
Q You did not place the safety lock before you went out of your house? the hammer, there is a space, is it not?

A I safety (sic) it, sir. A Yes, Your Honor.

Q So when you boarded the motorcycle, the gun was on a safety lock? Q That even if I pushed the safety grip forward, like this.

A Yes, Your Honor. The Court gave the gun to the accused for him to demonstrate.

Q Will you please place the safety lock of that gun, point it upwards. (to the witness)

(witness did as instructed) You push it forward in order to push the hammer. Hard if you want but do not remove the
safety lock.
It is now on a safety locked (sic)?
(witness did as instructed)
A Yes, Your Honor.
The witness tried to push the safety grip and it does not touch the hammer even if the hammer
is cocked.42
Q Pull the trigger if the hammer will move forward?
Fourth. The trial court was witness as the appellant's counsel himself proved that the defense proffered
(witness did as instructed) by the appellant was incredible. This can be gleaned from the decision of the trial court:

163
 3. More importantly, and which the Court considers it as providential, when the counsel of the
accused was holding the gun in a cocked position and the safety lock put in place, the gun
accidentally dropped on the cemented floor of the courtroom and the gun did not fire and
neither was the safety lock moved to its unlock position to cause the hammer of the gun to
move forward. The safety lock of the gun remained in the same position as it was when it
dropped on the floor.43
Fifth. After the shooting, the appellant refused to surrender himself and his service firearm. He hid from
the investigating police officers and concealed himself in the house of his friend SPO3 Angelito Lam in
Valenzuela City, and transferred from one house to another for three days to prevent his arrest:
Q So did you surrender that afternoon of September 26, 1998?
A No, Your Honor.
Q I thought you were surrendering to Major Suyo?
A I was but I was not able to surrender to Major Suyo, Your Honor.
Q Why, you were already able to talk to Major Suyo?
A Because at that time I was already confused and did not know what to do, Your Honor.
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
Q What is your relation with PO3 Angelito Lam of Valenzuela?
A Just my co-motorcycle unit cop in the TMG, sir.
Q Did I hear you right that you slept at the residence of PO3 Lam for three days?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why instead of going home to your residence at Bahay Toro?
A Because I am worried, sir.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q So what did you do for three days in the house of PO3 Lam?
A During daytime, I go to my friends, other friends and in the evening, I go back to the
house of PO3 Lam, Your Honor.
Q So if you were able to visit your friends on September 27 or 28, 1998 and then returned
to the house of PO3 Lam in the evening, why did you not go to Major Suyo or to your 103
Base?
A Your Honor, during those days I am really calling Major Suyo.
Q Why did you not go to your office at Camp Crame, Quezon City?
A At that time, I did not have money, Your Honor.
Q What is the connection of you having money to that of informing your officer that you will
surrender?
A What I know, Your Honor, is that if I do that I will already be detained and that I will have
no money to spend.
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
Q Mr. Witness, from the time of the incident up to Sept. 29, 1998, you did not even visit
your family in Barangay Bahay Toro?
A No, sir.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q Did you send somebody to visit your family?
A No, Your Honor.
ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)
Q Did you cause to blotter the shooting incident of Vincent?
A I was not able to do that, sir.
Q You did not even talk to the Bgy. Officials in Bgy. Bahay Toro?
A No sir, because I already brought the child to the hospital.44
The conduct of the appellant after the shooting belies his claim that the death of the victim was
accidental and that he was not negligent.
We agree with the encompassing disquisitions of the trial court in its decision on this matter:
164
 The coup de grace against the claim of the accused, a policeman, that the victim was A: He was at the roof of the karinderia, sir.
accidentally shot was his failure to surrender himself and his gun immediately after the
incident. As a police officer, it is hard to believe that he would choose to flee and keep himself Q: Was there any companion of Vincent?
out of sight for about three (3) days if he indeed was not at fault. It is beyond human
comprehension that a policeman, who professes innocence would come out into the open only
three (3) days from the incident and claim that the victim was accidentally shot. Human A: Yes, sir.
behavior dictates, especially when the accused is a policeman, that when one is innocent of
some acts or when one is in the performance of a lawful act but causes injury to another Q: What was the position of Vincent at that time that you saw him and Fallorina shot him?
without fault or negligence, he would, at the first moment, surrender to the authorities and give
an account of the accident. His failure to do so would invite suspicion and whatever account or A: "Nakatalikod po siya."
statement he would give later on becomes doubtful.

…
For the accused, therefore, to claim that Vincent was accidentally shot is odious, if not, an
insult to human intelligence; it is incredible and unbelievable, and more of a fantasy than a
reality. It was a deliberate and intentional act, contrary to accused's claim, that it happened Q: You included in this Exhibit O your drawing the figure of a certain Jeffrey and you and
outside the sway of his will.45 his tricycle? Why did you include this drawing?

It is a well-entrenched rule that findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the A: Because it was in the tricycle where Vincent was boarded to and brought to the hospital.
witnesses, its assessment of the credibility of the said witnesses and the probative weight of their
testimonies are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect by the appellate court, as the trial judge (Witness referring to Exhibit O-11)
was in a better position to observe the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses as they testified.46 We
have carefully reviewed the records of the case and found no reason to deviate from the findings of the
Q: And who was the driver of that tricycle?
trial court.

A: It was Jeffrey who drove the tricycle, sir.

The testimony of prosecution witness Ricardo Salvo deserves credence. He testified in a positive and
straightforward manner, which testimony had the earmarks of truth and sincerity. Even as he was
subjected to a grueling cross-examination by the appellant's counsel, he never wavered in his Q: You also drew here a motorcycle already marked as Exhibit O-7. Why did you include
testimony. He positively identified the appellant as the assailant and narrated in detail how the latter the motorcycle?
deliberately aimed his gun and shot the victim. The relevant portions of his testimony are quoted:
A: Because Fallorina was riding on that motorcycle at that time.
Q: While playing basketball with Nono, LA and Puti, do you remember of any unusual
incident which took place? COURT: (to the witness)

A: Yes, sir. Q: So when Ferdinand Fallorina shot the boy, the motorcycle was moving?

Q: What was that unusual incident? A: It was stationary, your Honor.

A: When Vincent was shot, sir. Q: Did you see where he came from, I am referring to Fallorina before you saw him shot
the boy?
Q: Who shot Vincent?
…
A: Ferdinand Fallorina, sir.
A: He came from their house, Your Honor.
…
Q: What was his attire, I am referring to Ferdinand Fallorina?
Q: And in what place that Vincent was shot by Fallorina?

165
A: He was wearing white shirt and blue pants, Your Honor. …

… Q: How many shots did you hear?

ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness) A: Only one, sir.

Q: At that time that Fallorina shot the victim, was Buddha still there? Q: Do you recognize the gun used by Fallorina?

A: He ran, sir. He jumped in this place, sir. A: Yes, sir.

(Witness is pointing to a place near the canal already marked as Exhibit O-14). Q: What was that gun?

Q: Now from the witness stand that you are now seated. Can you tell the Court how far A: .45 cal., sir.
where (sic) you from Fallorina at that time of the shooting?
Q: Are you familiar with .45 cal.?
COURT:
A: No, sir.
Can the prosecution and the accused stipulate that the distance pointed to by the witness is
more or less 7 meters. Q: Why do you know that it was .45 cal.?

… A: Because that kind of gun, I usually see that in the movies, sir.

ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness) Q: Ricardo, you said that you have known Fallorina for two (2) years and you saw him shot
Vincent on September 26, 1998 at around 2:30 in the afternoon. Please look around the
Q: How about the distance of Fallorina from Vincent, can you tell that? courtroom now and point at the person of PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina?

COURT: (to the witness) CT. INTERPRETER:

Can you point a distance between Fallorina and the boy at that time the body (sic) was shot? Witness is pointing to a male person the one seated at the back of the lady and wearing a
yellow shirt and maong pants and when asked of his name, he stated his name as Ferdinand
COURT: Fallorina.

10 meters more or less? ATTY. PRINCIPE: (to the witness)

… Q: Can you tell to the Court whether you heard utterances at that time that he shot the
victim?
Q: How long have you known Ferdinand Fallorina before the incident?
…
A: More or less two years, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know him?
Q: What was that?
A: I usually see him in that place at Sitio Militar, especially on Sundays, sir.
A: "Putang inang mga batang ito, hindi kayo magsisibaba diyan!"
166
 … We, however, note that the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public
Q: After Fallorina shot Vincent Jorojoro, you saw Vincent Jorojoro falling from the roof,
what about Fallorina, what did he do?
A: He was still on board his motorcycle and then he went at the back of the karinderia
where Vincent fell, Your Honor.
Q: And after he went at the back of the karinderia and looked at Vincent Jorojoro, what did
he do?
A: He carried Vincent, Your Honor.
Q: And after carrying Vincent, what did he do?
A: He boarded Vincent in the tricycle.
Q: What about the gun, what did he do with the gun?
A: I do not know anymore.47
The appellant even uttered invectives at the victim and Whilcon before he shot the victim. In fine, his act
was deliberate and intentional.
It bears stressing that of the eyewitnesses listed in the Information as witnesses for the prosecution,
only Ricardo Salvo remained steadfast after he was brought under the Witness Protection Program of
the Department of Justice. He explained that the reason why he testified for the prosecution, despite the
fact that the appellant was a policeman, was because he pitied the victim's mother who was always
crying,48 unable to obtain justice for her son. We find no ill motive why Ricardo would falsely testify
against the appellant. It was only his purest intention of ferreting out the truth in this incident and that
justice be done to the victim.49 Hence, the testimony of Ricardo is entitled to full faith and credence.
The Crime Committed by the Appellant
We agree with the trial court that the appellant committed murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code qualified by treachery. As the trial court correctly pointed out, Vincent was shot intentionally
while his back was turned against the appellant. The little boy was merely flying his kite and was ready
to get down from the roof when the appellant fired a shot directed at him. The essence of treachery is
the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his
part.50 Nonetheless, Vincent was an eleven-year-old boy. He could not possibly put up a defense
against the appellant, a police officer who was armed with a gun. It is not so much as to put emphasis
on the age of the victim, rather it is more of a description of the young victim's state of helplessness.51
Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an
adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.52 The abuse of superior strength as alleged in
the Information is already absorbed by treachery and need not be considered as a separate aggravating
circumstance.53
position in this case. We reverse the trial court on this score.
There is no dispute that the appellant is a policeman and that he used his service firearm, the .45
caliber pistol, in shooting the victim. However, there is no evidence on record that the appellant took
advantage of his position as a policeman when he shot the victim.54 The shooting occurred only when
the appellant saw the victim on the rooftop playing with his kite. The trial court erred in appreciating
abuse of public position against the appellant.
The trial court did not, however, err in ruling that the appellant is not entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. Surrender is said to be voluntary when it is done by the accused
spontaneously and made in such a manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them
the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.55
In this case, the appellant deliberately evaded arrest, hid in the house of PO3 Lam in Valenzuela City,
and even moved from one house to another for three days. The appellant was a policeman who swore
to obey the law. He made it difficult for his brother-officers to arrest him and terminate their
investigation. It was only after the lapse of three days that the appellant gave himself up and
surrendered his service firearm.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death.
Since there is no modifying circumstance in the commission of the crime, the appellant should be
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
95, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant PO3 Ferdinand Fallorina y Fernando is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
and, there being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime, is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Vincent
Jorojoro, Jr. the amount of P49,174 as actual damages; P50,000 as moral damages; P50,000 as civil
indemnity; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PRAXEDES AYAYA, defendant-appellant.
G. N. Trinidad for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
167
VILLAMOR, J.:
The appellant was tried in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas upon the following information:
That on or about January 15, 1928, in the municipality of Pagbilao, Province of Tayabas,
Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, with the
intent to kill her husband Benito dela Cruz, with whom she was united in lawful marriage, with
treachery and by means of an umbrella, did voluntarily, unlawfully, and feloniously assault and
attack her said husband Benito de la Cruz, inflicting a mortal wound in the upper left eyelid, as
a result of which said Benito de la Cruz died five (5) days thereafter. In violation of article 402
of the Penal Code.
It appears from the record that at about 1 o'clock in the morning of January 16, 1928, Jose Fajardo, the
chief of police of Pagbilao, Tayabas, was informed by a policeman that one Benito de la Cruz was
drunk, wounded, and vomiting in his house in said municipality. Said chief of police went to the place
and found Benito, the deceased, lying in bed with a wound on his left eyelid, and unconscious, for he
did not answer the questions put to him. When his wife, the defendant Praxedes Ayaya, was questioned
as to the cause of that wound, she replied that it was due to the fact that she herself had jabbed her
husband with an umbrella. Health officer Victoriano Litonjua was then called, and upon examining
Benito, found he had a wound on the left upper eyelid which was bleeding: that his pupils were dilated
and, from the odor of his breath and from his vomiting, it appeared that Benito was drunk. In view of the
wounded man's condition he was later taken to the provincial hospital of Tayabas, where he died four
days after the incident. Health officer Litonjua and Dr. G. Santos Cuyugan, the director of the provincial
hospital of Tayabas, who treated the wounded man, expressed different opinions as to the cause of the
death of Benito de la Cruz. Health officer Litonjua believes that the deceased's cerebral hemorrhage
was due to his alcoholic excesses, whereas Doctor Cuyugan, who performed the autopsy, declared that
the wound was caused by some blunt instrument and that his death was caused by the cerebral
hemorrhage produced by the wound he had received in the forehead, and that health officer Litonjua's
statement as to said hemorrhage being due to the alcohol is erroneous. The trial court found the
defendant guilty of the crime alleged in the information, and taking into account that the defendant did
not intend to inflict so grave an injury as she did, and that there had been provocation on the part of the
offended party, sentenced her to fourteen years, eight months and one day reclusion temporal, with the
accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P500 by way of indemnity, plus
the costs of the action.
The defendant appealed from this judgment, and her attorney, in support of the petition that the
judgment appealed from be reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs de oficio, assigns the
following errors: (1) The trial court erred in holding that the deceased's wound on the left upper eyelid
was caused by the appellant; (2) supposing, without admitting, that said wound was really caused by
the herein appellant, the lower court erred in concluding that said wound was the immediate cause of
the death of the deceased and consequently, in convicting the appellant; and (3) the lower court erred in
not acquitting the appellant, at least, for reasonable doubt.
The evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the crime charged, consists of the following:
Exhibit A, which is the sworn statement filed by the accused with the justice of the peace of Pagbilao;
Exhibit B, which is the umbrella used by the defendant and with which she jabbed the deceased; Exhibit
C, which is the report of the autopsy of Benito de la Cruz signed by Doctor Cuyugan; and Exhibit D,
which is the death certificate.
In the defendant's sworn statement she states, among other things, that at about 8 o'clock at night on
January 15, 1928, she, with her husband Benito de la Cruz, and her son Emilio, drank tuba in the store
of one Felicidad Losloso; that afterwards they went to a cinema; that while returning home and without
any warning her husband, who was drunk, gave her a blow which she dodged; that then her husband
went home, preceding her and her son and when they arrived at the house they found the door closed;
that she and her son pushed the door and attempted to open it, but her husband, who was inside,
prevented it; that then the door gave way somewhat and her son Emilio succeeded in putting his head
between the opening of the door and the wall and in order to prevent the door from crushing him, she
pushed it; that Benito then poked his head out of the opening of the door and when she saw him, she
jabbed him with the umbrella she carried; that she does not know where she jabbed him although she
thinks it was in the body; and that when she and her son finally succeeded in entering the house, they
found that Benito was already in bed with a wound in the forehead. The accused herself, in her
testimony in her own behalf, substantially repeated what she had declared before the justice of the
peace of Pagbilao, stating, however, that when the door was opened and her son put his head between
the opening of the door and the wall, in order to prevent the door from crushing her son's head, she
jabbed her husband with her umbrella with a downward motion, though she could not tell if she touched
him or not. She stated, furthermore, that she did not know how the wound in her husband's forehead
was caused. This point of the defendant's testimony has not been contradicted by any evidence to the
contrary; rather it has been corroborated by her son Emilio de la Cruz who also testified at the trial.
On the other hand, it appears from the testimony of the defendant and of her son that the husband and
wife did not quarrel in the street while returning home on the night in question, and, moreover, that
during the marriage they lived together in peace with no disagreements between them, either on or
before the date of the incident. lawphi1.net
In view of the fact that there is no eyewitness of the act herein prosecuted, with the exception of the
defendant and her son Emilio de la Cruz, we are compelled to accept the declaration of the defendant
that she jabbed her husband with her umbrella in order to prevent the door from closing and crushing
her son's head which was inserted between said door and the wall of the house. Said defendant,
explaining what took place, says in part: "When the door was ajar my son went in, and then my husband
pushed it and as I saw that he was about to crush my son's head, I jabbed my husband with the point of
the umbrella, downwards to prevent him from crushing my son's head." We find nothing improbable in
this statement and if we add to this the absence of any reasonable motive to prompt said defendant to
injure her husband, we are compelled to conclude that in thrusting her umbrella in the opening of the
door in question, she did so to free her son from the imminent danger of having his head crushed or
being strangled; and if she thus caused her husband's injury, it was by a mere accident, without any
fault or intention to cause it. This being so, we believe that she incurred no criminal liability in
accordance with article 8, No. 8, of the Penal Code, because, it being a licit act to free her son from the
grave danger threatening him, and the fact of having touched the left eye of her husband, who was
behind the door, with the end of her umbrella, does not make her criminally liable. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of November 30, 1888.)
Whereof the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the appellant Praxedes Ayaya must be, as she
hereby is, acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Romualdez and Villa-Real,
168
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ISAIAS CASTILLO y COMPLETO, Appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In an Information1 dated January 19, 1994, appellant Isaias Castillo y Completo was charged with the
crime of parricide, committed as follows:
That on or about November 5, 1993, in the Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Isaias Castillo y Completo, while conveniently armed with
illegally possessed sling and deadly arrow, with intent to kill his wife Consorcia Antiporta with whom he
was united in lawful wedlock did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot and hit his wife
Consorcia Antiporta with the aforesaid deadly arrow, hitting the latter on the right side of her neck
causing the laceration of the jugular vein which caused her instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 8590-B and raffled to Branch 24 of the Regional Trial
Court of Biñan, Laguna.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on April 15, 1994. Trial thereafter ensued.
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
There is no dispute that the victim, Consorcia Antiporta Castillo, died violently in the evening of
November 5, 1993. The cause of her death was massive hemorrhage due to "laceration of the jugular
vein of her neck". According to Dr. Solita P. Plastina, Municipal Health Officer of Calamba, Laguna, who
conducted the autopsy on the victim’s body, the fatal weapon could have been a "pointed instrument
like a nail". There is no dispute likewise that the accused shot with a dart from a rubber sling, his wife
hitting her at the neck and causing her instantaneous death. The letters written by the accused from his
detention cell addressed to his mother-in-law, to his father-in-law, and lastly, the victim’s sister, speak
so eloquently of someone who accepts the fault for the early demise of the victim. Asking forgiveness
from the close relatives of the victim is a clear admission of authorship of the fatal act.
In the same letters, the accused raised as an issue his lack of intent to do the fatal harm to his wife. This
is the same issue to be resolved by this Court. Whether or not the fatal injury sustained by the victim
was accidental.
xxxx
Guillermo Antiporta, father of the victim, narrated in Court that in the evening of November 5, 1993,
between 9:00 o’clock to 10:00 o’clock, the accused came home drunk and was in an angry mood. The
accused kicked the door and table, and then threw the electric fan away. He was prevailed upon by
Guillermo to take a rest. But the accused did not heed the advice of Guillermo as he took instead his
sling and arrow from the house ceiling where he was keeping them. Dejectedly, Guillermo transferred to
the adjacent house of her x x x daughter [in-law] Yolanda. From there, Guillermo heard the victim crying
and, afterwards, shouting at the accused. Guillermo concernedly ordered Yolanda to see what was
happening inside the house of Consorcia, and Yolanda obeyed. On her way, Yolanda met the accused
carrying the bloodied body of Consorcia. Guillermo, the accused, and Yolanda brought Consorcia to the
hospital but to no avail.
From all the circumstances gathered, the infliction of the fatal injury upon Consorcia was preceded by a
quarrel between her and the accused. This spat negated the accused’s version that he was practicing
the use of the weapon when Consorcia was hit by the arrow, and lends credence to the prosecution’s
contention that the shooting was intentional.
x x x To sustain the accused’s assertion that he was practicing the use of said weapon at the time of the
incident is patently absurd. The defense even failed to rebut Guillermo Antiporta’s testimony that the
accused was keeping said sling and arrow inside his house.
It might be true that the accused was one of those who rushed the victim to the hospital and while on
the way, he sounded remorseful. But Guillermo Antiporta further testified that while the victim was being
attended to by the medical personnel of said hospital, the accused stayed outside the hospital premises,
then he disappeared. He was later on apprehended by police authorities while hiding inside the comfort
room of a premises in an adjoining barangay. The accused’s omission to surrender himself to the
authorities is a clear indication of guilt.3
After several hearings, the trial court rendered on October 5, 1998, a decision, 4 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds accused ISAIAS CASTILLO Y COMPLETO GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of PARRICIDE and hereby sentences him to a penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00, as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.5
Appellant filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the prosecution failed to sufficiently
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, in a Decision 6 dated February 28, 2005, the
Court of Appeals denied appellant’s appeal and affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 5, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24 of Biñan, Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-appellant Isaias
Castillo y Completo is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱50,000.00 as
civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.7
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated June 16, 2005.
169
Hence, this appeal.
Appellant alleged that the pieces of circumstantial evidence on which his conviction was based did not
sufficiently establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; that the prosecution failed to prove his motive in
killing his wife; or that they had a quarrel immediately prior to the incident.
Appellant likewise claimed that it was not established that he was the one who shot his wife with a
deadly arrow considering that at the time of the incident, he and his drinking buddies were all engaged
in target shooting using the sling and arrow. Hence, he surmised that any one of them could have shot
the victim. At any rate, even assuming that he was the one who killed his wife, the same was accidental
and not intentional.
Furthermore, he claimed that his presence at the crime scene did not establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. His arrest while hiding inside a toilet in the adjoining barangay, while his wife was
being treated in the hospital, likewise does not prove his complicity since the prosecution did not prove
that he deliberately hid inside the toilet.
Finally, the letters he sent to his father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law where he asked for
forgiveness should not be considered as admission of guilt.
The petition lacks merit.
Direct evidence of the commission of the offense is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw
its conclusions and finding of guilt. Conviction can be had on the basis of circumstantial evidence
provided that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial
evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with
the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The
circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person. 8 Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean the degree of proof excluding the possibility of error and producing
absolute certainty. Only moral certainty or "that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind" is required.9
In the instant case, all the essential requisites for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, are
present. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, the following pieces of circumstantial evidence
indubitably established that appellant was the perpetrator of the crime, to wit:
1. Consortia would often confide to her sister Leticia about the violent behavior of her (Consortia)
husband, herein accused-appellant. And even if Consortia would not tell Leticia about the beatings, the
latter would see her face with black eyes as evident proofs of maltreatment.
2. On the night of the incident, accused-appellant arrived at their house drunk and displaying violent
behavior, kicking the door and table.
3. Accused-appellant was last seen holding and practicing his sling and arrow.
4. Immediately afterwards, Consortia was heard crying and shouting.
5. Accused-appellant was thereafter seen carrying Consortia, bloodied and unconscious, to be brought
to the hospital where she later died.
6. The autopsy findings indicate that Consortia sustained a punctured wound in the neck which fatally
lacerated her jugular vein. The cause of the wound was a pointed object.
7. While detained, accused-appellant wrote letters to the parents and sister of Consortia asking for
forgiveness.
Also notable is accused-appellant’s behavior immediately after the incident. He disappeared and did not
enter the clinic where Consortia was rushed for treatment. And when Consortia’s sister later sought
police assistance in searching for accused-appellant, the latter was found by the police hiding inside a
toilet at a nearby barangay.10
There is no merit in appellant’s contention that the prosecution failed to prove motive in killing his wife.
Intent to kill and not motive is the essential element of the offense on which his conviction rests.11
Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by
the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the
malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under
which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. If the victim dies as a result of a
deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed.12
In the instant case, the following circumstances satisfactorily established appellant’s intent to kill his
wife:
First: The killing was immediately preceded by a quarrel between the appellant and his wife. Leticia, the
victim’s sister, testified that the deceased suffered from the violent behavior of the appellant who would
often lay hand on the victim during their marital squabbles.
Guillermo, appellant’s father-in-law, testified that on the night of the incident, appellant arrived in their
conjugal abode drunk and in a foul mood. He kicked the door and table and threw away the electric fan.
Guillermo tried to prevail upon appellant but to no avail. Instead, appellant got his sling and arrow which
he kept near the ceiling.
Guillermo left appellant’s house and went to the house of his daughter-in-law, Yolanda, located about
four meters away; but he could still hear the victim and appellant arguing and shouting at each other.
After a while, Guillermo requested Yolanda to look on her sister-in-law. On her way, Yolanda met the
appellant carrying Consorcia soaked in blood.
Second: It has always been said that criminal cases are primarily about human nature. 13 In the instant
case, appellant disappeared after his wounded wife was rushed to the hospital. This is indeed contrary
to human nature. A husband is expected to lend comfort to his dying wife up to her last breath. In this
170
case, however, appellant took flight. It is well-established that the flight of an accused is competent
evidence to indicate his guilt, and flight, when unexplained, as in this case, is a circumstance from which
an inference of guilt may be drawn.14
Appellant alleged that his arrest by police authorities inside a toilet at the adjoining barangay is not an
indication of guilt because the prosecution failed to prove that he deliberately hid in order to evade being
arrested.15
The contention lacks merit.
As above-discussed, it is contrary to human nature for a husband to leave his dying wife, more so if his
absence is unexplained. Appellant did not offer any explanation for his flight. In appellant’s brief, he
claimed that in "all probability, it might have happened that he (appellant) was merely answering the call
of nature at the precise time when he was arrested." 16 However, we find it is highly illogical for appellant
to go as far as the adjoining barangay to answer the call of nature especially since he could do so inside
the premises of the hospital. Moreover, the allegation that he was fearful of reprisal coming from the
victim’s relatives17 is contrary to his claim of innocence.
Third: The location of the wound and its extent likewise proved appellant’s intent to kill the victim. The
autopsy report revealed that the victim sustained a punctured wound in the neck, a vital organ, which
fatally lacerated her jugular vein causing massive hemorrhage. The extent of the physical injury inflicted
on the deceased manifests appellant’s intention to extinguish life.18
Fourth: As regards appellant’s act of carrying the body of his wounded wife and bringing her to the
hospital, the same does not manifest innocence. It is merely an indication of an act of repentance or
contrition on the part of appellant.19
In fine, all these circumstances prove appellant’s intent to harm his wife.
There is likewise no merit in appellant’s contention that he was not the one who shot the deadly arrow
because at the time of the incident, he and his drinking buddies were all playing and practicing target
shooting with the use of the sling and arrow.
Prosecution witness Guillermo Antiporta categorically testified that appellant was alone with his wife
inside their house when the incident happened. This completely discounts the possibility that other than
appellant, there could be another person or persons who could have perpetrated the crime. There is no
paucity of evidence because the time when Guillermo left the appellant and the victim up to the time
Yolanda saw him carrying his wife, were all accounted for. Moreover, the testimony of defense witness
Galang supports the prosecution’s contention that appellant was alone with his wife at the time of the
incident. As noted by the Court of Appeals:
Defense witness, Jose Nelson Galang, testified that he left his drinking buddies and headed home at
about 9:00 p.m., as in fact he was already in bed at about 10:00 p.m. when he saw that Consortia was
being rushed to the hospital. Instead of weakening the evidence for the prosecution, Galang’s testimony
even supports the prosecution’s version that between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. of that fateful night,
accused-appellant arrived at their house drunk, presumably going home from that drinking session with
his friends. x x x20
There is likewise no merit in appellant’s contention that assuming he was the one who killed his wife,
the same was accidental and not intentional. The exempting circumstance of accident is not applicable
in the instant case. Article 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. – The following are exempt from criminal
liability:
xxxx
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it.
"Accident" is an affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and convincing
evidence.21 The defense miserably failed to discharge its burden of proof. The essential requisites for
this exempting circumstance, are:
1. A person is performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.22
By no stretch of imagination could playing with or using a deadly sling and arrow be considered as
performing a "lawful act." Thus, on this ground alone, appellant’s defense of accident must be struck
down because he was performing an unlawful act during the incident. As correctly found by the trial
court:
Furthermore, mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable under the law. In penalizing the act, the
legislator took into consideration that the deadly weapon was used for no legal purpose, but to inflict
injury, mostly fatal, upon other persons. Let it be stressed that this crude weapon can not attain the
standards as an instrument for archery competitions. To sustain the accused’s assertion that he was
practicing the use of said weapon at the time of the incident is patently absurd. The defense even failed
to rebut Guillermo Antiporta’s testimony that the accused was keeping said sling and arrow inside his
house.23
Furthermore, by claiming that the killing was by accident, appellant has the burden of proof of
establishing the presence of any circumstance which may relieve him of responsibility, and to prove
justification he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution, for even if this be weak, it can not be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the
killing.24 Other than his claim that the killing was accidental, appellant failed to adduce any evidence to
prove the same.
Likewise, we cannot lend credence to appellant’s contention that the letters he wrote to his parents-in-
law and sister-in-law, where he asked for forgiveness, should not be considered as an implied
171
admission of guilt. He claimed that he wrote the letters in order to explain that what happened was an
accident and that he was to be blamed for it because he allowed his drinking buddies to play with the
sling and arrow.
Settled is the rule that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law
to be settled through mutual concessions, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt. Evidently, no one would ask for forgiveness unless he had
committed some wrong and a plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to
compromise.25 Under the present circumstances, appellant’s plea for forgiveness should be received as
an implied admission of guilt. Besides, contrary to appellant’s assertion, the killing of Consorcia was
deliberate, and not by accident.
Finally, we find no cogent reason to review much less depart now from the findings of the lower court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When the trial court’s factual findings have been affirmed by the
appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court, for it is not our
function to analyze and weigh the parties’ evidence all over again except when there is serious ground
to believe a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby result. Our task in an appeal via certiorari is
limited, as a jurisdictional matter, to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the
Court of Appeals.26
Parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Likewise,
civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 were
properly awarded by the courts below.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 28, 2005
which affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24,
finding appellant Isaias Castillo y Completo guilty of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the heirs of his victim ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, is AFFIRMED.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SUSAN LATOSA y CHICO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated April 23, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 02192 which affirmed the April 12, 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 159, convicting appellant Susan Latosa y Chico of parricide.
Appellant was charged with parricide in an information3 which reads,
That, on or about the 5th of February 2002, in the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the legitimate wife
of one Felixberto Latosa y Jaudalso, armed with and using an unlicensed gun, with intent to kill, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot her husband, Felixberto Latosa y Jaudalso, hitting
him on the head, thereby causing the latter to sustain gunshot wound which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment on June 25, 2002, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial
thereafter ensued.
The prosecution’s evidence established the following version:
On February 5, 2002, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, appellant and her husband Major Felixberto
Latosa, Sr. (Felixberto) together with two (2) of their children, Sassymae Latosa (Sassymae) and
Michael Latosa (Michael), were at their house in Fort Bonifacio. Felixberto, Sr. was then asleep4 when
Sassymae saw appellant take Felixberto Sr.’s gun from the cabinet and leave. She asked her mother
where she was going and if she could come along, but appellant refused.5
Moments later, appellant returned and told Sassymae to buy ice cream at the commissary. Appellant
gave her money and asked her to leave.6 After Sassymae left, appellant instructed Michael to follow his
sister, but he refused as he was hungry. Appellant insisted and further told Michael not to make any
noise as his father was sleeping. Nevertheless, appellant went back inside the house and turned up the
volume of the television and the radio to full.7 Shortly after that, she came out again and gave Michael
some money to buy food at the grocery.
Instead of buying food, Michael bought ice candy and returned to the barracks located at the back of
their house. Michael thereupon saw his friend Mac-Mac Nisperos who told him that he saw appellant
running away from their house. Michael did not pay any attention to his friend’s comment, and simply
continued eating his ice candy. Moments later, a certain Sgt. Ramos arrived and asked if something had
happened in their house. Michael replied in the negative then entered their house. At that point, he saw
his father lying on the bed with a hole in the left portion of his head and a gun at his left hand.
Michael immediately went outside and informed Sgt. Ramos about what happened. Sgt. Ramos told him
that appellant had reported the shooting incident to the Provost Marshall office. 8 Then, Sassymae
arrived and saw her father with a bullet wound on his head and a gun near his left hand. 9
Felixberto Latosa, Jr., one (1) of the legitimate sons of appellant and the victim, also testified that
sometime in December 2001, their father told him and his siblings over dinner about a threat to their
lives by a certain Efren Sta. Inez.10
172
Appellant, testifying on her own behalf, on the other hand claimed that when Felixberto, Sr. woke up, he
asked her to get his service pistol from the cabinet adjacent to their bed. As she was handing the pistol
to him it suddenly fired, hitting Felixberto, Sr. who was still lying down. Shocked, she ran quickly to
Felixberto, Sr.’s office and asked for help.11 She also claimed that when Felixberto, Sr. asked her for his
gun, she was on her way out of the house to follow her children who left for the market on an errand she
had earlier given Sassymae. She claimed that she wanted to drive for them because it was hot. She ran
after them but after a few minutes, when she realized that she did not have with her the keys to their
jeep, she went back to their house. Felixberto, Sr. then asked again for his gun, and it was then that it
fired as she was handing it to him.12
Appellant further described herself as a good mother and a good provider for their six (6) children whom
she raised by herself while Felixberto, Sr. was in Mindanao. She claimed that they testified against her
because they were manipulated by her brother-in-law, Francisco Latosa.13 She denied that Sassymae
saw her holding a gun when she asked her to buy ice cream, alleging that Michael and Sassymae saw
her holding the gun only when she placed it inside the cabinet before they proceeded to the hospital. 14
Appellant also denied her children’s testimony15 that she was having an affair with a certain Col. Efren
Sta. Inez (Sta. Inez), a policeman. She claimed that she first met Sta. Inez when her youngest brother
was killed on June 6, 2001 by unidentified men. Sta. Inez was the one (1) who assisted her. She was
alone at that time since her husband informed her that he could not leave his post in Mindanao for he
had to rush some papers. She allegedly only saw Sta. Inez twice but admitted that Sta. Inez went to the
precinct when he learned of the shooting incident. 16 She also denied that she was terminated from her
job at the Philippine Public Safety College due to immorality for having said affair. She claimed that she
was terminated because she had incurred numerous absences from her work as she grieved the death
of her youngest brother and had lost interest in her work after his death.17
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for killing her husband Felixberto, Sr. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused SUSAN LATOSA Y CHICO
"GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide under Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended by RA 7659 in rel. to Sec. 1[,] 3rd par. PD 1866 as amended by RA 8294 and Sec. 5, RA
8294 and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to further
indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity[,] P50,000 as moral damages and
P25,000 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.18
The RTC held that the claim of accidental shooting was inconsistent with the evidence considering the
location of the gunshot wound, which was at the left temple of Felixberto, Sr., and the fact that the gun
was found near Felixberto, Sr.’s left hand despite his being right-handed. The trial court found that
appellant planned the killing by asking her two (2) children to leave the house and, after the shooting,
placing the gun near the victim’s left hand to suggest that the death was suicide. But appellant
overlooked the fact that Felixberto, Sr. was right-handed. The trial court noted that despite the grueling
cross-examination of the defense counsel, the Latosa children never wavered in their testimonies about
what they knew regarding the circumstances surrounding the shooting incident. Their testimonies bore
the hallmarks of truth as they were consistent on material points. The RTC found it inconceivable that
the children would testify against their own mother or concoct a story of parricide unless they were
impelled by their passion to condemn an injustice done to their father. 19
The RTC, in finding appellant guilty, considered the following circumstantial evidence established by the
prosecution: (1) shortly before the shooting, appellant asked her two (2) children to do errands for her
which were not usually asked of them; (2) at the time of the shooting, only the appellant and Felixberto,
Sr. were in the house; (3) appellant was seen running away from the house immediately after the
shooting; (4) when Michael went inside their house, he found his father with a hole in the head and a
gun in his left hand; (5) the medico-legal report showed that the cause of death was intracranial
hemorrhage due to the gunshot wound on the head with the point of entry at the left temporal region; (6)
the Firearms Identification Report concluded that appellant fired two (2) shots; (7) Felixberto, Sr. was
right-handed and the gun was found near his left hand; (8) Sassymae testified that she heard Sta. Inez
tell appellant "bakit mo inamin. Sana pinahawak mo kay Major iyong baril saka mo pinutok"; (9)
appellant’s children testified that they were informed by Felixberto, Sr. regarding the threat of appellant’s
paramour, Sta. Inez, to the whole family; and (10) Francisco Latosa presented a memorandum showing
that appellant was terminated from her teaching job by reason of immorality. 20
On appeal, the CA upheld the decision of the RTC. The CA held that since appellant admitted having
killed her husband albeit allegedly by accident, she has the burden of proving the presence of the
exempting circumstance of accident to relieve herself of criminal responsibility. She must rely on the
strength of her own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it
cannot be disbelieved after the appellant has admitted the killing.21
The CA, however, found appellant’s version of accidental shooting not credible. Citing the case of
People v. Reyes,22 the CA held that appellant’s claim of accidental shooting was negated by the
following facts: (1) a revolver is not prone to accidental firing as pressure on the trigger is necessary to
make the gun fire, cocked or uncocked; and (2) when handing a gun to a person, the barrel or muzzle is
never pointed to that person. In this case, appellant held the gun in one (1) hand and extended it
towards her husband who was still lying in bed. Assuming that appellant was not aware of the basic
firearm safety rule that the firearm’s muzzle is never pointed to a person, she failed to explain why the
gun would accidentally fire, when it should not have fired unless there was pressure on the trigger. The
location of Felixberto, Sr.’s wound also showed that the shooting was not accidental. Appellant did not
dispute that Felixberto, Sr. was lying down during the shooting and that after the incident, the gun was
found near his left hand. The CA found that it was contrary to human nature that a newly awakened
military man would suddenly ask his wife, who was busy doing other things, to bring his firearm, and
patiently wait for her to come back to their house, when the gun was just inside an adjacent cabinet only
two (2) meters away from his bed.23
The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 159, in Criminal Case No. 122621-H finding SUSAN LATOSA y CHICO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing
her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering her to pay the heirs of Felixberto Latosa the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.24
173
Undaunted, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on May 12, 2008. 25
Appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to prove
that she intentionally killed her husband. She insists that the gun fired accidentally while she was giving
it to Felixberto, Sr. Since she had no experience in handling firearms, she was not able to foresee that it
would fire accidentally and hit her husband. After her husband was hit, she immediately rushed to his
office and asked for assistance.26
The only issue the Court has to resolve in this case is whether the exempting circumstance of accident
was established by appellant.
The basis of appellant’s defense of accidental shooting is Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, which provides:
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. – The following are exempt from criminal
liability:
xxxx
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it.
Thus, it was incumbent upon appellant to prove with clear and convincing evidence, the following
essential requisites for the exempting circumstance of accident, to wit:
1. She was performing a lawful act;
2. With due care;
3. She caused the injury to her husband by mere accident;
4. Without fault or intention of causing it.27
To prove the circumstance she must rely on the strength of her own evidence and not on the weakness
of that of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it can not be disbelieved after the accused has
admitted the killing.28
However, by no stretch of imagination could the pointing of the gun towards her husband’s head and
pulling the trigger be considered as performing a lawful act with due care. As correctly found by the CA,
which we quote in full:
Appellant’s version that she "accidentally shot" her husband is not credible. Appellant’s manner of
carrying the caliber .45 pistol negates her claim of "due care" in the performance of an act. The location
of the wound sustained by the victim shows that the shooting was not merely accidental. The victim was
lying down and the fact that the gun was found near his left hand was not directly disputed by her. We
find it contrary to human nature that a newly awakened military man would suddenly ask his wife for his
firearm, and even patiently wait for her return to the house, when the said firearm was just inside the
cabinet which, according to appellant, was just about two meters away from his bed.
xxxx
In the case at bench, appellant held the gun in one hand and extended it towards her husband who was
still lying in bed. Assuming arguendo that appellant has never learned how to fire a gun and was merely
handing the firearm over to the deceased, the muzzle is never pointed to a person, a basic firearms
safety rule which appellant is deemed to have already known since she admitted, during trial, that she
sometimes handed over the gun to her husband. Assuming further that she was not aware of this basic
rule, it needed explaining why the gun would accidentally fire, when it should not, unless there was
pressure on the trigger.29
There is no merit in appellant’s contention that the prosecution failed to prove by circumstantial
evidence her motive in killing her husband. Intent to kill and not motive is the essential element of the
offense on which her conviction rests. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may
consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the
killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the
accused. If the victim dies as a result of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is presumed. 30
In the instant case, the following circumstantial evidence considered by the RTC and affirmed by the CA
satisfactorily established appellant’s intent to kill her husband and sustained her conviction for the
crime, to wit:
The prosecution established the following circumstantial evidence:
(1) Susan Latosa, the accused, asked her twins to do errands for her. She first asked
Sassymae to go to Commissary to buy ice cream, thereafter, she asked Michael to follow his
sister at the Commissary which according to the prosecution witnesses was not the usual thing
the accused would do;
(2) Thereafter, it was only the accused and the victim who were left alone in the house;
(3) After the witness Michael, son of the accused and the victim left and proceeded at the
barracks located at the back of their house, Susan Latosa was seen running away from the
house by Michael’s friend named Macmac;
(4) Immediately thereafter, Michael Latosa went inside the room of their barracks and saw his
father with sort of a hole in the head, blood on the nose and had a gun in his left hand (TSN,
May 5, 2003, pp. 7-8, 12-13);
(5) The cause of death of the victim Felixberto Latosa was intracranial hemorrhage due to
gunshot wound of the head (per Medico-legal Report No. M-052-2002, Exh. P);
174
 (6) Susan Latosa’s paraffin test yielded positive result for the presence of gunpowder nitrate in
her right hand;
xxx
(8) The point of entry of the gunshot wound found on the victim was located at the left temporal
region as evidenced by Medico Legal Report No. M-052-2002 (Exhibit P);
(9) The victim was a right-handed and the gun was found on the latter’s left hand;
(10) Sassymae Latosa [testified] that she heard Col. Sta. Inez [tell] her mother, …"bakit mo
inamin. Sana pinahawak mo kay Major iyong baril saka mo pinutok." (TSN, May 19, 2002, p.
13); and
(11) The children testified that they were informed by the victim regarding the threat of Sta.
Inez to the whole family who alleged[ly] has an amorous relationship with their mother.
Francisco Latosa presented a memorandum that accused was terminated from her teaching
job by reason of immorality.311avvphi1
Moreover, the Court finds no cogent reason to review much less depart now from the findings of the
RTC as affirmed by the CA that appellant’s version is undeserving of credence. It is doctrinally settled
that the assessments of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by
the trial court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. These are the most significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting
testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to
determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to believe. Verily,
findings of the trial court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or
circumstances of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially
affect the disposition of the case.32 We find none in this case.
One last note. On the matter of damages, the CA awarded exemplary damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00. We increase the award to ₱30,000.00 in light of prevailing jurisprudence 33 fixing the award
of exemplary damages to said amount.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Susan Latosa y Chico is DISMISSED. The April 23, 2008 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02192 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
amount of exemplary damages is increased to ₱30,000.00.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
ALVIN AMPLOYO y EBALADA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City , Branch 72, and its Resolution 3 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On 21 July 1997 , petitioner was charged with violation of Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No.
7610, in an Information worded as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of June, 1997, and on dates prior thereto, at Brgy. Calapandayan, in the
Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, with lewd design, and by means of force, intimidation and threats, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, commit acts of lascivious conduct with one Kristine Joy
Mosquera, a minor of eight (8) years old, by then and there touching, mashing and playing her breast,
against her will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of the latter. 4
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded 'NOT GUILTY. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. The
prosecution presented as witnesses (1) the complainant herself, Kristine Joy Mosquera; (2)
complainant's mother, Gnelida Gallardo Mosquera; and (3) Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) psychologist Lucrecia Cruz. Petitioner, on the other hand, waived his right to
present evidence 5 after his demurrer to evidence 6 was denied by the trial court. 7
The facts, as appreciated by the trial court, are as follows:
Kristine Joy Mosquera was eight years old on 27 June 1997 , 8 having celebrated her eighth year the
day before. A grade III student, she was walking to school (which was just a short distance from her
house) at around seven oclock in the morning when she was met by petitioner who emerged from
hiding from a nearby store. Petitioner and Kristine Joy were neighbors. Petitioner approached Kristine
Joy, touched her head, placed his hand on her shoulder where it then moved down to touch her breast
several times. Petitioner thereafter told Kristine Joy not to report to anybody what he did to her.
This was not the first time that the incident happened as petitioner had done this several times in the
past, even when Kristine Joy was still in Grade II. However, it was only during this last incident that
Kristine Joy finally told somebody ' her grandmother, who immediately talked to Gnelida Mosquera,
Kristine Joy's mother.
Mrs. Mosquera conferred with Kristine Joy who said that petitioner would sometimes even insert his
hand under her shirt to caress her breast. Mother and child then reported the matter to the barangay.
From the barangay, the case was referred to the DSWD then to the Police Department of Subic,
Zambales.
175
On 07 November 1997, Kristine Joy was seen by a psychologist, witness Lucrecia Cruz, who reported
that Kristine Joy was a victim of sexual abuse and was showing unusual behavior as a result thereof.
Among other things, Ms. Cruz detected in the eight-year old child feelings of insecurity, anger, anxiety
and depression. Guilt feelings were also noted. All in all, Kristine Joy appeared on the surface to be a
child with normal behavior despite the experience, but on a deeper level, she developed a fear of going
to school as petitioner might again be hiding in the store waiting for her. She was deeply bothered
during the interview and even uttered ' Nahihiya ako sa mga magulang ko at uncle ko baka tuksuhin
akong bobo na hindi ko agad sinabi.
Kristine Joy continued going to school, but this time accompanied always by an adult relative.
On 22 September 1999 , the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused Alvin Amployo
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Child Abuse defined under Section 5 (b) of Republic
Act 7610 and hereby sentences him to Reclusion Temporal in its medium period or FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY TO SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and to pay the costs. 9
The Court of Appeals, as adverted to earlier, affirmed the Decision of the trial court by dismissing
petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. Upon motion for reconsideration, however, the Court of Appeals
modified its ruling relative to the penalty imposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. However, the penalty is MODIFIED such that
accused-appellant is sentenced to imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. 10
Hence, the instant petition, the following issues having been presented for resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING
HEREIN PETITIONER OF ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS IN RELATION TO SEC. (5)
ARTICLE III OF RA NO. 7610 DESPITE THAT THE FACTUAL MILIEU NEGATES THE SAME
II.
WHETHER THE ALLEGED ACT OF HEREIN PETITIONER CONSTITUTES ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS AS PENALIZED UNDER SEC (5) ARTICLE III OF RA NO. 7610
The first issue basically questions the sufficiency of the evidence adduced to prove acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). According to petitioner, the
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of said crime, particularly the
element of lewd design.
On the second issue, petitioner contends that even assuming that the acts imputed to him amount to
lascivious conduct, the resultant crime is only acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC and
not child abuse under Section 5(b) of Rep. Act No. 7610 as the elements thereof have not been proved.
Rep. Act No. 7610, the 'Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act, defines sexual abuse of children and prescribes the penalty therefor in its Article III,
Section 5:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money,
profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution
and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the
following;
(a) . . .
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised
Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty
for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period; . . .
Thus, pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused can be convicted of child abuse through
lascivious conduct on a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of
Rep. Act No. 7610.
First Issue:
Article 336 of the RPC on Acts of Lasciviousness has for its elements the following:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
176
 (3) That the offended party is another person of either sex. 11
The presence of the second element is not in dispute, that is, Kristine Joy was below 12 years old on
the material date set in the information. It is the presence of the first element which petitioner
challenges, claiming that lewd design has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The term 'lewd is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene; 12 it is characterized by or
intended to excite crude sexual desire. 13 That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is
necessarily a mental process the existence of which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such
intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence of
lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances.
14 What is or what is not lewd conduct, by its very nature, cannot be pigeonholed into a precise
definition. As early as U.S. v. Gomez 15 we had already lamented that '
It would be somewhat difficult to lay down any rule specifically establishing just what conduct makes
one amenable to the provisions of article 439 16 of the Penal Code. What constitutes lewd or lascivious
conduct must be determined from the circumstances of each case. It may be quite easy to determine in
a particular case that certain acts are lewd and lascivious, and it may be extremely difficult in another
case to say just where the line of demarcation lies between such conduct and the amorous advances of
an ardent lover.
In herein case, petitioner argues that lewd design cannot be inferred from his conduct firstly because
the alleged act occurred at around seven oclock in the morning, in a street very near the school where
people abound, thus, he could not have been prompted by lewd design as his hand merely slipped and
accidentally touched Kristine Joy's breast. Furthermore, he could not have been motivated by lewd
design as the breast of an eight year old is still very much undeveloped, which means to say there was
nothing to entice him in the first place. Finally, assuming that he indeed intentionally touch Kristine Joy's
breast, it was merely to satisfy a silly whim following a Court of Appeals ruling. 17
Petitioner's arguments crumble under the weight of overwhelming evidence against him. Well-settled is
the rule that factual findings of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding on this Court barring arbitrariness and oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance 18 for which there are none in this case. Besides, Kristine Joy's testimony is indeed worthy of
full faith and credence as there is no proof that she was motivated to falsely accuse petitioner. Thus, we
stress anew that no young and decent girl like Kristine Joy would fabricate a story of sexual abuse,
subject herself to medical examination and undergo public trial, with concomitant ridicule and
humiliation, if she is not impelled by a sincere desire to put behind bars the person who assaulted her.
19
Clearly then, petitioner cannot take refuge in his version of the story as he has conveniently left out
details which indubitably prove the presence of lewd design. It would have been easy to entertain the
possibility that what happened was merely an accident if it only happened once. Such is not the case,
however, as the very same petitioner did the very same act to the very same victim in the past. 20
Moreover, the incident could never be labeled as accidental as petitioner's hand did not just slip from
Kristine Joy's shoulder to her breast as there were times when he would touch her breast from under
her shirt. 21 Finally, the theory that what happened was accidental is belied by petitioner having
threatened Kristine Joy to keep silent and not tell on him. 22
As to petitioner's argument that human experience negates the presence of lewd design as Kristine Joy
had no developed breasts with which to entice him, suffice it to say that on the contrary, human
experience has taught us painfully well that sexual misconduct defies categorization and what might be
an unusual, unlikely or impossible sexual conduct for most might very well be the norm for some.
Finally, we dismiss for being atrocious the proposition that petitioner was not compelled by lewd design
as he was merely satisfying a 'silly whim. Terrifying an eight-year old school girl, taking advantage of
her tender age with his sheer size, invading her privacy and intimidating her into silence, in our book,
can never be in satisfaction of a mere silly whim.
Second Issue:
Petitioner contends that assuming he is guilty of lascivious conduct, still he can only be convicted under
the RPC since his conduct does not amount to sexual abuse as defined under Section 5(b), Article III of
Rep. Act No. 7610.
The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of Rep. Act No. 7610 that must be proven in
addition to the elements of acts of lasciviousness are the following:
(1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and
(3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. 23
The first element obtains. Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Rep. Act
No. 7610 defines lascivious conduct as follows:
(T)he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast,
inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth of any person,
whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area of a person. (Emphasis supplied)
Undoubtedly, based on the foregoing definition, petitioner's act of purposely touching Kristine Joy's
breasts (sometimes under her shirt) amounts to lascivious conduct.
The second element is likewise present. As we observed in People v. Larin, 24 Section 5 of Rep. Act
No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one in which a
child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation. As case law has it, intimidation
need not necessarily be irresistible. 25 It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation
annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. 26 This is especially true in the
case of young, innocent and immature girls who could not be expected to act with equanimity of
disposition and with nerves of steel. 27 Young girls cannot be expected to act like adults under the
same circumstances or to have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat. 28 1âwphi1
177
In this case, it is not hard to imagine eight-year old Kristine Joy being intimidated by her neighbor, a full
grown adult male, who constantly accosted her while she was alone and on her way to school and who
consistently ordered her not to report what he had been doing to her. That this child was cowed into
silence and submission and was traumatized in the process is reflected in the psychological report 29
made by the DSWD psychologist, Lucrecia Cruz, the latter stating that:
BEHAVIOR OBSERVATION:
Subject appeared kemp, fair complexion, attractive, wearing white T-shirt and maong short pants. She
[was] observed to be cooperative, attentive and expressive.
In an interview, subject disclosed that since she was in Grade II a certain Alvin Amployo a.k.a. Tikboy
who (sic) sexually molested her. She narrated that her private part was fondled for many times. The
incident happened every time she went to school in the morning, noontime and in the afternoon. The
abuser hide (sic) along the store way to school. Then she was threatened not to reveal to anybody
especially to her parents.
TEST RESULT AND INTERPRETATION:
Test result revealed that subject manifest anger as she quoted 'gusto ko makulong si Tikboy ng
matagal. Indicate strong fear, anxiety, poor concentration, nightmare, shame and auditory hallucination.
Implies low self-esteem as she quoted ' madumi na ang sarili ko, nahihiya ako sa magulang ko at Uncle
ko baka tuksuhin akong bobo na hindi ko agad sinabi.
Indicate that subject disturbed towards past as she quoted ' ang masidhing ala-ala ng aking
kamusmusan ay yong panghihipo ni Tikboy. Thus, subject aiming that Tikboy be put to jail.
CASE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION:
In summary, Kristine Joy Mosquera is a victim of sexual molestation committed by a certain Alvin
Amployo or Tikboy. Subject was greatly affected psychologically and emotionally. Thus, subject
manifest from (sic) anger, anxiety, poor concentration, nightmare, shame, auditory hallucination and low
self-esteem. She is deeply depressed and suffer from traumatic sexualization. From psychotherapeutic
point of view subject needs constant counseling to overcome her presented (sic) crisis. To assist the
subject to ventilate her ambivalent feeling. To restore moral values, improve her self-esteem and
enhance her emotional and social functioning.
As to the third element, there is no dispute that Kristine Joy is a minor, as she was only eight years old
at the time of the incident in question.
Finally, we note that no award for moral damages was made by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals despite the fact that the mental anguish suffered by Kristine Joy on account of her harrowing
experience is spread all over the records of the case and has been well documented by the
psychologist who examined her as reflected in her report quoted above. At the risk of being repetitive,
proof of Kristine Joy's mental anguish, wounded feelings and social humiliation finds an express outlet
in her words: ' madumi na ang sarili ko, nahihiya ako sa magulang ko at Uncle ko baka tuksuhin akong
bobo na hindi ko agad sinabi and ' ang masidhing ala-ala ng aking kamusmusan ay yong panghihipo ni
Tikboy. We therefore modify the ruling of the Court of Appeals by awarding moral damages to Kristine
Joy in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
30
Additionally, we find relevant to discuss here the case of People v. Solmoro 31 wherein we declared
that upon a finding of guilt of the accused for acts of lasciviousness, the amount of P30,000.00 as moral
damages may be further awarded to the victim in the same way that moral damages are awarded to
victims of rape even without need of proof because it is assumed that they suffered moral injury.
Considering that the crime of acts of lasciviousness or abusos dishonestos is necessarily included in
rape 32 and both cases involve sexual assault albeit in different degrees, the rationale for foregoing with
proof of moral damages in rape cases applies with equal force to crimes of acts of lasciviousness, the
rationale being:
One other cognate development in the case law on rape is applicable to the present disposition. The
Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under consideration, moral damages may
additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems
just, without the need for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice.
Indeed, the conventional requirement of allegata et probate in civil procedure and for essentially civil
cases should be dispensed with in criminal prosecutions for rape with the civil aspect included therein,
since no appropriate pleadings are filed wherein such allegations can be made.
Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological
sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages are too obvious to still require the recital
thereof at the trial by the victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony on
her part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by necessary implication as being ineludibly present in
the case need not go through the superfluity of still being proved through a testimonial charade. 33
It does not end there. In People v. Abadies, 34 and with respect specifically to lascivious conduct
amounting to child abuse under Section 5(b) of Rep. Act No. 7610, we imposed a fine of P30,000 for
each count of lascivious conduct in addition to the award of moral damages on the justification that '
It will be noted that Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 7610 provides for the penalty of
imprisonment. Nevertheless, Section 31(f), Article XII (Common Penal Provisions) thereof allows the
imposition of a fine subject to the discretion of the court, provided that the same is to be administered as
a cash fund by the Department of Social Welfare and Development and disbursed for the rehabilitation
of each child victim, or any immediate member of his family if the latter is the perpetrator of the offense.
This provision is in accord with Article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which the
Philippines became a party on August 21, 1990, which stresses the duty of states parties to ensure the
physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of abused and exploited children in an
environment which fosters their self-respect and human dignity.
With the case of Abadies as guidepost, we impose a fine of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) on
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals modifying the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 72, finding accused-petitioner ALVIN AMPLOYO y
EBALADA alias 'TIKBOY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Republic Act No. 7610, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
178
minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is hereby ordered to pay a fine of Fifteen
Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) and moral damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00). No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
FEDERICO GENITA, JR. y CULTURA, appellant.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Challenged in this appeal is the Decision1 dated June 14, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4,
Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 4954 finding Federico Genita, Jr., appellant herein, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of murder and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua for each
count.
Appellant was charged in an Information which reads:
"That on or about the evening of December 17, 1991 in Barangay Bugsukan, Butuan City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot with the use of a high powered firearm one
Jesus Bascon thereby hitting him on both legs, and Reynaldo Timbal who was hit on his head
which caused their subsequent death."2
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty." Forthwith, trial ensued. The prosecution presented
Danilo Timbal, Vicente Olaco and Dr. Elsie Caballero as its witnesses. Appellant took the witness stand
for the defense.
The version of the prosecution is as follows:
On December 17, 1991, at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, while the victims Reynaldo Timbal and
Jesus Bascon were loading firewood in a truck in Barangay Bugsukan, Butuan City, appellant who was
drunk and armed with an M-14 rifle, asked Reynaldo for a Christmas gift. Reynaldo told him to just
come back because they were still loading firewood. Appellant left the place. Not long after, he returned
and fired his gun at Jesus’ feet, hitting his left leg. He immediately jumped into the truck. Appellant then
went near its bumper and fired at the tire near the chassis. Then he changed the magazine of his gun
and fired again at Jesus, this time, hitting his right leg. Reynaldo ran away, his right hand covering his
head. Appellant chased him and fired at him, hitting his nape and right hand. After the commotion, the
victims’ co-workers who were able to take refuge from the cascade of bullets returned to the scene and
found the dead body of Reynaldo. Jesus was immediately brought to the Butuan City General Hospital
but died thereafter.3
Dr. Elsie Caballero, City Health Officer of Butuan City, who conducted the post mortem examination of
the body of Reynaldo, found that he died of "shock, gunshot wound in the neck with avulsion of brain
tissues."4 On the other hand, the Death Certificate5 issued by Dr. Raul Monton, Medical Specialist II of
the Butuan City General Hospital, attributed Jesus’ death to "compound fractures, (R) & (L) Legs, and
Hypovolemic Shock."
Appellant, relying on the exempting circumstance of accident as his defense, presented a different
version. He testified that he was a member of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU)
stationed at Bugsukan, Butuan City, hence, he was officially issued an M-14 rifle. On the evening of
December 17, 1991, while on his way to his camp, he saw a truck parked at the right side of the road
with its rear lights on. While approaching the vehicle, somebody grasped his neck. As a consequence,
he accidentally pulled the trigger of the M-14 rifle slung on his shoulder. The weapon automatically fired.
At this instance, his assailant set him free. Immediately he rushed to the camp and reported the incident
to Sgt. Montealto who placed the camp on alert. Appellant stayed in the camp during the entire evening.
The following morning, he learned that two persons were killed.6
On June 14, 1996, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding accused FEDERICO GENITA, JR. y CULTURA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the death of the two (2) victims:
(1) He is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua with its accessory penalties for the death of
Reynaldo Timbal which penalty entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years.
(2) For the death of Jesus Bascon, the said accused, FEDERICO GENITA, JR. y CULTURA is
also sentenced to another penalty of reclusion perpetua with its accessory penalties which
penalty entails another imprisonment of at least thirty (30) years.
Both sentences shall be served by the accused successively at the Davao Prison and Penal
Farm at Panabo, Davao del Norte.
Accused is also ordered to indemnify the Heirs of Reynaldo Timbal the sum of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) pesos and another Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos for the Heirs of Jesus
Bascon plus costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED."7
Hence, this appeal anchored on the following assignments of error:
179
 "I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING EXCULPATORY WEIGHT TO THE
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ACCIDENT INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT
"II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE ITS ATTENDANCE ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE KILLING OF THE VICTIM
WAS NOT ACCIDENTAL."8
Appellant contends that he was performing a lawful act with due care when the victims were killed. He
was then on his way to the CAFGU station to report for duty. He had no intention to kill the victims. He
accidentally pulled the trigger of the rifle and the bullets hit the victims. Thus, he should have been
exempted from any criminal liability. Even assuming that he is liable for the death of the victims, he
contends that the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
The Solicitor General maintains that considering the number of gunshot wounds inflicted on the victims,
the shooting could not have been an accident. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General agrees with appellant
that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not sufficiently proven, stressing that the latter was
drunk when he approached Reynaldo. This should have put the victims on guard as it was established
during the hearing that appellant tends to be cantankerous and out of control when he is drunk. Also, it
was not proven that he consciously adopted the means of executing the crime.
Appellant’s version that he "accidentally shot" the two victims is incredible. Accident is an exempting
circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. It must be stressed that in raising this
defense, appellant has the burden of the evidence and it was incumbent upon him to establish that he
was exempt from criminal liability.9 He must show with clear and convincing proofs that: 1) he was
performing a lawful act with due care, 2) the injury caused was by a mere accident, and 3) he had no
fault or intention of causing the injury. Considering appellant’s evidence, it is clear that the requisites of
accident as an exempting circumstance were not proven. First, appellant’s manner of carrying his M-14
rifle negates his claim of "due care" in the performance of an act. Knowing that his rifle was automatic,
he should have seen to it that its safety lock was intact. Worse, he admitted that his finger was
constantly on the trigger. With the safety lock released and his finger on the trigger, how can we
conclude that he acted with due care? We cannot accept his version that he was just following his
trainer’s instruction to release the safety lock while in a critical area.10 For one, he never presented his
trainer to corroborate his statement; and for another, he was not in a critical area. Second, the number
of wounds sustained by the victims shows that the shooting was not merely accidental. Both victims
sustained more than one wound. While it could have been possible that the first wound sustained by
both victims was by accident, however, the subsequent wounds sustained by them in different parts of
their bodies could not have been similarly inflicted. And third, appellant manifested an unmistakable
intent to kill the victims when he reloaded his rifle after his first unsuccessful attempt to kill them. Jesus
had already sought refuge by jumping into the truck when another bullet hit his right leg. Reynaldo was
already running away when he was shot on his nape and right hand. That appellant chased the victims
and shot them several times clearly show that he had the intent to kill them.11 His defense must
necessarily fail.
Moreover, if it were true that someone attacked appellant, thus causing him to accidentally pull the
trigger of his rifle, then his natural reaction should have been to defend himself. Instead, he rushed
towards the camp. Furthermore, he did not present any evidence to support his allegation that the
CAFGU was placed on alert. And not a single witness corroborated his version of accidental shooting,
an indication that it is fabricated.
The trial court found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible. We stamp our agreement to
such finding. Woven in the fabric of our jurisprudence is that the findings of the trial court are accorded
not only the highest respect, but also finality, unless some weighty circumstance has been ignored or
misunderstood but which could alter the result and could affect the judgment to be rendered. Given the
direct opportunity to observe the witness on the stand, the trial judge was in a vantage position to
assess the demeanor of the witnesses and determine if they were telling the truth or not.12 Here, the
trial court keenly observed:
"The defense counsel attempted to force into the mouth of the accused the answer counsel
wanted accused to respond to his questions. During the direct examination, for instance,
defense counsel propounded this question:
‘Atty. Dagani:
Q It appears from your testimony that while you were walking from your house to the
camp, you seemed to be prepared for fight, do you agree with me on that?’
It is obvious that this leading question was propounded to explain why the finger of the
accused was on the trigger of the weapon. The attempt of the defense counsel to elicit the
desired answer was apparently to support the theory that the accused was on alert that
evening with the safety lock of his rifle released.
Pitted against the clear, positive and impressive account narrated by the prosecution
witnesses, the claim of accidental shooting is exposed of what it is – a farce, an invention of
the imagination."
Furthermore, the trial court found that the prosecution witnesses were not motivated by any ill desire to
implicate appellant with a serious charge. The absence of motive on their part lends more credence to
their testimonies.
However, we find that the trial court erred in finding that treachery exists in the commission of the crime.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and especially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Thus, for the
crime to be qualified by treachery the following elements must be proved: (1) the means of execution
employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means
of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.13 Treachery cannot be presumed but must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. Hence, where no
particulars are shown as to the manner by which the aggression was commenced or how the act which
resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, treachery can in no way be established from
mere suppositions, drawn solely from circumstances prior to the killing.14 In the instant case, it appears
from the record that the attack was not so swift so as to render the victims off guarded. Contrary to the
180
finding of the trial court, appellant could not have managed to "stealthily approach" and suddenly fire at
the victims. Therefore the means in executing the crime cannot be considered deliberate. Besides,
Jesus had the chance to jump into the truck after he was hit at the left leg. Reynaldo, on the other hand,
was able to run away and take cover, though unsuccessful. As a matter of fact, the other laborers who
were with the victims managed to evade the volley of bullets. It cannot be said, therefore, that the
victims were unprepared to put up a defense.
Since the aggravating circumstance of treachery was not proven, appellant can only be convicted of two
separate crimes of homicide punishable under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. The Solicitor
General maintains that he should be convicted of double homicide, a complex crime punishable under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
ARTICLE 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constituted two or more grave
or less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.
The instant case does not fall under the above provision. The finding of the trial court tells why, thus:
"Let it be noted, though, that herein accused killed both deceased one after the other. As
described by witness Danilo Timbal accused Genita first fired at Jesus Bascon who was in the
truck. He then shot the front tire of the truck. After reloading, he went back to Bascon and shot
him again. During this time Reynaldo Timbal was at the back of the truck. When Reynaldo
Timbal ran away, accused fired at him hitting the deceased on the head and wounding the
deceased’s right hand which covered his head while he was running. For each death,
therefore, accused shall be held criminally liable."
Appellant, therefore, must be convicted of two separate crimes of homicide.
The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. In view of the absence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, appellant can only be convicted of homicide punishable by reclusion temporal.15 There being
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime, the
imposable penalty is the medium period of reclusion temporal.16 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, appellant should be meted out the indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum.
With regard to civil liability, no proof was presented as to the actual or moral damages. The trial court,
however, ordered appellant to indemnify the heirs of each of the victims the amount of P50,000.00,
which we affirm. Unlike the award of actual damages, the award of civil indemnity need no proof other
than the death of the victim.17 In addition, temperate damages may be recovered under Article 2224 of
the Civil Code, as it cannot be denied that the heirs suffered some pecuniary loss although the exact
amount was not proved with certainty. Hence, an award of P25,000.00 by way of temperate damages
would be appropriate.18 The heirs of Reynaldo and Jesus are awarded P50,000.00 each as civil
indemnity and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court is MODIFIED in the sense that appellant is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of homicide. He is sentenced to suffer (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, for each crime of homicide.
The appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of each of the victims, Reynaldo Timbal and Jesus Bascon, the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for their deaths and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RODERICK LICAYAN, ROBERTO LARA AND ROGELIO "NOEL" DELOS REYES, Accused-
Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On August 15, 2001, this Court affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (R TC) of Marikina City
convicting two of herein accused-appellants, Roderick Licayan (Licayan) and Roberto Lara (Lara), of the
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and sentencing them to death. The dispositive portion of this Court's
August 15, 2001 Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 272, Marikina City finding accused-
appellant RODERICK LICA YAN and ROBERTO LARA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom and sentencing each of them to death is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
each of the accused-appellants is ORDERED to pay ₱50,000.00 as moral damages to each of the
complainants. The award of ₱20,000.00 as actual damages made in favor of complainant Joseph Co is
deleted. Costs against accused-appellants.
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the
finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of the
Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.1
The Motion for Reconsideration of Licayan and Lara was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated
October 9, 2001. The Decision became final and executory on November 9, 2001. On November 18,
2003, the trial court issued a Writ of Execution ordering the execution of Licayan and Lara on January
30, 2004 at 3 :00 p.m.
Before the date of Licayan and Lara's scheduled execution, and with the torrent of initiatives sparked by
the passionate national debate on the morality of capital punishment, two of their co-accused in the
original Information were arrested. On January 9, 2004, Pedro Mabansag (Mabansag), a double arm
amputee and suspected mastermind of the kidnapping of Joseph Tomas Co and Linda Manaysay, was
181
arrested at Sitio Lanipga, Barangay Magsaysay, Escalante City. On January 12, 2004, Rogelio Delos
Reyes (Delos Reyes) was arrested at Barangay Bayang Marihatag, Agusan del Sur.
In light of these arrests, the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) filed with this Court on January 15, 2004
(which was 15 days before the scheduled execution of Licayan and Lara) an Urgent Motion to Reopen
the Case with Leave of Court. Pending resolution of the Urgent Motion, this Court, by a vote of 7-6,
issued a Resolution on January 26, 2004 ordering the temporary suspension of the execution of Licayan
and Lara for a period of 30 calendar days.2 On February 17, 2004, this Court, voting 8-6, issued a
Resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court resolves to GRANT pro hac vice the Urgent Motion to Re-
Open the Case with Leave of Court. Accordingly, the execution of the Decision of this Court dated
August 15, 2001 is suspended. The records of the case are hereby REMANDED to the lower court for
further reception of evidence pursuant to Section 2 (b), Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, together with the
trial of accused Rogelio delos Reyes and Pedro Mabansag. In accordance with Section 6(b) and (c),
Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, insofar as the accused Roberto Lara and Roderick Licayan is
concerned, the evidence already taken shall stand and the additional evidence as the trial court may, in
the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered with the evidence already in
record. Towards this end, the Court directs Hon. Reuben P. dela Cruz, Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Marikina City, Branch 272, to hear the case of the accused Roberto Lara and Roderick
Licayan, and thereafter report to this Court with deliberate dispatch.
Let copies of this Resolution be personally served on the Office of the President and the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections.3
On April 19, 2005, Mabansag and Delos Reyes were finally arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
crimes charged in the Informations under which their co-accused Lara and Licayan were previously
indicted. We quote the material portions of said Informations here:
Crim. Case No. 98-2605-MK
That on or about August 10, 1998 at around 1:45 a.m., the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with a handgun and with evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation kidnap
JOSEPH TOMAS CO and LINDA MANA YSA Y for the purpose of extorting ransom in the amount of P
10 million at Goodies Pares Marni House located at Loyola cor. Constancia St., Sampaloc, Manila,
owned and managed by the aforementioned victim Co and thereafter took them with the use of Toyota
Tamaraw FX likewise owned by Co as getaway vehicle to a house in Daang Bakal, Parang, Marikina
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court where they were kept under detention against their
will until they were able to escape the following day at around 4:30 in the afternoon on August 11,
1998.4
Crim. Case No. 98-2606-MK
That on or about August 10 and 11, 1998 at Daang Bakal, Parang, Marikina City and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a handgun and with intent to
gain, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, by means of force and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and divested (sic) JOSEPH TOMAS CO and
LINDA MANA YSA Y of the following personal properties after forcibly taking them as hostages for
ransom, to wit:
1. Wallet of Co containing his driver's license, original copy of official receipt (OR), certificate of
registration (CR) of his two (2) L-300 vans;
2. Bank time deposit certificate at Metrobank, Valenzuela Branch;
3. Casio G-Shock watch;
4. Necklace and earrings of Manaysay; and
5. ₱10,000.00 cash
to the damage and prejudice of said victims as owners thereof against their will.5
Lara, Licayan, Mabansag and Delos Reyes had five other co-accused in said Informations, namely Alex
Placio, Jojo Sajorgo, Allan Placio, Dodong Adolfo and Benjie Mabansag, all of whom remain at-large.
On November 15, 2005, Mabansag died while detained at the Marikina City Jail. The trial against
Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes proceeded. On February 17, 2009, the RTC of Marikina City rendered
its Decision finding Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes guilty of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused RODERICK LICA
YAN, ROBERTO LARA and ROGELIO 'NOEL' DELOS REYES in Criminal Case No. 98-2605-MK,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM as defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences them to reclusion
perpetua and each of them is also ordered to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages to each
of the complainants.
The period during which the herein accused were in detention during the pendency of this case shall be
credited to them in full provided that they agree to abide by and comply with the rules of the City Jail of
Marikina.
However, in Criminal Case No. 98-2606-MK of the crime of ROBBERY, for lack of sufficient evidence
presented by the Prosecution to prove the guilt of the said accused beyond reasonable doubt, judgment
is hereby rendered ACQUITTING them of the said offense charged in the Information.
These two (2) cases against the other accused, ALEX PLACIO @ "Tata Pandak," JOJO SAJORGO,
ALLAN PLACIO, DODONG ADOLFO and BENJIE MABANSAG who remain at-large up to the present
are ordered archived and let an (sic) alias warrants of arrests be issued.6
The RTC Decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, on July 4, 2012, affirmed the
conviction of Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes in toto.7 Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes filed a Notice of
Appeal,8 thus allowing this Court another hard look into the events surrounding the captivity of Joseph
Tomas Co and Linda Manaysay on August 10-11, 1998.
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In this Court's February 17, 2004 Resolution granting accused-appellants' Motion to Reopen the Case,
we held that insofar as the accused Lara and Licayan are concerned, the evidence already taken shall
stand, although additional evidence may be introduced to be taken and considered with the evidence
already in record. This Court summarized said evidence in its August 15, 2001 Decision, thus:6
Complainant Joseph Tomas Co owns a restaurant called Goodies Pares Marni House with branches in
Valenzuela, Cubao, and Sampaloc. Co's regular routine was for him and the other complainant, Linda
Manaysay, the restaurant's cashier and accounting officer, to make the rounds of the three branches for
inspection and collection of left-over food and cash sales. The rounds would normally begin late in the
evening and last until early in the morning of the next day.
The prosecution evidence shows that on August 9, 1998, complainants went to the Goodies Valenzuela
branch where they stayed until midnight. From there, they proceeded to the Cubao branch where they
stayed until about 12:45 a.m., August 10, 1998. Their last stop was at the Sampaloc branch which they
visited at 1:30 a.m.
While Co was at the Sampaloc branch, supervising the loading of left-over food into the back of his
Tamaraw FX. service vehicle, three men approached him from behind. When Co saw the men, he
asked what they wanted. The men were armed with two caliber .45 pistols and a .38 revolver. None of
the men wore any mask.
Co told the men that if they wanted money, they could get it from the store. The men refused to get
money from the store. Without any warning, one of the men's guns went off. When Manaysay heard the
shot, she came out and asked the men what they wanted. She· told them that they could get money
from the store, but they refused to do so. Instead, complainants were made to board the rear of the
Tamaraw FX. Two of the men's companions were already seated in the front seat. The man in the
driver's seat asked Co for the key to the vehicle. The three other men also boarded the vehicle with the
complainants. Co identified accused-appellant Roderick Licayan as one of his five abductors.
Co said their hands were tied and their eyes taped, and that they were made to wear caps over their
heads as the vehicle reached Quezon Avenue in Quezon City. After 45 minutes, Co said he felt the
vehicle stop. The rear door was opened and he heard the voices of people approaching the vehicle.
Complainants were brought inside a room of a house made of light materials and which had no ceiling.
They were made to sit on the floor. Then, they were transferred to another room where the covers of
their eyes were removed and their feet were tied. Manaysay testified that she saw accused-appellants
in the house after the masking tape was removed from their eyes. Co's wallet which contained
₱5,000.00 in cash and his watch and Manaysay's necklace and earrings were taken from them. A
person was left to guard them inside the room, whom both complainants identified as accused-appellant
Roberto Lara.
After about two hours, Manaysay told Co that she wanted to urinate. Hence, Co asked their guard if
Manaysay could go outside to do it. The guard left and came back with a half-gallon container which he
gave Manaysay to urinate in.
Co tried talking to the guard9 and pleaded with him to let them go. But the guard replied that he was just
following orders. Co offered him some money which he had, but the guard did not accept the money
and instead threw it away.
[On August 11, 1998, at around 4:30 p.m., Licayan10 who was guarding them at that time] fell asleep
and Co and Manaysay somehow managed to escape without being noticed by the look-out outside their
room. After running for several meters, complainants took refuge in a house. An old woman living in the
house allowed them to use the telephone from which Co was able to call the Marikina Police
Headquarters. The woman told them that they were in Kaolin St., Twinriver Subdivision, Parang,
Marikina. Two police officers from the Marikina police arrived, followed by a police SWAT team.
Complainants' case was later turned over to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF) for investigation.
On August 11, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., members of the PAOCTF raided the safehouse at Daang
Bakal, Parang, Marikina where Co and Manaysay had been held captive. A man seen running away
was arrested by SPO3 Ismael Fajardo Jr. Upon being questioned, the man identified himself as
accused-appellant Roberto Lara. SP03 Fajardo identified accused-appellant Lara from photographs
shown to him in court as the man he arrested. Lara pointed to accused-appellant Licayan as one of his
companions and told the PAOCTF members that Lara was hiding in his (Lara's) uncle's house at the
back of the San Mateo Rizal Municipal Hall. The P AOCTF members thereafter proceeded to the house
and were able to arrest accused-appellant Licayan.
Lara and Licayan were thereafter brought to the PAOCTF headquarters in Camp Crame where they
were identified by Co and Manaysay in a line-up consisting of Lara, Licayan, and eight PAOCTF
members.
Benjamin Co, complainant Joseph Tomas Co's brother, testified that he was twice called in his office by
unidentified persons who demanded P 10 million for the release of complainants. The kidnappers were
of course frustrated as complainants were able to escape.
Accused-appellants' defense is alibi. Accused-appellant Licayan claimed that on August 11, 1998, at
around 7:00 p.m., he was at home in Sta. Cecilia Village, San Mateo Rizal, having dinner with Nicolas
Salvivia, a dump truck driver; that on the next day, August 12, 1998, he was arrested by members of the
PAOCTF while he was having drinks with Salvivia and Salvivia's father at the latter's residence in Sta.
Cecilia Village; and that when he was arrested, he was not informed of the charges against him. He said
he only learned that he was arrested for the kidnapping of complainants after he had been brought to
Camp Crame.
In Camp Crame, he and his co-accused were handcuffed and made to stand in a police-line up. They
were not assisted by counsel. The complainants pointed to him and Lara as part of the group who
kidnapped complainants. Licayan claimed he only saw complainant Co for the first time when he
(Licayan) was brought to Camp Crame.
On the other hand, accused-appellant Lara, a construction worker, testified that from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00
p.m. of August 10, 1998, he was in his place of work in Antipolo. At 7:00 a.m. of August 11, 1999, he
went home to Novaliches, stopping by the house of his uncle, Pedro Mabansag, in Parang, Marikina.
Mabansag had driven Lara's family out of his house and Lara had gone there to get his child's
belongings. However, before he could do so, he was arrested by the Marikina Police at Greenheights.
Lara wanted to ask his cousin Nicolas Salvivia for help. The police beat him up and told him that they
would go to Salvivia's house.
183
He was made to board a van where his head was covered with a plastic bag and he was again beaten
up. The police found Salvivia and Licayan in Salvivia's house and ordered the two to drop to the ground.
The police poked a gun to Lara's head and told him to identify his companions, otherwise he would be
killed. Thus, according to Lara, he pointed to Licayan.
Lara claimed that at Camp Crame, after he and Licayan were identified by complainants in a police line-
up, they were forced to sign a statement. They were not informed of their right to remain silent and to be
assisted by counsel. Lara denied that Atty. Confesor B. Sansano, who appeared to have assisted him in
making his statement, actually assisted him.11
In subsequent proceedings, the prosecution presented as rebuttal witness Confessor Sansano, the
lawyer whom Lara had claimed did not really assist him. Sansano testified that as IBP governor and
chairman, he gave free legal assistance to all persons who could not afford the services of a lawyer. On
August 12, 1998, Police Chief Inspector Trampe brought Lara to Sansano's office at the Justice Hall of
Quezon City. Sansano required the police agents to step out of the room when he personally
interviewed Lara for 10 minutes. He apprised Lara of his constitutional rights. He was assured that Lara
will tell the truth, and that La1:"a was not harmed. He even examined the upper torso of Lara and found
no signs of maltreatment. He was present throughout the investigation held in his office, until Lara
affixed his signature in the sworn statement. On cross-examination, Sansano admitted that he cannot
remember the number of persons brought to him by Trampe for legal assistance. He testified that he
warned Lara about the implication of the statement that he will give to the police.12
During the second trial, Prosecutor Nestor Gapuzan stated that the prosecution is adopting the direct
testimony given by the prosecution witnesses during the first trial. Co, however, was recalled for
additional direct examination on the alleged participation of Delos Reyes.
Joseph Tomas Co testified that Delos Reyes was one of the five men who abducted him and Manaysay.
Delos Reyes was the person who sat at the middle portion of the Tamaraw FX at the back of the driver,
while Co and Manaysay were forced to sit in the rear portion of the Tamaraw FX with two of their
abductors, who later tied their hands. Co identified Delos Reyes in court. He was not sure whether
Licayan was one of the five men who abducted them. Delos Reyes, while seated at the middle portion
of the Tamaraw FX, faced Co and demanded from him with a forceful voice, "Nasaan ang susi?" and
"Akina ang susi." He did not notice any hint of Manilefio or regional accent in the voice of Delos Reyes
and was not aware of said accents. He did not immediately give the key to Delos Reyes, but the latter
repeated "Akina ang susi." The man beside him pointed a gun at him, so he gave the key to Delos
Reyes, who then handed the key to the man seated at the driver's seat.13
During the time Co and Manaysay were detained in the safehouse, Co identified Licayan and Lara on
different occasions but was not able to see Delos Reyes.14 He reiterated that he tried to bribe Lara to
get the remaining money inside his pocket but Lara said that he could not do it because he will be killed.
Co explained that he did not identify Licayan and Lara by their feet. Even before he pointed to their feet,
he had already identified them by their faces which he was positive about and he was just even more
assured of their identities when he saw their feet.15 The defense presented Radio Veritas reporter
Corazon Zony Esguerra, New Bilibid Prison Chaplain Msgr. Roberto Olaguer, Lara's co-worker
Abelardo Ramirez, Lara's employer Florencia Lavarro Salvador, and accused-appellant Delos Reyes.
Licayan was likewise recalled to the witness stand.
Radio Veritas reporter Zony Esguerra testified that she was able to interview Mabansag at the airport
after he was arrested. Mabansag told her that his nephew, Lara, had nothing to do with the incident.
Esguerra also interviewed Delos Reyes at the PACER Office in Camp Crame around two hours after he
arrived from the airport. Delos Reyes told her that "talaga wala akong kasalanan pinilit lang nila akong
tagabantay sa victim." According to Delos Reyes, the real culprits are "Tata Placio and Allan Placio."16
New Bilibid Prison Chaplain Msgr. Roberto Olaguer, knowing that Licayan and Lara were scheduled for
execution in January 2004, told them before Christmas in December 2003 that he will personally attend
to their case more intensely. When he learned from .Lara that his relatives did not know the schedule of
his execution, he told Lara that he will personally inform his parents. On January 6, 2004, Lara finally
gave Msgr. Olaguer the address of his parents, but warned him about his uncle Pedro Mabansag: there
was a warrant for the arrest of Mabansag at the Marikina Police Station. It occurred to Msgr. Olaguer
that if Mabansag would be arrested, the execution of Lara and Licayan may be postponed. He
immediately called Mayor Marides Fernando of Marikina City and told her about the possibility of
helping him get a copy of the warrant. He was able to secure a copy of the warrant at around 8:00 p.m.
of January 7, 2004. He called the station manager of Radio Veritas, who told him to go to the station as
he will contact the chief of the PAO. He asked PAO Chief Atty. Acosta if there is a possibility that the
lives of Lara and Licayan would be saved if Mabansag is arrested, and she told him about the possibility
of reopening the case and suspending the execution.17
Before going to Bacolod, he told Lara about having secured the warrant. Lara warned him that even
though his uncle "Putol" (Mabansag) had both arms a,mputated, he can still drive a car, fire a shotgun,
and ride a horse. He relayed this warning to Col. A venido,. who organized two to three teams to arrest
Mabansag.18
In Bacolod on January 8, 2004, Msgr. Olaguer, Col Avenido and his group of around 20 men went to the
house of Lara's mother, and told her that her son will be executed on January 30, 2004. He invited her
to go to Manila and offered to shoulder her travel costs. She told him that BOMBO Radyo and ABS-
CBN already offered to pay for her expenses. During this time, the police were searching the area and
conducting interviews. The police told him that they have to go to a certain sugar plantation to look for
Mabansag. They arrived at the sugar plantation at 2:00 p.m. The people at the plantation, however,
were not cooperative and appeared to be afraid of Mabansag, except for a little child who gave them a
lead. Msgr. Olaguer was regularly updated as regards the search for Mabansag. At around 2:00 a.m.
the following day, January 9, 2004, CoL Inocentes Capuno called him and said that they were able to
apprehend Mabansag.19
At the police station, Msgr. Olaguer introduced himself to Mabansag. They were allowed to talk in
private, wherein Msgr. Olaguer told Mabansag that his nephew, Lara, will be executed by lethal injection
on January 30, 2004. Mabansag cried and said many things in Ilonggo. Msgr. Olaguer asked his
companion to translate what Mabansag was saying. He understood Mabansag saying "inosente man si
Tungkoy," referring to Lara. When he informed Mabansag about Licayan, Mabansag was so surprised
and told him that he had not seen Licayan for a long time. Mabansag said that he knew that he was one
of the accused in the case, but he was innocent. Mabansag denied that the house where the kidnap
victims were brought was his, but clarified that it was his daughter's house. The kidnappers offered
money if he could lend the house to them. He accepted because he needed money at that time.
Mabansag told him that he somehow participated in the safekeeping of the victims.20
Upon their arrival in the airport in Manila, they were brought to the VIP room. When Mabansag was
interviewed by reporter Gus Abelgas, Msgr. Olaguer was surprised to hear Mabansag say that he did
184
not know anything about the kidnapping. Mabansag also said that he was being threatened by the
police and the media people in Bacolod by telling him "lkaw ang ipapalit kay Roberto Lara."21
On cross-examination, Msgr. Olaguer testified that Lara told him exactly "Kung pupunta po kayo sa
Nanay ko, mag-ingat po kayo sa tiyo ko. Yung uncle ko, putol po ang dalawang kamay niyan pero kaya
pa na bumaril." Lara further told him that Mabansag was one of the masterminds in the kidnapping of
Co and Manaysay. Msgr. Olaguer observed that the people at the sugar plantation in Bacolod seemed
to be afraid of Mabansag as they told him that Mabansag had a close connection with the rebels who
were somehow controlling the sugar plantation.22 Abelardo Ramirez testified that he had known Lara
for five years since 1995 because they were neighbors at Daang Bakal, Bagong Silang, Parang,
Marikina. Lara's house was two houses away from his. Everytime he gets a job, he gets Lara as his co-
worker. Lara worked as a ''piyon," who mixes cement.23
On August 10, 1998, he was in his house in Daang Bakal at 6:00 a.m., waiting for Lara. At 7:00 a.m.,
Lara arrived. They took two jeepney rides to their place of work in Antipolo where they were
constructing a residential house. They arrived at the construction site at 8:00 a.m. and worked there
until 5 :00 p.m. They parted ways on Kaolin Street because Lara said he would go to his grandparent's
house in Novaliches. Ramirez arrived home at 6:30 p.m.24
On August 11, 1998, Lara arrived at Ramirez's house past 8:00 a.m. They proceeded to the same
construction site where they worked until 5 :00 p.m. They left the site at 6:00 p.m. and they parted ways
at Kaolin.25
On August 21, 1998, Ramirez secured a certification from their employer Florencia Lavarro Salvador to
prove that during the kidnapping, Lara was with him. He placed the certification in a small brown
envelope and kept it for five years. He retrieved the certification in 2003 when he saw on television that
Lara will be executed.26
Florencia Lavarro Salvador testified that Ramirez, whom she calls "Mang Bado," recommended Lara to
work in the construction of her house. On August 9, 1998, she supervised the work of Ramirez and
Lara, who both arrived at 7:00 a.m. and worked from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. On August 10, 1998,
Ramirez and Lara arrived at 7:30 a.m., worked from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and left at around 5:30 p.m.
On August 11, 1998, Ramirez and Lara arrived past 8:00 a.m., worked until 5:00 p.m., and left at around
6:00 p.m.
On August 12, 1998, Ramirez told her that Lara was arrested, and requested for a certification to prove
the whereabouts of Lara during the kidnapping incident. Salvador executed such certification.27
PAO lawyer Howard Areza testified that he assisted in the execution of the Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Delos Reyes and Mabansag. The latter was already deceased at the time of Atty. Areza's testimony.
Since Mabansag had no arms, he stamped his right toe on the document.28
Atty. Areza confirmed Mabansag's answers in Questions 17 and 18 of the Sinumpaang Salaysay
wherein he narrated that a TV reporter interviewed him upon arrival at the airport in Manila. He said in
the interview that Lara is not liable ("walang kasalanan") because Lara was working in a construction in
Cavite and Antipolo. Atty. Areza also confirmed Mabansag's answers in Question 30 and 31 wherein he
stated that he drove away (''pinalayas") Joy, Lara's wife, from Daang Bakal one week before August 10,
1998. Mabansag did not know whether Joy and Lara lived in Novaliches after he drove Joy away.29
Atty. Areza likewise confirmed Delos Reyes's answers in Questions 36 and 37 of the Sinumpaang
Salaysay wherein he stated that, on August 10, 1998, he saw Mabansag in the safehouse. According to
a certain Tata Alex Placio, Mabansag was the financier of the operation as he was the owner of the
house. Atty. Areza also confirmed the answers of Delos Reyes in Questions 15, 16, 18 and 20 that
Delos Reyes was interviewed by reporter Zony Esguerra when he was in the PACER Office. He stated
in said interview that Lara is not liable ("walang kasalanan"). Delos Reyes also stated that he guarded
the victims and did not report the matter to the police because of his fear of Tata Alex Placio, Allan
Placio, Jojo Sajorgo and Benjie.30 Recalled to the witness stand, Roderick Licayan testified that, in the
police line-up, he was at first identified by Co by pointing at his and Lara's feet. Co did not mention any
specific identifying mark on their feet. Licayan heard Co say that whenever anybody enters the room in
the safehouse, he looks at their feet. Licayan cannot recall how many of his companions in the line-up
were wearing shoes and how many were wearing slippers. Licayan testified that a police officer in
civilian clothes instructed Co to point to his face. It took a few minutes before the victims pointed to their
faces. Co identified him and Lara from among several persons (more than five; not sure if 10) who were
in the line-up.31
At the time he and Lara were arrested, Licayan already knew Delos Reyes because the latter was his
townmate. . Delos Reyes was not in the police line-up.32
Accused-appellant Rogelio "Noel" delos Reyes was arrested on January 12, 2004 in Barangay Bayang
Marihatag, Surigao del Sur, and was taken to Camp Crame where he was detained. Delos Reyes
confirmed the radio interview he had with Zony Esguerra, and that he said therein that he was forced to
guard the victims (''pinilit na magbantay") by Tata Placio, which the latter did by pointing a gun at him.33
Delos Reyes testified that on August 10, 1998, he went to the house of Mabansag to accompany a
friend who wanted to buy a fighting cock. He had previously met Mabansag at the "manukan" sometime
that same year, 1998. Delos Reyes stated that he met Tata and Alex for the first time in Mabansag's
house. The sale of the two fighting cocks was done outside Mabansag's house but, with Mabansag's
permission, he entered said house to drink water. Inside the house, Tata and Jojo pointed a gun at him.
He then saw a man and a woman seated near the kitchen. The couple saw him through the curtain.
Mabansag told him, "Noel, magmadali ka lumabas, may mangungupahan na mag-asawa." Tata,
however, said "Dito ka Zang, huwag kang aalis." Delos Reyes answered that he will leave and that he
does not want to stay any longer.34
The court noted at this point of Delos Reyes's testimony that he mentioned Tata as if he knew him prior
to the time he entered the house. Delos Reyes then admitted that he already knew Tata and Jojo two
months before the incident and that his earlier statement that he did not know Tata and Jojo when he
entered the house was not true.35
Delos Reyes did not ask Tata and Jojo why they were pointing a gun at him.36 He saw the hands of the
woman were tied, and suspected that Tata and Jojo were engaged in bad activities. He stayed in the
place from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. He did not help the victims because he was afraid that Allan, Jojo,
Tata and Benjie might shoot him. After leaving the place, he stayed in the house of his godmother,
Emelita Alcober, in Concepcion for two weeks.37
Delos Reyes knows both Licayan and Lara. He visited Lara in his residence every Sunday. Licayan was
his neighbor in the province. Delos Reyes affirmed his statement in the Sinumpaang Salaysay that
Licayan and Lara were not liable ("walang kasalanan"). Lara was not in the safehouse, while Licayan
185
just happened to pass by. When Delos Reyes entered Mabansag's house, Mabansag told him that
there were kidnap victims inside.38
During cross-examination, Delos Reyes stated that the friend he accompanied to buy fighting cocks was
named Luisito. He did not know Luisito' s surname because he had known him for only two weeks. He
had known Tata for around two months because Tata accompanied Mabansag when the latter went to
Delos Reyes' s residence three times to bring fighting cocks to sell. Delos Reyes learned from a
neighbor about Mabansag's trade of selling fighting cocks. Mabansag usually brings the fighting cocks
to Delos Reyes, at the latter's godmother's house. Delos Reyes did not know why this changed on
August 10, 1998, when. Mabansag told him to get the fighting cocks at the latter's house. When Delos
Reyes entered the safehouse, his companion, Luisito, had already left to drive a tricycle; Delos Reyes
will just give Luisito the fighting cocks they bought at a later time. Answering a query from the court,
Delos Reyes affirmed that after he and Luisito arrived. at the place, Luisito immediately left.39
Delos Reyes asked permission from Benjie Mabansag to go inside the house. He did not ask
permission from Pedro Mabansag to go inside the house since he had already gone to the place four
times.40 When asked by the court for clarification, Delos Reyes said he did not ask for permission from
Benjie.41 He asked Tata why he was pointing a gun at him, to which Tata replied that he should stay
and that Tata will kill him if he reports the matter to the police.42 When Delos Reyes went near the
kitchen, he saw a man and a woman. He noticed that the woman's hands were tied, but it did not occur
to him that their captivity was the matter that Tata warned him not to tell the police. Delos Reyes did not
consider it unusual to see a woman's hands tied.43 Despite what was happening, he stayed in the
house for one hour and merely sat on the floor near the door where the man and the woman were kept.
He was also allowed to leave after one hour. He did not notice the persons inside the room except for
the man and the woman. Even after Tata pointed a gun at him and he saw a woman tied, it did not
occur to him after he left the place that something was wrong.44
In the appeal now before the Court, accused-appellant Delos Reyes reiterates his defense that the
exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear was present in his case while accused-appellants
Licayan and Lara seek to overturn their conviction on the basis of the newly discovered evidence
presented during their retrial.
Whether or not the exempting
circumstance of uncontrollable fear
should be considered in favor of
Delos Reyes
Delos Reyes, who was still at-large during the first trial, was found guilty at the conclusion of the retrial.
The trial court held:
With respect to accused DELOS REYES, he did not refute the testimony of MR. CO that he was one (1)
of his abductors who [was] seated at the middle portion of the Tamaraw FX and who demanded from
him the key of said vehicle. Instead he admitted going to the house of Pedro Mabansag on August 10,
1998 accompanying a friend who would buy a fighting cock. According to DELOS REYES, after he
asked permission from Pedro Mabansag, he entered his house to drink water, but he was met by a
certain "TATA" and "JOJO" and they pointed a gun at him and he was told not to leave. He claimed that
Tata Placio and his companion after poking a gun at him threatened him that they would kill him if he
reports the matter to the police. He admitted that he saw two (2) persons inside the house near the
kitchen and the woman was hand tied. After he arrived at the said safehouse at 3 :00 p.m., of August
10, 1998, he was allowed to leave at 4:00 p.m., of said date. And after he left the safehouse, he
admitted that he feels not anymore being threatened by the group of Tata Placio, but still he did not
report what he witnessed in the house of Pedro Mabansag to the police authorities. Said accused also
claimed that when "TAT A" and "JOJO" poked a gun at him and was told not to leave and not to report
to the police, he acted under the "compulsion of an irresistible force, hence, one of the exempting
circumstances under Article 12, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court begs to disagree.
DELOS REYES testified that even before August 10, 1998, he knows already TATA and JOJO because
they went to the house of his Ninang together with Pedro Mabansag for three (3) times. Since they all
know each other, then the court cannot comprehend why TATA and JOJO still need to poke a gun at
DELOS REYES and threatened him. This is only a last ditch effort of said accused to deny any
participation in the conspiracy in kidnapping the two (2) victims. As could clearly be gleaned from the
testimony, DELOS REYES made inconsistent and improbable statements. The Court also observed the
demeanor of said accused when he testified and he is obviously lying [through] his teeth. Manifest
falsehood and discrepancies in the witnesses' testimony seriously impair their probative value and cast
serious doubts on their credibility.45
The Court of Appeals affirmed these findings, adding that the testimony of Delos Reyes was self-serving
and could not stand on its own to prove the elements of the exempting circumstance relied upon.46
Before this Court, Delos Reyes again pursues that he is exempt from criminal liability based on Article
12 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. -The following are exempt from criminal
liability:
xxxx
5. A.ny person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.
Delos Reyes claims exemption from criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal
Code, because he allegedly acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force, specifically the fact that
a co-accused, who is still at-large up to this date, pointed a gun at him. Delos Reyes has been invoking
practically the same defense even before the trial: in his Radio Veritas interview by reporter Zony
Esguerra, he insisted that "wala akong kasalanan" and that he was merely forced to guard the
victims.47
In People v. Dansal,48 this Court held that a person invoking the exempting circumstance of compulsion
due to irresistible force admits in effect the commission of a punishable act, and must therefore prove
the exempting circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. Specifically: He must show that the
irresistible force reduced him to a mere instrument that acted not only without will but also against his
will. The compulsion must be of such character as . to leave the accused no opportunity to defend
himself or to escape.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending; and it must be of such
a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not
done. A threat of future injury is not enough. A speculative, fanciful or remote fear, even fear of future
injury, is insufficient.49
186
The appellate court did not err when it relied on the doctrine that the matter of assigning values to
declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had
the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia
available but not reflected on the record. It is the trial judge that can capture the truth from the "forthright
answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the angry tone, the flustered look or the sincere
gaze, the modest blush or the guilty blanch."50 In the case at bar, the trial court even expressly stated
that it observed the demeanor of Delos Reyes when he testified and found that he is obviously lying
through his teeth.51 This is in contrast to the testimony of Co which the trial court described as very
clear, positive and straightforward.52 Even without the advantage of being able to observe the
demeanor of Delos Reyes, however, a mere examination of the transcript of his testimony convinces us
of the hesitation and untruthfulness of his testimony. Delos Reyes kept on changing details and
correcting himself even without inducement from opposing counsel. The content of the testimony was
itself incredible. This Court finds it hard to believe that a person who accidentally discovers kidnap
victims would be held at gunpoint by the kidnappers to guard said victims; or that a mastermind of a
kidnapping syndicate, instead of conducting his fighting cock selling activities in the regular meeting
place, would invite a recent affiliate to the place where he is holding prisoners; or that Delos Reyes did
not find it unusual to see a woman with her hands tied.
In all, we find no reason to doubt that Delos Reyes was part of the plan to abduct and detain Co and
Manaysay.
Whether or not Licayan and Lara
should be acquitted based on
purportedly newly discovered
evidence
The pro hac vice resolution of this Court on January 15, 2004 allows this Court an unusual, though not
unprecedented,53 task to revisit our own final and executory Decision. It should be stressed that a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence may only be granted by the court on motion of the accused, or
motu proprio with the consent of the accused "(a)t any time before a judgment of conviction becomes
final.54 Furthermore, the affidavits of Mabansag and Delos Reyes cannot be considered newly
discovered in that the affiants are the movants' co-accused who were already identified as such during
the trial.55 Nevertheless, the Court, alluding to its power to suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operations whenever the purposes of justice require it,56 and noting the support
of the Office of the Solicitor General to Licayan and Lara's motion, voted 8-6 to order the suspension of
the Rules of Court itself and remand the case to the trial court for further reception of evidence.57
On June 24, 2006, more than two years after the pro hac vice Resolution of this Court, Republic Act No.
934658 was approved, irrevocably sparing Licayan and Lara from the severest and most permanent of
penalties. In the meantime, both the R TC and the Court of Appeals were unmoved by the new
evidence presented for the accused-appellants. Thus, for the second time, Licayan and Lara were
convicted by the trial court and their appeals denied by the Court of Appeals.
To put things in perspective, the pro hac vice Resolution expressly granted the effects of Rule 121,
Section 6(b} of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. – The effects of granting a new trial or
reconsideration are the following:
xxxx
(b) when a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered evidence, the evidence already
adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other evidence as the court may, in .the
interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered together with
the evidence already in the record.
In general, the "new" evidence adduced in the second trial consists in (1) allegations that the
identification of Licayan and Lara by Co and Manaysay was unreliable; (2) testimonies and affidavits of
the recently apprehended Mabansag and Delos Reyes, both of whom allege that Licayan and Lara were
not involved in the crime; and (3) testimonies purporting to establish that Lara was at work in Antipolo
during the kidnapping incident.
While the second trial was meant to give Licayan and Lara the opportunity to present newly-discovered
evidence that were not available during the first trial, the focus of their defense was to show that the
identification made by the victims was unreliable. Licayan was recalled to the witness stand to testify
that in the police line-up, he was identified by Co by pointing at his and Lara's feet. Licayan emphasizes
that Co did not mention any specific identifying mark on their feet, and that he heard Co say that
whenever anybody enters the room in the safehouse, he looks at their feet. Likewise, when Co was
recalled to the witness stand to testify as regards the participation of Delos Reyes in the crime, the
cross-examination concentrated on trying to establish that Co was not certain about the identity of
Licayan and Lara. This Court observes that the defense was not successful in doing so as borne out by
the following portions of the transcript:
ATTY AREZA
Q But the reason why you were pointing to the feet of the accused was to assure yourself about the
footwear they were wearing, that was the reason you were pointing to their feet and not to their faces?
A I was positive with their faces, sir. The feet I was more assured of their identities when I saw their feet.
COURT
Q You already identified them through their faces?
A Yes, your honor.
Q You told the investigator?
A Yes, your honor.
Q As a support to their identification you pointed to their feet?
187
A Can I say something Your Honor. On the second day, there was a time that they would come and
enter the room with their faces covered, but there are times that they would forget to cover their faces
so I was able to identify them, that is the reason why I took an extra effort in remembering their feet and
what they were wearing. Your Honor.
ATTY AREZA:
Q What you are trying to say is that you are 100% sure of their identities and you were more assured by
looking at their feet?
PROSECUTOR GAPUZAN:
Misleading. There was no testimony that the witness ...
COURT
Witness may answer.
A I am sure with their faces. I was able to talk to them face to face, sir. I was more assured when I saw
their feet, sir.59
Even though Co was able to positively identify Licayan and Lara through their faces, prudence requires
that he at least check on the other details from his captivity to identify his abductors. His certainty is not
negated by his meticulosity.
The defense brings up several instances of supposed inconsistencies in Co's testimony, apparently to
prove that Co's memory was unreliable: (1) that Co was uncertain as to whether or not Licayan was
among the armed men who abducted them; (2) that Co was inconsistent as to who asked for the keys to
his Tamaraw FX, which was used to transport them; (3) that Co inaccurately described in his affidavit
what Mabansag looks like and omitted that he was a double arm amputee; ( 4) that Co saw a family
picture of Lara in the safehouse which might have been the basis of his identification of Lara; and (5)
that Co corrected himself about whether there was light in the room where he and Manaysay were held
captive.
We have, on numerous occasions, held that discrepancies in testimonies concerning minor details and
not actually touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair their credibility. Instead of
weakening the testimonies, these inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility, because they
discount the possibility of their being rehearsed.60
While Co may have been uncertain as to whether Licayan was among the armed men who abducted
him and Manaysay, he nevertheless positively identified Licayan as the person with medium built, fair
complexion and thin hairline whom he talked with regarding the ransom, and who fell asleep in the
afternoon of August 11, 1998, allowing them to escape.61 Manaysay also identified Licayan as one of
the persons she saw upon arriving at the safehouse,62 as the person who removed the masking tape
from her eyes,63 and the person guarding them who fell asleep, allowing them to escape.64
Co and Manaysay had no reason to lie. We find it hard to believe that Co and Manaysay, the victims of
a heinous crime, would use the picture of Lara at the safehouse and make up the following statements
just to pin an innocent person for an offense he did not commit. Co identified Lara as the short, tiny
black man who guarded them shortly after they arrived at the safehouse and brought the plastic
container for Manaysay,65 the guard with whom he tried to plead with for their lives but who told them
that he was just following orders, and refused the money that Manaysay managed to keep to herself
during their captivity.66 Manaysay identified Lara as one of the persons she saw upon arriving at the
safehouse,67 and as the one who guarded them shortly after they arrived at the safehouse, who gave
her a plastic container, and with whom Co pleaded with to help them escape.68
It bears to stress that both Co and Manaysay had several opportunities to see the faces of Lara and
Licayan.1avvphi1 Co and Manaysay each identified Lara and Licayan in both the police line-up and the
trial proper in open court. In the line-up, they were chosen from a group of 10 persons, the other
members of which have appearances that do not offer any clue that differentiate them from Lara and
Licayan.69
As regards Co's allegedly faulty identification of Mabansag in his affidavit,70 wherein he described
Mabansag as "matangkad at medyo matanda na ang tawag nila ay Putol"71 it was clear that Co was
merely being asked to describe in general the persons he saw during his captivity: "Doon sa bahay na
sinabi mong pinagdalhan sa inyo mayroon ka bang napansin na ibang tao doon maliban sa limang tao
na tumangay sa inyo?"72 We examined Mabansag's picture in the records73 and observe that even in
said picture, Mabansag's allegedly short stature and his being an amputee was not immediately
apparent because of what appears to be a jacket he was wearing. If he was wearing similar clothes at
the time Co saw him, it is very possible that he simply did not notice Mabansag's handicap.
The new evidence alluded to by this Court in its pro hac vice resolution to grant a new trial was
supposed to be the testimonies of the then recently captured Mabansag and Delos Reyes, who both
denied that Licayan and Lara participated in the crime. The statements of Mabansag and Delos Reyes,
however, would have been given more weight had they personally admitted their own involvement in the
crime. As testified by Msgr. Olaguer, witness for the defense, Mabansag stated in his interview with Gus
Abelgas that he (Mabansag) does not know anything about the kidnapping.74 We cannot give weight to
his denial that Licayan and Lara participated in the crime if he, himself, claims that he does not know
anything about the kidnapping. On the other hand, Delos Reyes swears that he was merely forced at
gunpoint to guard the victims, and was at the scene of the crime only from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. of
August 10, 1998.75 Delos Reyes claims that Lara was not in the safehouse, while Licayan just
happened to pass by.76 Co and Manaysay, however, placed Lara at the scene of the crime in the early
morning of August 10, 1998,77 making the testimony as regards his absence from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00
p.m. of same day irrelevant. Licayan, on the other hand, denies having been in the safehouse on
August 10 and 11, 1999, and claims that he was at home in San Mateo, Rizal.78 The testimony of
Delos Reyes that Licayan passed by the safehouse sometime from 3 :00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. was
therefore even unintentionally inculpating as to Licayan.
Finally, with respect to Lara's witnesses, namely co-worker Abelardo Ramirez and employer Florencia
Lavarro Salvador, their combined testimonies account for Lara's whereabouts during the following dates
and times:
August 9, 1998 (Sunday)-from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
188
 August 10, 1998 (Monday)-from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. (1) Roderick Licayan, Roberto Lara and Rogelio Delos Reyes are hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are also ordered to jointly and severally indemnify each
August 11, 1998 (Tuesday)-from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. of the victims in the following amounts:

Co79 and Manaysay,80 however, testified that Lara was at the scene of the crime during the early (a) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
morning of August 10, 1998, which was shortly after they were abducted at 1 :30 a.m. of the same day.
We have repeatedly held that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was (b) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; and
somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.81 Ramirez's (c) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages,
house, where he was fetched by Lara at 7:00 a.m. on August 10, 1998 is at Daang Bakal, Bagong
Silang, Parang, Marikina - the very same area where the safehouse was located. It was certainly not
physically impossible for Lara to have been at the scene of the crime at around 2:00 a.m. of August 10, (2) All of these amounts shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
1998 and still be able to arrive. at Ramirez's house within the same vicinity at 7:00 a.m. Furthermore, on date of the finality of the Court's Resolution until fully paid.
both August 10 and 11, Ramirez testified that he and Lara parted ways on Kaolin Street, which was the
very same street Co and Manaysay ran to when they escaped from the safehouse.82 SO ORDERED.

In sum, the new evidence presented by Licayan and Lara not only failed to prove that either of them
was in another place during their alleged participation in the kidnapping of Co and Manaysay, but
likewise failed to discredit the positive identification made by both Co and Manaysay. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
Criminal and Civil Liability for MIGUEL M. MORENO, defendant-appellant.

Delos Reyes, Licayan and Lara Santiago F. Alidio for appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes, Assistant Solicitor Cañizares and Solicitor Luciano for appellee.
The guilt of Delos Reyes, Licayan and Lara for the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom, having been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. With the passage, however, of Republic Act No. 9346, the
imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited. The RTC thus correctly imposed the penalty of FERIA, J.:
reclusion perpetua on Delos Reyes, Licayan and Lara.

Nevertheless, we have to modify the amount of damages to be awarded to conform to recent
jurisprudence. In the similar case of People v. Gambao83 for Kidnapping for Ransom, the Court set the
minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the imposition of the death penalty if not for
prohibition thereof by Republic Act No. 9346, to wit: (1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) ₱100,000.00
as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3)
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.
Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes are jointly and severally liable for these amounts awarded in favor of
each of the victims. These amounts shall accrue interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the date of the finality of the Court's Resolution until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03797 dated July 4, 2012,
which affirmed in toto the disposition of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina in Criminal Case No. 98-
2605-MK and 98-2606-MK dated February 17, 2009, is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
This is an appeal by the defendant Miguel M. Moreno from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga, which found him guilty of the crime charged with the aggravating circumstances of
premeditation and cruelty and without any mitigating circumstance, and sentenced the defendant to
death and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased.
The appellant was at the outbreak of the war a prisoner serving sentence in the San Ramon Penal
Colony Farm, situated in the City of Zamboanga. During the Japanese occupation, he befriended and
gained the confidence of the Japanese naval authorities, was released from prison, and appointed
Captain of a semi-military organization known as Kaigun Jeutay, composed of Filipinos and sponsored
by the Japanese navy. On October 23, 1944, the defendant was appointed by the Japanese naval
authorities as section commander of the San Ramon Penal Colony with plenary powers of supervision
and control over said colony and its environs.
On November 23, 1944, a group of defendant's soldiers went to the house of Paciano de los Santos,
and took with them two single young daughters of said Paciano, and on the next day, when the
deceased wet to San Ramon Penal Colony, he was confined in a cell by order of the defendant.

189
On the night of December 1, 1944, defendant gathered all the prison officials and employees of San
Ramon Penal Colony in a meeting in the house of P.D. Dellosa then Assistant Superintendent of the
institution, and in that gathering the accused arrogantly announced that he was not afraid to cut the
head of anybody, ordered all those present to witness the execution of Paciano de los Santos the
following day, and instructed Gregorio Magalit, a prisoner employee of said institution to prepare the
grave for said Paciano and issue a formal memorandum to that effect. A photostatic copy of which was
presented as Exhibit D during the trial.
And in the morning of December 2, 1944, Paciano de los Santos was taken to a place known as Fishery
Division of the colony with both hands tied at the back, and there the defendant ordered the victim
Paciano to kneel down with the head bent forward by the side of the grave already prepared for him by
order of the accused, and in that position the accused with a Japanese sabre held in the handle by his
both hands, hacked the head of Paciano de los Santos, and immediately kicked the prostrate body of
the victim into the grave.
The facts above stated were established beyond a per-adventure of doubt by the testimony of the
witnesses for the prosecution, and are substantially admitted by the defendant in his testimony during
the trial. When the defendant was asked whether he killed Paciano de los Santos in the form and
manner described by the witness for the prosecution, he answered the following: "When I arrived at the
place the deceased Paciano de los Santos was already in the place where I was to execute him, and
was taken there by four Japanese and several guards of San Ramon, and on the way they have
instructed me how should I kill him, I did kill him in the form and manner testified to by the witnesses for
the prosecution." (Pp. 49, 50, t.s.n.)
The attorney de oficio appointed by this court for the defendant contends, in the four assignments of
error assigned in his brief, that the court below erred (1) in trying the defendant in the same day on
which he was arraigned and pleaded not guilty, and not granting him two days to prepare for trial as
provided by law; (2) in trying and convicting the accused without a preliminary investigation by the
municipal judge or Fiscal of Zamboanga City;(3) in not compelling, by process of subpoena, the
attendance of witnesses in behalf of the defendant, and finding, despite this failure, that the latter's
testimony was not corroborated by any witness; and (4) in finding the accused guilty of murder with two
aggravating circumstances and imposing upon him the penalty of death.
(1) As to the first assigned error of the court below, it is true that, according to section 7, Rule 114, the
defendant after arraignment is entitled to at least two days to prepare for trial, except when the case is
on appeal from the justice of the peace. But this court in several cases, among them, the case of People
vs. Cruz (54 Phil., 24, 28), has already construed said section and held that the said right may be
waived either expressly, or impliedly by not asking for time to prepare for trial. In the present case, the
defendant has waived his right to have at least two days to prepare for trial, by submitting himself and
not objecting to the trial ordered by the court on the same day in which he was arraigned. The decision
of this court in the case of People vs. Valte (43 Phil., 907), quoted by the attorney for the accused, does
not support his contention, for in the said case the defendant did not waive but exercised his right by
demanding that he be granted two days to prepare for trial.
Besides, taking into consideration the fact that the defendant admitted having killed the victim in the
form and manner testified to by the witnesses for the prosecution, and the only defense he alleged is
that he was ordered to do so by Japanese naval authorities; that the defendant had in fact been given
time to prepare for his defense, because before the trial had begun, the said attorney, after a
conference with the defendant, asked the court to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to
Nicanor Punsala and Timoteo Almonte, employees in San Ramon Penal Colony, and to Gregorio
Magalit, a detainee in the stockade of Zamboanga, and the subpoenas were issued and served on the
same date, August 6, upon them; and that after three of the witnesses for the prosecution had testified,
the trial was adjourned and continued on August 7 and 8; it may be concluded that had there been any
error such an error is not a reversible one, for it did not impair the substantial rights of the defendant.
(2) With respect to the second assignment of error, the record shows that the defendant has waived his
right to a preliminary investigation in a communication called a motion of July 30, 1945, filed with the
court, in which the said defendant states that "he respectfully waives his right to a preliminary
investigation and request that this case be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga for
final decision."
Section 1 and 7, Rule 108, of the Rules of Court use the words "preliminary investigation," but a cursory
reading thereof would clearly show that the investigation mentioned therein is not the preliminary
investigation proper in which the defendant has the right to present his evidence. That is the reason why
said investigation made for the purpose of issuing the warrant of arrest of a defendant if it appears that
his arrest is justified, is defined by section 1 as "a previous inquiry or examination made before the
arrest of the defendant." Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued without a probable cause, has
nothing to do with the right of the defendant to a preliminary investigation, and cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal from a judgment in which the defendant is found guilty of the offense charged
beyond a reasonable doubt and sentenced to death.
The preliminary investigation proper to which the defendant is entitled as apart of the due process of law
in those cases in which the statute provides for it, is that established by section 11, of same Rule 108,
and consist in the right of the defendant, after his arrest, to "be informed of the complaint or information
filed against him . . . of the substance of the testimony and evidence presented against him," and to be
allowed "to testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his favor." And the defendant has waived
expressly his right to that preliminary investigation, as above stated.
(3) In his third assignment of error, the attorney for the defendant states that "the lower court erred in
not compelling by process of subpoena the attendance of witnesses in behalf of the appellant as
provided by the Philippine Constitution, and finding, despite this failure, that the testimony of the
appellant was corroborated by any witnesses."
This assignment of error is clearly without foundation; because the same attorney admits in his brief
that, the would be witnesses for the defense Nicanor Punsalan, Timoteo Almonte and Gregorio Magalit
were, upon petition of his attorney in the court below, served on August 6 with subpoena and subpoena
duces tecum issued by the court, That "Nicanor Punsalan and Timoteo Almonte were not examined or
presented as witnesses in behalf of the appellant," does not support the contention of dependant's
attorney that they have not been compelled by subpoena to appear in court as witnesses. The
presumption is that they had appeared in compliance with the subpoena, there being nothing in the
record to show the contrary, and that if they had not been presented as such by the attorney for the
defendant, it was because their testimonies were not favorable to the latter; as evidenced by the
testimony of said Magalit, the other witness subpoenaed for the defense, who was used by the
prosecution as a rebuttal witness and testified against the accused.
(4) The fourth or last assignment of error, is also without merit. Because the defendant, testifying in his
own behalf, admitted having killed Paciano de los Santos on the date and in the form and manner
190
testified to by the witnesses for the prosecution, and the only defense that he executed or killed the
deceased in obedience to an order given him by Japanese officers of the navy, by whom he was
informed that the deceased was one of those who were encountered by the Japanese in a mountain
and wounded a Japanese soldier, is not supported by any evidence in the record. And because
assuming that there was such an order, it would not justify the crime committed by defendant and
exempt him from criminal liability.
That there was no such order, oral or written, is clearly shown by the defendant's own incredible,
contradictory and unsupported testimony relating to his having been ordered by the Japanese naval
officer to kill the deceased, which reads as follows:
P. declarando aqui los testigos de la acusacion todos dijeron de que ejecucion de aquel
Paciano de los Santos era por orden de Vd, es cierto eso? — R, senor.
P. Tambien declararon aqui de que Vd. habia ordenado a n tal Magalit, su assistant para que
notificara al jefe y a los empleado de la Colonia de San Ramon para que estuviera presente en
el dia y hora de ejecucion de Paciano de los Santos, es cierto esto? —R. Eso era el diciembre
1.0.
P. Si? — R. Cuando el Capitan Susuki y el Commander Tanigawa se fueron a mi oficina me
ordeno para que ejectura a Paciano de los Santos.
P. Y cual era objecto de Vd. al notificar a los oficiales y empleados de la Colonia Penal de San
Ramon para el que estuviera presente al tiempo de la ejecucion de Paciano de los Santos? —
R. Para que durante la manana cuando me estaban dando ordenes de que yo ejecute esa
orden de matar a Paciano de los Santos que ellos esten presentes, porque yo estuve
discutiendo con el Capitan Susuki, yo les dije que no podia hacerlo.
P. Por que? — R. Por ellos insistian, y yo les dije que realmente no podia hacerlo, pero
entonces ellos me dijeron, Tienes que obedecer porque esa ordende Major Susuki tienes que
cumplir, de lo contrario tines que venir con nosotros.
P. Que mas? — R. Asi pues era la orden de Major Sasaki.
P. Que mas? — R. Y como yo no podia esquivarme de la orden que ellos me daban, yo les
pedi si voy a hacer la ejecucion ellos tienen que presenciar tambien para que ellos vean que
yo lo hago contra mi propia voluntad. Entonces, el Capitan Susuki me dijo que ellos no podian
estar presentes porque tenian que volver acquel mismo dia a Zamboanga. (Pp. 48, 49, t.s.n.).
JUZGADO: P. Aquel suspuesto orden que recibio Vd. de los oficiales del navy para la
ejecucion de Paciano de los Santos dada a Vd. por escrito o verbalmente? — R. Una carta del
Commander Tanigawa llevada alli a mi oficina y la orden fue firmada por el Major Sasaki.
P. Aquella carta estaba dirigida a Vd? — R. Si, senor.
P. Y tiene Vd. en sur poder esa carta? — R. Tenia todo eso en el record alli en San Ramon
pero no se ahora no se puede encontrar.
FISCAL ATILANO.
Q. you had office in San Ramon, as you say? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. You had also a record clerk who kept all your papers? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. And this particular order you said that was given to you by Major Sasaki was also delivered
to your record clerk Mr. Magalit? — A. Si, senor, yo le he dado para que ponga al file de cartas
recibidas. (Pp. 58, 59, t.s.n.).
The above-quoted appellant's testimony is unsupported. And it is not only unsupported, but contradicted
by the witness for the prosecution whose testimony about the order of the appellant to witness the
beheading of the victim we have already stated above, and by Gregorio Magalit who testified that he
had not received or seen the alleged written order of Major Sasaki.
It is also incredible and contradictory as a cursory reading of the above would show. The appellant
testified that he ordered them to witness the execution of Paciano de los Santos, so that "during the
morning when they will give me orders to execute the mandate to kill Paciano de los Santos, they be
present" (emphasis supplied); but in the same breath he added: "as I could not refuse to comply with
their order, I asked that if I had to execute it, they should also be present so that they would see that I
do against my will. The Captain Susuki told me that they could not be present because they had to
return that same day to Zamboanga." (P. 49, t.s.n.) Upon being pressed to explain how could the mere
act of his beheading Paciano de los Santos inform those present that he (the defendant) had acted
against the order of the Japanese authorities, he tried to give an explanation that does not explain by
saying that, on the night previous to the execution, he informed the officers and employees of San
Ramon Penal Colony, gathered by his order in the house of Mr. Dellosa, "that he had been ordered by
Major Sasaki to kill Paciano de los Santos, and asked their opinion about it." This explanation does not
explain, because, aside from being contradicted by the witnesses for the prosecution (p. 68, t.s.n.), if it
were true that he had already informed them about it, why did he still require them to be present at the
execution of Paciano de los Santos, specially when, according to his own testimony, the Japanese
officers who gave him the order could not be present because they had to return the same day to
Zamboanga?
But assuming that such an order was really given by Major Sasaki, it could not exempt the defendant
from criminal liability, either under subsection 6, article 11, or subsections 5 and 6, article 12, of the
Revised Penal Code.
Not under subsection 6 of article 11, because, in killing the deceased, the defendant has not acted in
obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose. The alleged order was not for
lawful purpose, because the deceased was to be killed without any previous trial or hearing, and
Commander Sasaki has no authority to give or issue such an order. This court, in the case of United
States vs. Garcia (5 Phil., 58), held that it is not a defense to a charge of homicide that it was committed
under an illegal order of an officer of the United States Army.
191
And not under subsections 5 and 6, article 12, of the same Revised Penal Code, which exempt from being accompanied by a Japanese, for whether or not he was accompanied by a Japanese was not
criminal liability any person "who acts under the compulsion of an irresistable force," or "who acts under material to the present case.
the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury." Because it is plain that there was no
compulsion of an irresistible force that compelled the defendant to kill the victim against his will; nor was In view of all the foregoing, we hold that the judgment of the lower court that finds the defendant guilty of
there any threat of such a serious character and imminence as to create in the mind of the defendant an the crime of murder with the aggravating circumstances of premeditation and cruelty and sentences him
uncontrollable fear that an equal or greater evil or injury would be inflicted upon him if he did not comply to death, is in conformity with the facts and law, and should therefore be affirmed with costs against the
with the alleged order to kill the deceased. The only part of the defendant's testimony relating to a sort appellant. But in view of the fact that one of the Justices dissents from this decision, the appellant
of a threat is the following: "As they insisted and I informed them that I could not do it, then Captain should, according to section 133 of Commonwealth Act No. 3, as amended by Executive Order No. 86
Susuki told me: You have to comply with the order, he had to come along with them, is not such a threat of the President of the Philippines dated January 7, 1946, suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
as contemplated by said provision of the Revised Penal Code; especially, taking into consideration that instead of death. So ordered.
the defendant himself declared that the captain told him "that they could not be present (at the
execution of the deceased) because they had to return that same day to Zamboanga." (P. 49, t.s.n.)
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.
Moran, C.J., I certify that Mr. Justice concurred in this decision.
At the oral argument, the appellant's attorney invited the attention of this court to a letter received by
him from the defendant Moreno, where it is stated, among other things, that his attorney de oficio in the
court below, Atty. Timoteo de los Santos, was a relative (kamaganak) of he deceased Pacianode los
Santos, and this court ordered that said letter be attached to the record. Later on, the Solicitor General
presented to this court the affidavits of Timoteo de los Santos and Maximo de los Santos, attorney in PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
the lower court and brother respectively, of the deceased Paciano de los Santos, in which the affiants vs.
declare that the victim was not related at all to said Timoteo de los Santos.lawphil.net CHARLIE FIELDAD, RYAN CORNISTA, and EDGAR PIMENTEL, Appellants.

Although the attorney for the appellant in this court did not impugn in his brief the manner of conducting DECISION
the defense by the attorney de oficio for the defendant in the court below, in his memorandum of
authorities submitted after the oral argument he states that the letter above referred to corraborates in CARPIO, Acting C.J.:
part the statement of Attorney De los Santos appearing in the stenographic transcript when he said,
among other things, "Por encima de micircunstancia personal y de mi opinion personal entre el
acusado, me veo ahora obligado a aceptar el nombramiento y defender al acusado." In view of the fact The Case
that the appellant is charged with a capital offense and the penalty imposed upon him by the court
below is death, we suggested, during and after the hearing of the case on appeal, that the appellant's On appeal is the Decision1 dated 22 October 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
attorney file a formal motion for a new trial accompanied by evidence or affidavit of merits of witnesses 03943, affirming with modification the Joint Decision2 dated 3 November 2008 of the Regional Trial
who could support the appellant's defense of having acted in obedience to a lawful order, so as to have Court of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan (trial court) in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053, U-10054, and U-10055.
some legal ground to grant a new trial and thus give the appellant additional opportunity to substantiate
his defense.
The Facts

We can not find a legal way of remanding this case to the lower court for a new trial. In the first place,
Appellants Charlie Fieldad (Fieldad), Ryan Comista (Comista) and Edgar Pimentel (Pimentel) were
because from the fact that about eight months having already elapsed since the oral argument or
charged in conspiracy with others for the murder of two jail guards and for camapping.
hearing of this case, and no formal motion for a new trial has been filed as suggested, it may be inferred
that the appellant has no other evidence to support his defense; and because after examining carefully
the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court by the attorney de oficio for defendant, we have come to The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10053 reads:
the conclusion that, though said attorney was somewhat reluctant at first to act as attorney de oficio for
the defendant, he accepted the appointment although his personal opinion is against the defendant, and The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, MIGUEL BUCCAT, JESUS GELIDO,
performed faithfully his duties as such. Atty. Timoteo de los Santos did not cross-examine the rebuttal FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, FEDERICO DELIM, JEFFREY ADVIENTO,
witness Magalit, whose testimony was limited to deny having received or seen any order by Major GIL ESPEJO, RUBEN PASCUA, and ELMO MEJIA of the crime of Murder with the use of unlicensed
Sasaki commanding the appellant to execute Paciano de los Santos, for it would have been useless to firearm committed as follows:
cross-examine him on that point. He did not cross-examine the witness Carmona because he merely
denied the testimony of the defendant that, during the meeting in the house of Dellosa, he told the
That on or about March 9, 1999 in the morning inside the BJMP Compound, Anonas, Urdaneta City,
officials and employees of the San Roman Penal Colony gathered there that he did not like to execute
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused being detention prisoners
Paciano de los Santos. And he did not cross-examine the other witnesses, Faustino Triplett, Rosa
armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intentto kill, treachery, evident premeditation and taking
Orquijo and Pedro Herrera, who testified that in the arrest of civilians by the defendant the latter was not
advantage of superior strength, conspiring with one another did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
192
feloniously grab, hold and shoot with said unlicensed firearm JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa inflicting upon him
multiple fatal gunshot wounds which caused his instant death, thereafter, accused escaped from their
detention, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7956 and R.A. 8294.3 The
Information in Criminal Case No. U-10054 reads:
The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, MIGUEL BUCCAT, JESUS GELIDO,
FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, FEDERICO DELIM, JEFFREY ADVIENTO,
GIL ESPEJO, RUBEN a.k.a. Joven, and ELMO MEJIA of the crime of Murder with the use of unlicensed
firearm committed as follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 in the morning inside the BJMP Compound, Anonas, Urdaneta City,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused being detention prisoners
armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation and taking
advantage of superior strength, conspiring with one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot with said unlicensed firearm JO1 JUAN BACOLOR, Jr. inflicting upon him multiple
fatal gunshot wounds which caused his instant death, thereafter, accused escaped from their detention,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7956 and R.A. 8294.4
The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10055 reads:
The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD, FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA,
EDGAR PIMENTEL, and FEDERICO DELIM of the crime of carnapping committed as follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 at Brgy. Anonas, Urdaneta City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having just escaped from the BJMP Compound, Anonas
Urdaneta, in order to expedite their escape armed with unlicensed firearm with intent to gain, conspiring
with one another, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and carry away one
(1) Tamaraw Jeep with Plate No. CDY-255 belonging to Benjamin J. Bau[z]on without the latter’s
knowledge and consent, which accused used as a get away vehicle. CONTRARY to R.A. 6539, as
amended.5
Upon arraignment, appellants pled not guilty.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the testimonies of Jail Officer (JO) 2 Marlon Niturada, Dr. Constante
Parayno, Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr., Senior Police Officer (SPO) 4 Ernesto Ganceña, Dionisio Badua,
Police Senior Inspector Philip Campti Pucay, PO3 Jimmy Garcia, PO3 Roberto Reyes, SPO1 Joselito
Sagles, Pitz Dela Cruz, PO2 Danny Torres, Police Inspector Pamfilo Regis, Police Inspector Reyland
Malenab, Theresa Bacolor, Julie Gamboa, Benjamin Bauzon, JO1 Victor A. Sidayen, Warden Romeo
Jacaban, SPO4 Cirilo Lagmay and Col. Theresa Ann B. Cid.
The prosecution established that at around 7:00 a.m. on 9 March 1999, JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa (JO2
Gamboa), JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr. (JO1 Bacolor) and JO2 Marlon Niturada (JO2 Niturada) were inside
the nipa hut searching area near the main gate of the district jail. JO2 Gamboa summoned inmate
Dionisio Badua (Badua). JO2 Gamboa gave Badua the keys to the prison cells and instructed the latter
to open all the cells for the routine headcount.
Julius Chan (Chan) went to the nipa hut to ask JO2 Gamboa regarding the time of his hearing
scheduled for that day. While JO2 Gamboa and Chan were conversing, the telephone in the
administration building rang. JO2 Niturada ran from the nipa hut to the administration building to answer
the phone.
After the phone call, JO2 Niturada proceeded towards the basketball court. On his way there, he turned
his head towards the nipa hut and saw Chan place an arm on the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa, who was
seated, and shoot the latter with a short firearm. JO2 Gamboa fell.
Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the possession of an armalite. Cornista
struck JO1 Bacolor at the back of the head, which caused the latter to fall down. Fieldad, armed with
JO2 Gamboa’s gun, shot JO1 Bacolor twice. Florante Leal (Leal) took the armalite from JO1 Bacolor
and shot at JO2 Niturada. JO2 Niturada returned fire with his .38 caliber handgun.
Cornista opened the main gate with keys taken from JO2 Gamboa. Twelve inmates went out the main
gate. After seeing the inmates run out, Badua padlocked the main gateand returned to his cell.
Once outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and Pimentel boarded a parked Tamaraw jeep
with plate number CDY-255 belonging to Benjamin Bauzon, without the latter’sknowledge and consent.
They picked up Federico Delim (Delim) and Chan along the way. Before they reached Asingan,
Pangasinan, the group alighted from the Tamaraw jeep and transferred to a Mazda pick-up truck. When
they reached San Miguel, Tarlac, the Mazda pick-up truck turned turtle. The group abandoned the
vehicle and ran towards a cane field. Police authorities surrounded the cane field and arrested
appellants and their companions.
Dr. Constante Parayno conducted anautopsy on the body of JO1 Bacolor, and concluded that the death
was caused by shock and hemorrhage due to gunshot wound of the right lung. Dr. Parayno also
testified that based on the injuries sustained by JO1 Bacolor, it was possible that the shooting was
preceded by a fight between the shooter and the victim.
Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr. conducted an autopsy on the body of JO2 Gamboa, and concluded that the
death was caused by cardiac tamponade due to the gunshot wound that damaged the heart.
Versions of Appellants
Appellants denied any criminal liability.
Fieldad’s Testimony
193
At around 6:00 in the morning on 9 March 1999, JO2 Gamboa brought Fieldad out of his cell and
ordered him to clean the administrative offices. After cleaning the offices, he was told to fix a vehicle
parked inside the jail compound. He needed to prop the vehicle on a jack, but he could not find the jack
handle. He went back toJO2 Gamboa, who was in the nipa hut with JO2 Niturada and JO1 Bacolor. JO2
Gamboa told him to look for Badua. When he came back with Badua, JO2 Gamboa handed Badua the
key of the jail compound. Badua went out of the compound, while Fieldad continued to look for the jack
handle.
While JO2 Niturada talked to him regarding the vehicle, Fieldad noticed Elmo Mejia (Mejia) and the
other inmates playing basketball. The ball rolled towards the nipa hut and Mejia went to retrieve it.
Then Fieldad heard gunshots from the direction of the nipa hut. JO2 Niturada got his gun and fired
towards the nipa hut. Fieldad got nervous and took cover in the outpost. He peeped through the
windows and saw Mejia pointing a firearm toward JO2 Niturada. He hid again when he heard the
exchange of fire between Mejia and JO2 Niturada. He went out of the outpost when he heard people
calling for help to push the parked vehicle. The vehicle did not start, and the people pushing it
dispersed. Intending to return to his cell, he followed JO2 Niturada, who was proceeding towards the
main building. However, JO2 Niturada pointed a gun towards him, so Fieldad ran away and took cover.
While still inside the jail compound, Leal told Fieldad that he needed the latter to go with him. Fieldad,
along with other inmates, left the jail compound. He followed Leal to a Tamaraw jeep parked outside.
Leal pointed a long firearm toward Fieldad,and ordered the latter to drive the vehicle. Frightened,
Fieldad drove the vehicle. On their way, they picked up Delim and Chan.
Pimentel’s Testimony
At around 7:30 in the morning of 9 March 1999, Pimentel was allowed to go out of his cell. He
proceeded to the basketball court for the headcount. He heard two or three gunshots, but did not
immediately mind it because he was used to the guards firing their guns in the morning. When he saw
Leal with an armalite, running after and shooting at JO2 Niturada, Pimentel ran to a house outside the
jailcompound. He was afraid to go back to his cell because of the exchange of fire. Inmates were
running in different directions.
Leal arrived at the place where Pimentel was hiding, and motioned to the latter by pointing his armalite
downward several times. Pimentel approached Leal, who ordered him to remove the stone blocking the
tire of the jeep parked near the house. Pimentel obliged. Pimentel boarded the jeep because Leal told
him at gun point to do so. Fieldad drove the jeep. He did not notice who their other companions were.
Along the way, they passed a parked vehicle. Leal ordered everyone to alight from the jeep, and to
board the other vehicle. The vehicle turned turtle in Tarlac.
Cornista’s Testimony
Cornista was 17 years old on 9 March 1999. Between 6:00 and 6:45 that morning, he was cleaning the
jail compound. He was shocked and confused when he heard three rapid gunfires followed by
consecutive gunfires coming from the direction of the nipa hut. JO2 Gamboa, JO1 Bacolor, Leal and
Mejia were at the nipa hut. Leal was chasing JO2 Niturada, both of them armed. Then he saw the jail
guards lying down. Out of fear, he ran towards the already opened main gate.
Cornista hid in a Tamaraw jeep parked behind the jail compound. Then he saw Leal, Fieldad and
Pimentel board the jeep. He tried to alight but Leal threatened to shoot him if he did. Fieldad drove the
Tamaraw jeep. Delim flagged the jeep down and boarded.Chan also joined them along the way. Upon
seeing a parked Mazda pick up, Leal ordered Fieldad to stop the jeep and the inmates to transfer to the
other vehicle. Fieldad also drove the Mazda pick up until it turned turtle in Tarlac.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. U-10053, accused Julius Chan, Charlie Fieldad and Ryan Cornista are
declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and each is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They are also ordered to pay the heirs of the
deceased the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral damages,
Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages, Php47,845.00 as actual damages and Php153,028.00
for loss of earning capacity.
Accused Jesus Gelido, Edgar Pimentel, Federico Delim, Jeffrey Adviento, Miguel Buccat and
Ruben Pascua are ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt.
2. In Criminal Case No. U-10054, accused Julius Chan, Charlie Fieldad and Ryan Cornista are
declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and each is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA. They are also ordered to pay the heirs of the
deceased the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral damages,
Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages, Php87,349.45 for the actual damages, and
Php178,500.00 for the loss of earning capacity.
Accused Jesus Gelido, Edgar Pimentel, Federico Delim, Jeffrey Adviento, Miguel Buccat and
Ruben Pascua are ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt.
3. In Criminal Case No. U-10055, accused Charlie Fieldad, Edgar Pimentel and Ryan Cornista
are declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of CARNAPPING and each is
sentenced to suffer imprisonment from FOURTEEN YEARS AND EIGHT MONTHS to
SIXTEEN YEARS AND TWO MONTHS, and to pay nominal damages of Php15,000.00 and
moral damages of Php25,000.00.
For insufficiency of evidence, accused Julius Chan and Federico Delim are ACQUITTED.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
Appeal was interposed only by Fieldad, Cornista and Pimentel since Chan had died.7 They assigned
the following errors:
194
I Fieldad, Cornista and Pimentel appealed from the Court of Appeals’ decision. In the interim,
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE
THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING CONSPIRACY AND TREACHERY IN
THE ALLEGED KILLINGS OF JO2 REYNALDO GAMBOA AND JO1 JUAN BACOLOR, JR.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE MINORITY OF THE
ACCUSED RYAN CORNISTA AT THE TIME THE ALLEGED CRIMES WERE COMMITTED.
IV
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS’
TESTIMONIES.8
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court only with respect to the penalties imposed
upon Cornista in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054, taking into account the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the
penalties of imprisonment imposed on Ryan Cornista in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054.
Accordingly the penalties of reclusion perpetua imposed on him are reduced to eight (8) years and one
(1) day of prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal, as maximum, per each information.
IT IS SO ORDERED.9
The appellate court held that "it ismanifest that Cornista acted with discernment, being able to
distinguish between right and wrong and knowing fully well the consequences of his acts."10 The Court
of Appeals enumerated the following acts of Cornista that clearly establish discernment:
x x x. His act of grappling for possession of an armalite with Bacolor and hitting the latter’s head clearly
demonstrated his discernment. He took advantage of the situation where Fieldad was also grappling
with JO1 Bacolor by striking the head of JO1 Bacolor which he obviously knew would weaken the
latter’s defenses. Moreover, his act of getting the keys from JO2 Gamboa which he usedin opening the
main gate clearly demonstrates the idea of escape and thus established discernment on his part.
Cornista, having acted with discernment may not be excused from criminal liability.11
Cornistafiled a Motion to Withdraw Appeal12 dated 15 June 2011, which the Court granted in a
Resolution13 dated 15 August 2011. The case became final and executory as to Cornista on 5 October
2011.14 The instant appeal thus pertainsto Fieldad and Pimentel only.
Appellants and appellee adopted their respective briefs15 filed before the Court of Appeals as their
supplemental briefs in this case.16
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Nature of the Killings
Fieldad argues that there can be notreachery since "the jail guards were all issued with firearms to
protect themselves from danger and to maintain peace and order within the compound."17 This
argument is untenable.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and speciallyto insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might take.18
In People v. Escote, Jr.,19 where an armed off-duty police officer was killed, we held:
x x x. There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving
the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission withour risk of himself.
Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger to his life where he was
defenseless and unable to flee atthe time of the infliction of the coup de grace. In the case at bar, the
victim suffered six wounds, one on the mouth, another on the right ear,one on the shoulder, another on
the right breast, one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one above the right iliac crest. Juan
and Victor were armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as
hepleaded for dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He was shot at close range,
thus insuring his death.20 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
In the case of People v. Tabaco,21 treachery was appreciated in the killing of three peace officers, one
of whom was armed and assigned to maintain the peace and order. They were attending an event
where many armed peace officers were present to maintain peace and order. In that case, the victims
were completely taken by surprise and had no means of defending themselves against the sudden
attack.
In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers were not afforded any chance of defending
themselves. Without warning, Fieldad and his cohorts disabled the defenses of the jail officers. Chan
held the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa as he shot the latter. Meanwhile, Fieldad teamed-up with Cornista to
195
divest JO1 Bacolor of his armalite, and to knock him down. Then Fieldad took JO2 Gamboa’s gun and COURT
shot JO1 Bacolor.
Do you know Charlie?
Fieldad’s Identity was Established
A Yes, sir.
According to Fieldad, since JO2 Niturada did not identify him as a participant in the killings of JO1
Bacolor and JO2 Gamboa, his identity and complicity in the killings were not established. However, Q Is he in the courtroom?
contrary to his contention, Fieldad’s identity in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054 was proven by
the prosecution. Fieldad disregarded the testimony of Badua, who categorically identified Fieldad and
recounted in detail his participation in the incident: A Yes, sir.

Q What happened when you bring (sic) water to the kubo? Q You go to him, where is Charlie there?

A At the time when I brought water to the place where (sic) the guards used to take a bath there were A This one, sir. (Witness is pointing to the accused, Charlie Fieldad).
persons grappling possession of the armalite, sir.
COURT
Q With whom?
Warden what is the name?
A Charlie and Cornista, sir.
BJMP WARDEN JACABAN
Q You were told to fetch water, then you returned and brought the water to the place where (sic) the
guards used to take a bath and you saw Charlie and Cornista grappling with whom? Felmer Fieldad and the nickname is Charlie, Your Honor.

A Bacolor, sir. PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO

PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO How about Cornista is he inside the courtroom?

You are referring to Jail Guard Bacolor? A Yes, sir.

A Yes, sir. Q Will you please point to him?

Q Is this Charlie inside the courtroom right now? A (The witness is pointing to one ofthe accused who when asked his name he answered Ryan
Cornista).
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened next when you saw Charlie and Cornista grappling possession of the armalite of Jail
Q Will you please point to him, you step down? Guard Bacolor?

A This one, sir. (Witness pointed (sic) and shaked (sic) hand (sic) with accused and who when asked A They struck the back of the head of Bacolor, sir.
his name he answered Felmer Fieldad).
Q Who struck the back head (sic) of Bacolor?
Q Is he the same Charlie you are referring to?
A Cornista, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened to Bacolor when Cornista struck the back of his head?

196
A Bacolor fell down, sir. Moreover, the positive identification of Fieldad by Badua is corroborated by circumstantial evidence. A
careful examination of the record reveals that the following evidence establish Fieldad’s active
xxxx participation in the conspiracy to kill the jail guards:

Q What happened when Gamboa was shot by Julius? 1. Badua testified that Fieldad, together with Cornista, grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the
possession of the latter’s armalite gun, and JO1 Bacolor finally fell when Cornista struck him at
back of the head;26
A He fell down, sir.
2. Badua also testified that after Chan shot JO2 Gamboa, Fieldad took JO2 Gamboa’s gun and
Q What else happened when Gamboa fell down? usedit to shoot JO1 Bacolor;27

A They got his gun, sir. 3. Dr. Constante F. Parayno, the medical doctor who conducted the autopsy on JO1 Bacolor,
testified that because of the abrasions, the shooting of the victim may have been preceded by
Q Who got the gun of Gamboa? a fight between the victim and the shooter;28

A Charlie, sir. 4. JO2 Niturada testified that he saw Fieldad confederating with Leal and Chan by the nipa hut
before heading out the main gate;29
COURT
5. JO Sidayen testified that he saw Fieldad with Leal, Chan and Cornista at the nipa hut but
What kind of firearm? moments before the gun shots rang;30

A 9 MM, sir. 6. P/Insp. Pamfilo Regis testified that he took the paraffin casts31 of the hands of Fieldad;32
and

PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
7. Forensic chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong-Cid testified that the paraffin test done on
Fieldad’s hands was positive for the presence of gun powder nitrates,33 as contained in her
What did Charlie do with the gun taken from Gamboa? report.34 In addition, Fieldad failed to controvert the paraffin evidence. We note that Fieldad’s
counsel manifested duringtrial that the paraffin casting was performed without the assistance
A Charlie shot Bacolor, sir. of counsel, contrary to the right of the accused.35 However, all the exhibits offered by the
prosecution, including the paraffin casts and test results, wereadmitted in the Order dated 3
March 2000.36 To be sure, the taking of paraffin casts does not violate the right of the accused
Q How many times did Charlie shoot Bacolor?
against self incrimination. In People v. Gamboa,37 we held:

A Two (2) times, sir.22 (Emphasis supplied)

It is a settled rule that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best
undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to
note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.23 Positive identification of the
accused is entitled to greater weight than the bare denial and explanation by the accused.24
In light of the positive testimony of Badua, Fieldad’s self-serving defense of denial and alibi must fail.
Alibi is the weakest of all defenses, as it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove.25 True, the
conviction of an accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the
prosecution evidence. Hence, whenthe prosecution evidence has firmly established the guilt of accused
beyondreasonable doubt, conviction is in order.
Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence
As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question, under the sixth
assigned error, that it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer. This right is afforded to any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession or admission may not be
taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to havecompetent and independent counsel
of his own choice. His right against self incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test of
his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the
accused is proposed to be examined as in this case. Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively thathe
just recently fired a gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution.38
(Emphasis supplied)
Conspiracy in the Killings
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.39 Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the
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accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.40 Once conspiracy is shown the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
Contrary to his contentions, the acts of Fieldad before, during and after the attacks on JOs Bacolor, Jr.
and Gamboa disclose his agreement with the joint purpose and design in the commission of the
felonies. The positive testimony of Badua is corroborated by a web of circumstantial evidence that
points to no other conclusion than that Fieldad was complicit in the conspiracy to murder the jail guards.
Penalty and Damages for Murder
All the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants admitted that they boarded the
Tamaraw jeep and drove away in it. The owner of the vehicle, BenjaminBauzon, testified that he did not
consent to the taking of his vehicle by appellants.
Appellants argue that the testimony of the vehicle owner, Benjamin Bauzon, cannot be considered for
being hearsay because he was merely informed that his Tamaraw jeep was missing.
Appellants’ argument is misplaced. Bauzon had personal knowledge that when he arrived home, his
Tamaraw jeep was no longer at the place where he parked it, and that he had to retrieve it from Bactad:

Since treachery qualified the killingsto murder and there being no aggravating nor mitigating PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
circumstances, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed. However, it must be stated that
Fieldad is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting When you arrived in your house where a tamaraw jeep was parked what did you do?
the Imposition of Death Penalty.
A The tamaraw is no longer there, sir.
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the trial court correctly ordered appellant to pay to the heirs of
each deceased the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
however, the amount of exemplary damages must be increased to ₱30,000.00.41 Exemplary damages xxxx
are recoverable due to the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery in the
commission of the crimes.42 COURT

The award of actual damages for the expenses incurred in connection with the funerals of JO2 Gamboa What is the description of your tamaraw?
and JO1 Bacolor in the amounts of ₱47,845.00 and ₱87,349.45, respectively, are supported by receipts
and are in order. A Old fashioned tamaraw, sir.

The trial court awarded the amounts of ₱153,028.00 and ₱178,500.00 to the heirs of JO2 Gamboa and PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
JO1 Bacolor, respectively, for loss of earning capacity, applying the formula

What is the color of your tamaraw jeep?

Net earning capacity = {2/3 x [80 – age at the time of death] x [gross
annual income– reasonable and necessary living A Red, sir.
expenses]}43
Q Plate number?
However, instead of using the annual income, the trial court computed the net earning capacity using
the monthlyincome. Hence, we multiply the amounts by twelve in order to arrive at the amounts of A CDY 255, sir.
₱1,836,336.00 for JO2 Gamboa and ₱2,142,000.00 for JO1 Bacolor.
Q In whose name was that tamaraw jeep registered?
Elements of Carnapping
A In my name, sir.
Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without consent, or
by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.44 The elements Q What did you do when you learned that your tamaraw jeep was in Bactad?
of the crime of carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual taking of the vehicle; (2) the offender intends to
gain from the taking of the vehicle; (3) the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
A Somebody told me that the tank was emptied so I went to buy gas and then I went to Bactad, sir.
and (4) the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof, or it was committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.45
COURT

198
Did you leave the key?
A Yes, sir, at the ignition.
Q Is it visible?
A Yes, sir.
xxxx
COURT
Did you find your tamaraw jeep at Bactad?
A Yes, sir.46 (Emphasis supplied)
As for intent to gain, we held in People v. Bustinera:47
Intent to gain or animus lucrandiis an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor
vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is
not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be
derived orexpected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken
without the owner’s consent constitutes gain.48
Defense of Uncontrollable Fear
To escape liability for the crime of carnapping, appellants claim that Leal forced them to take the
Tamaraw jeep to facilitate his flight from jail.
Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from criminal liability if he acts under
the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.49 For such defense to prosper the
duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such a nature as to
induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done.50 A person
invoking uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere
instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well.51 It is necessary that the compulsion
be of such a character asto leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in equal combat.52
In this case, appellants had ample opportunity to escape. In the first place, Leal was already armed
when Fieldad voluntarilyfollowed him to the place where the Tamaraw jeep was parked. The vehicle
stopped three times: to board Delim; to board Chan; and when they stopped to transfer vehicles. In
addition, according to appellants’ testimonies, only Leal was armed. The following discussion of the
Court ofAppeals is quoted with approval:
x x x. Considering, however, that there were five of them who boarded the Tamaraw jeep, they could
have easily overpowered Leal, who was then alone, had they wanted to. Thus, there could not have
been any appreciable imminent danger to their lives. In fact, they had every opportunity to escape
individually. Bynot availing of this chance to escape, accused-appellants’ allegation of fear or duress
becomes untenable.53
To be believed, testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstance.54 The circumstances under which appellants participated in the commission of
the carnapping would notjustify in any way their claim that they acted under an uncontrollable fear of
being killed by their fellow carnapper. Rather, the circumstances establish the fact that appellants, in
their flight from jail, consciously concurred with the other malefactors to take the Tamaraw jeep without
the consent of its owner.
Penalty and Damages for Carnapping
The penalty for carnapping is provided in Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539:
SECTION 14.Penalty for Carnapping.— Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is
defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and
four months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force
upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than
thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months
and not more than seventeen years and four months. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
applied to an offense punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence expressed at a range whose maximum term shall not exceed the maximum
fixed by the special law, and the minimum term not be less than the minimum prescribed.55 Hence, the
penalty imposed by the trial court of imprisonment from fourteen years and eight months to sixteen
years and two months is in order.
The trial court awarded nominal damages in the amount of ₱15,000.00 and moral damages in the
amount of ₱25,000.00 to the owner of the vehicle.
No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that nominal or moral damages may be adjudicated.56
Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.57 Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury.58
The trial court's award of nominal damages is in order.1âwphi1 However, we delete the award of moral
damages since there was no showing that Benjamin Bauzon experienced any physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, or any similar injury.
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Finally, in addition to the damages awarded in the murder cases and in the carnapping case, we also
impose on all the ·amounts of damages an interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.59
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal. The Decision dated 22 October 2010 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03943, affirming with modification the 3 November 2008 Joint Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. Fieldad is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole in
Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054;
2. The award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. U-10053 is increased to
₱30,000.00; 3. The award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. U-10054 is increased
to ₱30,000.00; 4. The amount of Pl 53,028.00 for loss of earning capacity awarded to the heirs
of JO2 Gamboa in Criminal Case No. U-10053 is increased to ₱1,836,336.00;
From said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the Court of Appeals for
Southern Luzon, and in her brief filed therein on June 10, 1944, claimed —
(1) That the lower court erred in not holding that said appellant had acted in the legitimate
defense of her honor and that she should be completely absolved of all criminal responsibility;
(2) That the lower court erred in not finding in her favor the additional mitigating circumstances
that (a) she did not have the intention to commit so grave a wrong as that actually committed,
and that (b) she voluntarily surrendered to the agents of the authorities; and
(3) That the trial court erred in holding that the commission of the alleged offense was attended
by the aggravating circumstance of having been committed in a sacred place.
The evidence adduced by the parties, at the trial in the court below, has sufficiently established the
following facts:

5. The amount of Pl 78,500.00 for loss of earning capacity awarded to the heirs of JO1 Bacolor That both the defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue and the deceased Amado Capina lived in the
in Criminal Case No. U-10054 is increased to ₱2,142,000.00; barrio of Sta. Isabel, City of San Pablo, Province of Laguna; that for sometime prior to the stabbing of
the deceased by defendant and appellant, in the evening of September 20, 1942, the former had been
6. The award of moral damages in Criminal Case No. U-10055 is deleted; and courting the latter in vain, and that on one occasion, about one month before that fatal night, Amado
Capina snatched a handkerchief belonging to her, bearing her nickname "Aveling," while it was being
7. Interest is imposed on all the damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the washed by her cousin, Josefa Tapay.
finality of this judgment until fully paid.
On September 13, 1942, while Avelina was feeding a dog under her house, Amado approached her and
SO ORDERED. spoke to her of his love, which she flatly refused, and he thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed her
and touched her breasts, on account of which Avelina, resolute and quick-tempered girl, slapped
Amado, gave him fist blows and kicked him. She kept the matter to herself, until the following morning
when she informed her mother about it. Since then, she armed herself with a long fan knife, whenever
she went out, evidently for self-protection.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. On September 15, 1942, about midnight, Amado climbed up the house of defendant and appellant, and
NICOLAS JAURIGUE and AVELINA JAURIGUE, defendants. surreptitiously entered the room where she was sleeping. He felt her forehead, evidently with the
AVELINA JAURIGUE, appellant. intention of abusing her. She immediately screamed for help, which awakened her parents and brought
them to her side. Amado came out from where he had hidden under a bed in Avelina's room and kissed
Jose Ma. Recto for appellant. the hand of Nicolas Jaurigue, her father, asking for forgiveness; and when Avelina's mother made an
Assistant Solicitor General Enriquez and Solicitor Palma for appellee.. attempt to beat Amado, her husband prevented her from doing so, stating that Amado probably did not
realize what he was doing. Nicolas Jaurigue sent for the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada, and for
DE JOYA, J.: Amado's parents, the following morning. Amado's parents came to the house of Nicolas Jaurigue and
apologized for the misconduct of their son; and as Nicolas Jaurigue was then angry, he told them to end
the conversation, as he might not be able to control himself.
Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, for
the crime of murder, of which Nicolas Jaurigue was acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was
found guilty of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from seven years, four In the morning of September 20, 1942, Avelina received information that Amado had been falsely
months and one day of prision mayor to thirteen years, nine months and eleven days of reclusion boasting in the neighborhood of having taken liberties with her person and that she had even asked him
temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Amando to elope with her and that if he should not marry her, she would take poison; and that Avelina again
Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to pay one-half of the costs. She was also credited with one-half of received information of Amado's bragging at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day.
the period of preventive imprisonment suffered by her.

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At about 8 o'clock in the evening of the same day, September 20, 1942, Nicolas Jaurigue went to the
chapel of the Seventh Day Adventists of which he was the treasurer, in their barrio, just across the
provincial road from his house, to attend religious services, and sat on the front bench facing the altar
with the other officials of the organization and the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada. Inside the chapel
it was quite bright as there were electric lights.
Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the arrival of her father, also
for the purpose of attending religious services, and sat on the bench next to the last one nearest the
door. Amado Capina was seated on the other side of the chapel. Upon observing the presence of
Avelina Jaurigue, Amado Capina went to the bench on which Avelina was sitting and sat by her right
side, and, without saying a word, Amado, with the greatest of impudence, placed his hand on the upper
part of her right thigh. On observing this highly improper and offensive conduct of Amado Capina,
Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled out with her right hand the fan
knife marked Exhibit B, which she had in a pocket of her dress, with the intention of punishing Amado's
offending hand. Amado seized Avelina's right hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand
and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting upon him a wound about 4
1/2 inches deep, which was necessarily mortal. Nicolas Jaurigue, who was seated on one of the front
benches, saw Amado bleeding and staggering towards the altar, and upon seeing his daughter still
holding the bloody knife, he approached her and asked: "Why did you do that," and answering him
Avelina said: "Father, I could not endure anymore." Amado Capina died from the wound a few minutes
later. Barrio lieutenant Casimiro Lozada, who was also in the same chapel, approached Avelina and
asked her why she did that, and Avelina surrendered herself, saying: "Kayo na po ang bahala sa aquin,"
meaning: "I hope you will take care of me," or more correctly, "I place myself at your disposal." Fearing
that Amado's relatives might retaliate, barrio lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas Jaurigue and herein
defendant and appellant to go home immediately, to close their doors and windows and not to admit
anybody into the house, unless accompanied by him. That father and daughter went home and locked
themselves up, following instructions of the barrio lieutenant, and waited for the arrival of the municipal
authorities; and when three policemen arrived in their house, at about 10 o'clock that night, and
questioned them about the incident, defendant and appellant immediately surrendered the knife marked
as Exhibit B, and informed said policemen briefly of what had actually happened in the chapel and of
the previous acts and conduct of the deceased, as already stated above, and went with said policemen
to the police headquarters, where her written statements were taken, and which were presented as a
part of the evidence for the prosecution.
The high conception of womanhood that our people possess, however humble they may be, is
universal. It has been entertained and has existed in all civilized communities.
A beautiful woman is said to be a jewel; a good woman, a treasure; and that a virtuous woman
represents the only true nobility. And they are the future wives and mothers of the land. Such are the
reasons why, in the defense of their honor, when brutally attacked, women are permitted to make use of
all reasonable means available within their reach, under the circumstances. Criminologists and courts of
justice have entertained and upheld this view.
On the other hand, it is the duty of every man to protect and show loyalty to womanhood, as in the days
of chivalry. There is a country where women freely go out unescorted and, like the beautiful roses in
their public gardens, they always receive the protection of all. That country is Switzerland.
In the language of Viada, aside from the right to life on which rests the legitimate defense of our own
person, we have the right to property acquired by us, and the right to honor which is not the least prized
of our patrimony (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., pp. 172, 173).
The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a state of
legitimate defense, inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not
more, than her very existence; and it is evident that a woman who, thus imperiled, wounds, nay kills the
offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability, since such killing cannot be considered a
crime from the moment it became the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great an
outrage (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., p. 301; People vs. Luague and Alcansare, 62 Phil., 504). .
As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing her aggressor, in the
defense of her honor. Thus, where the deceased grabbed the defendant in a dark night at about 9
o'clock, in an isolated barrio trail, holding her firmly from behind, without warning and without revealing
his identity, and, in the struggle that followed, touched her private parts, and that she was unable to free
herself by means of her strength alone, she was considered justified in making use of a pocket knife in
repelling what she believed to be an attack upon her honor, and which ended in his death, since she
had no other means of defending herself, and consequently exempt from all criminal liability (People vs.
De la Cruz, 16 Phil., 344).
And a woman, in defense of her honor, was perfectly justified in inflicting wounds on her assailant with a
bolo which she happened to be carrying at the time, even though her cry for assistance might have
been heard by people nearby, when the deceased tried to assault her in a dark and isolated place, while
she was going from her house to a certain tienda, for the purpose of making purchases (United States
vs. Santa Ana and Ramos, 22 Phil., 249).
In the case, however, in which a sleeping woman was awakened at night by someone touching her arm,
and, believing that some person was attempting to abuse her, she asked who the intruder was and
receiving no reply, attacked and killed the said person with a pocket knife, it was held that,
notwithstanding the woman's belief in the supposed attempt, it was not sufficient provocation or
aggression to justify her completely in using deadly weapon. Although she actually believed it to be the
beginning of an attempt against her, she was not completely warranted in making such a deadly
assault, as the injured person, who turned out to be her own brother-in-law returning home with his wife,
did not do any other act which could be considered as an attempt against her honor (United States vs.
Apego, 23 Phil., 391)..
In the instant case, if defendant and appellant had killed Amado Capina, when the latter climbed up her
house late at night on September 15, 1942, and surreptitiously entered her bedroom, undoubtedly for
the purpose of raping her, as indicated by his previous acts and conduct, instead of merely shouting for
help, she could have been perfectly justified in killing him, as shown by the authorities cited above..
According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the learned trial court in this case,
when the deceased sat by the side of defendant and appellant on the same bench, near the door of the
barrio chapel and placed his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh, without her consent, the said
chapel was lighted with electric lights, and there were already several people, about ten of them, inside
the chapel, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant and other dignitaries of the organization;
and under the circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her being raped. And when
she gave Amado Capina a thrust at the base of the left side of his neck, inflicting upon him a mortal
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wound 4 1/2 inches deep, causing his death a few moments later, the means employed by her in the maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and under the facts and circumstances of the case, she Amado Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, not to
cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability.. exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Defendant and appellant
should also be given the benefit of 1/2 of her preventive imprisonment, and the knife marked Exhibit B
But the fact that defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and unconditionally surrendered to ordered confiscated. So ordered..
the barrio lieutenant in said chapel, admitting having stabbed the deceased, immediately after the
incident, and agreed to go to her house shortly thereafter and to remain there subject to the order of the Ozaeta, Perfecto, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.
said barrio lieutenant, an agent of the authorities (United States vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472); and the
further fact that she had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against her a
few moments before, and upon such provocation as to produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary
loss of reason and self-control, should be considered as mitigating circumstances in her favor (People
vs. Parana, 64 Phil., 331; People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil., 27; United States vs. Arribas, 1 Phil., 86). RODEL URBANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Defendant and appellant further claims that she had not intended to kill the deceased but merely wanted
to punish his offending hand with her knife, as shown by the fact that she inflicted upon him only one
single wound. And this is another mitigating circumstance which should be considered in her favor DECISION
(United States vs. Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; United States vs. Diaz, 15 Phil., 123).
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The claim of the prosecution, sustained by the learned trial court, that the offense was committed by the
defendant and appellant, with the aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place This petition for review under Rule 45 seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated January 25,
dedicated to religious worship, cannot be legally sustained; as there is no evidence to show that the 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25371 which affirmed with modification the April
defendant and appellant had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel that fatal night. Avelina is 30, 2001 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39 in Lingayen, Pangasinan in Criminal
not a criminal by nature. She happened to kill under the greatest provocation. She is a God-fearing Case No. L-5028. The RTC found petitioner Rodel Urbano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
young woman, typical of our country girls, who still possess the consolation of religious hope in a world of Homicide.
where so many others have hopelessly lost the faith of their elders and now drifting away they know not
where. The Facts

The questions raised in the second and third assignments of error appear, therefore, to be well taken; In an Information filed before the RTC, petitioner was charged with Homicide, committed as follows:
and so is the first assignment of error to a certain degree.

That on or about the 28th of September 1993 in the evening, in Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of
In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death the deceased Amado Lingayen, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
Capina, in the manner and form and under the circumstances above indicated, the defendant and above-named accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
appellant committed the crime of homicide, with no aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at assault, hit and maul Brigido Tomelden, inflicting upon him mortal injuries and as borne out from the
least three mitigating circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in her favor; and, in autopsy report the following findings:
accordance with the provisions of article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, she is entitled to a reduction by
one or two degrees in the penalty to be imposed upon her. And considering the circumstances of the
instant case, the defendant and appellant should be accorded the most liberal consideration possible EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
under the law (United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391; United States vs. Rivera, 41 Phil., 472; People
vs. Mercado, 43 Phil., 950).. A- Softened portion of the scalp over (R) occipito-temporal area about 5 inches above and
posterior to the (R) ear.
The law prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide; and if it should be
reduced by two degrees, the penalty to be imposed in the instant case is that of prision correccional; B- Clotted blood over the (R) occipito-temporal area.
and pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 4103 of the Philippine Legislature, known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, herein defendant and appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate
C- No lacerations noted.
penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its medium degree, to prision correccional in its medium degree.
Consequently, with the modification of judgment appealed from, defendant and appellant Avelina
Jaurigue is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from two months and one day of INTERNAL FINDINGS:
arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional, as

202
 A- On opening the skull there is oozing of dark colored blood from the brain substances.
B- More darked blood vessels at the (L) side of the brain.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage
due to mauling incident.
Which directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Brigido Tomelden.
CONTRARY to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner, when arraigned, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Following the parties’ waiver of pre-trial,
trial on the merits then ensued.
As summarized in the decision subject of review, the prosecution’s evidence established the following
facts:
On September 28, 1993, at around 8:00 p.m., the victim Brigido Tomelden and petitioner were at the
compound of the Lingayen Water District (LIWAD) in Lingayen, Pangasinan, having just arrived from a
picnic in the nearby town of Bugallon, Pangasinan, where, with some other co-workers, they drunk beer
in a restaurant. While inside the compound, the two had a heated altercation in the course of which
Tomelden hurled insulting remarks at petitioner. Reacting, petitioner asked why Tomelden, when drunk,
has the penchant of insulting petitioner.
The exchange of words led to an exchange of blows. Cooler heads succeeded in breaking up the fight,
but only for a brief moment as the protagonists refused to be pacified and continued throwing fist blows
at each other. Then petitioner delivered a "lucky punch," as described by eyewitness Orje Salazar, on
Tomelden’s face, which made Tomelden topple down. Tomelden was on the verge of hitting his head on
the ground had their companions not caught him and prevented the fall. The blow, however, caused
Tomelden’s nose to bleed and rendered him unconscious.
Petitioner and his other co-workers brought Tomelden to the office of the LIWAD general manager
where he spent the night. He remained in the compound the following day, September 29, 1993. Upon
arriving home at around 6:00 p.m. of that day, Tomelden informed his wife, Rosario, of the fight the
previous night and of his having been rendered unconscious. He complained of pain in his nape, head,
and ear which impelled Rosario to immediately bring him to the Lingayen Community Hospital where Dr.
Daisy Arellano examined him and treated his lacerated left index finger, contusions, and hematoma at
the right cerebrum.
On October 2 and 7, 1993, Tomelden went back to the hospital complaining of dizziness, headache,
and other pains. The attending doctors observed the patient to be in a state of drowsiness and frequent
vomiting. On October 8, 1993, Rosario brought Tomelden to the Sison Memorial Provincial Hospital in
Dagupan City, where the attending physician, Dr. Ramon Ramos, diagnosed Tomelden suffering from
"brain injury, secondary to mauling to consider cerebral hemorrhage." 3
Tomelden was confined in the provincial hospital until 3:00 p.m. of October 10, 1993, and, due to
financial constraints, was thereafter discharged despite signs negating physical condition improvement.
Upon reaching their house, however, Tomelden again complained of extreme head pain, prompting his
wife to bring him back to the Lingayen Community Hospital where Dr. Arellano again attended to him.
This time, things turned for the worst, the doctor noting that Tomelden appeared to be semi-conscious,
sleepy, uncooperative, and not responding to any stimulant. Tomelden died at 9:00 p.m. of that day due,
per Dr. Arellano, to "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral
hemorrhage due to mauling incident."
The defense presented petitioner who denied having any intention to kill, asserting that hypertension,
for which Tomelden was receiving treatment, was the cause of the latter’s death.
The Ruling of the RTC
On April 30, 2001, the RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty as charged. The fallo of the
RTC’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused of
the crime of HOMICIDE as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code, this Court
in the absence of any modifying circumstances, hereby sentences said accused to suffer the
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as minimum to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of Reclusion Temporal as maximum and to indemnify the legal heirs of
the victim in the amount of PHP50,000.00, plus cost of the suit.
The period of preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused shall be credited in full in the service of
his sentence in accordance with Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code. 4
Therefrom, petitioner appealed to the CA, his recourse docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 25371.
The Ruling of the CA
On January 25, 2008, the CA rendered a decision, affirming the conviction of petitioner, but awarding
moral damages to the heirs of Tomelden, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appeal of the accused-appellant is DISMISSED. The
decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that an award of P50,000.00 moral
damages is GRANTED.
Remand of the records should immediately follow finality for the consequent execution of the decision. 5
The appellate court held that the commission by petitioner of the crime of homicide, as defined and
penalized under Article 2496 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), had been proved beyond moral
certainty of doubt, pointing to the lucky punch as the proximate cause of Tomelden’s hospitalization and
ultimately his death. And like the RTC, the CA found no qualifying circumstance to increase or lower the
penalty.
203
Following the denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, per the CA Resolution 7 of April 24, 2008,
he interposed this petition.
The Issues
On essentially the same issues raised before the CA, petitioner now urges the Court to set aside the
appealed decision, or at least modify it, maintaining that the appellate court:
I. x x x erred in affirming the decision of the [RTC] finding [him] guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged.
II. x x x erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the
part of the victim and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong in favor of the petitioner. 8
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
Homicide Duly Proved
It is petitioner’s threshold posture that the fistic injury Tomelden sustained was not "the main underlying
cause of his death."9 In this regard, petitioner draws attention to the fact that the fist fight in question
happened on September 28, 1993. Tomelden, however, died only on October 10, 1993 or 12 days
thereafter and that, during the intervening days, particularly September 29, 1993, the deceased
regularly reported for work. Moreover, petitioner avers that days prior to the fateful incident of
September 28, 1993, Tomelden failed to come to work as he was suffering from malignant hypertension
and that this circumstance greatly engenders doubt as to the proximate cause of the victim’s death.
Petitioner, thus, contends that he could only be adjudged guilty of physical injuries.10
We are not persuaded.
The prosecution witness, Salazar, testified about petitioner’s lucky punch hitting Tomelden right smack
on the face. And even if Tomelden’s head did not hit the ground as his co-workers averted that actuality,
that punch gave him a bleeding nose and rendered him unconscious right after the September 28, 1993
fight. From then on, Tomelden was in and out of the hospital complaining of headache, among other
pains, until his demise on October 10, 1993, or 12 days after the blow that made Tomelden
unconscious.
Significantly, Dr. Arellano testified conducting an autopsy on the body of Tomelden and stressed that
the "softened portion of the scalp over (R) occipito-temporal area about 5 inches above and posterior to
the (R) ear" of the victim could have been caused by a fist blow. She also opined that the fist blow which
landed on Tomelden’s head could have shaken his brain which caused the cerebral concussion; and
that the cause of the victim’s death was "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with
resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident."
The combined effects of the testimonies of Salazar and Dr. Arellano, buttressed by that of Rosario who
related about her husband’s post September 28, 1993 severe head pain, clearly establish beyond cavil
the cause of Tomelden’s death and who was liable for it.
The CA observed aptly:
It was through the direct accounts of the prosecution witnesses of the events that transpired during the
fisticuff incident x x x more specifically the landing of the "lucky punch" on the face of [Tomelden], taken
together with the result of the medical examinations and autopsy report which described the death of
the victim as "cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral
hemorrhage due to mauling incident" that we are convinced that the "lucky punch" was the proximate
cause of [Tomelden’s] death. The prosecution had satisfactorily proven that it was only after the incident
that transpired on September 28, 1993 that the victim was hospitalized on several occasions until he
expired, twelve days later x x x. It is moreover of no consequence whether the victim was able to report
for work during the intervening days x x x.
We find no reason to depart from the doctrinal rule that great weight is accorded the factual findings of
the trial court, particularly with respect to the ascertainment of the credibility of witnesses. There was
absence of any ill motive on the part of x x x Salazar who in fact testified that he was a friend of both
[petitioner] and [Tomelden]; more so on the part of the attending physicians.11 x x x
Petitioner’s suggestion that Tomelden succumbed to heart ailment and/or that his death was the result
of his malignant hypertension is untenable, given that the post-mortem report yields no positive
indication that he died from such malady.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
Petitioner next contends that the mitigating circumstances of no intention to commit so grave a wrong
and sufficient provocation on the part of the victim ought to be appreciated in petitioner’s favor.
On this score, we agree with petitioner.
Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Art. 13, RPC provide as follows:
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances.––The following are mitigating circumstances:
xxxx
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act.
When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or as an essential element of
self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper conduct of the offended party capable of exciting,
inciting, or irritating anyone;12 it is not enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying; 13
the provocation must be sufficient to excite one to commit the wrongful act 14 and should immediately
204
precede the act.15 This third requisite of self-defense is present: (1) when no provocation at all was A ‘Akina tua lanti".
given to the aggressor; (2) when, even if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3) when even if
the provocation was sufficient, it was not given by the person defending himself; or (4) when even if a PROS. CHIONG
provocation was given by the person defending himself, it was not proximate and immediate to the act
of aggression.16
Q Who said that?
In the instant case, Tomelden’s insulting remarks directed at petitioner and uttered immediately before
the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. This is not to mention other irritating statements made by WITNESS
the deceased while they were having beer in Bugallon. Petitioner was the one provoked and challenged
to a fist fight. A It was Brigido Tomelden, sir.

Petitioner’s unrebutted testimony on the events immediately preceding the fisticuff and earlier dovetails Q And what transpired next?
with the testimony of Salazar.
A After that they exchange words, sir. " If you like we will have a fist fight" he said.
In gist, petitioner testified being, in the afternoon of September 28, 1993, in the nearby town of Bugallon
for a picnic. He was with Tomelden and several others, including Dominador Navarro, Chairperson of Q Who said that?
LIWAD. At a restaurant in Bugallon, the group ordered goat’s meat and drank beer. When it was time to
depart, Navarro asked petitioner to inform Tomelden, then seated in another table, to prepare to leave.
A Brigido Tomelden said.
When so informed, Tomelden insulted petitioner, telling the latter he had no business stopping him from
further drinking as he was paying for his share of the bill. Chastised, petitioner returned to his table to Q At that time, were you already inside the compound of the LIWAD?
report to Navarro. At that time, petitioner saw that Tomelden had already consumed 17 bottles of beer.
In all, the group stayed at the picnic place for three and a half hours before returning to the LIWAD. A Yes, sir.

Upon reaching the LIWAD compound, Tomelden allegedly slapped and hurled insults at him, calling him Q After the victim allegedly told the accused, "If you want a fist fight," what transpired next?
"sipsip" just to maintain his employment as Navarro’s tricycle driver. Tomelden allegedly then delivered
several fist and kick blows at petitioner, a couple of which hit him despite his evasive actions. Petitioner
A Rodel Urbano said, "if it is a fist fight we fight."17
maintained that he only boxed the victim in retaliation, landing that lucky punch in the course of parrying
the latter’s blows.
Q And when you were already in the compound of LIWAD Office, Brigido Tomelden was challenging
the accused for a fist fight?
The following testimony of Salazar attests to the provocative acts of Tomelden and to his being the
aggressor:
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR CHIONG
Q And the accused refused to accept the challenge?
Q After you heard from the accused those remarks, what if any did the victim replied if any?
A Yes because Mr. Brigido Tomelden is very much bigger than Mr. Rodel Urbano. He is stouter
than the accused.
WITNESS

Q But finally the fist fight took place?

A They exchanged angry words, sir.

A Yes, sir.18
Q What were these words?

PROS. CHIONG
A Rodel Urbano said, "When you’re already drunk, you keep on insulting me."

Q And what was the reply if any?

205
Q When the victim and this accused had this fight, fist fight, they exchanged blows, but there was this
lucky punch that hit the victim because the victim fall down, is that correct?
A When I stop pacifying them x x x, I saw Biring the late Brigido Tomelden, he was much aggressive
than the accused, sir.
Q You mean that although it was the victim who was more aggressive than the accused here, he also
[threw] punches but sometime some of his punches most of which did not hit the victim?
A He tried to parry the blows of the late Brigido Tomelden, sir.
Q Because he tried to parry the blow of the Brigido Tomelden, when the accused throw punches, the
punch was directed to the victim but most of them did not hit the victim, is that what you saw?
A Yes, sir.19 (Emphasis added.)
It is abundantly clear from the above transcript that the provocation came from Tomelden. In fact,
petitioner, being very much smaller in height and heft, had the good sense of trying to avoid a fight. But
as events turned out, a fisticuff still ensued, suddenly ending when petitioner’s lucky punch found its
mark. In People v. Macaso,20 a case where the accused police officer shot and killed a motorist for
repeatedly taunting him with defiant words, the Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance of
sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the shooting.
The Court had the same attitude in Navarro v. Court of Appeals,21 a case also involving a policeman
who killed a man after the latter challenged him to a fight. Hence, there is no rhyme or reason why the
same mitigating circumstance should not be considered in favor of petitioner.
Moreover, the mitigating circumstance that petitioner had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed should also be appreciated in his favor. While intent to kill may be presumed from the
fact of the death of the victim, this mitigating factor may still be considered when attendant facts and
circumstances so warrant, as in the instant case. Consider: Petitioner tried to avoid the fight, being very
much smaller than Tomelden. He tried to parry the blows of Tomelden, albeit he was able, during the
scuffle, to connect a lucky punch that ended the fight. And lest it be overlooked, petitioner helped carry
his unconscious co-worker to the office of the LIWAD’s general manager. Surely, such gesture cannot
reasonably be expected from, and would be unbecoming of, one intending to commit so grave a wrong
as killing the victim. A bare-knuckle fight as a means to parry the challenge issued by Tomelden was
commensurate to the potential violence petitioner was facing. It was just unfortunate that Tomelden died
from that lucky punch, an eventuality that could have possibly been averted had he had the financial
means to get the proper medical attention. Thus, it is clear that the mitigating circumstance of "no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" must also be appreciated in favor of petitioner
while finding him guilty of homicide. That petitioner landed a lucky punch at Tomelden’s face while their
co-workers were trying to separate them is a compelling indicium that he never intended so grave a
wrong as to kill the victim.
Withal, with no aggravating circumstance and two mitigating circumstances appreciable in favor of
petitioner, we apply par. 5 of Art. 64, RPC, which pertinently provides:
Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods.––In cases in which the
penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed
of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of
Articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules,
according to whether there are or are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
xxxx
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present,
the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem
applicable, according to the number and nature of such circumstances.
The prescribed penalty for homicide under Art. 249 of the RPC is reclusion temporal or from 12 years
and one day to 20 years. With the appreciation of two mitigating circumstances of no intention to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed and of sufficient provocation from the victim, and the application of
par. 5 of Art. 64, RPC, the imposable penalty would, thus, be the next lower penalty prescribed for
homicide and this should be prision mayor or from six years and one day to 12 years. Consequently,
with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner ought to be incarcerated from prision
correccional as minimum and prision mayor as maximum. In view of the circumstances of the case,
considering that the petitioner never meant or intended to kill the victim, a prison term of eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum period is proper while the period of two (2) years and four
(4) months of prision correccional as minimum period is reasonable.
We find no reason to modify the award of civil indemnity and moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the CA Decision dated January 25, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 25371 is, in the light of the
presence and the appreciation of two mitigating circumstances in favor of petitioner, hereby MODIFIED
by decreasing the term of imprisonment. As thus modified, petitioner Rodel Urbano is hereby sentenced
to serve an indeterminate prison term of from two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, with whatever
imprisonment he has already served fully credited in the service of this sentence. The rest of the
judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CLEMENTE AMPAR, defendant-appellant.
Filemon A. Cosio for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
206
 In the amended decision[1] dated June 2, 1999, in Criminal Case No. 96-CR-2522, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 8, found appellant June Ignas y Sanggino guilty of murder
MALCOLM, J.: aggravated especially by the use of an unlicensed firearm. Appellant was initially sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua,[2] but on motion for reconsideration by the prosecution, the penalty was
upgraded to death by lethal injection.[3] Hence, the case is now before us for automatic review.
A fiesta was in progress in the barrio of Magbaboy, municipality of San Carlos, Province of Occidental
Negros. Roast pig was being served. The accused Clemente Ampar, a man of three score and ten, Appellant is an elementary school graduate. He resided at Cruz, La Trinidad, Benguet, where he
proceeded to the kitchen and asked Modesto Patobo for some of the delicacy. Patobo's answer was; operated a bakery.[4] He is married to Wilma Grace Ignas, by whom he has a son of minor age. [5] Wilma
"There is no more. Come here and I will make roast pig of you." The effect of this on the accused as Grace used to be the cashier of Windfield Enterprise, which is owned by Pauline Gumpic. [6] Pauline had
explained by him in his confession was, "Why was he doing like that, I am not a child." With this as the a brother, Nemesio Lopate. It was he whom appellant fatally shot.
provocation, a little later while the said Modesto Patobo was squatting down, the accused came up
behind him and struck him on the head with an ax, causing death the following day. In the amended Information,[7] pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110[8] of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Provincial Prosecutor of Benguet charged appellant as follows:
As the case turns entirely on the credibility of witnesses, we should of course not interfere with the That on or about the 10th day of March 1996 at Trading Post, Km. 5, Municipality of La Trinidad,
findings of the trial court. In ascertaining the penalty, the court, naturally, took into consideration the Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, without any
qualifying circumstance of alevosia. The court, however, gave the accused the benefit of a mitigating authority of law or without any lawful permit did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in
circumstance which on cursory examination would not appear to be justified. This mitigating his possession, control and custody a Cal. .38 hand gun and two (2) ammunitions, (sic) which firearm
circumstance was that the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one and ammunitions were used by the accused in unlawfully killing NEMESIO LOPATE at the above-
committing the felony. mentioned place and date in violation of the said law.

The authorities give us little assistance in arriving at a conclusion as to whether this circumstance was CONTRARY TO LAW.[9]
rightly applied. That there was immediate vindication of whatever one may term the remarks of Patobo Appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the foregoing amended information. The case then
to the accused is admitted. Whether these remarks can properly be classed as "a grave offense" is proceeded to be heard on the merits.
more uncertain. The Supreme court of Spain has held the words "gato que arañaba a todo el mundo,"
"landrones," and "era tonto, como toda su familia" as not sufficient to justify a finding of this mitigating Gleaned from the records, the facts of this case are as follows:
circumstance. (Decisions of January 4, 1876; May 17, 1877; May 13, 1886.) But the same court has
held the words "tan landron eres tu como tu padre" to be a grave offense. (Decision of October 22, Sometime in September 1995, appellant's wife, Wilma Grace Ignas, confided to her close friend,
1894.) We consider that these authorities hardly put the facts of the present case in the proper light. The Romenda[10] Foyagao, that she was having an affair with Nemesio Lopate. [11]
offense which the defendant was endeavoring to vindicate would to the average person be considered
as a mere trifle. But to this defendant, an old man, it evidently was a serious matter to be made the butt On the evening of October 16, 1995, Wilma Grace, Romenda, and Nemesio went to Manila. Romenda
of a joke in the presence of so many guests. Hence, it is believed that the lower court very properly and Nemesio were sending off Wilma Grace at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport as she was
gave defendant the benefit of a mitigating circumstance, and correctly sentenced him to the minimum leaving for Taiwan to work as a domestic helper. Upon arrival in Manila, the trio checked at Dangwa Inn,
degree of the penalty provided for the crime of murder. lawph!1.net with Nemesio and Wilma Grace sharing a room.[12] All three of them stayed at the inn until October 18,
1995, when Wilma Grace left for Taiwan. [13]

Judgment of the trial court sentencing the defendant and appellant to seventeen years four months and Thereafter, Romenda received from Taiwan four letters written by Wilma Grace on various
one day of cadena temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the dates. Although all the letters were addressed to Romenda, two of them were meant by Wilma Grace to
deceased, Modesto Patobo, in the amount of one thousand pesos, and to pay the costs is affirmed, with be read by her paramour, Nemesio.[14] In the other two letters, Wilma Grace instructed Romenda to
the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered. reveal to appellant her affair with Nemesio.

It was only sometime late in February 1996 that Romenda, following her bosom friend's written
instructions, informed appellant about the extramarital affair between Wilma Grace and Nemesio.
Romenda informed him that the two had spent a day and a night together in a room at Dangwa Inn in
PEOPLE v. JUNE IGNAS Y SANGGINO +
Manila.[15] Appellant became furious. He declared "Addan to aldaw na dayta nga Nemesio, patayek
dayta nga Nemesio" (There will be a day for that Nemesio. I will kill that Nemesio). [16] Appellant then got
DECISION all the letters of Wilma Grace from Romenda. [17]

458 Phil. 965 That same week Alfred Mayamnes, appellant's neighbor who was presented at the trial as a
prosecution witness, had a talk with appellant. Mayamnes was an elder of the Kankanaey tribe to which
appellant belonged. He wanted to confirm whether Nemesio Lopate, who was likewise from the same
QUISUMBING, J.:
207
tribe, [18] was having an affair with appellant's spouse. Talk apparently had reached the tribal elders and
they wanted the problem resolved as soon as possible. [19] A visibly angry appellant confirmed the Dr. Doris C. Jovellanos, Municipal Health Officer of La Trinidad, Benguet, testified during that trial that
gossip.[20] Mayamnes also testified that he advised Nemesio to stay at the Mountain Trail Kankanaey she conducted the post-mortem examination of the victim's cadaver. Among her findings were:
community until things had cooled down.[21]
1. Ovaloid hole, 2.0 x 5.0 cm. dms., with blackened edges (1.8 x 1.3 cms. span), on the right side
Shortly after their talk, appellant closed down his bakeshop and offered his equipment for sale. Among of the mouth, above the edge of the upper lip
the potential buyers he approached was Mayamnes, but the latter declined the offer. [22]

Sometime during the first week of March, Mayamnes saw appellant load his bakery equipment on board xxx
a hired truck and depart for Nueva Vizcaya. [23]
3. Exit hole on the left side of the mouth, 5.0 x 1.3 cm. dms., with avulsion of the upper lip on the
At around 10:00 p.m. of March 10, 1996, according to another prosecution witness, Annie Bayanes, a left side
trader in vegetables, she was at the Trading Post, La Trinidad, Benguet. [24] The Trading Post is a
popular depot where vegetable growers in the Cordilleras bring their produce late in the evenings for xxx
sale to wholesalers and retailers. Witness Bayanes said she was at the unloading area (bagsakan),
conversing with another dealer at the latter's booth, when suddenly two gunshots shattered the quiet
evening.[25] 9. Circular hole, penetrating, on the back, right side, 0.7 cm. x 0.7 cm. diam., with blackened
edges (0.9 x 0.9 cm. span), at the level of the fifth intercostal space, subscapular area, 13 cm.
Bayanes turned towards the place where the sound of the gunshots came from. She testified that she from the midline, directed to the left side of the chest, 38.0 cm. from the embedded bullet slug
saw a person falling to the ground.[26] Standing behind the fallen individual, some 16 inches away, [27] of the left shoulder.[42]
was another person who tucked a handgun into his waistband and casually walked away. [28]
Dr. Jovellanos determined the cause of death to be "Hypovolemia due to gunshot wound, back, right,
Initially, she only saw the gunman's profile, but when he turned, she caught a glimpse of his face. [29] (Point of Entry - fifth intercostal space subscapular area)."[43] She further stated on the witness stand
She immediately recognized him as the appellant June Ignas. She said she was familiar with him as he that she recovered a bullet from the victim's left shoulder, which she turned over to the police
was her townmate and had known him for several years. Witness Bayanes was five or six meters away investigators.[44] According to her, given the blackened edges of the gunshot wound at the victim's back,
from the scene, and the taillight of a parked jeepney, which was being loaded with vegetables, plus the Nemesio was shot from a distance of less than three (3) feet. [45]
lights from the roof of the bagsakan, aided her recognition of appellant.[30]
On March 14, 1996, police investigators accompanied by one of appellant's brother as well as
Also at the bagsakan area that night was prosecution witness Marlon Manis. He testified that on hearing prosecution witness Julio Bayacsan, a friend of appellant, went to Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya, to invite
gunshots from the Trading Post entrance, he immediately looked at the place where the gunfire came appellant to shed light on the slaying of Nemesio. The law enforcers found appellant selling bread at
from. He saw people converging on a spot where a bloodied figure was lying on the ground.[31] Witness Kayapa and brought him back to La Trinidad, Benguet. [46]
Manis saw that the fallen victim was Nemesio Lopate, whom he said he had known since Grade 2 in
elementary school.[32] Manis then saw another person, some 25 meters away, hastily walking away from Witness Bayacsan testified that shortly after they arrived from Kayapa, he had an opportunity to talk
the scene. He could not see the person's face very well, but from his gait and build, he identified the with appellant at the La Trinidad Police Station. There, appellant disclosed to this witness that he shot
latter as his close friend and neighbor, June Ignas. [33] Manis said that the scene was very dimly lit and and killed Nemesio.[47] Bayacsan, however, did not inform the police about appellant's revelation as he
the only illumination was from the lights of passing vehicles, but he was familiar with appellant's build, considered appellant his good friend.[48]
hairstyle, and manner of walking.[34]
Prosecution witness Pauline Gumpic, the victim's sister, testified that she and appellant had a private
Prosecution witness Mona Barredo, a bakery worker, testified that she knew appellant. She said they talk, while the latter was in police custody, and appellant admitted to her that he killed her brother. [49]
were co-workers formerly at the Annaliza Bakery at Km. 10, Shilan, La Trinidad, Benguet. [35] Barredo Gumpic declared that appellant revealed to her that he shot Nemesio for having illicit relations with
declared that at around 10:30 p.m. of March 10, 1996, appellant came to her residence at Pico, La appellant's wife and failing to ask for his forgiveness. [50]
Trinidad. After being served refreshments, appellant took out a handgun from his jacket and removed
the empty shells from the chamber.[36] Appellant then told her to throw the empty cartridges out of the SPO4 Arthur Bomagao[51] of the La Trinidad police, who headed the team that investigated the fatal
window. Because of nervousness she complied.[37] Barredo also said that appellant disclosed to her shooting of Nemesio, declared on the stand that appellant voluntarily admitted to him that he shot the
that he had just shot his wife's paramour.[38] Appellant then stayed at her house for 8 or 9 hours; he left victim with a .38 caliber handgun.[52] Bomagao further testified that appellant surrendered to him the
only in the morning of March 11, 1996,[39] according to her. Police investigators later recovered the letters of Wilma Grace, wherein the latter admitted her affair with Nemesio.[53]
spent gun shells from witness Barredo's sweet potato garden.[40]
Appellant interposed the defense of alibi. Sometime during the last week of February 1996, he said, he
According to witness on the scene, responding policemen immediately brought the victim, Nemesio entered into a partnership with a friend and fellow baker, Ben Anoma, to operate a bakery in Kayapa,
Lopate, to the Benguet General Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. [41] Nueva Vizcaya.[54] Appellant claimed that he was having a hard time operating his bakeshop in La

208
Trinidad as he had no helpers. When Anoma proposed a business arrangement, he added, he 1. P150,000.00 for funeral expenses and those incurred for and during the wake;
immediately seized the opportunity.[55] On March 8, 1996, he and Anoma then transferred his equipment
to Anoma's bakery in Kayapa,[56] which is some four (4) to five (5) hours away from La Trinidad, 2. P2,040,000.00 for unearned income;
according to appellant. He averred that he was baking bread with Anoma in Kayapa on the night
Nemesio was killed.[57] Under oath, appellant said that he never left Kayapa since his arrival on March 8, 3. P50,000.00 as death compensation established by jurisprudence; and
1996. He and Anoma were engrossed in baking and marketing their produce, he testified, until the
policemen from La Trinidad brought him back to Benguet for questioning on March 14, 1996. [58]
4. P50,000.00 as and for moral damages; and
Defense witness Ben Anoma corroborated appellant's alibi. Anoma declared that during the last week of
February 1996, he met with appellant in La Trinidad. There, the witness said, he proposed a 5. P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.
partnership with appellant in the baking business to be based in Kayapa.[59] Appellant agreed and on
March 8, 1996, they transferred appellant's equipment to Kayapa. [60] They immediately commenced Costs against the accused.
their operations and on the evening of March 10, 1996, he and appellant baked bread at his bakery in
Kayapa until 11:00 p.m., when they rested for the night.[61] SO ORDERED in Chambers.[64]
Hence, this automatic review, with appellant imputing the following errors to the court a quo:
The trial court disbelieved appellant's defense and sustained the prosecution's version. Its initial I
judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused June Ignas is hereby found GUILTY beyond THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE WEAKNESS OF THE
Penal Code, and considering the aggravating circumstances of treachery, nighttime and the special CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION.
aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm, without any mitigating circumstance, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is further sentenced to pay the heirs II
of the VICTIM the following sums:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT TO THE ALLEGED
1. P150,000.00 for funeral expenses and those incurred for and during the wake; EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS MADE BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE ITS BEING HEARSAY
IN NATURE AND IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
2. P1,800,000.00 for unearned income;
III
3. P50,000.00 as death compensation established by jurisprudence; and
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE DEFENSE OF
ALIBI INTERPOSED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
4. P50,000.00 as and for moral damages; and
IV
5. P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT
Costs against the accused. GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE KILLING OF THE DECEASED WAS ATTENDED BY
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION, TREACHERY AND NIGHTTIME.
SO ORDERED in Chambers this 18th day of February 1999 at La Trinidad, Benguet, Philippines.[62]
Both the prosecution and the defense filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The V
prosecution sought the imposition of the death penalty. [63] The defense prayed for acquittal on the
ground of reasonable doubt. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT APPRECIATED THE ALLEGED
USE OF AN UNLICENSED .38 CALIBER FIREARM AS AN AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE
On June 2, 1999, the trial court granted the prosecution's motion. It amended its judgment to read as COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS.
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused June Ignas is hereby found GUILTY beyond
VI
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, and considering the aggravating circumstances of treachery, nighttime and the special
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DID NOT APPRECIATE IN
aggravating circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm, without any mitigating circumstance, he is
FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF IMMEDIATE
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. He is further sentenced to pay the
VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE, PASSION AND OBFUSCATION AND VOLUNTARY
heirs of the victim the following sums:
SURRENDER.
209
VII the assailant was equally doubtful. The fact is she did not see the alleged gunman's face, considering
that the only illumination on the scene was a vehicle's taillight. Appellant stresses that both Bayanes
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT AWARDED EXCESSIVE and Manis were in a state of excitement and nervousness as a result of the incident, hence the resultant
DAMAGES IN THE FORM OF FUNERAL EXPENSES AND UNEARNED INCOME OF THE commotion and fear distracted their powers of observation. Appellant insists that given these
DECEASED WHICH WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN.[65] considerations, the testimonies of Bayanes and Manis failed to show that he was at the scene of the
Appellant's assigned errors may be reduced to the following pertinent issues: (1) the nature of the crime crime, much less prove that he was the gunman.
committed, if any; (2) the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to prove appellant's guilt; (3) the
correctness of the penalty; and (4) the propriety of the damages awarded. For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the failure of Manis to see the
actual shooting is irrelevant, as such was not the purpose for which his testimony was offered in
1. Murder or Homicide evidence. Rather, Manis' testimony was meant to provide circumstantial evidence tending to show the
physical description of Nemesio's attacker, and not as an eyewitness' testimony to positively identify
Assuming arguendo that the evidence on record suffices to sustain the appellant's conviction for the said assailant. Neither was Bayanes presented to testify as an eyewitness to the shooting, but to
unlawful killing of Nemesio Lopate, the question arises: Was the killing murder as found by the trial court declare that she got a clear look at the face of the suspected gunman.
or mere homicide? Note that the amended information under which the appellant stands charged does
not, unlike the original information, charge appellant with murder but with mere "unlawful killing" albeit We note that at the heart of the prosecution's case is the familiarity of Annie Bayanes and Marlon Manis
through the use of an unlicensed firearm. Note further that the amended information does not definitely with appellant. Absent this familiarity, the prosecution's theory that circumstantial evidence shows that
and categorically state that the "unlawful killing" was attended by the aggravating or qualifying appellant killed Nemesio would collapse like a house of cards. It was precisely this familiarity with
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and nocturnity. appellant, which enabled said witnesses to recognize him as the person tucking a gun in his waistband
and walking away from the fallen victim. Bayanes had known appellant for some ten (10) years before
The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the qualifying and aggravating the incident and even described him as a "good man." [73] She was only five or six meters away from the
circumstances must be specifically alleged in the information. [66] Although the Revised Rules of Criminal scene of the crime and was able to fully look at the face of the person tucking a gun in his pants and
Procedure took effect only on December 1, 2000 or long after the fatal shooting of Nemesio Lopate, as walking away. Familiarity with the physical features, particularly those of the face, is actually the best
a procedural rule favorable to the accused, it should be given retrospective application. Hence, absent way to identify the person.[74] That the only illumination in the area came from the taillight of a parked
specific allegations of the attendant circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and nocturnity in vehicle and the lights on the roof of the bagsakan does not discredit her account. We have held that
the amended information, it was error for the trial court to consider the same in adjudging appellant moonlight,[75] starlight,[76] kerosene lamps,[77] a flashlight,[78] and lights of passing vehicles[79] may be
guilty of murder. As worded, we find that the amended information under which appellant was charged adequate to provide illumination sufficient for purposes of recognition and identification. Under the
and arraigned, at best indicts him only for the crime of homicide. Any conviction should, thus, fall under circumstances of these cases, this Court believes that Bayanes was in the position and had a fair
the scope and coverage of Article 249[67] of the Revised Penal Code. opportunity to identify appellant as the person leaving the crime scene with a gun tucked in his waist.

As for the separate case for illegal possession of firearm, we agree with the trial court's order to dismiss Her testimony was buttressed by that of witness Marlon Manis. A former neighbor of appellant, he had
the information for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 97-CR-2753.[68] known appellant since 1993. He was a frequent customer at appellant's bakery. In the rural areas,
Under R.A. No. 8294,[69] which took effect on July 8, 1997, where murder or homicide is committed with people tend to be more familiar with their neighbors. This familiarity may extend to body movements,
the use of an unlicensed firearm, the separate penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall no longer which cannot easily be effaced from memory. Hence, Manis' testimony that he could recognize
be imposed since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance.[70] This Court has held in a appellant even just from his build and manner of walking is not improbable. His declaration that he was
number of cases[71] that there can be no separate conviction of the crime of illegal possession of firearm some twenty-five (25) meters away from the person walking away from the victim does not make
where another crime, as indicated by R.A. No. 8294, is committed. Although R.A. No. 8294 took effect recognition far-fetched. Once a person has gained familiarity with another, identification is an easy task,
over a year after the alleged offense was committed, it is advantageous to the appellant insofar as it even from that distance.[80]
spares him from a separate conviction for illegal possession of firearms and thus should be given
retroactive application.[72] Evidence should only be considered for the purpose it was formally offered.[81] As the Solicitor General
points out, the statements of Bayanes and Manis were not offered to positively identify appellant as the
2. Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence assailant, but to provide circumstantial evidence concerning Nemesio's assailant, tending to prove that
appellant did shoot the victim. Thus, the court a quo committed no reversible error in giving weight and
But is the prosecution's evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for homicide? credence to the testimonies of Bayanes and Manis for the stated purposes therefor.

Appellant primarily contests the accuracy of the identification made by the prosecution witnesses who
testified that they saw him at the locus criminis, tucking a gun in his pants and casually walking away.
For one, he contends that the prosecution witnesses who were present at the scene did not in fact see
appellant as the person who allegedly shot the victim. Witness Marlon Manis was not certain that the
person he saw walking away from the fallen victim was appellant. As per Manis' own admission, he
merely presumed that it was appellant. As to witness Annie Bayanes, her identification of appellant as
Appellant next assails the testimonies of the following prosecution witnesses: (1) Pauline Gumpic for
being inconsistent and flawed with contradictions; (2) Annie Bayanes and Julio Bayacsan for their
unexplained delay in giving their respective sworn statements to the police; and (3) Mona Barredo for
"flip-flopping" with respect to the alleged admission to her by appellant and how the police investigators
knew about said admission, after she claimed that she did not tell anyone about his revelation.
Appellant submits that the trial court erred in giving weight to the aforementioned testimonies.

210

For appellee, the OSG argues that with respect to Gumpic's alleged contradictions, they refer only to
unimportant and collateral matters; they do not affect her credibility. With respect to the delay or
vacillation by Bayacsan and Bayanes in giving their statements to the authorities, the OSG points out
that a reading of their declarations in court will show that the alleged delay was adequately explained.
As to Barredo's testimony, a closer reading of her supposed "flip-flopping" shows that the alleged
contradictions were due to an honest misapprehension of fact on her part.
When the issue boils down to the credibility of witnesses, the appellate court will not generally disturb
the findings of the trial court because the latter is in the vantage position of observing witnesses through
the various indicia of truthfulness or falsehood.[82] However, this rule is not absolute. One exception is
where the judge who wrote the decision did not personally hear the prosecution's evidence. [83] In this
case, the records show that Judge Angel V. Colet, who authored the assailed decision, took over from
Judge Benigno M. Galacgac only on April 29, 1997 or after the witnesses for the prosecution had
testified. It does not follow, however, that a judge who was not present at the trial cannot render a just
and valid judgment. The records and the transcripts of stenographic notes are available to him as basis
for his decision.
After going over the transcripts of the witnesses' testimonies, we find no reason to disturb the findings of
the trial court. With respect to the statements of Gumpic, we agree with the Solicitor General that
alleged inconsistencies refer only to irrelevant and collateral matters, which have nothing to do with the
elements of the crime. It is axiomatic that slight variations in the testimony of a witness as to minor
details or collateral matters do not affect his or her credibility as these variations are in fact indicative of
truth and show that the witness was not coached to fabricate or dissemble.[84] An inconsistency, which
has nothing to do with the elements of a crime, is not a ground to reverse a conviction. [85]
We likewise find no basis for appellant's contention that Bayanes and Bayacsan failed to give a
satisfactory explanation for the delay or vacillation in disclosing to the authorities what they
knew. Bayanes gave a satisfactory reason for her delay in reporting to the authorities what she knew.
She had simply gone about her normal business activities for some months, unaware that a case had
been filed concerning the killing of Nemesio. It was only nine (9) months after the incident that she read
a notice for help posted by the victim's relatives at the Trading Post, appealing to possible witnesses to
the killing to come forth and assist them in their quest for justice. It was only then that she decided to
reveal to the authorities what she knew.
As to Bayacsan, he candidly admitted in court that he considered appellant his friend and he wanted to
protect him and hence, he only disclosed appellant's admission to him when the police started
questioning him. There is no rule that the suspect in a crime should immediately be named by a
witness.[86] Different people react differently to a given situation and there is no standard form of human
behavior when one is confronted with a strange, startling, or frightful experience. [87] The Court
understands the natural reluctance or aversion of some people to get involved in a criminal case. [88]
More so where, as in these cases, a townmate of Bayanes and Bayacsan is involved. We have taken
notice that when their townmates are involved in a criminal case, most people turn reticent. [89] Hence,
the failure of Bayanes and Bayacsan to immediately volunteer information to the police investigators will
not lessen the probative value of their respective testimonies. The delay, having been satisfactorily
explained, has no effect on their credibility. [90]
We have likewise closely scrutinized the testimony of Mona Barredo regarding the alleged admission by
appellant to her that he killed the victim. We find nothing "flip-flopping" about her testimony. Instead, we
find a witness who admitted she was "nervous" that she might not be able to answer all the
questions.[91] Said nervousness was engendered by her erroneous belief that to be a credible witness,
she must have personal knowledge of the crime.[92] Even the most candid witnesses make mistakes and
may give some contradictory or inconsistent statements, but such honest lapses need not necessarily
affect their credibility. Ample margin should be accorded a witness who is tension-filled with the novelty
of testifying before a court.[93]
Appellant further contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the verbal admissions of guilt
he made to Gumpic and SPO4 Bomagao inside the police station since said admissions are
inadmissible in evidence as uncounseled confessions.
The OSG submits that said verbal admissions of complicity, as well as those made to appellant to
Bayacsan and Barredo, are admissible as statements forming part of the res gestae. We agree on this
point with the OSG.
The requisites of res gestae are: (1) the principal act or res gestae must be a startling occurrence; (2)
the statement is spontaneous or was made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise a false
statement, and the statement was made during the occurrence or immediately prior or subsequent to
thereto; and (3) the statement made must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.[94] All these elements are present in appellant's verbal admission to Barredo
that he killed the victim when he went to the latter's house half an hour after the fatal shooting of
Nemesio.
The verbal admission by appellant to Barredo was made before appellant had the time and opportunity
to contrive a falsehood. Similar statements have been held to be part of the res gestae: (1) a child's
declaration made an hour after an alleged assault; [95] (2) the testimony of a police officer as to what the
victim revealed to him some 30 minutes after the commission of an alleged crime;[96] and (3) a victim's
declaration made some 5 to 10 minutes after an alleged felony took place. [97] Note that since appellant's
admission was not solicited by police officers in the course of a custodial investigation, but was made to
a private person, the provisions of the Bill of Rights on custodial investigation do not apply. The Rules of
Court[98] provides that an admission made to a private person is admissible in evidence against the
declarant.[99]
Prosecution's evidence here is admittedly circumstantial. But in the absence of an eyewitness, reliance
on circumstantial evidence is inevitable.[100] Resort thereto is essential when the lack of direct evidence
would result in setting a felon free. [101]
Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict if the following requisites are met: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. [102] In our mind, the
following pieces of circumstantial evidence show with moral certainty that appellant was responsible for
the death of Nemesio:
1. Appellant had the motive to kill Nemesio Lopate for having an affair with his wife, and appellant
had openly expressed his desire and intention to do so;
2. At around 10:00 p.m. of March 10, 1996, Annie Bayanes and Marlon Manis heard two gun
shots at the Trading Post, La Trinidad, Benguet and saw Nemesio Lopate fall to the ground;
3. Bayanes saw appellant behind the victim, tucking a gun into his waistband, and walking away;
211
 4. From another angle, Manis also saw a person whose gait and built resembled that of appellant
walking away from the crime scene;
5. At around 10:30 p.m. of March 10, 1996, appellant went to the house of Mona Barredo,
brought out a handgun, emptied it of two spent .38 caliber shells and instructed Barredo to
throw the shells out of the window, which she did;
6. Appellant then told Barredo that he had shot and killed his wife's paramour, after which he
stayed at Barredo's house for the night;
7. On March 11, 1996, Dr. Doris C. Jovellanos, Municipal Health Officer of La Trinidad, Benguet
recovered a .38 caliber slug from Nemesio's corpse and found two (2) bullet entry wounds on
the said cadaver;
8. On March 18, 1996, police investigators, assisted by Barredo, recovered two (2) spent .38
caliber shells from Barredo's sweet potato patch, immediately outside her residence wherein
appellant had slept a week before.
The foregoing circumstances clearly show that appellant had the motive, the opportunity, and the
means to commit the crime at the place and time in question. Simply put, the circumstantial evidence
adduced by the prosecution has successfully overcome the claim of innocence by appellant. Under the
proved circumstances, appellant's defense of alibi is untenable. More so, in this situation where
prosecution witness Bayanes unflinchingly declared that she saw appellant standing behind the victim,
tucking a gun in his pants, moments after the latter was shot. As we held in People v. Salveron,[103] and
reiterated in People v. Sesbreño,[104] where an eyewitness saw the accused with a gun, seconds after
the gunshot and after the victim fell to the ground, the reasonable conclusion is that said accused killed
the victim.
Appellant's alibi cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Bayanes concerning appellant's
identification and presence at the crime scene. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused
must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. [105] Physical impossibility refers to the
distance between the place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it
was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. [106] In these cases, the defense
admitted that the distance between La Trinidad, Benguet and Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya is 79 kilometers,
which can be negotiated in 4 or 5 hours.[107] Clearly, it was not physically impossible for appellant to be
at the locus criminis at the time of the killing. Hence, the defense of alibi must fail.
In sum, we find that the prosecution's evidence suffices to sustain the appellant's conviction for
homicide.
3. Crime and its Punishment
As appellant can only be convicted of homicide, it follows that he cannot, under the provisions of RA No.
7659, be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Our task now is to determine whether there are aggravating
or mitigating circumstances which could modify the penalty.
More specifically, may the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm be taken
against the appellant?
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in appreciating the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm in the present case. Like the killing, said aggravating circumstance must likewise be
proved beyond reasonable doubt, says the appellant. On this point, he adds, the prosecution failed to
adduce the necessary quantum of proof.
We find merit in the appellant's contentions. It is not enough that the special aggravating circumstance
of use of unlicensed firearm be alleged in the information, the matter must be proven with the same
quantum of proof as the killing itself. Thus, the prosecution must prove: (1) the existence of the subject
firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding
license or permit to own or possess the same. [108] The records do not show that the prosecution
presented any evidence to prove that appellant is not a duly licensed holder of a caliber .38 firearm. The
prosecution failed to offer in evidence a certification from the Philippine National Police Firearms and
Explosives Division to show that appellant had no permit or license to own or possess a .38 caliber
handgun. Nor did it present the responsible police officer on the matter of licensing as a prosecution
witness. Absent the proper evidentiary proof, this Court cannot validly declare that the special
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm was satisfactorily established by the
prosecution. Hence such special circumstance cannot be considered for purposes of imposing the
penalty in its maximum period.
Coming now to the obverse side of the case, is the appellant entitled to benefit from any mitigating
circumstance?
Appellant, firstly contends that assuming without admitting that he is guilty, the lower court should have
considered at least the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense as well as
that of passion and obfuscation. Appellant points out that the victim's act of maintaining an adulterous
relationship with appellant's wife constituted a grave offense to his honor, not to mention the shame,
anguish, and anxiety he was subjected to. Even the mere sight of the victim must have triggered an
uncontrollable emotional outburst on appellant's part, so that even a chance meeting caused in him an
irresistible impulse powerful enough to overcome all reason and restraint. Secondly, appellant points
out that the trial court failed to consider his voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.
The Solicitor General counters that there was literally no "immediate vindication" to speak of in this
case. Appellant had sufficient time to recover his serenity following the discovery of his wife's infidelity.
Nor could passion and obfuscation be appreciated in appellant's favor because the killing was not
proximate to the time of the offense. Appellant became aware of the treatment offensive to his dignity
as a husband and to the peace and tranquility of his home two weeks earlier. This interval between the
revelation of his wife's adultery and the fatal shooting was ample and sufficient for reason and self-
control to reassert themselves in appellant's mind. As to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, the OSG stresses that his supposed surrender at Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya was actually due
to the efforts of law enforcers who came looking for him. There he did not resist, but lack of resistance
alone is not tantamount to voluntary surrender, which denotes a positive act and not merely passive
conduct.
According to the OSG, for the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense to apply, the
vindication must be "immediate." This view is not entirely accurate. The word "immediate" in the English
text is not the correct translation of the controlling Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code, which uses
the word "proxima."[109] The Spanish text, on this point, allows a lapse of time between the grave
offense and the actual vindication.[110] Thus, in an earlier case involving the infidelity of a wife, the killing
212
of her paramour prompted proximately though not immediately by the desire to avenge the wrong done,
was considered an extenuating circumstance in favor of the accused. [111] The time elapsed between the
offense and the suspected cause for vindication, however, involved only hours and minutes, not
days. Hence, we agree with the Solicitor General that the lapse of two (2) weeks between his discovery
of his wife's infidelity and the killing of her supposed paramour could no longer be considered
proximate. The passage of a fortnight is more than sufficient time for appellant to have recovered his
composure and assuaged the unease in his mind. The established rule is that there can be no
immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient time to recover his
serenity.[112] Thus, in this case, we hold that the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a
grave offense cannot be considered in appellant's favor.
We likewise find the alleged mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation inexistent. The rule is
that the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense and passion and obfuscation cannot
be claimed at the same time, if they arise from the same facts or motive. [113] In other words, if appellant
attacked his victim in proximate vindication of a grave offense, he could no longer claim in the same
breath that passion and obfuscation also blinded him. Moreover, for passion and obfuscation to be well
founded, the following requisites must concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such condition of mind; and (2) the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his moral equanimity.[114] To repeat, the period of two (2) weeks which spanned the discovery of
his wife's extramarital dalliance and the killing of her lover was sufficient time for appellant to reflect and
cool
Appellant further contests the award of P2,040,000 for loss of earning capacity as unconscionable.
Since the victim's widow could not present any income tax return of her husband to substantiate her
claim that his net income was P60,000 annually, then according to appellant, there is no basis for this
award at all. At best, appellant says, only temperate or nominal damages may be awarded.
The OSG responds that the award for loss of earning capacity has adequate basis as the prosecution
presented sufficient evidence on the productivity of the landholdings being tilled by the deceased and
the investments made by the Lopate family from their income. Hence, said the OSG, it was not a
product of sheer conjecture or speculation. Nonetheless, the OSG submits that the original amount of
P1,800,000 for loss of earning capacity should be restored as it is this amount which takes into account
only a reasonable portion of annual net income which would have been received as support by the
heirs.
In setting said award at P2,040,000, amended from P1,800,000, for lost earnings, the trial court took
note of the following factors in its computations:
The Death Certificate of Nemesio Lopate shows that he died at the age of 29. [119] His widow's detailed
testimony shows that their average annual net income from vegetable farming was P60,000.[120] The
victim's share of the annual net income from the couple's farm is half thereof, or P30,000. Using the
American Expectancy Table of Mortality, the life expectancy of the victim at age 29 is set at 34 years.
off. Therefore, total loss of Earning Capacity (X) should be computed as follows:

Appellant further argues that the lower court erred in failing to consider voluntary surrender as a X = 2/3 (80-29) x P30,000
mitigating circumstance. On this point, the following requirements must be satisfied: (1) the offender X = 2/3 (51) x P30,000
has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the X = 34 x P30,000
surrender was voluntary.[115] Records show, however, that leaflets and posters were circulated for X = P1,020,000
information to bring the killer of Nemesio to justice. A team of police investigators from La Trinidad,
Benguet then went to Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya to invite appellant for questioning. Only then did he return This amount should form part of the damages awarded to the heirs.
to Benguet. But he denied the charge of killing the victim. Clearly, appellant's claimed surrender was
neither spontaneous nor voluntary. We sustain the award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto. But there being no testimony or other proof
thereon, the award of P50,000 as moral damages cannot now be sustained. Instead, temperate
Absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance for the offense of homicide the penalty imposable damages in the amount of P25,000 should be awarded.
under Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty which could actually be imposed on appellant is an The award of P20,000 in attorney's fees should be maintained. Records show that the victim's widow
indeterminate prison term consisting of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to had to hire the services of a private prosecutor to actively prosecute the civil aspect of this case, [121] and
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. in line with Article 2208 of the Civil Code, [122] reasonable attorney fees may be duly recovered.

4. Proper Award of Damages WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 8, in Criminal
Case No. 96-CR-2522 is MODIFIED as follows:
Appellant and the Solicitor General are one in contending that the trial court awarded excessive actual
damages without adequate legal basis. Thus, the amount of P150,000.00 was awarded for funeral and Appellant June Ignas y Sanggino is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE
burial expenses without any supporting evidence on record. [116] This cannot be sustained in this as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. There being
review. In order for actual damages to be recovered, the amount of loss must not only be capable of neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
proof but must actually be proven with reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
or best evidence obtainable of the actual amount thereof, such as receipts or other documents to months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
support the claim.[117] The records clearly show in this case that only the amount of P7,000 as funeral
expenses was duly supported by a receipt. [118] Hence, the award of actual damages should be limited to Appellant June Ignas y Sanggino is ORDERED TO PAY the heirs of the victim, Nemesio Lopate, the
P7,000 only. following sums: a) P7,000 as actual damages; b) P1,020,000 for loss of earning capacity; c) P50,000 as
civil indemnity; d) P25,000 as temperate damages; and e) P20,000 as attorney's fees. Costs de oficio.

213
 "dismissal order" ni Commissioner Subido ay inapela ko sa Civil Service Board of
SO ORDERED. Appeals.

Magmula noong Idinismiss nila ako sa aking trabaho dahil sa "fabricated" charges ay
naghirap na ko sa aking buhay at nahihiya ako sa mga kaibigan ko. Ako ay
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, assign(ed) sa collecting department noon at nagagalit sa akin ang mga empleyado ng
vs. Civil Service dahil mahigpit ako sa kanila.
ALBERTO BENITO y RESTUBOG accused-appellant.
Noong bandang alas 7:00 ng gabi noong Dec. 11, 1969, ako ay nagpunta sa Civil
RESOLUTION Service sa kalye Paredes at nakita ko si PEDRO MONCAYO, Jr. at kinausap ko siya
at tinanong ko siya na iyong kaso ko ay matagal na at hindi pa natatapos at baka
matulungan niya ako at ang sagot niya ay "UMALIS KA NA NGA DIYAN BAKA MAY
MANGYARI PA SA IYO AT BAKA IPAYARI KITA DITO" at umalis na ko.
AQUINO, J.:
Kaninang bandang alas 11:00 ng umaga ay nagkita kami ni PEDRO MONCAYO Jr.
sa loob ng compound ng Civil Service at sa harapan ng maraming tao sinabi niya na
Alberto Benito was sentenced to death by the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila after he pleaded guilty to "NAGIISTAMBAY PALA DITO ANG MAGNANAKAW" kaya ang ginawa ko ay umalis
the charge of murder for having shot with a .22 caliber revolver Pedro Moncayo, Jr. on December 12, na ako.
1969. The killing was qualified by treachery and aggravated by premeditation and disregard of rank. It
was mitigated by plea of guilty.
Kaninang bandang alas 5:25 ng hapon, nitong araw na ito, Desiyembre 12, 1969,
nakita ko si PEDRO MONCAYO Jr. na nagmamanejo noong kotse niya sa kalye P.
After a mandatory review of the death sentence, this Court in its decision of February 13, 1975 affirmed Paredes sa tapat ng Civil Service, sinundan ko siya at pagliko ng kotse niya sa kanto
the judgment of conviction. It appreciated in Benito's favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary ng P. Paredes at Lepanto, Sampaloc, Maynila, ay binaril ko siya ng walong beses at
surrender. The penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua. (People vs. Benito, 62 SCRA 351). tinamaan siya at napatumba siya sa kaniyang upuan sa kotse.

Benito filed a motion for reconsideration. He contends that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance Pagkatapos ay tumawag ako sa telepono sa MPD Headquarters para sumurender at
of immediate vindication of a grave offense and that the aggravating circumstances of disregard of rank kayo nga ang dumating kasama ninyo iyong mga kasama ninyo.
should not be appreciated against him.
Benito surrendered to the police the revolver (Exh. C) used in the shooting with the eight empty shells of
Benito, 26, a native of Naga City, in his sworn statement , which was taken, about five hours after the the bullets which he had fired at Moncayo.
shooting, by Corporal E. Cortez and Patrolmen J. de la Cruz, Jr., and
H. Roxas of the Manila Police, recounted the background and circumstances of the tragic incident in this
manner (Exh. A): The Police report contains the following background and description of the killing (Exh. B):

... alam ninyo ho, ako ay dating empleyado ng Civil Service Commission sa kalye P.
Paredes, Sampaloc, Maynila, at ako ay Clerk 2 sa Administrative Division at ako ay
nagumpisa ng pagtratrabaho sa Civil Service magmula pa noong November, 1965 ng
ako ay nasuspende sa aking trabaho dahil kinargohan nila ako ng "DISHONESTY" at
nasuspende ako ng 60 days at nabalik ako sa trabaho noong January 1966 pero
kinarguhan uli nila ako ng "MALVERSARTION OF PUBLIC FUNDS, QUALIFIED
THEFT, ESTAFA at FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT at dinimanda din ako
ng Civil Service ng Administrative case ng "DISHONESTY" at dinismiss na ako sa
trabaho ni Commissioner Subido noong February 16, 1966.
According to the suspect, he was a former employee of the Civil Service Commission
at its main office located at P. Paredes, Sampaloc. Mla., and was assigned as Clerk 2
in the Administrative Division from Nov. 1963 continuously up to Nov. 1965 when he
was suspended for "DISHONESTY".
After two months, he was reinstated but was criminally charged for QUALIFIED
THEFT, MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS, ESTAFA and FALSIFICATION OF
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS and administratively charged for "DISHONESTY" culminating
in his dismissal from the Civil Service on February 1966.

At magmula noon ay nawalan na ako ng trabaho pero lahat ho noong kinargo nila sa
akin na sinabi ko sa inyo ay "fabricated" lang ang mga evidensiya at ang gumawa ho
noong ay ang binaril ko kanina na si PEDRO MONCAYO JR. Y RAMOS at naka
pending pa ngayon sa City Fiscal ng Maynila kay Asst. Fiscal Magat at iyon namang
The aforecited criminal charges against the suspect was allegedly investigated by
Asst. Fiscal MAGAT. Records from the CRID, MPD, reveals that on Dec. 6, 1966,
Hon. Judge ROAN of the City Court of Mla. issued a Warrant No. E-316758 for the
arrest of the suspect for the crime of ESTAFA.
214
 On May 24, 1969, Hon. Judge JUAN O. REYES of the CFI of Mla. issued an order
No. OA-87409 for the arrest of the suspect for the crime of MALVERSATION OF
PUBLIC FUNDS. According to the suspect, the aforecited criminal and administrative
charges filed him were allegedly instigated and contrived by the victim and since the
time of his dismissal, he was allegedly jobless.
On Dec. 11, 1969, the suspect went to the Civil Service at P. Paredes st. and
requested the victim to help him in his cases but the former allegedly uttered to the
suspect "UMALIS KA NGA DIYAN BAKA MAY MANGYARI PA SA IYO AT BAKA
IPAYARI KITA DITO".
The suspect left and returned the following morning at 11:00 a.m. of Dec. 12, 1969,
and when they met again, the victim allegedly remarked in the presence of many
people, "NAGIISTAMBAY PALA DITO ANG MAGNANAKAW". The suspect who was
humiliated and incensed, left.
At about 5:25 p.m. of that same day, Dec. 12, 1969, the suspect who was armed with
an unlicensed Cal. 22 black revolver (w/ SN - P-5317, Trademarked "SENTINEL",
SQUIRES BINGHAM MFG. CO. INC. MLA. P.I.) loaded with nine (9) live Cal. 22
bullets in its cylinder, waited for the victim outside the Civil Service compound at P.
Paredes st. Sampaloc, Mla.
The victim showed up and drove his green Chevrolet 2 door car (w/ Plate No.
L-10578 Mla. 69) along P. Paredes st. The suspect with evident premeditation,
surreptitiously followed the victim and when the latter's car was at a full stop at the
corner of Lepanto and P. Paredes sts. due to heavy traffic of motor vehicles, the
suspect without any warning or provocation, suddenly and treacherously shot the
victim eight (8) times on the head and different parts of the body at closer range which
consequently caused the latter's death on the spot inside his car.
The suspect then fled while the victim was conveyed on board a red private car (w/
Plate No. L-55117) by his co-employees (composed of VICTOR VILLAR,
ELEUTERIO MENDOZA & FORTUNATO JOSE Jr.) to the FEU Hospital.
Unfortunately, the victim was pronounced DOA by Dr. P. PAHUTAN, SOD, at 5:40
p.m. of Dec. 12, 1969.
The thirty-six year old victim, a certified public accountant, was the Assistant Chief of the Personnel
Transactions Division and Acting Chief, Administrative Division of the Civil Service Commission (Exh. E
to E-2). The accused was a clerk in the cash section, Administrative Division of the Commission,
receiving P1,884 per annum (Exh. D). He started working in the Commission on November 7, 1963.
On October 21, 1965 Moncayo, as an administrative officer, reported to the Commissioner of Civil
Service that Benito admitted having malversed an amount between P4,000 and P5,000 from his sales
of examination fee stamps. Moncayo's report reads as follows (Exh. F):
MEMORANDUM for
The Commissioner
Through Proper Channels
This refers to the case of Mr. ALBERTO R. BENITO, Clerk II in the Administrative
Division of this Commission, who, as had previously been reported, malversed public
funds in the amount of approximately P5,000.00 out of his collections from the sale of
examination fee stamps.
I wish to state that this matter came to my attention on the evening of March 1, 1965
when Mr. Teodoro Abarquez, Acting Cashier I, reported to me that fifty (50) money
orders at P2.00 each with a total vlaue of P100.00 were missing from a bundle of
money orders received from the Provincial Treasurer of Cotabato, which were kept by
him in one of the cabinets inside the Cashier's Cashier' room.
At the same time he also informed me that he suspected that Mr. Benito stole the
missing money orders. His suspicion arose from the fact that he found several money
orders marked "Cotabato" as their place of issue among the cash receipts turned over
to him by Mr. Benito that afternoon as his collection from the sale of examination fee
stamps. Mr. Abarquez showed to me the said money orders issued in Cotabato which
were turned over to him by Mr. Benito and after checking their serial numbers with the
records of list of remittances on file, we were able to establish definitely the fact that
the said money orders were those missing.
It may be stated that at that time, Mr. Benito was assigned to work in the Cash
Section and one of his duties was to sell examination fee stamps to applicants for
examinations. It was then the practice of the cashier to issue to Mr. Benito in the
morning examination fee stamps to be sold during the day and in the afternoon he
turned over to the Cashier the proceeds from the sale of stamps including the unsold
stamps issued to him. After considering the work performed by Mr. Benito, it became
evident that he succeeded in malversing the amount of P100.00 by substituting
equivalent amount of money orders in the place of the cash extracted by him from his
daily collections from the sale of examination fee stamps when he clears his
accountability with the Cashier.
The following day, I confronted Mr. Benito in the presence of Mr. Abarquez and ask
him whether he had something to do with the loss of the fifty (50) money orders at
P2.00 each. At first he denied, but when I asked him where he obtained the money
orders issued in Cotabato which were included in his collections the day preceding,
he admitted having stolen the missing money orders.
Having confessed his guiltk, I then asked Mr. Benito when he started committing the
said irregularity and how much in all did he actually malversed out of his daily
collections from the time that he started the anomaly. He stated in the presence of Mr.
Abarquez that he started in January, 1965 and that although he did not know exactly
the total amount malversed by him, he believed the amount to be between P4,000.00
to P5,000.00. He also confessed that he used the money orders remitted by the
Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental in the amount of P3,436.00 in substituting
various amounts extracted by him from his daily cash collections and used by him for
personal purposes.
215
It appears from the records that the List of Remittances covering the money orders .
received from the Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental was duly receipted by
Mr. Benito. He was supposed to issue an Official Receipt therefor in favor of the said M
Provincial Treasurer and then turn over to the Cashier the amount involved for deposit O
to the National Treasurer. The said List of Remittances, duly signed by Mr. Benito, is N
enclosed for use as evidence in this case. C
A
I told Mr. Benito that I cannot do anything but report the matter to the Commissioner. Y
However, he pleaded that he be given first an opportunity to restore the amount O
before I make my report in order that the penalty that may be imposed upon him may
be lessened to a certain degree. As I thought it wise in the interest of the service to A
recover the amount involved, I allowed him to go and see his parents in Naga City to d
raise the amount in question. m
i
n
After two weeks, Mr. Benito informed me that his parents filed an application for a i
loan with the Government Service Insurance System and that the proceeds of the s
said loan which he intended to use in restoring the amount malversed by him were t
expected to be released during the last week of May, 1965. However, when the r
month of May, 1965 elapsed without the amount involved having been restored, I a
conferred with Mr. del Prado, my immediate superior and asked him whether we t
should wait further for the release of the said loan in order that the amount involved i
may be recovered. Mr. Prado consented to giving him a little more time. v
e
When Mr. Benito still failed to restore the amount in question by the end of June,
1965, I got hold of him on July 5, 1965 and together with Messrs. del Prado, O
Abarquez and Gatchalian, also of this Commission, brought him before Deputy f
Commissioner A. L. Buenaventura and reported the entire matter to the Deputy f
Commissioner. In the presence of Messrs. del Prado, Abarquez, Gatchalian and i
myself, Mr. Benito admitted readily and voluntarily before the Deputy Commissioner c
the commission of the offense of malversation of public funds as stated above. e
r
In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that Mr. Benito be charged formally and
that he be suspended from office immediately considering the gravity of the offense I
committed by him. I

( Benito was charged with dishonesty. He had admitted to Deputy Commissioner Alipio Buenaventura
S that he had misappropriated his collections and spent the amount in nightclubs and pleasure spots and
g for personal purposes. The decision dismissing him from the service reads as follows (Exh. G):
d
. This is an administrative case against Mr. Alberto R. Benito, Clerk I, Cash Section,
) Administrative Division of this Office, for dishonesty.

P The following excerpts from the letter dated October 22, 1965 of the Commissioner of
E Civil Service connect respondent with the alleged misappropriation of public funds
D representing his collection from the sale of examination fee stamps and constitute the
R basis of the instant case against him:
O

R
216
 An investigation made by this Commission shows that you
malversed public funds in the amount of P3,536.00 out of your
collections from the sale of examination fee stamps while in the
performance of your official duties as Clerk II in the Cash Section,
Administrative Division of this Office. It appears that you succeeded
in malversing the above-stated amount from your cash collections
by substituting in lieu thereof money orders worth P3,436.00
remitted to this Commission by the Provincial Treasurer of Negros
Occidental which were duly receipted for by you. It also appears
that you extracted from a bundle of money orders remitted by the
Provincial Treasurer of Cotabato the amount of P100.00 in money
orders which were kept in one of the cabinets in the Cashier's
room.
Respondent denied the charge. He explained, among others, that money orders were
always kept in the Cashier's safe and he had no access to them. Although he
admitted having received money orders amounting to P3,436.00 remitted by the
Provincial Treasurer of Negros Occidental and another remittance of the Provincial
Treasurer of Cotabato he, however, disclaimed having substituted the same for cash
collections in his sale of examination fee stamps. He reasoned out further that he
could not be charged with malversation of public funds inasmuch as he was not then
an accountable officer.
It appears that respondent, as Clerk in the Cash Section, performs, among other
duties, the selling of examination fee stamps, receiving payments therefor, and
receiving remittances in form of cash and/or money orders from provincial treasurers
in connection with examinations held in the provinces. It was also his duty to issue
official receipts for said remittances. In the course of the performance of his duties, he
received said remittances from the Provincial Treasurers of Negros Occidental and
Cotabato, but no official receipts were issued by him, as shown by the reply telegrams
pertaining thereto. While records disclose that remittances from the province of
Cotabato were submitted to the Cashier of the Civil Service Commission, there is no
evidence showing that remittances from Negros Occidental were likewise submitted.
Investigation further reveals that 50 money orders were discovered missing from the
remittances of Cotabato Provincial Treasurer which were kept in the cabinet of the
Cashier. On or about March 2, 1965, the Cashier of the Commission noticed that 15
money orders turned over by respondent as part of his collections in the sale of
examination fee stamps were among the missing money orders. This triggered off the
filing of this case against the respondent.
On July 5, 1965, respondent admitted before the then Deputy Commissioner Alipio
Buenaventura having misappropriated an aggregate amount ranging from P3,000 to
P7,000, which he spent in night clubs, pleasure spots and other personal benefits.
Despite the testimonies of several witnesses regarding his confession, including that
of the then Deputy Commissioner himself, respondent, when asked to take the stand,
denied his previous admission.
Instead, he argued that the cash and accounts of the Cashier of the Civil Service
Commission, when examined by representatives of the Auditor's Office, did not
indicate any shortage and therefore there was no irregularity involved. This argument
is not well taken. Inasmuch as the remittances received by respondent from said
Provincial Treasurers of Negros Occidental and Cotabato were not in turn given
corresponding official receipts, naturally, the same were not reflected on the Cashier's
cash book.
The weakness of respondent's defense lies not so much on its failure to establish
convincingly his innocence as its irreconciliability with established facts. Obviously,
none of the circumstances in this case is consistent with his claim of innocence. On
the contrary, all of them put together produce reasonable assurance of respondent's
guilt.
In view of the foregoing, this Office finds respondent Alberto R. Benito guilty as
charged. Wherefore, he is dismissed from the service effective upon his receipt of this
decision.
In the interest of the service this decision is executed also on the date of his receipt of
this decision.
Benito appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals from the Commissioner's decision dismissing
him. The appeal was pending at the time when he assassinated Moncayo (Exh. I).
The foregoing antecedents of the assassination shed light on the remark which the victim, Moncayo,
allegedly made upon seeing Benito in the compound of the Civil Service Commission near the canteen
at eleven o'clock in the morning of December 12, 1969 (about six hours before the shooting):
"Nagiistambay pala dito and magnanakaw." (Exh. A or 1); or, as Benito testified, Moncayo said: "Hindi
ko alam na itong Civil Service pala ay istambayan ng magnanakaw." (27 tsn December 26, 1969).
Mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense. — Benito contends that Moncayo
insulted him when he (Moncayo) remarked that a thief was loitering in the premises of the Civil Service
Commission. Benito argues that that remark "was tantamount to kicking a man already down and to
rubbing salt into a raw wound" and that, as it was made publicly and in a loud voice, he was exposed to
ridicule in the presence of his officemates.
Benito attached to his motion a copy of the decision of Judge Jose C. Colayco dated January 16, 1975,
acquitting him of the charge of malversation in connection with his alleged misappropriation of the fees
collected from the examinees of the 1974 patrolman examination. That same decision makes reference
to Benito's exoneration from the administrative charge. The court's decision reads as follows:
The accused is charged with malversation under the following information:
That on or about and during the period comprised between October
17, 1964, to February, 1965, inclusive, in the City of Manila
Philippines, the said accused being then employed as Clerk I of the
Civil Service Commission, a branch of the government of the
217
 Republic of the Philippines, among whose duties were to accept
payments of fees collected from the examinees of the 1964
Patrolman examination, and by reason of his said position received
the total amount of P3,536.00, with the duty to turn over and/or
account for his collections to the cashier of the Civil Service
Commission immediately or upon demand but the said accused
once in possession of the said amount of P3,536.00, with intent to
defraud, despite repeated demands made upon him to turn over
and to account for the same, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert and malverse
the said amount to his own personal use and benefit, to the
detriment of public interest and to the damage and prejudice of the
said Civil Service Commission in the said amount of P3,536.00,
Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.
The evidence shows that the accused had an appointment as clerk in the Civil
Service Commission from May 27, 1964, as clerk I, range 23 from June 1, 1965 and
as clerk I, range 26 from July 23, 1965 (Exhibits A, A-1, A-2). He had the duty, among
others, of selling Civil Service examination- fee stamps and to receive payment
therefor, as well as to receive remittances of money orders and checks from the
provincial treasurers for payments of examination fee stamps (Exhibit B).
Teodoro Abarquez, a cashier of the Civil Service Commission during the period
alleged in the information, testified in his direct examination that Benito was working
in his office; that one of the duties that he assigned to him was to sell examination fee
stamps; that it was customary for him to give stamps to Benito at the start of office
hours in the morning and that Benito turned over to him the proceeds of the sale, as
well as the unsold stamps, at the close of office hours in the afternoon; that one
afternoon he noticed that Benito turned over to him 50 money orders from Cotabato,
together with some cash, as proceeds of the sale of stamps for that day; that he
remembered that he was missing money orders from one of his cabinets where he
kept them; that when he discovered that the 50 money orders were those which were
missing, he reported the matter to Pedro Moncayo, the chief administrative officer; on
March 1, 1965; that the money orders were for P2.00 each, and were payments of the
examination fees from Cotabato (Exhibit F); that he discovered the loss of the 50
money orders on February 28, 1965 and reported it to Moncayo on March 1, 1965,
together with the list of missing orders (Exhibit M); that after receiving the report,
Moncayo called Benito to the office of Abarquez where he admitted taking the missing
money orders; that Moncayo submitted a memorandum to the Commissioner, dated
October 21, 1965, after giving Benito a chance to refund the value of the money
orders (Exhibit O). Alipio Buenaventura, acting Deputy Commissioner at the time, and
Eliseo S. Gatchalian, budget officer, testified that when Benito was confronted with
the report of Moncayo and Abarquez, he admitted that he misappropriated about
P3,000.00 because of bad company and that he asked for a chance to refund the
money.
Under cross-examination, Abarquez elucidated his testimony in his direct examination
and explained that when Benito turned over the proceeds of the sale of stamps for
that particular day, he kept the sum of P100.00 and replaced it with the 50 money
orders that he had taken from the cashier's office to cover up the money that he had
pocketed. When he was asked when he discovered that Benito substituted the 50
money orders from Cotabato, he answered that he checked them the following night
(March 2, 1965) with the list of money orders remitted by the Provincial treasurer
(Exhibits F, F-1); but when he was confronted with his affidavit which he executed on
April 18, 1966 (Exhibit R), he reluctantly admitted that he had only verified 15 money
orders missing as of April 18, 1966 and that he did not keep any record of the money
and the money orders given to him by Benito on March 1, 1965.
He also admitted that the room where he kept the money orders in an unlocked
drawer was also occupied by two other persons, and that this was the first time that
he had not followed the usual procedure of keeping them in the safe. He further
admitted that, although regular examinations were conducted during the period of
October 1, 1964 to February 28, 1965 by the examiners of the Civil Service
Commission and the auditors of the General Auditing Office, they did not find any
shortage in the accounts of Benito.
Finally, when the Court asked him what happened to the 50 money orders, at first he
hinted that they were not deposited with the Bureau of Treasury because they were
reported missing; but when pressed further, he said that he deposited them, but did
not issue any official receipt for them. When asked if he had any evidence to show
that they were actually deposited, he admitted that he could not even remember when
he deposited them.
The testimony of Teodoro Abarquez upon which the prosecution has built its case, is
too weak and shaky to sustain a finding of guilt because of his glaring inconsistencies,
contradictions and gaps in memory. The prosecution has failed to present convincing
evidence that the 50 money orders were even lost: According to Abarquez he had
only verified the loss of 15 on April 18, 1966, although he testified earlier that he
determined the loss of 50 the night after March 1, 1965.
The examiners of the Civil Service Commission and the auditors of the General
Auditing Office did not find any irregularity in the cash accountability of Benito,
according to Abarquez. This was corroborated by Romeo Jarabelo, auditor of the
Commission on Audit and Miguel Games, auditing examiner assigned to the Civil
Service Commission, who testified for the accused. Benito was in fact exonorated the
administrative charge filed against him for the time same transaction (Exhibit E).
In fact, the testimony of Abarquez under cross-examination that he has not issued
any official receipt for the 50 money orders and his inability to prove that he deposited
them with the bureau of Treasury gives rise to the suspicion that other persons, not
the accused, may have stolen the 50 missing money orders. Even without taking into
account the testimony of the accused, who denied the testimonies of the witnesses
for the prosecution, the court believes that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt
of the accused.
218
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered acquitting the accused, with costs de
oficio.
The Solicitor General argues that the defamatory remark imputed to Moncayo cannot give rise to the
mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense because it was not specifically directed at
Benito. The prosecution notes that the remark was uttered by Moncayo at eleven o'clock in the morning.
According to Benito's testimony (not consistent with his confession), he saw Moncayo three hours later
or at two o'clock in the afternoon and inquired from him about his case and Moncayo said that he had
already submitted his report and he could not do anything more about Benito's case (26 tan). As already
stated, the assassination was perpetrated at around five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day.
Assuming that Moncayo's remark was directed at Benito, we see no justification under the
circumstances recited above for changing our prior opinion that the mitigating circumstance of "haber
ejecutado el hecho en vindicacion proxima de una ofensa grave, causada al autor del delito," cannot be
appreciated in Benito's favor. As aptly stated by the ponente, Justice Esguerra, Benito "had more than
sufficient time to suppress his emotion over said remark if he ever did resent it."
"La apreciacion de la proximidad queda al arbitrio del tribunal; el Tribunal Supremo (de España) no ha
apreciado la proximidad ... cuando la ofensa se realizo por la mañana y el delito tuvo lugar por la tarde
(Sentencia de 11 noviembre 1921); por regla general no es proxima cuando transcurre tiempo
suficiente para la razon recobre su imperio sobreponiendose a la pasion (Sentencias de 28 mayo 1882,
4 noviembre 1893, 24 junio 1908, etc.) ... Si falta el requisito de la proximidad debe desestimarse
(Sentencia de 3 julio 1950). Exige gravedad en la ofensa y proximada en la reaccion." (Note 9, 1 Cuello
Calon, Derecho Penal. 1975 Ed., p. 564).
The Spanish Supreme Court also held that "no puede apreciarse esta circunstancia atenuante en favor
del autor de un homicidio cometido 'algunas horas despues de haberle invitado el interfecto a renir y
golpeado en el pecho con las manos', porque el tiempo transcurrido entre los golpes y la muerte fue
suficiente para que el animo del reo se serenase (Sentencia de 24 Junio 1908, Gaceta 28 Agosto 1909,
IV-V Enciclopedia Juridica Española 1182).
The six-hour interval between the alleged grave offense committed by Moncayo against Benito and the
assassination was more than sufficient to enable Benito to recover his serenity. But instead of using that
time to regain his composure, he evolved the plan of liquidating Moncayo after office hours. Benito
literally ambushed Moncayo just a few minutes after the victim had left the office. He acted with
treachery and evident premeditation in perpetrating the cold-blooded murder.
The facts of the case strongly suggest that what really impelled Benito to assassinate Moncayo was not
the latter's alleged defamatory remark that the Civil Service Commission compound was a hangout for a
thief or for thieves but the refusal of Moncayo to change his report so as to favor Benito. Benito did not
act primarily to vindicate an alleged grave offense to himself but mainly to chastise Moncayo for having
exposed the alleged anomalies or defraudation committed by Benito and for obstinately refusing to
change his report.
Aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank.— Benito contends that disregard of rank should not be
considered against him because there was no evidence that he "deliberately intended to offend or insult
the rank" of Moncayo. That contention has no merit.
It should be borne in mind that the victim was a ranking official of the Civil Service Commission and that
the killer was a clerk in the same office who resented the victim's condemnatory report against him. In
that situation, the existence of the aggravating circumstance of "desprecio del respeto que por la
dignidad mereciere el ofendido" is manifest.
The instant case is similar to a case where the chief of the secret service division killed his superior, the
chief of police (People vs. Hollero, 88 Phil. 167) and to the killing of the acting Spanish consul by his
subordinate, the chancellor of the consulate, who had misappropriated the funds of the consulate, which
misappropriation was discovered by the victim (People vs. Martinez Godinez, 106 Phil, 597, 606). In
these two cases the murder was aggravated by disregard of rank.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
SO ORDERED.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,
vs.
AUGUSTUS HICKS, defendant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for plaintiff.
Jose Robles Lahesa for defendant.
TORRES, J.:
For about five years, from September, 1902, to November, 1907, Augustus Hicks, an Afro-American,
and Agustina Sola, a Christian Moro woman, illicitly lived together in the municipality of Parang,
Cotabato, Moro Province, until trouble arising between them in the last-mentioned month of 1907,
Agustina quitted Hick's house, and, separation from him, went to live with her brother-in-law, Luis
Corrales. A few days later she contracted new relations with another negro named Wallace Current, a
corporal in the Army who then went to live in the said house.
On the 21st of December following, at about 7:30 p. m., Augustus Hicks together with a soldier named
Lloyd Nickens called at said house, and from the sala called out to his old mistress who was in her room
with Corporal Current, and after conversing with her in the Moro dialect for a few minutes, asked the
corporal to come out of said room; in response thereto the corporal appeared at the door of the room,
and after a short conversation, Current approached Hicks and they shook hands, when Hicks asked him
the following question: "Did I not tell you to leave this woman alone?," to which Current replied: "That is
all right, she told me that she did not want to live with you any longer, but if she wishes, she may quit
me, and you can live with her." The accused then replied: "God damn, I have made up my mind;" and
as Corporal Current saw that Hicks, when, he said this, was drawing a revolver from his trousers'
pocket, he caught him by the hand, but the latter, snatching his hand roughly away, said: "Don't do
that," whereupon Current jumped into the room, hiding himself behind the partition, just as Hicks drew
his revolver and fired at Agustina Sola who was close by in the sala of the house. The bullet struck her
in the left side of the breast; she fell to the ground, and died in a little more than an hour later.
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Upon hearing the shot Edward Robinson, who was also in the house, went to render assistance and
wrested the weapon from the hand of the accused. The latter immediately fled from the house and gave
himself up to the chief of police of the town, H. L. Martin, asking him to lock him up in jail; and, when a
few minutes later a policeman came running in and reported that Hicks had fired a shot at Agustina, the
said chief of police caused Hicks to be arrested. The latter, when once in jail, threw eight revolver
cartridges out of the window; these were picked up by a policeman who reported the occurrence and
delivered the cartridges to his chief.
In view of the foregoing the provincial fiscal on the 8th of February, 1908, filed a complaint with the
Court of First Instance of said province charging Augustus Hicks with the crime of murder. Proceedings
were instituted, the trial court, after hearing the evidence adduced, entered judgment on the 10th of
September of the same year, sentencing the accused to the penalty of death, to be executed according
to the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The case
has been submitted to this court for review.
The above-stated facts, which have been fully proven in the present case, constitute the crime of
murder, defined and punished by article 403 of the Penal Code, in that the woman Agustina Sola met a
violent death, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia), she being suddenly and roughly
attacked and unexpectedly fired upon with a 45-caliber revolver, at close, if not point blank range, while
the injured woman was unarmed and unprepared, and at a time when she was listening to a
conversation, in which she was concerned, between her aggressor and third person, and after usual
and customary words had passed between her and her aggressor. From all of the foregoing it is
logically inferred that means, manners, and forms were employed in attack that directly and specially
insured the consummation of the crime without such risk to the author thereof as might have been
offered by the victim who, owing to the suddenness of the attack, was doubtless unable to flee from the
place where she was standing, or even escape or divert the weapon.
The accused, Augustus Hicks, pleaded not guilty, but notwithstanding his exculpatory allegations which
were certainly not borne out at the trial, the evidence in the case is absolutely at variance therewith and
conclusively establishes, beyond peradventure of doubt, his culpability as the sole fully convicted author
of the violent and treacherous death of his former mistress, Agustina Sola.
It is alleged by the accused that when he withdrew his hand from that of Current, who had seized him,
he fell backward but managed to support himself on his two hands, and when he got up again the said
corporal threatened him with a revolver thrust into his face; whereupon he also drew his revolver, just as
Edward Robinson caught him from behind, when his revolver went off, the bullet striking the deceased.
This allegation appears to be at variance with the testimony of the witnesses Wallace Current, Edward
Robinson, Luis Corrales, and Lloyd Nickens in their respective declaration, especially with that of the
second and third, who witnessed the actual firing of the shot by the aggressor at the deceased, as
shown by the fact that Robinson immediately approached the accused in order to take his weapon away
from him which he succeeded in doing after a brief struggle, whereupon the aggressor ran out of the
house. Thus, the shot that struck the deceased in the breast and caused her death was not due to an
accident but to a willful and premeditated act on the part of the aggressor with intent to deprive the
victim of her life.
In addition to the qualifying circumstance of treachery, as above referred to, the presence of other
aggravating circumstances, such as premeditation, and the fact that the crime was committed in the
dwelling of the deceased should be taken into consideration. The last-mentioned circumstances
appears proven from the testimony of several witnesses who were examined at the trial of the case.
Inasmuch as in the present case the crime has already been qualified as committed with treachery, the
circumstance of premeditation should only be considered as a merely generic one. Premeditation is,
however, manifest and evident by reason of the open acts executed by the accused. According to the
testimony of Charles Gatchery and Eugenio R. Whited, Hicks asked leave from the former to be absent
from the canteen where he was working on the morning of the day when the affray occurred, alleging
that his mind was unsettled and that he feared getting into trouble. It is also shown by the fact that
Whited, who was in Hicks' house about noon upon the latter's invitation, and while both where drinking
gin, and while the revolver, the instrument of the crime, was lying on the table on which were also
several loaded cartridges, heard the accused repeatedly say, referring to the deceased, that her time
had come, adding that he would rather see her dead than in the arms of another man, and when the
accused went to bed apparently very much worried, and refusing to answer when called, the witness left
him. On the day after the crime the police found on a table in the cuprit's house several loaded
cartridges, a bottle of oil and a piece of cloth used undoubtedly for cleaning the revolver.
All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused, deliberately and after due
reflection had resolved to kill the woman who had left him for another man, and in order to accomplish
his perverse intention with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was already provided with a clean
and well-prepared weapon and carried other loaded cartridges besides those already in his revolver, he
entered the house, greeting everyone courteously and conversed with his victim, in what appeared to be
a proper manner, disguising his intention and claiming her by his apparent repose and tranquility,
doubtless in order to successfully accomplish his criminal design, behaving himself properly as he had
planed to do beforehand.
As against the two foregoing aggravating circumstances no mitigating circumstances is present, not
even that mentioned in paragraph 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, to wit loss of reason and self-control
produced by jealousy as alleged by the defense, inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate the
criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those
which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.
From the foregoing considerations, and as the judgment appealed from is in accordance with the law, it
is our opinion that the same should be affirmed, as we do hereby affirm it with costs, provided, however,
that the death penalty shall be executed according to the law in force, and that in the event of a pardon
being granted, the culprit shall suffer the accessory penalties of article 53 of the Penal Code unless the
same be expressly remitted in the pardon. So ordered.
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HILARIO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
F.C. Fisher for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
220
The guilt of the defendant and appellant of the crime of homicide of which he was convicted in the court
below is conclusively established by the evidenced of record.
The trial court was of opinion that its commission was not marked by either aggravating or extenuating
circumstances, and sentenced the convict to fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal, the medium degree of the penalty prescribed by the code. Burt we are of opinion that the
extenuating circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article 9 should have been taken into consideration,
and that the prescribed penalty should have been imposed in its minimum degree. Subsection 7 of
article 9 is as follows:
The following are extenuating circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and
obfuscation.
The evidence clearly discloses that the convict, in the heat of passion, killed the deceased, who had
theretofore been his querida (concubine or lover) upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal
communication with a mutual acquaintance. We think that under the circumstances the convict was
entitled to have this fact taken into consideration in extenuation of his offense under the provisions of
the above-cited article.
This was the view taken by the Court of Spain upon a similar state of facts as set forth in its sentence of
July 4, 1892, which is summarized by Viada (p. 69, in question 19, art. 9 of vol. 6) as follows:
Shall he who kills a woman with whom he is living in concubinage for having caught her in her
underclothes with another party and afterwards shoots himself, inflicting a serious wound, be
responsible for that crime with the extenuating circumstance of having acted with violent
passion and obfuscation? The Audiencia of Santiago de Cuba did not so hold and its judgment
was reversed by the supreme court for the improper disregard of article 9, number 8, of the
Penal Code for Cuba and Puerto Rico: "The facts held to be true by the trial court, and which
were the immediate cause of the crime by producing in the accused strong emotion which
impelled him to the criminal act and even to attempt his own life, were a sufficient impulse in
the natural and ordinary course to produce the violent passion and obfuscation which the law
regards as a special reason for extenuation, and as the judgment did not take into
consideration the 8th circumstance of article 9 of the code, the Audiencia rendering it seems to
have violated this legal provision."
It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Hicks (14 Phil. Rep.., 217), we held that the "causes which mitigate
the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate feelings, not
those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions," and declined to give the benefit of the
provisions of this article to the convict in that case on the ground that the alleged causes for his loss of
self-control did not "originate from legitimate feelings." But in that case we found as facts that:
All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused, deliberately and after due
reflection had resolved to kill the woman who had left him for another man, and in order to
accomplish his perverse intention with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was already
provided with a clean and well-prepared weapon and carried other loaded cartridges besides
those already in his revolver, he entered the house, greeting everyone courteously and
conversed with his victim, in what appeared to be in a proper manner, disguising his intention
and calming her by his apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully
accomplish his criminal design, behaving himself properly as he had planned to do
beforehand.
In the former case the cause alleged "passion and obfuscation" of the aggressor was the convict's
vexation, disappointment and deliberate anger engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to
live in illicit relations with him, which she had a perfect right to do; his reason for killing her being merely
that he had elected to leave him and with his full knowledge to go and live with another man. In the
present case however, the impulse upon which defendant acted and which naturally "produced passion
and obfuscation" was not that the woman declined to have illicit relations with him, but the sudden
revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another. As
said by the supreme court of Spain in the above-cited decision, this was a "sufficient impulse" in the
ordinary and natural course of things to produce the passion and obfuscation which the law declares to
be one of the extenuating circumstances to be taken into consideration by the court.
Modified by a finding that the commission of the crime was marked with the extenuating circumstance
set out in subsection 7 of article 9, and by the reduction of the penalty of fourteen years eight months
and one day of reclusion temporal to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, the judgment of
conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be and are hereby affirmed, with the costs
of this instance against the appellant.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CATALINO RABAO, defendant-appellant.
Jose F. Oreta for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Paredes, Jr. for appellee.
IMPERIAL, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur convicting the
appellant of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of from eight years
and one day of prision mayor to twenty years of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the costs.
The information filed by the acting provincial fiscal of said province charged the defendant with parricide
for having killed his wife Salvacion Agawa on December 15, 1937, in the municipality of Naga, Province
of Camarines Sur, which crime was committed with evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength.
221
The defendant and the deceased Salvacion Agawa were married before the justice of the peace of
Naga on January 15, 1936 and had since been born to the marriage. Since their marriage they had
made their home in the house of Urbano Rellora, who lived maritally with the mother of the accused. On
the morning of December 15, 1937, when the defendant was hardly awake after staying up late the
previous night on account of the elections held in the municipality of Naga, he noticed that his wife was
preparing water with which to give the child a bath. He told his wife not to bathe the child because it had
a cold, but the wife insisted and a quarrel arose in the heat of which the accused punched his wife on
the abdomen. She fell seated on a sack of rice nearby and immediately suffered an attack of which she
died in spite of the aid rendered her by the accused himself and other persons who had arrived. The
following morning Dr. Vicente Roxas performed an autopsy and found that the spleen of the deceased
had been hypertrophied due to an acute and chronic malaria from which she had been suffering, and
that death was caused by the hemorrhage of the spleen when it was ruptured as a consequence of an
external blow on the abdomen which might have been that delivered by the accused.
The defense alleges that the lower court erred in declaring that the accused hit the deceased on the
abdomen, which caused her death, instead of finding him, at most, guilty of parricide through reckless
imprudence.
After an examination of the evidence, we are of the opinion that the lower court did not err in finding that
the accused hit the deceased on the abdomen which directly caused the rupture of her spleen
producing thereby an internal hemorrhage that caused her almost instant death. Urbano Rellora who, as
stated before, was the owner of the house where the defendant and the deceased lived and who
maintained marital relations with the mother of the accused, testified positively that he saw the accused
punched his wife on the abdomen, as a result of which she fell seated on a sack of rice and that very
moment she had an attack, became unconscious and expired. This testimony is corroborated by Dr.
Roxas who performed the autopsy, when he declared that the death was caused by the hemorrhage
produced by the rupture of the spleen which rupture was caused by an external blow on the abdomen of
the deceased. The defendant himself, in his sworn declaration (Exhibit C) subscribed before the justice
of the peace of Naga, voluntarily admitted having hit his wife on the abdomen with his fist when she said
things that offended and made him nervous. The aggression was likewise corroborated by another eye-
witness, Raymundo Hilano, who declared that he was at that time passing in front of the defendant's
house when he heard and saw him quarrelling with his wife and that the defendant was delivering blows
on his wife. The testimony of this witness however, seems incredible and deserves no merit for he
testified having seen the aggression through a window which was three and a half meters high from the
ground where he stood. Considering the height of the window and the location of the witness, it is clear
that he could not have seen what was happening inside the house.
The defendant's act is not mere reckless imprudence, as the defense contends, since under article 365
of the Revised Penal Code the acts that go to make up reckless imprudence must be lawful in
themselves, and the attack consisting in the blow the defendant dealt his wife is certainly not lawful,
since it transgresses the Revised Penal Code itself, which expressly prohibits it under pain of
punishment.
The facts proven constitute the crime of parricide defined by article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, and
in its commission there were present the following mitigating circumstances considered by the lower
court in favor of the defendant: lack of intention to commit so grave a crime (article 13 [3], Revised
Penal Code); having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or
obfuscation (article 13 [6]); having surrendered himself to the authorities immediately after the
commission of the crime (article 13 [7]); with no aggravating circumstance. As to the penalty imposed,
we find that it is not in accordance with that prescribed by the law. Under article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code the crime of parricide is punished with reclusion perpetua to death. These penalties are
indivisible and the Revised Penal Code provides, in article 63, rule 3, that whenever there is present
some mitigating circumstance with no aggravating one, the lesser penalty shall be applied. In conformity
with this legal provision, the penalty that should be imposed on the accused is that of reclusion
perpetua.
After reviewing the facts, we are convinced that the defendant did not really have the intention of
committing so grave a crime as parricide. The quarrel that led to the aggression had its origin from the
natural and justifiable desire of the defendant, as a father, to prevent his child, which was then ill, from
being given a bath. If, under the circumstances, he transgressed the law by an unjust attack on his wife,
he is, nevertheless, deserving of the mitigating circumstances allowed in his favor. We invoke, for this
reason, article 5, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, and recommended to his Excellency, the
President of the Philippines, the commutation of the penalty imposed on the defendant in this decision.
Modifying the appealed judgment, we declare the defendant Catalino Rabao guilty of the crime of
parricide and hereby sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and to the accessory penalties provided in
article 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000,
and to pay the costs in both instances. So ordered.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ELADIO VIERNES y ILDEFONSO, appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Rules of Court, a judgment of conviction in a criminal prosecution may be modified only upon
motion of the accused. As a rule, the prosecution is prohibited from seeking, and the trial court from
granting, a more severe penalty than that imposed in the original decision. This is especially true in a
case in which the new and amended penalty imposed is death.
The Case
Before us is an appeal1 from the April 6, 1998 Decision and the May 21, 1998 Order 2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City (Branch 12) in Criminal Case Nos. 0532-97, 0533-97 and 0534-97. The
assailed Decision convicted appellant of two counts of rape and one count of attempted rape. It
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, ELADIO VIERNES y ILDEFONSO, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No. 0532-97 of the crime of Rape, as defined and penalized
under Article 335, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 2532
and Republic Act No. 4111; in Crim. Case No. 0533-97 of the crime of Attempted Rape, as
defined and penalized under Article 335, par. 3 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 2532 and Republic Act No. 4111; and, in Crim. Case
No. 0534-97 of the crime of Rape, as defined and penalized under Article 335, par. 1 of the
222
 Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 2532 and Republic Act No. 4111, and
sentences him, as follows:
"1. CRIM. CASE NO. 0532-97 — to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to
indemnify Catherine Linatoc in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay P10,000 as moral
damages pursuant to Article 2219 (3) of the Civil Code, as well as exemplary
damages in the amount of P5,000.00 pursuant to Article 2229 of the same Code and
the costs of this suit;
"2. CRIM. CASE NO. 0533-97 — to suffer an indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4)
YEAR, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional, as Minimum, to
EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor, as Maximum, to indemnify
Catherine Linatoc in the amount of P25,000.00, and to pay the costs of this suit; and
"3. CRIM. CASE NO. 0534-97 — to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to
indemnify Catherine Linatoc in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay P10,000.00 as moral
damages pursuant to Article 2219 (3) of the Civil Code, as well as exemplary
damages in the amount of P5,000.00 pursuant to Article 2229 of the same Code and
the costs of this suit."3
On the other hand; the assailed Order increased the penalties as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, ELADIO VIERNES y ILDEFONSO, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No. 0532-97 of the crime of Rape, as defined and penalized
under Article 335, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; in
Crim. Case No. 0533 of the crime of Attempted Rape, as defined and penalized under Article
335, par. 3 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, and in Crim. Case No. 0534-97 of the crime of Rape, as defined and penalized
under Article 335, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
and sentences him, as follows:
"1. CRIM. CASE NO. 0532-97 — to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to indemnify
CATHERINE LINATOC in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay P10,000 as moral
damages pursuant to Article 2219 (3) of the Civil Code, as well as exemplary
damages in the amount of P5,000.00 pursuant to Article 2229 of the same Code and
the costs of this suit;
"2. CRIM. CASE NO. 0533-97 — to suffer an indeterminate penalty of TEN (10)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor, as Minimum, to FOURTEEN (14)
YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal, as
Maximum, to indemnify Catherine Linatoc in the amount of P25,000.00 and to pay the
costs of this suit; and
"3. CRIM. CASE NO. 0534[-97] — to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to indemnify
Catherine Linatoc in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay P10,000.00, as moral
damages pursuant to Article 2219 (3) of the Civil Code, the amount of P5,000.00, as
exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 2229 of the same Code and the costs of this
suit."4
Three criminal Complaints, all dated August 21, 1997, were filed by Catherine Linatoc (assisted by her
mother Lina Dela Cruz-Linatoc) before Second Assistant City Prosecutor Danilo S. Sandoval. The
Complaint in Criminal Case No. 0532-97 charged appellant with rape committed as follows:
"That on or about the 29th day of September, 1996 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning at
Barangay Tibig, Lipa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being then the common law husband of the mother of the victim, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation have
carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant who is a minor below 12 years old, against
her will and consent to her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her
under the provision of the Civil Code."5
The Complaint in Crim. Case No. 0534-97 likewise charged him with consummated rape:
"That on or about the 18th day of August 1997 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, at Barangay Tibig,
Lipa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being then the common law husband of the mother of the victim, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation have carnal knowledge
of the undersigned complainant who is a minor of 12 years old against her will and consent to
her damage and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under provisions of the
Civil Code."6
Finally, in Criminal Case No. 0533-97, appellant was charged with attempted rape:
"That on or about the month of March 1997, around noon time, at Barangay Tibi, Lipa City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being then the common law husband of the mother of the victim, by means of force and
intimidation and with lewd design pursuant to his carnal desire, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the felony of rape directly by overt
acts against the undersigned complainant who is a minor below 12 years old, by then and
there undressing her and going on top of her with his exposed private organ but did not
perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the said felony because the
undersigned offended party resisted."7
Criminal Case Nos. 0532-97 and 0534-97 were raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City, Branch
12; and Criminal Case No. 0533-97, to Branch 85 of the same court. Later, all the cases were
consolidated in Branch 12.8
On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. 9 After trial in due course, the lower court rendered the
assailed Decision.
In a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 18, 1998, Prosecutor Sandoval asked that the imposed
penalties be increased pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 7659. The RTC granted the Motion via the
assailed Order.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
223
In its Brief,10 the Office of the Solicitor General presents the following narration of facts:
"Catherine Linatoc stood quietly by the door of the toilet of appellant's — her mother's
common-law husband — house. Her skirt's hemlines were slowly falling to her knees vainly
covering the panty that were pulled down mid-way her lower legs. This was the third of a series
of dismaying sex that she and appellant had been through. Like the others before this one,
there was by appellant much pulling, shoving and forcible grasping of her hands, thus
rendering her immobile for three minutes or so.
"The third rape happened in appellant's house in Tibig, Lipa City, around noontime of August
18, 1997. Appellant then bidded [sic] the two brothers and a step-brother of Catherine Linatoc
to clean the his tricycle, which was parked on the side of the street across his house. They
followed his order. Appellant also instructed Catherine Linatoc to fetch water for the house
toilet. She obliged, returning with two pails of it. She deposited them by the door of the toilet.
Turning about, Catherine Linatoc was surprised to find appellant behind her. In quick
succession, appellant pushed her to the wall, pulled her skirts up, drag her panty mid-way her
lower leg, and rushed his own pants down. Grasping her hands tightly with one hand, appellant
began inserting his penis into her vagina. She resisted to no avail. His penis established a
comfortable slide into and out of her [organ], as the pace quickened for about three minutes.
The gyration was furious. After appellant spurted out, he backed off and left saying nothing.
"Frightened and crying, Catherine Linatoc went to her great-grandmother's abode in San
Guillermo, Lipa City. She reported the incident to this elder, and recounted some more.
Catherine Linatoc told her great-grandmother of two other acts of sexual abuse by appellant.
The first one, she narrated, happened on September 29, 1996, about ten in the morning[;] and
the second, on March 1997 around noon-time.
"The first rape happened on September 4, 1996 in appellant's house. Catherine Linatoc was
on the ground floor of the house when so suddenly appellant sprung from wherever he was,
grabbed and carried her to the second floor. The second floor was just three steps from the
ground floor. He then undressed her, taking off her sando, skirt and panty. He undressed
himself too, and then floored both their bodies, [his] on top of her. He caressed her breasts and
started inserting his penis into her vagina. Appellant held her hands tightly and fought off her
struggle. There was push and pull for about three minutes, then appellant came through.
Appellant dressed up, and before walking away, apologized to her. It would be the first and last
rape, he said.
"There was soon the second sexual abuse. In March 1997, about noontime, using the same
strategy as he did in the [first] rape, appellant unburdened himself on Catherine Linatoc. From
nowhere, appellant appeared. He dragged her to the second floor where he undressed her and
himself. He mightily threw her to the floor, his sweaty body covering her's. Appellant engaged
in the now familiar gyration once again. This time, however his penis landed on the thighs of
the victim as insertion, because of her struggle and vagina's virginal qualities, became
frustratingly difficult. Between her thighs appellant thrusted his penis. He satisfied himself just
the same.
"The great-grandmother was helpless to remedy the abuse done to Catherine Linatoc. They
waited for the father of Catherine Linatoc, Orlando Linatoc, who arrived four days later. The
mother of Catherine Linatoc, Lina Viernes, also arrived. Catherine Linatoc had her medico-
legal examination with these results.:
'x x x lacerated hymen on the 3:00 and 9:00 o'clock positions with small amounts of
whitish discharge.'
"The medico-legal examination was performed by Dr. Helen S. Dy. The present criminal
complaints against appellant were thereafter filed." 11
Version of the Defense
Appellant denies the charges against him. Claiming to have been elsewhere at the time of the
commission of the alleged crimes, he submits the following counterstatement of the facts:
"1) ELADIO, at the lower court, stated that he is the common law husband of Lina de la Cruz-
Linatoc (mother of the alleged victim . . . Catherine Linatoc). He is a security guard and at the
same time, a tricycle driver. On September 29, 1996 he was living with Lina, together with
Catherine, his two sons and other relatives. On September 28, 1996 he scolded Catherine. As
a consequence thereof, Catherine went to the house of her great grandmother and stayed
therein even beyond September 29, 1996. Therefore, it is impossible for him (ELADIO) to have
attacked Catherine sexually on September 29, 1996. It is not true that he attempted to rape
Catherine in March of 1997 because he was on duty at that time. Their company logbook will
bear witness thereto. (Exhibit '2', Original Records) On August 18, 1997 it is not true that he
raped Catherine since he was plying his tricycle then. (TSN, pp. 2-13, December 11, 1997; and
pp. 2-22, January 8, 1998)
"2) Lina de la Cruz at the Court below, testified that she confirms claim/s [sic] of ELADIO that
Catherine was no longer in their house on September 29, 1996 and that ELADIO could not
have abused Catherine sexually. Catherine's charge for March 1997 and August 18, 1997
were not also true. (TSN, pp. 2-7, February 3, 1998).
xxx xxx xxx
"D. Sur-Rebuttal Evidence
"ELADIO, as a sur-rebuttal witness, denied to have asked the settlement of the case." 12
Ruling of the Trial Court
The court a quo held that the testimony of Catherine Linatoc — both on direct and on cross-examination
— was clear, positive and steadfast. Corroborated by the medicolegal examination conducted on her, it
was replete with details that jibed on material points. The prosecution successfully proved that she was
the daughter of appellant's common-law wife and that, at the time of the crime, she was 12 years old.
The declarations of complainant were accorded full faith and credence on the theory that she would not
publicly acknowledge the defilement of her virtue or subject herself to public humiliation, if her purpose
224
was not to obtain justice for the wrong committed. There is no evidence that she was a woman of loose Q What was that unusual incident that transpired?
morals or that she had any ill motive to falsely accuse appellant.
A After my mother left, I was pulled sir.
On the other hand, appellant's denial and alibi were unsubstantiated and self-serving; hence, they
deserve no weight in law. They cannot stand against Catherine's positive testimony. Q By whom, who pulled you?

In the assailed Order, the trial court noted that the prosecution's Motion was unopposed. It ruled that the
increase in the penalty did not place appellant in double jeopardy.
Hence, this appeal.13
The Issues
In his Brief,14 appellant raises this sole alleged error:
A My step father, sir.
Q Where were you brought, towards what direction?
A Towards the second floor of our house and to the place where we sleep, sir.
Q By the way, that house where you were living in Brgy. Tibig, Lipa City on that date
September 29, 1996, what kind of house is that?

"The lower court has committed an error in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes A It is made of Sawali, sir.
charged and on meting out on him the supreme penalty of death, more particularly in Criminal
Cases Nos. 0532-97 and 0534-97."
Q How about the flooring, how many floors does it have?
An appeal from a criminal conviction, especially one involving the death penalty, throws the whole case
open for review. Thus, it becomes the duty of the reviewing court to correct any error in the appealed A Three (3) steps sir.
judgment, whether or not it is made the subject of an assignment of error. 15 In this light, the Court
believes that a second issue needs to be taken up, namely: Q What do you mean by three (3) steps?

"Whether the trial court erred in increasing the penalties via the assailed Order." A Our stairs is made of three (3) steps, sir.

This Court's Ruling Court:

The trial court was correct in convicting appellant in accordance with the challenged Decision, but was From the ground floor?
wrong in imposing the new penalties through the assailed Order.
A Yes, sir.
First Issue:
Appellant's Culpability Q What is located after going this stairs composed of three (3) steps?

After a thorough review of the pleadings, the transcripts of stenographic notes and other records of the
case, we are convinced that the court a quo did not err in giving credence to the testimonies of the
victim and the other prosecution witnesses. The testimony of private complainant, detailing how she
was abused by appellant on two separate occasions and how he tried to rape her once more, was clear
and convincing. We quote at length:
A That is the place where we sleep sir.
Q After you [were] pulled upstairs to where you usually sleep by Eladio Viernes, what did
Eladio Viernes do to you after reaching that upper portion of your house, if he did anything?

"Q While you were in your house on that date, September 29, 1996, 10:00 o'clock in the Atty. Dimaandal
morning, do you remember of any unusual incident that transpired if any?
Leading your Honor.
A Yes, sir.
Court

225
 Answer. Q When he inserted his penis into your vagina, what did you feel?

A He undressed me sir. A Painful, sir.

Q What were you wearing that Eladio Viernes took of[f] from your body? Q Was Eladio Viernes able to actually insert his penis[?]

A I was wearing a skirt which was my uniform sir. Atty. Dimaandal

Q What else i[f] any were taken of[f] from your body by Eladio Viernes? Leading your honor.

A My blouse, sando and my skirt and my panty sir. Q After Eladio Viernes inserted his private organ into your private organ, what else did he
do if anything more?
Q After Eladio Viernes took your clothing, after removing your clothing what did Eladio
Viernes do on your body? A He did pumping motion, sir.

A He placed himself on top of me. Q For how long did he do this pumping motion, while his penis was inside your vagina?

Q When Eladio Viernes placed himself on top of you, what was he wearing if any? A About three (3) minutes sir.

A None sir. Q After three (3) minutes when Eladio Viernes did this pumping motion while his penis
was inside your vagina, what else did he do if he did anything more?
Q By the way, when Eladio Viernes pulled you to where you usually sleep, what was his
wearing at that time? A He removed his private organ sir."16

A He was wearing pants, sir. We also quote the testimony of the victim regarding appellant's attempt to rape her:

Q You said that after Eladio Viernes took of[f] all your clothing he went on top of you you "Q When was the second time, after September 26, 1996?
said he was already naked, what did he do with hi[s] pants before he went on top of you?
A In May 1997 but I do not remember the exact date sir.
A He mashed [m]y breast sir.
Q Are you sure about the date?
Q What else did he do [to] you aside from mashing your breast?
Atty. Dimaandal
A He inserted his penis into my vagina.
That is the answer of the witness.
Q By the way, while he was mashing your breast, what were you doing if you did
anything? Prosecutor

A I was fighting him back sir. That's why I am asking, are you sure about the date?

Q What did Eladio Viernes do when you fought him back while he was mashing your A May 19, 1997 sir.
breast?

A He was slapping me sir.

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Q By the way, in [the] second incident [where] Eladio Viernes according to you raped you Q What kind of wearing apparel that you were wearing that were taken off by Eladio
again, where did this happen? Viernes on that same occasion?

A At Barangay Tibig, Lipa City. A I was wearing a skirt sir.

Q In what particular place in Bgy. Tibig were you raped for the second time by Eladio Q After you were undressed by Eladio Viernes what did Eladio Viernes do to you if he did
Viernes? anything?

Q In the upper portion of our house at the place where we are sleeping sir. A He again placed himself on top of me sir.

Q The same place where the second rape was committed? Q What was he wearing he placed himself on top of you if he was wearing anything?

A Yes, sir. A He was wearing pants sir.

Q Around what time did this happen, this second rape happened? Q When he placed himself on top of you, where was his pants?

Atty. Dimaandal A He removed pants sir.

We make it of record that the witness cannot answer. Q When Eladio Viernes went on top of you, what did you [sic] do if he anything more on
the second time around?
Prosecutor
A He again mashed my breast sir.
The witness is thinking . . .
Q What did you do when Eladio Viernes again mashed your breast?
A Noontime sir.
A I was fighting him back sir.
Q How did this happen?
Q What else did he do aside from mashing your breast, what did Eladio Viernes do to
A He again pulled me sir. you?

Q By the way on that second occasion, where was your mother? A He was inserting his penis into my vagina sir.

A She was working sir. Q When Eladio Viernes was inserting his penis into your vagina, what did you do?

Q You said that you were again pulled, where were you brought by Eladio Viernes at the A I was struggling sir.
same time around?
Q When you struggled, what happened to that effort of Eladio Viernes to insert his penis
A The upper portion of our house and at the place where we were sleeping sir. into your vagina?

Q After you were pulled by Eladio Viernes, what did Eladio Viernes do to you? A It was not inserted sir.

A He undressed me sir. Q What did Eladio Viernes do when he failed to insert his penis into your vagina?

A He just placed it between my thighs sir.

227
 Q After placing his penis between your thighs, what else did Eladio Viernes do if he did Q You said that you had just arrived from school, when you arrived in your house in Brgy.
anything? Tibig, Lipa City on August 18, 1997 around 12 noon, whom did you meet in your house if you
met anybody there?
Atty. Dimaandal
A My step father sir.
May we interrupt . . That after translations the answer of this witness. He just place on
my thigh, there was no vagina [sic]. Q Meaning Eladio Viernes?

Q You said that Eladio Viernes placed his penis in your thighs, in what particular part of A Yes sir.
your thighs?
Q Seeing Eladio Viernes in your house on that date August 18, 1997 around 12 noon,
Atty. Dimaandal what did he do if he did anything upon seeing him or meeting you?

Leading A He instructed our companions in the house to clean the motor tricycle sir.

Court Q After instructing your companions in your house to clean the motor tricycle, what else
did Eladio Viernes do, if he did anything more?
Answer.
A He asked me to fetch two (2) containers of water sir.
Interpreter
Q By the way, these your companions of your house, [sic] who where given the instruction
Witness pointing to the inner portion of her two thighs by Eladio Viernes to clean the motor tricycle, who are these companions [sic] of your house?

Q What did Viernes do after he put his penis between the inner portion of your two A My two brothers and one step brother, sir.
thighs?
Q How old were these two brothers of yours and your one step brother who were given
A [H]e placed his penis between my thighs and he again did the pumping motion sir."17 the instruction by Eladio Viernes to clean the motor tricycle?

Pertinent portions of the testimony of complainant regarding her second defilement in the hands of A My step brother was 12 years old; my two brothers were six and 5 years old sir.
appellant read as follows:
Q How far was this tricycle from your house?
"Q Miss Witness, on August 18, 1997 around 12:00 noon where were you?
A Near the street sir.
A I was at home sir.
Q Around how many meters if you can calculate was this tricycle from your house or can
Q What were you doing? you point distance from the place where you are sitting now to any place inside the court
room?
A I just arrived from school sir.
Interpreter
Q You said that you were in your house, where was this house located on that date,
August 18, 1997? Witness pointing to the railings inside the Court room as their house and the witness
pointed to the western wall of the court room as the place where the tricycle was to be
around 7 meters sir.
A At Barangay Tibig sir.

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Q What did your two (2) brothers and one (1) step brother do if they did anything more A He pulled up my skirt and when I was trying to go out from the comfort room he was
upon receiving the instruction from your step father Eladio Viernes to clean the motor tricycle? stopping me from going out sir.

A They followed the instruction of my step father to clean the tricycle sir. Q What happened to your struggle, to free from the hold of Eladio Viernes when you were
inside the comfort room?
Q How about you when you were instructed by your step father to fetch two (2) containers
of water, what did you do? A I could not go out [o]f the comfort room because I was held by my step father sir.

A I brought the water near the comfort room sir. Q After Eladio Viernes pulled up your skirt, what did he do with you if he did anything
more?
Q After you brought the two (2) containers of water to the place were you said a while
ago, what did Eladio Viernes do to you if he did anything? A He pulled down my panty sir.

A He followed me sir. Q Up to what portion was that panty of yours pulled down?

Q After Eladio Viernes followed you, what did he do [to] you if he did anything? Interpreter

A I was frightened sir. Witness pointing to her ankle

Q Why? Q After Eladio Viernes pulled down your panty up to your ankle, what did he do to you?

Atty. Dimaandal A He was inserting his penis into my vagina, sir.

Not responsive your honor. I move to strike out the answer of the witness.' Q What was your position in relation to Eladio Viernes when he was inserting his penis
into your vagina?
Court
A I was standing sir.
Continue.
Q How about Eladio Viernes, where was he in relation to you while he was inserting his
Q Why did you get frightened? penis into your vagina?

A Because I felt that he will repeat the same thing sir. A He was at my back sir.

Q What do you mean repeat the same thing? Q What happened to this effort of Eladio Viernes in trying to insert his private organ into
your private organ?
A He will again repeat raping me sir.
A It was inserted sir.
Q When you got frightened, what did you do?
Q You said that you were standing, what was the form or what was the position of your
body aside from the fact that you were standing when Eladio Viernes was able to insert his
A I tried to struggle sir. penis into your vagina while he was at your back?

Q Why did you struggle, what was Eladio Viernes doing [to] you? A I was standing and I was struggling sir.

229
 Q When Eladio Viernes was actually able to insert his penis into your vagina, what was
the position of your body aside from the fact that you were standing?
A I was standing with my knees bent sir.
Q After Eladio Viernes was able to insert his, penis into your vagina while you are in a
standing position, how long was his penis inside your vagina?
A About three (3) minutes sir."18
Catherine impressed the trial court as "a decent woman [who has] not been shown to be of loose
morals or one who goes out with different men any time of the day or night." 19 A rape victim who
testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner — and remains consistent —
is a credible witness.20 It is well-entrenched that the trial court is in the best position to assess the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of its unique opportunity to observe them firsthand
and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude on the stand. 21 In the absence of any showing that its
assessment is flawed, an appellate tribunal is bound by it.
Despite the tender age of complainant, her accounts on direct and cross-examination were replete with
details that jibed on material points.22 Considering her young age, it would have been highly improbable
for her to fabricate a charge so humiliating to her and her family, had she not been truly subjected to the
painful experience of sexual abuse.23
The moral ascendancy of appellant as the common-law husband of complainant's mother takes the
place of force and intimidation as an element of rape, 24 although the presence of such element is
apparent from Catherine's testimony.
Alibi and Corroboration
Appellant denies having raped Catherine on September 29, 1996, claiming she was at her
grandmother's house in San Guillermo, while he was outside his house digging a toilet pit. Allegedly, in
March 1997, he was on duty as a security guard at the Smart Tower; and on August 18, 1997, he was
busy the whole day plying his tricycle route.
The trial court correctly disbelieved his alibi. Alibi and denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence that deserve no weight in law. They cannot be given
greater evidentiary value over a credible witness' testimony on affirmative matters.25 Except for Lina
Linatoc's corroboration, the only evidence supporting the alibi and denial of appellant is his own say-so.
And Lina happens to be his common-law wife; thus, her testimony is necessarily suspect and cannot
prevail over the testimonies of more credible witnesses. 26 Negative testimony cannot prevail over the
offended party's positive identification of the accused as her rapist. 27
Finally, for alibi to prosper, it must be shown that the accused was in another place at the time the crime
was committed, and that it would have been physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime at the time it was committed.28 Such physical impossibility was not proven in the present case.
The Smart Tower where appellant worked as a security guard was located also in Barangay Tibig, Lipa
City, and was only a thirty-minute walk from his house. The tricycle station, on the other hand, was only
1000 meters away. Note that he had a motorized tricycle at his disposal. His alibi, therefore, is unworthy
of credence.
Attempt to Settle the Case
Appellant strongly denies the prosecution's assertion that he attempted to settle the case with
complainant's family.
We remain unconvinced. Instead, we concur with the finding of the RTC that the letter dated November
25, 1997 — addressed to Orlando and Catherine Linatoc, signed by appellant and delivered by Lina
Linatoc — was admissible evidence against appellant. Perusal of the letter reveals that he attempted to
bribe Orlando with P150,000 or a house and lot and a promise of an additional P100,000 in exchange
for dropping the charges against him.29 Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
Voluntary Surrender
Appellant pleads for leniency on account of his alleged voluntary surrender.
We disagree. The act of surrender must be spontaneous, accompanied by an acknowledgment of guilt,
or an intention to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that search and capture would
require.30 Going to the police station "to clear his name" does not show any intent of appellant to
surrender unconditionally to the authorities.31
Medicolegal Officer's Testimony
Appellant avers that the medicolegal officer who examined complainant admitted being unsure of her
findings.
We disagree with the assessment by appellant of the testimony of the medicolegal officer. However,
even if we discount the testimony of the latter, complainant's testimony by itself can sustain the former's
conviction. Medical examination is not an indispensable requirement, and its absence does not affect
the verdict of conviction, if sufficient evidence is presented to prove the crime charged. 32 When a rape
complainant, especially one of tender age like Catherine, says that she has been raped, she in effect
says all that is necessary to show that she has indeed been raped.
Civil Indemnity and Moral Damages
The Solicitor General takes issue with the damages awarded by the RTC. In the assailed Order, it
ordered appellant to pay P50,000 in civil indemnity, P10,000 in moral damages and P5,000 in
exemplary damages for every count of consummated rape; and P25,000 in civil indemnity for the
attempted rape.
Recent jurisprudence has increased the indemnification for the victim in a case of consummated rape to
P75,000 if the crime was committed with, or effectively qualified by, any of the circumstances under
230
which the death penalty is authorized by the applicable amendatory laws. 33 Moral damages are pegged
at P50,000 without further need of pleading or proof.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are granted when an aggravating circumstance, which is not
offset by a mitigating circumstance, attended the commission of the crime. In several cases, the
relationship between the appellant and the rape victim justifies the award of exemplary damages, as in
this case.34
Second Issue:
Modification of Penalties
One day after the promulgation of the April 6, 1998 Decision, the prosecution filed a Motion for
Reconsideration seeking the imposition of the death penalty on appellant for the two cases of
consummated rape and reclusion temporal for the attempted rape, in accordance with Section 11 of RA
7659. The prosecution argued that the Motion would not place appellant in double jeopardy, because
"what is sought is just the imposition of the proper penalty as provided by law." 35 The trial court
concurred with the prosecution and granted the Motion in the assailed Order, saying that the Motion
was unopposed and that there was no violation of appellant's right against double jeopardy. 36
We disagree. Conflicting decisions rendered over the years — both allowing the prosecution to seek the
reconsideration of a conviction and prohibiting it therefrom — necessitate a review of the rule on the
modification of judgments of conviction. Early on, in People v. Ang Cho Kio,37 the Court, citing Article 2
of Rule 118 of the pre-1964 Rules of Court, held that the prosecution cannot move to increase the
penalty imposed in a promulgated judgment. Reopening the case for the purpose of increasing the
penalty as sought by the government would place the accused in double jeopardy. This ruling was
followed in People v. Pomeroy38 and People v. Ruiz.39
The 1964 amendment of the Rules, however, allowed the fiscal to move for the modification or the
setting aside of the judgment before it became final or an appeal was perfected. 40 Under this
amendment, a judgment acquired finality and the trial court lost jurisdiction only in the following cases:
(1) after the 15-day period to appeal lapsed,41 (2) when the defendant voluntarily submitted to the
execution of judgment, (3) when the defendant perfected the appeal,42 (4) when the accused withdrew
the appeal, (5) when the accused expressly waived in writing the right to appeal, 43 and (6) when the
accused filed a petition for probation.44 Under this amendment, the trial court had plenary power to alter
or revise its judgment in accordance with the requirements of law and justice.
In 1985, Section 7 of Rule 120 was amended to include the phrase "upon motion of the accused" —
effectively resurrecting the Ang Cho Kio ruling prohibiting the prosecution from seeking a modification of
a judgment of conviction.45 As amended, the provision was worded as follows:
"SEC. 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the
accused, be modified or set aside by the court rendering it before the judgment has become
final or appeal has been perfected. A judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse
of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally
satisfied or served, or the accused has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal, or the
accused has applied for probation."
Under this Rule, a judgment of conviction, before it became final, could be modified or set aside upon
motion of the accused.46 It obviously aims to protect the accused from being put anew to defend himself
from more serious offenses or penalties which the prosecution or the court may have overlooked in the
original trial. It does not however bar him from seeking or receiving more favorable modifications.
Significantly, the present Rules, as amended last year, retained the phrase "upon motion of the
accused," as follows:
"SEC. 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the
accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except
where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or
when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation."
Therefore, the assailed Order is erroneous and reversible. The trial court cannot increase the penalties
without the consent of the accused.
We close this Decision with an exhortation to the defense counsel to be more circumspect in defending
appellant and others similarly situated. Counsel should have immediately objected to the Motion for
Reconsideration in the trial court. Because of this failure to take exception, the RTC judge meekly
granted the relief prayed for and condemned the accused, inter alia, to two death sentences.
Before this Court, counsel was again caught flat-footed by not raising the erroneous basis of the
assailed Order. We cannot disregard such serious lapse. We urge counsel, as well as all the members
of the bench and the bar, to be more vigilant in protecting the rights of the accused — especially those
in jeopardy of the death penalty — and to keep abreast of legal developments. Indeed, the learning
process in law never ceases.47 Utmost dedication to duty and excellence is expected of every lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Order is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE, while the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED and REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that
the awards of moral damages are increased to P50,000 and those for exemplary damages to P25,000
for each consummated rape, pursuant to current jurisprudence. 48
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
RONNIE ABOLIDOR, CLAUDIO BARCIMO, JR. and FRANCISCO COMODA, accused.
CLAUDIO BARCIMO, JR., appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
231
This is an appeal from the decision1 dated January 31, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City,
Branch 31, in Criminal Case No. 40948, convicting Claudio Barcimo, Jr. @ "Noc-noc", Ronnie Abolidor
and Francisco Comoda of the crime of murder, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordering them to pay P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P16,000.00 as actual damages and
P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages.
Claudio Barcimo, Jr., Ronnie Abolidor and Francisco Comoda were indicted for Murder in an
Information alleging:
That on or about the 14th day of June 1993, in the Municpality of New Lucena, Iloilo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and
helping one another together with another unidentified person, armed with firearms of unknown caliber,
with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, with treachery, superior strength and evident
premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shoot Thelma Subosa
with said firearms hitting the latter on the head, chest and other parts of her body which caused the
death of said Thelma Subosa immediately thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment,3 the three accused pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.
The victim, Thelma Subosa, was the mother of 14 children with her deceased husband, Primo Subosa.
Subsequently, she cohabited with her common-law husband Warlito Huesca and lived together with
some of her children in Brgy. Janipa-an, Oeste, New Lucena, Ilo-ilo. Thereafter, Warlito Huesca also
died.
In the early morning of June 14, 1993, a day after Warlito was buried, the victim, her children namely,
Ellyn, Roselyn, Evelyn, Manilyn, Leopoldo and Lilibeth, and Milagros Huesca, the younger sister of
Warlito Huesca, were awakened by the forcible opening of the door of their house. Four men entered
the house and declared a "hold up". The victim pleaded not to be harmed. Instead, accused Ronnie
Abolidor tied her mouth with a handkerchief to silence her. Then appellant Claudio Barcimo, Jr. shot the
victim several times causing her instantaneous death.4
Prosecution witnesses Ellyn and Roselyn identified Claudio Barcimo, Jr. and Ronnie Abolidor since they
slept on the same mat with the victim and a kerosene lamp was near the victim’s head. 5 Both testified
that they knew Ronnie Abolidor because he was their neighbor for several years, and Claudio Barcimo,
Jr. because he was a friend of their deceased stepfather. Francisco Comoda was later identified by the
witnesses at the police station.6
Roselyn also testified that on June 12, 1993, at the burial of their stepfather, the victim told her that it
was Claudio Barcimo, Jr. @ "Noc-Noc" who killed Warlito Huesca.7
For his part, appellant denied any participation in the killing of Thelma Subosa and claimed that he
could not have done it because he was a good friend of Warlito Huesca; that on June 13, 1993, at
around 4:00 p.m., he was with Brgy. Capt. Buñol in a celebration at the house of Brgy. Capt. Gerardo
Paniza at Brgy. Dawis. He had dinner and watched game of mahjong; that at around 10:00 p.m., he
went to sleep on the sofa near the mahjong table; that the mahjong game lasted until 4:00 a.m. the
following day; that he and Capt. Buñol went back to New Lucena at about 6:00 a.m. of June 14, 1993;
and on the next day, he left for Manila for treatment of tuberculosis.8
After trial, the trial court convicted the three accused on January 31, 2000 in a decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having sufficiently established the guilt of all the three accused, namely,
Claudio Barcimo, Jr., alias Nocnoc, Ronilo Abolidor alias Ronnie and Francisco Comoda, beyond
reasonable doubt (Rule 133, Sec. 2, Revised Rules of Court) of the offense of Murder under Art. 248,
R.P.C. as alleged in the Information, this Court hereby renders judgment sentencing all the said
accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment consisting of Reclusion Perpetua, with all the attendant
accessory penalties, to pay P100,000.00 as indemnity for death to the heirs of the late Thelma Sobusa,
to pay the sum of P16,000.00 as actual damages, and P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary
damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.9
Only Claudio Barcimo, Jr. appealed the decision raising the following assignment of errors:
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES ELLEN SOBUSA AND ROSELYN SOBUSA AND IN NOT APPRECIATING THE
TESTIMONY OF THE AUNT OF SAID WINTNESSES AS CORROBORATED BY THE
BARANGAY CAPTAIN OF THE PLACE WHERE THE INCIDENT HAPPENED THAT THE
SAID PROSECUTION WITNESSES HAVE NOT IDENTIFIED THE KILLERS.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY IS ATTENDANT IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NIGHTTIME IS ATTENDANT IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
OF THE ACCUSED.10
Appellant Claudio Barcimo, Jr. contends that his identification by Ellyn and Roselyn as one of the
assailants is doubtful because when asked whether they know the assailants, they replied in the
negative.
The contention is without merit.
By challenging his identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, as one of the assailants of the
victim, the appellant attacks the credibility of said witnesses and the probative weight of their
testimonies. However, when the issue of credibility of witnesses is in question, the findings of facts of
the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight
thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded by the appellate court high
respect if not conclusive effect, precisely because of the unique advantage of the trial court in observing
232
and monitoring at close range the demeanor, deportment and conduct of the witnesses as they testify,
unless the trial court has overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts of substance which if
considered might affect the result of the case.11
In the case at bar, there is no showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, misapplied or
misconstrued any fact of substance that might materially affect the outcome of the case. The trial court
found the collective testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Ellyn and Roselyn to be:
…generally impressionable but their natural naiveté and inexperience make them reliable witnesses.
Their statements are generally free from any bias or prejudice as to be slanted or malicious. It is
observed that the testimonies of Ellyn and Roselyn Sobusa are direct, straightforward and delivered
without any hesitancy whatsoever.12
The two prosecution witnesses, Ellyn and Roselyn Sobusa, positively identified appellant as the one
who shot the victim. Although the incident occurred during nighttime, the house of the victim was
sufficiently illuminated by the kerosene lamp placed near the head of the victim, which provided enough
light for purposes of identifying the killers.
On direct testimony, Ellyn Sobusa narrated the incident as follows:
Q. Can you recall in the morning of June 14, 1993 if there was any unusual incident that
happened?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What is that incident about?
A. At around that time I was awakened by the sound of the opening of the door. I saw four (4)
persons entered our house and one them said, "This is a hold up." My mother then pleaded,
"Do not kill me. Have mercy."
Q. What happened after your mother pleaded have mercy?
A. There was a shot and I ducked. Then another shot was fired which I do not know anymore
because I lied with my face down.
Q. Do you know the person who said this is a hold up?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who is he?
A. Nocnoc.
Q. How far is this Nocnoc when you said he shot your mother?
A. Very near.
Q. What was the position of your mother by the time she was shot by Nocnoc?
A. She was lying down.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Miss witness, this incident happened at around 2:00 o’clock in the morning, why are you
sure that Ronnie Abolidor was one of the four persons who entered your house?
A. Because we have a kerosene lamp placed very near the head of my mother.
Q. How far is that kerosene lamp from your mother?
A. Witness demonstrates about 5 to 6 inches more or less.
Q. At that time that she was shot by Nocnoc, how far is Nocnoc from the kerosene lamp?
A. Nocnoc was situated on the feet of my mother.
Q. What was the position of Nocnoc when he shot your mother?
A. He was standing.13
Considering the illumination from the kerosene lamp, and Ellyn’s proximity to her mother and to the
appellant, she could have clearly seen and recognized the appellant when he shot the victim.
In People v. Prieto,14 we ruled that the illumination provided by kerosene lamp or wicklamps, and
flashlights, moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations, be considered as sufficient illumination,
making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious.
Moreover, Roselyn testified that she was familiar with the voice of the appellant as he was a friend of his
stepfather and she visited appellant’s house several times.15 The voice of a person is an acceptable
means of identification where it is established that the witness and the accused knew each other
personally and closely for a number of years. Once a person has gained familiarity with another,
identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance.16 We also note that
appellant did not deny that Warlito Huesca was his good friend and that he visited their house many
times.17
The credibility of the prosecution witnesses Ellyn and Roselyn is not adversely affected by their failure
to immediately report the identities of the perpetrators to the responding authorities immediately after
the incident. Indubitably, fear stifled the witnesses from voicing their knowledge of the identities of the
perpetrators. There is no rule that a witness should immediately name the suspect in a crime.18
Nevertheless, the delay was not that long as when the police authorities investigated the witnesses in
233
the afternoon of June 14, 1993 at Brgy. Agutayan, Sta. Barbara, Iloilo, they named appellant and
accused Ronnie Abolidor as two of the perpetrators.19
To escape criminal liability, appellant invokes the defense of alibi and denial. He asserts that he could
not have done it considering that Warlito Huesca, the common-law husband of the victim, was his good
friend and at the time of the incident he was at Brgy. Dawis together with Brgy. Capt. Buñol in the house
of Brgy. Capt. Gerardo Pineza watching the game of majhong.
We are not convinced.
It is well settled that positive identification, where categorical and consistent and not attended by any
showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and
denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving
evidence undeserving weight in law.20 Hence, the defense of denial and alibi cannot prosper in the light
of the positive identification by eyewitnesses Ellyn Sobusa and Roselyn Sobusa that appellant was the
one who shot their mother.
We agree with the trial court’s appreciation of the presence of qualifying circumstance of treachery.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. It is settled that
there is treachery if the victim, when killed, was sleeping or had just awakened, because in such cases
the victim was in no position to put up any form of defense.21
In the case at bar, the victim had just awakened from sleep because of the forcible opening of their
door. When she was shot by appellant, she was lying down on the mat with a handkerchief tied around
her mouth. Obviously, in this position she can not defend herself from the aggression of the
perpetrators.
The trial court did not err in disregarding the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. To benefit
an accused, the following requisites must be proven, namely: (1) the offender has not actually been
arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was
voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to
submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes
to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Voluntary
surrender presupposes repentance.22 In People v. Viernes,23 we held that going to the police station to
clear one’s name does not show any intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities.
In the case at bar, appellant surrendered to the authorities after more than one year had lapsed since
the incident and in order to disclaim responsibility for the killing of the victim. This neither shows
repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor intention to save the government the trouble and
expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Besides, at the time of his surrender, there was
a pending warrant of arrest against him.24 Hence, he should not be credited with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Appellant is guilty of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the killing of Thelma Sobusa. Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for Murder. The
trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court awarded the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim. Said
amount must be reduced to P50,000.00, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.25
The award of actual damages must also be modified. While appellant admitted the amount of
P19,000.00 as actual damages,26 the trial court only awarded the amount of P16,000.00.27 Ordinarily,
receipts should support claims of actual damages, but where the amount claimed was admitted, it
should be granted.28 Consequently, the heirs of the victim is entitled to be awarded the amount of
P19,0000.00 as actual damages.
The trial court likewise erred when it awarded the amount of P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages without indicating what amount constitutes moral damages and exemplary damages. In
murder and homicide cases, the award of moral damages should be substantiated by evidence. 29 In the
case at bar, the prosecution failed to present proof of moral damages. Therefore, the same should be
deleted.
On the other hand, exemplary damages must be awarded in view of the attendance of treachery which
qualified the killing to Murder. Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages as part of the
civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances. The term aggravating circumstances as used therein is to be understood in its broad or
generic sense since the law did not specify otherwise. The ordinary qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil
liability of the offender. Thus, the heirs of the victim are entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00.30
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 31,
in Criminal Case No. 40948, insofar as it finds Claudio Barcimo, Jr. @ "Noc-noc" guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Thelma Sobusa
the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P19,000.00 as actual damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages. The award of moral damages is DELETED.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE v. EDGAR DAWATON +
DECISION
437 Phil. 861
234
BELLOSILLO, J.:
EDGAR DAWATON was found by the trial court guilty of murder qualified by treachery and sentenced
to death, ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 plus the accessory penalties provided
by law, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs of suit. [1]
An Information[2] for murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation was filed against Edgar
Dawaton on 11 March 1999. When first arraigned he pleaded not guilty, [3] but during the pre-trial on 7
May 1999, he offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide but was rejected by the
prosecution, hence, the case proceeded to trial.
The prosecution presented as witnesses the very persons who were with the accused and the victim
during the incident, namely, Domingo Reyes and Esmeraldo Cortez. The prosecution also presented
Generosa Tupaz, the mother of the victim, to prove the civil liability of the accused.
The evidence for the prosecution: On 20 September 1998 Esmeraldo Cortez was entertaining visitors in
his house in Sitio Garden, Brgy. Paltic, Dingalan, Aurora. His brother-in-law Edgar Dawaton and
kumpadre Leonides Lavares dropped by at about 12:00 o'clock noon followed by Domingo Reyes
shortly after. All three (3) guests of Esmeraldo were residents of Sitio Garden. They started drinking
soon after. At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and after having consumed four (4) bottles of gin, they
went to the house of Amado Dawaton, Edgar's uncle, located about twenty (20) meters away from
Esmeraldo's house. They stayed at the balcony of the house and continued drinking. Amado Dawaton
was not in.
Already drunk, Leonides decided to sleep on a papag or wooden bench, lying down on his right side
facing Domingo and Edgar using his right hand for a pillow. Edgar, Domingo and Esmeraldo continued
drinking until they finished another bottle of gin.
At about 3:30 in the afternoon, twenty (20) minutes after Leonides had gone to sleep, Edgar stood up
and left for his house. When he returned he brought with him a stainless knife with a blade 2 to 3 inches
long. Without a word, he approached Leonides who was sleeping and stabbed him near the base of his
neck.[4] Awakened and surprised, Leonides got up and blurted: "Bakit Pare, bakit?"[5] Instead of
answering, Edgar again stabbed Leonides on the upper part of his neck, spilling blood on Leonides'
arm.
Leonides attempted to flee but Edgar who was much bigger grabbed the collar of his shirt and thus
effectively prevented him from running away. Edgar then repeatedly stabbed Leonides who, despite
Edgar's firm hold on him, was still able to move about twenty (20) meters away from the house of
Amado Dawaton before he fell to the ground at the back of Esmeraldo's house. But even then, Edgar
still continued to stab him. Edgar only stopped stabbing Leonides when the latter already expired. Edgar
then ran away towards the house of his uncle Carlito Baras situated behind the cockpit.
Domingo and Esmeraldo were positioned a few meters away from where Leonides was sleeping when
he was initially assaulted by Edgar. They were shocked by what happened but other than pleading for
Edgar to stop they were unable to help Leonides.
Domingo left for his house soon after the stabbing started as he did not want to get involved.
Nonetheless he felt pity for Leonides so he returned a few minutes later.
By then, Leonides was already dead and people had already gathered at the site. The mayor who was
in a nearby cement factory arrived and instructed them not to go near the body. They pointed to the
direction where Edgar fled. Edgar was later arrested at the house of his uncle, Carlito Baras, at Sitio
Aves, Brgy. Paltic, Dingalan.
Accused-appellant Edgar Dawaton was the sole witness for the defense. He did not deny that he
stabbed Leonides Lavares but insisted that he was provoked into stabbing him. Edgar claimed that the
night prior to the stabbing incident, or on 19 September 1998, his uncle Armando Ramirez went to his
house to welcome his return from Cavite where he worked as a carpenter. They started drinking gin at
about 7:00 o'clock in the evening and ended at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day. He slept
and woke up at 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 20 September 1998.
Apparently, he did not have enough of the prior evening's drinking orgy. He went to his uncle's house
early that morning and after his uncle bought two (2) bottles of gin they started drinking again. Domingo
Reyes arrived at around 7:30 in the morning and joined them. Esmeraldo Cortez joined them about
12:00 o'clock noon and bought two (2) more bottles of gin. Later, the group with the exception of
Armando Ramirez transferred to the house of Esmeraldo upon the latter's invitation and drank two (2)
more bottles of gin.
In Edgar's version of the stabbing incident, a drunk and angry Leonides arrived at about 2:30 in the
afternoon and demanded that they - he and Edgar - return candles (magbalikan [tayo] ng kandila).[6]
Leonides was godfather of a son of Edgar. Leonides also cursed and threatened to hang a grenade on
Edgar (P - t - ng ina mo. Hintayin mo ako. Kukuha ako ng granada at sasabitan kita!).[7]
According to Edgar, he tried to calm down Leonides but the latter insisted on going home purportedly to
get a grenade. Alarmed because he knew Leonides had a grenade, Edgar went home to look for a
bladed weapon. He already had a knife with him but he thought it was short. Not finding another
weapon, he returned to Esmeraldo's house.
When he returned, Leonides was still in Esmeraldo's house and had joined in the drinking. He sat
opposite Leonides who resumed his tirades against him.
Again Leonides started to leave for his house purportedly to get a grenade. Afraid that Leonides would
make good his threat, Edgar held on to him and stabbed him. He did not know where and exactly how
many times he struck Leonides but he recalled doing it three (3) times before his mind went blank
(nablangko).[8] Edgar also claimed that he was in this mental condition when he left Leonides and ran to
the house of Carlito Baras. He did not know that he had already killed Leonides, only that he stabbed
him thrice. He regained his senses only when he reached his uncle Carlito's house.
Edgar further said that he sought his uncle's help so he could surrender but he was told to wait because
his uncle was then taking a bath. It was while waiting for his uncle when the policemen arrived to arrest
him. He maintained that he voluntarily went with them.
235
The medico-legal certificate dated 24 September 1998 issued by Dr. Ernesto C. del Rosario [9] showed
that the victim sustained a stab wound at the back and ten (10) stab wounds in front. He also had slash
wounds on his left hand and his tongue was cut off. The immediate cause of death was determined to
be "Hypovolemic Shock due to hemorrhage, multiple stabbed (sic) wounds."[10]
On 20 October 1999 the parties entered into several stipulations which were embodied in an Order. [11]
Specifically, they admitted the veracity of the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 21 September 1998
executed by SPO2 Ramil D. Gamboa and PO3 Gerry M. Fabros,[12] the police officers who arrested the
accused; the genuineness and due execution of the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Ernesto C.
del Rosario; and, the authenticity of the certificate of death [13] also issued by Dr. del Rosario. Thus, the
presentation of the arresting officers and Dr. del Rosario as witnesses was dispensed with.
On 20 November 1999 the trial court convicted Edgar Dawaton of murder qualified by treachery and
sentenced him to death.
We affirm the conviction of accused-appellant; we however modify the penalty imposed on him.
The conclusion that accused-appellant murdered Leonides Lavares was sufficiently proved by the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Domingo Reyes and Esmeraldo Cortez who both witnessed the
fatal stabbing. This was not refuted by the accused himself who admitted that he stabbed the victim
three (3) times before his mind went blank and could no longer recall what he did after that.
Treachery clearly attended the killing. The accused attacked the victim while the latter was in deep
slumber owing to the excessive amount of alcohol he imbibed. We are not persuaded by the version of
the accused that the victim threatened to harm him with a grenade and that it was only to prevent this
from happening that he was forced to stab Leonides. We defer instead to the judgment of the trial court
which gave more credence to the version of the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as it was in a better
position to decide on the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed
their deportment during trial.
According to the prosecution witnesses, the victim had no chance to defend himself as he was dead
drunk and fast asleep. He had no inkling at all of what was going to happen to him since there was no
prior argument or untoward incident between him and the accused. From all indications they were on
friendly terms; as in fact they were even kumpadres. No one knew nor expected that when the accused
momentarily excused himself, it was for the purpose of looking for a knife, and without any warning,
stabbing the victim who was sleeping.
There is treachery when the attack is upon an unconscious victim who could not have put up any
defense whatsoever,[14] or a person who was dead drunk and sleeping on a bench and had no chance
to defend himself.[15] Clearly, the attack was not only sudden but also deliberately adopted by the
accused to ensure its execution without risk to himself.
The accused argues that trial court erred in imposing the death penalty despite the attendance of
mitigating and alternative circumstances in his favor. [16] He avers that he is entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty. We disagree. While the accused offered to plead guilty to the lesser
offense of homicide, he was charged with murder for which he had already entered a plea of not guilty.
We have ruled that an offer to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense cannot be considered as an
attenuating circumstance under the provisions of Art. 13 of The Revised Penal Code because to be
voluntary the plea of guilty must be to the offense charged. [17]
Furthermore, Sec. 2, Rule 116, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor before an accused may be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense
necessarily included in the offense charged. We note that the prosecution rejected the offer of the
accused.
Nor can the accused avail of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender as he himself admitted
that he was arrested at his uncle's residence. [18] The following elements must be present for voluntary
surrender to be appreciated: (a) the offender has not been actually arrested; (b) the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority, and, (c) the surrender must be voluntary. [19]
Resorting to sophistry, the accused argues that he was not arrested but "fetched" as he voluntarily went
with the policemen when they came for him. This attempt at semantics is futile and absurd. That he did
not try to escape or resist arrest after he was taken into custody by the authorities did not amount to
voluntary surrender. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the
accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or
because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily included in his search and
capture.[20] It is also settled that voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated where the evidence adduced
shows that it was the authorities who came looking for the accused. [21]
Moreover, the evidence submitted by the prosecution belies the claim of the accused that he intended to
submit himself to the authorities. The joint affidavit of the arresting officers, the veracity of which was
admitted by the parties and evidenced by a 20 October 1999 Order of the trial court, revealed that they
chanced upon the accused trying to escape from the rear of the cockpit building when they came
looking for him.[22]
Similarly, there is no factual basis to credit the accused with the mitigating circumstance of outraged
feeling analogous or similar[23] to passion and obfuscation.[24] Other than his self-serving allegations,
there was no evidence that the victim threatened him with a grenade. Domingo Reyes and Esmeraldo
Cortez testified that there was no prior altercation or disagreement between Edgar and Leonides during
the drinking spree, and they did not know of any reason for Edgar's hostility and violence. On the
contrary, Esmeraldo Cortez even recalled seeing the two (2) in a playful banter (lambingan) during the
course of their drinking[25] indicating that the attack on the accused was completely unexpected.
The accused would want us to reconsider the penalty imposed on him on account of his not being a
recidivist. He contends that an appreciation of this factor calls for a reduction of the penalty.
We are not persuaded. Recidivism is an aggravating circumstance the presence of which increases the
penalty. The converse however, that is, non-recidivism, is not a mitigating circumstance which will
necessarily reduce the penalty. Nonetheless, we hold that the trial court erred in not appreciating the
alternative circumstance of intoxication in favor of the accused. Under Art. 15 of The Revised Penal
Code, intoxication of the offender shall be considered as a mitigating circumstance when the offender
commits a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to
commit said felony. Otherwise, when habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
236
The allegation that the accused was drunk when he committed the crime was corroborated by the
prosecution witnesses. The accused and his drinking companions had consumed four (4) bottles of gin
at the house of Esmeraldo Cortez, each one drinking at least a bottle. [26] It was also attested that while
the four (4) shared another bottle of gin at the house of Amado Dawaton, it was the accused who drank
most of its contents.[27] In addition, Esmeraldo testified that when Edgar and Leonides arrived at his
house that noon, they were already intoxicated. [28] There being no indication that the accused was a
habitual drunkard or that his alcoholic intake was intended to fortify his resolve to commit the crime, the
circumstance of intoxication should be credited in his favor.
Consequently, we find that the trial court erroneously imposed the penalty of death. The accused was
charged with murder for which the law provides a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Under Art. 63,
par. 3, of The Revised Penal Code, in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
(2) indivisible penalties, such as in this case, when the commission of the act is attended by a mitigating
circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Since no
aggravating circumstance attended the killing but there existed the mitigating circumstance of
intoxication, the accused should be sentenced only to the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The trial court correctly ordered the accused to pay civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 to the
heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the fact that a crime was committed resulting in the
death of the victim and that the accused was responsible therefor. [29] The heirs are also entitled to moral
damages pursuant to Art. 2206 of the New Civil Code on account of the mental anguish which they
suffered, and the amount of P50,000.00 is considered reasonable according to existing
jurisprudence.[30]
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the court a quo finding the accused EDGAR DAWATON guilty
of MURDER qualified by treachery is AFFIRMED with the modification that the penalty is reduced from
death to reclusion perpetua. The accused is ordered to pay the heirs of Leonides Lavares P50,000.00 in
civil indemnity and P50,000.00 in moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO DEOPANTE y CARILLO, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:p
In deciding this appeal, the Court finds occasion to reiterate some well-settled doctrines in
appreciating evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of murder, and in
evaluating claims of self-defense, voluntary surrender and physical defect.
This is an appeal from the decision1 dated September 6, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 164,2 in Criminal Case No.
85155, convicting accused Rogelio Deopante y Carillo of the crime of murder and sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua.
On January 11, 1991, an Information3 was filed against the appellant charging him as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of January, 1991, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with a fan knife (balisong), with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation and treachery did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
stab with a fan knife one Dante Deopante on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
Arraigned on March 8, 1991, the accused, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to
the charge.4
The Facts
According to the Prosecution
The facts as summarized by the Solicitor General, who added the page references to the
transcript of stenographic notes, are as follows:5
At around nine o'clock in the evening (9:00 p.m.) of January 10, 1991 at Alkalde Jose
Street, Barrio Kapasigan, Pasig, Metro Manila, Dante Deopante was having a
conversation with his friend Renato Molina when they saw appellant Rogelio
Deopante coming towards their direction. Renato noticed that as appellant was fast
approaching, the latter was drawing out an open fan knife (balisong) from his right
back pants pocket. Sensing danger, Renato immediately called out to Dante and told
the latter to flee the place. As Dante took flight, so did Renato in another direction.
(pp. 3-4, 6, 8, t.s.n. June 3, 1991)
Appellant ran after Dante and overpowered the latter at a basketball court located in a
lot between Alkalde Jose and Pariancillo Streets. Appellant and victim grappled with
each other and both fell on the ground. Appellant was able to assume the dominant
position and as Dante lay flat on his back the former proceeded to stab the latter twice
with his fan knife. Immediately thereafter, appellant stood up and fled the scene
leaving Dante mortally wounded. Bystanders milling around Pariancillo Street then
rushed victim to the Rizal Medical Pariancillo Street then rushed victim to the Rizal
Medical Center. (pp. 3-5, t.s.n., April 25, 1991; pp. 8, 9, 11, t.s.n. June 3, 1991)
At about the same time on the aforesaid date, the Pasig Police Station received a
telephone call from the Rizal Medical Center informing them that a stabbing victim
has been brought to said hospital for treatment. Patrolman Crispin Pio proceeded to
the hospital and there received the information that appellant was the one who
stabbed Dante. Said policeman later obtained the sworn statement of Nestor
237
 Deopante indicating that appellant stabbed the victim. Renato refused to give his
sworn statement to the police, but insisted that indeed it was appellant who stabbed
Dante. (pp. 5-7, t.s.n., May 15, 1991)
At around eleven o'clock (11:00 p.m.) of the same evening, Patrolman Crispin Pio and
two (2) other police officers went to the house of appellant located at No. 12 Alkalde
Jose Street, Barrio Kapasigan, Pasig, Metro Manila. After informing appellant of the
allegation against him, they invited the former to the police station for investigation.
Appellant went with the police officers and maintained his innocence throughout the
investigation. Patrolman Crispin Pio recovered a fan knife from appellant measuring
around ten (10") inches when opened. He sent the fan knife to the P.N.P. Crime
Laboratory Service for examination. (pp. 8-9, t.s.n., May 15, 1991)
The autopsy report shows a total of seven (7) wounds all over victim's body. Of these
wounds, two (2) were stab wounds (Wound Nos. 2 & 3) and the rest mere abrasions.
Dr. Emmanuel Aranas, the medico-legal officer of the P.N.P. Crime Laboratory
Service who conducted the autopsy testified that the stab wounds were caused by a
sharp pointed object like a balisong or fan knife. He further declared that Wound No.
2, a stab wound located at the left side of the chest, lacerated the diaphragm, liver
(left lobe) and stomach of the victim causing the latter's instantaneous death.
Moreover, he concluded that the fan knife sent to him for examination could have
been used in stabbing a person since it showed minute traces of human blood. (pp. 7-
8, t.s.n., April 19, 1991; p. 17. t.s.n., May 30, 1991)
The prosecution presented six witnesses. Aside from Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas, who testified
on the results of the autopsy, the other witnesses included Manolo Angeles and Renato
Molina, who gave eyewitness accounts of the stabbing. Patrolman Crispin Pio of the Pasig
Police Station testified that he invited the accused for investigation after receiving a report on
the killing, and that upon frisking the accused, he found and recovered from him a 10-inch fan
knife which he submitted to the crime lab for examination. Alfonso Reyes, barangay captain of
Barangay Kapasigan, Pasig, Metro Manila, testified that on August 19, 1989, Dante Deopante
made a personal complaint to him as barangay captain, that Rogelio Deopante had threatened
to kill him (Dante). He testified that his office kept a logbook of all the incidents that happened
in the barangay and that the same contained a record of the said complaint6 of Dante
Deopante. However, on cross-examination, he admitted that he was not the one who
personally made the entry.
Version of the Defense
In contrast to the prosecution's theory that the victim was killed with evident premeditation, the
defense claimed that the fatal injuries inflicted by accused-appellant upon the victim were done
in self-defense.7 The defense presented three witnesses, viz.: the accused himself, his
longtime friend Benito Carrasco, and the son of the accused, Vladimir Deopante. Their version
of the event was as follows:
On January 10, 1991, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, in Alcalde Jose Street,
Pasig, Metro Manila, while the appellant was allegedly on his way home he was seen
by his nephew, the victim (Dante Deopante) and the witness for the prosecution,
Renato Molina, who at that time were allegedly both drunk. (TSN June 6, 1991, page
3). The victim (Dante Deopante) suddenly boxed him and the said appellant ran away
and (was) pursued by the victim and Renato Molina. The appellant was overtaken by
the victim by holding the back portion of his shirt. Both
of them fell. The victim pulled-out a knife which appellant allegedly wrested . . . away
from Dante Deopante. After he (appellant) wrested the knife from the victim, they
continued rolling over and over the ground and he does not know whether he stab
(sic) the victim or not. (TSN June 6, 1991, page 4). Said appellant sustained also
injuries on (the) little finger of his right hand and abrasion on his right leg, left knee
and left hand (sic). The said appellant was treated by one Dr. Leonides Pappa on
January 11, 1991, and issued medical certificate, marked as Exhibits "1, 1-A, 1-B and
1-C" for the defense. (TSN June 6, 1991, pages 5-6); Appellant claimed that he
placed behind bars (incarcerated) the victim for being a drug addict when he was still
a policeman and member of the Police Department of Pasig. Renato Molina eluded
arrest by him, for being a drug addict too. (TSN June 6, 1991, page 6).8
On cross-examination, accused Rogelio Deopante testified that he was a former member of
the Pasig Police Department but was discharged for having been absent without leave, by
reason of a complaint filed against him by Manolo Angeles before the National Police
Commission, and in which case the victim, Dante Deopante, was presented as witness for
complainant Angeles. He further testified that his left hand was completely severed at the wrist
when it was hacked off by his brother Nestor Deopante.
The Trial Court's Ruling
On September 6, 1991, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the appellant of murder,
the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds the accused Rogelio Deopante y Carillo GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as charged; and therefore hereby
imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, there being no other generic
aggravating or mitigating circumstance adduced; and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim the amount of P50,000.00 as well as to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
The Issues
In his brief, the appellant charges that the trial court erred:
I. In considering the entry in the (barangay) peace and order chairman's blotter under
entry no. 0097, page 58 (logbook) as a basis in holding the commission of the offense
with evident premeditation.
II. In not affording the accused-appellant the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and his physical condition.
238
 III. In not considering appellant's claim of self-defense.
IV. In not considering the flaws and inconsistencies of the testimonies of the
prosecution's witnesses and its biased character and wanting of credibility (sic).
V. In not considering the provision of Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code in the
imposition of penalty.
The Court's Ruling
First Issue: Evident Premeditation
Very familiar by now to members of the legal profession are the elements which need to be
proven before evident premeditation can be appreciated. These are: (1) the time when the
accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that the accused
had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between
the decision to commit the crime and the execution thereof, to allow the accused to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. Mere lapse of time is not enough, however, because
premeditation is not presumed from the mere lapse of time.9 It must be "evident" from his overt
act.
Considering the evidence on record, and the events leading up to the killing, we cannot agree
with appellant's contention that the lower court based its finding of evident premeditation on the
victim's report to the barangay captain that the accused-appellant had threatened to kill him.
We hold that the record contains sufficient basis for the finding of evident premeditation. The
first and third elements were proven by the testimony of the barangay captain, Alfonso Reyes,
as to the report made by the deceased about the threat on his life, taken together with the
record of the report in the barangay logbook,10 all of which established the time when
appellant decided to commit the crime. The period of time between the said report and the
killing (January 10, 1991) constituted a sufficient lapse of time between the determination to
commit the crime and the execution of the same, the enable the accused to coolly consider
and reflect upon his resolution to do away with the victim. Finally, the second element was
proven by the eyewitness testimony of Renato Molina, friend of the victim since childhood, who
was present from the inception to the culmination of the assault launched by appellant against
the victim. We quote with approval the trial court's ratiocination, to wit:
That at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of January 10, 1991, he (Renato Molina)
and Dante Deopante were conversing at Alkalde Jose St., Pasig, Metro Manila when
the accused Rogelio Deopante arrived. He told Dante Deopante to run away. Both of
them ran but in different directions.
That he told Dante Deopante to run away because the latter and the accused had a
previous (sic) misunderstanding and the accused always threatened Dante Deopante
after the latter testified against the accused for shooting a certain Maning Angeles.
That he also told Dante Deopante to run away because he saw the accused carrying
a fan knife in his back pocket. He saw it because the place was lighted as there as a
lamp post.
xxx xxx xxx
This witness (Molina) testified that when he saw the accused more than six feet away
and was approaching them, he immediately warned his childhood friend and victim
Dante Deopante to run away which the latter did. At the time, the accused was seen
by this witness about to draw a knife from his back pant's pocket; and that he, too, ran
away but took the opposite direction. Having traversed a short distance, he stopped
and looked back and saw the accused chasing his victim and nephew until the former
caught up with the latter, took hold of him and they both fell to the ground.
The accused could have desisted from carrying his plan to kill into effect had he
stopped when his nephew took off and ran away from him. The latter did so because
he knew in his heart that his uncle was about to kill him and this was also felt by
eyewitness Molina because of the immediate warning given by him to his friend.
But then, although he saw his nephew sprinting away, he nevertheless did chase him
for a distance and all the while he could have stopped and go home to his residence
situated only a few meters away.
Again he could have let go the victim when he caught up and took hold of him. He did
not, but on the contrary, when they both fell and rolled on the ground, he grappled
with his victim and at the very first opportune moment, mercilessly stabbed his
nephew, not only once but twice, inflicting very serious blows, one of which was most
fatal and could have caused instantaneous death of his prey.
So it is that from this very actuation of the accused at the time, it is obviously clear
that he clung to this determination to kill Dante Deopante when he could have
stopped at anytime between the moment that his nephew ran away until the time that
he dealt the fatal blows that ultimately caused the death of Dante Deopante.11
(emphasis ours)
The three elements having been duly proven, the presence of evident premeditation in the
case at bar is therefore conclusive.
Second Issue: Voluntary Surrender and Physical Defect
as Mitigating Circumstances?
Contrary to appellant's protestations, the trial court was correct in finding no voluntary
surrender in this case. In order to appreciate voluntary surrender by an accused, the same
must be shown to have been "spontaneous and made in such a manner that it shows the
intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily
incurred in his search and capture. In the absence of any of these reasons, and in the event
239
that the only reason for an accused's supposed surrender is to ensure his safety, his arrest
being inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous and, hence, not voluntary.12 It will be
observed in this case that there was no conscious effort on the part of the accused — who was
fetched from his house by police officers to go to police headquarters for investigation — to
voluntarily surrender and/or acknowledge his guilt. He went with them for the purpose of
clearing his name as he in fact tried to do during the investigation where he professed his
innocence. The fact alone that he did not resist but went peacefully with the lawmen does not
mean that he voluntarily surrendered.13 On this point, it is apt to quote the decision of this
Court in People vs. Flores14 where we stated that:
Neither can we accept accused-appellant's plea of voluntary surrender. He did not
surrender to the police. In fact, the evidence adduced shows that it was the police
authorities who came to the factory looking for him. It was there that accused-
appellant was pointed to them. With the police closing in, accused-appellant actually
had no choice but to go with them. Seeing that the police were already approaching
him, accused-appellant did not offer any resistance and peacefully went with them. To
be sure, no surrender was made by accused-appellant.
The fact that appellant suffers from a physical defect, a severed left hand, does not mean that
he should automatically be credited with the mitigating circumstance contained in paragraph 8,
Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. In order for this condition to be appreciated, it must be
shown that such physical defect limited his means to act, defend himself or communicate with
his fellow beings to such an extent that he did not have complete freedom of action,
consequently resulting in diminution of the element of voluntariness.15 Such cannot be
appreciated in the case at bar where the appellant's physical condition clearly did not limit his
means of action, defense or communication, nor affect his free will. In fact, despite his
handicap, appellant nevertheless managed to attack, overcome and fatally stab his victim.
At this point, one might wonder how a one-handed attacker can open a fan knife and grapple
with and overcome his two-handed prey. This was answered by the testimony of Renato
Molina who revealed that at the time the accused closed in for the kill, his balisong was already
open and ready for use in his back pocket, and that he had already drawn the same even
during the chase. Molina's testimony16 is as follows:
Q You said that this Rogelio Deopante arrived while you were
conversing with Dante Deopante and you ask (asked) Dante
Deopante to run away, why did you ask Dante Deopante to run
away?
A Because, Sir I saw the open fan knife on his pocket, Sir at his
back.
Q When you said that you have seen an open fan knife at his
pocket, to whom are you referring to?
A Rogelio Deopante's, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q How did you notice the fan knife which is placed at the back if
(sic) his pocket?
A Because at the time, Sir he was drawing it out.
Hence, at the time the accused-appellant chased the victim, the former already had the
balisong in hand. Clearly, the fact that he had only one hand in no way limited his freedom of
action to commit the crime.
Third Issue: Self-defense
Equally well-known and well-understood by now are the requirements in order for self-defense
to be appreciated. The accused must prove that there was unlawful aggression by the victim,
that the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression were reasonable, and
that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part.17 And having admitted that he killed
his nephew Dante Deopante, "the burden of the evidence that he acted in self-defense was
shifted to the accused-appellant. It is hornbook doctrine that when self-defense is invoked, the
burden of evidence shifts to the appellant to show that the killing was justified and that he
incurred no criminal liability therefor. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be
disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the killing.18 Hence, he must prove
the essential requisites of self-defense aforementioned.
In the case at bar, appellant failed to prove unlawful aggression by the victim, hence, his claim
of self-defense cannot be sustained. The self-serving and unsupported allegation of appellant
that he wrested the knife away from the victim while they were struggling and rolling around on
the ground (in the process sustaining only a minor scratch on his little finger and abrasion on
the right knee) does not inspire belief, when contrasted with the positive and categorical
eyewitness accounts of Renato Molina and Manolo Angeles that appellant ran after and
stabbed the victim. The latter's testimonies are corroborated by the number and extent of the
stab wounds sustained by the victim.
(Testimony of Manolo Angeles)
Q While you were urinating at a post in Pariancillo, can you
remember if there was an unusual incident that happened at that
time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that unusual incident?
A Nakita ko po si Rogelio Deopante na tikad-tikad ng saksak si
Dante Deopante (I saw Rogelio Deopante chasing Dante Deopante
with intention of stabbing).
240
 COURT: A They were both lying on the ground when this Rogelio Deopante
used that Balisong or fan knife in stabbing the victim, only I did not
Q You mean by "tikad-tikad", habol? know how many stabs he made on the victim (but witness
demonstrating as if he is stabbing somebody from his right hand
going downward).20
A Yes, your Honor.
Due to appellant's failure to prove unlawful aggression by the victim, and in view of the
ATTY. VALERIO: prosecution's evidence conclusively showing that it was appellant who was the unlawful
aggressor, appellant's claims of self-defense must be completely discounted, since even
Q How far were you when you were urinating from the place where incomplete self-defense "by its very nature and essence, always would require the attendance
the victim was chased by the accused? of unlawful aggression initiated by the victim which must clearly be shown." 21 We agree with
the finding of the trial court that:
A More or less twenty (20) meters, sir.
There is no gainsaying the fact that the accused herein was responsible for slaying
Q What happened after that? his nephew and victim Dante Deopante. Only, by way of avoidance, the accused
stated that while he and his nephew were rolling and grappling on the ground, the
latter took a knife out of nowhere but he managed to wrest it away from his nephew
A He overtook him and stabbed him. and he stabbed him (Dante Deopante) with it.

Q Can you remember how many stabs that the deceased received Such a posture adopted by the accused deserves scant consideration from the Court.
from the accused?
For one, the victim would not have time to draw a knife from his person and then
A Two (2), Sir. opened it while at the same time grappling with his uncle while both were rolling on
the ground.
Q Did you see the position of the deceased while he was being
stabbed? For another, such declaration was self-serving on the part of the accused and
remains unsupported by the evidence. Even the accused's own witness and friend for
A At that time Dante Deopante was lying on his back and this a long time Benito Carrasco who professed that he was only about five to seven
Rogelio Deopante stabbed him.19 meters away from the accused and who witnessed the latter grappling with the victim
on the ground, did not see Dante took out a knife and that the accused manage to
wrest it away or else the defense would certainly underscore such an event and made
(Testimony of Renato Molina)
much of it during his testimony in court. The fact that he did not state such a
circumstance gave the lie to such posture taken by the accused.22
Q If you know, what did Rogelio Deopante do with the knife that he
was then carrying?
Furthermore, based on the number of stab wounds sustained by the victim, we are convinced
that the accused did not act in self-defense in killing the former. "It is an oft-repeated rule that
xxx xxx xxx the presence of a large number of wounds on the part of the victim negates self-defense;
instead it indicates a determined effort to kill the victim.23 Accused, after struggling with the
COURT: victim, had the latter on his back and in an obviously helpless and vulnerable position. Even
assuming arguendo that it was the deceased who had initiated the attack and accused was
merely defending himself, clearly there could not have been any need for him to stab the victim
Witness may answer.
twice if the purpose was simply to disable the victim or make him desist from his unlawful
assault.
A He used (it) in stabbing Dante Deopante.
Forth Issue: Credibility of Witnesses
Q How did he (use) it?
We see no reason to disturb the trial court's evaluation and assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, the same not being tainted by any arbitrariness or palpable error. "Jurisprudence
241
teaches us that the findings of the trial court judge who tried the case and heard the witnesses
are not to be disturbed on appeal unless there are substantial facts and circumstances which
have been overlooked and which, if properly considered, might affect the result of the case.
The trial judge's evaluation of the witness' credibility deserves utmost respect in the absence of
arbitrariness.24 Furthermore, "conclusions and findings of the trial court are entitled to great
weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and valid reasons because the
trial court is in a better position to examine the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying on
the case.25
We reviewed the entire record of the case, and found that the trial court correctly gave
credence to the testimonies of Manolo Angeles and Renato Molina. As aptly stated by it:
So it is that the Court gave full credence to the eyewitnesses accounts of prosecution
witnesses Manolo Angeles and Renato Molina.
Both are disinterested eyewitnesses.
Manolo Angeles would not testify falsely against accused because the latter is the
uncle of the full blood of his wife, being the daughter of the sister of the accused. He
would not dare incur the wrath of his wife and her family, specially of the accused
whose temperament he well knew.
The same is true with Renato Molina. He resides nearby and in the same locality as
the accused and the victim, the latter being his childhood friend.
Knowing the accused very well and his reputation, he dare not trifle with the truth and
testify falsely against him. In fact, he was very reluctant to testify and it look coercive
process of the Court to bring him to the witness stand.
Besides his presence at the scene of the stabbing incident was even acknowledged
by the accused himself during the trial so that this witness' testimony is well worth
considering.26
Furthermore, we note and concur in the court a quo's assessment of the testimony of the son
of the accused, which definitely tends to negate the theory of self-defense.
Again, another defense witness presented was Vladimir Deopante, son of the
accused who mentioned in passing during the course of his testimony that when
informed of an on-going quarrel involving his father, he immediately proceeded to the
place where the incident was going on and there and then saw his father grappling on
the ground with his cousin Dante and the latter was holding a weapon with his left
hand so much so that he went back home and informed his mother about the matter
and he was instructed to go back and pacify the protagonists.
This portion of the testimony of Vladimir Deopante sounded incredulous and
unbelievable.
Confronted with a like situation, a son, seeing that his father being (beleaguered) and
in immediate danger of being stabbed and possibly killed, would instinctively and
intuitively rush in, come (to) succor and render immediate assistance to his
endangered parent and would not turn his back on his father and go back home to
await instructions on what to do under the premises.
It may be that this witness was actually at the scene when he saw his father and
cousin were grappling on the ground and seeing that his father had a knife in his hand
and had the upper hand as well as in control of the situation, he did not interfere but
turned back and went home and informed his mother. This would be more in keeping
with the natural course of events.27
Fifth Issue: Incomplete Self-defense
Appellant argues that the trial court should have applied Art. 69 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides for imposition of a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by
law where the killing "is not wholly excusable", as in the case at bar, given the absence of
some of the requisites to justify the killing. Appellant is in error. Said provision of law applies
only where a majority of the conditions required to justify a criminal act or exempt from liability
are present. Such is not the situation in the case at bar. Unlawful aggression is indispensable
in self-defense, complete or otherwise. When unlawful aggression (by the victim) alone is
proved, such incomplete self-defense is to be appreciated as an ordinary mitigating
circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. When it is combined
with another element of self-defense, such incomplete self-defense becomes a privileged
mitigating circumstance under Article 69 of the same Code.28 But in the instant case, as
already mentioned above, it was conclusively shown that appellant was the aggressor.
WHEREFORE, the herein appealed Decision convicting appellant Rogelio Deopante y Carillo
of the crime of murder and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the payment
to the victim's heirs of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MORO MACBUL, defendant-appellant.
Cesar C. Climaco for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Madamba for appellee.
OZAETA, J.:
242
Appellant pleaded guilty to an information for theft of two sacks of papers valued at P10 belong to the
Provincial Government of Sulu, alleged to have been committed on March 9, 1943, in the municipality of
Jolo; it being also alleged that he was a habitual delinquent, having been twice convicted of the same
crime on November 14, 1928, and August 20, 1942. The trial court sentenced him to suffer one month
and one day of arresto mayor as principal penalty and two years, four months, and one day of prision
correccional as additional penalty for habitual delinquency.
The trial court found two mitigating circumstances: plea of guilty under paragraph 7, and extreme
poverty and necessity under paragraph 10, of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code; but it took into
account the aggravating circumstance of recidivism in imposing the principal as well as the additional
penalty.
The only question raised here by counsel for the appellant is the correctness of the consideration by the
trial court of recidivism as an aggravating circumstance for the purpose of imposing the additional
penalty for habitual delinquency, counsel contending that recidivism should not have been taken into
account because it is inherent in habitual delinquency. While that contention is correct, as we have
decided in the case of People vs. Tolentino, 1 Off. Gaz., 682, it is beside the point here because the
error committed by the trial court lies not so much in its having considered recidivism as an aggravating
circumstance for the purpose of penalizing habitual delinquency, as in its having considered appellant
as a habitual delinquent at all, it appearing from the information that his two previous convictions were
more than ten years apart. "A person shall be deems to be habitually delinquent, if within a period of ten
years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of robo, hurto, estafa, or falsification,
he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener." (See last paragraph, article 62, No. 5, of
the Revised Penal Code.) Therefore, appellant's first conviction, which took place in November, 1928,
cannot be taken into account because his second conviction took place in August, 1942, or fourteen
years later. Hence within the purview of the Habitual Delinquency Law appellant has only one previous
conviction against him, namely, that of 1942.
The trial court considered extreme poverty and necessity as a mitigating circumstance falling within No.
10 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, which authorizes the court to consider in favor of an
accused "any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned." The
trial court predicates such consideration upon its finding that the accused, on account of extreme
poverty and of the economic difficulties brought about by the present cataclysm, was forced to pilfer the
two sacks of papers mentioned in the information from the Customhouse Building, which he sold for
P2.50, in order to be able to buy something to eat for various minor children of his. (The stolen goods
were subsequently recovered.) The Solicitor General interposes no objection to the consideration of
such circumstance as mitigating under No. 10 of article 13. We give it our stamp of approval,
recognizing the immanent principle that the right to life is more sacred than a mere property right. That
is not to encourage or even countenance theft but merely to dull somewhat the keen and pain-producing
edges of the stark realities of life.
Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, the sentence appealed from is modified by
affirming the principal penalty and eliminating the additional penalty, without costs.
Yulo, C.J., Moran and Paras, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BOCOBO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. In view of the far-reaching significance of the doctrine enunciated in the foregoing
opinion — that extreme poverty is a mitigating circumstance — and of the fact that such a rule deviates
from established precedents, I deem it appropriate to set forth my reasons for subscribing to the new
principle.
I believe that extreme poverty and necessity is a mitigating circumstance, not only because it is
analogous mitigating circumstance under No. 10 of art. 13 of the Revised Penal Code, as stated in the
above opinion, but also for the reason that it is an incomplete exempting circumstance contemplated in
No. 1 of said article 13, in relation to Nos. 5 (irresistable force) and 6 (uncontrollable fear) of art. 12. The
trial court found that the accused committed the crime of theft "por extrema pobreza y necesidad," and
considered this as an analogous mitigating circumstance within the meaning of No. 10, art. 13 of the
Revised Penal Code. Such a finding is based on the fact that on March 9, 1943, the accused took the
two sacks of papers and sold the same for P2.50 because he is the father of several minor children and
they and he had nothing to eat on that day.
The Supreme Tribunal of Spain has refused to recognize extreme poverty as a mitigating circumstance
by analogy in cases of robbery and theft. (See sentences of April 20, 1871; July 12, 1904; April 18,
1907; and July 9, 1907).lawphil.net
As for Philippine jurisprudence, as far as I know, this question has never been squarely passed upon by
this court. Possibly one of the reasons is that in view of the well-established doctrine of the Spanish
Supreme Court, above referred to, it seems to have been taken for granted by the legal profession here
that extreme poverty and need is not a mitigating circumstance by analogy in cases of robbery and
theft.
In spite of precedents and widespread belief to the contrary, I do not hesitate to hold the proposition that
extreme poverty and need is a mitigating circumstance analogous to two of the circumstances
enumerated in art. 13. These two are:
1. "That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or
obfuscation." (No. 6)
2. "Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of will-power without however
depriving him of consciousness of his acts." (No. 9)
It will be noted that there is a common idea underlying these two mitigating circumstances, namely, that
the offender either by a powerful impulse or through illness had no effective control over himself at the
time he committed the crime. Was this the state of mind of the defendant herein when he took the
papers? I believe so because the thought that his little children would starve on that day must have
temporarily dulled his conscience and driven him to steal. The spectre of hunger of his loved ones
terrified him into stealing. The reason for Nos. 6 and 9 of art. 13, above quoted, being the same as in
243
the instant case, the rule of analogy authorized in No. 10 of that article should be applied. The ancient
principle upheld by the Roman jurists, Eadem dispositio, ubi eadem ratio is a puissant logic and is
eminently just.
Furthermore, the facts of this case come within the purview of No. 1 of art. 13, which provides:
Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances:
1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify the
act or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant.
In other words, the offense of the accused herein may be properly considered as mitigated by
incomplete exemption from criminal liability, under Nos. 5 and 6 of art. 12, (irresistible force and
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.)
The first question in this aspect of the case is whether No. 1 of art. 13 refers only to those exempting
circumstances which contain two or more requisites (self-defense, defense of relatives or of stranger,
and avoidance of an evil or injury in Nos. 1 to 4, art. 11.) The answer is negative because No. 1 of art.
13 refers to the preceding chapter relative to justifying and exempting circumstances, and the preceding
chapter, which consists of art. 11 and 12, includes circumstances which are not composed of several
requisites. In People vs. Oanis, G.R. No. 47722, (July 27, 1943) we held that improper performance of a
duty (No. 5, art. 11) is mitigating circumstance.
Coming now to irresistible force, No. 5 of art. 12 provides that "any person who acts under the
compulsion of an irresistible force" is exempt from criminal liability. It is true that according to the
doctrine of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, the irresistible force must be external, proceeding from a
third person (S. of Feb. 28, 1891). But considering that the law makes no distinction between force
within the accused himself and from another person, and that one type of force is just as compelling as
another, I think it is but right to hold that such force need not be exerted by another person.
This being so, why should the offense of the accused herein be mitigated by extreme poverty and
need? Because misery and hunger impelled him to steal, although such force was not absolutely
irresistible, under No. 5 of art. 12. His condition was sufficiently grave to drive him to take the papers,
but it was not utterly inevitable that he should do so.
The same considerations apply in regard to uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury (No. 6, art.
12). The accused, desperate because of fear that his little children would starve, stole the papers, but
his fear was not absolutely uncontrollable.
Taking irresistible force and uncontrollable fear together, I believe that the force and the fear which
coerced the accused herein to steal are of the same nature contemplated in Nos. 5 and 6 of art. 12, but
they are of less degree than that required for complete exemption from criminal responsibility.
Therefore, I am of the opinion that according to No. 1 of art. 13, there is a mitigating circumstance of
incomplete exemption from criminal liability under Nos. 5 and 6 of art. 12 of the Revised Penal Code.
I am not unmindful of the possible objection that the doctrine herein enunciated may encourage theft
and robbery and undermines the right of property, and is therefore revolutionary. But so long as extreme
poverty and need is not declared an exempting but only a mitigating circumstance, the rule herein
announced is fully warranted. The crime itself is condemned, though the punishment is tempered. It can
not be successfully contended that a mitigating circumstance fosters crime. It is easy to understand the
conservatism of the precedents and of the attitude of the legal profession, but considerable water has
flowed under the bridge during the last two decades. Governments and peoples all over the world have
visualized more clearly the sufferings and hardships of the poor. Humanitarian ideas have loomed larger
on the horizon. More and more, legislation in all countries has been removing from the bending backs of
the underprivileged the unbearable burdens which had been crushing and overwhelming their
existence. More and more, lawmaking bodies throughout the world have seen to it that the toiling
masses participate, as much as possible, in the good things of life. More and more, legislatures have
realized that extreme poverty is brought about by general social conditions and through no fault of the
poor. More and more, legislation has remedied the sinister state of affairs which seemed to consider
poverty a crime.
Therefore, the original interpretation of laws must give way to a new one, which should be attuned to the
spirit of the age all over the earth. Although the wording of the articles of the Penal Code under
discussion has not been changed, their interpretation may be changed in order that they may not
become anachronistic. Considering that social conditions often unfold faster than legislation, it is a
salutary function of old laws as to adjust them to contemporary exigencies of the public weal. This is not
judicial legislation at all because the lawmakers intended that the law which they approved should
govern for many years to come, and that therefore it should be interpreted by the courts in such a way
as to meet new problems, provided the fundamental objectives of the law are distinctly kept in view. In
the instant case, theft is punished, so the principle of crime repression is carried out; and the penalty is
moderated because of extreme poverty and need, so the idea of punishment according to the
circumstances of each case is also recognized.
Finally, so long as there is widespread unemployment and so long as relief work, both private and
governmental, is inadequate, the punishment for stealing because of hunger should be lessened, but
not waived or lifted. Unless and until there is a job for every person willing to work, to mete out the
ordinary or highest penalty for stealing due to dire necessity flies in the face of the principle of social
justice. It is tantamount to exacting the pound of flesh in accordance with the letter of the law.
The foregoing considerations are strengthened by the leeway given to the courts in determining what in
each case constitutes a mitigating circumstance by analogy. The lawmaker, fully aware of the
impossibility of laying down an exhaustive enumeration of circumstances that would extenuate crime,
has formulated a general statement in No. 10 of art. 13. It is thus that each case must be judged by the
courts on its own merits, the only condition being that there must be similarity or analogy to one or more
of the nine circumstances specifically mentioned in said art. 13. Commenting on a similar provision of
the Spanish Penal Code (No. 8, art. 9), Groizard makes these observations:
Recuerdense una por una las siete circunstancias atenuantes que ya llevamos examinadas, y
se advertira la exactitud de lo que venimos diciendo. Todas y cada una son generalizaciones y
en todas se hallara que la libertad, o la inteligencia, o la intencion aparecen mutiladas en
bastante grado para influir en la responsabilidad de los actos humanos. Descender a
demostrar esta verdad, lo tenemos por inutil: su evidencia no han de ponerla en duda los que
recuerden el texto de los numeros y el espiritu que las vivifica.
Pero ese estudio amplio, vastisimo; estudio en el cual parece que se pierde el hombre dentro
de la humanidad; esas grandes corrientes, puntos cardinales, moldes en que todos se funden,
244
 aunque el legislador crea que lo abarcan todo, podria suceder que se equivocase, y logico en
su aspiracion de ser un reflejo de la justicia moral, al trazar el circulo en que queda a salvo el
principio de que parte, en prevision de que algun caso quedase sin definir y fuera de las
clasificaciones hechas, que ni por su generalidad, ni por su alcance, pudiera engendrar una
regla de aplicacion constante, un canon, fue preciso establecer el unico criterio que pudiera
apreciarle con entera conciencia: aludimos al criterio de los Tribunales.
De aqui la circunstancia 8.a, que, en rigor, no es mas que una regla generica para todo lo que
hallandose fuera del cuadro de las anteriormente formuladas pudiera correr igual suerte que
estas, cuando lo exigieran igual identidad y analogia, El Codigo Penal de 1870, Concordado y
Comentado, Vol. 1, p. 401. (Emphasis supplied).
Although perhaps many decades will have to elapse before penal codes of the world recognize extreme
poverty and need as an exempting circumstance, yet I believe that in the meantime it is in keeping with
the humanitarian ideas of this generation to recognize the cruel pangs of hunger as a factor that
mitigates the penalty. Possibly the growing atmosphere favorable to the submerged classes will
eventually uphold the stand of Judge Paul Magnaud who about fifty years ago became popularly known
in France as the "bon judge" because of his significant decisions acquitting those who had been
impelled to steal on account of the excruciating tortures of hunger. Be that as it may, I am convinced
that the doctrine herein declared responds to the heart-throbs of mankind.
All in all, I am persuaded that the principal penalty fixed by the trial court, one month and one day of
arresto mayor, extreme poverty and need having been considered as a mitigating circumstance by
analogy, fits the facts of the instant case.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GETULIO PANTOJA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Gamaliel Magsaysay for defendant-appellant.
CAPISTRANO, J.:
This murder case is before us for review of the sentence of death passed upon the accused by the
Court of First Instance of Quezon.
Late in the night of June 28, 1957, in the Barrio of Malinao, Atimonan, Quezon, a group of seven young
men serenaded the house, where Estelita Erotes lived. Invited to come up, the young men accepted the
invitation. When Wenceslao Hernandez was seated beside Estelita, an uninvited Philippine Army
Sergeant, Getulio Pantoja, in T-Shirt, came up and asked Hernandez to allow him to sit beside Estelita,
but Hernandez refused the request. The time was about 1:30 A.M., June 29. Pantoja said nothing and
showed no sign of anger. However, he immediately left and went to his camp about half a kilometer
distant, put on his fatigue uniform, got a rifle went back to the house and stationed himself on the
stairway. The time was about 2:00 A.M. At this time, the serenaders left the house to go to and
serenade another house in the Northern part of the Barrio. Pantoja followed the group. When the
serenaders had walked a distance of about thirty meters with Pantoja following them at a distance of
about five meters, Pantoja suddenly shouted "Ano yan? Ano yan?" Turning their heads back they saw
Pantoja raise the garand rifle and aim at them. Before any of them could run away, Pantoja fired two
shots in rapid succession. The first shot hit Angel Marasigan who instantly fell on his back. The second
shot hit Wenceslao Hernandez who fell down. The other serenaders scampered away for safety.
Pantoja, who had walked nearer, then fired one more shot at the prostrate body of Marasigan and four
more shots at the prostrate body of Hernandez.
The accused, testifying in his own defense, admitted that the shots he fired from the garand rifle killed
Marasigan and Hernandez. The autopsy report attributed the deaths to internal hemorrhage and the
destruction of vital organs.
The lower court found the defendant guilty of double murder, that is, of a complex crime, and sentenced
him to the penalty of death.
We immediately noted that the lower court erred in finding the appellant guilty of a complex crime.
Appellant's brief, however, does not contain an assignment of this error. This notwithstanding, we can
consider the error, the case under review being a criminal case.
It is well known to students of criminal law, as early as thirty-five years ago, that, according to Article 48
as amended, of the Revised Penal Code, there are two classes of complex crimes. The first class
comprises cases where a single act constitutes two or more crimes. The second class covers cases
where one crime is the necessary means for committing the other. The case at bar does not fall under
the first class because in this case there were two acts, two shots, one killing Marasigan, and the other
killing Hernandez. If there were only one shot killing both Marasigan and Hernandez, there would have
been a complex crime, double murder. The second class, obviously, does not cover the case at bar. We
are of the considered opinion that the appellant is guilty of two separate and distinct murders and that
he should suffer the penalty for each murder.
Appellant contends that the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery did not
exist. The contention is tenable with respect to evident premeditation because the appellant only had
about half an hour (1:30 to 2:00 A.M.) for meditation and reflection from the time he left the house, went
to his camp, put on his fatigue uniform, got a garand rifle and returned to said house, followed the
serenaders a short distance and then fired the two shots. The time in the circumstances was insufficient
for full meditation and reflection. It was insufficient, in the juridical sense, for his conscience to overcome
the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its warning. The contention is untenable with
respect to treachery.The appellant followed the serenaders as they walked, made no indication that he
would shoot, and then suddenly fired from behind two shots in rapid succession at Marasigan and
Hernandez from a distance of about five meters. Under the circumstances, clearly there was treachery.
Appellant contends that the generic aggravating circumstances of abuse of public position and ignominy
were not present. The contention is meritorious.There is nothing to show that the appellant took
advantage of his being a sergeant in the Philippine Army in order to commit the crimes. The mere fact
that he was in fatigue uniform and had an army rifle at the time is not sufficient to establish that he
misused his public position in the commission of the crimes. With regard to ignominy the mere fact that
the appelant fired one more shot at the prostrate body of Marasigan and four more shots at the
prostrate body of Hernandez is not sufficient to show the existence of said aggravating circumstance.
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Appellant contends that he should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. The contention is tenable. The evidence shows that immediately after the commission of the
murders, the appellant voluntarily surrendered to his detachment camp commander to whom he also
surrendered the garand rifle, and that he was ordered confined in the stockade.
The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death (Art. 248, Revised Penal
Code). There being one mitigating circumstance, voluntary surrender, the penalty for each murder
should be reclusion temporal in its maximum period in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The appellant contends that the lower court erred in rejecting his defense of insanity. The contention
lacks merit. The legal presumption of sanity is reinforced by the evidence showing that when he
committed the crimes, appellant was calm and collected, and did not show any sign of anger. The fact
that he fired four more shots at the prostrate body of Hernandez, who had refused his request to be
allowed to sit beside Estelita, shows that revenge was in his heart. The report of Dr. Cesar Catindig of
the V. Luna General Hospital where appellant was confined for one month by order of the trial court
does not show that appellant was insane. It merely shows that he was suffering from psychoneurotic
depressive reaction and psychoneurotic dissociative reaction. The report, however, concludes:
In the absence of reliable information it could not be ascertained whether the crime imputed to
him was committed when he was in such a state of mind.
That part of the judgment below awarding compensatory damages in the amounts of P6,000 to the heirs
of Angel Marasigan and P6.000 to the heirs of Wenceslao Hernandez should be modified. In 1947,
when the Project of Civil Code was drafted, the Code Commission fixed the sum of P3,000 as the
minimum amount of compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict. The Project of
Civil Code was approved by both Houses of the Congress in 1949 as the New Civil Code of the
Philippines, which took effect in 1950. In 1948 in the case of People vs. Amansec, 80 Phil. 424, the
Supreme Court awarded P6,000 as compensatory damages for death caused by a crime "considering
the difference between the value of the present currency and that at the time when the law fixing a
minimum indemnity of P2,000 was enacted." The law referred to was Commonwealth Act No. 284 which
took effect in 1938. In 1948, the purchasing power of the Philippine peso was one-third of its pre-war
purchasing power. In 1950, when the New Civil Code took effect, the minimum amount of compensatory
damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict was fixed in Article 2206 of the Code at P3,000.
The article repealed by implication Commonwealth Act No. 284. Hence, from the time the New Civil
Code took effect, the Courts could properly have awarded P9,000 as compensatory damages for death
caused by a crime or quasi- delict. It is common knowledge that from 1948 to the present (1968), due to
economic circumstances beyond governmental control, the purchasing power of the Philippine peso has
declined further such that the rate of exchange now in the free market is U.S. $1.00 to almost P4.00
Philippine pesos. This means that the present purchasing power of the Philippine peso is one-fourth of
its pre-war purchasing power. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the amount of award of
compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict should now be P12,000.
Parenthetically, we should point out that, in proper cases, besides compensatory damages in the sum of
P12,000, the courts may also award additional sums as further compensatory damages for loss of
earnings and for support. The courts may likewise award additional sums as moral damages and as
exemplary damages. (Arts 2206 and 2230, New Civil Code.)
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment of the court below is hereby modified by: 1. Sentencing the
appellant for each murder to an indeterminate penalty of from 15 years to 20 years; 2. Ordering the
appellant to pay the heirs of Angel Marasigan the sum of P12,000 as compensatory damages, and to
pay the heirs of Wenceslao Hernandez the sum of P12,000 as compensatory damages. Costs against
appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
LITO HERNANDEZ, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us on automatic appeal is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Lemery, Batangas, Branch
5, in Criminal Case No. 13-95, convicting the appellant of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death."
The Information charging the appellant with the aforesaid offense alleges as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of December, 1994, at about 12:00 noon, at Brgy. Mahabang
Parang, Municipality of San Luis, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bolo (gulukan) and a knife
(balisong), conspiring and confederating together acting in common accord and mutually
helping each other, with intent to gain and by means of violence and intimidation against
person, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away from
one Natividad Yuzon Mendoza pieces of jewelry and cash money in the total amount of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said
owner in the aforementioned amount; and that on the occasion of and by reason of the said
robbery, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and strangle to death said Natividad Yuzon Mendoza.
Contrary to law.2
The accused Nestor Catapang and the appellant, assisted by counsel, were arraigned for the crime
charged and pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. During the trial, accused
Catapang was shot dead while attempting to escape from the Batangas Provincial Jail. Trial continued
as against the appellant Lito Hernandez.
The Case for the Prosecution
At about 7:00 a.m. on December 19, 1994, Cesar Yuzon, a forty-four-year-old sweepstakes ticket
vendor, went to the Rural Health Center of Banoyo, San Luis, Batangas, to seek medical treatment for
his ailment. After receiving his daily medication from the nurse, he left the health center and went to a
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nearby store to wait for a ride back to his house in Barangay Mahabang Parang, San Luis, Batangas.
When no public utility jeepney passed by, he started walking towards the direction of Barangay
Mahabang Parang. It was about 11:00 a.m.3 Upon reaching the boundary of Banoyo and Mahabang
Parang at around 12:00 noon, he saw his cousin-in-law, the appellant,4 and Catapang dragging his
seventy-two-year-old auntie, Natividad Yuzon Mendoza,5 in the direction of a forested area where there
were also mango and coconut trees.6
Cesar shouted, "Hoy, bakit ninyo kinakaladkad ang aking tiya?" Catapang and the appellant
approached and told him not to interfere. Then Catapang pointed a knife at Cesar and, with the
appellant, warned him not to reveal what he saw to anyone; otherwise, they would kill him and his
family, including his children.7
The appellant and Catapang then returned to the place where Natividad was. Cesar followed them and
concealed himself behind a mango tree about ten arm’s length away, and saw them forcibly taking
money, a pair of earrings and a necklace from the bag of his aunt, who was lying prostrate on the
ground. Catapang and the appellant positioned themselves at Natividad’s right and left side, and
strangled her with the use of a white rope made of buri or vine string.8 She pleaded, "Huwag po, huwag
po," to no avail.9
Cesar hurriedly left the place on foot and went home. He kept the gory incident to himself for fear of
retaliation from the accused and the appellant.
That afternoon, Natividad’s son, Nemensio Mendoza, had already started looking for his mother. Cesar
joined the search at 5:00 p.m. together with the barangay captain and some of the barangay folks. The
cadaver of Natividad was found at about 11:00 p.m.10
SPO3 Ronald C. Macatangay and other police officers of the San Luis Police Station arrived at the
scene of the crime and found the cadaver of Natividad wrapped in a piece of cloth. After taking pictures
of the cadaver at different angles, it was brought to the De Guia Funeral Parlor. 11
Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, the NBI Medico-Legal Officer, performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim
and found injuries on the face, neck, and index finger. He also found a hematoma on the victim’s chin,
possibly caused by a bladed instrument,12 and a ligature mark on her neck. He concluded that the victim
died because of asphyxia by ligature strangulation. 13
Cesar’s fear was heightened when Catapang and the appellant warned him anew on Christmas Eve
that if he divulged to anyone what he had witnessed on December 19, 1994, they would kill him and his
children.14 However, on February 7, 1995, Cesar finally decided to tell his cousin, Nemensio, how
Natividad died and who the perpetrators were. He narrated how he saw Catapang and the appellant rob
Natividad of her money and jewelry, and then strangled her to death. He and Nemensio forthwith went
to the police station where they gave their respective sworn statements to SPO3 Macatangay. 15 Cesar
and Nemensio also informed the barangay captain that Catapang and the appellant were the culprits in
the killing of Natividad.
The Defense of the Appellant
The appellant denied killing Natividad and divesting her of her money and jewelry. He testified that he
eked out a living as a sweepstakes ticket vendor, while his wife, Natividad’s niece, earned a living as a
sewer of baby dresses. He also revealed that his wife’s father was the brother of Natividad.
December 19, 1994, a Sunday, was his birthday. At 12:00 noon, he had lunch at the Fresh Food
restaurant in Parañaque. The following day, December 20, 1994, Juanito Yuzon informed him of
Natividad’s death. He then attended Natividad’s wake, for two nights and two days. He only learned that
Cesar had implicated him in the crime charged when he was arrested by policemen on April 18, 1995.16
On February 8, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Finding the accused LITO HERNANDEZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of Robbery With Homicide and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA to DEATH, considering the presence of
aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength, disregard of age, sex of the
victim and the absence of any mitigating circumstance.
2. Ordering Lito Hernandez to indemnify the heirs of the deceased:
₱50,000.00 – Death of Natividad Yuzon
61,000.00 – Actual damages, jewelries (sic) and money
75,000.00 – Attorney’s fees
50,000.00 – Moral damages
3. Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.17
On automatic appeal before this Court, the appellant contends as follows:
I THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF RAPE (SIC)
WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE UNCORROBORATED, INCONSISTENT AND
CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONY OF THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESS CESAR YUZON.
II
ASSUMING SANS ADMITTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT PERPETRATED THE
SUBJECT OFFENSE, THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING
247
 AGAINTS HIM THE GENERIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF ABUSE OF Q- What do you mean when you say that?
SUPERIOR STRENGTH, DISREGARD OF AGE AND SEX OF THE VICTIM.
A- Because I was threatened that if I will tell that to anybody, I and my family would be killed.
III
Prosecutor:
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE IN ACCUSED-
APPELLANT’S FAVOR THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY Q- Who actually threatened you to kill you and your family?
SURRENDER.18
A- The two (2) of them.
The appellant avers that the trial court’s reliance on the testimony of Cesar Yuzon in convicting him of
the crime charged is erroneous, because the latter failed to immediately report the incident to the
barangay and police authorities and to his cousin, Nemensio, without any valid justification therefore. Court:
Cesar even joined Nemensio and the barangay officers in searching for Natividad in the afternoon of
December 19, 1994; yet, he failed to reveal to them that he saw Catapang and the appellant strangle Q- Are you afraid of those words uttered to you?
the victim and rob her of her jewelry and money. According to the appellant, Cesar’s conduct after
witnessing the crime is contrary to human experience; hence, his testimony is barren of probative A- Why should I not be afraid of the two (2) when my family, including me, threatened us (sic)
weight. The appellant furthers that Cesar could not have seen the killing from a distance of thirteen or to be killed.
fourteen meters, as his view was blocked by tall grasses, as well as the leaves of a mango tree.
Furthermore, the appellant points out that the testimony of Cesar is inconsistent on material points.
Thus, the appellant concludes, the prosecution failed to prove that he and Catapang brought the victim’s Q- For how long have you known these two (2)?
money and jewelry with them when they left the crime scene.
A- I have known these two (2) for a long time.
We agree with the appellant that the natural reaction of one who witnessed the commission of a crime,
especially if the victim is his kin, is to immediately and spontaneously report the case to the police Q- What is your relation to the two?
authorities so that the perpetrators are charged, prosecuted and punished if found guilty. 19 The
principle, however, is not iron-clad.
A- Lito Hernandez is married to a first cousin of mine.

Fear of reprisal and the natural reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case are sufficient
Q- So what?
explanations for a witness’ delay in reporting the crime to the authorities. 20 Such failure in making a
prompt report to the proper authorities does not destroy the truth per se of the complaint.21 Likewise, the
natural hesitance of the witnesses in this country to volunteer information about a criminal case, and A- "Tinakot akong papatayin ang aking pamilya."
their unwillingness to be involved or dragged into a criminal investigation is common, and has been
judicially declared not to affect their credibility.22 Q- Until now you are afraid?

In this case, Cesar testified that when he shouted at the appellant and Catapang to stop dragging his A- No more, Sir, because they are handcuffed, even [if] they are handcuffed, I can fight them
aunt Natividad, the two confronted him and ordered him not to interfere. Then, Catapang pulled out his now.23
balisong and pointed it at Cesar. He was then warned not to reveal what he had just seen; otherwise, he
and his family would be killed. Afraid for his life and those of his family, he kept the horrid crime to
…
himself:

Q- So, you will confirm that you allegedly witnessed the incident which took place on
Q- Did you not inform them of what you saw?
December 19, 1994?

A- I did not mention to anybody what I have seen or witnessed.

A- Yes, Sir.

Q- Why?
Q- After having allegedly witnessed that incident, you reported the matter to the police because
you are a nephew of Natividad Yuzon?
A- For fear that if they will know about it, my family would be killed.
248
A- Ay, hindi po. Q Mr. Witness, this incident happened on December 19, 1994 and you made your statement
on February 7, 1995 why (sic) it took you two months to give your statement in relation to this
Q- Why? incident?

A- Because, Sir, they threatened to kill my family. A I was afraid for my life, my school children were being threatened by them of the death if I
report the matter to the authorities.
Q- Who threatened to kill your family?
Q Who actually threatened your school children?
A- These two, Sir.
Atty. Lacap:
Q- When did they threaten your family?
Witness will be incompetent.
A- That very exact time, Sir.
Prosecutor Cuevas:
Q- On December 19, they already threatened you?
Q How did you come to know that your children were being threatened?
A- Yes, Sir.
A The two themselves told me that if I make any report of the incident they would kill my
children.25
Q- You were there on December 19 at the scene of the incident?
Cesar, a forty-five-year-old farmer, cannot be blamed for not immediately revealing to his relatives, and
A- Yes, Sir. the barangay and police authorities that he witnessed the killing of Natividad, especially since the
appellant and Catapang repeated their threats barely a week later, or on Christmas Eve:
Q- They merely threatened you?
Q This incident that you have witnessed and you are testifying now happened on December
A- Yes, Sir. 19, 1994 and you made your statement to the San Luis Police Station on February 7, 1995,
why did it take you so long for almost two (2) months to report the incident?
Q- How did they threaten you?
A I was threatened of death.
A- They poked at me a bladed weapon, saying, they would kill me, including my children.
Q Will you tell this Honorable Court when were you threatened of death?
Q- They did not kill you inspite of poking you that bladed weapon?
Atty. Reyes:
A- No, Sir.
That is very improper for re-direct.
Q- Did you make any reply to the threat made upon (sic) you by the two accused?
Atty. Tenorio:
A- I did not make any reply, I just raised my two hands, saying, wala, wala. 24
Why?
As to why it took him until February 17, 1995 to report the incident to the police officers, Cesar
explained, thus: Atty. Reyes:

That was already mentioned in the direct examination. To alter that would be improper already,
answered by the witness.

249
Atty. Tenorio: Witness may answer.

The purpose of re-direct examination is to clarify things. Atty. Reyes:

Atty. Reyes: May we manifest vehemently of this representation that the question was already propounded
to this witness.
Answered by the witness.
Court:
Court:
Witness may answer.
The facts are mentioned.
Witness:
Atty. Reyes:
A On December 19, 1994.
We leave it to the court.
Atty. Tenorio:
Prosecutor Cuevas:
Q Only on December 19, 1994?
If Your Honor, please, the question of the private prosecutor is within the ambit of …
A Then the second, it was on the 24th of the month of the same year, 1994. 26
Atty. Reyes:
The appellant’s contention that Cesar could not have seen him and Catapang strangle Natividad
We have stated that in the direct examination, Your Honor. because the tall grasses and the leaves of a mango tree blocked his view is belied by Cesar’s
testimony:
Atty. Tenorio:
Prosecutor:
It was touched during the cross.
Q- How did the two (2) strangle your auntie?
Prosecutor Cuevas:
A- "Tinalian ang leeg."
It was mentioned in the direct.
Q- After the two (2) accused tied the neck, what happened next?
Court:
A- "Binigti nila."
Objection overruled.
Q- While this incident was taking place, the act of taking the money and pieces of jewelry after
which your auntie was tied and was strangled, what were you doing at that time?
Atty. Reyes:
A- I peeped at them.
The record is very clear, my last question is will you not change your answer anymore,
meaning to say that he testified, he said no, Sir, and now he will change.
Q- At that place where you were peeping to the place where the taking of money and jewelry
and strangulation of your auntie, how far were you from the place where you were peeping?
Court:
Atty. Lacap:
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 The question is vague. Cesar’s positive identification of the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime, absent any showing of ill
motive, must prevail over the appellant’s lame and obviously fabricated defenses of denial and alibi.
Prosecutor: Denials, as negative and self-serving evidence, do not deserve as much weight in law as positive and
affirmative testimonies. Prevalently repeated is the rule that for alibi to countervail the evidence of the
prosecution confirming the appellant’s guilt, he must prove that he was not at the locus delicti when the
From the place where you were peeping? crime was committed and that it was also physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time it was perpetrated.30 In the case at bar, the defense utterly failed to satisfy these
Court: requirements.

Q- What do you mean by "sumilip?" Remarkable is the fact that the defense had no corroborating witness to strengthen the testimony of the
appellant that he was at the Fresh Food restaurant in Parañaque at the time of the commission of the
A- "Noong sinisilip ko sila, pinanonood ko sila." crime. Strangely, the appellant even testified that he was certain that December 19, 1994 was a
Sunday, because it also happened to be his birthday. The trial court, however, took judicial notice of the
fact that December 19, 1994 was a Monday, thereby further debilitating the appellant’s defense.
Prosecutor:
The appellant’s claim that he cannot be convicted of robbery because the prosecution failed to prove
Q- From the place where you peeped to the place where your aunt was being strangulated by that, after divesting Natividad of her money and jewelry, he and Catapang carried the same with them
these two, how far were you from that place? when they left the situs criminus is barren of merit.

A- More or less ten (10) arm[’s] lengths (sic) also. In robbery, there must be an unlawful taking or apoderamiento which is defined as the taking of items
without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using
Court: force upon things. Taking is considered complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the
thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.31 There is, likewise, no need to prove the
exact amount of money taken, as long as there is proof of the unlawful taking. 32 Intent to gain, or
Q- Mr. Witness, when you say that you were peeping to the three (3), what do you mean?
animus lucrandi, as an element of the crime of robbery, is an internal act; hence, presumed from the
unlawful taking of things.33
A- Because I was hiding from something which is (sic) leaves of mango tree.
Cesar testified that the appellant and Catapang took the money and jewelry of Natividad and then
Q- Do you want to convey to the Court that from the place where you were peeping and the strangled her to death:
place where the three (3) were, is there something that obstruct (sic) your view?
Prosecutor Cuevas:
A- Not so much of an obstruction but then you have to separate the leaves in order to peep,
"hinahawi."27
Q After you were approached by the two, Lito Hernandez and Nestor Catapang, what
happened if anything happened?
It bears stressing that the crime was committed in broad daylight, about 12:00 noon. We have ruled that
where the conditions of visibility are favorable and the witness does not appear to harbor any ill motive
A Tinutukan nila ako, saying for (sic) me not to report the matter.
against the malefactors, his testimony as to how the crime was committed and on the identities of
perpetrators must be accepted.28 There is no evidence on record of any ill motive on the part of Cesar
to falsely implicate Catapang and the appellant in the heinous crime for which the latter could be Q When you said tinutukan nila, what do you mean?
sentenced to the capital penalty.
A The balisong or boloet (sic) was poked at me telling me not to make any report.
The well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction is that the matter of ascribing substance to the testimonies
of witnesses is best discharged by the trial court, and the appellate courts will not generally disturb the Q Who actually poked the balisong?
findings of the trial court in this respect. The rationalism is quite simple: the trial judge is in a better
position to ascertain the conflicting testimonies of witnesses after having heard them and observed their
deportment and mode of testifying.29 A Nestor Catapang, Sir.

Q After that, what happened next if anything happened?

251
A Thereafter, they returned to the place where my aunt was. Q Aside from that money, do you know of what (sic) other items were taken from the body of
your aunt, if any?
Q After that, when they returned to the place where your aunt was, what happened if anything
happened? Atty. Lacap:

A After they had strangled her, they took the money. No basis, Your Honor.

Q Which took first, the strangulation or the taking of the money and others? Court:

A The taking of the money took first. Witness may answer.

Q While the two were taking the money and after they strangled … A Jewelries (sic).

Atty. Lacap: Prosecutor Cuevas:

Objection, Your Honor, what did you do if you did anything. Q What kind of jewelries (sic)?

Court: A Necklace and earrings.

Reform. Q After your aunt was strangled, what did you do?

Prosecutor Cuevas: A After the strangulation (sic) of my aunt, I left the place.

Q You said, how far were you from the two when Lito Hernandez and Nestor Catapang Q A while ago, how did these two strangled (sic) your aunt?
strangled your aunt?
A They used a white object in the strangulation of my aunt.
Atty. Lacap:
Q That white material, it is made of what?
Objection, Your Honor, there was no statement from the witness …
A Somewhat buri or vine but whitish.
Prosecutor Cuevas:
Q The position of your aunt, can you please demonstrate to us how these two strangled (sic)
Q According to the witness a while ago after the two returned to the place where his aunt was your aunt using that white material either buri or vine.
and my question …
(At this juncture, witness playing the role of the accused and the court interpreter playing the
Court: role of the victim place[d] his right hand, made two rounds around the neck of the Court
Interpreter.)34
Witness may answer.
We agree with the trial court that the appellant is guilty of robbery with homicide under Article 294,
Witness: paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.

A Less than ten armlengths (sic). In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with
homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. 35 The intent to commit robbery must
precede the taking of human life.36 The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is

252
only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes, modes or
persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. 37 There is no
such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The
constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery and homicide, must be consummated.
When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of
robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that
they endeavored to prevent the same.38
All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although
not all profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal
designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized.39
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was
committed to (a) facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the
culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate
witnesses in the commission of the crime. As long as there is a nexus between the robbery and the
homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of the robbery.40
In this case, the appellant conspired with Catapang in committing the crime charged in the light of the
evidence on record. The original design of the appellant and his cohort was to rob the victim. They did
rob the victim, and then strangled her to death.
We disagree with the trial court’s finding that abuse of superior strength, disregard of sex and age, were
attendant in the commission of the crime. Section 8, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure now explicitly requires the complaint or information to "state the designation of the offense
given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances." Under the old rule, only the qualifying circumstances were needed to be
alleged in order to be considered by the court. The present rules, however, require even the aggravating
circumstances to be alleged in the complaint or information. The information in the present case failed
to precisely aver that abuse of superior strength and disregard of age and sex attended the commission
of the crime.41 Although the rule took effect only on December 1, 2000 and it was the old law that was in
effect at the time of the commission of the crime, the same may be applied retroactively insofar as it
benefits the accused.42
Moreover, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and disregard of age and sex
cannot be appreciated as no evidence was presented to prove the same. To establish the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength, there must be a deliberate intent on the part of the
malefactors to take advantage of their greater number. They must have nefariously selected and made
use of superior strength in the commission of the crime.43 As an aggravating circumstance, what should
be considered is not that there are two or more assailants as against one victim, but whether the
aggressors took advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the offense. 44
With respect to disregard of age and sex, the Court has pronounced in the case of People v. Collado45
that the same may be appreciated only in crimes against persons or honor. It is not correct to consider
this aggravating circumstance in crimes against property. Besides, robbery with homicide is principally a
crime against property and not against persons. Homicide is a mere incident of the robbery, the latter
being the main purpose and object of the criminal. Moreover, it has not been proven that in committing
the crime, the appellant determinedly intended to offend or insult the age and sex of the victim. 46
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is not present in the case at bar. To benefit an
accused, the following requisites of this circumstance must be proven, namely: (1) the offender has not
actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the
surrender was voluntary.47 A surrender is said to be voluntary when it is done by the accused
spontaneously and made in such manner that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender
unconditionally to authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the
trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. 48 In this case, there is no indication
in the record that the appellant, of his own accord, came forward and presented himself before the
authorities, manifesting his desire to spare the Government the time, effort and expense of pursuing
him.49 The appellant surrendered only after the warrant of arrest was served upon him. The fact that the
appellant did not defy but went peacefully with the arresting officer does not mean that he voluntarily
surrendered. Hence, this mitigating circumstance can not be appreciated in favor of the appellant.
There being neither aggravating nor modifying circumstances that attended the commission of robbery
with homicide, the appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, conformably to Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code.50
The award of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity for the death of Natividad Yuzon Mendoza should be upheld
without need of proof for being in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. Similarly, the appellant is
liable to pay ₱50,000 as moral damages to the heirs of the victim for the pain and sorrow they
suffered.51 The prosecution in this case adduced evidence to prove the factual basis for an award
therefor.
However, we find that the grant of ₱61,000 as actual damages is not properly supported by the
evidence on record. The trial court relied exclusively on the testimony of Nemensio Mendoza, the
victim’s son, with respect to the amount of burial expenses. Further, there was insufficient basis for the
award as only the receipt of Funeraria De Guia (Contract Invoice No. 333) amounting to ₱11,000 as
proof of funeral expenses, was presented in evidence. Thus, this award should be reduced accordingly.
Nevertheless, the heirs are entitled to temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000. 52
Likewise, nothing on the record manifests the actual expenses incurred by the heirs of Natividad for
attorney’s fees. Attorney’s fees are in the concept of actual or compensatory damages allowed under
the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, one of which is when the court deems it
just and equitable that attorney’s fees should be recovered. 53 In this case, we find the award of ₱75,000
as attorney’s fees unsupported by evidence and, therefore, should be deleted for lack of basis.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated February 8, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Lemery,
Batangas, Branch 5, in Criminal Case No. 13-95 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS.
Appellant Lito Hernandez is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide under
Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to an indivisible
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The said appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Natividad Yuzon
Mendoza the following amounts: (a) Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000) as civil indemnity; (b) Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000) as moral damages; and, (c) Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000) as
temperate damages.
253
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARLON PARAZO Y FRANCISCO, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
PURISIMA, J.:
This case was docketed on November 27, 1995, upon the elevation for automatic review of Criminal
Case Nos. 6167 and 6168, for rape and frustrated homicide, from Branch 27, Regional Trial Court,
Cabanatuan City, which imposed on accused-appellant Marlon Paraza y Francisco the supreme penalty
of death.
On May 14, 1997, this Court handed down a Decision, 1 affirming with modification subject Joint
Decision of Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija, in Criminal Case Nos. 6167 and 6168,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the joint decision appealed from dated March 24, 1995, is hereby
AFFIRMED with respect to Crim. Case No. 6167, and accused Marlon Parazo y
Francisco is found guilty of the crime of rape under Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, with the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, and is sentenced to the penalty of death, with two (2)
members of the Court, however, voting to impose reclusion perpetua.
The decision appealed from with respect to Crim. Case No. 6168, for frustrated
homicide is MODIFIED in that the accused is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum penalty to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor maximum, as maximum penalty.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the
pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
On May 29, 1997, appellant interposed the Motion for Reconsideration under consideration, bringing to
the attention of the Court facts and circumstances, such as the absence of a sign language expert,
which if true would warrant the setting aside of his judgment of conviction.
On February 10, 1998, the Court resolved 2 to grant appellant's Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) to hold in
abeyance consideration of his motion for reconsideration pending his medical examination; (2) to allow
a supplemental motion for reconsideration after his medical examination; and (3) to submit him
(appellant) for examination by a physician of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, or on January 19, 1999,
to precise, appellant was allowed to be brought to the UP-PGH Medical Center, with appropriate
escorts, to undergo the necessary neurologic and otolaryngologic evaluation and work-up. 3
In compliance with the said resolution of the Court, Dr. Rosa Mendoza, Senior Chief Staff Officer of the
Supreme Court Clinic Services, submitted two (2) Memorandum Reports, dated July 29, 1998 and
March 5, 1999, respectively, on the mental, neurologic and otolaryngologic examination and evaluation
of appellant.
On July 20, 1998, the appellant was examined, on the basis of which examination SC Medical Services
Psychologist III Beatriz O. Cruz came out with the following findings and general observation, to wit:
GENERAL OBSERVATION AND TEST BEHAVIOR:
xxx xxx xxx
An encounter with this person revealed him to have an average physique and height,
with fair complexion and somewhat curly hair. Throughout the testing session he was
in a pensive mood. Doubt and an agitated appearance was written all over his face
particularly when he struggled to say something, but which ideas could not get
across. One security officer, Mr. Gutierrez, came to our aid and communicated to Mr.
Parazo through sign language to comprehend and answer the question being asked
[what he was guilty of]. When he could not understand it, we wrote the question in
tagalog in the paper and to our surprise he could not even read. However thru some
efforts made he was able to utter "rep" [rape].
Another inmate whom they call "mayor" [he is the leader of the group] and another
close friend of Mr. Parazo where (sic) called in to provide help to the examiner. And
with difficulties being experienced by the undersigned in giving instructions in
gestures, he was able to draw the geometric figures and a person, respectively. Hand
tremor was noticeable [Mr. Parazo is left handed]. With the help of mayor, an attempt
was further made by the examiner to show him the ink blot test, counting on the idea
that the examiner might get something out of his responses to the task just like in the
previous paper and pencil test. But our efforts proved futile at this time. No amount of
gestures could make him comprehend the instructions given. It was during this time
that he was able to verbalize "dilam" in high pitched, cracking voice which the
undersigned took for "di alam" [I don't know]. The examiner did not go further from
this point hence, the termination of test administration.1âwphi1.nêt
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
254
 Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Good enough Figure Drawing Test
TESTS RESULT & DISCUSSION:
The results of the paper and pencil test reveal that Mr. Parazo's intelligence function
based on the Goodenough is gauged on the Mild to Moderate degree of Mental
Retardation with an estimated IQ of 60. His mental age on the other hand, is
equivalent to 7 years and 9 months.
Further, signs of regressive features and distortion of the gestalt figures are
manifested with strong indication of impulsive behavior. His inability to reproduce from
memory the same figures was noteworthy. His writing output is unsteady that gives an
inkling of difficulty in the motor area.
The above clinical findings are typical reproduction of a person with history of
neurological dysfunction as maybe true in the case of Mr. Parazo who is deaf. It
cannot be discounted also that his intellectual and psychological deficiencies are not
only based on organic brain pathology but primarily on the basis of mental retardation
which impedes the effective use of whatever abilities he does have and which renders
him psychologically incompetent to comprehend fully the significance of the acts he
commits. 4 (emphasis ours)
In connection therewith, there was presented the Memorandum Report of July 29, 1998, stating thus:
Based on the foregoing, it appears that the problem of appellant Marlon Parazo is the
severe hearing defect or deafness. The presence of an organic disorder cannot be
determined because of the latter's inability to communicate. However, some degree of
mental retardation was gathered with the use of "Paper and Pencil Test." His mental
age is seven (7) years and nine (9) months. His Intelligence Quotient (IQ) is 60.
This mental retardation could be secondary to an inherent defect in the brain or
secondary to the sensory deprivation [deafness], which connotes a substantial
limitation in intellectual and adaptive functioning. (emphasis ours)
Appellant was then examined at the UP-PGH Medical Center, and the Memorandum Report of Dr. Rosa
Mendoza, dated March 5, 1994, summarized the findings of the UP-PGH Medical Center as follows:
Quoted hereunder are the report on the test conducted:
Ma. Luz S. Casimiro-Querubin, MD, DPBP, Psychiatrist, Department of Psychiatry
and Behavioral Medicine, College of Medicine and Philippine General Hospital,
Manila in her Psychiatric Assessment Report, stated that:
On the day of assessment, Mr. Parazo was seen sitting on the
examining table. His hands were cuffed in front of him. He was
feeding himself a sandwich. He was appropriately groomed. He
wore the orange bilibid prison uniform with denim jeans and rubber
shoes. He appeared tired and fearful. His mood was generally
anxious and his affect was appropriate to the situation. When
approached, Mr. Parazo would look down but would glance at the
examiner after a few seconds. He was unable to follow simple
instructions initially and was able to do so only after much coaxing
from those around him and repeated demonstrations of the task he
was being asked to do. He was unable to read. The only thing he
could write is his name. Mr. Parazo was able to copy simple patters
(sic) but could not participate in any verbal assessment procedure.
His thought content, thought process and flow of ideas could not be
determined because of his inability to speak. (Emphasis supplied).
He was able to maintain good eye contact. The client remained
calm during the assessment procedure. It was evident that he felt
insecure with the manipulative tasks he was presented with.
Initially, Mr. Parazo appeared resistant to the examiner but he
eventually warmed.
Throughout the examination, Mr. Parazo sought for encouragement
by looking at the examiner after each and every task. He worked
quietly, exerted obvious efforts to perform well and was visibly
careful in trying not to commit mistakes. It was only when he was
signaled that he could use both hands that Mr. Parazo did so. His
behavior was consistent throughout the period of the examination.
The above behavioral description strongly supports the fact that Mr.
Marlon Parazo is indeed hearing impaired and suffers from mental
retardation. He is unable to understand both written and spoken
language, needs repetitive sign language instructions and
demonstration to understand the task he was being asked to do.
Meredith F. Castro, MA, Psychologist, PGH, Manila, on the other hand, supported the
assessment findings of Dra. Ma. Luz C. Querubin and reported as follows:
Psychological Evaluation Report Summary
xxx xxx xxx
Measure
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Rev. (WISC-R),
Performance Scale. (This is a comprehensive test of intelligence
that measures both verbal and non-verbal aspects and is intended
for children aged 6-16 years old and for adults suspected of mental
deficiency. It is composed of two scales that can be administered
255
 separately. Given the examinee's sensory impairment and absence
of speech, this present assessment used only the performance
scale, which taps the non-verbal intelligence).
xxx xxx xxx
Performance Prorated Scale Score: 23
Performance IQ: 65+9
Mean Test-Age: 8 years, 5 months
Impressions
Given his sensory impairment and limited educational background,
M.P. Fared poorly in this intelligence test for children and has been
assessed to be within mild mental deficiency to borderline range of
intellectual functioning.
Charlotte M. Chiong, M.D., Otology, Neurotology, Neurotologic Skull Base Surgery,
Diplomate, Philippine Board of Otolaryngology-Head and Neck Surgery, PGH certified
that:
I examined Mr. Marlon Parazo, 28-year-old death convict last
February 3, 1999. Brainstem auditory evoked response audiometry
was done and with 2000 click stimuli no wave responses were
gerated in the left suggestive of profound hearing loss in that ear. In
the right ear there was a response 80 db click intensities suggestive
of a severe hearing loss. Puretone Audiometry was done and
patient was also noted to have bilateral profound hearing loss.
Speech Testing could not be done due to severity of hearing loss.
From my evaluation Mr. Marlon Parazo has a severe disability and
could not possibly understand conversational speech without
powerful amplification such as a hearing aid. (Emphasis supplied).
For her part, Dr. Grace O. Orteza, MA, MD, FPNA, Section of Neurology, Department
of Medicine, UP-PGH, Manila, in her Assessment stated that . . . there are no
significant neurologic findings aside from the manifest deafness and muteness of
patient.
To corroborate the medical findings of the Medical Team from the Philippine General
Hospital, we conducted an on-the-spot gathering of vital information's on the physical
infirmities of Marlon Parazo to determine whether the same is congenital or acquired.
Mrs. Eufrocina "Zenaida" Francisco, the mother of Marlon admitted that her son was
born deaf and mute. Their day to day communications relied simply by a pat at the
back, a tap on the lap or sometimes by the very basic sign language that could best
convey the message to him. He never had any formal education. Medical intervention,
according to her, never crossed her mind because of their poverty. If food, which is a
very basic need is already a problem how much more with medications.
The Barangay Chairman of Caimito, Palayan City, Mr. Antonio Sebastian, on the
other hand, claims that he has known Marlon since childhood. In the locality he was
branded as "Pipi" because of his inability to communicate. Nothing significant was
noted in his childhood days. It was only when he was about his late teens that he was
involved in petty theft.
An interview with Mrs. Juliana Baltazar, a retired school teacher, likewise
strengthened the fact that Marlon was deaf and mute. Marlon, according to her, never
actively participated in class though his enthusiasm to learn was present. He never
completed a Grade I full school term, even on a "sit in basis" since he and his sister
were forced to drop from the class during the harvest season to earn a living.
The Department of Social Welfare and Development, Field Office, Palayan City, on
the other hand added the information that since 1975 Marlon was a beneficiary of
their projects relative to "Persons with Disability." During his early childhood, he was
an active participant of their project. As he grew older however, he did not anymore
bother to visit their office.
Based on the collateral information's (sic) gathered from persons who have known the
patient since childhood, together with the results of the diagnostic test at UP-PGH and
evidenced by the psychological report, it is now established that Marlon Parazo is
suffering from (1) Profound Hearing Loss, left ear; (2) Severe Hearing Loss, right ear;
(3) Mental Retardation, Mild.
The American Association of Mental Deficiency and the Fourth Edition of Diagnostic
and Statistical/Manual of Mental Disorder enumerated the Diagnostic Criteria for
Mental Retardation as follows:
1. Significantly sub-average intellectual
functioning: an IQ. of approximately 70 or below
on an individually administered IQ. test.
2. Concurrent deficits or impairments in present
adaptive functioning (i.e., the person's
effectiveness in meeting the standards expected
for his or her age by his or her cultural group) in
at least two of the following skill areas:
communication, self-care, home-living,
social/interpersonal skills, use of community
resources, self-direction, functional academic
skills, work, leisure, health and safety).
3. Onset before age of 18.
256
 xxx xxx xxx
During the tympanovactic examination, the intense sound given to ear of the patient
that is above the normal hearing threshold will elicit facial and neck contraction of the
muscle, which this patient (Marlon) did not manifest. Instead, he continued staring
blatantly [blankly] at the roof of the room.
For her part, Dra. Querubin elucidated that given the physical infirmities coupled with
mental retardation there is no way that Marlon can determine the propriety of his
actions. Perhaps, it would have been different if he had a formal education and given
the opportunity to communicate effectively through the sign language. He, however is
in a situation where due to immense poverty never had a chance to improve his lot.
In conclusion, as per Resolution of the Court En Banc, the undersigned [Rosa J.
Mendoza, M.D.] conducted hand in hand with Dr. Charlotte M. Chiong, in the medical
evaluation of Mr. Marlon Parazo, together with the panel of Medical Specialist of UP-
PGH, the S.C. Medical Team and the lawyer representative from the Office of the
Court Administrator, it is our unanimous opinion that Mr. Marlon Parazo is deaf and
mute with mental retardation mild.
The affidavits 5 of Rev. Fr. Roberto A. Olaguer, the National Bilibid Prisons Chaplain, and Rev. Fr. Roy
Rolando L. Cosca, S.J., Executive Director of Philippine Jesuit Prison Service, state that appellant is a
deaf-mute. The results of medical examinations conducted on appellant also indicate that appellant is
really a deaf-mute, a mental retardate, whose mental age is only seven (7) years and nine (9) months,
and with low IQ of 60 only.
Records on hand show that appellant was tried below without the benefit of a sign language expert. The
fact that he was "helped and assisted by a person who has been known to him since 1983", as noted by
the trial court of origin and appearing on page 6 of the transcript of stenographic notes for February 8,
1995, is of no moment, absent any clear showing that appellant was aided by a competent sign
language expert able to fully understand and interpret the actions and mutterings of appellant.
As held in People v. Crisologo 6:
The absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed to the
accused a deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense with which he was charged and who
could also have communicated the accused's own version of the circumstances which
led to his implication in the crime, deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and a
reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Not even the accused's final plea of not
guilty can excuse these inherently unjust circumstances.
The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means,
whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him
denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The accuracy and
fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was
determined was not safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the
right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at
stake.
All the foregoing studiedly considered, the court is of the irresistible conclusion that movant richly
deserves a re-arraignment and re-trial, to the end that only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
may he be consigned to the lethal injection chamber.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of this Court promulgated on May 14, 1997 is VACATED, the Joint
Decision rendered by Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija in Criminal Case Nos. 6167
and 6168 is SET ASIDE; and appellant is hereby GRANTED a RE-ARRAIGNMENT and RE-TRIAL,
with the assistance of counsel and a competent sign language expert, before the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMADO DANIEL alias "AMADO ATO", accused-appellant.
Eraulio D. Yaranon for appellant.
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Rosalio
A. de Leon for appellee.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J:
This case originated from the Court of First Instance of Baguio City by virtue of a complaint filed by 13-
year old Margarita Paleng accusing Amado Daniel alias "Amado Ato" of rape alleged to have been
committed as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 1965, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, armed with a
sharp instrument and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersignedcomplaint,
against her will, and in her own room situated at No. 25 Interior, Pinsao, Guisad,
Baguio City.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance that it was
committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the latter not having givenprovocation
for it, is present. (p. 1, CFI record)
257
The trial court, presided then by Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, after due trial rendered its decision on May
30, 1966, finding the accused guilty and sentencing him to suffer "not more than TWELVE (12) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal and not less than SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor, and to pay the costs." 1
His motion for reconsideration and new trial having been denied, accused filed a notice of appeal;
forthwith the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
On September 23, 1974, the Court of Appeals through its Tenth Division rendered a decision the
dispositive portion of which follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We find that the guilt of the accused Amado Daniel has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt, and he should accordingly suffer the penalty
for the crime herein charged.
We find, however, that the sentence imposed the accused in the judgment appealed
from is not in accordance with law.
Republic Act No. 4111, which took effect on June 20, 1964, amended Article 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, providing that —
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
Under Section 17 of Chapter 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296, as
amended) —
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify
or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and
decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in —
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment; ...
WHEREFORE, We hereby certify this case to the Supreme Court for appropriate
further proceedings pursuant to law. 2
By virtue of the foregoing decision of the Court of Appeals the case was certified to this Court and in a
Resolution of March 6, 1975, the same was ordered docketed. 3
Preliminary question —
The certification of the case to Us poses a preliminary question which strikes at the very root of a long
standing practice and procedure evoked for the last forty years or so since the creation of the Court of
Appeals. 4
Is the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to act on an appeal in a criminal case where the offense is
punishable by reclusion perpetua or death certified to it by the Court of Appeals with findings of facts
and of the guilt of the accused, but without imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death on the
appellant pursuant to Rule 124, Section 12, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court?5
Mr. Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, joined by other ,Justices, expresses the view that for this Court to
acquire jurisdiction over the appeal, the decision before Us must have imposed on the appellant the
penalty either of reclusion perpetua or death as the facts warranted.
The rest of the Justices together with the writer of this Opinion, believe otherwise and hold the view that
the dispositive portion of the decision as written and rendered is in accordance with the Constitution and
the law, and vests jurisdiction on the Court to act on the appeal.
A. In People v. Ramos, decided on November 28, 1947, 6 a case was certified to this Court by the Court
of Appeals without findings of facts and simply on the ground that it was "on the opinion that the penalty
that should be imposed ill this case is reclusion perpetua, as recommended by the Solicitor-General,
and not reclusion temporal, as imposed by tile lower court." The question arose as to the proper
procedure to be followed by the appellate court in certifying cases to this Court under Section 145-K of
the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Republic Act No. 52 which read:
Whenever in any criminal cases submitted to a division the said division should be of
the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed, the said
Court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the case
to the Supreme Court for final determination, as if the case had been brought before it
on appeal.
In disposing of the issue several matters came up which evoked different, and We may say, strong
reactions from the Justices then composing the Court, but for brevity we shall not dwell on them. Simply
stated, it is was ruled that the Court of Appeals was duty bound to make its findings of facts to support
its opinion that the penalty to the imposed upon the appellant was either life imprisonment or death so
as to bring the case within the jurisdiction of this Court.
From the Resolution written for the Court by then Mr. Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran, We quoted the
following pertinent portions:
The jurisdiction of this Court predicated upon the opinion of the Court of Appeals, as
provided in the above-quoted provisions of the law, must of necessity defend upon
the correctness of that opi nion There is nothing in the law precluding this Court from
exercising ing its authority to pass upon such question which concerns its own
jurisdiction. And in order that this Court may exercise its power of review the Court of
appeals is bound to make in its order f certification such findings of facts as are
necessary to support its conclusion that either life imprisonment or death is the
penalty to be imposed. This is indeed covered by Rule 52, section 3, which provides
th where a court to which an appeal has been taken has no appellate jurisdiction over
258
 lic case and it certifies the same to the proper court, it must do so "with a specific and
clear statement of grounds therefor." the requirement of with and specific grounds is
precisely a device to prevent erroneous transmissions of jurisdiction from a lower to a
superior court.
Furthermore, the words "shall refrain from entering judgment thereon" appearing in
the provision above quoted, are sufficient indication that the Court of Appeals, at the
time of certifying the case to this Court, had already examined the evidence and was
ready to render judgment on the merits, but having found from the facts established
by proof that the penalty to be imposed is either death or life imprisonment, instead of
entering judgment thereon , it certifies the case to the Supreme Court for final
determination. Since the Certification is the only ground for determining our
jurisdiction, it must contain not only conclusions of law but also findings of fact, the
latter being more important than the former for they supply the real basis for
determining jurisdiction ...
The instant case cannot be compared with cases coming directly from a Court of First
Instance wherein either life imprisonment or death penalty is imposed, for in such
cases, if we assume jurisdiction even where the judgment appears to be erroneous
on its face, it is because the Court of First Instance has already exhausted its
jurisdiction by rendering judgment on the merits containing both findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and under such circumstance it is more practical for the
administration of the law that this Court should exercise its appellate jurisdiction by
examining the evidence and correcting all errors both of fact and of law that might
have been committed by the trial court. But here, the Court of Appeals is refraining
from rendering judgment on the merits and is refusing to complete the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction because it believes that such jurisdiction belongs to the
Supreme Court and thus, it proceeds to transfer the case to this Court. lt is in that
transfer that we believe we may intervene in order to prevent an erroneous transfer,
xxx xxx xxx
Section 145-K of the Administrative Code is merely a method designed to make
effective the appellate jurisdiction of both the Court of Appeals and this Court, as
defined by law. According to the law of jurisdiction (section 138, Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259), offenses,
for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment, including offenses arising
from the same occurrence or committed on the same occasion, come within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the remaining offenses fall within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals ...
We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like this, the Court of
Appeals, in certifying it to this Court, must state its findings of fact necessary to
support its conclusion that the penalty to be imposed is either life imprisonment or
death. While this Court will not review the findings of fact, it will pass upon the
correctness of the legal conclusions derived therefrom. And if this Court finds the
conclusions to be correct, it will assume jurisdiction. If it finds them to be wrong, the
case will be returned to the Court of Appeals. (pp. 613-616, supra, emphasis
supplied)
In Ramos, the case was accepted because the Court considered that there was substantial compliance
with the law as the order of certification made reference to the opinion and recommendation of the
Solicitor General whose brief contained sufficient findings of fact to warrant the conclusion that life
imprisonment should be imposed upon the appellant. Justices Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Briones
concurred in the Resolution.
Justice Gregorio Perfecto in a separate opinion concurred with the principle that the Court of Appeals is
bound to make its findings of fact and study the evidence so as to determine whether the appellant is
guilty or not, but dissented from that portion of the Resolution which accepted the case as he was of the
opinion that the case should have been remanded to the Court of Appeals.7
Justice Pedro Tuason wrote a separate opinion and dissented from the majority insofar as it held that it
was necessary for the Court of Appeals or a division thereof to state the reasons for its opinion that
death penalty or life imprisonment should be imposed. He particularly dissented from statements that if
this Court found the conclusions of the Court of Appeals to be wrong, the case should be returned to the
Court of Appeals for further proceedings. According to Justice Tuason when a case is certified to this
Court it is placed, by force of the Court of Appeals' opinion, within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
for the latter to decide the appeal on the merits; findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are neither
essential nor necessary. Justice Tuason was joined in his dissent by Justice Cesar Bengzon who later
became Chief Justice of this Court and Justice Sabino Padilla.8
B. The theory is now advanced that We go one step further than that ruled in Ramos — that is, for the
Court of Appeals not only to make its findings of fact and finding of guilt, but also to impose the penalty
either of reclusion perpetua or death as the facts warrant in order that We may exercise Our appellate
jurisdiction.
We believe that such a judicial ruling will be violence to the letter and spirit of the law which confers on
the Supreme Court the exclusive prerogative to review on appeal and impose the corresponding penalty
in criminal cases where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua or death.
Both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vest upon the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, in "(A)ll
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment."9 This jurisdiction is
constitutional: the Supreme Court ma not be deprived thereof by, Congress then, now the National
Assembly. 10
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act 1948 as amended in turn provides that the foregoing appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exclusive.
Basically therefore, the objection to this new theory is one of jurisdiction - the lack of jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death.
The present controversy springs from the construction given to the second paragraph of Sec. 12, Rule
124, Rules of Court 11 more particularly to the use of the phrases "should be imposed" and "shall
refrain from entering judgment", viz:
xxx xxx xxx
259
 Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division the said division should be of
the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed, the said
court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the case
to the Supreme Court for final determination, as if the case had been brought before it
on appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
As we construe it, the Rule cited does not charge the appellate court with the duty of
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death. All that the Rule requires is that
should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion that death or life imprisonment should
be imposed, it "shall refrain from entering judgment thereon ...
The clause "entering judgment" means "rendering judgment". Thus, the Court of Appeals shall refrain
from rendering judgment if and when it is of the opinion that reclusion perpetua or death is the proper
penalty for the crime committed. This can be the only logical interpretation considering that the Court of
Appeals is without jurisdiction to impose the penalties concerned. The phrase "entering judgment" is not
to be equated with an "entry of judgment" as the latter is understood in Rule 36 in relation to Section 8,
Rule 121 and Section 16, Rule 124, Rules of Court. "Entry of judgment" presupposes a final judgment
— final in the sense that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial or appellate court within the
reglementary period. A judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the
defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal.12 It is only then that there is a judgment
which is to be entered or recorded in the book of entries of judgments. 13
It would be incongruous or absurd to state that Section 12, second paragraph, Rule 124 enjoins the
Court of Appeals from entering judgment" when there is no judgment to be entered .
But then the argument is advanced — what is there to be reviewed by the Supreme Court when the
decision being certified contains no penalty or sentence, as distinguished from appeals from the Court
of First Instance where there is a complete judgment to be passed upon. The answer is simple. Section
12 itself states that the case is for final determination by the Supreme Court as if the case had been
brought before it on appeal. Hence, based on the findings of facts of the appellate court which as a rule
are conclusive and binding on Us, this Court "will pass upon the correctness of the legal conclusions
derived therefrom" (People v. Ramos, supra) and impose the correct penalty for the offense committed.
We realize that had Section 12, Rule 124 used the phrase shall refrain from rendering judgment " there
would be no cause for any ambiguity. We can only assume that the intent of the Rule was so clear to
the Court when it drafted the Revised Rules of Court that it did not envision a possible contrary or
adverse interpretation or ambiguity in its implementation under the phraseology used. It is incumbent
upon Us to construe the Rule in the spirit and intent it was conceived and in harmony with pertinent laws
and jurisprudence.
On the merits of the appeal —
1. Generally in a case of this nature, the evidence of the prosecution consists solely of the testimony of
the offended party. Here We have the declaration of the victim, who at the time of the incident was a
little less than 13 years of age, on the basis of which the trial court found the charge of rape duly
established. The happenings are briefly summarized in the People's brief as follows:
The offended party in this case is Margarita Paleng who was born on November 20,
1952 (p. 3, t.s.n., Manipon). She is a native of Balangabang Tublay, Mountain
Province (pp. 3, 12, Id.) At the time of the incident in question on September 20,
1965, complainant was temporarily boarding at a house located at Pinsao Guisad
Baguio City, as she was then a first year high school student at the Baguio Eastern
High School (pp. 3, 12, 20, Id.; p. 36, Estigoy).
On September 20, 1965, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, she had just arrived
in the City from Tublay in a Dangwa bus (p. 3, Manipon). Because it was then raining
and the bus was parked several meters away from the bus station, she waited inside
the bus (pp. 3, 22, Id.). After about three minutes of waiting, the accused came and
started molesting her by inquiring her name and getting hold of her bag (pp. 4, 22-24,
Id.). But she did not allow him to hold her bag (p. 24, Id.). She called the attention of
the bus driver and the conductor about the actuation of the accused, but it seemed
that the former were also afraid of him (pp. 24-25, Id.).
Despite the rain, she left the bus and went to ride in a jeep parked some 100 meters
away (pp. 4, 25, Id.). The accused closely followed her (p. 4, Id.). When the jeep
started to go, the accused also rode and sat beside her (p. 5, Id.).
When the jeep reached Guisad, she alighted on the road but she still had to negotiate
a distance of ten meters (p. 5, Id.). The accused also alighted and again he tried to
carry her bag (p. 5, Id.). Although he was not allowed to carry her bag, her was
adamant in following her (p. 5, Id.).
Reaching her boarding house, she opened the door and was about to close it when
the accused dashed in and closed the door behind him (pp. 31-32, Id.). When she
entered her room, the accused went in (p. 7, Id.). He pulled a dagger eight inches
long and threatened her: "If you will talk, 1 will kill you". (p. 7, Id.). Margarita was
stunned into silence because of her fear (p. i Id.). Thereupon, the accused held her
hair with his left hand and forced her Lo lie down in bed (p. 7, Id.) He also placed his
left hand with a handkerchief in Margarita's mouth, at the same time holding the
dagger and her neck with his right hand (pp. 7-8, Id.). She was forcibly made to the
down and, at this moment, the accused removed the buttons of his pants (p. 8, Id.).
He then put down the dagger on tile bed (p. 8, Id.). Her attempts to extricate herself
from the accused was to no avail assile was only 4 ft. and 8 inches tall and weighed
about 95 to 100 pounds (p. 35, Id.) while the accused was 5 ft. and 7 inches tall and
weighed about 126 pounds (pp. 8, 59, Id.). He then held his penis (pp. 8. 36, Id.),
used his thigh to separate the legs of Margarita (p. 38, Id.). tried, but failed. to remove
her panty (p. 36, Id.). He nonetheless guided his penis and inserted it inside the
vagina of the complainant after prying open the part of her panty covering her private
parts (pp. 9, 36, Id.). Then he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the offended
party (p. 9, Id.). Margarita lost consciousness. When she recovered, he was already
gone (p. 9, Id.).
The following morning, her father came to visit her. She confided to him the terrible
misfortune which befell her (pp. 9-10, Id.). She was immediately brought to the Baguio
General Hospital where she was examined (p. 10, Id.). Then they proceeded to the
Police Department. The Chief of Police accompanied them to the Health Center
260
 where she was again examined by Dr. Perfecto O. Micu who thereafter submitted his
medical report (Exh. C; p. 3, rec.; pp. 11, 14-16, Id.). Margarita and her father gave
their respective statements before the police authorities (Exh. B, pp, 5-6, rec.; p. 11,
t.s.n.). She signed her criminal complaint prepared by the Fiscal's Office of Baguio
(Exh. A; p. 1, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n. (pp. 2-4, Brief at p. 83, rollo
The City Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Perfecto Micu was called to the witness stand and he testified on the
physical examination conducted on the person of Margarita Paleng on September 23, 1965 and his
findings as contained in the report were as follows:
1. Hymen-circular-stellate type with healing lacerations at 6:00, 8:00, 9:00 and 11:00
o'clock positions in the face of a clock.
2. Contusions at the base of the hymen at 3:00 & 9:00 o'clock regions.
3. Vaginal Orifice - tight and hardly admits 2 fingers.
4. Vaginal wall — tight and vaginal folds are prominent.
5. Vaginal smear — negative for spermatozoa and for gram negative intra or extra-
cellular diplococci. (Exh. "C", p. 3, CFI record)
Dr. Micu concluded that "defloration was recent". He further declared that the condition of the hymen
revealed that Margarita Paleng was a virgin before the incident complained of, and that the number of
lacerations and contusions at the base of the hymen indicated the degree of force exerted to effect the
sexual act. 14
For his defense, appellant claimed that he and Margarita were acquainted with each other since 1963,
and there were occasions when they rode together in a bus; that the incident of September 20, 1965
inside the room of Margarita was with the latter's consent, and in fact it was the second time he had
carnal knowledge with her, the first time having occurred inside a shack; that he promised Margarita that
he would marry her, but to his surprise, she filed the instant complaint against him. 15
2. The issue being one of credibility, We find no cogent reasons for discarding the findings of facts of
the trial court which were sustained by the Court of Appeals after the latter had examined the evidence
as a result of which it certified the case to this Court.
Appellant assails the veracity of the testimony of the complainant. But what possible motive could a
thirteen-year old girl barely in her teens have in fabricating a story that could only bring down on her and
her family shame and humiliation and make her an object of gossip and curiosity among her classmates
and the people of her hometown. It cannot be denied that a public trial involving a crime of this nature
subjects the victim to what can be a harrowing experience of submitting to a physical examination of her
body, an investigation by police authorities, appearance in court for the hearing where she has to
unravel lewd and hideous details of a painful event which she would prefer to forget and leave it
unknown to others. If Margarita did forego all these and preferred to face the cruel realities of the
situation it was due to her simple and natural instincts of speaking out the truth.
The insinuation that this complaint was filed because appellant had not married the girl although he
promised to marry her, is preposterous. On September 20, 1965, Margarita was only twelve years and
ten months old and was not of marriageable age, hence, marriage was a legal impossibility. And as
regards appellant's testimony that the complaint was instigated by the Chief of Police of Tublay who
was Margarita's uncle, the trial court did not give credit to such a declaration.
Counsel for appellant stresses that notwithstanding that Margarita had the opportunity to ask for help or
attract the attention of other people before she reached her boarding house, she failed to do so.
According to counsel there were people at the Dangwa station, in the busy streets, in the market place,
in the jeepney parking place where the girl took a jeep to proceed to the boarding house, and in the
neighboring houses the closest of which was about 5 meters away, but no attempt was ever made by
complainant to seek help so as to prevent appellant from molesting her. 16
Appellant's contention presupposes that Margarita was well aware all the time from the moment she
saw the appellate inside the bus that the latter had intentions of abusing or raping her. All that the
appellant did inside the bus was to hold her bag and she caged the attention of the driver and the
conductor to the impertinence of appellant but the two did not do anything about it. 17 And when
Margarita walked from the bus to the jeepney station, although she saw appellant walking behind her
she did not suspect that he was following her. To a question propounded by His Honor whether she
suspected that appellant was following her, Margarita answered: "No sir, I did not suspect." 18 All along
Margarita could not call the attention of the people in the street or shout for help inasmuch as at that
particular moment the appellant was not doing anything against her. And when Margarita reached the
boarding house there were no persons around 19 and in fact she went straight to her room and it was at
that particular moment when appellant barged into the room before she could close the door. In short,
the Poor girl was simply taken by surprise by the forced entrance of appellant who immediately took out
an 8-inch long dagger and said "If you will talk I will kill you."
Persons can have different reactions to a situation like that — some may manifest an aggressive or
violent attitude of confronting a molesting or impertinent fellow while others, like 12-year old Margarita,
may assume a silent. fearful attitude.
Appellant's counsel also claims that Margarita did not offer any resistance to the acts of the accused at
the time the latter was allegedly forcing himself on her as shown by the medical findings that there were
no signs of extra-genital injuries on the girl's body, and no blood stains on her dress and underwear.
The foregoing arguments are inadequate to weaken and destroy the veracity of Margarita's
straightforward and positive declaration as to how appellant, a 22-year old farmer in the prime of his
manhood, weighing 126 lbs and five feet 21 and six inches tall,20 overpowered her and succeeded in
accomplishing the sexual act despite her resistance. Margarita was less than 13 years of age, was 4' 8 "
in height, and weighed around 95 lbs.21
In a crime of rape, force need not be irresistible; "it need but be present, and so long as it brings about
the desired result, all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible, is beside the point. 22
All that is necessary is that the force used by the accused is sufficient for him to consummate his evil
purpose. In U.S. v. Villarosa, 1905, there was a similar situation. A 12 year old girl was sexually abused
in the woods by a man of superior physical strength. In holding the accused Villarosa guilty of rape the
Court held:
261
 It is a doctrine well established by the courts that in order to consider the existence of
the crime of rape it is not necessary that the force employed in accomplishing it be so
great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force
used by the guilty party be sufficient to consummate the purpose which he had in
view. (4 Phil. 434, 437 citing Judgment May 14, 1878, Supreme Court of Spain. The
Villarosa doctrine has been followed in numerous cases involving the crime of rape
and one of the latest is People v. Equec, 1977, per Justice Enrique Fernando, 70
SCRA 665.)
And as stated in People v. Savellano, per Justice Ramon Aquino, the force or violence necessary in
rape is naturally a relative term, depending on the age, size, and strength of the parties and their
relation to each other. 23
Rape is likewise committed when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter submits herself against
her will because of fear for her life and personal safety. In this case of Margarita Paleng, appellant was
armed with a dagger and with it threatened to kill the girl if she would talk or scream for help. Her fear
naturally weakened whatever resistance Margarita could muster at the time and as a result appellant
was able to consummate his coitus on the victim. 24
One last point raised by the able counsel of appellant, Atty. Braulio D. Yaranon, who at the time of the
trial in 1965 was the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, was that appellant voluntarily submitted to a lie detector
test with the National Bureau of Investigation and the report of the lie detector examiner is in appellant's
favor, that is, the latter was telling the truth on the questions propounded to him one of which was
whether he forced Margarita Paleng into having sexual intercourse with him and the reply was "No". 25
On this matter We find the trial Judge's observations and conclusions meritorious and We quote from
his decision the following:
As to the N.B.I. lie detector test report, the Court does not put much faith and credit
on it. It is well known that the same is not conclusive. Its efficacy depends upon the
time, place and circumstances when taken and the nature of the subject. If subject is
hard and the circumstances, as in this instant, were not conducive to affect the
subject emotionally, the test will fail. The subject had nothing more to fear because
the trial was over. He was not confronted by the victim or other persons whom he had
a reason to fear. Naturally, his reaction to the questions propounded was normal and
unaffected and the apparatus could not detect it. (pp. 172-173, CFI record)
To conclude, the crime committed by the appellant is rape with the use of a deadly weapon with the
aggravating circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling of the offended party. Although
Margarita was merely renting a bedspace in a boarding house, her room constituted for all intents and
purposes a "dwelling" as the term is used in Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary,
under the law, that the victim owns the place where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a
bed-spacer, the place is his home the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold.
Hence, the correct penalty for the crime committed is death pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended. However, for lack of the necessary number of votes, the penalty next lower in
degree is to be applied.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the judgment of conviction of Amado Daniel for the crime of rape
as charged, and We sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and order him to indemnify
Margarita Paleng by way of moral damages in the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) and
pay the costs.
Decision Modified.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, J., concurs.
Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur in the result on the merits.
Castro, C.J., Makasiar, Fernando and Fernandez, JJ., took no part.
Guerrero, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
The phrase shall refrain from entering judgment thereon" found in section 12 of Rule 124 and in section
34 of the Judiciary Law means that the Court of Appeals should not decide the case. The Court of
Appeals has been certifying to this Court criminal cases, wherein the imposable penalty is death or
reclusion perpetua without rendering any judgment but merely expressing its opinion that the penalty
imposed by the trial court is erroneous and that the imposable penalty is death or reclusion perpetua.
Invariably, this Court accepted those cases and decided the same. This Court's jurisdiction in criminal
cases, as defined in the Constitution, cannot be diminished but it can be enlarged.
Appealed criminal cases may be divided into three classes: (1) those wherein the lower court imposed
the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua and which are within this Court's exclusive appellate
jurisdiction; (2) criminal cases wherein the trial court imposed reclusion temporal or a lesser penalty and
which fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, and (3) criminal cases wherein the
trial court imposed a penalty of reclusion temporal or a lesser penalty but a Division of the Court of
Appeals, while in the process of deciding the case, comes to the conclusion that the imposable penalty
is death or reclusion perpetua. That third class of criminal cases should be elevated to this Court "for
final determination".
Reclusion perpetua was properly imposed in this case upon the appellant who is a pedophiliac.
262
CASTRO, C.J., dissenting:
1 (d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death, life imprisonment;
The preliminary issue at bar is: What is the correct course of action that the Court of Appeals should
take when, in a criminal case properly appealed to it, that court determines that the penalty of death or
reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) should be imposed instead of the lesser penalty imposed by the
court a quo? Should it refrain from rendering judgment and forthwith certify the case to the Supreme
Court? Or should it render judgment imposing what it considers as the proper penalty (either life
imprisonment or death) but refrain from entering judgment and thereafter certify the case to the
Supreme Court?
At the center of scrutiny is the pertinent provision of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, and the Identical statement in the second paragraph of section 12 of Rule 124 of the Rules of
Court, both of which read:
Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division [of the Court of Appeals] the
said division should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment
should be imposed, the said court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and
shall forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for final determination, as if the
case had been brought before it on appeal.
Justices Claudio Teehankee, Cecilia Munoz Palma and Ramon C. Aquino interpret the phrase "entering
judgment" in the inhibitory clause "shall refrain from entering judgment" to mean "rendering judgment" or
"pronouncing judgment," arguing that [t]his can be the only logical interpretation considering that the
Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction" to impose the penalties of death and life imprisonment. They
thus opt to maintain the present practice1 of requiring no more than a forwarding certification
(embodying findings of fact supporting the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should
be imposed) by the Court of Appeals for the purpose of placing such case within the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.
For the reasons hereunder stated, we consider their interpretation unwarranted and therefore reject the
conclusion that it leads to.
2.
Section 34 of the amended Judiciary Act and the second paragraph of section 12 of Rule 124 of the
Rules of Court must be construed in the light of the unequivocal phraseology of paragraph (d),
subsection (2), section 5 of Article X of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Review and revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferiors courts in —
xxx xxx xxx
Varying the language of this provision only to the extent necessary to carry out its intention, the first
subdivision of the third paragraph of section 17 of the Judiciary Act made exclusive the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in the following words:
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify
or affirm on appeal as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and
decrees of inferior courts as herein provided in -
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment: ...
The constitutional mandate, given due statutory acknowledgment, sets forth the pertinent appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. We accord capital significance to the phrases "final judgments and
decrees of inferior courts and "the penalty imposed." These phrases are crystal-clear. Read together
with the remainder of the provision, they state in precise and unmistakable terms the sole intended
inescapable meaning that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of
inferior courts in criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment. No
hermeneutic expertise or exercise can validly fashion some other meaning or intention.
3.
The constitutionally determined nature of the criminal cases falling within the periphery of the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court fixes our perspective, defines and delimits our judicial prerogative in
the interpretation of section 34 of the Judiciary Act, and dictates the manner in which the law in question
should be read and made operative.
This being so, the clause enjoining the Court of Appeals to "refrain from entering judgment" whenever it
"should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed" cannot
validly be interpreted as a bar to that appellate court's "rendering judgment." If the meaning given to the
law by the minority should prevail and the case is forwarded, as this case before us was, to the
Supreme Court on a bare certification by the Court of Appeals, then we have the unacceptable
happenstance of an ordinary legislative act upstaging the fundamental law, since, plainly, the Supreme
Court will be constrained to exercise its power to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal" in
criminal cases where NO "final judgment" in which "the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment"
has been rendered or pronounced.
The minority view would thus result not only in an unconstitutional imposition on the Supreme Court of
assumption of jurisdiction over a case that is beyond its original appellate competence but would also
compel abandonment by the Court of Appeals of appellate jurisdiction legally and duly vested in and
acquired by it.
4.
263
Because sec. 34 of the Judiciary Act does not and cannot have primacy or ascendancy over the
Constitution, we assert that the Court of appeals is legally empowered to impose the penalties of death
and life imprisonment. Four basic and compelling considerations underlie our view.
First: There is no law — no law at all — that states such prohibition in categorical terms. The minority
view rests solely on the strained interpretation foisted on the very law under consideration — and this
interpretation, as we have said, is entirely unwarranted.
Second: In the case at hand, the Court of appeals duly and legally assumed appellate jurisdiction over
the accused Amado Daniel's appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio
sentencing him to suffer a penalty less than life imprisonment. This cannot be debated since section 29
of the Judiciary Act specifically places such appeal within the Court of Appeals' jurisdictional ambit with
the statement that
The Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases,
actions, and proceedings, not enumerated i section seventeen of this Act, properly
brought to it.
Thus, absent any constitutional or legal constraints, the Court of Appeals should have rendered the
proper judgment in the case. For, verily, judicial jurisdiction is "the power with which judges are invested
for administering Justice — that is, for trying civil or criminal cases, or both, and deciding them and
rendering judgment, ..., 2 (emphasis supplied)
Third: Harking back to the Constitution, the Court of Appeals, by unmistakable constitutional
categorization, is an "inferior court." And it is its judgments as such inferior court which, so the
Constitution plainly states, are the subject of the Supreme Court's plenary power of review, revision,
reversal, modification or affirmance.
Fourth: Absurdity and incongruity should not be read into the law so as to support the view that a panel
of three Justices of the Court of Appeals is denied the power to impose the penalties of life
imprisonment and death at the same time that such power is recognized in a single judge of a lower
court of admittedly lesser category,
5.
The resulting conclusion that the Court of Appeals must impose the proper penalty does not justify the
apprehension that the Supreme Court will be hampered in the exercise of its jurisdiction because the
findings of fact made by the inferior appellate court "will have to be respected." This stated procedural
practice has never been honored in the absolute. The ultimate function of the Supreme Court is to
render justice. And we need not elaborate on or belabor the numerous occasions when, to attain this
objective, the Court shunted aside technicalities to bare wide open the controversy and inquire into each
and every aspect, be it legal or factual or a mixture of both.
And this is one perfect instance where the avowed ends of justice must override practice and
procedure, for, no less than human life is at stake. And this would not be a novelty. When a trial court's
judgment imposing the death penalty is elevated to this Court en consulta, we strip the case into
minutiae: fact by fact, detail by detail, facet by facet. We see no reason why, when a decision imposing
the penalty of death or life imprisonment is rendered by the Court of Appeals, the same manner of
meticulous inquiry should not be resorted to by the Supreme Court. A sentence imposing death or life
imprisonment is of the self-same gravity, whichever is the sentencing tribunal.3
6.
It is rather obvious that the phrase "entering judgment" is completely disparate from the term "rendering
judgment." There is no need to perambulate and meander the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of Rule 36
of the Rules of court need merely be read to perceive the strikingly sharp antithesis between the two
phrases. These sections read:
Section 1. Rendition of judgments. — All judgments determining the merits of cases
shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it [sic] is based, signed by him, and filed with
the clerk of the court.
Section 2. Entry of judgments and orders.— If no appeal or motion for new trial is filed
within the time provided in these rules, the judgment or order shall be entered by the
clerk. The recording of the judgment or order in the book of entries of judgments shall
constitute its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or
order and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or order
has become final and executory.
The word "enter" (which undeniably is the root of "entering") with reference to judgments has acquired a
definite meaning in our procedure. There simply exists no ambiguity to warrant embroiled interpretation.
We need not hammer out meaning from the word "entered." It is there. Section 2, Rule 36 chisels out
the legal import of the word.4 To repeat and stress the Rule, "[t]he recording of the judgment or order in
the book of entries of judgments shall constitute its entry. Upon the other hand, the rendition of
judgment is the judicial act of the writing by the judge of the decision and the filing thereof with the clerk
of court. 5
Such being the precise acceptations of the terms "entering judgment" and "rendering judgment," we see
no cogent reason why our indisputably learned lawmakers should have written in the former when they
meant the latter. If, as the minority would have it, the intention was just that, why then has not section 34
of the Judiciary Act been accordingly amended, considering that the said Act has been amended no
less than ninety (90) times 6 since its enactment thirty years ago in 1948?
The conclusion is thus ineluctable that section 34 of the Judiciary Act means exactly what it says. (And
its intendment cannot and should not be altered through tile expedient of palpably tortuous and
torturous statutory interpretation.) This rightly projects the limited character of the said section — a
procedural device designed to effect and make effective the jurisdictions of both the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals. Read as written, this section neither imposes nor curtails constitutionally and
legally established jurisdictions. The Court of Appeals can and must render a decision and impose the
proper penalty of death or life imprisonment, and, to effect the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, refrain
from entering its judgment, and forthwith certify tile case to the Supreme Court.
7.
264
Aside from according the respect that is due to the Constitution and setting aright the import of section
34 of tile Judiciary Act, our reading of the law will obviate unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting
shuttling of criminal cases between the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. We advert to that
portion of the Ramos 7decision, cited with approval by Justice Muñoz Palma, which states:
We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like this, the Court of
Appeals, in certifying it to this Court, must state its findings of fact necessary to
support its conclusion that the penalty to be imposed is either life imprisonment or
death. While this Court will not review the findings of fact, it will pass upon the
correctness of the legal conclusions derived thereof And if this Court finds the
conclusions to be correct, it will assume jurisdiction. If it finds then to be wrong the
case will be returned to the Court of Appeals. (emphasis supplied)
We particularly and especially object to the return of the ease to the Court of Appeals if the Supreme
Court "finds" the legal conclusions in the certification "to be wrong." This incident will never come to
pass if section 34 is correctly construed — that is, as we construe it — for, the Supreme Court will
acquire jurisdiction over the case from the very inception and can, without bothering the Court of
Appeals which has fully completed the exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the case.
8.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court directs that, henceforth, should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion that
the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) should be imposed in any criminal case
appealed to it where the penalty imposed by the trial court is less than reclusion perpetua the said
Court, with a comprehensive written analysis of the evidence and discussion of the law involved, render
judgment expressly and explicitly imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua as the
circumstances warrant, refrain from entering judgment, and forthwith certify the case and elevate the
entire record thereof to this Court for review.
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
LEOSON DELA CRUZ y ECHECHE, Appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is theDecision1 dated August 18, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00780, affirming with modification the Decision2 dated May 17, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Marikina City, Branch 272. The trial court had found appellant Leoson dela Cruz y Echeche
guilty of murder and frustrated murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 99-3101-MK and 99-3102-MK,
respectively.
The amended informations charging appellant with murder and frustrated murder, respectively, read as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-3101-MK
(For Murder)
xxxx
That on or about the 20th day of November 1999, in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a kitchen knife, with
intent to kill by means of treachery and evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength
and using disguise, fraud and craft to enter the dwelling of one JULIANA RICALDE y RODRIGUEZ, and
once inside, did then and there, with insult to or in disregard of the respect due the latter on account of
rank, age and sex, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab said JULIANA RICALDE
y RODRIGUEZ, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which directly caused her death.
(Underscoring omitted.)
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 99-3102-MK
(For Frustrated Murder)
xxxx
That on or about the 20th day of November 1999, in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a kitchen knife, with
intent to kill by means of treachery and evident premeditation, and using disguise, fraud and craft to
enter the dwelling of PELAGIO RICALDE y TAN, and once inside, did then and there, with insult to and
in disregard of the respect due the latter on account of rank, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab said PELAGIO RICALDE y TAN, thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds which
ordinarily would have caused his death, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have
produced the crime of Murder, as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
cause independent of his will, that is, due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said
Pelagio Ricalde y Tan which prevented his death. (Underscoring omitted.)
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.
The facts below as found by the RTC and confirmed by the Court of Appeals were gleaned from the
testimonies of (1) Atty. Pelagio T. Ricalde, survivor and husband of the victim Juliana; (2) Rebecca R.
Ricalde, their 19-year-old daughter; (3) Sgt. Robert D. Esgana, the guard-on-duty at Gate 3 of the Cinco
Hermanos Subdivision; (4) Godofredo E. Meriel, the responding subdivision guard; (5) SPO4 Conrado
J. Cruz and (6) SPO4 Jaime E. Gamueda,5 crime investigators from the Marikina Police; (7) SPO4
265
Celso J. Cruz, evidence custodian of the Marikina Police; (8) Drs. Bu C. Castro and (9) Noel B. Minay,
medico-legal officer of St. Luke’s Medical Center and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
respectively; and (10) Aida V. Magsipoc, Forensic Chemist of the NBI.
It appears that around 10:00 a.m. on November 20, 1999, appellant dela Cruz presented an I.D. with
the name Allan B. Reyes to Sgt. Esgana, the guard-on-duty at Gate 3 of the Cinco Hermanos
Subdivision in Marikina City. Sgt. Esgana recorded the entry in his logbook. 6
Upon reaching the house of Pelagio, dela Cruz told Rebecca, Pelagio’s daughter who met him at the
gate, that her father had told him to go there. He stepped in the small gate in the garage that was
already opened, and Rebecca walked ahead of him to fetch her father. As the father and daughter
returned, dela Cruz was already in the kitchen. According to Rebecca, she first heard the two converse
quietly as dela Cruz asked her father for a job recommendation. It was then that she noticed dela Cruz’s
blue backpack. Suddenly, she heard her father scream, "Becca, tulungan mo ako."7 She screamed,
"Daddy, Daddy,"8 as she ran towards him, and noticed dela Cruz holding a knife. She screamed for help
and saw her mother, Juliana, rushing in. Her father was covered with blood and she sought help to rush
him to the hospital.
According to Pelagio, dela Cruz was a messenger in his law firm who got fired based on his secretary’s
recommendation that dela Cruz had been absent without leave at least three times. 9 This information
was corroborated by Priscila M. Dimaano, Pelagio’s secretary. 10 When his daughter informed him that
dela Cruz wanted to talk to him, he met with dela Cruz who was by then in their kitchen already. He told
him he did not have his stationery with letterhead and had to still check with the companies he knew
which had vacancies. He said that he would write dela Cruz a recommendation letter which the latter
could pick up from the office. As he escorted dela Cruz out towards the garage gate, the latter suddenly
stabbed him at the back and kept on stabbing him until he lost his balance. When he managed to turn
and face dela Cruz, the latter kept on stabbing him frontally. He tried to put his arms around dela Cruz
but his attacker shook him off. As he ran towards the kitchen, dela Cruz chased and kept on stabbing
him at the back of his left shoulder. At this point, Juliana appeared and rushed to him begging, "Leo,
tama na, tama na, tama na."11 Dela Cruz dropped the knife and ran towards the garage.12
As Juliana was attending to her husband, dela Cruz suddenly reappeared and stabbed her at the back
with a letter opener. As she jerked backward, she received another stab below the left shoulder. She
tried to ward off the letter opener with her left hand, but again was stabbed at the back of her left arm.
Pelagio shouted, "Huwag Leo, si Julie yan."13 When the letter opener broke, dela Cruz dropped the
instrument and rushed outside where he was apprehended by Meriel, the guard-on-duty in Gate 1.
In court, Meriel,14 SPO4 Conrado J. Cruz15 and SPO4 Gamueda16 all identified that dela Cruz was the
person who was arrested in connection with the incident in the Ricalde residence. SPO4 Gamueda, who
recovered the weapons used in the stabbing, identified the same in court. SPO4 Celso J. Cruz, the
evidence custodian of the Marikina Police, identified the kitchen knife and the letter opener, one
bloodied yellow and blue backpack, one striped blue and white t-shirt with the word MAUI printed on it
with the initials "J.G.," and one khaki pants marked Geraldo Jelleni with initials "J.G." 17
Dr. Castro, medico-legal officer of the St. Luke’s Medical Center, examined and described the wounds
of Pelagio. He said that the first and second wounds of Pelagio could have been fatal were they not
timely treated; that the knife was made of aluminum softer than Pelagio’s bone and was bent as it hit the
bone; and that Pelagio also sustained multiple bruises in the body.18
Dr. Minay, medico-legal officer of the NBI, conducted the post-mortem on Juliana. He described eight
stab wounds inflicted on Juliana, and said the first wound caused her internal bleeding that proved fatal.
All the wounds were inflicted by a pointed instrument with one-sided blade. Three of them were inflicted
on her back.19
Forensic chemist Magsipoc testified that the DNA profile of the bloodstain on the backpack and on the
khaki pants, which were presented in evidence, matched the DNA profile of Pelagio although the stains
in the t-shirt did not.
Dela Cruz denied the accusations against him. He admitted that he went to the Ricalde residence to ask
for a job recommendation from Pelagio upon Pelagio’s instruction. Pelagio denied he gave this
instruction.20 Dela Cruz said he traveled one and a half hours and took three rides to get there. He
presented his I.D. card to the guard-on-duty and saw the guard make an entry in the logbook. He said
he was frisked and his bag was inspected. He claimed that he was frequently at the Ricalde residence
and had at times, when the owners were abroad, slept there and watched the place for them. According
to him, when Rebecca led him in and when Pelagio saw him, Pelagio was red-eyed and was furious
when he reminded Pelagio that it was the latter who had told him to be there. At this juncture, Pelagio
shouted at him, "Shit, bullshit, putang ina,"21 then shoved him towards the garage gate. Still furious,
Pelagio continued shouting, "Tang-ina mo, wala akong kakilalang Leo."22 Dela Cruz recalled that as he
was leaving, Pelagio was blocking the gate so he just stared back. Then, Pelagio grabbed a kitchen
knife in the nearby sink, three steps away from the gate. Pelagio was about to stab him so he grabbed
the knife and stood up. As Pelagio was still blocking his exit, he saw Juliana hand a knife to Pelagio. It
appeared to him that Pelagio was in a daze and did not recognize anyone. Pelagio tried to stab him but
started hitting Juliana instead. According to dela Cruz, Pelagio stopped only when Juliana dropped to
her knees. He saw Pelagio embrace Juliana. Then, dela Cruz added, he rushed outside where he was
apprehended and brought to the Marikina Police Station.23 He said he did not know how Pelagio got his
wounds and how the knife was bent as he was busy grappling for the knife. 24
During rebuttal, Rebecca testified that there was no sink in the garage, disputing dela Cruz’s story that
Pelagio got the knife from there. She said that the sink was located in the generator/engine room that
could be accessed through a door with an iron shutter that was always locked. 25 This information was
corroborated by SPO4 Gamueda.26
Dr. Rocco B. Paragas, resident surgeon at the Amang Rodriguez Medical Center, treated dela Cruz. He
testified that dela Cruz had contusions on the right hand and left thigh and had wounds on the fifth digit
of the right hand. The wounds were probably caused by sharp object like a knife. They could also be
defense wounds. The hematomas on the hand and on the left thigh were probably caused by hitting a
blunt object or falling hard atop a hard object. 27 He first explained that it was improbable for dela Cruz to
have the incise wounds in the fifth digit of the right hand, considering the relative positions of the
protagonists as they grappled for the knife, but did not rule out the possibility that the incise wounds
were sustained if dela Cruz’s fingers slipped towards the knife, as he was being stabbed by the attacker
or when while holding the knife, he hit a hard object. 28
On May 17, 2001, the trial court convicted appellant. The dispositive portion of the decision reads,
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the accused LEOSON DELA CRUZ y ECHECHE is
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 99-3101-
MK and of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 99-3102-MK penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised
266
Penal Code, as amended, and is sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH by lethal injection
and the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, respectively, the crime having been qualified with
treachery and attended with the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling. The accused is further
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Atty. Juliana Ricalde y Rodriguez the amount of P50,000.00 for the
latter’s death, the amount of P200,000.00 as moral damages and another amount of P200,000.00 as
exemplary damages for both cases. The court, however, cannot award actual damages for the death of
the victim Atty. Juliana Ricalde y Rodriguez and for the damages sustained by Atty. Pelagio Ricalde in
view of the failure of the prosecution to substantiate such damages with official receipts and other
documents to support the same.
SO ORDERED.29
Following People v. Mateo,30 the cases were transferred to the Court of Appeals for review.
On August 18, 2005, the appellate court affirmed with modification the trial court’s decision. The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The joint Decision
dated 17 May 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272, in the cases entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Leoson Dela Cruz y Echeche," docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 99-
3101-MK and 99-3102-MK, is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
In Criminal Case No. 99-3101-MK, appellant LEOSON DELA CRUZ Y ECHECHE is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER qualified by treachery with the aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and dwelling and is hereby SENTENCED to the supreme
penalty of DEATH.
The appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Atty. Juliana Ricalde the amounts of: (a)
Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) Php50,000.00 as moral damages; (c) Php25,000.00 as exemplary
damages; (d) Php25,000.00 as temperate damages; and (e) Php2,441,423.00 for the victim’s loss of
earning capacity.
In Criminal Case No. 99-3102-MK, the appellant LEOSON [DELA] CRUZ Y ECHECHE is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER qualified by treachery with
the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and dwelling and is hereby SENTENCED to an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) [y]ears of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
The appellant is further ordered to pay the victim Atty. Pelagio Ricalde the amounts of: (a)
Php50,000.00 as moral damages; (b) Php25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (c) Php30,000.00 as
civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.31
Appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opted not to submit their respective
supplemental briefs.32 However, on record we find their briefs filed before the appellate court on the
following issues brought before it, to wit:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING TREACHERY AS A QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE.33
III.
…EVIDENT PREMEDITATION [WAS] SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED.
IV.
…DWELLING WAS ALSO PRESENT.34
In sum, the issues for our review are: (1) Did the prosecution prove appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt? (2) Did treachery, evident premeditation and dwelling attend the commission of the crimes?
First, appellant contends that in criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution
and unless there is overwhelming evidence of the guilt of the accused, the constitutional presumption of
innocence applies.35 He claims that this burden had not been satisfied by the prosecution. Second,
appellant contends that treachery was not present in this case. He avers that the informations did not
allege treachery with specificity, hence, it was only a generic aggravating circumstance and he should
only be charged with homicide and frustrated homicide. 36 He points out that his wounds would clearly
show that Pelagio resisted his attack. He also insists that the alleged attack on Juliana was an
afterthought of Pelagio since Juliana saw the danger to her life.
On the other hand, the OSG submits that appellant’s guilt had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The OSG insists that there was treachery since Pelagio was totally caught off-guard by appellant’s
sudden attack. Further, as appellant’s attack on Juliana was so sudden, it was impossible for her to
defend herself.37
Likewise, according to the OSG, evident premeditation was present since appellant planned the death
of the victims as reflected in the following circumstances: (1) he traveled one and a half hours to reach
the Ricalde residence; (2) he presented a fake I.D. upon entering the subdivision; and (3) he was armed
with a knife and a letter opener when he went there. Thus, the OSG claims that despite sufficient time
for reflection, appellant went on with his criminal plan.38
Further, the OSG contends that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is also present because the
crimes were committed in the house of the victims who had not provoked appellant. 39
Lastly, the OSG contends that the two informations against appellant specifically alleged the
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and dwelling to have attended the commission of the
267
crimes. The OSG cites People v. Aquino,40 where we clarified that the words "aggravating/qualifying,"
"qualifying," "qualified by," "aggravating," or "aggravated by," need not be expressly stated as long as
the particular attendant circumstances are specified in the information.41
With the prosecution’s overwhelming evidence, we see no reason to reverse the findings of the trial
court and of the appellate court as appellant’s guilt on the crimes charged was proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
We find Pelagio’s testimony to the minutest detail and his categorical identification of appellant as the
assailant credible, unwavering and consistent. Both the trial and appellate courts agree on the facts
surrounding the attack on the victims. Positive identification made with moral certainty suffices to convict
the accused.42 Further, the testimony concerning the death of Juliana and the near death of Pelagio
acquires greater weight since it is amply supported by the testimonies and medical findings of Dr.
Castro43 and Dr. Minay,44 who examined the victims.45
On the other hand, appellant’s defense suggesting that Pelagio, for no motive or reason at all, would
suddenly harm and violently kill his wife is highly improbable. Appellant insinuates that Pelagio was
dazed, red-eyed and beside himself. However, Pelagio’s testimony was corroborated by his daughter
when she heard her father’s cry for help and she saw dela Cruz with a knife. Appellant’s testimony that
Pelagio got a knife from a nearby sink had been more than contradicted by Rebecca that the sink was
nowhere in the garage but in the generator/engine room. Rebecca’s testimony on this point was
corroborated by a police officer who had no reason to lie. Testimonial evidence, to be credible, should
come not only from the mouth of a credible witness but it should also be credible in itself, reasonable,
and in accord with human experience.46
As to the presence of treachery, we agree with both the trial and appellate courts that the suddenness
of appellant’s attack on the victims ensured the commission of the crimes, giving no opportunity for
Pelagio and Juliana to defend themselves. At the time of the attack, Pelagio was talking with appellant
on the way out. At that time, Pelagio did not have the slightest idea he was going to be stabbed and had
no chance to defend himself.
Treachery also accompanied the death of Juliana. Juliana was by her fallen husband when appellant
reappeared with a letter opener. The attack on her was instantaneous and Juliana was not ready to fight
back thinking appellant had left. In People v. Vallespin, we ruled that even if the victim is warned of the
danger to her person, treachery may still be appreciated as long as the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend herself or to retaliate.47
Appellant further contends that the informations 48 filed against him failed to allege treachery with
specificity in order to qualify the killing to murder. Appellant’s contention is disingenuous, to say the
least. The informations sufficiently apprised appellant of the nature of the charges against him, i.e., that
treachery, evident premeditation and dwelling attended the killing of Juliana, and the attack on Pelagio.
It is not the use of the words "qualifying" or "qualified by" that raises a crime to a higher category, but
the specific allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the essential element raising the crime
to a higher category.49
When treachery is present, an allegation of abuse of superior strength can no longer be appreciated as
an independent aggravating circumstance.50 The same holds true with the circumstance of disregard of
the respect on account of rank, age or sex, which in this case could not be aggravating. 51 In like
manner, we do not find that disguise, fraud or craft attended the commission of the crimes. Also, we find
no intellectual trickery nor cunning resorted to by appellant to lure his victims into a trap and conceal his
identity.52
As to the presence of evident premeditation, we find that only the attack on Pelagio was evidently
premeditated. The same cannot be said on the assault on Juliana.
To prove evident premeditation, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the following
elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that he has clung to such determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and execution to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequence of his act. 53
As testified to by Rebecca, she had never before the incident seen the knife used by appellant in their
home. Pelagio and his secretary also testified that the letter opener had been missing from the law firm
after appellant was dismissed from employment. These uncontroverted testimonies constitute direct
evidence of appellant’s pre-conceived plan against Pelagio. Further, as the Court of Appeals noted,
despite the one and a half hours travel time for reflection, appellant still clung to his criminal plan against
Pelagio.
On the other hand, Juliana’s arrival to help her husband was unexpected. When Juliana rushed to her
wounded husband and begged appellant to stop, appellant left, but suddenly reappeared with a letter
opener and stabbed Juliana at the back. Appellant’s momentarily leaving the scene did not give him
enough opportunity to fully contemplate on his resolution to kill Juliana. We stress the importance of the
requirement in evident premeditation of sufficiency of time between the criminal act and the resolution to
carry out the criminal intent,54 affording such opportunity to coolly and serenely think and deliberate on
the meaning and the consequences of what appellant had planned to do, an interval long enough for
the conscience and better judgment to overcome the evil desire and scheme. In the stabbing of Juliana,
this element was wanting.55
Finally, we agree that dwelling aggravated the commission of the crimes. Appellant’s greater perversity
was revealed when he deliberately entered the victims’ domicile, 56 at the pretext of soliciting help from
its owners. The garage, where the incidents took place, is undoubtedly an integral part of the victims’
residence.
Clearly, the presence of the attending circumstances in this case qualified the killing of Juliana to
murder under Article 24857 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended.
As to the attack on Pelagio, the crime committed was frustrated 58 murder as appellant performed all
acts of execution which could have claimed the life of Pelagio but because of prompt medical
intervention, a cause independent of appellant’s will, Pelagio survived.59
On the whole, we are fully convinced that there is no ground to reverse appellant’s conviction. He is
guilty of murder and frustrated murder beyond any reasonable doubt.
Conformably, in Criminal Case No. 99-3101-MK the proper imposable penalty is death. However, in
view of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
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Philippines," signed into law on June 24, 2006, the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole.60
As to Criminal Case No. 99-3102-MK, applying Article 248 of the RPC, as amended, in relation to
Articles 50,61 61, paragraph 262 and 64, paragraphs 3 and 6,63 we affirm the appellate court’s sentence
of an indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
As to the proper monetary awards imposable in each of the two criminal cases, modifications are in
order.
In Criminal Case No. 99-3101-MK, for the murder of Juliana Ricalde, the award of civil indemnity is
mandatory and must be granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime. However, we modify the civil indemnity imposed by the Court of Appeals, from
₱50,000 to ₱75,000 to conform with current jurisprudence.64
Because the prosecution failed to present receipts or other evidence to substantiate actual damages,
we could not award such damages. Nonetheless, in lieu of actual damages, the heirs of Juliana Ricalde
may be awarded temperate damages of ₱25,000, in accordance with current jurisprudence, as it has
been shown that the family of the victim incurred burial and funeral expenses, although the amount
thereof cannot be proved with certainty.65
An award of moral damages is also proper in view of the violent death of Juliana and the resultant grief
to her family. We affirm the reduction made by the Court of Appeals from ₱200,000 to ₱50,000 to
conform with current jurisprudence,66 as moral damages are imposed to compensate the heirs of the
victim for the injuries to their feelings and not to enrich them.
Exemplary damages of ₱25,000 have been properly imposed by the Court of Appeals to serve as an
example and deterrent to future similar transgressions. Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary
damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances,67 as in this case.
It is also proper to award compensation to the heirs of the victims for loss of earning capacity, pursuant
to Article 2206 (1)68 of the Civil Code. The testimonial evidence for the prosecution, as corroborated by
documents69 presented, were sufficient bases for the award. At the time of her death, Juliana was 46
years old,70 and was receiving pay in the amount of ₱215,388 per annum as an Associate Professor I
with a salary grade of 22 at the University of the Philippines. 71 Applying the formula "Net earning
capacity = [2/3 x (80 – age at time of death) x (gross annual income – reasonable and necessary living
expenses)],"72 we arrive at a loss of earning capacity of ₱2,441,064.73
In Criminal Case No. 99-3102-MK, for the frustrated murder of Pelagio Ricalde, we grant an award of
₱30,000 as civil indemnity without proof other than the commission of the crime and the culprit’s liability
therefor.74 In addition, an award of moral damages of ₱50,000 is proper for the suffering endured by the
victim from appellant’s criminal acts.75
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 18, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00780 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
In Criminal Case No. 99-3101-MK, appellant Leoson dela Cruz y Echeche is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, qualified by treachery and with the attendant aggravating circumstance
of dwelling. The proper imposable penalty would have been death. However, pursuant to Rep. Act. No.
9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without possibility of parole.
Appellant is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of Juliana Ricalde, the amounts of: (a) ₱75,000 as civil
indemnity; (b) ₱50,000 as moral damages; (c) ₱25,000 as exemplary damages; and (d) ₱2,441,064 for
the victim’s loss of earning capacity, all with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from this date
until fully paid.76
In Criminal Case No. 99-3102-MK, appellant Leoson dela Cruz y Echeche is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER qualified by treachery with the attendant
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and dwelling and is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal as maximum. Appellant is further ORDERED to pay the victim Pelagio Ricalde the
amounts of: (a) ₱50,000 as moral damages; (b) ₱25,000 as exemplary damages; and (c) ₱30,000 as
civil indemnity, all with interest at the legal rate of 6% from this date until fully paid.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAGDALENA CALISO, defendant-appellant.
Juan Sumulong for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The appellant in this case was convicted of the crime of murder by the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Negros, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the parents
of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the
costs. On this appeal, her counsel de oficio attacks the findings of fact of the trial court, but does not
raise any question of law.
The questions of fact involved in this case are fully discussed in well considered decision of the trial
court, presided over by then Judge Quirico Abeto, which decision reads as follows:
Se halla acusada Magdalena Caliso del delito de asesinato de un niño de 9 meses de edad,
ocurrido en La Carlota, Negros Occidental, el dia 8 de febrero del presente año, 1932. La
querella alega que la acusada, siendo una criada de los Sres. Esmeralda (Emilio), voluntaria,
ilegal y criminalmente y con el proposito de satisfacer una venganza, administro cierta
cantidad de acido acetico concentrado, que es una sustancia venenosa, a Emilio Esmeralda,
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Jr., un niño de 9 meses de edad, causandole quemaduras en la boca, en la garganta, en los
intestinos y otras partes vitales de los organos internos que le produjeron necesariamente la
muerte de la victima, quien sucumbio pocas horas despues; que en la comision de este delito,
han concurrido las circunstancias agravantes de alevosia, abuso de confianza y que el acto se
ha cometido en la propia morada de los padres de la victima.
Despues de presentadas las pruebas, tanto de la acusacion, como de la defensa, y despues
de oidos los brillantes informes aducidos tanto por el Fiscal Provincial, como por el abogado
de oficio de la acusada, el Juzgado se ha reservado la decision para este dia, no sin antes
felicitar tanto a la acusacion como a la defenda, la primera por lo concienzudo en la reunion y
presentacion de sus pruebas, y la segunda por el interes grande con que ha demostrado a
favor de la acusada. El Juzgado ha querido tomar tiempo para decidir esta causa, porque se
da cuenta de lo grave que es el delito cometido y de las circunstancias tanto de la acusada
como de los ofendidos en esta causa. Por un lado, esta la acusada, que es una mujer que
pertenece al sexo debil, en la primavera de su vida, a quien una sentencia podria privar de
todos los beneficios que la vida le ofrece. Por otro lado, una madre loca de dolor que ha
perdido al unico hijo varon de la familia y que considera a la causada como la persona que le
ha arrebatado su unico cariño. Por eso el Juzgado ha querido, hasta donde le ha sido posible,
poner toda su atencion en todos los detalles de las pruebas, observando hasta los menores
actos de los testigos y de la acusada.
Y de las pruebas presentadas, el Juzgado encuentra que en la tarde del dia 8 de febrero de
1932, mientras los esposos. Sres. Emilio Esmeralda y Flora Gonzalez estaban durmiendo
tomando la siesta, repentinamente la Sra. de Esmeralda se desperto porque oyo un grito
agudo de su hijo Emilio Esmeralda, de 9 meses de edad, que estaba durmiendo en una cama
al lado opuesto del sitio donde estaba ella durmiendo con su marido. Cuando la Sra. de
Esmeralda llego, seguida de su marido, a la cama donde habia dejado dormido a su hijo, al
levantar el mosquitero de la cama, percibio inmediatamente un olor fuerte de acido acetico y
encontro a su hijo, que seguia llorando fuertemente, con los ojos en blanco, los labios
hinchados y blanquecinos y la cara amoratada, y al levantarle percibio olor de acido acetico en
la respiracion del niño. Entonces grito preguntando quien habia puesto acido acetico en la
boca de su hijo, y como ella es farmaceutica de profesion, se acordo inmediatamente de un
antidoto que podia neutralizar los efectos del acido acetico y ella misma saco agua de cal y
mojando un algodon hidrofilo, limpio la boca del niño, al mismo tiempo que mandaba a su
marido que llamara por telefono al doctor. Pocos momentos despues llego el Dr. Augusto
Locsin, quien segun su declaracion, noto inmediatamente el olor de acido acetico en la
respiracion del niño, y quiso hacer la primera cura, lavando el estomago del niño, pero la
madre no quiso que el lavado llegara hasta el estomago, por el temor de lastimar la garganta
del chiquillo con el 'catheter', y por este motivo el lavado solamente se pudo hacer hasta la
garganta del niño. Despues de algun tiempo, llegaron, procedentes de Bacolod, los Dres.
Orosa y Ochoa, quienes por telefono habian sido llamados tambien por el padre de la victima.
El Dr. Orosa es el jefe medico del Hospital Provincial de esta provincia, y el Dr. Ochoa es uno
de los medicos residentes en dicho hospital, especialista en las enfermedades de los cinco
sentidos. Ambos doctores declararon positivamente que habian percibido el olor de acido
acetico en la respiracion del niño, y habiendo ellos concluido que el chiquillo habia tomado
acido acetico, aplicaron la cura para eliminar dicha sustancia del organismo del niño, y
despues de hacer las primeras curas, llevaron al niño al Hospital Provincial y alli murio pocos
minutos despues de haber llegado.
Ambos doctores, asi como el Dr. Locsin, son unanimes en la afirmacion de que la muerte del
chiquillo se debio al envenenamiento por medio de acido acetico, y todos, especialmente el
Dr. Ochoa, coinciden en la opinion de que la muerte ha sido por asfixia, pues el acido acetico
ha hecho estragos en la laringe del niño y este no pudo respirar. El Dr. Ochoa que, como se
ha dicho, es un especialista en los cinco sentidos, examino la boca y la garganta del niño y
encontro alli quemaduras ocasionadas, segun el, por el acido acetico. Y tan seguros estan los
doctores de que el niño habia tomado acido acetico y que la muerte del mismo se debio a esta
sustancia, que el mismo Dr. Orosa, que es un medico de muy larga experiencia y un experto
cirujano, le aseguro al Fiscal que no habia necesidad de autopsia para llegar a una conclusion
rayana a la seguridad sobre la causa de la muerte del chiquillio, y que aun cuando la autopsia
demostrara que no existia acido acetico en los intestinos de, niño, ya porque este habia sido
absorbido por el organismo, o ya porque el estomago habia sido lavado, el estaba segurismo
de que la muerte se debio al envenenamiento por acido acetico, porque el habia olido esa
sustancia, cuyo olor es inconfundible, en la respiracion del niño y ha visto los estragos de la
sustancia en la garganta y en la boca del occiso. Ambos medicos, de un modo positivo, sin
dudar ni un momento, aseguraron al Juzgado de que la causa de la muerte, como se ha
repetido varias veces, es por envenenamiento por acido acetico. Y el Juzgado esta conforme
en que en tales circunstancias, no habia necesidad de autopsia para que el Juzgado pueda
concluir, en vista de las afirmaciones de los medicos basadas en los hechos por ellos
encontrados, que la muerte ha sido por envenenamiento por acido acetico.
El Juzgado no tiene duda alguna de la competencia de estos dos doctores, sobre todo
tratandose de la opinion del Dr. Ochoa, que es un especialista en los cinco sentidos y que ha
reconocido la garganta y la boca del niño, en las cuales encontro quemaduras pruducidas por
aciso acetico.
Aparte de esto, la madre del occiso, que es una farmaceutica, acostumbrada a oler y distinguir
sustancias, percibio el olor del acido acetico en los primeros momentos en que alzo a su hijo
de la cama. El marido de esta señora, Sr. Emilio Esmeralda, tambien es un quimico y aseguro
tambien haber olido el olor fuerte del acido acetico desde los primeros momentos. Aparte de
estas dos personas que pueden equivocarse, ya por su pasion o por las preocupaciones de
momento por estar interesados por su hijo, esta el Sr. Julian Gomeri, otro quimico que vivia en
la misma casa, quien aseguro al Juzgado que al entrar en el cuarto donde estaba el chiquillo
en brazos de su madre, olio inmediatamente el olor sofocante del acido acetico, tanto es asi
que pregunto inmediatamente quien habia puesto acido acetico en la cama del niño y en
seuida se puso a buscar por si habia dicha sustancia en la cama del niño, pero no encontro
ninguna botella de acido acetico, ni rastro de esta sustancia en la cama, sino en la respiracion
del niño.
Por eso el Juzgado repite que esta probado fuera de toda duda racional que el niño Emilio
Esmeralda, Jr., murio a consecuencia de envenenamiento de acido acetico, y es insostenible
la teoria de que pubo haber tenido una indigestion por haber ingerido jugo de naranja de
California despues de haber tomado leche, y de que el olor del acido acetico podia derivarse
del vomito dle chiquillo por la mezcala del jugo de naranja con la leche. Tres medicos y tres
quimicos es imposible que confundan el olor del jugo de naranja que se ha vuelto acido al
mezclarse con la leche, con el olor fuerte del acido acetico concentrado.
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Habiendo llegado a esta conclusion de que la muerte del niño Emilio Esmeralda, Jr., se debio
a envenenamiento por acido acetico, la otra cuestion que el Juzgago tiene que resolver es:
quien le administro esta sustancia.
Desde este punto las pruebas son todas circunstanciales unicamente.
Es un hecho probado que dias antes de este suceso, al volver el Sr. Emilio Esmeralda a su
casa, procedente de la fabrica de la Central La Carlota, a eso de la madrugada, not cierto
bulto que se movia en los bajos de su cama en el cuarto-habitacion de el y de su señora
cuando esta pasaba algunos dias en La Carlota. Temiendo que algun ladron se habia
introducido debajo de la cama, cogio su revolver y amenazo con dispararle un tiro al que
estaba alli metido si no salia. Efectivamente de alli salio un hombre y, todo temblando, le dijo
al Sr. Esmeralda que el no era un ladron, sino que estaba alli porque habia sido llamado por la
acusada con quien estaba en relaciones amorosas. El Sr. Esmeralda entonces le recrimino
por su acto y le dejo marchar, conminandole que no volviera a repetir el acto. Cuando la Sra.
Flora Gonzalez llego a La Carlota algunos dias despues, o sea en el dia de autos, el Sr.
Esmeralda, despues del desayuno y estando entonces ausente la acusada por haber ido al
mercado, le conto a su señora lo que habia sucedido en uno de los dias pasados, o sea, el
haber sorprendido a un hombre en su propio cuarto y debajo de su misma cama, acudiendo a
una cita que tuvo con la acusada. La Sra. de Esmeralda, dada su educacion y por ser mujer al
fin, se sintio muy ofendida e indignada por el acto de su criada y, muy nerviosa, espero la
vuelta de la acusada, y cuando esta llego, la Sra. Esmeralda la busco en la cocina, la empezo
a insultar de pies a cabeza, recriminandola por su acto inmoral y por haberse permitido ocultar
a su amante en el propio cuartro de sus amos, y despues de regañar a la acusada, se volvio a
su cuarto, y pareciendole poco la recriminacion que acababa de hacer a la acusada, otra vez
la Sra. de Esmeralda volvio a la cocina a reprenderla de nuevo, y como no se calmaban los
nervios de la Sra. de Esmeralda en estas dos ocasiones, a medida que volvia a la cocina,
emprendia nuevos insultos a la acusada, en terminos que cuando la Sra. de Esmeralda puso a
dormir a su hijo en la cama, cuando encontro algo sucias las fundas de la almohada, otra vez
se fue a la cocina y volvio a amonestar a la acusada recriminandola y diciendola que
solamente sabia tener amantes y no sabia cumplir sus deberes como criada. Apenas dos
horas escasas de ocurrir estos insultos, ocurrio el suceso que dio lugar a la muerte del niño
Emilio Esmeralda, Jr.
Procediendo por eliminacin, el Ministerio Fiscal ha tratado de probar al Juzgado, y asi alega en
su informe, que en el momento de ocurrir el incidente del envenenamiento del niño, solamente
estaban en aquel dia viviendo en la casa donde ocurrio el suceso, diez personas, a saber: los
esposos Esmeralda, sus dos hijas, Lilia y Elsa, el niño Emilio Esmeralda, Jr., Julai Gomeri,
Jose Colmenares, Catalino Ramos, una criada de unos 12 años de edad, llamada Magdalena
Soriano, y la aqui acusada. El Ministerio Fiscal dice que no pueden ser autores dle
envenenamiento, ni el Sr. Esmeralda, ni su esposa. El Juzgado, desde luego, esta conforme
con esta eliminacion. No es posible que estos sean los autores de tal envenenamiento;
ademas de ser padres, la actitud de la madre, enloquecida de dolor por la muerte de su hijo,
aleja toda duda. Seria absurda la mas remota suposicion de que estas personas fuesen los
autores de tal envenenamiento. No podia ser Elsa Esmeralda porque esta, aparte de sus
pocos años, estaba durmiendo con su hermanito en la misma cama donde ocurrio el incidente.
No podia ser Lilia, ni la criada Magdalena Soriano, porque ambas estaban entonces en el
retrete, segun las pruebas; ademas que no podia caber la suposicion de que, o Magdalena
Soriano, o Lilia hayan administrado equivocadamente acido acetico al niño dormido, por
cuanto que la botella que lo contenia estaba en la cocina, segun la acusada misma, cerca del
cantaro de agua donde ella habia puesto, y la acusada, segun ella misma, estaba toda la tarde
en la cocina fregando platos, de tal manera que si Magdalena Soriano o Lilia hubiesen querido
alcanzar la botella de acido acetico, la acusada los hubiera visto. Julian Gomeri estaba
dormido en su cuarto; era un compañero del Sr. Esmeralda en el trabajo, amigo intomo de la
familia y no ha tenido ningun disgusto con ningun miembro de ella y no hay motivo alguno
para atribuir que el haya puesto en la boca del niño acido acetico. Jose Colmenares estaba en
la fabrica de la Central, que dista medio kilometro de la casa ocupada por los Sres. de
Esmeralda, ocupado en sus trabajos como empleado de dicha Central. Catalino Ramos
estaba ausente entonces en la localidad, pues se encontraba en el pueblo de Talisay.
Eliminadas estas personas, solamente queda la acusada como posible autora del acto de
administrar acido acetico al niño Emilio Esmeralda, Jr.
Desde luego, la prueba de que la acusada, pocas horas antes del suceso, era la unica de la
casa que habia recibido insultos de la madre del niño, es una prueba circunstancial contra ella.
Ninguno tenia motivos de resentimiento hacia ningun miembro de la familia del occiso mas
que la acusada. Ella misma ha admitido durante su testimonio que en aquel dia ella habia sido
reprendida por su ama. Cuando el niño Emilio Esmeralda, Jr., dio un grito agudo que hizo
despertar a su madre, Julian Gomeri, que estaba dormido en el otro cuarto, pudo abrir los ojos
y vio a la acusada saliendo de la puerta de la sala y dirigiendose hacia la cocina. Por esta sala
habia que pasar al salir del cuarto donde estaba dormido el niño, para ir a la cocina; y la
distancia de la puerta de esta sala al sitio donde estaba durmiendo el niño habia apenas 4 o 5
metros. La acusada no ha podido desmentir esta declaracion de Julian Gomeri, ni ha podido
dar explicacion alguna por que en aquel preciso momento ella salia de la sala para ir a la
cocina. Es posible que despues de haberse puesto el acido acetico en la boca del niño, este
no haya podido gritar inmediatamente, sino algunos segundos despues al sentir los efectos
del acido, de tal manera que la acusada tuvo tiempo para abandonar el sitio y volver a la
cocina y estando en la sala, el niño dio el primer grito que le hizo abrir los ojos a Julian
Gomeri. Este hecho es otra prueba circunstancial bastante fuerte, a juicio del Juzgado, contra
la acusada. Cuando la madre del niño estaba curando a este, ordeno a la acusada y a
Magdalena Soriano a que hirvieran agua en la cocina, y mientras estas dos criadas cumplian
la orden, la acusada, sin motivo alguno plausible, le puso las manos debajo de las narices de
Magdalena Soriano y le dijo: "Mis manos estan oliendo acido acetico porque se ha derramado
algo alli cuando hice vinagre esta mañana con acido acetico." Esta explicacion no pedida
hecha por la acusada no parece indicar otra cosa mas que algun temor que abrigaba por si
alguien pudiese oler acido acetico en sus manos. Otra prueba circunstancial contra la acusada
es el hecho de que en la casa ella era la unica que tenia bajo su custodia esta botella Exhibit
A que contenia acido acetico. Magdalena Soriano no sabia siquiera donde estaba puesta esta
botella. Cuando la Sra. de Esmeralda busco esta botella, cuyo recuerdo le trajo a la memoria
al oler el acido acetico en la boca de su hijo, la acusada fue quien saco la botella de la cocina
y le entrego a la Sra. de Esmeralda, diciendola, poco mas o menos, estas palabras: "Señora,
aqui esta botella; no ha salido de la cocina."
La acusada, al declarar en la silla testifical como testigo a su favor, al ser preguntada por el
Juzgado si ha olido acido acetico al entrar en el cuarto, se inmuto algun tanto; pero
inmediatamente se repuso y nego rotundamente haber olido acido acetico. El Juzgado le
dirigio varias veces esta pregunta, y la acusada insistio en su negativa. El Juzgado le pregunto
si conocia el acido acetico y el olor del mismo, y afirmo que si y volvio a afirmar que no habia
percibido tal olor en el cuarto al entrar y durante todo el tiempo que habia permanecido alli.
Ahora bien, tres medicos imparciales, does quimicos y una farmaceutica, aparte de
271
Magdalena Soriano, han olido el inconfundible olor de acido acetico en el cuarto. La unica que
no ha podido oler dicha sustancia es la acusada. En la comisionde un crimen, el unico que
tiene interes en negar la existencia de un cuerpo del delito es casi siempre, o sin casi, el autor
del mismo. Y esta actitud de la acusada de negar una cosa tan evidente y sobre la cual el
Juzgado no tiene duda alguna, corrobora, a juicio del Juzgado, todas las pruebas
circunstanciales que se han presentado por la acusacion.
La defensa hace enfasis en el hecho de que la acusada, lejos de escaparse, entro en el cuarto
para ayudar a la madre del niño para salvar a este, y tanto es asi que la misma acusada,
segun Julian Gomeri, tan pronto como la Sra. de Esmeralda pidio algodon, fue la que saco de
las manos de Julian Gomeri el algodon y lo entrego a la Sra. de Esmeralda. Este hecho no es,
a juicio del Juzgado, suficiente para demostrar la inocencia de la acusada. ¡Cuantas veces ha
sucedido que el que ha realizado un acto criminal, se arrepiente de su crimen y trata de
remediarlo! El que acaba de herir a un hombre, despues de pasado el primer momento de
obcecacion, si el pudiera curarlo, indudablemente no se encontraria mejor medico para el
herido. Tambien puede suceder que la acusada, habiendo querido causar daños unicamente a
la criatura, haya querido usar de toda su habilidad para que los efectos del daño no fuesen tan
grandes. La actitud de la acusada, por tanto, es perfectamente explicable y no incompatible
con su culpabilidad. Otra actitud de la acusada que parece tener bastante peso es su actitud
cuando ella volvio por la tarde del dia siguiente del suceso a la estacion de policia cuando el
Jefe de Policia le dijo que volviera en aquella tarde. Y el abogado de la acusada tiene razon
para hacer enfasis sobre esta circunstancia. La acusada ha sido arrestada casi a media noche
del mismo dia del suceso. Fue puesta en libertad a las 11 de la mañana del dia siguiente, en
vista de que no llegaba orden de arresto contra ella; pero el Jefe de Policia le dijo que volviera
a las 3 en punto de la tarde, y a las 3 de aquella tarde la acusada volvio al edificio municipal.
El abogado de la acusada arguye que una conciencia criminal no procederia como ha
procedido la acusada; ella se hubiera escapado. El Juzgado ha considerado detenidamente
este aspecto de la cuestion; ha meditado largamente sobre este acto de la acusada; pero la
conclusion del Juzgado es que si la acusada volvio en la tarde de aquel dia al edificio
municipal, era porque la acusada no sabia que el niño Emilio Esmeralda, Jr., habia muerto.
Ademas, ella debia saber que, mujer que era, no podia ir a ninguna parte sin que le
alcanzaran las autoridades correspondientes y, por tanto, era mejor para ella presentarse ante
las autoridades aparentando tener una conciencia tranquila y preparando en esa forma su
futura defensa. El Juzgado cree que desde el momento en que la acusada mostro solicitud
suma para salvar la vida del niño que ella habia segado en momentos de colera, la acusada
ya habia concebido su plan de defensa.
Se dira tal vez quo no es usual que, habiendo la madre del niño ofendido a la acusada, esta,
en lugar de tomar venganza de la madre, que muchas oportunidades hubiera ella tenido
porque, segun ha tratado de resaltar el abogado de la defensa, la acusada dormia en el
mismo cuarto de los esposos Esmeralda y preparaba la comida de estos, haya dirigido su
accion vengadora a una inocente criatura, maxime teniendo en consideracion que la acusada
es una mujer y las mujeras, por regla general, son mas caritativas que los hombres. En primer
lugar, ya sea un hombre, ya sea una mujer, cuando estan obcecados por el odio y la
venganza, ya no consideran las circunstancias y procuran dirigir su venganza al que les ha
ofendido alli mismo donde es mas facil ejecutar. En este caso, el niño Emilio Esmeralda, Jr.,
era el que dormia mas cerca a la puerta entrando inmediatamente, procedente de la cocina, y
era el que, por su tierna edad, podia sentir inmediatamente los efectos del acido acetico,
pudiendo asi ejecutar su venganza con mayor seguridad de su parte. Causando daño al niño,
que, por ser el unico varon de la familia, era el mas querido por los Sres. de Esmeralda, se
causaba mayor daño a la Sra. de Esmeralda. El Juzgado, desde luego, acepta la teoria de que
la mujer es mucha mas caritativa que el hombre y mucho mas debil del consenso comun; pero
precisamente por ser mas caritativa, por ser mas debil, cuando la mujer se vuelve mala y
quiere vengarse, su venganza busca al mas debil tambien y sobre este hace recaer esa
venganza, y la experiencia diaria nos enseña que los seres mas debiles, sean hombres o
mujeres, cuando se vuelven malos, son peores enemigos; y no es nada extraño, por tanto,
que la acusada, temiendo atacar al Sr. Esmeralda y a la Sra. de Esmeralda, porque contra
ellos no tenia asegurada la ejecucion de su venganza, ha escogido como victima a una
criatura indefensa de 9 meses de edad.
Por las consideraciones expuestas, el Juzgado encuentra probado fuera de toda duda racional
que Emilio Esmeralda, Jr., de 9 meses de edad, fallecio el dia 8 de febrero de 1932, a
consecuencia de envenenamiento por acido acetico concentrado, y que la acusada,
aprovechando la ocasion en que sus amos estaban durmiendo, administro una pequeña
cantidad de esta sustancia a dicho niño, quemandole de este modo la boca y la garganta, a
consecuencia de lo cual dicho niño fallecio.
Se declara, por tanto, a la acusada Magdalena Caliso culpable del delito de asesinato, y
estimando en la comision del delito la concurrencia de la circunstancia agravante de alevosia,
porque se trata de un ser indefenso, y de la circunstancia de haberse realizado el acto en la
propia morada de los padres de la victima, cuyas circunstancias estan compensadas con las
circunstancias atenuantes de falta de instruccion y de haber obrado la acusada a impulsos de
un sentimiento que la hayan producido arrebato y obcecacion, le condena a la pena de
reclusion perpetua, a indemnizar a los padres del occiso en la suma de P1,000, con las
accesorias de ley, y a pagar las costas del juicio. Asi se ordena.
We agree to the conclusions of fact reached by the trial court. As to the application of the law to the
facts of the case, we are inclined to the proposition advanced by the Attorney-General that in the
commission of the crime the aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of confidence was present since
the appellant was the domestic servant of the family and was sometimes the deceased child's amah.
The circumstance of the crime having been committed in the dwelling of the offended party, considered
by the lower court as another aggravating circumstance, should be disregarded as both the victim and
the appellant were living in the same house. (U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 9 Phil., 136; U.S. vs. Destrito and De
Ocampo, 23 Phil., 28.) Likewise, threachery cannot be considered to aggravate the penalty as it is
inherent in the offense of murder by means of poisoning (3 Viada, p. 29). Similarly the finding of the trial
court that the appellant acted under an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and
obfuscation should be discarded because the accused, in poisoning the child, was actuated more by a
spirit of lawlessness and revenge than by any sudden impulse of natural and uncontrollable fury (People
vs. Hernandez, 43 Phil., 104, 111) and because such sudden burst of passion was not provoked by
prior unjust or improper acts of the victim or of his parents (U.S. vs. Taylor, 6 Phil., 162), since Flora
Gonzalez had the perfect right to reprimand the defendant for indecently converting the family's
bedroom into a rendezvous of herself and her lover.
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence being offset by the extenuating circumstance of
defendant's lack of instruction considered by the lower court, the medium degree of the prescribed
penalty should, therefore, be imposed, which, in this case, is reclusion perpetua.
The penalty imposed by the lower court upon the appellant being thus within the limits fixed by law, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs. So ordered.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BELINDA LORA Y VEQUIZO alias LORENA SUMILEW, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
The defendant Belinda Lora y Vequizo alias Lorena Sumilew was accused in the Court of First Instance
of Davao of serious illegal detention with murder in an amended information which reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of Serious Illegal Detention with
Murder under Art. 267 in relation to Articles 248 and 48 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:
That on or about May 28, 1976, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused being then a private person, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and for the purpose of extorting ransom from spouses Ricardo Yap and Myrna Yap, illegally
detained their three (3) year old child Oliver Yap, a minor, from May 28 to 29, 1975 and with treachery,
evident premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted Oliver
Yap by tying his mouth with stocking, placing him inside a Pallmall cigarette box, covering the said box
with a mat and piece of sack and filing the same with other boxes in the third floor (bodega) of the
house owned by said spouses Ricardo Yap and Myrna Yap, thereby inflicting upon said Oliver Yap the
following to wit: Asphyxia due to suffocation" which caused the death of said Oliver Yap.
That the commission of the foregoing offense was attended by the following aggravating circumstances:
(1) taking advantage of superior strength; (2) disregard of the respect due the offended party on account
of his age; (3) that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party; (4) that the crime was
committed with abuse of confidence, she being a domestic helper (maid) or obvious ungratefulness; (5)
that craft, fraud and disguise was employed; and (6) that the crime was committed with cruelty, by
deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim.
Contrary to law.
According to the trial judge, "he has appointed as counsel de oficio Atty. Hildegardo Inigo a bar
topnotcher with considerable practice," in view of the gravity of the offense.
Upon motion of the counsel for the accused, the arraignment was postponed to enable him to study the
charge against the accused. Thereafter, after being arraigned, the accused Belinda Lora in the
presence and with the assistance of her counsel, entered a plea of guilty in Visayan dialect, which is her
native dialect.
The Court thereafter directed the prosecution to present its evidence and the counsel for the "accused
manifested that the evidence of the defense would be presented only for proving mitigating
circumstances.
Eight witnesses for the prosecution, namely: Myrna Yap, David Cortez, Fidencio Bisnar, Ricardo Yap,
Agaton Bonahos, Emmanuel Mesias, Rolando Estillori and Juan Abear, Jr. were presented.
The facts are undisputed.
On May 26, 1975, accused Belinda Lora using the name "Lorena Sumilew", applied as a housemaid in
the household of the spouses Ricardo Yap and Myrna Yap at 373 Ramon Magsaysay Avenue, Davao
City. The spouses had a store on the ground floor; a mezzanine floor was used as their residence; while
the third floor was used as a bodega for their stocks. They had two children, Emily and Oliver Yap.
Oliver was 3 years and five months old. 1
Belinda Lora was accepted as a housemaid in the residence of the Yaps and reported for work the
following day, May 27, 1975. Her duties were to wash clothes and to look after Oliver Yap. 2
On May 28, 1975, Mrs. Myrna Yap returned home from the market to find her mother-in-law and her
husband panicky because their son, Oliver, and the maid, accused Belinda Lora were missing. The
mother-in-law had found a ransom note at the stairway to the mezzanine floor. The note said that Oliver
was to be sold to a couple and that the writer (defendant herein) needed money for her mother's
hospitalization. 3 Four pieces of residence certificates were also found inside the paper bag of the maid.
One residence certificate bore the No. 1941785 with the name Sumiliw, Lorena Pamintil. 4
The incident was reported immediately to the police. Mrs. Yap, accompanied by one Mrs. Erlinda Velez,
went to look for Oliver and the housemaid. Not finding them in Davao City, they went to Digos and
Bansalan (Davao) and looked in the hospitals there. The residence certificate in the name of Lorena
Sumiliw was issued in Digos and the ransom letter stated that the mother of the defendant was very
sick. 5
In the evening of May 28, 1975, the Yaps received two telephone calls at their residence. The first call
was received by Mrs. Yaps's mother-in-law while the second call was received by Ricardo Yap. Lorena
Sumiliw (defendant), the caller, instructed Ricardo Yap to bring the amount of P3,000.00 to the island
infront of the (Davao) Regional Hospital and to go there alone without any policeman or companion,
after which his son (Oliver) would be left to the security guard of the hospital at the emergency exit. 6
The Yaps borrowed the amount of P3,000.00. Upon instructions of the NBI, the money was marked with
Mrs. Yap's initials "MY". 7
Ricardo Yap wrapped the P3,000.00 in a piece of paper and went to the Regional Hospital at 9:30 in the
evening of May 28, 1975. He placed the money near the Imelda Playground. He proceeded to the
hospital and looked for his child from the security guard. However, the security guard said nobody left a
boy with him. 8 Ricardo Yap stayed at a corner looking and calling for his child but could not locate him.
After ten minutes, he went back to where he had placed the money but the money was not there
anymore. He waited until 11:00 o'clock, after which he went home. 9
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The following morning, May 29, 1975, Mrs. Yap received a phone call from the accused informing her
that her son was at the Minrapco Terminal and that she was asking for another P 3,000.00. Mrs. Yap
proceeded to the terminal whereupon she learned that the terminal had moved to a place near a
theatre. When Myrna Yap arrived at the place, she saw the accused board a Minica bus. She followed
and grabbed the accused. 10 As the accused said that Mrs. Yap's son was brought to the Regional
Hospital they proceeded there. Upon arriving there, a couple, Mr. and Mrs. Bonahos said that the Yap
son was in Panacan. Mrs. Yap and the accused went to Panacan. After arriving at Panacan the
accused told Mrs. Yap that her son was in the custody of a woman whom she paid P 100.00 and that
the woman would return her son at 6:00 o'clock P.M. that day. Mrs. Yap therefore, made the accused
sign a promissory note that she would return Oliver on the same day. 11 After the accused boarded a
bus for Surigao, Mrs. Yap listed down the bus number and the seat number and reported to Lt. Mesias
of the Davao City Police Force that the "kidnapper" was on board the Surigao bus. 12
Lt. Mesias stopped the bus and placed the accused under arrest. From the body of the accused was
taken an improvised pouch containing 36 pieces of P 50.00 bills and 24 pieces of P 20.00 bills. The
money had initials reading "MY" below the serial numbers. 13
The following morning, May 30, 1975, upon waking up at around 6 o'clock in his house, Ricardo Yap
noticed that blood was dripping from the ceiling. He went upstairs, which was being utilized as a
bodega, to verify, and found his son placed inside the carton of Marlboro cigarettes. The head of the
child was inside the carton while his feet protruded outside. 14 His mouth was tied with stockings. 15 The
child was already dead. 16 He had died of "asphyxhia due to suffocation. 17
The defendant presented evidence only for the purpose of proving alleged mitigating circumstances.
She claims that she did not intend to kill the child. 18
To support her plea for mercy, she stated that she had three children aged from one to five years whom
she left in Pagadian. 19 On objection to the materiality of the evidence, the appellant's counsel pleaded
that she be allowed to prove those facts for "humanitarian consideration" which might enable the
Supreme Court to review the penalty with compassion. 20
The defendant capped her testimony with the following plea:
A I would request the Honorable Court that LIFE IMPRISONMENT
will be the penalty imposed upon me because I really committed the
crime. I did not really intend to kill the child.
Q Would you like to make any further appeal?
A I really repent to what I have done, sir. 21
On cross-examination, the defendant admitted that she gagged the child's mouth with stockings; placed
the child inside the box with head down and legs up; that she covered the box with some sacks and
boxes and left the child in that condition inside the storeroom of the house of Ricardo Yap. 22
When the defendant left the store room, the voice of the child, who was previously shouting, "was
already slow and to make sure that his voice would not be heard I closed the door. 23
On the basis of the plea of guilt of the defendant and the evidence of the prosecution, the court
convicted the defendant with complex crime of serious illegal detention with murder and imposed,
among others, the extreme penalty of death.
Hence, this automatic review.
The guilt of the defendant is so patent that there is no further need to discuss the evidence. The only
task remaining after the plea of guilty and the presentation of the undisputed evidence for the
prosecution is to determine the crime committed, the penalty to be imposed and the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances to be appreciated. The crime actually committed is not the complex crime of
kidnapping with murder, as found by the trial court, but the simple crime of murder qualified by
treachery.
Kidnapping is a crime against liberty defined in Article 267, Title IX, Book 11 of the Revised Penal Code.
The essence of kidnapping or serious illegal detention is the actual confinement or restraint of the victim
or the deprivation of his liberty. 24
Where there is no showing that the accused intended to deprive their victims of their
liberty for some time and for some purpose, and there being no appreciable interval
between their being taken and their being shot from which kidnapping may be
inferred, the crimes committed were murder and frustrated murder and not the
complex crimes of kidnapping with murder and kidnapping with frustrated murder. 25
In the instant case. the gagging of the child with stockings, placing him in a box with head down and
legs upward and covering the box with some sacks and other boxes were only the methods of the
defendant to commit murder. The child instantly died of suffocation. This is evident from the testimony of
Dr. Juan Abear, Jr. who performed the autopsy on May 30, 1975 at 8 o' clock in the morning. When Dr.
Abear conducted the autopsy, the body of the child was already in a state of decomposition. Dr. Abear
opined that the child must have died three days before the autopsy. 26 In other words, the child died
practically on the very day that the child was stuffed into the box on May 28,1975.
The demand for ransom did not convert the offense into kidnapping with murder. The defendant was
well aware that the child would be suffocated to death in a few moments after she left. The demand for
ransom is only a part of the diabolic scheme of the defendant to murder the child, to conceal his body
and then demand money before the discovery of the cadaver.
There is treachery because the victim is only a 3-year old child. 27 The commission of the offense was
attended with the aggravating circumstances of lack of respect due to the age of the victim, cruelty and
abuse of confidence.
The circumstance of lack of respect due to age applies in cases where the victim is of tender age as
well as of old age. This circumstance was applied in a case where one of the victims in a murder case
was a 12-year-old boy. 28 In the instant case, the victim was only 3 years old. The gagging of the mouth
of a three-year-old child with stockings, dumping him with head downwards into a box, and covering the
box with sacks and other boxes, thereby causing slow suffocation, is cruelty. There was also abuse of
confidence because the victim was entrusted to the care of the appellant. The appellant's main duty in
the household is to take care of the minor child. There existed a relation of trust and confidence
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between the appellant and the one against whom the crime was committed and the appellant made use
of such relation to commit the crime.
When the killer of the child is the domestic servant of the family and was sometimes the deceased
child's amah the aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of confidence is present. 29
On the other hand, the defendant invokes the following as mitigating circumstances, namely; (1) she
pleaded guilty; (2) she did not intend to commit so grave a wrong, (3) she was overcome by fear that
her mother will die unless she is able to raise money for her mother's hospitalization, thus; she
committed kidnaping for ransom (4) the appellant should live so that her children who are of tender
years would not be deprived of a mother; and (5) we have a compassionate society. 30
The only mitigating circumstance that may be appreciated in favor of the defendant is her voluntary plea
of guilt. Her contention that she had no intention to kill the child lacks merit. The defendant was well
aware that her act of gagging the mouth of the child with stockings, placing him with head down and feet
up in a box and covering the box with sacks and other boxes would result to the instant suffocation of
the child.
There being three aggravating circumstances, namely, lack of respect due to the tender age of the
victim, cruelty and abuse of confidence and only one mitigating circumstance in favor of the defendant,
she deserves the death penalty imposed upon her by the lower court.
WHEREFORE, the defendant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified with
treachery and appreciating the aggravating circumstances already indicated above, We hereby impose
the penalty of death with costs de oficio.
With this modification, the rest of the decision is hereby affirmed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN LOGALADA BOQUILA, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
On October 8, 1996, around 3:30 in the morning at Don Gervacio Quijada St., Guadalupe, Cebu City,
Cresencio Demol, a taxi driver was shot inside his taxicab. Allegedly, Demol's wristwatch was also
stolen. Three days later, Ruben Logalada Boquila, a security guard, went to the police and confessed to
the commission of the offense. Boquila was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City with
the crime of robbery with homicide in an information that reads as follows:
"That on or about the 8th of October, 1996 at about 3:30 in the morning, in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a
cal. 38 revolver, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill and by means of violence and
intimidation upon person, did then and there attack, assault and use personal violence upon
one CRESENCIO DEMOL, by shooting him causing upon said Cresencio Demol, the following
injuries, to wit:
'SHOCK, SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT WOUND (L) THORACO-ABDOMINAL AREA,
ANTERIOR ASPECT.'
and as a consequence of which said Cresencio Demol died instantaneously and with intent of
gain, without the knowledge and consent of said Cresencio Demol, did then and there take,
steal and carry away one Seiko 5 black dial men's watch valued at P500.00 while the latter
was driving his taxi cab along Upper Don Gervacio Quijada St., Brgy. Guadalupe, Cebu City, to
the damage and prejudice of Shirley Demol, the wife of the victim, in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW."1
When Boquila was arraigned on October 29, 1996, he pleaded not guilty to the charge. 2 Trial ensued.
On January 30, 1997, before the prosecution could complete the presentation of its evidence, Boquila
was re-arraigned and changed his plea. The trial court thereafter ordered the prosecution to continue
the presentation of its evidence to prove its case and to determine the culpability of the accused. 3
On February 11, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision finding Boquila guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. The trial court based its judgment on Boquila's extrajudicial
confession made before SPO2 Mario Monilar of the Cebu City Police Department on October 11, 1996.
Considering that the commission of the crime was attended by the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime, and there being no mitigating circumstance, the trial court imposed upon Boquila the supreme
penalty of death. It also ordered him to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00 and to
restitute to them the sum of P500.00 representing the value of the watch allegedly robbed from the
victim. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, accused RUBEN LOGALADA BOQUILA is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH to be carried out in the manner prescribed by law.
The accused is further directed to pay to the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 and to
restitute to the heirs the sum of P500.00 representing the value of the Seiko 5 black dial men's
watch being (sic) robbed and to pay the costs."
The case was elevated to this Court on automatic review.
We modify the decision of the trial court.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on October 8, 1996, around 3:30 in the morning, Sechem
Dagangan, a resident of Sambag II, Guadalupe, Cebu City, heard two successive gunfire and some
people crying. The sound came from a taxicab outside his residence. He learned from his neighbor that
the driver of the taxicab was robbed. He tried to rouse his neighbors to help the driver, but they were
overcome by fear as none of them was armed. Dagangan later saw Boquila, who was also his neighbor,
come out of the taxicab and walk toward the house of the latter's sister. 4
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Upon receipt of a dead person alarm, members of the Homicide Section of the Cebu City Police
Department, SPO1 Solomon Gandiongco, SPO2 Edilberto Castaneda and PO3 Alex Dacua,
immediately proceeded to the crime scene to conduct an investigation. They found the victim's lifeless
body inside a CTC taxicab bearing plate number GVJ 566. He had a gunshot wound on the chest. They
also recovered a .38 caliber Armscor revolver with serial number 50440, 5 four (4) empty shells6 and one
live bullet, and a plastic nameplate with the name RT Para-asi, SG.7 They found out after a follow-up
investigation that the revolver belonged to Samantha Security Agency. The nameplate, on the other
hand, was owned by Raynel T. Para-asi, a security guard of Samantha Security Agency. Boquila, who
was also connected with the same agency, carried the nameplate in his pocket at the time of the
commission of the offense. The police submitted the firearm, as well as the empty shells and the bullet
to the National Bureau of Investigation8 for ballistic examination.9
Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police Medico-Legal Officer, autopsied the victim's cadaver on October 8, 1996 at
10:00 in the morning. The Necropsy Report10 shows that the victim's cause of death was shock
secondary to two gunshot wounds on the left thoraco-abdominal area.11 Dr. Cerna recovered a bullet
slug apparently from a .38 caliber revolver from the victim's cadaver. He indorsed said slug to the
Homicide Section of the Cebu City Police Department which submitted the same to the NBI for ballistic
examination.12
The ballistic examination13 revealed that the live bullets found inside the .38 caliber revolver with serial
number 50440 and the bullet extracted from the body of the victim match, meaning that the fatal bullet
was fired from the same gun found at the scene of the crime.14
Three days after the incident, on October 11, 1996, Boquila went to the Cebu City Police Department
and owned to the commission of the offense. He made an extrajudicial confession with the assistance of
his lawyer, Atty. Charter Antonio L. Tayurang, and in the presence of his sisters, Anecita Boquila and
Remedios Azucena, and his brother, Justiniano Boquila.15 We quote his confession:
"x x x xxx xxx
Question # 1. Will you please state your name and other personal circumstances to (sic)
include you[r] educational attainment?
Answer # 1. I am Ruben Boquila y (L)ogalada, Fil., 20 years old, single, first year college of
General Radio Operator, a native of Sitio Arba, Brgy. San Roque, Talibon, Bohol but at present
I am connected with Samantha Security Agency in Juana Osmena St., Cebu City and
presently residing at corner Mango Avenue and D. Jakosalem Sts., Cebu City.1âwphi1.nêt
Question # 2. Where were you in the dawn of October 8, 1996?
Answer # 2. That on or about 3:30 in the dawn/morning of October 8, 1996, I leave (sic) my
post as security guard on duty of River Gate in General Maxilom Ave., Cebu City and boarded
a PUJ to Robinson Fuente Osmena where I again boarded a PUJ to Guadalupe, Cebu City for
me to ask money to (sic) my sister, Remedios Azucena who is living in Guadaljara Village,
Brgy. Guadalupe and because the PUJ I was riding was up to only in the corner of Banawa
and Guadalupe I boarded a Taxicab in going to the house of my sister and riding a taxicab it
came to my mind that my said sister can not help me so I decided to announce to a driver that
sorry, this is A HOLD UP because I need the money but then the driver quickly held and
grappled the barrel of my firearm, Armscor Cal. 38 revolver with serial number 50440.
Question # 3. In what particular place when you announced that it was a HOLD UP and aimed
your handgun to (sic) the driver?
Answer # 3. Near the Artesian well in Gervacio Quijada St., Brgy. Guadalupe, Cebu City.
Question # 4. What happened during the grappling of the handgun?
Answer # 4. Considering that the driver was holding the barrel of my gun I squeezed several
times and in that first fire I think I was hit and in the continuing grapple, the driver was able to
bite my chin and in that particular instance I continued squeezing the trigger of my firearm until
finally I was able to get out from the taxicab without knowing that I left my gun due to
nervousness and proceeded back to my work place in the River Gate, General Maxilom
Avenue and later I came to know from the taho vendor that there was taxi driver found dead in
Guadalupe, this City but prior to it I confided to my co-workers, Security Guard Ladiona and
Almadin that I intend to rob a certain taxi driver on the aforementioned place, time and date.
Question # 5. What did you do next?
Answer # 5. I then went to our office in Juana Osmena St., Cebu City and reported that my
firearm was snatched by somebody else and then Mr. Paquiao brought me for treatment in
Southern Islands Medical Center. Thereafter, I supposed to tell the truth to the Security Agency
and to the Police but in the first place I was afraid that I will be harmed but I was able to read
the Sun Star Newspaper that the victim - a taxi driver had six children my conscience was
bothered, so I finally decided to tell the whole truth about such incident to the Police
authorities.
xxx xxx x x x"16
From the foregoing narration of facts, we find the accused-appellant guilty only of homicide and not of
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. In prosecuting robbery with homicide cases, the
government needs to prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with
violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is
done with animus lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery, or on the occasion thereof, homicide (used
in its generic sense) is committed.17 To sustain a conviction for this special complex crime, robbery
must be proved conclusively as any other essential element of the crime. It is necessary for the
prosecution to clearly establish that a robbery has actually taken place, and that, as a consequence or
on the occasion of such robbery, homicide is committed. Where the evidence does not conclusively
prove the robbery, the killing of the victim would be classified either as a simple homicide or murder,
depending upon the absence or presence of any qualifying circumstance, and not the complex offense
of robbery with homicide.18 There is nothing in the evidence on record that would show that the victim
had a wristwatch and that accused-appellant took said watch on that fateful night, as alleged in the
information. Not even accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession proves the robbery. Accused-
appellant merely stated in his confession that he announced a hold-up and thereafter he and the victim
grappled for the gun. As they struggled, accused-appellant squeezed the trigger, thus shooting the
victim. Accused-appellant then hurriedly got off the taxicab, leaving his gun behind. There was no
276
mention about the taking of the wristwatch. As the prosecution failed to prove the robbery, accused-
appellant should only be convicted for homicide.
We further find that accused-appellant's liability is mitigated by his voluntary surrender. Three days after
the death of the victim, accused-appellant read in the local newspaper that the victim had six children.
This bothered his conscience, prompting him to go to the police and admit his guilt. This should be
considered in favor of the accused-appellant. For the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to
be taken into consideration, it is necessary that the same be spontaneous and done in such manner to
show the interest of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he
acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense, necessarily
incurred in his search and capture. This mitigating circumstance may be properly appreciated if the
following requisites concur: (1) the offender was not actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a
person in authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary.19 All these requisites are present in this case.
In imposing the maximum penalty upon accused-appellant, the trial court held that the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime attended the commission of the crime. We disagree. Nighttime would be a
modifying element only when (1) it was specially sought by the offender; or (2) the offender took
advantage of it; or (3) it facilitated the commission of the crime by ensuring the offender's immunity from
identification or capture. The mere fact that the killing was committed at night would not suffice to
sustain nocturnity for, by and itself.20 The facts do not show that accused-appellant purposely sought or
took advantage of the darkness to perpetrate the crime or to conceal his identity. Witness Sechem
Dagangan testified that the area where the crime was committed was illuminated by lights coming from
the surrounding residence. Under these circumstances, nighttime cannot be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
Accused-appellant faults the trial court for readily accepting accused-appellant's plea of guilt. The
argument is specious. Accused-appellant's conviction is not based merely on his plea of guilt. The
prosecution has already commenced its presentation of evidence when accused-appellant changed his
plea of not guilty to guilty. Thereafter, the trial court ordered the prosecution to continue with the
presentation of its evidence.
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the trial court is required to: (1) conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea; (2)
order the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of
his culpability; and (3) ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to
do so if he desires. This is in accordance with Section 3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which prevailed at the time of the commission of the offense. The Rules provided:
"SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.--When the accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also
present evidence in his behalf."
The presentation of evidence is required even after the accused has pleaded guilty to preclude any
room for reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the
possibility that there might have been some misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the
nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the
commission of the crime which justify or require the exercise of greater or lesser degree of severity in
the imposition of the prescribed penalty.21 A reading of the transcript of stenographic notes22 shows that
the trial court complied with all that is required by the Rules. First, it asked the accused-appellant
whether he understood the consequences of his plea. His counsel manifested that he has already
conferred with his client. The trial court then directed the prosecution to present its evidence, which it
did. After the prosecution rested its case, the defense chose not to present its own evidence. Thus, it
cannot be said that the trial court rushed to convict accused-appellant after the latter has pleaded guilty.
The conviction of accused-appellant is supported not simply by his plea of guilt, but more importantly by
the testimonial, documentary and object evidence presented by the prosecution during the trial.
We now go to the penalty. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide is
reclusion temporal. Considering the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,
the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we rule
that accused-appellant should be sentenced to imprisonment of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
minimum to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.1âwphi1.nêt
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds accused-appellant GUILTY of the crime of HOMICIDE and
imposes upon him an indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to
fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity. The order of the trial court for
accused-appellant to restitute to the heirs the sum of five hundred pesos (P500.00) is hereby deleted.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MADELO ESPINA Y CAÑASARES, accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision dated September 4, 1995, of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 14 1
convicting appellant of the crime of murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P100,000.00, as indemnity, P15,000.00
as funeral expenses, and P50,000.00 as damages.
Appellant, a 17 year-old jeepney conductor, was charged with murder for the killing of Ma. Nympha
Belen y Melano, a 21 year-old mental retardate.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On July 1, 1993, at about 12:00 in the evening, prosecution witness Tolentino A. Colo was sleeping
inside a jeepney parked at a garage in Francisco Homes, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. Suddenly, he
was awakened when a woman cried out "Aruy!". Colo stood up and saw appellant coming out of a hut
located some eight (8) meters away from the garage. Appellant was holding a curved knife in his hand.
His t-shirt, hands, and knife were drenched with blood. Colo saw a woman inside the hut fall down on
277
her face. Although it was nighttime, there was a light inside the hut and a mercury lamp some three (3)
meters away which cast enough illumination for Colo to recognize appellant and the woman as Ma.
Nympha Belen. When appellant saw Colo, he shouted "panglima ire" referring to the victim, and
"panganim ka! referring to Colo. Scared out of his wits, Colo immediately jumped out of the window of
the jeepney and hid in the roof of a nearby house. Appellant gave chase but when he could not find
Colo, he finally gave up and left. Colo remained on the roof for five (5) long hours. At around 6:00 the
following morning, he gingerly went down and drove the jeepney in his usual route. On July 2, 1993, at
around 7:00 in the evening, Colo was arrested by the police and brought to the station for investigation.
The following day, Colo told Mrs. Precila Melanio-Belen, mother of the victim, that it was appellant who
killed her daughter.2
On August 3, 1993, appellant was charged with the crime of murder under the following Information: 3
INFORMATION
The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses Madelo Espina y Cañasares of
the crime of murder, penalized under the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of July, 1993, in the municipality of San Jose del Monte,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused Madelo Espina y Cañasares, armed with a bladed weapon and with
intent to kill one Maria Nympha Belen, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery,
attack, assault and stab with the said bladed weapon he was then provided the said
Maria Nympha Belen, a mentally retarded woman, hitting the latter on the different
parts of her body, thereby causing her serious physical injuries which directly caused
her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Malolos, Bulacan, August 3, 1993.
Upon arraignment on October 29, 1993, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. 4 At the pre-trial
conference,5 the sworn statements of Mrs. Precila Melanio-Belen6 and Tolentino Colo,7 the post-mortem
examination8 and death certificate of Ma. Nympha Belen9 were marked in evidence.
During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Mrs. Precila Melanio-Belen, mother
of the victim, who testified that her daughter was a mental retardate, and that their family paid more than
P15,000.00 for the funeral of the victim;10 (2) Tolentino A. Colo, a jeepney driver, who narrated the
events he witnessed in connection with the stabbing incident; (3) SPO3 Rogelio Encina, a member of
the Philippine National Police (PNP), San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, who was tasked to bring to court
the knife used in the killing from the Municipal Trial Court of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan; 11 (4) Dr.
Juan V. Zaldariaga, Jr., Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), who
conducted the post-mortem examination and testified that the victim sustained six (6) stab wounds, five
(5) of which were fatal.12
For the defense, appellant himself testified. He stated that in the evening of July 1, 1993, he was having
a drinking spree with Jun, Gusing, Panis, Colo, and some others, at the garage in San Jose Del Monte,
Bulacan. At around 10:00 P.M., he left the group and being drunk, he decided to sleep inside the parked
jeepney in the garage instead of going home. At around 12:10 in the morning, he was awakened by
policemen and brought to the police detachment where he was questioned regarding the killing. He told
the police that he did not know who killed the victim.13
On September 4, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision14 finding appellant guilty of murder, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Madelo Espina y Cañasares guilty of the crime of
Murder, the court hereby imposes upon the accused the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
To indemnify the heirs of the victim P100,000.00.
To pay Precila Belen P15,000.00 expenses for wake & burial.
To pay P50,000.00 moral damage.
The accused a detention prisoner, the Provincial Warden of Malolos, Bulacan is ordered to
commit the accused to the National Penitentiary immediately upon receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.15
Hence, the present appeal. Appellant contends that the trial court gravely erred in —
I. . . . GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF ALLEGED
EYEWITNESS, AND IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON GROUND OF
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. . . . ORDERING ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM IN
THE AMOUNT OF P100,000.00; TO PAY THE AMOUNT OF P15,000.00 AS
REIMBURSEMENT FOR THE WAKE AND THE BURIAL EXPENSES; AND P50,000.00 AS
MORAL DAMAGES.
In his brief,16 appellant assails the credibility of prosecution witness Colo considering that the latter was
also a suspect in the killing, and was under detention at the time he gave his statement pointing to
appellant as the killer. Further, appellant claims, Colo had a motive in pointing to appellant as the
assailant since they had a previous quarrel over money. Appellant also, contends that Colo's behavior
after witnessing the incident is not in consonance with normal human behavior, for instead of reporting
the matter to the police, he merely went ahead plying his usual jeepney route. Appellant also avers that
the murder weapon was not positively identified in court. Lastly, appellant insists that he was convicted
on the basis of insufficient circumstantial evidence. And even assuming that appellant committed the
crime, the lower court failed to take into consideration the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority,
appellant being only seventeen (17) years old at the time of the commission of the crime.
278
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General17 contends that Colo was released after investigation,
suggesting the insufficiency of evidence to implicate him. Further, the OSG belies the imputation of ill-
motive on the part of Colo to testify against appellant considering that the alleged quarrel over money
was brought up to explain why appellant was no longer living with Colo, not why Colo would implicate
appellant. The OSG also contends that there is also no standard form of behavior when one is
confronted with a shocking incident. Hence, the OSG prays for the affirmance of the conviction for
murder since the killing is qualified by abuse of superior strength. But, it recommends that indemnity be
reduced to P50,000.00 pursuant to existing jurisprudence.
In sum, the issues center on the credibility of the prosecution witness Colo and the sufficiency of the
circumstantial evidence to convict appellant of the crime charged.
Anent the issue of credibility of witnesses, the elementary rule is that appellate courts will generally not
disturb the findings of the trial court. The latter is in a better position to decide the question, having
heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial,
unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the
result of the case.18 The rule admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) when patent inconsistencies in
the statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at are
clearly unsupported by the evidence.19 No inconsistencies in Colo's testimony were pointed out by
appellant. Neither does appellant contend that the trial court erred in relying on the evidence on record.
Appellant attempts to impeach the testimony at this late stage of the proceeding. The records show that
appellant was afforded ample opportunity to cross examine Colo and to demonstrate any falsity or error
in his allegedly biased testimony. Appellant failed, however, to undermine Colo's credibility.
The fact that a witness may have been investigated in connection with the commission of the crime and
that he had a previous quarrel with appellant are not grounds for disqualification of a witness under
Section 20 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. By itself, prejudice against an accused cannot warrant the
disqualification of witnesses or the total disregard of their testimonies. 20 Under the same rule, in
general, any person can testify in court, regardless of personal interest in a case. At any rate, these
circumstances may affect the credibility of the witness, the assessment of which is within the province of
the trial court. Anent his motive in testifying, Colo repeatedly insisted that he offered to testify because
he pitied the mother of the victim who could find no witnesses willing to shed light on the death of her
daughter.21 The foregoing factors considered, we find no cogent reason to overturn the factual findings
of the trial court.
As to the sufficiency of evidence to convict appellant, we have likewise held that direct evidence of the
commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding
of guilt.22 Under Section 4 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, conviction may be had even on
circumstantial evidence provided three requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven: and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The following circumstances, when pieced together, lead to the ineluctable conclusion that appellant
stabbed the victim: (1) Appellant, by his own admission, was at the locus criminis at around the time of
stabbing incident.23 (2) He was seen leaving the hut, barely seconds after the killing, by witness Colo. 24
(3) He was seen leaving the hut holding a bloodied knife, and his t-shirt and hands drenched with
blood.25 (4) The knife, which had one blunt extremity and one sharp extremity, was presented in
evidence, was akin to the knife used to inflict the wounds sustained by the victim. 26 (5) He was heard
exclaiming "pang lima ire" referring to the victim and "pang-anim ka" referring to Colo.27 (6) Appellant,
still holding the knife, even chased Colo, but eventually left when he could not find Colo. 28
The most incriminating piece of evidence against appellant is Colo's testimony that he saw appellant
holding a bloodied curved knife, with his t-shirt and hands drenched with blood, leaving the locus
criminis. Thus, in People v. Malimit,29 one of the circumstantial evidence considered in convicting
appellant of the crime of Robbery with Homicide is the testimony of two witnesses that they saw
appellant holding a blood-stained bolo in his right hand, rushing out of the victim's store mere seconds
prior to their discovery of the crime.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent
with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that
of guilt.30 Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided the circumstances
proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, 31 a conclusion adequately proven in this
case.
Appellant's defense of denial is unavailing. For the defense of denial and alibi to prosper, it must be
clearly established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that (1) the accused was somewhere else
when the offense was committed, and (2) it was physically impossible for the accused to have been
physically present at the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. 32
Appellant was right smack in the midst of the locus criminis at the time of the commission of the crime.
Hence, his defense of denial and alibi miserably failed to comply with the strict requirements of time and
place.33
As to the crime committed, the Information alleged three qualifying circumstances — abuse of superior
strength, evident premeditation, and treachery. The trial court appreciated abuse of superior strength
and evident premeditation without specifying which one qualified the crime to murder. We find, however,
that only abuse of superior strength qualified the killing to murder.
In several cases,34 we have held that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed
and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the
weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself. This is
the exact scenario in this case.
Evident premeditation, however, was not sufficiently proven by the prosecution. The following requisites
must be established before evident premeditation may be considered in imposing the proper penalty: (a)
the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the
accused clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and
execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.35 Given the attendant factual
circumstances in this case, we find them insufficient to establish evident premeditation.
Treachery likewise did not attend the commission of the crime. The qualifying circumstance of treachery
can not be taken into consideration in the absence of evidence showing the manner of attack and what
ensued inside the hut. Nobody witnessed the actual killing, only its immediate aftermath. Where
treachery is alleged, the manner of attack must be proven.36 It cannot be presumed or concluded
279
merely on the basis of the resulting crime.37 When no particulars are known regarding the manner in
which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and
developed, it cannot be established from mere supposition that the accused perpetrated the killing with
treachery38.
The trial court erred ill appreciating nighttime as a generic aggravating circumstance. Nighttime only
becomes an aggravating circumstance when (1) it is especially sought by the offender; (2) it is taken
advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring the offender's immunity
from capture.39 Here, other than the time of the crime, there is nothing else to suggest that appellant
deliberately availed himself or took advantage of the circumstances of nighttime. Further, when the
place of the crime is illuminated by light, as in this case, nighttime is not aggravating. 40
In sum, we find the crime committed by appellant to be murder because killing was qualified by abuse of
superior strength. At the time of the commission of the crime, the penalty for murder was reclusion
temporal maximum to death.41 Appellant having been born on May 16, 1976, 42 he was 17 years, 1
month and 15 days old, at the time of the commission of the crime. The existence of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority requires the imposition of the penalty next lower in degree 43 which is
prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum penalty to be imposed upon appellant shall be taken from the medium period of the
imposable penalty, which is reclusion temporal minimum, while the minimum shall be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium.
As to the amount of damages, the death indemnity should be lowered to P50,000.00 pursuant to
existing jurisprudence.44 As to actual damages, the records do not contain any receipts for the funeral
expenses incurred by the family of the victim. The mother of the victim likewise did not testify as to the
moral damages sustained as a result of the death of her daughter. Hence, for lack of competent proof,
we cannot award either actual or moral damages.45
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding appellant Madelo Espina y Cañasares guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION regarding
the penalty imposed so that appellant is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4)
years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional maximum as minimum, to twelve
(12) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum, to pay the
heirs of the victim the amount of P50.000.00 as death indemnity, and to pay the costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
FELIPE DEMATE y LOGANA alias "Dodong Morales" and DANTE MORALES (At Large),
Appellants.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In Criminal Case No. 8511, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City, Branch 84, found appellant
Felipe Demate y Logana a.k.a. "Dodong Morales" guilty of murder and sentenced him to death.1 Hence,
this instant automatic review2 of said decision, together with the trial court’s supplemental decision,3
dated January 15, 1998, which found co-appellant Dante Morales guilty of murder and sentenced him to
death in absentia.
In Criminal Case No. 8512, the trial court found appellants Felipe Demate and Dante Morales guilty of
frustrated murder. Each was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for
the offense of frustrated murder. Before us now, appellant Demate does not seek an acquittal4 but
rather prays that he be adjudged guilty only of homicide and frustrated homicide instead of murder and
frustrated murder, respectively.
The two cases are reviewed together as they arose from two related indictments against Demate and
Morales for murder and frustrated murder filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Batangas. In Criminal
Case No. 8511 for murder, the accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 26th day of May 1996, between 3:00 o’clock and 4:00 o’clock in the morning, at
Sitio Alagao, Barangay Galamay-Amo, Municipality of San Jose, Province of Batangas, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed
instrument, conspiring and confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually helping each
other, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and without any justifiable cause, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack with the said bladed
instrument, one Jaime Ricablanca y Husmillo, suddenly and without warning, thereby inflicting upon the
latter hack wounds on his back which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.5
In Criminal Case No. 8512, Demate and Morales were charged with frustrated murder allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of May 1996, between 3:00 o’clock and 4:00 o’clock in the morning, at
Sitio Alagao, Barangay Galamay-Amo, Municipality of San Jose, Province of Batangas, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed
instrument, conspiring and confederating together, acting in common accord and mutually helping each
other, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and without any justifiable cause, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack with the said bladed instrument,
one Violeta Ricablanca y Moog, suddenly and without warning, thereby inflicting upon the latter hack
wounds on her face which injuries required medical attendance and prevented her from performing her
customary work for a period of more than thirty (30) days, the said accused thus performing all the acts
of execution which should have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence, but which
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of some cause independent of the will of the perpetrators, that
is, because of the timely and able medical attendance rendered to the said offended party which
prevented her death.
Contrary to law.6
280
When arraigned, with the assistance of counsel, Demate and Morales pleaded not guilty to both
charges.7 They waived pre-trial, and the cases against them proceeded to trial jointly.
On February 18, 1997, however, the trial court was informed that Morales had escaped from detention
at the Batangas Provincial Jail.8 He remains at large. Trial then proceeded against Morales in absentia.
He was identified by Violeta Ricablanca in open court by means of his picture9 in the record.10
Based on the records of the case, the following are the facts:
Felipe Demate is the stepbrother of his co-appellant Dante Morales.11 About a year before the incident
in question, Morales was employed by the spouses Jaime and Violeta Ricablanca in their poultry
business.12 However, he quit in April 1996.13 The Ricablancas had a maid, Jimbie14 Alfaño, who had
been working with them for three (3) years. Morales introduced Demate to Jimbie15 and the latter
began courting her.16 Jimbie did not spurn his affections and the two became quite close and Demate
would usually visit her to pay court in the evenings.17
At about eight o’clock in the evening of May 24, 1996, Jimbie was outside the house of the Ricablancas
in Sitio Alagao, Barangay Galamay-Amo, San Jose, Batangas. She was doing the family laundry when
Demate, whom she knew as "Dodong Morales," engaged her in a conversation. Demate told her to
open the door in front of the garage of her employer at 3:00 a.m. of May 26, 1996, a Sunday.18
However, Demate did not tell her the reason for his request.
In the wee hours of the morning of May 26, 1996, Jimbie woke up at more or less three o’clock in the
morning. She opened the door in front of the garage of the Ricablanca residence as per Demate’s
request.19 Soon thereafter, she saw Demate at the stairs of the house. He repeated his request that
she open the door. Jimbie opened the main door of the house, and then went back to her room.20
Inside the house, Jaime and Violeta Ricablanca and their minor son, Joseph Ryan, were fast asleep in
their respective rooms.
Suddenly Jimbie heard loud thuds coming from the middle room where her master, Jaime, was
sleeping.21 The commotion ("kalabugan sa kwartong kinatutulugan ng aking asawa") also woke up
Violeta,22 who heard her husband, Jaime uttering, "Papatayin mo ako, bakit mo ako papatayin?" ("You
will kill me, why will you kill me?")23 Violeta immediately rushed to Jaime’s room, followed by Joseph
Ryan who had also been awakened by the noise24 and Jimbie.25
When she looked inside the room, Violeta saw Demate astride Jaime, who was still lying on the bed.
Demate was repeatedly stabbing her husband.26 She was around two (2) meters away from the bed
and could clearly recognize Demate as the room was brightly lit by a 100-watt fluorescent lamp
immediately outside the door.27 Joseph Ryan peeped in and also saw Demate stab his father many
times.28 Jimbie also looked in and saw Demate stab her master.29
Violeta was about to enter the room when Demate turned towards her. On meeting her, he hacked her
face with a bolo.30 Violeta then ran outside to call for help. She then saw Morales near the garage of
her house31 and she discovered that the garage door was unlocked.32 On seeing her, Morales
immediately fled.33
Meanwhile, Jimbie saw Demate run outside, jump over the terrace railing,34 and follow Morales, whom
she had earlier noticed near the area of the house where she usually washed clothes.35 Morales had
run away when he caught sight of Violeta approaching and shouting for help.
The neighbors of the Ricablancas who rushed to their aid immediately brought Jaime to a hospital. The
bolo used by Demate was still embedded in his back.36 On removing it, Violeta identified the bolo as
the property of the Ricablancas,37 taken from their kitchen. Jaime was beyond medical help, however,
and he succumbed to his wounds.
Violeta sustained a hack wound on the right side of her face which caused serious damage to her facial
muscles.38 She was treated by Dr. Cesar Guillo, a surgeon of San Jose General Hospital. Dr. Guillo
stated that while the wound by itself was not necessarily fatal per se,39 nonetheless, it could have
caused death from complications had no medical treatment been given.40
Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) performed an
autopsy on Jaime’s remains. The autopsy report showed that Jaime sustained the following injuries:
Chopped wound, right, subauricular area, 6.0 x 5.0 cms.
Incised wounds: neck, posterior aspect, 5.0 cms., arm, right, postero-lateral aspect, middle third, 7.0
cms., hand, right, palmar aspect, thenar eminence, 8.0 cms.
Stab wounds, edges clean cut, each having a sharp and opposite contused extremities:
I. 3.0 cms. long, located at the left anterior chest wall, 8.0 cms. from the anterior median line
directed backwards, downwards and medially involving the skin and soft tissues into the
thoracic cavity via the 2nd intercostal space, perforating upper lobe left lung with an
approximate depth of 13.0 cms.
II. 4.0 cms. long, located at the left anterior chest wall, 9.0 cms. from the anterior median line,
directed backwards, upwards and medially involving the skin and soft tissues via the 6th
intercostal space into the thoracic cavity, perforating lower lobe left lung with an approximate
depth of 17.0 cms.
III. 3.5 cms. long, located at the left infraclavicular area, 16.0 cms. from the posterior median
line, directed forward, downward and medially involving the skin and soft tissues only with an
approximate depth of 3.0 cms.
IV. 5.0 cms. long, gaping, located at the right supra scapular area, 15.0 cms. from the posterior
median line, directed forward, downward and medially involving the skin and soft tissues into
the thoracic cavity, perforating middle lobe, right lung with an approximate depth of 14.0 cms.
V. 5.0 cms. long, located at the right posterior axillary, 19.0 cms. from the posterior median
line, directed forward, upward and medially involving the skin and underlying soft tissues into
the abdominal cavity incising the right lobe of the liver with an approximate depth of 16.0 cms.
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 VI. 1.0 cm. long, located at the left scapular area, 16.0 cms. from the posterior median line,
directed forward, upward and medially involving the skin and soft tissues, into the thoracic
cavity, piercing the upper lobe of the left lung with an approximate depth of 13.0 cms.
VII. 3.0 cms. long, located at the left arm, upper third, posterior aspect, 20.0 cms. where the
left elbow, directed forward, upwards and medially involving the skin and underlying soft
tissues and creating an EXIT wound, at the left arm, upper third antero-medial aspect, 7.5 cms.
long, 21.0 cms. above the left elbow.
VIII. 5.0 cms. long, located at the left arm, posterior aspect, middle third, 10.0 cms. above the
left elbow, directed forward, upwards and medially involving the skin and soft tissue and
making an EXIT wound, 3.0 cms. and 15.0 cms. above the left elbow located at the left elbow
anterior aspect, middle third.
IX. 4.0 cms long, located at the left arm, posterior aspect, lower third, 5.0 cms. above the left
elbow directed forward, upward and medially involving the skin and soft tissue and making an
EXIT, 3.0 cms. long, 10.0 cms above the left elbow at the left arm antero-medial aspect.41
In sum, the victim sustained one (1) chopped wound, four (4) incised wounds, and nine (9) stab
wounds,42 at least four (4) of which were serious in nature.43 Dr. Vertido identified the cause of Jaime’s
death as "hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds."44
After fleeing the scene of the crime, Demate and Morales went into hiding. Three months later, they
were arrested in San Francisco, Quezon by elements of the Philippine National Police.
Demate raised the defense of alibi. He claimed that he was in his hometown, Aurora, Quezon at the
time of the incident.45 He denied having known or courted Jimbie, claiming that he only met her after
his incarceration.46 To corroborate his alibi, Demate presented one Nolito Olayes who testified that in
April 1996, he knew for a fact that Demate was residing in Mabunga, San Francisco, Quezon, as they
were neighbors there.47
The trial court found the prosecution’s version convincing, stressing that the positive identification of
Felipe Demate by the eyewitnesses made his defense of alibi untenable and accordingly decided
Criminal Cases Nos. 8511 and 8512 in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 8511, finding the accused Felipe Demate y Logana @ "Dodong
Morales" GUILTY of MURDER with [the] generic aggravating circumstance of nighttime, he is hereby
sentenced to a penalty of DEATH as imposed in Article 248 of Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 6 of Republic Act 7659, otherwise known as the Heinous Crimes Act.
In Criminal Case No. 8512, the said accused is likewise found guilty of Frustrated Murder for which he is
hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
the maximum, with a minimum of Ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
Said accused is further ordered to pay the heirs of deceased Jaime Ricablanca in the following
amounts: ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for death; ₱50,000.00 as actual damages and ₱100,000.00 as moral
damages.
Accordingly, he is hereby ordered to be transferred to the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa City
where the death penalty shall be executed through lethal injection after this judgment shall have
become final and executory.
Let the records of this case including exhibits and transcripts of stenographic notes consecutively
numbered be transmitted immediately to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
SO ORDERED.48
With respect to Dante Morales, the trial court in its supplemental decision dated January 15, 1998,
convicted him as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 8511, finding co-accused Dante Morales GUILTY OF MURDER as
charged with [the] generic aggravating circumstance of nighttime, he is hereby sentenced to a penalty of
DEATH as imposed in Article 248 of Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act
7659, otherwise known as the Heinous Crimes Act.
In Criminal Case No. 8512, the said co-accused is likewise found guilty of Frustrated Murder for which
he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as the maximum, with a minimum of Ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
Said co-accused is further ordered to pay the heirs of deceased Jaime Ricablanca in the following
amounts: ₱50,000.00 as indemnity for death; ₱50,000.00 as actual damages and ₱100,000.00 as moral
damages.
Let the records of this case including exhibits and transcripts of the stenographic notes consecutively
numbered be transmitted immediately to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
This supplements and forms part of the Decision dated December 18, 1997 in the above entitled cases.
SO ORDERED.49
Before us, appellants submit the following assignment of errors:
1. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION WERE PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR.
2. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STATING THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
NIGHTTIME WAS ALSO PRESENT.
3. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SAYING THAT THE CRIME OF MURDER WAS COMMITTED
BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.50
Appellants pray not for an acquittal or seek a reversal of their conviction, but merely modification of their
conviction for murder and frustrated murder to homicide and frustrated homicide, respectively. The
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issues for our resolution relate to: (1) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to sustain the
convictions; (2) the gravity of the offenses committed; and (3) the propriety of the penalties imposed on
each of the appellants.
The records show that three prosecution eyewitnesses, namely: the victim’s wife, Violeta Ricablanca;
the victim’s teenaged son, Joseph Ryan Ricablanca; and the Ricablancas’ maid, Jimbie Alfaño, saw
appellant Felipe Demate in the act of repeatedly stabbing Jaime Ricablanca inside the master’s
bedroom of the Ricablanca residence at the wee hours of the morning, on May 26, 1996. Demate was
positively identified in open court by all three eyewitnesses. As for appellant Dante Morales, he was
seen by both Violeta and Jimbie immediately outside the Ricablanca house at the time of the incident,
acting as a look-out for Demate. Violeta positively identified Morales in open court based on his photo in
the records.
These prosecution witnesses were intensively grilled on cross-examination, but their testimonies
remained unshaken. Moreover, their testimony on the stabbing of Jaime Ricablanca is corroborated by
the autopsy report of Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, to the effect that the
victim suffered nine (9) stab wounds, one (1) chopped wound, and four (4) incised wounds resulting in
his death.
That Violeta and Joseph Ryan were wife and son of the victim does not detract from their credibility, nor
diminish the weight of their testimonies. Relatives of victims of crimes have a natural knack for
remembering the face of the attacker and they, more than anybody else, would be concerned with
vindicating the crime by having the felon brought before the bar of justice.51 Appellants did not point to
any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to testify falsely against them, or implicate
them in the commission of heinous crimes. Hence, we can only conclude that no such improper motive
exists and the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are entitled to full faith and credit.52
Against the positive identification made by prosecution witnesses of Demate and Morales as the
perpetrators of the crime, all that appellant Demate can offer is a shaky alibi. Alibi is a weak defense.
Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused
as the author of the crime by credible witnesses.53
In sum, we find no basis to doubt or dispute, much less overturn, the findings of the trial court that
Demate repeatedly stabbed the victim, while Morales stood as his look-out. That both appellants were
criminally liable for the unlawful death of the victim as principals by direct participation was amply shown
by the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses, coupled with the medical evidence on the victim’s
death. They constitute sufficient proof of the guilt of the appellants beyond cavil or doubt.1âwphi1
This brings us to the next issue for our resolution: Was the unlawful killing of Jaime Ricablanca murder
or only homicide?
Appellants contend that it was error for the trial court to hold that the killing was murder qualified by
treachery and evident premeditation. They argue that treachery cannot be appreciated in the instant
case as a closer look at the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses show that none of them saw
how the attack commenced. Moreover, they claim it was erroneous for the trial court to rule that the
victim was asleep when attacked, thus, making the killing treacherous. Appellants submit that the
victim’s utterances of "Papatayin mo ako, bakit mo ako papatayin?" clearly show that he was awake
when assaulted.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that what the testimonies cited
clearly show is that Demate unexpectedly and swiftly attacked the victim, whom he roused from sleep
and mercilessly stabbed and hacked, while the victim was lying on his back. According to the OSG,
these clearly show that the killing was attended by alevosia. Treachery must be appreciated where the
onslaught was so swift that the victim, who had suddenly been awakened from his sleep, had no
opportunity to defend himself, says the OSG.
Alevosia or treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.54 For treachery to be appreciated, the prosecution has the burden to prove
that: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the offender
consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed by him.55 We find that
both elements have been proven in this case.
The victim was in bed, flat on his back, when the killer went on top of him and stabbed him several
times.56 The killing occurred at three o’clock in the morning, an hour when generally people are asleep.
The victim had been awakened when the killer entered the room and on seeing the latter armed with a
bolo, he remarked, "Papatayin mo ako, bakit mo ako papatayin?" Evidently the victim was caught
unaware totally defenseless against the armed invader. Even when the victim was warned of the danger
to his person as long as the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself
or to retaliate, treachery could be appreciated.57
Violeta Ricablanca testified that the attack upon her husband, including the assault made by Demate on
her person, lasted only five seconds or less.58 In other words, the assault was executed with swiftness,
which caught the victim helpless. In his position (lying in bed) and condition (newly awakened from
sleep), the victim was deprived of any real chance to defend himself, much less retaliate against his
attacker. What is decisive in an appreciation of treachery is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself. Hence, we find that the trial court did not err in ruling that the
killing of Jaime Ricablanca as well as the wounding of his wife, Violeta Ricablanca, was attended by
treachery.
Appellants next argue that it was erroneous for the trial court to rule there was evident premeditation
merely from Demate’s instructions to the maid, Jimbie Alfaño, to open the door of the victim’s house at
3:00 a.m. of May 26, 1996. They stress that Jimbie categorically stated on the witness stand that
Demate did not disclose to her the reason or motive behind his request. Hence, they contend there is no
basis to infer from said request that Demate carefully planned to surreptitiously enter the victim’s house
for the purpose of killing its owner.
The Solicitor General points out, however, that a careful study of the facts of the case shows that the
appellants carefully planned and reflected upon their plan, to wit: (1) Morales used to work at the poultry
farm of the Ricablancas but left without word one month before the incident. (2) Morales introduced his
stepbrother and co-appellant Demate to Jimbie, the Ricablancas’ maid, and the latter began a romantic
dalliance with her. (3) At around 3:00 a.m. of April 16, 1996, Jimbie let in Demate inside the Ricablanca
dwelling and the latter stole ₱14,000.00 in cash from the victim’s room (Criminal Case No. 8510). (4)
Around 8:00 p.m. of May 24, 1996, Demate again asked Jimbie to open the door of the Ricablanca
residence for him at 3:00 a.m. of May 26, 1996. (5) Sometime around three o’clock in the morning of
May 26, 1996, Jimbie did open the door of the Ricablanca residence to let Demate in, while Morales
stood guard. Demate then proceeded to the master’s bedroom where the killing occurred. The OSG
submits that the foregoing circumstances clearly showed the appellants’ predetermined plan to harm the
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victim and his family should they get in the way of their attempt to steal some more from the
Ricablancas. The Solicitor General lays great weight on the fact that appellants had stolen from the
Ricablancas previously. Apparently dissatisfied with their loot, they wanted more and were prepared to
kill to get it.
Like any aggravating or qualifying circumstance, evident premeditation must be established with equal
certainty and clarity as the crime itself.59 To prove evident premeditation, the prosecution is tasked to
show: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act indicating that the
offender had clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination to
commit the crime and the execution thereof to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequences of
his act.60 Evident premeditation is not presumed from the mere lapse of time.61 It may only be
appreciated when the execution of the crime is preceded by cool thought and deliberate reflection upon
the resolution to carry out the felonious intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment.62
Despite the OSG’s vigorous submission, we are not prepared to accept that evident premeditation can
be appreciated against appellants. The record is less than clear as to when and how the killing was
planned. Whether the plan was only to steal valuables from the victims, or to kill them as well if they got
in the way, is not discernible from the record. Jimbie testified that Demate did not tell her the reason
why he wanted her to open the door of the Ricablanca house come 3:00 a.m. of May 26, 1996. We are
not free to speculate that the request was made by appellants with murder or robbery or both in their
minds. Absent a clear showing of its requisites, we are here constrained to rule out evident
premeditation.
Appellants next fault the trial court for appreciating the aggravating circumstance of nighttime against
them. They contend that the mere fact that Demate entered the house of the victim at around three
o’clock in the morning of May 26, 1996, does not necessarily mean that appellants took advantage of
darkness when the alleged offense took place.
The Solicitor General, in turn, points out that under Article 1363 of the Civil Code the offense was
committed at nighttime, having been committed before the sunrise. Hence, under Article 14 (6)64 of the
Revised Penal Code, nocturnity should be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. It is clear that
in committing the crime at three o’clock in the morning, the appellants purposely sought the cover of
darkness to make it difficult for them to be identified, says the OSG.
There are two tests for nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance. First is the objective test, under
which nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitates the commission of the offense. Second is the
subjective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely sought by the offender.
The two tests should be applied in the alternative.65 When appellant Demate asked the housemaid to
let him inside her master’s house at 3:00 a.m., we can grant that the subjective test was passed.
However, in the imposition of the penalty on appellants, we cannot appreciate the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime for two reasons. First, the aggravating circumstance of nighttime is already
absorbed by treachery.66 Second, the Information in Criminal Case No. 8511 did not specifically allege
the aggravating circumstance of nighttime. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which should
be given retroactive effect following the rule that statutes governing court proceedings will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage,67 every Information
must state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances.68 Hence, since the
aggravating circumstance of nighttime was not alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 8511, it
could not be appreciated against the appellants.
Under Article 24869 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. Absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the crime, the lesser
of the two indivisible penalties must be applied. Thus, in Criminal Case No. 8511, the imposable penalty
is not death but only reclusion perpetua.
In Criminal Case No. 8512, for frustrated murder, the penalty to be imposed shall, pursuant to Article
5070 of the Revised Penal Code, be one degree lower than that for consummated murder. Under Article
61 (2)71 of said Code, the penalty next lower in degree is reclusion temporal, whose duration is from 12
years and 1 day to 20 years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty
should be applied in its medium period or from 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day to 17 years and 4
months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed should be within the
range of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal. Thus, we
find the penalty imposed by the trial court in Criminal Case No. 8512 to be in order.
However, there is need to modify the award of damages. In Criminal Case No. 8511, following current
case law, the heirs of Jaime Ricablanca are entitled to ₱50,000.00 as indemnity ex delicto. The award
of moral damages, however, should be reduced from ₱100,000.00 to ₱50,000.00.72 In addition,
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 must be awarded, considering the attendance of
treachery, which qualified the killing to murder.73 Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary
damages may be imposed as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. The term aggravating circumstance as used therein should be construed in
its generic sense since the law did not specify otherwise.
The award by the trial court of ₱50,000.00 as actual damages should be reduced to ₱45,000.00, based
on the supporting receipt. To be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount
of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best evidence
obtainable to the injured party.74
Finally, in Criminal Case No. 8512, the victim Violeta Ricablanca is entitled to actual damages in the
amount of ₱67,380.00 for medical and dental bills, which are duly supported by competent evidence.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 84, dated December
18, 1997, finding appellant FELIPE DEMATE Y LOGANA alias "Dodong Morales" guilty of murder
beyond reasonable doubt, and its supplemental decision dated January 15, 1998, finding appellant
DANTE MORALES guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, in Criminal Case No. 8511, are
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Their respective sentences are hereby REDUCED TO RECLUSION
PERPETUA. Further, appellants Demate and Morales are hereby ORDERED to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of the victim the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, ₱45,000.00 as actual damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In Criminal Case No. 8512, the decision and supplemental decision of the trial court finding Demate and
Morales guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder and sentencing each of them to a prison
term of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the appellants are also ORDERED to pay
jointly and severally the victim, Violeta Ricablanca, the sum of ₱67,380.00 as actual damages.
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Let a warrant of arrest issue against DANTE MORALES, for the immediate service of his sentence. The
Director General, Philippine National Police, is hereby DIRECTED to effect immediate service of said
warrant of arrest, and to report to this Court the results thereof within 10 days from such service.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
FELIX VENTURA y QUINDOY and ARANTE FLORES y VENTURA, appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On automatic appeal1 before this Court is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental, Branch 50, finding appellants Felix Ventura (Ventura) and Arante Flores (Flores) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20692 and Attempted Murder in Criminal
Case No. 00-20693.
The accusatory portion of the Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20692 reads as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of February, 2000 in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, conspiring, confederating and
acting in concert, without any justifiable cause or motive, with intent to kill and by means of
treachery and evident premeditation, accused Felix Q. Ventura armed with a .38 Caliber
Home-made Revolver and Arante V. Flores armed with a bladed weapon, and by taking
advantage of their superior strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and stab with bladed weapon one Aileen Bocateja y Peruelo, thereby inflicting
upon the person of the latter the following wounds, to wit:
- Cardio respiratory arrest
- Hemothorax
- stab wounds
which wounds were the direct and immediate cause of the death of said victim, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of the latter.
That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, night time
and with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
Act contrary to law.2 (Emphasis supplied)
The accusatory portion of the Information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 00-20693 reads as
follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of February, 2000 in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping each other, without any justifiable cause or motive, accused Felix Q.
Ventura armed with a .38 Caliber Homemade Revolver and Arante Flores y Ventura armed
with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident
premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and stab with said bladed weapon one Jaime Bocateja, thereby
causing upon of the latter the following wounds, to wit:
- multiple stab wounds
- #1 Posterior axillary area right
- #2 Posterior axillary area left with minimal hemothorax
- lacerated wound right parietal area
OPERATION PERFORMED:
- Exploration of wound right parietal for removal of foreign body
thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a
consequence, but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some cause or accident
independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is, due to the timely and able medical
assistance, which saved the life of the victim and the victim was able to escape.
That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, night time,
and with the use of an unlicensed firearm.
Act contrary to law.3 (Emphasis supplied)
When arraigned, appellants pleaded not guilty to both charges.4 The two criminal cases were
consolidated following which they were jointly tried.5
The spouses Jaime and Aileen Bocateja were, in the early hours of February 23, 2000, fast asleep in
their room on the ground floor of their two-storey house at Alunan-Yulo in Bacolod City, Negros
Occidental. The room had a glass wall with a glass sliding door which was closed but not locked. The
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kitchen light was open, as was the light in the adjoining room where the couple's young children,
Jummylin and Janine, were sleeping. Their niece, Aireen Bocateja, and Jaime's elder daughter, Rizza
Mae, were asleep in their rooms on the second floor.6
At around 2:00 a.m.,7 Jaime was roused from his sleep by appellant Ventura who, together with his
nephew appellant Flores, had stealthily entered the couple's room after they gained entry into the house
by cutting a hole in the kitchen door.
As established by the testimonial and object evidence for the prosecution, the following transpired
thereafter:
Appellant Ventura pointed a revolver at Jaime's face, announced a hold-up, hit Jaime on the head with
the gun and asked him for his keys. 8
When appellant Ventura struck him again, Jaime called out for help and tried to grab the revolver. The
two men then struggled for possession of the gun. As Jaime almost succeeded in wresting possession
of the gun from him, appellant Flores shouted to appellant Ventura to stab Jaime. Using the knife he
was carrying, appellant Flores stabbed Jaime three times. Jaime thereupon released the gun, threw a
nearby plastic stool at the jalousy glass window causing it to break and cried out for help.9
In the meantime, Aileen who had been awakened, began shouting for help as she saw her husband in
mortal danger. Appellant Flores stabbed her, however, with his knife, and although Aileen tried to
defend herself with an electric cord, appellant Flores continued stabbing her.10
Awakened by the commotion, Aireen descended the stairs and saw the knife wielding appellant Flores
whom she recognized as a former employee of the butcher shop of the Bocataje spouses. Pleading with
appellant Flores not to harm her, Aireen ran back upstairs into Rizza Mae's room, and the two called to
their neighbors for help.11
Appellants Ventura and Flores thereupon fled the Bocateja house,12 bringing nothing with them.13
Soon members of the Central Investigation Unit (CIU) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) arrived in
response to a flash report.14 Some of the police officers took the spouses to the Western Visayas
Regional Hospital,15 while other elements of the CIU team intercepted appellants Ventura and Flores
who were being pursued by neighbors of the spouses at the corner of Araneta-Yulo. Recovered from
appellant Ventura was a .38 caliber revolver with five (5) live bullets, and from appellant Flores a blood
stained knife16 measuring 14½ inches from tip to handle with a 10-inch blade.17
Shortly after their arrest, appellants were interviewed by reporters from Bombo Radio to whom they
admitted responsibility for stabbing Jaime and Aileen. In response to questions from the reporters,
appellant Ventura explained that he suspected his wife was carrying on an affair with Jaime.18
In the ocular inspection of the Bocateja residence, the CIU team found the spouses' room in disarray,
with some cabinets opened and blood splattered all over the floor, the bed and the ceiling. 19
Aileen eventually died in the hospital on the same day of the commission of the crime.20 Dr. Luis
Gamboa, City Health Officer of Bacolod City who conducted the autopsy of her body, found that she
suffered a hack wound on her face and four stab wounds on her body, three at the chest and one at the
back of the right shoulder, all caused by a sharp bladed instrument, such as the knife recovered from
appellant Flores. One of the stab wounds penetrated Aileen's chest near the left nipple, the intercoastal
space and the middle of her right lung causing internal hemorrhage and ultimately resulting in her
death.21
Jaime who was hospitalized for a total of six days, was treated by Dr. Jose Jocson,22 who certified that
he sustained the following non-lethal injuries: 23
Multiple Stab Wounds
#1 Posterior Axillary Area Right
#2 Posterior Axillary Area Left with Minimal Hemothorax
Lacerated Wound Right Parietal Area24
From the evidence for the defense consisting of the testimonies of appellants Ventura and Flores and
Primitiva Empirado, the following version is culled:
Four days after February 13, 2000 when appellant Ventura arrived in Negros Occidental from Manila
where he had been working as a security guard,25 he noticed that his wife, Johanna, who had
previously been employed as a house helper of the Bocateja spouses, was wearing a new ring. When
he confronted her, she said that it came from Jaime who was courting her, and that it was because
Jaime's wife, Aileen, had discovered their illicit relationship that she had been dismissed from the
Bocateja household. Incensed at the revelation, he slapped his wife whereupon she left the conjugal
home.26
On February 22, 2000, Johanna returned to the conjugal home in Barangay Alegria, Municipality of
Murcia, Negros Occidental to get her things. After a verbal confrontation with her husband, she left to
find work in Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. This was the last time that Johanna and appellant Ventura
saw each other.27
That same day, appellant Flores visited his uncle-appellant Ventura. The two spoke at length and
appellant Flores, who had previously worked for a day at the meat shop of the Bocateja spouses,
confirmed that Johanna and Jaime were having an affair.28
Since appellant Flores knew where the Bocateja spouses lived, appellant Ventura asked him to go with
him to their residence so he could confront Jaime about his affair with Johanna.29
Appellants, armed with an unlicensed revolver and a knife, thus repaired to the Bocateja residence still
on the same day, February 22, 2000, arriving there at around 11:00 p.m. They were not able to
immediately enter the premises, however. After boring a hole through the kitchen door with the knife,
appellants entered the Bocateja residence at 2:00 a.m. of the next day, February 23, 2000.30
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Once inside, appellants entered the room of the Bocateja spouses through the unlocked sliding door.
Appellant Ventura woke Jaime up, confronted him and told him to stop his relationship with Johanna.
Jaime fought back, and he and appellant Ventura grappled for possession of the latter's gun.31
Soon after, Aileen woke up, screamed for help, and began throwing things at appellant Flores whom
she attempted to strangle with an electrical extension cord. Unable to breathe, appellant Ventura
stabbed Aileen twice with his knife. And seeing that Jaime had wrested control of the gun from appellant
Ventura, appellant Flores also stabbed Jaime.32
Since appellants had not intended to kill Aileen or stab Jaime, they fled in the course of which Jaime
began shooting at them with a 9 mm pistol. Appellants were eventually intercepted by policemen who
placed them under arrest.33
Interviewed by the media after his arrest, appellant Ventura stressed that he just wanted to confront
Jaime about the latter's relationship with appellant's wife, Johanna.34
By the appealed Decision of December 15, 2000, the trial court disposed as follows:
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused FELIX VENTURA y QUINDOY and
ARANTE FLORES y VENTURA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principals by Direct
Participation of the crime of ATTEMPTED MURDER as alleged in Criminal Information No.
00-20693 with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling,
nighttime and the breaking of door to gain entrance to the house and with no mitigating
circumstance. Accordingly, they are sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Temporal in
its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, they shall serve a prison term
of from Eight (8) years of Prision Mayor as Minimum to Eighteen (18) years of Reclusion
Temporal as Maximum.
The Court also finds the two (2) above-named accused GUILTY as Principal[s] by Direct
participation for the crime of Murder as alleged in Criminal Information No. 00-20692 qualified
by abuse of superior strength. The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime
and by the breaking of a door are present in the commission of the crime. There is no
mitigating circumstance. The accused, therefore, are meted the Supreme penalty of DEATH.
By way of civil liability, the accused are solidarily ordered to pay the heirs of Aileen Bocoteja
the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity. The accused are likewise held solidarily liable to
pay Jaime Bocateja the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages and the sum of P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages.35 (Emphasis supplied)
In their Brief,36 appellants contend that the trial court erred (1) in convicting them despite the failure of
the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; (2) in considering abuse of superior
strength as a qualifying circumstance in Criminal Case No. 00-20892; (3) in considering
evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance in Criminal Case No. 00-20893; and (4) in
considering the aggravating circumstances of breaking of door and nocturnity in both cases.37
Appellants argue that, at most, they can only be convicted of attempted homicide for the stabbing of
Jaime and homicide for the fatal stabbing of Aileen.38
From a considered review of the records and applicable jurisprudence, the instant appeal fails.
The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool
thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.39 For it to be appreciated, the following must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act.40
By appellants' argument, even if appellant Ventura became jealous when he learned of the illicit affair
between his wife and Jaime, it is not, by itself, sufficient proof that he determined to kill the latter; that
with Jaime's testimony that appellant had announced a "hold-up," they, at most, intended to rob, but not
kill the spouses; that their only purpose was to confront Jaime regarding his supposed affair with
appellant Ventura's wife, Johanna; and that if they had truly intended to kill Jaime, then appellant
Ventura would not have bothered to awaken him, but would just have shot him in his sleep.
These assertions run counter to the established facts and are debunked by appellants' own admissions.
Appellants admittedly arrived at the Bocateja residence at 11:00 p.m. and surreptitiously entered therein
at 2:00 a.m. At that time, the surrounding premises were decidedly dark, and all the members of the
household were fast asleep. Armed with a gun and a knife, they proceeded directly to the bedroom of
the spouses, where appellant Ventura woke up Jaime. These actuations are not of those seeking
parley, but instead betray an unmistakable intention to kill, not merely confront, Jaime.
Indeed, when pressed during cross-examination to explain why he chose to "confront" Jaime under the
foregoing circumstances, appellant Ventura became evasive and did not give a clear answer:
Q Mr. Witness, you said that your purpose in going to the house of Jaime was only to
confront him. My question is, why is it that you went there at 11:00 o'clock in the evening
and not in the morning so that you will have all the opportunity to confront him?
A Because at that time, I was not on my proper frame of mind.
Q Why, is it not a fact that as early as February 17, 2000, you were already told by your
wife that there was that relationship with Jaime Bocateja and your wife?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why did you not immediately confront Mr, Bocateja after that day or February 17?
WITNESS:
A On that day, I don't know Jaime Bocateja.
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xxx Already answered. He said that he was not at the proper frame of his mind.41
(Emphasis supplied)
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Cross-examined on the same point, appellant Flores was equally evasive, but eventually revealed that
Q On February 22. So that you did not ask your wife where the place of Jaime the timing and method of entry were purposely chosen to avoid detection by either the Bocateja family
Bocateja was at that time you were by him on February 22, 2000? or their neighbors:

A Johanna did not tell me the place of Jaime Bocateja. Q You arrived in the house of Bocateja at about 11:00 o'clock is that right?

Q Why did you not ask her where the house is, at that time? A Yes, sir.

A What she told me was that, she is working in Bacolod City. Q And your purpose in going to the house of Bocateja was only to confront Jaime Bocateja
about his relationship with Johanna is that right?
Q Mr. Witness, you had from February 17 to 22, a number of days to confront Mr.
Jaime Bocateja. Did you not confront your wife or perhaps ask her about the place or A Yes, sir.
where this Jaime Bocateja was at that time and have the intention to confront him, if
that was really your intention to confront him? ATTY. ORTIZ:

WITNESS: Q Why did you wait Mr. Witness why did you and the other accused Felix Ventura wait
for three (3) hours for you to confront him in his house?
A No, I did not ask her because we had a confrontation and the next day, February
17, she left. WITNESS:

Q Of course, when you arrived at the house of the Bocateja [spouses] at 11:00 o'clock in A Because we were not able to enter the door right away because the door could not
the evening, you were armed at that time, is that right, you and your companion, Arante be opened.
Flores?
Q My question Mr. Witness, is this you ate your supper at Libertad market at about
A Yes, sir. 8:00 o'clock why did you not go to the house of Jaime Bocateja at 9:00 o'clock
immediately after supper? At that time when the members of the family were yet
Q What was that weapon at that time? awake?A We stayed at Burgos market and then from Burgos to Libertad we only walk
and from Libertad to the house of Bocateja.
A .38 caliber revolver.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
xxx
Q You will admit Mr. Witness at the time you left your place at Brgy. Alegria you were
already armed, is that right?
ATTY. ORTIZ:
WITNESS:
Q Mr. Witness, if your intention was only to confront Mr. Jaime Bocateja, why is it
that you did not wait or you did not come to that place earlier so that at that time, Jaime
Bocateja was still awake or perhaps waited until the next day? A Yes, sir.

COURT: Q Your uncle Felix Ventura was armed with [a] .38 caliber revolver, is that right?

A Yes, sir.

288
Q And you were also armed with a bladed weapon is that correct? Q And when you confront, are you saying that you cannot any more knock at the
door, perhaps call any member of the family inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
WITNESS:
Q Why do you have to bring this weapon Mr. Witness?
A No, sir.
A We brought this weapon just to frighten Jaime Bocateja during [the] confrontation.
ATTY. ORTIZ:
ATTY. ORTIZ:
Q Why Mr. Witness, Why?
Q Are you saying Mr. Witness if your purpose was only to confront him you have to
bring this [sic] weapons? A We did not call or knock at the person inside the house because it will make noise
or calls and alarm to the neighbors.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WITNESS:
To be sure, all the elements of evident premeditation were clearly established from the lips of appellants
A Yes, sir. themselves. Thus, on clarificatory questioning by the trial court, appellant Ventura testified:

Q When you arrived at the house of Jaime Bocateja about 11:00 o'clock. . . by the way COURT:
when did you arrive at the house of Jaime Bocateja?
Q I recall that you left Murcia [at] 4:00 o'clock. Is that morning or afternoon?
A 11:00 in the evening.
A I left Murcia at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Q Of course you did not anymore knock at the door Mr. Witness?
Q 4:00 o'clock from Alegria then to Alangilan, then to Bacolod, is that correct?
A No, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Or you did not also call any member of the family to open [the door for] you, is
that right? Q From Alangilan to Bacolod, what mode of transportation did you make?

WITNESS: A From Alegria to Alangilan, we only hiked and then from Alangilan to Bacolod we
took the passenger jeepney.
A No, sir.
Q From Alegria to Alangilan, how long did it take you to walk? How many
ATTY. ORTIZ: kilometers?

Q As a matter of fact you only broke the gate Mr. Witness in order to enter the compound A Four (4) kilometers.
of the Bocateja family?
Q And, I assume that while you were walking, you were talking with Arante Flores,
A We scaled over the gate. your nephew, about the plans to go to the house of Jaime Bocateja?

Q And why do you have Mr. Witness to go over the fence and open a hole at the A Yes, sir.
kitchen for you to confront Mr. Jaime Bocateja if that was your purpose?
COURT:
A The purpose of my uncle was just to confront Jaime.
289
Q By the way, what did you do at Alangilan? Q And you said yet, you destroyed the main door of the house. Can you tell the
Court, how did you destroy the main door of the house?
A I went there because my clothes were at my sister's house.
A No, the kitchen door, sir.
Q So, what time did you arrive in [Bacolod]?
COURT:
A We arrived here in [Bacolod] late in the evening.
Q How were you able to destroy it?
Q I assume that you disembarked at Burgos Market?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
A We used the knife in unlocking the door. We made a hole.
Q And you just walked from Burgos Market to Libertad Baybay to the house of Jaime
Bocateja? Q You made a hole and with the use of your hand, you were able to unlock the inside lock
because of the hole?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q It took you about thirty (30) [minutes] to one (1) hour, more or less?
Q And I assume that it took you twenty (20) – thirty (30) minutes to make that hole?
A More than one (1) hour.
A Yes, sir.43 (Emphasis supplied)
Q And during this time, you were talking again with Arante Flores [about] the course
of action that you will take once a confrontation takes place with Jaime Bocateja? The immediately foregoing narration was echoed by appellant Flores who gave the following testimony
on direct examination:
WITNESS:
ATTY. JACILDO:
A Yes, I asked him the location of 3rd Road since I do not know the house of Jaime
Bocateja. Q So from Brgy. Alegria where did you proceed?

COURT: WITNESS:

Q I assume that the front main door of the house was close[d] at that time, correct? A We proceeded to Brgy. Alangilan.

A Yes, sir. Q This Brgy. Alegria how far is it from Brgy. Alangilan?

Q You scaled that door, the front main door of the gate? A The distance between Brgy. Alegria to Brgy. Alangilan is about three (3) kilometers.

A Yes, sir, we scaled the gate. Q So, what means of transportation did you used in going to Alangilan?

Q You were not able to open it but you simply scaled, you went over? A We walked in going to Alangilan.

A Yes, sir. Q When you arrived at Brgy. Alangilan what did you do?

290
WITNESS: can get in the house. We entered the house at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning the
following day.44 (Emphasis supplied)
A We went to our aunt's house.
Undoubtedly, the accounts of appellants evince not only their resolve to kill Jaime, but the calm and
ATTY. JACILDO: methodical manner by which they sought to carry out his murder. As pointed out by the Solicitor
General, unless shown to be customary,45 appellants' act of arming themselves with a gun and a knife
constitutes direct evidence of a careful and deliberate plan to carry out a killing. Consider the following
Q From Alangilan where did you proceed? ruling of this Court in People v. Samolde:46

A In Alangilan, we stayed at the house of my aunt and then we proceeded to As stated earlier, accused-appellant and Armando Andres tried to borrow Cabalin's tear gas
Bacolod. gun. This attempt by the accused-appellant and his co-accused to arm themselves prior
to the commission of the crime constitutes direct evidence that the killing of Feliciano
Q So what time did you arrived [sic] in Bacolod? Nepomuceno had been planned with care and executed with utmost deliberation. From
the time the two agreed to commit the crime to the time of the killing itself, sufficient time had
A 8:00 o'clock in the evening. lapsed for them to desist from their criminal plan had they wanted to. Instead, they clung to
their determination and went ahead with their nefarious plan. x x 47 (Emphasis supplied)

Q When you arrived in Bacolod, what did you do?

From the time appellants left Murcia, Negros Occidental, after they had resolved to go to confront
Jaime, to the time they entered the Bocateja residence in Bacolod City, ten hours had elapsed –
A We ate our supper at Libertad Market. sufficient for appellants to dispassionately reflect on the consequences of their actions and allow for
their conscience and better judgment to overcome the resolution of their will and desist from carrying
Q After eating your dinner at Libertad, what did you do? out their evil scheme, if only they had desired to hearken to such warnings. In spite of this, appellants
evidently clung to their determination to kill Jaime.
A After eating our supper, we proceeded to the house of Jaime Bocateja.
That evident premeditation was established through the testimonies of appellants and not by those of
the prosecution witnesses is of no moment. While appellants could not have been compelled to be
ATTY. JACILDO:
witnesses against themselves,48 they waived this right by voluntarily taking the witness stand.
Consequently, they were subject to cross-examination on matters covered by their direct
Q What time did you arrived [sic] at the house of Jaime? examination.49 Their admissions before the trial court constitute relevant and competent evidence
which the trial court correctly appreciated against them. 50
WITNESS:
Although he admitted stabbing Jaime, appellant Flores sought to justify his actions by claiming that he
A 11:00 o'clock in the evening. was impelled by the need to prevent Jaime from shooting his uncle, appellant Ventura. This pretense
does not impress.
Q When you arrived at the house of Jaime, what did you do?
To successfully claim that he acted in defense of a relative, the accused must prove the concurrence of
the following requisites: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed or injured; (2)
A We enter[ed] the gate of their house.
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) the
person defending the relative had no part in provoking the assailant, should any provocation have been
Q Please continue? given by the relative attacked.51 Of these, the requisite of "unlawful aggression" is primary and
indispensable without which defense of relative, whether complete or otherwise, cannot be validly
A Then, we opened the door. invoked.52

Q And then?
A We reach[ed] [the Bocateja residence] at around 11:00 o'clock and we tried to
open the door but we could not open the door immediately. We made a hole so that we
Not one of the foregoing requisites of defense of a relative is present. From all accounts, it was
appellants who initiated the unlawful aggression, and it was the victim Jaime who acted in self defense.
Hence, neither the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative53 nor the special mitigating
circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative54 may be appreciated in appellant Flores' favor.

291
While appellant Ventura did not directly participate in the stabbing of Jaime, the trial court correctly held
both appellants collectively liable for the attempt on the latter's life since they were shown to have acted
in conspiracy with each other.
There is a conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it.55 Where conspiracy has been adequately proven, as in these cases,
all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their
participation because, in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all.56
By stabbing Jaime Bocateja pursuant to their pre-conceived plot, appellants commenced the
commission of murder directly by overt acts. Despite their efforts, however, they failed to inflict a mortal
wound on Jaime, hence, their liability only for attempted murder.57
With respect to the death of Aileen, the trial court found both appellants guilty of murder qualified not by
evident premeditation but by taking advantage of superior strength, 58 to wit:
The killing of Aileen Bocateja is qualified by the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. The accused Arante Flores who delivered the stabbing blow is big and strong,
standing about five feet and six (5'6") inches tall. His weapon was a 14 inch dagger.
Aileen Bocateja [stood] only about five (5'0") feet tall. The disparity of their strength is
enormous.59 (Emphasis supplied)
To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the
means of defense available to the person attacked.60 The appreciation of this aggravating
circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties, and is considered whenever there is
a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous to the aggressor, which is selected or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime.61
Appellants "agree with the trial court that accused-appellant Arante Flores is taller, and probably
stronger than the victim Aileen Bocateja because of their difference in sex as well as the fact that the
accused appellant Flores was armed at that time x x x."62 Nevertheless, they argue that Aileen's death
was not attended by abuse of superior strength since: (1) though ultimately unsuccessful, she was able
to put up a defense against appellant Flores; and (2) the prosecution failed to show that appellant Flores
deliberately took advantage of the disparity in their size and sex in order to facilitate the commission of
the crime.
Unlike in treachery, where the victim is not given the opportunity to defend himself or repel the
aggression,63 taking advantage of superior strength does not mean that the victim was completely
defenseless. Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor's natural strength over
that of the victim, considering the momentary position of both and the employment of means weakening
the defense, although not annulling it.64 Hence, the fact that Aileen attempted to fend off the attack on
her and her husband by throwing nearby objects, such as an electric cord, at appellant Flores does not
automatically negate the possibility that the latter was able to take advantage of his superior strength.
On the contrary, this Court in a very long line of cases has consistently held that an attack made by a
man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of
abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him, and from which the
woman was unable to defend herself.65 Thus, in People v. Molas,66 where the accused was convicted
of murder for stabbing to death two women and an eight year old boy, this Court discoursed:
While treachery was not appreciated as a qualifying circumstance against Molas, the killing of
the three victims was raised to murder by the presence of the qualifying circumstance of abuse
of superior strength. There was abuse of superior strength when Molas inflicted several
mortal wounds upon Soledad. Molas, besides being younger and stronger, was armed
with a weapon which he used in seriously wounding her. That circumstance was also
present when he hacked eight-year old Abelaro and also Dulcesima who, besides being
a woman of lesser strength was unarmed.67 (Emphasis supplied)
And in the more recent case of People v.Loreto,68 this Court opined:
The contention of accused-appellant is barren of merit. Article 14, paragraph 15 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that a crime against persons is aggravated by the accused taking advantage of superior
strength. There are no fixed and invariable rules regarding abuse of superior strength or employing
means to weaken the defense of the victim. Superiority does not always mean numerical superiority.
Abuse of superiority depends upon the relative strength of the aggressor vis-à-vis the victim. There is
abuse of superior strength even if there is only one malefactor and one victim. Abuse of superiority is
determined by the excess of the aggressor's natural strength over that of the victim, considering the
position of both and the employment of means to weaken the defense, although not annulling it. The
aggressor must have advantage of his natural strength to insure the commission of the crime. In this
case, accused-appellant was armed with a knife and used the same in repeatedly stabbing Leah,
a young wisp of a girl, no less than eighteen times after overtaking her in the sala of Dan's
house. Irrefragably, then, accused-appellant abused his superior strength in stabbing Leah. In a
case of early vintage [People v. Guzman, supra. at 1127], the Court held that:
There is nothing to the argument that the accused was erroneously convicted of murder. An
attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman
constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon
used in the act afforded him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself
(U.S. vs. Camiloy, 36 Phil. 757; U.S. vs. Consuelo, 13 Phil. 612; People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil.
446). The circumstance of abuse of superior strength was, therefore, correctly appreciated by
the trial court, as qualifying the offense as murder.69 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
By deliberately employing a deadly weapon against Aileen, appellant Flores clearly took advantage of
the superiority which his strength, sex and weapon gave him over his unarmed victim.
As for appellant Flores' claim of self-defense, it cannot be sustained. As in defense of a relative, one
claiming self defense must prove by clear and convincing evidence70 both unlawful aggression on the
part of the person killed or injured and reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
the unlawful aggression. As a third requisite, he must also prove lack of sufficient provocation on his
part.71 None of these requisites was shown to be present. As expounded by the trial court:
Arante declared that Aileen panicked and screamed and was hitting him with an extension cord
so he stabbed her. Arante was suggesting that had Ai[l]een remained cool, composed and
friendly, she would not have died.
292
 This perverted reasoning need not detain the Court. There was an on-going aggression being
committed inside her house and within the confines of her room, hence, Aileen's actuations
were perfectly just and legitimate.72
As adverted to earlier, the trial court, citing People v. Dueno,73 did not consider evident premeditation
as having aggravated the killing of Aileen since she was not the intended victim of appellants'
conspiracy. Upon further scrutiny, however, this Court finds that this aggravating circumstance should
have been appreciated in connection with Aileen's murder. Jurisprudence is to the effect that evident
premeditation may be considered as present, even if a person other than the intended victim was killed,
if it is shown that the conspirators were determined to kill not only the intended victim but also anyone
who may help him put a violent resistance.74
Here, it was established that upon seeing her husband being attacked by appellants, Aileen immediately
called for help and hurled objects at appellant Flores. And it was because of this passionate defense of
her husband that appellant Flores hacked at her face and stabbed her four times. These factual
circumstances are analogous to those in People v. Belga,75 where this Court had occasion to state
that:
While it would seem that the main target of the malefactors were Alberto and Arlene Rose, this
does not negative the presence of evident premeditation on the physical assault on the person
of Raymundo Roque. We have established jurisprudence to the effect that evident
premeditation may be considered as present, even if a person other than the intended
victim was killed (or wounded, as in this case), if it is shown that the conspirators were
determined to kill not only the intended victim but also anyone who may help him put a
violent resistance. Here, Raymundo Roque provided such violent resistance against the
conspirators, giving the latter no choice but to eliminate him from their path.76
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
Thus, while appellants' original objective may have only been the killing of Jaime, the trial court correctly
held both of them responsible for the murder of Aileen. Co-conspirators are liable for such other crimes
which could be foreseen and are the natural and logical consequences of the conspiracy.77 In Pring, et
al. v. Court of Appeals,78 this Court held:
While the acts done by the petitioners herein vary from those of their co-accused, there
is no question that they were all prompted and linked by a common desire to assault and
retaliate against the group of Loreto Navarro. Thus, they must share equal liability for all the
acts done by the participants in such a felonious undertaking. While petitioners herein, Rogelio
Pring and Alberto (Roberto) Roxas, on their part, had ganged up Jesus Yumol who belonged
to the group of their adversaries by hitting the latter with a bench and a piece of wood, and that
it was a certain David Ravago who stabbed the deceased Loreto Navarro, nevertheless, it is a
rule that conspirators would necessarily be liable also for the acts of the other
conspirators unless such acts differ radically or substantially from that which they
intended to commit (People vs. Enriquez, 58 Phil. 536; People vs. Rosario, 68 Phil. 720).
The pronouncements made by this Court in the aforecited case of People vs. Enriquez, still
serve as the governing rule that should be applied to the case at bar. In the said case, this
Court stated:
"x x x x x x x x x
'We are of the opinion that this contention is not tenable. The accused had
undoubtedly conspired to do grave personal injury to the deceased, and now that the
injuries actually inflicted have resulted in death, they cannot escape from the legal
effect of their acts on the ground that one of the wounds was inflicted in a different
way from that which had been intended. x x x x x x x x x.
'As has been said by the Supreme Court of the United States, 'If a number of persons
agree to commit, and enter upon the commission of the crime which will probably
endanger human life such as robbery, all of them are responsible for the death of a
person that ensues as a consequence.' (Boyd vs. U.S., 142 U.S. 450; 35 Law. ed.
1077). In United States vs. Patten, the court said: 'Conspirators who join in a criminal
attack on a defenseless man with dangerous weapons, knock him down, and when
he tries to escape, pursue him with increased numbers, and continue the assault, are
liable for manslaughter when the victim is killed by a knife wound inflicted by one of
the them during the beating, although in the beginning they did not contemplate the
use of a knife.' (42 Appeals, D.C., 239)"
Although during the incident in question the aggression committed by the petitioners herein
was directed against the other members of the group of Loreto Navarro and not on the
deceased, this would not relieve them from the consequence of the acts jointly done by
another member of the petitioners' group who stabbed the deceased Loreto Navarro.79
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
And in the more recent case of People v. Bisda, et al.,80 this Court held:
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows
incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural
consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original design.
Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular
purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and
growing out of the purpose intended. Conspirators are held to have intended the
consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and
directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with
intending that result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another
conspirator unless such act differs radically and substantively from that which they
intended to commit. As Judge Learned Hand put it in United States v. Andolscheck, "when a
conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its
content and membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes as he understands
them." (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Indeed, since they deliberately planned to attack Jaime in the sanctity of his bedroom where his wife
Aileen was also sleeping, appellants cannot now claim that the latter's violent resistance was an
unforeseen circumstance. Hence, neither of them can escape accountability for the tragic
consequences of their actions.
293
In determining appellants' criminal liability, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating
circumstances of dwelling,81 nighttime82 and breaking of door83 in connection with both crimes.
Dwelling is considered aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to human
abode.84
Thus, it has been said that the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows greater perversity in
the accused and produces greater alarm.85 Here, dwelling was correctly appreciated since the crimes
were committed in the place of abode of the victims who had not given immediate provocation.86
Upon the other hand, as pointed out by both appellants and the Solicitor General, the breaking of a door
was not alleged in either of the two informations. Thus, the same cannot be appreciated against
appellants. On this point, this Court's discussion in People v. Legaspi,87 quoted in the Solicitor
General's Brief, is instructive:
Nonetheless, it is to be noted that the appreciation by the trial court of the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and nighttime, despite the non-allegation thereof in the Information,
resulted in the imposition of the supreme penalty of death upon accused-appellant. In People
v. Gallego (G.R. No. 130603, 338 SCRA 21, August 15, 2000), We had occasion to rule thus:
"In People v. Albert (251 SCRA 136, 1995), we admonished courts to proceed with
more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form – death – because
the execution of such a sentence is irrevocable. Any decision authorizing the State to
take life must be as error-free as possible, hence it is the bounden duty of the Court to
exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties' evidence. Safeguards designed to
reduce to a minimum, if not eliminate the grain of human fault ought not to be ignored
in a case involving the imposition of capital punishment for an erroneous conviction
'will leave a lasting stain in our escutcheon of justice.' The accused must thence be
afforded every opportunity to present his defense on an aggravating
circumstance that would spell the difference between life and death in order for
the Court to properly 'exercise extreme caution in reviewing the parties' evidence.'
This, the accused can do only if he is appraised of the aggravating
circumstance raising the penalty imposable upon him to death. Such
aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information, otherwise the
Court cannot appreciate it. The death sentence being irrevocable, we cannot allow
the decision to take away life to hinge on the inadvertence or keenness of the
accused in predicting what aggravating circumstance will be appreciated against him.
xxx
The principle above-enunciated is applicable to the case at bar. Consequently, we hold that
due to their non-allegation in the Information for rape filed against accused-appellant, the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling cannot be considered in raising the
penalty imposable upon accused-appellant from reclusion perpetua to death.
xxx
It is to be noted carefully that the rule on generic aggravating circumstances has now been
formalized in the Revised Rules of Criminal procedure, which took effect on December 1,
2000. Section 8 of Rule 110 now provides that:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. – The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting
the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is
no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of
the statute punishing it.
Likewise, Section 9 of the same Rule provides:
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. – The acts or omission complained of as constituting
the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in
ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the
statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.88 (Emphasis supplied)
Appellants and the Solicitor General also argue that nocturnity should not have been considered since
Jaime himself testified that their bedroom was well-lit and there was light coming from the kitchen and
the adjoining bedroom of their children.89
In determining nocturnity, two tests are employed in the alternative: (1) the objective test, under which
nighttime is aggravating because the darkness facilitated the commission of the offense; and (2) the
subjective test, under which nighttime is aggravating because the darkness was purposely sought by
the offender.90 Applying these tests to the established factual circumstances, this Court concludes that
nocturnity was correctly appreciated in connection with both crimes.
While the bedroom where the crimes occurred was well-lit, the evidence shows that, in furtherance of
their murderous intent, appellants deliberately took advantage of nighttime, as well as the fact that the
household members were asleep, in order to gain entry into the Bocateja residence. Indeed, their own
testimony indicates that while they were already outside the Bocateja house at around 11:00 p.m., they
purposely waited until 2:00 a.m. before breaking into the residence so as not to call the attention of the
Bocatejas and/or their neighbors. It is thus clear that appellants deliberately took advantage of the
darkness of the night, not to mention the fact that the Bocatejas were fast asleep, to conceal their
actions and to facilitate and insure that their entry into the victims' home would be undetected.
No mitigating circumstances are present to offset the foregoing aggravating circumstances. While the
trial Court noted that appellants were apparently motivated by their belief that Johanna and Jaime were
carrying on an illicit relationship, to wit:
The accused presented evidence to prove that Jaime Bocateja and Johanna Ventura, wife of
the accused Felix Ventura, were maintaining an illicit relationship. The evidence on this point is
principally hearsay – the alleged admissions made by Johanna of the relationship. There is no
doubt, however, that the accused Ventura believes that [his] wife and Jaime Bocateja are
clandestine lovers. It is fairly reasonable, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that it
is Ventura's belief of this illicit relationship which prompted him to confront Jaime Bocateja,91
294
it nevertheless ruled out passion or obfuscation92 or immediate vindication of a grave offense93 as
mitigating circumstances.
While jealousy may give rise to passion or obfuscation,94 for the appreciation of this mitigating
circumstance it is necessary that the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover
his normal equanimity.95 In the same vein, while "immediate" vindication should be construed as
"proximate" vindication in accordance with the controlling Spanish text96 of the Revised Penal Code,
still this mitigating circumstance cannot be considered where sufficient time elapsed for the accused to
regain his composure.97
In these cases, appellant Ventura's suspicions were aroused as early as February 17, almost a week
before the stabbing incidents on February 23, when he first confronted his wife about her ring.
Moreover, as previously noted, ten hours had elapsed from the time appellants left Murcia, Negros
Occidental, weapons in hand, to the time they entered the Bocateja residence in Bacolod City. Within
that period appellant Ventura had opportunity to change his clothes at a relatives' house in a
neighboring barangay and both appellants were able to take their dinner at the Burgos Market in
Bacolod City. They even waited three hours outside the Bocateja residence before carrying out their
plan. Without question, sufficient time had passed for appellants' emotions to cool and for them to
recover their equanimity.
In fine, for stabbing Jaime, appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted murder qualified
by evident premeditation with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime. However, as
pointed out by the Solicitor General, the trial court erred in imposing the sentence of Eight (8) Years of
prision mayor as minimum to Eighteen (18) Years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed for
the consummated penalty shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempted felony. Under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is
reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty two degrees lower is prision mayor.98 Applying Section 1 of
Act No. 4103,99 as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and considering
the presence of two aggravating circumstances, the proper imposable penalty falls within the range of
prision mayor in its maximum period (from Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day to Twelve (12) Years) as
maximum and prision correccional (from Six (6) Months and One (1) Day to Six (6) Years) as minimum.
Accordingly, this Court hereby sentences appellants to an indeterminate penalty of Six (6) Years of
prision correccional as minimum to Twelve (12) Years of prision mayor as maximum.
For fatally stabbing Aileen, appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by abuse
of superior strength with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling and
nighttime. As already noted, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that when the law prescribes two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty
shall be imposed when, in the commission of the deed, one aggravating circumstance is present.
Consequently, the trial court's imposition of the supreme penalty of death must be sustained.
Three members of the Court maintain their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People vs.
Echegaray100 that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death, is
unconstitutional; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and
that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
As regards the civil liability of the appellants, the award of the trial court is hereby modified as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 00-20692, the award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of Aileen as civil indemnity for her
death is sustained, the commission of the crime by appellants having been duly proven.101 The award
of moral damages to her heirs is likewise proper considering that the prosecution presented adequate
proof that they suffered mental anguish and wounded feelings.102 However, the amount of moral
damages awarded by the trial court is hereby reduced from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with
current jurisprudence.103 It should be borne in mind that the purpose for such award is to compensate
the heirs of the victim for the injuries to their feelings and not to enrich them.104
The award of exemplary damages should be increased from P20,000.00 to P25,000.00. Such award is
proper in view of the presence of aggravating circumstances.105 Furthermore, considering that counsel
for appellants admitted that the heirs of Aileen incurred funeral expenses of P100,000.00106 and such
admission has not been shown to have been made through palpable mistake, the same should be
awarded as actual damages.107
In Criminal Case No. 00-20692, the trial court did not grant Jaime's claim for P20,000.00 in actual
damages for hospitalization expenses since he failed to present any receipts to substantiate the same.
Nonetheless, in light of the fact that Jaime was actually hospitalized and operated upon, this Court
deems it prudent to award P20,000.00 as temperate damages.108 Moreover, Jaime is also entitled to
moral damages in accordance with Article 2219, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, which this Court hereby
awards in the amount of P25,000.00.109 Finally, exemplary damages of P25,000.00 are also in order
considering that the crime was attended by two aggravating circumstances.110
WHEREFORE, the judgment in Criminal Case No. 00-20693 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellants Felix Ventura and Arante Flores are found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of attempted murder qualified by evident premeditation with the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and nighttime and are hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of Six
(6) Years of Prision Correccional as minimum to Twelve (12) Years of Prision Mayor as maximum.
Appellants are solidarily ORDERED to pay the victim, Jaime Bocateja, the amounts of: (a) Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) as temperate damages; (b) Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00)
as moral damages; and (c) Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
The judgment in Criminal Case No. 00-20692 is likewise AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants
Felix Ventura and Arante Flores are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by
abuse of superior strength with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling and
nighttime and are SENTENCED to the supreme penalty of DEATH.
Appellants are solidarily ORDERED to pay the heirs of Aileen Bocateja the amounts of: (a) Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity; (b) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as
actual damages; (c) Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; and (d) Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages.
Upon the finality of this Decision, and pursuant to Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Sec. 25 of R.A. No. 7659, let the records of the cases be immediately forwarded to the President of the
Philippines for the exercise, at her discretion, of her power to pardon appellants Felix Ventura and
Arante Flores.
295
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSALIO LAGUARDIA, DANTE BARTULAY, BALTAZAR BERAN, and RAYMUNDO BARTULAY,
accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
In this automatic review of the death sentence imposed upon the lone accused-appellant, we are asked
to determine if, while concededly guilty of robbery, he should also be held for the killing of the victim
notwithstanding that this was actually done by another person. The Solicitor General says the judgment
should be affirmed because of the proven conspiracy between the accused-appellant and the actual
killer. The defense, on the other hand, impliedly admits the conspiracy only with respect to the robbery
but not as regards the murder which it claims was not part of the original plan.
The facts, as derived by the lower court from the evidence adduced at the trial, are briefly narrated as
follows:
On September 6, 1979, at about 10:30 o'clock in the evening, Dante Bartulay and Baltazar Beran, the
herein accused-appellant, signaled to a stop a truck owned by Fortune Tobacco Corporation then being
driven by Miguel Chua on the zigzag road in Kilometer 36 inside the Iwahig Penal Colony at Puerto
Princess in Palawan City. Beran approached one side of the truck and pretended to borrow a
screwdriver and while Chua looked for the tool Bartulay shouted from the other side of the truck, "This is
a hold-up!" With guns drawn, the two men ordered Chua and his three companions, Benigno Caca,
Frank Morante, and Eduardo Aniar, to alight. Bartulay forced Chua to lie face down on the ground about
3 meters away from his companions. Bartulay was pointing a gun at Chua's head. On orders of
Bartulay, Beran got the wallets and watches of the four. Bartulay asked about the money they were
carrying and Chua pointed to its location. Beran got it and gave it to Bartulay. The money amounted to
about P100,000.00. Then, again on orders of Bartulay, Beran herded the three companions inside the
panel where they were locked. It was while they were still inside the panel that Beran and the others
heard two gunshots. When Beran got off the truck, he saw Chua still lying on the ground but now
bleeding in the head. Thereafter, Beran drove the truck from the scene of the crime while Bartulay
followed in a motorcycle. Somehow, Caca and Morante managed to escape by jumping from the truck
through a secret exit of the panel. They subsequently reported the occurrence to the law-enforcement
authorities who, returning to the scene of the crane the following day, found Chua already dead. 1
Beran was arrested on September 8, 1979, with the amount of P4,500.00 in his possession and upon
questioning pointed to the place where he had hidden the pistol he had used during the hold-up. 2
Further investigation disclosed that the motorcycle and guns by Bartulay and Beran were owned by
Rosalio Laguardia, who was Identified by Beran as the mastermind of the crime. 3 The money stolen
was supposed to have been divided in the house of Raymundo Bartulay Dante's brother. 4
Dante Bartulay could not be tried at the time because he was at large. Baltazar Beran was found guilty
of robbery with homicide and sentenced to death. Rosalio Laguardia was convicted (presumably as a
principal by inducement) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Raymundo Bartulay was acquitted for
insufficient evidence. 5
This case involves Baltazar Beren only as Laguardia later withdraw his appeal.
In finding Beran guilty and sentencing him to death, the trial court made the following conclusion:
... It is undisputed that the crime committed by the accused was robbery with
homicide, and the killing of the victim was done with the use of a gun. The heinous act
was preceded by taking of the wallets, the watches and the money from the victim of
the robbery. Whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence, or on the
occasion, of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be
held guilty as principals of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide (Pp. v.
Darwin Veloso y Militante, alias Carlito Villareal, accused-appellant, G.R. No. 32900,
Feb. 25, 1982). In the case at bar, evidence is strong and clear that Baltazar Beran
did not endeavor to prevent the homicide of the killing (sic) of Mike Chua by Dante
Bartulay ... 6
The accused-appellant now faults the trial court for holding inter alia that Beran should be held guilty of
the homicide committed on the occasion of the robbery notwithstanding that he was not the one who
actually killed Chua; that he should have tried to prevent the killing of Chua but did not; and that the
aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, nighttime and use of a motor vehicle
should not have been appreciated against him.
The accused-appellant suggests that the case 7 cited by the lower court in convicting him is not
applicable because the crime involved therein was robbery with homicide committed by a band whereas
the robbery in the instant case was perpetrated only by two persons. The trial judge did err in this
respect. Nevertheless, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the offense, while not covered by
Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code, still comes under Article 294(l) which may also impose the death
penalty "when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed" even if cuadrilla is not present.
Under this provision, it is enough to show conspiracy among the participants in the crime of robbery to
render each and every one of them liable for any homicide that may be committed by reason or on the
occasion of such robbery. And in the instant case, evidence of such conspiracy is not lacking. Indeed, it
is not disputed that Bartulay and Beran together went to the scene of the crime and lay in wait for
Chua's truck; that they together pretended to borrow a screwdriver from the victim; that while Bartulay
pointed a gun at Chua and his companions, Beran divested them of their cash and watches; that Beran
got the bag containing P100,000.00 on orders of Bartulay; that also on the latter's orders, Beran locked
up Chua's three companions in the panel; that Beran drove the stolen truck away from the scene of the
crime while Bartulay followed in the motorcycle; and that Beran later got P4,500.00 as his share of the
stolen money.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it, whether they act through the physical volition of one or all proceeding
severally or collectively. 8 It is also a settled rule that conspiracies need not be established by direct
evidence of acts charged but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts,
conditions, and circumstances which vary according to the purpose accomplished. The very existence
296
of a conspiracy is generally a matter of inference deduced from certain acts of the persons accused,
done in pursuance of an apparent criminal or unlawful purpose in common between them. The
existence of the agreement, or joint assent of the minds, need not be proved directly. 9
Confronted with the established fact of conspiracy to commit the robbery, the accused-appellant cannot
plead that he should not be held responsible for the murder on the ground that he did not conspire to
commit it or that he had no opportunity to prevent its commission.
"The rule is that where the conspiracy to commit robbery was conclusively shown by the concurrent and
coordinate acts of the accused, and homicide was committed as a consequence or on the occasion of
the robbery, all the accused are guilty of robo con homicidio whether or not they actually participated in
the killing." 10
That rule was applied in People v. Puno, 11 where the accused and confederate Tenarife, in pursuance
of a preconceived plan, boarded a jeep and help up its passengers, with Tenarife killing one of them
after divesting him of his wallet and his watch. Puno himself robbed another passenger but did not
participate in the shooting of the deceased victim. Nonetheless he was held guilty of robbery with
homicide as the killing was committed by Tenarife in connection with the robbery which Puno and
Tenarife had conspired to commit.
Generally, when robo con homicidio has been proven, all those who had taken part in
the robbery are guilty of the complex crime unless it appears that they endeavored to
prevent the homicide (U.S. v. Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1; Decisions of Supreme Court of
Spain dated Feb. 23 and April 30, 1972 and June 19, 1980; 3 Viada, Codigo Penal
347, 354, 358). 12
It may be observed that, although Puno did not actually take part in the killing of
Oyong by Tenarife, his presence in the jeepney was a crucial factor that emboldened
his confederate in perpetrating that homicidal act with impunity. 13
In People v. Veloso, 14 this Court held:
... Well entrenched is the rule that whenever a homicide has been committed as a
consequence, or on the occasion, of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in
the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless
it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide.
That decision cited the earlier case of People v. Mangulabnan, 15 where it was categorically declared:
... in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is
enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery
(Decision of Supreme Court of Spain of Nov. 26, 1892, and Jan. 7, 1878, quoted in 2
Hidalgo's Penal Code, p. 267, and 259-260, respectively). This High Tribunal
speaking of the accessory character of the circumstances leading to the homicide,
has also held that it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident
(Decision of Sept. 9, 1886, Oct. 22, 1907, April 30, 1910 and July 14, 1917), provided
that the homicide be produced by reason or on the occasion of robbery, inasmuch as
it is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances,
causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be
taken into consideration (Decision of Jan. 12, 1889 — see Cuello Calon's Codigo,
Penal pp. 501-502; Emphasis supplied).
It is futile therefore for the accused-appellant to argue that he was inside the panel with the companions
of Chua when the latter was killed by Bartulay and could not have stopped the shooting. The undisputed
fact is that the killing was committed on the occasion of the robbery which Beran and Bartulay plotted
and were carrying out together. In the absence of clear evidence that he endeavored to prevent it,
Beran is as guilty of the homicide as Bartulay although it was Bartulay who pulled the trigger.
Concerning the aggravating circumstances which the accused-appellant insists should not have been
taken against him, the Court notes that no specific finding regarding such circumstances was made by
the trial judge, who simply meted out the penalties without explanation. The trial judge, notably, did not
say why, after finding both Beran and Laguardia guilty, the former should be sentenced to death and the
latter only to life imprisonment. If any error has been committed with respect to Laguardia's penalty —
and the circumstances so indicate — it is too late to correct it now as the same has long since become
final. By withdrawing his appeal, Laguardia may have benefited from the trial judge's carelessness.
The trial court also does not clearly impute to Beran any ag gravating circumstance and merely hints at
nighttime and use of motor vehicle almost in passing. This is another censurable flaw in the decision. It
is no wonder that the case itself is perplexed over the accused-appellant's assignment of error that the
trial court had taken the said several aggravating circumstances against him.
In any event, it is clear that, as alleged in the amended information, the crime committed by Beran was
aggravated by despoblado and justified the imposition on him of the death penalty as prescribed by
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. The evidence shows that the accused lay in wait for the truck
being driven by Chua at an isolated portion of Highway 36, choosing that particular spot where they
could commit the crime they were planning without disturbance or discovery and with easy opportunity
for escape. 16 The use of motor vehicles is also appreciated because the conspirators drove away from
the scene of the crime to facilitate their escape and also to prevent the other passengers of the truck,
whom they took with them, from reporting the offense to the authorities. 17
Nighttime is rejected, however, because it was not especially sought, as Chua's trip schedule and not
the discretion of the culprits determined the time of its commission. Evident premeditation is, of course,
inherent in the crime of robbery and was not proved in the commission of the killing. As for treachery,
there is no evidence of its employment as none of the witnesses actually saw the shooting of Chua,
being all inside the panel when they heard the fatal shots.
Miguel Chua was only 32 years old at the time he was killed and left a wife and three children aged,
respectively, 11, 10 and 8, the youngest a daughter. To provide for his family, he was willing to work
even at night, not unaware perhaps, given the condition of the times, of the dangers that lurked in the
desolate routes he traveled, considering especially the sizeable amounts of money he often carried. If
he was nonetheless undeterred, it was probably because, like the promising young man that he was, he
had a dream for the future. Tragically, that dream died with him on the lonely stretch of road where
greed lay in ambush with a gun.
297
The indemnity for the death of Chua is increased to P30,000.00. Funeral expenses amounted to
P16,500.00. 18 As the victim was earning at the time of his death a monthly compensation of
P2,500.00, 19 consisting of salary and commission, or P30,000.00 annually, and could have lived about
24 more years, 20 his total earnings for the period would have amounted to P720,000.00. The heirs are
also entitled to this amount plus P10,000.00 moral damages and P10,000.00 exemplary damages. 21
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED as MODIFIED but in view of the provisions of the
new Constitution, the death penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua. The accused-appellant shall also
pay the civil indemnity specified above, and costs.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUGENIO GALAPIA y BACUS, accused-appellant.
Felino C. Ampil (Counsel de Oficio) for appellant.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza Assistant Solicitor General Octavio A. Ramirez and Solicitor N. P.
de Pano, Jr. for appellee.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
MANDATORY REVIEW of the decisions of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte imposing the
death penalty upon Eugenio Galapia y Bacus in three criminal cases.
The record shows that the accused Eugenio Galapia y Bacus and Leonida Agudelo were married on
August 8, 1971 before Mayor Leonardo A. Velasco of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte. 1 After their marriage, the
spouses lived with Bonifacia Castro Agudelo, the mother of Leonida, in Barrio Libong, Bacarra, Ilocos
Norte. Living with his mother-in-law became extremely difficult so that sometime in May, 1973, 2 the
husband left the house to live with his own parents, about a kilometer away. His wife and son, however,
were left behind.
In the early evening of February 11, 1974, the husband, feeling a need for sexual fulfillment, went to the
house of his mother-in-law in order to sleep with his wife. But, he was denied entry to the house. Not
one to be easily frustrated, the husband left and waited until all the occupants of the house were asleep
and then entered the house by breaking the glass blades or jalousies of a window. Once inside, he went
to the bed shared by his wife and son. His wife, however, repulsed his advances and threatened to stab
him with a kitchen knife. After a brief scuffle, the husband was able to wrest the knife from his wife. The
commotion, however, attracted the attention of the mother-in-law who came to the aid of her daughter
with a bolo in hand. The husband also succeeded in wrenching the bolo from her, and with it, attacked
his mother-in-law, his wife, and two young nephews of his wife, Francisco Bulong and Hermenigildo
Bulong, who were then sleeping in the sala of the house. The husband then left the house, taking his
small son along with him and brought the boy to the house of his parents. On the way, he threw the bolo
into the sea, but kept the kitchen knife. He then proceeded to the house of the barrio captain in order to
surrender. The barrio captain, however, was sick. So, he went to the poblacion of Bacarra and
surrendered to a policeman on duty at the town hall. The following day, he signed an extra-judicial
confession before the investigating officers, admitting the killing of his wife, his mother-in-law, and the
wife's nephew, Francisco Bulong. 3
Meanwhile, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of February 12, 1974, Dr. Irineo Bustamante, the Rural
Health Physician of Bacarra, was summoned to attend to four (4) bleeding persons in Barrio Libong.
Upon reaching the house of Bonifacia Agudelo, he found three (3) of the four persons already dead, and
the fourth, barely alive. The wounded person, subsequently Identified as Hermenigildo Bulong, was
brought to the hospital and was saved.
Dr. Bustamante conducted an autopsy on the cadavers of the deceased persons and certified that: (1)
Leonida Agudelo Galapia sustained a stab wound in the heart and five lacerated wounds in various
parts of her body; 4 (2) Bonifacia Agudelo suffered a stab wound in the abdomen, perforating the
intestines, and four lacerated wounds in body, two of which were in the head, fracturing the skull; 5 and
(3) Francisco Bulong sustained two lacerated wounds , one in the face other on the right side of the
head, both fraturing the skull. 6
As a result, Eugenie Galapia y Bacus was indicted for the killing of his wife (Criminal Case No. 228-III,
for Parricide);his mother-in-law ( Criminal Case No. 229-II for Murder); and the nephew of his wife,
Francisco Bulong (Criminal Case No. 230-III, also for Murder), as well as the attempt on the life of
Hermenigildo Bulong (Criminal Case No. 231-III, for Frustrated Murder). These cases were tried jointly,
and the accused when arraigned, pleaded guilty to the charges and insisted on his plea despite the
admonition of the trial judge that the maximum penalty of death may be upon him. The plea of guilty
notwithstanding, the trial complaint the presentation of evidence, during which, the accused invoking the
mitigating circumstances of voluntary, surrender and plea guilty. On August 9, 1974, judgment was
sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of death in Criminal Case Nos. 228-III, 229-III, and 230-III,
all of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. In view of penalty imposed upon the accused these
cases are now before the Court for review.
Counsel de oficio does not seek the reversal of the jugdment in these cases and the consequent
aquittal of the accused; Eugenio Galapia Bacus, since the said accused had voluntarily entered a plea
of guilty to the charges. Counsel, however, contends that the imposition of the death penalty in each of
the three cases is correct and, therefore, prays for a reduction of the penalty to reclusion perpetua in
each case. The Solicitor General observed that "there does appear some misappreciation of the
aggravating and mitigating circumtances attendant to the commission of the crime, 7 and, accordingly,
recommends the modification of the judgments under review and the diminution of the penalty to
reclusion perpetua in each case.
The rule is that a judicial confessions of guilt admits all the material facts alleged in the information
including the aggravating circumtances listed therein. 8 But, where such circumtances are disproven by
the evidence, it should be disallowed in the judgment. Thus, in People v. Gungab, 9 the Court ruled
"that when an accused, who lacks instruction, guilty to the of parricide described in the information
petition as having been committed with the aggravating circumstances of and evident premeditation and
his testimony given under oath before the trial court, upon his petition, fails to show the existence of
such aggravating circumstances, his plea of guilty shall be understood as being limited to the admission
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of having committed the crime of parricide, not of having done so with treachery and evident
premeditation"
Criminal Case No 229-III
A petition for parricide, the victim being the wife of the assailant. The information alleges that the
offense was commuted with evident premeditation and abuse of superior and accompanied by the
aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and dwelling.
The parties are agreed that the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation has not been
established by the testimony of prosecution witness Hermenigildo Bulong, nor by the extra-judicial
confession of the accused. We agree with this observation because the purpose of the accused in going
to the house of his mother-in-law was to sleep with his wife, not to kill her.
We also agree with the parties that abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated in this case for the
reason that the said circumstance is inherent in the crime of parricide where the husband kills the wife.
It is generally accepted that the husband is physically stronger than the wife.
Nocturnity cannot also be appreciated, although the crime was committed at night, because nighttime
was not specially sought by the offender, or taken advantage of by him to facilitate the commission of,
the crime or to insure its consummation with a minimum of resistance from the inmates of the house.
But the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is present since the crime was committed in the house
occupied by his estranged wife, other than the conjugal home. Unlawful entry is also present since the
accused admittedly destroyed the glass blades or jalousies of a window in gaining entry into the house.
10
The Solicitor General claims that treachery, although not alleged in the information, is also present since
the victims were all asleep, totally unaware of the evil forces that would eventually snuff out their lives
without warning. It does not appear in the record, however, how and in what position the victim was
when she was killed so that it cannot be said that the accused had adopted a mode or means of attack
tending directly to insure or facilitate the commission of the offense without risk to himself arising from
the defense or retaliation which the victim might put up. Upon the other hand, the accused stated in his
extra-judicial confession that his wife tried to stab him with a kitchen knife when he tried to sleep with
her.
It results that two aggravating circumstances — dwelling and unlawful entry — attended the commission
of the crime. These circumstances, however, are offset by two mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and plea of guilty. The proper penalty to be imposed is, therefore, reclusion perpetua.
Criminal Case No. 229-III.
Prosecution for the murder of Bonifacia Agudelo. The information avers that the crime was committed
with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, and attended by nocturnity, dwelling, and
disregard of the age, sex and relationship of the offended party, she being 60 years old and the mother-
in-law of the offender.
The parties are also agreed that there is no sufficient proof to establish that the crime was committed
with evident premeditation. Hence, abuse of superior strength is the qualifying circumstance.
Nocturnity cannot he appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case because, as previously
stated, nighttime was not specially sought by the offender.
The offense cannot also be said to have been committed in disregard of the age, sex and relationship of
the offended party because there is no proof that the accused deliberately intended to offend the sex or
age of the offended party. As Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino says: "The mere fact that the victim of the
crime is a woman is not in itself sufficient to support the contention that there is present the aggravating
circumstance of insult or disrespect to sex. It is necessary to prove the specific fact or circumstance,
other than that the victim is a woman, showing insult or disregard of sex in order that it may be
aggravating." 11
However, as in Criminal Case No. 228-III, dwelling and unlawful entry are evident because the crime
was committed in the house of the victim who did not give provocation, and that the accused admittedly
destroyed the glass blades or jalousies of a window in order to gain entrance to the house.
The Solicitor General also contends that the crime was committed with treachery. The prosecution,
however, failed to present an eyewitness who directly saw the killing of the victim so that it cannot be
said for certain that the accused had employed means tending to insure the success of the crime
without any danger to his person. On the other hand, the accused stated that the victim tried to attack
him with a bolo. 12 Treachery cannot, therefore, be appreciated to aggravate the crime.
The crime committed is murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength and attended by the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and unlawful entry which are, in turn offset by the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and the plea of guilty. The Penalty to be imposed upon the accused should,
therefore, be reclusion perpetua.
Criminal Case No. 23-III.
Prosecution for the killing of Francisco Bulong, an 11-year old grandson of Bonifacia Agudelo, who was
sleeping with his brother, Hermenigildo Bulong, in the sala of the house when he was attacked by the
accused.
The indictment is that the offense was committed with evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength and attended by the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity.
As in Criminal Case Nos. 228-III and 229-III, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in the
absence of proof thereof. Abuse of superior strength, therefore, qualifies the killing to murder.
Nocturnity is not also present as previously stated in Criminal Cases Nos. 228-III and 229-III. But,
treachery is present because the victim was then asleep when he was attacked by the accused. Unlike
in Criminal Cases Nos. 228-III and 229-III where there was no eyewitness to the killing of Leonids
Agudelo Galapia and Bonifacia Agudelo and, consequently, no treachery, the killing of Francisco Bulong
was witness by his brother, Hermenigildo Bulong, who testified that the accused attacked Francisco with
a bolo while the latter was asleep. 13
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But, as in Criminal Cases Nos. 228-111 and 229-111, there was unlawful entry in this case because of
the destruction of the glass blades or jalousies of a window in order to gain entrance to the house.
The crime is murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength and attended by the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and unlawful entry which are offset by the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and plea of guilty. The penalty to be imposed upon the accused should therefore,
be reclusion perpetua.
To recapitulate, the proper penalty that should be imposed upon the accused in Criminal Cases No.
228-III, 229-III, and 230-III of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte is reclusion perpetua.
With the modification of the penalty as above stated, the judgments under review should be, as it is
hereby, affirmed in all other respects. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SPO1 ARMANDO LOZANO @ AMID,
(acquitted) DAVE SAMSON, (acquitted) EUTIQUIANO PACAA, JR., @ TOKING PACAA, (acquitted)
and RAUL OCO @ BOY USHER, accused,
RAUL OCO @ BOY USHER, appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an Automatic Review of the Decision1[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, in
Criminal Cases Nos. CBU- 46172-73 finding appellant Raul Boy Usher Oco guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of murder and frustrated murder, and imposing the supreme penalty of death. The
antecedent facts are as follows:
On January 19, 1998, the appellant, together with Armando Amid Lozano, Dave Samson and
Eutiquiano2[2] Toking Pacaa, Jr. were charged with murder and frustrated murder in the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 7. The Information for murder reads as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1997 at about 9:30 oclock in the evening, in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, riding on two
motorcycles, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping one another, together with
Peter Doe, John Doe and Jane Doe, whose cases will be separately considered as soon as procedural
requirements are complied with, armed with unlicensed firearms, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation and abuse
of superior strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Alden Abiabi by shooting
him with the use of said unlicensed firearms, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3[3]
The Information for the frustrated murder case reads:
That on or about the 24th day of November, 1997, at about 9:30 oclock in the evening, in the City of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, riding on two
motorcycles, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping one another, together with
Peter Doe, John Doe and Jane Doe, whose cases will be separately considered as soon as procedural
requirements are complied with, armed with unlicensed firearms, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill,
with treachery and evident premeditation and grave abuse of superior strength, did then and there
suddenly attack, assault and use, personal violence upon the person of one Herminigildo Damuag by
shooting him with the use of said unlicensed firearms, hitting him on the different vital parts of his
body, thereby inflicting upon said Herminigildo Damuag serious physical injuries, which injuries under
ordinary circumstances would cause the death of the victim, thus performing all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence, but which nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the herein accused, that is, by the timely and
able medical assistance rendered to said Herminigildo Damuag which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4[4]
Forthwith, the trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of the appellant and his co-accused. On January
20, 1998, upon learning of the issuance of the warrant for his arrest, accused PO2 Armando Lozano
turned himself to the authorities and filed an Urgent Motion5[5] praying that he be detained at the PNP
Jail in Camp Sotero Cabahug, Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City. He feared that he might be a victim of
reprisal and vengeance in Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center (BBRC) since many of the persons he
has arrested as a police officer were detained in the facility. On January 21, 1998, appellant Raul Oco
surrendered to the authorities and filed an Urgent Motion6[6] praying similar relief sought by accused
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Lozano. Police Senior Inspector Pablo Gayacan Labra II returned to the court the unserved
warrants.7[7]
In the afternoon of January 21, 1998, Judge Martin A. Ocampo issued an Order8[8] acting favorably on
the request of the appellant and his co-accused to be detained at Camp Sotero Cabahug instead of at
the BBRC.
Accused Dave Samson was arrested that same day,9[9] while accused Eutiquiano Pacaa voluntarily
surrendered to the police authorities on January 26, 1998.10[10]
On January 29, 1998, Judge Martin issued an Omnibus Order11[11] directing the detention of all
accused at the BBRC for the duration of the trial. That same day, the appellant and his co-accused were
arraigned in both cases. Assisted by their respective counsels, all of them entered a plea of not guilty to
both charges.12[12] The cases were tried jointly pursuant to Rule 119, sec. 14 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
During the trial, the prosecution presented twelve (12) witnesses while the defense presented thirty-one
(31) witnesses.
Surviving victim Herminigildo Damuag testified that at around 9:30 p.m. of November 24, 1997, he
was driving his motorcycle (referred to as the first motorcycle in the Records) along V. Rama Avenue,
Cebu City with the late Alden Abiabi riding with him at the back. When they reached the vicinity of Pica
Lumber, a white Tamaraw FX AUV overtook their motorcycle (first motorcycle) and blocked their path,
forcing him to slow down.13[13] Another motorcycle (second motorcycle), with two (2) riders on it,
appeared behind the first motorcycle. From a distance of about two (2) to three (3) meters, one of the
riders of the second motorcycle suddenly fired two (2) shots in close succession. Damuag attempted to
look at the tires of his motorcycle, thinking that they have exploded. Suddenly, Abiabi pushed him with
his body. Abiabi fell from the first motorcycle and slumped on the pavement face down. The Tamaraw
FX AUV sped away.14[14]
As Damuag was trying to control his motorcycle, he noticed another motorcycle (third motorcycle)
passed by from behind him. His motorcycle zigzagged towards the gutter. Damuag was thrown off and
hit the ground. He stood up and realized that he was hit at the right side of his body. He then heard a
burst of gunfire from behind.15[15]
Damuag saw the third motorcycle at about two (2) to three (3) meters. It was on a stop. Appellant was at
the back of the third motorcycle, holding a short firearm in his right hand. Appellant fired his gun at him
but missed. Although wounded, Damuag was able to run. However, the third motorcycle chased him.
Upon reaching the vicinity of Five Brothers restaurant, Damuag stopped because he could not pass
anymore. From a distance of about four (4) to five (5) meters, the appellant again fired two (2) more
shots at Damuag.16[16] The third motorcycle sped away towards B. Rodriguez Street.17[17] Damuag
was initially rushed to the Southern Islands Hospital. About three (3) hours later, his wife brought him to
the Sacred Heart Hospital. He survived the attack due to the timely medical attention given to him at the
latter hospital.18[18]
The attending physician, Dr. Dale Pasco, testified that when Damuag was brought to the hospital, the
latter was bleeding profusely from the four (4) gunshot wounds at his back, two (2), at the side of his
chest, and one (1), at the abdominal area. Damuag was immediately operated on. The doctor opined
that without the surgery, Damuag would have died due to the gunshot wounds he sustained.19[19]
Damuag was confined at the Sacred Heart Hospital from November 25, 1997 to December 10,
1997.20[20] Subsequently, he was moved to CIG hospital. His hospitalization bills allegedly amounted
to P160,000.00.21[21] He likewise spent five thousand pesos (P 5,000.00) for medicines after having
301
been discharged from the hospital. Prior to the shooting incident, he was earning P 150.00 a day as a
driver of Marilou Aznar. The incident made him feel fearful for his life.22[22]
Alden Abiabi did not survive the ambush. He sustained eight (8) gunshot wounds on the different parts
of his body. Dr. Jesus P. Cerna testified that a bullet was deeply embedded in Abiabis thoracic
vertebrae and had not been retrieved despite diligent efforts to extract the same. Necropsy Report No.
N-97-191 revealed that he died due to shock, secondary to multiple gunshot wounds, face, body and
extremities.23[23] At the time of his death, Abiabi was working as a legal researcher at Clear, Inc., with
a monthly income of P 8,000.00. 24 [24] Mrs. Amelia Abiabi testified that she spent a total of P
250,000.00 for funeral services; P 50,000.00 of which was spent for the coffin alone.25[25]
Damuag testified that he did not recognize the driver and the passenger of the second motorcycle and
the driver of the third motorcycle because they were wearing their helmets. 26 [26] He, however,
recognized the appellant as one of the triggermen because the appellant was not wearing helmet at
the time of the shooting incident. Instead, he had a towel tied around his forehead. The appellant
was wearing a sleeveless undershirt (sando) and maong short pants. 27[27]
Ronald Barellano, a sixteen-year (16) old candle and flower vendor, corroborated Damuags
identification of the appellant as the second gunman. He testified that on the night of the shooting
incident, he was in the company of eight other (8) children,28[28] including another eyewitness, 14-year
old Salem Tenebroso. They were buying barbeque in a store across the cemetery when a blue colored
motorcycle (first motorcycle) driven by Herminigildo Damuag, with Alden Abiabi as a backrider, passed
by them. Suddenly, a white Tamaraw FX blocked the first motorcycle, causing it to reduce its speed.
Then, a black-colored motorcycle (second motorcycle) passed from behind the first motorcycle, and its
backrider fired two shots at Abiabi. Abiabi fell from the motorcycle while Damuag continued driving in a
zigzag manner. Damuag eventually fell to the ground five (5) meters away from Abiabi.29[29]
Moments later, another motorcycle (third motorcycle) arrived at the scene. The motorcycle stopped and
its backrider stepped his right foot on the ground. Without alighting from the third motorcycle, the
backrider, whom Barellano recognized as the appellant, fired three (3) successive shots at Abiabi who
was still sprawled on the ground face down.30[30] Damuag tried to get near Abiabi but the appellant
also fired at him. Damuag ran away, but the third motorcycle was able to catch up with him near the
Five Brothers Restaurant. Appellant again shot Damuag twice. The third motorcycle then sped
away.31[31]
Barellano claimed that when the first shooting occurred, he and his companions walked towards the
fallen Abiabi and stayed at a distance of around four (4) to five (5) meters. Thus, he had a good look at
the face of the appellant when he arrived aboard the third motorcycle and shot Abiabi and
Damuag.32[32] Furthermore, the place was illuminated by a lamp post.33[33] He recalled that the
appellant had a towel wrapped around his forehead.34[34] He knew the appellant even prior to the
shooting incident. He used to accompany his friend, Salem Tenebroso, whenever the latter would go to
the residence of the appellant to feed the latters roosters. Barellano, however, failed to recognize the
three (3) other riders of the motorcycles because they were wearing helmets.35[35] After the shooting
incident, people milled at the crime scene. Barellano recognized barangay tanods Nato Maraveles and
Zaldy Regodo in the crowd.36[36]
For his part, Magno Ybanez, Jr. claimed that several minutes before the shooting incident, he saw the
appellant and the three (3) accused (Dave Samson, Lorenzo Amid Lozano, and Eutiquiano Toking
Pacaa) beside two (2) motorcycles parked along the sidewalk near the cemetery. At that time, the three
(3) accused were not yet wearing their helmets. At 9:00 p.m., Ybanez, Jr. was walking along V. Rama
Avenue, in front of Pica Lumber, when a motorcycle went past him. Although the two (2) riders were
wearing their helmets, Ybanez, Jr. claimed that accused Samson was driving the second motorcycle,
with accused Lozano as his passenger. Lozano allegedly shot twice at Abiabi, the passenger of the first
motorcycle. Shortly thereafter, the third motorcycle, driven by Pacaa, appeared at the scene and its
302
passenger, the appellant, fired at Abiabi and Damuag. Pacaa was then wearing his helmet while the
appellant only had a towel tied around his forehead.37[37]
Virginia Gamboa claimed that she also saw the three (3) accused and the appellant a couple of hours
or so before the shooting incident along V. Rama Avenue. 38[38] Samson was wearing a black jacket
and a puruntong short pants, Lozano was wearing a white sando and maong pants, while Pacaa was in
short pants and maong jacket. The appellant was in a sleeveless undershirt, with a towel tied
around his forehead.39[39] The accused were not yet wearing their helmets. She recognized the three
(3) accused and the appellant because she was only about five (5) to six (6) meters away from them
and there was a bright light coming from the VECO post. She got curious why the accused and the
appellant were there but she shrugged the thought off and went home.40[40]
After dinner, Gamboa went out and proceeded towards Pica Lumber. She waited at a nearby store for
her husband to come home from work. She then saw the accused and the appellant near the cemetery.
They drove their motorcycles toward Lucio Drive and came back towards Nadelas compound. Gamboa
claimed she recognized the three (3) accused although they wore their helmets because the front
covers of the helmets were transparent. Samson was driving the motorcycle, with Lozano riding behind
him. The motorcycle driven by Pacaa, with the appellant as passenger, was right behind Samson and
Lozanos motorcycle. They were following the motorcycle of Damuag and Abiabi that was cruising at
normal speed along V. Rama Avenue.41[41]
Suddenly, a white Tamaraw FX AUV cut-off Damuags motorcycle. Without much ado, Lozano, then
riding another motorcycle, shot Abiabi twice. The latter fell on the ground. Damuags motorcycle
zigzagged and hit the ground. Lozano and Samson fled on board their motorcycle. The motorcycle of
Pacaa and the appellant stopped near Abiabi who was then sprawled on the ground face down. The
appellant fired several shots at Abiabi. Thereafter, the appellant fired at Damuag while the latter was
trying to stand up. Damuag was hit. He tried to run, but Pacaa and the appellant chased him on board
their motorcycle. The appellant again shot Damuag until he fell on the ground. The appellant and
Pacana sped towards the direction where the other two (2) accused had earlier fled.42[42]
Gamboa personally knew the three (3) accused and the appellant even before the shooting incident.
Lozano is known as a policeman in their locality. The appellant, also known as Boy Usher in their place,
was a barkada of her late husband, Rene Gamboa, while Pacaa is the brother-in-law of her brother-in-
law. She also knew Samson since 1992 as she had seen him in the cockpit when she went there to
fetch her husband.43[43]
The prosecution theorized that the shooting incident was drug-related. The late Abiabi was a known
anti-drug advocate while the appellant was a suspected drug lord. The other accused, on the other
hand, allegedly had connections with the drugs trade.44[44]
The appellant and his co-accused denied any participation in the shooting incident.
The appellant testified that at the time of the shooting incident, he was inside a chapel in Sambagan. He
claimed that on November 24, 1997, he played mahjong from 3:00 p.m.- 9:00 p.m.45[45] At around 9:00
p.m., he proceeded home to have supper and thereafter, went out to look for his five- year old
son.46[46] Not able to find his son, the appellant proceeded to Sambagan to meet Boy Misa and inform
the latter that he could not lend him some money. On his way to Sambagan, he passed by a sari-sari
store in A. Lopez St. and bought a bottle of Red Bull. The appellant also passed by the Our Lady of
Lourdes Chapel. He noticed that the door was slightly opened so he went in to look at the clothes of the
Virgin47[47] for he intended to change the Virgins clothes for the forthcoming fiesta celebration.
Upon entering the chapel, the appellant saw a group of women who informed him that the scheduled
meeting that night in the chapel in connection with the forthcoming fiesta celebration was postponed. He
recognized one of them as the wife of his co-accused Toking Pacaa. Appellant was seated at the
cement floor for a few minutes when he heard an unusual burst. However, he did not bother to
investigate the origin or nature of the unusual burst. He asked some people inside the chapel if they had
seen Boy Misa but none of them did. He went out of the chapel, proceeded to a store across the chapel,
and inquired from a group of persons milling around the store the whereabouts of Misa. Appellant was
told that Misa was there earlier but had left however, and they did not notice where he went.48[48]
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The appellant proceeded home and went to bed. His son and daughter soon arrived and slept with him.
A few minutes later, his wife, along with his sister-in-law and some neighbors, awakened him and told
him that his kumpadre and good friend, Alden Abiabi, was shot at V. Rama St. He was shocked upon
learning the information because the victim had no known enemy.49[49]
The appellant changed his shirt and went towards Sambagan to inquire about the incident. On his way
to Sambagan, he saw a group of women who told him that his good friend Alden was shot. He met
another group who relayed the same information when he arrived in Sambagan. The appellant
proceeded to A. Lopez and stayed at the barbeque stand until past 2:00 a.m.50[50]
The appellant was thus surprised when he learned that he was implicated in the shooting of Alden. He
and Abiabi were good neighbors and friends and he had no motive to kill the victim. He denied that he
was a drug lord.51[51] He also said that he was not in good terms with his three co-accused, hence,
there was no basis for the alleged conspiracy. The appellant also charged Magno Ybaez with bias as he
was one of the suspects in the killing of the latters older brother.52[52] Lolita Mosqueda,53[53] Ernesto
Herhuela54[54] and Herminia Ferraren55[55] were presented to corroborate appellants defense of alibi.
Accused Armando Lozano, on the other hand, claimed that on November 24, 1997, he was training
fighting cocks in the cockpit arena from 9:00 p.m. until 1:00 a.m. of the next day. Accused Lozanos
companions, Vic Lozano,56[56] Prospero Lozano, 57[57] Ritchie Ho,58[58] Ramon Tabares59[59] and
Bendicto Orge,60[60] corroborated his alibi. Accused Dave Samson asserted that he was in Larena,
Siquijor on the night of November 24, 1997. His alibi was corroborated by Felizardo Balmadres.61[61]
Accused Eutiquio Toking Pacaa alleged that he was sleeping at his house at the time of the
incident.62[62]
The defense also presented Salem Tenebroso, Jr., Patsy Bolls, and PO1 Bienvenido Arlan, Jr. to prove
that none of the alleged eyewitnesses recognized any of the perpetrators of the crime. Tenebroso, 14-
year old, is one of Barellanos companion on the eve of November 24, 1997. Previously, he issued an
Affidavit wherein he identified the appellant as one of the malefactors in the shooting incident.63[63]
Thereafter, he executed an Affidavit of Recantation,64[64] claiming that he did not recognize any of the
perpetrators because all of them were wearing helmets. Tenebroso testified in court that shortly after
the incident, he and Junnie Quigao were brought to the CIG Office at Camp Sotero Cabahug and were
interviewed by a policeman. The two of them told the police officer that they could not recognize the
persons who shot Abiabi because they were all wearing helmets. However, they were told by the
investigator to state that the appellant was the one who killed Abiabi.65[65]
For her part, Patsy Bolls, a reporter of Sunstar Super Balita Daily, testified that on December 7, 1997,
she interviewed Damuag at the Sacred Heart Hospital where the latter was confined.66[66] During the
course of the interview, Damuag told her that he did not see who shot him and Abiabi.67[67] The
contents of the interview were printed on the December 8, 1997 issue of the SunStar Super
Balita.68[68] Bolls further testified that the interview was witnessed by another reporter, Garry Cabotaje
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of Sunstar Daily, and photographer Alex Badayos.69[69] Damuags wife, a lady whom she surmised as
Damuags neighbor, other patients, and the policemen guarding Damuag were also inside the room
during the interview.70[70]
PO1 Arlan, Jr. corroborated Bolls testimony. He told the court that he was inside Damuags room during
his interview. PO1 Arlan, Jr. claims that he heard Damuag telling the reporter that he did not recognize
any of his assailants. His curiosity was aroused by Damuags answer. So after Bolls interview, he asked
Damuag if the latter really did not recognize who shot him and Abiabi. Damuag confirmed that he did
not recognize any of the assailants.71[71]
Teresita Bunal72[72] and Eduardo Nabua73[73] testified that prosecution witness Virgilia Gamboa was
not present during the shooting incident. Rosalia Ybanez Nadela74[74] and Christy Labistre,75[75] on
the other hand, contradicted Magno Ybanezs claim that he was within the vicinity of the incident and
saw the tragic event.
After the trial, the trial court found the appellant guilty of murder and frustrated murder. The trial court
disregarded Salem Tenebrosos Affidavit of Recantation and gave full credence to his previous Affidavit
identifying the appellant as one of the gunmen. Further, the court doubted the credibility of
eyewitnesses Gamboa and Ybanez, Jr. who claimed to have seen not only the face of the appellant but
of his three (3) co-accused as well. Thus, the appellants co-accused were acquitted. The dispositive
portion of the trial courts Judgment, dated December 16, 1998, provides:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby makes the following dispositions:
1). In Crim. Case No. CBU-46172: the Court finds accused Raul Oco alias Boy Usher Guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the crime of Murder defined and penalized by Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 7659 and hereby sentences him to Death. Said accused is
further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Alden Abiabi in the sum of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00);
2). In Crim. Case No. CBU-46173: the Court finds accused Raul Oco alias Boy Usher Guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal in the crime of Frustrated Murder defined and penalized by Article
248 in relation to Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and to indemnify the victim Herminigildo Damuag in the sum of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00);
3). In Crim. Case Nos. CBU-46172 for Murder and CBU-46173 for Frustrated Murder on the
ground of reasonable doubt- accused SPO2 Armando Lozano alias Amid Lozano, Dave Samson, and
Eutiquiano Pacaa alias Toking Pacaa are ACQUITTED-because there is no moral certainty in the
unprejudiced mind of this Court that said three (3) other accused had participated in the commission of
the crimes with which they were charged (Rule 133, Rules of Court).
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
The case is now with this Court for review.
The appellant insists that he has no motive to kill Abiabi, a known anti-drug advocate, because he is not
a drug lord as the prosecution depicted him to be during trial.76[76] In fact, Mrs. Abiabi admitted during
trial that she has a debt of gratitude to the appellant as the latter lent her some money in the past.77[77]
Furthermore, Damuag is his close friend and he has no reason to injure.78[78]
The appellant also assails that his identification as one of the assailants of Abiabi and Damuag is
incredulous because it is against human experience for an assassin to kill without covering his face to
prevent his identification. He claims that the fact that his co-accused used helmets to hide their identities
would make it more logical for him to use also a helmet while shooting at Abiabi and Damuag in plain
view of many witnesses. 79 [79] The appellant insists on his alibi that he was inside a chapel in
Sambagan, Cebu City, while the shooting incident was in progress.
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
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Motive is not an essential element of a crime, and hence, need not be proved for purposes of Q: You actually saw Abiabi being shot while he was still riding on a motorcycle?
conviction.80[80] Standing alone, the failure of the prosecution to adduce proof of the appellants motive
to kill Abiabi and injure Damuag would not exculpate him, especially since he was positively identified A: Yes, Your Honor.
by at least two credible witnesses as one of the assailants.
Q: And you saw him fell down with (sic) the motorcycle as a result of the shooting?
To be sure, the fact that the appellants companions wore helmets does not make his identification by
the eyewitnesses incredulous. We agree with the Solicitor Generals observation that criminals carry out
their criminal designs differently. Some cover their faces, but others boldly perform their criminal acts in A: Yes, Your Honor.
full view of the public. The records show that appellant belongs to the latter category.
Q: Who shot him?
Ronald Barellano gave a detailed account of the incident, and emphatically claimed that he saw the
appellant when he shot Abiabi, viz: A: I do not know the person, Your Honor.

ATTY. SENO: Q: Where was he located, the person who first shot Abiabi?

Q: In other words, Master Barellano, when you turned your eyes towards where Abiabi was, the A: The person was backriding on a motorcycle.
first two (2) shots which you heard were already fired?
Q: There were two (2) persons on that motorcycle?
WITNESS:
A: Yes, Your Honor.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You said you saw Raul Oco in (sic) that crime scene. When did you first see Raul Oco? When
Q: And what you saw when you turned your eyes towards where the two (2) shots, the first two (2) he was still riding on a motorcycle?
shots were fired, was Abiabi who fell on the ground?
A: I saw Raul Oco at the time he shot (Abiabi).
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did not see him riding a motorcycle before the shooting?
Q: In other words, you did not witness the actual firing of the first two (2) shots. Is that correct?
A: No, Your Honor.
WITNESS:
Q: You never saw him riding a motorcycle before the shooting started or before you saw him
A: I saw when he was shot twice. shooting Abiabi?

COURT TO WITNESS: A: While Raul Oco was riding a motorcycle I did not see his face. I saw his face at the time he
shot Abiabi.
Q: You mean before he was shot by Raul Oco you saw somebody else shooting Abiabi while he
was riding at the back of the motorcycle? Q: You saw his face at the time he shot Abiabi?

WITNESS: A: Yes, Your Honor.

A: I saw when he was shot. Q: Did you see Raul Oco while he was still riding a motorcycle before the shooting or before he
shot Abiabi?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

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Q: Did you see his face while he was seated in the motorcycle? A: No, sir.

A: No, Your Honor, I did not see his face. Q: What did he do?

Q: How did you know that it was Raul Oco if you did not see his face? A: He still shot Damuag.

A: When the motorcycle stopped and he stepped his right foot on the ground and shot I saw his Damuags testimony identifying Raul Oco as his gunman was unequivocal, direct and leaves no room for
face. doubt. He related in open court how he was able to identify the appellant that tragic night, thus:

Q: So, that was the only time that the person you saw riding that motorcycle before was Raul COURT TO WITNESS:
Oco?
Q: Alright that first shot that hit you, did you glance back already and saw Raul Oco immediately
A: Yes, Your Honor. after you were hit?

Q: Because the person you saw riding in (sic) the motorcycle have (sic) the same clothes as Raul WITNESS:
Oco when he was shooting Abiabi?
A: I saw him and I face (sic) him.
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: You saw him immediately after the first shot was fired that hit you?
Q: And you saw that person riding the motorcycle wearing that towel around his head that you
described before? A: Yes, Your Honor.

A: Yes, Your Honor. 81[81] Q: Did he fire another shot at you afterwards?

Barellanos testimony on how the appellant shot Damuag is equally clear. His testimony reads as A: At the time I ran away he fired another shot, Your Honor.
follows:
Q: And that second shot hit you?
COURT:
A: No, Your Honor.
So let us ask him again
Q: So, you glanced back and saw the accused Raul Oco in between the first and the second shot.
Q: Do you mean that Raul Oco, when you saw him shooting Abiabi, was still on the top of the Is that correct?
motorcycle?
A: When I stood up after I was slumped I saw Raul Oco, Your Honor.
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: I thought you said you glanced back after you were hit by the first shot. You did not. So when
ATTY. SENO: you were hit by the first shot, did you glance back immediately at Raul Oco?

Q: So, after that person who fired the three (3) successive shots space(d) at less than a second A: I saw Raul Oco, Your Honor.
from each other completely fired the three (3) shots, he sat back straight on the motorcycle and sped
away? Is that not correct?
Q: After you were hit?

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A: Yes, Your Honor.82[82] A: Yes, Your Honor, I was not hit.

The appellants identity as one of the assailants became even more apparent after a series of Q: And then you ran away?
clarificatory questions propounded by Judge Ocampo on Damuag, to wit:
A: Yes, I ran away, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q: And you suffered three (3) other gunshot wounds. Is that correct?
Q: Alright lets ask him again for the last time. Were you hit by the first shot?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
WITNESS:
Q: Did you see actually Raul Oco fire those three (3) other shots at you?
A: At the time when my motorcycle was in a zigzag manner I was already hit, Your Honor.
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Did you see who fired that shot at you that hit you?
Q: So you actually saw him shooting at you those three (3) shots?
A: No, Your Honor.
A: Yes, Your Honor.83[83]
Q: You did not. So after you were hit you immediately glanced back and saw Raul Oco?
Despite the cross-examination by the defense counsel, Damuag was unmoved. He firmly asserted that
A: When my motorcycle was in a zigzag manner I slumped to the gutter then stood up and I saw notwithstanding the wounds he sustained from the first shot, he glanced back and saw appellant Oco
Raul Oco. fire his gun at him.

Q: You saw him after you were hit by the first shot? ATTY. BRAGAT:

A: Yes, Your Honor. Q: After the shot that did not hit you, your instinct was to run away with all immediacy because
you feared for your life. Correct? Having been wounded earlier?
Q: So that is very clear- he saw Raul Oco when he glanced back after he was hit by the first shot.
So what happened? Did he shoot you again? A: Yes, sir.

A: Yes, Your Honor. Q: And you are telling the Honorable Court that while running away for fear of (sic) your life you
still turned your back to see what was at your back so that you could see Oco firing those three (3)
Q: You saw him shooting at you? shots hitting you?

A: Yes, Your Honor? A: I did not run fast because I was already hit.

Q: You actually saw Raul Oco shooting at you the second shot he fired? COURT:

A: Yes, Your Honor. That does not answer the question.

Q: But that second shot did not hit you? WITNESS:

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 Yes, sir, I saw Raul Oco. Q: Why did you go to that hospital?
A: Because earlier Congressman Cuenco called the police informing us that nobody, no
COURT TO WITNESS: policeman was guarding Damuag in his room and we were assigned by our Editor-in-Chief, Atty. Seares
to see and for us to confirm how true the information of Cong. Cuenco (is).
Q: So inspite of the three (3) hits you still looked at? (sic)
Q: Were you able to interview the police officers?
A: Yes sir, I asked them how true (is) the allegation that earlier on the day there were no
A: Yes, Your Honor.84[84] policemen assigned there to guard Damuag.

We stress the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses must be respected and Q: And what was the answer of the police officers?
not disturbed on appeal, unless there is a compelling reason to revise them. The trial court is in the best A: They said it was true because the duty in the hospital was from 8:00 to 4:00; 4:00 to 12:00;
position to calibrate the credibility of the eyewitnesses, having seen and heard them testify in court as 12:00 to 8:00. So those policemen- when we went there those policemen were assigned on the 4:00 to
they recount events that took place that fateful evening.85[85] 12:00 shifting. So it was true that there were no policemen assigned during the 8:00 to 4:00 shifting.

We see no reason to deviate from this rule.
It is to be noted that Damuag is not just an ordinary eyewitness. He is a survivor of that tragic incident.
His identification of his attacker deserves full credit. It is the natural reaction of victims of criminal
violence to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the
crime was committed. Most often, the face of the assailant and the body movements create lasting
impression that cannot be easily erased from their memory.86[86] The Court finds Damuags testimony
credible as it is replete with details and corroborated on material points by Ronald Barellano, also a
credible witness. These two eyewitnesses had no ulterior motive to be untruthful in their identification of
appellant as one of the culprits. Where there is nothing to indicate that a witness was actuated by
improper motive, his positive identification and categorical declarations on the witness stand under
solemn oath deserve full faith and credence.87[87]
Q: Were there other matters that you interviewed the police about?
A: Actually, I did not interview the policemen, it was them who divulged the information that earlier
a certain Junjun, brother of Abiabi went to see and almost he made a scene in the room and almost
according to the policemen almost choke him but I didntit was alleged that was their statement and it
was confirmed by Damuag and his wife that it was true because this certain Junjun was really angry
with Damuag thinking that Damuag was part of the crime. 88[88]
PO1 Bienvenido Arlan, Jr. also admitted before the court that there was no one guarding Damuag in the
morning of December 7, 1997. He also testified that Damuags life was in danger, viz:
COURT TO WITNESS

The failure of Damuag to reveal the identity of his assailants shortly after the shooting incident does not Q: How did you come to know that the person you are going to guard is one of the victims in the
taint his credibility. He was in critical condition when rushed to the Sacred Heart Hospital. Dr. Dale shooting incident?
Pasco opined that Damuag would have died due to the wounds he sustained if he were not immediately A: Your Honor, when we were ordered by Sinugbuhan to guard Damuag, we were also informed
operated on. He was placed in the intensive care unit (ICU) until November 30, 1997 and stayed at the that Damuag was one of the victims and his life is (sic) in danger.
hospital until December 10, 1997 without adequate security.
Q: Did you know or come to know why nobody was guarding Damuag prior to your shift?
In her testimony, Patsy Bolls revealed that on December 7, 1997, she was sent by her editor to verify A: I do (sic) not know, Your Honor.
Congressman Cuencos complaint that there were no policemen guarding Damuag at the Sacred Heart
Hospital. She interviewed some people and was able to verify the complaint, thus: Q: But those police officers in that shift failed to appear?
A: Yes, Your Honor.

(PROS. GALANIDA)

Q: Did you come to know who were those tasked to guard Damuag before your shift at 4:00
oclock of December 7?
A: Yes, mam, it was PO3 Teves and PO1 Baquerquer.

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Q: They were not there in their post? Correct?
A: Yes, mam.
Q: Did you come to know what happened to them?
A: No, mam.
Q: You did not hear that they were sanctioned or what?
A: They were sanctioned, mam. Teves is now in the Detachment of Cebu City Mobile Group and
Baquerquer is now in Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental. 89[89]
Given the circumstances, it is but natural for Damuag not to disclose the identity of his assailants. It
would be unfair to expect Damuag, a surviving witness to a tragic incident, to further expose himself to
the danger possibly accompanying his revelation of the appellants identity.
As against his positive identification by the prosecution witnesses, the appellants alibi is worthless. For
alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and distance must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that
the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during
its commission.90[90] Ferraren, who allegedly saw the appellant at the chapel at the time of the
shooting incident testified that the distance between the chapel and the crime scene can be negotiated
on foot within five minutes.91[91] Given this distance, it is not impossible for appellant to be at the scene
when the crime was committed.
That the other accused were acquitted does not necessarily mean that the appellant likewise deserves
an acquittal. Accused Lozano, Pacaa and Samson were acquitted based on reasonable doubt as to
their identity. This does not negate the trial courts findings on the existence of the acts constituting the
crimes alleged in the Informations. In any event, appellants conviction does not only result from the trial
courts finding of conspiracy but from his own act of shooting Abiabi and Damuag.
We come now to the proper designation of the crimes committed by the accused and the corresponding
penalties for these crimes.
We agree with the trial court that treachery attended the killing of Abiabi and the wounding of Damuag.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might take.92[92] For treachery
to exist, two conditions must be found: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position
to defend himself; and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of
attack employed by him.93[93] In the case at bar, the motorcycle driven by Damuag (first motorcycle)
was suddenly blocked by a white Tamaraw FX. Without any warning, the backrider of the second
motorcycle, coming from behind, suddenly fired successive shots at Damuag and Abiabi. While Abiabi
was helplessly laid at the pavement face down due to the wounds he sustained, appellant mercilessly
shot at him. On the other hand, Damuag, already wounded, tried to escape but appellant pursued him
and shot at him three more times. The unexpected and sudden attack on the victims, rendering them
unable and unprepared to defend themselves, such suddenness having been meant to ensure the
safety of the gunman as well as the success of the attack clearly constitutes alevosia.94[94]
The trial court also found that the offenses were committed with abuse of superior strength. The
malefactors not only outnumbered the victims; at least two of them were armed. More, the
circumstances clearly show that the assailants deliberately took advantage of their combined strength in
order to consummate the crime. Nevertheless, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength is absorbed by treachery.95[95]
We also agree with the trial court that the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle is
present. The appellant and his companions used motor bicycles in going to the place of the crime, in
carrying away the effects thereof, and in facilitating their escape.
We do not agree with the trial court, however, in its appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime. This circumstance is considered aggravating only when it facilitated the commission of the
crime, or was especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of impunity. The
essence of this aggravating circumstance is the obscuridad afforded by, and not merely the
chronological onset of, nighttime.96[96] Although the offense was committed at night, nocturnity does
not become a modifying factor when the place is adequately lighted, and thus could no longer insure the
offenders immunity from identification or capture.97[97] In this case at bar, a lamp post illuminated the
scene of the crime.
Likewise, we find that the offenses were not committed by a band. A crime is deemed to have been
committed by a band or en cuadrilla when more than three armed malefactors take part in its
commission.98[98] The four armed persons contemplated in this circumstance must all be principals by
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direct participation who acted together in the execution of the acts constituting the crime. The Code
does not define or require any particular arms or weapons; any weapon which by reason of its intrinsic
nature or the purpose for which it was made or used by the accused, is capable of inflicting serious or
fatal injuries upon the victim of the crime may be considered as arms for purposes of the law on
cuadrilla. In the case at bar, the prosecution alleged that the accused and his three other co-
conspirators used unlicensed firearms in the perpetration of the offenses. However, the evidence on
record shows that only two of them carried firearms. En cuadrilla, as an aggravating circumstance,
cannot therefore be appreciated.
There was also no evidence presented to show that the offenses were committed with the aid of armed
men. Aid of armed men or persons affording immunity requires that the armed men are accomplices
who take part in minor capacity, directly or indirectly.99[99] We note that all four accused were charged
as principal. The remaining suspects --- John Doe, Jane Doe and Peter Doe--- were never identified
and charged. Neither was proof adduced as to the nature of their participation.
There was also a paucity of proof to show that evident premeditation attended the commission of the
crimes. For this circumstance to be appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as that of the killing, of
the following elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
indicating that he clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between determination and
execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 100 [100] Evident
premeditation must be based on external facts which are evident, not merely suspected, which indicate
deliberate planning. There must be direct evidence showing a plan or preparation to kill, or proof that
the accused meditated and reflected upon his decision to kill the victim.101[101] No such evidence was
presented to prove the presence of this circumstance.
In the same vein, no evidence was adduced to prove that the firearms used in the shooting incident
were unlicensed, hence, this circumstance cannot be appreciated.
The presence of treachery qualified the killing of Abiabi to Murder punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act. No. 7659, viz:
ART. 248. Murder.- Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. (emphasis supplied)
The presence of the aggravating circumstance of the use of motor vehicle would have raised the
penalty to death, pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code, if not for the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender which the trial court failed to appreciate.
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: (1) the offender
has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the
latters agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary.102[102] Further, the surrender must be spontaneous
in such a manner that it shows the interest of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities,
either because he acknowledged his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses
necessarily incurred in search and capture.103[103] All these requisites have been complied with in the
case at bar.
The records reveal that the warrant for the appellants arrest was issued on January 19, 1998.
Immediately upon learning its issuance, and without having been served on him, the appellant
contacted his co-accused PO2 Lozano and communicated his desire to surrender. PO2 Lozano called
City Director, Police Superintendent Alejandro Carpio Lapinid and voluntarily surrendered himself at
around 7:00 p.m. of January 20, 1998. As per their agreement, the appellant was fetched by SPO2
Perfecto Silvederio Codiera at around 12:15 a.m. of January 21, 1998, and was directly brought to the
PNP Jail at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Gorordo Ave., Cebu City. Police Senior Inspector Pablo Gayacan
Labra II issued a compliance report attaching thereto the unserved warrants, and explaining the
attendant circumstances, viz:
The COMPLIANCE/RETURN OF WARRANT OF ARREST
That on the 20th day of January 1998 this office received the original copy of the Warrant of Arrest
against Police Officer 2 Armando LOZANO, Raul OCO @ Boy Usher, Dave SAMSON and Eutiquio
PACAA, Jr., all residents of A. Lopez St., Lobangon, Cebu City for Violation of Murder and Frustrated
Murder issued and signed by that Honorable Court dated 19 January 1998.
However, at about 7:00 oclock in the evening of January 20, 1998, Police Officer 2 Armando LOZANO
voluntarily surrendered to City Director, Police Superintendent Alejandro Carpio LAPINID while at
around 12:15 oclock in the morning of January 21, 1998, Raul OCO @ Boy Usher was fetched by
Senior Police Officer 2 Perfecto Silvederio Codiera and immediately brought to this office.104[104]
Moreover, one of the reasons cited by Judge Ocampo in acting favorably to the request of the appellant
and accused Lozano to be detained at the PNP Jail at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Gorordo Avenue, Cebu
City instead of the Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center (BBRC) was their voluntary surrender, viz:
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In the meantime and until further orders of this Court- since this case is now under the jurisdiction of offsets the aggravating circumstance of the use of motor vehicle, and pursuant to Art. 63(4) of the
Branch 7 presided by undersigned judge- and since the said accused had voluntarily surrendered to Revised Penal Code, the appellant should be meted the lesser of the two penalties, i.e., reclusion
the authorities anyway- they may continue to be detained at the PNP Jail where they have been perpetua.
brought after their surrender- since their transfer to the BBRC forthwith would obviously expose them to
the harm or danger that they are precisely adverting to and explained by them in their aforesaid Urgent For the serious wounding of Damuag, the appellant committed frustrated murder, the same having been
Motions. 105[105] (emphasis supplied) committed with intent to kill and with treachery, as afore explained. A crime is at its frustrated stage
when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence
Finally, the appellants testimony as to the circumstances of his voluntary surrender was never rebutted. but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
He testified as follows: perpetrator. The means and method employed by the appellant clearly show intent to kill. Indeed,
Damuag could have died as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained if it were not for the timely
Q: When did you see him (accused Dave Samson) again from that last time you said 1993 when operation performed on him. Under Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty next lower in degree
you saw him last? than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a
frustrated felony. Applying the same offsetting of the aggravating circumstance of the use of motor
vehicle and of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty should have been
A: At the time I surrendered at Gorordo. reclusion temporal in its medium period. However, under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum of which shall be that which, in
Q: When you said you surrendered, you surrendered to whom? view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and
the minimum of which shall be within the range of the penalty lower to that prescribed by the Code for
. the offense.107[107] Considering all the circumstances, the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, and fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum would be proper.
A: At first, I approached Atty. Bragat and I also approached Dodong Lozano and Dodong Lozano
called up thru telephone at the camp.
We come to the award of damages. The trial court ordered the appellant to indemnify the heirs of Abiabi
and the victim Herminigildo Damuag the amount of P1,000,000.00 and P500,000.00, respectively,
Q: And did you in effect voluntarily surrender at the camp? without specifying what these amounts represent.

A: Yes, sir. In line with the recent jurisprudence, we modify the amount due the heirs of Abiabi as follows: (a)
P50,000.00 as actual damages representing the duly receipted expense for the purchase of the coffin,
Q: Do you recall when was that? (b) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and (c) P25,000.00 as temperate damages.

A: On January 21, 1998.
Q: You said you surrendered voluntarily at the camp on January 21, 1998. Was that voluntary
surrender in relation to these two cases for which you now stand trial?
A: Yes, sir.106[106]
Like any other common criminal, the appellant could have opted to go on hiding. But he chose to
surrender himself to the authorities and face the allegations leveled against him. True, he did not admit
his complicity to the crimes charged against him but he nonetheless spared the government of time and
expense. For this, he should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. This
Except for the cost of the coffin, the remainder of P250,000.00, which Mrs. Abiabi claimed to have spent
for funeral and burial services, is unsubstantiated and therefore, cannot be awarded.
Furthermore, although Mrs. Abiabi testified that her husband earned P8,000.00 monthly as a legal
researcher of Clear, Inc., we cannot award indemnity for loss of earning capacity in the absence of
documentary evidence. 108 [108] There are only two exceptions to the general rule requiring
documentary evidence for claims for damages for loss of earning capacity: (1) if the deceased is self-
employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be
taken of the fact that in the victims line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) if the

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deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor
laws.109[109] Clearly, this case does not fall under the exceptions.
We reduce the amount due the victim Herminigildo Damuag. Damuag cannot recover actual damages
for aside from his bare allegations that he spent P160,000.00 for hospitalization and P5,000.00 for
medicinal needs, there is nothing on the record to substantiate his claim. In lieu of this, we award the
amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages since it cannot be denied that he has suffered some
pecuniary loss because of the incident.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the joint decision on review is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS.
The testimony of the witnesses and the confession of the accused himself show unquestionably that the
latter stabbed Constantino Nabaonag to death while he was bound, and therefore unable to defend
himself against the aggression. This circumstance constitutes alevosia, and the offense is therefore
properly classified as murder, defined and punished by article 403 of the Penal Code. It follows,
therefore, that the judgment of the court below now before us in consultation is correct, in so far as it
finds the defendant guilty of the crime of murder.
This judgment condemns the accused to the penalty of death, the court considering that the crime was
committed with the aggravating circumstances of deliberate premeditation, the employment of means
tending to add ignominy to the necessary effects of the acts, and the commission of the crime with the
assistance of armed men.

(1) In Crim. Case No. CBU-46172, appellant RAUL OCO @ BOY USHER is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. He is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Alden Abiabi the amount of
P50,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P25,000.00 as
temperate damages.
(2) In Crim. Case No. CBU-46173, appellant RAUL OCO @ BOY USHER is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of FRUSTRATED MURDER and is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum. He is ORDERED to indemnify Herminigildo Damuag the amount of
P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
The opinion of the court in this regard does not meet with our approval. There was no premeditation,
because an examination of the record shows that the purpose of killing Constantino arose suddenly in
the mind of the defendant, and was instantaneously carried into effect, upon information that the
deceased had spoken ill of the defendant.
The accused says: "As soon as I heard of this I became furiously enraged; I seized my dagger and
killed him at once." This part of the defendant's testimony was not disproven in the course of the trial.
The determination to kill was, then, followed immediately by the execution of the crime; and
consequently between the determination to commit the act and its actual commission there was no
opportunity for the cold, meditative, and persistent reflection, which constitutes premeditation, which is
essentially different from a simple determination of the will, which is always presumed in the
commission of every offense.
The circumstance of ignominy was not present because no means were employed nor did any
circumstances surround the act tending to make the effects of the crime more humiliating. Ignominy is a
circumstance pertaining to the moral order, which adds disgrace and obloquy to the material injury
caused by the crime. The fact that the deceased was killed in the presence of his wife is the
circumstance which the court below had in view when declaring that this circumstance had concurred.

Furthermore, the evidence shows that the crime was not committed with the assistance of armed men.
The testimony of the accused, corroborated by that of the witness for the prosecution, Francisco
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, Abadiano, is that the crime was committed by the defendant alone, without assistance from any one. It
vs. is true that in the house near the place where the crime was committed there were ten men armed with
FELIPE ABAIGAR, defendant-appellant. daggers, according to the statements of the witness referred to, and five without arms, according to the
accused, but as these men took no part, directly or indirectly, in the commission of the crime, and it
Fermin Mariano for appellant. does not appear that they heard the conversation which caused the sudden determination on the part of
Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee. the accused to kill the deceased, and still less that they had in any way participated in this
determination, we can not, within the law, find that this circumstance concurred in the commission of the
crime prosecuted for the purpose of augmenting the criminal responsibility of the accused. The mere
MAPA, J.: casual presence of armed men, more or less numerous, near the place of the occurrence does not
constitute an aggravating circumstance when it appears that the defendant did not avail himself in any
way of their aid, and did not knowingly count upon their assistance in the commission of the crime.

In the present case, there being no circumstancial tending to modify the guilt of the defendant, the
penalty is that prescribed by article 403 of the Penal Code in its medium grade, to wit, the penalty of life
imprisonment, and not the penalty of death imposed by the court.

313
For the reasons stated we reverse the judgment in so far as it condemns the defendant to death, and
impose upon the latter the penalty of life imprisonment, and condemn him to the payment of an
indemnification of 1,000 Mexican pesos to the heirs of the deceased, together with the costs of this
instance.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BALTAZAR LACAO, SR., PATRIA LACAO and TRINIDAD LACAO MANSILLA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Geomer C. Delfin for accused-appellants.
REGALADO, J:p
In an information filed on February 3, 1986 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 1416 in the Regional
Trial Court of Capiz, Branch XXI, Baltazar Lacao, Sr., alias "Bantan", Patria Lacao, Trinidad Mansilla,
Baltazar Lacao II, alias "Boticol," and Baltazar Lacao III, alias "Toto," were charged with the complex
crime of murder with direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority allegedly committed as
follows:
That on or about the 28th day of September, 1985, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in
Brgy. Manibad, Municipality of Mambusao, Province of Capiz, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the above-named accused armed with knives and wooden stools, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of nighttime and
superior strength to better facilitate the commission of the offense, assault, attack and hit one
POLICE CORPORAL JOSE G. INOCENCIO, JR., an agent of person in authority while in the
actual performance of his official duties, thereby inflicting upon the latter several injuries on the
different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death; that due to the death of said
Police Corporal Jose G. Inocencio, Jr. and the consequent loss of his earning capacity, his
heirs have suffered and are entitled to an indemnity in the sum of P30,000.00 plus moral and
exemplary damages.
That accused Baltazar Lacao, Sr., alias "Bantan", has been previously convicted by final
judgment of the crime of homicide.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Upon arraignment, herein accused-appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. admitted killing the victim but
interposed self-defense, hence a plea of not guilty was entered in his behalf, while Patria Lacao and
Trinidad Mansilla pleaded not guilty. The other two accused, Baltazar Lacao II and Baltazar Lacao III,
were not apprehended and have remained at large.
The facts found by the trial court, as established by unassailable evidence adduced at the trial, are as
follows: At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of September 28, 1985, prosecution witness Mila Parto
was at her house in Barangay Manibad attending to persons who came to the wake of her aunt,
Nemesia Lacao. Mila Parto is the sister-in-law of the deceased police Cpl. Jose G. Inocencio, Jr. While
she was so engaged, she heard and witnessed a commotion at the first floor of the two-storey house
and the events that took place thereafter. The commotion arose from a card game where one Mansueto
Rivera was losing and accused Baltazar Lacao II, who was playing with him, was furiously arguing with
the former. Baltazar Lacao II then unsheathed his knife and threatened Mansueto Rivera by pointing the
knife at the latter's neck. Wilma Rivera, the sister-in-law of Mansueto, intervened and Baltazar Lacao II
released the latter. Baltazar Lacao II then went inside the house wielding his knife and causing the other
guests to panic.
It was then that Cpl. Jose G. Inocencio, Jr. went down to inquire into the matter and to pacify the
people. When he saw Baltazar Lacao II with a knife, he held the latter's hand holding that knife. Baltazar
Lacao II then said: "Nyor, release me." As Cpl. Inocencio did not release him, the latter's mother, Patria
Lacao, then said: "Nyor, release my son." When Cpl. Inocencio released Baltazar Lacao II, the latter
suddenly stabbed Inocencio on his right side. Baltazar Lacao, Sr. and his other son, Baltazar Lacao III,
together with his wife, Patria Lacao, and his sister, Trinidad Lacao Mansilla, rushed inside the house
and surrounded the victim.
The men then stabbed Cpl. Inocencio several times while the women hit him with stools. As the attack
continued, the victim was pushed toward the door of the kitchen and he later slumped on the floor facing
downward. Baltazar Lacao, Sr. then sat astride him and continued stabbing the latter as he was thus
lying prostrate. Thereafter, this appellant asked: "Nyor, Nyor, are you still alive?" Appellant Patria Lacao
interjected: "What are you waiting for, it is already finished, we have to go." Baltazar Lacao III then got
the gun of Cpl. Inocencio and all the accused went away.2
All the foregoing facts were clearly and categorically established by said prosecution witness, unshaken
and unaffected by the gruelling cross-examination to which she was subjected. In the process she
categorically identified the three appellants then present in the courtroom, as well as the knives and the
stools used against the victim in the commission of the crime. Ample and credible corroboration was
afforded by the straightforward testimonies of two other eyewitnesses, Isabel Llorente3 and the victim's
widow, Nelfa Inocencio,4 who were admittedly present at the scene and the time of the bloody incident.
After an examination of the body of the deceased by Dr. Abel P. Martinez, a medico-legal officer and
rural health physician, the following autopsy report was submitted and thereafter admitted in evidence:
PERTINENT POST-MORTEM FINDINGS ON THE BODY OF P/CPL. JOSE G. INOCENCIO,
JR. DONE AT MAMBUSAO, CAPIZ, ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1985 at 4:30 AM
1. Rigor mortis — present.
2. Livor mortis — present.
314
3. Lacerated wound about 1" dia located at the left frontopa reital region of the head,
superficial.
4. Stab wound, about 3/4" dia. located at the level of 31 CS MCL, left, going posters-inferiorly
reaching the anterior pericardium.
5. Stab wound, about 3/4" dia. located at the level of 31 CS 1" lateral to MCL right, going
posters-inferiorly reaching the right lung tissue.
6. Stab wound, about 2-1/2" horizontally located at the subcostal area, MCL right, going
posters-superiorly hitting the liver.
7. Stab wound 1" dia. located at the level of 51 CS AAL, right, going medio-superiorly reaching
the right lung.
8. Stab wound, about 2" dia. located at the level of the 10ICS AAL right, going media-
superiorly reaching the right lung.
9. Incised wound, about 1/2" dia. superficially located at the superior portion of the posterior
elbow.
10. Stab wound, about 1/2" dia. located at the base of the neck, left going medio-inferiorly
reaching the body of the cervical vertebra.
11. Stab wound, about 1" dia. diag. located at the supra-scapular region, left going antero-
inferiorly reaching the left lung.
12. Two stab wounds superimposed to one another located at the scapular region, left,
superficial, reaching the scapula.
13. Stab wound about 1-1/2" dia. perpendicularly located at the midscapular region, superficial,
reaching the body of the scapula.
14. Stab wound, about 1" dia. located at the left paravertebral line 10T, left hitting the rib.
15. Stab wound, about 1" dia. located at the left paravert, line 1L, superficial, hitting the
underlying muscles.
16. Stab wound, 1" dia. located 2" lateral to Wd 15 going anteromedially hitting the underlying
muscles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: CARDIAC TAMPONADE SEVERE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
HEMORRHAGES SECONDARY TO THE HEREIN INFLICTED WOUNDS.5
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment convicting the three appellants of the crime charged,
imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering them to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the sum of P30,000.00 for his death, P9,250.00 as actual damages, plus P100,000.00 as moral
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.6
In their present recourse, appellants assign the following errors:
I
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS BALTAZAR
LACAO, SR., PATRIA LACAO AND TRINIDAD LACAO MANSILLA GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER WITH DIRECT ASSAULT UPON AN
AGENT OF PERSON IN AUTHORITY PURSUANT TO THE PROVISION OF ARTICLES 248
AND 148 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 48 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, As AMENDED,
WHERE THE TRIAL COURT SENTENCES EACH OF THEM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF
RECLUSION PERPETUA AND TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM P/CPL JOSE
INOCENCIO, JR. IN THE SUM OF THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) FOR HIS
DEATH; PLUS P9,250.00 AS ACTUAL DAMAGES; PLUS P100,000.00 MORAL DAMAGES
AND TO PAY THE COST OF THE SUIT.
II
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
BALTAZAR LACAO, SR. ACTED IN COMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE WHEN HE STABBED THE
DECEASED JOSE INOCENCIO, JR.
III
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY AS A QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE ATTENDED IN THE KILLING OF JOSE INOCENCIO BY ALL ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
IV
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING APPELLANTS PATRIA LACAO AND
TRINIDAD MANSILLA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER WITH DIRECT ASSAULT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE
NOT PERFORMED OVERT ACT SHOWING CONSPIRACY FOR MERE KNOWLEDGE,
ACQUIESCENCE OR APPROVAL OF THE ACT, WITHOUT COOPERATION IS NOT
ENOUGH TO CONSTITUTE ONE A PARTY TO A CONSPIRACY, AND THAT THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT APPELLANTS TRINIDAD MANSILLA AND PATRIA
LACAO NOT HAVING CONSPIRED WITH BALTAZAR LACAO, SR. IN KILLING THE VICTIM
JOSE INOCENCIO, JR. TREACHERY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AGAINST THEM.
V
315
 THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
BALTAZAR LACAO, SR. ON SELF-DEFENSE AND IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS PATRIA LACAO AND TRINIDAD MANSILLA FOR FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF SAID ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.7
The main thrust of the defense is that appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. acted in self-defense since Cpl.
Jose Inocencio, Jr. attempted to shoot him but the gun did not fire. Said appellant allegedly grabbed the
gun and stabbed the deceased more than five (5) times.8
The other appellants, Trinidad Mansilla and Patria Lacao, interposed the defense of alibi. Their version
is that at 7:30 in the evening of September 28, 1985, they and one Consolacion Lago went to the wake
at Barangay Manibad. They prayed and, at about 9:30 A.M., they went home but Baltazar, Sr. was left
behind.9 Baltazar Lacao II was alleged to be sleeping in their house and Baltazar Lacao III was said to
be then in Roxas City studying at the La Purisima College.10
The Court finds the appeal to be devoid of merit.
Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr., by pleading self-defense necessarily admits that he killed the victim and
he is thus duty bound to prove the essential requisites for this justifying circumstance.11 This
circumstance he has to prove by clear and convincing evidence,12 the onus probandi having shifted to
him.
Now, this appellant admitted stabbing the victim more than five (5) times. As seen from the medico-legal
report, the victim actually suffered fifteen (15) stab wounds, that the cause of death was hemorrhage
and multiple stab wounds,13 and that most of the injuries inflicted were indeed fatal. It cannot now be
denied that, even indulging said appellant in his theory, he definitely exceeded the limits of what is
necessary to suppress an alleged unlawful aggression directed to him by the victim. In fact, from the
eyewitness accounts, he even continued stabbing the victim who was already slumped prone and
helpless.
Said appellant also sought to buttress his defense by claiming that Cpl. Inocencio, prior to the stabbing,
fired his gun at the former but the gun did not fire. This subterfuge is refuted by the unequivocal
statements of the prosecution witnesses that the victim never removed his gun from his waistband,14
and that the revolver only fell when appellants pushed the deceased.15 Significantly, this story of
appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. was never corroborated by any evidence of unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim. The first requisite of self-defense is indispensable. There can be no self-defense
unless it is proven that there has been unlawful aggression on the part of the person injured or killed by
the accused. If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or to repel. The second
requisite of self-defense will have no basis.16
We also take note of the finding of the court below that none of the six (6) bullets recovered from the
gun showed any sign or mark that the gun was ever fired. Had the gun been fired, the base of at least
one bullet would have been impressed in the center by the corresponding indentation caused by the
impact thereon by the firing pin of the revolver when the trigger is pulled. The absence of such physical
evidence further sustains the holding of the trial court that even the first element of self-defense has not
been proved despite said appellant's protestations.
Appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Mansilla were positively identified by all the prosecution witnesses
as the ones who hit the victim with stools several times while the other three (3) male accused were
stabbing the victim with their knives. In their defense, Patria and Trinidad sought refuge in the
impuissant sanctuary of alibi. Trite as it is, we have to impress on appellants once again the doctrine
that alibi is the weakest defense an accused can concoct. In order to prosper, it must be so convincing
as to preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically present at the place of the
crime or its vicinity at the time of the commission. In the face of positive identification of the accused by
eyewitnesses, an alibi crumbles like a sand fortress.17
The trial court definitely held that appellants "Patria Lacao and Trinidad Mansilla were positively
identified by all the eyewitnesses for the prosecution who were without any motive to falsely testify and
implicate or point an unerring finger at the three accused inside the courtroom as the perpetrators of the
crime. Their disavowal of participation in the gory killing of Cpl. Inocencio are self-serving and feeble
attempts to disprove complicity and to which the court gives scant consideration."18 Indeed, the
participatory acts of said appellants having been testified to so clearly in detail by three (3)
eyewitnesses, to refute the same by the discreditable defense of alibi would be an evidential travesty.
Identification of the culprits in this case was not difficult because the place where the crime occurred
was sufficiently lighted. Where considerations of visibility are favorable and the witnesses do not appear
to be biased against the accused, their assertions as to the identity of the malefactor should be normally
accepted. This is more so when the witness is the victim or his near relative because these witnesses
usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants. Moreover, the trial court gave credence to the
prosecution's identification of the appellants as the culprits. Subject to exceptions which do not obtain in
this case, the trial court is in a better position to decide this question, having seen and heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.19
The Court, however, is not favorably impressed with the prosecution's theory that the assailants acted
pursuant to a conspiracy just because they apparently acted in unison in attacking the victim. True,
conspiracy is always predominantly mental in composition because it consists primary of the meeting of
minds and, generally, complicity may be inferred from circumstantial evidence, i.e., the community of
purpose and the unity of design in the contemporaneous or simultaneous performance of the act of
assaulting the deceased.20 However, conspiracy must be proved with as much certainty as the crime
itself.21 The same degree of proof required to establish the crime is required to support a finding of
conspiracy,22 that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt.23
At the very least, conspiracy presupposes a prior agreement or contemporaneous understanding on the
part of the conspirators to commit a felony, in this case, to kill Cpl. Inocencio. A dispassionate appraisal
of the facts readily reveals, however, that the attack on the victim originated spontaneously from and
was initiated unexpectedly by Baltazar Lacao II. Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. and his other son,
Baltazar Lacao III, immediately joined in the fray by attacking the victim with their knives, whereupon the
two female appellants, also assisted their menfolk by hitting the victim with stools.
The rapidity in the succession of such consecutive acts of the assailants, with the last four coming
instinctively, as it were, to the aid of the original assailant, cannot but produce the conclusion that their
actuations were activated without prior or apparent deliberation. It does not even appear that there was
a call or a signal from one to the other to join the attack on Cpl. Inocencio, much less is there even an
intimation that they had such a murderous intent or cabal at any time prior thereto. The spontaneity of
their respective reactions, albeit resulting in an attack where they all participated, rules out the existence
of a conspiracy.
316
As a consequence, therefore, the respective liabilities of appellants shall be determined by the nature of SO ORDERED.
their individual participations in the felonious act.24 It is understood, however, that whatever liabilities
may attach to Baltazar Lacao II and Baltazar Lacao III are not concluded by the dispositions herein nor
shall they be bound by the discussions in this opinion on their putative participations in the crime
charged.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
Anent the issue on whether or not treachery was properly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, we MELCHOR REAL y BARTOLAY, accused-appellant.
agree with the holding of the court below since this was sufficiently proven by the evidence. It is
elementary hornbook knowledge that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make.25 QUIASON, J.:

In the present case, the deceased was stabbed without warning the moment he unsuspectingly
released the hand of Baltazar Lacao II. So sudden and unanticipated was the attack that the victim was
given no chance to defend himself. Then herein appellants, although apparently acting without prior
agreement, also instantly and all together attacked him. Even if their aforesaid acts were independently
performed on their individual initiatives, such concerted action ensured the commission of the crime
without risk to them arising from any defense or retaliation that the victim might have resorted to.
Treachery was thus correctly appreciated against all appellants, the use of superior strength being
absorbed as an integral part of the treacherous mode of commission.
Appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. admitted during the trial that he was once convicted of the crime of
homicide but he was granted an absolute pardon therefor.26 The lower court properly considered
recidivism since a pardon for a preceding offense does not obliterate the fact that the accused is a
recidivist upon his conviction of a second offense embraced in the same title of the Code.27 This
aggravating circumstance of recidivism accordingly offsets the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender by Baltazar Lacao, Sr.
With respect to appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla, they did cooperate in the
execution of the offense by simultaneous acts which, although not indispensable to the commission of
the offense, bore a relation to the acts done by the principal and supplied material or moral aid in the
execution of the crime in an efficacious way.28 Since they were aware of the criminal intent of the
principals and having participated in such murderous criminal design sans a conspiracy, we hold them
guilty of the milder form of responsibility as accomplices.29
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Masbate, Masbate, in
Criminal Case No. 1606 finding appellant guilty of murder.
We affirm with modification, the appealed decision.
I
The information against appellant reads as follows:
That on or about March 11, 1978, in the morning thereof, at the Poblacion of the
Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the said accused with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and criminally attack, assault and hack
with a sharp bolo one Edgardo Corpus y Rapsing, hitting the latter on the nape,
causing an injury which caused the death of the said Edgardo Corpus y Rapsing
several days thereafter.
That the accused is a recidivist having been convicted by the Municipal Court of
Aroroy, in the following cases:
Crime Date of Conviction

The penalty for the complex crime at bar is that for the graver offense, the same to be applied in its
1. Ill treatment by Deed — July 6, 1965
maximum period. No modifying circumstance can be considered for or against herein appellants. With
the proscription against the imposition of the death sentence, the trial court correctly sentenced
appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. to suffer reclusion perpetua. Appellants Patria Lacao and Trinidad Lacao 2. Grave Threats — November 25, 1968
Mansilla are hereby sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. (Rollo, p. 14).
The death indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with the present policy on the
matter, with appellant Baltazar Lacao, Sr. primarily liable for P40,000.00 and appellants Patria Lacao
Upon being arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.
and Trinidad Lacao Mansilla for P10,000.00, subject to the provisions of Article 110 of the Revised
Penal Code.
After trial, the court convicted appellant and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000.00 and costs.
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing modifications, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.

317
Hence, this appeal.
II
At about 9:00 A.M. on March 17, 1978, in the public market of Aroroy, Masbate, appellant and Edgardo
Corpus, both vendors, engaged in a heated argument over the right to use the market table to display
their fish.
Moreno de la Rosa, the Municipal Mayor, who happened to be at the public market, tried to pacify them,
saying that they were arguing over trivial matters.
The two protagonists momentarily kept their peace but after awhile Corpus raised his voice again and
said something to appellant. The latter, in a soft voice, uttered "SOBRA NA INA NA IMO
PAGDAOGDAOG" (You are being too oppressive).
When Corpus kept on walking to and fro near the disputed fish table, appellant started to sharpen his
bolo while murmuring to himself. Once Corpus turned around with his back towards appellant, the latter
hacked him on the nape. The blow caused Corpus to collapse. He was rushed to a medical clinic. When
asked by his wife as to who hacked him, he answered "Melchor Real."
A police investigator went to the clinic to take the dying declaration of Corpus, who said that it was
appellant who stabbed him. Corpus died two days later.
Appellant admitted hacking Corpus but claimed that he did so out of humiliation and anger when the
victim threw his fish in the presence of so many people.
He testified as follows:
Q. When Edgardo Corpus was lambasting you in the presence of
the public, what did you do, how did you feel?
A. I got angry.
Q. And what did you do?
A. So I hacked him.
Q. Was he hit?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. In what part of his body was he hit?
A. At the right neck.
Q. Did you admit to the authorities that it was you who hacked
Edgardo Corpus?
A. Yes, sir.
On cross-examination, he again admitted his guilt.
Q. And when this Edgardo Corpus turn (sic) his back, you
immediately hacked him on his neck?
A. Yes, sir ( TSN, July 9, 1986, pp. 6-8; Emphasis supplied).
III
Before us, appellant argues that the crime committed was only homicide and not murder and that he is
entitled to two mitigating circumstances: namely, passion and obfuscation and vindication of a grave
offense.
We agree with appellant that the offense committed was homicide. He is entitled to the benefit of the
doubt as to whether he acted with alevosia when he attacked the victim. As a rule, a sudden attack by
the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is treachery if such mode of attack was cooly and
deliberately adopted by him with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat.
The rule does not apply, however, where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but
was just triggered by the sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of the provocative act of
the victim (People v. Aguiluz, 207 SCRA 187 [1992]). This is more so, where the assault upon the victim
was preceded by a heated exchange of words between him and the accused (People v. Rillorta, 180
SCRA 102 [1989]). In the case at bench, the assault came in the course of an altercation and after
appellant had sharpened his bolo in full view of the victim. Appellant's act of sharpening his bolo can be
interpreted as an attempt to frighten the victim so the latter would leave him alone. It was simply
foolhardy for the victim to continue walking to and fro near appellant in a taunting manner while the
latter was sharpening his bolo.
The suddenness of the attack does not, by itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia where the
decision to attack was made peremptorily and the victim's helpless position was accidental (People v.
Ardisa, 55 SCRA 245 [1974]).
Appellant also claims that he is entitled to two mitigating circumstances: namely, vindication of a grave
offense and passion and obfuscation. The peculiarity of these two mitigating circumstances is that they
cannot be applied at the same time if they arise from the same facts or motive.
If appellant attacked his victim in the proximate vindication of a grave offense, he cannot successfully
claim in the same breath that he was also blinded by passion and obfuscation. At most, only one of two
circumstances could be considered in favor of appellant (People v. Yaon, Court of Appeals, 43 O.G.
4142 cited in I Reyes, Revised Penal Code [1981]).
318
The act of the victim in berating and humiliating appellant was enough to produce passion and
obfuscation, considering that the incident happened in a market place within full view and within hearing
distance of many people.
The trial court held, and the Solicitor General agreed, that the attendant aggravating circumstance was
reiteracion and not reincidencia as alleged in the information. The trial court and the Solicitor General
are in error.
According to the information charging appellant of murder and the evidence, the accused was
previously convicted of ill-treatment by deed on July 6, 1965 and grave threats on November 25, 1968.
In recidivism or reincidencia, the offender shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of
another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code (Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[g]).
In reiteracion, the offender shall have been punished previously for an offense to which the law attaches
an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty (Revised
Penal Code, Art. 14[10]). Unlike in reincidencia, the offender in reiteracion commits a crime different in
kind from that for which he was previously tried and convicted (Guevarra, Penal Sciences and Philippine
Criminal Law 129 [1974]).
Appellant was previously convicted of ill-treatment by deed (Revised Penal Code, Art. 266, Title Eight)
and grave threats (Revised Penal Code, Art. 282, Title Nine). He was convicted of homicide in the
instant criminal case (Revised Penal Code, Art. 249, Title Eight). Inasmuch as homicide and ill-
treatment by deed fall under Title Eight, the aggravating circumstance to be appreciated against him is
recidivism under Article 14[g] rather than reiteracion under Article 14(10) of the Revised Penal Code.
There is no reiteracion because that circumstance requires that the previous offenses should not be
embraced in the same title of the Code. While grave threats fall in title (Title Nine) different from
homicide (Title Eight), still reiteracion cannot be appreciated because such aggravating circumstance
requires that if there is only one prior offense, that offense must be punishable by an equal or greater
penalty than the one for which the accused has been convicted. Likewise, the prosecution has to prove
that the offender has been punished for the previous offense. There is no evidence presented by the
prosecution to that effect.
Appellant is convicted of homicide, appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation, which is offset by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is
convicted of the crime of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of TEN (10) YEARS of
prision mayor as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion temporal
as maximum. The indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the victim is increased to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME REYES y AROGANSIA, accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellant Jaime Reyes y Arogansia seeks the reversal of the decision1 of Branch 27 of the
Regional Trial Court in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, dated October 5, 1994, declaring him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as then punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
be fore its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659.
By way of backdrop, appellant was arrested by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation in
Parañaque pursuant to a warrant of arrest2 issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
and was turned over to the custody of the Philippine National Police of said province. On May 2, 1990,
appellant was admitted to bail. The criminal complaint was later amended to change his middle name
stated therein from "Bautista" to "Arogansia."3
Appellant failed to submit his counter-affidavit as ordered by the municipal trial court, hence he was
deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation. The records of the case were then
forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna which filed an information on July 2, 1990
charging herein appellant with murder and alleging —
That on or about February 15, 1990, in the municipality of Santa Cruz, province of
Laguna, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovenamed accused while conveniently armed with a handgun and motivated by
hate and revenge with intent to kill, with evident premeditation, by means of treachery,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot at
MEYNARDO ALTOBAR y MENGUITO with the said weapon, thereby the latter
suffered gunshot wound which directly caused his death to the damage and prejudice
of his surviving heirs.
That in the commission of the crime the qualifying circumstances were present: (1)
evident premeditation & treachery.4
During his arraignment with the assistance of his counsel de oficio, appellant pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged.5 The pre-trial conference was terminated on November 28, 1990 and, thereafter, trial
proceeded. In the course of the proceedings, the bail of appellant was cancelled and he was ordered
arrested by virtue of a bench warrant for failure to appear on a scheduled hearing.
Prosecution witness Iluminado Broas testified that on or about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of February
15, 1990, he and the victim, Meynardo "Jun Boy" Altobar, Jr., together with another prosecution witness,
Joel Apundar, were seated in front of the sari-sari store of Edwin Laborde at M.H. del Pilar Street, Sta.
Cruz, Laguna. They were talking with each other when suddenly a "bemoustached" man approached
them and asked Altobar, Jr., "Ikaw ba si Jun Boy?" When the latter replied by nodding his head, the
319
man, who was later identified as herein appellant, immediately pulled out a gun from something which
looked like a book tightly held under his left armpit and shot the victim, hitting him in the neck.
Broas was able to push the wounded victim aside before the assailant pulled the trigger for a second
shot. Thereafter, appellant pointed the gun at the group and pulled the trigger, but the gun jammed and
did not fire. Appellant thereupon ran towards the opposite direction, obviously to avoid being caught or
identified by them.6 The group rushed to the aid of the victim who sat slouched on the pavement,
bathed in his own blood, about a meter away from where they were seated. They hailed a tricycle and
brought the victim to the hospital where he expired.7
Prosecution witness Joel Apundar corroborated the testimony of Broas in its material points. He testified
further that when appellant escaped by running towards the direction of the P. Guevarra Memorial High
School, he shouted, "Habulin ninyo iyan, habulin ninyo!" which was heard by several persons within the
vicinity.8 Broas and Apundar both testified that the man was wearing a piece of lady's stocking as a
mask, RayBan type sunglasses, a "surefit" cap,9 black pants and a white t-shirt. 10
Another prosecution witness, Johnny Abao, testified that at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of
February 15, 1990, he was in the company of Felix Herbosa and Jun Laborte at Del Pilar Street in the
same town. They heard two gunshots and somebody shouted, "Habulin ninyo." Then, he saw a man
running away from the direction where the gunshots and shouts emanated and going towards them.
Their group was about 30 meters away from the Laborte store. The man ran along Del Pilar Street,
turned right to Kamatoy Street, and then right to P. Guevarra Street. As he ran after the man, he picked
up something for his defense. He only gave up the chase when he saw that the man had boarded a
slow moving tricycle waiting along P. Guevarra Street. He later helped witnesses Apundar and Broas in
bringing the victim to the hospital on board a tricycle driven by Martin Buena. 11
Dr. Guia G. Abad, a medico-legal officer, conducted an autopsy on the body of the victim. Her findings
were set forth in a Medico Necropsy Report, marked as Exhibit "G" by the prosecution, as follows:
1. One circular wound measuring 2 mm x 2 mm penetrating located 2 cm above the
medial insertion of the left clavicle directed rightwards to a wound with irregular edges
measuring 1 cm x 1 cm located 12 cm from midspinal on right upper back at a level 4
cm below the lower border of nape, just above the upper edge of right scapular bond.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Shock due to hemorrhage due to penetrating wound. 12
Another prosecution witness Manolito A. Manuel testified that, while riding on his racer-type bicycle
passing along P. Guevarra Street on his way home to Barangay Sto. Angel Sur in the same town, he
heard two gunshots which he ignored. Upon reaching the corner of P. Guevarra and Kamatoy Streets,
he fell from his bicycle because he was nearly sideswiped by a passenger jeep. While sprawled on the
street with his bicycle, he saw a man running towards a slow-moving tricycle and who then boarded the
same. Inside the tricycle, the man removed his mask and put a gun on the passenger seat. 13 When
Manuel stood up and rode his bicycle again, he noticed that the man was staring at him. He was more
or less five meters away from the said tricycle and the place was illuminated by a lamppost.
Just as he reached the big bridge, he noticed that the said tricycle, with the same driver and passenger,
was moving behind him. Upon reaching a street corner, he made a full stop and again he noticed the
driver and the passenger of the said tricycle giving him an intimidating look. He thereafter proceeded
towards his home and the tricycle went in the direction of Patimbao. 14 He later identified the passenger
as appellant, 15 and the driver as Ernan Reyes, a son of Ely Reyes who is a cousin of appellant.
16
Appellant, as expected, denied having killed Altobar, Jr. He testified that on the date and time in
question, he was at the Parañaque Cockpit owned by Rolly Ligon, together with Obet Legasto
and Raul Reyes, on a painting job. The Said cockpit is reportedly 85 to 90 kilometers away from
Sta. Cruz, Laguna and it would take more than two hours to travel from one place to the other. 17
Appellant's alibi was corroborated by his relative, Raul Reyes, who testified that he and
appellant were together the whole night of February 15, 1990 and they never left the cockpit
compound. 18
However, the prosecution presented two rebuttal witnesses, Serafin Nepomuceno and Eleodoro
Anibersaryo to refute this alibi of appellant. Witness Nepomuceno testified that at around 5:30 in
the afternoon of February 15, 1990, he was at the house of witness Anibersaryo at Green Village
Subdivision, also in Sta. Cruz. They were having a celebration when appellant arrived together
with Felix Mercado, Anibersaryo's half-brother. Appellant left after drinking a bottle of beer. The
celebration did not last long because the group had to attend to important matters in the public
market. On their way thereto aboard an owner-type jeep, they saw appellant walking along
Taleon Street 19 which was a few blocks away from the scene of the crime.
The other rebuttal witness, Eleodoro Anibersaryo, corroborated the testimony of Nepomuceno.
He testified that they saw appellant on February 15, 1991 at around 5:30 in the afternoon, first,
when appellant arrived in Anibersaryo's house and, second, when appellant was walking along
Taleon Street. 20 In fact, their group greeted appellant but could not accommodate him in their
jeep which was already full.21
Based on the evidence introduced by the prosecution vis-a-vis what was adduced by the
defense, which will hereafter be discussed, the trial court concluded that it was appellant Jaime
Reyes who shot and killed victim Meynardo Altobar, Jr. Thus, on October 5, 1994, the court
below rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused JAIME REYES
y AROGANSIA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder qualified
by evident premeditation defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code with the attendant generic circumstance of nocturnity and hereby
sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its
accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of the victim Meynardo Altobar y
Menguito the amount of P90,000.00 for and as actual and compensatory
damages inclusive of expenses incident to the burial, P100,000.00 for and as
moral damages, P50,000.00 for and as exemplary damages and the further sum
of P200,000.00 for expenses of litigation inclusive of attorney's fee, all without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
320
 In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited in full with the A: The exact words uttered by the man was (sic) "ikaw ba si
period of his preventive imprisonment. 22 Jun Boy?" and then he pulled out a gun from something like a
book pressed between his left armpit and then he fired a shot
Hence, this appeal wherein appellant imputes four supposed errors to the trial court, namely, (1) at Jun Boy.
in finding that treachery attended the killing of the victim Meynardo Altobar, Jr.; (2) in
appreciating the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation to qualify the crime to Q: Was Jun Boy hit by that first shot?
murder; (3) in appreciating nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
crime; and (4) in convicting him of the crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to A: He was hit, sir.
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 23
Q: Did you notice on what part of his body as Jun Boy hit?
Appellant faults the trial court for holding that the killing of victim Altobar, Jr. was attended by
treachery. He contends that when he openly approached the victim and asked him, "Ikaw ba si
Jun Boy?" the latter must already have been alerted and forewarned of an impending attack. A: Jun Boy was hit near the neck.
Moreover, the attack was frontal as shown by the fact that the victim was hit near the neck 24
above the left clavicle. The Court disagrees. Q: Before he was shot by this man, was Jun Boy able to
answer or utter any remarks?
The prosecution evidence meets the requisites for appreciating alevosia in the commission of
the crime, viz.: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; A: Yes, sir.
and (2) appellant consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms
of the attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack Q: What was his answer?
by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend
himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk to himself. 25
A: He just nodded his head.
As argued by the prosecution, the fact that appellant approached the victim and asked him if he
was "Jun Boy" could not have served as a warning to the victim of an impending harm. It could Q: After Jun Boy nodded if as you mentioned that he was the
not have taken appellant more than three seconds to ask the question and immediately after Jun Boy being sought by this man, this man suddenly pulled
getting a positive response, he fired at the victim. 26 This is sustained by reliable eyewitness out a gun from what appeared to be a book pressed between
accounts. his left armpit, is that what you mean?

Prosecution witness Iluminado Broas lucidly explained: A: Yes, sir. 27

Q: Do you recall of (sic) any unusual incident which happened
on that particular occasion while in the process of telling
stories among yourselves?
A: Yes, sir.
This was corroborated by witness Joel Apundar:
Q: While you were there at that time in the store of this
Laborde, do you recall of (sic) any unusual incident that
happened?

Q: Will you tell the Court what happened? A: There was.

A: While we were telling stories at that time, a certain man
came and then asked who this Jun Boy is.
Q: Will you tell the court if you recall the exact words of this
man, what was (sic) the exact words?
Q: What happened?
A: We were sitting on a wooden bench and while we were
sitting on a wooden bench, somebody approached us and
asked who among us is Jun Boy and after knowing who was
Jun Boy, he immediately fired a gun at us. 28

321
We can infer from the foregoing testimonies of these prosecution witnesses that the
suddenness and mode of the attack adopted by appellant placed the victim in a situation where
it would be impossible for him to foresee any impending harm and to resist the attack or defend
himself. It has repeatedly been held that even if the attack on the victim was immediately
preceded by a cry or signal from the accused, such attack is no less treacherous 29 since the
immediacy of the assault prevents the victim from evading the same or defending himself
therefrom. Even a frontal attack can be treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected and the
victim was unarmed, 30 as what happened in the case at bar.
Apropos to the foregoing, the rule is that the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity is
ordinarily deemed absorbed in treachery 31 because it forms part of the treacherous means and
manner specifically employed by the accused to insure the execution of his criminal act.
Nocturnity is appreciated as an aggravating circumstance only when it is purposely sought by
or affords some degree of impunity to the offender, which does not appear to be so in this case.
The prosecution witnesses testified that although the crime was committed at around 7:00
o'clock in the evening, the locus criminis was well lighted32 and the face of appellant could
easily be seen through his transparent mask. 33 The circumstances of treachery and nocturnity
may well be regarded then as complementing each other, with the latter absorbed by treachery
thus creating a single circumstance qualifying the killing as murder.
It is also worth mentioning that while appellant reportedly had a sort of a mask and was using
sunglasses, these clumsy accouterments could not constitute the aggravating circumstance of
disguise. Legally, disfraz contemplates a superficial but somewhat effective dissembling to
avoid identification. Here, even if it is true that he assumed that masquerade, appellant was
readily recognizable because his face could easily be seen together with the identifying feature
of his mustache. Thus, there was no mention of his having used a disguise, whether in the
information or by the trial court, the prosecution or the Solicitor General. Why appellant resorted
to that juvenile gaucherie is an example of the delusive quirks of the criminal mind which defy
rational explanation.
What is instead in issue is the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. Appellant
claims that the trial court erred in appreciating this as another qualifying circumstance, on the
ground that the prosecution failed to prove all the requisites thereof. 34 Appellant is correct. The
prosecution failed to prove (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b)
an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination and (c) a sufficient
interval of time between the determination and execution of the crime to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. 35 These elements of evident premeditation must be
established with equal certainty and clarity as the criminal act itself before it can be appreciated
as a qualifying circumstance.
The testimony of prosecution witness Jonas Soriano that on February 7, 1990 Mercy Reyes,
daughter of appellant, told him to inform the victim to be careful because appellant had a gun
and was looking for him; 36 and the testimony of Perla Ramos that on February 8, 1990,
appellant went to her house looking for his daughter 37 and, before leaving, he stated, "Huwag
lang mayroong mangyayari sa anak ko wala kayong narinig, wala kayong nakita," 38 cannot be
taken against appellant as evidence of his intent or plan to kill the victim.
Mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical and probable they might be, would not
be enough to sustain a finding of this qualifying circumstance. 39 For that matter, absent the
elements thereof as earlier noted, neither can it be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Nonetheless, appellant is still liable for the crime of murder as the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was present and proven by the prosecution.
Appellant faults the lower court in convicting him of the crime charged despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. 40 This submission is not only too generalized an averment but is likewise devoid of
merit. Although the prosecution's eyewitnesses, Broas and Apundar, initially failed to reveal or
disclose the name of appellant in their preliminary affidavits, the physical description and
identification of the gunman as narrated by them matches the identity of herein appellant.
Moreover, during the trial, appellant was positively identified by Broas and Apundar as the man
who shot Altobar, Jr. Broas explained that the delay in his disclosure of the name or identity of
appellant was because he was afraid to mention the name of the person who shot the victim and
he was so afraid because he definitely knew the assailant. 41 Apundar, in turn, confessed that
the delay in his revelation of the identity of appellant was because he was "afraid that Jaime
might return" to him. 42
The failure of the prosecution witnesses to immediately name or identify herein appellant as the
culprit is understandable. It is common for witnesses to delay or vacillate in disclosing the
identity of the offender after the startling occurrence for fear of reprisal, more so since they were
townmates and one of them is related to appellant. Incidentally, prosecution witness Manuel, on
his part, positively identified appellant as the man who ran towards a slow-moving tricycle,
boarded the same, placed his gun on the passenger seat, removed his mask, and gave him an
intimidating look.43
It is a jurisprudential doctrine of long standing that, aside from its intrinsic weakness, the
defense of alibi and denial invoked by herein appellant cannot prevail over the positive
identification by these prosecution witnesses who had no improper motive whatsoever to falsely
testify against him. 44 This decisional rule applies squarely to demolish appellant's pretensions.
As to the trial court's award of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of deceased Meynardo
Altobar, Jr., the Court finds the same to be excessive with respect to moral damages and
unwarranted with regard to exemplary damages. Consistent with our jurisprudence, the award of
moral damages in the present case has necessarily to be limited by the Court to the maximum
amount of P50,000.00. 45
Exemplary damages may be awarded in criminal cases where the crime was committed with one
or more aggravating circumstance. 46 In the instant case, no aggravating circumstance is
present to warrant the award of exemplary damages since treachery has been used to qualify
the killing to murder, nocturnity has been absorbed by treachery, and evident premeditation has
not been proved.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED, but with MODIFICATION of the civil
liability of accused-appellant Jaime Reyes. Conformably with the foregoing discussion, he is
hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Meynardo Altobar, Jr. the sum of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, P90,000.00 as compensatory damages for funeral expenses, P50,000.00 by way of
moral damages, and P20,000.00 as actual damages for litigation expenses inclusive of attorney's
322
fees, all without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and with costs against accused-
appellant.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee.
vs.
SABANGAN CABATO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reubin L. Maraon for accused-appellant.
CORTES, J.:
Accused-appellant Sabangan Cabato appeals from the judgment of the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Zamboanga del Norte finding him guilty of the crime of ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE in Criminal Case No. 307.
The facts of the case are as follows:
In an INFORMATION dated February 12,1971, the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Norte accused
Sabangan Cabato of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE committed as follows:
That in the evening on or about the 25th day of January, 1971, ... the said accused
SABANGAN CABATO, conspiring, confederating and working together with two (2)
other DOES who are stin at large, all armed with firearms and stones and with intent
of illicit gain by means of force, violence and intimidation against persons, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the dwelling house of one VICTOR
GUINIT and once inside attack, hold tight and squeeze the mouth of Id Victor Guinit,
and hug his wife Herminia Ames Guinit, and then rob them of cash money (coins) in
the amount of P300.00; ... that in pursuance to (sic) their evil motives, during and on
the occasion of said robbery, the above-named accused taking advantage of their
superior strength and of the darkness of the night to better accomplish their purpose
and with intent to kill by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did there and
then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, strike with stones for several times
said HERMINIA AM-ES GUINIT thereby inflicting upon her several abrasions and
contusions... which caused her death on the spot;. .
xxx xxx xxx
CONTRARY TO LAW with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation, dwelling, superior strength, and without respect due to ages of the
victims (spouses) and due to the sex of Herminia Ames Guinit [Rollo, pp. 9-101.
Upon arraignment, the accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded NOT GUILTY.
During the hearings in the Trial Court, the prosecution, relying heavily on the eyewitness account of
Victor Guinit, established that:
xxx xxx xxx
Offended party Victor Guinit, 69 years old, widower, testified that he knows accused
Sabangan Cabato personally; that witness pointed to accused in open court, that on
January 25, 1971, his wife was his only companion in their house; that at around 7:30
p.m., three persons came to their house while they were taking supper; that his wife
brought food to their dog; that they have two lamps in the house, one lamp near the
bed, and another lamp brought by his wife; that the two persons [who] hugged him
covered his mouth; that the robber hit his mouth with a stone causing s tooth to fell
out (sic); that one of the robbers grappled with his wife, and the mask covering the
face fell out (sic) and his wife recognized accused Sabangan Cabato; that his wife
shouted. 'Sabangan, do not kill us, we will give you the money,- that the accused was
at a distance of three meters from him; that accused Sabangan Cabato said: "Get
your money; that she (deceased) said: "Victor, we will give the money in the piggy
bank"; that his wife went down; that later the deceased said: "Victor I do not know
where you put the money; that the robbers untied him and he went downstairs; that
he got the money and gave the same to one of the bandits; that one of the bandits
said, let us go upstairs, and got (sic) the paper bills, we want P3,000.00; that the
money given to the bandits were their saving (sic) for five years consisting of coins
which were proceeds from the sale of the bananas; that the deceased and accused
Cabato went to the kitchen; that they told the bandits that we do not have paper bills
an of the bandits struck d that they do not have P3,000.00; that one of the bandits
struck him with a pistol while the other boxed him that one of the bandits struck the
back of his head with a stone and his teeth fell out that the accused and his
companions left the house; that he noticed that wife was already dead; that he gave
the stones to the police (Exh. C, C-1, C-2); that after the bandits left, he untied
himself, that he called for held but nobody came; that he went to his two married sons
who were living uphill; that the land owned by them is two hectares; that the two
bandits wore masks. [CFI Decision, pp. 5-6,] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, the accused vehemently denied his alleged participation in the gruesome crime and
testified to the effect that:
xxx xxx xxx
...he [Cabato] knew offended party Victor Guinit and his wife since he was young; that
the home of the Guinit is one kilometer away from his house; that he visited them
323
 before as a neighbor; that the Guinit has (sic) children named Felix and Isco who are
living at tambalang ; that he never committed the crime of robbery with homicide
attributed to him; that on January 25, 1971, he was gathering corn in their farm in the
interior at Balatan, Salug together with his father-in-law; that he left Tambalang bound
for Balatan at 6:00 A.M., the same day; that he gathered corn and returned to
Tambalang at 5:00 P.M. and then pastured his carabao and stayed in his house the
whole night; that on January 25, 1971, in the evening, he did not know of any robbery;
that on January 26, 1971, he was informed by their neighbors of the robbery; that he
was Hold that the victims were the Guinits; that as a moslem he did not go to the
Guinit to give alms as they are prohibited; that be met the son of Guinit named Felix
Guinit in the house of Isco; that he went Isco Guinit to find out if the report of the
robbery of the parents of Isco is true; that Isco Guinit told him that the robbers were
not Identified; that the amount taken was P80.00; that on January 29th, he was
arested at the market of Tambalang;...[CFI Decision, pp. 12-13].
xxx xxx xxx
Faced with the issue of whether or not the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime-
barged, the Trial Court had to first settle the question concerning the positive Identification of Sabangan
Cabato as one of the robbers who killed the deceased Herminia Ames Guinit.
Weighing and evaluating the evidence on record, the Trial Court rendered the following decision:
xxx xxx xxx
There exists no doubt that accused Sabangan Cabato was clearly Identified as one of the participants in
the gruesome crime that took place in the residence of Victor Guinit on January 25, 1971. By his own
admission, accused Sabangan Cabato is well-known to the Guinit family for their houses are only one
kilometer apart. Accused Cabato visited the house of the deceased at least two times. Besides, during
the incident in question, there were two kerosene lamps in the house of Victor Guinit which illuminated
their home such that the solicitors were clearly seen. Another factor that clinched the Identification of the
accused, Sabangan Cabato, is the fact that when the deceased, Herminia Guinit grappled with the
accused Cabato, the mask woman by the accused Cabato fell so much so that the deceased
exclaimed, "Sabangan do not kill us, we will give you the money.
According to the evidence, accused Sabangan Cabato brought the deceased to the kitchen in order to
compel her to divulge the whereabouts of the P3,000.00 paper bills. But the deceased denied they had
any other money except the coins inside the bamboo tube in the approximate sum of P300.00, which
led the accused, Cabato, to strike the deceased with the stone in the head which caused cerebral
hemorrhage (Exh. A) leading to her death.
From the findings of the Sanitary Inspector who examined the injury suffered by deceased Herminia
Guinit, the cerebral hemorrhage was caused by hitting the head with a hard object presumably a stone
(Exh. C, C-1, C-2) which were (sic) found in the kitchen near the dead body.
The contention of the defense that Victor Guinit was unable to Identify any of the perpetrators for the
police blotter (Exh. 1) is devoid of merit.
According to Patrolman Mananguil and Llenes, they were informed by Victor Guinit on January 28,1971,
that accused Cabato was one of the robbers who perpetrated the crime. The investigation was
conducted in the Office of the Chief of Police and on the 29th day of January, 1971, accused Cabato
was brought for Identification in the Municipal Building of Salug. Although accused Cabato was together
with-any persons, Victor Guinit pinpointed him as one of the robbers.
The accused defense is alibi, claiming that he was in Barrio Balakan, in the house of his in-laws
gathering corn. But his testimony must be rejected for lack of sufficient corroboration. Outside of his
lone testimony, no other witness was presented to substantiate his alibi. [CFI Decision, pp. 15-17.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
Maintaining his innocence, accused appeals the decision assetting that his guilt has not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt. His Identification by the prosecution witness Victor Guinit allegedly lacked
definiteness and concreteness not to mention that it was tainted with serious inconsistencies [Brief for
the Accused, p. 1]. These alleged. inconsistencies painstakingly narated by accused.-appellant cannot
overturn the finding of guilt by the Trial Court.
Accused-appellant alleged that Victor Guinit, in his cross-examination, declared that he recognized the
accused when the place of cloth which covered the latter's mouth fell down as a result of the grappling
by the deceased [TSN, June 8, 1972, p. 2]1. But in his examination in chief, he testified that he
recognized the, accused as early as when the robbers were still at the recognized the accused as early
as when the robbers were still at the door [TSN, Jure 8, 1972, p, 14]. This is allegedly incredible
because when the robbers were at the door, they still had their marks on Brief for Accused, p, 4].
A close perusal of the direct examination of Victor Guinit would show that the Identification of Cabato
was indeed made when the latter's mask fell down.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, what did you do when you noticed that after your wife
opened the door, Sabangan Cabato bumped your wife with two (2)
other persons?
A The two (2) other persons passed towards me and hugged me;
one of them covered my mouth with his palm and I was hit by a
piece[of stone] on my nape and one of my teeth fell down.
Q Now what about this Sabangan Cabato, what did he do?
A He grappled with my wife.
Q And what happened while [he was.] grappling with your -wife?
324
 A During the course of the grappling, my wife happened to scratch
Sabangan Cabato's face and the piece of cloth used as mask fell
Q Now, how far were you from your wife and Sabangan Cabato,
while the two (2) were grappling each other?
A About three (3) meters.
Q Now, from that distance, were you able to recognize and Identify
the person grappling with your wife?
A Yes.
Q How were you able to recognize him?
A Because his mask fell down. [TSN, June 8, 1971, pp. 14-15.]
xxx xxx xxx
Accused-appellant further pointed out that Guinit, in his cross-examination, testified that he was
unconscious for 20 minutes after he was struck with a stone by one of the robbers [TSN, June 8, 1972,
P. 24). Accused alleged that if Guinit was unconscious, it was physically impossible for him to see what
happened in the kitchen between the deceased and the accused nor to see the falling down of the
mask.
However, the Identification of the accused was made by Victor Guinit even before the former proceeded
to the kitchen with the deceased. The sequence of events as culled from the records would reveal that
when the deceased was opening the door to feed the dog, three masked men bumped her on their way
into the house. Once inside, two of the masked men hugged Victor Guinit while the third grappled with
Herminia. During the course of the grappling, the wife happened to scratch the face of the masked man
as a result of which the mask fen down. This was when the Identity of the accused was revealed to the
couple with the wife exclaiming, "Sabangan, do not kill us. We will give you the money." [TSN, June
8,1972, p. 15.] At that precise time, Guinit was only three meters away from his wife. Afterwards, Guinit
proceeded to where the money was hidden then he went back into the house to hand over the money.
Not being satisfied, the robbers demanded for paper bills which the couple denied possessing. This was
when the two robbers whose Identities were not revealed, beat Guinit while Cabato went to the kitchen
with Herminia.
The other inconsistencies alleged by the accused to buttress his appeal centered on minor details.
Conceding that there may have been inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution, these far
from being badges of fraud and fabrication, can justifiably be considered as a manifestation of good
faith and a confirmation of the fact that the witness was not a rehearsed witness. It is a truism that the
most candid witness oftentimes makes mistakes but such honest lapses do not necesssarily impair his
intrinsic credibility. [People v. Alcantara, L-26967, 33 SCRA 812; People v. Canada, G. R. No. 63728,
Sept. 15, 1986, 144 SCRA 121]. Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses due only to inaccurate
expressions or honest mistake or observations are not fatal. [People v. Demalate, L-38960, March 30,
1982, 113 SCRA 353; People vs. Delavin, G.R. Nos. 73762-63, Feb. 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 257]. When
they lie.
Further, there was not even an iota of evidence presented by the accused-appellant ascribing to
prosecution witness Guinit any motive or intent to implicate the former as the person who killed his wife.
The testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense, in fact would picture the Guinits and the
Cabatos as neighbors on good terms. As the accused himself narrated, the Guinits were neighbors
whom he used to visit since he was young. In this light, Guinit's testimony becomes more credible. As
was held in one recent case:
xxx xxx xxx
We have no doubt about the credibility of Rolando Blanco [the witness"). ... The
recorda do not show any improper motive on his part to falsely implicate the
appellants in this diabolic crime. In fact, Antonio Guilbao is his first cousin. They were,
all positively identified by Blanco. [People v. Ladrera, G.R. 55339, May 21, 1987, 150
SCRA 113, 123-124.]
Accused's admissions would negate any improper motive for Guinit to testify falsely against him. In this
Summing up, the alleged inconsistencies brought forth by the accused boil down to the question of the
eyewitness' credibility.
Time and again, it has been held that the Supreme Court respects the trial court's findings on credibility
of witnesses [People v. Palon, L-33271, Feb. 20,1984,120 SCRA 529; People v. Dava Nos. L-41642-
41645, May 15, 1987, 149 SCRA 582]. The appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the
lower court for the latter is in a better position to gauge the credibility of eyewitnesses. [People v.
Mercado, G.R. No. 65152, Aug. 30,1984,131 SCRA 501] "The matter of assigning value to declarations
at the witness stand is best and most completely performed by a trial judge who, unlike appellate
magistrates can weigh such testimony in the light of the defendant's demeanor, conduct and attitude at
the time and is thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate between the true and the
false" [People v. Bermudez, L-30931, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 629, People v. Laganzon, L-47118, May
21, 1974, 129 SCRA 333, 347].
In this case, the decision of the trial court clearly outlined the evidence for both prosecution and
defense. The trial judge had observed the demeanor of both prosecution and defense witnesses on the
witness stand and found nothing amiss with the credibility of the prosecution witness.
Accused interposed alibi as his defense claiming that he was in Balakan gathering corn with his wife
and in-law [TSN, Dec. 13,1972, PP. 10-11].
Considering however that the Identification of the accused was positively established, accused's
defense of alibi becomes weak.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses by an accused especially if there is direct testimony of an
eyewitness Identifying the accused as the culprit. [U.S. v. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434 (1907); People v.
325
Coronado, G.R. No. 68932, Oct. 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 250; People v. Inot, 36790, May 29, 1987, 150
SCRA 322]. It is rarely given credence because it is easily fabricated [People v. Millarpe G.R. No.
69281, Feb. 25,1985,134 SCRA 555; People v. Petil, G.R. No. 70223, Mar. 31, 1987,149 SCRA 92].
Uncorroborated alibi, as in this case, is not credible against positive Identification (People v. Jones, G.R.
No. 61165, June 24,1985, 134 SCRA 166; People v. Canturia, G.R. No. 67598, Oct. 11, 1985,139
SCRA 280]. Alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the accused himself
without any corroboration from his wife or in-law.
xxx xxx xxx
Absence of such corroboration, in the light of the categorical statement of one of the
victims, . . . , that he saw [accused] stab Luisita Apostol because there was a lighted
post at the place of the incident ... is fatal to the defense. [People v. dela Cruz, G.R.
Nos. 71044-45, Mar. 16,1987, 148 SCRA 582, 589].
xxx xxx xxx
The Court now addresses itself to the aggravating circumstances alleged by the plaintiff-appellee to
have attended the commission of the crime.
The prosecution argues that since "the attack was by a robust man of 29 years with a huge stone
against an ageing defenseless woman" (Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 15], abuse of supe prior strength
should aggravate the crime.
The records of the case are bereft of any information with respect to the physical conditions of both the
accused and the victims. Thus, abuse of superior strength cannot be considered. This aggravating
circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties. It is considered whenever there is a
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a situation of superiority
of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken advantage of by him
in the commission of the crime. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use
excessive force out of proportion to the means of the defense available to the person attacked [People
v. Cabiling, L-38091 Dec. 17, 1976, 74 SCRA 285, 303].
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that there was indeed a notorious inequality between the
ages, sizes and strength of the antagonists and that these notorious advantages were purposely souhgt
for or used by the accused to achieve his ends.
However, the Court considers dwelling as an aggravating circumstance since it has been proven that,
indeed robbery with homicide was committed inside the house of the offended parties. Dwelling is
aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation because this class of robbery can be committed
without the necessity of trespassing the sanctity of the offended party's house [People v. Mercado, L-
39511, April 28,1980, 97 SCRA 232; People v. Dajaresco, L-32701, June 19, 1984, 129 SCRA 576;
People's vs. Gapasin, G.R. No. 52017, Oct. 27, 1986, 145 SCRA 178].
Likewise, the Court considers disguise as another aggravating circumstance. The accused, together
with two others, wore masks to cover their faces. There could have been no other purpose for this but to
conceal their Identities particularly for Cabato who was very much known to the offended parties. The
fact that the mask subsequently fell down thus paving the way for Cabato's Identification will not render
this aggravating circumstance inapplicable. In a recent case, the Court held 'that Darwin Veloso and his
five (5) companions wore masks [which eventually fell down] to conceal their Identities during the
commission of the crime constitutes disguise" [People v. Veloso, L-32900, Feb. 25, 1982, 112 SCRA
173, 182].
Robbery with homicide under Art. 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code is punishable with reclusion
perpetua to death. However, in view of Sec. 19 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution the supreme penalty
of death can no longer be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the judgment sentenced the
accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA but is MODIFIED insofar as the civil
indemnity is concerned which is hereby increased to P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BALIWANG BUMIDANG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
Accused-appellant Baliwang Bumidang (hereafter BALIWANG) was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, with the crime of rape in an information1 the accusatory portion of
which reads as follows:
That on or about September 29, 1996, in the Municipality of Villaverde, Province of Nueva Vizcaya,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
designs, taking advantage of superior strength, and by means of force, violence, threat and intimidation
and with the use of spear, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and have carnal knowledge of Gloria
Imbat y Bumatay against her will, to the damage and prejudice of said Gloria Imbat y Bumatay.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3170 and was assigned to Branch 27 of the court.
The prosecution of the case was commenced with the filing on 8 October 1996 of a complaint for rape
with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Villaverde-Quezon, Nueva Vizcaya. After appropriate
proceedings, the MCTC, having found a prima facie case against BALIWANG, forwarded the records of
the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.2
326
At the arraignment3 on 14 May 1997 BALIWANG entered a plea of not guilty and thereafter trial
ensued.
On 2 June 1997 at around 2:30 a.m., BALIWANG escaped from jail. By reason thereof, the trial court
issued an order to proceed with the trial of the case in absentia.4
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision5 on 10 July 1997, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused GUILTY of rape with the use of a deadly weapon under Art. 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, accused Baliwang Bumidang is hereby sentenced to death by lethal injection
and to pay the victim the sum of ₱30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.6
The evidence in chief for the prosecution consisted mainly of the testimonies of Gloria Imbat, the
offended party (hereafter Gloria); Melencio Imbat y Reyes, father of Gloria; and Dr. Elpidio Quines,
Municipal Health Officer of the Municipality of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya.
Since BALIWANG had escaped and has remained at large, the defense did not present any evidence.
The facts of the case are aptly summarized by the trial court in its decision which is herein quoted
verbatim:
On September 29, 1996, at around 2:00 a.m. while father and daughter, namely, Melencio and Gloria
Imbat, were already asleep in their house, the accused Baliwang Bumidang y Baohan aged 19 years
and half-naked, loudly called Melencio Imbat and asked the latter to open the door. Melencio was
aroused from his sleep and he opened the door downstairs because Bumidang threatened to kill them if
the door was not opened. Accused Bumidang entered and asked the old man to bring him upstairs.
While they were upstairs, Bumidang asked him where he was sleeping. When Melencio indicated that
he slept at the place where they were, Bumidang got a spear at the side of his (Melencio's) bed.
Pointing the weapon at him in a threatening manner, the accused ordered him to lie in a prone position
which he obeyed because he was afraid. Then Bumidang asked the room of his unmarried daughter,
Gloria, aged 56. Melencio, 80 years old, pointed the room of his daughter which was in the same room
but separated by an aparador. Bumidang went to Gloria's room, still carrying the spear. Suddenly,
Gloria screamed for help, but the octogenarian remained in a prone position as Bumidang threatened to
kill him if he would help his daughter. Bumidang, a betel nut-chewing man, approached Gloria and
poked the spear at her. She recognized him because he was lighting the room with a flashlight. The
accused ordered her to stand up and removed her pajama, with the panty going along with it. While the
accused was removing her clothes, she sat and struggled. Bumidang then removed his shortpants and
became completely naked. He used the flashlight to examine her genital. He placed the spear beside
her and whenever she attempted to move, he would point the spear at her. The accused then went on
top of her, inserted his penis into her pudenda. At this instant, Gloria shouted to her father but the
accused pointed the spear at her, and told her, "can you see this?" The accused then made a pumping
motion. After he was sated, having satisfied his lust, the accused held her breast and kissed her lips.
After resting on top of her, he went to the door and left. Melencio helplessly saw the accused on top of
her daughter but he could not move because he was too afraid and weak. He did not see how the
accused consummated his beastly desire because he was too ashamed to look at what he was doing to
her daughter. Before the accused left, he made the following threat: "If you will report to the authorities, I
will come back and kill all of you." Gloria then put on her dress. She was trembling. So she went to her
father and slept with him as she was afraid to be alone. She did not immediately report the incident in
the morning because they were afraid of the threat. She reported her ordeal to Kagawad Rodolfo
Pontillan who handed a note to be given to the authorities (security). The accused was immediately
arrested. Gloria submitted herself to the examination of Dr. Quines on October 1, 1996. Dr. Quines
conducted a vaginal examination which is an internal examination of the vagina. When the physician
introduced his index finger, severe pain was suffered by Gloria. This was due to the laceration of the
hymen at 6:00 o'clock. No spermatozoa was [sic] obtained. The laceration was about 3 to 5 days old at
the time of the examination.7
The trial court appreciated against BALIWANG the aggravating circumstances of (a) dwelling, because
the crime was committed inside the house of the victim; (b) nighttime, because the sexual assault was
perpetrated at about 2:00 a.m. to facilitate the commission of the offense; and (c) ignominy, because he
used his flashlight to examine Gloria's vagina and raped her in the presence of her old father, thereby
making its effects more humiliating.
The trial court then concluded that since the crime was committed with a deadly weapon, the prescribed
penalty therefor under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,8 is
reclusion perpetua to death, and considering the presence of three aggravating circumstances, the
greater penalty of death should be imposed pursuant to Article 63 of the same Code.
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penalty Code, as amended by Section 22 of R.A. No. 7659, the
record of the case was forwarded to this Court for automatic review.
In the Brief for the Appellant, BALIWANG submits that the trial court erred in
I. ...CONVICTING [HIM] DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. ...HOLDING THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF DWELLING, NIGHTTIME
AND IGNOMINY ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
BALIWANG contends that the declarations of complainant Gloria and of her father Melencio were
inaccurate and of doubtful veracity. Specifically, the allegations in their sworn statements dated 3
October 1996 that: (1) they allowed BALIWANG to enter their house in order to forestall the latter from
making good his warning of setting their house on fire; (2) Gloria was awake when BALIWANG made
his threats; and (3) Gloria had identified BALIWANG through his voice; which are different from or
inconsistent with their testimonies during the trial. Such being the case, the trial court should not have
given credit to their testimonies in court.
BALIWANG further argues that the imposition of the death penalty is without factual and legal basis.
The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime and ignominy were absent in the instant case.
The fact that the alleged crime was committed inside the house of Gloria cannot be considered as an
aggravating circumstance because the prosecution has failed to show clearly that BALIWANG
committed the crime with the intention to violate the sanctity of Gloria's abode. There was no showing
that BALIWANG purposely sought the cover of darkness or that nocturnity facilitated the commission of
the crime. The fact that BALIWANG shouted and used a flashlight thereby revealing his identity to the
327
victim negated the presence of nighttime as an aggravating circumstance. Ignominy was not present Gloria was clear, categorical and convincing when she testified on how she was sexually ravaged by
since the alleged examination of Gloria's private parts by BALIWANG did not in any manner make the BALIWANG. She declared:
effects of the crime more humiliating and disgraceful.
Q: Do you recall where you were in the earning morning of September 29, 1996 at around 2:00 o'clock?
In the Appellee's Brief the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) asserts that BALIWANG's criminal
complicity was established beyond reasonable doubt through Gloria's testimony of her sordid A: Yes, sir.
experience which was corroborated by her father's declaration that he witnessed BALIWANG heap his
sexual depravity on Gloria, and Dr. Quines' opinion that the fresh lacerations on Gloria's hymen may
have been caused by an erect penis. Furthermore, BALIWANG's unexplained flight erased whatever Q: Where were you?
doubt there may be on his guilt. The inconsistencies in the sworn declarations of the prosecution
witnesses vis-a-vis their testimonies in open court did not diminish their credibility for the following A: I was in our house sleeping, sir.
reasons: firstly, during the trial, prosecution witnesses Gloria and Melencio were not confronted with the
alleged inconsistencies, pursuant to Section 13, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court, in order to afford Q: Were you alone?
them an adequate opportunity to explain the discrepancies; secondly, the sworn statements or affidavits
which are usually taken ex parte do not truly reflect the state of mind of the declarant and are often
inaccurate and incomplete; and, lastly, the inconsistencies pointed to by the defense refer only to minor A: We were two with my father, sir.
details, which all the more strengthen the value of the testimonies of the witnesses.
Q: While you were sleeping on that time and date, what happened?
The OSG argues that the trial court did not err in holding that dwelling, nighttime and ignominy were
present in the instant case. That BALIWANG committed the crime of rape inside the house of Gloria, A: I felt the accused went near me, sir.
without the latter giving provocation, was sufficient to support a finding of the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling. It was not necessary to show that BALIWANG entered the
Q: How did you come to know that it was the accused who went near you?
dwelling of the offended party with the intention to commit the crime thereat. The circumstance of
nighttime was conclusively established by the fact that nocturnity allowed BALIWANG to perpetrate his
dastardly deed with impunity thereby facilitating the commission of the crime. Ignominy should also be A: He had a flashlight and I recognized him, sir.
considered because BALIWANG by his acts of examining the genital of GLORIA and raping her in the
presence of her father made the effects of the crime more humiliating and outrageous. xxx

Finally, the OSG stresses that the severity of the offense committed justifies an award of ₱75,000 to the Q: What transpired next after Baliwang Bumidang was already at that place where you were then
victim as civil indemnity pursuant to current case law. sleeping?

After a careful and thorough review of the record of the case and of the transcripts of the testimonies of A: He went near me and suddenly he poked the spear to me and ordered me to stand up, sir.
the witnesses for the prosecution, the Court finds no acceptable reason to reverse the judgment of the
trial court.
Q: What else happened when you were ordered to stand?

It is this Court's common observation drawn from judicial experience that in most rape cases the
A: Upon standing he immediately removed my pajama and that my panty went with it, sir.
criminal responsibility of the offender almost always depends on the declaration of the complainant
considering that the crime of rape is not usually committed in the presence of witnesses.9 Like in many
other rape cases, the guilt or innocence of the accused depends to a large extent on the truthfulness of Q: What did you do while the accused was removing your pajama including the panty?
the offended party's testimony. It is therefore axiomatic in rape cases that the testimony of the offended
party be subjected to a careful scrutiny. This particular case is not an exception. In ascertaining whether A: I sat and struggled, sir.
to believe the version of the prosecution or that of the defense, this Court calls to mind the well-
entrenched principle that the conclusion of the trial court as regards the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses is generally viewed as correct and is accorded the highest respect considering that it is in a Q: What did the accused Bumidang do while you were already sitting and struggling?
better position to discern and weigh the conflicting testimonies of the witnesses during trial. There are
exceptions to this rule, such as when the evaluation was reached arbitrarily or when the trial court A: He removed his pants. He got his flashlight and used it in examining my genital, sir.
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which if
considered would affect the result of the case.10 None of the exceptions is present in this case. Q: Where was the spear while he was examining your private parts?

328
A: He placed it at my side and if I would move he would point the spear at me, sir.
Q: What did the accused do after he removed his pants as you have stated?
A: He went on top of me and inserted his penis into my vagina, sir.
Q: What did you do when the accused was on top of you inserting his penis?
A: I called my father but he said (referring to the accused) can you see this? (referring to the spear).
Q: What was your purpose in calling your father?
A: I do not know because after inserting his penis to my vagina I said, "Amang."
Q: After the accused inserted his penis into your vagina, what else did he do next?
A: He made a pumping motion, sir.
Q: For how long had he been doing that?
A: I did not count and I was not in my right mind at that time, sir.
Q: After the pumping, what did he do?
A: He held my breast and kissed my lips, sir.
Q: After that, what transpired next?
A: He rested on top of me and then went down, sir.
Q: Where did he go if he went somewhere?
A: He proceeded towards the door and left, sir.11
On the basis of the foregoing narration of events, the Court sees no material flaw sufficient to discredit
Gloria's testimony which the trial court found convincing enough and which remains unrebutted by the
defense. Surely, nothing can be more credible and persuasive than the testimony of the defiled woman
and her old father who were one in spirit in fighting for truth and justice to prevail.
There is no merit in the argument of BALIWANG that the trial court should not have given credence to
the testimonies of Gloria and her father as they were allegedly fraught with inconsistencies. The
argument is anchored on the alleged disparity between their testimonies given in open court and their
statements in their affidavits. However, the alleged inconsistencies are too minor to affect the credibility
of Gloria and Melencio. Settled is the rule that discrepancies or inconsistencies on minor matters do not
impair the essential integrity of the prosecution's evidence as a whole or reflect on the witness’ honesty.
Such inconsistencies, which may be caused by the natural fickleness of memory, even tend to
strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the witness because they erase any suspicion of
rehearsed testimony.12 Likewise, BALIWANG cannot capitalize on the alleged flaws in the affidavits.
Being taken ex parte, affidavits are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open
court, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestion or for want
of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected
collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his
accurate recollection of all that belongs to the subject.13
We shall now dissect the trial court's appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling,
nighttime and ignominy.
The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.14 There was a clear
violation of the sanctity of the victim's place of abode when Gloria, who apparently did not gave any
provocation, was raped in her own house. Dwelling is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily
because of the sanctity of privacy the law accords to human abode.15
Nighttime is an aggravating circumstance16 when (1) it is especially sought by the offender; (2) it is
taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring the offender's
immunity from capture.17 In this case, other than the fact that the crime was committed at about 2:00
o'clock in the morning, nothing on the record suggests that BALIWANG deliberately availed himself or
took advantage of nighttime nor proved that BALIWANG used the darkness to facilitate his evil design
or to conceal his identity.1âwphi1
The aggravating circumstance of ignominy18 shall be taken into account if means are employed or
circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the offense; or if the crime
was committed in a manner that tends to make its effects more humiliating to the victim, that is, add to
her moral suffering.19 It was established that BALIWANG used the flashlight and examined the genital
of Gloria before he ravished her. He committed his bestial deed in the presence of Gloria's old father.
These facts clearly show that BALIWANG deliberately wanted to further humiliate Gloria, thereby
aggravating and compounding her moral sufferings. Ignominy was appreciated in a case where a
woman was raped in the presence of her betrothed,20 or of her husband,21 or was made to exhibit to
the rapists her complete nakedness before they raped her.22
The crime of rape is defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
In the case at bar, the prosecution established that BALIWANG committed the crime charged with the
use of a deadly weapon, i.e., with a spear. Accordingly, pursuant to the 3rd paragraph of Article 335, of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, a rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. The aggravating circumstances of dwelling and ignominy having been
duly proven, the greater penalty of death shall be imposed, applying Article 63, paragraph 2, no. 1,
Revised Penal Code, which provides that when an aggravating circumstance is present in the
commission of an offense, the penalty for which is composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater
penalty should be imposed.
The Court finds it fitting to award Gloria the sum of ₱20,000 as exemplary damages since the crime was
committed with at least one aggravating circumstance, pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
Likewise, it is appropriate to award Gloria an amount of ₱50,000 by way of moral damages even in the
329
absence of proof therefore in accordance with the ruling in People v. Prades.23 Lastly, the civil
indemnity of ₱30,000 awarded by the trial court is hereby increased to ₱75,000 pursuant to the policy
enunciated in recent case law.24
WHEREFORE, the 10 July 1997 decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, in Criminal Case No. 3170 finding accused-appellant BALIWANG BUMIDANG guilty of rape
with the use of a deadly weapon and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is hereby
AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the victim
Gloria Imbat, the sums of ₱75,000 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000 as moral damages and ₱25,000 as
exemplary damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon finality of this decision, let the certified true copies of the records of this case be forthwith
forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISRAEL CARMINA alias "Boy" and VALERO CARMINA, accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
The grisly details of the killing cannot be told without revulsion, but they must be told. It is unbelievable
that it happened in this day and age and not in a distant and savage time when brutality was a way of
life and death when it came aroused no special reverence. This case belongs to that barbaric past.
The victim was Jose Billy Agotano, who was only twenty years old when he was killed in cold blood.
According to the prosecution, the killers were Valero Carmina, the herein accused-appellant, and his
son Israel Carmina, also known as Boy.
The two were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Mati, Davao Oriental, in an information reading
as follows:
That on or about November 15, 1986, in the Municipality of Tarragona, Province of Davao
Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with treachery and
evident premeditation, armed with garand rifles and sharp-pointed bolo (pinuti), and with intent
to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said
garand rifle one JOSE BILLY AGOTANO, thereby inflicting upon the latter wound which
caused his death, and not contended with that, with the use of the said bolo, accused
slaughtered the dead body of said Jose Billy Agotano.
The commission of the crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances of abuse of
superior strength and adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime.
Only Valero Carmina could be arraigned and tried because Israel disappeared and remains at large to
date. After trial, the accused-appellant was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment.** He was
also required to pay civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 to the victim's heirs plus the costs of
the suit.1
The case for the prosecution was established mainly through the testimony of two eyewitnesses,
namely, Victoriano Agotano, the victim's brother, and Ramon Katiad, in whose yard the crime was
committed.
Victoriano testified that he and Billy were on their way home from their farm when they were intercepted
at gunpoint by Valero, his wife Ernita, their son Israel, and Aileen Masanguid at about 2:30 o'clock in the
afternoon of November 15, 1986. Valero had a carbine, Israel a Garand rifle and a hunting knife, and
Ernita a bolo at her waist. The group accused Billy of being a "pulahan" because of the red t-shirt he
had wrapped around his head to cover it from the rain. The two of them were taken to the nearby house
of Dionisio Megriño, where Billy was struck in the forehead by Valero and in the chest by Israel with the
handle of their respective firearms.
The group stayed there for about thirty minutes, and then Victoriano and Billy were ordered to march to
their brother Alfredo's house, with their captors trailing them closely. He, Billy and Alfredo, together with
two other persons named Pilo and Roger, who happened to be in the house at the time, were ordered to
fall in line and sing "Bayang Magiliw." When they reached the line "Ang mamatay nang dahil sa iyo,"
Valero and Israel told them, "You shall die." Twenty minutes later, they were all taken to a cousin of the
Agotanos from whom the Carminas demanded tuba, rice and chickens. Alfredo, Roger and Pilo were
forced to drink the tuba with Valero and Israel. The drinking lasted for two hours. Then the Carminas
decided to leave, taking with them Victoriano and Billy, who were ordered to carry a kettle, the rice and
the chickens.
The group walked to the house of Ramon Katiad about one and a half kilometers away and arrived
there at 6:30 p.m. Katiad was not there at the time but came home at about seven o'clock. The
Agotanos cooked the rice and roasted the chickens which they and the Carminas ate. Katiad and his
family had their own supper later.
At about ten o'clock, Israel told Billy, "You can no longer be home, Do." When asked why, he replied:
"Because you are wearing a red cloth around your head." Katiad pleaded that Israel not do anything in
his house but Israel said, "I am going to kill him." In desperation and fear, Victoriano told Billy to kneel
before Israel and beg for his life, which Billy did. But to no avail. Israel took Billy with him downstairs
while Valero detained Victoriano in the house, pointing his rifle at him.
In the yard, Israel pushed Billy from behind and then shot him, hitting him in the nape. Billy died as he
fell to the ground. Israel then stripped and exposed the dead body. He went back to the house to get his
mother's bolo and ordered Victoriano to go down and look at his brother's corpse. The Katiad family
330
(including the children) was also told to go to the yard. When everyone had gathered around the dead
body, they watched in horror at the gruesome acts that followed.
Israel chopped off Billy's arms and legs. Then he beheaded the corpse and, raising the severed head,
shouted "Taganlang," meaning God. He cut open the stomach and pulled out the intestines. He hung
these around Victoriano's neck, saying, "You use this as your necklace, the intestines of your younger
brother." Going back to the dismembered corpse, he pulled out the liver and the lungs. Triumphantly
raising them, he shouted. "We will use this as pulutan!"
Having done all this, Israel then turned his attention to Victoriano and said, "I will kill you next!" He
lunged at Victoriano but lost his balance and the latter was able to parry the blow. Victoriano ran for his
life! It was, as he put it later, "a suicide run." Israel pursued and took a shot at him but missed.
Victoriano made good his escape. Arriving at about two o'clock in his mother's house, he reported what
had happened and warned the family that the Carminas were after them. Under cover of darkness even
as deathly fear stalked them, they took refuge in a neighbor's house. Later in the morning, they reported
the killing to the authorities.
Victoriano's narration of the killing and slaughter was corroborated by Katiad, the other eyewitness. He
added the distasteful detail that after shooting Billy to death, Israel broke into happy song: "Siga-siga sa
baryohan, hindi natatakot sa barilan!" He said that the Carminas took him with them after Victoriano's
escape but finally released him after about fifteen minutes. Later, he and several policemen gathered
the parts of the dismembered corpse that were scattered in his yard and put them in a sack.
Valero's defense was alibi. He declared under oath that at the time of the murder, he was hiding in the
mountains of Manay from the family of Elnoro Badadao, whom he "was forced to kill" over a land
dispute. He denied knowing the Agotanos and Megriño but admitted that Katiad was his friend and
former neighbor. He said the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were all lies because the last
time he was in Ompao was in 1983.
Charito Garsona, the only other witness for the defense, testified that on November 15, 1986, the
accused-appellant and three other persons passed by her house in Manay, Davao Oriental, at about 4
o'clock in the afternoon and asked for food.
In his brief, the accused-appellant contends that he should not be blamed for the killing of Billy Agotano,
granting arguendo that it was Israel who killed the victim and dismembered his corpse. Israel, if at all,
should be held accountable alone for his act. The fact that the accused-appellant did not try to escape
but yielded when he was arrested should indicate his innocence, which should be presumed in the
absence of proof of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
There is indeed such proof. His alibi must fall not only because of its inherent weakness but also
because of his positive identification by the two eyewitnesses, one of whom was his near-victim and the
other his compadre.
While it is true that it was not he who actually shot and later dismembered Jose Agotano, the evidence
has clearly established a conspiracy between him and his son that makes him equally guilty with the
latter. The two of them acted in concert in the conception and execution of the killing. The decision to kill
Billy was reached by the two of them although it was Israel who personally implemented it. while Israel
did his part in the killing yard, Valero detained Victoriano in the house at gunpoint and watched the
shooting and dismemberment of Billy. As a father, Valero made no move to restrain his son; on the
contrary, he watched with approval as Israel carried out their joint decision.
The crime was qualified with treachery because, although the victim was forewarned of his impending
death, he was shot in the back while he was entirely defenseless and the killers were under no risk
whatsoever from any retaliation the victim might make. In People v. Barba,2 the accused pointed a rifle
at the victim from a distance of six meters and said, "Pardong, stand up, we are going to shoot you!"
With hands raised, the victim pleaded, "Do not kill me, investigate first what was my fault!" This Court
held there was treachery when the accused shot and killed the victim.
Even if treachery were not present in this case, the crime would still be murder because of the
dismemberment of the dead body. One of the qualifying circumstances of murder under Article 248, par.
6, of the Revised Penal Code is "outraging or scoffing at (the) person or corpse" of the victim. There is
no question that the corpse of Billy Agotano was outraged when it was dismembered with the cutting off
of the head and limbs and the opening up of the body to remove the intestines, lungs and liver. The
killer scoffed at the dead when the intestines were removed and hung around Victoriano's neck "as a
necklace" and the lungs and liver were facetiously described as "pulutan."
Although the information did not categorically allege this qualifying circumstances in the exact words of
the law, it was nevertheless deducible from the statement that the "accused slaughtered the dead body
of said Jose Billy Agotano."
Thus, in People v. Obenque,3 the information charged "that after thus shooting Sergio Cabradilla, the
accused Elpidio Obenque in the furtherance of his criminal design, loaded the body of his victim in the
Volkswagen Brasilia Sedan with Plate No. BEE 164, Series of 1977 and with utmost cruelty, dump the
corpse in a ravine . . . ." It was held that this act of the accused constituted an outrage of or scoffing at
the corpse of the victim.
We agree with the trial court that evident premeditation should be disregarded because sufficient time
had not elapsed between the determination to commit the crime and its execution, to enable the
accused to reflect upon the consequences of their act. It is not certain that when early in that afternoon,
Valero told the captives in Megriño's house that they would die, the Carminas had already definitely
resolved to commit the murder. In fact, although the threat was made to all of the captives, only Billy
was killed in the end. Moreover, there was no showing that they had coolly and dispassionately planned
the execution of the offense. The events leading to the murder suggest that the Carminas were from the
start busy with oppressing the Agotanos or drinking tuba, leaving no time for that detached and
undisturbed premeditation of the murder. It was only when they were in Katiad's house that the decision
to kill Billy was made, the justification being that "we have already maltreated him, this time we will just
finish him because he might retaliate."
Abuse of superior strength was also correctly not considered, being absorbed in alevosia.
But it was incorrect to appreciate adding ignominy to the offense because the victim was already dead
when his body was dismembered. This aggravating circumstance requires that the offense be
committed in a manner that tends to make its effects more humiliating to the victim, that is, add to his
moral suffering.4
331
On the other hand, the fact that Valero yielded when he was apprehended did not operate to mitigate
the penalty because mere non-resistance to arrest is not considered voluntary surrender.
What possessed the killers in the commission of their nauseating acts can only be left to incredulous
conjecture.1âwphi1 What is certain is that whether it was caused by fanatic ideology, or plain
intoxication, or an innate bestiality, the bizarre desecration of the corpse was utterly disgusting and
deserves the strongest if helpless condemnation. The penalty prescribed by law, which is only reclusion
perpetua, does not seem severe enough.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The sentence imposed, except only as to the civil indemnity,
which is increased to P50,000.00, is AFFIRMED. It is so ordered.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NORBERTO MANERO, JR., EDILBERTO MANERO, ELPIDIO MANERO, SEVERINO LINES, RUDY
LINES, EFREN PLEÑAGO, ROGER BEDAÑO, RODRIGO ESPIA, ARSENIO VILLAMOR, JR., JOHN
DOE and PETER DOE, accused.
SEVERINO LINES, RUDY LINES, EFREN PLEÑAGO and ROGER BENDAÑO, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romeo P. Jorge for accused-appellants.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This was gruesome murder in a main thoroughfare an hour before sundown. A hapless foreign religious
minister was riddled with bullets, his head shattered into bits and pieces amidst the revelling of his
executioners as they danced and laughed around their quarry, chanting the tune "Mutya Ka Baleleng", a
popular regional folk song, kicking and scoffing at his prostrate, miserable, spiritless figure that was
gasping its last. Seemingly unsatiated with the ignominy of their manslaughter, their leader picked up
pieces of the splattered brain and mockingly displayed them before horrified spectators. Some accounts
swear that acts of cannibalism ensued, although they were not sufficiently demonstrated. However, for
their outrageous feat, the gangleader already earned the monicker "cannibal priest-killer" But, what is
indubitable is that Fr. Tulio Favali1 was senselessly killed for no apparent reason than that he was one
of the Italian Catholic missionaries laboring in heir vineyard in the hinterlands of Mindanao.2
In the aftermath of the murder, police authorities launched a massive manhunt which resulted in the
capture of the perpetrators except Arsenio Villamor, Jr., and two unidentified persons who eluded arrest
and still remain at large.
Informations for Murder,3 Attempted Murder4 and Arson5 were accordingly filed against those
responsible for the frenzied orgy of violence that fateful day of 11 April 1985. As these cases arose from
the same occasion, they were all consolidated in Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Kidapawan,
Cotabato.6
After trial, the court a quo held —
WHEREFORE . . . the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr. alias
Commander Bucay, Edilberto Manero alias Edil, Elpidio Manero, Severino Lines,
Rudy Lines, Rodrigo Espia alias Rudy, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, and with the aggravating
circumstances of superior strength and treachery, hereby sentences each of them to
a penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua; to pay the Pontifical Institute of
Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, the congregation to which Father Tulio Favali
belonged, a civil indemnity of P12,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00
for each of the eight (8) accused or a total sum of P400,000.00; court appearance fee
of P10,000.00 for every day the case was set for trial; moral damages in the sum of
P100,000.00; and to pay proportionately the costs.
Further, the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr. alias Commander Bucay
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Arson and with the application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years, nine (9) months, one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum, and to
indemnify the Pontifical Institute of Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, the congregation
to which Father Tulio Favali belonged, the sum of P19,000.00 representing the value
of the motorcycle and to pay the costs.
Finally, the Court finds the accused Norberto Manero, Jr., alias Commander Bucay,
Edilberto Manero alias Edil, Elpidio Manero, Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Rodrigo
Espia alias Rudy, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Attempted Murder and with the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences each of them to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of not less than two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, and minimum, to eight (8) years and twenty (20) days of
prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the complainant Rufino Robles the sum of
P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and P2,000.00 as court appearance fee for every day
of trial and to pay proportionately the costs.
The foregoing penalties shall be served by the said accused successively in the order
of their respective severity in accordance with the provisions of Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.7
From this judgment of conviction only accused Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago and Roger
Bedaño appealed with respect to the cases for Murder and Attempted Murder. The Manero brothers as
well as Rodrigo Espia did not appeal; neither did Norberto Manero, Jr., in the Arson case.
Consequently, the decision as against them already became final.
332
Culled from the records, the facts are: On 11 April 1985, around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the
Manero brothers Norberto Jr., Edilberto and Elpidio, along with Rodrigo Espia, Severino Lines, Rudy
Lines, Efren Pleñago and Roger Bedaño, were inside the eatery of one Reynaldo Diocades at Km. 125,
La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato. They were conferring with Arsenio Villamor, Jr., private secretary to
the Municipal Mayor of Tulunan, Cotabato, and his two (2) unidentified bodyguards. Plans to liquidate a
number of suspected communist sympathizers were discussed. Arsenio Villamor, Jr. scribbled on a
cigarette wrapper the following "NPA v. NPA, starring Fr. Peter, Domingo Gomez, Bantil, Fred Gapate,
Rene alias Tabagac and Villaning." "Fr. Peter" is Fr. Peter Geremias, an Italian priest suspected of
having links with the communist movement; "Bantil" is Rufino Robles, a Catholic lay leader who is the
complaining witness in the Attempted Murder; Domingo Gomez is another lay leader, while the others
are simply "messengers". On the same occasion, the conspirators agreed to Edilberto Manero's
proposal that should they fail to kill Fr. Peter Geremias, another Italian priest would be killed in his
stead.8
At about 1:00 o'clock that afternoon, Elpidio Manero with two (2) unidentified companions nailed a
placard on a street-post beside the eatery of Deocades. The placard bore the same inscriptions as
those found on the cigarette wrapper except for the additional phrase "versus Bucay, Edil and Palo."
Some two (2) hours later, Elpidio also posted a wooden placard bearing the same message on a street
cross-sign close to the eatery.9
Later, at 4:00 o'clock, the Manero brothers, together with Espia and the four (4) appellants, all with
assorted firearms, proceeded to the house of "Bantil", their first intended victim, which was also in the
vicinity of Deocades' carinderia. They were met by "Bantil" who confronted them why his name was
included in the placards. Edilberto brushed aside the query; instead, he asked "Bantil" if he had any
qualms about it, and without any provocation, Edilberto drew his revolver and fired at the forehead of
"Bantil". "Bantil" was able to parry the gun, albeit his right finger and the lower portion of his right ear
were hit. Then they grappled for its possession until "Bantil" was extricated by his wife from the fray.
But, as he was running away, he was again fired upon by Edilberto. Only his trousers were hit. "Bantil"
however managed to seek refuge in the house of a certain Domingo Gomez. 10 Norberto, Jr., ordered
his men to surround the house and not to allow any one to get out so that "Bantil" would die of
hemorrhage. Then Edilberto went back to the restaurant of Deocades and pistol-whipped him on the
face and accused him of being a communist coddler, while appellants and their cohorts relished the
unfolding drama. 11
Moments later, while Deocades was feeding his swine, Edilberto strewed him with a burst of gunfire
from his M-14 Armalite. Deocades cowered in fear as he knelt with both hands clenched at the back of
his head. This again drew boisterous laughter and ridicule from the dreaded desperados.
At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his motorcycle. He entered the house of
Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his co-accused Pleñago towed the motorcycle outside to the
center of the highway. Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned
the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved and rejoiced. 12
Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But the latter simply stepped
backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At this point, Edilberto asked the priest: "Ano ang
gusto mo, padre (What is it you want, Father)? Gusto mo, Father, bukon ko ang ulo mo (Do you want
me, Father, to break your head)?" Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at the head of the priest. As Fr.
Favali dropped to the ground, his hands clasped against his chest, Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if that
was the only way he knew to kill a priest. Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate
body three (3) times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the head of
Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr., flaunted the brain to the terrified
onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their comrades-in-arms
who now took guarded positions to isolate the victim from possible assistance. 13
In seeking exculpation from criminal liability, appellants Severino Lines, Rudy Lines, Efren Pleñago and
Roger Bedaño contend that the trial court erred in disregarding their respective defenses of alibi which,
if properly appreciated, would tend to establish that there was no prior agreement to kill; that the
intended victim was Fr. Peter Geremias, not Fr. Tulio Favali; that there was only one (1) gunman,
Edilberto; and, that there was absolutely no showing that appellants cooperated in the shooting of the
victim despite their proximity at the time to Edilberto.
But the evidence on record does not agree with the arguments of accused-appellants.
On their defense of alibi, accused brothers Severino and Rudy Lines claim that they were harvesting
palay the whole day of 11 April 1985 some one kilometer away from the crime scene. Accused Roger
Bedaño alleges that he was on an errand for the church to buy lumber and nipa in M'lang, Cotabato,
that morning of 11 April 1985, taking along his wife and sick child for medical treatment and arrived in
La Esperanza, Tulunan, past noontime.
Interestingly, all appellants similarly contend that it was only after they heard gunshots that they rushed
to the house of Norberto Manero, Sr., Barangay Captain of La Esperanza, where they were joined by
their fellow CHDF members and co-accused, and that it was only then that they proceeded together to
where the crime took place at Km. 125.
It is axiomatic that the accused interposing the defense of alibi must not only be at some other place but
that it must also be physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. 14
Considering the failure of appellants to prove the required physical impossibility of being present at the
crime scene, as can be readily deduced from the proximity between the places where accused-
appellants were allegedly situated at the time of the commission of the offenses and the locus criminis,
15 the defense of alibi is definitely feeble. 16 After all, it has been the consistent ruling of this Court that
no physical impossibility exists in instances where it would take the accused only fifteen to twenty
minutes by jeep or tricycle, or some one-and-a-half hours by foot, to traverse the distance between the
place where he allegedly was at the time of commission of the offense and the scene of the crime. 17
Recently, we ruled that there can be no physical impossibility even if the distance between two places is
merely two (2) hours by bus. 18 More important, it is well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail
over
the positive identification of the authors of the crime by the prosecution witnesses. 19
In the case before Us, two (2) eyewitnesses, Reynaldo Deocades and Manuel Bantolo, testified that
they were both inside the eatery at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 April 1985 when the
Manero brothers, together with appellants, first discussed their plan to kill some communist
sympathizers. The witnesses also testified that they still saw the appellants in the company of the
Manero brothers at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon when Rufino Robles was shot. Further, at 5:00 o'clock
that same afternoon, appellants were very much at the scene of the crime, along with the Manero
brothers, when Fr. Favali was brutally murdered. 20 Indeed, in the face of such positive declarations
333
that appellants were at the locus criminis from 10:00 o'clock in the morning up to about 5:00 o'clock in Q Aside from those persons listed in that paper to be killed, were
the afternoon, the alibi of appellants that they were somewhere else, which is negative in nature, cannot there other persons who were to be liquidated?
prevail. 21 The presence of appellants in the eatery at Km. 125 having been positively established, all
doubts that they were not privy to the plot to liquidate alleged communist sympathizers are therefore A There were some others.
removed. There was direct proof to link them to the conspiracy.
Q Who were they?
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to
commit it. 22 It is not essential that all the accused commit together each and every act constitutive of
the offense. 23 It is enough that an accused participates in an act or deed where there is singularity of A They said that if they could not kill those persons listed in that
purpose, and unity in its execution is present. 24 paper then they will (sic) kill anyone so long as he is (sic) an Italian
and if they could not kill the persons they like to kill they will (sic)
make Reynaldo Deocades as their sample.
The findings of the court a quo unmistakably show that there was indeed a community of design as
evidenced by the concerted acts of all the accused. Thus —
That appellants and their co-accused reached a common understanding to kill another Italian priest in
the event that Fr. Peter Geremias could not be spotted was elucidated by Bantolo thus 29 —
The other six accused, 25 all armed with high powered firearms, were positively
identified with Norberto Manero, Jr. and Edilberto Manero in the carinderia of
Reynaldo Deocades in La Esperanza, Tulunan, Cotabato at 10:00 o'clock in the Q Who suggested that Fr. Peter be the first to be killed?
morning of 11 April 1985 morning . . . they were outside of the carinderia by the
window near the table where Edilberto Manero, Norberto Manero, Jr., Jun Villamor, A All of them in the group.
Elpidio Manero and unidentified members of the airborne from Cotabato were
grouped together. Later that morning, they all went to the cockhouse nearby to finish Q What was the reaction of Norberto Manero with respect to the
their plan and drink tuba. They were seen again with Edilberto Manero and Norberto plan to kill Fr. Peter?
Manero, Jr., at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day near the house of Rufino
Robles (Bantil) when Edilberto Manero shot Robles. They surrounded the house of
Domingo Gomez where Robles fled and hid, but later left when Edilberto Manero told A He laughed and even said, "amo ina" meaning "yes, we will kill
them to leave as Robles would die of hemorrhage. They followed Fr. Favali to him ahead."
Domingo Gomez' house, witnessed and enjoyed the burning of the motorcycle of Fr.
Favali and later stood guard with their firearms ready on the road when Edilberto xxx xxx xxx
Manero shot to death Fr. Favali. Finally, they joined Norberto Manero, Jr. and
Edilberto Manero in their enjoyment and merriment on the death of the priest. 26
Q What about Severino Lines? What was his reaction?

From the foregoing narration of the trial court, it is clear that appellants were not merely innocent
A He also laughed and so conformed and agreed to it.
bystanders but were in fact vital cogs in perpetrating the savage murder of Fr. Favali and the attempted
murder of Rufino Robles by the Manero brothers and their militiamen. For sure, appellants all assumed
a fighting stance to discourage if not prevent any attempt to provide assistance to the fallen priest. They Q Rudy Lines.
surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez to stop Robles and the other occupants from leaving so that
the wounded Robles may die of hemorrhage. 27 Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to ensure success A He also said "yes".
of the commission of the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. The appellants acted
in concert in the murder of Fr. Favali and in the attempted murder of Rufino Robles. While accused-
Q What do you mean "yes"?
appellants may not have delivered the fatal shots themselves, their collective action showed a common
intent to commit the criminal acts.
A He also agreed and he was happy and said "yes" we will kill him.
While it may be true that Fr. Favali was not originally the intended victim, as it was Fr. Peter Geremias
whom the group targetted for the kill, nevertheless, Fr. Favali was deemed a good substitute in the xxx xxx xxx
murder as he was an Italian priest. On this, the conspirators expressly agreed. As witness Manuel
Bantolo explained 28 — Q What about Efren Pleñago?

A He also agreed and even commented laughing "go ahead".

334
 Q Roger Bedaño, what was his reaction to that suggestion that THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUAN MARQUI, Defendant-Appellant.
should they fail to kill Fr. Peter, they will (sic) kill anybody provided
he is an Italian and if not, they will (sic) make Reynaldo Deocades Alejo Mabanag for Appellant.
an example?
Solicitor-General Harvey for Appellee.
A He also agreed laughing.
SYLLABUS

Conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design being sufficiently shown, the act of one is
the act of all the other conspirators, and
the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary. 30
The award of moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 to the congregation, the Pontifical Institute
of Foreign Mission (PIME) Brothers, is not proper. There is nothing on record which indicates that the
deceased effectively severed his civil relations with his family, or that he disinherited any member
thereof, when he joined his religious congregation. As a matter of fact, Fr. Peter Geremias of the same
congregation, who was then a parish priest of Kidapawan, testified that "the religious family belongs to
the natural family of origin." 31 Besides, as We already held, 32 a juridical person is not entitled to moral
damages because, not being a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such
sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock. It is only when a
juridical person has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation, that moral
damages may be awarded.
1. CRIMINAL LAW; EVIDENCE; NEGOTIATIONS FOR COMPROMISE. — The weight of authority and
reason sustains the rule which admits evidence of offers to compromise, in criminal cases, but permits
the accused to show that such offers were not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid
the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused
that the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal
consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
2. ID.; ARTICLE 11, PENAL CODE. — The beneficent provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code, as
amended by Act No. 2142 of the Philippine Legislature, are peculiarly applicable to offenders who are
shown to be members of those uncivilized tribes, and to other offenders who, as a result of the fact that
their lives are cast with such people far away from the centers of civilization, appear to be so lacking in
"instruction and education" that they should not be held to so high a degree of responsibility as is
demanded of those citizens who have had the advantage of living their lives in contact with the refining
influences of civilization.

Neither can We award moral damages to the heirs of the deceased who may otherwise be lawfully
entitled thereto pursuant to par. (3), Art. 2206, of the Civil Code, 33 for the reason that the heirs never
presented any evidence showing that they suffered mental anguish; much less did they take the witness
stand. It has been held 34 that moral damages and their causal relation to the defendant's acts should
be satisfactorily proved by the claimant. It is elementary that in order that moral damages may be
awarded there must be proof of moral suffering. 35 However, considering that the brutal slaying of Fr.
Tulio Favali was attended with abuse of superior strength, cruelty and ignominy by deliberately and
inhumanly augmenting the pain and anguish of the victim, outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse,
exemplary damages may be awarded to the lawful heirs, 36 even though not proved nor expressly
pleaded in the complaint, 37 and the amount of P100,000.00 is considered reasonable.
With respect to the civil indemnity of P12,000.00 for the death of Fr. Tulio Favali, the amount is
increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with existing jurisprudence, which should be paid to the lawful
heirs, not the PIME as the trial court ruled.
3. ID.; ID.; THEFT AND ROBBERY. — While it is true that this court has quite uniformly held that
convicts of the crimes of theft and robbery were not entitled to the benefits of the provisions of article 11
of the Penal Code prior to its amendment by Act No. 2142: Held, That under the provisions of the article
thus amended, the courts may and should, even in cases of theft and robbery, take into consideration
the lack of instruction and education of the offender where it appears that under all the circumstances
attending the commission of the offense, he should not be held to the strict degree of responsibility
prescribed in the Code for the ordinary offender.
4. ID.; ID.; ID. — Mere ignorance or lack of education will not always be sufficient to justify the mitigation
of the prescribed penalties for crimes such as theft or robbery, though cases may and will arise wherein
under all the "circumstances attending" the commission of these offenses the benefits of the provisions
of this article as amended should be extended to convicts of these offenses.
DECISION

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from being in accord with law and the evidence is AFFIRMED
with the modification that the civil indemnity which is increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 is CARSON, J. :
awarded to the lawful heirs of the deceased plus exemplary damages of P100,000.00; however, the
award of moral damages is deleted.
The appellant in this case was convicted in the court below of the theft of a caraballa and her calf, and
Costs against accused-appellants. sentenced to imprisonment for a period of five years, to suffer the accessory penalties prescribed by
law, and to pay his share of the costs of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Counsel for the accused contends that the trial court erred in giving probative value to the testimony of
one Dagsa, the principal witness for the prosecution; in accepting proof as to certain extrajudicial
admissions alleged to have been made by the accused, including an offer to compromise the case by
335
the payment of a sum of money; and in declining to accept as true the testimony of the accused in his admission of guilt, or as disclosing possession of the property which is the subject of the burglary and
own behalf at the trial. We find nothing in the record, however, which would justify us in disturbing the larceny charged in the indictment. (State v. Rodrigues, 45 La. Ann., 1040; 13 Southern, 802.)
findings of the trial judge as to the degree of credit which should be accorded the various witnesses
called at the trial. It may be shown that the prisoner sent a message to the prosecutor, proposing to take a whipping and
to be let go. (State v. DeBerry, 92 N. C., 800.)
Counsel rests his contention that evidence as to the extrajudicial statements made by the accused
should have been excluded on the ground that, as counsel insists, there is no formal proof in the record We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, but we are of opinion that in
that they were made voluntarily, and that they were therefore inadmissible as proof in so far as they can imposing the penalty the trial court should have taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance
be construed as admission or confessions of guilt. In answer to this contention it is sufficient to say that the manifest lack of "instruction and education" of the offender. It does not clearly appear whether he is
there is no suggestion in the record in the court below that these extrajudicial statements were not made or is not an uncivilized Igorot, although there are indications in the record which tend to show that he is.
voluntarily, and we are satisfied that if the evidence as to the circumstances under which these But in any event, it is very clear that if he is not a member of an uncivilized tribe of Igorot, he is a
incriminating statements were made accepted as true it clearly rebuts the possibility that they were densely ignorant and untutored fellow, who lived in the Igorot country, and is not much, if any, higher
made involuntarily, or extorted by force, threats, or promise of reward. The record clearly discloses that than are they in the scale of civilization. The beneficent provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code as
these extrajudicial statements were made in the course of offers to compromise and that they were amended by Act No. 2142 of the Philippine Legislature are peculiarly applicable to offenders who are
made by the accused voluntarily, though doubtless these offers to compromise were made in the hope shown to be members of these uncivilized tribes, and to other offenders who, as a result of the fact that
that if accepted he would escape prosecution. their lives are cast with such people far away from the centers of civilization, appear to be so lacking in
"instruction and education" that they should not be held to so high a degree of responsibility as is
The question as to the admissibility of offers to compromise in criminal cases has frequently been demanded of those citizens who have had the advantage of living their lives in contact with the refining
discussed in the courts of the United States, and the practice there does not appear to be wholly influences of civilization.
uniform. We think, however, that the weight both of authority an of reason sustains the rule which
admits evidence of offers to compromise, but permits the accused to show that such offers were not It is true that this court has quite uniformly held that convicts of the crimes of theft and robbery are not
made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for entitled to the benefits of the provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code prior to its amendment by Act
some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in No. 2142, this on the theory that under the provisions of the article prior to its amendment the ground
truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily upon which the courts were authorized in their discretion to mitigate the penalties prescribed by the
ensue therefrom. code was "the circumstance of the offender being a native, mestizo, or Chinese." As to crimes of this
nature we declined to hold that the mere fact that one is a native of the Philippine Islands, a mestizo or
Satisfaction to the owner of the goods stolen is admissible, as evidence against the accused, but if a Chinese would justify a claim that upon conviction of crimes such as theft or robbery he should be
made merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment, and not under a consciousness of guilt, it is treated more leniently than the members of any other race or people, no sound presumption arising
not evidence. (U. S. v. Hunter, 1 Cranch, C.C., 317.) from the mere racial affiliation of the convict that he was less able to appreciate the criminal character of
such offenses or to resist the temptation to commit them than are they.
In a prosecution for seduction, evidence that the accused had sought an adjustment with the prosecutrix
is inadmissible, if such offer of adjustment did not contain an admission of guilt. (Wilson v. State, 73 Under the provisions of the article as amended by Act No. 2142, the ground upon which the courts are
Ala., 527.) authorized to mitigate the prescribed penalties is not the racial affiliation of the convict, but "the degree
of instruction and education of the offender;" and while mere ignorance or lack of education will not
On a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape upon a married woman, evidence is admissible always be sufficient to justify the mitigation of the prescribed penalties for crimes such as theft and
on behalf of the prosecution to show that the defendant sent a third person to the father of the robbery, there can be no doubt that cases may and will arise wherein under all the "circumstances
prosecutrix to ascertain if the case could be compromised. (Barr v. People, 113 Ill., 471.) attending" the commission of these offenses the exercise of a sound discretion will justify a more lenient
treatment of an ignorant and semicivilized offender, than that which should be accorded one who has
In a larceny case, evidence is not admissible to show that defendant stated that he would pay $50 if it had the advantage of such a degree of instruction and education as would fully and properly
could be settled, in reply to threats by the owner of the goods stolen that he would prosecuted for understanding and appreciating the criminal character of the offense committed by him.
damages, and a solicitation to settle. (Frain v. State, 40 Ga., 530.)
We conclude, therefore, that under the provisions of article 11 as amended by Act No. 2142, the courts
In a prosecution for larceny, evidence is not admissible that the defendant paid a sum of money in may and should, even in cases of theft and robbery should, even in cases of theft and robbery, take into
settlement of a civil action brought to recover the property alleged to have been stolen. (State v. consideration the lack of instruction and education of the offender where it appears that under all the
Emerson, 48 Iowa, 172.) circumstances attending the commission of the offense, he should not be held to the strict degree of
responsibility prescribed in the code for the ordinary offender.
An offer of compromise, voluntarily made by the accused, without threat or promise, and the reply
thereto, are admissible in evidence upon his trial for a crime. (State v. Bruce, 33 La. Ann., 186.) The larceny was of large cattle and falls within articles 517, 518, and 520 of the Penal Code, as
amended by Act No. 2030. According to those sections, as amended, the value of the animals stolen
An offer compromise of a crime, unaccepted by the prosecutor, may be proven by the state as an being 650 pesetas, a penalty one degree higher than arresto mayor in its medium degree to presidio

336
correctional in its minimum degree should have been imposed; in other words, presidio correctional in
its medium degree to presidio mayor in its minimum degree. Giving the convict the benefit of the
provisions of article 11 of the Penal Code, as amended, this penalty should be imposed its minimum
degree — that is to say, the penalty applicable in this case is that of presidio correctional in its medium
degree.
Modified by imposing the penalty prescribed for the offense of which the defendant and appellant was
convicted in the minimum degree — that is to say, by imposing upon accused the penalty of two years
four months and one day of presidio correctional, in lieu of that of five years’ imprisonment imposed by
the court below — the judgment convicting and sentencing him should be is hereby affirmed, with the
costs of this instance against the Appellant.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
KIICHI OMINE, EDUARDO AUTOR, LUIS LADION, and AGAPITO CORTESANO, defendants-
appellants.
Jose Ma. Capili and Habana and Quimpo for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
VICKERS, J.:
Defendants appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao finding them guilty of
frustrated homicide, with the aggravating circumstance that advantage was taken of their superior
strength, and sentencing each of them to suffer an indeterminate sentence from six years of prision
correccional to twelve years of prision mayor, to indemnify Angel Pulido jointly and severally in the sum
of P540, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the corresponding costs.
The only assignment of error made by the attorneys for the defendants is that the lower court erred in
convicting the appellants, and in not acquitting them with the costs de oficio.
The first question to be considered is the participation of the several defendants in the commission of
the crime.
It appears from the evidence that the defendant Eduardo Autor, Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano
were working on the hemp plantation of Angel Pulido under the direction of their co-defendant Kiichi
Omine, who was the overseer or manager, with a compensation of ten per cent of the gross receipts.
The four defendants lived together in a house on the plantation.
Kiichi Omine asked Angel Pullido for permission to open a new road through the plantation. According
to the offended party he refused to grant this request because there was already an unfinished road.
Kiichi Omine on the other hand contends that Angel Pulido gave him the permission requested and he
began work on December 24, 1933. When Angel Pulido and his son, Hilario, accompanied by Saito
Paton and a Moro by the name of Barabadan, were returning home from the cockpit that evening they
noticed that a considerable number of hemp plants had been destroyed for the purpose of opening a
new road. Angered by the destruction of the hemp plants, Angel Pulido and his party went to the house
of the defendants, who had just finished their supper. There is a sharp conflict in the evidence as to
what followed. The witnesses for the prosecution contend that while the offended party was talking with
Omine, Eduardo Autor attempted to intervene, but was prevented by Hilario Pulido; that Eduardo Autor
attacked Hilario Pulido with a bolo, but did not wound him except on the left thumb; that Luis Ladion and
Agapito Cortesano then held Angel Pulido by the arms, and when Eduardo Autor approached, Omine
shouted to him "pegale y matale", and Autor struck Angel Pulido in the breast with his bolo.
Kiichi Omine, Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano on the other hand maintain that the offended party
and his son were the aggressors; that the first to arrive was Hilario Pulido, who after applying to Kiichi
Omine an offensive epithet and asking him why he had grubbed up the hemp plants, struck him in the
breast with brass knuckles; that when Eduardo Autor attempted to intervene, Angel Pulido and his son
attacked him their fists, Hilario Pulido him on the right cheek with brass knuckles; that Luis Ladion and
Agapito Cortesano ran away before Angel Pulido was wounded by Eduardo Autor; that Kiichi Omine
never uttered the words attributed to him or urged Autor to strike Angel Pulido.
The only eyewitness for the prosecution were the offended party and his son, and a Bagobo, named
Saito, who was their relative and lived with them. Barabadan was not presented as a witness. The
witnesses for the defense were the four appellants.
The offended party received only one wound. Only one blow struck, and it was struck by Eduardo Autor.
The anger of Angel Pulido and his son was, however, directed chiefly against Kiichi Omine, who was
responsible for the destruction of the hemp plants. There was obviously no conspiracy among the
defendants, but the offended party and his son and his relative, Saito, narrated the facts of the incident
in such away that all the four defendants would appear to be equally responsible for the injury sustained
by the offended party. The evidence does not convince us that Ladion and Cortesano took any part in
the fight; on the contrary it inclines us to believe that they ran away and were not present when Angel
Pulido was wounded. This impression is strengthened by the fact that they were not included in the
original complaint subscribed and sworn not by the offended party on December 29th. They were not
included as defendants until the amended complaint was filed on February 19, 1934. But if they were
present and held the offended party by the arms, as alleged by him, the evidence does not show that
they held him for the purpose of enabling Eduardo Autor to strike him with his bolo. If they did in fact
intervene, it may have been for the purpose of preventing the offended party and his son from
continuing their attack on Omine. There was no need for Ladion and Cortesano to hold Angel Pulido in
order to enable Eduardo Autor to strike him with his bolo, or for Kiichi Omine to induce him to do so by
shouting "pegale y matale". According to the witness for the prosecution, Hilario Pulido and Eduardo
Autor had already struck each other in the face with their fists, and Eduardo Autor had received a blow
in the right eye, and then struck Hilario Pulido with his bolo. Angel Pulido would naturally intervene in
the fight between his son and Eduardo Autor, and if he did so, Autor, who had already drawn his bolo,
would strike him without the need of any inducement from Omine. Furthermore, under the
circumstances of this case, even if it were satisfactorily proved that Kiichi Omine uttered the words in
question, we are of the opinion that they would not be sufficient to make him a principal by induction,
because it does not appear that the words uttered by Kiichi Omine caused Eduardo Autor to strike
Angel Pulido. In the first place, as we have indicated, Eduardo Autor had already other reasons for
striking Angel Pulido when Omine is alleged to have uttered the words of inducement. In the second
place, the words in question were not in this particular case sufficient to cause Eduardo Autor to strike
the offended party with his bolo. Although Eduardo Autor was working under the direction of Omine,
apparently according to the testimony of Angel Pulido, he was being paid by Pulido. It does not appear
that Omine had any particular influence over Eduardo Autor. The cases cited by the Solicitor-General of
a father giving orders to his son are obviously different from the case at bar.
337
In the leading case of the United States vs. Indanan (24 Phil., 203), it was held that in order that a
person may be convicted of a crime by inducement it is necessary that the inducement be made directly
with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement be the
determining cause of the commission of the crime. In that case various decisions of the Supreme Court
of Spain illustrating the principles involved and their application to particular cases were cited with
approval. One of the decisions cited was that of April 24, 1871, where it was held that one who, during a
riot in which a person was killed, said to one of the combatants, "Stab him! Stab him!", it not appearing
the he did anything more than say these words except to be present at the fight, was not guilty of the
crime of homicide by inducement. The Supreme Court of Spain said: "Considering that, although the
phrases pronounced were imprudent and even culpable, they were not so to the extent that they may be
considered the principal and moving cause of the effect produced; direct inducement cannot be inferred
from such phrases, as inducement must precede the act induced and must be so influential in producing
the criminal act that without it the act would not have been performed." Another decision cited was that
of December 22, 1883, where it was held that a father who simply said to his son who was at the time
engaged in combat with another. "Hit him! Hit him!", was not responsible for the injuries committed after
such advice was given.
Commenting upon No. 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code, which has been incorporated in the Revised
Penal Code without change as No. 2 of article 17, Viada says that in order that, under the provisions of
the Code, such act can be considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or such words
have great dominance and great influence over the person who acts, that it is necessary that they be as
direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself. (2 Viada, 386, 5th
Edition.)
We are therefore of the opinion that the co-defendants of Eduardo Autor are not responsible for the
injury inflicted by him on Angel Pulido.
The lower court, taking into consideration the nature and location of the wound of the offended party,
found that it was the intention of the defendant Eduardo Autor to kill the offended party, and accordingly
found said defendant guilty of frustrated homicide, but in our opinion the evidence does not justify this
finding. It is true that the wound was serious and in a vital part of the body, but judging from the nature
of the wound, which was about eleven inches in length, extending from the breast to the lower ribs on
the right side, we think it is probable that it was caused by the point of the bolo on a downward stroke. It
was not a stab wound, and was probably given during a commotion and without being aimed at any
particular part of the body. As we have already stated, Eduardo Autor struck the offended party only
once. This fact tends to show that it was not his intention to take the offended party's life. If he had so
intended, he could easily have accomplished his purpose, so far as the record shows. It might be
contended that Eduardo Autor did not strike the offended party a second time, because he thought that
he had already killed him. This was apparently the theory of the prosecution, because the offended
party and his witnesses testified that the offended party dropped down unconscious when he was
wounded, but the evidence does not seem to us to sustain that contention. In the first place a cutting
wound like that in question would not ordinarily render the injured man immediately unconscious.
In the second place it appears from the affidavit of Saito, one of the witnesses for the prosecution, that
Angel Pulido did not fall down unconscious; but swayed and asked for help, while the blood was flowing
from his breast and stomach; that Saito approached the wounded man to support him and take him
home.
It is a rule that in a case of physical injuries the court must be guided by the result unless the intent to
kill is manifest.
When criminal liability is made to consist in the intention to perform an act which was not
realized, the facts from which it is claimed that intention sprang must be such as to exclude all
contrary supposition. When this intention is not necessarily disclosed by the acts performed by
the defendant, greater importance should not be given to such acts than that which they in
themselves import, nor should the defendant's liability be extended beyond that which is
actually involved in the material results of his act. Intention may only be deduced from the
external acts performed by the agent, and when these acts have naturally given a definite
result, the courts cannot, without clear and conclusive proof, hold that some other result was
intended. (U.S. vs. Mendoza, 38 Phil., 691.)
There is no merit in the contention of Eduardo Autor that Angel Pulido was accidentally wounded in a
struggle for the possession of the offended party's bolo. That claim is disproved by the affidavit of Autor,
Exhibit E, executed on December 26, 1933, where he stated that he snatched out his bolo and struck
Angel Pulido in the stomach because Pulido was very aggressive.
We are therefore of the opinion that Eduardo Autor is guilty of lesiones graves, since the offended party
was incapacitated for the performance of his usual work for a period of more than ninety days, and not
of frustrated homicide.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed as to Kiichi Omine, Luis Ladion, and
Agapito Cortesano, and they are acquitted with the proportionate part of the costs de oficio. As to the
appellant Eduardo Autor, the decision of the lower court is modified, and he is convicted of lesiones
graves and sentenced to suffer one year, eight months, and twenty-one days of prision correccional, to
indemnify the offended party in the sum of P540, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
which shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the corresponding costs. In
accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum sentence to be served by him is fixed at
one year of prision correccional.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERDINAND SUAREZ, alias "Jojo", LORETO REYES, alias "Dondon" and "Larry" WILFREDO
LARA alias "Cortal" and Willy"; MARIA VICTORIA G. SUAREZ; NOLI LICSI, alias "Niño";
VICENTE RODRIGUEZ, alias "Waway"; and MORRIS SANTOS, alias. "Wanky", accused,
WILFREDO LARA, accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
In the early hours of December 8, 1987, Arlene Tuyor was awakened by loud knocking sounds on the
door of her room. She was a domestic helper at that time, working in the household of Estrellita
338
Guzman at 22 Sta. Teresita Street, Barrio Capitolyo, Pasig, Metro Manila. Also in the house then were
the nieces of Estrellita, namely, Maria Prescilla Guzman (Babyruth), Maria Cristina Guzman (Cristy) and
Maria Victoria Suarez (Marivic). Babyruth and Marivic had been adopted by Estrellita as her own
daughters. Marivic's husband, Ferdinand Suarez (Jojo), and her three children likewise lived in
Estrellita's bungalow-type house.
Upon opening the door, Tuyor was surprised to see Ferdinand Suarez, her "Señorito Jojo," surrounded
by two men wearing black nylon cloths over their heads and faces. One of the men had a big body
frame while the other had a small physique. The men immediately entered her room, tied her up land
asked for her money. She was also asked if she knew Jojo. Getting no response from Tuyor, the
intruders left her room bringing Suarez with them.
From her room, Tuyor heard the sound of the microwave oven located in the kitchen. She also heard
the main door of the house slamming and someone crying in the house. When Tuyor went out of her
room, she saw Marivic weeping in the living room. She proceeded to her employer's bedroom and found
Estrellita bleeding and lying on her bed. All this time, accused Suarez was just sitting on the chair of the
piano.1
Estrellita later died due to severe hemorrhage secondary to stab wounds. Post-mortem examinations
revealed that she had sustained an elliptical and gaping wound on the right side of her abdomen and
another wound of the same nature on the left side of her back. Further examination also disclosed that
the deceased suffered an incised wound on her left thumb.2
When police investigators arrived at the scene of the crime, they found a half-eaten chicken on the
dining table,3 four pieces of black nylon cloth,4 pieces of blue and white ropes,5 three pieces of cloth,6
and two strands of ordinary
wire.7 They initially surmised that the intruders had forcibly entered the house through its back door
located in the kitchen.8 They arrived at this conclusion after finding a piece of wire inserted in the knob
of the kitchen door9 and its chain lock's anchor detached from the doorjamb. However, the door's dead
bolt lock was intact and in perfect condition.10
Ferdinand Suarez narrated to Patrolman Pablo Roxas11 of the Eastern Police District (EPD) at Meralco
Avenue, Pasig what he claimed to have experienced on that fateful day, in this wise:
At around 3:00 A.M. of December 8, 1987, he was awakened by someone holding his hands and
putting a piece of rag in his mouth. When he opened his eyes, he saw somebody pointing a knife at him
and another at his wife. He saw inside their room six men with nylon cloths over their faces. When he
was about to resist, one of the men hit him on the face and threatened to kill him, his wife and his
children. After they had tied and gagged him and also covered his eyes, the men brought him out to the
dining room. He heard the door of Estrellita being pushed open, and then Estrellita shouting.
Afterwards, he was brought to the room shared by Cristy and Babyruth and mauled in front of them.
After that, he was brought to the room of Arlene Tuyor. From the maid's room, he was again brought-to
the dining room where he was tied to one of the chairs of the dining table. From there, he heard the men
cooking with the use of the microwave oven in the kitchen. After a while, Estrellita cried loudly and
called for Marivic. He later heard the running of the engine of one of their cars and the main door being
slammed shut. After the men left at about five o'clock in the morning, he discovered that the trespassers
had taken some things in the house such as a television set, a radio, a betamax and other household
items.
As the police were getting no leads about the identity of the malefactors, the lawyer of the family of the
deceased sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The case was assigned to Atty.
Salvador Ranin. Atty. Ranin concluded that the perpetrators could not have entered the house without
the aid of somebody inside as the bolt lock of the kitchen door can only be released from within. He had
one suspect in mind, that is, Ferdinand Suarez, or Jojo.12
Ranin had discovered in the course of his investigation that there were no signs of injuries or rope
marks on Suarez and that he was not on good terms with Estrellita when the crime happened. He was
even found positive for deception after taking the polygraph test at the NBI. Suarez eventually revealed
to Ranin his involvement in the commission of the crime after Ranin told him that he had damaging
information to the effect that Suarez had left the house in the evening of December 7, 1987.
In his sworn statement13 before the NBI, Suarez said that one Loreto Reyes, alias "Dondon" or Larry,
approached him during the last week of November, 1987 and talked to him to allow Reyes and his
group to rob their house as they badly needed money for the Christmas season. It was only after the
group threatened to kill him that Suarez acceded to their demand, on the condition that they would only
steal but should not kill him.
On November 29, 1987, Suarez gave to Reyes and his gang the keys to the door of the house, the door
of Babyruth's and Cristy's room, and the door of Estrellita's room in order to have them duplicated. He
returned to Reyes and the others on December 5, 1987 to receive instructions on what to do. He was
told that the group would go to their place in the early morning of December 8, 1987. On the agreed
date, at around twelve o'clock noon, Suarez disengaged the bolt lock of the kitchen door and unlocked
the door of their rooms as earlier instructed by the gang.
The felons arrived at the house at around two o'clock in the morning and proceeded to Suarez and
Marivic's room. Suarez saw four men with covers on their faces, but he recognized one of them as
Reyes through his voice and build. They immediately bound Marivic and when one of the members of
the gang was about to tie up Suarez, Reyes stopped him.
After Suarez was dragged out of the room, he told the group who were the occupants of the different
rooms in the house. Two men entered the room of Babyruth and Cristy while Reyes and the fourth man
went to Estrellita's room. They were able to enter Estrellita's room with the use of their duplicate key and
after they had kicked open the door of her room.; Estrellita shrieked when they went inside her room.
The two men brought Suarez to his sisters-in-law's room to point out to them what they could get from
that room. Afterwards, he was brought to the dining table. From there, he saw the men asking Estrellita
for the keys of the gate of the house and the car. After they brought Estrellita back to her room, two of
the men brought Suarez to the maid's quarters.
Reyes asked Suarez to cook a chicken he found in the refrigerator While Suarez was cooking the
chicken in the microwave oven, the men took off the covers on their faces, smoked marijuana and drank
liquor. They were not able to finish eating the chicken because it was not evenly cooked. When
Estrellita shouted the name of Marivic, Rodriguez, one of the companions of Reyes, went to her room.
Suarez heard only soft and fading moans from Estrellita after that.
339
Before they left, the marauders told Suarez not to tell the police or the NBI or else they would kill his
mother, They slammed the front door shut and used the car of Estrellita to leave the house at around
five o'clock in the morning.
The NBI soon found out that "Dondon" or Larry is Loreto Reyes, a former neighbor of Suarez in San
Miguel, Pasig where he used to live before he transferred to his wife's residence at Barrio Capitolyo.14
Reyes also admitted his participation in the commission of the crime and gave a written statement15 to
the NBI.
He began his confession by implicating Wilfredo Lara in the crime. He said that while he, Arthur Lara,
Morris Santos, and Eduardo Lozada were doing nothing in their place in San Miguel, Pasig, Lara
approached them and told them that he had some good news. Lara told them that he was asked by
Suarez to look for some men who could kill his Auntie Estrellita. Reyes could not believe what he heard,
so Lara called Suarez to let him tell the gang about his offer.
Apparently, Suarez wanted his aunt killed so that he and his wife could get at once any property that
Marivic might inherit from Estrellita upon the latter's demise. In exchange for the job, Suarez would
allow them to steal what they wanted from the house, in addition to giving them P100,000.00 after one
month from the killing of Estrellita.
They initially planned to carry out the criminal plot on December 5, 1987 but the group of Reyes backed
out on the agreed date when they felt unsure about the plan. However, they had duplicates made of the
keys to the house, which keys had been left by Suarez under one of Estrellita's cars. The plan finally
materialized on December 8, 1987 at about two o'clock in the morning. The persons who were to
execute the plan were Noli Licsi, Vicente Rodriguez, Morris Santos, and Reyes. Before they went to
Capitolyo, the group took some prohibited drugs and smoked marijuana.
Aided by the sketch of the house provided by Suarez, the group went directly to the back of the house
and opened the back door with their duplicate key. As agreed upon earlier, Suarez had released the bolt
and chain lock of the said door to facilitate their entry into the house. Once inside, Suarez, who was
waiting for them there, instructed them to tie him and his wife. After doing so, they opened the
bedrooms of Babyruth, Cristy and Estrellita. The men then tied them up inside their respective rooms.
Since Santos and Licsi were the ones who entered Cristy's and Babyruth's room, Reyes could not be
sure what they got from those rooms.
Reyes further revealed that before they went into the house, Suarez had earlier loosened the screws of
the chain lock on the door of Estrellita's room. So, with their duplicate key and a little push from outside,
Reyes and Rodriguez were able to easily enter Estrellita's room. As Estrellita was surprised by the entry
of the two men, she instinctively held the knife being brandished by Reyes which thereby cut her thumb.
The two men then tied Estrellita.
It was after the gang was able to tie all the occupants of the house that they started taking the betamax,
jewelry, computer machine, camera, watches and other things inside the house. Estrellita Guzman
pointed out to them where they could find her jewelry. They brought Suarez inside her room so that he
could also show them where Estrellita's other jewelry and valuables were, and then they covered her
with a blanket.
After taking what they wanted, the scoundrels ate the chicken Suarez had cooked for them and drank
the imported liquor he offered. They also smoked marijuana.·While they were drinking, Suarez
remembered the maid, Tuyor, so he and two men went to her room and staged a show of their mauling
Suarez in front of her. They then tied the maid and continued drinking outside. Thereafter, Suarez told
the gang to kill Estrellita. Reyes said that Santos and Rodriguez were the ones who stabbed Estrellita
because they told him later that each of them stabbed the old lady once.
Before Reyes and the gang left the place, Marivic told them to get their television ranger and to
disarrange the things in their room to show that the couple was not spared by the criminals. Suarez
ordered them to cut the telephone line and Reyes did so. Then, Suarez told Reyes to pull the chain lock
of the kitchen door to make it appear that the door had been forced open from outside. Reyes complied
with Suarez instructions. To hide the fact that a duplicate key was used in opening the kitchen door, the
perpetrators inserted a wire in the doorknob keyhole of the kitchen door upon the prodding of Suarez.
The intruders left the house at around four o'clock in the morning. In getting out of the house, the gang
used the front door and rode in one of the cars of Estrellita. From the statement of Reyes, it appears
that the cabal wore black nylon cloths over their heads and faces when they committed the despicable
crime.
Atty. Ranin was able to retrieve the duplicate keys used by the gang16 from the father of Reyes17 after
Reyes had admitted that the keys could be found in his father's house in Montalban. Wilfredo Lara was
arrested by the NBI at the house of his parents-in-law in Northern Samar. When brought to the NBI
office at Taft Avenue, Manila, he likewise confessed his participation in the crime and gave a sworn
statement.18
According to Lara, Suarez went to his house at San Miguel, Pasig on December 2, 1987 to ask him if he
knew people who would be willing and capable of robbing a house. Lara told him that there were some
persons he knew who could do the job and he brought Suarez to the group of Larry Reyes, Noli Licsi,
Morris Santos and Vicente Rodriguez at Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel, Pasig. When Reyes and Suarez
started talking, Lara left the place.
On December 4, 1987, Lara saw Suarez talking with the same group in front of a store. He overheard
them planning the robbery .of a house in Barrio Capitolyo on December 8, 1987. On December 7, 1987,
he again saw Suarez and the gang when they agreed to consummate their earlier plan. Lara denied that
he joined the group that robbed the house in Barrio Capitolyo and added that he never received any
share of the loot from them. He did not report the matter to the police for fear of reprisal. He even went
to the place of his in-laws at Nabas, Samar to avoid the group.
Based on the foregoing statements and on other evidence submitted by the NBI to the then provincial
fiscal of the former municipality of Pasig, an information for the crime of robbery with homicide was filed
against Ferdinand Suarez, Loreto Reyes, Wilfredo Lara, Maria Victoria G. Suarez, Noli Licsi, Vicente
Rodriguez, and Morris Santos. The case was raffled to Branch 152 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig19 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 72249.
As stated in the information, which was twice amended, the felony was allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of December, 1987 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
340
 named accused, conspiring and confederating together with one Mauro Santos
whose true identity and present whereabout is still unknown and mutually helping and
aiding with one another, by means of force, violence and intimidation employed upon
the person of one Estrellita Guzman did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, rob and carry away from the house of said Estrellita Guzman the
following articles, to wit:
a. Jewelry
b. Computer machine
c. TC Sony Ranger
d. Radio Cassette
e. Five (5) assorted cameras and other valuables
all in the total amount of P650,000.00 more or less; that on the occasion of the said
robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take, rob and carry away the articles
above-mentioned, herein accused; conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding with one another, armed with bladed weapons, with intent
to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab said Estrellita
Guzman, thereby causing the latter to sustain fatal injuries which directly caused her
death.20
Only accused Suarez, Reyes and Lara were brought within the jurisdiction of the lower court as the
other accused went into hiding and were able to evade the joint manhunt set up by the police and the
NBI. Suarez, Reyes and Lara pleaded not guilty despite their earlier confessions before the NBI.
Although they admitted that they signed and placed their thumbmarks on their respective statements,
they tried to show during their trial that those statements were procured through coercion, intimidation
and violence by the NBI agents and without the assistance of counsel. Accused Suarez reiterated the
earlier version he gave to the EPD, while accused Reyes and Lara raised the defense of alibi by
claiming that they were respectively at Montalban, Rizal and Samar at the time the crime was
committed.
The prosecution however, presented witnesses who were present during the taking of the statements of
the accused and they testified that those statements were given freely and voluntarily, and were take
with observance of the constitutional guarantees, during the custodial investigation.
Relying on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused and on the circumstantial evidence adduced by
the prosecution, the trial court found the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with
homicide, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to solidarily pay to the
heirs of the victim P30,000.00 as death indemnity, P420,00.00 for loss of earning capacity, and the
costs.21
While Suarez and Reyes have already accepted the trial court's verdict, Lara now questions the lower
court's decision by challenging the admissibility of their extrajudicial declarations marked as Exhibits O,
P and Q. He claims that their extrajudicial confessions were obtained through force and intimidation and
without the benefit of an effective counsel.22
It is important to note at the outset that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the judgment of
conviction imposed upon Suarez and Reyes for they have not filed any notice of appeal for
themselves.23 And while we are cognizant of the rule that the right to claim the inadmissibility of an
extrajudicial confession is personal in nature, in the sense that only the confessant whose rights during
an investigation were violated can raise an objection,24 we deem it necessary to discuss in this appeal
the circumstances surrounding the execution of Reyes's sworn statement in evaluating appellant Lara's
own extra curia declaration. Although an extrajudicial confession is admissible only against the
confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to
establish the guilt of his co-accused.25
The lower court treated the confessions of the three accused as interlocking confessions sufficient to
corroborate and bolster the truth of each accused's own incriminating statements. This doctrine of
interlocking confessions has been accepted and recognized in numerous decisions of this Court as an
exception to the res incer alios acta rule and the hearsay rule. 26 Reyes' confession is thus admissible
against Lara to show the probable involvement of the latter in the perpetration of the crime. Where the
confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by an accused co-
conspirator, that confession is receivable as evidence against him.27
But while herein appellant does not deny the validity and operation of the above rule in his situation, he
maintains that his co-accused's confessions must comply with the requirements found in Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution before they can be considered probative of his guilt.28 We see no need to
rule on the admissibility of Suarez' statement because Lara was never mentioned or implicated therein.
What interests us is that of Reyes, since appellant Lara claims alleged violence, torture and
maltreatment suffered by him and Reyes at the hands of the NBI agents.
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we agree with the lower court's factual finding and
conclusion that the extrajudicial confessions of accused Reyes and appellant Lara were freely and
voluntarily given and that their retraction and claims of violence and coercion were merely belated
contrivances and efforts at exculpation. Their claim that they were forced to sign their respective
statements was sufficiently refuted by the witnesses for the prosecution who were present on the day
and time the duo gave and signed their sworn statements.29
Once the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-
interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of
proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue.30 The burden is on the accused to destroy this
presumption.31 A confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a
result of violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency.32
The sworn statements signed by accused Reyes and appellant Lara state that they had been informed
of their rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Reyes stated that he had been assisted by counsel
during the custodial investigation and appellant Lara confirmed that he was assisted by a lawyer when
he waived his constitutional rights. Additionally, several witnesses for the People testified before the
lower court that the constitutional mandates were observed during their investigation. Reyes and Lara
were not even able to show any evil or dubious motive corrosive of the credibility of these witnesses
whom the court a quo found more worthy of belief than the witnesses for the defense.
Accused failed to submit any evidence, apart from their own testimony, that violence and intimidation
had been inflicted upon them to extort their sworn confessions. They never complained to Prosecutor
Capistrano nor to anyone else about the physical beatings that they claim had been inflicted upon them.
They did not ask for medical assistance and there was no proof that any such request was denied.
341
Although Reyes submitted a medical certificate to attest to supposed injuries, the court below did not
believe it and accepted it merely to prove its existence.33
Extrajudicial confessions independently made without collusion, almost identical with each other in their
essential details which could have been known only to the declarants, and corroborated by other
evidence against the person or persons implicated to show the probability of the latter's actual
participation in the commission of the crime, are thus impressed with features of voluntariness in their
execution.34 Also, the failure of an accused to complain to the swearing officer35 or to file charges
against the persons who allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do so, manifests
voluntariness in the execution of the confession.36
We find no merit in herein appellant's contention that Atty. Saunar was not Reyes' own choice as
counsel for the interrogation. While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under
custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police
investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and
ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where
he never raised any objection against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation
and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.37
Here, while the lawyers of the accused were provided by the NBI, the accused never signified their
desire to have a lawyer of their own choice. Thus, we also disagree with appellant's claim that the
lawyer who assisted him in his waiver came in only after he had executed his waiver. His own
statements shows that he waived his rights in the presence and with the advice of Atty. Rodolfo
Dahiroc.
To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his
client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might
incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would
lead the accused to admit something false.38 The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused
from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.39 Hence, absent any showing that the lawyers who assisted
the accused were remiss in their duties, it can be safely concluded that the custodial investigation of
Reyes and Lara were regularly conducted.40
Even disregarding for a moment Reyes' extrajudicial declaration, appellant Lara can still be held
accountable under his own sworn statement. Well-entrenched is the rule that it is not necessary that an
eyewitness should testify to having seen the accused committing the crime or had seen him under
circumstances indicating his having committed the crime, before the accused may be held liable under
his confession.41 This is how much weight and credence our jurisprudence gives to a confession. The
Rules of Court42 provide that "(t)he declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him."
Of course, when the confession is made outside of court proceedings, it must be accompanied by
evidence of the corpus delicit to be sufficient for conviction.43 If it is made freely and voluntarily, a
confession constitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no
sane person or one of a normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the
perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and
conscience.44 Withal, appellant Lara did not appeal in vain. Although he himself admitted his role in the
crime of robbery with homicide, we deem it just and equitable to delineate in this decision his exact
criminal liability even though he failed to clearly raise it before us.
We reject the prosecution's theory and the trial court's conclusion that appellant acted as a lookout
during the commission of the special complex crime. The prosecution did not present any evidence
showing that he took part in the planning or execution of the crime nor any proof indicating that he
profited from the fruits of the crime, or of acts indicative of confederacy on his part.
The pictures of the reenactment depicting Lara's role in the commission of the crime45 cannot be
utilized as evidence of his participation as a principal therein as that reenactment was conducted
without any lawyer assisting appellant. We have held that reenactments are covered by the right against
self-incrimination.46 Atty. Ranin himself admitted on the witness stand that no lawyer assisted Lara
during the reenactment because he could not find any available lawyer at that time who could act as his
counsel.47
From Reyes and appellant's confessions, which we believe bear the mark of truth and credibility, it can
only be inferred that Lara merely introduced the group of Reyes to Suarez. With such a nominal role, we
cannot conscientiously declare that Lara was a co-conspirator or a principal by inducement or
indispensable cooperation in the crime of robbery with homicide.
Where the accused does not fall under any of the three concepts of principals defined in Article 17 of
the Revised Penal Code, he may only be considered guilty as an accomplice.48 And where there is no
showing of conspiracy or confabulation on his part, and the extent of the accused's participation in the
crime is uncertain, he should be given the benefit of the doubt and be declared as a mere accomplice
therein.49 We are sufficiently persuaded to declare appellant as a mere accomplice in the crime
charged.
WHEREFORE, the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant Wilfredo Lara is hereby MODIFIED and he
is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The death indemnity awarded by the court a quo is hereby INCREASED to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) in line with present case law and policy, to be assessed against the accused and herein
appellant in accordance with Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code.
In all other respects, the judgment of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
LITO VINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Frisco T. Lilagan for petitioner.
342
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue posed in the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the resolution of this Court dated
January 18, 1989 denying the herein petition is whether or not a finding of guilt as an accessory to
murder can stand in the light of the acquittal of the alleged principal in a separate proceeding.
At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March 21, 1985, Roberto Tejada left their house at Burgos
Street, Poblacion, Balungao, Pangasinan to go to the house of Isidro Salazar to watch television. At
around 11:00 P.M., while Ernesto, the father of Roberto, was resting, he heard two gunshots.
Thereafter, he heard Roberto cry out in a loud voice saying that he had been shot. He saw Roberto ten
(10) meters away so he switched on the lights of their house. Aside from Ernesto and his wife, his
children Ermalyn and Julius were also in the house. They went down to meet Roberto who was crying
and they called for help from the neighbors. The neighbor responded by turning on their lights and the
street lights and coming down from their houses. After meeting Roberto, Ernesto and Julius saw Lito
Vino and Jessie Salazar riding a bicycle coming from the south. Vino was the one driving the bicycle
while Salazar was carrying an armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto's house, they stopped to watch Roberto.
Salazar pointed his armalite at Ernesto and his companions. Thereafter, the two left.
Roberto was brought to the Sacred Heart Hospital of Urdaneta. PC/Col. Bernardo Cacananta took his
ante-mortem statement. In the said statement which the victim signed with his own blood, Jessie
Salazar was Identified as his assailant.
The autopsy report of his body shows the following-
Gunshot wound
POE Sub Scapular-5-6-ICA. Pal
1 & 2 cm. diameter left
Slug found sub cutaneously,
2nd ICS Mid Clavicular line left.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Tension Hemathorax 1
Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with murder in a complaint filed by PC Sgt. Ernesto N.
Ordono in the Municipal Trial Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. However, on March 22, 1985, the
municipal court indorsed the case of Salazar to the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) inasmuch
as he was a member of the military, while the case against Vino was given due course by the issuance
of a warrant for his arrest. Ultimately, the case was indorsed to the fiscal's office who then filed an
information charging Vino of the crime of murder in the Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan.
Upon arraignment, the accused Vino entered a plea of not guilty. Trial then commenced with the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution. Instead of presenting evidence in his own behalf, the
accused filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence to which the prosecutor filed an answer.
On January 21, 1986, 2 a decision was rendered by the trial court finding Vino guilty as an accessory to
the crime of murder and imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 4 Years and 2
months of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum. He was also
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P10,000.00 being a mere accessory to the
crime and to pay the costs.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the accused having been denied, he interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals. In due course, a Decision was rendered affirming the judgment of the lower court. 3
Hence, the herein petition for review wherein the following grounds are invoked:
1. THAT AN ACCUSED CAN NOT BE CONVICTED AS AN ACCESSORY OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER FOR HAVING AIDED IN THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL IF
SAID ACCUSED IS BEING CHARGED SOLELY IN THE INFORMATION AS
PRINCIPAL FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THE CRIME PROVED IS NOT
INCLUDED IN THE CRIME CHARGED.
2. THAT "AIDING THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL" TO BE CONSIDERED
SUFFICIENT IN LAW TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED UNDER ARTICLE 19,
PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE MUST BE DONE IN SUCH A
WAY AS TO DECEIVE THE VIGILANCE OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
OF THE STATE AND THAT THE "ESCAPE" MUST BE ACTUAL;
3. THE CONVICTION OF AN ACCESSORY PENDING THE TRIAL OF THE
PRINCIPAL VIOLATES PROCEDURAL ORDERLINESS. 4
During the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals, the case against Salazar in the JAGO was
remanded to the civil court as he was discharged from the military service. He was later charged with
murder in the same Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. 2027-A. In a
supplemental pleading dated November 14, 1988, petitioner informed this Court that Jessie Salazar was
acquitted by the trial court in a decision that was rendered on August 29, 1988.
The respondents were required to comment on the petition. The comment was submitted by the
Solicitor General in behalf of respondents. On January 18, 1989, the Court resolved to deny the petition
for failure of petitioner to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any reversible error in
its questioned judgment. Hence, the present motion for reconsideration to which the respondents were
again required to comment. The required comment having been submitted, the motion is now due for
resolution.
343
The first issue that arises is that inasmuch as the petitioner was charged in the information as a
principal for the crime of murder, can he thereafter be convicted as an accessory? The answer is in the
affirmative.
Petitioner was charged as a principal in the commission of the crime of murder. Under Article 16 of the
Revised Penal Code, the two other categories of the persons responsible for the commission of the
same offense are the accomplice and the accessory. There is no doubt that the crime of murder had
been committed and that the evidence tended to show that Jessie Salazar was the assailant. That the
petitioner was present during its commission or must have known its commission is the only logical
conclusion considering that immediately thereafter, he was seen driving a bicycle with Salazar holding
an armalite, and they were together when they left shortly thereafter. At least two witnesses, Ernesto
and Julius Tejada, attested to these facts. It is thus clear that petitioner actively assisted Salazar in his
escape. Petitioner's liability is that of an accessory.
This is not a case of a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved or established by
the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, in
which case the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or
of the offense charged included in that which is proved. 5
In the same light, this is not an instance where after trial has begun, it appears that there was a mistake
in charging the proper offense, and the defendant cannot be convicted of the offense charged, or of any
other offense necessarily included therein, in which case the defendant must not be discharged if there
appears to be a good cause to detain him in custody, so that he can be charged and made to answer
for the proper offense. 6
In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information. The commission of the said
crime was established by the evidence. There is no variance as to the offense committed. The variance
is in the participation or complicity of the petitioner. While the petitioner was being held responsible as a
principal in the information, the evidence adduced, however, showed that his participation is merely that
of an accessory. The greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. An accused can be validly
convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an information charging him as a principal.
At the onset, the prosecution should have charged the petitioner as an accessory right then and there.
The degree of responsibility of petitioner was apparent from the evidence. At any rate, this lapse did not
violate the substantial rights of petitioner.
The next issue that must be resolved is whether or not the trial of an accessory can proceed without
awaiting the result of the separate charge against the principal. The answer is also in the affirmative.
The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice and accessory are distinct from each
other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence the determination
of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.
The third question is this-considering that the alleged principal in this case was acquitted can the
conviction of the petitioner as an accessory be maintained?
In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 7 a case involving the crime of theft, this Court ruled that
notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal due to the exempting circumstance of minority or insanity
(Article 12, Revised Penal Code), the accessory may nevertheless be convicted if the crime was in fact
established.
Corollary to this is United States vs. Mendoza, 8 where this Court held in an arson case that the
acquittal of the principal must likewise result in the acquittal of the accessory where it was shown that
no crime was committed inasmuch as the fire was the result of an accident. Hence, there was no basis
for the conviction of the accessory.
In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility of the petitioner as an
accessory was established. By the same token there is no doubt that the commission of the same
offense had been proven in the separate case against Salazar who was charged as principal. However,
he was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt by the same judge who convicted Vino as an
accessory. The trial court held that the identity of the assailant was not clearly established. It observed
that only Julius Tejada identified Salazar carrying a rifle while riding on the bicycle driven by Vino, which
testimony is uncorroborated, and that two other witnesses, Ernesto Tejada and Renato Parvian who
were listed in the information, who can corroborate the testimony of Julius Tejada, were not presented
by the prosecution.
The trial court also did not give due credit to the dying declaration of the victim pinpointing Salazar as
his assailant on the ground that it was not shown the victim revealed the identity of Salazar to his father
and brother who came to his aid immediately after the shooting. The court a quo also deplored the
failure of the prosecution and law enforcement agencies to subject to ballistic examinations the bullet
slug recovered from the body of the victim and the two empty armalite bullet empty shells recovered at
the crime scene and to compare it with samples taken from the service rifle of Salazar. Thus, the trial
court made the following observation:
There appears to be a miscarriage of justice in this case due to the ineptitude of the
law enforcement agencies to gather material and important evidence and the seeming
lack of concern of the public prosecutor to direct the production of such evidence for
the successful prosecution of the case. 9
Hence, in said case, the acquittal of the accused Salazar is predicated on the failure of the prosecution
to adduce the quantum of evidence required to generate a conviction as he was not positively identified
as the person who was seen holding a rifle escaping aboard the bicycle of Vino.
A similar situation may be cited. The accessory was seen driving a bicycle with an unidentified person
as passenger holding a carbine fleeing from the scene of the crime immediately after the commission of
the crime of murder. The commission of the crime and the participation of the principal or assailant,
although not identified, was established. In such case, the Court holds that the accessory can be
prosecuted and held liable independently of the assailant.
We may visualize another situation as when the principal died or escaped before he could be tried and
sentenced. Should the accessory be acquitted thereby even if the commission of the offense and the
responsibility of the accused as an accessory was duly proven? The answer is no, he should be held
criminally liable as an accessory.
Although in this case involving Vino the evidence tended to show that the assailant was Salazar, as two
witnesses saw him with a rifle aboard the bicycle driven by Vino, in the separate trial of the case of
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Salazar, as above discussed, he was acquitted as the trial court was not persuaded that he was
positively identified to be the man with the gun riding on the bicycle driven by Vino. In the trial of the
case against Vino, wherein he did not even adduce evidence in his defense, his liability as such an
accessory was established beyond reasonable doubt in that he assisted in the escape of the assailant
from the scene of the crime. The identity of the assailant is of no material significance for the purpose of
the prosecution of the accessory. Even if the assailant can not be identified the responsibility of Vino as
an accessory is indubitable.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied and this denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE, MANUEL GARCIA y RIVERA and JOHN DOE, accused,
BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE and MANUEL GARCIA y RIVERA, accused-appellants.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A person who commits a felony is liable for the direct, natural and logical consequences of his wrongful
act even where the resulting crime is more serious than that intended. Hence, an accused who originally
intended to conceal and to bury what he thought was the lifeless body of the victim can be held liable as
a principal, not simply as an accessory, where it is proven that the said victim was actually alive but
subsequently died as a direct result of such concealment and burial. Nonetheless, in the present case,
Appellant Garcia cannot be held liable as a principal because the prosecution failed to allege such
death through drowning in the Information. Neither may said appellant be held liable as an accessory
due to his relationship with the principal killer, Appellant Ortega, who is his brother-in-law.
Statement of the Case
This case springs from the joint appeal interposed by Appellants Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel
Garcia from the Decision,1 dated February 9, 1994 written by Judge Adriano R. Osorio,2 finding them
guilty of murder.
Appellants were charged by State Prosecutor Bernardo S. Razon in an Information3 dated October 19,
1992, as follows:
That on or about October 17, 1992 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
together and mutually helping one another, without any justifiable cause, with
treachery and evident premeditation and with abuse of superior strenght (sic) and with
deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the different parts of the body
one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious
physical injuries which directly caused his death.
During arraignment, Appellants Ortega and Garcia, assisted by counsel de oficio,4 pleaded not guilty to
the charge.5 Accused "John Doe" was then at large.6 After trial in due course, the court a quo
promulgated the questioned Decision. The dispositive portion reads:7
WHEREFORE, finding accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. y Conje and Manuel Garcia y
Rivera [g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, the Court hereby
sentenced (sic) them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the
costs of suit.
Accused are hereby ordered to pay the offended party the sum of P35,000.00 for
funeral expenses of deceased Andre Mar Masangkay and death indemnity of
P50,000.00.
The Notice of Appeal, dated March 9, 1994, was thus filed by Atty. Evaristo P. Velicaria8 who took over
from the Public Attorney's Office as counsel for the accused.
The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as follows:9
Diosdado Quitlong substantially testified that on October 15, 1992 at about 5:30 in the
afternoon, he, the victim Andre Mar Masangkay, Ariel Caranto, Romeo Ortega,
Roberto San Andres were having a drinking spree in the compound near the house of
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. at Daangbakal, Dalandanan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. That
while they were drinking, accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia who were
[already] drunk arrived and joined them. That victim Andre Mar Masangkay answered
the call of nature and went to the back portion of the house. That accused Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. followed him and later they [referring to the participants in the drinking
session] heard the victim Andre Mar shouted, "Don't, help me!" (Huwag, tulungan
ninyo ako!) That he and Ariel Caranto ran towards the back portion of the house and
[they] saw accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr., on top of Andre Mar Masangkay who was
lying down in a canal with his face up and stabbing the latter with a long bladed
weapon. That Ariel Caranto ran and fetched Benjamin Ortega, Sr., the father of
accused Benjamin, Jr. That he [Quitlong] went to Romeo Ortega in the place where
they were having the drinking session [for the latter] to pacify his brother Benjamin, Jr.
That Romeo Ortega went to the place of the stabbing and together with Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia lifted Andre Mar Masangkay from the canal and
brought Andre Mar to the well and dropped the latter inside the well. That Romeo
Ortega, Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia then dropped stones measuring 11
to 12 inches high, 2 feet in length and 11 to 12 inches in weight to the body of Andre
Mar Masangkay inside the well. That Romeo Ortega warned him [Quitlong] not to tell
anybody of what he saw. That he answered in the affirmative and he was allowed to
go home. That his house is about 200 meters from Romeo Ortega's house. That upon
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reaching home, his conscience bothered him and he told his mother what he
witnessed. That he went to the residence of Col. Leonardo Orig and reported the
matter. That Col. Orig accompanied him to the Valenzuela Police Station and some
police officers went with them to the crime scene. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr.
and Manuel Garcia were apprehended and were brought to the police station.
On cross-examination, he said that he did not talk to the lawyer before he was
presented as witness in this case. That he narrated the incident to his mother on the
night he witnessed the killing on October 15, 1992. That on October 15, 1992 at 5:30
in the afternoon when he arrived, victim Andre Mar Masangkay, Romeo Ortega,
Serafin and one Boyet were already having [a] drinking spree and he joined them.
That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia were not yet in the place. That
the stabbing happened between 12:00 midnight and 12:30 a.m. That they drank gin
with finger foods such as pork and shell fish. That he met the victim Andre Mar
Masangkay only on that occasion. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel
Garcia joined them at about 11:00 p.m. That there was no altercation between
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia in one hand and Andre Mar Masangkay,
during the drinking session. That at about 12:30 a.m. Andre Mar Masangkay
answered the call of nature and went to the back portion of the house. That he cannot
see Andre Mar Masangkay from the place they were having the drinking session.
That he did not see what happened to Andre Mar Masangkay. That he only heard
Masangkay asking for help. That accused Manuel Garcia was still in the drinking
session when he heard Masangkay was asking for help. That Benjamin Ortega, Jr.
and Manuel Garcia are his friends and neighbors. That when he heard Andre Mar
Masangkay was asking for help, he and Ariel Caranto ran to the back portion of the
house and saw Benjamin Ortega, Jr. on top of Andre Mar Masangkay and stabbing
the latter. That Andre Mar Masangkay was lying down with his back in the canal and
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. on top stabbing the former. That he did not see any injuries on
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. That he called Romeo Ortega to pacify his brother Benjamin, Jr.
That he did not do anything to separate Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Masangkay. That
he knows that Andre Mar Masangkay was courting Raquel Ortega. That Raquel
Ortega asked permission from Andre Mar Masangkay when she left between 8:00
and 9:00 p.m. That there was no trouble that occurred during the drinking session.
PNP Superintendent Leonardo Orig substantially testified that Diosdado Quitlong is
his neighbor for about 9 years. That on October 16, 1992 at 5:00 in the morning, he
was summoned by Diosdado Quitlong and reported to him the stabbing incident that
occurred at Daangbakal near the subdivision he is living. That he relayed the
information to the Valenzuela Police Station and a police team under police officer
Param accompanied them to the place. That he asked the police officers to verify if
there is a body of person inside the well. That the well was covered with stones and
he asked the police officers to seek the help of theneighbors (sic) to remove the
stones inside the well. That after the stones were removed, the body of the victim was
found inside the well. That the lifeless body was pulled out from the well. That the
body has several stab wounds. That he came to know the victim as Andre Mar
Masangkay. That two men were arrested by the police officers.
On cross-examination, he said that he saw the body when taken out of the well with
several stab wounds. That Diosdado Quitlong told him that he was drinking with the
victim and the assailants at the time of the incident. That Benjamin Ortega, Jr.
stabbed the victim while the latter was answering the call of nature.
NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ludivico J. Lagat substantially testified that he
conducted [an] autopsy on the cadaver of Andre Mar Masangkay on October 16,
1992 at the Valenzuela Memorial Homes located at Macarthur Highway. That he
prepared the autopsy report and the sketch of human head and body indicating the
location of the stab wounds. That the cause of death is multiple stab wounds,
contributory, [a]sphyxia by submersion in water. That there were 13 stab wounds, 8 of
which were on the frontal part of the body, 2 at the back and there were contused
abrasions around the neck and on the left arm. There was stab wound at the left side
of the neck. That the contused abrasion could be produced by cord or wire or rope.
That there is (an) incised wound on the left forearm. That the stab wounds which were
backward downward of the body involved the lungs. That the victim was in front of the
assailant. That the stab wound on the upper left shoulder was caused when the
assailant was in front of the victim. That the assailant was in front of the victim when
the stab wound near the upper left armpit was inflicted as well as the stab wound on
the left chest wall. That the stab wound on the back left side of the body and the stab
wound on the back right portion of the body may be produced when the assailant was
at the back of the victim. That the assailant was in front of the victim when the stab
wound[s] on the left elbow and left arm were inflicted. That the large airway is filled
with muddy particles indicating that the victim was alive when the victim inhaled the
muddy particles. The heart is filled with multiple hemorrhage, loss of blood or
decreased of blood. The lungs is filled with water or muddy particles. The brain is pale
due to loss of blood. The stomach is one half filled with muddy particles which could
[have been] taken in when submerged in water.
On cross-examination, he said that he found 13 stab wounds on the body of the
victim. That he cannot tell if the assailant or the victim were standing. That it is
possible that the stab wounds was (sic) inflicted when both [referring to participants]
were standing or the victim was lying down and the assailant was on top. That he
cannot tell the number of the assailants.
Evidence for the Appellants
Appellant Manuel Garcia testified that in the early morning of October 15, 1992, he and his wife,
Maritess Garcia, brought their feverish daughter, Marjorie, to the Polo Emergency Hospital. He left the
hospital at seven o'clock in the morning, went home, changed his clothes and went to work. 10 After
office hours, he and Benjamin Ortega, Jr. passed by the canteen at their place of work. After drinking
beer, they left at eight o'clock in the evening and headed home. En route, they chanced on Diosdado
Quitlong alias Mac-mac and Andre Mar Masangkay, who invited them to join their own drinking spree.
Thereupon, Appellant Garcia's wife came and asked him to go home because their daughter was still
sick. To alleviate his daughter's illness, he fetched his mother-in-law who performed a ritual called
"tawas." After the ritual, he remained at home and attended to his sick daughter. He then fell asleep but
was awakened by police officers at six o'clock in the morning of the following day.
Maritess Garcia substantially corroborated the testimony of her husband. She however added two other
participants in the drinking session aside from Diosdado Quitlong alias Mac-mac and Andre Mar
Masangkay, namely, a Mang Serafin and Boyet Santos. 11
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Benjamin Ortega, Jr. likewise substantially corroborated the testimony of Appellant Manuel Garcia. 12
According to him, between eleven and twelve o'clock in the evening, Masangkay left the drinking
session. Thirty (30) minutes after Masangkay left, he also left the drinking place to urinate. 13 He went
behind the house where he saw Masangkay peeping through the room of his sister Raquel. He ignored
Masangkay and continued urinating. 14 After he was through, Masangkay approached him and asked
where his sister was. He answered that he did not know. Without warning, Masangkay allegedly boxed
him in the mouth, an attack that induced bleeding and caused him to fall on his back. When he was
about to stand up, Masangkay drew a knife and stabbed him, hitting him on the left arm, thereby
immobilizing him. Masangkay then gripped his neck with his left arm and threatened to kill him. Unable
to move, Ortega shouted for help. Quitlong came and, to avoid being stabbed, grabbed Masangkay's
right hand which was holding the knife. Quitlong was able to wrest the knife from Masangkay and, with
it, he stabbed Masangkay ten (10) times successively, in the left chest and in the middle of the stomach.
When
the stabbing started, Ortega moved to the left side of Masangkay to avoid being hit.15 Quitlong chased
Masangkay who ran towards the direction of the well. Thereafter, Ortega went home and treated his
injured left armpit and lips. Then, he slept.
When he woke up at six o'clock the following morning, he saw police officers in front of his house.
Taking him with them, the lawmen proceeded to the well. From the railroad tracks where he was asked
to sit, he saw the police officers lift the body of a dead person from the well. He came to know the
identity of the dead person only after the body was taken to the police headquarters. 16
The Trial Court's Discussion
The trial court explained its basis for appellants' conviction as follows: 17
The Court is convinced that the concerted acts of accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr.,
Manuel Garcia, Jr. and one Romeo Ortega in lifting, carrying and dumping the victim
Andre Mar Masangkay who was still alive and breathing inside the deep well filled
with water, head first and threw big stones/rocks inside the well to cover the victim is
a clear indication of the community of design to finish/kill victim Andre Mar
Masangkay. Wounded and unarmed victim Andre Mar Masangkay was in no position
to flee and/or defend himself against the three malefactors. Conspiracy and the taking
advantage of superior strength were in attendance. The crime committed by the
accused is Murder.
Concert of action at the moment of consummating the crime and the form and manner
in which assistance is rendered to the person inflicting the fatal wound may determine
complicity where it would not otherwise be evidence (People vs. Yu, 80 SCRA 382
(1977)).
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Accused (m)ust
reimburse the heirs of victim Andre Mar Masangkay the amount of P35,000.00 for the
funeral expenses of the deceased.
The Issues
In their ten-page brief, appellants fault the trial court with the
following: 18
I. The trial court erred in holding that there is conspiracy on the
basis of the prosecution's evidence that at the time both accused
and one Romeo Ortega lifted the body of Andrew Masangkay from
where he succumbed due to stab wounds and brought and drop
said body of Andrew Masangkay to the well to commit murder;
II. The trial court erred in finding and holding that Andrew
Masangkay was still alive at the time his body was dropped in the
well;
III. The trial court erred in convicting Manuel Garcia and in not
acquitting the latter of the crime charged; and
IV. The trial court erred in not finding that if at all Benjamin Ortega
Jr. is guilty only of homicide alone.
On the basis of the records and the arguments raised by the appellants and the People, we believe that
the question to be resolved could be simplified thus: What are the criminal liabilities, if any, of Appellants
Ortega and Garcia?
The Court's Ruling
We find the appeal partly meritorious. Appellant Ortega is guilty only of homicide. Appellant Garcia
deserves acquittal.
First Issue: Liability of Appellant Ortega
The witnesses for the prosecution and defense presented conflicting narrations. The prosecution
witnesses described the commission of the crime and positively identified appellants as the
perpetrators. The witnesses for the defense, on the other hand, attempted to prove denial and alibi. As
to which of the two contending versions speaks the truth primarily rests on a critical evaluation of the
credibility of the witnesses and their stories. In this regard, the trial court held: 19
The Court has listened intently to the narration of the accused and their witnesses
and the prosecution witnesses and has keenly observed their behavior and demeanor
on the witness stand and is convinced that the story of the prosecution is the more
believable version. Prosecution eyewitness Diosdado Quitlong appeared and
sounded credible and his credibility is reinforced by the fact that he has no reason to
testify falsely against the accused. It was Diosdado Quitlong who reported the
stabbing incident to the police authorities. If Quitlong stabbed and killed the victim
Masangkay, he will keep away from the police authorities and will go in hiding. . . .
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Because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the the house of Benjamin Ortega Sr. and the house of his son
stand as they rendered their testimonies, its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the Benjamin Ortega, Jr. are near each other.
highest respect. Therefore, unless the trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, his assessment of credibility must be respected. xxx xxx xxx
20
Q Mr. Witness, who were the companions of said persons,
In the instant case, we have meticulously scoured the records and found no reason to reverse the trial Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia, you (sic) in drinking in said
court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies 21 insofar as Appellant place?
Ortega is concerned. The narration of Eyewitness Diosdado Quitlong appears to be spontaneous and
consistent. It is straightforward, detailed, vivid and logical. Thus, it clearly deserves full credence.
A The other companions in the drinking session were Ariel Caranto
y Ducay, Roberto San Andres and Romeo Ortega.
On the other hand, in asserting alibi and denial, the defense bordered on the unbelievable. Appellant
Ortega claimed that after he was able to free himself from Masangkay's grip, he went home, treated his
injuries and slept. 22 This is not the ordinary reaction of a person assaulted. If Ortega's version of the Q What about this victim, Andrew Masangkay, where was he at that
assault was true, he should have immediately reported the matter to the police authorities, if only out of time?
gratitude to Quitlong who came to his rescue. Likewise, it is difficult to believe that a man would just
sleep after someone was stabbed in his own backyard. Further, we deem it incredible that Diosdado A Also the victim, Andrew Masangkay, he was also there.
Quitlong would stab Masangkay ten (10) times successively, completely ignoring Benjamin Ortega, Jr.
who was grappling with Masangkay. Also inconsistent with human experience is his narration that Q You said that the two accused, Manuel Garcia and Benjamin
Masangkay persisted in choking him instead of defending himself from the alleged successive stabbing Ortega, Jr. arrived drunk and joined the group?
of Quitlong.23 The natural tendency of a person under attack is to defend himself and not to persist in
choking a defenseless third person.
A Yes, sir.
Murder or Homicide?
Q What happened next?
Although treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength were alleged in the
information, the trial court found the presence only of abuse of superior strength. A While we were there together and we were drinking ...
(interrupted by Atty. Altuna)
We disagree with the trial court's finding. Abuse of superior strength requires deliberate intent on the
part of the accused to take advantage of such superiority. It must be shown that the accused purposely Q Who is that "we"?
used excessive force that was manifestly out of proportion to the means available to the victim's
defense. 24 In this light, it is necessary to evaluate not only the physical condition and weapon of the A Referring to Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia, Ariel Caranto,
protagonists but also the various incidents of the event. 25 Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres, myself and Andrew
Masangkay. Andrew Masangkay answer to a call of nature and
In his testimony, Witness Dominador Quitlong mentioned nothing about Appellant Ortega's availment of went to the back portion of the house, and Benjamin Ortega, Jr.
force excessively out of proportion to the means of defense available to the victim to defend himself. followed him where he was.
Quitlong described the assault made by Appellant Ortega as follows: 26
Q What happened next?
ATTY. ALTUNA:
A And afterwards we heard a shout and the shout said "Huwag,
Q Will you please tell me the place and date wherein you have a tulungan n'yo ako".
drinking spree with Andrew Masangkay and where you witnessed a
stabbing incident? Q From whom did you hear this utterance?

A It was on October 15, 1992, sir, at about 5:30 in the afternoon we A The shout came from Andrew Masangkay.
were drinking in the house of Mr. Benjamin Ortega, Sr., because

348
 Q After Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed Andrew Masangkay to
answer a call of nature and after you heard "huwag, tulungan n'yo
ako" coming from the mouth of the late Andrew Masangkay, what
happened next?
A Ariel Caranto and I ran towards the back portion of the house.
Q And what did you see?
A And I saw that Benjamin Ortega, Jr. was on top of Andrew
Masangkay and he was stabbing Masangkay.
Q Will you please demonstrate to the Honorable Court how the
stabbing was done telling us the particular position of the late
Andrew Masangkay and how Benjamin Ortega, Jr. proceeded with
the stabbing against the late victim, Andrew Masangkay?
INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture, the witness demonstrating.)
Andrew Masangkay was lying down on a canal with his face up,
then Benjamin Ortega, Jr. was "nakakabayo" and with his right
hand with closed fist holding the weapon, he was thrusting this
weapon on the body of the victim, he was making downward and
upward motion thrust.
ATTY. ALTUNA: (To the witness)
Q How many times did Benjamin Ortega, Jr. stabbed Andrew
Masangkay?
A I cannot count the number of times.
It should be noted that Victim Masangkay was a six-footer, whereas Appellant Ortega, Jr. was only five
feet and five inches tall. 27 There was no testimony as to how the attack was initiated. The accused and
the victim were already grappling when Quitlong arrived. Nothing in the foregoing testimony and
circumstances can be interpreted as abuse of superior strength. Hence, Ortega is liable only for
homicide, not murder.
Second Issue: Liability of Appellant Manuel Garcia
Appellants argue that the finding of conspiracy by the trial court "is based on mere assumption and
conjecture . . ." 28 Allegedly, the medico-legal finding that the large airway was "filled with muddy
particles indicating that the victim was alive when the victim inhaled the muddy particles" did not
necessarily mean that such muddy particles entered the body of the victim while he was still alive. The
Sinumpaang Salaysay of Quitlong stated, "Nilubayan lang nang saksak nang mapatay na si Andrew ni
Benjamin Ortega, Jr." Thus, the prosecution evidence shows Masangkay was already "dead" when he
was lifted and dumped into the well. Hence, Garcia could be held liable only as an accessory. 29
We do not agree with the above contention. Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code states that
criminal liability shall be incurred by "any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended." The essential requisites for the application of this
provision are that (a) the intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the
unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor's wrongful acts. In assisting Appellant
Ortega, Jr. carry the body of Masangkay to the well, Appellant Garcia was committing a felony. The
offense was that of concealing the body of the crime to prevent its discovery, i.e. that of being an
accessory in the crime of homicide. 30 Although Appellant Garcia may have been unaware that the
victim was still alive when he assisted Ortega in throwing the body into the well, he is still liable for the
direct and natural consequence of his felonious act, even if the resulting offense is worse than that
intended.
True, Appellant Garcia merely assisted in concealing the body of the victim. But the autopsy conducted
by the NBI medico-legal officer showed that the victim at that time was still alive, and that he died
subsequently of drowning.31 That drowning was the immediate cause of death was medically
demonstrated by the muddy particles found in the victim's airway, lungs and stomach. 32 This is evident
from the expert testimony given by the medico-legal officer, quoted below: 33
ATTY. ALTUNA:
Q Will you please explain this in simple language the last portion of
Exhibit N, beginning with "tracheo-bronchial tree", that is sentence
immediately after paragraph 10, 2.5 cms. Will you please explain
this?
A The trancheo-bronchial tree is filled with muddy particles.
Q I ask you a question on this. Could the victim have possibly get
this particular material?
A No, sir.
Q What do you mean by no?
A A person should be alive so that the muddy particles could be
inhaled.
Q So, in short, you are telling or saying to us that if there is no
inhaling or the taking or receiving of muddy particles at that time,
the person is still alive?
A Yes, sir.
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Q Second point?
A The heart is pale with some multiple petechial hemorrhages at
the anterior surface.
Q And this may [be] due to stab wounds or asphyxia?
A It indicates at the right side. There are around 1,400 cc of blood
that accumulate at the thoraxic cavity and this was admixed with
granular materials?
Q And what cause the admixing with granular materials on said
particular portion of the body?

A These are the effects or due to asphyxia or decreased amount of A Could be muddy particles.
blood going to the heart.
Q Due to the taking of maddy (sic) materials as affected by
Q This asphyxia are you referring to is the drowning? asphyxia? Am I correct?

A Yes, sir. A It's due to stab wounds those muddy particles which set-in thru
the stab wounds.
Q Next point is the lungs?
Q So, because of the opening of the stab wounds, the muddy
particles now came in, in that particular portion of the body and
A The lungs is also filled with multiple petechial hemorrhages. caused admixing of granular materials?

Q What could have caused this injury of the lungs? A Yes, sir.

A This is due to asphyxia or the loss of blood.
Q Are you saying that the lungs have been filled with water or
muddy particles?
A Yes, sir.
Q And, precisely, you are now testifying that due to stab wounds or
asphyxia, the lungs have been damaged per your Report?
Q Continuing with your report, particularly, the last two portions, will
you please explain the same?
A The hemoperitoneum there are 900 cc of blood that accumulated
inside the abdomen.
Q And what could have cause the same?
A [T]he stab wound of the abdomen.

A Yes, sir. Q The last one, stomach 1/2 filled with muddy particles. Please
explain the same?
Q Continuing this brain and other visceral organs, pale. What is
this? A The victim could have taken these when he was submerged in
water.
A The paleness of the brain and other visceral organs is due to loss
of blood. Q What is the take in?

Q And, of course, loss of blood could be attributed to the stab A Muddy particles.
wound which is number 13?
Q And he was still alive at that time?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir. (Emphasis supplied)
Q And the last one, under the particular point "hemothorax"?

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A Filipino authority on forensic medicine opines that any of the following medical findings may show that
drowning is the cause of death: 34
1. The presence of materials or foreign bodies in the hands of the
victim. The clenching of the hands is a manifestation of cadaveric
spasm in the effort of the victim to save himself from drowning.
2. Increase in volume (emphysema aquosum) and edema of the
lungs (edema aquosum).
3. Presence of water and fluid in the stomach contents
corresponding to the medium where the body was recovered.
4. Presence of froth, foam or foreign bodies in the air passage
found in the medium where the victim was found.
5. Presence of water in the middle ear.
The third and fourth findings were present in the case of Victim Masangkay. It was proven that
his airpassage, or specifically his tracheo-bronchial tree, was filled with muddy particles which
were residues at the bottom of the well. Even his stomach was half-filled with such muddy
particles. The unrebutted testimony of the medico-legal officer that all these muddy particles
were ingested when the victim was still alive proved that the victim died of drowning inside the
well.
The drowning was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony that. Appellant Garcia had
intended to commit; it exemplifies praeter intentionem covered by Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal
Code. Under this paragraph, a person may be convicted of homicide although he had no original intent
to kill. 35
In spite of the evidence showing that Appellant Garcia could be held liable as principal in the crime of
homicide, there are, however, two legal obstacles barring his conviction, even as an accessory — as
prayed for by appellants' counsel himself.
First. The Information accused Appellant Garcia (and Appellant Ortega) of "attack[ing], assault[ing], and
stab[bing] repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR
MASANGKAY y ABLOLA." The prosecution's evidence itself shows that Garcia had nothing to do with
the stabbing which was solely perpetrated by Appellant Ortega. His responsibility relates only to the
attempted concealment of the crime and the resulting drowning of Victim Masangkay. The hornbook
doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly
charged in the complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the
complaint or information would be a violation of this constitutional right. 36 Section 14, par. 2, of the
1987 Constitution explicitly guarantees the following:
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable. (Emphasis supplied)
In People vs. Pailano, 37 this Court ruled that there can be no conviction for rape on a woman "deprived
of reason or otherwise unconscious" where the information charged the accused of sexual assault "by
using force or intimidation," thus:
The criminal complaint in this case alleged the commission of the crime through the
first method although the prosecution sought to establish at the trial that the
complainant was a mental retardate. Its purpose in doing so is not clear. But whatever
it was, it has not succeeded.
If the prosecution was seeking to convict the accused-appellant on the ground that he
violated Anita while she was deprived of reason or unconscious, such conviction
could not have been possible under the criminal complaint as worded. This described
the offense as having been committed by "Antonio Pailano, being then provided with
a scythe, by means of violence and intimidation, (who) did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant, Anita Ibañez,
15 years of age, against her will'. No mention was made of the second circumstance.
Conviction of the accused-appellant on the finding that he had raped Anita while she
was unconscious or otherwise deprived of reason — and not through force and
intimidation, which was the method alleged — would have violated his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. [Article IV, Sec. 19,
Constitution of 1973; now Article III, Sec. 14(2)] This right is safeguarded by the
Constitution to every accused so he can prepare an adequate defense against the
charge against him. Convicting him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating
his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. This
right was, of course, available to the herein accused-appellant.
In People vs. Ramirez, [fn: 69 SCRA 144] we held that a person charged with rape
could not be found guilty of qualified seduction, which had not been alleged in the
criminal complaint against him. In the case of People vs. Montes, [fn: 122 SCRA 409]
the Court did not permit the conviction for homicide of a person held responsible for
the suicide of the woman he was supposed to have raped, as the crime he was
accused of — and acquitted — was not homicide but rape. More to the point is Tubb
v. People of the Philippines, [fn: 101 Phil. 114] where the accused was charged with
the misappropriation of funds held by him in trust with the obligation to return the
same under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code, but was convicted
of swindling by means of false pretenses, under paragraph 2(b) of the said Article,
which was not alleged in the information. The Court said such conviction would violate
the Bill of Rights.
351
By parity of reasoning, Appellant Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide through drowning in an
information that charges murder by means of stabbing.
Second. Although the prosecution was able to prove that Appellant Garcia assisted in "concealing . . .
the body of the crime, . . . in order to prevent its discovery," he can neither be convicted as an
accessory after the fact defined under Article 19, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The records show
that Appellant Garcia is a brother-in-law of Appellant Ortega, 38 the latter's sister, Maritess, being his
wife. 39 Such relationship exempts Appellant Garcia from criminal liability as provided by Article 20 of
the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. — The penalties
prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with
respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted
brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees with the single
exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article.
On the other hand, "the next preceding article" provides:
Art. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals
or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following
manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the
offender to profit by the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the
crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in
order to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the
escape of the principal of the crime, provided the
accessory acts with abuse of his public functions
or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take
the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime.
Appellant Garcia, being a covered relative by affinity of the principal accused, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., is
legally entitled to the aforequoted exempting provision of the Revised Penal Code. This Court is thus
mandated by law to acquit him.
Penalty and Damages
The award of actual damages should be reduced to P31,790.00 from P35,000.00. The former amount
was proven both by documentary evidence and by the testimony of Melba Lozano, a sister of the victim.
38 Of the expenses alleged to have been incurred, the Court can give credence only to those that are
supported by receipts and appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death of the
victim. 39 However, in line with current jurisprudence, 40 Appellant Ortega shall also indemnify the heirs
of the deceased in the sum of P50,000.00. Indemnity requires no proof other than the fact of death and
appellant's responsibility therefor. 43
The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, which is
imposable in its medium period, absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, as in the case of
Appellant Ortega. Because he is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum term shall be one degree lower, that is, prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the joint appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Appellant Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. is found GUILTY of homicide and sentenced to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum. Appellant Ortega, Jr. is also ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as
indemnity and P31,790.00 as actual damages. Appellant Manuel Garcia is ACQUITTED. His immediate
release from confinement is ORDERED unless he is detained for some other valid cause.
SO ORDERED.
NORMA DIZON-PAMINTUAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Puno and Puno for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The chief issue presented for our determination in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is the correctness of the decision of 29 March 1993 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
110241 which affirmed the decision of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case
No. 88-649542 finding the petitioner guilty of the violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. No. 1612) but
set aside the penalty imposed and ordered the trial court to receive additional evidence on the "correct
valuation" of the pieces of jewelry involved for the sole purpose of determining the penalty to be
imposed.
The information in Criminal Case No. 88-64954 charged the petitioner with the violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law in that
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 on or about and during the period from February 12, to February 24, 1988, inclusive,
in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent of gain for herself or for
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly buy and keep in her
possession and/or sell or dispose of the following jewelries, to wit: one (1) set of
earrings, a ring studded with diamonds in a triangular style, one (1) set of earrings
(diamond studded) and one (1) diamond-studded crucifix, or all valued at
P105,000.00, which she knew or should have known to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery committed by Joselito Sacdalan Salinas against the
owner Teodoro and Luzviminda Encarnacion.3
On the basis of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Teodoro Encarnacion (one of the offended
parties), Cpl. Ignacio Jao, Jr., and Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez, both of the Western Police District, the trial
court promulgated on 16 November 1990 its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilty of the accused for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1612 beyond reasonable doubt, the accused Norma Dizon-
Pamintuan is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS of prision mayor to NINETEEN (19) YEARS of
reclusion temporal.
No civil liability in view of the recovery of the items, subject-matter of this case.
With costs.4
The evidence of the prosecution is summarized by the trial court as follows:
Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary, Department of Public Works and Highways
testified that he has just arrived at his residence located at Better Living Subdivision,
Parañaque at around 9:45 p.m. of February 12, 1988 coming from the Airport and
immediately proceeded inside the house, leaving behind his driver and two
housemaids outside to pick-up his personal belongings from his case. It was at this
point that five unidentified masked armed persons appeared from the grassy portion
of the lot beside the house and poked their guns to his driver and two helpers and
dragged them inside his house. That the men pointed a gun at him and was made to
lie face down on the floor. The other occupants, namely his wife, the maids and his
driver were likewise made to lie on the floor. Thereafter, the robbers ransacked the
house and took away jewelries and other personal properties including cash. After the
intruders left the house he reported the matter immediately to the police. He was then
interviewed by the Parañaque police and was informed that an operation group would
be assigned to the case.
He likewise reported the matter to the Western Police District on February 15, 1988.
Two days later, a group of WPD operatives came over to his house and he was asked
to prepare a list of items of jewelry and other valuables that were lost including a
sketch of distinctive items. He was later told that some of the lost items were in
Chinatown area as tipped by the informer the police had dispatched. That an
entrapment would be made with their participation, on February 14, 1988. As such,
they went to Camp Crame at around 9:00 a.m. and arrived at the vicinity of 733
Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila at about 10:00 a.m.; that he is with his wife
posed as a buyer and were able to recognize items of the jewelry stolen displayed at
the stall being tended by Norma Dizon Pamintuan; the pieces were: 1 earring and ring
studded with diamonds worth P75,000 bought from estimator Nancy Bacud (Exh. "C-
2"), 1 set of earring diamond worth P15,000 (Exh. "C-3") and 1 gold chain with crucifix
worth P3,000 (Exh. "C-4").
Corporal Ignacio Jao, Jr. of the WPD testified that he was with the spouses Teodoro
Encarnacion, Jr. in the morning of February 24, 1988 and they proceeded to
Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila at the stall of Norma Dizon-Pamintuan
together with Sgt. Perez. After the spouses Encarnacion recognized the items subject
matter of the robbery at the display window of the stall being tended by the herein
accused, they invited the latter to the precinct and investigated the same. They
likewise brought the said showcase to the WPD station. He further testified that he
has no prior knowledge of the stolen jewelries of the private complainant from one
store to another.
Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez of the WPD testified that he reported for duty on February
24, 1988; that he was with the group who accompanied the spouses Encarnacion in
Sta. Cruz, Manila and was around when the couple saw some of the lost jewelries in
the display stall of the accused. He was likewise present during the early part of the
investigation of the WPD station.5
The recovery of the pieces of jewelry, on the basis of which the trial court ruled that no civil liability
should be adjudged against the petitioner, took place when, as testified to by Teodoro Encarnacion, the
petitioner "admitted that she got the items but she did not know they were stolen [and that] she
surrendered the items and gave them to [his] wife."6
On the other hand, the version of the defense, as testified to by Rosito Dizon-Pamintuan, is summarized
by the trial court thus:
The defense presented only the testimony of Rosito Dizon-Pamintuan who testified
that he is the brother of Norma Dizon-Pamintuan and that sometime around 11:00
a.m. of February 24, 1985, he, together with the accused went infront of the
Carinderia along Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila waiting for a vacancy
therein to eat lunch. Suddenly, three persons arrived and he overheard that Cpl. Jao
told her sister to get the jewelry from inside the display window but her sister
requested to wait for Fredo, the owner of the stall. But ten minutes later when said
Fredo did not show up, the police officer opened the display window and got the
contents of the same. The display stall was hauled to a passenger jeepney and the
same, together with the accused were taken to the police headquarters. He likewise
testified that he accompanied his sister to the station and after investigation was sent
home.7
In convicting the petitioner, the trial court made the following findings:
The prosecution was able to prove by evidence that the recovered
items were part of the loot and such recovered items belong to the
353
 spouses Encarnacion, the herein private complainants. That such
items were recovered by the Police Officers from the stall being
tended by the accused at that time. Of importance, is that the law
provides a disputable presumption of fencing under Section 5
thereof, to wit:
Mere possession of any goods, article, item object, or anything of
value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be
prima facie evidence of fencing.
There is no doubt that the recovered items were found in the possession of the
accused and she was not able to rebut the presumption though the evidence for the
defense alleged that the stall is owned by one Fredo. A distinction should likewise be
made between ownership and possession in relation to the act of fencing. Moreover,
as to the value of the jewelries recovered, the prosecution was able to show that the
same is Ninety Three Thousand Pesos (P93,000.00).8
The petitioner then appealed her conviction to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CR No. 11024) where she
raised two issues: (1) that the judgment was based on a mere presumption, and (2) that the prosecution
failed to show that the value of the jewelry recovered is P93,000.00.
In its challenged decision of 29 March 1993, the Court of Appeals disposed of the first issue in this wise:
The guilt of accused-appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt. All the
elements of the crime of fencing in violation of the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 (P.D. No.
1612), to wit:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. A person, not a participant in said crime, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells; or in any manner deals in any
article or item, object or anything of value;
3. With personal knowledge, or should be known to said person that said item, object
or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft;
4. With intent to gain for himself or for another;
have been established by positive and convincing evidence of the prosecution . . .
...
The fact that a crime of robbery has been committed on February 12, 1988 is
established by the testimony of private complainant Teodoro T. Encarnacion who
immediately reported the same to Parañaque Police Station of the Southern Police
District (TSN, Hearings of October 3, 1988, November 9, 1988 and January 11, 1989;
Exh. A) and submitted a list and sketches of the jewelries robbed, among other
things, from their residence located at Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro
Manila (Exh. C,
C-1 to C-4 and D).
The second element is likewise established by convincing evidence. On February 24,
1988, accused-appellant was found selling the jewelries (Exhs. C-2, C-3 and C-4)
which was displayed in a showcase in a stall located at Florentino Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila. [Testimonies of Teodoro Encarnacion (id. supra); Cpl. Ignacio Jao (TSN,
Hearing of February 13, 1989) and Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez (TSN, Hearing of June 4,
1989)].
On the element of knowledge that the items are derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery and of intent to gain for herself or for another, the Anti-Fencing Law
provides:
Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. — Mere possession of any good,
article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject
of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
Knowledge and intent to gain are proven by the fact that these jewelries were found in
possession of appellant and they were displayed for sale in a showcase being tended
by her in a stall along Florentino Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.9
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals was of the opinion that there was not enough evidence to prove the
value of the pieces of jewelry recovered, which is essential to the imposition of the proper penalty under
Section 3 of P.D.
No. 1612. It opined that the trial court erred in concluding that "the value of the recovered jewelries is
P93,000.00 based on the bare testimony of the private complainant and the self-serving list he
submitted (Exhs. C, C-2 and C-4, TSN, Hearing of October 3, 1993)."10
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding that the trial court did not commit any reversible error, its
decision dated October 26, 1990 convincing accused appellant is hereby AFFIRMED
with the modification that the penalty imposed is SET ASIDE and the Regional Trial
Court (Branch 20) of Manila is ordered to receive evidence with respect to the correct
valuation of the properties involved in this case, marked as Exhibits "C", "C-2" and "C-
4" for the sole purpose of determining the proper penalty to be meted out against
accused under Section 3, P.D. No. 1612. Let the original records be remanded
immediately.11
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner contends that:
I
354
 PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE CAÑEBA, IN
BLATANT DISREGARD OF APPLICABLE LAW AND WELL-ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY ERRED IN
REMANDING THE CASE TO THE COURT A QUO FOR RECEPTION OF
EVIDENCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING THE CORRECT PENALTY TO
BE IMPOSED.12
On 23 February 1994, after the public respondents had filed their Comment and the petitioner her Reply
to the Comment, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
The first assigned error is without merit.
Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), is "the act of any person who,
with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or
dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft."
Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held liable as an accessory, as the term
is defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty applicable to an accessory is obviously
light under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55, and 57 of the Revised Penal Code, subject to the
qualification set forth in Article 60 thereof. Nothing, however, the reports from law enforcement agencies
that "there is rampant robbery and thievery of government and private properties" and that "such
robbery and thievery have become profitable on the part of the lawless elements because of the
existence of ready buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen properties," P.D.
No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes of
robbery and theft." Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as
such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case, he ceases to
be a mere accessory but becomes a principal in the crime of fencing. Elsewise stated, the crimes of
robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate and distinct offenses.13 The
state may thus choose to prosecute him either under the Revised Penal Code or P.D. No. 1612,
although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable considering that fencing is a malum
prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing14 and prescribes a higher penalty
based on the value of the property.15
The elements of the crime of fencing are:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of
the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any
article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the
proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for
another.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the first, second, and fourth elements were duly established. A
robbery was committed on 12 February 1988 in the house of the private complainants who afterwards
reported the incident to the Parañaque Police, the Western Police District, the NBI, and the CIS, and
submitted a list of the lost items and sketches of the jewelry taken from them (Exhibits "C" and "D").
Three of these items stolen, viz., (a) a pair of earrings and ring studded with diamonds worth
P75,000.00 (Exhibit "C-2"); (b) one set of earrings worth P15,000.00 (Exhibit "C-3"); and (c) a chain with
crucifix worth P3,000.00 (Exhibit "C-4"), were displayed for sale at a stall tended to by the petitioner in
Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The public display of the articles for sale clearly manifested
an intent to gain on the part of the petitioner.
The more crucial issue to be resolved is whether the prosecution proved the existence of the third
element: that the accused knew or should have known that the items recovered from her were the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof,
or is aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something
within the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity.16 When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact
is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of
its existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist.17 On the other hand, the words "should
know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in
performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists.18 Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot
penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what is contained therein, it must determine
such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person. And given two equally plausible states of
cognition or mental awareness, the court should choose the one which sustains the constitutional
presumption of innocence.19
Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that "[m]ere possession of any good, article, item,
object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing," it follows that the petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of the fact that the
items found in her possession were the proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is reasonable for
no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of her possession of the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. This presumption does not offend the presumption of
innocence enshrined in the fundamental law.20 In the early case of United States vs.
Luling, 21 this Court held:
355
 It has been frequently decided, in case of statutory crimes, that no constitutional
provision is violated by a statute providing that proof by the state of some material fact
or facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that then the burden is
shifted to the defendant for the purpose of showing that such act or acts are innocent
and are committed without unlawful intention. (Commonwealth vs. Minor, 88 Ky.,
422.)
In some of the States, as well as in England, there exist what are known as common
law offenses. In the Philippine Islands no act is a crime unless it is made so by
statute. The state having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain well
defined limitations, has a right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as
well as what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon
the defendant the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not
committed with any criminal intent or intention.
In his book on constitutional law,22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz said:
Nevertheless, the constitutional presumption of innocence may be overcome by
contrary presumptions based on the experience of human conduct [People vs.
Labara, April 20, 1954]. Unexplained flight, for example, may lead to an inference of
guilt, as 'the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous is as bold as a lion.
Failure on the part of the accused to explain his possession of stolen property may
give rise to the reasonable presumption that it was he himself who had stolen it [U.S.
vs. Espia, 16 Phil. 506]. Under our Revised Penal Code, the inability of an
accountable officer to produce funds or property entrusted to him will be considered
prima facie evidence that he has appropriated them to his personal use [Art. 217].
According to Cooley, the constitutional presumption will not apply as long as there is
"some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed,
and the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to
be purely arbitrary mandate" [1 Cooley, 639].
The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied solely on the
testimony of her brother which was insufficient to overcome the presumption, and, on the contrary, even
disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry and that she used to buy
from a certain Fredo.23
Fredo was not presented as a witness and it was not established that he was a licensed dealer or
supplier of jewelry. Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 provides that "all stores, establishments or entitles
dealing in the buy and sell of any good, article, item, object or anything of value obtained from an
unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before offering the same for sale to the public, secure the
necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town
or city where such store, establishment or entity is located." Under the Rules and Regulations24
promulgated to carry out the provisions of Section 6, an unlicensed dealer/supplier refers to any person,
partnership, firm, corporation, association or any other entity or establishment not licensed by the
government to engage in the business of dealing in or supplying "used secondhand articles," which
refers to any good, article, item, object or anything of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or
supplier, regardless of whether the same has actually or in fact been used.
We do not, however, agree with the Court of Appeals that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
actual value of the recovered articles.
As found by the trial court, the recovered articles had a total value of P93,000.00, broken down as
follows:
a) one earring and ring studded with diamonds (Exh. "C-2") — P75,000.00
b) one set of earring (Exh. "C-3") — P15,000.00
c) one gold chain with crucifix (Exh. "C-4") — P3,000.00
These findings are based on the testimony of Mr. Encarnacion 25 and on Exhibit "C,"26 a list
of the items which were taken by the robbers on 12 February 1988, together with the
corresponding valuation thereof. On cross-examination, Mr. Encarnacion re-affirmed his
testimony on direct examination that the value of the pieces of jewelry described in Exhibit "C-
2" is P75,000.0027 and that the value of the items described in Exhibit "C-3" is P15,000.00,
although he admitted that only one earring — and not the pair — was recovered. 28 The cross-
examination withheld any question on the gold chain with crucifix described in Exhibit "C-4." In
view, however, of the admission that only one earring was recovered of the jewelry described
in Exhibit "C-3," it would be reasonable to reduce the value from P15,000.00 to P7,500.00.
Accordingly, the total value of the pieces of jewelry displayed for sale by the petitioner and
established to be part of the proceeds of the robbery on 12 February 1988 would be
P87,000.00.
Section 3(a) of P.D. No. 1612 provides that the penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon the
accused if the value of the property involved is more than P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00,
and if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty of prision mayor should be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00; the total penalty which
may be imposed, however, shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed
reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code
shall also be imposed. The maximum penalty that can be imposed in this case would then be eighteen
(18) years and five (5) months, which is within the range of reclusion temporal maximum. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence law which allows the imposition of an indeterminate penalty which, with respect
to offenses penalized by a special law, shall range from a minimum which shall not be lower than the
minimum prescribed by the special law to a maximum which should not exceed the maximum provided
therein, the petitioner can thus be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum to eighteen (18) years and five (5) months of
reclusion temporal maximum as maximum, with the accessory penalties corresponding to the latter.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the penalty imposed by the trial
court and in remanding the case to the trial court for further reception of evidence to determine the
actual value of the pieces of jewelry recovered from the petitioner and for the imposition of the
appropriate penalty.
We do not agree with the petitioner's contention, though, that a remand for further reception of evidence
would place her in double jeopardy. There is double jeopardy when the following requisites concur: (1)
the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have validly been
356
terminated, and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.29 Such a
concurrence would not occur assuming that the case was remanded to the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED by setting aside the challenged decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 11024 insofar as it sets aside the penalty imposed by Branch 20 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case No. 88-64954 and orders the remand of the case for
the trial court to receive evidence with respect to the correct value of the properties involved. The
decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED subject to the modification of the penalty which is
hereby reduced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of Prision
Mayor maximum as minimum to Eighteen (18) years and Five (5) months of Reclusion Temporal
maximum as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the latter.
SO ORDERED.
RAMON C. TAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals * affirming
that of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19, ** convicting petitioner of the crime of fencing.
Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal Industries, located at 301 Jose Abad Santos
St., Tondo, Manila, engaged in the business of manufacturing propellers or spare parts for boats.
Manuelito Mendez was one of the employees working for her. Sometime in February 1991, Manuelito
Mendez left the employ of the company. Complainant Lim noticed that some of the welding rods,
propellers and boat spare parts, such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws were
missing. She conducted an inventory and discovered that propellers and stocks valued at P48,000.00,
more or less, were missing. Complainant Rosita Lim informed Victor Sy, uncle of Manuelito Mendez, of
the loss. Subsequently, Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas and he admitted that he and his
companion Gaudencio Dayop stole from the complainant's warehouse some boat spare parts such as
bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws. Manuelito Mendez asked the complainant's
forgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one who bought the stolen items and who
paid the amount of P13,000.00, in cash to Mendez and Dayop, and they split the amount with one
another. Complainant did not file a case against Manuelito Mendez and Gaudencio Dayop.
On relation of complainant Lim, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Manila, Branch 19, an information against petitioner charging him with violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) committed as follows:
That on or about the last week of February 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously knowingly receive, keep,
acquire and possess several spare parts and items for fishing boats all valued at P48,130.00
belonging to Rosita Lim, which he knew or should have known to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of theft.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment on November 23, 1992, petitioner Ramon C. Tan pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged and waived pre-trial. To prove the accusation, the prosecution presented the testimonies of
complainant Rosita Lim, Victor Sy and the confessed thief, Manuelito Mendez.
On the other hand, the defense presented Rosita Lim and Manuelito Mendez as hostile witnesses and
petitioner himself. The testimonies of the witnesses were summarized by the trial court in its decision,
as follows:
ROSITA LIM stated that she is the owner of Bueno Metal Industries, engaged in the business
of manufacturing propellers, bushings, welding rods, among others (Exhibits A, A-1, and B).
That sometime in February 1991, after one of her employees left the company, she discovered
that some of the manufactured spare parts were missing, so that on February 19, 1991, an
inventory was conducted and it was found that some welding rods and propellers, among
others, worth P48,000.00 were missing. Thereafter, she went to Victor Sy, the person who
recommended Mr. Mendez to her. Subsequently, Mr. Mendez was arrested in the Visayas, and
upon arrival in Manila, admitted to his having stolen the missing spare parts sold then to
Ramon Tan. She then talked to Mr. Tan, who denied having bought the same.1âwphi1.nêt
When presented on rebuttal, she stated that some of their stocks were bought under the name
of Asia Pacific, the guarantor of their Industrial Welding Corporation, and stated further that
whether the stocks are bought under the name of the said corporation or under the name of
William Tan, her husband, all of these items were actually delivered to the store at 3012-3014
Jose Abad Santos Street and all paid by her husband.
That for about one (1) year, there existed a business relationship between her husband and
Mr. Tan. Mr. Tan used to buy from them stocks of propellers while they likewise bought from
the former brass woods, and that there is no reason whatsoever why she has to frame up Mr.
Tan.
MANUELITO MENDEZ stated that he worked as helper at Bueno Metal Industries from
November 1990 up to February 1991. That sometime in the third week of February 1991,
together with Gaudencio Dayop, his co-employee, they took from the warehouse of Rosita Lim
some boat spare parts, such as bronze and stainless propellers, brass screws, etc. They
delivered said stolen items to Ramon Tan, who paid for them in cash in the amount of
P13,000.00. After taking his share (one-half (1/2) of the amount), he went home directly to the
province. When he received a letter from his uncle, Victor Sy, he decided to return to Manila.
He was then accompanied by his uncle to see Mrs. Lim, from whom he begged for forgiveness
on April 8, 1991. On April 12, 1991, he executed an affidavit prepared by a certain Perlas, a
CIS personnel, subscribed to before a Notary Public (Exhibits C and C-1).
VICTORY [sic] SY stated that he knows both Manuelito Mendez and Mrs. Rosita Lim, the
former being the nephew of his wife while the latter is his auntie. That sometime in February
1991, his auntie called up and informed him about the spare parts stolen from the warehouse
357
 by Manuelito Mendez. So that he sent his son to Cebu and requested his kumpadre, a police Presidential Decree No. 1612, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX
officer of Sta. Catalina, Negros Occidental, to arrest and bring Mendez back to Manila. When (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor and to indemnify Rosita
Mr. Mendez was brought to Manila, together with Supt. Perlas of the WPDC, they fetched Mr. Lim the value of the stolen merchandise purchased by him in the sum of P18,000.00.
Mendez from the pier after which they proceeded to the house of his auntie. Mr. Mendez
admitted to him having stolen the missing items and sold to Mr. Ramon Tan in Sta. Cruz, Costs against the accused.
Manila. Again, he brought Mr. Mendez to Sta. Cruz where he pointed to Mr. Tan as the buyer,
but when confronted, Mr. Tan denied the same.
SO ORDERED.
ROSITA LIM, when called to testify as a hostile witness, narrated that she owns Bueno Metal
Industries located at 301 Jose Abad Santos Street, Tondo, Manila. That two (2) days after Manila, Philippines, August 5, 1996.
Manuelito Mendez and Gaudencio Dayop left, her husband, William Tan, conducted an
inventory and discovered that some of the spare parts worth P48,000.00 were missing. Some (s/t) ZENAIDA R. DAGUNA
of the missing items were under the name of Asia Pacific and William Tan. Judge

MANUELITO MENDEZ, likewise, when called to testify as a hostile witness, stated that he
received a subpoena in the Visayas from the wife of Victor Sy, accompanied by a policeman of
Buliloan, Cebu on April 8, 1991. That he consented to come to Manila to ask forgiveness from
Rosita Lim. That in connection with this case, he executed an affidavit on April 12, 1991,
prepared by a certain Atty. Perlas, a CIS personnel, and the contents thereof were explained to
him by Rosita Lim before he signed the same before Atty. Jose Tayo, a Notary Public, at
Magnolia House, Carriedo, Manila (Exhibits C and C-1).
That usually, it was the secretary of Mr. Tan who accepted the items delivered to Ramon
Hardware. Further, he stated that the stolen items from the warehouse were placed in a sack
and he talked to Mr. Tan first over the phone before he delivered the spare parts. It was Mr.
Tan himself who accepted the stolen items in the morning at about 7:00 to 8:00 o'clock and
paid P13,000.00 for them.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
After due proceedings, on January 29, 1998, the Courts of Appeals rendered decision finding no error in
judgment appealed from, and affirming the same in toto.
In due time, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration; however, on June 16,
1998, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, this petition.
The issue raised is whether or not the prosecution has successfully established the elements of fencing
as against petitioner.2

RAMON TAN, the accused, in exculpation, stated that he is a businessman engaged in selling We resolve the issue in favor of petitioner.
hardware (marine spare parts) at 944 Espeleta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
"Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is "the act of any person who, with intent to gain for
He denied having bought the stolen spare parts worth P48,000.00 for he never talked nor met himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall
Manuelito Mendez, the confessed thief. That further the two (2) receipts presented by Mrs. Lim buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or
are not under her name and the other two (2) are under the name of William Tan, the husband, should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." 3
all in all amounting to P18,000.00. Besides, the incident was not reported to the police
(Exhibits 1 to 1-g).
"Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon things." 4
He likewise denied having talked to Manuelito Mendez over the phone on the day of the
delivery of the stolen items and could not have accepted the said items personally for
The crime of theft is committed if the taking is without violence against or intimidation of persons nor
everytime (sic) goods are delivered to his store, the same are being accepted by his staff. It is
force upon things.5
not possible for him to be at his office at about 7:00 to 8:00 o'clock in the morning, because he
usually reported to his office at 9:00 o'clock. In connection with this case, he executed a
counter-affidavit (Exhibits 2 and 2-a).1 "The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit,
or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft." 6
On August 5, 1996, the trial court rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Before the enactment of P.D. No. 1612 in 1979, the fence could only be prosecuted as an accessory
after the fact of robbery or theft, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, but the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused RAMON C. TAN is hereby found guilty
penalty was light as it was two (2) degrees lower than that prescribed for the principal. 7
beyond reasonable doubt of violating the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979, otherwise known as
358
P.D. No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the
crimes of robbery and theft." Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be
prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter case,
the accused ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a principal in the crime of fencing. Otherwise
stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate and
distinct offenses.8 The State may thus choose to prosecute him either under the Revised Penal Code or
P.D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable considering that fencing is
malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing 9 and prescribes a higher
penalty based on the value of the property.10
In Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, we set out the essential elements of the crime of
fencing as follows:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery
or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and
sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been
derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.11
Consequently, "the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused by establishing the existence of all
the elements of the crime charged."12
Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the essential elements of
fencing, there can be no conviction for such offense.13 "It is an ancient principle of our penal system that
no one shall be found guilty of crime except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt (Perez vs.
Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 9)."14
In this case, what was the evidence of the commission of theft independently of fencing?
Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito Mendez confessed that he
stole those items and sold them to the accused. However, Rosita Lim never reported the theft or even
loss to the police. She admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the
unlawful taking of the items, she forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public crime. It can
be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. As
complainant Rosita Lim reported no loss, we cannot hold for certain that there was committed a crime of
theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, crime of robbery or theft has been
committed.
There was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of another's property. True, witness Mendez
admitted in an extra-judicial confession that he sold the boat parts he had pilfered from complainant to
petitioner. However, an admission or confession acknowledging guilt of an offense may be given in
evidence only against the person admitting or confessing. 15 Even on this, if given extra-judicially, the
confessant must have the assistance of counsel; otherwise, the admission would be inadmissible in
evidence against the person so admitting.16 Here, the extra-judicial confession of witness Mendez was
not given with the assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible against the witness. Neither may such
extra-judicial confession be considered evidence against accused.17 There must be corroboration by
evidence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of guilt.18 Corpus delicti means the "body or substance of
the crime, and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been actually committed."19 The
"essential elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another;
(3) the taking away was done with intent of gain; (4) the taking away was done without the consent of
the owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished without violence or intimidation against persons or
force upon things (U.S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000)."20 In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely:
(1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking.21 In this case, the
theft was not proved because complainant Rosita Lim did not complain to the public authorities of the
felonious taking of her property. She sought out her former employee Manuelito Mendez, who
confessed that he stole certain articles from the warehouse of the complainant and sold them to
petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to convict, without evidence of corpus delicti.22
What is more, there was no showing at all that the accused knew or should have known that the very
stolen articles were the ones sold him. "One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the
cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has the
acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity. When
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is
established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it
does not exist. On the other hand, the words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable
prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would
govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Knowledge refers to a mental state of
awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with
certainty what is contained therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of
that person. And given two equally plausible states of cognition or mental awareness, the court should
choose the one which sustains the constitutional presumption of innocence."23
Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he can not be guilty of "fencing". 24
Consequently, the prosecution has failed to establish the essential elements of fencing, and thus
petitioner is entitled to an acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. C.R. No. 20059 and hereby ACQUITS petitioner of the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 92-
108222 of the Regional Trial Court, Manila.1âwphi1.nêt
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
359
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CARLOS BOCO y ALEJO and INOCENTES y CRUZ, accused-appellants.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The capital penalty is not automatically imposed upon illegal peddlers of dangerous drugs. The
penalties under the latest amendments to the Dangerous Drugs Law, introduced by Republic Act 7659,
range from prision correcional to death, depending on the quantity and the kind of the prohibited or
regulated drug involved and on the attendant mitigating and aggravating circumstances. More
specifically, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when the amount of shabu involved is 200 grams
or more. Since the prosecution did not prove the presence of any aggravating circumstance in the
present case, the trial court indubitably erred in sentencing the appellants to death.
The Case
Before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 163, 1 accused-appellants Carlos Boco and
Ronaldo Inocentes were charged with violation of Section 21, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425 (RA
6425), as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Law. The accusatory portion of the
Information 2 dated October 24, 1996, filed against them by 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Felicitas A. Asinas-Guevarra, reads as follows:
That on or about [the] 22nd day of October, 1996 in the City of Mandaluyong,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring[,] confederating together and mutually helping one another,
without having been authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attempt to deliver, distri[b]ute, transport or sell to another, white crystalline
substance weighing 234.84 grams all contained in various heat-sealed transparent
plastic bag[s] found positive to the test for [m]ethamphetamine hydrochloride locally
known as "shabu", a regulated d[ru]g.
During their arraignment on November 12, 1996, the accused-appellants, duly assisted by counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charge. 3 After trial, the RTC promulgated its herein assailed Decision 4 dated
June 5, 1997, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Carlos Boco y Alejo @
Caloy and Ronaldo Inocentes @ Boyet Paa guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principals for violation of Section 21, Art. IV, R.A. 6425, as amended, and imposes
upon them the supreme penalty of death and ... a fine in the sum of P5,000,000.00.
The 234.84 grams of shabu subject of the information in this case is hereby ordered
forfeited in favor of the government and ordered turned over to the Dangerous Dru[gs]
Board c/o NBI Manila, for disposal as provided by law.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
Based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution, the trial court summarized the factual antecedents
of the case as follows: 5
About 2:00 o'clock in the morning on 22 October 1996, a confidential informer arrived
in the District Anti-Narcotic Unit, Eastern Police District (DANU-EPD), Camp Miguel
Ver, Capitol Compound, Pasig City and talked with Capt. Rodrigo Bonifacio [who, in
turn,] tol[d] SPO1 Emmanuel Magallanes that the informer [would] come back and if
the suspect [was] available, he [would] act as poseur-buyer. When the confidential
informer returned and informed Capt. Bonifacio that the suspect [was] available, Capt.
Bonifacio formed a team to effect a buy-bust operation. The team left their
headquarters about 3:15 a.m. on 22 October 1996 and arrived at the target area
about 3:45 a.m. on the same date. Upon arrival in the place, SPO1 Magallanes with
the confidential informer proceeded to the pre-arranged meeting place located at
Martinez St., corner Gen. Kalentong St., Brgy. Vergara, Mandaluyong City. The rest
of the team members placed themselves in strategic places in the area, while SPO1
Magallanes and the confidential informer stood-by in the designated meeting place.
Soon thereafter, a Mitsubishi Lancer car arrived and stopped at where SPO1
Magallanes and the confidential informer were standing by. On board the car were
two (2) men, the driver and a passenger. When the confidential informer recognized
@ Caloy, the man seated in th[e] passenger seat [o]f t[h]e Mitsubishi Lancer, he
introduced SPO1 Magallanes to him telling @ Caloy that he would be a potential
regular customer. After a short conversation, SPO1 Magallanes asked @ Caloy if he
ha[d] the shabu which was previously ordered. Alias Caloy told SPO1 Magallanes that
he ha[d] the shabu and it [would] cost him P20.000.00. SPO1 Magallanes then
showed @ Caloy his P20,000.00, but before giving it, he asked [if he could] examine
first the shabu. Alias Caloy then asked his companion, @ Boyet Paa, to get the
shabu. Boyet Paa then got one (1) piece of heat sealed plastic from the glove
compartment of the car and handed it to @ Caloy who in turn handed it over to SPO1
Magallanes who examined it and found that it contained crystalline substance
suspected to be shabu. SPO1 Magallanes then made the pre-arranged signal to his
back-up who rushed to where he was and after introducing themselves as policemen,
arrested the suspects. SPO1 Magallanes then frisked @ Caloy and found five (5) pcs.
of heat sealed plastic bags neatly taped around his right leg weighing about 210
grams. SPO1 P[o]ngyan who frisked "Boyet Paa found from his right front pocket one
(1) piece of heat sealed plastic containing crystalline substance weighing about 5
grams. The suspects then were informed of the offense they ha[d] committed and
their constitutional rights. They were also identified as Carlos Boco y Alejo @ Caloy
and Ronaldo Inocentes y Cruz @ Boyet Paa. Thereafter, they were brought to the
police headquarters together with the confiscated items. At the headquarters, the
suspects were turned over to the police investigator and the suspected shabu
forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for examination and P/Insp.
Isidro Cariño to whom the required examination was assigned, found the same
positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug (Exhibit "C").
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, the defense presented the following version of the facts: 6
360
 On 21 October 1996 before midnight, Carlos Boco, Jr. and Ronaldo Inocentes went to
246 La Torre St., Sta. Ana, Manila to pic[k]-up the former's live-in partner. They
stayed in the place for about three (3) hours. When they boarded their car and [was]
about to leave, men approached them with the[i]r guns drawn, ordered them [t]o alight
from their car and to board a van to bring them to the Eastern Police District. Francis
Labutap corroborated Boco on this point. Before proceeding to said Eastern Police
District, they passed by the7-11 Restaurant at New Panaderos, Mandaluyong City.
They stopped there for about half an hour. While in the place, the driver of the van
took from Boco his jewelries consisting of three (3) rings, one (1) necklace, one (1)
bracelet and his wrist watch plus 10,000.00 Yen, $100.00 and P18,500.00.
Thereafter, Capt. Bonifacio arrived in the place [and] told them . . . "[Y]ari kayo",
shabu was found on board your car. Boco told Capt. Bonifacio that they d[id] not have
any drug. Thereafter, they were brought to the Eastern Police District and about 2:00
p.m. that day, they were required to fac[e] press people and there, they denied the
charges agai[n]st them. About 7:00 p.m. that [s]ame day, they were transferred to the
City Jail of Mandaluyong City.
Ruling of the Trial Court
In giving more credit to the prosecution evidence than the defense, the trial court reasoned: 7
As between a denial and an alibi [of the accused] and the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, the latter has more weight than the former .... Moreover, police
officers are entitled to the presumption that they have performed their official duties.
Their testimony is entitled to great respect . . . .
In arriving at its conclusion that there was a consummated unauthorized sale of the regulated drug
methamphetamine hydrochloride, the court a quo explained: 8
In buy-bust operations involving drugs, the delivery of the buy-bust money to the
seller is not a prerequisite. The fact that the money was shown to the pusher and the
poseur-buyer asked that he be shown the drug before he [would deliver] the money
and said drug was handed to said poseur-buyer, that circumstance is enough for the
police to apprehend accused. Sale transaction of drugs under such circumstances is
already perfected. After all, [a] contract of sale is perfected upon [the] meeting of the
minds of the parties to the object and the price thereof (Art. 1475, New Civil ).
Therefore, the arrest of the accused is legal, accused having been caught in flagrante
delicto pushing prohibited drugs . . . . Hence, the search subsequent to accused's
arrest is also legal (Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court; . . .).
The trial court also concluded from the acts of both accused-appellants that conspiracy existed between
them. "Inocentes was the driver of the car they were using at the time. When asked by SPO1
Magallanes to allow him to examine the shabu before giving the money, Boco asked Inocentes to get
the shabu and the latter got one heat[-]sealed plastic sachet from the glove compartment of the car and
handed it to Boco who in turn handed it to SPO1 Magallanes. Such acts," the court ruled, "clearly
constitute conspiracy." 9
Finally, addressing the variance between the offense (attempted sale or delivery) for which the accused
were charged on the one hard and, on the other, the evidence (of consummated sale) presented by the
prosecution during the trial, the lower court said: 10
The evidence shows that a perfected contract of sale [o]f shabu has been entered into
between Carlos Boco @ Caloy and SPO1 Emmanuel Magallanes although SPO1
Magallanes did not deliver the money but instead confiscated the entire shabu in the
possession of accused. Although the evidence shows a perfected buy-bust operation,
the investigating prosecutor played safe. Instead of filing [for] violation of Section 15,
Article IV of RA 6425, as amended, he chose to file the information under Section 21
of the same law. That, nevertheless, did not affect the liability of the accused because
if the evidence is sufficient to support conviction of a consummated offense under
Section 15, Article IV of RA 6425, as amended, there is no reason why the same
evidence cannot support conviction for an attempted offense under Section 21 of the
same law. Besides, violation of Section[s] 15 and 21 of the law provides the same
penalty.
Issues
In his Appeal Brief 11 filed by his own counsel, 12 Carlos Boco assigns in the following alleged errors in
the RTC Decision:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the prosecution has established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
a. The lower court erred in holding that what transpired in the arrest
of the accused was a buy-bust operation and not a frame-up.
b. The lower court erred in not considering the buy-bust operation,
assuming that it did occur[,] as a case of instigation and not [of] a
valid entrapment.
2. Assuming that the testimonies of the prosecution were true, the court erred in
convicting the accused for conspiracy in committing illegal sale of seven (7) packs of
shabu weighing 234.84 grams when only one pack containing about 20 grams
appeared to be the object of the sale and the rest having been merely found in the
possession of the accused when they were subjected to body search.
In his separate Brief 13 filed by his counsel de parte, 14 Ronaldo Inocentes makes the following
assignment of errors:
I.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN . . . CONCLUDING [THE] EXISTENCE OF
CONSPIRACY ON THE BASIS OF INCONCLUSIVE, UNCLEAR,
UNSUBSTANCIATED AND UNCORROBORATED FACT AND EVIDENCE OF THE
MERE PRESENCE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT INOCENTES AT THE PLACE OF
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THE INCIDENT WHICH WAS EXPLAINED AND UNREBUTTED, WHERE THE
SPECIFIC TARGET WAS BOCO WHERE [THE] ACTUAL FACT AND EVIDENCE
SHOW CLEAR OR PARTICIPATORY ACT OF INOCENTES OF A CONSCIOUS
DESIGN TO COMMIT AN OFFENSE SAVE THE LONE UNSUPPORTED
TESTIMONY OF SPO1 MAGALLANES ABSOLVING INOCENTES TESTIFYING
THAT INOCENTES WAS SIMPLY SEATED AT THE DRIVER'S SEAT AND THAT IT
WAS BOCO WHO TOOK THE SHABU FROM THE COMPARTMENT OF THE CAR
HIMSELF.
II.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED GRIEVIOUSLY IN RENDERING AND
PROMULGATING A DECISION CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS BOCO
AND INOCENTES FOR THE ALLEGED SALE AND DELIVERY OF SHABU IN AN
INFORMATION CHARGING AND DESCRIBING THE OFFENSE BEING
PROSECUTED AS "WILLFULLY, UNLAWFULLY, AND FELONIOUSLY [AN]
ATTEMPT TO DELIVER, DISTRIBUTE TRANSPORT OR SELL TO ANOTHER,
WHITE CRYSTALLINE SUBSTANCE' AND THEREFORE A VERY CLEAR
VARIANCE EXISTED BETWEEN THE CRIME CHARGED AND THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED RESULTING IN THE PROMULGATION OF AN ERRONEOUS
DECISION.
III.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AND CONVICTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS ON MERE INFERENCES AND ASSUMPTIONS OF COMPLETE
SALE OR TRANSACTION WHERE EVEN THE EXISTENCE OF THE SHABU AND
THE ALL IMPORTANT BUY-BUST MONEY IS DOUBTFUL CONSIDERING THAT IN
OUR JURISDICTION, NOT ONLY EACH AND EVERY ASPECT AND FACT
CLAIMED AS EVIDENCE OF THE COMMISSION OF A CRIME MUST BE PROVEN
BY VERY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE, THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT
MUST BE PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT WHICH SADLY IN THE
CASE AT BAR, THE PROSECUTION FAILED MISERABLY TO PRODUCE.
IV.
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED GRIEVIOUSLY IN NOT RESOLVING ALL
DOUBTS, INCONSISTENCIES, HIGHLY IMPROBABLE AND UNCONVINCING
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT INOCENTES, TOTALLY IGNORING AND FAILING TO GIVE WEIGHT
AND RECOGNITION TO THE MOST SUPERIOR AND IMPORTANT
PRESUMPTION IN LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, THAT OF THE PRESUMPTION
OF IN[N]OCENCE WHICH OVERRIDES ALL OTHER PRESUMPTIONS, MOST
ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE AT BAR WHERE THE PROSECUTION HA[S] FAILED
MISERABLY IN ITS ASSIGNED TASK OF PRODUCING THAT QUANTUM OF
EVIDENCE REQUIRED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
RONALDO INOCENTES BEYOND THE SHADOW OF ANY DOUBT.
Furthermore, Aurora Salva Bautista, collaborating counsel who represented both appellants during
some part of the trial, submits a Supplemental Brief 15 in which she makes the following assignment of
errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE SHABU WHICH
CONSTITUTES THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED;
2. THE TRIAL COURT MISERABLY FAILED TO REFUTE THE
IRRECONCILIABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES SPO1 EMMANUEL MAGALLANES AND SPO1
ROBERT S. PONGYAN IN RELATION TO THEIR JOINT
AFFIDAVIT AS POINTED OUT BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
IN THEIR MEMORANDUM SUBMITTED BEFORE SAID COURT[;]
3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON THE WEAKNESS
OF THE DEFENSE RATHER THAN ON THE STRENGTH OF THE
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE;
4. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING MAINLY ON THE
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY OF DUTY PERFORMED
RATHER THAN ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF
THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED; AND
5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE BUY-
BUST OPERATION AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
WAS A MERE FRAME-UP.
In sum, the issues raised by the accused-appellants involve (1) the sufficiency of the prosecution
evidence to support their conviction, (2) the existence of conspiracy between them, (3) the validity of the
entrapment ("buy-bust" operation or frame-up), and (4) the alleged variance between the offense
charged and the evidence proffered.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal 16 has no merit. We find, however, that the trial court erred in imposing the proper penalty.
First Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
The various briefs filed by the appellants similarly aver that the evidence adduced by the prosecution
failed to establish their guilty beyond reasonable doubt. According to them, (1) the money allegedly
used by the police to buy the shabu from the appellants was not presented or identified in court; (2) the
shabu itself was not properly identified; and (3) there were material inconsistencies in the testimonies of
362
the police officers, which could have been clarified by the informant who, however, was not presented Q What else did Capt. Bonifacio [tell] you he talked [about] with that
as a witness. All these circumstances, appellants claim, are enough to create doubt as to the person?
occurrence of the alleged crime.
A I [was] the one who talked to that person and Capt. Bonifacio
To dispose of the appellants' first argument, we reiterate the rule that the non-presentation of the introduced me.
marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution, so long as the sale of the
dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug itself is presented before the court. 17 As to the Q So, you were introduced to that informant?
appellants second argument, we hold that the dangerous drugs confiscated from them during the buy-
bust operation were sufficiently identified and offered as evidence. To refresh their memories, it should
be recalled that their counsel 18 during the initial part of the trial agreed to dispense with the direct A Yes, ma['a]m.
examination of P/Insp. Isidro Cariño regarding the test he had conducted on the substances confiscated
from the appellants. Thus, the public prosecutor 19 proceeded to mark the pieces of evidence that were Q And, were you able to talk to that informant?
supposed to be presented by said witness: (1) the Request for Laboratory Examination dated October
22, 1996, submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory, and the latter's receiving stamp thereon (as Exhibits A Yes, ma['a]m.
B and B-1, respectively); (2) the Physical Sciences Report, stating that such examination yielded
positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu (as Exhibit C;) and (3) a sealed blue
plastic bag containing seven (7) plastic sachets, each with undetermined amounts of the Q What did you talk about?
methaphemtamine hydrochloride (as Exhibit D). 20 During its formal offer of evidence, the prosecution
submitted said Exhibit D, which was described as the "blue self-sealing envelope with markings of A The informant told me to wait and the person he [was] talking with
[']bianchi blue['] containing 232.84 grams of shabu," to "prove the existence of shabu which is the [come back and I will return to the office when I finished talking to,
subject matter of the Information." 21 him. The person named Caloy.

We deem such offer a substantial compliance with the pertinent rules on evidence. The separate Q And, after that, what happened?
marking of each of the seven sachets, as insisted by the appellants, is not a must. At any rate, they do
not deny that the marked plastic bag contained the packs of shabu that were confiscated from them.
A At about 2:10 o'clock, he c[a]me back and told me that [he]
already talked to the person named Caloy.
Material to a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. 22 Corpus
Q Now, after relaying that information, what did your office do, if
delicti has two elements: (1) proof of the occurrence of a certain event — for example, that a man has
any?
died or a building has been burned; and (2) some person's criminal responsibility for the act. 23

A I was ordered to go with that person to meet Caloy.

The principal witnesses to the commission of the offense for which the appellants are accused clearly
established the above elements: an illegal sale of the regulated drug actually took place both appellants
were the authors thereof. The poseur-buyer, SPO1 Emmanuel C. Magallanes, categorically testified as Q Other than that, what else was the instruction of Capt. Bonifacio?
follows:
A Capt. Bonifacio told me to make sure that we will be able to buy
Q Now, could you recall . . . any unusual incident that transpired shabu.
when you were at the office at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning?
Q Then, after that, what happened?
A Capt. Bonifacio [was] talking to somebody and told me not to
leave. A We proceeded [to] Martinez St. cor. Vergara, ma['a]m.

Q After Capt. Bonifacio talked to that person, what happened? Q Were is that Martinet Street?

A He told that the person he [was] talking with will come back and I A Mandaluyong, ma['a]m.
will be the one to accompany him to buy [from a certain] Caloy.

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Q You said that we proceeded to . . . Martinez St., at
Mandaluyong[;] who are you referring to as we?
A The informant, ma['a]m.
Q Who else [was] with you, if any?
A Our Team, ma['a]m.
Q Who [were] the members of that Team that you [are] talking
about?
A I [was] with SPO4 Basco, SPO1 Pongyan, SPO4 Bernardo,
SPO4 Velasco and the others I cannot remember.
Q Were you able to reach the place, Mr. witness?
A Yes, ma['a]m.
Q Now, what happened when you reached that place?
A A car arrived with two (2) persons.
Q What kind of vehicle . . . arrived?
A It [was] like a Lancer.
Q When the motor vehicle arrived, where were you then
positioned?
A We were just standing side by side with the informant because
that [was] what we ha[d] agreed upon.
Q What [were] you wearing at that time, Mr. witness?
A Civilian clothes, ma['a]m.
Q What about the other members of the team, where were they
then?
A They were a little bit farther but they saw me.
Q Upon the arrival of the two (2) what happened?
A I was introduced to Caloy Boco.
Q And, how were you introduced by the informant of yours?
A The informant told [me] that "okay ito[,] walang problema[,]
gumagamit ito.
Q And, then, what happened after that?
A I asked him if I [could] buy and [he] told me[,] if you have
P20,000.00 I will give you.
Q And, what was your response to that [remark of] this Boco?
A I showed him the P20,000. 00, ma['a]m.
Q After you showed the P20,000.00, what happened?
A I asked him if I could examine the shabu.
Q Were you able to examine the shabu?
A He got a pack from the compartment and when I examined it I
found it to be positive. I lighted a cigarette to signal to my
companions.
Q What [was] the purpose of lighting a cigarette?
A That [would] be a signal that I [was] holding the evidence.
Q After the pre-arrange[d] signal, what happened?
A I introduced myself that I [was] a police [officer].
Q Then, after introducing yourself as a police officer, what
happened?
A My companions approached us, then, pinaligid na po nila,
pinaputok na po sila.
Q After ordered him to a shot, who searched?[sic]
A Carlos Boco, ma['am].
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 Q And, when you searched the question [sic] of Boco, [what] did A Yes, ma['a]m.
you [find], if any?
Q When you were dispatched. you said, "we". Wh[o] [were] you
A Yes, ma['am], on his right leg . . . shabu [was] taped. referring [to] as "we"?

Q What else did you find on his body, if any? A My companions [we]re Sr. Insp. Bonifacio, SPO Bernardo[,] PO3
Enano, SPO Magallanes, Silva and Sgt. Basco.
A Five (5) pcs. of shabu, ma['am].
Q What was your participation with respect to the team created by
Q What about the other person? Bonifacio?

A Iyong isa po si Pongyan ang nanghuli. 24 A I was tasked to be a back-up.

A member of the arresting team, SPO1 Robert Pongyan who personally searched the body of Appellant Q How about Magallanes?
Inocentes right after his arrest, testified on the incident as follows:
A As I know, he was tasked to be the poseur buyer.
Q At 1:00 o'clock in the morning of October 22, 1996 could you
recall where were you then? Q Now, after dispatching, where did you proceed?

A We were at the headquarters of the District Anti-Narcotics Unit. A We proceeded to Mandaluyong City.

Q While you were in your office, could you recall of any unusual Q Where in Mandaluyong City?
incident that transpired?
A At Brgy. Vergara corner Kalentong.
A Yes, ma['a]m.
COURT:
Q What was that unusual incident?
Q Is this Barangay Vergara corner Kalentong or Vergara Street?
A I noticed that our Chief, Sr. Insp. Rodrigo Bonifacio was having a
conversation with an informant. A Street, Your Honor.

PROSEC. LEONARDO: PROSEC. LEONARDO:

Q Did you happen to know what was the nature of the conversation Q Were you able to reach that place of your target?
of Bonifacio with that informant?
A Yes, ma['a]m.
A It [was] regarding ... narcotics or drug dealing.
Q What happened [when you]; reach[ed] that place?
Q And after that talk with Bonifacio, what happened?
A Sr. Insp. Bonifacio told us to position our vehicle.
A Sr. Insp. Bonifacio told us to stand by for possible dispatch.
PROSEC. LEONARDO:
Q Were you actually dispatch[ed] during that time?

365
Q After positioning your vehicle, what happened?
A We waited.
Q For what?
A Subject.
Q [Did] the subject of your operation [arrive] at the scene?
A Yes, ma['a]m.
Q When the subject person arrived what happened?
A SPO Magallanes together with the informant talked to the subject.
Q You said that the subject arrived[;], did you happen to see how
did they arrive in the place?
A They were on hoard a Mitsubishi car.
Q How many were inside that car that arrived?
A Two (2).
Q Two (2) persons?
A Two (2) persons.
Q What [were] their gender[s], male or female persons?
A Two (2) male persons.
Q You said Magallanes and the informant talked to these two (2)
male persons. How far were you when Magallanes and the
informant were talking to these male persons[?] How far were you
from them?
A We were about ten (10) to fifteen (15) meters [away].
Q When Magallanes and the informant were talking to the 2 male
persons, what happened?
A The subject handed something to SPO Magallanes.
PPOSEC. LEONARDO:
Q How did you know that the subject male person was handling
something to Magallanes?
A From our position, we saw their action, their movement from our
position.
Q So, it was visible from where you were standing what transpiring
[at] the place where Magallanes and the informant were?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q When you saw that, after that something was handed by the
subject to Magallanes, what happened?
A After that, we saw Magallanes [accost] the subject.
Q After the subject was . . . accosted by Magallanes[,] what
happened?
A Our team leader, Sr. Insp. Bonifacio, told us to immediately alight
and proceed to where Magallanes [was].
Q You alighted from the vehicle?
A Yes, ma['am].
Q After lighting from the vehicle, what happened?
A We rendered assistance to SPO1 Magallanes.
Q When you rendered assistance, what happened?
A I proceeded to the vehicle of the subject together with Enano.
Q Why did you proceed to the vehicle of the subject?
A Because Sr. Insp. Bonifacio told me to secure the car.
Q What did you do after proceeding to the car?
A We introduced ourselves as policemen and frisked the occupant
of it.
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 PROSEC. LEONARDO:
Q You frisked the occupant of the car?
A Yes, ma['am].
Q You mean to tell the Court that you asked the occupant of the car
to step out of the car?
A Yes, ma['am].
Q And you said you frisked the persons [—] there were two (2) [—]
did you happen to know the identit[ies] of the persons inside the
car?
A It [was] only a certain Boyet, Ma'am.
Q This Boyet, where was he seated while they were inside the car?
A The driver's sea[t]. Ma'am.
Q He was the one driving the car?
A Yes, Ma'am.
Q And this was the person whom you frisked?
A Yes, Ma'am.
Q When you frisked [him], what did you recover, if any?
A We recovered, [to] my personal knowledge . . . a shabu.
Q How [much] shabu [did] you [recover] from this Boyet[?]
A One (1) pack of approximately five (5) grams.
Q From what part of this person of Boyet did you recover the
shabu?
A Right front pocket of his shorts. 25
Apparently, there are no material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the two principal prosecution
witnesses. Rather, they complement each other to give a complete picture of how the accused-
appellants' illegal sale of the regulated drug transpired, and how the sale led to their apprehension in
flagrante delicto. At the very least, their testimonies establish beyond doubt that regulated drugs were in
the possession of both appellants, who had no authority to possess or sell them.
Under the circumstances, we do not find any necessity for additional corroborating testimony,
particularly that of the confidential informant. Intelligence agents, due to the nature of their work, are
often not called to testify in court so as not to reveal their identities publicly. Once known, they could no
longer be used again, and worse, may be the object of revenge by the criminals they implicate. The
prevailing doctrine is that their testimonies are not essential for conviction, nor are they indispensable to
a successful prosecution. With the testimonies of the arresting officers, they would be, after all, merely
corroborative and cumulative. 26
Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are accorded great weight and respect, in the absence of a clear showing that some facts or
circumstances of weight or substance that could have affected the result of the case have been
overlook, misunderstood or misapplied. This is because the lower court had the opportunity to observe
directly the demeanor of the witnesses they testified. 27
Second Issue:
Conspiracy
Appellant Inocentes asserts that he had no participation in the commission of the crime and that the
prosecution miserably failed to prove that conspiracy existed between him and his co-appellant. He
claims that he merely drove for the latter and that the single pack of shabu allegedly found in his pocket
was planted evidence.
It is settled in our jurisprudence that direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it may be
inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all of which
indubitably point to or indicate a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest. 28
In the case at bar, both appellants arrived at the crime scene on board the same vehicle. While only
Appellant Boco talked to the informant and the police officer who posed as the buyer, it was Appellant
Inocentes who took out the sample shabu from the glove compartment of the car and handed it over to
Policeman Magallanes. When both were frisked right after their arrest, packs of the regulated substance
were found in their respective bodies. Obviously, their behavior and demeanor were indicative of a joint
purpose — to sell the shabu.
One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts in effect the criminal design of his co-conspirators, and he
can no longer repudiate the conspiracy after it has materialized. 29 Conviction is proper upon proof that
the accused-appellants acted in concert. The act of one then becomes the act of all, and each of the
accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty as co-principals of the crime committed. 30
Third Issue:
Buy-Bust Operation or Frame-up?
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A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a valid
means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. 31 It is commonly employed by police officers
as an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime. 32 In a buy-bust
operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or
prodding him to commit the offense. 33 Its opposite is instigation or inducement, wherein the police or
its agent lures the accused into committing the offense in order to prosecute him. 34 Instigation is
deemed contrary to public policy and considered an absolutory cause. 35
An allegation of frame-up and extortion by police officers is a common and standard defense in most
dangerous drug cases. 36 It is, however, viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can be easily
concocted. 37 To substantiate such defense, including instigation, the evidence must be clear and
convincing. 38
In the case at bar, the appellants merely claimed that they were victims of frame-up and extortion by the
narcotics agents of the Eastern Police District. They, however, failed to present sufficient credible
evidence to substantiate their claims. They submitted no plausible reason or ill motive on the part of the
arresting officers that could have spurred the latter to collar them in particular. We have held in
numerous cases that frame-up, often imputed to police officers, requires strong proof when offered as a
defense, because of the presumption that public officers acted in the regular performance of their official
duties. 39
Moreover, the defense of instigation asserted by Appellant Boco is incompatible with frame-up. In the
former, the crime is actually performed by the accused, except that the intent originates from the mind of
the inducer. In frame-up, however, the offense is not committed by the accused. Precisely, the accused
is only framed or set up in a situation leading to a false accusation against him. Instigation and frame-
up, therefore, cannot be present concurrently.
In the absence of proof of any ill motive or intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute a
serious crime to the appellants, what must prevail over the latter's self-serving and uncorroborated claim
that they have been framed is the presumption of regularity in the performance of the former's official
duties, as well as the doctrine that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great respect. 40
Fourth Issue:
Variance Between Offense Charged
and Evidence Proffered
Finally, appellants argue that the Information charged them with violation of Section 21 of the
Dangerous Drugs Law, or merely an attempt to sell the regulated drug without authority of law. Hence,
they contend that they cannot be tried and convicted of consummated sale under Section 15 of the
same law, which the prosecution evidence tried to establish.
Such argument is flawed. More particularly, the accused-appellants were charged with violation of
Section 21, Article IV of RA 6425, as amended, committed by "conspiring[,] confederating together and
mutually helping one another, without having been authorized by law, . . . [in] attempt[ing] to deliver,
distri[b]ute, transport or sell to another, white crystalline substance . . . found positive . . . for
[m]ethamphetamine hydrochloride . . . ." Said Section 21 reads:
Sec. 21. Attempt and Conspiracy. — The same penalty prescribed by this Act for the
commission of the offense shall be imposed in case of any attempt or conspiracy to
commit the same in the following cases:
(a) Importation of dangerous drugs;
(b) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of
dangerous drugs;
(c) Maintenance of a den, dive or resort for prohibited drug users;
(d) Manufacture of dangerous drugs; and
(e) Cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of prohibited
drugs.
Clearly, the provision covers attempt and conspiracy, both of which were alleged in the Information. This
negates any surprise that could have adversely affected the appellants in their defense. As said earlier,
the prosecution evidence has convincingly established that both appellants conspired to sell the shabu,
without authority of law.
Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that conspiracy was not proven, the appellants may still be convicted
of the attempt to sell. A mere attempt to commit a felony is surely subsumed in the full execution
thereof. To attempt is to commence the commission of a crime by overt acts. 41 If one has been proven
to have completely carried out all the acts necessary to commit the crime, he has certainly been proven
to have executed the initial act required in an attempt.
In any case, we quote with approval the trial court's comment that a "violation of Section[s] 15 and 21 of
the [Dangerous Drugs] law provides the same penalty." Thus, the appellants could have suffered no
prejudice, had they been tried under either one or the other section.
Proper Penalty
An automatic appeal of a death sentence such as the present case opens the entire record for review.
Hence, though not raised as an issue by the parties, the propriety of the penalty imposed, among
others, was looked into by this Court. We find and so hold that the trial court wrongly sentenced the
appellants to death. The penalty prescribed for an attempt or a conspiracy to sell at least 200 grams of
shabu without authority of law, as well as a consummated sale thereof, is reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from P500,000 to P10 million. 42 In accordance with Article 63 (No. 2) of the Revised
Penal Code, the lesser penalty is applied when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the offense. 43 In the case at bar, the prosecution did not allege or
prove the attendance of any modifying, much less aggravating, circumstance to justify the imposition of
368
the extreme penalty. Hence, the prison sentence imposable upon the appellants is only reclusion
perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that both
appellants shall each serve reclusion perpetua and pay a fine of one million pesos
(P1,000,000).1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

369