J O U R N A L OF SOCIAL ISSUES

V O L U M E 32, N U M B E R 2. 1976

Symbolic Racism
John B. McConahay
Duke University

Joseph C. Hough, Jr.

School of Theology at Claremont

Symbolic racism is the expression by suburban whites in terms of abstract

ideological symbols and symbolic behaviors of the feeling that blacks
are violating cherished values and making illegitimate demands for
changes in the racial status quo. In this paper, the correlates of symbolic
racism from a sample of seminary students and of voters in a Los
Angeles suburb are presented. Measures of symbolic racism predicted
voting preferences for a white incumbent over a black challenger in
the 1969 Los Angeles mayoralty election, and symbolic racism was
itself correlated negatively with sympathetic identification with the underdog
and with education. It was positively correlated with Republican party
identification and with measures of traditional or conventional religious
and secular American values. Symbolic racism was not correlated with
measures of occupation, income, tolerance of ambiguity, alienation,
social rootlessness, self-concept, or relative deprivation. It is proposed
that symbolic racism rests upon antiblack racial socialization and
conservative political and value socialization, and some speculations
are offered to account for why symbolic racism has emerged at
a time when traditional measures of racism indicate a decline in antiblack
prejudice.

Symbolic racism is a new form of antiblack feelings, attitudes,

and behaviors perceived to be emerging among relatively affluent,
This research was supported by a grant from the Irwin-Sweeney-Miller
Foundation to the School of Theology at Claremont, by NIMH Grant
MH-11526 to Yale University, John B. McConahay, Director, and by a
Rockefeller Foundation grant to Duke University. T h e authors wish to thank
Carol Brown, Wendy Graetz and John Nelson for research assistance, James
DeNardo and Robert Hutton for computer assistance, and Richard D.
Ashmore, Lewis Austin, and David Hamilton for suggestions on the manu-
script.
Correspondence regarding this article may be addressed to J. B. Mc-
Conahay, Department of Psychology, Duke University, Durham, NC 27706.

23
24 J O H N B. MCCONAHAY AND JOSEPH C. HOUGH, JR.

suburban segments of the American white population. It is not

the racism of the red-neck bigots of old who spewed forth
hatred, doctrines of racial inferiority, and support for d e jure
segregation. Though these bigots might also engage in symbolic
racism, our concern is with the racism of those who are both
sociologically and psychologically “the gentle people of prejudice”
(Campbell, 1971; Williams, 1964). O u r purposes in this article
are threefold: (a) to present new data on correlates of symbolic
racism, (b) to work toward a theoretical framework for the concept,
and (c) to advance some speculations concerning symbolic racism’s
emergence at this time.
As with other forms of American racism, symbolic racism
consists both of prejudicial o r negative attitudes, opinions, and
feelings, and of discriminatory acts o r behaviors on the part of
white Americans directed toward black Americans (Ashmore,
1970; Pettigrew, 1975). In American history, racism has most
frequently appeared in two ways. First, it was expressed in the
public sector by support for overt acts of discrimination such
as de jure segregation in public schools and other public agencies,
and in the private sector by systematic exclusion of blacks from
jobs, housing, and social clubs (Pettigrew, 1975; Sheatsley, 1966).
Second, it was indicated by the belief in or expression of negative
racial stereotypes, i.e., blacks are lazy, dumb, shiftless, etc. (Ash-
more, 1970; Katz & Braly, 1933; Karlins, Coffnian, & Walters,
1969). We have called these expressions of white racism “old-
fashioned” or “red-neck” racism-old-fashioned because it is now
out of style in sophisticated and opinion-making circles, and
t-ed-neck because it was (and is) most fervently expressed by the
uneducated and by lower class Southern whites (Proshansky, 1966;
Sears, 1969).
Symbolic racism is an expression of some of the negative
feelings underlying old-fashioned o r red-neck racism, but it
differs from them in its other psychological roots and in many
of its specific forms of expression. Attitudinally, syinbolic racism
is a set of “abstract moral assertions about blacks’ behavior as
a group, concerning what blacks deserve, how they ought to
act, whether o r not they are treated equitably, and so on” (Sears
& McConahay, 1973, p. 138). Behaviorally, it is a set of acts
(voting against black candidates, opposing affirmative action
programs, opposing desegregation in housing and education) that
are justified (or rationalized) on a nonracial basis but that operate
to maintain the racial status quo with its attendant discrimination
against the welfare, status, and symbolic needs of blacks.
 SYMBOI,IC RACISM 25

T h e concept of symbolic racism has been used previously

in analyzing the antecedents and consequences of the 1965 Watts
riot (Sears & McConahay, 1973) and in examining voting behavior
in the 1969 Los Angeles mayoralty election (Sears & Kinder,
1971). Typical items used to measure the attitude (racist responses
in parentheses) include:
Negroes shouldn’t push themselves where they’re not wanted.
(agree)
Over the past few years, Negroes have gotten more economically
than they deserve. (agree)
Do Los Angeles city officials pay more, less, or the same attention
to a request from a Negro person as from a white person? (more
attention)
Do you think that Negroes who receive welfare could get along
without it if they tried 0 1 ‘ do they really need this help? (could get
along without it)
Streets aren’t safe these days without a policeman around. (agree)
T h e 1969 Los Angeles mayoralty contest (see McConahay
& Hough, Note 1) was an ideal situation in which to study symbolic
racism because it pitted an unpopular white incumbent (Yorty)
against a well-qualified black city councilman (Bradley). During
the 1969 campaign, Sears and Kinder (197 1) conducted a sample
survey of 198 voters in the northern half of the San Fernando
Valley, a white, mostly gentile area within the city limits of Los
Angeles. While “the Valley” is part of the city, it is a region
characterized by physical and social fealures more typical of the
suburbs of other American cities: single family dwellings, barbecue
pits, swimming pools, expensive condominiums, scattered shop-
ping centers, and, except for a Mexican-American ghetto, few
unassimilated ethnic and religious minorities. T h e analysis of
racism and voting factors in this region thus has implications
for suburban racism across the country.
There are four general conclusions to be drawn from the
many reported by Sears and Kinder:
1 . Bradley-Yorty preferences were not related to indicators of personal
discontent or old-fashioned or I-ed-neck racism. Such factors as
number of social ties, concern with “community,” personal economic
well-being, personal and political efficacy, feelings of personal safety,
support for segregated schools and public accommodations, and
the belief in black intellectual inferiority were not correlated with
voting preference. I n other words, Yorty supporters were not simply
alienated, dissatisfied, powerless bigots.
2. Current life experiences (economic well-being, pei-sonal efficacy,
contact with or physical proximity to blacks) were unrelated to racism
26 JOHN B. MCCONAHAY AND JOSEPH C . HOUGH, JR.

items. On the other hand, indicators of previous conservative political

and racial socialization (state or origin, generation, education, etc.)
were related to these items.
3. Relatively ideological or abstract versions of the symbolic racism
items (“Negroes have gotten more economically than they deserve”)
related to pro-Yorty voting, while more concrete and personal
versions (“Negroes have done better economically than 1 have”) did
not.
4. Both symbolic racism and political conservatism had independent
effects upon the vote; that is, measures of political conservatism
(Republican party identification and self-labelled conservatism) and
items measuring symbolic racism were related to pro-Yorty voting
independently of their relationship to each other. Yorty was vic-
torious in 1969 because political conservatism and symbolic racism
yielded votes in his favor; political conservatism by itself would
not have been sufficient to give him the victory.

Two Relevant Studies

In October 1968, six months before the Bradley-Yorty contest,
we began a series of studies of religious beliefs and their relation-
ships to political behaviors and racial attitudes (McConahay &
Hough, 1973; Hough & McConahay, Note 2). In the first study,
with seminary students, we employed an extensive inventory of
attitudes toward blacks drawn from Schuman and Harding (1963)
and Woodmansee and Cook (1967). We also formulated four
new items about emerging issues in American race relations which
had a face content quite similar to the symbolic racism items
of Sears and Kinder.
In April 1969, in the midst of the Bradley-Yorty contest,
we surveyed a random sample of voters in the city of Claremont,
a suburb of Los Angeles located in the eastern part of Los Angeles
County. Although our principal interest was in a local school
board election, we asked our respondents for their preferences
in the Bradley-Yorty contest. Although not eligible to vote in
the city election, Claremont residents were dependent upon Los
Angeles television and newspapers for their information on
current affairs, exposed to the Los Angeles media coverage of
the mayoralty election, and not surprisingly were not hesitant
to express a Bradley-Yorty preference. T h e survey included the
most reliable religious items from our seminary study plus two
symbolic racism items along with a number of items thought
to tap feelings of personal discontent and traditional American
values. It did not include any items from the domain of old-
fashioned or red-neck racism.
 SYMBOLIC RACISM 27

Both of the studies reported here have one strength that

previous research did not. They enable us to look directly at
the relationships among religious factors, traditional values, and
symbolic racism. This is important because the residues of early
socialization to traditional values were hypothesized to be a major
factor in producing symbolic racism (Sears & Kinder, 1971; Sears
& McConahay, 1973) and because scholars of American thought
have noted that many of the traditional values of Americans,
especially those relating to hard work and self-reliance, are
secularized versions of old-fashioned Calvinism and methodism
(Bellah, 1967; Niebuhr, 1958; Weber, 1958).
Hence, while no study yet allows us to examine all of the
theoretically important relationships, there is enough overlap
to examine the replicability of some findings in three different
samples and to explore a potentially important additional variable.

STUDY
T H ESEMINARIAN
Sample
T h e data were generated by a sample of 160 white Protestant,
American seminary students in Southern California, drawn from
three Protestant graduate (post BA) seminaries in Southern
California: the California Baptist Seminary, Fuller Theological
Seminary, and the School of Theology at Claremont. Two of
these schools (Fuller and Claremont) have international reputa-
tions and draw faculty and students from all over the world,
though the overwhelming majority come from the United States.
Fuller is considered conservative and attracts students whose
theological beliefs are quite traditional, while Claremont is known
for its liberal faculty and thus attracts students whose theology
is liberal or unorthodox. The seminary sample was typical of
the Southern California seminarian population with respect to
all demographic variables (McConahay & Hough, Note 1; Hough
& McConahay, Note 2).
Although our results might not generalize to all seminarians
(Protestant, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Jewish, Buddhist, etc.)
or to all suburban Americans, the sample had two strengths for
our purposes. First, we were able to administer a more extensive
questionnaire than one normally can administer to persons in
a general sample, enabling us to explore dimensions of antiblack
prejudice in depth. (See Campbell, 1971, for an example of the
28 JOHN B. MCCOWAHAY AND JOSEPH C. HOUGH, JR.

opposite approach.) Second, Dittes’s (1969) review of the literature

suggested that the best samples for exploring multiple dimensions
of religious attitudes and their correlates were those that are
religiously homogenous (all believers o r all leaders) rather than
heterogenous. I n addition, the seminary sample is of interest
in its own right because the students we surveyed in 1968 are
now filling the pulpits of suburban churches across the nation,
playing a n important role in shaping the way in which religious
beliefs will be related to symbolic racism in this and future
generations of laypersons.
Items arid Scales
A number of Likert-type scales were developed, following
the procedures outlined in Scott (1968). Since most of our results
are based upon a series of stepwise regression analyses (Draper
8c Smith, 1966), those scales in the pool of potential predictors
not making the final equation will be summarized only.
We gathered data on the students’ age, urban or rural
background, student-reported social class of parents, income of
parents, education of parents, occupational prestige of parents,
birth order of students, and their own subjective social class.
Since the seminary sample was drawn from a rather narrow range
o f educational backgrounds, many factors correlated with educa-
tion were controlled b y our choice of sample, and few of o u r
demographic measures related to symbolic racism.
T h e political and economic liberalism or conservatism of the
seminarians was assessed in two ways. First, they were asked what
party they were registered with o r usually voted with in a n election.
Democrats ( N = 5 8 ) were treated as liberals, Republicans as con-
servatives. For the second measure three judges, drawn from
the same population as the students, divided responses to the
item “What major (nationally known) political figure most closely
expressed your own political and social philosophy?” into ‘‘leftist’’
o r “rightist” figures, with agreement in all but one of the 160
cases. While this procedure might introduce a large amount o f
error variance into the measure in a mass sample d u e to the
respondents’ low level of knowledge regarding the actual political
positions of the persons they named (Converse, 1964), in our
highly educated seminary sample this did not present a problem.
Several scales were used to measure aspects of racism. Old-
fashioned or red-neck racism was assessed by eight items from
Woodmansee and Cook (1967) which had manifest segregationist
(e.g., “ I think it is right that the Negro race should occupy a
 SYMBOLIC RACISM 29

somewhat lower position socially than the white race”) or negative

stereotype content (e.g., “Many Negroes spend money for big
cars and television sets instead of spending it for better housing”).
We had hoped that these items would be sufficiently subtle versions
of old-fashioned or red-neck racism that they would not offend
the sensibilities of the seminarians, but some were offended
anyway. Only 97 respondents answered questions in this section
of the questionnaire as compared with 159 or 160 on most other
items and 154 who answered the symbolic racism items. Of the
63 persons not answering, 15 wrote on the questionnaire that
they refused because they disagreed strongly not only with the
items but with our even including statements of this sort.
We expected (Sears, 1969) to find little expression of red-neck
racism in this sample. This proved indeed to be the case. T h e
items were positively correlated and produced a scale with an
alpha coefficient of .72 1 for the subjects who responded. However,
the scale variance was quite small relative to other scales in the
study and the mean was 15.7, indicating that the responses among
those answering tended to cluster around mild disagreement.
If the 15 who refused had gone ahead to answer these items,
this mean would most likely have been even lower. We do not
know how the other nonresponders would have scored, but
responders and nonresponders did not differ significantly on
other scales used in the study. Hence, the high nonresponse rate
for this scale did not bias its relationships with other variables
in any obvious fashion.
In addition to red-neck racism, we wanted a more subtle
measure of antiblack prejudice which might tap nonverbalized
affect. Hence, we included an instrument developed by Schuman
and Harding ( I 963) designed to assess the respondents’ sympathetic
identification with the underdog. For each of a series of paragraphs
describing an event in which a black was insulted, harmed, or
aggressed against, the respondent was asked to pick the response
(from four possibilities) which was probably the black person’s
reaction to the incident. Only the anger, hurt, or frustration
response in each instance was scored as sympathetic identification
(or nonprejudiced). However, because the nonidentifying re-
sponses might also reflect a generalized lack of ability to sympathize
with anyone regardless of race, and to disguise our intentions
somewhat, we interspersed among the paragraphs with black
principal characters a series of analogous paragraphs featuring
a “seminary student” or a “young minister” who was insulted,
harmed, or aggressed against. The scale proved quite reliable.
30 JOHN B. MCCONAHAY AND JOSEPH C. HOUGH, JR.

Each item correlated positively with the sum of the other items
in the scale, and the alpha coefficient for the total scale was
.’79.
Symbolic racism was assessed by four items:
1 . Negroes are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights.
2. Whites should support Negroes in their struggle against discrimina-
tion and segregation.
3. It is easy to understand the anger of black people in America.
4. Negroes have it better than they ever had it before.
Agreement with the first and fourth items and disagreement with
the second and third were scored as indicating symbolic racism.
T h e items formed a Likert-type scale with an alpha coefficient
of .511, which is acceptable for work relating group scores to
one another (McConahay & Hough, Note 1). The face similarity
of these items to those of Sears and Kinder (19’71) was quite
high. It should be noted, though, that the items were not generated
from an a priori theory of symbolic racism but were based upon
our intuitions of what the new issues in race relations emerging
at that time would be.
Most of the religious items were of the Likert type, using
the standard agree-disagree format (Scott, 1968). All items from
the Allport and Ross (1967) scales of intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation for participation in religious activities were included.
Interspersed among these items were a series of statements tapping
love- and guilt-oriented dimensions of Christian beliefs and a
dimension of cultural or conventional religious beliefs. Of the
final scales which emerged (Hough & McConahay, Note 2;
McConahay & Hough, Note l ) ,the most important for our analysis
was the measure of conventional religious beliefs. It was a reasona-
bly reliable scale (alpha = .66) with a content reflecting a set
of conventional or “Mainstreet” religious values, e.g., “A religious
man should be thrifty and honest, clean and hardworking.”
Finally, we asked the seminarians to indicate their theological
position, and divided the sample into liberals (46%)and conserva-
tives (5496) on the basis of their self-labels.

Correlations among Racism Scales

Our three scales of various forms of racism were only modestly
related to one another in the seminary sample. The red-neck
prejudice and symbolic racism scales were not significantly corre-
lated, but the sympathetic identification scale was significantly
related to both the symbolic racism ( r = -.299, 9 < .01) and
the red-neck prejudice scales ( r = -.201, 9 < .05). That is, while
 SYMBOLIC RACISM 31

scores on the red-neck prejudice and symbolic racism scales were

unrelated, those who identified with blacks in the human situations
depicted in the sympathetic identification scale tended to score
significantly less racist on the other two measures than persons
who could not identify sympathetically. Furthermore, the sympa-
thetic identification scale was not simply a measure of generalized
inability to sympathize with anyone; o u r parallel items involving
a minister were not correlated with the two other measures of
racism (red-neck prejudice and symbolic racism). And the partial
correlations between sympathetic identification and the other two
racism measures with generalized lack of sympathy controlled
were still significantly different from zero ( r = -.179, p < .05
for red-neck prejudice and r = -.293, p < .01 for symbolic
racism).
These findings suggest that (a) the three racism scales formed
separate dimensions of racism; (b) old-fashioned o r red-neck
racism was not a direct factor in producing symbolic racism since
those high on the symbolic racism scale were no more likely than
others to express the sentiment that blacks are inferior o r that
de jure segregation is proper; (c) a low score on the sympathetic
identification scale indicated a subtle, not readily verbalizable form
of antiblack affect; and (d) the antiblack affect tapped by the
sympathetic identification scale was associated with both red-neck
prejudice and symbolic racism even though the two d o not act
directly on each other.
Correlates of Symbolic Racism
T h e significant bivariate correlations between the various
social, demographic, political, racial, and religious variables and
the symbolic racism scale are summarized in Table 1. Because
TABLE 1
VARIABLES
CORRELATING WITH SYwoix: RACISM
SIGNIFICANTLY SCA~.E
(Seminary Sample)
Variable Correlation N
Conventional Religious Beliefs .4 11 153
Party Identification (High = Republican) .363 123
Political Figure (High = Liberal) -.319 134
Guilt-Oriented Beliefs ,319 153
Sympathetic Identification (High = Nonprejudiced) - ,297 153
Love-Oriented, Others -.239 153
Allport-Ross Intrinsic ,239 153
Love-Oriented, Self ,216 153
Theological Position (High = Liberal) -.I81 149
Note. All correlations significant at p<.05 or better.
32 JOHN B. MCCONAHAY AND JOSEPH C . HOUGH, JR.

these correlates were themselves correlated, a series of stepwise

multiple regressions was performed to untangle the web of
interrelations among the predictor variables (Gorsuch, 1973),
stopping the regressions when new variables added to the equation
no longer had significant independent effects (Draper 8c Smith,
1966).T h e best regression equation which emerged involved three
statistically significant ( p < .05) variables: conventional religious
beliefs, sympathetic identification, and a party identification by
conventional beliefs interaction. T h e standardized regression
coefficients-the partial correlation between the variable and
symbolic racism with all the other variables held constant-for
the three are .372, -.296, and ,272, respectively. T h e overall
equation was also statistically significant ( R = .566, F = 23.4,
p < .001). Hence, holding conventional religious beliefs was
associated with high symbolic racism scores, while sympathetic
identification with blacks was associated with low scores. Party
identification made little or no difference for persons who were
relatively free of conventional beliefs, but for students who
endorsed more conventional beliefs, the Republicans scored higher
in symbolic racism than did the Democrats (McConahay & Hough,
Note 1). For Democrats, as beliefs became more conventional,
symbolic racism increased; however, for Republicans there was
a much greater increase in symbolic racism with a n increase in
conventionalism.
T h e important correlates of symbolic racism found in the
seminary study (conventionalism, low levels of sympathetic identi-
fication with blacks, and Republican party identification) seem
quite similar to those residues of early socialization hypothesized
by Sears and Kinder to affect symbolic racism: traditional values,
racism, and political conservatism.

THECLAREMONT
STUDY
Sample
A random sample of 185 voters was drawn from the official
rcgistration records of the Claremont Registrar of Voters in April
1969. Respondents were contacted in their homes, and 162 inter-
views were conipleted (88%).Of those not interviewed, 2 refused,
9 were too old o r too sick to be surveyed, and the remainder
could not be contacted at all since they had moved, were on
vacation, and so forth. In 1969, Claremont had five colleges,
a graduate school, and a theological seminary within its city limits,
and the town was very close to many highly technical operations
 SYMBOLIC RACISM 33

of the aerospace-computer-defense industry. Hence, it had a highly

educated and affluent population and o u r sample reflected this:
Median educational level was three years of college, median income
was $16,500 (in 1969), and 41% of our respondents labelled
themselves as upper o r upper-middle class. T h e sample could
be characterized also as white (96%), politically conservative (54%)
Republican), geographically mobile (median number of years lived
in Claremont was 5 ) , and in the middle years of life (median
age, 43). Finally, the religious socialization of the respondents
was predominantly Christian: 48’% reported that they grew u p
in Protestant families and 17% in Catholic, while only 2%) were
Jewish-however, 33% of the sample did not o r would not respond
to the denominational affiliation questions.
Items and Scales
Many of the religious and demographic items from the
seminarian study were included in the Claremont study. Because
racial attitudes and relations were not here central to our interests,
only two of the symbolic racism items were included and no
measures of red-neck prejudice or of sympathetic identification.
O n the other hand, the Claremont survey had better measures
of party identification than the seminarian study, a wider range
of items tapping traditional American values, and a set of itenis
on current life experiences and /or psychological states.
T h e two symbolic racism items were correlated (Y = -.422)
and both items distinguished between preferences in the Bradley-
Yorty run-off election of 1969. Of those agreeing 01- strongly
agreeing with the item “It is easy to understand the anger of
Negroes in America,” 59% supported Yorty, while among those
who disagreed o r disagreed strongly, 7 1% supported Yorty. On
the second item, “Negroes are getting too demanding in their
push for equal rights,” the difference was even greater: 75%
of those agreeing o r agreeing strongly supported Yorty, but only
32% of those expressing varying degrees of disagreement pre-
ferred Yorty. A mini-scale of symbolic racism-combining the
two items, with reversed scoring o n the “anger” item-correlated
+ .392 with Bradley-Yorty preference. This relationship between
high levels of symbolic racism and pro-Yorty voting was statistically
significant (fi < .001)and remained significant even after controll-
ing for party identification by means of partial correlation ( r
= +.318, p < .OOl). Clearly, these symbolic racism items were
tapping many of the sentiments similar to those expressed by
Sears and Kinder’s San Fernando Valley respondents.
34 JOHN B. MCCONAHAY AND JOSEPH C. HOUCH, JR.

Whereas the measure of party identification used in the

seminarian study only permitted us to separate the sample into
Democrats and Republicans, the Claremont data could be used
to separate respondents into strong Democrats (15%), weak
Democrats (2 1%), Independents usually voting Democratic (5%),
Independents usually voting Republican (5%),weak Republicans
(27%), and strong Republicans (27%). This categorization was
treated as a six-point scale running from strong Democrat (1)
to strong Republican (6).
All of the religious measures described in the seminarian
study were included here. Once again, only the conventional
religious beliefs scale proved to be of any importance; it had
an even higher overall reliability in the Claremont sample (alpha
= .79) than in the seminarian sample (alpha = .66). In addition
to the scale of religious conventionalism, we included a number
of other items dealing with patriotism, traditional family authority
patterns, sex education, dress codes in the local high school, new
as opposed to old methods of teaching, and respect of children
for their elders. We had hoped that they might form a scale
of traditional secular values; however, though these items were
weakly correlated, neither factor analyses nor Likert scaling
techniques produced a scale or subscale of an acceptable level
of reliability.
Finally, because many psychologists have linked psychological
variables involving self-concept and cognitive style to racism and
prejudice (Ashmore, 1970; Harding, Proshansky, Kutner, 8c
Chein, 1969), we included measures of tolerance of ambiguity,
of alienation, and of self-esteem in the Claremont instrument.
Though these formed reliable scales, they were of little conse-
quence in the final analyses. Measures of relative deprivation
identical to those used by Cantril (1965) and measures of root-
lessness such as those of the mass society theorists (Kornhauser,
1959) were not substantially related to symbolic racism.
Correlates of Symbolic Racism
T h e variables that did relate significantly to the symbolic
racism mini-scale are shown (in descending order of their bivariate
correlations) in Table 2.Four features of the pattern of correlation
should be emphasized. First, in both studies (Tables 1 and 2),
party identification was the second highest correlate of symbolic
racism. Second, in both studies the conventional religious beliefs
scale had a strong positive relationship to symbolic racism (.411
and .330). Third, items expressing beliefs in various forms of
 SYMBOLIC RACISM 35

the secular traditional values of American culture (patriotism,

sexual prudery, proper dress for high school students, traditional
approaches to education and teaching) were very prominent
correlates of the symbolic racism mini-scale in the Claremont
study.

TABLE 2
VARIABLES CORRELATING SlChlFlCANTLY W I T H SYMBOLIC RACISM MIYI-SCALF
(Claremont Sample)
Variable Correlation N
Teaching Patriotism (High=Very Important) ,468 152
Party Identification (High=Strong Republican) ,454 128
Prefer Old Ways of Teaching ,396 143
Education Level (Years of Schooling) -.387 152
Prefer a Dress Code in High School ,374 142
Conventional Religious Beliefs Scale ,330 145
Opposes Sex Education in Schools ,324 142
Local Education Policy is too New ,319 121
Length of Residence in Southern California (Number 3f
Years) ,272 153
Local Board Harms Education ,230 138
Age (Number of Years Old) ,196 I52
Lenah of Residence in Claremont (Number of Years) ,170 153
Note. All correlations significant at p<.05 or better.

The fourth feature of the bivariate correlations to be empha-

sized is that, aside from the traditional values and religious beliefs
and as opposed to the measures of current experience or psycho-
logical state, the most powerful correlates of symbolic racism were
measures reflecting political, racial, and value socialization at
earlier historical and developmental periods of the respondents’
lives: party identification, education, age, length of residence in
Southern California, and length of residence in Claremont. It
should be noted, however, that two potentially important indicators
of socialization (denominational socialization and region or origin)
did not relate to symbolic racism. When subjects were divided
into those who grew up in Reformation-era Protestant denomina-
tions (Congregational, Episcopal, Lutheran, Presbyterian), Pietistic
Protestant denominations (Baptist, Methodist), or the Roman
Catholic denomination and an analysis of variance was performed
on the three groups using symbolic racism as the dependent
variable, no significant differences emerged. Catholics did not
differ from either Protestant group, nor from the average of
the Protestant groups, and the Protestant groups did not differ
significantly from each other. Hence, socialization to specific
36 J O H S K. MCCONAHAY AND JOSEPH C . HOCGH, JR.

denominational doctrines was not as important ill producing

symbolic racism as was socialization to the American cultural or
traditional values which were derived from Protestant thought
several generations ago. Civil Protestantism as opposed to religious
Protestantism was the important rocialization factor here.
Only 9% of the Claremont sample was reared in the states
defined as Southern by the U.S. Census Bureau. These respond-
ents were n o more likely to score high on the symbolic racism
mini-scale than were those who had been socialized in the North
o r West. Since Southern socialization is highly correlated with
old-fashioned racism (Campbell, 197 1; Sears, 1969), this finding
is consistent with, but by no means conclusive for, the finding
in the seminarian study that symbolic racism was not directly
related to old-fashioned or red-neck racism.
Mu1tip1e Regre 5 \ io ti A nu l y is
A multiple regression analysis using the same procedures
as in the seminarian study was performed, exploring two
models-one involving interaction and main effect terms and
one involving only main effects. Two specific equations, one with
interaction ternis ( R = .678, F = 25.0, p < .001) and one with
only main effects ( R = .658, F = 28.2, p < .001) appeared to
be equally capable of “predicting” symbolic racism mini-scale
scores. Without a n a pr-iori theory, choosing between them is
difficult and fortunately unnecessary at this stage of symbolic
racism research.
Though they differ in some details, both equations suggest
that the most important correlates of symbolic racism are variables
reflecting different aspects of early socialization: education, party
identification, and the expression of opinions reflecting socializa-
tion to traditional American values (preference for the old ways
of teaching and for a school dress code, reverence for patriotism,
and opposition to sex education). Equally important was what
did not appear in either equation: measures of current experience,
current psychological state, alienation, and rootlessness.

DISCUSSION
There are two important characteristics of the content of
the symbolic racism items of the seminarian, Claremont, and
Sears and Kinder studies. First, the content is concerned with
actions of blacks as a group (particularly their demands) as well
as the characteristics of individual black persons. We would
 SYMBOLIC RACISM 37

propose that while old-fashioned o r red-neck racism may also

have included opinions about blacks as a group, there was less
emphasis upon black group action and more emphasis upon
individual characteristics. This suggests that symbolic racism is
very much a reaction of whites to the civil rights movement,
especially the Northern phase of that movement. Second, the
items have a moral tone to them: Blacks are found wanting in
comparison to some abstract standard of morality and justice;
they are too pushy, they are getting more economically than they
deserve, they have nothing to be angry about. Of particular
importance here is the finding of Sears and Kinder (1971) that
items with a personal referent (“Blacks have done better economi-
cally than I”) did not relate to Bradley-Yorty voting, while the
abstract version (“Blacks have done better economically than they
deserve”) did.
A second important finding is that personal experience and
current psychological (or emotional state) have little relationship
to symbolic racism. Amount, extent, and nature of personal contact
with blacks was not correlated with symbolic racism (Sears &
Kinder, 1971; see also Hamilton & Bishop, 1975). Measures of
alienation (Sears & Kinder, Claremont), tolerance for ambiguity
and self-esteem (Claremont), social ties, rootlessness, and satisfac-
tion with the community (Sears & Kinder, Claremont), and current
income, relative deprivation, and social class (Claremont) were
not correlated with measures of symbolic racism.
T h e important demographic correlates of symbolic racism
were those reflecting early political, racial, and value socialization:
education, party identification, and, to a lesser extent, age and
length of time in the area (Claremont). T h e most important
psychological factors in producing symbolic racism appear- to be
ideological: political and economic conservatism (Sears 8c Kinder,
seminarian, Claremont), and various measures of religious and
secular traditionalism o r conventionalism (seminarian,Claremont).
And finally, symbolic racism was related to sympathetic identifica-
tion with the underdog, but not at all or only minimally (Sears
& Kinder, 1971) related to old-fashioned o r red-neck racism
(seminarian).
Toward a Definition and Theory of Symbolic Racism
We would propose that for Northern white suburbanites (and
perhaps for other whites as well) the attitudes, opinions, and
behaviors constituting symbolic racism have three elements. First,
they are the expression of the feeling that blacks are becoming
38 JOHN B. MCCONAHAY AND JOSEPH C. HOUGH, JR.

too demanding, too pushy in their drive for justice and equality,
that blacks are not playing by the rules that applied to earlier
generations of deprived minorities, and that blacks simply do
not deserve their most recent gains. Unlike the old-fashioned
or red-neck racism which denied that blacks had the right to
an opportunity (the freedom tocompete) for the good life, symbolic
racism grants this right but holds that blacks want more than
simply the rights that everyone else has. Blacks are too pushy,
too demanding, too angry, things are moving too fast, and blacks
are getting more than they deserve.
T h e second element is the lack of personal reference in making
these judgments. Whites who feel that blacks are getting too much
are not using themselves or their own experience as the standard.
In contrast to the perception of threat among less affluent whites
living inside American cities (Ashmore & McConahay, 1975), it
is not the personal welfare of these suburban whites that is
threatened, it is their values, their sense of propriety. Hence,
these whites fear for the survival of the nation and fear that
blacks do not deserve to make further demands or advances.
T h e final element of symbolic racism is that it is expressed
in symbols. Welfare, black anger and militance, riots, black mayors,
crime in the streets, affirmative action programs, public officials
sensitive to black demands, fair housing laws-all symbolize the
unfair advances or demands of blacks at the expense of “the
values that made this nation great.” The only behavior we have
examined so far has been the symbolic act of voting for an
unpopular white who ran against an experienced well-qualified
black, but other behaviors influenced by symbolic racism might
include attempting to prevent integration of the suburbs by blacks
who can afford to live there (Hamilton & Bishop, 1976) and
various other attempts to subvert or prevent affirmative action
programs.
Our most concise definition of symbolic racism, then, is that
it is the expression in t e r m of abstract ideological symbols and symbolic
behaviors of the feeling that blacks are violating cherished values and
making illegitimate demands for changes in the racial status quo.
We do not think that symbolic racism is rooted in current
or personal experience with blacks. Because of “black invisibility”
(Johnson, Sears, 8c McConahay, 1971) and isolation, what little
information suburban whites do have is from the media and
from rumor. Hence, studying the behavior or characteristics of
blacks will shed little illumination upon symbolic racism. However,
symbolic racism has at least three apparent roots-all of them
 SYMBOLIC RACISM 39

representing the residues of earlier socialization: (a) the traditional

religious and value socialization of secular American civil Protes-
tantism, (b) socialization to laissez faire political conservatism, and
(c) unacknowledged, negative feelings toward blacks. This gives
symbolic racism a potent one-two-three punch as the independent
effects of these residues of socialization are cumulative. Two of
the three roots also provide ready-made nonracial rationalizations
for symbolic racism behavior.
If we consider the sympathetic identification scale a measure
of a subtle, more affect-relevant form of prejudice than the other
measures used in these studies, the pattern of relationships among
the three racism scales in the seminarian study-red-neck preju-
dice and symbolic racism each related to sympathetic identification
but not to each other-would suggest that symbolic racism is
not just another manifestation of old-fashioned or red-neck racism.
Rather, both symbolic racism and old-fashioned racism are dif-
ferent expressions of basic antiblack feelings.
Finally, we would speculate that in the affluent suburbs, the
level of negative affect is rather mild compared with the feeling
level in other segments of white society. Symbolic racism in the
suburbs does not rest upon the violent antiblack attitudes and
feelings of a bygone era, but upon mildly negative feelings coupled
with a sense that blacks are not playing fair.
Why Now?
If both red-neck and symbolic racism are expressions of the
same antiblack feeling, why does the first appear to be on the
decline (Karlins et al., 1969; Sheatsley, 1966; Sigall & Page, 1971)
while the second is possibly on the rise (Sears & McConahay,
1973)? Though based upon a substantial body of research, our
answer to this question will be highly speculative, but may give
us some new perspectives on contemporary race relations.
Socialization. The events of the past, what Brewster Smith
(1968) has termed “the distal social antecedents,” affect current
political behavior in two ways. First, past events shape the political,
racial, and value socialization of current political actors (both
leaders and nonleaders); and, second, the past feeds into the
ongoing stream of events creating the contemporary political and
racial context. For simplicity, we shall concentrate our discussion
of socialization upon factors which our research has suggested
as important for understanding symbolic racism: antiblack affect,
Republican party identification, and traditional values.
Racial attitudes are among the earliest attitudes acquired by
40 JOHN B. MCCONAHAY AND JOSEPH C . HOUGH. JR

the individual (perhaps as early as five o r six years of age) and

are relatively stable throughout the individual’s lifetime (Sears,
1969; Sears & McConahay, 1973). Furthermore, these attitudes
correlate highly with parental attitudes (not with contact with
blacks or other minorities) and are acquired at the affective level
before they are articulated at the verbal o r cognitive level (Ehrlich,
1973; Horowitz, 1936). And virtually every systematic study of
regional differences in affective or cognitive antiblack prejudice
has shown that Northern whites were less prejudiced than South-
ern whites (Campbell, 1971; Erskine, 1967; Sears, 1969; Sheatsley,
1966). This does not mean that Northern whites were free of
racism o r prejudice, only that their prejudice was less than that
of Southerners a n d that it was less obvious.
During most of this century, the majority of Northern,
suburban whites have been too preoccupied with their own lives
to give much thought to blacks (Sears & McConahay, 1973). In
addition, blacks received little coverage in the press except when
they rioted during World Wars I and I1 and in the middle to
late 1960s (Johnson et al., 1971). With a few minor exceptions,
the major public opinion organizations did not think black issues
were of sufficient general importance to ask people questions
about them until the start of the direct action period o f the civil
rights movement in 1954 (Sheatsley, 1966). As a consequence,
Northern whites never had to confront their racial feelings. Thus,
because affluent and educated Northerners were especially less
likely than Southerners to espouse old-fashioned o r red-neck
prejudice, these suburbanites perceived that the North did not
have a race problem.
Feeding into these perceptions was the fact that most efforts
by social reformers to combat prejudice in this century concentrat-
ed on the most blatant antiblack attitudes and behaviors rather
than upon the affective components. (And rightly so; it was, after
all, more important to prevent whites from lynching and abusing
blacks than to get whites to feel good about blacks o r to l o ~ e
them.) Perhaps as a consequence of these reform efforts, old-
fashioned and red-neck racism declined in both the North and
South, but the best evidence available indicates that for persons
socialized between 1930 and 1960 (the developmental period for
most current adult voters) antiblack affect o r feeling has not
declined at all in recent years (Campbell, 1971), o r it has not
declined at the same rate as have expressions of old-fashioned
or red-neck racism (Sigall & Page, 197 1 ; Weitz, 1972). As a result,
many Northern white adults at the present time do not (or will
 SYMBOLIC RACISM 41

not) express old-fashioned racism, while they still harbor a great

residue of unacknowledged antiblack affect.
Party identification is also socialized at a fairly early stage
of development and is quite stable over the lifetime of the
individual (Sears, 1969). It too is apparently acquired at an affective
level before individuals discover the specific policies and ideologies
that their party endorses. People d o change party identifications
for ideological reasons, nevertheless, and there is general (though
not unanimous) agreement that in the North, Republican party
identifiers are more conservative than Democratic identifiers
(Sears, 1969). Though conservatism niay have more than one
dimension, we hypothesize that in our studies, after the controls
for traditionalism and conventionalism were applied, the impor-
tant dimension tapped by Republican party identification has to
do with the role of government in regulating social affairs. That
is, Republican party identification in this context reflects the
sentiment that the government ought to interfere with the affairs
of people only in the most minimal way. Persons holding this
philosophy, if consistent and other things being equal, would
oppose de jure segregation or discrimination against blacks because
the government ought not put unnecessary obstacles in blacks’
path to the good life and would oppose government affirmative
action policies because they might put de jure obstacles in the
path of some whites.
T h e values that appear to be most important for producing
symbolic racism are those associated with what we call American
civil Protestantism. Specific expressions of these values may be
multidimensional, but they are, we would hypothesize, derived
from the secularized versions of the Protestant Ethic (Weber,
1958): hard work, individualism, sexual repression, and delay
of gratification, with a large dose of patriotism and reverence
for the past thrown in. Such values are not in themselves racist.
Persons holding such values would regard anyone, white, brown,
or black, who appeared to deviate from these values-e.g., hippies,
vagrants, sexual libertines-as immoral. Not every Northern white
held these values in an extreme o r dogmatic fashion any more
than every Northern white was a politically conservative (anti-
government-interventionist) Republican who harbored unac-
knowledged negative feelings toward blacks. But a large number
of Northern whites were influenced by this socialization back-
ground when they were called upon to interpret and vote upon
issues created by the civil rights movement as it shifted from
South to North.
42 JOHN B. MCCONAHAY AND JOSEPH C . HOUGH, JR.

History. T h e civil rights movement began slowly in the South,

but as it gained momentum there Northern whites began to pay
somewhat more attention to blacks and to the issues associated
with civil rights (Johnson et al., 1971; Sheatsley, 1966). I n
this context there are two important characteristics of the civil
rights struggle which began with the Montgomery boycott and
continued through the battles of Birmingham and Selma: (a)
the problem was visible and well-defined, and (b) there was a
visible enemy who openly espoused red-neck racism. T h e problem
was de jure segregation of public schools and other public facilities
and a denial of the right to vote by legal chicanery. Signs proclaimed
it from every restroom, restaurant, and movie theater. Further-
more, the conflicting parties and even casual observers could
spot one another. Blacks stood eyeball to eyeball with Bull Conner,
Jim Clark, and George Wallace, while Northern whites looked
on through the media. For Northern whites, it was easy to spot
the racism of Connor et al. because it was open red-neck prejudice.
Northern whites knew that once the laws were changed to give
blacks their freedom to eat, shop, and study where they could
afford to, the problem became one of changing individuals, a
problem which accorded well with American civil Protestantism.
Just as each individual had to work out his own religious salvation,
each black would have to work his or her way ahead in the
system and each Southern bigot would have to come to grips
with his or her own racism.
As long as the civil rights movement remained principally
in the South, the nature of the problem and of the conflicting
parties made Northern whites real if reluctant allies of blacks.
As is always the case when a conflict is at a distance, the issues
were moral and the blacks were clearly and unambiguously upon
the side of justice. Blacks were seeking their freedom (as opposed
to an equal opportunity) to compete in the quest for the American
dream. This accorded well with the Protestant Ethic with its
emphasis upon individuals’ working hard to attain earthly evidence
of individual success in the race for salvation. A desire to compete
in this manner could only indicate the righteousness of the cause.
Second, the laws passed by Northern congressmen in response
to the pressures of the civil rights movement were all aimed
at imposing reforms upon the South. It is always easier to be
for reform when it will not inconvenience you or take away your
power than when you must make the sacrifices. Third, and finally,
the nonviolent attack upon de jure segregation and individual
racism not only did not inconvenience Northerners, it did not
 SYMBOLIC RACISM 43

threaten any of the basic institutions, values, systems, or preroga-

tives of Northern society. T o allow someone to eat in a restaurant
was good for business; it did not mean that someone else could
not have a meal. Hence, as revealed in the various polls (Erskine,
1967) Northerners gave strong support to specific reforms and
to specific protests even though they were not too happy with
the protests in general.
When the press of events shifted the locus of civil rights
activity to the North, the nature of the conflict was radically
altered. The problem was no longer a well-defined de jure
segregation; it was a diffuse de facto racism. The need was no
longer for freedom to compete and enjoy. Northern blacks had
possessed that freedom for years. It was now an equal opportunity
which blacks sought to obtain. T h e reforms needed were not
specific and limited. Rather, they threatened every Northern
institution.
But the most profound differences were in the nature of
the antagonists. Here the conflict was between a different kind
of black (Sears & McConahay, 1973) and a different kind of
white. The blacks in the North started legally, sociologically, and
psychologically from a point that Southern blacks were just striving
toward, and they pressed their demands for programs aimed
at doing away with de facto segregation and discrimination by
means of an almost unbelievably wide range of tactics, including
violence or the threat of violence (Sears & McConahay, 1973).
Their white opponents were not Southern bigots, but Northerners
who were relatively lacking in old-fashioned racism and
preoccupied with their own privatistic lifestyles. These whites were
angered by the blacks’ tactics and they viewed as immoral the
blacks’ demands for hiring, educational and housing quotas,
recognition and respect, and an end to all aspects of de facto
segregation and discrimination. Furthermore, the more traditional
and conservative these whites were and the more negative were
their feelings toward blacks, the more likely they were to express
their anger and moral outrage in symbolic opinions (to pollsters
and researchers) and in symbolic behaviors, especially that most
symbolic of American political behaviors, the vote. In short,
symbolic racism emerged.
However, because they do not see themselves as fitting the
model of the old-fashioned or red-neck racist, but as persons
morally outraged for nonracial reasons, many Northern whites
do not view themselves as bigoted. As a consequence, appeals
to them to repent of their racism (or programs designed to attack
44 JOHN B. MCCONAHAY AND JOSEPH C. HOUGH, JR.

old-fashioned racism) seem incomprehensible to them and they

do not understand what all the fuss is about. This enables racism
to be considered “sotnebody else’s’’problem while white suburban-
ites concentrate upon their own private lives.
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1. McConahay, J. B., & Hough, J. C. Value roots of symbolic racism (Working
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2. Hough, J. C., & McConahay, J. B. Racism, prejudice, and police brutctlity
as (1 fiiirctioii of love arid guilt orzetited re/igious beliefs. Papei- presented
at the meeting o f the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, Boston,
October. 1969.
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