PEOPLE vs. GENOSA G.R. No.

135981 September 29, 2000

Facts: That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang,
Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, hit and wound one BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a
hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the purpose. Appellant
alleges that the trial court grievously erred in concluding that she had lied about the
means she employed in killing her husband. On the contrary, she had consistently
claimed that she had shot her husband. Yet the trial judge simply ruled that the cause of
his death was "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial
hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the occipital bone," which resulted from
her admitted act of "smashing" him with a pipe. Such conclusion was allegedly
unsupported by the evidence on record, which bore no forensic autopsy report on the
body of the victim.
Appellant further alleges that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe
beatings she had suffered at the hands of her husband, the trial court failed to
appreciate her self-defense theory. She claims that under the surrounding
circumstances, her act of killing her husband was equivalent to self-defense.
Furthermore, she argues that if she "did not lie about how she killed her husband, then
she did not lie about the abuse she suffered at his hands.
The information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death
of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self
defense and defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating
circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death. On automatic review
before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that
the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination
of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified
psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she
killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the
records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a
partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists
and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of expert
psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome” plea.
Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan
and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently
submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.
Issues: (1) whether the body of the victim should be exhumed and reexamined in order
to ascertain the cause of his death (2) whether the appellant should be examined by
qualified psychologists or psychiatrists in order to determine her state of mind at the
time of the killing.
Ruling: (1) Accused-appellant seeks the exhumation of the victim's body to be able to
determine his exact cause of death, assailing the court a quo's conclusion that he was
"smashed or beaten at the back of his head" rather than shot, as claimed by appellant.
Considering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts
of hitting his nape with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the
Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of
said acts actually caused the victim's death. There is no need to exhume the body at
this time and conduct an autopsy thereon for the purpose. Moreover, the matter of
proving the cause of death should have been made before the trial court. Time and
again, we have said that this Court is not a trier of facts. Neither will it authorize the
firsthand reception of evidence, where the opportunity to offer the same was available to
the party during the trial stage. Consistent with this principle alone, the prayer sought by
appellant for the exhumation of the victim's body cannot be granted.
(2) n seeking to be "examined and evaluated by psychologists and psychiatrists to bring
into evidence the abuse inflicted upon her; [and] to determine whether such abuse will
support the 'battered woman syndrome'," the appellant brings to the fore a novel
defense theory. Through Counsel Katrina Legarda, she asks the Court to "re-evaluate
the traditional elements" used in determining self-defense and to consider the "battered
woman syndrome" as a viable plea within the concept of self-defense. Allegedly,
there are four characteristics of the syndrome:
(1) the woman believes that the violence was her fault;
(2) she has an inability to place the responsibility for the violence elsewhere;
(3) she fears for her life and/or her children's lives; and
(4) she has an irrational belief that the abuser is omnipresent and omniscient.
Living in constant danger of harm or death, she knows that future beatings are
almost certain to occur and will escalate over time. Her intimate knowledge of the
violent nature of her batterer makes her alert to when a particular attack is forthcoming,
and when it will seriously threaten her survival.
Trapped in a cycle of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she would
succumb to her helplessness and fail to perceive possible solutions to the problem other
than to injure or kill her batterer. She is seized by fear of an existing or impending lethal
aggression and thus would have no opportunity beforehand to deliberate on her acts
and to choose a less fatal means of eliminating her sufferings.
The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is
afflicted with the “battered woman syndrome”.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman
 • who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to
do without concern for her rights.

• Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate

relationship with men.

• Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple

must go through the battering cycle at least twice.

• Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If
it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as
a battered woman.”

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However,
considering the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any
aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum
penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may
immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for
parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.

(U.S. vs. Rivera, 26 Phil. 138)

Domingo Rivera challenged the deceased to prove who of them was the better man.
When the deceased picked up a bolo and went after him, Domingo Rivera took to flight.
The deceased pursued him and upon overtaking him inflicted two wounds. Antonio
Rivera, father of Domingo, rushed to his son's assistance and struck with a cane the
bolo from the hands of the deceased. Domingo Rivera inflicted fatal wounds upon the
deceased. While the son was originally at fault for giving provocation to the deceased,
yet the father was justified in disarming the deceased, having acted in lawful defense of
his son. But Domingo Rivera was declared guilty of the crime of homicide. (U.S. vs.
Rivera, 26 Phil. 138)
People vs. Valdez
FACTS:
Appellant Valdez, who is a barber, was in his shop on the ground floor of the same
house engaged in cutting the hair of a customer. They heard the screams and cries for
help of Egmidio's wife, Maria Aragon, and the appellant's wife, Rosita Otero. The
appellant at once ran upstairs followed by Porfirio. Neither of them was armed. As we
reconstruct the drama, Egmidio was attacking his wife, Maria Aragon, with a dagger
when the appellant entered the room. The wife received five wounds but it is not clear
whether she had received all of these wounds before the appellant appeared on the
scene. The appellant's wife was in the room and his children in the next room. The
appellant, in the defense of Maria, struggled with Egmidio for the possession of the
dagger, in the course of which he inflicted the three wounds that caused the death of
the latter.
ISSUE: Whether or not Appellant Valdez's act is justified under Article 11 of RPC.
Hence, exempting him from criminal liability.
Held: Yes. The appellant was not actuated by revenge or resentment or other illegal
motive, and that the appellant intervwned in the defense of Maria Aragon and in trying
to prevent Egmidio from wounding or killing his wife.
U.S. vs. Subingsubing
Brief Facts: A Japanese hit an old man 78 years of age on the face, shoved him to the
ground and attempted to choke him. The accused furnished the old man with a small
gaff, used by game cocks, with which the old man killed his assailant. The accused was
justified in furnishing the old man with the gaff, it being in defense of stranger. (U.S. vs.
Subingsubing, 31 Phil. 376)
Facts:
A Japanese called Mariano, approached and said indecent remarks to Pablo
Montealto's wife who was walking along one of the streets of San Remigio, Cebu in
October, 1914. Upon the woman's rejection, the Japanese seized her hands. Juan
Subingsubing, who went near them upon seeing the situation, told the Japanese to let
the Mrs. Montealto go, but the Japanese refused. At that instant, Pablo Montealto, a 78-
year old, came up to his wife's rescue, but he was suddenly hit him in the face and
shoved to the ground buy the Japanese who then got on top of him and with one hand,
choked him while beating him with his fist.
Juan Subingsubing, thereafter approached the two men, and instructed Montealto not to
move for he was going to pull the assailant off, but Montealto said he had stabbed the
Japanese with a gaff such as is used on gamecocks. The Japanese died because of the
stab wound. A 12 year old witness, Alipio Sinining, however, said that when Montealto
was on the ground being choked by the Japanese, Subingsubing handed him
something, but the witness could not identify what the item was.
Pablo Montealto and Juan Subingsubing were charged with homicide. On the ground of
self-defense, Montealto was acquitted but Juan Subingsubing was convicted for having
furnished Montealto with the weapon that killed the Japanese.
Issue: Whether or not Juan Subingsubing has criminal liability in the death of the
Japanese, Mariano.
Held: Held:
No. The court found no satisfactory and conclusive proof that the defendant
Subingsubing gave a gaff to Pablo Montealto he the latter was on the ground being
beaten and choked by the Japanese. The only incriminating circumstance that
appeared in the case is the testimony of Sinining, which was contradicted by the
defendants.
Montealto claimed that he had the gaff, which he used to defend himself, in his shirt
pocket.
The court stated that defendant Juan Subingsubing, who denied the charges against
him, would be acquitted, if the testimony of Montealto is given more weight than
Sinining's testimony.
The court explained that Subingsubing performed no physical act in defense of Pablo
Montealto. He did not attack or even lay hands on the person of the Japanese. under
No. 6 of article 8 of the Penal Code (now, Art. 11, Par. 3 in RPC) which reads: "Anyone
who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and
second circumstances mentioned in paragraph four are present, and the further
circumstance that the person defending be not actuated by revenge, resentment, or
other evil motive."

PEOPLE vs. NORMA HERNANDEZ G.R. 22553-R April 14, 1959 F

Facts: Vivencio Lacsano, the plaintiff, started courting Maria Norma Hernandez, the
appellant, sometime around August, 1954. On January 6, 1655, Norma Hernandez
finally accepted Vivencio. On the said date the parents of the appellant, Mariano
Hernandez and Ramona Martinez, talked about a marriage between Norma and
Vivencio. The following month Vivencio, together with his parents and his twelve aunts
went to Norma’s House to ask for her hand in marriage. Mariano and Ramona agreed to
the marriage proposal. On the day of the wedding between Vivencio and Norma, the
appellant never showed up but instead went to her cousin in Mindoro. In a letter sent to
her parents, Norma stated that she did not love Vivencio and that was the reason she
left for Mindoro.
Issue: Whether or not Norma is guilty of slander by deed.
Ruling: No. Norma is not guilty of slander by deed because there was no malice when
she changed her mind in marrying Vivencio. Norma was exercising her right not to give
her consent to the marriage. Norma has the right to avoid herself the evil of going
through a loveless marriage pursuant to Art. 11 Par 4 of the RPC.
People vs. Ricohermoso
Avoidance of Greater Evil or Injury
Facts:
Geminiano de Leon, together with his common-law wife, son Marianito de Leon and one
Rizal Rosales, chanced upon Pio Ricohermoso. Owning a parcel of land, which
Ricohermoso cultivated as kaingin, Geminiano asked about his share of palay harvest
and added that she should be allowed to taste the palay harvested from his land.
Ricohermoso said Geminiano could collect the palay anytime.

Upon returning from his trip to Barrio Bagobasin, Geminiano dropped by Ricohermoso’s
house and asked him about the palay, to which the latter answered defiantly that he will
not give him the palay, whatever happens. Geminiano remonstrated and that point (as if
by prearrangement), Ricohermoso unsheathed his bolo, while his father-in-law Severo
Padernal got an axe, and attacked Geminiano. At the same time and place,
Ricohermoso’s brother-in-law Juan Padernal suddenly embraced Marianito. They
grappled and rolled down the hill, at which point Marianito passed out. When he
regained consciousness, he discovered that the rifle he carried beforehand was gone
and that his father was mortally wounded.

The defendants shifted the responsibility of killing in their version of the case.

Issue:
W/N appellant Juan Padernal can invoke the justifying circumstance of avoidance of a
greater evil or injury

Held:
No. Juan Padernal’s reliance on the justifying circumstance is erroneous because his
act in preventing Marianito from shooting Ricohermoso and Severo Padernal, the
aggressors in this case, was designed to insure the killing of Geminiano de Leon
without any risk to the assailants and not an act to prevent infliction of greater evil or
injury. His intention was to forestall any interference in the assault.
Treachery was also appreciated in the case. The trial court convicted the appellants
with lesiones leves, from an attempted murder charge with respect to Marianito de
Leon.
Judgment as to Juan Padernal affirmed.

(Note: Severo Padernal withdrew his appeal, thus, in effect, accepted the prosecution’s
version of the case and trial court’s finding of guilt.)

People vs. Felipe Delima (46 Phil. 738)

Facts: Lorenzo Napilon escaped from the jail where he was serving sentence. Some
days afterwards the policeman, Felipe Delima, who was looking for him, found him in
the house of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a
lance, and demanded his surrender. The fugitive answered with a stroke of his lance.
The policeman dodged it, and to impose his authority fired his revolver, but the bullet did
not hit him. The criminal ran away, without parting with his weapon. The peace officer
went after him and fired again his revolver, this time hitting and killing him. The
policeman was tried and convicted by the Court of First Instance of homicide and
sentenced to reclusion temporal and the accessory penalties.

Held: The killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under the
obligation to surrender, and had no right, after evading service of his sentence, to
commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in his hand, which compelled the
policeman to resort to such an extreme means, which, although it proved to be fatal,
was justified by the circumstances. Article 8, No. 11 of the Penal Code (Art. 11, par. 5,
Revised Penal Code) being considered, Felipe Delima committed no crime, and he is
hereby acquitted with costs de oficio.

Ruling in Delima case, applied to the case of a guard who killed a detained prisoner
while escaping. If a detained prisoner under the custody of the accused, a policeman
detailed to guard him, by means of force and violence, was able to leave the cell and
actually attempted to escape, notwithstanding the warnings given by the accused not to
do so, and was shot by the accused, the latter is entitled to acquittal in accordance with
the ruling laid down in People vs. Delima, 46 Phil. 738. (People vs. Bisa, C.A., 51 O.G.
4091)

People Vs Tan

Summary:

Doctrine:

1. The prisoner's re-arrests would not place him twice in jeopardy because his re-
incarceration is merely a continuation of the penalty that he had not completely served
due to the erroneous act of the warden, it is not a new or subsequent conviction.
Neither would his re-arrest deprive him of liberty without due process of law, because
he was not yet entitled to liberty at the time he was released.

2. Service of penalties and allowance for good conduct are specifically, even
elaborately, governed by the Penal Code and do not depend upon the good faith of
the warden and of the prisoner.

3. The court's jurisdiction was not terminated by the commitment of the convict to the
jail authorities — the commitment was but the start in carrying out of the court's
decision. It is the prerogative of the court meting out the punishment to see to it that
the punishment be served until, by act of lawfully authorized administrative agencies
of the state the convict is pardoned or paroled or, on lawful grounds, set at liberty
sooner than the expiration of the sentence imposed.

Facts:

Fidel Tan was convicted by the Court of First instance of Samar and was jailed therein
for TWO (2) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS and
TWO (2) MONTHS, as maximum. Tan was committed to the Director of prisons, but
the warden chose to retain Tan in Samar Provincial Jail for health reasons.
Subsequently, Tan was released under GCTA by the provincial jail warden.

Issues Ratio:

1. WON the Provincial warden committed breach of duty in deciding to retain Tan in
Samar Provincial Jail.
2. WON the court loses jurisdiction when the accused-appellee commenced serving
his sentence and was committed to the warden.
3. WON the jail warden has the authority to release Tan under GCTA.
4. WON the re-arrest of Tan constitutes Double Jeopardy and deprive him of his
liberty wothout due process of law.

I. YES, the Provincial warden committed breach of duty. The excuses tendered by the
provincial warden are clearly inacceptable. The alleged fear that the convict Tan might
be involved in occasional riots in the Insular Penitentiary is but a flimsy pretext for
evading the warden's plain duty of remitting the prisoner to his proper place of
confinement. Having been sentenced to more than one year of imprisonment, the
convict was not a provincial Prisoner but an insular prisoner (Adm. Code, section
1740), and there being no showing that his life would be endangered by the trip to
Muntinlupa penitentiary, the warden's failure to send him thither was a breach of duty
for which said officer should be held accountable. It needs no stressing that to allow
provincial wardens to retain insular prisoners without proper authorization would open
the way to all sorts of discrimination in the treatment of prisoners and constitute a
standing invitation for the commission of abuses and anomalies for personal or
political motives.

II. No. The court's jurisdiction was not terminated by the commitment of the convict to
the jail authorities — the commitment was but the start in carrying out of the court's
decision. It is the prerogative of the court meting out the punishment to see to it that
the punishment be served until, by act of lawfully authorized administrative agencies
of the state the convict is pardoned or paroled or, on lawful grounds, set at liberty
sooner than the expiration of the sentence imposed.

III. No. The warden usurps the authority of the Director of Prisons in crediting the
prisoner with good conduct time allowance. Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code
vests such authority exclusively in the Director and no one else.
IV. No. The prisoner's re-arrests would not place him twice in jeopardy because his re-
incarceration is merely a continuation of the penalty that he had not completely served
due to the erroneous act of the warden, it is not a new or subsequent conviction.
Neither would his re-arrest deprive him of liberty without due process of law, because
he was not yet entitled to liberty at the time he was released.

Dispositive:

For the foregoing reasons, the appealed order is hereby reversed and a new one
entered, ordering the re-arrest, and the continuance of the imprisonment of the
accused-appellee, Fidel Tan, for one (1) year, five (5) months and eleven (11) days
more.

PEOPLE vs. DARIO MARGEN

FACTS: Before 11 March 1944, deceased Diego Testor was asked by one Ponting to take a
quantity of fish to 8 constabulary detachment headed by Accused Sergeant Margen. Needing for
food for his children, Diego traded the fish for camote, and when he was sent for by Sgt Margen
to make him account for his breach of trust, he brought with him to the barracks a quantity of
fish called Kalapion. Irritated by Diego’s conduct, Sgt Margen threw the fish into Diego’s face.
And then he had Diego’s hand tied behind his back and gave him fist blows. Thereafter, Sgt
Margen forced Diego to eat up two of the Kalapion. In this he was aided by Tarrayo, who shoved
the fish into Diego’s mouth, and by Midoranda, who held the loose ends of the rope with which
Diego’s hand were tied. After this, Diego was taken to Calbyagog where he died the following
day. For the death of Diego Testor, Margen, Tarrayo and Midoranda were prosecuted for murder
but only Midoranda was tried because the other two had escape.

ISSUE: W/N appellant Andres Midoranda should not be charged with the crime of murder for
following an order of Sgt Margen

HELD: NO, obedience to an order of a superior give rise to exemption from criminal liability
only when the order is for some lawful purpose, in accordance with Article 11 of the Revised
Penal Code. Sgt Margen’s order to have deceased Diego tortured was not of that kind. Although
Diego may have given offense, but it did not give Sgt Magen the right to take the law into his
own hands and have the offender subjected to inhuman punishment. The order was illegal, and
Andres Midoranda was not bound to obey it.