Sample Answers of Famous Bar

Topnotchers!
Justiniano Montano (2nd Place, 1929) – Civil Law, 100%
Q.- Distinguish between nullity of marriage and divorce.

A.- Divorce presupposes a valid marriage while a nul-lity

presupposes a vicious or voidable marriage.

In nullity the cause exists before or at the time of the

celebration; in divorce the cause arises subsequent to the
celebration.

Q.- Differentiate between mortgage and sale with

stipulation for repurchase.

A.- 1. Mortgage is an accessory contract while sale con pacto

de retro is a principal contract.

2. In sale with. pacto de retro the title is conveyed; in

mortgage not.

3. In sale with repurchase possession is transferred; in

mortgage it is not transferred.

4. In sale with repurchase, title in the vendee becomes

absolute the moment the period for redemption expires; in
mortgage, foreclosure is necessary whether judicial or extra-
judicial.

Hermenegildo Atienza (1st Place, 1932) – Civil Law, 95%

Q.- A executes in favor of B a promissory note for P10,000.00,

payable after two years, secured by a mortgage on a cement
build-ing valued at P20,000.00. One year after the execution
of the note the mortgaged building was totally burned. Can B
demand from A the payment of the value of the note? Reason
out your answer.

A.- A can demand the payment of the note. Mort-gage is an

accessory obligation and the payment of the debt in this case
is the principal obligation. Loss of the thing due extinguishes
an obligation. But the extinguish-ment of an accessory
obligation does not extinguish the principal obligation. The
mortgage is lost and extinguished by the destruction of the
mortgaged building. But it does not, as an accessory
obligation, necessarily bring about the extinction of the
principal obligation to pay the note.

Arturo Tolentino (2nd Place, 1934) – Civil Law, 91%

Q.- A built a house on land belonging to B in the belief that the
land was his own. The error discovered, B formally notified A
that he elected to appropriate the house. All efforts to reach
an agreement as to the sum to be paid to A having failed, A
began an action to recover the expenditures incurred by him
in building the house. The house was destroyed in a fire of
purely accidental origin. Do you think that notwithstanding the
loss of the house A would be entitled to recover from B the
said expenditures? Why?

A.- A would be entitled to recover the expenditures incurred

by him in building the house. The law provides that when
something is built in good faith upon the land of another, the
latter shall have the option to appropriate the same upon
payment of the expenses to the builder, or to require the
builder to pay the price of the land on which said building was
constructed. In the exercise of this op-tion, B elected to
appropriate the house. By so doing he incurred the obligation
to pay the expenses to A, which is an obligation which does
not depend on the continued existence of the house. It may be
said that his exercise of the option given by law made the
house his own by ac-cession. Res perit domino; hence, he
must bear the loss and pay the expenses.

Cesar Bengzon (2nd Place, 1919) – Commercial Law, 92%

Q.- The vessel “A” collided with the vessel “B” in Manila Bay.
The officers of both vessels were negligent in the performance
of their duties at the time of the accident. Has the owner of “B”
any right to recover anything from the owner of “A”? Give
reasons.
A.- The owner of B has no right to recover from A any damage
suffered by the vessel “B”.

The owner of B however has a right to demand con-tribution

from the owner of A for the amount (if any) which the former
has been compelled to pay damages to the cargo of B.
Because the law provides that when two vessels collide and
both are to blame, each suffers its own damage but they are
solidarily respon-sible for their cargo. And it is but reasonable
that this should be the rule; because the shippers or freighters
are not to be prejudiced by the negligence of the crew of the
respective vessels; and it is also reasonable that each ship
should suffer individually for the wrong of its officers. This is to
be understood, however, subject to the rule that in collisions
the responsibility does not extend farther than the value of the
ship and the freightage earned.

Estanislao Fernandez (4th Place, 1933) – Criminal Law,

97%
Q.- A received from B for safeguarding during B’s absence
abroad a sealed trunk containing valuable articles. A
afterwards broke the trunk open with a hatchet without B’s
consent and appro-priated its contents to his own use. What
crime did A commit? State your reason.

A.- This case falls within the intriguing boundary line of cases
between theft and estafa.

The test whether a crime is one or the other is: was the
juridical possession of the thing delivered with it to the
offender? If so, then there is estafa; otherwise, theft results.

Juridical possession means a possession which gives the

transferee a right over the thing which, in the words of Judge
Albert, the transferee may set up even against the owner.

Tested by this rule, it is respectfully submitted that A is guilty

of estafa. Estafa is committed by any person who shall
defraud another by any of the following means:
(1) with ungratefulness or abuse of confidence, (2) by
ap-propriating money, goods, or other personal property
re-ceived in trust, for administration or on commission or
under any obligation which imposes the duty to deliver or
return the thing.

In the instant case, A was given the juridical posses-sion over

the trunk, namely, the possession of a depositary, thereby
imposing upon him by the duty to hold the prop-erty in trust
and to deliver it to B on demand.

Roberto Concepcion (1st Place, 1924) – Criminal Law,

95%
Q.- The municipal president of a town, in a fit of anger,
muti-lated and destroyed a municipal payroll presented to him
by the municipal treasurer for approval and signature. This
payroll had not yet been signed by the other municipal officials
as required by law. What crime, if any, was committed by the
municipal president? Reasons.

A.- He has not committed any crime, because the papers

destroyed were nothing more than some ordinary documents,
a kind of rough draft (so we may say), because they were
mere documents prepared to be converted into public
documents. When they were destroyed, they did not have any
value other than what they had materially as paper. At most,
the president will be liable for the value of the papers
destroyed, which is certainly too insignificant to raise the
responsibility of said president to the category of crime.

Manuel Roxas (1st Place, 1913) – International Law, 100%

Q.- Jusara, a Turkish subject, sells to Hatchina of the same
nationality, 100 slaves, for which the latter gives a promissory
note. The sale is made in Turkey and is perfectly valid in that
country. Both come to Manila where Jusara sues Hatchina for
failure to pay the note. Will action prosper? Explain the
doctrine on this matter.

A.- The action would not succeed because, although the

contract was perfectly valid where made, yet the
considera-tion for the same is not only illegal and immoral but
is dis-countenanced and condemned by all civilized countries.
Our courts cannot let themselves be the instrument for the
enforcement of such a contract. It is against our plain public
policy and slavery being considered an inhuman practice, our
courts would not even entertain a suit for the recovery of the
purchase price.

Roque Desquitado (1st Place, 1923) – International Law,

98%
Q.- Is a state responsible for the damages caused to the
subjects of another in cases of revolution or civil war? And in
cases of local disturbances?

A.- A state is not liable for damages caused the other subjects
in cases of revolution or civil war. The subjects must suffer the
consequences arising from revolution or civil war. A state is
not expected to guarantee to other subjects that they shall
never be molested in their peace-ful residence therein. There
are certain events in which a state cannot at times cope with
the situation, and revo-lution and civil war are among those
cases. Moreover, the residence of other subjects in the
territory is a mere privilege conferred upon them by the state.
If the revolu-tion or civil war attains such proportion that other
states deem it expedient to recognize their belligerency, then
the state where such revolution happens shall with more
rea-son be released from the consequences arising from such
state of things.

In local disturbances the state is liable as in the case of the

Boxer Rebellion in China where China was compelled to pay
indemnity to states whose subjects were injured thereby.

Hermenegildo Atienza (1st Place, 1932) – Political Law,

100%

Q.- Can the judicial power ever exercise any control over
the executive or legislative?
A.- When the judicial power declares a law unconsti-tutional,
or nullifies an act of the executive, it may be said for practical
effect that the judicial power exercises a cer-tain degree of
control over these branches. Yet in legal theory, as repeatedly
declared by the courts, such acts of the judiciary in no way
control the other branches, but simply gives effect to the
fundamental law which is of superior obligation. It is the
partic-ular province of the courts to declare what the law is,
and when a statutory enactment contravenes a constitutional
provision, it is for the courts to give effect to the consti-tution.
In the famous case of Marbury vs. Madison, Chief Justice
Marshall denied that in the declaration by the Su-preme Court
that a certain act of Congress was unconsti-tutional, it was
thereby in control of the legislative branch. It was only
declaring what the fundamental law is, and to show the way
for the legislature. For like any branch of government, the
legislative and the executive branches must act within the law,
or they are lawless usurpations.

Q.- Can legislative powers be delegated?

A.- Legislative powers cannot be delegated. This is based on
the ethical principle that the power is not simply a right or
privilege, but a duty and obligation. It has its constitutional
justification in the doctrine, that where the sovereign power
has placed a power, there it must remain, and one to whose
judgment, wisdom and patriotism a duty has been entrusted
should not perform it through the judg-ment, wisdom, or
patriotism of another. However, where the ‘delegation is not of
the power to determine what the law is, but how it is to be
executed, the delegation is proper. (U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho; U.
S. vs. Barrias; Inchausti vs. Public Utility Commission).

Q.- Define the police power. What are its bases? What are
its limitations?
A.- Police power has been defined as the inherent power of
the state to adopt any measure necessary to pro-tect public
interest and promote public welfare. It in-cludes practically the
whole field of regulation. (U. S. vs. Pompeya). It extends to
everything essential to public safety, health, morals, peace
and order and justifies abate-ment of anything that may be
considered a public nuisance. (U.S. vs. Toribio).
It is based on 2 well-known maxims: “Salus populi est
suprema lex” (The welfare of the people is the supreme law);
and “Sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas” (So use yours that
it may not damage your neighbor’s)

The only limitations on public power are that it must be

reasonable and not oppressive or discriminatory, and must be
for the public benefit or purpose primarily, and not for the
benefit of a private person, although the public be incidentally
benefited. There must, therefore, be a fair and reasonable
necessity and relation between the means employed and the
end to be achieved.

Manuel Roxas (1st Place, 1913) – Remedial Law, 100%

Q.- Upon what ground is hearsay evidence excluded?

A.- Hearsay evidence is excluded upon the broad grounds of
public policy. It is excluded upon the sound theory that no man
can better express his ideas than he himself. A perfect
knowledge of human nature must com-mend this rule, for it is
very seldom, if at all, that a man can repeat in court what
another has told him regarding a particular fact, and the
allowance of the evidence would lead to innumerable frauds
and to great difficulty in the determination of facts. Besides, if
hearsay is admissible if given by the person who say that he
heard another say something, logically, at least, it must also
be admissible if told by a third or a fifth, or a tenth person who
testifies as to what he had heard the previous man said to
what he had heard another previous man saying, and so on,
and thus a story of three words may become a thousand. The
law cannot allow that.

Hearsay is only admitted in very few cases where the law on

the ground of necessity or convenience admits it, but well
guarded by technical rules.

Arturo Tolentino (2nd Place, 1934) – Legal Ethics, 94%

Q.- What limitation is there upon the right of an attorney

to coach his witnesses?
A.- The attorney may coach his witnesses in the prop-er
manner of answering questions so that the facts to which they
testify may be clearly brought out. The limita-tion is that he
should never teach the witness to state facts which the
witness does not know; in other words, he should not
manufacture evidence and then make the witness his
mouthpiece. He should never induce the witness to com-mit
perjury.