THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005]

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE,
respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity, needs special safeguard and care, including
appropriate legal protection before as well as after birth.[1] In case of assault on his rights by those who
take advantage of his innocence and vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense with the single-minded
purpose of upholding only his best interests.

This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and private respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte, and
a child named Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989.[2] After
their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresas parents in Fairview, Quezon City.[3] Almost a year later, on
December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.[4]

Gerardo and Ma. Theresas relationship turned out to be short-lived, however. On December 19, 1991,
Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy.[5] He
alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on December 10, 1980, she had married one
Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled.[6] Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive
and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon City.[7]

Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was twenty years old. She, however, averred that
the marriage was a sham and that she never lived with Mario at all.[8]

The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married
Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an
illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was
granted visitation rights.[9]

Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She held him
responsible for the bastardization of Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration of the above decision
INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the decision which grant(ed) to the petitioner so-called visitation rights
between the hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of any Sunday.[10] She argued that there was
nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child.[11] She
further maintained that Jose Gerardos surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her
maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the mothers surname.
Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of Concepcion as Jose
Gerardos surname.

Applying the best interest of the child principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresas motion and made
the following observations:

It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son to get at or to hurt the other, something
they should never do if they want to assure the normal development and well-being of the boy.

The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that the minor needs a father, especially as he is
a boy, who must have a father figure to recognize something that the mother alone cannot give.
Moreover, the Court believes that the emotional and psychological well-being of the boy would be better
served if he were allowed to maintain relationships with his father.

There being no law which compels the Court to act one way or the other on this matter, the Court
invokes the provision of Art. 8, PD 603 as amended, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, to wit:

In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the
paramount consideration.

WHEREFORE, the respondents Motion for Reconsideration has to be, as it is hereby DENIED.[12]

Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error the ruling of the trial court
granting visitation rights to Gerardo. She likewise opposed the continued use of Gerardos surname
(Concepcion) despite the fact that Jose Gerardo had already been declared illegitimate and should
therefore use her surname (Almonte). The appellate court denied the petition and affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court.[13]

On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in the law that granted a putative father
visitation rights over his illegitimate child, the appellate court affirmed the best interest of the child
policy invoked by the court a quo. It ruled that [a]t bottom, it (was) the childs welfare and not the
convenience of the parents which (was) the primary consideration in granting visitation rights a few
hours once a week.[14]

The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child cannot use the mothers surname motu
proprio. The child, represented by the mother, should file a separate proceeding for a change of name
under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to effect the correction in the civil registry.[15]

Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the appellate court.
She also filed a motion to set the case for oral arguments so that she could better ventilate the issues
involved in the controversy.
After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of the parties, the appellate court resolved
the motion for reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son
of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage:

It is, therefore, undeniable established by the evidence in this case that the appellant [Ma. Theresa] was
married to Mario Gopiao, and that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with the appellee
[Gerardo] since the so-called marriage with the latter was void ab initio. It was [Gerardo] himself who
had established these facts. In other words, [Ma. Theresa] was legitimately married to Mario Gopiao
when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo under
the law is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario
Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and non-existent marriage between
[Ma. Theresa] and [Gerardo], but is said by the law to be the child of the legitimate and existing marriage
between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art. 164, Family Code). Consequently, [she] is right in firmly
saying that [Gerardo] can claim neither custody nor visitorial rights over the child Jose Gerardo. Further,
[Gerardo] cannot impose his name upon the child. Not only is it without legal basis (even supposing the
child to be his illegitimate child [Art. 146, The Family Code]); it would tend to destroy the existing
marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Gopiao, would prevent any possible rapproachment between the
married couple, and would mean a judicial seal upon an illegitimate relationship.[16]

The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo
was their son. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardos birth certificate showing that he was born a little less
than a year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married:

We are not unaware of the movants argument that various evidence exist that appellee and the
appellant have judicially admitted that the minor is their natural child. But, in the same vein, We cannot
overlook the fact that Article 167 of the Family Code mandates:

The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (underscoring ours)

Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate
status on the bare declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the supposed father. In fine, the law
and only the law determines who are the legitimate or illegitimate children for ones legitimacy or
illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth certificate of the minor can change his
status for the information contained therein are merely supplied by the mother and/or the supposed
father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is.[17] (Emphasis supplied)

Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same was
denied.[18] Hence, this appeal.

The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.[19] Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A
child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.[20]
As a guaranty in favor of the child[21] and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
Code provides:

Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.[22] We explained
the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals[23]:

The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the
broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to
protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.

Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)[24] of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to
dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case,[25] his heirs,
who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.[26] Impugning the legitimacy
of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.[27] Since the
marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband
and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the
period of conception.[28] To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family
Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the
husband to father the child.[29] Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not
disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.[30]

The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of
coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded
the birth of the child.[31]

To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital
intimacy impossible.[32] This may take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or
provinces and they were never together during the period of conception.[33] Or, the husband was in
prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the
violation of prison regulations.[34]

Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City,
Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a
scant four kilometers apart.

Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all was
presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these circumstances, the separation
between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically
impossible for them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be
presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of
legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.

Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresas statement in her answer[35] to the petition for annulment of
marriage[36] that she never lived with Mario. He claims this was an admission that there was never any
sexual relation between her and Mario, an admission that was binding on her.

Gerardos argument is without merit.

First, the import of Ma. Theresas statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but
her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration ― an avowal by the mother that her child is
illegitimate ― is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code.

The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child
cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.

Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an instance
where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no
intercourse between them. All she said was that she never lived with Mario. She never claimed that
nothing ever happened between them.

Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose Gerardos
conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity to each
other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of physical access was never
established beyond reasonable doubt.

Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresas statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right
exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs.[37] A mother has no right to disavow a
child because maternity is never uncertain.[38] Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question
Jose Gerardos legitimacy.

Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no
intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate.[39] The proscription is in consonance
with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law to lean
toward the legitimacy of children.[40]

Gerardos insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in the trial court and in the
appellate court does not hold water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo admitted and agreed
that Jose Gerardo was born to them was immaterial. That was, in effect, an agreement that the child was
illegitimate. If the Court were to validate that stipulation, then it would be tantamount to allowing the
mother to make a declaration against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to the denial of filiation
of the child by persons other than her husband. These are the very acts from which the law seeks to
shield the child.
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child.[41] Otherwise,
the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.

The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardos birth certificate is misplaced. It has no evidentiary value in this
case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the court shall not
consider any evidence which has not been formally offered.[42]

Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth.[43] Although a
record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child,[44] as the
status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of
the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the termination
of marriage is sought to be established.[45]

Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not be contested
collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the
presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and uncalled for.

In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.[46] As prima
facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It
is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the
interested parties.[47] Between the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardos
illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable
doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is also more
conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law.

It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly press for Jose Gerardos illegitimacy
while claiming that they both had the childs interests at heart. The law, reason and common sense
dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable to the child. In the eyes of the law, the legitimate child
enjoys a preferred and superior status. He is entitled to bear the surnames of both his father and
mother, full support and full inheritance.[48] On the other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to use the
surname and be under the parental authority only of his mother. He can claim support only from a more
limited group and his legitime is only half of that of his legitimate counterpart.[49] Moreover (without
unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination against him), in the eyes of society, a bastard is usually
regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless to state, the legitimacy presumptively vested
by law upon Jose Gerardo favors his interest.

It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the bitter squabble between the very persons
who were passionately declaring their concern for him. The paradox was that he was made to suffer
supposedly for his own sake. This madness should end.

This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially tragic is that an innocent child
is involved. Jose Gerardo was barely a year old when these proceedings began. He is now almost fifteen
and all this time he has been a victim of incessant bickering. The law now comes to his aid to write finis
to the controversy which has unfairly hounded him since his infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.

As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and
mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames.[50] A persons
surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from parent to child.
[51] Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not
related to him in any way.

The matter of changing Jose Gerardos name and effecting the corrections of the entries in the civil
register regarding his paternity and filiation should be threshed out in a separate proceeding.

In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code grants
visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights flow from
the natural right of both parent and child to each others company. There being no such parent-child
relationship between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.

Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, is clear and unequivocal:

Article 8. Childs Welfare Paramount. In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property
of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.

Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a
signatory is similarly emphatic:

Article 3

1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration.

The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender
years.[52] Through its laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even their own parents, to the
end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be
impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this case,
the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and January 10, 1996 resolutions
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION

BELEN SAGAD ANGELES, G.R. No. 153798

Petitioner,

Present:

PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CORONA,

- versus - CARPIO-MORALES, and

GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:

ALELI CORAZON ANGELES

MAGLAYA,

Respondent. September 2, 2005

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Belen Sagad
Angeles seeks to set aside the Decision dated May 29, 2002[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
66037, reversing an earlier Order of the Regional Trial Court at Caloocan City which dismissed the
petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles, thereat commenced by the
herein respondent Aleli Corazon Angeles-Maglaya.

The legal dispute between the parties started when, on March 25, 1998, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
at Caloocan City, respondent filed a petition[2] for letters of administration and her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles (Francisco, hereinafter). In the petition,
docketed as Special Proceedings No. C-2140 and raffled to Branch 120 of the court, respondent alleged,
among other things, the following:

1. That Francisco, a resident of 71 B. Serrano St., Grace Park, Caloocan, died intestate on January 21,
1998 in the City of Manila, leaving behind four (4) parcels of land and a building, among other valuable
properties;

2. That there is a need to appoint an administrator of Franciscos estate;

3. That she (respondent) is the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, and,
together with petitioner, Belen S. Angeles, decedents wife by his second marriage, are the surviving heirs
of the decedent; and

4. That she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required of an administrator.

Petitioner opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of respondent, be made the
administratrix of Franciscos estate.[3] In support of her opposition and plea, petitioner alleged having
married Francisco on August 7, 1948 before Judge Lucio M. Tianco of the Municipal Court of Rizal, a
union which was ratified two (2) months later in religious rites at the Our Lady of Grace Parish in
Caloocan City, and that Francisco represented in their marriage contract that he was single at that time.
Petitioner also averred that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was
recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him.
Pressing on, petitioner further alleged that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of
Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed
parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. And evidently to debunk
respondents claim of being the only child of Francisco, petitioner likewise averred that she and Francisco
had, during their marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. Petitioner thus urged that she, being
the surviving spouse of Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to the administration of
his estate.

In her reply to opposition, respondent alleged, inter alia, that per certification of the appropriate offices,
the January to December 1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where
the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. In the same reply,
respondent dismissed as of little consequence the adoption adverted to owing to her having interposed
with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan.[4]

Issues having been joined, trial ensued. Respondent, as petitioner a quo, commenced the presentation
of her evidence by taking the witness stand. She testified having been born on November 20, 1939 as
the legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado, who died in January 1988.[5] She
also testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Four (4)
other witnesses testified on her behalf, namely: Tomas Angeles,[6] Francisco Yaya,[7] Jose O. Carreon[8]
and Paulita Angeles de la Cruz.[9] Respondent also offered in evidence her birth certificate which
contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila, to Francisco
Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word Yes appears on the space below the
question Legitimate? (Legitimo?); pictures taken during respondents wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo
T. Maglaya; and a copy of her marriage contract. Likewise offered were her scholastic and government
service records.

After respondent rested her case following her formal offer of exhibits, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. In it, she prayed for the dismissal of the
petition for letters of administration on the ground that the petition failed to state or prove a cause of
action, it being her stated position that [P]etitioner [Corzaon], by her evidence, failed to establish her
filiation vis--vis the decedent, i.e., that she is in fact a legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles.[10]

To the motion to dismiss, respondent interposed an opposition, followed by petitioners reply, to which
respondent countered with a rejoinder.

Eventually, in an Order dated July 12, 1999,[11] the trial court, on its finding that respondent failed to
prove her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco, dismissed the petition, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby ordered DISMISSED for failure of the [respondent] to state a
cause of action in accordance with Section 1(g) of Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil of Procedure. (Word
in bracket added]

Respondent then moved for reconsideration, which motion was denied by the trial court in its Order of
December 17, 1999.[12] Therefrom, respondent went on appeal to the Court of Appeals where her
recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66037.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision dated May 29, 2002,[13]
reversed and set aside the trial courts order of dismissal and directed it to appoint respondent as
administratrix of the estate of Francisco, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is REVERSED. The Trial Court is hereby ordered to appoint
petitioner-appellant Aleli Corazon Angeles as administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco Angeles.

SO ORDERED.

The appellate court predicated its ruling on the interplay of the following main premises:

1. Petitioners Motion to Dismiss filed with the trial court, albeit premised on the alleged failure of the
underlying petition for letter of administration to state or prove a cause of action, actually partakes of a
demurrer to evidence under Section 1 of Rule 33;[14]

2. Petitioners motion being a demurer, it follows that she thereby waived her right to present opposing
evidence to rebut respondents testimonial and documentary evidence; and

3. Respondent has sufficiently established her legitimate filiation with the deceased Francisco.

Hence, petitioners instant petition for review on certiorari, on the submission that the Court of Appeals
erred: (1) in reversing the trial courts order of dismissal;[15] (2) in treating her motion to dismiss as a
demurrer to evidence; (3) in holding that respondent is a legitimate daughter of Francisco; and (4) in
decreeing respondents appointment as administratrix of Franciscos intestate estate.

We resolve to grant the petition.

The principal issue tendered in this case boils down to the question of whether or not respondent is the
legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. The Court of Appeals
resolved the issue in the affirmative and, on the basis of such determination, ordered the trial court to
appoint respondent as administratrix of Franciscos estate.

We are unable to lend concurrence to the appellate courts conclusion on the legitimate status of
respondent, or, to be precise, on her legitimate filiation to the decedent. A legitimate child is a product
of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is
strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more
emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.

In finding for respondent, the Court of Appeals, citing and extensibly quoting from Tison vs. Court of
Appeals,[16] stated that since petitioner opted not to present any contrary evidence, the presumption
on respondents legitimacy stands unrebutted.[17]

Following is an excerpt from Tison:

It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably overlooked the
universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing than the presumption that children
born in wedlock are legitimate. And well-settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be
attacked collaterally.

The rationale for this rule has been explained in this wise:

The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . .

actually fixes a status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally.
xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170 [of the Family Code], the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child can no longer be bought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore,
becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious intention of the law is to prevent the
status of a child born in wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty. It also aims to force early action to
settle any doubt as to the paternity of such child so that the evidence material to the matter . . . may still
be easily available.

xxxxxxxxx

Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife . . . .(Words in bracket added;
Emphasis ours)
Contextually, the correct lesson of Tison, which the appellate court evidently misapplied, is that: (a) a
child is presumed legitimate only if conceived or born in wedlock; and (b) the presumptive legitimacy of
such child cannot be attacked collaterally.

A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal presumption to
establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to prove that fact.[18] For, a presumption is
prima facie proof of the fact presumed. However, it cannot be over-emphasized, that while a fact thus
prima facie established by legal presumption shall, unless overthrown, stand as proved,[19] the
presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code[20] may be availed only upon convincing
proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the childs parents were legally married and that his/her
conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Else, the presumption of law that a
child is legitimate does not arise.

In the case at bench, the Court of Appeals, in its decision under review, did not categorically state from
what facts established during the trial was the presumption of respondents supposed legitimacy arose.
But even if perhaps it wanted to, it could not have possibly done so. For, save for respondents gratuitous
assertion and an entry in her certificate of birth, there is absolutely no proof of the decedents marriage
to respondents mother, Genoveva Mercado. To stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract
doubtless the best evidence of Franciscos and Genovevas marriage, if one had been solemnized[21] was
offered in evidence. No priest, judge, mayor, or other solemnizing authority was called to the witness
box to declare that he solemnized the marriage between the two. None of the four (4) witnesses
respondent presented could say anything about, let alone affirm, that supposed marriage. At best, their
testimonies proved that respondent was Franciscos daughter. For example, Tomas Angeles and Paulita
Angeles de la Cruz testified that they know respondent to be their cousin because his (Tomas) father and
her (Paulitas) mother, who are both Franciscos siblings, told them so.[22] And one Jose Carreon would
testify seeing respondent in 1948 in Franciscos house in Caloocan, the same Francisco who used to court
Genoveva before the war.[23] In all, no evidence whatsoever was presented of the execution of the
Francisco Angeles-Genoveva Mercado marriage contract; when and where their marriage was
solemnized; the identity of the solemnizing officer; the persons present, and like significant details.

While perhaps not determinative of the issue of the existence of marriage between Francisco and
Genoveva, we can even go to the extent of saying that respondent has not even presented a witness to
testify that her putative parents really held themselves out to the public as man-and-wife. Clearly,
therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in crediting respondent with the legal presumption of legitimacy
which, as above explained, should flow from a lawful marriage between Francisco and Genevova. To
reiterate, absent such a marriage, as here, there is no presumption of legitimacy and, therefore, there
was really nothing for petitioner to rebut.
Parenthetically, for all her unyielding stance that her mother and Francisco Angeles were married in
1938, respondent never, thru the years, even question what would necessarily be a bigamous Francisco-
Belen Sagad marriage. Ironical as it may seem, respondent herself undermined her very own case. As it
were, she made certain judicial admission negating her own assertion as well as the appellate courts
conclusion - that Francisco was legally married to Genoveva. As may be recalled, respondent had
declared that her mother Genoveva died in 1988, implying, quite clearly, that when Francisco contracted
marriage with petitioner Belen S. Angeles in 1948, Genoveva and Francisco were already spouses. Now,
then, if, as respondent maintained despite utter lack of evidence, that Genoveva Mercado and Francisco
were married in 1938, it follows that the marriage of Francisco to petitioner Belen Angeles in 1948, or
prior to Genovevas death, would necessarily have to be bigamous, hence void,[24] in which case
petitioner could not be, as respondent alleged in her petition for letters of administration, a surviving
spouse of the decedent. We quote the pertinent allegation:

4. The surviving heirs of decedent are the petitioner [Corazon] herself who is 58 years old, and BELEN S.
Angeles, the surviving spouse of deceased Francisco M. Angeles by his second marriage, who is about 77
years old . . . .YEARS OLD . . . (Emphasis and word in bracket added)

We can concede, because Article 172 of the Family Code appears to say so, that the legitimate filiation of
a child can be established by any of the modes therein defined even without direct evidence of the
marriage of his/her supposed parents. Said article 172 reads:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgments; or

2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and

signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Here, respondent presented, in support of her claim of legitimacy, a copy of her Birth Certificate dated
November 23, 1939 issued by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila (Exh. E). In it, her birth was
recorded as the legitimate child of Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado. And the word married is
written in the certificate to indicate the union of Francisco and Genoveva.

Petitioner, however, contends, citing jurisprudence, that [I]t was error for the Court of Appeals to have
ruled . . . that [respondents] Birth Certificate indubitably establishes that she is the legitimate daughter
of Francisco and Genoveva who are legally married.

The contention commends itself for concurrence. The reason is as simple as it is elementary: the Birth
Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even
by Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician, one Rebecca De Guzman, who certified to having
attended the birth of a child. Such certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is,
under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, evidence only of the fact which gave rise to its
execution: the fact of birth of a child.[25] Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered
as validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and
mother jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses.[26] Dr. Arturo Tolentino, commenting on the
probative value of the entries in a certificate of birth, wrote:

xxx if the alleged father did not intervene in the making of the birth certificate, the putting of his name
by the mother or doctor or registrar is void; the signature of the alleged father is necessary.[27]

The conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the Birth Certificate of respondent, unsigned as it
were by Francisco and Genoveva, establishes and indubitably at that - not only respondents filiation to
Francisco but even her being a legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva, taxes credulity to the
limit. In a very real sense, the appellate court regarded such certificate as defining proof of filiation, and
not just filiation but of legitimate filiation, by inferring from it that Francisco and Genoveva are legally
married. In the apt words of petitioner, the appellate court, out of a Birth Certificate signed by a
physician who merely certified having attended the birth of a child who was born alive at 3:50 P.M. ,
created a marriage that of Francisco and Genoveva, and filiation (that said child) is the daughter of
Francisco[28]
It cannot be over-emphasized that the legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself.[29] It
cannot, as the decision under review seems to suggest, be made dependent on the declaration of the
attending physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child. For then, an unwed mother,
with or without the participation of a doctor or midwife, could veritably invest legitimate status to her
offspring through the simple expedient of writing the putative fathers name in the appropriate space in
the birth certificate. A long time past, this Court cautioned against according a similar unsigned birth
certificate prima facie evidentiary value of filiation:

Give this certificate evidential relevancy, and we thereby pave the way for any scheming unmarried
mother to extort money for her child (and herself) from any eligible bachelor or affluent pater familias.
How? She simply causes the midwife to state in the birth certificate that the newborn babe is her
legitimate offspring with that individual and the certificate will be accepted for registration . . . . And any
lawyer with sufficient imagination will realize the exciting possibilities from such mischief of such prima
facie evidence when and if the father dies in ignorance of the fraudulent design xxx[30]

Just like her Birth Certificate, respondent can hardly derive comfort from her marriage contract to Atty.
Maglaya and from her student and government records which indicated or purported to show that
Francisco Angeles is her father. The same holds true for her wedding pictures which showed Francisco
giving respondents hands in marriage. These papers or documents, unsigned as they are by Francisco or
the execution of which he had no part, are not sufficient evidence of filiation or recognition.[31] And
needless to stress, they cannot support a finding of the legitimate union of Francisco and Genoveva.

The argument may be advanced that the aforesaid wedding pictures, the school and service records and
the testimony of respondents witnesses lend support to her claim of enjoying open and continuous
possession of the status of a child of Francisco. The Court can even concede that respondent may have
been the natural child of Francisco with Genoveva. Unfortunately, however, that angle is not an, or at
issue in the case before us. For, respondent peremptorily predicated her petition for letters of
administration on her being a legitimate child of Francisco who was legally married to her mother,
Genoveva, propositions which we have earlier refuted herein.

If on the foregoing score alone, this Court could very well end this disposition were it not for another
compelling consideration which petitioner has raised and which we presently take judicially notice of.
As may be recalled, respondent, during the pendency of the proceedings at the trial court, filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for the annulment of the decision of the RTC Caloocan granting the petition
of spouses Francisco Angeles and petitioner Belen S. Angeles for the adoption of Concesa A. Yamat and
two others. In that petition, docketed with the appellate court as CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 and captioned
Aleli Corazon Angeles Maglaya vs. Hon Jaime T. Hamoy, Consesa A. Yamat, Teodora A. Santos, Franco
Angeles and Belen S. Angeles, respondent alleged that as legitimate daughter of Francisco, she should
have been notified of the adoption proceedings.

Following a legal skirmish, the Court of Appeals referred the aforementioned annulment case to RTC,
Caloocan for reception of evidence. Eventually, in a Decision[32] dated December 17, 2003, the Court of
Appeals dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 47832 on the ground, inter alia, that herein respondent is not,
contrary to her claim, a legitimate daughter of Francisco, nor a child of a lawful wedlock between
Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado. Wrote the appellate court in that case:

Petitioner [Aleli Corazon Maglaya] belabors with repetitious persistence the argument that she is a
legitimate child or the only daughter of Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado . . . .

In the case at bench, other than the self-serving declaration of the petitioner, there is nothing in the
record to support petitioners claim that she is indeed a legitimate child of the late Francisco M. Angeles
and Genoveva Y. Mercado. xxx In other words, Francisco M. Angeles was never married before or at
anytime prior to his marriage to Belen Sagad, contrary to the claim of petitioner that Francisco M.
Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado were married in 1938

While petitioner may have submitted certifications to the effect that the records of marriages during the
war years . . . were totally destroyed, no secondary evidence was presented by petitioner to prove the
existence of the marriage between Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Y. Mercado, even as no witness
was presented to confirm the celebration of such marriage . . . .

Petitioner presented pictures. x x x However, it is already settled law that photographs are not sufficient
evidence of filiation or acknowledgment.

To be sure, very little comfort is provided by petitioners birth certificate and even her marriage contract..
. . Reason: These documents were not signed by Francisco . . . . Equally inconsequential are petitioners
school records . . . . all these lacked the signatures of both Francisco and Genoveva . . . .
xxx xxx xxx

Having failed to prove that she is the legitimate daughter or acknowledged natural child of the late
Francisco M. Angeles, petitioner cannot be a real party in interest in the adoption proceedings, as her
consent thereto is not essential or required. (Emphasis in the original; words in bracket added)

Significantly, the aforesaid December 17, 2003 Decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No.47832
was effectively affirmed by this Court via its Resolution dated August 9, 2004 in G.R. No. 163124, denying
Aleli Corazon Maglayas petition for Review on Certiorari,[33] and Resolution dated October 20, 2004,[34]
denying with FINALITY her motion for reconsideration. Another Resolution dated January 24, 2005
resolved to NOTE WITHOUT ACTION Maglayas second motion for reconsideration.

In the light of the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832, as affirmed with finality by this
Court in G.R. No. 163124, there can be no serious objection to applying in this case the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment,[35] one of two (2) concepts embraced in the res judicata principle.
Following the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she
is the legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein respondents
legitimate filiation to Francisco and the latters marriage to Genoveva, having been judicially determined
in a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res judicata and may not
again be resurrected or litigated between herein petitioner and respondent or their privies in a
subsequent action, regardless of the form of the latter.[36]

Lest it be overlooked, the same ruling of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832, as sustained by this
Court in G.R. No. 163124, virtually confirms the ratio of the trial courts order of dismissal in Special
Proceedings (SP) No. C-2140, i.e, that respondent failed to establish that she is in fact a legitimate child
of Francisco. Accordingly, the question of whether or not the Motion to Dismiss[37] interposed by herein
petitioner, as respondent in SP No. C-2140, is in the nature of a demurer to evidence has become moot
and academic. It need not detain us any minute further.

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent.[38] When the law
speaks of next of kin, the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the
decedents property;[39] one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as
distributed,[40] or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters
of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine
and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this
consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and pass upon the claimed
relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.

WHEREFORE, the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and the order of the trial court dismissing Special Proceedings No. C-2140 REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.