CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Political Law Review (6th BATCH)
1. CHAVEZ vs. GONZALES
G.R. No. 168338, Promulgated: February 15, 2008
FACTS:
 The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004
national and local elections.
 On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the
opposition was planning to destabilize the administration by releasing
an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the
President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-
ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
 The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping.
 Later, in a Malacaang press briefing, Secretary Bunye produced two
versions of the tape, one supposedly the complete version, and the
other, a spliced, doctored or altered version, which would suggest that
the President had instructed the COMELEC official to manipulate the
election results in the Presidents favor.
 It seems that Secretary Bunye admitted that the voice was that of
President Arroyo, but subsequently made a retraction
 On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary
Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the
compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents
could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping
 He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were
committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had
personal knowledge if the crime was committed or was being committed
in their presence
 On June 9, 2005, in another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales ordered
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to go after media
organizations found to have caused the spread, the playing and the
printing of the contents of a tape of an alleged wiretapped conversation
involving the President about fixing votes in the 2004 national election
 On June 11, 2005, the NTC gives fair warning to radio and television
owners/operators to observe anti-wiretapping law.
ISSUE: Did the press statements of DOJ Secretary Gonzales and the NTC
constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the
Constitution?
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the mere press statements of respondents
DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of content-based prior
restraint that has transgressed the Constitution and these statements are acts
that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible prior restraint on
freedom of expression. Any content-based prior restraint on protected
expression is unconstitutional without exception. A protected expression
means what it says – it is absolutely protected from censorship. Prior restraint
on expression is content-based if the restraint is aimed at the message or idea
of the expression.
PRINCIPLES:
Content-Based Regulation
-the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or
speech.
- prior restraint on expression is content-based if the restraint is
aimed at the message or idea of the expression
Contend-Neutral Regulation
- merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that
merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined
standards
- prior restraint on expression is content-neutral if the restraint is not
aimed at the message or idea of the expression
- not designed to suppress any particular message
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DISCUSSION:
A content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of
invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger rule. The
latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason,
and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague
The government must show the type of harm the speech sought to
be restrained would bring about especially the gravity and the imminence of
the threatened harm otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint
on speech based on its content cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, but
only by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a
reality already on ground
2. SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK INC. vs.
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL
Doctrine of vagueness vs. Doctrine of overbreadth
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) IT VIOLATES DUE PROCESS For failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct
to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[57]
The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose
to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may
not be achieved by means WSUB (which sweep unnecessarily broadly) and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.[
A facial challenge vs. As-applied challenge.
An as-applied challenge
1.examines the law based only extant facts affecting real litigants,
2.a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to
petitioners of a case
A facial challenge
1.examines the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, based not only
on its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction
that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities
2. facial challenge applies only to free speech cases, not to Criminal statutes
or statutes which regulate conduct
FACTS: Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,[2] petitioner
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government
organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and
lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed
as G.R. No. 178552. On even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU),
National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and
Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by their
respective officers[3] who are also bringing the action in their capacity as
citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition also against the effectivity
of RA 9372 docketed as G.R. No. 178554.
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the
definition of the crime of terrorism[46] under RA 9372 in that terms
like widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace and coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand are
nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the
prohibited acts.
Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-
vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case since
these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates
conduct, not speech.
ISSUES:
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1.Can petetioners assail the constitutionality of RA 9372 based on as applied
challenge?
2.Can petetioners assail the constitutionality of RA 9372 based on facial
challenge?
RULING:
1. NO. A penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as
applied to petitioners of a case
In this case there are no actual or imminent charge for violation of RA
9372,against petetioners nor are they connected to any terrorist group
charged with it.
In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due
process clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal
statutes. In at least three cases,[76] the Court brought the doctrine into play in
analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on
fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of
the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases, similar to
those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with
the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the present case.
2. NO. There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech
so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity
In this case, What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of
RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an
act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
or under any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the
predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary
fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the
desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.
3. PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES vs. DUQUE
NOTE: This petition seeks to nullify A.O. No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise
Known as The "Milk Code," Relevant International Agreements, Penalizing
Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes; Only Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of
A. O.No. 2006-0012 are declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires.
FACTS: E.O. No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino
on October 28, 1986. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states
that the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the International Code of
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World
Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted
several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be, promoted
hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted
for breastmilk substitutes.
On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR. However, on June
28, 2006, petitioner, representing its members that are manufacturers of
breastmilk substitutes, filed the present Petition.
MAIN ISSUE: WON A.O. NO. 2006-0012 IS UNCOSTITUTIONAL
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT. Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going
beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and expanding the
coverage of said law.
THE DEFENSE OF THE DOH. is that the RIRR implements not only the Milk
Code but also various international instruments regarding infant and young
child nutrition. It is respondents' position that said international instruments
are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may implement
them through the RIRR.
SUB-ISSUE 1: WON PERTINENT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ARE
PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND AND MAY BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE
DOH
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RULING: The international instruments that do have specific provisions
regarding breastmilk substitutes are the ICMBS and various WHA
Resolutions.
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere
of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation
method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
The ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been transformed
into domestic law through local legislation, the Milk Code. However, the Code
did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting
advertising of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk
Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing
materials may be allowed if such materials are duly authorized and approved
by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).
On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution provide that the Philippines adopts
the generally accepted principles of international law (customary international
law) as part of the law of the land. (Incorporation method). Customary
international law means "a general and consistent practice of states followed
by them from a sense of legal obligation
Under Article 23 of 1946 WHO Constitution, recommendations of the
WHA do not come into force for members. Apparently, the WHA
Resolution adopting the ICMBS and subsequent WHA Resolutions
urging member states to implement the ICMBS are merely
recommendatory and legally non-binding. Thus, unlike what has been
done with the ICMBS whereby the legislature enacted most of the provisions
into law which is the Milk Code, the subsequent WHA Resolutions, specifically
providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, continued
breastfeeding up to 24 months, and absolutely prohibiting advertisements and
promotions of breastmilk substitutes, have not been adopted as a domestic
law.
Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA
Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact
enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states; neither have
respondents proven that any compliance by member states with said WHA
Resolutions was obligatory in nature. Respondents failed to establish that
the provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary
international law that may be deemed part of the law of the land.
SUB-ISSUE 2: WON THE DOH MAY IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS OF
THE WHA RESOLUTIONS EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A DOMESTIC
LAW.
RULING: Under the Revised Administrative Code, the DOH shall issue orders
and regulations concerning the implementation of established national
health policies.
Respondents submit that the national policy on infant and young child feeding
is embodied in A.O. No. 2005-0014. However, nowhere in A.O. No. 2005-
0014 is it declared that as part of such health policy, the advertisement
or promotion of breastmilk substitutes should be absolutely prohibited.
In view of the enactment of the Milk Code which does not contain a total ban
on the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes, but instead,
specifically creates an IAC which will regulate said advertising and promotion,
it follows that a total ban policy could be implemented only pursuant to
a law amending the Milk Code . Thus, only the provisions of the Milk Code,
but not those of subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly implemented
by the DOH through the subject RIRR.
SUB-ISSUE 3: WON THE PROVISIONS OF THE RIRR ARE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THOSE OF THE MILK CODE.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT 1. The Milk Code limits its coverage to children
0-12 months old, but the RIRR extended its coverage to "young children" or
those from ages two years old and beyond.
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RULING: A perusal of the Milk Code would show that its coverage is not
dependent on the age of the child but on the kind of product being marketed
to the public. The law treats infant formula, bottle-fed complementary food,
and breastmilk substitute as separate and distinct product categories.
Therefore, by regulating breastmilk substitutes, the Milk Code also intends to
protect and promote the nourishment of children more than 12 months old.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT 2. The Milk Code recognizes that infant formula
may be a proper and possible substitute for breastmilk in certain instances;
but the RIRR provides "exclusive breastfeeding for infants from 0-6 months"
and declares that "there is no substitute nor replacement for breastmilk":
RULING: The entirety of the RIRR would show that it recognizes in certain
cases that the use of breastmilk substitutes may be proper specifically Section
7 and 8.
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT 3. WON THE LABELING REQUIREMENTS
AND ADVERTISING REGULATIONS UNDER THE RIRR ARE VALID
RULING: DOH is authorized by the Milk Code to control the content of any
information on breastmilk vis-à-vis breastmilk substitutes, supplement and
related products, as well as its purpose and to whom sum purpose may be
disseminated. It bears emphasis, however, that the DOH's power is not
absolute as it does not encompass the power to absolutely prohibit the
advertising, marketing, and promotion of breastmilk substitutes.
Labeling Requirement. Ineluctably, the requirement under Section 26(f) of
the RIRR for the label to contain the message regarding health hazards
including the possibility of contamination with pathogenic microorganisms is
in accordance with Section 5(b) of the Milk Code.
Advertising Regulations. SECTIONS 11 AND 4(F) OF THE RIRR ARE
CLEARLY VIOLATIVE OF THE MILK CODE. The DOH, through its co-
respondents, evidently arrogated to itself not only the regulatory authority
given to the IAC but also imposed absolute prohibition on advertising,
promotion, and marketing. Nowhere in the Milk Code provides for the absolute
prohibition.
4. RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY
Nature of Case: Administrative Matter in the SC
Petitioner: Supreme Court
Respondent: UP Law Faculty
SUMMARY: Shortly after the promulgation of the Supreme Court decision in
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, the counsel for the petitioners therein filed, 1)
a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating the fundamental responsibility of
states in protecting its citizens’ human rights specifically pertaining to jus
cogens norms; and, 2) a supplement thereto asserting that the Vinuya
decision was plagiarized from different sources and that the true intents of the
plagiarized sources were twisted by the ponente to suit the arguments laid
down in said decision. Thereafter, an ethics committee tasked to investigate
the veracity of the alleged plagiarism, the authors who were purportedly
plagiarized sent their respective letters to the Supreme Court.Due to this, the
faculty of UP College of Law came up with a statement (Restoring Integrity
Statement), which alleged plagiarism against Justice del Castillo, treating the
same not only as an established fact, but as a truth. Said statement was
posted online and at the College’s bulletin board and was submitted to the
Supreme Court. Thus, the Supreme Court issued a Show Cause Resolution
directing respondents to show cause why they should not be disciplined as
members of the Bar for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
DOCTRINE: The right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be
balanced against the equally primordial concern that the independence of the
Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In cases where the
critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has
repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose
statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or
extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.
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FACTS: Shortly after the promulgation of the Supreme Court decision in
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (the Vinuya decision), the case involving the
Filipino comfort women during the Japanese occupation, the counsel for the
petitioners therein filed, first, a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating the
fundamental responsibility of states in protecting its citizens’ human rights
specifically pertaining to jus cogens norms and, second, a supplement thereto
asserting that the Vinuya decision was plagiarized from different sources and
that the true intents of the plagiarized sources were twisted by the ponente,
Justice Mariano del
Castillo (Justice del Castillo), to suit the arguments laid down in said decision.
Vis-a-vis the Court’s formation of an ethics committee tasked to investigate
the veracity of the alleged plagiarism, the authors who were purportedly
plagiarized sent their respective letters to the Supreme Court, noting the
misreading and/or misrepresentation of their articles. Hence, in their articles,
they argue that the crimes of rape, torture and sexual slavery can be classified
as crimes against humanity, thus attaining the jus cogens status;
consequently, it shall be obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on behalf
of its aggrieved citizens. However, the Vinuya decision cited them to support
the contrary stand.
In response to this controversy, the faculty of UP College of Law came up
with a statement entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of
the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court” (Restoring Integrity
Statement), which statement alleged plagiarism against Justice del Castillo,
treating the same not only as an established fact, but as a truth. Said
statement was posted online and at the College’s bulletin board and was
submitted to the Supreme Court.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The authors also not only
assumed that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism, they went further by
directly accusing the Court of perpetrating extraordinary injustice by
dismissing the petition of the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary.
They further attempt to educate this Court on how to go about the review of
the case. The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by
imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its
dismissal on the basis of “polluted sources,” the Court’s alleged indifference
to the cause of petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern
of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and
respect.
The manner in presenting the arguments and the language used therein, the
Court believed, were inappropriate considering its signatories are lawyers.
Thus, the Supreme Court issued a Show Cause Resolution directing
respondents to show cause why they should not be disciplined as members
of the Bar for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Conversely, compliance to such resolution was unsatisfactory, except for one
respondent.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the Show Cause Resolution denies respondents their freedom
of expression
NO A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was
neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that
they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that motivated the said
Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious language
by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case,
have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending
case for the “proper disposition” and consideration of the Court that gave rise
to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the
statements that the Court considered excessive and uncalled for under the
circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later submission to
this Court of the UP Law faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement.
The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of
expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised
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responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom
is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. Thus,
proscribed are the uses of unnecessary language, which jeopardizes high
esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration, or
tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of people in the integrity of the
members of the Court. In other words, while a lawyer is entitled to present his
case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of
offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
A long line of cases shows that the Court has held that the right to criticize the
courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial
concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due
influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but
members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of
this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and
fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of
fair comment and common decency.
2. WON the Show Cause Resolution violates respondents’ academic
freedom as law professors
NO. There is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon
respondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their
instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic
freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action
for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in
favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even
if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.
Respondents cannot successfully invoke academic freedom in this case. The
constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be
circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the
courts and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the justice
system. The Court believes that the reason that freedom of expression may
be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the
academic freedom of law professors. The Court reiterates that lawyers when
they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike
professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law,
respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the
legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured
against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of
members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably
entwined with the fact that they are lawyers.
RULING: PETITION DISMISSED.
5. RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY
FACTS: Shortly after the promulgation of the Supreme Court decision in
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (the Vinuya decision), the case involving the
Filipino comfort women during the Japanese occupation, the counsel for the
petitioners therein filed, first, a Motion for Reconsideration reiterating the
fundamental responsibility of states in protecting its citizens’ human rights
specifically pertaining to jus cogens norms and second, a supplement thereto
asserting that the Vinuya decision was plagiarized from different sources and
that the true intents of the plagiarized sources were twisted by the ponente
Justice Mariano Del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo), to suit the arguments laid
down in said decision vis-à-vis the Courts formation of an ethics committee
tasked to investigate the veracity of the alleged plagiarism, the authors who
were purportedly plagiarized sent their respective letters to the SC, noting the
misreading and/or misrepresentation of their articles.
Hence, in their articles, they argue that the crimes of rape, torture and sexual
slavery can be classified as crimes against humanity, thus, jus cogens status.
Consequently, it shall be obligatory upon the state to seek remedies on behalf
of its aggrieved citizens. However, the Vinuya decision cited them to support
the contrary stand. In response to this controversy, the faculty of UP College
of Law came up with a statement entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by
the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the
Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court”
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(Restoring Integrity Statement), which statement alleged plagiarism against
Justice Del Castillo, treating the same as an established fact, but as a truth.
Said statement was posted online and at the College’s bulletin board and was
submitted to the Supreme Court. The manner in presenting the arguments
and the language used therein, the Court believed, were inappropriate
considering its signatories are lawyers. Thus, the Supreme Court issued a
Show Cause Resolution directing respondents to show cause why they
should not be disciplined as members of the Bar
ISSUE: Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of
expression?
HELD: No. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it
was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor
that they had charged one of its members of the plagiarism that motivated the
said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious
language by which respondents, who are neither parties nor counsels in the
Vinuya Case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the
said pending case for the “proper disposition” and consideration for the Court
that gave rise to said resolution. The show cause resolution painstaking
enumerated the statements that the Court considered excessive and uncalled
for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later
submission to this Court of the UP Law faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement.
To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondent’s
freedom of expression.
In the long line of cases, the court held that the right to criticize the courts and
judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that
the independence of the judiciary be protected from due influence or
interference.
6. OSMENA and GARCIA vs. COMELEC
FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition, seeking a reexamination of the
validity of §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which
prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space
or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the
Commission on Elections. Petitioners are candidates for public office in the
forthcoming elections. Petitioner Emilio M. R. Osmeña is candidate for
President of the Philippines, while petitioner Pablo P. Garcia is governor of
Cebu Province, seeking reelection. They contend that events after the ruling
in National Press Club v. Commission on Elections2 "have called into question
the validity of the very premises of that [decision]."
ISSUE: WON SEC 11(B) OF RA 6646 OF THE ELECTORAL REFORMS
LAW OF 1987 IS VALID
HELD: The term political "ad ban," when used to describe §11(b) of R.A. No.
6646, is misleading, for even as §11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print
space and air time to political candidates, it mandates the COMELEC to
procure and itself allocate to the candidates space and time in the
media. There is no suppression of political ads but only a regulation of
the time and manner of advertising.
There is a difference in kind and in severity between restrictions such as those
imposed by the election law provisions in question in this case and those
found to be unconstitutional in the cases cited by both petitioners and the
Solicitor General, who has taken the side of petitioners. In Adiong v.
COMELEC the Court struck down a regulation of the COMELEC which
prohibited the use of campaign decals and stickers on mobile units, allowing
their location only in the COMELEC common poster area or billboard, at the
campaign headquarters of the candidate or his political party, or at his
residence. The Court found the restriction "so broad that it encompasses even
the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned car." Nor
was there a substantial governmental interest justifying the restriction.
Here, on the other hand, there is no total ban on political ads, much less
restriction on the content of the speech. Given the fact that print space
and air time can be controlled or dominated by rich candidates to the
disadvantage of poor candidates, there is a substantial or legitimate
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governmental interest justifying exercise of the regulatory power of the
COMELEC under Art. IX-C, §4 of the Constitution, which provides:
The commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate
the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation
of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or
information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its
subsiding. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal
opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and
forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
The provisions in question involve no suppression of political ads. The only
prohibit the sale or donation of print space and air time to candidates
but require the COMELEC instead to procure space and time in the mass
media for allocation, free of charge, to the candidates. In effect, during the
election period, the COMELEC takes over the advertising page of
newspapers or the commercial time of radio and TV stations and allocates
these to the candidates.
The validity of regulations of time, place and manner, under well-defined
standards, is well-nigh beyond question. What is involved here is simply
regulation of this nature. Instead of leaving candidates to advertise freely in
the mass media, the law provides for allocation, by the COMELEC, of
print space and air time to give all candidates equal time and space for
the purpose of ensuring "free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections."
The main purpose of §11(b) is regulatory. Any restriction on speech is
only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to achieve its
purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the use of mass media
for political advertising. The restriction on speech, as pointed out in
NPC, is limited both as to time and as to scope.
What makes the regulation reasonable is precisely that it applies only to
the election period. Its enforcement outside the period would make it
unreasonable.
Petitioners contend that §11(b) is not a reasonable means for achieving the
purpose for which it was enacted. They claim that instead of levelling the
playing field as far as the use of mass media for political campaign is
concerned, §11(b) has abolished it. They further claim that §11(b) does not
prevent rich candidates from using their superior resources to the
disadvantage of poor candidates.
All this is of course mere allegation. As stated in the beginning, what
petitioners claim to be the nation's experience with the law is merely
argumentation against its validity. The claim will not bear analysis, however.
Assuming that rich candidates can spend for parades, rallies, motorcades,
airplanes and the like in order to campaign while poor candidates can only
afford political ads, the gap between the two will not necessarily be reduced
by allowing unlimited mass media advertising because rich candidates can
spend for other propaganda in addition to mass media advertising. Moreover,
it is not true that §11(b) has abolished the playing field. What it has done, as
already stated, is merely to regulate its use through COMELEC-sponsored
advertising in place of advertisements paid for by candidates or donated by
their supporters.
It is finally argued that COMELEC Space and COMELEC Time are ineffectual.
It is claimed that people hardly read or watch or listen to them. Again, this is
a factual assertion without any empirical basis to support it. What is more, it
is an assertion concerning the adequacy or necessity of the law which should
be addressed to Congress. Well-settled is the rule that the choice of remedies
for an admitted social malady requiring government action belongs to
Congress. The remedy prescribed by it, unless clearly shown to be repugnant
to fundamental law, must be respected.30 As shown in this case, §11(b) of
R.A. 6646 is a permissible restriction on the freedom of speech, of expression
and of the press.
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In Adiong v. COMELEC this Court quoted the following from the decision
of the U.S. Supreme Court in a case sustaining a Los Angeles City
ordinance which prohibited the posting of campaign signs on public
property:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
This test was actually formulated in United States v. O'Brien. It is an
appropriate test for restrictions on speech which, like §11(b), are
content-neutral. Unlike content-based restrictions, they are not imposed
because of the content of the speech. For this reason, content-neutral
restrictions are tests demanding standards. For example, a rule such as that
involved in Sanidad v. COMELEC, prohibiting columnists, commentators, and
announcers from campaigning either for or against an issue in a plebiscite
must have a compelling reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under
strict scrutiny. These restrictions, it will be seen, are censorial and therefore
they bear a heavy presumption of constitutional invalidity. In addition. they will
be tested for possible overbreadth and vagueness.
Justice Panganiban's dissent invokes the clear-and-present-danger test
and argues that "media ads do not partake of the 'real substantive evil' that
the state has a right to prevent and that justifies the curtailment of the people's
cardinal right to choose their means of expression and of access to
information." The clear-and-present-danger test is not, however, a sovereign
remedy for all free speech problems. As has been pointed out by a thoughtful
student of constitutional law, it was originally formulated for the criminal law
and only later appropriated for free speech cases. For the criminal law is
necessarily concerned with the line at which innocent preparation ends and a
guilty conspiracy or attempt begins.39 Clearly, it is inappropriate as a test
for determining the constitutional validity of laws which, like §11(b) of
R.A. No. 6646, are not concerned with the content of political ads but
only with their incidents. To apply the clear-and-present-danger test to
such regulatory measures would be like using a sledgehammer to drive
a nail when a regular hammer is all that is needed.
The reason for this difference in the level of justification for the restriction of
speech is that content-based restrictions distort public debate, have improper
motivation, and are usually imposed because of fear of how people will react
to a particular speech. No such reasons underlie content-neutral regulations,
like regulations of time, place and manner of holding public assemblies under
B.P. Blg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985. Applying the O'Brien test
in this case, we find that §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is a valid exercise of the
power of the State to regulate media of communication or information
for the purpose of ensuring equal opportunity, time and space for
political campaigns; that the regulation is unrelated to the suppression
of speech; that any restriction on freedom of expression is only
incidental and no more than is necessary to achieve the purpose of
promoting equality.
7. SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS INC. vs. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-
stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in various
fields. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation
publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation.
Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on
Elections from enforcing Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which
provides that: “Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published
fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates
shall not be published seven (7) days before an election”.
Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey
results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech
without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that
SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior
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to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the
election day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is
neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the conclusion that there
is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting process posed by election
surveys. No similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their
opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing
articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. They contend
that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results
of election surveys, which are relatively objective.
Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in §5.4 of R.A.
No. 9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the
electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the
election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of election
survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a rational connection
to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the
electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and
absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to meet the "evils" sought to be
prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the
restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the
national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as
it does not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness.
ISSUE: Whether Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional
abridgment of freedom of speech, expression and the press.
HELD: YES. It constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of
expression, speech and the press.
§5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press by
prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates
within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days immediately preceding a
national election and seven (7) days before a local election. Because of the
preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the
press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity.
Indeed, “any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. The
Government ‘thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the
enforcement of such restraint.’ There is thus a reversal of the normal
presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation.
On the other hand, the COMELEC contends that under Art. IX-A, §7 of the
Constitution, its decisions, orders, or resolutions may be reviewed by this
Court only by certiorari. The flaws in this argument is that it assumes that its
Resolution 3636, dated March 1, 2001 is a “decision, order, or resolution”
within the meaning of Art. IX-A, §7. Indeed, counsel for COMELEC maintains
that Resolution 3636 was “rendered” by the Commission. However, the
Resolution does not purport to adjudicate the right of any party. It is not an
exercise by the COMELEC of its adjudicatory power to settle the claims of
parties. To the contrary, Resolution 3636 clearly states that it is promulgated
to implement the provisions of R.A. No. 9006. Hence, there is no basis for the
COMELEC’s claim that this petition for prohibition is inappropriate. Prohibition
has been found appropriate for testing the constitutionality of various election
laws, rules, and regulations.
8. GMA NETWORK INC. vs. COMELEC
FACTS: The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged
unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting
the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for
national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120)
minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively.
They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time
violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as
their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to
elect during the forth coming elections Section 9 (a) provides for an
“aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per station” airtime for
political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC
approval for candidates’ television and radio guestings and appearances.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on
airtime limits violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.
HELD: YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based”
airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains
the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate
with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-
based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a
compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on
the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas,
philosophies, platforms and programs of government.
And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition
of such a prohibitive measure. It is also particularly unreasonable and
whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time when
we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands.
There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens
across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to
as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that
he conveys his message through his advertisements in languages and
dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all
of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such
candidate to express himself – a form of suppression of his political speech.
9. SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS INC. vs. COMELEC
FACTS: COMELEC Resolution No. 9674 directed Social Weather StatCons,
Inc. (SWS) and Pulse Asia, Inc. (PulseAsia), as well as "other survey firms of
similar circumstance" to submit to COMELEC the names of all commissioners
and payors of all surveys published from February 12, 2013 to April 23, 2013,
including those of their "subscribers." SWS and Pulse Asia are social research
and public polling firms. Among their activities is the conduct of pre-election
surveys. On March 20, 2013, Representative Tobias M. Tiangco (Tiangco),
Secretary-General of the United Nationalist Alliance (UNA), wrote Atty.
Esmeralda Ladra, Director of COMELEC's Law Department. In his le³er,
Tiangco asked COMELEC to "compel [SWS] to either comply with the
directive in the Fair Election Act and COMELEC Resolution No. 9[6]1[5] and
give the names or identities of the subscribers who paid for the pre-election
survey conducted from February15 to February 17, 2013], or be liable for the
violation thereof, an act constitutive of an election offense.
ISSUE: WON the right of the petitioners to free speech will be curtailed by the
requirement to submit the names of their subscribers
RULING: The Court sustained the validity of Resolution No. 9674 the names
of those who commission or pay for Election surveys, including subscribers of
survey firms, must be disclosed pursuant to Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election
Act. This requirement is a valid regulation in the exercise of Police Power and
effects the constitutional policy of "guarantee[ing] equal access to
opportunities for Public service. "47 Section 5.2(a)'s requirement of disclosing
subscribers neither curtails petitioners' free speech rights nor violates the
constitutional proscription against the impairment of contracts. The Court also
ruled that the Fair Election Act also governs published surveys during
elections. The nature of the speech involved, as well as the Fair Election Act's
purpose of ensuring political equality, calls into operation the equality-based
approach to weighing liberty to express vis-a-vis equality of opportunities.
10. DIOCESE OF BACOLOD vs. COMELEC
FACTS: On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a
private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each
tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were
posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin
contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive
Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the
subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience
Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with
a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral
candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption
of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted
for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team
Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”
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Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored
nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin
contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who
helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a
political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of
review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the
COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions.
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private
citizens.
4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin
violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression.
5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-
neutral regulation.
6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property.
7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No. The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the
exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be
acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court
through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the
act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or
collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the
discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it
cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an
issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the
answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on
powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our
courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the
government properly acted within such limits.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political
bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies
subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this
court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free
speech. Any instance that this right may be abridgeddemands judicial
scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.
SECOND ISSUE: No. The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that
the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite
that something had by then been accomplished or performed by
either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may come
into the picture.”
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their
medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections.
COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against
petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending
threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as
COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their
freedom of speech.
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THIRD ISSUE: No. Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and
jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power to regulate the
tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to
candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do
they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to
regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression
exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
FOURTH ISSUE: Yes. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with
political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election
propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted
against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of
the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it
is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for
consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while
sponsored messages are covered.
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and
civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been
defined as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial
transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is,
however, definitely political speech.
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the
subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral
regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as
time, place, or manner of the speech.
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The
tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this
court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be
substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’”
“Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger
rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden
of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the
regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered
by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom
of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-
candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of
the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
SIXTH ISSUE: Yes. The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily
seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners.
Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of
private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of
property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties
of due process and equal protection of the laws.
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals
and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the
citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law.
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SEVENTH ISSUE: No. The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon
by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic
religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify
the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on
such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin
precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences
and not religious speech.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into
account not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their
purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise
of, a person’s or institution’s religion.
As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account
. . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental
regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise
thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in
which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.”
Lemon test
A regulation is constitutional when:
 Bill of rights
 Contribution
 Affiliate program commission
1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
11. UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK) vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 and Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court filed by 1-United Transport Koalisyon (petitioner), a party-list
organization, assailing Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section
7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9006, otherwise known as the "Fair Elections Act",
was passed. Section 9 thereof provides:
Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. - The COMELEC may authorize
political parties and party-list groups to erect common poster areas for their
candidates in not more than ten (10) public places such as plazas, markets,
barangay centers and the like, wherein candidates can post, display or exhibit
election propaganda: Provided that the size of the poster areas shall not
exceed twelve (12) by sixteen (16) feet or its equivalent.
Independent candidates with no political parties may likewise be authorized
to erect common poster areas in not more than ten (10) public places, the size
of which shall not exceed four (4) by six (6) feet or its equivalent.
Candidates may post any lawful propaganda material in private places with
the consent of the owner thereof, and in public places or property which shall
be allocated equitably and impartially among the candidates.
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615,
which provided for the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with
the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and subsequent elections.
Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the prohibited forms of election
propaganda, pertinently provides:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. - During the campaign
period, it is unlawful:
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xxxx
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda
material outside of authorized common poster areas, in public places,
or in private properties without the consent of the owner thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any
of the following:
xxxx
5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs,
ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus
terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the like.
The petitioner, through its president, Melencio F. Vargas, sought clarification
from the COMELEC as regards the application of Resolution No. 9615,
particularly Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis-a-
vis privately owned public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The
petitioner explained that the prohibition stated in the aforementioned
provisions impedes the right to free speech of the private owners of
PUVs and transport terminals. The petitioner then requested the
COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the assailed provisions
and allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post
election campaign materials on their vehicles and transport terminals.
On February 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No.
13-0214, which denied the petitioner's request to reconsider the
implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615.
COMELEC EN BANC:
From the foregoing, x x x the primary fact in consideration here is actually
whether 1 -UTAK or any other [PUV] owners in the same position do in fact
possess a franchise and/or certificate of public convenience and
operate as a public utility. If it does not, then the ruling in Adiong applies
squarely. If it does, then its operations, pursuant to Section 4, Article IX-C of
the Constitution, will be placed directly under the supervision and regulation
of the Commission for the duration of the election period so as to ensure
equality of opportunity, time, and space for all candidates in the placement of
political advertisements. Having placed their property for use by the general
public and having secured a license or permit to do so, 1-UTAK and other
PUV owners, as well as transport terminal owners, cannot now complain that
their property is subject to regulation by the State. Securing a franchise or a
certificate of public convenience in their favor does not exempt them from the
burdens imposed by the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9006 x x x, and other
related statutes. It must be stressed that the Constitution itself, under Section
6, Article XII, commands that the use of property bears a social function
and all economic agents shall contribute to the common good; and there
is no higher Common good than that as espoused in R.A. No. 9006 - the
equalization of opportunities for all candidates for political office during
elections - a policy which Res. No. 9615 merely implements.
As required in Adiong, and in compliance with the O'Brien standards, the
prohibition furthers two important and substantial governmental interests -
equalizing opportunity, time, and space for all candidates, and putting to a
stop excessive campaign spending. The regulation bears a clear and
reasonable nexus with these Constitutionally- and statutorily-sanctioned
objectives, and the infringement of freedom is merely incidental and limited
as to time. The Commission has not taken away all avenues of expression
available to PUV and transport terminal owners. They may express their
political preferences elsewhere.
The COMELEC further claims that Resolution No. 9615 is a valid content-
neutral regulation and, thus, does not impinge on the constitutional right to
freedom of speech. It avers that the assailed regulation is within the
constitutional power of the COMELEC pursuant to Section 4, Article IX-C of
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the Constitution. The COMELEC alleges that the regulation simply aims to
ensure equal campaign opportunity, time, and space for all candidates - an
important and substantial governmental interest, which is totally unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; that any restriction on free speech is
merely incidental and is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of the
said governmental interest.
ISSUE: Whether Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 violate the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs
and transport terminals
RULING: YES.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution
No. 9615 are prior restraints on speech.
Free speech may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
any matter of public concern without prior restraint or censorship and
subsequent punishment. Prior restraint refers to official governmental
restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom
from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship,
and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial
branch of the government. Any system of prior restraints of expression comes
to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its validity.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people to freedom of
speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the
owners of PUVs and private transport terminals, to express their preference,
through the posting of election campaign material in their property, and
convince others to agree with them.
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an
election campaign material during an election period in PUVs and transport
terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of the public utility franchise
and shall make the owner thereof liable for an election offense.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression
of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition,
owners of PUVs and transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited
from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election
offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.
It is now deeply embedded in our jurisprudence that freedom of speech and
of the press enjoys a preferred status in our hierarchy of rights. The
rationale is that the preservation of other rights depends on how well we
protect our freedom of speech and of the press. It has been our constant
holding that this preferred freedom calls all the more for utmost respect
when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make
more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.
The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is an
invalid content-neutral regulation repugnant to the free speech clause.
The COMELEC claims that while Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution
No. 9615 may incidentally restrict the right to free speech of owners of PUVs
and transport terminals, the same is nevertheless constitutionally permissible
since it is a valid content-neutral regulation. The Court does not agree.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents
of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and
under well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts
the right to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur: first, the
government regulation is within the constitutional power of the
Government; second, it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; third, the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and fourth, the incidental restriction on freedom of expression
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
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Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral
regulations since they merely control the place where election campaign
materials may be posted. However, the prohibition is still repugnant to the free
speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-
neutral regulation.
It is conceded that Resolution No. 9615, including the herein assailed
provisions, furthers an important and substantial governmental interest, i.e.,
ensuring equal opportunity, time and space among candidates aimed at the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. It is further
conceded that the governmental interest in imposing the said prohibition is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression. However, Section 7(g) items
(5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615, are not within
the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4, Article
IX-C of the Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no necessity to restrict the
right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
12. BAYAN, KARAPATAN, KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG
PILIPINAS (KMP) vs. ERMITA
FACTS:
The rally was scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the
University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge. Police officers
blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented them from proceeding
further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them.
Three other rallyists were arrested in the case of Bayan, et al allege that they
are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as
organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in
on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880,
some of them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as
well as the policy of CPR, "Calibrated Preemptive Response". They seek to
stop violent dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and the
CPR policy recently announced. Bayan et al argued that B.P. No. 880 requires
a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence
or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue
and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and
place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression
is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass
actions in support of the government. The words "lawful cause," "opinion,"
"protesting or influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause not
espoused by the government. Also, the phrase "maximum tolerance" shows
that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are
being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict
scrutiny test.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the implementation of B.P. No. 880 violated their rights as
organizations and individuals when the rally they participated in on October 6,
2005
HELD:
Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to
engage in peaceful assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed
by the Constitution, is directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a permit
for all who would publicly assemble in the nation’s streets and parks. They
have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required
permits to press their claim that no such permit can be validly required without
violating the Constitutional guarantee. Respondents, on the other hand, have
challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed the public
assemblies held without the permit.
Sec. 4 Art. III Section 4 of Article III of the Constitution
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for
redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and
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of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional
protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional democratic
polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and
unprotected Rights to peaceful assembly to petition the government for a
redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form associations
for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted
activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the Constitution,
particularly Sections 4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article IX,
and Section 3 of Article XIII. Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed
pronouncements defending and promoting the people’s exercise of these
rights. It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of
public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and
manner of the assemblies, it as a "content-neutral" regulation of the time,
place, and manner of holding public assemblies. A fair and impartial reading
of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does
not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful
causes, otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection.
Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition
of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The
words "petitioning the government for redress of grievances" come from the
wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum
tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of
the content of the expressions in the rally. Furthermore, the permit can only
be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public
safety, public convenience, public morals or public health the so-called
calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and
must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses
our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses.
On the other hand, B.P. No.880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it
does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of
public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being
insidious, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the
government. The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits"
is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear and present
danger "standard.” In this Decision, the Court goes even one step further in
safeguarding liberty by giving local governments a deadline of 30 days within
which to designate specific freedom parks as provided under B.P. No. 880. If,
after that period, no such parks are so identified in accordance with Section
15 of the law, all public parks and plazas of the municipality or city concerned
shall in effect be deemed freedom parks; no prior permit of whatever kind shall
be required to hold an assembly therein. The only requirement will be written
notices to the police and the mayor’s office to allow proper coordination and
orderly activities.
13. INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ATIENZA
FACTS: In June 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed an
application for a rally permit with the office of Manila Mayor Jose “Lito”
Atienza. The IBP sought their rally to be staged at the Mendiola Bridge.
Atienza granted the permit but indicated thereon that IBP is only allowed to
stage their rally at the Plaza Miranda, a freedom park.
IBP President Jose Anselmo Cadiz received the rally permit on the day before
the scheduled rally. Cadiz immediately went to the Court of Appeals to assail
the permit because what Atienza did was only a partial grant which was
alleged to be a violation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression
and a grave abuse of discretion on the part of Atienza.
Meanwhile, IBP pushed through with the rally not at Plaza Miranda but at the
Mendiola Bridge. Subsequently, the Manila Police District (MPD) filed a
criminal case against Cadiz for allegedly violating the Public Assembly Act or
specifically, for staging a rally in a place different from what was indicated in
the rally permit.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Atienza. The CA ruled that what Atienza
did was within his power; that freedom of expression is not absolute.
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Cadiz appealed before the Supreme Court. Cadiz also prayed for the
suspension of the criminal case against him on the ground that the certiorari
case he filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the criminal case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the certiorari case Cadiz filed against Atienza is a prejudicial
question to the criminal case filed against him (Cadiz).
2. Whether or not it is within Mayor Jose Atienza’s power to modify the rally
permit without consulting with the IBP.
HELD:
1. No. It is improper for Cadiz to raise the issue of prejudicial question at this
stage and in this certiorari case. Under the Rules of Court, a prejudicial
question is a ground to suspend the criminal proceeding. However, Cadiz
must first file a petition to suspend the criminal proceeding in the said criminal
case. The determination of the pendency of a prejudicial question should be
made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not before the Supreme
Court in an appeal from the civil action.
2. No. In modifying a rally permit or in granting a rally permit which contains a
time and place different from that applied for, the mayor must first consult with
the applicant at the earliest opportunity. This is in order to give the applicant
some time to determine if such change is favorable to him or adverse (and if
adverse, he can seek judicial remedies) – Section 6 of the Public Assembly
Act.
It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear
and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of
the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil, the applicant must be heard on the matter. In this case, Atienza did not
consult with the IBP. Atienza capriciously and whimsically changed the venue
without any reason therefor. Such is a grave abuse of discretion and a
violation of the freedom of expression.
14. ALEJANDRO ESTRADA vs. SOLEDAD ESCRITOR (2003 and
2006)
A.M. No. P-02-1651, O4 August 2003, En Banc (Puno, J.)
The public morality expressed in the law is necessarily secular for in our
constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from
establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions. When the law
speaks of immorality in the Civil Service Law or “immoral” in the Code
of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, or “public morals” in the
Revised Penal Code, or “morals” in the New Civil Code, or “moral
character” in the Constitution, the distinction between public and
secular morality on the one hand and religious morality, on the other
should be kept in mind- the morality referred to in the law is public and
necessarily secular not religious.
FACTS: Alejandro Estrada filed a complaint against Soledad Escritor, a court
interpreter of the Regional Trial Court Branch 253 in Las Pinas, for living with
a man not her husband and allegedly having a child from such relationship.
Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the
image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein
as it might appear that the court condones her act.
Escritor admitted that she has been living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without
the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they have a son. But as a
member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the
Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal arrangement is in
conformity with their religious beliefs through the execution of “Pledge of
Faithfulness”. The scriptural basis is in Matthew 5:32 that when the spouse
commits adultery, the offended spouse can remarry. Once all legal
impediments for both are lifted, the couple can already register their marriage
with the civil authorities and the validity of the declarations ceases.
In sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing
immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and
they remain members in good standing in the congregation.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Escritor is guilty of “disgraceful and immoral conduct”
and must be administratively liable.
HELD: No. Escritor is not guilty of “disgraceful and immoral” conduct and must
not be held administratively liable. It may be true that in a catena of cases, the
Court has ruled that government employees engaged in illicit relations are
guilty of “disgraceful and immoral conduct” for which he/she may be held
administratively liable.
Respondent Escritor does not claim that there is an error with such settled
jurisprudence. Nor is there an allegation that the norms of morality with
respect to illicit relations have shifted towards leniency from the time the
precedent cases were decided. The Court finds that there is no such error or
shift, thus there is no reason to deviate from these rulings that such illicit
relationship constitutes “disgraceful and immoral conduct” punishable under
the Civil Service Law. In the normal circumstances, Escritor having admitted
the alleged immoral conduct, she could be held administratively liable.
However, there is a distinguishing factor that sets the case at bar apart from
the precedents. As a defense, respondent invokes religious freedom since her
religion, the Jehovah’s Witnesses, has, after thorough investigation, allowed
her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio based on the church’s religious
beliefs and practices. This distinguishing factor compels the Court to apply
the religious clauses to the case at bar .
The public morality expressed in the law is necessarily secular for in our
constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from establishing a
religion, including the morality it sanctions. Religious morality proceeds from
a person’s “views of his relations to His Creator and to the obligations they
impose of reverence to His being and character and obedience to His Will,” in
accordance with this Court’s definition of religion in American Bible Society
citing Davis.
The Establishment Clause puts a negative bar against establishment of this
morality arising from one religion or the other, and implies the affirmative
“establishment” of a civil order for the resolution of public moral disputes. This
agreement on a secular mechanism is the price of ending the “war of all sects
against all”; the establishment of a secular public moral order is the social
contract produced by religious truce. Thus, when the law speaks of
“immorality” in the Civil Service Law or “immoral” in the Code of Professional
Responsibility for lawyers or “public morals” in the Revised Penal Code before
“morals” in the New Civil Code or “moral character” in the Constitution the
distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand, and religious
morality, on the other, should be kept in mind
The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not
religious. Expansive religious freedom therefore requires that government be
neutral in matters of religion; governmental reliance upon religious justification
is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.
Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of
religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution’s religion clauses
prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality
recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but
at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality
contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.
The distinction between public and secular morality as expressed - albeit not
exclusively - in the law, on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other,
is important because the jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes min the case at
bar should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. More
concretely, should the Court declare respondent’s conduct as immoral and
hold her administratively liable, the Court will be holding that in the realm of
public morality, her conduct is reprehensible or there are state interests
overriding her religious freedom. For as long as her conduct is being judged
within this realm, she will be accountable to the state. However, in so ruling,
the Court does not and cannot say that her conduct should be made
reprehensible in the realm of her church where it is presently sanctioned and
that she is answerable for her immorality to her Jehovah God nor that other
religions prohibiting her conduct are correct.
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On the other hand, should the Court declare her conduct permissible, the
Court will be holding that under her unique circumstances, public morality is
not offended or that upholding her religious freedom is an interest higher than
upholding public morality thus her conduct should not be penalized. But the
Court is not ruling that the tenets and practice of her religion are correct nor
that other churches which do not allow respondent’s conjugal arrangement
should likewise allow such conjugal arrangement or should not find anything
immoral about it and therefore members of these churches are not
answerable for immorality to her Supreme Being. The Court cannot speak
more than what it has authority to say. But while the state, including the Court,
accords such deference to religious belief and exercise which enjoy protection
under the religious clauses, the social contract and the constitutional order
are designed in such a way that when religious belief flows into speech and
conduct that step out of the religious sphere and overlap with the secular and
public realm, the state has the power to regulate, prohibit and penalize these
expressions and embodiments of belief insofar as they affect the interests of
the state.
Having distinguished between public and secular morality and religious
morality, the more difficult task is determining which immoral acts under this
public and secular morality fall under the phrase “disgraceful and immoral
conduct” for which a government employee may be held administratively
liable. The line is not easy to draw for it is like “a line that divides land and
sea, a coastline of irregularities and indentations.”
Only one conduct is in question before this Court, i.e., the conjugal
arrangement of a government employee whose partner is legally married to
another which Philippine law and jurisprudence consider both immoral and
illegal.
The case at bar being one of first impression, now subject the respondent’s
claim of religious freedom to the “compelling state interest” test from a
benevolent neutrality stance - i.e. entertaining the possibility that respondent’s
claim to religious freedom would warrant carving out an exception from the
Civil Service Law; necessarily, her defense of religious freedom will be
unavailing should the government succeed in demonstrating a more
compelling state interest.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondent’s right to religious
freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between
keeping her employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and
family on the one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her
religious practice and family on the other hand, puts a burden on her free
exercise of religion.
The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her religious belief.
Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is
not merely using the “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” to avoid
punishment for immorality. She did not secure the Declaration only after
entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict and defined, much
less only after an administrative case for immorality was filed against her. The
Declaration was issued to her by her congregation after ten years of living
together with her partner, Quilapio, and ten years before she entered the
judiciary. Ministers from her congregation testified on the authenticity of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ practice of securing a Declaration and their doctrinal or
scriptural basis for such a practice. As the ministers testified, the Declaration
is not whimsically issued to avoid legal punishment for illicit conduct but to
make the “union” of their members under respondent’s circumstances
“honorable before God and men.” It is also worthy of notice that the Report
and Recommendation of the investigating judge annexed letters of the OCA
to the respondent regarding her request to be exempt from attending the flag
ceremony after Circular No. 62-2001 was issued requiring attendance in the
flag ceremony. Respondent’s request for exemption from the flag ceremony
shows her sincerity in practicing the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ beliefs and not
using them merely to escape punishment. She is a practicing member of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Jehovah ministers testified that she is a
member in good standing. Nevertheless, should the government, thru the
Solicitor General, want to further question the respondent’s sincerity and the
centrality of her practice in her faith, it should be given the opportunity to do
so. The government has not been represented in the case at bar from its
incipience until this point.
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In any event, even if the Court deems sufficient respondent’s evidence on the
sincerity of her religious belief and its centrality in her faith, the case at bar
cannot still be decided using the “compelling state interest” test. The case at
bar is one of first impression, thus the parties were not aware of the burdens
of proof they should discharge in the Court’s use of the “compelling state
interest” test.
Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present
evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence
should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the
Office of the Solicitor General. To properly settle the issue in the case at bar,
the government should be given the opportunity to demonstrate the
compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s
stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it
comes within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit
and punish her conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the
Court’s action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to
religious freedom. We cannot therefore simply take a passing look at
respondent’s claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the
“compelling state interest” test. The government must be heard on the issue
as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of
demonstrating the state’s compelling interest which can override respondent’s
religious belief and practice. To repeat, this is a case of first impression where
we are applying the “compelling state interest” test in a case involving purely
religious conduct. The careful application of the test is indispensable as how
we will decide the case will make a decisive difference in the life of the
respondent who stands not only before the Court but before her Jehovah God.
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA v. SOLEDAD ESCRITOR
A.M. No. P-02-1651, 22 June 2006, Puno, J. (En Banc)
The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that
freedoms – including religious freedom – may be enjoyed. In the area of
religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state
interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will
erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In
the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be
allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
FACTS: Soledad Escritor is the court interpreter of Branch 253, Regional Trial
Court of Las Piñas City. She was already a widow when she entered the
judiciary in 1999. She started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the
benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband was still
alive but living with another woman. She and Quilapio have a son. But as a
member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the
Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, Escritor asserted that their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval
of her congregation. In fact, after ten years of living together, she executed on
July 28, 1991, a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.”
For Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Declaration allows members of the
congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital
relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union moral and binding
within the congregation all over the world except in countries where divorce is
allowed. As laid out by the tenets of their faith, the Jehovah’s congregation
requires that at the time the declarations are executed, the couple cannot
secure the civil authorities’ approval of the marital relationship because of
legal impediments. Only couples who have been baptized and in good
standing may execute the Declaration, which requires the approval of the
elders of the congregation. As a matter of practice, the marital status of the
declarants and their respective spouses’ commission of adultery are
investigated before the declarations are executed. Escritor and Quilapio’s
declarations were executed in the usual and approved form prescribed by the
Jehovah’s Witnesses, approved by elders of the congregation where the
declarations were executed, and recorded in the Watch Tower Central Office.
Moreover, the Jehovah’s congregation believes that once all legal
impediments for the couple are lifted, the validity of the declarations ceases,
and the couple should legalize their union. In Escritor’s case, although she
was widowed in 1998, thereby lifting the legal impediment to marry on her
part, her mate was still not capacitated to remarry. Thus, their declarations
remained valid. Therefore, insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is
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nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and
Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the congregation.
In a sworn-letter complaint, Alejandro Estrada requested Judge Jose F.
Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Piñas City, for an
investigation of Escritor, for living with a man not her husband, and having
borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is
committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she
should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the
court condones her act. Consequently, Escritor was charged with committing
“disgraceful and immoral conduct” under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec.
46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code.
Escritor invoked the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of her
congregation, in asserting that her conjugal arrangement does not constitute
disgraceful and immoral conduct for which she should be held administratively
liable. Hence, the Court had to determine the contours of religious freedom
under Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides, viz:
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever
be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
The Court, in its decision dated August 4, 2003, after a long and arduous
scrutiny into the origins and development of the religion clauses in the United
States (U.S.) and the Philippines, held that in resolving claims involving
religious freedom, benevolent neutrality or accommodation, whether
mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the
religion clauses in our Constitution; and in deciding Escritor’s plea of
exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause (from the law with which she
is administratively charged), it is the compelling state interest test, the strictest
test, which must be applied. The Court subjected Escritor’s claim of religious
freedom, being one of first impression, to the “compelling state interest” test
from a benevolent neutrality stance – i.e., entertaining the possibility that
Escritor’s claim of religious freedom would warrant carving out an exception
from the Civil Service Law; necessarily, her defense of religious freedom will
be unavailing should the government succeed in demonstrating a more
compelling state interest.
As held, the benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these
governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to
promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals
and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. The purpose of
accommodations is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a
person’s or institution’s religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the
“government [may] take religion into account…to exempt, when possible, from
generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious
beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create
without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise
may flourish.” In the ideal world, the legislature would recognize the religions
and their practices and would consider them, when practical, in enacting laws
of general application. But when the legislature fails to do so, religions that
are threatened and burdened may turn to the courts for protection.
Thus, what is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration
of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its
application or its “burdensome effect,” whether by the legislature or the courts.
Most of the free exercise claims brought to the U.S. Court are for exemption,
not invalidation of the facially neutral law that has a “burdensome” effect.
As to whether allowance of accommodation is proper, the Court held that the
Constitution itself mandates the Court to do so for the following reasons. First,
as previously discussed, while the U.S. religion clauses are the precursors to
the Philippine religion clauses, the benevolent neutrality accommodation
approach in Philippine jurisdiction is more pronounced and given leeway than
in the U.S. Second, the whole purpose of the accommodation theory,
including the notion of mandatory accommodations, was to address the
“inadvertent burdensome effect” that an otherwise facially neutral law would
have on religious exercise. Just because the law is criminal in nature,
therefore, should not bring it out of the ambit of the Free Exercise Clause. As
stated by Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion in Smith, “[t]here is
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nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general applicability or general
criminal prohibitions, for laws neutral towards religion can coerce a person to
violate his religious conscience or intrude upon his religious duties just as
effectively as laws aimed at religion.” Third, there is wisdom in
accommodation made by the Court as this is the recourse of minority religions
which are likewise protected by the Free Exercise Clause. Mandatory
accommodations are particularly necessary to protect adherents of minority
religions from the inevitable effects of majoritarianism, which include
ignorance and indifference and overt hostility to the minority. Fourth,
exemption from penal laws on account of religion is not entirely an alien
concept, nor will it be applied for the first time, as an exemption of such nature,
albeit by legislative act, has already been granted to Moslem polygamy and
the criminal law of bigamy. Finally, the Court considered the language of the
Religion Clauses vis-à-vis the other fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights. It
has been noted that unlike other fundamental rights like the right to life, liberty
or property, the Religion Clauses are stated in absolute terms, unqualified by
the requirement of “due process,” “unreasonableness,” or “lawful order.” Only
the right to free speech is comparable in its absolute grant. Given the
unequivocal and unqualified grant couched in the language, the Court cannot
simply dismiss a claim of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause,
solely on the premise that the law in question is a general criminal law. If the
burden is great and the sincerity of the religious belief is not in question,
adherence to the benevolent neutrality-accommodation approach require that
the Court make an individual determination and not dismiss the claim outright.
With respect to the application of the compelling state interest test, it was held
that it could result to three situations of accommodation: First, mandatory
accommodation would result if the Court finds that accommodation is required
by the Free Exercise Clause. Second, if the Court finds that the State may,
but is not required to, accommodate religious interests, permissive
accommodation results. Finally, if the Court finds that that establishment
concerns prevail over potential accommodation interests, then it must rule that
the accommodation is prohibited. The adoption of the benevolent neutrality-
accommodation approach does not mean that the Court ought to grant
exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes before it. This is an
erroneous reading of the framework. Although benevolent neutrality is the
lens with which the Court ought to view religion clause cases, the interest of
the state should also be afforded utmost protection. This is precisely the
purpose of the test—to draw the line between mandatory, permissible and
forbidden religious exercise. Thus, under the framework, the Court cannot
simply dismiss a claim under the Free Exercise Clause because the conduct
in question offends a law.
In applying the “compelling state interest” test from a benevolent neutrality
stance, the first inquiry is whether Escritor’s right to religious freedom has
been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between keeping her
employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on
the one hand, and giving up her employment and keeping her religious
practice and family on the other hand, puts a burden on her free exercise of
religion. In Sherbert, the Court found that Sherbert’s religious exercise was
burdened as the denial of unemployment benefits “forces her to choose
between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the
one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to
accept work, on the other hand.” The burden on Escritor is even greater as
the price she has to pay for her employment is not only her religious precept
but also her family which, by the Declaration Pledging Faithfulness, stands
“honorable before God and men.”
The second step is to ascertain Escritor’s sincerity in her religious belief.
Escritor appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not
merely using the “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” to avoid punishment
for immorality. She did not secure the Declaration only after entering the
judiciary where the moral standards are strict and defined, much less only
after an administrative case for immorality was filed against her. The
Declaration was issued to her by her congregation after ten years of living
together with her partner, Quilapio, and ten years before she entered the
judiciary. Ministers from her congregation testified on the authenticity of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ practice of securing a Declaration and their doctrinal or
scriptural basis for such a practice. As the ministers testified, the Declaration
is not whimsically issued to avoid legal punishment for illicit conduct but to
make the “union” of their members under Escritor’s circumstances “honorable
before God and men.” It is also worthy of notice that the Report and
Recommendation of the investigating judge annexed letters of the OCA to
Escritor regarding her request to be exempt from attending the flag ceremony
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after Circular No. 62-2001 was issued requiring attendance in the flag
ceremony. The OCA’s letters were not submitted by Escritor as evidence but
annexed by the investigating judge in explaining that he was caught in a
dilemma whether to find Escritor guilty of immorality because the Court
Administrator and Deputy Court Administrator had different positions
regarding Escritor’s request for exemption from the flag ceremony on the
ground of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ contrary belief and practice. Escritor’s
request for exemption from the flag ceremony shows her sincerity in practicing
the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ beliefs and not using them merely to escape
punishment. She is a practicing member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the
Jehovah ministers testified that she is a member in good standing.
Nevertheless, should the government, thru the Solicitor General, want to
further question the Escritor’s sincerity and the centrality of her practice in her
faith, it should be given the opportunity to do so. The government has not
been represented in the case at bar from its incipience until this point.
In any event, even if the Court deems sufficient Escritor’s evidence on the
sincerity of her religious belief and its centrality in her faith, the case cannot
still be decided using the “compelling state interest” test. The case is one of
first impression, thus the parties were not aware of the burdens of proof they
should discharge in the Court’s use of the “compelling state interest” test. The
Court noted that the OCA found Escritor’s defense of religious freedom
unavailing in the face of the Court’s ruling in Dicdican v. Fernan, et al., viz:
It bears emphasis that the image of a court of justice is
mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the
personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of
its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to
adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency
in their professional and private conduct in order to
preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of
justice.
It is apparent from the OCA’s reliance upon this ruling that the state interest it
upholds is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining
among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. However, there is
nothing in the OCA’s memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this
interest is so compelling that it should override Escritor’s plea of religious
freedom nor is it shown that the means employed by the government in
pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to Escritor’s religious exercise.
It was also held that, indeed, it is inappropriate for the Alejandro Estrada, a
private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state.
The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the
government which is the Office of the Solicitor General. To properly settle the
issue, the government should be given the opportunity to demonstrate the
compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the Escritor’s stance
that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes
within the scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and
punish the conduct of Escritor where it is protected by the Free Exercise
Clause, the Court’s action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom. The Court cannot therefore simply take a passing
look at Escritor’s claim of religious freedom, but must instead apply the
“compelling state interest” test. The government must be heard on the issue
as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of
demonstrating the state’s compelling interest which can override Escritor’s
religious belief and practice. To repeat, the case is of first impression where
the Court applied the “compelling state interest” test in a case involving purely
religious conduct. The careful application of the test is indispensable as how
the Court will decide the case will make a decisive difference in the life of the
Escritor who stands not only before the Court but before her Jehovah God.
Because the Court could not, at that time, rule definitively on the ultimate issue
of whether Escritor was to be held administratively liable for there was need
to give the State the opportunity to adduce evidence that it has a more
“compelling interest” to defeat the claim of Escritor to religious freedom. Thus,
in the aforesaid decision dated August 4, 2003, the complaint was remanded
to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), and ordered the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) to intervene in the case so it can examine the
sincerity and centrality of Escritor’s claimed religious belief and practice;
present evidence on the state’s “compelling interest” to override Escritor’s
religious belief and practice; and show that the means the state adopts in
pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to Escritor’s religious freedom.
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It bears stressing, therefore, that the residual issues of the case pertained
NOT TO WHAT APPROACH THIS COURT SHOULD TAKE IN
CONSTRUING THE RELIGION CLAUSES, NOR TO THE PROPER TEST
APPLICABLE IN DETERMINING CLAIMS OF EXEMPTION BASED ON
FREEDOM OF RELIGION. These issues have already been ruled upon prior
to the remand, and constitute “the law of the case” insofar as they resolved
the issues of which framework and test are to be applied in this case, and no
motion for its reconsideration having been filed. The only task that the Court
is left to do is to determine whether the evidence adduced by the State proves
its more compelling interest. This issue involves a pure question of fact.
ISSUE: Whether or not the State was able to adduce evidence to prove its
more compelling interest
in overriding Escritor’s religious belief and practice
HELD: The administrative complaint is DISMISSED.
On the sincerity of religious belief, the Solicitor General categorically
concedes that the sincerity and centrality of Escritor’s claimed religious belief
and practice are beyond serious doubt. Thus, having previously established
the preliminary conditions required by the compelling state interest test, i.e.,
that a law or government practice inhibits the free exercise of Escritor’s
religious beliefs, and there being no doubt as to the sincerity and centrality of
her faith to claim the exemption based on the free exercise clause, the burden
shifted to the government to demonstrate that the law or practice justifies a
compelling secular objective and that it is the least restrictive means of
achieving that objective.
A look at the evidence that the OSG has presented fails to demonstrate “the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests” which could limit or
override Escritor’s fundamental right to religious freedom. Neither did the
government exert any effort to show that the means it seeks to achieve its
legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means.
The OSG merely offered the following as exhibits and their purposes:
1. EXHIBIT “A-OSG” AND SUBMARKING — The September 30, 2003 Letter
to the OSG of Bro. Raymond B. Leach, Legal Representative of the Watch
Tower Bible and Tract Society of the Philippines, Inc.
PURPOSE: To show that the OSG exerted efforts to examine the sincerity
and centrality of Escritor’s claimed religious belief and practice.
2. EXHIBIT “B-OSG” AND SUBMARKING — The duly notarized certification
dated September 30, 2003 issued and signed by Bro. Leach.
PURPOSES: (1) To substantiate the sincerity and centrality of Escritor’s
claimed religious belief and practice; and (2) to prove that the Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness, being a purely internal arrangement within the
congregation of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, cannot be a source of any legal
protection for Escritor.
In its Memorandum-In-Intervention, the OSG contends that the State has a
compelling interest to override Escritor’s claimed religious belief and practice,
in order to protect marriage and the family as basic social institutions. The
Solicitor General, quoting the Constitution and the Family Code, argues that
marriage and the family are so crucial to the stability and peace of the nation
that the conjugal arrangement embraced in the Declaration of Pledging
Faithfulness should not be recognized or given effect, as “it is utterly
destructive of the avowed institutions of marriage and the family for it reduces
to a mockery these legally exalted and socially significant institutions which in
their purity demand respect and dignity.”
There has never been any question that the state has an interest in protecting
the institutions of marriage and the family, or even in the sound administration
of justice. Indeed, the provisions by which Escritor’s relationship is said to
have impinged, e.g., Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised
Administrative Code, Articles 334 and 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and
even the provisions on marriage and family in the Civil Code and Family Code,
all clearly demonstrate the State’s need to protect these secular interests.
Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one
of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is a fundamental right that
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enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights — “the most inalienable
and sacred of human rights,” in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough
to contend that the state’s interest is important, because our Constitution itself
holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate in
specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the exemption, which
must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests can limit the fundamental right to religious freedom. To rule otherwise
would be to emasculate the Free Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself.
Thus, it is not the State’s broad interest in “protecting the institutions of
marriage and the family,” or even “in the sound administration of justice” that
must be weighed against Escritor’s claim, but the State’s narrow interest in
refusing to make an exception for the cohabitation which Escritor’s faith finds
moral. In other words, the government must do more than assert the
objectives at risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to what
extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions are granted. This,
the Solicitor General failed to do.
To paraphrase Justice Blackmun’s application of the compelling interest test,
the State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition, in order to be sufficiently
compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim, cannot be merely abstract or
symbolic. The State cannot plausibly assert that unbending application of a
criminal prohibition is essential to fulfill any compelling interest, if it does not,
in fact, attempt to enforce that prohibition. In the case at bar, the State has
not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy
charges against Escritor or her partner. The State has never sought to
prosecute Escritor nor her partner. The State’s asserted interest thus amounts
only to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Incidentally,
as echoes of the words of Messrs. J. Bellosillo and Vitug, in their concurring
opinions in our Decision, dated August 4, 2003, to deny the exemption would
effectively break up “an otherwise ideal union of two individuals who have
managed to stay together as husband and wife [approximately twenty-five
years]” and have the effect of defeating the very substance of marriage and
the family.
As previously discussed, our Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause. Thus, in arguing that Escritor should
be held administratively liable as the arrangement she had was “illegal per se
because, by universally recognized standards, it is inherently or by its very
nature bad, improper, immoral and contrary to good conscience,” the Solicitor
General failed to appreciate that benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.
Finally, even assuming that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest,
it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to
achieve the legitimate goal of the state, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve
its legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible on religious liberties.
Again, the Solicitor General utterly failed to prove this element of the test.
Other than the two documents offered as cited above which established the
sincerity of Escritor’s religious belief and the fact that the agreement was an
internal arrangement within Escritor’s congregation, no iota of evidence was
offered. In fact, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to procure any
such evidence to show that the means the state adopted in pursuing this
compelling interest is the least restrictive to Escritor’s religious freedom.
Thus, in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, Escritor’s
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for
exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion.
The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that
freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of
religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable
to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be
upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the
state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing that such
state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
15. ANONYMOUS vs. RADAM
FACTS: Ma. Victoria Radam, utility worker in the Office of the Clerk of Court
of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos City in Pangasinan, was charged with
immorality. The unnamed complainant alleged that respondent was
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unmarried but got pregnant and gave birth outside wedlock. The complainant
claimed that respondent’s behavior tainted the image of the judiciary.
In connection with the complaint, Judge Abella conducted a discreet
investigation to verify the allegations against respondent. He find out that
truthfulness of the allegation. He was told by the respondent that they are
unable to marry because they plan to migrate to Canada. In a further
investigation it was revealed that the father of her son is unknown, as shown
by the child’s Certificate of Live Birth.
In this connection, Judge Abella recommends that respondent MA. VICTORIA
RADAM be accordingly found GUILTY of IMMORAL CONDUCT or ACT
UNBECOMING A COURT EMPLOYEE. A suspension of one (1) month or a
fine of Php5,000.00 is respectfully recommended, with warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely. After reviewing the findings and recommendation of Judge Abella,
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that, respondent
be absolved of the charge of immorality because her alleged misconduct (that
is, giving birth out of wedlock) did not affect the character and nature of her
position as a utility worker. However, it proposed that she be held liable for
conduct unbecoming a court employee and imposed a fine ofP5,000 for
stating in the birth certificate of her child Christian Jeon that the father was
"unknown" to her.
ISSUE: whether or not respondent may be held liable in relation to her entry
in her child’s birth certificate regarding her son’s father?
HELD: No. The essence of due process in an administrative proceeding is
the opportunity to explain one’s side, whether written or verbal.
This presupposes that one has been previously apprised of the accusation
against him or her. Here, respondent was deprived of both with regard to her
alleged unbecoming conduct in relation to a certain statement in the birth
certificate of her child. She was indicted only for alleged immorality for giving
birth out of wedlock. It was the only charge of which she was informed. Judge
Abella’s investigation focused solely on that matter. She was neither
confronted with it nor given the chance to explain it. To hold her liable for a
totally different charge of which she was totally unaware will violate her right
to due process. Case dismissed
16. RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO
Facts: Valenciano reported that the basement of the Hall of Justice of
Quezon City had been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete
with offertory table, images of Catholic religious icons, a canopy, an electric
organ, and a projector. He believed that such practice violated the
constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State and the
constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public money or property
for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion.
Valenciano further averred that the holding of masses at the basement of the
QC Hall of Justice showed that it tended to favor Catholic litigants; that the
rehearsals of the choir caused great disturbance to other employees; that the
public could no longer use the basement as resting place; that the employees
and litigants could not attend to their personal necessities such as going to
the lavatories because they could not traverse the basement between 12:00
o'clock noontime and 1: 15 o'clock in the afternoon; that the court employees
became hostile toward each other as they vied for the right to read the epistle;
and that the water supply in the entire building was cut off during the mass
because the generator was turned off to ensure silence.
Issue: WHETHER THE HOLDING OF MASSES AT THE BASEMENT OF
THE QUEZON CITY HALL OF JUSTICE VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE AS WELL AS THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC
MONEY OR PROPERTY FOR THE BENEFIT OF ANY SECT, CHURCH,
DENOMINATION, SECTARIAN INSTITUTION, OR SYSTEM OF RELIGION.
Held: The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA
and denies the prayer of Valenciano that the holding of religious rituals of any
of the world's religions in the QC Hall of Justice or any halls of justice all over
the country be prohibited.
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OCA believed that the practical inconveniences cited by Valenciano were
unfounded. It, thus, recommended that his letter-complaints, be dismissed for
lack of merit.
The OCA opined that the principle of separation of Church and State,
particularly with reference to the Establishment Clause, ought not to be
interpreted according to the rigid standards of separation; that the neutrality
of the State on religion should be benevolent because religion was an
ingrained part of society and played an important role in it; and that the State,
therefore, instead of being belligerent (in the case of Strict Separation) or
being aloof (in the case of Strict Neutrality) towards religion should instead
interact and forbear.
The OCA advanced the view that the standard of Benevolent
Neutrality/Accommodation was espoused because the principal religion
clauses in our Constitution were not limited to the Establishment Clause,
which created a wall between the Church and the State, but was quickly
followed by the declaration of the Free Exercise Clause, which protected the
right of the people to practice their religion. In effect, the standard of
Benevolent Neutrality/Accommodation balanced the interest of the State
through the Establishment Clause, and the interest and right of the individual
to freely exercise his religion as guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause.
The OCA observed that the present controversy did not involve a national or
local law or regulation in conflict with the Free Exercise Clause. On the
contrary, Valenciano was merely questioning the propriety of holding religious
masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice, which was nothing more
than an issue of whether the said religious practice could be accommodated
or not. It ended up concluding that based on prevailing jurisprudence, as well
as the interpretations given to the religion clauses of the 1987 Constitution,
there was nothing constitutionally abhorrent in allowing the continuation of the
masses.
The OCA added that by allowing or accommodating the celebration of
Catholic masses within the premises of the QC Hall of Justice, the Court could
not be said to have established Roman Catholicism as an official religion or
to have endorsed the said religion, for the reason that it also allowed other
religious denominations to practice their religion within the courthouses.
Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of separation of
Church and State. In fact, these two principles are in perfect harmony with
each other.
Clearly, allowing the citizens to practice their religion is not equivalent to a
fusion of Church and State.
Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have its way if there is
a compelling state interest. To successfully invoke compelling state interest,
it must be demonstrated that the masses in the QC Hall of Justice unduly
disrupt the delivery of public services or affect the judges and employees in
the performance of their official functions.
As reported by the Executive Judges of Quezon City, the masses were being
conducted only during noon breaks and were not disruptive of public services.
The court proceedings were not being distracted or interrupted and that the
performance of the judiciary employees were not being adversely affected.
Moreover, no Civil Service rules were being violated. As there has been no
detrimental effect on the public service or prejudice to the State, there is
simply no state interest compelling enough to prohibit the exercise of religious
freedom in the halls of justice.
In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State
adopts a policy of accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition of the
reality that some governmental measures may not be imposed on a certain
portion of the population for the reason that these measures are contrary to
their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right
does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or
prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional encroachment.
Establishment entails a positive action on the part of the State.
Accommodation, on the other hand, is passive. In the former, the State
becomes involved through the use of government resources with the primary
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intention of setting up a state religion. In the latter, the State, without being
entangled, merely gives consideration to its citizens who want to freely
exercise their religion.
Here, the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not appropriated, applied or
employed for the sole purpose of supporting the Roman Catholics.
Further, it has not been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel for the
exclusive use of its faithful contrary to the claim of Valenciana.
Thus, the basement of the QC Hall of Justice has remained to be a public
property devoted for public use because the holding of Catholic masses
therein is a mere incidental consequence of its primary purpose.
In fine, the Court denies the plea that the holding of Catholic masses at the
basement of the QC Hall of Justice be prohibited because the said practice
does not violate the constitutional principle of separation of Church and State
and the constitutional prohibition against appropriation of public money or
property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system
of religion.
17. ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a
party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds,
the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited
certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since
their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered
nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal
Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition
on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed
Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech
and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations
of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that
the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first
time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification
reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
Issue:
Whether Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the
Constitution;
Whether Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and
legal grounds.
Held: Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani
stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in
the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the
party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
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thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance
on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus
find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented,
or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-
list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal
and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil
Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal
Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other
hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in
the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral
grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
18. ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES INC. vs.
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR No. 153888, July 9, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner is a non-governmental organization that extends voluntary
service to the Filipino people, especially to Muslim Communities. The
Regional Islamic Dawah Council of Southeast Asia accredited the petitioner
to issue halal certifications in the Philippines. Among the functions petitioner
carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and
issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers.
Petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and procedures based on the
Quran and the Sunnah for the analysis of food, inspection thereof and
issuance of halal certifications. In that same year, petitioner began to issue,
for a fee, certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers.
On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued
EO 46 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating
respondent OMA (Office of the Muslim Affairs) to oversee its implementation.
Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal
certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. As a result,
petitioner lost revenues after food manufacturers stopped securing
certifications from it. Petitioner contends that subject EO violates the
constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.
ISSUE: Whether the EO 46 violates the constitutional provision on religious
freedom and separation of Church and State.
RULING: The Supreme Court disagrees with the contention of the Solicitor
General arguing that the freedom of religion is subservient to the police power
of the State and by delegating to OMA the authority to issue halal
certifications, the government allegedly seeks to protect and promote the
Muslim Filipinos right to health, and to instill health consciousness in them.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If
the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat,
State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic
framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference with the affairs
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of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of
personal and religious activity.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no compelling justification for the
government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their
religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the
health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA
the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and promotion
of the Muslim Filipinos right to health are already provided for in existing laws
and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring that food
products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly
labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious
freedom of Muslims.
19. MVRS PUBLICATIONS INC. vs. ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL OF
THE PHILIPPINES INC.
FACTS: Respondents, a local federation of 70 Muslim Religious
organizations together with some individual Muslims, filed a complaint for
damages against herein Petitioners, due to the latter’s alleged libellous
statement that insulted Muslims. The said statement presented a trivial fact to
wit: "ALAM BA NINYO? Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa
Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim? Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay
isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay
magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong
Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-
lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang Ramadan, which roughly implies that “the
pig is considered as a God and therefore, sacred to the Muslims”.
Respondents claimed that on account of theses libellous words, Petitioners
not only insulted Filipino Muslims, but that of the entire Muslim community in
the world, especially such Muslim Individuals in Non-Muslim Countries. In
their answer, Petitioners explained that since the article did not mention with
any particularity the identity of herein Respondents nor that which the latter
alleges to be identified, they cannot entitled to any damages. Petitioners add
that the article was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was
published without Malice nor intention to cause damage, prejudice, or injury
to Muslims. The RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed
the decision of the RTC. Hence this appeal
ISSUE: WON Petitioner can be held liable for damages
RULING: No. Moral and Exemplary damages cannot be awarded. The former
may only be given when the factual basis and causal connection for the
damages were clearly proven; while the latter may only be given if the
claimant can prove his right to moral or compensatory damages. It need not
be stressed that this Court has no power to determine which is proper religious
conduct or belief. Neither does it have the authority to rule on the merits of
one religion over another, nor declare which belief to uphold or cast asunder.
The validity of Religious beliefs or values are outside the sphere of the
Judiciary. Such matters are better left for the religious authorities to address
what is rightfully within their doctrine and realm of influence. Courts must be
viewpoint-neutral when it comes to religious matters
20. IMBONG vs. OCHOA
FACTS: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012. Challengers from various sectors of society
are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are
assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. (TOPIC)
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause
of the Constitution.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by
the Constitution
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PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
1. Power of Judicial Review
2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule
ISSUE RELATED TO OUR TOPIC:
Freedom of religion and right to free speech
a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom since it
mandates the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, which
contravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners (NO)
b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by
compelling medical health practitioners, hospitals, and health care providers,
under pain of penalty, to refer patients to other institutions despite their
conscientious objections (YES)
c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious freedom by requiring
would-be spouses, as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, to
attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant
nutrition (NO)
RULING/S:
The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or
participation in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious
standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However,
the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law
contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
a) The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being
dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects
to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III,
Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus,
establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its
population control program through the RH Law even if the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of
e.g. the petitioners.
b) Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law obliges a hospital or medical
practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and
services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider
despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical
beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. They are contrary
to Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution or the Free
Exercise Clause, whose basis is the respect for the inviolability
of the human conscience.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health
care service providers to refer patients to other providers and penalizing them
if they fail to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well as compelling them to
disseminate information and perform RH procedures under pain of penalty
(Sections 23(a)(1) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit)
the freedom of religion. While penalties may be imposed by law to ensure
compliance to it, a constitutionally-protected right must prevail over the
effective implementation of the law.
Excluding public health officers from being conscientious objectors
(under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also violates the equal protection clause. There
is no perceptible distinction between public health officers and their private
counterparts. In addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual
and the protection of this freedom remains even if he/she is employed in the
government.
Using the compelling state interest test, there is no compelling
state interest to limit the free exercise of conscientious objectors. There is no
immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived
scenario of the above-quoted provisions. In addition, the limits do not pertain
to life-threatening cases.
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The respondents also failed to show that these provisions are
least intrusive means to achieve a legitimate state objective. The Legislature
has already taken other secular steps to ensure that the right to health is
protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The Population Act of the
Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women).
c) Section 15 of the RH Law, which requires would-be spouses to
attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and
infant nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license,
is a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The
law does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to
be included in the seminar. Those who attend the seminar are free
to accept or reject information they receive and they retain the
freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of
the State.
21. IN RE: EDILION
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing
attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short)
Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri,
submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,
pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing,
the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral
arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would
show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to
particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court
Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated
— and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws
(hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme
Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys
is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas
the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10
of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in
such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of
the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated
in these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official
national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed
of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of
the Court Rule:
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SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay
such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval
of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is
being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a
lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-
Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE: WON edilion can be compelled to become a member of the integrated
bar of the Philippines
HELD: The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now
concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. (MAIN ISSUE)
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the
Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote
or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of
the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see
nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the
respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged
class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration.
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty
provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and
hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law
is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length,
as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary
powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right
to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter
subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary.
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But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property
right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's
public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient
to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and
are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities,
and the authorities holding such are legion.
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the
Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and
disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky,
said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers
does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power
which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that
this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or
accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the
duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an
unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar,
particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave
responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the
Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the
public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself
a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when
it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness
of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed
undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-
A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained
of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
22. IN RE: INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing for the Integration
of the Philippine Bar and Appropriating Funds Therefore” was passed in
September 1971, ordaining “Within two years from the approval of this Act,
the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar.” The Supreme Court formed a Commission on Bar Integration
and in December 1972, the Commission earnestly recommended the
integration of the bar. The Court accepted all comments on the proposed
integration.
ISSUES: Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine bar?
Would the integration of the bar be constitutional? Should the Court ordain
the integration of the bar at this time?
RULING: In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first adopted the definition
given by the Commission to “integration” in this wise: “Integration of the
Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of
the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in
reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the
practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.” The term “Bar” refers to the collectivity of all persons whose
names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or unified Bar)
perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with
power to do so; the State. Bar integration therefore, signifies the setting up by
government authority of a national organization of the legal profession based
on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice
and the rule of law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures,
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through their own organized action and participation, the promotion of the
objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar
autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.
On the first issue, the Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the exercise
of its power “to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.” Indeed, the power to
integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s constitutional authority over the Bar.
The second issue hinges on the following constitutional rights: freedom of
association and of speech, as well as the nature of the dues exacted from the
lawyer, i.e., whether or not the Court thus levies a tax. The Court held:
Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does not
compel a lawyer to become a member of any group of which he is not already
a member. All that it does is “to provide an official national organization for the
well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is
already a member.”
The lawyer too is not compelled to attend meetings, participate of activities,
etc. The only compulsion is the payment of annual dues. Assuming, however,
that it does compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated bar, the court
held that “such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of
the state” Integration is also not violative of the freedom of speech just
because dues paid b the lawyer may be used for projects or programs, which
the lawyer opposes. To rule otherwise would make every government
exaction a “free speech issue.” Furthermore, the lawyer is free to voice out his
objections to positions taken by the integrated bar.
The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for
purposes of regulation. As to the third issue, the Court believes in the
timeliness of the integration. Survey showed an overwhelming majority of
lawyers who favored integration.
23. STA. CLARA HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION vs. SPOUSES
GASTON
FACTS: Spouses Victor Ma. Gaston and Lydia Gaston, the private
respondents, filed a complaint for damages with preliminary
injunction/preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order
before the Regional Trial Court against petitioners Sta Clara Homeowners
Association (SCHA).
The complaint alleged that the private respondents purchased their lots in Sta.
Clara Subdivision and at the time of the purchase, there was no mention or
requirement of membership in any homeowners’ association. From that time
on, they have remained non-members of the SCHA.
They also stated that an arrangement was made wherein homeowners who
were non-members of the association were issued non-member gate pass
stickers for their vehicles for identification by the security guards manning the
subdivision’s entrances and exits. This arrangement remained undisturbed
until sometime in the middle of March 1998, when SCHA disseminated a
board resolution which decreed that only its members in good standing were
to be issued stickers for use in their vehicles.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case as it involved an intra-corporate dispute between
SCHA and its members. The proper forum must be the Home Insurance and
Guarantee Corporation (HIGC).
They stated that that the Articles of Incorporation of SCHA, which was duly
approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission , provides that the
association shall be a non-tock corporation with all the homeowners of Sta.
Clara constituting its membership. Its by-laws also contains a provision that
all real estate owners automatically become members of the association.
Moreover, the private respondents allegedly enjoyed the privileges of
membership and abided by the rules of the association, and even attended
the general special meeting of the association members.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents are members of SCHA
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RULING: The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association includes the
freedom not to associate. The right to choose with whom one will associate
oneself is the very foundation and essence of the partnership. It should be
noted that the provision guarantees the right to form an association. It does
not compel others to form or join one.
Private respondents cannot be compelled to become members of SCHA by
the simple expedient of including them in its Articles of Incorporation and By-
Laws without their express or implied consent. True, it may be to the mutual
advantage of lot owners in a subdivision to band themselves together to
promote their common welfare. But that is possible only if the owners
voluntarily agree, directly or indirectly, to become members of the association.
True also, membership in homeowners’ association may be acquired in
various ways – often through deeds of sale, Torrens certificates or other forms
of evidence of property ownership. However, when private respondents
purchased their property and obtained Transfer Certificates of Title, there was
no annotation showing automatic membership in the SCHA. Thus, no privity
of contract arising from the title certificate exists between petitioners and
private respondents.
24. PADCOM CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION vs. ORTIGAS
CENTER ASSOCIATION INC.
FACTS: Padcom Condominium Corporation (PADCOM) owns and manages
the Padilla Office Condominium Building (PADCOM Building) located at
Emerald Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City. The land on which the building
stands was originally acquired from the Ortigas & Company, Limited
Partnership (OCLP), by Tierra Development Corporation (TDC) under a Deed
of Sale dated 4 September 1974. Among the terms and conditions in the deed
of sale was the requirement that the transferee and its successor-in-interest
must become members of an association for realty owners and long-term
lessees in the area later known as the Ortigas Center. Subsequently, the said
lot, together with improvements thereon, was conveyed by TDC in favor of
PADCOM in a Deed of Transfer dated 25 February 1975. In 1982, Ortigas
Center Association, Inc. was organized to advance the interests and promote
the general welfare of the real estate owners and longterm lessees of lots in
the Ortigas Center. It sought the collection of membership dues in the amount
of P2,724.40 per month from PADCOM. The corporate books showed that
PADCOM owed the Association P639,961.47, representing membership
dues, interests and penalty charges from April 1983 to June 1993. The letters
exchanged between the parties through the years showed repeated demands
for payment, requests for extensions of payment, and even a settlement
scheme proposed by PADCOM in September 1990.
In view of PADCOM's failure and refusal to pay its arrears in monthly dues,
including interests and penalties hereon, the Association filed a complaint for
collection of sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 264 (Civil Case No. 63801). The Association averred that purchasers
of lands within the Ortigas Center complex from OCLP are obligated under
their contracts of sale to become members of the Association, and that this
obligation was allegedly passed on to PADCOM when it bought the lot from
TDC, its predecessor-in-interest. In its answer, PADCOM contended that it is
a non-stock, non-profit association, and for it to become a special member of
the Association, it should first apply for and be accepted for membership by
the latter's Board of Directors; that no automatic membership was apparently
contemplated in the Association's By-laws. PADCOM added that it could not
be compelled to become a member without violating its right to freedom of
association; and that since it was not a member of the Association, it was not
liable for membership dues, interests and penalties. On 1 September 1997,
the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. The Association
appealed the case to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR CV 60099).
In its decision of 30 June 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
the trial court's decision, and entered a new one ordering PADCOM to pay the
Association (1) P639,961.47 as and for membership dues in arrears inclusive
of earned interests and penalties; and (2) P25,000.00 as and for attorney's
fees; with costs against PADCOM; on the ground that PADCOM automatically
became a member of the Association when the land was sold to TDC; and
that the intent to pass the obligation to prospective transferees was evident
from the annotation of the same clause at the back of the Transfer Certificate
of Title covering the lot. The appellate court held that despite disavowal of
membership, PADCOM's membership in the Association was evident from
these facts: (1) PADCOM was included in the Association's list of bona fide
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members as of 30 March 1995; (2) Narciso Padilla, PADCOM's President,
was one of the Association's incorporators; and (3) having received the
demands for payment, PADCOM not only acknowledged them, but asked for
and was granted repeated extensions, and even proposed a scheme for the
settlement of its obligation. PADCOM filed the petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether PADCOM can be compelled to join the association pursuant
to the provision on automatic membership appearing as a condition in the
Deed of Sale of 4 September 1974 and the annotation thereof on Transfer
Certificate of Title 457308.
HELD: When the land in question was bought by PADCOM's predecessor-in-
interest, TDC, from OCLP, the sale bound TDC to comply with paragraph (G)
of the covenants, conditions and restrictions of the Deed of Sale. It was
agreed by the parties that dues shall be collected from an automatic member
and such fees or assessments shall be a lien on the property. The stipulation
was likewise annotated at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title 457308
issued to TDC. When the latter sold the lot to PADCOM on 25 February 1975,
the Deed of Transfer expressly stated that "for and in consideration of the
foregoing premises, the DEVELOPER, by these presents, cedes, transfers
and conveys unto the CORPORATION the above-described parcel of land
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title 457308, as well as the Common and
Limited Common Areas of the Condominium project mentioned and described
in the Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions, free from all liens and
encumbrances, except those already annotated at the back of said Transfer
Certificate of Title 457308." As the provision on automatic membership was
annotated in the Certificate of Title and made a condition in the Deed of
Transfer in favor of PADCOM; consequently, PADCOM is bound by and must
comply with the covenant.
Moreover, Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides that contracts take effect
between the parties, their assigns and heirs. Since PADCOM is the
successor-in-interest of TDC, it follows that the stipulation on automatic
membership with the Association is also binding on the former. Further, as lot
owner, PADCOM is a regular member of the Association. No application for
membership is necessary. If at all, acceptance by the Board of Directors is a
ministerial function considering that PADCOM is deemed to be a regular
member upon the acquisition of the lot pursuant to the automatic membership
clause annotated in the Certificate of Title of the property and the Deed of
Transfer.
Furthermore, the automatic membership clause is not a violation of its
freedom of association. PADCOM was never forced to join the association. It
could have avoided such membership by not buying the land from TDC.
Nobody forced it to buy the land when it bought the building with the
annotation of the condition or lien on the Certificate of Title thereof and
accepted the Deed. PADCOM voluntarily agreed to be bound by and respect
the condition, and thus to join the Association. Lastly, under the principle of
estoppel, from the facts or circumstances it enumerated in the appellate
court's decision, PADCOM is barred from disclaiming membership in the
Association.
25. FERDINAND MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS
FACTS: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the
presidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and was forced into
exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just
beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar
the return of Marcos and his family.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to
the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened
from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and
his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following
supervening events: failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders,
channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists, plan of Marcoses to return w/
mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer (this is to
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prove that they can stir trouble from afar), Honasan’s failed coup, Communist
insurgency movements, , secessionist movements in Mindanao, devastated
economy because of: accumulated foreign debt and plunder of nation by
Marcos & cronies.
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the
respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent the
implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning
in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the
country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was
made in the interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner
also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.
Marcosses alleged that such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty,
property without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said
that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article
3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
According to the court, this case is unique, so it should not create a precedent,
for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty
years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within
the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning
to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses
a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar
their return.
3. Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to
return to the Philippines and reestablish their residence here even if
their return and residence here will endanger national security and
public safety
4. Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners
Ferdinand E. Marcos and family shall return to the Philippines and
establish their residence here?
RULING:
1. No, it is not granted by the constitution. However, separation of power
dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1,
Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it does not define what
is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on
exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws,
the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII
secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list
is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not
stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general
welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their
welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution).
Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President
can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at
153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman,
American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during
times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending
on the circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to
the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to
certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations
even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that
is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President
which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that
office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request
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or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part
of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the
common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power
involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the
people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President
but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws
that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power
borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also
may be viewed as a power implicit in the President's duty to take care that the
laws are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the
author advances the view that an allowance of discretionary power is
unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President].
The consideration of tradition and the development of presidential power
under the different constitutions are essential for a complete understanding of
the extent of and limitations to the President's powers under the 1987
Constitution. The 1935 Constitution created a strong President with explicitly
broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973 Constitution attempted to
modify the system of government into the parliamentary type, with the
President as a mere figurehead, but through numerous amendments, the
President became even more powerful, to the point that he was also the de
facto Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the
presidential system of government and restored the separation of legislative,
executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct
branches of government with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power
to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head of
government and whatever powers inherent in such positions pertain to the
office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution
itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the powers of the
President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the
execution of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign
relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution
imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
"executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to
be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other
words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated,
2. The question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual
basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar
the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual
bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her
decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the
self-preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold
the Constitution.
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security
over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution,
to wit: Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect
the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State
and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions
provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service. Section 5. The
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by
all the people of the blessings of democracy.
The decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines
for reasons of national security and public safety has international precedents.
Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of Nicaragua,
Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, Fulgencio batista of Cuba, King Farouk of Egypt,
Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez
of Venezuela were among the deposed dictators whose return to their
homelands was prevented by their governments.
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It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel
from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are
what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved
is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international
law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the
Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode
within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter
one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the
"right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state"
[Art. 13(l)] separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own,
and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand, the Covenant
guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his
residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including
his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are
necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or
enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art.
12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the
right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the
liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and
the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may
be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and,
under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the
Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and
enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Thus, the rulings in the cases Kent and Haig which refer to the issuance of
passports for the purpose of effectively exercising the right to travel are not
determinative of this case and are only tangentially material insofar as they
relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a protected
right. The issue before the Court is novel and without precedent in Philippine,
and even in American jurisprudence.
Fernan, Concurring
1. The president’s power is not fixed. Limits would depend on the
imperatives of events and not on abstract theories of law. We are
undergoing a critical time and the current problem can only be
answerable by the President.
2. Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear & present
danger. Thus, it’s the executive’s responsibility & obligation to
prevent a grave & serious threat to its safety from arising.
3. We can’t sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political &
economic gains to give in to Marcos’ wish to die in the country.
Compassion must give way to the other state interests.
Cruz, Dissenting
1. As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ right to return, live & die in
his own country. It is a right guaranteed by the Consti to all
individuals, whether patriot, homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.
2. Military representatives failed to show that Marcos’ return would
pose a threat to national security. Fears were mere conjectures.
3. Residual powers – but the executive’s powers were outlined to limit
her powers & not expand.
Paras, Dissenting
1. AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to impair
Marcos’ right to return to the Philippines. .
2. Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that one dies,
he/she should be buried w/in 10 days.
3. Untenable that without a legislation, right to travel is absolute & state
is powerless to restrict it. It’s w/in police power of the state to restrict
this right if national security, public safety/health demands that such
be restricted. It can’t be absolute & unlimited all the time. It can’t be
arbitrary & irrational.
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4. No proof that Marcos’ return would endanger national security or
public safety. Fears are speculative & military admits that it’s under
control. Filipinos would know how to handle Marcos’ return.
Padilla, Dissenting
Sarmiento, Dissenting
1. President’s determination that Marcos’ return would threaten
national security should be agreed upon by the court. Such threat
must be clear & present.
26. FERDINAND MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS
OCT. 27, 1989
FACTS: In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court,dismissed the
petition, after finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos
and his family at the present time and under present circumstances pose a
threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the
Philippines.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners, raising the following
major arguments to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning
to the Philippines is to deny them not only the inherent right of citizens to
return to their country of birth but also the protection of the Constitution and
all of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution; the President
has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had
exercised it arbitrarily; there is no basis for barring the return of the family of
former President Marcos. Thus, petitioners prayed that the Court reconsider
its decision, order respondents to issue the necessary travel documents to
enable Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos
The Solicitor General argued that the motion for reconsideration is moot and
academic as to the deceased Mr. Marcos.Thus, he prays that the Motion for
Reconsideration be denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether the motion for reconsideration should be granted.
HELD: NO. We deny the motion for reconsideration.
The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event,
has not changed the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was
rendered. The threats to the government, to which the return of the Marcoses
has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have
ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the destabilization that
will be caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the basis
for the decision to bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal,"
claiming that it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" President of
the Philippines, and declared that the matter "should be brought to all the
courts of the world."
Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon
whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are
implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to
comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President
are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is
so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the
abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of
specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-
in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.
There is no similarity between the residual powers of the President under the
1987 Constitution and the power of the President under the 1973 Constitution
pursuant to Amendment No. 6. First of all, Amendment No. 6 refers to an
express grant of power. It is not implied. Then, Amendment No. 6 refers to a
grant to the President of the specific power of legislation
Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with
his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of
the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently,
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the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present
circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the absence of a
clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave abuse of
discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the
implementation of this decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration
for lack of merit.
27. OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES – OFFICE OF
THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE MACARINE
FACTS: The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) filed the present
administrative case against Judge Ignacio B. Macarine (respondent) for
violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003.
OCA Circular requires that all foreign travels of judges and court personnel,
regardless of the number of days, must be with prior permission from the
Court. A travel authority must be secured from the OCA. Judges must submit
the following requirements: (1.) application or letter-request addressed to the
Court Administrator stating the purpose of the travel abroad; (2.) application
for leave covering the period of the travel abroad, favorably recommended by
the Executive Judge; and (3.) certification from the Statistics Division, Court
Management Office, OCA as to the condition of the docket.
The complete requirements should be submitted to and received by the OCA
at least two weeks before the intended time of travel. No action shall be taken
on requests for travel authority with incomplete requirements. Judges and
personnel who shall leave the country without travel authority issued by the
OCA shall be subject to disciplinary action.
On August 13, 2009, the respondent wrote then Court Administrator, now
Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez, requesting for authority to travel to
Hongkong with his family for the period of September 10 - 14, 2009 where he
would celebrate his 65th birthday. The respondent stated that his travel
abroad shall be charged to his annual forced leave. However, he did not
submit the corresponding application for leave. For his failure to submit
the complete requirements, his request for authority to travel remained
unacted upon. The respondent proceeded with his travel abroad without
the required travel authority from the OCA.
On January 28, 2010, the respondent was informed by the OCA that his leave
of absence had been disapproved and his travel considered unauthorized by
the Court. His absences shall not be deducted from his leave credits but from
his salary corresponding to the seven (7) days that he was absent. The
respondent was also required to submit his explanation on his failure to
comply with OCA Circular No. 49-2003.
In his letter-explanation, the respondent narrated that his daughter, a nurse
working in New Jersey, USA, gave him a trip to Hongkong as a gift for his 65th
birthday. In the first week of September 2009, he received a call from his
daughter that she had already booked him, together with his wife and two
sons, in a hotel in Hongkong from September 13 to 15, 2009. They flew in to
Manila from Surigao City on September 9, 2009, intending to prepare the
necessary papers for his authority to travel at the Supreme Court the following
day. However, sensing time constraint and thinking of the futility of completing
the requirements before their scheduled flight, he opted not to immediately
complete the requirements and simply went ahead with their travel abroad.
He thought of submitting his compliance upon his return to Manila. He
acknowledged his mistake and regretted his failure to comply with OCA
Circular No. 49-2003. He promised not to commit the same infraction again.
He further requested for reconsideration of the OCA’s intended action to
deduct his salary corresponding to the seven (7) days that he was absent,
instead of charging his absences to his leave credits.
In an Evaluation Report, the OCA found the respondent guilty of violation of
the OCA for traveling out of the country without filing the necessary application
for leave and without first securing a travel authority from the Court. The OCA
recommended: a) this matter be RE-DOCKETED as a regular
administrative matter;
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RULING: True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the Constitution.
However, the exercise of such right is not absolute. Section 6, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution allows restrictions on one’s right to travel
provided that such restriction is in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health as may be provided by law. This, however,
should by no means be construed as limiting the Court’s inherent power
of administrative supervision over lower courts.
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing
guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go
on leave to travel abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a person from
doing something; to "regulate" is to govern or direct according to rule.
To ensure management of court dockets and to avoid disruption in the
administration of justice, OCA Circular No. 49-2003 requires a judge who
wishes to travel abroad to submit, together with his application for leave of
absence duly recommended for approval by his Executive Judge, a
certification from the Statistics Division, Court Management Office of the OCA,
as to the condition of his docket, based on his Certificate of Service for the
month immediately preceding the date of his intended travel, that he has
decided and resolved all cases or incidents within three (3) months from date
of submission, pursuant to Section 15(1) and (2), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution.
For traveling abroad without having been officially allowed by the Court, the
respondent is guilty of violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003. Under Section
9(4), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, violation of Supreme Court
directives and circular is considered a less serious charge and, therefore,
punishable by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not
less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than
P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Section 53, Rule IV of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service grants the disciplining authority the discretion to consider mitigating
circumstances in the imposition of the proper penalty. The Court had in
several instances refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the presence
of mitigating facts, such as the employee’s length of service,
acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feelings of remorse for the
same, advanced age, family circumstances, and other humanitarian and
equitable considerations.
In the present case, the respondent, after learning that his daughter had
already booked him and his family in a hotel in Hongkong, immediately went
to Manila to secure his travel authority from the Court. However, with the short
period of time from their arrival in Manila on September 9, 2009 up to the time
of their booking in Hongkong from September 13 to 15, 2009, he was pressed
for time and opted not to complete the required travel authority, with the
intention of securing one after his travel. The respondent regretted his failure
to comply with the requirements of OCA Circular No. 49-2003. He
acknowledged his mistake and promised not to commit the same infraction in
the future.
We consider the outlined circumstances as mitigating. Following judicial
precedents, the respondent deserves some degree of leniency in imposing
upon him the appropriate penalty. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Ignacio
B. Macarine, is hereby given the ADMONITION that he acted irresponsibly
when he opted not to immediately secure a travel authority and is saved only
from the full force that his violation carries by the attendant mitigating
circumstances. He is also WARNED that the commission of a similar violation
in the future will merit a more severe penalty. The recommendation of the
Office of the Court Administration that his absences, which were
unauthorized, shall not be deducted from his leave credits but from his salary
is hereby APPROVE.
28. LEAVE DIVISION, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES –
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. HEUSDENS
FACTS: This case stemmed from the leave application for foreign travel sent
through mail by Wilma Salvacion P. Heusdens (respondent), Staff Clerk IV of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Tagum City, Davao del Norte. Records
disclose that the Employees Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services,
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), received respondents leave
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application for foreign travel from September 11, 2009 to October 11, 2009.
Respondent left for abroad without waiting for the result of her application. It
turned out that no travel authority was issued in her favor because she was
not cleared of all her accountabilities as evidenced by the Supreme Court
Certificate of Clearance. Respondent reported back to work on October 19,
2009.
The OCA, in its Memorandum recommended the disapproval of respondents
leave application. It further advised that respondent be directed to make a
written explanation of her failure to secure authority to travel abroad in
violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003. then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
approved the OCA recommendation.
OCA Deputy Court Administrator Nimfa C. Vilches informed respondent that
her leave application was disapproved and her travel was considered
unauthorized. Respondent was likewise directed to explain within fifteen (15)
days from notice her failure to comply with the OCA circular.
Respondent admitted having travelled overseas without the required travel
authority. She explained that it was not her intention to violate the rules as
she, in fact, mailed her leave application which was approved by her superior,
Judge Arlene Lirag-Palabrica, as early as June 26, 2009.She honestly
believed that her leave application would be eventually approved by the Court.
The OCA, in its Report found respondent to have violated OCA Circular No.
49-2003 for failing to secure the approval of her application for travel authority.
Hence, the OCA recommended that the administrative complaint be re-
docketed as a regular administrative matter and that respondent be deemed
guilty for violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003 and be reprimanded with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future would be
dealt with more severely.
ISSUE: Whether the OCA can restrict the right to travel?
RULING: It has been argued that OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (B) on vacation
leave to be spent abroad unduly restricts a citizens right to travel guaranteed
by Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.[10] Section 6 reads:
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
[Emphases supplied]
Let there be no doubt that the Court recognizes a citizens constitutional right
to travel. It is, however, not the issue in this case. The only issue in this case
is the non-compliance with the Courts rules and regulations. It should be noted
that respondent, in her Comment, did not raise any constitutional concerns.
In fact, she was apologetic and openly admitted that she went abroad without
the required travel authority. Hence, this is not the proper vehicle to thresh out
issues on ones constitutional right to travel.
Nonetheless, granting that it is an issue, the exercise of ones right to travel or
the freedom to move from one place to another, as assured by the
Constitution, is not absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and inherent
limitations regulating the right to travel.
Inherent limitations on the right to travel are those that naturally emanate from
the source. These are very basic and are built-in with the power. An example
of such inherent limitation is the power of the trial courts to prohibit persons
charged with a crime to leave the country. In such a case, permission of the
court is necessary. Another is the inherent power of the legislative department
to conduct a congressional inquiry in aid of legislation. In the exercise of
legislative inquiry, Congress has the power to issue a subpoena and
subpoena duces tecum to a witness in any part of the country, signed by the
chairperson or acting chairperson and the Speaker or acting Speaker of the
House; or in the case of the Senate, signed by its Chairman or in his absence
by the Acting Chairman, and approved by the Senate President.
29. CHAVEZ vs. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNANCE
G.R. No. 130716. December 9, 1998
Doctrine/s: Right to information may be properly invoked, subject to
limitations as provided by law. Access to information on government
transactions includes future or on-going negotiations. What comprises
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matters of public concern is determined by the courts on a case to case basis.
The recovery of ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern.
Nature: Petition for Mandamus to enjoin respondents PCGG and its chairman
from privately entering into agreement with the heirs of Marcos relating to their
properties here and/or abroad, and to compel respondents to make public all
negotiations and agreement related to such negotiations between the PCGG
and the Marcos heirs.
Facts: Petitioner Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen, and former government official
who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses and their cronies, and impelled
by the news reports sometime in September 1997 pertaining to the discovery
of the ill-gotten wealth in Swiss banks and the reported execution of a
compromise between the respondents and the heirs, invoked his
constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of the state to
disclose publicly all its transactions involving national interest. Chavez
demands that respondents make public any and all negotiations and
agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten
wealth. Respondents do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the
Marcos heirs.
Petitioner’s contentions:
1. Any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves
an issue of “paramount public interest,” since it has a “debilitating
effect on the country’s economy” that would be greatly prejudicial to
the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in
general have a right to know the transactions or deals being
contrived and effected by the government.
Respondent’s contentions:
1. Petitioner’s action is premature, because there is no showing that he
has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the
Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled
to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of
the Agreements have not become effective and binding.
2. The Republic has opposed the agreements in a civil case pending in
the Sandiganbayan on the grounds that such agreements have not
been ratified or even submitted to the President for approval and that
the heirs have failed to collate and submit an inventory of their
assets.
3. Pres. FVR also sent a memorandum in May 4, 1998 to former PCGG
Chaiman Gunigundo categorically stating that he has not authorized
the PCGG to approve any compromise agreements and would have
disapproved them had they been submitted.
In essence, the General Agreement executed on December 28, 1993
states that the Marcos heirs, impelled by their sense of nationalism and love
of country, and the desire of the Republic, thru the PCGG, to avoid a long
drawn-out litigation, executes an agreement to have the heirs collate all their
assets, make an inventory of such assets, exempting them from taxes, waving
their rights over their foreign assets, and that such disclosure shall not be
used as evidence against them in any criminal, civil, tax, or administrative
case. The Republic, on the other hand, shall be authorized to withdraw the
$365M Swiss deposits but with the presence of a representative from the
heirs, shall own any asset which may be discovered in the future, and shall
desist from instituting new suits and dismiss pending ones against the heirs.
A supplemental agreement which was executed on the same date, expresses
their right to pursue their interests over local assets against other parties, their
burden on all expenses related to the recovery of their assets, and their
entitlement to 25% of the amount eventually withdrawn from the said $365M
Swiss deposits.
The SC issued a TRO on March 23, 1998 to enjoin respondents from
entering into any agreement with the heirs. On August 19, 1998, Gloria,
Celnan, Scarlet, and Teresa, all surnamed Jopson, filed a Motion for
Intervention before the SC, averring that they are among the 10,000 claimants
in a class suit decided by US Court of Appeals in 1994 and the Swiss SC
Decision in 1997, and that they have a personal and direct interest in the case.
SC granted their motion and the Solicitor General, in behalf of the
respondents, merely reiterated their arguments against the main petition.
Issue: Whether the Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public
the details of any agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcoses.
Held: Yes. In seeking the public disclosure of negotiations and agreements
pertaining to a compromise settlement with the Marcoses as regards their
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alleged ill-gotten wealth, petitioner invokes the following provisions of the
Constitution:
Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.
Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest.
The information and the transactions referred to in the provisions
have as yet no defined scope and extent. However, there are recognized
restrictions, such as:
(1) national security matters and intelligence information –
governmental privilege with respect to state secrets regarding
military, diplomatic, and other national security matters. However, if
there is no need to protect such state secrets, they may be examined
in strict confidence and given scrupulous protection.
(2) trade secrets and banking transactions – exemptions
pursuant to Intellectual Property Code and other related laws, as well
as the Bank Secrecy Law.
(3) criminal matters – those relating to apprehension, prosecution
and detention of criminals which courts may not inquire into prior to
such arrest, detention and prosecution such as rescue operations,
whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covert criminal activities.
(4) other confidential information – under the Ethical Standards
Act, prohibiting public officials and employees from using or divulging
confidential or classified information officially known to them by
reason of their office and not made available to the public; diplomatic
correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive
sessions of either house of Congress, internal deliberations of the
SC.
There is no rigid test to determine whether a particular information is a
matter of public concern. It is for the courts to determine on a case to case
basis. Under RA 6713, the law mandates free public access, at reasonable
hours, to the annual performance reports of offices and agencies of the
government and GOCCs, and the statements of assets, liabilities and financial
disclosures of all public officials and employees. In general, writings coming
into the hands of public officers in connection with their official functions must
be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of transparency of
governmental affairs.
The issuance of EO 1 (creation of PCGG), EO 2 (prohibiting
concealment, transfer and dissipation of ill-gotten assets), and EO 14
(additional powers to PCGG) makes the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth a
matter of public concern and imbues it with public interest. By its very
nature, ill-gotten wealth assumes a public character: these are assets and
properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former President
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates through or as a
result of their improper or illegal use of government funds or properties; or
their having taken undue advantage of their public office; or their use of
powers, influences or relationships, resulting in their unjust enrichment and
causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic
of the Philippines.
SC also ruled that the intent of the framers of the Constitution
obligates PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives
to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they
have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten
wealth, subject to the aforementioned restrictions.
Related matters:
1. Petitioner has legal standing as access to public documents and
records is a public right, and the real parties in interest are the people
themselves. Mandamus is the proper remedy to enforce their right to
be informed on matters of public concern. Also, by the intervention
of the Jopsons, who are legitimate claimants, the question on the
standing of Chavez is rendered moot.
2. SC has jurisdiction over the petition, not Sandiganbayan because
the subject matter of the case is not only confined in compromise
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agreements already drawn but includes any other ongoing or future
undertakings on the alleged Marcos loot.
3. A compromise is executed to avoid or to end a litigation and
damages may be mitigated by the courts. But a compromise with
terms so palpably unconscionable may be invalidated by the courts.
Also, any compromise relating to the civil liability arising from an
offense does not automatically terminate the criminal proceeding
against or extinguish the criminal liability of the malefactor.
4. PCGG is empowered to grant criminal immunity (Sec. 5, EO 14),
provided: the person provides information or testifies in the
investigation, the information or testimony pertains to the unlawful
matter in which the respondent has acquired ill-gotten property, such
information is necessary to ascertain or prove guilt or civil liability of
such individual, and he must not be the principal respondent,
defendant or accused.
5. The compromise agreements are flawed: criminal immunity cannot
be granted to the heirs as they are principal defendants in the cases
before the Sandiganbayan; PCGG is not empowered to grant tax
exemptions, and even if they are, the exemption will constitute class
legislation, and will violate the principle on uniform and equitable
taxation; PCGG will encroach judicial powers in agreeing to dismiss
all cases against the heirs; waiver of all claims and counterclaims
against the heirs is contrary to law and will serve as a virtual warrant
for public officials to amass public funds illegally since there is an
open option to compromise their liability; no definite or determinable
period to fulfill respective prestations; no specific standard to
determine which asset shall be forfeited and which shall be retained;
no approval of the President, and even if approved, will still be invalid
because of the aforementioned details.
Fallo: Petition is granted. The General and Supplemental Agreements are
null and void. Respondents are directed to disclose to the public the terms of
any proposed compromise settlement, as well as the final agreement.
30. HILADO vs. JUDGE REYES
FACTS: The present petition is one for mandamus and prohibition. JULITA
CAMPOS BENEDICTO (PRIVATE RESPONDENT), the surviving spouse of
the deceased Roberto S. Benedicto, filed on May 25, 2000 a petition for
issuance of letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila.
On August 2, 2000, the Court appointed Benedicto as Administratrix of the
estate. Thereafter, PETITIONERS, ALFREDO HILADO, MANUEL LACSON,
JOSE M. TUVILLA, JOAQUIN LIMJAP, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION
AND FIRST FARMERS HOLDING CORPORATION had, during the lifetime
of deceased Benedicto, filed before the Bacolod City RTC two complaints for
damages or collection of sums of money against Roberto Benedicto et al.
In the initial inventory of the estate which private respondent submitted on
January 18, 2001 Benedicto listed, among other liabilities of the estate, the
claims of petitioners.
From January 2002 until November 2003, the Branch Clerk of Manila RTC
allowed petitioners through counsel Sedigo and Associates to regularly and
periodically examine the records of the case and to secure certified true
copies thereof.
By December 2003, however, Atty. Grace Carmel Paredes, an associate of
petitioners' counsel, was denied access to the last folder-record of the case
which, according to the court's clerical staff, could not be located and was
probably inside the chambers of public respondent for safekeeping.
Petitioners' counsel thus requested public respondent to allow Atty. Paredes
to personally check the records of the case. Acting on the letter, the Officer-
In- Charge advised petitioners' counsel in writing inform them that "per
instruction of the Hon. Presiding Judge[,] only parties or those with authority
from the parties are allowed to inquire or verify the status of the case pending
in this Court," and that they may be "allowed to go over the records of the
above-entitled case upon presentation of written authority from the
[administratrix].
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Despite of the denial of their 1st request, again a letter was sent requesting to
be furnished with certified true copies of the "updated inventory." And a
certified true copies of the order issued by the court during the hearing of
February 13, 2004, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken
thereon.
The same was denied by the Court indicating that the petitioners had no
standing to file the Motion for Inhibition as well as to request for certified true
copies of the above-indicated documents.
Petitioners thus filed on April 30, 2004 before this Court the present petition
for mandamus and prohibition to compel public respondent to allow them to
access, examine, and obtain copies of any and all documents forming part of
the records of the case and disqualify public respondent from further presiding
thereover.
Private respondent further submits that the petition for prohibition should be
dismissed since petitioners are not parties to the case, hence, they have no
personality to file a motion for inhibition
ISSUE: Whether the Petitioner’s right to information (Article 3 Section 7) was
denied.
HELD: YES, Section 7 of Article III of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents,
and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
The constitutional provision guarantees a general right – the right to
information on matters of "public concern" and, as an accessory thereto,
the right of access to "official records" and the like. The right to information on
"matters of public concern or of public interest" is both the purpose and the
limit of the constitutional right of access to public documents
Insofar as the right to information relates to judicial records
The term "judicial record" or "court record" does not only refer to the orders,
judgment or verdict of the courts. It comprises the official collection of all
papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by the parties, all processes issued and
returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word testimony which took
place during the trial and which are in the possession, custody, or control of
the judiciary or of the courts for purposes of rendering court decisions includes
all evidence it has received in a case.
In determining whether a particular information is of public concern,
there is no right test. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine
on a case to case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance as it relates to or affect the public.
Decisions and opinions of a court are of course matters of public
concern or interest for these are the authorized expositions and
interpretations of the laws, binding upon all citizens, of which every citizen is
charged with knowledge. Justice thus requires that all should have free
access to the opinions of judges and justices, and it would be against
sound public policy to prevent, suppress or keep the earliest knowledge
of these from the public.
However, unlike court orders and decisions, pleadings and other documents
filed by parties to a case need not be matters of public concern or interest. In
thus determining which part or all of the records of a case may be accessed
to, the PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE PARTIES FILED THEM IS TO BE
CONSIDERED.
In intestate proceedings, the heirs file pleadings and documents for the
purpose of establishing their right to a share of the estate. As for the creditors,
their purpose is to establish their claim to the estate and be paid therefor
before the disposition of the estate.
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Information regarding the financial standing of a person at the time of his
death and the manner by which his private estate may ultimately be
settled is not a matter of general, public concern.
Granting unrestricted public access and publicity to personal financial
information may constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy to which
an individual may have an interest in limiting its disclosure or
dissemination.
If the information sought then is not a matter of public concern or
interest, denial of access thereto does not violate a citizen's
constitutional right to information.
Once a particular information has been determined to be of public
concern, the accessory right of access to official records, including
judicial records, are open to the public.
The accessory right to access public records may, however, be
restricted on a showing of good cause.
"To determine whether good cause is shown, a judge must balance the
rights of the parties based on the particular facts of each case." In so
doing, the judge "must take into account all relevant factors, 'including, but not
limited to, the nature of the parties and the controversy, the type of information
and the privacy interests involved, the extent of community interest, and
the reason for the request.'’
And even then, the right is subject to inherent supervisory and protective
powers of every court over its own records and files.
Access to court records may be permitted at the discretion and subject to the
supervisory and protective powers of the court, after considering its:
Actual use or purpose for which the request for access is based and
the obvious prejudice to any of the parties.
Whether information is being sought for legitimate purpose and whether
case involves issues important to the public."
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records — to monitor
prompt compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper
disposition of the assets of the estate
They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of
Court reading:
Rule 135, SEC. 2. Publicity of proceedings and records. – x x x x The records
of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the
inspection of any interested person, at all proper business hours, under the
supervision of the clerk having custody of such records, unless the court shall,
in any special case, have forbidden their publicity, in the interest of morality
or decency.
Clearly they are entitled to be informed of the inventory as well as other
records which are relevant to their claims against Benedicto.
As long then as any party, counsel or person has a legitimate reason to
have a copy of court records and pays court fees, a court may not deny
access to such records.
Of course precautionary measures to prevent tampering or alteration must be
observed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is GRANTED. Public respondent
is ORDERED to allow petitioners to access, examine, and obtain copies of
any and all documents-part of the records of Special Proceeding No. 00-
97505 subject to precautionary measures to prevent tampering or alteration
thereof.
31. GUINGONA vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 191846 | 6 May 2010
In this special civil action for mandamus filed on 23 April 2010, petitioners
invoke their constitutional rights to suffrage and to information in compelling
respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) to explain fully the complete
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details of its preparations for the 10 May 2010 elections, in view of the
unraveling of alarming events of late.
FACTS: Smartmatic-Total Information Management Corporation supplied the
wrong ultraviolet ink used in the printing of the ballots for the May 2010
elections. The security marks were unreadable by the Precinct Count Optical
Scan (PCOS) machines. This prompted Comelec to disable the ultraviolet
light detector in the PCOS machines, and to buy ultraviolet lamps for ₱30
million. Director Ferdinand Rafanan of the Comelec’s legal department, who
challenged Comelec’s decision to buy ultraviolet lamps, was quoted as
saying, "Why is Comelec shouldering this expense when it was not its fault
that this deficiency came about."
Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. then disclosed that election
officials bought nearly two million ballot secrecy folders for the May 2010
elections at an overpriced rate of ₱380 each without any public bidding.
Comelec promptly canceled the awarding of the ₱690 million contract for the
supply and delivery of the ballot secrecy folders, which the Bids and Awards
Committee of Comelec had recommended to be awarded to OTC Paper
Supply for 1,815,000 ballot secrecy folders.
In an interview, Cesar Flores, president of Smartmatic, admitted that
"Machines will break on election day, and machines will have to go to
contingency procedures and there will be replacements, and there will be
cases where no replacements will be available and the Board of Election
Inspectors (BEIs) will have to resort to the next-door machines." Flores
explained that hiccups could either be due to hardware failure or operational
failure if the paper was inserted incorrectly or some connections were not
plugged in. Flores continued, "It’s very important that we say these things to
the public and we manage the expectations of people. If you’re planning on
getting your headlines from machines broken, you’re going to run out of space
on your front page on election day."
The Court further takes judicial notice of the fact, as widely reported in print
and broadcast media, that with just six days to go before the 10 May 2010
elections, Comelec recalled 76,000 compact flash cards following widespread
failure of the PCOS machines to read and tally the votes during the machine
test conducted by Comelec and Smartmatic. Comelec spokesman James
Jimenez was quoted as saying, "Right now we are assuming that all of the
machines were affected. We have stopped the testing and are pulling out all
memory cards for reconfiguration."
Prior to this, Comelec unanimously discarded the proposal of information
technology experts for a parallel manual count to safeguard the integrity and
credibility of the election results.
In light of the foregoing alarming events, petitioners filed a special civil action
for mandamus and pray that the Court order respondent COMELEC to explain
the complete details of its preparations for the impending election. COMELEC
contends that petitioners have no legal standing to file the present special civil
action for mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are real party-in-interest and mandamus is
the proper remedy.
HELD: The SC granted the petition in part.
In order that a petition for mandamus may be given due course, it must be
instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal,
corporation, board, or person, which unlawfully excludes said party from the
enjoyment of a legal right.3 However, if the petition is anchored on the
people’s right to information on matters of public concern, any citizen
can be the real party in interest. The requirement of personal interest is
satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of
the general public which possesses the right.4 There is no need to show any
special interest in the result. It is sufficient that petitioners are citizens and, as
such, are interested in the faithful execution of the laws.5
Coming now to the substantive issues, Section 7, Article III of the Constitution
enshrines the people’s fundamental right to information, thus:
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Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution succinctly expresses this state policy:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.
InLegaspi v. Civil Service Commission,7 the Court explained that the people’s
right to information is limited to matters of public concern. The Court then
formulated a broad definition of what constitutes matters of public concern, to
wit:
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern,
there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public
interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because
such matters directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters
naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it
is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at
issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
There can be no doubt that the coming 10 May 2010 elections is a matter of
great public concern. On election day, the country’s registered voters will
come out to exercise the sacred right of suffrage. Not only is it an exercise
that ensures the preservation of our democracy, the coming elections also
embodies our people’s last ounce of hope for a better future. It is the final
opportunity, patiently awaited by our people, for the peaceful transition of
power to the next chosen leaders of our country. If there is anything capable
of directly affecting the lives of ordinary Filipinos so as to come within the
ambit of a public concern, it is the coming elections, more so with the alarming
turn of events that continue to unfold. The wanton wastage of public funds
brought about by one bungled contract after another, in staggering amounts,
is in itself a matter of grave public concern.
In sum, petitioners’ prayer to compel Comelec to explain fully its preparations
for the coming 10 May 2010 elections finds overwhelming support in the
Constitution, specifically under Section 7 of Article III and Section 28 of Article
II on the people’s right to information and the State’s corresponding duty of
full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest; the
jurisprudential doctrines laid down in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., Legaspi v.
Civil Service Commission, and Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino xxx
Respondent Comelec cannot shirk its constitutional duty to disclose fully to
the public complete details of all information relating to its preparations for the
10 May 2010 elections without violating the Constitution and relevant laws.
No less than the Constitution13 mandates it to enforce and administer election
laws.
However, due to the proximity of the 10 May 2010 elections which is less than
five days away, we shall grant only the specific reliefs prayed for by petitioners
which by necessity must be disclosed before the 10 May 2010 elections or
are expressly mandated by law to be disclosed or performed in connection
with the holding of the 10 May 2010 elections. Petitioners can press Comelec
for the other reliefs after the 10 May 2010 elections, and if they still fail to
secure such reliefs, they may take such actions as may be allowed under the
law. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in part.
32. RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 SALN and PERSONAL DATA
SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE
SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE
JUDICIARY
AM 09-8-6-SC, 13; June 2012 - Alexis Guiang
FACTS: In a letter, dated July 30, 2009, Rowena C. Paraan, Research
Director of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), sought
copies of the Statementof Assets, Liabilities and Networth (SALN) of the
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Justices of this Court for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of the
Personal Data Sheet (PDS) or the Curriculum Vitae (CV) of the Justices of
this Court for the purpose of updating their database of information on
government officials.
the Justices of the above-mentioned courts and the various judges
associations argue that while the Constitution holds dear the right of the
people to have access to matters of concern, the Constitution also holds
sacred the independence of the Judiciary.
ISSUE: Can Rowena Paraan invoke right to information for her to have public
access to the SALN, PDS and CV of the Justices of the Court and other
magistrates of the Judiciary subject?
HELD: Yes. Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to
information, with its companion right of access to official records, is not
absolute. While providing guaranty for that right, the Constitution also
provides that the peoples right to know is limited to matters of public
concern and is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
Jurisprudence has provided the following limitations to people’s right to
information and right ro access offocoal records:
(1) national security matters and intelligence information;
(2) trade secrets and banking transactions;
(3) criminal matters; and
(4) other confidential information such as confidential or classified information
officially known to public officers and employees by reason of their office and
not made available to the public as well as diplomatic correspondence, closed
door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress,
and the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
This could only mean that while no prohibition could stand against access
to official records, such as the SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to
regulation.(which is a limitation that may be provided by law)
In this regard, Section 8 (c) and (d) of R.A. No. 6713 provides for the limitation
and prohibition on the regulated access to SALNs of government officials and
employees, viz:
(C) Accessibility of documents. - (1) Any and all statements filed under this
Act, shall be made available for inspection at reasonable hours.
(2) Such statements shall be made available for copying or reproduction after
ten (10) working days from the time they are filed as required by law.
(3) Any person requesting a copy of a statement shall be required to pay a
reasonable fee to cover the cost of reproduction and mailing of such
statement, as well as the cost of certification.
(4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available to the public for a
period of ten (10) years after receipt of the statement. After such period, the
statement may be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation.
(D) Prohibited acts. - It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain or use any
statement filed under this Act for:
(a) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or
(b) any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media
for dissemination to the general public.
Considering the foregoing legal precepts vis--vis the various requests
made, the Court finds no cogent reason to deny the public access to the
SALN, PDS and CV of the Justices of the Court and other magistrates of the
Judiciary subject, of course, to the limitations and prohibitions provided in R.A.
No. 6713, its implementing rules and regulations, and in the guidelines set
forth in the decretal portion.
33. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS vs. BCA
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
FACTS: In an Amended Build-Operate-Transfer Agreement dated 5 April
2002 (Agreement), petitioner Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) awarded
the MRPN Project (Machine Readable Passport and Visa Project) to
respondent BCA International Corporation, a domestic corporation. DFA
sought to terminate the Agreement. However, BCA opposed the termination
and filed a Request for Arbitration before an ad hoc tribunal (which is a remedy
stipulated in the said Amended Build-Operate-Transfer Agreement in case
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that the 2 parties (DFA and BCA) encountered a disagreement which they
Failed to Settle Amicably.)
BCA sought the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces
tecum to the following witnesses and documents in their custody
DFA argues that the presentation of the witnesses and documents was
prohibited by law and protected by the deliberative process privilege.
RTC ruled in favor of BCA and held that the evidence sought to be produced
was no longer covered by the deliberative process privilege.
ISSUE: Are the witnesses presented during the hearing before the ad
hoc arbitral tribunal prohibited from disclosing information on the basis of the
deliberative process privilege?
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the disclosure of information covered
by deliberative privilege will defeat the bases and purpose of the privilege.
"Deliberative process privilege has three policy bases: first, the privilege
protects candid discussions within an agency; second, it prevents public
confusion from premature disclosure of agency opinions before the agency”
In this case, Nothing in Section 20.03 of the Amended Build-Operate-Transfer
Agreement mandates compulsory disclosure of privileged information.
Section 20.03 merely allows a party, if it chooses, without the consent of the
other party, to disclose to the tribunal privileged information in such disclosing
party's possession. In short, a party can disclose privileged information in its
possession, even without the consent of the other party, if the disclosure is to
a tribunal. However, a party cannot be compelled by the other party to disclose
privileged information to the tribunal, where such privileged information is in
its possession and not in the possession of the party seeking the compulsory
disclosure.
Clearly the burden of proving Deliberative Process Privilege, lies on DFA, but
this government agency’s assertions of the deliberative process privilege is
broad and lack specificity, hence we will not be able to determine whether the
evidence sought to be produced is covered by the deliberative process
privilege.
WHEREFORE, The case is remanded to RTC, and the parties are directed to
specify their claims before the RTC and, thereafter, the RTC shall determine
which evidence is covered by the deliberative process privilege, if there is any,
based on the standards provided in this Decision. It is necessary to consider
the circumstances surrounding the demand for the evidence to determine
whether or not its production is injurious to the consultative functions of
government that the privilege of non-disclosure protects.
DOCTRINE / DISCUSSION:
Rights cannot be waived if it is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law. There is a public policy involved in a claim of deliberative
process privilege - "the policy of open, frank discussion between subordinate
and chief concerning administrative action."
Under the deliberative process privilege (as distinguished from "presidential
communications" privilege), documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated, may not be compelled to
be disclosed --- not because of national security but, on the "obvious
realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if
each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news," the
objective of the privilege being to enhance the quality of agency decisions.
As a qualified privilege, the burden falls upon the government agency
asserting the deliberative process privilege to prove that the information in
question satisfies both requirements - predecisional and deliberative. "The
agency bears the burden of establishing the character of the decision, the
deliberative process involved, and the role played by the documents in the
course of that process." It may be overcome upon a showing that the
discoverant's interests in disclosure of the materials outweigh the
government's interests in their confidentiality "The determination of need must
be made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc basis," and the "factors relevant
to this balancing include: the relevance of the evidence, whether there is
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reason to believe the documents may shed light on government misconduct,
whether the information sought is available from other sources and can be
obtained without compromising the government's deliberative processes, and
the importance of the material to the discoverant's case."
34. TERESITA SALCEDO- ORTANEZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage
with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack
of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette
tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified
persons.
The trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence offered
by private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone conversations
of petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and
obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire
tap his home telephone.
Issue: Whether such tape recordings are inadmissible in evidence for
violation of Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication.
Ruling: Yes. RA 4200 expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in
evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are as follows:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,
or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept,
or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-
recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents,
substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation
of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
35. ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband Dr. Martin
and forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet and took 157 documents
consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, passport, and
photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in
a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the the documents and papers in question are inadmissible
in evidence
HELD: Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication
and correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is
the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the
party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from
a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any
telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does
not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
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The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the
other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.
Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
36. BLAS OPLE vs. RUBEN TORRES
FACTS: The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator
Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered
Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men."[1] Petitioner Ople prays that we
invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important
constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone
of privacy.
A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos, "ADOPTION OF A
NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM:
There is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the
facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security
providers and other government instrumentalities; this will require a
computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic
services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations; Establishment of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System. A decentralized Identification
Reference System among the key basic services and social security providers
is hereby established.
Petitioner contends:
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE
ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF
THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO
APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE
GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF
RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION
Respondents counter-argue:
THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD
WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW
A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT
ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS
THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE
BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES
A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY
ISSUE: Whether the A.O NO. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System” is unconstitutional because it
violates their right to privacy.
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HELD: Yes. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a policy.[24] We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the
Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987.
the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative
It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
power.[4] As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National
System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of
Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a
public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.[
delicate adjustment of various contending state policies-- the primacy of
Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by
face. government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice
Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of
Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a
thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic
law and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that
rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the
A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing
administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power
in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign
of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be
resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy
covered by law.
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law
executes the laws.[14] The executive power is vested in the President.[15] It
because it confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and
is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws.[16] It is
creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with
the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
government agencies delivering basic services to the people without the
observance. Head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief
contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification
Executive. He represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all
card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight
laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department.[18] He
that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and
has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices.
enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.
enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.[21] It
It is here that administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and
enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency
application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general
and check the official conduct of his agents.[22] To this end, he can issue
policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although
administrative orders, rules and regulations.
administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe
we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws."
covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is an ordinance
A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional
issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to
operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be
privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let alone."
for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative

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In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc,[32] we adopted the Griswold ruling that
there is a constitutional right to privacy.
We held: The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made
the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to
an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons;
rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications
though. The constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is
particularly apt: 'The concept of limited government has always included the
idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the
personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between
absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In
contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which
belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which
the state can control. Protection of this private sector-- protection, in other
words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual--has become increasingly
important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological
age --industrialization, urbanization, and organization-- operate to narrow the
area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to
maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between
a democratic and a totalitarian society.'"
It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights:
"Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law."
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil
Code provides that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes
as actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the
privacy of another.[35] It also holds a public officer or employee or any private
individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of
another person,[36] and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
communications.[37] The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of
secrets by an officer,[38] the revelation of trade and industrial secrets,[39] and
trespass to dwelling.[40] Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like
the Anti-Wiretapping Law,[41] the Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act[42] and the
Intellectual Property Code.[43] The Rules of Court on privileged
communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information.
We prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show
that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the
need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally
eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking
basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough
to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the
broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population
Reference Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a
linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics
Technology" and "computer application designs."
. It is noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological
characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to
identify people who will seek its coverage. Considering the banquet of options
available to the implementers of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it threatens the
right to privacy of our people is not groundless.
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Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN
every time he deals with a government agency to avail of basic services and
security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be
recorded-- whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the
agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments,
income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for
medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the
better the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through
the electronic linkage of the files.[55] The data may be gathered for gainful
and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of
personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation
that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the
name, address and other basic personal information about the individual.[57]
Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional
infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms
how these information gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who
shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what
purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty
the integrity of the information.[58] Well to note, the computer linkage gives
other government agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no
controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of
the control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder,
without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever
purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal
information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for
unequivocally specified purposes.[60] The lack of proper safeguards in this
regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and
travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also enable
unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the
right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions"
by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures.[61] The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN,
biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that
the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much
less verify the correctness of the data encoded.[62] They threaten the very
abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.
We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to the National ID and the use
of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a
person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his
conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2)
whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.[67]
The factual circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of the
expectation.[68] However, other factors, such as customs, physical
surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or
diminish this expectation.[69] The use of biometrics and computer technology
in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of
privacy.[70] As technology advances, the level of reasonably expected
privacy decreases.[71] The measure of protection granted by the reasonable
expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely
accepted.[72] The security of the computer data file depends not only on the
physical inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in hardware and
software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a
minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of
technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.
the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the
right of privacy by using the rational relationship test.[75] He stressed that the
purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the
implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding
duplication of services, and (3) generate population data for development
planning. He concludes that these purposes justify the incursions into the right
to privacy for the means are rationally related to the end.
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We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc,[77] we upheld the
constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a
valid police power measure.
For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, not an administrative order. Secondly, R.A.
3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices were
prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. In the
case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but,
it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And we now
hold that when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court will
give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter
scrutiny. It will not do for the authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties. Nor is it enough for the authorities to
prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not
defeated, even when the government does not act irrationally. They must
satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests and that the law,
rule, or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is
demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire matrix is designed to protect
human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we
can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the rights
protected by the Constitution.
We reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy will be
subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny. The reason for this stance was laid
down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
"The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of
the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and
limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all
aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system
of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can
control. Protection of this private sector-- protection, in other words, of the
dignity and integrity of the individual-- has become increasingly important as
modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological age--
industrialization, urbanization, and organization-- operate to narrow the area
of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to
maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between
a democratic and a totalitarian society."
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a
mass society. The threats emanate from various sources-- governments,
journalists, employers, social scientists, etc.[88] In the case at bar, the threat
comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No.
308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information
about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services.
Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent will fail
to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to
compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to
take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could
be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and
his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the
society will have lost its benign capacity to forget."[89] Oblivious to this
counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in labelling the right
to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right
to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308
entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference
System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
37. KILUSANG MAYO UNO vs. DIRECTOR GENERAL, NEDA
G.R. No. 167798 April 19, 2006
FACTS: EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April
2005, reads:
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REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-
OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND
HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND
AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO
IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 2. Coverage – All government agencies and government-owned and
controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their members or constituents shall
be covered by this executive order.
Section 3. Data requirement for the unified ID system – The data to be
collected and recorded by the participating agencies shall be limited to the
following:
Name
Home Address
Sex
Picture
Signature
Date of Birth
Place of Birth
Marital Status
Names of Parents
Height
Weight
Two index fingers and two thumbmarks
Any prominent distinguishing features like moles and others
Tax Identification Number (TIN)
Provided that a corresponding ID number issued by the participating agency
and a common reference number shall form part of the stored ID data and,
together with at least the first five items listed above, including the print of the
right thumbmark, or any of the fingerprints as collected and stored, shall
appear on the face or back of the ID card for visual verification purposes.
Under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and
government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data
collection and format for their existing identification (ID) systems.
Petitioners in this case allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it
constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of the
government. Furthermore, they allege that EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s
right to privacy.
ISSUE: Whether EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy.
RULING: No. Section 2 of EO 420 provides, "Coverage. – All government
agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations issuing ID
cards to their members or constituents shall be covered by this executive
order." EO 420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part
of their functions under existing laws. These government entities have already
been issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420. Examples of these government
entities are the GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, Mayor’s Office, LTO, PRC, and similar
government entities.
Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to "adopt a unified
multi-purpose ID system." Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part
of their functions under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data
collection and format for their IDs. Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the
purposes of the uniform data collection and format, namely:
a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both
the government and the public brought about by the use of multiple
ID cards and the maintenance of redundant database containing the
same or related information;
b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business
with the government and those availing of government services;
c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the
unified ID card as provided under this executive order;
d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID
cards; and
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e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective
government service.
In short, the purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to
reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility, and
provide convenience to the people served by government entities.
Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the
uniform ID system to only 14 specific items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home
Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of
Birth; (8) Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12)
Two index fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent distinguishing
features like moles or others; and (14) Tax Identification Number.
The uniform ID format under Section 3 of EO 420 requires only "the first five
items listed" in Section 3, plus the fingerprint, agency number and the
common reference number, or only eight specific data. Thus, at present, the
Supreme Court’s ID contains far more data than the proposed uniform ID for
government entities under EO 420. The nature of the data contained in the
Supreme Court ID is also far more financially sensitive, specifically the Tax
Identification Number.
Making the data collection and recording of government entities unified, and
making their ID formats uniform, will admittedly achieve substantial benefits.
These benefits are savings in terms of procurement of equipment and
supplies, compatibility in systems as to hardware and software, ease of
verification and thus increased reliability of data, and the user-friendliness of
a single ID format for all government entities.
EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420 does not compel
all citizens to have an ID card. EO 420 applies only to government entities
that under existing laws are already collecting data and issuing ID cards as
part of their governmental functions. Every government entity that presently
issues an ID card will still issue its own ID card under its own name. The only
difference is that the ID card will contain only the five data specified in Section
3 of EO 420, plus the fingerprint, the agency ID number, and the common
reference number which is needed for cross-verification to ensure integrity
and reliability of identification.
On the Alleged Infringement of the Right to Privacy
On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly
limits the data that can be collected, recorded and shown compared to the
existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides strict
safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to
the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.
The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by
government entities. Some one hundred countries have compulsory national
ID systems, including democracies such as Spain, France, Germany,
Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Other countries which do not
have national ID systems, like the United States, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, Ireland, the Nordic Countries and Sweden, have sectoral cards for
health, social or other public services. Even with EO 420, the Philippines will
still fall under the countries that do not have compulsory national ID systems
but allow only sectoral cards for social security, health services, and other
specific purposes.
Without a reliable ID system, government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth,
and LTO cannot perform effectively and efficiently their mandated functions
under existing laws. Without a reliable ID system, GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and
similar government entities stand to suffer substantial losses arising from false
names and identities. The integrity of the LTO’s licensing system will suffer in
the absence of a reliable ID system.
In U.S. Justice Department, the issue was not whether the State could collect
and store information on individuals from public records nationwide but
whether the State could withhold such information from the press. The
premise of the issue in U.S. Justice Department is that the State can collect
and store in a central database information on citizens gathered from public
records across the country. In fact, the law authorized the Department of
Justice to collect and preserve fingerprints and other criminal identification
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records nationwide. The law also authorized the Department of Justice to Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating
exchange such information with "officials of States, cities and other undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights.
institutions." The Department of Justice treated such information as The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably
confidential. A CBS news correspondent and the Reporters Committee put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful
demanded the criminal records of four members of a family pursuant to the attacks on the system.
Freedom of Information Act. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Freedom
of Information Act expressly exempts release of information that would ISSUES: Are the following provisions valid and constitutional?
"constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," and the information
demanded falls under that category of exempt information.
a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the personal
data collected and recorded under EO 420 are treated as "strictly confidential" b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
under Section 6(d) of EO 420. These data are not only strictly confidential but
also personal matters. Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution grants the c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
"right of the people to information on matters of public concern." Personal
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
matters are exempt or outside the coverage of the people’s right to information
on matters of public concern. The data treated as "strictly confidential" under e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
EO 420 being private matters and not matters of public concern, these data
cannot be released to the public or the press. Thus, the ruling in U.S. Justice f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
Department does not collide with EO 420 but actually supports the validity EO
420. g.Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but
makes the existing sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS, i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of
SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly Cybercrimes;
to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
the President’s constitutional power of control over government entities in the
Executive department, as well as under the President’s constitutional duty to k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
ensure that laws are faithfully executed. and R.A. 10175;

38. DISINI vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE l. Section 8 on Penalties;

m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of several provision of the Republic Act
(R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;

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p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC);
and
u. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and Functions.
Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354,
361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.
HELD:
Section 4(a)(1) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(a)(1) provides:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer
data and systems:
(1) Illegal Access. The access to the whole or any part of a computer system
without right.
Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny
standard required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the
people and should thus be struck down.
The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the
strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved
in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act accessing the computer
system of another without right. It is a universally condemned conduct.
Besides, a clients engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement
between them as to the extent of the search, the methods to be used, and the
systems to be tested. Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior
permission from the client, such permission would insulate him from the
coverage of Section 4(a)(1).
Hence, valid and constitutional.
Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(a)(3) provides:
(3) Data Interference. The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging,
deletion or deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or electronic
data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of
viruses.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it
seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected
speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these
guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose,
constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that
unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of
protected freedoms.But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms
at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism,the act of
willfully destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case
their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such
act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to
destroy other peoples computer systems and private documents.
Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of
proving that under no set of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be
valid.Petitioner has failed to discharge this burden.
Hence, valid and constitutional.
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Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(a)(6) provides:
(6) Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad
faith to profit, mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive others from
registering the same, if such a domain name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered
with the appropriate government agency at the time of the domain name
registration;
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the
registrant, in case of a personal name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal
protection clausein that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using
his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the
name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device.
The law is reasonable in penalizing the offender for acquiring the domain
name in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who
are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same.
Hence, valid and constitutional.
Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(b)(3) provides:
b) Computer-related Offenses:
xxxx
(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional acquisition, use, misuse,
transfer, possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying information
belonging to another, whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that
if no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1)
degree lower.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due
process and to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom
of the press.
In Morfe v. Mutuc,it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its
identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional
protection.
Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the
"Zones of Privacy."
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these
zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in
accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord
to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a
"constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized men," but also from
our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates
that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and
"everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference
or attacks." In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus
of Sabio v. Senator Gordon, 535 Phil. 687, 714-715 (2006).
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis of the right
to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and
correspondence. In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly
intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person
has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.
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Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related
identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the
right to due process of law.
Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use,
misuse or deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no
fundamental right to acquire anothers personal data.
Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press
in that journalists would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted user
account of a person in the news to secure information about him that could
be published.
The Court held, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social
investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to
negate intent to gain which is required by this Section.
Hence, valid and constitutional.
Section 4(c)(1) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(c)(1) provides:
(c) Content-related Offenses:
(1) Cybersex. The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation,
directly or indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual
activity, with the aid of a computer system, for favor or consideration.
Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression clause.
They express fear that private communications of sexual character between
husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes
under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done "for favor"
in cyberspace. In common usage, the term "favor" includes "gracious
kindness," "a special privilege or right granted or conceded," or "a token of
love (as a ribbon) usually worn conspicuously." This meaning given to the
term "favor" embraces socially tolerated trysts. The law as written would invite
law enforcement agencies into the bedrooms of married couples or
consenting individuals.
The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and
pornography for favor and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution
and pornography, i.e., by webcam.
Likewise, engaging in sexual acts privately through internet connection,
perceived by some as a right, has to be balanced with the mandate of the
State to eradicate white slavery and the exploitation of women.
Hence, valid and constitutional.
Section 4(c)(2) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(c)(2) provides:
(2) Child Pornography. The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable
by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009,
committed through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be
imposed shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act
No. 9775.
The above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of
2009(ACPA) to cover identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing
prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons
who commit child pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPAs
definition of child pornography already embraces the use of "electronic,
mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means."
Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is
committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or
duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational basis for
such higher penalty.The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular
piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.
Hence, valid and constitutional.
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Section 4(c)(3) of the Cybercrime Law domain without prior permission. The OSG contends that commercial speech
enjoys less protection in law.
Section 4(c)(3) provides:
These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have
(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The transmission of commercial
interest in such ads. What matters is that the recipient has the option of not
electronic communication with the use of computer system which seeks to
opening or reading these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients
advertise, sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:
always have the option to delete or not to read them.
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him.
announcements from the sender to its existing users, subscribers or Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
customers; or
Hence, void for being unconstitutional.
(iii) The following conditions are present:
Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code and Section 4(c)(4) of the
(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and Cyber Crime Law
reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on
messages (opt-out) from the same source;
libel as well as Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.
(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise
The RPC provisions on libel read:
the source of the electronic message; and
Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime,
(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include
or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status,
misleading information in any part of the message in order to induce the
or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a
recipients to read the message.
natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed
communications, also known as "spam." The term "spam" surfaced in early
to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games. One who repeats the
making it is shown, except in the following cases:
same sentence or comment was said to be making a "spam."
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that
performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
unsolicited commercial communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes
the storage and network capacities of internet service providers, reduces the 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes with the owners remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not
peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams amounts to trespass of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said
to ones privacy since the person sending out spams enters the recipients

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proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise
of their functions.
Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. A libel committed by
means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph,
painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar
means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the
civil action which may be brought by the offended party.
The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely
incorporates to form part of it the provisions of the RPC on libel. Thus Section
4(c)(4) reads:
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of
cybercrime punishable under this Act:
xxxx
(c) Content-related Offenses:
xxxx
(4) Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system
or any other similar means which may be devised in the future.
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal codeand, in effect, the libel
provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of
"presumed malice" even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with
the higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis for conviction.Petitioners
argue that inferring "presumed malice" from the accuseds defamatory
statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has
an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel
is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the
penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms
that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.
But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law
penalizes the author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with
it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal code provisions on libel were
enacted. The culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of
print.
The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes
writing style. In a sense, they are a world apart in terms of quickness of the
readers reaction to defamatory statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated
by one-click reply options offered by the networking site as well as by the
speed with which such reactions are disseminated down the line to other
internet users.
Hence, Section 4(c)(4) penalizing online libel is valid and constitutional with
respect to the original author of the post; but void and unconstitutional with
respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it.
Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 5 provides:
Sec. 5. Other Offenses. The following acts shall also constitute an offense:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who
willfully abets or aids in the commission of any of the offenses enumerated in
this Act shall be held liable.
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully
attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held
liable.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable
any person who willfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit
any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth,
creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.
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The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current body of
jurisprudence and laws on aiding and abetting sufficiently protects the
freedom of expression of "netizens," the multitude that avail themselves of the
services of the internet. He points out that existing laws and jurisprudence
sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or abetting" a crime as to protect
the innocent. The Solicitor General argues that plain, ordinary, and common
usage is at times sufficient to guide law enforcement agencies in enforcing
the law.
Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a persons image with just one click
of the mouse. Scurrilous statements can spread and travel fast across the
globe like bad news. Moreover, cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with
cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends, evoking
from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks
to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a
persons reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means that will
unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of protected freedoms.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister
predicaments await internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion
of public issues. Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal
laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials
and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
(Adonis) G.R. No. 203378The terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad
sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves
through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages.
Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel
on the cyberspace is a nullity.
As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of
communication. It is inevitable that any government threat of punishment
regarding certain uses of the medium creates a chilling effect on the
constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of the great masses that use
it. In this case, the particularly complex web of interaction on social media
websites would give law enforcers such latitude that they could arbitrarily or
selectively enforce the law.
Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness
raises apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious
chilling effect on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of
aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy
way.In the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens and their
level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5, in relation to
Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand
scrutiny.
But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under
Section 5 should be permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access,
Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference,
Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices,
Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related
Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on
Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of
these offenses borders on the exercise of the freedom of expression.
Section 6 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 6 provides:
Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of
information and communications technologies shall be covered by the
relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall
be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, and special laws, as the case may be.
Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a
qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a
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substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of 2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender
information and communications technology and similar crimes committed under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or
using other means. In using the technology in question, the offender often the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the
evades identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater same proscription, and, in respect to these, is void and unconstitutional.
harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for
Section 8 of the Cybercrime Law
cybercrimes.
Section 8 provides:
Hence, valid and constitutional.
Sec. 8. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts
Section 7 of the Cybercrime Law
enumerated in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Act shall be punished with
Section 7 provides: imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand
pesos (PhP200,000.00) up to a maximum amount commensurate to the
Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. A prosecution under this Act shall be
damage incurred or both.
without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, or special laws. Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be
punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of not more than Five
Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published
hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.
material on print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that
identical material cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure,
offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the the penalty of reclusion temporal or a fine of at least Five hundred thousand
other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same pesos (PhP500,000.00) up to maximum amount commensurate to the
elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself damage incurred or both, shall be imposed.
claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section
already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the
4(c)(1) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a
computer system as another means of publication. Charging the offender
fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) but not
under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against double
exceeding One million pesos (PhP1,000,000.00) or both.
jeopardy.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section
The Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct
4(c)(2) of this Act shall be punished with the penalties as enumerated in
application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both
Republic Act No. 9775 or the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009:" Provided,
the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE
That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that
EXCEPTION of the crimes of:
provided for in Republic Act No. 9775, if committed through a computer
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) system.
of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes
a violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as

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Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section
4(c)(3) shall be punished with imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine of at
least Fifty thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) but not exceeding Two hundred
fifty thousand pesos (PhP250,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section
5 shall be punished with imprisonment one (1) degree lower than that of the
prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least One hundred thousand
pesos (PhP100,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos
(PhP500,000.00) or both.
The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a
legislative prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a measure of severe
penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. Judges and
magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify
or revise their range as determined by the legislative department.
The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.
Hence, valid and constitutional.
Section 12 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. Law enforcement authorities,
with due cause, shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or
electronic means traffic data in real-time associated with specified
communications transmitted by means of a computer system.
Traffic data refer only to the communications origin, destination, route, time,
date, size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not content, nor
identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement
authorities in the collection or recording of the above-stated information.
The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted
upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated
hereinabove has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be
committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that
will be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the
solution of, or to the prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no
other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to
collect or record traffic data in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or
provide opportunities for official abuse. They claim that data showing where
digital messages come from, what kind they are, and where they are destined
need not be incriminating to their senders or recipients before they are to be
protected. Petitioners invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be
protected from government snooping into the messages or information that
they send to one another.
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime
law for there is a need to put order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace
for public good. To do this, it is within the realm of reason that the government
should be able to monitor traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts
of cybercrimes.
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information
disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.In
determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court
has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming
the right must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a
certain matter. The second is an objective test, where his or her expectation
of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively
reasonable. 429 U.S. 589 (1977)
Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation to
its application to a particular person or group, petitioners challenge to Section
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12 applies to all information and communications technology (ICT) users,
meaning the large segment of the population who use all sorts of electronic
devices to communicate with one another. Consequently, the expectation of
privacy is to be measured from the general publics point of view. Without
reasonable expectation of privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact.
In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)the United States Supreme Court
classified privacy into two categories: decisional privacy and informational
privacy. Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in making
certain important decisions, while informational privacy refers to the interest
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter rightthe right to
informational privacythat those who oppose government collection or
recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.
Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the
contents of the messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the
recipient.
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated
with specified communications." But this supposed limitation is no limitation at
all since, evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that would specify the
target communications. The power is virtually limitless, enabling law
enforcement authorities to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever
specified communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of
individuals to privacy.
The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these
technologies be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect
for the rights that the Constitution guarantees.
Hence, void for being unconstitutional
Section 13 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 13 provides:
Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. The integrity of traffic data and
subscriber information relating to communication services provided by a
service provider shall be preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months
from the date of the transaction. Content data shall be similarly preserved for
six (6) months from the date of receipt of the order from law enforcement
authorities requiring its preservation.
Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six
(6) months: Provided, That once computer data preserved, transmitted or
stored by a service provider is used as evidence in a case, the mere furnishing
to such service provider of the transmittal document to the Office of the
Prosecutor shall be deemed a notification to preserve the computer data until
the termination of the case.
The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep
confidential the order and its compliance.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 203391 (Palatino v. Ochoa)claim that Section 13
constitutes an undue deprivation of the right to property. They liken the data
preservation order that law enforcement authorities are to issue as a form of
garnishment of personal property in civil forfeiture proceedings. Such order
prevents internet users from accessing and disposing of traffic data that
essentially belong to them.
No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the internet
belong to their authors or recipients and are to be considered private
communications. But it is not clear that a service provider has an obligation to
indefinitely keep a copy of the same as they pass its system for the benefit of
users. By virtue of Section 13, however, the law now requires service
providers to keep traffic data and subscriber information relating to
communication services for at least six months from the date of the
transaction and those relating to content data for at least six months from
receipt of the order for their preservation.
At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that service
providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made
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inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process
of preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of
the same.
Hence, valid and constitutional
Section 14 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 14 provides:
Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. Law enforcement authorities, upon
securing a court warrant, shall issue an order requiring any person or service
provider to disclose or submit subscribers information, traffic data or relevant
data in his/its possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt
of the order in relation to a valid complaint officially docketed and assigned for
investigation and the disclosure is necessary and relevant for the purpose of
investigation.
The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a
subpoena.
Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued
court warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to
enable them to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure
for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it
violate the privacy of communications and correspondence. Disclosure can
be made only after judicial intervention.
Hence, valid and constitutional.
Section 15 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 15 provides:
Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. Where a search
and seizure warrant is properly issued, the law enforcement authorities shall
likewise have the following powers and duties.
Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as
defined in this Act, and:
(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;
(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage
medium; and
(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed
computer or computer and communications network.
Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who
has knowledge about the functioning of the computer system and the
measures to protect and preserve the computer data therein to provide, as is
reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the undertaking of the
search, seizure and examination.
Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete
the examination of the computer data storage medium and to make a return
thereon but in no case for a period longer than thirty (30) days from date of
approval by the court.
Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will supplant
established search and seizure procedures.
The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the person
from whom they were taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede
existing search and seizure rules but merely supplements them.
Hence, valid and constitutional.
Section 17 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 17 provides:
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Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. Upon expiration of the periods as
provided in Sections 13 and 15, service providers and law enforcement
authorities, as the case may be, shall immediately and completely destroy the
computer data subject of a preservation and examination.
Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data subject of previous
preservation or examination violates the users right against deprivation of
property without due process of law. But, as already stated, it is unclear that
the user has a demandable right to require the service provider to have that
copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he wanted
them preserved, he should have saved them in his computer when he
generated the data or received it. He could also request the service provider
for a copy before it is deleted.
Hence, valid and constitutional.
Section 19 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to
computer data:
Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. When a computer
data is prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the
DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer data.
Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and
violates the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Solicitor
General concedes that this provision may be unconstitutional. But since laws
enjoy a presumption of constitutionality, the Court must satisfy itself that
Section 19 indeed violates the freedom and right mentioned.
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also
disregards jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of
restrictions on speech. Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on
one of or a combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the
balancing of interest test, and the clear and present danger rule. Section 19,
however, merely requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in
violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into
consideration, this can actually be made to apply in relation to any penal
provision. It does not take into consideration any of the three tests mentioned
above.
The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative
of the constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Section 20 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 20 provides:
Sec. 20. Noncompliance. Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV
hereof specifically the orders from law enforcement authorities shall be
punished as a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of
prision correctional in its maximum period or a fine of One hundred thousand
pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each and every noncompliance with an
order issued by law enforcement authorities.
Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The
argument is that the mere failure to comply constitutes a legislative finding of
guilt, without regard to situations where non-compliance would be reasonable
or valid.
But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) 1829, PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION
AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS. Section 20 necessarily
incorporates elements of the offense which are defined therein.
Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done
"knowingly or willfully." There must still be a judicial determination of guilt,
during which, as the Solicitor General assumes, defense and justifications for
non-compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies
to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court.
Hence, valid and constitutional.
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Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Law
Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center. There is hereby
created, within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency
body to be known as the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center
(CICC), under the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, for
policy coordination among concerned agencies and for the formulation and
enforcement of the national cybersecurity plan.
Sec. 26. Powers and Functions. The CICC shall have the following powers
and functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate
assistance of real time commission of cybercrime offenses through a
computer emergency response team (CERT); x x x.
Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when
it gave the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the
power to formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient
standards or parameters for it to follow.
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power,
the Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.1avvphi1The second
test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot. Gerochi v. Department of Energy, 554 Phil. 563 (2007).
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to
formulate and implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the
position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to
follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management
approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that
can be used to protect cyber environment and organization and users
assets.This definition serves as the parameters within which CICC should
work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.
Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy
of the law to "prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their
detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and
international levels, and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable
international cooperation." This policy is clearly adopted in the interest of law
and order, which has been considered as sufficient standard.
Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a) are likewise valid and constitutional.
39. DISINI vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
POLITICAL LAW; CONGRESS EXCLUSIVELY HAS THE POWER TO FIX
THE PENALTIES. The Court had ample opportunity to consider the
proposition that Section 6 violates the equal protection clause via the parties’
pleadings, oral arguments, and memoranda. But, as the Decision stressed,
the power to fix the penalties for violations of penal laws, like the cybercrime
law, exclusively belongs to Congress.
CRIMINAL LAW; CYBERCRIME LAW; SECTION 6 MAKES COMMISSION
OF EXISTING CRIMES THROUGH THE INTERNET A QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE. In any event, Section 6 of the cybercrime law merely
makes the commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying
circumstance that raises by one degree the penalties corresponding to such
crimes. This is not at all arbitrary since a substantial distinction exists between
crimes committed through the use of ICT and similar crimes committed using
conventional means.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LIBEL IS NOT A PROTECTED SPEECH. The
majority of the movants believe that the Court’s decision upholding the
constitutionality of Section 4(c)(4), which penalizes online libel, effectively
tramples upon the right to free expression.1âwphi1 But libel is not a protected
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speech. There is no freedom to unjustly destroy the reputation of a decent
woman by publicly claiming that she is a paid prostitute.
CRIMINAL LAW; ONLINE LIBEL; NOT A NEW CRIME. The movants argue
that Section 4(c)(4) is both vague and overbroad. But, again, online libel is not
a new crime. It is essentially the old crime of libel found in the 1930 Revised
Penal Code and transposed to operate in the cyberspace. Consequently, the
mass of jurisprudence that secures the freedom of expression from its reach
applies to online libel. Any apprehended vagueness in its provisions has long
been settled by precedents.
FACTS: A number of petitioners seek reconsideration of the Court’s February
18, 2014 Decision that declared invalid and unconstitutional certain provisions
of Republic Act 10125 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 and upheld
the validity of the others.
 In any event, the Court will briefly address certain aspects of the
decision that drew the most objections.
 Section 6 of the cybercrime law imposes penalties that are one
degree higher when the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code
and certain special laws are committed with the use of information
and communication technologies (ICT). Some of the petitioners
insist that Section 6 is invalid since it produces an unusual chilling
effect on users of cyberspace that would hinder free expression.
 Petitioner Bloggers and Netizens for Democracy insist that Section
6 cannot stand in the absence of a definition of the term “information
and communication technology”. But petitioner seems to forget the
basic tenet that statutes should not be read in isolation from one
another. The parameters of that ICT exist in many other laws.
Indeed those parameters have been used as basis for establishing
government systems and classifying evidence. These along with
common usage provide the needed boundary within which the law
may be applied.
 The Court had ample opportunity to consider the proposition that
Section 6 violates the equal protection clause via the parties’
pleadings, oral arguments, and memoranda. But, as the Decision
stressed, the power to fix the penalties for violations of penal laws,
like the cybercrime law, exclusively belongs to Congress.
 In any event, Section 6 of the cybercrime law merely makes the
commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying
circumstance that raises by one degree the penalties corresponding
to such crimes. This is not at all arbitrary since a substantial
distinction exists between crimes committed through the use of ICT
and similar crimes committed using conventional means.
 Petitioners share the Chief Justice’s concern for the overall impact
of those penalties, being one degree higher than those imposed on
ordinary crimes, including the fact that the prescriptive periods for
the equivalent cybercrimes have become longer.
 Prescription is not a matter of procedure over which the Court has
something to say. Rather, it is substantive law since it assumes the
existence of an authority to punish a wrong, which authority the
Constitution vests in Congress alone. Thus, there is no question that
Congress may provide a variety of periods for the prescription of
offenses as it sees fit. What it cannot do is pass a law that extends
the periods of prescription to impact crimes committed before its
passage.
 It is pointed out that the legislative discretion to fix the penalty
for crimes is not absolute especially when this discretion is
exercised in violation of the freedom of expression. The
increase in the penalty for online libel creates, according to this
view, greater and unusual chilling effect that violates the
protection afforded to such freedom.
 The majority of the movants believe that the Court’s decision
upholding the constitutionality of Section 4(c)(4), which
penalizes online libel, effectively tramples upon the right to free
expression.
ISSUE: Whether the cybercrime law is unconstitutional.
RULING: No.
 What the stiffer penalty for online libel truly targets are those who
choose to use this most pervasive of media without qualms, tearing
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down the reputation of private individuals who value their names and
community standing. The law does not remotely and could not
have any chilling effect on the right of the people to disagree, a
most protected right, the exercise of which does not constitute
libel.
 Libel is not a protected speech. There is no freedom to unjustly
destroy the reputation of a decent woman by publicly claiming
that she is a paid prostitute.
 As early as 1912, the Court held that libel is a form of expression not
protected by the Constitution. Libel, like obscenity, belongs to those
forms of speeches that have never attained Constitutional protection
and are considered outside the realm of protected freedom. As
explained by the US Supreme Court in Champlinsky v. New
Hampsire:
Allowing the broadest scope to the language and
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well
understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at
all times and under all circumstances. There are certain
well–defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or “fighting” words – those which, by their very
utterance, inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace. It has been well observed that such
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality. “Resort to
epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense
communication of information or opinion safeguarded by
the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would
raise no question under that instrument.” (Emphasis
supplied)
 The constitutional guarantee against prior restraint and subsequent
punishment, the jurisprudential requirement of “actual malice,” and
the legal protection afforded by “privilege communications” all
ensure that protected speech remains to be protected and guarded.
As long as the expression or speech falls within the protected
sphere, it is the solemn duty of courts to ensure that the rights of the
people are protected.
40. REPUBLIC vs. JUDGE EUGENIO
FACTS: After the Agan v PIATCO ruling, a series of investigations concerning
the award of the NAIA 3 contracts to PIATCO were undertaken by the
Ombudsman and the Compliance and Investigation Staff (“CIS”) of the Anti-
Money Laundering Council (AMLC).
The OSG wrote AMLC requesting AMLC’s assistance in “in obtaining more
evidence to completely reveal the financial trail of corruption surrounding the
NAIA 3 Project,” and also noting that the Republic was presently defending
itself in two international arbitration cases. The CIS conducted an intelligence
database search on the financial transactions of certain individuals involved
in the award, including Alvarez (Chairman of the Pre-Qualification Bids and
Awards Technical Committee). By this time, Alvarez had already been
charged by the Ombudsman with violation of Section 3(J) of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The search revealed that Alvarez maintained 8
bank accounts with 6 different banks.
The AMLC issued a resolution authorizing its Executive Director to sign and
verify an application to inquire into the deposits or investments of Alvarez et
al. and to authorize the AMLC Secretariat to conduct an inquiry once the RTC
grants the application. The rationale for the resolution was founded on the
findings of the CIS that amounts were transferred from Hong Kong bank
account to bank accounts in the Philippines maintained by respondents. The
Resolution also noted that by awarding the contract to PIATCO (despite its
lack of financial capacity) Alvarez violated Section 3(E) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The Makati RTC rendered an Order granting the AMLC
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the authority to inquire and examine the subject ban accounts of Alvarez et
al.
In response to a letter of Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio, AMLC issued a
Resolution authorizing its Executive Director to inquire into and examine the
accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several other entities involved in the
nullified contract. AMLC filed an application before the Manila RTC to inquire
into the Accounts alleged as having been used to facilitate corruption in the
NAIA 3 Project. The ex parte application was granted and the Manila RTC
issued a bank inquiry order.
Alvarez alleged that he fortuitously learned of the bank inquiry order, which
was issued following an ex parte application, and he argued that noting in the
Anti-Money Laundering Act (“AMLA”) authorized the AMLC to seek authority
to inquire into bank accounts ex parte.
After several motions, manifestations, orders and resolutions the case went
up to the SC, Alvaerz et al’s position: The AMLA, being a substantive penal
statute, has no retroactive effect and the bank inquiry order could not apply to
deposits or investments opened prior to the effectivity of the AMLA (17
October 2001). The subject bank accounts, opened in 1989 to 1990, could
not be the subject of the bank inquiry order without violating the constitutional
prohibition against ex post facto laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proscription against ex post facto laws applies to
Section 11 of the AMLA (a provision which does not provide a penal sanction
BUT which merely authorizes the inspection of a suspect accounts and
deposits)
RULING: Yes It is clear that no person may be prosecuted under the Penal
provisions of the AMLA for acts committed prior to the enactment of the law
(17 October 2001).
With respect to the AUTHORITY TO INSPECT, it should be noted that an ex
post facto law is one that (among others) deprives a person accused of a
crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the
protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
Prior to the AMLA:
1. The fact that bank accounts were involved in activities later on
enumerated in the law did not, by itself, remove such accounts from
the shelter of absolute confidentiality.
2. In order that bank accounts could be examined, there was need to
secure either the written permission of the depositor or a court order
authorizing such examination, assuming that they were involved in
cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in a case
where the money deposited or invested was itself the subject matter
of the litigation.
The passage of the AMLA stripped another layer off the rule on absolute
confidentiality that provided a measure of lawful protection to the account
holder. The application of the bank inquiry order as a means of inquiring into
transactions entered into prior to the passage of the AMLA would be
constitutionally infirm, offensive as to the ex post facto clause.
Nevertheless, the argument that the prohibition against ex post facto laws
goes as far as to prohibit any inquiry into deposits in bank accounts opened
prior to the effectivity of the AMLA even if the transactions were entered into
when the law had already taken effect cannot be sustained. This argument
will create a loophole in the AMLA that would result to further money
laundering. It is hard to presume that Congress intended to enact a self-
defeating law in the first place, and the courts are inhibited from such a
construction by the cardinal rule that “a law should be interpreted with a view
to upholding rather than destroying it.”
41. MERALCO vs. LIM
FACTS: Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an
administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). On June 4,
2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of
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the Administration building of MERALCO at which respondent is assigned,
denouncing respondent. The letter reads: “Cherry Lim, MATAPOS MONG
LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY
GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA
NG GOBYERNO.” Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of
MERALCO linesmen.
Petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource Staffing,
directed the transfer of respondent, through a memorandum, to MERALCO’s
Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa in light of the receipt of “reports that there were
accusations and threats directed against her from unknown individuals and
which could possibly compromise her safety and security.”
Respondent appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could
voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the “punitive”
nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process, citing the grueling
travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and
violation of the provisions on job security.
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her
transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised.
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the
RTC of Bulacan.
It was alleged by the Respondent that petitioners’ unlawful act and omission
consisting of their continued failure and refusal to provide her with details or
information about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly
received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation
of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition on the grounds that, inter
alia, resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in order, and that
jurisdiction over this case is with the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether the resort to a Writ of Habeas Data is proper.
HELD: The petition is impressed with merit. The Writ of Habeas Data will not
lie in this case.
An employee’s plea that she be spared from complying with her employer’s
Memorandum directing her reassignment under the guise of a quest for
information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within
the province of a writ of habeas data; The habeas data rule, in general, is
designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual—it is meant to provide
a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus
safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty
and security against abuse in this age of information technology.
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by
means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual.
Like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the
lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in
the number of killings and enforced disappearances—its intent is to address
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy
independently from those provided under prevailing Rules; The writs of
amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or
commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions
therefor are vague or doubtful—employment constitutes a property right under
the context of the due process clause of the Constitution.
Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC
and the Labor Arbiters.
42. LEE vs. ILAGAN
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FACTS: In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data dated June
22, 2012, Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were
former common law partners. Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the
latter's condominium, rested for a while and thereafter, proceeded to his
office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital camera was missing. On
August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter's office regarding a
purported sex video (subject video) she discovered from the aforesaid camera
involving Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the video and demanded
Lee to return the camera, but to no avail.
During the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee's head against a wall
inside his office and walked away. Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video
as evidence in filing various complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal
complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the
"Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b) an administrative complaint for
grave misconduct before the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM). Ilagan claimed that Lee's acts of reproducing the subject
video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the
NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated not only his right to life,
liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other woman, and thus, the
issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted.
Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of Habeas
Data dated June 25, 2012, directing Lee to appear before the court a quo, and
to produce Ilagan's digital camera, as well as the negative and/or original of
the subject video and copies thereof, and to file a verified written return within
five (5) working days from date of receipt thereof.
In her Verified Return dated July 2, 2012, Lee admitted that she indeed kept
the memory card of the digital camera and reproduced the aforesaid video but
averred that she only did so to utilize the same as evidence in the cases she
filed against Ilagan. She also admitted that her relationship with Ilagan started
sometime in 2003 and ended under disturbing circumstances in August 2011,
and that she only happened to discover the subject video when Ilagan left his
camera in her condominium. Accordingly, Lee contended that Ilagan's petition
for the issuance of the writ of habeas data should be dismissed because: (a)
its filing was only aimed at suppressing the evidence against Ilagan in the
cases she filed; and (b) she is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or
storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC correctly extended the privilege of the writ
of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.
HELD: The petition is meritorious. The Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response, given the lack of
effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances. It was conceptualized as a
judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to
informational privacy of individuals, which is defined as "the right to control the
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself."
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now
stands as "a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party." Thus, in order to
support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas
Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among
others, "[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it
affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party." In other
words, the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between
the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on
the other. Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported
by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right
to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.[20] In this relation, it bears
pointing out that the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely
property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of
the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that
his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through
the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex
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video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video
which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the
internet for public consumption he failed to explain the connection between
such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed,
courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As
the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and
eventually proving the nexus between one's privacy right to the cogent rights
to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a
failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible,
as in this case.
In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would
equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As
the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his
self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence
requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing
therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act
towards the end of violating Ilagan's right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
Nor would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude that
Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends say
for instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan's reputation.
Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason
why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as
evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan.
Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring
absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the RTC
Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.
43. GAMBOA vs. CHAN
FACTS: Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte
(PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her
and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army
Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos
Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of
individuals maintaining PAGs. Contending that her right to privacy was
violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition
for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their
capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
ISSUE: WON the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper
when the right to privacy is invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in
preserving the right to life, liberty or security.
RULING: No. The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary
remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce
one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a
person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means
in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the
privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right
to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through
substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining
PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to
increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently
explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation to the
criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the
presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest
of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of
Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of
information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the
privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.
44. RHONDA VIVARES vs. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE
FACTS: In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s
College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her
classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their
undergarments.
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Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher,
Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded
said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for
appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and
banned them from “marching” in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in
March 2012.
The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order)
granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the school from barring the students in
the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students.
Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed
a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. They
argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at
“Friends Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which
must be respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and
reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by
saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to
STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were intruded
upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of
information, data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer
Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all
soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such data be declared
illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy.
The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.
HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper. Contrary to the
arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a
case of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an
entity engaged in the business of “gathering, collecting, or storing data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party”.
First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in
cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances. Second, nothing in
the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only
against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering,
storing, and collecting of data.
Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)
The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like
Facebook has privacy tools, and the user makes use of such privacy tools,
then he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to informational
privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be respected and protected.
In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made
use of such privacy tools. Evidence would show that that their post (status)
on Facebook were published as “Public”.
Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s
posts on his “wall” (profile page):
(a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can
view the photo;
(c) Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
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(d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or
networks of the Facebook user; and
(e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy, then
he must choose any setting other than “Public”. If it is true that the students
concerned did set the posts subject of this case so much so that only five
people can see them (as they claim), then how come most of their classmates
were able to view them. This fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was their
classmates who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of the said
pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the privacy settings of
Facebook hence, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy on the
pictures of them scantily clad.
STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school
gathered the pictures cannot be considered illegal. As it appears, it was the
classmates of the students who showed the picture to their teacher and the
latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to the proper
school authority and it was for a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their
students according to the standards of the school (to which the students and
their parents agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they enrolled
their children there).

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