Money and Power PDF

Moneyand Power*
DAVID A. BALDWIN
Politicalscientists
are fondof observing
that"poweris to us what
moneyis to the economist:themediumvia whichtransactions are
observedand measured."' The analogysometimesimplies,as it
does in thisquotation,thatmoneyand powerperform similarsocial
functions.At othertimesit seemsto meanthatpoliticalscientists
oughtto spendas muchtimethinking aboutpoweras economists
do thinking aboutmoney. At stillothertimesone detectsan en-
vious tone thatseemsto say, "How luckyare the economists to
*The authorwould like to thankthe followingcolleagueswho reviewed

the manuscriptand offeredhelpfulsuggestions:Colin Campbell,RogerDavid-
son, Nelson Kasfir,David Kettler,JosephMassey,Michael Smith,Denis G.
Sullivan,and RichardWinters.
1J. David Singer,"Inter-NationInfluence:A Formal Model," American
PoliticalScience Review,57 (June 1963), 420.
MONEY AND POWER 579
have money,while our nearest equivalent is that slipperyconcept

of power." The precise implicationrarelymatters,however,since
the analogy is usually more a rhetoricalthan an analyticaldevice.
The article cited is typical in its use of the analogy as littlemore
than a device to introducea discussionof power.
If the analogybetween moneyand power were confinedto such
offhanduse, it would hardlymeritscrutiny. Such is not the case.
Serious and systematicuse of the analogy as an analytical device
was suggested and demonstratedby G.E.G. Catlin in The Science
and Method of Politics.2 His chapterentitled"The Process of Poli-
tics" is an extended comparisonof the processes of political and
economic exchange. Catlin believed thatin the "attemptto reduce
politicsto the compass and systemof thatscience which it has long
pretendedto be, no subject is likelyto prove more instructivefor
comparativestudythan that of economics."3 He also believed that
the key to progressin politicalscience lay in the establishmentof a
political analogue formoney:
Thesupreme ofa scienceofpolitics

difficulty liesnotso muchin the
establishment
of a humanconstant, suchas economics had in the
'economicman,'or in establishing
analoguesto thedesireforcon-
sumptionandtheirksomeness ofproduction,
butin theestablishment
of a standardand unitof value. Withoutmeasurement physics,
without moneyeconomics, couldnot have becomesciences;both
requiredfirst
a numericalunit.4
It is clear thatCatlin was not using the analogybetween power and

money casually. He wanted the comparisonof economic and po-
liticalprocessesto proceed on a seriousand systematicbasis.
Catlin's call forsystematicdevelopmentof the analogy between
economicsand politicshas recentlybeen renewedby Karl Deutsch
and Talcott Parsons.5 They see politics as a process of social ex-
2( New York: AlfredA. Knopf,1927), 206-279.

3Iid., 206.
4Ibid.,251. (Italics mine.)
5Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government(New York: Free Press,
1963), 116-127; Karl W. Deutsch, The Analysisof InternationalRelations
(Englewood Cliffs,N.J.: Prentice-Hall,1968), 40-47; Talcott Parsons,"On
the Conceptof Influence,"Public OpinionQuarterly,
27 (Spring1963), 37-62;
580 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS, VOL. 33, 1971
change in which power plays a role similarto the role played by

moneyin economicexchanges. Parsonsconceivesof politicalanaly-
sis as parallel to economicanalysis"in the sense that a centralplace
in it is occupied by a generalizedmediuminvolvedin the political
interactionprocess,which is also a 'measure' of the relevantvalues.
[He conceives of] . . . power as such a generalized medium in a
sense directlyparallel in logical structure,though very different
substantively, to moneyas the generalizedmediumof the economic
process."6 The extentto which Deutsch agrees with Parsons is un-
clear. He does note,however,that the remarkson power as a cur-
rencyin The Nerves of Governmentare based on the interimre-
sults of a continuingcollaborationbetween Parsons and himself.7
The importancethat Parsonshimselfattachesto the analogy is evi-
dent in the conclusionof a recent essay: "Perhaps the main point
of my analysisis the conceptionof politicalpower as a generalized
medium of politicalprocess that parallels the role of moneyin eco-
nomic process."8 Whateverone thinksabout the value of the anal-
ogy between money and power, one cannot dismiss it by saying
that Catlin, Deutsch, and Parsons did not expect it to be taken
seriously.
Another reason the analogy deserves serious attentionis the
extravaganceof the claims made on its behalf. William Mitchell
believes that Parsons's concept of power is a dramaticnew usage
Talcott Parsons,"On the Concept of Political Power," Proceedingsof the

AmericanPhilosophicalSociety,107 (June 1963), 232-262; Talcott Parsons,
"Some Reflectionson the Place of Force in Social Process,"in InternalWar,
ed. by HarryEckstein (New York: Free Press, 1964), 33-70; and Talcott
Parsons,"The PoliticalAspectof Social Structureand Process,"in Varietiesof
PoliticalTheory,ed. by David Easton (Englewood Cliffs,N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1966), 71-112. The conceptionof power as moneyis a recentdevelopment
in Parsons'sthought. It representsa change fromthe conceptionof power
thathe employedpriorto about 1960. See WilliamC. Mitchell,Sociological
Analysisand Politics: The Theoriesof Talcott Parsons (Englewood Cliffs,
1967), 35-36; and AnthonyGiddens,"'Power' in the Re-
N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
centWritings ofTalcottParsons,"Sociology,2 (September1968), 257-272.
6Parsons,"Conceptof PoliticalPower,"234.
7Deutsch,Nervesof Government, 120.
8Parsons,"PoliticalAspect,"104.
MONEY AND POWER 581
thatis likelyto generateconsiderableinterestand controversy.He

sees Parsons as having "sponsored one of the most revolutionary
changes in recentpolitical science."9 Deutsch claims that Parsons
"has perhaps opened a path to a more fundamentalreinterpretation
of power than has been possible since the days of Hobbes and
Locke."'10 Such claims as these indicate that close scrutinyof the
conceptionof power as money is in order. Let us not engage in
revolutionuntilwe have a firmidea as to the cause we are to fight
forand the weapons we are to fightwith.
The followingdiscussionwill examinethe Deutsch-Parsonsform-

ulation of the analogy and otherpossible formulations.The main
questions to be asked are: Is the conceptionof power as money
compatiblewith otherconceptionsof power currentlyin use by po-
litical scientists? What is the nearest political counterpartfor
money? What is the nearest economic counterpartfor power?
How much isomorphismis there in the power-moneyanalogy?
How could the analogy be developed so as to make it more useful
to political scientists?
COMPARINGSUBSETS OF POWER
Robert Dahl has suggestedthat "power termsin modern social

science referto subsetsof relationsamong social unitssuch thatthe
behaviorsof one or more units ... depend in some circumstances
on the behaviorof otherunits."" Notingthat power so conceived
spreads widely over the whole domain of human relations,he ob-
serves that studentsof power have tended to focus theirattention
on a few subsets of power relations. Given the ubiquityof power
relationsand the utilityof the comparativemethod,it seems promis-
ing to compare one subset of power relationswith another. This,
in effect,is what Parsons and Deutsch are proposing. Parsons
identifiesa "family"of ways by which one social unit can get an-
other social unit to behave in desired ways, and he proceeds to
9Mitchell,SociologicalAnalysis,87-90.
'0Deutsch,Nervesof Government, 116.
:"RobertA. Dahl, "Power,"InternationalEncyclopediaof the Social Sci-
ences,XII (New York: Free Press,1968), 407.
compare and contrastthese mechanisms.'12 The labels he chooses

for these "ways of gettingresults"-influence,power, money, and
generalizationof commitments-are unnecessarilyconfusing.Par-
sons's "ways of gettingresults"correspondclosely to what Dahl
mightcall "ways of exercisingpower." We should not, however,
let Parsons's terminologyobscure the fact that he is calling for a
comparisonof the subset of power relations (in Dahrs sense) as-
sociated with economicexchange and the subset of power relations
associated with political exchange. The analogy between money
and power invitesus to search forpolitical counterpartsto money
and economiccounterpartsto politicalpower.
PurchasingPower
An obvious candidate as an economic counterpartto political

power is purchasingpower. It is possible to conceive of purchasing
power relationsas a subset of those social relationsin which A gets
B to do somethinghe would not otherwisedo. The economists,
who have conducted most of the discussionsof purchasingpower,
have shown little interestin or awareness of the political-science
literatureon power. The conceptual apparatus developed for the
analysis of political power, however, appears to be adequate for
describingpurchasingpower. In fact, economistscould probably
benefitfromusingthisapparatusmorethantheydo.
Purchasingpower can be considered as a subset of the power
relations conceived by Dahl without distortingthe conventional
meaningof the term. Althoughrarelymade explicit,the following
perspectivesare oftenimpliedin commonusage:
(1) Purchasing power is a human relation. Although we
sometimesreferto it as "command over goods and services,"this
can be misleading. One can acquire goods without purchasing
them,e.g., the man who acquires apples by picking them froma
tree. A purchase, however, requires both a buyer and a seller.
RobinsonCrusoe could have neitherpoliticalnor purchasingpower
untilthe arrivalof Friday. Purchasingpower is a relationin which
A gets B to sell him something.
12Parsons,
"Conceptof Influence,"42-45.
MONEY AND POWER 583
(2) Purchasingpower is not money. Althougheconomistsare

prone to say that money is generalized purchasing power, this
merelyindicatesa lack of interestin distinguishing between power
and the bases of power. A comparablelack of interestis exhibited
by the political scientistwho carelesslyrefersto an armyas power,
thus blurringthe distinctionbetween power relations and power
bases. The relationbetween money and purchasingpower could
be describedin conventionalpower terminologyas follows: Money
is a power resource(power base or base value) thatwill veryprob-
ably allow the possessorto exercisepurchasingpower that is gen-
eralized in scope and domain.73 Such a definitionmakes "money-
ness" a matterof degree, since probability,scope, and domain are
all variable. The higherthe probabilityand the wider the scope
and domain,the more"moneyness"a givenpowerbase has.'4
(3) Money is neithera necessarynor a sufficient conditionfor
the exercise of purchasingpower. Money does not guaranteethe
exerciseof purchasingpower. A blind deaf mute may findit diffi-
cult to exercisepurchasingpower no matterhow much money he
possesses. Like any other power resource, money is used with
varyingdegrees of skill. Money is only one of many base values
that can be used to exercisepurchasingpower. In some situations
the followingresources can serve almost as well: (1) an honest
face, (2) personal acquaintance with the seller, (3) reputationfor
honesty,or (4) goods or servicesto barter. Lasswell and Kaplan
have advised us of the crucial importanceof recognizingthat po-
litical power may rest on a varietyof bases.'5 This advice applies
to purchasingpower as well.
(4) Purchasingpower varies in scope, weight,and domain.16
13Cf.Harold D. Lasswell and AbrahamKaplan, Power and Society(New

Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,1950), 83-86.
'4Definingmoneyas a matterof degreeis not unusual. Cf. AlbertGailord
Hart, "Money,"International Encyclopediaof the Social Sciences,X (New
York: Free Press,1968), 426; Peter M. Blau, Exchangeand Power in Social
Life (New York:JohnWiley,1964), 269; and KennethE. Boulding,Economic
Analysis,II (4th ed.; New York:Harper& Row, 1966), 71-72.
'5Lasswell and Kaplan, Power,85.
'6These termsare used in the sense Lasswell and Kaplan used them.
Ibid., 73.
Variationsin the weightof purchasingpower are evidentto anyone

who can tell a dollar froma dime, but variationsin scope and do-
main are less obvious. Because money enables us to exercise gen-
eralized purchasingpower so easily, we tend to forgetabout the
limitson scope and domain. In our daily lives most of us, if we
have the money,can buy whatever we want fromwhomeverwe
want. We rarelythinkabout the thingsoutside the scope of the
buying power of our money,such as (dare I say drugs?) atomic
bombs, nerve gas, or certainkinds of friendship. Likewise, varia-
tions in domain are not very salient unless one travels abroad a
greatdeal. He who triesto insertan Americanquarterin a French
vendingmachine will become keenlyaware of variationsin the do-
main of purchasingpower. Like otherkinds of power, purchasing
power varies in scope, weight, and domain. If we are going to
compare moneywith its political counterpart,we should be careful
to specifythese threedimensionsof power.
The above discussion was designed to show that conceptions
developed for analyzing political power, such as those suggested
by Dahl, Lasswell, and Kaplan, can be used to analyze purchasing
power as well. Purchasingpower can plausibly be viewed as one
of Dahrs subsets of power relations. It is this conceptionof pur-
chasing power that will be used as a touchstonein the discussion
that follows.
Power and Exchange

The analogy of power and money is almost invariablylinked
with the conceptionof politicsas an exchange process. This is not
surprisingsince there is widespread agreementthat the most im-
portantfunctionof moneyis to facilitateeconomic exchange.'7Ex-
change models of politicsmay well be the wave of the future,'8but
17Thefollowing passage takenfroma standardtextbookis typical:"Money
has but one fundamental purposein an economicsystem:to facilitatethe ex-
changeof goods and services-to lessenthe timeand effort requiredto carry
on trade." LesterV. Chandler,The Economicsof Moneyand Banking(3rd
ed.; New York: Harper,1959), 2.
'8See WilliamC. Mitchell,"The Shape of PoliticalTheoryto Come: From
PoliticalSociologyto PoliticalEconomy,"in Politicsand the Social Sciences,
ed. by SeymourMartinLipset (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1969),
105 ff.
MONEY AND POWER 585
they are certainlynot new in political analysis. Thomas Hobbes,

JohnLocke, Edmund Burke,and othersconceivedpoliticsas a kind
of exchangebetween the rulersand the ruled. More recently,Cat-
lin and Lasswell have suggestedexplicitcomparisonsbetween poli-
tics and the processof economicexchange.19AlthoughParsonsand
Deutsch help to focus our attentionon the continuingnatureof the
exchange process, there would appear to be nothingvery revolu-
tionaryabout the use of a politicalexchangemodel.
There are, however, some importantimplicationsfor power
analysisin the comparisonof the role moneyplays in economic ex-
change with the role power plays in political exchange. If there
is one point on which most power theoristshave come to agree, it
is the utilityof treatingpower as a relationratherthan as a posses-
sion.20 The failureto distinguishbetween power as a relationand
the resources (base values or power bases) that may be used to
bringabout such a relationhas been a source of great confusionin
political science.2' It has led to many fruitlessdiscussionsof such
paradoxes as "the power of the powerless,""the powerlessnessof
the powerful,"and so on. Those who thinkthat it is usefulto dis-
tinguishbetween power bases and power relationsshould be wary
of the versionof the power-moneyanalogy propagatedby Deutsch
and Parsons,since it blurs this distinction.
Parsons has explicitlycomplained that Dahrs concept of power
makes it logically impossibleto treat power as a "specificmecha-
nismoperatingto bringabout changesin the action of otherunits."22
ThroughoutParsons's recentwritingson power one findsthe con-
ceptionof power as a "means, a "mechanism,"or a "'medium,"that
can be possessed and used in orderto get thingsdone. Power, for
Parsons, is not a form of social interaction;it is a "generalized
mechanismoperatingin social interaction."23It is not the process
19Catlin,
Science,206-279;Lasswelland Kaplan,Power,80-81.
20DorwinCartwright, "Influence,
Leadership,Control,"in Handbookof Or-
ganizations,
ed. by JamesMarch(Chicago: Rand McNally,1965),40.
21See RobertA. Dahl, ModernPoliticalAnalysis(Englewood Cliffs,N.J.:
Prentice-Hall,1963), 47-49, 53-54.
23Parsons,"Conceptof Influence," 38-42. JamesS. Colemanindicatesthat
he objectedat firstto "the analogyof influence
to money,on the groundsthat
of A gettingB to do somethinghe would not otherwisedo; it is

merelyone of several means by which A can affectthe behavior of
B.
This concept of power as a means ratherthan a relationis im-
bedded in the analogy between power and money. Thus Parsons
writes: "I conceive power to be a generalized symbolicmedium
which circulatesmuch like money,the possessionand use of which
enables the responsibilitiesof an officewith authorityin a collectiv-
ity to be more effectivelydischarged."24 And Deutsch suggests:
"Justas money is the currencyof economic life, so power can be
thoughtof as the currencyof politics. Here, power is the currency
or medium that makes easy the exchange of more-or-lessenforce-
able decisions formore-or-lessdependable support."25It is rather
easy to argue, as Deutsch does, thatpower is neitherthe centernor
the essence of politicsif one definespower as a specificmechanism
instead of as a relation.26 Now we see why it is so importantto
distinguishbetween money and purchasingpower. Whereas pur-
chasing power is a relation,moneyis but one of several means by
which such a relationcan be created. It is one thingto conceive
of power as a kind of exchange;it is quite anotherto conceive of it
as a medium,of exchange. Those who definepower as a relation
may findit more usefulto comparepoliticalpower withpurchasing
power ratherthan with money.
Barter. If political power is considered the counterpartof
purchasingpower, what is the political counterpartof money? If
we are to finda political counterpartto money,we must firstun-
derstandwhat moneyis; but we cannot understandwhat moneyis
the term'influence'refersto an effect,while the term'money'refersto a

mediumby which this effectmay be obtained." Coleman apparentlyaban-
doned thisobjectionafterreadingthe paper severaltimes. He does not say
why. JamesS. Coleman,"Commenton 'On the Conceptof Influence,"'Pub-
lic OpinionQuarterly,27 (Spring 1963), 81. In a later articleColeman ap-
of power as a resource. See JamesS.
pears to have accepted the definition
Coleman,"PoliticalMoney,"AmericanPoliticalScience Review,64 (Decem-
ber 1970), 1076-1077.
"PoliticalAspect,"79.
24Parsons,
25Deutsch,InternationalRelations,41.
MONEY AND POWER 587
unless we know what money does. Sometimeswoodpecker scalps

are money; other times they are not. "Anyone who begins his
studyof moneywiththe belief that thereis some one thingthat 'is
by naturemoney'and thathas been used as moneyat all timesand
in all places will findmonetaryhistoryvery disconcerting..27
There seems to be general agreementthat, as a medium of ex-
change, moneyis that which differentiates bartertransactionsfrom
other transactions. It would seem, then,that one's conception of
the role of moneyas a medium of economic exchange will depend
in part on one's conceptionof barter.
For most laymenand professionaleconomiststhe prototypeof a
bartersituationis a directexchange of goods or servicesfor goods
or serviceswhen the partiesto the exchange are the ultimatecon-
sumersof the goods and servicesinvolved.28 When personsaccept
goods or servicesin trade not because theywant to use (consume)
thembut because theycan exchange themlater forothergoods or
servicestheydo want to use, indirectexchangehas begun and pure
barterhas ceased.29 Thus barter situationsare mattersof degree,
depending upon the extentto which the parties involved perceive
the objects being exchanged as symbolsof the ability to exercise
purchasingpower. To the degree that an item being exchangedis
viewed as such a symbol it has become money. "Moneyness"is
also a matterof degree ratherthan of kind. Thus, insofaras we
are consideringonly the medium-of-exchange functionof money,
it is the degree to which an exchange is director indirectthat de-
termineswhetherwe classifyit as barteror as a monetarytransac-
tion.
If thereis agreementamong laymenand economistsas to what
constitutesbarter,why belabor the point? Reiterationof the com-
mon conceptionof barteris necessaryif we are to appreciate the
extraordinary natureof the conceptionof barterin the writingsof
Deutsch and Parsons. For Deutsch and Parsons power at firstap-
27Chandler, Moneyand Banking,15.

28Cf. Boulding,EconomicAnalysis,I, 18.
29Cf. Blau, Exchangeand Power,268; and Max Weber, The Theoryof
Social and Economic Organization,trans. by A.M. Hendersonand Talcott
Parsons,and ed. with an introduction
by Talcott Parsons (New York: Free
Press,1964), 177, 179, 202-203.
pears to mediate political exchange,thus differentiatingit frompo-

litical barter,just as moneymediates economic exchange,thus dif-
ferentiatingit from economic barter. The importance of this
phenomenonis indicated by Parsons's observationthat "a complex
politycould not operateon a basis of politicalbarter."30What is re-
markable about theirconceptionof barteris that it is definednot
so much in termsof directversus indirectexchange as in termsof
what is being exchanged.
As regardsthe politicalsystem, households maybe considered in

themostsimplecase as making specificdemandsuponthepolitical
system.Theyoffer specificsupport to rulerswho in turnuse this
support to makeandenforce binding ofthekinddesired
decisions by
theirsupporters. Thus,in effect, specificsupport appearsexchanged
fordependable specificdecisions,responsiveto specificdemands, in a
politicalanalogyto economic barter.
In a slightly
moreextended case,however, thegovernment may
assumea generalized leadership role-it assumesresponsibility-far
beyondthisor thatparticular decision;andthepopulation maygive
it generalpoliticalloyalty-that is, generalizedpoliticalsupportand
trust-tosomeextent ofthegreater
regardless orlesserpopularity of
anyoneofthegovernment's policies.Forbeyondtheformer political
logrolling,or trading of favors,
generalized support is askedforand
givenin termsof an onlypartly "currency"
quantifiable of responsi-
bilityand loyalty....31
The crucial distinctionhere between barter and non-barter

of the itemsbeing exchanged. If spe-
transactionsis the specificity
cific support is exchanged for specific policy decisions, political
barteris occurring. If generalsupportis exchangedforgeneralre-
30Parsons,"PoliticalAspect,"90.
3tDeutsch,Nerves of Government, 118-119. (Italics added.) See Par-
sons,"Conceptof PoliticalPower,"254-255; "PoliticalAspect,"87, 90, 93, 98,
100. At timesParsonsappearsto see barteras directexchange;see "Concept
of PoliticalPower,"256 and "Conceptof Influence,"40-42. One mustdis-
tinguish,however,between the conceptionof barterthat Parsons identifies
and the one that he uses. Althoughhe has definedbarteras the directex-
changeof one itemof commodity or serviceforanother("Concept of Political
Power,"237), his usage of the termelsewhereimpliesthata directexchange
of a package of vaguelydefinedgoods or servicesforanothersimilarpackage
would not be barter. It is the specificity
of the itemsbeing exchangedthat
seemsto matterforParsons,notthedirectness of theexchange.
MONEY AND POWER 589
sponsibilityforpolicy decisions,political monetizationis occurring.

The economic analogy would be to regard the exchange of one
apple for one orange as barter but to regard the exchange of a
truckloadof assortedfruitfora boatload of miscellaneousitemsas a
monetarytransaction. Accordingto the commonconception,what
Parsons and Deutsch call a monetarytransactionwould be nothing
more than a "package deal" based on barter. Althoughfew would
deny the need in complex polities to have generalized supportex-
changed for generalizedpolicy-makingresponsibility, it is not ap-
parentwhethersuch exchangesare or mustbe mediatedby a politi-
cal equivalent of money. Deutsch confuses the issue when he
describesloyaltyas a "currency."Loyaltyis politicalsupport,not a
symbolthereof. The crucial question,formost people, is whether
the generalized support is exchanged directlyfor generalized
policy-makingresponsibilityor whether the exchange occurs in-
directlythrougha symbolicmediumakin to money.
Symbolsof Power. The moment item X is accepted in ex-
change not because of its "use value" but because of its "exchange
value" item X has become to some degree a symbol,i.e., a thing
that representssomethingelse. Since every medium of exchange
is symbolicin thissense,it is probablyredundantto describemoney
as a symbolic medium of exchange. When something (shark's
teeth,colored beads, dollar bills, bank checks,or whatever) comes
to be widely accepted as a symbolof the ability to exercise gen-
eralized purchasingpower, we call it money. To compare power
withmoneyis thus to suggestthatpower is a symboljust as money
is a symbol. Here we confronta basic dilemma in the power-
money analogy: Are we to regard power as a symbolor as some-
thingto be symbolized?
Parsons and Deutsch treat power as a symbol. For Parsons it
symbolizesthe capacity foreffectivecollectiveaction;32forDeutsch
it symbolizes"the abilityto change the distributionof results,and
particularlythe resultsof people's behavior."33 Many political sci-
entistsmay findthis confusing. For them power is not a symbol
of the abilityto change results;it is the abilityto change results.It
32Parsons,
"Conceptof Influence,"48.
33Deutsch,International
Relations,41.
is not a symbolof A's abilityto affectB's behavior; it is A's ability

to do so.
There is a furthersource of confusionin Deutsch's treatment
of the symbolicnatureof power and money. This becomes appar-
ent as soon as one introducesthe distinctionbetween symbolsfunc-
tioningin social processes and symbolsused in inquiry into such
processes.34 We use the word "money"in inquiringinto the role of
those things (dollars, pounds, lira, woodpecker scalps, wampum,
etc.) that actually functionas symbolsof purchasingpower. The
differenceis that one can buy thingswith dollars,but one can buy
nothingwith the word "money." When Deutsch suggeststhat it is
the word "power"thatsymbolizesthe abilityto change the distribu-
tion of results,he is unlikelyto be disputed, since all words are
symbols.35This suggestion,however,is not veryhelpfulin under-
standingthe power-moneyanalogy. Are we to compare the word
"power" with the word "money" or with those concrete symbols
that actuallyfunctionas moneyin the economic system? Like the
word "money,"the word "power"cannotbe used to exercisepower;
it does not functionin politicalprocesses;-it is merelya symbolused
in analyzing such processes. Althoughsuch semantic comparison
may be useful,it is not the kind of comparisonthat is usually im-
plied by the power-moneyanalogy.
Ordinarily,those who suggest the analogy are interestedin
stimulatinga search forsymbolsthat performfunctionsin political
exchange similarto those performedby (things called) money in
economic exchanges. Those who undertakethis search will find
thatthe literatureon politicalpower has focusedmuch attentionon
political symbols. The influentialstudy by Lasswell and Kaplan
viewed politicalinteractionsas "constitutedby patternsof influence
and power,manifestedin and affectedby symbols...."36 This does
notmean,however,thatsuch symbolsresemblemoney.
In the process of using moneyto exercisepurchasingpower,the
symbolof abilityto exercisepurchasingpower changes hands. The
person who has received money in an economic exchange can in
see Lasswelland Kaplan,Power,xviii-xix.

340nthisdistinction,
Relations,41.
36Lasswelland Kaplan, Power,53.
MONEY AND POWER 591
turnuse it to exercisepurchasingpower. Are theresymbolsof po-

litical power that can be similarlyused as media of exchange to
transferpolitical power fromone person (or group) to another? I
suggestthat the nearestpolitical counterpartof moneyis found in
those symbolsof legitimatepolitical power, the possession and use
of which allows one to exercise legitimatepolitical power. Why
legitimatepolitical power? Because it is in this realm that widely
accepted symbols are most often found. Indeed, the concept of
"legitimacy"of the symbolsof political power correspondsclosely
to the concept of "acceptability"(or liquidity) of the symbolsof
purchasing power.37 The symbols of legitimate political power
mightinclude such thingsas titles (judge, senator,president,etc.),
uniforms,badges, identificationcards, officialcars, votes, office
space in public buildings,crowns,thrones,etc. Note that not all
politicalsymbolsare included. Possessionof an Americanflagmay
not allow one to exercise much political power. Possession of a
police uniform,however,may well allow one to exercise political
power even ifone is not a policeman-at least fora while.
Althoughwe are accustomedto thinkingof money in termsof
an exchange process,there is somethingdisconcertingabout view-
ing politicalsymbolsin a similarway. In what ways do these sym-
bols functionas media of exchange? One example would be the
town representative badge on JohnWayne in a
who pins a sheriff's
westernmovie,thus allowingWayne to exerciselegitimatepolitical
power. Similarly,the Americanpeople, as the joint owners of all
the officialbadges, buildings,vehicles, and titles,can be seen as
giving these thingsto certainpeople as symbolsof their support.
The people to whom such symbolicsupport has been given can
then use it to exercise legitimatepolitical power. It is easier to
thinkof votingas an exchangeprocess,since we are accustomedto
thinkingof ourselvesas "having a vote" and as "givingit to some-
one." We are not, however,accustomed to thinkingof ourselves
as ownersof the White House who permitselected personsto live
there in exchange for the performanceof certain services. The
process by which the people exchange symbols of legitimatepo-
37Cf. Parsons,"Conceptof PoliticalPower,"238; and Coleman,"Political

Money,"1081.
litical power for performanceof governmentalfunctionshas be-

come so bureaucratizedthat it is easy to lose sightof it. Evidence
of a basic residueof understandingof thisexchangeprocess,though,
is found in the irate speeder who remindsthe policeman who has
stopped him that as a taxpayerhe is in some sense the policeman's
employer.
In summary:(1) there is nothingrevolutionaryin the concept
of political exchange; (2) it is probably more useful to consider
power as a kind of exchangethan to considerit as a mediumof ex-
change; (3) the conceptionof bartermost likely to be helpful in
analyzingpolitical exchange is that definedin termsof the direct-
ness of exchange; (4) it is probably more useful to regard power
as a relationto be symbolizedthan to regard it as a symbol; and
(5) the nearestpolitical equivalentof moneyis a set of symbolsof
legitimatepolitical power, the possession and use of which facili-
tates the exercise of political power. To say that certain symbols
of legitimatepolitical power are the closest political counterpartto
moneyis not to say that the similaritiesare great. It may well be
that the differences between these two kinds of symbolicmedia are
more interestingthan the similarities. Let us take a closer look at
the degree to which the symbols of purchasingpower resemble
those of political power.
How MUCH ISOMORPHISM?
Thus far we have been discussingmoneyin termsof its role as

a medium of economic exchange. This neglect of the otherfunc-
tions oftenattributedto money is typical of discussionsbased on
the power-moneyanalogy. These otherfunctionsare: (1) measure
of value, (2) standard of deferredpayments,and (3) store of
value. Since the last two are oftentreatedas secondaryfunctions
of money,theirneglect is perhaps not so important.38To ignore
the standard-of-valuefunctionof money,however,is to riska gross
misunderstanding of the basic nature of money. Almosteveryone
who has discussedthe power-moneyanalogyhas alluded in one way
38Cf. Chandler,Money and Banking,5; and T. E. Gregory,"Money,"

EncyclopediaoftheSocial Sciences,IX (New York:Macmillan,1937), 601.
MONEY AND POWER 593
of extendingit to include the measure-

or anotherto the difficulty
of-valuefunctionof money. Some have regardedthis difficulty as
while othershave viewed it as a relativelyminor dis-
significant,
crepancybetween power and money.
Measuring Power
Althoughthereis widespread agreementthat purchasingpower
is easier to measurethan politicalpower,thereis less agreementas
to why this is true and what the implicationsare for the power-
moneyanalogy. Thus, Parsonsargues thatpower is "directlyparal-
lel in logical structure"to moneyin its abilityto functionas both a
medium of exchange and a measure of value.39 A few pages later
in the same article he notes that a "crucial difference"between
money and power is that money can be measured in linear terms;
whereas power measurementinvolves a quite differentdimension
which makes power harder to measure than money.40 Deutsch
tends to minimize the differencein the measurabilityof power
and moneyby focusingattentionon the factthat"like othercurren-
cies, power can be quantified,althoughfar more imperfectlyso."'4
The question that goes unansweredhere is whetherthere is more
significanceforpoliticalscientistsin the factthatpower and money
can both be quantifiedor in the factthat quantification is easier for
moneythan forpower. To clarifythis question let us examinethe
originsof money,not in historicaltermsbut in termsof the logic of
the situation.
If there were no money,there would still be a number of re-
sources (base values or power bases) that could be used to exer-
cise purchasingpower in direct exchange. These would include
everygood or serviceforwhich thereis any demand. Since there
is no generallyagreed-uponstandard of value, the price of every
resource would theoreticallyhave to be stated in terms of every
other resource. Thus, if there were 500,000 resources,each one
would have 499,999 different prices. Since this is extremelyincon-
40Ibid.,242.
4'Deutsch,Nervesof Government, 120. See also, International
Relations,
42.
venient,the inventionof moneyis almost inevitableif exchange is

to occur. One power base will be chosen to serve as a standardby
which to measure the value of the otherpower bases. Their value
will henceforthbe treated as derivativeratherthan primary;and
all power bases will be priced in termsof the primarypower base,
e.g., gold, beads, rice, or whatever. Once a standardof value has
been established,a medium of exchange can emerge. The power
resourceselected as a medium of exchange need not be the same
as that selected as a standardof value, but it must be measurable
in termsof a power resourcethat is a standardof value.42 Viewed
fromthis perspective,the standard-of-value functionof money is
not just anotherfunctionof money;it is a prerequisiteto perform-
ance of the medium-of-exchange function. The implicationsfor
the power-moneyanalogy are significant.To say that power is like
money except for the lack of a standardized measuring rod for
power is to put oneselfin a ratherawkward position. If the two
characteristicsin termsof which moneyis definedare its abilityto
functionfirstas a medium of exchange,and second as a standard
of value, and if these functionsare highly interdependent,it is
difficultto see how power can be regarded as similarto money if
it is severelydeficientin its abilityto performone of these func-
tions.43 Deutsch's treatmentof the measurementproblem is illus-
trative:
Like othercurrencies,power can be quantified,althoughfar more
42Cf.TalcottParsonsand Neil J. Smelser,Economyand Society(London:

Routledgeand Kegan Paul, 1956), 140-141; Roy Harrod,Money (London:
Macmillan,1969), 4; D. H. Robertson,Money (4th ed.; Cambridge:Cam-
bridgeUniversity Press,1948), 3; Weber,Social and EconomicOrganization,
179; Gregory,"Money,"601-603;and Boulding,EconomicAnalysis,II, 68-69.
43Parsons'sanalogybetweenlanguage and moneycan also be used to il-
lustratethe high degree of interdependence betweenthese two functionsof
money. He comparesthe medium-of-exchange functionwith messagetrans-
missionand the measure-of-value function withthe code used to give meaning
to the message. Both are obviouslynecessaryforcommunication."Concept
of Influence,"38-39. AlthoughIlchmanand Uphoffrecognizethe absence of
a commondenominator of politicalvalue, theyunderestimatethe far-reaching
implicationsof thislack fortheiranalysis. See WarrenF. Ilchmanand Nor-
man Thomas Uphoff,The PoliticalEconomyof Change (Berkeleyand Los
Angeles:University of CaliforniaPress,1969), 54-55.
IONEY AND POWER 595
imperfectly so. Power cannot be countedexactly,but it can be

estimatedin proportion to thepowerresourcesor capabilitiesthatare
visiblyavailable,such as the numbersof countablesupporters, voters,
or soldiersavailableor requiredin a particular
politicalcontext.44
ikewise,one could say that priorto the inventionof money,pur-

hasing power could not be measured exactly,but could be esti-
iatedin termsof a varietyof power resources. This was precisely
ie situationthatthe inventionof moneywas designed to eliminate.
"he point of inventingmoneyis to make measurementof purchas-
-ig power easy by eliminatingthe need to express purchasing
lowerin termsof 499,999 power resources. To say that power is
ke moneyexcept forthe lack of a standardizedmeasure of power
? to say thatthe problemof measuringpoliticalpower is verymuch
ke the problem of measuringpurchasingpower in an economy
,ithoutmoney.
If political scientistsare to benefitfromcomparingthe measure-
Tientof purchasingpower withthe measurementof politicalpower,
ve must understandwhy one is easier to count than the other.To
ttributethisto some "peculiarproperty"45of politicalpower is not
ery helpful. Parsons explains the relativedifficulty of measuring
ioliticalpower in termsof an inherentquality that he calls "the
uierarchicalaspect of power systems."46This line of argumentleads
LS to thinkthat purchasingpower has always been easier to meas-
ire than political power because the peculiar nature of political
towermakes it inherentlyharder to quantify. Purchasingpower,
iowever,has not always been easier to measure than political
tower. The Almightydid not create a standardized measuring
od forpurchasingpower at the time He created life. Man had to
nventhis own measure of value. Prehistoricman may even have
ound politicalpower easier to measure,i.e., widespread agreement
inphysicalstrengthas the measureof politicalpower but relatively
ittle agreementon a standard by which to measure purchasing
44Deutsch,Nervesof Government, 120. AlthoughDeutschmakesa similar

)ointin InternationalRelations(42), he seemsmorecautiousabout stressing
he similarities
betweenmoneyand powerin thisbook.
45Mitchell,
SociologicalAnalysis,90.
46See Parsons,"Concept of PoliticalPower,"242-248; "PoliticalAspect,"
'9; and Mitchell,SociologicalAnalysis,90.
power. The base values of political power are no harderto count

thanthe base values of purchasingpower. It is just as easy to count
soldiers,tanks,votes,and officialbadges as it is to count pigs, dol-
lars,woodpeckerscalps, and gold. What differentiates moneyfrom
the otherresourcesof purchasingpower is not its countabilitybut
ratherthe widespread consensus that the value of other resources
should be expressedin termsof this particularresource. Purchas-
ing power is easy to measure because men have agreed upon a
standardizedmeasuringrod; political power is difficult to measure
because men have not so agreed. In short,the difficulty of meas-
uring political power is due to the absence of somethingthat ful-
fillsthe measure-of-value functionof money.
One may agree that thereis no standardunit of account similar
to money in the political realm but deny that it matters. Does
recognitionof the absence of a generallyaccepted measure of po-
litical value draw attentionto aspects of politics that are worth
looking into? This recognitioncan be valuable in at least three
ways:
(1) Those who would study the media of political exchange
cannot affordto ignore the measure-of-valuefunctionof money.
Peter Blau describesthe developmentof a generallyvalid measure
of comparativevalue as "the crucialproblemof indirectexchange."47
Anythingthat cannot easilybe expressedin termsof a standardized
unitof accountis likelyto be severelylimitedin the extentto which
it can serve as a medium of exchange.
(2) Awareness of the lack of a standard of political value can
help us to understandthe state of the disciplineof political science.
It was not withoutreason that Catlin singled out the absence of
47"Thecrucialproblemof indirectexchangeis that of a generallyvalid

measureof comparativevalue. The cost a man is willingto incurforan ob-
ject he wantsto use in tradedependson his estimateof what it is worthto
others,not on its subjectiveworthto himself,as would be the case were he
onlyinterestedin usingit himself. For men to make such estimatesrealisti-
cally, theremustbe universalagreementin a community on a standardof
value in termsof which diverseproductsand servicescan be compared. A
universalistic
standardof value,intowhichthe worthof the different products
of labor can be translated,servesas a mediumof exchange." (Blau, Ex-
changeand Power,268.) See also,Weber,Social and EconomicOrganization,
179, 202-211.
MONEY AND POWER 597
of a science of poli-
such a measuringrod as "the supremedifficulty
tics."48 When Parsonsinvitesus to view politicalanalysisas parallel
to economicanalysisin the sense that "a centralplace in it is occu-
pied by a generalizedmedium involved in the political interaction
process, which is also a 'measure' of the relevantvalues,"49 he is
obscuringone of the mostimportantdifferences between economics
and political science. One of the fundamental reasons why politi-
cal analysis is so enormously is
difficult the absence of a "gener-
alized medium involved in the political interactionprocess, which
is also a 'measure' of the relevant values."50 Lasswell and Kaplan
were especially concerned about the consequences of a failureto
realize that political power was tied to particularpower bases and
could not be expressedin termsof a "unitaryconceptionof power."51
They warned: "Failure to recognizethatpower may reston various
bases, each with a varyingscope, has confused and distortedthe
conceptionof power itself,and retardedinquiryinto the conditions
and consequences of its exercise in various ways."52 Purchasing
power also restson various bases, but it does not matterso much,
since economistscan convert the potential purchasing power of
each base into a commondenominator. The power-moneyanalogy
can be helpfulif it stimulatesawarenessof the similaritiesbetween
barterand political exchange,but the analogy can be harmfulif it
temptsus to single out a particularbase value in termsof which to
expressthe value of the others. If thereis no generalagreementon
a measure of political value, it would be follyto pretendthatthere
is.
(3) Recognitionthatpolitical exchange occurs under conditions
that are more akin to barterthan to the sophisticatedmarketsof a
48Catlin,Science,251.
5oWilliamMitchellseemsto agreethatit is usefulto focusattentionon the
betweenmoneyand its politicalanalogues. Contrary
differences to the above
however,he sees Parsons'sapproachas helpingto producethis
interpretation,
focus. See Mitchell,SociologicalAnalysis,87-93.
5lLasswelland Kaplan, Power,92.
52Ibid.,85. On the difficulty of analyzingpower withouta satisfactory
commondenominator formsof power can be reduced,see
to which different
also RobertA. Dahl and CharlesE. Lindblom,Politics,Economicsand Wel-
fare (New York: Harper& Row, 1953), 228-229.
modernmoney economycan lead us to ask a numberof theoreti-

cally provocativequestions. Why are the media of political ex-
change not more like money? Under what conditionsmight one
expect generalizedmedia of political exchange to emerge? Would
it be desirable to have media of political exchange that were more
like money? What are the consequences of using relativelyprimi-
tive media of politicalexchange?53 These questionsand otherslike
themare unlikelyto be asked by those who focus only on the simi-
laritiesbetween the media of political and economic exchange and
neglect the differences.
Scope and Domain

One importantconsequence of a standardizedmeasure of eco-
nomic value is that economistsneed not be so careful as political
scientistsmustbe in specifyingthe scope and domain of power re-
lations. Whereas economistsrarely bother to specify the scope
and domain of purchasingpower, Dahl and Lasswell both have
warned that it is practicallymeaninglessfor a political scientistto
discusspower withoutreferenceto thesetwo dimensionsof power.54
Economistscan comparethe purchasingpower of diversegoods and
services simplyby convertingthem into the common denominator
of money. Money may be thoughtof as different fromother re-
sourcesprimarilyin its higherdegree of liquidity.55This "liquidity"
is a functionof (1) time, (2) scope, and (3) domain. In other
words, the differencebetween money and other resourcesis that
with money one can buy a greatervarietyof things frommore
people more quickly. Because money is so generalized in scope
and domain and because the value of most goods and servicescan
be expressedin monetaryterms,economistscan ignore scope and
domainand get away withit-at least mostof the time.56
53Mitchell'sSociologicalAnalysis(87-93) containssome very interesting

speculationon the implicationsof theabsenceof a politicalanalogueto money.
He suggeststhatthereis a significantdegreeof uncertainty in politicalcalcula-
tionthatis due to theabsenceof a standardizedmeasureofpoliticalvalues.
54Dahl,"Power,"408; Lasswelland Kaplan,Power,76.
55Cf.Blau, Exchangeand Power,269; and Boulding,EconomicAnalysis,
II, 70-72.
56Foran exampleof a case in whichfailureto specifythescope and domain
MONEY AND POVVER 599
The media of political exchange, however, seem to be much

more limitedin scope and domain than the media of economic ex-
change. The authorityof policemen is usually quite narrow in
termsof scope and domain. Even the chiefexecutive'spowers are
relatively circumscribedin Western democracies. There is no
"general purpose" currencythat can be used to exercise political
power of generalized scope and domain. In economics one man's
moneyis as good as the next man's, but in politics the symbolsof
power are morecloselytied to particularcontexts.
Parsons's contentionthat complex polities cannot operate with-
out generalizedmedia of political exchange may be similarto the
pessimistictheorizingon the flightcapabilities of the bumblebee.
Media as generalized as money may be neithernecessarynor de-
sirable in complex polities. One suspects that relativelynarrow
limitson the scope and domain of the symbolsof legitimatepoliti-
cal power may be importantsafeguardsof limitedgovernment. In
a totalitarianpolitical systemthe rightpolitical symbol-say, mem-
bershipin the rulingparty-will allow one to exercise generalized
politicalpower in a vast numberof situations-in homes,at parties,
in stores,and on the street. But in constitutionalpolitical systems
the symbolsof legitimatepolitical power are not generalized; in-
stead theypermitthe exerciseof power only withinnarrowlyspeci-
fied limits. Let us not be hastyin describingthis "inefficiency" in
the political exchange process as undesirable. Perhaps we would
notwant a politicalequivalentto moneyeven ifwe could get it.57
Gold and Force

Both Deutsch and Parsons have suggested that the power-
moneyanalogy be expanded to include the propositionthat physi-
cal forceis to power as gold is to paper money. This is a danger-
ous undertaking,since it involves singling out one of the most
of the purchasingpowerof moneyhad seriousconsequencesforpublicpolicy,

see my discussionof softloans and Americanforeignpolicy. David A. Bald-
win, EconomicDevelopmentand AmericanForeignPolicy: 1943-1962 (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press,1966).
57Fora studythattreatsthelack of a politicalanalogueformoneyas a "de-
fect"in thepoliticalexchangesystem,see Coleman,"PoliticalMoney."
frequent sources of confusion in political analysis (the role of

force) forcomparisonwitha recurrentsource of confusionin mone-
taryanalysis (the role of gold). The basic rationaleof an analogy
is to clarifythe unfamiliarby comparing it with that which is
clearly understood. Comparison of one popular fallacy with an-
othermay only compound confusion.
There are two analyticalpitfallsthat are particularlydangerous
when comparinggold withforce. One is to treatthem as the ulti-
mate measuringrods of economicand politicalvalue; and the other
is to assume a fixedsystemicrole foreach. Justas popular political
discussionoftenassumes thatpoliticalpower ultimatelycomes from
a gun barrel,so popular economicdiscussionis proneto assume that
the purchasingpower of moneyis ultimatelybased on gold. Such
reasoningusually growsout of a belief thatforceis the mostintrin-
sically effectivepolitical power base and that gold is the most in-
trinsicallyeffectivepurchasingpower base. This kind of argument
is anathema to most economists,e.g.:
Popular economicdiscussionoftenassumesthat thingshave an in-

trinsicworth. As soon as we perceive the truthof . . . [the "law of
diminishing marginalutility"],however,it becomesclear thatwhat a
thingis worthto us dependson how muchof it we have, and that
thereforethe worthis not anythingin a commodity. It is not a
physicalpropertyof an object like weightor volume,but is simply
how we feel about it. Things are valuable because somebody
thinkstheyare,and forno otherreasonwhatever. This is true,as we
shall see, even of gold-a commodity which people are inclinedto
thinkhas an intrinsicvalue. Gold, like everything else, is valuable
onlybecause people thinkit iS.58
It is the attitudesof people, not the intrinsicpropertiesof gold and

force,that determinetheirsocial role. In some societies,gold and
force are very liquid assets, i.e., they are readily convertibleinto
otherassets; in othersocietiestheyare less liquid. There is nothing
intrinsically-
valuable about gold-as King Midas learned.
Parsons's discussionsof gold and force are likelyto encourage
58Boulding,Economic Analysis,I, 23. Cf. Thomas C. Schelling,The

Strategyof Conflict(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity
Press,1960), 92-
94.
MONEY AND POWER 601
thinkingin termsof intrinsicworth. When he speaks of the value

of money as groundedin the value of gold,59of gold as the "rock
bottom"of economic security,60 and of gold and force as the ulti-
mate symbolicbases of securityof the value of money and power,
respectively,61Parsons risks seriouslyconfusinghis readers. He
goes on, moreover,to comparethe groundingof the value of money
in gold withthe groundingof the value of power in physicalforce,
which he regardsas the "mostintrinsically effectiveof all means of
coercion."62 Regardlessof Parsons'sintendedmeaning,his readers
may be forgivenif they understandhim to be saying that gold is
the most intrinsicallyeffectivemeans of exercising purchasing
power, just as forceis the most intrinsically
effectivemeans of ex-
ercisingpolitical power.
AlthoughParsons at times rejectsthe idea that gold is the ulti-
mate determinantof the value of money (and correspondingly that
force is the ultimate determinantof power), at other times he
seems to embrace it. This ambivalenceis illustratedby his sugges-
tion that there are two directionsin which one can pursue the an-
swer to the question: "On what basis does the 'value of money'
rest?"63These two directionslead to the conclusionthat the value
of moneyis determined,in the firstcase, by the value of the mone-
tary metal backing it up and, in the second case, by the general
confidencein the productivityof the economic system.64Parsons's
treatmentof these two kinds of explanationimplies that both are
intellectuallyrespectable,even thoughthe monetarymetal version
59Parsons,"Conceptof PoliticalPower,"237, 240. Max Weber'sdiscussions

of moneyand monetarymetals are also likelyto bewildera contemporary
reader. See Weber,Social and EconomicOrganization, 173-181,280-309.
60Parsons,"Conceptof Influence,"46.
61Parsons,"Reflections
on the Place of Force,"69.
62Parsons,"Conceptof PoliticalPower,"238, 240. See also Parsons'sdis-
cussionof the intrinsic
qualitiesof gold and forcein "Conceptof Influence,"
48-49. Parsonsusuallyplaces theword"intrinsic" in quotationmarks,leaving
the readerto wonderwhetherhe reallymeansit. On Parsons'shabitof using
quotationmarksin thisway, see Coleman,"Comment," 81.
63Parsons,"Reflections
on thePlace of Force,"43-44.
64Ibid.,43-48. A similardifficulty
is foundin Coleman,"PoliticalMoney,"
1074-1076,1080-1081.
"does not tell quite the whole story."65He impliesthat the portion
of the storyit does tell is correctbut incomplete. Most economists,
however,would regardexplanationsof the value of moneyin terms
of the value of gold not merely as incomplete,but as incorrect.
When economistsreferto the belief that gold determinesthe value
of money,they usually depict it as one of several discreditedor
erroneousbeliefs on this subject.66 (In the Americancase, for ex-
ample, it would make more sense to say that dollars determinethe
value of gold than it would to say that gold determinesthe value of
dollars.) On the basis of his dual explanation of the value of
money,Parsons observesthat "the question of whetherit [force] is
or is not the 'basis' of power is ambiguousin a sense exactlyparallel
to that of the question of 'basing' the value of moneyon command
of gold reserves."67In the eyes of most economists,however,it is
not ambiguous to say that monetaryvalue is based on gold; it is
wrong. AlthoughParsons may not intend to argue that gold and
force are the ultimate determinantsof economic and political
power, he is certainlyambivalenton the issue. Given the wide-
spread misunderstanding of both gold and force,such ambivalence
is likelyto do more harm than good.
The second pitfallto be avoided in comparinggold with force
is the assumptionof a fixedsocial role foreach. AlthoughDeutsch
and Parsonsfrequentlysay thatthe role of forcein politicalsystems
is parallel to the role of gold in economic systems,it is not clear
what thismeans. It is obvious thattheyview forceas occupyinga
special place in political systemscomparable to the special place
that they thinkgold occupies in economic systems;but precisely
what is this special place, and why is it occupied by gold and
force?68 Apparently,they see gold and force as the most intrinsi-
cally effectivebases of purchasingand political power. As such,
65Ibid., 44.
66See,forexample,Chandler,Moneyand Banking,24; and Hart,"Money,"
431.
67Parsons,"Reflectionson the Place of Force,"47.
68See Parsons,"Conceptof PoliticalPower,"237-240; "Reflections on the
Place of Force," 48; and "Conceptof Influence," 47. Parsonsusuallythanks
betweengold and
Deutsch forhavingcalled his attentionto the similarities
force.
MONEY AND POWER 603
theyare usuallyheld in reserveand used onlyin "showdown"situa-

tions. In such situationsthe ultimateweapons of gold and force
are broughtinto action as "damage-controlmechanisms."69 Justas
governmentswill oftenuse forceto bolster confidencein theirpo-
litical power,so theywill also use gold to bolsterconfidencein the
purchasingpower of money.
Althoughone could dispute the particularsocial roles attributed
by Deutsch and Parsons to gold and force-e.g., Parsons's conten-
tion that gold provides the base upon which a complex credit
structureis erected70-such disputes would matter less than the
overall assumptionthat the social roles of gold and force are un-
changing. From the writingsof Deutsch and Parsons one gets the
impressionthat there is some generallyshared conceptionof "the
role of gold in economicsystems"and "the role of forcein political
systems." When Parsonstalksabout the role of gold in "the'normar
circumstancesof monetarytransaction,"'1we are apparently ex-
pected to know what he means. In discussinggold Deutsch and
Parsons seem to have in mind one of the roles played by gold in
certaineconomicsystemsfor a few years beforethe Second World
War. Gold has played severalroles in economicsystems,and these
roles have never been fixed.72Contemporarystudentswill findit
hard to reconcilethe discussionof gold and forceby Deutsch and
Parsons with Samuelson's observationsthat metallic backing for
moneyhas no real meaningany more,that gold ceased to be legal
tenderin Americain 1933,that it would be illegal foran American
to use gold to pay a debt even if he wanted to, and that gold is not
even one of the componentsof the U.S. moneysupply,let alone the
mosteffective component.73When Parsonsand Deutsch tell us that
69Deutsch,Nervesof Government, 122-123.

70Parsons, on the Place of Force,"44.
"Reflections
71Ibid.
natureof the role of gold in monetarysystems,see
720n the evolutionary
RobertTriffin, Our InternationalMonetarySystem: Yesterday,Today, and
Tomorrow(New York: RandomHouse, 1968); and Gregory,"Money,"605-
608.
73PaulA. Samuelson,Economics(8th ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill,1969),
259-261. Compare Deutsch's claim that gold is "the power to purchasein
its mosttangibleform"(InternationalRelations,43) withBoulding'sobserva-
the role of forcein politicalsystemsis parallel to the role of gold in

monetarysystems,we are entitledto ask: Which'role of gold? In
which monetarysystems? During which period of history?Similar
questions could also be asked concerningforce. The social roles
of gold and force do not grow out of their intrinsicnature; they
grow out of social attitudestoward gold and force,attitudesthat
vary in space and time.
Whetheror not Deutsch and Parsons have avoided fallinginto
the analyticalpitfallsdescribed above, it is difficultto deny that
they have led others dangerouslynear the edge. The gold-and-
forceanalogy,as presentedby Deutsch and Parsons,is a step back-
ward in the analysisof power. One of the mostimportantcontribu-
tionsof Lasswell and Kaplan was to impressupon politicalscientists
the crucial importanceof recognizingthat power may rest on vari-
ous bases and that there is no primarypower base fromwhich all
the otherscan be derived.74 The gold-and-force analogy temptsus
to become preoccupied with a singlepower base, to treatit as pre-
eminent,and to treat othersas derived fromit. This temptation,
togetherwith the widespread popular misunderstandingof both
forceand gold, suggeststhe need to search for more fruitfulways
to develop the power-moneyanalogy.
Does IsomorphismMatter?
Althoughisomorphismdoes matter,it is a mistaketo attribute

the value of the power-moneyanalogy to the similaritiesbetween
moneyand the symbolsof power. In science the value of an anal-
ogy depends on the extentof "actual structuralcorrespondencebe-
tween the two systemsfromwhich the analogy is drawn."75 It is
thus the isomorphismbetween political and economic systemsthat
matters,not that between money and power. To focus on money
is to focuson the singlemostimportantdifference between political
tionthatmostpeople "wouldneverthinkof goingdownto thestorewitha bag

of gold dust,and it would be mostdoubtfulwhethertheycould buy anything
withit if theydid." (EconomicAnalysis,II, 72.)
74Lasswelland Kaplan, Power,esp. 83-94.
MONEY AND POWER 605
and economic systems,i.e., the fact that only the latterhas a gen-
eralized medium of exchange that also serves as a standardized
measure of value. One of the most valuable services the analogy
between politics and economics can renderto political scientistsis
of this difference. In comparingpolitical with
clear identification
economic processes, as in comparingmen with women, we may
findthe differences as the similarities.
as interesting
THE "ZERO-SUM PROBLEM"
In developing his versionof the power-moneyanalogy Parsons

claims to have solved somethinghe calls "the famous zero-sum
problem."76 In evaluating the significanceof Parsons's work for
political scientistsWilliam Mitchell sees revolutionaryimplications
in his treatmentof this problem.77 The "zero-sumproblem"stems
froman alleged tendencyin the literatureon power to assume that
"there is a fixed'quantity'of power in any relational systemand
hence any gain of power on the part of A mustby definitionoccur
by diminishingthe power at the disposal of other units, B, C, D
"78 Whereas the dominanttendencyin the literatureon power
has been to treatit as a fixedquantityto be divided up, Parsonshas
challenged this unquestioned assumption about the nature of
power.79 This "orthodox"view of power as a zero-sumphenomenon
is attributedto Dahl, Lasswell, and Kaplan.80 There are, of course,
many political scientistswho have treatedpower as a quantifiable
mass to be divided amongrivalclaimants;but it is surprisingto find
Dahl, Lasswell, and Kaplan amongthem. In the struggleto replace
the conceptionof power as a quantifiablemass with the conception
ofpower as a relationtheyare usuallyconsideredleaders.
If Parsons'sversionof the power-moneyanalogy is incompatible
78Parsons,"Conceptof PoliticalPower,"232-233.
80Parsons,"Conceptof Influence," 60; "Conceptof PoliticalPower,"232-
the zero-sum
233, 250-251; "PoliticalAspect,"99-100. Parsonsalso attributes
assumptionto V. 0. Key and C. WrightMills. I have not examinedtheir
writingsto determinethe accuracyof thisclaim.
with the basic concept of power developed by Dahl, Lasswell, and

Kaplan, the implicationscould indeed be revolutionary. Before
stormingthe barricades,however,let us ask whetherDahl, Lass-
well, and Kaplan reallydo have a zero-sumconceptionof the nature
of power.81 For them power relationsreferto situationsin which
one man or group affectsa specifiedaspect of the behavior of an-
otherman or group. One has not defineda power relationuntilone
has specifiedboth scope and domain.82 Thus, as long as Robinson
Crusoe and Friday have separate islands, neitherhas any political
power. When Friday comes to live on Robinson Crusoe's island,
eitheror both may gain political power, but neithercan lose what
he does not have. Since Dahl, Lasswell, and Kaplan could describe
such situationsas increasesin the power of either (or both), their
conceptionof power cannotbe said to involvethe assumptionthat
one man's gain in power is always offsetby another man's loss.
Parsons seems to have overlookedthe factthat Dahl, Lasswell, and
Kaplan do not considercontrolover one's own behavioras political
power; thus,a loss of individual autonomyis not tantamountto a
loss of political power. The Dahl-Lasswell-Kaplan conception of
power also permitsus to describe situationsin which A's abilityto
get B to do X increasessimultaneouslywith B's abilityto get A to
do X. If RobinsonCrusoe handcuffshimselfto Friday,he may in-
crease his abilityto affectFriday'smovements;but he also increases
Friday's abilityto affecthis (Crusoe's) movements. Similarly,the
United States militaryinvolvementin Vietnam increases not only
Americanabilityto affectVietnamese policy but also Vietnamese
abilityto affectAmericanpolicy. The assumptionthat an increase
in one man's political power is always offsetby a decrease in an-
other man's political power is not inherentin the conception of
power put forthby Dahl, Lasswell, and Kaplan. The claim that
Parsons's solutionof the zero-sumproblem heralds a revolutionin
political science appears exaggerated,for Parsons has "solved" a
problem that does not exist.
81Parsonsrefersto the worksof Dahl, Lasswell, and Kaplan, but never

identifiesspecificpages or passages. The sole exceptionis his referenceto
ChapterFive of Dahl's ModernPoliticalAnalysis.
82Lasswelland Kaplan,Power,75-76; and Dahl, ModernPoliticalAnalysis,
40, 45, 53.
MONEY AND POWER 607
DEVELOPINGTHE ANALOGY: SPECULATION
Althoughthe power-moneyanalogy is not new, systematicde-

velopmentof it has not proceeded very far. A few of the more
promisinglines of developmentmay now be surveyedin the hope
of stimulatingfurtherinvestigation.83
(1) Political banking. Perhaps the mostprovocativesuggestion

forexpandingthe analogyis Parsons'scomparisonof the processby
which banks create money with the process by which power is
generatedin a polity.84 He compareslendingsupportto a political
group (e.g., by joiningit or votingforit) to depositingmoneyin a
bank. Justas banks can safelylend out part of the money depos-
ited with them withoutspecificauthorizationfrom depositors,so
politicalgroupscan lend out part of the power depositedwiththem
withoutspecificauthorization. Political leaders can thus increase
the amount of power in a polity just as bankers can increase the
amountof moneyin an economy. One consequence of this power
creation,however,is that,like bankers,politicianswill be unable to
meet all theirobligationsinstantaneously.This illiquiditypresents
no problemforeitherpoliticiansor bankersas long as the psycho-
logical atmospherewithin which transactionsoccur remains rela-
tivelystable. If it is disturbed,however,theremay be a confidence
crisisthat will starta rush to withdrawdeposits of money and/or
power.
The politics-bankinganalogy must be developed with extreme

care. Describing the process by which banks create money is not
easy, as anyone who has ever tried to explain it to undergraduates
will testify. Both Coleman and Deutsch have damaged the analogy
while attemptingto improve it. They have fallen victim to the
commonfallacyof assumingthat banks lend more moneythan has
83Usefulsuggestionsfor developingthe analogy are found in Coleman,

"Comment,"77-80; Coleman,"PoliticalMoney,"1082-1087;Deutsch,Nerves
of Government, 125-127; Mitchell,SociologicalAnalysis,95-97; and Ilchman
and Uphoff,PoliticalEconomy.
84Parsons,"Conceptof Influence,"59-62; "ConceptofPoliticalPower,"250-
257; "PoliticalAspect,"90-104. See also, Deutsch, Nerves of Government,
120-121; and InternationalRelations,43-44.
been depositedwiththem.85 In fact,no bank could or would allow

its outstandingloans to exceed its total deposits. Banks can create
money only if the money they lend is redepositedin the banking
system. Thus, assuminga 20 percentreserverequirement,an ini-
tial deposit of $10 million can lead to $40 million in new loans
onlyif each loan is redepositedin a bank. At the end of the money
creationprocess the bankingsystemwill show total loans outstand-
ing of $40 million,but it will also show total deposits of $50
million. This is not a trivial point. Just as banks cannot lend
money that has not been deposited with them,so political groups
cannot lend supporttheydo not have. Justas loan recipientsmust
have enough confidencein the banking systemto redeposit their
loan funds,so recipientsof politicalsupportmusthave enough con-
fidencein the systemto redepositit; otherwise,the process of cre-
atingpolitical or financialcreditcomes to a halt. The expansionof
such credit depends on the existenceof an atmosphereof mutual
trustand confidence. Parsons has performeda valuable service in
calling our attentionto the importanceof expectationsand the
linkagesbetween themand the politicalprocess.
(2) Inflationand Deflation. The phenomena of inflationand
deflationshould not be confusedwith the related but analytically
distinguishablephenomena of credit expansion and contraction.
Creating money is inflationary only if it changes the purchasing
power of money. If the goods and serviceson the marketexpand
simultaneously withthe increasein money,therewill be no inflation
(ceteris paribus). Similarly,an increasein the numberof symbols
of legitimatepolitical power resultsin political inflationonly if it
decreases the amountof power that each symbolallows one to ex-
ercise; e.g., if everyone walked around dressed in a policeman's
uniform,real policemen would findthemselvesthe victimsof po-
liticalinflation;but if the increasein the numberof people wearing
police uniformsincreased at the same rate as the population,the
power of each policemanmightremainstable.
Investigationof the analogies between political and economic
inflationand deflationis hampered by the fact that we have so
85Coleman,"Comment,"72; Deutsch, Nerves of Government,

121; and
International
Relations,43.
MONEY AND POWER 609
many definitionsof the terms. The InternationalEncyclopedia of

the Social Sciences, for example, definesinflationas a fall and de-
flationas a rise in the purchasingpower of money,but it then pro-
ceeds to offerfouradditionaldefinitions.86 The existenceof several
definitionsmakes more precise definitionsimperativein the search
for political counterpartsto inflationand deflation. In particular,
it is importantto distinguishbetween definitionsand empiricalob-
servations. In Parsons's writings,for example,it is clear that eco-
nomic and political deflationare likelyto culminatein the use of
gold and force,respectively,but it is not clear whetherthis is true
by definitionor by observation.87 Also, the distinctionbetween
power (purchasing or political) and the symbolsthereofmust be
especiallyclear in analyses of inflationor deflation,since most defi-
nitionsagree that these termsare supposed to focus attentionon
the relationbetweenpurchasingpower and its symbols.
Anotherdefinitionof inflation/deflation, which may be usefulto

political scientistsis as follows: inflationis a condition in which
too much moneychases too few goods; and, conversely,deflationis
a condition in which too many goods chase too little money.88
Rather than focusingon whetherthe purchasingpower of money
has gone up or down,thisdefinition focuseson whetherthe amount
of purchasingpower of moneyis adequate in termsof a postulated
standard of social desirability. One could use this conception of
deflationto describe such situationsas: (1) scarcityof generalized
media of economic exchange (money). This mightbe applied to
situationsin which lack of money necessitatedreliance on barter,
thus slowing the transactionflow to an undesirable degree. (2)
scarcityof generalized media of political exchange (symbols of
legitimatepolitical power). This mightbe used to explain either
86M. Bronfenbrenner, "Inflationand Deflation,"InternationalEncyclopedia

of the Social Sciences,VII (New York: Free Press, 1968), 289-290. The
definition
of inflation
as a fall in purchasingpower of moneyis employedin
the previousparagraph.
87Thisdefinitionaldifficultyis also reflected Revolu-
in ChalmersJohnson,
tionaryChange (Boston: Little-Brown, 1966), 28-30,69, 91.
88Thisis one of the additionaldefinitions offeredby Bronfenbrenner,
"In-
flationand Deflation,"290.
why revolutions8"occur or why world governmentdoes not. In

both cases political exchangeis hamperedby the lack of agreement
on a common standard of political value that can be used as a
medium of exchange. As long as people disagree as to whether
legitimacy should be accorded to the wealthy, the clever, the
strong,the ideologicallycorrect,or the side with the mostvotes,no
generallyacceptable medium of exchange is likelyto emerge; and
the rate at which political transactionsflow is likely to be unde-
sirablyslow.
The inflation/deflationcomparisoncould also be extended to
sub-typesof these phenomena. Creeping and runaway inflation
are radically differentphenomena, as are recessions and depres-
sions. It is sometimessuggestedthatthe extremesof hyper-inflation
and deep depressionresembleeach otherin some ways. It might
be worthwhileto ask whetherthis applies to the political counter-
parts of these phenomena.90
(3) Employmentlevels. Another direction in which to de-
velop the analogyis to searchforpoliticalequivalentsof the degree
to which economicresourcesare productivelyemployedin an econ-
omy. Mitchell has contributeda number of suggestionslooking
toward this end includingthe possibilityof a political counterpart
to business cycles.91
Questions concerningthe optimum level of political employ-
mentcould be especiallyinteresting.Althoughthe prevailingview
is that full employmentis desirable in the economy,it is not at all
clear that this would apply to the polity. Perhaps such a focus
could lead to new ways of lookingat such problemsas limitedgov-
ernmentand totalitarianism.One hypothesisto be considered,for
example,is that constitutionalgovernmentrequiresmaintenanceof
equilibriumat levels of political resourceuse that are well below
full employment.
(4) Investmentand Saving. Deutsch has suggested that, like
89SeeJohnson'sRevolutionaryChange foran imaginative exploration

along
these lines.
900nthispointsee Ilchmanand Uphoff, PoliticalEconomy,136-159.
SociologicalAnalysis,81, 86, 95, 133-136.
91Mitchell,
MONEY AND POWER 611
money,power can be saved, spent on consumption,or invested.92

Two focusesforresearchon this topic are: (1) Under what condi-
tions do people choose to spend power resourceson consumption
instead of saving them? (2) Under what conditionsare people
willingto tie up theirsavings of power resourcesin long-termin-
vestmentinstead of keeping them in liquid form? The concept of
"liquidity"in economicsbears some similarityto that of "power po-
tential"in political science. A liquid power resourcewould be one
that could readilybe used to exercisepower, whereas it would be
more difficult to realize the power potentialof an illiquid power re-
source. Power potential,like liquidity,is a matterof degree. Econ-
omistshave identifiedthree primarymotives for holding money:
the transactionsmotiverefersto the need to smoothout irregulari-
ties in the conduct of day-to-daybusiness; the speculative motive
refersto benefitsof "being ready when the time is right";and the
precautionarymotive refersto a desire to mitigate uncertainty.98
Discoveryof political counterpartsforthese motivescould be very
interesting.
(5) Uncertaintyand Risk. In one sense money is a device for
reducing uncertaintyin an economic system. Barter exchange
necessitatesa "double coincidence of wants." This is basically an
informationscarcityproblem in the sense that it arises fromthe
difficulty of answeringthe question, "How do I identifythe men
who want what I have and who have what I want?" Money makes
it possible to concentrateon findingthe men who have what one
wants and allows one to assume with confidencethat these men
will accept money in payment. Just as money helps us identify
those who have purchasingpower, so uniforms,titles,and identifi-
cation cards help us to identifythose who have political power.
There is, after all, a certain utilityin being able to reduce un-
certaintyas to whetherthe man standingin an intersectionwaving
his arms is a policeman or a drunk.
Little attentionhas been devoted to the role of uncertaintyin
political systems. Mitchellsuggeststhat the absence of a close po-
litical counterpartto moneymeans that the level of uncertaintyin
92lnternation.al
Relations,44-46.
93Hart,"Money,"428.
the politywill be significantlyhigherthan in the economy.94Does

this matter? How can uncertaintybe reduced? Would its reduc-
tion be desirable? How is uncertaintydistributedin the political
system? Answersto these and otherquestions could be generated
by comparingeconomicand politicalexchangeprocesses.
(6) Byways of Economics. Political scientistsmay be well ad-
vised to avoid the main road of sophisticatedeconometricsand ad-
vanced economic theoryand to concentrateinstead on some less
traveled roads to economic understanding. Two areas that are of
relativelylittleinterestto contemporary economistsbut that should
be of interestto political scientistsare the non-marketeconomies
and the historyof economicthought. If it is true,as was suggested
above, that political exchange resemblesbarter,then we may want
to focus attentionon the transitionfrombarterexchange to mone-
tary exchange. The process of monetizationof economic symbols
is comparable to the process of legitimationof political symbols.
Economic anthropologyis likelyto be at least as useful in under-
standingthisproblemas is formaleconomics.95
The works writtenby economistswhen their discipline was in
its early stages of developmentshould not be overlooked. They
may well be more appropriate to the present stage of political
science than the sophisticatedmodels of contemporaryeconomics.
Amongworksthat should be usefulare those by Adam Smith,John
Stuart Mill, Alfred Marshall, Frank H. Knight, Clarence Ayres,
John Maynard Keynes, Joseph Schumpeter,and Jacob Viner, to
name but a few. The point is that the most up-to-dateideas in
economicsmay not be the most usefulones to political scientistsat
this time.
CONCLUSION
Dissatisfactionwith particularformulations of the power-money

analogy should not blind us to the value of the underlyingassump-
it
tion that is useful to compare political and economic processes.
94SociologicalAnalysis,86, 92-93. See also FrankH. Knight,Risk,Uncer-

taintyand Profit(New York: Harper,1921).
95See, for example,George Dalton, ed., Primitive,Archaic,and Modern
Economies:EssaysofKarlPolanyi(GardenCity,N.Y.: Doubleday,1968).
MONEY AND POWER 613
The analogy encourages us to consider politics and economics as

subsetsof a familyof social processes. One can accept the conten-
tion of Catlin or Parsonsthat thereare importantparallels between
the conceptual schemes appropriatefor the analysis of economic
and political aspects of society withoutnecessarilyaccepting the
conclusions they draw from this parallelism. If power relations
pervade human relationsas much as Dahl claims,we should not be
surprisedto findthat other social sciences have somethingto say
about them. Coleman's claim that the theory of money "comes
closerthan any otherto a theoryof influencesystems"96 may not be
true,but it should at least provokean interestin furtherinvestiga-
tion. The economists'good fortunein havingmoneyto studyis our
good fortunealso. They have been able to erecta formidablebody
of theory. Althoughwe may never be able to emulate them,we
can at least understandour own disciplinebetterif we understand
how they did it and why they have succeeded in doing what we
have been unable to do.
There is, however,no automatic or intrinsicheuristicvalue in
comparingeconomic and political processes. The basic rationale
of analogy is to improveunderstandingof the unfamiliarby com-
paring it with the familiar. The analogy can be a useful device
forpolitical scientiststo the extentthat theyare familiarwith such
mattersas the functionsof money,the process of credit creation,
theoriesof the value of money,monetaryhistory,and the role pre-
cious metals have played in monetarysystems. Without such fa-
miliaritythe heuristicvalue of the comparisonmay be negative.
Althoughwe are accustomed to envyingthe economistsbecause
theyhave money,we should not forgetthat this is not an unmiti-
gated blessing for them. It is only too easy to confuse monetary
aspects of economic affairswith what is happeningin termsof real
goods and services. When economistsspeak of the need to "pierce
the veil of money"in order to see what is reallyhappeningin the
economy,97 we should take it as a warningthat the power-money
analogycan conceal as much or morethanit reveals.
In evaluatingthe power-moneyanalogy a willingnessto trynew
96Coleman,"Comment,"77.
97Robertson,
Money,1, 9-10; and Boulding,EconomicAnalysis,I, 20.
ways of thinkingmustbe balanced by healthyskepticism. Perhaps

Deutsch set the proper tone for a balanced approach when he
said: "Political science cannot and will not become simply the
'economicsof power,'but it can benefitfromthe limitedsimilarities
between money and [the symbols of?] power by using them as
guides to the deeper similaritiesand differences
behind them. For
these similarities,
thoughlimited,are by no means trivial."98There
may be no revolutionaryimplicationsin the analogy,but we may
at least get a reshuffling
of the cabinet.
Relations,43.

Money and Power PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Money and Power PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Moneyand Power*

*The authorwould like to thankthe followingcolleagueswho reviewed

have money,while our nearest equivalent is that slipperyconcept

Thesupreme ofa scienceofpolitics

It is clear thatCatlin was not using the analogybetween power and

2( New York: AlfredA. Knopf,1927), 206-279.

change in which power plays a role similarto the role played by

Talcott Parsons,"On the Concept of Political Power," Proceedingsof the

thatis likelyto generateconsiderableinterestand controversy.He

The followingdiscussionwill examinethe Deutsch-Parsonsform-

Robert Dahl has suggestedthat "power termsin modern social

compare and contrastthese mechanisms.'12 The labels he chooses

An obvious candidate as an economic counterpartto political

(2) Purchasingpower is not money. Althougheconomistsare

13Cf.Harold D. Lasswell and AbrahamKaplan, Power and Society(New

Variationsin the weightof purchasingpower are evidentto anyone

Power and Exchange

they are certainlynot new in political analysis. Thomas Hobbes,

of A gettingB to do somethinghe would not otherwisedo; it is

the term'influence'refersto an effect,while the term'money'refersto a

unless we know what money does. Sometimeswoodpecker scalps

27Chandler, Moneyand Banking,15.

pears to mediate political exchange,thus differentiatingit frompo-

As regardsthe politicalsystem, households maybe considered in

The crucial distinctionhere between barter and non-barter

sponsibilityforpolicy decisions,political monetizationis occurring.

is not a symbolof A's abilityto affectB's behavior; it is A's ability

see Lasswelland Kaplan,Power,xviii-xix.

turnuse it to exercisepurchasingpower. Are theresymbolsof po-

37Cf. Parsons,"Conceptof PoliticalPower,"238; and Coleman,"Political

litical power for performanceof governmentalfunctionshas be-

How MUCH ISOMORPHISM?

Thus far we have been discussingmoneyin termsof its role as

38Cf. Chandler,Money and Banking,5; and T. E. Gregory,"Money,"

of extendingit to include the measure-

venient,the inventionof moneyis almost inevitableif exchange is

42Cf.TalcottParsonsand Neil J. Smelser,Economyand Society(London:

imperfectly so. Power cannot be countedexactly,but it can be

ikewise,one could say that priorto the inventionof money,pur-

44Deutsch,Nervesof Government, 120. AlthoughDeutschmakesa similar

power. The base values of political power are no harderto count

47"Thecrucialproblemof indirectexchangeis that of a generallyvalid

modernmoney economycan lead us to ask a numberof theoreti-

Scope and Domain

53Mitchell'sSociologicalAnalysis(87-93) containssome very interesting

The media of political exchange, however, seem to be much

Gold and Force

of the purchasingpowerof moneyhad seriousconsequencesforpublicpolicy,

frequent sources of confusion in political analysis (the role of

Popular economicdiscussionoftenassumesthat thingshave an in-

It is the attitudesof people, not the intrinsicpropertiesof gold and

58Boulding,Economic Analysis,I, 23. Cf. Thomas C. Schelling,The

thinkingin termsof intrinsicworth. When he speaks of the value

59Parsons,"Conceptof PoliticalPower,"237, 240. Max Weber'sdiscussions

theyare usuallyheld in reserveand used onlyin "showdown"situa-

69Deutsch,Nervesof Government, 122-123.

the role of forcein politicalsystemsis parallel to the role of gold in

Althoughisomorphismdoes matter,it is a mistaketo attribute

tionthatmostpeople "wouldneverthinkof goingdownto thestorewitha bag

THE "ZERO-SUM PROBLEM"

In developing his versionof the power-moneyanalogy Parsons

with the basic concept of power developed by Dahl, Lasswell, and

81Parsonsrefersto the worksof Dahl, Lasswell, and Kaplan, but never