Pre-Week: Last Minute Tips

SAN BEDA UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LAW
RGCT - Bar Operations Center
PRE-WEEK
LAST MINUTE TIPS
CRIMINAL LAW
CRIMINAL LAW
Rockylle Dominique L. Balisong
Subject Chair
Joshua L. Labonera
Assistant Subject Chair
Sinjin Joshua M. Taloma

Subject Electronic Data Processing
Arabella Matheia M. Adriano

Subject Head for criminal law 1
Angela Michaella S. Yumul

Subject Head forcriminal law 2
Gilda Francesca G. Flores

Subject Head for special penal laws
Subject Members
Jamon M. Espares, Jr.
Johannah Mae L. Badiola
Mikhail Joshua T. Bellosillo
Kristine Aira M. Inao
Alyssa Aimee S. Batle
Eric Carlos V. Panga, Jr.
Mark James F. Mariano
Maltha Denise D. Villarubia
Jhon Ian Michael P. Carlos
EDITORS
Rochelle S. Enrile
Chairperson for Academics
Academics Core Members

Mia Carmina Buencamino
Yzzabel Danganan
Ray Robin Ravelas
Jerenel Rendon
William Paul Sale
Gabrielle Anne S. Endona

Vice-Chairperson for
Electronic Data Processing
Electronic Data Processing

Committee Core Members
Micah P. Calip
Roemma Kara G. Palo
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CRIMINAL LAW
I. PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL LAW (REVISED PENAL CODE -

BOOK 1)
General Principles 5
Mala in se v. Mala Prohibita
Applicability and Effectivity of the RPC
Interpretation of Penal Laws
Felonies 10
Criminal Liabilities and Felonies
Circumstances Affecting Criminal Liability
Persons Liable and Degree of Participation
Penalties
Execution and Service of Sentence
Extinction of Criminal Liability
Civil Liability in Criminal Cases
II. CRIMES UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE (REVISED PENAL

CODE – Book 2)
Crimes against National Security and the Laws of Nations 37
Crimes against the Fundamental Law of the State 38
Crimes against Public Order 39
Crimes against Public Interest 41
Crimes against Public Morals 43
Crimes Committed by Public Officers 43
Crimes against Persons 45
Crimes against Personal Liberty and Security 55
Crimes against Property 58
Crimes against Chastity 65
Crimes against the Civil Status of Persons 68
Crimes against Honor 68
Quasi-Offenses 70
III. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

Anti-Child Pornography Act 72
Anti-Fencing Law 73
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 74
Anti-Hazing Act of 2018 77
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001 78
Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act 78
Anti-Plunder Act 80
Anti-Torture Act 80
Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act 81
Anti-Violence against Women and their Children 83
Anti-Wire Tapping Act 84
Bouncing Checks Law 85
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 87
Cybercrime Prevention Act 90
New Anti-Carnapping Act 90
Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and 91
Discrimination Act
Swindling by Syndicate 93
IV. PRACTICAL EXERCISES

Drafting of Complaint, Information, Affidavits of Desistance, etc. 95
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 104

CRIMINAL LAW
PRE-WEEK AND LAST MINUTE TIPS
Principles of Criminal Law (Revised Penal Code – Book 1)
General Principles
Mala in se v. Mala Prohibita
R was charged for both the crimes of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa. The five (5)
complainants uniformly alleged that they heard either from a radio advertisement or from a friend
about an employment opportunity in East Timor linked to R, who represented that she is authorized to
recruit workers in the Philippines for said employment opportunity. Thereafter, complainants left the
Philippines for East Timor. After the lapse of three (3) months in East Timor, complainants were never
issued their work permits. During trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of L, a senior Labor
and Employment Officer from the POEA, who confirmed that R was neither licensed nor authorized
to recruit workers for employment abroad. Is proof of criminal intent necessary to convict R for both
crimes?
No, criminal intent is not necessary to convict R of illegal recruitment in large scale. In illegal recruitment in large
scale, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction because said crime is malum prohibitum.
A person or entity engaged in recruitment and placement activities without the requisite authority is engaged in
illegal recruitment (RA 8042, Sec. 6).
Yes, proof of criminal intent is necessary to convict R of estafa. In estafa, such intent must be established because it
is malum in se. Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC is committed by any person who defrauds another
by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of fraud (People v. Racho, G.R. No. 227505, October 2, 2017).
Note: The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination
of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018).
When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished under a
special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise,
no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently
immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is
whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of
public policy (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157171, March 14, 2006).
Note: When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It is
sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to commit
the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to
commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself.
In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act)
it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously (Fajardo v. People, G.R. No. 190889, January 10,
2011).
T is the President of Looney Tons (“Looney”), a company engaged in mining operations in the province
of Cagayan Valley. Looney had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit. At the base of said pit
ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Cagayan River. It appears that Looney had placed a concrete plug
at the tunnel’s end. One day, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels’ end. Eventually, the said pit
had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Cagayan River. Looney was separately charged with
violations of the Water Code (PD 1067), Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942), National Pollution Control
Decree (PD 984) and Art. 365 of the RPC for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
T moved to quash the Informations on the ground of duplicity of suits as there were multiple charges
arising from a single act. Decide on T’s motion.
The motion to quash the Informations shall be denied. The filing of multiple charges against Looney, although
based on the same incident, is consistent with the settled doctrine that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating PD
1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa); what
San Beda University College of Law 5 RGCT - Bar Operations Center 2022
CRIMINAL LAW
makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them. Thus, the Informations separately charging Looney with
violations of PD 1067, RA 7942, PD 984 and violation of the RPC shall not be dismissed (Loney v. People, G.R.
No. 152644, February 10, 2006).
Applicability and Effectivity of the RPC
An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against M, an Iranian National. The
criminal charge followed a “buy-bust operation” concluded by the Philippine police narcotic agent in
the house of M where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have been seized. The narcotic
agents were accompanied by S, a special agent of United States Drug Enforcement Administration (US
DEA), who would, in due time, become one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. Subsequently,
Presiding Judge rendered a decision acquitting M. M filed Civil Case before the RTC for damages on
account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by S. S filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity.
1. Is S entitled to diplomatic immunity?
No. S contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the Philippines is a signatory,
grants him absolute immunity from suit being an agent of the US DEA. However, the main yardstick in
ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he
performs duties of diplomatic nature. The Vienna Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions
to include (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state, (b) envoys, ministers or inter nuncios
accredited to the head of states, and (c) charges d’ affairs accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs. The
Convention defines “diplomatic agents” as the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus
impliedly withholding the same privileges from all others. S asserted that he was an Assistant Attache of the
US diplomatic mission. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under him.
These officials are not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor they normally designated
as having diplomatic rank. Thus, S is not entitled to diplomatic immunity (Minucher v. CA, G.R. No. 142396,
February 11, 2003).
2. If not, is S still exempt from criminal liability? If yes, On what grounds?
Yes, S is still exempt from criminal liability. While the diplomatic immunity of S might thus remain
contentious it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the US DEA. If it should be ascertained
that S was acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts allegedly complained of, the
present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit. While the
doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the State without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints
filed against officials of the State for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The
official exchanges of communication, certifications from officials, as well as participation of members of the
Philippine Narcotics Command may be inadequate to support to support the diplomatic status of S but they
give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur to the activities of S. It can
hardly be said that he acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties. All told, S is entitled to the
defense of state immunity from suit (Minucher v. CA, G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003).
C, a Chinese national employed as an Economist by the Asian Development Bank, was charged with grave
oral defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory words against F, C’s Filipino secretary. The MeTC
judge received an “office of protocol” from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that C is
covered by immunity from “legal process with respect to acts performed by him in his official capacity
except when the Bank waives the immunity” under Section 45(a) of the Agreement between the ADB
and the Philippine Government. The MeTC judge, without notice to the prosecution, dismissed the
criminal case based on the immunity under said protocol communication. He had not given opportunity
to the prosecution to rebut the claim of immunity. Do you agree with the MeTC judge?
I disagree. The immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute, and is subject to the exception
that the act was done in “official capacity.” It is therefore necessary to determine if C’s case falls within the ambit
of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must
be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire. The slander of a person,
by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB officers and
personnel. As an Economist, slandering a person could not possibly be part of C’s official duties. Our laws also do
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not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty (Liang v. People, G.R. No.
125865, January 28, 2000).
Note: Article 31 of the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic Relations provides that a diplomatic agent has
absolute immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state.
The diplomatic agent shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of:
1. A real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State unless
he holds it on behalf of the sending State for purposes of the mission;
2. An action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir
or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State;
3. An action relating to any professional or commercial activity by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state
outside his official functions (Article 31, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961).
While on board a Malaysian-owned, MARINA-registered merchant vessel, I, an Indonesian crew,

stabbed U, a Ukrainian crew. U died. If the stabbing incident occurred beyond 200 nautical miles from
the Philippine baselines, may I be prosecuted before a Philippine court?
Yes. Under Art. 3 of the UNCLOS, the territorial sea extends up to twelve (12) nautical miles from the baseline,
within which all penal laws apply (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011). Under the Principle
of Extraterritoriality, the provisions of the RPC shall be enforced outside the jurisdiction of the Philippines against
those who should commit an offense while on board a Philippine ship or aircraft (RPC, Art. 2, par. 1). It is the
registration of the vessel in accordance with the laws of the Philippines, not the citizenship of her owner, which
makes it a Philippine ship (U.S. v. Fowler, G.R. No. L- 496, December 31, 1902). Here, the stabbing incident
occurred outside of the Philippine territory. However, since the vessel is registered with the MARINA, I was
considered to be on board a Philippine ship at the time of the commission of the offense. Hence, Philippine courts
have jurisdiction.
B left his wife, G, and their children in their home in Quezon City to work abroad. A few years later,
B acquired a permanent resident status. One day, G received an e-mail from B’s mother showing pre-
nuptial photos of B and his live-in partner abroad. Aggrieved, G filed a complaint before the RTC
of Quezon City against B for violation of RA 9262. G claims that B’s marital infidelity constitutes
psychological violence and have caused her mental and emotional anguish. When B came home to the
Philippines to buy wedding souvenirs, he was arrested. For his defense, B claims that the local courts do
not have jurisdiction over the case because the acts complained of transpired abroad.
1. Is B’s defense tenable?
No. While it is true that penal laws only apply within the Philippine territory, RA 9262 contemplates that
acts of violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes. Under Sec.
7, cases may be filed where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
A person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory
where the offense was in part committed. Psychological violence is an indispensable element of the offense
but equally essential is the element of mental and emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant.
Here, the marital infidelity was committed by B abroad while its effects of mental and emotional anguish to G
occurred here in the Philippines. Thus, B may be validly tried before the RTC of Quezon City where G and
their children reside (AAA v. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018).
2. Assuming instead that the case filed against B was for the crime of bigamy, does RTC Quezon City
have jurisdiction?
No, B cannot be prosecuted for bigamy before the local court because the bigamous marriage was contracted
abroad. Following the Principle of Territoriality, penal laws are only enforceable within the Philippine
territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulation (CIVIL CODE, Art.
14). The Principle of Extra-Territoriality does not find application in this case because the act complained of
is not one of the instances under which Philippine penal laws may apply to crimes committed outside of its
territorial boundaries (RPC, Art. 2).
Who are bound to follow the Philippine penal laws?

As a general rule, penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn
in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations (CIVIL
CRIMINAL LAW
CODE, Art. 14). However, this is subject to exceptions under the following: (1) principles of public international
law, (2) treaty stipulations, and (3) laws of preferential application (CIVIL CODE, Art. 14; RPC, Art. 2).
The following persons are not subject to the operation of our criminal laws: (SCAMR)
1. Sovereigns and other heads of state;
2. Charges d’affaires;
3. Ambassadors;
4. Ministers plenipotentiary; and
5. Other Representatives accredited to the host heads of the State Ministers resident
Note: The following special penal laws also have extra-territorial application (not an exclusive list):
1. Cybercrime Prevention Act (RA 10175, Sec. 21);
2. Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (RA 11479, Sec. 49); and
3. Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (RA 9206, Sec. 26-A, as amended by RA 10364).
When can penal laws be applied retroactively?

Under Article 22 of the RPC, penal laws are applied retroactively:
1. When the law is favorable to the accused, except when accused is a habitual criminal; and
2. When the law decriminalizes an act, except when the new law is expressly made inapplicable to pending
actions or existing causes of actions (Tavera v. Valdez, G.R. No. L-922, November 08, 1902).
May the provisions of RA 10951 (An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and Damage
on Which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed under the RPC) be given retroactive effect?
The answer must be qualified. As a rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the
character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused
(Valeroso v. People, G.R. No. 164815, February 22, 2008). The amendatory effects of RA 10951 are either favorable
or prejudicial to the accused. If a provision of said Act is favorable to the accused, it shall be given a retroactive
effect. If a provision of said Act is prejudicial to the accused, it shall be given a prospective effect. RA 10951
expressly provides that said Act shall have retroactive effect to the extent that it is favorable to the accused or person
serving sentence by final judgment (RA 10951, Sec. 100).
Note: An example of a provision which is prejudicial to the accused is the imposition of a minimum penalty of
prision mayor for estafa by postdating check punished under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC (RA 10951, Sec. 85).
Prior to RA 10951, estafa by postdating a check was punishable by a minimum penalty of arresto mayor, which is
a penalty lower than prision mayor.
May an accused who is a habitual delinquent benefit from the retroactive application of favorable
provisions of RA 10951?
Yes. It is well-settled that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony,
who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of the RPC, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same (RPC, Art. 22).
However, this rule does not apply when the subsequent law expressly provides for retroactive application. Here,
RA 10951 can still be given retroactive effect because it expressly provides that for cases pending before the courts
upon its effectivity where trial has already started, the courts hearing such cases shall not lose jurisdiction over the
same by virtue of said Act (Sec. 101, RA 10951).
Note: When exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant amendatory law (RA 10951)
imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the reopening
of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the
applicable penalties to be imposed (Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, December 5, 2017).
Interpretation of Penal Laws
In case of doubt and ambiguity in the language used, what is the rule on the construction of penal laws?
In case of doubt and ambiguity in the language used, the following rules are followed in construing penal laws:
1. Penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are
CRIMINAL LAW
not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable considerations. They

are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply
felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny
and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the accused (People v. Sullano, G.R. No.
228373, March 12, 2018). This interpretation can only be invoked where the law is ambiguous and there
is doubt as to its interpretation (REYES, Book One, supra at 27);
2. In construing the Old Penal Code and the RPC, the Supreme Court had accorded respect and persuasive,
if not conclusive effect to the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and construing the
1850 Penal Code of Spain (People y. Escote, Jr. GR No. 140756, April 4, 2003); and
3. Spanish text is controlling over English language in case of doubt to its interpretation. The Supreme Court
found merits on the contention of the appellee. Since the RPC was originally approved and enacted in
Spanish, the Spanish text governs. In this case, the word “imprisonment” used in the English text is a
wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase “sufriendo privacion de libertad” used in the Spanish text.
Furthermore, though partial, destierro is a deprivation of liberty in the sense that the appellant is deprived
of liberty to enter the City of Manila. The Court held that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of
sentence under Article 157 of the RPC (Spanish text) (People v. Abilong L-1960, November 26, 1948)
What is the purpose of the liberal construction in favor of the accused?

The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise
definition of forbidden acts (People v. Sullano, G.R. No. 228373, March 12, 2018).
A burned the house of V, with the main objective of killing the latter and his daughter, D, resulting in
their deaths. What is the doctrine of pro reo and how may it be applied to the crime/s committed by A?
The doctrine of pro reo advocates that penal laws and laws penal in nature are to be construed and applied in a way
lenient or liberal to the offender, constant to and consistent with the constitutional guarantee that an accused shall
be presumed innocent until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.
The single act of A resulted in the complex crime of double murder. Following the doctrine of pro reo, under Art.
48 of the RPC, crimes are complexed and punished with a single penalty (i.e., that prescribed for the most serious
crime and to be imposed in its maximum period). The rationale being, that the accused who commits two crimes
with single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity that when the crimes are committed by different acts
and several criminal resolutions. Applying the doctrine of pro reo, A should be sentenced to suffer a single count of
reclusion perpetua for both deaths (People v. Comadre, G.R. No. 153559, June 8, 2004).
What is the rule of lenity?

The rule applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial
to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is
more lenient to the accused.
The time-honored principle is that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor
of the accused. When there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the
accused. Since penal laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court must determine whether their application
is consistent with the purpose and reason of the law (Ient v. Tullett Prebon PHL Inc., G.R. No. 189158, January
11, 2017).
D was charged before the trial court with violation of RA 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004. D claims that he may only be held liable for slight physical injuries
under Art. 266 of the RPC which imposes a lesser penalty than violation of the Anti-VAWC Law.
Considering that the penalty imposable under the RPC is more favorable to D, may the rule of lenity be
applied in this case?
No. The rule of lenity may not be used to construe RA 9292 because there is no ambiguity that would necessitate
any construction. The rule of lenity is intimately intertwined with the in dubio pro reo principle. The rule means that
“a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, should
resolve the ambiguity in favor of more lenient punishment” (People v. Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17,
2008). While the degree of physical harm under RA 9262 and Art. 266 are the same, there is sufficient justification
for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly, the legislative intent of RA 9262 is to purposely impose a
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more severe sanction on offenders to promote the protection of women and children (People v. Dabalos, G.R. No.
193960, January 7, 2013).
Felonies
Criminal Liabilities and Felonies
J was convicted for the crime of murder for killing his cousin, K. The trial court’s decision was anchored
on purely circumstantial evidence carved out principally from the testimonies of A, Police and Doctor.
A said that a week before the commission of the crime, he saw J armed with a knife. Police said that J
went into hiding but was present during the wake of K. Doctor said that K’s death could have been due
to a stab wound in the chest. On appeal, J claims that the trial court erred in convicting him because
the prosecution failed to prove any motive on his part in order to implicate him in the murder of his
cousin. Assuming there is no eyewitness to the commission of the crime and there is doubt as to whether
J committed the crime, how will you rule on the appeal?
The appeal is meritorious. As an accepted principle, proof of motive in criminal prosecutions is neither
indispensable nor necessary if the guilt of the accused is otherwise established by other competent evidence, as
the absence of motive or the apparent lack of it is not proof of innocence. When there is no eyewitness and there
is doubt as to whether the accused is or is not the person who committed the offense charged, as in this case,
the question of motive becomes important. Proof as to motive is essential when evidence on the commission of
the crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive. Thus, in the absence of other competent evidence sufficient
to sustain the conviction and lack of proof of motive, J must be acquitted (People v. Abillar, G.R. No. 134606,
November 29, 2000; Ubales v. People, G.R. No. 175692, October 29, 2008).
R was ordering bread at Aling N’s store when V suddenly appeared and without uttering a word,
stabbed the left side of Ross’ body using a sharpened bamboo stick and immediately fled. The bamboo
stick broke and was left in R’ body. Aling N and Mang C brought R to Tondo Medical Center and was
treated as an out-patient. R went home and continued to work as a carpenter. Twenty-five (25) days
later, R was brought to the San Lazaro hospital due to abdominal pains and convulsions. The following
day, R died. The medico-legal report showed that R died of severe tetanus infection secondary to stab
wound. V was then arrested and prosecuted for the murder of R. For his defense, V claims that the severe
tetanus infection was an efficient intervening cause resulting to R’s death and that the stab wounds he
had inflicted twenty-five days earlier was just a remote cause.
1. What is a proximate cause?
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
It is that cause acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion
all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events such that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have the reasonable ground to expect at that moment
of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom (Urbano v. IAC, G.R. No.
72964, January 7, 1988).
2. May the severe tetanus infection be considered an efficient intervening cause? Explain.
Yes. To be considered efficient, an intervening cause must be one not produced by a wrongful act or omission,
but independent of it, and adequate to bring the injurious results. Any cause intervening between the first
wrongful cause and the final injury which might reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated by the original
wrongdoer is not such an efficient intervening cause as will relieve the original wrong of its character as the
proximate cause of the final injury (Sps. Abrogar v. Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc., G.R. No. 164749, March
15, 2017). Considering the lapse of twenty-five days and the fact that Ross worked as a carpenter, he might
have contracted the severe tetanus infection which was not there at the time of the stabbing incident. Here,
the severe tetanus infection was distinct and foreign to the stab wounds inflicted by Victor hence it may be
considered an efficient intervening cause.
Note: The SC in Urbano v. IAC discussed the nature of tetanus. The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time
between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80
percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and
when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury, the mortality rate approaches 100 percent. Mild tetanus is
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characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Moderately severe
tetanus has somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time. Severe tetanus includes a short incubation time,
and an onset time of 72 hours or less.
Classify felonies according to gravity and explain each.

As to gravity, felonies may be classified as grave, less grave or light. Grave felonies are those to which the law attaches
the capital punishment (i.e. death; but note that RA 9346 prohibits the imposition of death penalty and reduces
the sentence to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole) or penalties which in any of their periods are
afflictive in accordance with Art. 25 of the RPC.
Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in their maximum period are correctional
in accordance with Art. 25 of the RPC.
Light felonies are those infractions of law or the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding Php40,000.00 or both is provided (RPC, Art. 9, as amended by RA 10951, Sec. 1).
When is fine considered afflictive, correctional or light penalty?

A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it exceeds
Php1,200,000.00; a correctional penalty, if it does not exceed Php1,200,000.00 but is not less than Php40,000.00;
and a light penalty, if it be less than Php40,000.00 (RPC, Art. 26, as amended by RA 10951, Sec. 2).
Note: The classification of felonies as grave, less grave and light is relevant in determining:
1. Whether felonies can be complexed or not. Art. 48 of the RPC excludes from its operation a light felony as
a component part of a complex crime (RPC, Art. 48);
2. Prescription of the crime (RPC, Art. 90);
3. To determine the duration of subsidiary penalty to be imposed (RPC, Art. 39(2)).
4. To determine whether an accused is liable. Only principals and accomplices are liable for light felonies
(RPC, Art. 16);
5. To determine whether the felony committed is punishable. Light felonies are punishable only when they
have been consummated, with the exception of crimes against persons and against property (RPC, Art. 7);
6. To determine the duration of the detention in case of failure to post the bond to keep the peace (RPC,
Art. 35);
7. To determine whether or not the person in authority or his agents have committed delay in the delivery of
detained persons to the judicial authority (RPC, Art. 125); and
8. To determine the proper penalty for quasi-offenses (RPC, Art. 365).
A was staying with his two-year old granddaughter, BBB at the terrace of the house. Suddenly, Z appeared
and started attacking A with a panabas. While A was able to evade Z’s blows, the latter hit BBB on her
abdomen and back, causing her instantaneous death. Is Z liable for BBB’s death?
Yes. BBB’s death is a case of aberratio ictus, given that the fatal blow therefor was only delivered by mistake as it
was actually A who was accused’s intended target. In this regard, accused’s single deed actually resulted in the: (a)
Attempted Murder of A; and (b) Consummated Murder of the BBB. This may be classified as species of complex
crime defined under Art. 48 of the RPC, particularly, a delito compuesto, or a compound crime where a single
act produces two (2) or more grave or less grave felonies. In relation to Article 4(1) of the RPC, a person shall be
criminally liable if he committed a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended
(People vs. Umawid, G.R. No. 208719, June 9, 2014).
B was riding his motorcycle when he chanced upon C, who was also on his motorcycle. B overtook C but
the latter flagged him down and an intense argument occurred between them. C drew his gun and fired
at B. B was hit at the back of his left arm and right wrist. Meanwhile, T, an 8 year-old boy was hit on the
head by one of the bullets fired by C. B survived but T died. Is C liable for the death of T?
Yes. Under Art. 4 of the RPC, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The author of the felony shall be criminally liable
for the direct, natural and logical consequence thereof, whether intended or not. For this provision to apply, it
must be shown that (a) an intentional felony has been committed, and (b) the wrong done to the aggrieved party
be the direct, natural and logical consequences of the felony committed. The foregoing elements are present in
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this case. C committed an intentional felony in shooting B, and the death of T was its direct, natural and logical
consequence. The death of T is an example of aberratio ictus under Art. 4 of the RPC (Cruz v. People, G.R. No.
216642, September 8, 2020).
A, B, C and D were on board a motor vehicle when a group of men, including E and F, fired shots on
them thereby killing A and B, while severely injuring C and D. An extrajudicial statement was made
by G, who testified that E and F mistook the vehicle of A, B, C and D as that of their rivals’. Hence,
when they saw the vehicle of the victims, shots were fired. The court found them guilty of murder and
frustrated murder. Are E and F liable for the crimes charged?
Yes. The case is an error in personae or mistake in the identity of the victims. The fact that they mistook the
identities of the victim does not diminish their culpability. As held by the Court, the mistake in the identity of the
victim carries with it the same gravity as that of killing the intended victim (People v. Sabalones, G.R. No. 123485,
August 31, 1998).
A has been suffering from partial paralysis and has lost control of the movement of his right arm. A
learned that M got his daughter P pregnant. When P gave birth, M promised to give monthly allowance
to P and their child. However, he never did. Consequently, A went to the office of M and asked the latter
to marry P but M refused. A then stabbed M on his face and due to his lack of control of his arm, the
knife landed on M’s neck, which caused the latter’s death. A argued that he did not intend to kill M, but
merely to inflict a wound on the face of M. Is A liable for homicide?
Yes. Notwithstanding the fact that A never intended to kill M and that the stabbing resulted in the fatal wound
at his neck was due solely to the fact the A did not have control of his right arm due to paralysis, A is still liable for
homicide. However, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause so grave an injury as the death of
the deceased should be taken into consideration in favor of A (People v. Alburquerque, G.R. No. 38773, December
19, 1933).
A, B, C and D discussed and agreed to kill Z. Upon reaching Z’s house, C struck Z on the nape then
hacked Z’s body on the side. Z lost consciousness. After five minutes, B stabbed Z. B then opened Z’s
chest and took out the heart. C took out Z’s liver. The organs were fed to a pig. B contends that he did
not kill Z for the latter was already dead when C stabbed him. Is B guilty of an impossible crime?
No. An impossible crime is attendant when the act performed would be an (1) offense against persons or property,
(2) that the act was done with evil intent, and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means
employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. To be impossible under the third element, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either: (1) legal impossibility,
or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. The
impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category. On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs
when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the
intended crime”. It was not shown that Z was dead when B stabbed him as Z was merely unconscious. Thus, B
may be held liable for murder and not for impossible crime (People vs. Callao, G.R. No. 228945, March 14, 2018).
X, Y and Z were employees of ABC Company and as such had free access inside the latter’s establishment.
X then unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to ABC Company. It was later on discovered that
the check was without value, as it was dishonored upon presentment. Discuss X’s criminal liability.
X is liable for an impossible crime. The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be
an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment
was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. Here, X performed all the
acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property. X’s evil intent cannot be denied,
as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for ABC Company showed his intent to gain or be unjustly
enriched. It was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to X at the
time, that prevented the crime from being produced (Jacinto v. People, G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009).
B hacked G with a bolo three times, hitting the latter twice on his face and forehead. Due to prompt
medical assistance, G survived and according to the report of the medico-legal officer, the injuries may
only possibly cause the victim’s death. The trial court found B guilty of frustrated murder. Is B liable
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for frustrated murder?

No. It is a well-settled rule that in order to convict an accused for the crime of frustrated murder or homicide,
the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim should be fatal. Otherwise, the accused can only be convicted
of attempted murder or homicide. Any doubt as to the nature of the wound should be resolved in favor or the
accused. In this case, since the report of the medico-legal officer failed to categorically state whether the wounds
sustained by G were fatal, the crime committed is only attempted murder (Oliveros v. People, G.R. No. 242552,
March 3, 2021, Caguioa case).
AAA and BBB took 15 boxes of detergent soap without paying for their price and loaded them on a
pushcart. They were apprehended by the security guard hauling the pushcart at the parking lot and
loading the boxes in a taxi. AAA and BBB were convicted of consummated theft. On appeal, AAA and
BBB argued that they should only be held liable for frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended,
they were never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen. Is their contention correct?
The contention of AAA and BBB is wrong because there is no crime of frustrated theft. The ability of the offender
to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft. Here, with intent to gain,
AAA and BBB acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of time that
they were able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a taxicab. Unlawful
taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if
he has no opportunity to dispose of the same (Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007).
Give examples of crimes which do not have a frustrated stage.

The examples of crimes which do not have a frustrated stage are as follows:
1. Rape, since the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge, hence, no matter how slight the penetration,
the felony is consummated (People v. Orita, G.R. No. 88724, April 3, 1990);
2. Indirect Bribery, because it is committed by accepting gifts offered to the public officer by reason of his
office. If he does not accept, he does not commit the crime. If he accepts, it is consummated;
3. Direct Bribery;
4. Corruption of Public Officers, because the offense requires the concurrence of the will of both parties,
such as that when the offer is accepted, the offense is consummated. But when the offer is rejected, the
offense is merely attempted;
5. Adultery, because the essence of the crime is sexual congress;
6. Physical Injury, since it cannot be determined whether the injury will be slight, less serious, or serious
unless and until consummated; and
7. Theft, because the unlawful taking immediately consummates the offense and the disposition of the thing
is not an element thereof (Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007).
A vehicular accident occurred on the national highway in Bulacan. Among the first to arrive at the scene
of the accident was B, who found one of the victims already dead and the two others unconscious. Before
rescuers could come, B, taking advantage of the helpless condition of the victims, took their wallets and
jewelry. The police who responded to the report of the accident caught B. He was charged with three (3)
counts of qualified theft under Article 310 of the RPC. Is the charge correct?
No. Only one crime of qualified theft may be charged as the case constitutes a continuing crime as the single act
consists of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution. It was a continuous, unlawful act or series
of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force. Although there are series of acts,
there is only one crime committed. The act of B in taking the properties of several victims was motivated by a single
criminal impulse of going on a thieving spree. Hence, only one penalty shall be imposed (Mallari v. People, G.R.
No. L-58886, December 13, 1988).
What are the differences between a complex crime and special complex crime?
As to concept, a complex crime is made up of two or more grave or less grave crimes being punished in distinct
provisions of the RPC but alleged in one information either because they were brought about by a single felonious
act or because one offense is a necessary means for committing the other offense or offenses. On the other hand,
a special complex crime is made up of two or more crimes which are considered only as components of a single
indivisible offenses being punished in one provision of the RPC.
As to penalty, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period in cases of complex
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crimes, whereas the penalty specifically provided for special complex crime according to the rules on imposition of
penalty shall be applied.
When A, B, and several companions saw the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor X approaching
towards the waiting shed, they opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle using high-powered
firearms. Two (2) of Mayor X’s security escorts died while five (5) others were injured. What crime, if
any, was committed?
The accused are liable for two (2) counts of murder and five (5) counts of attempted murder. When various victims
expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. In a complex crime, two (2) or more
crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute
only one (1) crime, and thus, only one (1) penalty is imposed. In this case, a complex crime was not committed
because the killing and wounding of the victims were not the result of a single discharge of firearms. The accused
opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle boarded by Mayor X and his group. As a result, two (2) security
escorts died while five (5) others were injured. Moreover, more than one gunman fired at the vehicle of the victims.
Obviously, accused performed not only a single act but several individual and distinct acts in the commission of
the crime. Thus, Article 48 of the RPC would not apply for it speaks only of a “single act” (People v. Nelmida, G.R.
No. 184500, September 11, 2012).
A, a Filipino, is a transgender who underwent gender reassignment and had implants in different parts
of his body. He changed his name to A and was a finalist in the Miss Gay International. He came back to
the Philippines and while he was walking outside his home, he was abducted by M and R who took him
to a house in the province. He was then placed in a room and R forced him to have sex with him at knife’s
point. After the act, it dawned upon R that A is actually a male. Incensed, R called M to help him beat A.
The beatings that Angelina received eventually caused his death. Is R liable for forcible abduction, rape,
acts of lasciviousness and homicide, or kidnapping with homicide? Explain.
R is liable for kidnapping with homicide. Abducting A is not forcible abduction since the victim in this crime must
be a woman. Gender reassignment will not make him a woman within the meaning of Art. 342 of RPC. There is
no showing, moreover, that at the time abduction is committed with lewd design; hence, his abduction constitutes
illegal detention. Since A was killed in the course of the detention, the crime constitutes kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide under Art. 267.
Since the victim is not a woman, it cannot be rape by sexual intercourse. Neither can it be rape by sexual assault for
R did not insert his penis into the anal orifice or mouth of Angelina or an instrument or object into anal orifice or
genital orifice, hence, this act constitutes acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336. Since the acts of lasciviousness is
committed by reason or occasion of kidnapping, it will be integrated into one and indivisible felony of kidnapping
with homicide M is liable for kidnapping with homicide as an accomplice since he concurred in the criminal design
of R in depriving A his liberty and supplied the former material aid in an efficacious way by helping him beat the
latter (People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016).
X and two (2) cohorts, armed with guns and a knife, robbed the house of Spouses Y during a birthday
celebration. After tying the hands of all the persons inside the house and divesting them of their
belongings, X and his co-accused, Z, proceeded to the maid’s quarters. Z held A at gunpoint and proceeded
to have carnal knowledge of her. X was convicted of robbery with rape together with Z, as X had the
opportunity but did not endeavor to stop his co-accused from raping A. Is the conviction proper?
Yes, the conviction of X is proper as he is liable for the crime of robbery with rape for failing to prevent the
commission of the rape despite having the opportunity to do so. Once conspiracy is established between two (2)
accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would be both equally culpable for the rape committed
by one of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the other
from committing the rape. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or
on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with
rape, although not all of them took part in the rape. Here, although X did not directly participate in raping A, his
failure to stop Z despite the opportunity to do so will make him equally liable for the crime committed (People v.
Belmonte et. al., G.R. No. 220889, July 5, 2017).
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Circumstances Affecting Criminal Liability
Justifying Circumstances
When is there a justifying circumstance of self-defense?

There is a justifying circumstance of self-defense if the accused is able to establish: a) that there was unlawful
aggression by the victim; b) that the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression were reasonable; and
c) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part. Of the three, unlawful aggression is the foremost
requirement. Hence, absent such element, self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated
(People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 218946, September 5, 2018, Caguioa case).
When is the means employed in the act of self-defense considered reasonable?

Whether or not the means of self-defense is reasonable depends upon the nature or quality of the weapon; the
physical condition, the character, the size and other circumstances of the aggressor; as well as those of the person
who invokes self-defense, and also the place and the occasion of the assault. Perfect balance between the weapon
used by the one defending himself and that of the aggressor is not required, because the person assaulted loses
sufficient tranquility of mind to think, to calculate or to choose which weapon to use (Remegio vs. People, G.R. No.
196945, September 27, 2017). What the law requires is rational equivalence and the proportionateness thereof does
not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger of such injury (People v. Encomienda, G.R.
No. L-26750, August 18, 1972).
C was smoking at a nearby store when D and his companions approached him, slapped him in the face,
and held him by the neck. Due to the intervention of Tanod E, the altercation ceased and C was able
to run away. Thereafter, C returned to the store and stabbed D, leading to his death. May C claim self-
defense?
No. C may not claim self-defense because the primordial element which is unlawful aggression is not present.
To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must be able to prove that: (1) the victim mounted an unlawful
aggression against the accused; (2) that the means employed by the accused to repel or prevent the aggression were
reasonable and necessary; and (3) the accused did not offer any sufficient provocation. As a rule, when unlawful
aggression which has begun no longer exists, the one making the defense is not anymore justified in killing or even
wounding the former aggressor. Here, the unlawful aggression on the part of D ceased to exist due to Tanod E’s
intervention, negating C’s claim of self-defense (People vs. Ramelo, G.R. No. 224888, November 22, 2017).
Note: Unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it are common
requisites of self-defense, defense of relative and defense of a stranger. These three justifying circumstances differ as
to their third element. In defense of relative, the third element is that in case provocation was given by the person
attacked, the one making a defense had no part therein. In defense of a stranger, the third element is that the person
defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive (RPC, Art. 11, pars. 2 and 3).
G, a police officer and crime investigator, proceeded to the residence of V upon the report of several
bursts of gunfire from the direction of the rear portion of V’s house. Gundam introduced himself as an
investigator to the group of V and asked the group who fired the gunshots. The group ignored him and
laughed. Without effecting an arrest, G admonished the group for their dangerous behavior considering
that they could have hit somebody. At that moment, V suddenly cocked and fired his pistol at G but it
jammed in the process. G immediately got hold of his gun and fired at V notwithstanding the latter’s
plea, ‘Huwag pare!’. V died on the spot. During the trial, G raised the defense, by way of exoneration,
that he acted in the fulfillment of a duty. Is the defense tenable? Explain.
No, the defense of G is untenable. In People v. Oanis (G.R. No. L47722, July 27, 1943), the Supreme Court set forth
two requisites in order that fulfillment of duty and exercise of a right may be considered as justifying circumstance,
namely: (a) that the offender acts in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the
injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or in the lawful
exercise of such right or office. Here, G was not performing his duties at the time of the shooting because he was
not effecting an arrest. At most, he was in the house of V to determine who had fired the gunshots that were heard
by the neighborhood. The fatal injuries that he inflicted on V was not a necessary consequence of the performance
of his duty as a police officer, thus negating his claim for exoneration (People v. Catbagan, G.R. Nos. 149430-32.
February 23, 2004).
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Note: In the performance of his duty, an agent of the authorities is not authorized to use force, except in an
extreme case when he is attacked or is the subject of resistance and finds no other means to comply with his duty or
cause himself to be respected and obeyed by the offender. In case injury or death results from the exercise of such
force, the same could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing the death of the offender if the officer had used
necessary force (Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012).
A had been married to B for ten (10) years. Since their marriage, B had been jobless and a drunkard,
preferring to stay with his “barkadas” until the wee hours of the morning. A was the breadwinner and
attended to the needs of their three (3) growing children. Many times, when B was drunk, he would beat
A and their three (3) children, and shout invectives against them. In fact, in one of the beating incidents,
A suffered a deep stab wound on her tummy that required a prolonged stay in the hospital. Due to the
beatings and verbal abuses committed against her, she consulted a psychologist several times, as she was
slowly beginning to lose her mind. One night, when B arrived dead drunk, he suddenly slapped A several
times while shouting invectives against her. B then went to sleep and left A crying. While B was sound
asleep, A stabbed B several times causing his instantaneous death. Medico-Legal Report showed that the
husband suffered three (3) stab wounds. Can A validly put up a defense? Explain. (2014 Bar)
Yes. A can put up the defense of battered woman syndrome. It appears that she is suffering from physical and
psychological or emotional distress resulting from cumulative abuse by her husband. Under Section 26 of RA
9262, “victim survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur
any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of
self-defense under the RPC.” As a rule, once the unlawful aggression ceased, stabbing the victim further is not
self-defense. However, even if the element of unlawful aggression in self-defense is lacking, A, who is suffering for
battered woman syndrome, will not incur criminal and civil liability (RA 9262, Sec. 26).
Note: For the discussion of the “cycle of violence” involved in the claim of Battered Woman Syndrome, kindly
refer to the discussion of RA 9262 under Special Penal Laws.
Exempting Circumstances
R went to a store to buy iced tea powder. While he was at the store, C, a minor, 17 years old, poked a gun
at his face and pulled the trigger but the gun did not fire. C then hit R in the head and punched him
several times. P, his friend, hit R in the head with a stone that caused the latter to lose his consciousness.
R was in coma for seven (7) days. The trial court convicted C with frustrated murder. C appealed arguing
that he should be exempted because it should be presumed that he acted without discernment due to the
prosecutor’s failure to prove that he was acting with discernment. Is C exempted from criminal liability?
Yes, C is exempted from criminal liability. Jurisprudence provides that when a minor over 15 but below 18 years old
is charged with a crime, it cannot be presumed that he acted with discernment. It is the duty of the prosecution to
prove as a separate circumstance that C committed the alleged crime with discernment by direct or circumstantial
evidence. Discernment is different from intent. The former cannot be presumed. In this case, C must be exempted
from criminal liability for failure to prove that he acted with discernment. (CICL XXX v. People, G.R. No. 237334,
August 14, 2019, Caguioa case).
What are the corresponding liabilities of a minor based on age and discernment?
Under RA 9344, Sec. 6, as amended by Sec. 3 of RA 10630, the corresponding liabilities based on age and
discernment are as follows:
1. Minors who are 15 years or under, regardless of discernment are exempted from criminal liability but shall
undergo intervention program;
2. Minors who are above 15 but below 18 years old, without discernment, are exempted from criminal
liability but shall undergo intervention program;
3. Minors who are above 15 but below 18 years old, with discernment, are subject to criminal liability but
shall undergo diversion program; and
4. Persons who are at least 18 years old are subject to criminal liability.
While in a drinking spree, R suddenly hacked X on the neck, back and fingers, which caused the latter’s
demise. During trial, R pleaded insanity as defense. R, prior to the incident, was admitted for his suicidal
tendencies. He presented the testimony of Dr. G who diagnosed him as a schizophrenic three (3) years
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prior to the incident and three (3) months after the incident. Dr. G testified that upon examination, R
was having auditory hallucinations, depressed mood with appropriate effect and could not remember
what he did at the time of the incident. Nevertheless, the court convicted R of homicide. On appeal,
R argued that he should be exempted from criminal liability on the ground of insanity. Is R exempted
from criminal liability?
No. For the defense of insanity to be successfully invoked as an exempting circumstance, it is necessary that: a)
the accused was completely deprived of intelligence; and b) such complete deprivation of intelligence must be
manifest at the time or immediately before the commission of the offense. The testimony of proof of an accused’s
insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense which
he is charged. In this case, R failed to prove that he was insane at the time or immediately before the commission
of the offense. The claim that he has absolutely no recollection of the hacking incident amounts to a mere general
denial, which, by itself, does not prove that R had lost his grip on reality at the time of the incident. Thus, R failed
to prove insanity and is not exempted from criminal liability (People v. Bacolot, G.R. No. 233193, October 10, 2018,
Caguioa case).
L allegedly hacked S until the latter died. Policemen arrived at the scene and L immediately claimed
responsibility for the death and adding that he had already washed the bolo he used to hack his victim.
Family members of L testified that the latter exhibited odd behavior. He would smile without anyone
in front of him; he would call a chicken late at night; and would keep on saying to himself that S was a
witch. During trial, L claimed not to know or recall the events surrounding the incident, the identity of
the victim, and his confinement and treatment at the mental hospital. The defense claims that L is insane
which should be appreciated as an exempting circumstance in the case. May the exempting circumstance
of insanity be appreciated considering the odd behavior exhibited by the accused? Explain.
No. Unusual behaviors such as smiling to oneself and calling a chicken late at night are not proof of a complete
absence of intelligence, because not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity. For the
defense of insanity to prosper, it must be proven that the accused, was completely deprived of intelligence, which
must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous to the commission of the offense with which he is
charged. Here, L was capable of discernment during the time of the incident considering that he had the foresight
to wash the bolo after killing the victim and the consciousness to decide to confess to the authorities what he had
done upon their arrival. L’s actuations immediately after the incident negate a complete absence of intelligence or
discernment when he killed the victim (People vs. Miraña, G.R. No. 219113, April 25, 2018).
Note: The Supreme Court has held that “the prevalent meaning of the word ‘crazy’ is not synonymous with
the legal terms ‘insane,’ ‘non compos mentis,’ ‘unsound mind,’ ‘idiot,’ or ‘lunatic.’ The popular conception of the
word ‘crazy’ is being used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary. A man may behave in a
crazy manner, but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so.” In order to be exempt from
criminal liability, the accused must be so insane as to be incapable of criminal intent (People vs. Miraña, G.R. No.
219113, April 25, 2018).
C was terminated from her job as the Vice President for Finance of UMC. The termination from
employment was allegedly caused by a private document falsified by M to make it appear that C was using
office funds for personal use. As a result, M was criminally charged of Falsification of Private Documents.
In her defense, M maintained that she was merely acting upon Finance Manager L’s instructions and
that M only performed such acts out of fear that she would lose her job if M defied her superior’s
order. M was apprehensive to follow because she suspected something, but nevertheless acquiesced to
such instruction. May the exempting circumstance of acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear be
appreciated in favor of M?
No, it may not be appreciated because there was an absence of any real and imminent threat, intimidation or
coercion that would have compelled her to do what she did. For the appreciation of such circumstance to prosper,
the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce
a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not
enough. Here, there is no showing that M was threatened with loss of employment by her superior should she
fail to do the instruction, thereby negating her claim of having acted under an impulse of uncontrollable fear
(Manansala vs. People, G.R. No. 215424, December 9, 2015).
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Riding on a bicycle, V passed by the house of E who was repairing his tricycle. Three (3) meters from
the house, V alighted, walked towards E and brought out a revolver. V poked the same to E and fired it
hitting the latter who took refuge behind D. V and D struggled for control of the gun and accidentally
fired and hit D in the thigh during the struggle. V again fired his gun two times hitting D on his nape
and back causing the latter to fall down. V was charged with homicide for the death of D. On his part,
V interposed the exempting circumstance of accident. Is V’s defense meritorious?
No, V could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as a defense. The exempting circumstance
of accident contemplates a situation where a person is in fact in the act of doing something legal, exercising due
care, diligence and prudence, but in the process produces harm or injury to someone or to something not in
the least in the mind of the actor – an accidental result flowing out of a legal act. Accident presupposes the lack
of intention to commit the wrong done. Here, V’s acts were by no means lawful, being a criminal assault with
his revolver against both E and D. As there was intent to commit the killing, the defense of accident must fail
(Talampas v. People, G.R. No. 180219, November 23, 2011).
A was on her way home from work when F approached and told her that B, A’s neighbor, wanted to
talk to her to offer her the position of treasurer in their fraternity, Junior-Senior Org. A refused such
offer. Thereafter, F and another fraternity member, M held her hands and forced her to go with them
to a nipa hut owned by B. While inside the nipa hut, A again refused the offer which led the members
of the fraternity to forcibly bring her to the cornfield nearby. There, B forcibly removed A’s pants and
forcibly entered his penis into her vagina. After B consummated his act, another fraternity member, C, a
thirteen-year-old minor, raped A. B and C were charged with rape. B interposed the defense that he has
a mental age of a nine-year old and thus should be exempted from criminal responsibility.
1. May C be criminally charged with rape?
No, C may not be criminally charged because he is a child below the age of criminal responsibility. Sec. 6 of
RA 9344 provides that a child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability. Pursuant to Sec. 20(a) of said Act, a child is deemed a neglected child
if he/she is above twelve (12) years of age up to fifteen (15) years of age and commits the crime of murder or
rape among others. Sec. 20(a) further provides that a neglected child shall be mandatorily placed in a special
facility within the Bahay Pag-asa called the Intensive Juvenile Intervention and Support Center (IJISC). Thus,
instead of being arraigned, BBB, who is deemed a neglected child, will be mandatorily committed to the IJISC
(People vs. Balanza, G.R. No. 207943, September 11, 2017).
2. May B avail of minority as a defense?
No, B may not be exempted from liability on the basis of minority. In determining the age for purposes of
exemption from criminal liability, Section 6 of RA 9344 as amended by RA 10630 clearly refers to the age
as determined by the anniversary of one’s birth date, and not the mental age as argued by B. Thus, B is not
a minor contemplated under RA 9344 as amended by RA 10630 and is not exempt from criminal liability
(People v. Roxas, G.R. No. 200793, June 4, 2014).
A, 15 years old, testified that her classmates J, C and T (aged 15 and 11 months, 16 and 17, respectively)
convinced her to go with them to the apartment of J’s aunt, where they handed her a shot of liquor.
After five to ten minutes from drinking the liquor, A started feeling dizzy. As she was closing her eyes, A
felt that she was being carried by J. Then, J proceeded to lower her shorts while C and T were guarding
the door. After successfully lowering A’s shorts, J went on top of her and raped her. After performing
the deed, J invited C and T to take their turns. When A regained consciousness, she tried to escape but
her ravishers blocked her way. J told A not to report them and threatened to hurt A’s brother if she did.
Suddenly, A’s brother knocked on the door of the apartment causing J, C and T to run away. J, C and T
were later convicted of rape. On appeal, as a group of 15-17-year-olds, they interposed exemption from
criminal liability claiming to not have acted with discernment in the commission of the crime.
1. Is their appeal meritorious?
No, as minors who have acted with discernment, J, C and T are not exempt from criminal liability. Under
Section 6 of RA 9344, the minor appellants herein, all above 15 years of age but under 18, shall only be
exempt from criminal liability if they did not act with discernment. Discernment is the mental capacity of a
minor to understand between right and wrong. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by
taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. Here, the acts
of the appellants of intoxicating their victim, guarding the door, blocking her escape, threatening her and
running away upon confrontation prove the presence of discernment. Thus, despite being minors above 15
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but under 18 years old, they are not exempt from criminal liability for having acted with discernment (People
vs. Sisracon, et al., G.R. No. 226494, February 14, 2018).
2. Should their claim for exemption fail, are appellants entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority?
Yes, they are so entitled. Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC, when the offender is over fifteen (15) and
under eighteen (18) years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but
always in the proper period (RPC, Art. 68, par. 2).
Mitigating Circumstances
R filed a complaint for bigamy against her spouse A and D, whom A allegedly married despite the
subsistence of his first marriage with R. The following day, the trial court issued an order finding
probable cause and for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In the afternoon of the same day, A learned
of such order and immediately surrendered to the court to file a motion for reduction of bail. During
the trial, A raised voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. R opposed contending that A’s
surrender was involuntary as a warrant of arrest was already issued beforehand.
1. What are the requisites for voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance?
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: (1) the offender has not
been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter’s agent;
and (3) the surrender was voluntary. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the
accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he
wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture (People
v. Maglian, G.R. No. 189834, March 30, 2011).
2. Is R’s contention correct? Explain.
No, R is incorrect because the mere issuance of a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the surrender
involuntary. In a case, the Supreme Court held that notwithstanding the pendency of a warrant for his arrest,
the accused may still be entitled to the mitigating circumstance in case he surrenders, depending on the actual
facts surrounding the very act of himself giving up (People v. Lozano, G.R. Nos. 137370-71, September 29,
2003). Here, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender shall be appreciated in favor of A because
immediately upon learning that a warrant for his arrest was issued, and without the same having served on
him, he surrendered to the court (De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No. 172832, April 7, 2009).
M was convicted for the murders of his aunt A and her live-in partner. Prior to A’s death, A alleged that
it was M who hit her on the head and set their house on fire. For his defense, M denied the allegation
and argued that he did not hit his aunt on the head nor did he set on fire. M contended that while he
was watching their house being engulfed by fire, the barangay tanod approached him and handcuffed
him, to which he did not resist. M further argued that the court erred in not considering in his favor the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to the barangay tanod. Is the argument of M correct?
No. For voluntary surrender to mitigate the offense, the following elements must be present: a) the offender has
not been actually arrested; b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and c) the surrender must
be voluntary. For a surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous, that is, there must be an intent to submit
oneself to authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble
and expenses in capturing him. In this case, M did not actually surrender. He simply did not offer any resistance
when he was arrested. The mere fact that he did not resist cannot be equated with voluntary surrender (People v.
Mercado, G.R. No. 218702, October 17, 2018, Caguioa Case)
H was legally married to L. After two (2) years, H left L for K. Since then, H and K lived as husband and
wife. One day, K saw H and his secretary, J, passionately kissing each other inside a bar. K got furious so
she took a knife from the counter and stabbed H which caused his death. K was prosecuted for homicide.
K claims that she is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation as she was driven
by jealousy when she stabbed H. Is K correct? Explain.
No, K is incorrect because passion or obfuscation is not mitigating when the relations between the parties are
illegitimate. The mitigating circumstance cannot be considered in favor of an accused when the relationship
between him and the deceased is illicit, because the causes which mitigate criminal responsibility for the loss of self-
control are such which originate from legitimate feelings, and not those which arises from vicious, unworthy and
immoral passions (People v. Visagar, G.R. No. L-5384, June 12, 1953). Since H was still lawfully married to L at the
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time he was attacked by K, his relationship with H cannot be considered legitimate thereby denying the application
of the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation (People v. Olgado, G.R. No. L-4406, March 31, 1952).
Aggravating Circumstances
B and his nephew, X, were outside the former’s house and were taunting each other. X punched B who
failed to retaliate. R, the brother of X, suddenly emerged and without warning stabbed B three times
with a knife on his left forearm, middle of his chest, and at his stomach. B died while in surgery. R
admitted that he stabbed and killed B to defend himself. The court found R guilty of murder and held
that there was treachery when he suddenly and unexpectedly attacked B. Is treachery present?
No. There is treachery when the offender commits any crimes against persons, employing means and methods or
forms which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. To qualify, the following conditions must be met: a) the assailant employed
means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the victim no opportunity to defend
himself or retaliate; and b) said means, methods or forms were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant.
In this case, treachery is not present. It does not always follow that if the attack was sudden and unexpected, it
should necessarily be deemed as an attack attended with treachery. The wounds of B show that the attack was
frontal which indicates that the latter was not totally deprived of the opportunity to defend himself. In the absence
of treachery, R is only liable for homicide and not murder (People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 218946, September 5, 2018,
Caguioa case)
At around 1:00 a.m., B and C were about to leave the Christmas party held at Tip-Topp Disco in Sing-
Song Garden Restaurant. As they were on their way downstairs, M pushed C. A heated argument
ensued. It appeared that M was looking for the girl who left him on the dance floor and had mistaken C
to be that girl. D pacified B and M. When they were already on their path on the sidewalk of the Sing-
Song Garden, M suddenly came from behind and shot B, who fell on the shoulders of C. At around 3:00
p.m. of the same day, B died. Is the aggravating circumstance of treachery present in the case to qualify
the crime of homicide to murder?
No, treachery is not present in this case. To qualify the crime to murder, the following elements of treachery
in a given case must be proven: (a) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend or retaliate; and (b) said means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
Treachery is never presumed. It is required that the manner of attack must be shown to have been attended by
treachery as conclusively as the crime itself. Likewise, it has been consistently held by the Court that chance
encounters, impulse killing, or crimes committed at the spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated
altercations are generally not attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ
a treacherous mode of attack.
Here, M and B had a heated altercation at the restaurant prior to the killing of the B by M. Although D had
pacified their fight, it does not necessarily mean that at the time the shooting incident happened, they already had
cool and level heads since only a short amount of time had lapsed between the heated altercation and the shooting.
The means of execution used by M cannot be said to be deliberately or consciously adopted since it was more of a
result of a sudden impulse arising from a heated altercation with M than a planned and deliberate action. Thus, M
should only be convicted of the crime of homicide, not murder (People v. Menil y Bongkit, G.R. No. 233205, June
26, 2019, Caguioa case).
What are the circumstances absorbed by treachery?

The circumstances absorbed by treachery are as follows:
1. There is an abuse of superior strength in committing murder but such should be considered as absorbed
in treachery (People v. Layson, G.R. No. L-25177, October 31, 1969; People v. Kalipayan, G.R. No. 229829,
January 22, 2018);
2. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime is absorbed by treachery if it facilitated the treacherous attack
(People v. Costales, G.R. No. 141154-56, January 15, 2002);
Exception: When nighttime is not absorbed by the aggravating circumstance of treachery. — Inasmuch
as the treachery consisted in the fact that the victims’ hands were tied at the time they were beaten, the
circumstance of nighttime is not absorbed in treachery, but can be perceived distinctly therefrom, since the
treachery rests upon an independent factual basis. A special case therefore is present to which the rule that
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nighttime is absorbed in treachery does not apply (People vs. Ong, G.R. No. L-34497 January 30, 1975).
Where both the treacherous mode of attack and nocturnity were deliberately decided upon in the same
case, they can be considered separately if such circumstances have different factual bases (ESTRADA, Book
One, page 148).
3. Craft
Exception: When craft was employed not with a view to making treachery more effective as nighttime
and abuse of superior strength would in the killing of the victim (People v. San Pedro, G.R. No. L-44274,
January 22, 1980).
4. Aid of armed men
5. Cuadrilla (band) (People v. Ampo-an, G.R. No. 75366. July 4, 1990)
6. Employing means to weaken the defense (Reyes, Book One, supra at 470).
Several members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned
their places of assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the government. They disarmed the security of a
hotel and planted explosive devices around the building. When arrested, the RTC charged them with the
crime of coup d’etat under the RPC. However, the court martial, pursuant to Article 96 of the Articles
of War, ordered their arrest and detention. On appeal, the accused argued that the violation of Art. 96
of the Articles of War has been absorbed by the RTC in the crime of coup d’etat. Will the contention of
the accused prosper?
No. The doctrine of absorption of crimes is peculiar to criminal law and applies only to crimes punished by the
same statute. In this case, the RTC erred in absorbing the violation of Art. 96 of the Articles of War in the crime
of coup d’etat, which is governed by a different statute, the RPC (Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August 10,
2006).
At the first meeting in hatching a plan to rob the spouses G and H inside their home, accused A, B, E, F
were present. At the second meeting, C and D attended the meeting. In both cases, the plan did not push
through. Subsequently, E was informed by A, B, C and D, that they would push through with their plan
that night. The plan was E, the helper of G and H, would assist the group by helping them get access
inside the house. The plan pushed through. They hogtied H and grabbed all the valuable items they
could carry. Thereafter, they stabbed G and H to death and hogtied E, to make it appear that she had no
part in the robbery and exited the house.
In the testimony J, D hired him to ferry them to where G and H were living before the incident J
also testified that he was hired by the same accused on the evening of the crime and saw them going
towards the victims’ house. Lastly, he testified that it was D who paid him for the use of his motorcycle
two days after the commission of the crime. May evident premeditation be considered an aggravating
circumstance in the present case for complex crime of Robbery with Homicide against A, B, C, D, and E?
Yes, evident premeditation may be appreciated in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. In this
case, there was conspiracy, thus, the act of one is the act of all. While it was previously ruled that the circumstance
of evident premeditation is inherent in robbery, it is not inherent in the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide. However, it may be considered in the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide if there is
premeditation to kill besides stealing.
To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, it must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the
crime prior to the moment of its execution, but also that such decision was the result of “meditation, calculation,
reflection, or persistent attempt.” Here, the persistent attempts made by the accused sufficiently demonstrate how
determined they were to adhere to their agreement despite the sufficient lapse of time. As discussed above, the first
attempt of the malefactors to carry out their scheme was foiled, and it was only on their second attempt that they
were able to consummate the conspiracy. Such circumstances show that the crime committed was a product of
intent and coordination among the accused.
Hence, the accused-appellant conspired with the co-accused in the commission of the said crime attended by
evident premeditation. Thus, if there is there is a premeditation to kill besides stealing, evident premeditation may
be considered as an aggravating circumstance in the present case for the special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide. (People v. Olazo, G.R. No. 220761, October 3, 2016, Caguioa case).
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A and V occupied adjacent apartments, each being a separate dwelling unit of one big house. A suspected
his wife of having an illicit relation with V. One afternoon, A saw V and A’s wife together on board
a vehicle. At 10 o’clock in the evening of the same day, A went to bed and tried to sleep, but being
so annoyed over the suspected relation between his wife and V, he could not sleep. After thirty (30)
minutes, A resolved to kill V. He rose from bed and took hold of a knife. He entered the apartment of
V through an unlocked window. Inside, he saw V soundly asleep. He thereupon stabbed V, inflicting
several wounds, which caused his death within a few hours. Would you say that the killing was attended
by the qualifying or aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery, nighttime, dwelling
and unlawful entry?
Evident premeditation cannot be considered against A because he resolved to kill V just after thirty (30) minutes
and there was no sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow his conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will. The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act was
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment (People v. Ducabo, G.R. No. 175594, September 28, 2007).
Treachery is present because A stabbed V while the latter was sound asleep. Treachery under paragraph 16 of
Article 14 of the RPC is defined as the deliberate employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of a
crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the intended V might raise (People v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271, August 31, 2006).
Nighttime cannot be appreciated because there is no showing that A deliberately sought or availed of nighttime
to insure the success of his act. The intention to commit the crime was conceived shortly before its commission
(People v. Pardo, G.R. No. L-562, November 19, 1947). Moreover, nighttime is absorbed in treachery.
Dwelling may also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. It must be a building or structure, exclusively
used for rest and comfort. He who goes to another’s house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he
who offends him elsewhere (People v. Belo, G.R. No. 109148, December 4, 1998). Here, A and V live in separate
apartment units and the attack happened inside the dwelling of V.
Unlawful entry may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, inasmuch as A entered the room of V through
the window, which is not the proper place for entrance into the house (RPC, Art. 14. par. 18; People v. Baruga,
G.R. No. L42744, March 27, 1935).
N was selling halo-halo outside her mother’s (V) store. At that time, V was inside her store cradling N’s
18-month-old daughter, A, in a blanket with its ends tied behind her back. Moments later, J, live-in
partner of N, standing 5’10” and with heavy build, entered the store and an argument ensued between
him and V. Apparently, J was asking V why N had not answered his calls. V responded by telling J not
to create trouble. Thereafter, N heard V moaning as if her mouth was being covered. N immediately
ran inside the store where she saw J stab V twice. Is the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength attendant in this case?
Yes, the facts show that J abused his superiority when he stabbed V. The circumstance of abuse of superior strength
is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of
superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes advantage of it in the
commission of the crime. The appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength depends
on the age, size, and strength of the parties. In this case, it was sufficiently shown that J was of heavy build, stood
at 5’10”, and armed with a knife, while V was then burdened by a child and had no means to defend and repel the
attacks of her assailant. Clearly, J abused his superiority afforded him by his sex, height, and build and a weapon
when he attacked V who was then carrying a child (People v. Mat-an, G.R. No. 215720, February 21, 2018).
M confronted D, and asked, “ano bang pinagsasasabi mo?” D replied “wala,” and without warning, M
delivered a fist blow hitting D on the left cheek and causing him to teeter backwards. M then pulled out
his gun and frontally shot D, who fell face-first on the pavement. While D remained in that position, M
shot him several more times leading to his death. M was prosecuted for murder since it was alleged that
treachery attended the killing of D. M contends that there was no treachery because he shot D during
their face-to-face confrontation. Do you agree with M?
I disagree with M. Although the attack was frontal, the sudden and unexpected manner by which it was made
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rendered it impossible for D to defend himself. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
M, who was armed with a gun, confronted D, and without any provocation, punched and shot him. The heated
exchange of words that preceded the incident was insufficient to forewarn D against any impending attack from his
assailant. Thus, the frontal attack made by M does not negate the presence of treachery (People v. Matibag, G.R.
No. 206381, March 25, 2015).
When is the use of a loose firearm considered an aggravating circumstance?

If the use of a loose firearm is inherent in the commission of a crime punishable under the RPC or other special
laws – the use of loose firearm is an aggravating circumstance, subject to the following conditions:
1. If the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty
which is lower than that prescribed for illegal possession of firearm, the penalty for illegal possession of
firearm shall be imposed in lieu of the penalty for the crime charged;
2. If the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty
which is equal to that imposed for illegal possession of firearms, the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed in addition to the penalty for the crime punishable under the RPC or
other special laws of which he/she is found guilty.
However, if the violation is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion of
insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or
insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat (RA 10591, Sec. 29).
Note: There are two requisites to establish such aggravating circumstance: (a) the existence of the subject firearm;
and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or permit
to carry it outside his residence. The onus probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the information
lies with the prosecution. In case of failure to do so, the Court cannot simply appreciate the use of an unlicensed
firearm as an aggravating circumstance (Ramos, et. al. vs. People, G.R. No. 218466, January 23, 2017).
R and M were charged with murder for the killing of J. The information read: that the accused, with
intent to kill, and with treachery and abuse of superior strength, did then and there knowingly and
feloniously attack, assault, and use personal violence upon J. R and M were found guilty by the trial
court. On appeal, the CA held that the information did not properly inform the accused of the cause of
the accusation because it did not provide the facts constituting treachery and abuse of superior strength.
Thus, R and M should only be found guilty of Homicide. Decide.
The CA is correct. An essential component of the right to due process in criminal proceedings is the right of the
accused to be sufficiently informed, in writing, of the cause of the accusation against him to furnish the accused
with such a description of the charge against him. Prosecutors are instructed to state with sufficient particularity
not just the acts complained of or the acts constituting the offense, but also the aggravating circumstances, whether
qualifying or generic, as well as any other attendant circumstances, that would impact the penalty to be imposed
on the accused should a verdict of conviction be reached. An information alleging that treachery exists, to be
sufficient, must therefore have factual averments on how the person charged had deliberately employed means,
methods, or forms in the execution of the act that tended directly and specially to insure its execution without
risk to the accused arising from the defense that the victim might make. In this case, the information merely
enumerated the aggravating circumstances present but did not sufficiently provide the facts which constituted
such circumstances. Thus, the CA is correct in convicting the accused with homicide only. (People v. Solar, G.R.
No. 225595, August 6, 2019, Caguioa Case)
Note: Although the Supreme Court agreed that the accused should only be convicted of homicide, the Court
nevertheless, sustained the ruling of the trial court finding the accused guilty of murder for failure to timely file a
motion to quash the information, thereby waiving his right to question the defects in the Information filed against
him.
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Alternative Circumstances
A failed to read the label of his drink and did not notice that it was alcoholic. He became intoxicated after
drinking it. Upon going home, he argued with B, his wife, and while in the state of intoxication, punched
and kicked her in the abdomen, which led his wife’s untimely death. Is the alternative circumstance of
intoxication aggravating or mitigating in the case at bar?
The intoxication is mitigating. Intoxication is mitigating if it is not habitual or if such intoxication is not subsequent
to the plan to commit a felony (Art. 15, RPC). In the case at bar, A’s intoxication was inadvertent. As such, A’s
commission of the offense while in the state of intoxication is to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance (People
v. Mat-an, G.R. No. 215720, February 21, 2018).
Note: For violations of RA 9262, being under the influence of alcohol, any illicit drug, or any other mind-altering
substance shall not be a defense (RA 9262, Sec. 27).
Absolutory Causes
W is the son-in-law of M who owns several pieces of real property. In 2014, W’s wife, Anita, died. In
2016, W caused the preparation of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) giving him the authority to sell
a parcel of land registered in the name of M. The signature of M in the SPA was forged and, through
this forged SPA and without the consent and knowledge of M, W succeeded in selling the parcel for
Php2,000,000. He pocketed the proceeds of the sale. M eventually discovered W’s misdeeds and filed a
criminal complaint. W was subsequently charged with estafa through falsification of public document.
May W successfully invoke the absolutory cause of relationship by affinity under Art. 332 of the RPC?
(Modified 2013 Bar)
No, W may not be absolved from criminal liability because the absolutory cause under Art. 332 of the RPC
exclusively applies to theft, swindling and malicious mischief. All other crimes, whether simple or complex, are not
affected by the absolutory cause provided by said provision. Here, the crime of estafa was a component crime in the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document. To apply the absolutory cause under Art. 332 to
one of the component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence of that complex crime
is to unduly expand the scope of said article (Intestate Estate of Vda. de Carungcong v. People, G.R. No. 181409,
February 11, 2010).
A is the legitimate wife of M. One night, M killed A with the use of a knife. M invoked Article 247 of the
RPC. He claimed that he saw his wife and a man seated beside each other conversing. Furious by what he
had seen, M went out of the room, got a knife, and delivered a stab blow towards the man but the latter
was shielded by A. May M be absolved of the criminal liability based on Article 247?
No, M may not be absolved because Article 247 necessitates the proof that the accused killed his wife and her
paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter. Here, M disclosed that he saw A and a man
just seated beside each other and were simply talking. Evidently, the absolutory cause embodied in Article 247 is
not applicable in the present case (People v Macal, G. R. No. 211062, January 13, 2016).
Distinguish Instigation from Entrapment.

The distinctions between instigation and entrapment are as follows:
1. As to nature, instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense
charged in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of such ways and
means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker;
2. As to the source of criminal intent, in instigation, officers of the law or their agents incite, induce,
instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense which he or she would otherwise not commit
and has no intention of committing. While in entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the
offense charged originates in the mind of the accused, and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the
apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes; thus, the accused cannot justify his or her
conduct; and
3. As to exemption from criminal liability of the accused, in instigation, where law enforcers act as co-
principals, the accused will have to be acquitted. While entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction
(People v. Bartolome, G.R. No. 191726, February 6, 2013).
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The NBI received a report that A was involved in prostituting women, some of whom were minors.
Special Investigator H decided to proceed with an entrapment operation and prepared entrapment
money. Two NBI agents acted as poseur-customers and proceeded to the hotel where they were met by A
together with the alleged prostitutes. When the poseur-customers handed the entrapment money to A,
the rest of the team proceeded with the rescue operation. A was arrested and was charged with the crime
of violation of RA 9208 or Trafficking in Person. B, C and D, the minors, testified that A employed them
as prostitutes. On appeal, A interposed the defense of instigation, alleging that he was forced by the NBI
agents to commit the crime. Will the argument of A prosper? What is the difference between instigation
and entrapment?
No. The argument of A will not prosper because there is no instigation in this case but mere entrapment. The use
of entrapment by law enforcement officers as means to arrest wrongdoers is an accepted practice. In this case, the
minors even testified that A has been involved in trafficking of persons prior to the entrapment operation. The NBI
agent did not induce A to procure the prostitutes.
The difference between an instigation and entrapment is that an instigation is the means by which the accused is
lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the
employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation,
the law officers or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense which he
or she would otherwise not commit and has no intention of committing. However, in entrapment, the criminal
intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused, and law enforcers merely
facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes. (People v. Amurao, G.R. No. 229514,
July 28, 2020, Caguioa case)
Persons Liable and Degree of Participation
Distinguish an accomplice from a conspirator as to their knowledge of the criminal design of the
principal, their participation, the penalty to be imposed in relation to the penalty for the principal, and
the requisites/elements to be established by the prosecution in order to hold them criminally responsible
for their respective roles in the commission of the crime. (2012 Bar)
The distinctions between a conspirator and an accomplice are as follows:
1. As to knowledge of the principal’s criminal design: Conspirators and accomplices have one thing
in common – they know and agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal
intention because they themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know
about it after the principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its
execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it.
2. As to their participation: A conspirator authors the commission of the crime; whereas, an accomplice
is a mere instrument who performs acts which are not indispensable, previous or simultaneous, to the
commission of the crime.
3. As to the penalty to be imposed: The penalty to be imposed on a conspirator is of the same degree as
that of the principal; whereas, the penalty to be imposed on an accomplice is one degree lower than that
of the principal.
4. As to the elements to be established by the prosecution: To convict one as a conspirator, the elements
are: (a) that two or more persons come to an agreement; (b) that the agreement concerns the commission
of felony; and (c) that these persons decide to commit the felony; whereas, the elements to be proved to
convict one as an accomplice are: (a) that there is a community of design between the principal and the
accomplice; (b) that the accomplice performs previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to
the commission of the crime; and (c) that the acts performed by an accomplice are related to those of the
principal (People v. De Vera, G.R. No. 128966, August 18, 1999).
M and A are brothers. Sometime in August 1998, while A was in his office, M, together with two other
men in police uniform, came with two heavy bags. M asked A to keep the two bags in his vault until
he comes back to get them. When A later examined the two bags, he saw bundles of money that, in
his rough count, could not be less than Php5 Million. He kept the money inside the vault and soon he
heard the news that a gang that included M had been engaged in bank robberies. A, unsure of what to
do under the circumstances, kept quiet about the two bags in his vault. Soon after, the police captured,
and secured a confession from, M who admitted that their loot had been deposited with A. What is A’s
liability? (2013 Bar)
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A is not criminally liable. To be criminally liable as an accessory under Article 19 of the Code, one must have
knowledge of the commission of the crime. He is not liable as an accessory because he has no knowledge of the
commission of the crime of robbery. The facts stated would show lack or absence of intent to conceal the effects
of the crime as he was unsure of what to do under the circumstances. Moreover, assuming arguendo that his act
would amount to that of an accessory (i.e. concealing the body of the crime or the effects or instruments thereof to
prevent its discovery under Article 19, par.2, RPC), he is still exempted from criminal liability, being the brother
of M (Article 20, RPC).
Coming home from a dance event, J and T, together with two girls, were intercepted by E and S. S
immediately went behind J and embraced him with both hands while he struggled in vain. Facing the
hapless J, E got his knife and thrusted it at the right side of J’s body, just below his navel. E and S fled and
disappeared in the dark. “May tama ako,” were the words uttered by J just before he fell to the ground
and died. What is S’s criminal liability?
S is a principal by indispensable cooperation. There can be no question that his act in holding the victim from
behind immediately before the latter was stabbed by E constitutes a positive and an overt act towards the realization
of a common criminal intent, although the intent may be classified as instantaneous. The requisites for criminal
liability Article 17, par. 3 are: 1) participation in the criminal resolution, i.e., there is either anterior conspiracy
or unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before or simultaneously with the commission of the
crime charged; and 2) cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it
would not have been accomplished. The appellant’s voluntary and indispensable cooperation was a concurrence
of the criminal act to be executed. Consequently, he is a co-conspirator by indispensable cooperation, although the
common desire or purpose was never bottled up by a previous undertaking (People v. Guevarra y Papasin, G.R. No.
65017, November 13, 1989).
Ferdie was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the PMMA. In order to reach active status, all
new entrants were required to successfully complete the mandatory “Indoctrination and Orientation
Period,” which was set from May 2 to June 1, 2001. Ferdie died on May 3, 2001. Several people were
charged as principals to the crime of hazing. Some school authorities were also charged as accomplices
to the crime on a separate case. Upon acquittal of those charged as principals, the school authorities
contended that there being no more principals with whom they could have cooperated in the execution
of the offense, the case against them must be dismissed. Is the contention meritorious?
No, the contention is untenable. It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not ipso
facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the latter; or
even the latter’s acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established. As long as the
commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice
or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal (People v. Bayabos, G.R. Nos. 171222 & 174786,
February 18, 2015). Moreover by express provision of law, school authorities including faculty members who
consent to the hazing or who have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from
occurring shall be punished as accomplices for the acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators (RA 11053, Sec.
14, amending RA 8049, Sec. 4).
Define conspiracy.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it (Article 8, RPC). The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action and purpose. Conspiracy
requires the same degree of proof required to establish the crime — proof beyond reasonable doubt (People v.
Gimpaya, G.R. No. 227395, January 10, 2018).
Differentiate and illustrate Wheel Conspiracy and Chain Conspiracy. (2016, 2017 Bar)
The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or
more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke typically interacts with the hub rather than with another
spoke. In the 2002 case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, Former President Estrada was the hub while the spokes
were all the other accused individuals. The rim that enclosed the spokes was the common goal in the overall
conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth (Macapagal-Arroyo v. People,
G.R. Nos. 220598 & 220953, July 19, 2016).
The chain conspiracy recognized in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan involves individuals linked together in a vertical
CRIMINAL LAW
chain to achieve a criminal objective. Illustrative of chain conspiracy usually involves the distribution of narcotics
or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with
legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then
retailer and consumer (Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, G.R. Nos. 220598 & 220953, July 19, 2016).
X is the part time driver and neighbor of A. One day, X overheard that A received a broker’s commission
in the sale of a fishpond. X informed Y and Z of such commission and plotted a robbery after inducing
them. The following day, Y and Z robbed the house of A and his wife, B. They demanded jewelry and
cash that A earned from the sale of the fishpond. Further, the robbers carted off the television sets, Sony
Betamax sets, Karaoke, compact disc, assorted pieces of jewelry, VHS player and cash. The said stolen
items were loaded in the couple’s stainless owner type jeep. Y and Z were identified, and circumstances
linked them to X. Upon further investigation, it was found out that X sold the jeep to a third person and
the Betamax stolen from A and B was found in X’s nipa hut. X was charged with robbery under Article
294, par. 5, and violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. He contends that there is no conspiracy
between him and Y and Z as there is failure to establish his actual participation in the commission of the
crimes charged. Decide.
X is incorrect. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a crime and decide to commit it. For an accused to be validly held to conspire with his co-accused in committing
the crimes, his overt acts must tend to execute the offense agreed upon, for the merely passive conspirator cannot
be held to be still part of the conspiracy without such overt acts, unless such passive conspirator is the mastermind.
Conspiracy can also be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense is perpetrated or can be inferred
from the acts of the several accused evincing their joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest. Here, the fact that X directly induced Y and Z to commit the crimes made him the
mastermind. Thus, despite the absence of his active participation in the commission of the crimes charged, X,
being the mastermind, is liable as a co-conspirator (Chua v. People, G.R. No. 172193, September 13, 2017).
How may conspiracy be proved?

Proof of conspiracy need not even rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct
of the parties before, during or after the commission of the crime indicating a common understanding among
them with respect to the commission of the offense (People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 211082, December 13, 2017).
Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy for it may be deduced from the acts of the accused before, during
and after the commission of the crime charged, from which it may be indicated that there is a common purpose
to commit the crime. It is not sufficient, however, that the attack be joint and simultaneous for simultaneousness
does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will or unity of action and purpose which are the bases of the
responsibility of the assailants. It is necessary that the assailants be animated by one and the same purpose. (People
v. Gimpaya, G.R. No. 227395, January 10, 2018, Caguioa Case)
Differentiate Multiple Offenders.

Habitual
Recidivism Reiteracion Quasi-Recidivism
Deliquency
(Art. 14, par. 9) (Art. 14, par. 10) (Art. 160)
(Art. 62, par. 5)
As to Crime Committed
It is sufficient that the The previous and subse- Nature of previous crime The crimes are
accused, on the date of quent offenses must not be and present crime are specified. These are
the trial, shall have been embraced in the same title of IMMATERIAL serious or less serious
previously convicted by the Code. physical injuries,
final judgment of anoth- robbery, theft, estafa,
er crime embraced in the or falsification.
same title of the RPC.
As to Period of Time the Crimes are Committed
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Habitual
Recidivism Reiteracion Quasi-Recidivism
Deliquency
(Art. 14, par. 9) (Art. 14, par. 10) (Art. 160)
(Art. 62, par. 5)
No period of time Accused committed the Accused committed present The offender is
between the former present crime AFTER serv- crime release or conviction found guilty within
conviction and the last ing sentence for previous BEFORE beginning to serve ten (10) years from
conviction is fixed by law. crime. OR WHILE serving sentence his last release or last
for previous crime. conviction.
As to Number of Crimes Committed

The second conviction At least two (2) crimes are At least two (2) crimes are The accused must
for an offense embraced committed but if penalty for committed. be found guilty the
in the same title of the previous crime is lighter than third time or oftener
RPC is sufficient. the present crime, there must of any of the crimes
be at least three (3) crimes. specified.
As to Effects on Penalties
If not offset by a If not offset by a mitigating Presence of this will require An additional
mitigating circumstance, circumstance, serves to application of penalty for penalty is also
serves to increase the increase the penalty only to present crime in MAXIMUM imposed.
penalty only to the the maximum. period, regardless of mitigating
maximum. circumstances.
Penalties
What are the cases when destierro is imposed?

The following are the cases when destierro is imposed:
1. Serious physical injuries or death under exceptional circumstances (RPC, Art. 247);
2. In case of failure to give bond for good behavior (RPC, Art. 284);
3. As a penalty for the concubine in concubinage (RPC, Art. 334); and
4. In cases where after reducing the penalty by one or more degrees, destierro is the proper penalty.
Senator Bernardo was convicted of plunder. About one year after beginning to serve his sentence, the
President of the Philippines granted him absolute pardon. The signed pardon states: “In view hereof,
and in pursuance of the authority vested upon me by the Constitution, I hereby grant absolute pardon
unto Bernardo, who was convicted of plunder in Criminal Case No. XV32 and upon whom the penalty
of reclusion perpetua was imposed.” He now comes to you for advice. He wants to know if he could run
for senator in the next election. (2015 Bar)
1. What advice will you give Bernardo?
If I were the counsel of Senator Bernardo, I will advise him not to run for another Senatorial race since the
terms of the pardon granted to him by the President did not expressly defer his accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification nor restore his right to hold public office. Article 36 of the RPC states that a pardon
shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office unless such right be expressly restored by terms
of the pardon. Moreover, as according to Article 41 of the RPC, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall carry
with it perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the
principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon (Risos-Vidal v. Lim, G.R.
No. 206666, January 21, 2015).
2. Assuming that what Bernardo committed was heading a rebellion for which the same penalty of
reclusion perpetua was imposed, and what he received was amnesty from the government, will your
answer be the same? Explain.
No. If what was granted to him was an amnesty, then he can run in the Senatorial race. As stated under
Article 89 of the RPC, amnesty totally extinguishes criminal liability including the penalty and all its effects.
CRIMINAL LAW
Therefore, it does not only extinguish the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua but also its effects, in this
case, the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Amnesty looks backward and abolishes and
puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, so that
the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as he had committed no offense (Barrioquinto
v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949).
What are the accessory penalties and under what penalties are they attached?
Penalties in which other accessory penalties are inherent:
1. Article 40. Death—perpetual absolute disqualification, and civil interdiction during 30 years following
date of sentence;
2. Article 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal—civil interdiction for life or during the period of the
sentence, as the case may be, and perpetual absolute disqualification;
3. Article. 42. Prision mayor—temporary absolute disqualification, perpetual special disqualification from
the right of suffrage;
4. Article. 43. Prision correccional—suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or
calling, and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage if the duration of the imprisonment
shall exceed 18 months;
5. Article. 44. Arresto—suspension of the right to hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the
sentence.
There are accessory penalties which are true to other principal penalties. An example is the penalty of civil
interdiction. This is accessory penalty, and, as provided in Article 34, a convict sentenced to civil interdiction
suffers certain disqualification during the term of the sentence. One of the disqualifications is that of making
conveyance of his property inter vivos.
Note: Persons convicted of election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code cannot avail of the benefits of the
Probation Law (Omnibus Election Code, Sec. 261).
Distinguish a privileged mitigating circumstance from an ordinary mitigating circumstance as to

reduction of penalty and offsetting against aggravating circumstance/s.
The distinctions between ordinary and privileged mitigating circumstances are as follows:
1. As to reduction of penalty, the presence of an ordinary mitigating circumstance, if not offset by an
aggravating circumstance, has the effect of applying the divisible penalty in its minimum period (RPC,
Art. 64). Under the rules on graduation of penalty, the presence of privileged mitigating circumstance
has the effect of lowering the penalty by one or two degrees (RPC, Arts. 68 and 69).
2. As to offsetting, an ordinary mitigating circumstance can be offset against a generic aggravating
circumstance while privileged mitigating cannot be offset by any aggravating circumstance (People v.
Takbobo, G.R. No. 102984 (Resolution), June 30, 1993).
What is the rule when there are two or more penalties to be served by the culprit?
Under Art. 70 of the RPC, when the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously
if the nature of the penalties will so permit. Otherwise, the order of their severity (under this article) shall be
followed – so that they may be executed successively (Art. 70, RPC).
What are the penalties that may be served simultaneously with imprisonment?
The penalties which may be served simultaneously with imprisonment are: (1) perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification, (2) perpetual or temporary special disqualification, (3) public censure, (4) suspension from public
office and (5) other accessory penalties (Rodriguez v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-35386, September 28, 1972).
A hit his wife B with a maso after seeing the latter kiss another man. He voluntarily went with the
officers to the police station. B was rushed to the hospital but died the next day. The trial court convicted
A of parricide, imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without appreciating any of the
claimed mitigating circumstance of passion, obfuscation, and voluntary surrender. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals appreciated one mitigating circumstance but held that the penalty imposed was correct. Was
the imposition of the penalty proper?
CRIMINAL LAW
Yes. The crime of parricide is punishable by two indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death and that the
presence of only one mitigating circumstance with no aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the imposition of
reclusion perpetua, applying Article 63 of the RPC. Under Article 63, when there are some mitigating circumstances
and no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. As such, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was
properly imposed (People v. Brusola, G.R. No. 210615, July 26, 2017).
Ariel was found guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the RPC, which prescribes the penalty of
reclusion temporal. There were no attendant mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the crime.
1. Determine the proper penalty.
Applying the rules under the RPC and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty – which is reclusion temporal – shall
be imposed in its medium period, following Article 64, paragraph 1. The minimum term of the indeterminate
penalty is anywhere within the range of prision mayor – the penalty next lower from reclusion temporal,
following Article 71 – with or without reference to the period into which it may be subdivided. Thus, the
maximum term of the penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period (i.e. from 14 years, 8 months and 1
day to 17 years and 4 months) and the minimum term is anywhere within the range of prision mayor (i.e. from
6 years and 1 day to 12 years), subject to the court’s sound discretion (ISLAW, Sec. 1; RPC, Art. 64, par. 1).
2. Assuming that Ariel purposely sought to commit the crime at night to better accomplish his plan,
but later on voluntarily surrenders to the police officer and pleaded guilty to the charge during his
arraignment, what is the proper penalty?
In this case, there is thus one mitigating circumstance left after offsetting the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime (RPC, Art. 14, par. 6) with the two ordinary mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
plea of guilty (RPC, Art. 13, par. 7). Hence, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be imposed in its minimum period (i.e. from 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months). The
minimum term is the same – prision mayor in any of its period or anywhere within its range. The attendant
circumstances shall be considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty
(ISLAW, Sec. 1; RPC, Art. 64, par. 4).
Explain how the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applied in crimes punished by the RPC?
It is a sentence with a minimum term and a maximum term which the court is mandated to impose for the benefit
of a guilty person who is not disqualified therefore, provided that the maximum imprisonment exceeds one (1)
year. It applies to both violations of RPC and special laws.
If the offense is punished under the RPC, the maximum term is that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of the said code. It is noteworthy that the mitigating or aggravating is
only to be considered in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. In contrast, the
minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the code (RPC) for the
offense. The basis for fixing the minimum term is the prescribed penalty, and not the imposable penalty (People v.
Yco, G.R. No. 6545, July 27, 1954; ISLAW, Sec. 1).
Explain how the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applied in crimes punished by special laws. (2017 Bar)
If the offense is punished by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum term shall not be less
than the minimum prescribed by the same (ISLAW, Sec. 1).
X was charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and six (6) counts of Estafa, as she allegedly recruited
and promised several people of employment in East Timor, knowing fully that such representation be
false and was only made to induce the victims to pay her varying amounts of money, to their damage and
prejudice. Y, one of the victims, paid Php 35,000 to X to cover the alleged necessary fees. The trial court
convicted X of the crimes charged. As to the estafa case filed by Y, the trial court imposed the straight
penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor. Was the imposition of the penalty proper?
Yes, the imposition of the penalty is proper. With the enactment of RA 10951, Section 85 of which provides that
if the amount involved is less than P40,000.00, the imposable penalty is only arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods (i.e., two months and one day to six months), as is applicable in the case at bar. The Indeterminate
Sentence Law no longer applies because the imposable penalty is less than one (1) year. Thus, a straight penalty of
CRIMINAL LAW
six (6) months of arresto mayor is proper (People v. Racho, G.R. No. 227505, October 2, 2017).
When is the Indeterminate Sentence Law inapplicable?

Its application shall be mandatory except in the following cases:
1. Those persons convicted of offenses punished with life imprisonment;
2. Those persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua (People v. Rocha, G.R. No. 173797,
August 31, 2007; People v. Asturias, G.R. No. 61126, January 31, 1985);
3. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason;
4. Those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage;
5. Those convicted of piracy;
6. Those who are habitual delinquents;
7. Those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence;
8. Those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the terms
thereof; and
9. Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year (not to those already sentenced by
final judgment at the time of approval of the Act, except as provided in Sec. 5 thereof);
10. Those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of the approval of this Act; and
11. Those, whose sentence imposes penalties which do not involve imprisonment, like destierro (RA 4103,
Sec. 2).
M, a security guard, arrived home late one night after rendering overtime. He was shocked to see J, his
wife, and K, his best friend, in the act of having sexual intercourse. M pulled out his service gun and shot
and killed K. The court found that K died under exceptional circumstances and exonerated M of murder
but sentenced him to destierro, conformably with Article 247 of the RPC. While serving his sentence,
M entered the prohibited area and had a pot session with I (J’s sister). Is M entitled to an indeterminate
sentence in case he is found guilty? Explain your answer. (2007 Bar)
No, M is not entitled to the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. By virtue of Section 2 of RA 4103 as
amended by Act No. 4225, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to those whose maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one (1) year. Thus, by implication, the ISLAW is not applicable to those whose
penalties do not involve imprisonment, such as destierro.
Furthermore, it may be said that M is still not entitled to the benefit of the law for having evaded his sentence of
destierro when he entered the prohibited area specified in the judgment of conviction. The same Section 2 of the
said law expressly provides that the law shall not apply to those who shall have evaded sentence (People v. Abilong,
G.R. No. L-1960, November 26, 1948).
What is subsidiary imprisonment?

Subsidiary imprisonment is a subsidiary personal liability to be suffered by the convict who has no property with
which to meet the fine, at the rate of one day for each amount equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate
prevailing in the NCR at the time of rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial court. The principal penalty
imposed must not be higher than prision correctional and fine, or fine only (RPC, Art. 39, as amended by RA
10159).
The rules in applying subsidiary imprisonment are the following:

1. If principal penalty is prision correccional or arresto, and fine:
a. One (1) day is equal to the highest minimum wage in NCR at the time of the rendition of judgement
of the trial court;
b. Subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed 1/3 of the term of the sentence;
c. In no case shall subsidiary imprisonment exceed 1 year; and
d. No fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner.
2. If fine only:
a. One (1) day is equal to the highest minimum wage in NCR; and
b. Subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed 6 months, if culprit was prosecuted for grave (i.e. fine
exceeds Php1,200,000) or less grave (i.e. fine ranging from Php40,000 to Php1,200,000) felony. If for
a light felony (i.e. fine of less than Php40,000), it shall not exceed 15 days (RPC, Art. 39, as amended
by RA 10159).
CRIMINAL LAW
Spouses Cruz were charged with eight (8) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the MTC. Myrna
Cruz was acquitted but Salvador Cruz was sentenced to pay a fine and to indemnify the offended party,
Britchford, in the amount of Php 411,000. However, Salvador failed to pay the fine imposed by MTC.
As a result, Britchford filed a Motion to Impose Subsidiary Penalty for Salvador’s failure to pay the
fine. The MTC denied Britchford’s motion on the ground that their decision did not impose subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. Is the accused compelled to serve subsidiary imprisonment for
his failure to pay the fine imposed by the MTC where said court did not specify, in the judgment of
conviction, any subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay?
No, Salvador cannot be compelled to undergo subsidiary imprisonment because the MTC’s judgment of
conviction did not specify a subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the penalty of fine. Art. 78 of the
RPC states that “no penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment. A penalty shall not be executed
in any other form than that prescribed by law, nor with any other circumstances or incidents than those expressly
authorized thereby.” Since the said subsidiary imprisonment is not stated in the judgment finding Salvador guilty,
the court could not legally compel him to serve said subsidiary imprisonment. To allow such would be a violation
of the RPC and the constitutional provision on due process (People vs. Alapan, G.R. No. 199527, January 10,
2018).
Execution and Service of Sentence
Three-fold Rule

What are the requisites of the three-fold rule?
The following are the requisites of the three-fold rule:
1. The maximum duration of the convict’s sentence shall not be more than three (3) times the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him;
2. But in no case to exceed forty (40) years;
3. This rule shall apply only when the convict is to serve four (4) or more sentences successively (RPC, Art.
70).
The three-fold rule applies only when the convict has to serve continuous imprisonment for several offenses. If the
convict already served sentence for one (1) offense, that imprisonment will not be considered (Alejandro v. Director
of Prisons, G.R. No. L-3215, October 6, 1949).

In 1995, Mayor A and his six (6) cohorts were convicted for seven (7) counts of rape with homicide of
two college students. Each one was sentenced to suffer a total of seven (7) reclusion perpetua. Mayor
Anton has been in the Bilibid prison for twenty-five (25) years. Due to the recent SC decision which
declared that the GCTA law may be applied retroactively, there is a possibility that Mayor A and his
co-principals may be eligible for an early release, assuming that they meet the qualifications under the
GCTA law. The families of the victims are opposing such possibility, contending that each of the accused
must not be released as they must serve the total of seven (7) reclusion perpetuas each, when in fact they
have only served around 25 years. Is the contention correct?
No, the contention of the families is incorrect. The three-fold rule applies in this case. Under Article 70 of the
RPC, the maximum duration of the convict’s sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable
shall be inflicted after the sum of those imposed equals the said maximum period. Further, such maximum period
shall in no case exceed forty (40) years. In the case of People v. Mendoza, it was held that the accused were guilty of
five counts of murders and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count. In this case, it was held that the
duration of the aggregate penalties shall not exceed 40 years (RPC, Art. 70; People v. Mendoza, G.R. L-3271, May
5, 1950).
Probation Law
Who are disqualified from availing themselves of the benefits of probation law?
Section 9 of the Probation Law, as amended by RA 10707, provides for the following disqualified offenders:
1. Those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than 6 years;
2. Those convicted of any crime against the national security;
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3. Those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of
more than 6 months and 1 day and/or a fine of more than Php1,000.00;
4. Those who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and
5. Those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree became
applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
What is the legal effect of his application for probation on the judgment of conviction? Does said
application interrupt the running of the period of appeal?
The judgement becomes final. Once an offender has filed an application for probation, such act is already considered
as a waiver of his right to appeal. As a result of the finality of the decision, there is no more period of appeal (Sec.
4, PD 968, as amended by RA 10707).
J was convicted of the Regional Trial Court of a crime and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
for a minimum of eight years. He appealed both his conviction and the penalty imposed upon him to
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court ultimately sustained J’s conviction but reduced his sentence
to a maximum of four years and eight months imprisonment. Could J forthwith file an application for
probation? Explain. (2003 Bar)
Yes, he can. When a judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed, and
such judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty, the defendant shall be allowed
to apply for probation based on the modified decision before such decision becomes final. The application
for probation based on the modified decision shall be filed in the trial court where the judgment of conviction
imposing a non-probationable penalty was rendered, or in the trial court where such case has since been re-raffled
(Sec. 4, PD 968, as amended by RA 10707). J may apply for probation as he did not appeal a judgment that would
have allowed him to apply for probation (Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011).
A was convicted of drug trafficking punished under RA 9165. May A be released on probation?
No. Probation Law is not applicable to drug traffickers (Padua v. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008). Under
Section 24 of RA 9165, any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty imposed by
the Court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended
by RA 10707. Thus, A may not be released on probation.
Note: Persons convicted of election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code cannot avail of the benefits of
the Probation Law (Omnibus Election Code, Sec. 261)
B was convicted of a crime. Thereafter, he applied for probation and was granted. Discuss the effect of
the termination of his period of probation.
After the period of probation and upon consideration of the report and recommendation of the probation
officer, the court may order the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled the terms and
conditions of his probation and thereupon the case is deemed terminated. The final discharge of the probationer
shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to totally extinguish
his criminal liability as to the offense for which probation was granted. The probationer and the probation officer
shall each be furnished with a copy of such order (Sec. 16 of PD 968, as amended by RA 10707).
S, a newly appointed Municipal Budget Officer, was found guilty of falsification of public documents
under Article 172 in relation to Article 171(4) of the RPC in making false statements in his Personal
Data Sheet. S did not appeal and then applied for probation. His application was granted, and he was
placed under probation for a period of one (1) year. An administrative complaint for the offense of
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude was then filed against S because of his conviction. He
argues that his conviction and eventual discharge from probation presents another administrative case
to be filed against him because to do so would defeat the purpose of the Probation Law which was to
erase the effect of conviction and to restore civil rights that were lost or suspended. Is his contention
correct? Will his eventual relief from probation affect his administrative liabilities?
No. Probation does not erase the effects and fact of conviction, but merely suspends the penalty imposed. The
criminal action is separate and distinct from the administrative case. And, if only for that reason, so is administrative
liability separate and distinct from penal liability. The reform and rehabilitation of the probationer cannot justify
his retention in the government service. Probation only affects the criminal liability of the accused, and not his
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administrative liabilities, if any (Pagaduan v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 206379, November 19, 2014).
What are the rules of community service in lieu of imprisonment?

Community Service Act (Republic Act No. 11362) adding Article 88a in the RPC allows courts to impose
community service as penalty for minor offenses punishable by arresto menor and arresto mayor, in lieu of
imprisonment.
“Community service shall consist of any actual physical activity which inculcates civic consciousness and is
intended towards the improvement of a public work or promotion of a public service.
“If the defendant violates the terms of the community service, the court shall order his/her re-arrest and the
defendant shall serve the full term of the penalty, as the case may be, in jail, or in the house of the defendant as
provided under Article 88. However, if the defendant has fully complied with the terms of the community service,
the court shall order the release of the defendant unless detained for some other offenses.
“The privilege of rendering community service in lieu of service in jail shall be availed of only once.”
Juvenile Justice Welfare Act (RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630)
A was 2 months below 18 years of age when he committed the crime. He was charged with the crime 3
months later. He was 23 when he was finally convicted and sentenced. Instead of preparing to serve a jail
term, he sought a suspension of the sentence on the ground that he was a juvenile offender. Should he
be entitled to a suspension of sentence? If not, what provision of RA 9344 may he avail of? (2003 Bar)
No. Although A was below 18 years old when he committed the crime, he was already 23 years old when he was
finally convicted and sentenced. The provisions of Sec. 38 and Sec. 40 allow suspension of sentence only until the
offender reaches 21 years of age. Thus, A is no longer eligible for suspension of sentence (Sec 38, RA 9344). Even
if the offender may no longer avail of suspension of sentence, he may still avail of Sec. 51, which is confinement in
agricultural camps or other training places.
M, a minor, was bullied by B, his classmate. Having had enough, M got the key to the safe where his
father kept his licensed pistol and took the weapon. Knowing that B usually hung out at a nearby
abandoned building after class, he went ahead and hid while waiting for B. He then shot B, who died on
the spot. M then hid the gun in one of the empty containers. At the time of the shooting, M was fifteen
years and one month old. What is M’s criminal liability? Explain. (2015 Bar)
Based on the facts presented, M shall be liable of murder which is qualified by treachery or evident premeditation,
and illegal possession of firearms. Since his age falls above fifteen years but below eighteen, and his actions clearly
showed discernment, minority under Section 7 of RA 9344 is not exempting. The accused’s discernment was
displayed through his surprise attack as well as the hiding of the murder weapon in an empty container. Nonetheless,
minority will be considered as a privileged mitigating circumstance, which will require the graduation of the
penalty prescribed by law to one degree lower (RPC, Art. 68).
Good Conduct and Time Allowance (RA 10592)
May the Good Conduct Time Allowance or the GCTA law (RA 10592), signed on May 29, 2013, be
given retroactive effect?
Yes, it is a penal law dealing with substantive matters. While RA 10592 does not define a crime/offense or provide/
prescribe/establish a penalty as it addresses the rehabilitation component of our correctional system, its provisions
have the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the crime. The further reduction on
the length of the penalty of imprisonment is, in the ultimate analysis, beneficial to the detention and convicted
prisoners alike; hence, calls for the application of Article 22 of the RPC which provides that a penal law that is
favorable or advantageous to the accused shall be given retroactive effect if he is not a habitual criminal (Inmates of
the New Bilibid Prison v. De Lima, et al. and Reynaldo Edago, et al., G.R. No. 212719 and G.R. No. 214637, June
25, 2019).
Assuming RA 10592 will be given retroactive effect, will this result to a mass release of inmates?
No. Any release of eligible inmates would have to be based on two factual determinations and one arithmetical
computation.
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The first factual determination is that they are eligible to the GCTA, i.e., under Article 29 or Article 97. The second
factual determination is that they have actually been on good behavior within the periods specified in Article 97 to
merit the GCTA. Under the IRR of RA 10592, “good conduct” refers to the conspicuous and satisfactory behavior
of a detention or convicted prisoner consisting of active involvement in rehabilitation programs, productive
participation in authorized work activities or accomplishment of exemplary deeds coupled with faithful obedience
to all prison/jail rules and regulation. These determinations are to be made by the Management, Screening, and
Evaluation Committee (MSEC), created under the IRR.
Assuming these two factual determinations are made, the arithmetical computation would come in. Each eligible
inmate’s GCTA would have to be applied to the respective sentence each is serving to determine the PDL’s
remaining sentence. Only if the eligible inmate’s sentence, after applying the GCTA, is zero will there be immediate
release (RPC, Arts. 29 and 97, as amended by RA 10592; IRR of RA 10592).
Mayor T was convicted in 1995 for the rape and murder of two college students-Los Baños students –
and in 1999, for the double murder of two other persons. He has been in the New Bilibid prison for
about 25 years. Due to the recent SC decision which declared that the GCTA law be applied retroactively,
decide whether Mayor T must be released under the new law.
Section 1 of RA 10592 or the GCTA law provides that “recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons
charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act”. Section 3 of the same, referring to the
Allowance for Good Conduct, provides that “the good conduct of any offender qualified for credit for preventive
imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of this Code, or of any convicted prisoner in any penal institution,
rehabilitation or detention center or any other local jail shall entitle him to the following deductions xxx”.
Reconciling both Sections, it would seem that the law is not explicit about excluding convicts of heinous crimes
from good conduct time allowance. What it is clear about is this: those who committed heinous crimes cannot
avail of a “credit of preventive imprisonment” or CPI under Article 29 of the RPC. Preventive imprisonment refers
to the pre-conviction jail time of persons charged with a non-bailable offense or the period a person stays in jail
because he is unable to post bail. CPI refers to the time credit for preventive imprisonment. Although one may
argue that those disqualified from credit for preventive imprisonment are also disqualified from allowance of
good conduct, Section 3 provides that Article 97 of the RPC may apply to “any convicted prisoner in any penal
institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any other local jail”. Since there is a doubt as to the interpretation
of the law, such interpretation as would be beneficial to the accused must be adhered to. Thus, persons convicted
of heinous crimes such as Mayor T in this case may be released under the GCTA law (RPC, Arts. 29 and 97, as
amended by RA 10592).
Note: The Revised IRR of the GCTA Law, provides that persons deprived of liberty charged with heinous crimes
are disqualified from both credit of preventive imprisonment and good conduct time allowance.
F was sentenced to serve an indeterminate penalty ranging from two (2) years and four (4) months, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months, as maximum. The sentence became final. Instead of
committing him in the national penitentiary, the provincial warden retained him in the provincial jail.
Thereafter, the warden took it upon himself to apply the provisions of Articles 97 and 99 of the RPC,
as amended by RA 10592, and credited the prisoner with good conduct time allowance. The warden
released F. The provincial prosecutor moved for the re-arrest of the prisoner on the ground that the
computation was wrong, and he still has an unserved portion of his sentence. Will you grant the motion?
Yes. As held in the case of People v. Tan, the prisoner’s re-arrest would not place him twice in jeopardy because his
re-incarceration is merely a continuation of the penalty that he had not completely served due to the erroneous
act of the warden; it is not a new or subsequent conviction. Neither would his re-arrest deprive him of liberty and
without due process of law, because he was not yet entitled to liberty at the time he was released. Service of penalties
and allowance for good conduct are specifically, even elaborately, governed by the Penal Code and do not depend
upon the good faith of the warden and of the prisoner (People v. Tan, G.R. No. L-21805, February 25, 1967).
Extinction of Criminal Liability
What are the causes of total extinguishment of criminal liability?

Article 89 of the RPC provides for the following causes of total extinction of criminal liability:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor
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is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment (thus, if the case is on
appeal, there is no final judgement, the criminal liability is extinguished if death occurred);
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code (RPC, Art. 89).
How is criminal liability partially extinguished?

Article 94 of the RPC states that criminal liability is partially extinguished by:
1. Conditional Pardon;
2. Commutation of sentence;
3. Good conduct allowance during confinement;
4. Parole; and
5. Probation (RPC, Art. 94).
Differentiate prescription of crime and prescription of penalty as to the right forfeited and the penalty
considered in determining the prescriptive period.
As to right forfeited, prescription of crime involves the loss of the right of the State to prosecute while in prescription
of penalty involves the loss of the right of the government to execute the final sentence. In the former, the penalty
prescribed by law is considered in determining the prescriptive period while in the latter, it is the penalty imposed
(Arts. 91 and 92, RPC).
When does the period of prescription of a crime begin to run as provided for under the RPC and when
is it interrupted?
The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and
shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted,
or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. The term of prescription shall not run when
the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago (RPC, Art. 91). It shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The running of the prescriptive period of the crime is interrupted when “any kind of investigative proceedings is
instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution” (Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department
of Justice, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008).
On January 1990, while 5-year-old M was urinating at the back of their house, he heard a strange noise
coming from the kitchen of their neighbor and playmate, A. When he peeped inside, he saw Mimi, A’s
stepmother, strangling A to death. M saw Mimi carry the dead body and place it inside the trunk of
her car and drive away. The dead body of A was never found. For fear of his life, M did not tell anyone,
even his parents and relatives. 20 and 1⁄2 years after the incident, and right after his graduation in
Criminology, M reported the crime to NBI authorities. The crime of homicide prescribes in 20 years.
Can the State still prosecute Mimi for the death of A despite the lapse of 20 and 1⁄2 years? Explain. (2000
Bar)
Yes. Despite the lapse of 20 and ½ years, M may still be prosecuted for A’s death. Article 91 of the RPC states that
the period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party,
the authorities or their agents. However, in the facts presented, such crime was only known by M who was not an
offended party nor an authority or an agent of the latter. The authorities had knowledge over the same only when
M informed them of the commission of the crime. Hence, the period of prescription of 20 years for homicide
commenced to run only from the time M revealed it to the NBI Authorities (RPC, Art. 91).
T was convicted of a violation of the Election Code and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one
year as minimum, to three years as maximum. The decision of the trial court was affirmed on appeal and
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became final and executory. T failed to appear when summoned for execution of judgment, prompting
the judge to issue an order for his arrest. T was able to use the backdoor and left for the United States.
Fifteen years later, T returned to the Philippines and filed a Motion to Quash the warrant of arrest
against him, on the ground that the penalty imposed against him had already prescribed. If you were the
judge, would you grant T’s Motion to Quash? Explain. (2015 Bar)
If I were the judge, I will deny the motion to quash. Article 93 of the RPC provides when the prescription of
penalties shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date the felon evades the
service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed
only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence. T never
served a single minute of his sentence, and thus, prescription never started to run in his favor. Clearly, one who
has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom (Del Castillo v. Torrecampo, G.R. No.
139033, December 18, 2002).
Civil Liability in Criminal Cases
If an accused is acquitted, does it necessarily follow that no civil liability arising from the acts complained
of may be awarded in the same judgment? Explain briefly.
No. If an accused is acquitted, it does not necessarily follow that no civil liability arising from the acts complained
of may be awarded in the same judgment except if there is an express waiver of the civil liability or if there is a
reservation to file a separate civil action (People v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-57555 August 28, 1984).
The court may acquit an accused on reasonable doubt and still order payment of civil damages already proved in
the same case without need for a separate civil action. The reason is that the accused has been accorded due process.
To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court
dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort and money on the part
of all concerned (Maximo v. Gerochi, Jr., G.R. Nos. L-47994-97, September 24, 1986).
X was found guilty of statutory rape by the CA. However, before an Entry of Judgment could be issued
in the instant case, the Court received a Letter from the Bureau of Corrections informing the Court of
accused-appellant’s death as evidenced by the Certificate of Death. What will be the effect of this on his
criminal and civil liabilities?
Upon accused-appellant’s death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify
that accused-appellant’s civil liability in connection with his acts against the victim, may be based on sources other
than delicts; in which case, the victim may file a separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant, as may
be warranted by law and procedural rules (People v Raga, G.R. No. 211166, June 5, 2017).
Crimes under the Revised Penal Code (Revised Penal Code – Book 2)
Crimes against National Security and Laws of Nations
Piracy and Qualified Piracy
While a ship was negotiating the sea route from Hongkong towards Manila, and while still 300 miles
from Aparri, Cagayan, its engines malfunctioned. The Captain ordered the ship to stop for emergency
repairs lasting for almost 15 hours. Due to exhaustion, the officers and crew fell asleep. While the ship
was anchored, a motorboat manned by renegade X and Y from Claveria, Cagayan, passed by and took
advantage of the situation. They cut the ship’s engines and took away several heavy crates of electrical
equipment and loaded them in their motorboat. Then they left hurriedly towards Aparri. At daybreak,
the crew found that a robbery took place. They radioed the Aparri Port Authorities resulting in the
apprehension of the culprits. What was the crime committed? (2006 Bar)
X and Y committed the crime of piracy. The elements of the crime of piracy under Art. 122 of the RPC are: 1. A
vessel is on the high seas or in Philippine waters; 2. The offenders are not members of its complement or passengers
of the vessel; 3. The offenders either attack or seize the vessel or seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its
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equipment or personal belongings of its complement or passengers. This crime may be committed in the high seas
or in the Philippine waters by offenders who are not members of the vessel’s complement or its passengers through
seizing the whole or part of the cargo of the said vessel, its equipment or personal belongings of its complement or
passengers. The culprits, who are neither members of the complement nor passengers of the ship, seized part of the
equipment of the vessel while it was three hundred miles away from Aparri, Cagayan. Thus, X and Y committed
the crime of piracy.
The inter-island vessel, while cruising off Batanes, was forced to seek shelter at the harbor of Kaoshiung,
Taiwan because of a strong typhoon. While anchored in said harbor, X, Y and Z arrived in a speedboat,
fired a bazooka at the bow of the vessel, boarded it and divested the passengers of their money and
jewelry. A passenger of the vessel, A, took advantage of the confusion to settle an old grudge with
another passenger, and killed him. After their apprehension, all four were charged with qualified piracy
before a Philippine court. Was the charge of qualified piracy against the three person (X, Y and Z) who
boarded the inter-island vessel correct? (2008 Bar)
Yes, the charge of qualified piracy against X, Y, and Z is correct. Under Article 122 of the RPC, the crime of piracy
is committed by offenders who are not members of the complement or passengers of the vessel by seizing the whole
or part of the cargo of the said vessel, its equipment or personal belongings of its complement or passengers. Article
123 par. 3 of the RPC, the crime of Piracy is qualified if murder, homicide, physical injuries, or rape accompanied
the commission of the crime of piracy. In this case, X, Y and Z boarded the vessel and divested the passengers of
their money and jewelry. The crime of murder was also committed by A against a passenger. As long as murder or
homicide is committed as a result of or on occasion of piracy, the crime of qualified piracy is committed.
Crimes against the Fundamental Law of the State
Arbitrary Detention
X, a policeman of Pateros, acting under the orders of his chief who desired to put a stop to pilfering in a
certain locality, patrolled this district. About midnight, seeing two persons acting suspiciously in front
of an uninhabited house, X arrested them without warrant, and took them to the municipal presidencia
where they were detained in the jail for six or seven hours before they were released. X was accused of
arbitrary detention. Should he be convicted? Explain.
No, X cannot be convicted of arbitrary detention. Under Article 124 of the RPC, the elements of the crime are:
(1) That the offender is a public officer or employee; (2) That he detains a person; and (3) That the detention is
without legal grounds. In this case, since the two persons acted suspiciously in front of the uninhabited house at
midnight, and entered the same, X was justified to arrest them even without a warrant under the circumstances of
the case, mainly, since he was patrolling the place upon orders of his chief. The persons were arrested in a suspicious
place at midnight under suspicious circumstances that they were about to commit a crime or breach of peace;
therefore, the third element is wanting (U.S. v. Santos, G.R. No. 12779, September 10, 1917).
Violation of Domicile
In the morning of April 19, 2014, X, lieutenant of the barrio, made his appearance at the gate of the
yard of Y’s house, and stated that he intended to enter the house and search it. The landlady objected
to such search. In spite of her opposition to such search, not being provided with and showing no order
of court, X insisted upon entering the said dwelling under a threat that he would procure a search
warrant. Thereupon, he entered and proceeded to search the house and inspect some jars and baskets.
The inhabitants were not aware of what was being searched for. What crime/s did X commit?
X is liable for violation of domicile. Under Article 128 of the RPC, the elements are: (1) that the offender is a public
officer or employee; (2) that he is not authorized by judicial order to enter the dwelling and/or to make a search for
papers or other effects; and (3) that the offender shall: (a) enter any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof;
(b) search papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner; or (c) refuse to leave
the premises, after having surreptitiously entered said dwelling and after having been required to leave the same.
In this case, (1) X is a lieutenant of the barrio making him a public officer; (2) the facts stated that X was not
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authorized by judicial order; and (3) X searched jars and baskets without the previous consent of the owners.
Hence, X is liable for violation of domicile (U.S. v. Macaspac, G.R. No. L-3878, November 16, 1907).
Crimes against Public Order
Rebellion
X, without taking arms or being in open hostility against the Government, incited others to deprive
Congress of its legislative powers by means of speeches or writings. What crime was committed by X?
(2012 Bar)
X committed the crime of Inciting to Rebellion. Under Article 138 of the RPC, this crime may be committed
by an offender who does not take arms or is not in open hostility against the government. The offender must
incite other to the execution of any of the acts of rebellion and the inciting must be done through speeches or
proclamations. Under Article 134 of the RPC, depriving the Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
or prerogatives is considered as an act of rebellion. Here, X through his speeches and writings incited others to
deprive the Congress of its legislative powers hence, he is liable for inciting to rebellion.
The prosecution charged X, Y and Z with rebellion with multiple murder, arson and robbery. The
prosecution alleged that X, Y and Z took arms with the HUKBALAHAP, a rebel group, to commit armed
raids, ambushes and attacks against the police, constabulary and armed detachments as well as innocent
civilians. It is further alleged that, as a necessary means to commit rebellion, they also committed the
crime of murder, arson and robbery. Was the charge of the prosecution correct?
No, the charge was not correct. The theory of absorption applies in this case. If a crime usually regarded as common,
like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to the Government the territory of
the Philippine Islands or any part thereof then said offense becomes stripped of its common complexion, in as
much as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquired the political character of the latter.
The killing, in this case, was committed in furtherance of rebellion. It is absorbed by the crime of rebellion under
the theory of absorption, hence, only a single charge of rebellion is proper (People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. L-6025-
26, July 18, 1956; Lagman v. Medialdea G.R. No. 231658, July 27, 2017).
There was a rebellion staged by several people in the City of Marawi. Among those who participated in
the rebellion were X and Y. X concealed and harbored Y in order to protect him from being captured
by the police. X was charged with a violation of Presidential Decree 1829 which penalizes obstruction
of apprehending of criminal offenders and was also charged for the crime of Rebellion under the RPC.
May X be separately charged for Rebellion and for violation of PD 1829?
No. According to the Supreme Court in the case of Enrile vs. Amin, all crimes, whether punishable under a special
law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become
absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves. Theory
of absorption in rebellion does not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which
are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense. In this case, it is clear from the facts that the act of X in
concealing and protecting Y from the police officers was committed in furtherance of rebellion thus constituting a
component thereof. It was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion (Enrile v.
Amin, G.R. No. 93335, September 13, 1990).
Coup d’état
X and his companions were charged before the RTC of Makati of coup d’etat, and in the Military Court,
particularly for acts unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman under the Articles of War. While the
case was in trial, they filed a motion to assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the RTC
contending that violations of Articles of War is already absorbed in the crime of coup d’etat. The RTC
granted the motion saying that indeed violation of Articles of War is absorbed in the crime of coup
d’etat. Was the RTC correct?
No. Supreme Court held that coup d’etat cannot absorb violation of the Articles of War. The theory of absorption
in rebellion and coup d’etat would lie only in cases which could be heard by the same court. It refers only to cases
or crimes which are under the jurisdiction of the same court. In this case, the crime of coup d’etat is under the
jurisdiction of civilian court, RTC of Makati, whereas violation of the Articles of War is under the jurisdiction of
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the Military Court. Violation of Articles of War cannot be heard, it is not within the jurisdiction of any civilian
court, hence, coup d’etat cannot absorb violation of articles of war. Furthermore, a violation of the Articles of War
is sui generis, it is a crime of its own, nothing compares to it, no one is the same as violation of the Articles of War,
hence, unlike any other law, it cannot be absorbed by coup d’état or rebellion (Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007,
August 10, 2006).
Direct Assault
X, a lady professor, caught Y, one of her students, cheating during an examination. Aside from calling
Y’s attention, she confiscated his examination booklet and sent him out of the room, causing Y extreme
embarrassment. In class the following day, Y approached X and without any warning, slapped her on the
face. Y would have inflicted grave injuries on X had Z, another student, not intervened. Y then turned
his ire on Z and punched him repeatedly, causing him injuries.
1. What crime did Y commit against X?
Y is liable for Qualified Direct Assault with respect to X. Under Article 148 of the RPC the crime of Direct
Assault may be committed by an offender by attacking a person in authority or his agent while they are
engaged in the actual performance of their official duties. In this case, Y slapped his teacher X, who is a person
in authority as expressly provided in Article 152 of the RPC. X was in the performance of her duties on the
day of the commission of the assault. The crime of Direct Assault is qualified since the laying of hands upon
a person in authority qualifies Direct Assault.
2. What crime or crimes did Y commit against Z? (2013 Bar)
Direct Assault was committed by Y to Z. Article 152 of the RPC states that any person who comes to the aid
of persons in authority shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority. Under Article 148 of the RPC, the
crime of direct assault may be committed by an offender by attacking a person in authority or his agent. Here,
Z became an agent of the person in authority when he came to the aid of a person in authority, X. Hence, the
crime of direct assault was committed against him when Y punched him repeatedly (Gelig v. People, G.R. No.
173150, July 28, 2010).
A police officer was manning traffic along Taft Avenue. Despite his presence, traffic was still heavy and
the cars were not moving. X, one of the drivers of a car stuck in the traffic was so mad. He alighted from
his vehicle and went directly to the police officer and boxed the police officer several times. The police
officer fell on the ground. The police officer suffered less serious physical injuries.
1. What crime or crimes are committed by X?
The crime committed by X is the complex crime of direct assault with less serious physical injuries. Under
Article 148 of the RPC, the crime of direct assault may be committed by making an attack against an agent
of a person in authority while he is engaged in the actual performance of his official duties. The crime is
complexed with Less Serious Physical Injuries by virtue of Article 48 of the RPC. In this case, the police officer
is considered as an agent of a person in authority. X punched the police officer while the said police officer was
manning traffic along Taft Avenue. As a result, the police officer suffered less serious physical injuries hence, it
is proper to charge X of the crime of Direct Assault with Less Serious Physical Injuries.
2. What if in the same problem, a pedestrian saw X punching the police officer. The pedestrian then
tried to stop X. This angered X and as a result he also punched the pedestrian. What crime was
committed against the pedestrian?
The crime committed was Indirect Assault. Under Article 149 of the RPC, the crime of Indirect Assault is
committed when a person who comes to the aid of an agent of a person in authority is a victim of any of the
forms of direct assault under Article 149. In this case, the pedestrian came to the aid of the police officer who
was being boxed by X. Hence, X is liable for the crime of Indirect Assault.
Evasion of Service of Sentence
X was convicted and sentenced to a penalty of destierro. By virtue of such final judgment he was
prohibited from entering the city of Manila. A few days after, X went to the City of Manila. X was
charged with Evasion of Service of Sentence. Was the charge correct?
Yes, X is liable for the crime of Evasion of Service of Sentence. Under Article 157 or the RPC, the crime may be
committed if the offender is convicted by a final judgment and evades the service of his sentence by escaping during
the term of his sentence. The sentence must be one which consists in deprivation of liberty. Furthermore, in the
case of People v. Abilong, the Supreme Court held that inasmuch as the RPC was originally approved and enacted
CRIMINAL LAW
in Spanish, the Spanish text governs. It is clear that the word “imprisonment” used in the English text is a wrong
translation of the phrase “sufriendo privacion de libertad” used in the Spanish text. Here, the penalty of destierro
was imposed. Destierro is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that X, by his sentence of destierro
was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. X therefore evaded his sentence by entering the City during
the period of his sentence (People v. Abilong, G.R. No. L-1960, November 26, 1948).
D, a member of a drug syndicate, was a detention prisoner in the provincial jail of X Province. B, another
member of the syndicate, regularly visited D. E, the guard in charge who had been receiving gifts from
B every time the latter visited D, became friendly with E and became relaxed in the inspection of B’s
belongings during B’s jail visits. In one of B’s visits, he was able to smuggle a pistol which D used to
disarm the guards and destroy the padlock of the main gate of the jail, enabling D to escape. (2015 Bar)
1. Did D commit the crime of evasion of service of sentence?
No, D did not commit the crime of evasion of service of sentence. To be convicted under Article 157 of
the RPC, the accused shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment
by reason of final judgement. In this case, D was only a detention prisoner. By escaping while undergoing
preventive imprisonment, D is not evading the service of his sentence.
2. What other crimes, if any, did D commit?
D committed the crime of direct assault. Under Article 148 of the RPC, the crime of direct assault may be
committed by making an attack against an agent of a person in authority while he is engaged in the actual
performance of his official duties. Disarming the guards with the use of pistol while they are engaged in the
performance of their duties constitutes direct assault.
3. What crime, if any, did B commit?
B committed the crime of delivery of prisoner from jail qualified by bribery. Under Article 156 of the RPC,
helping a person confined in jail to escape constitutes a crime. Helping means furnishing the prisoner with
the material means or tools which greatly facilitate his escape. In this case, B provided D with a pistol which
helped D to escape. Thus, B is liable for the crime of delivery of prisoner from jail.
4. What crime, if any, did E commit?
E committed the crime of infidelity in the custody of prisoner or evasion through negligence under Article
224. As the guard in charge, E was negligent in relaxing the inspection of B’s belongings during jail visits
allowing B to smuggle a pistol to D, which D used to escape. By accepting gifts from B, who was part of the
syndicate to which D belonged, E is also guilty of indirect bribery under Article 211 of the RPC.
Crimes against Public Interest
Falsification by Public Officer, Employee, or Notary, or Ecclesiastical Minister
Mayor Y is the incumbent mayor of municipality X. Pursuant to his authority to appoint as the chief
executive, he appointed his legitimate son, M, as meat inspector in the office of the municipal treasurer.
He signed the appointment document — Civil Service Form No. 40 — twice, first as the appointing
authority and second, as the personnel officer, certifying that all the required supporting papers have
been complied with, reviewed and found to be in order to be submitted to the Civil Service Commission.
Among the supporting papers required for the appointment is the Certification declaring M is not
related to him and to any person exercising immediate supervision over him within the third degree of
either consanguinity or affinity. The appointee, however, neither assumed the position to which he was
appointed nor collected the salary corresponding to it.
1. What is the criminal liability of Mayor Y, if any?
He is liable for committing falsification of public document under Art. 171, par. 4 of the RPC. This fourth
kind of falsification has the following requisites that must concur: (a) that the offender makes in a document
untruthful statement in a narration of facts; (b) that he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated by him; and (c) that the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false. Mayor Y was a public officer
being then the incumbent mayor of the Municipality X, when he issued the appointment. In connection
with such appointment, Mayor Y taking advantage of his official position, issued the certification — a public
document — stating therein that he is not related to the appointee within the third degree of consanguinity or
affinity; but he had the legal obligation to disclose his true relationship with the appointee. The facts narrated
by him in the said certification are absolutely false because the bare fact and naked truth is that the appointee
is his legitimate son (Layno v. People, G.R. No. 93842, September 7, 1992).
2. Mayor Y raises the defense of lack of criminal intent to commit the crime by his withdrawal of the
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appointment, followed by his order to the municipal treasurer not to honor the appointment of his
son and not to allow him to report for work; being in good faith, he should not be liable for any
crime. Is he correct? Discuss.
No, Mayor Y’s claim of good faith is unavailing. Although Art. 171 allows the defense of good faith in the
crime of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. He
brazenly certified that he was not related to his own within the 3rd degree of consanguinity. The perversion
was designed to conceal his father-son relationship from the Civil Service Commission and thereby deceived
it, as it was in fact deceived, in approving the appointment he extended to him. The criminal intent is not only
obvious, but is also presumed, from the untruthful narration of fact. The crime of falsification having already
been committed, no acts showing subsequent repentance and abandonment of purpose, even if true, can
relieve the accused of his penal liability (Layno v. People, G.R. No. 93842, September 7, 1992).
When is the commencement period of prescription for instituting criminal actions for falsification of
public document?
If the offense is falsification of a public document punishable under Art 172 of the RPC, the period for prescription
commences on the date of registration of the forged or falsified document (Lim vs. People, G.R. No. 226590, April
23, 2018).
In the implementation of the “Medical Indigency Program”, various purchase orders (PO) and requests
for medical supplies were approved by AAA, Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte. After a post-
audit of the COA, it was revealed that the purchase orders for medicines from a supplier was altered to
make it appear that it was prepared after a public bidding was held when in fact it was prepared by BBB,
then OIC of the General Services Office, and approved by AAA prior thereto. AAA argued that he may
have acted negligently when he affixed his signature on the subject purchase orders, which document
was forwarded to him with all the necessary signatures of his subordinates, and that he had no criminal
intent. He stressed that he relied in good faith on his subordinates and provincial officers. May AAA be
convicted of the crime of falsification of public document?
Yes. Wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime
of falsification of public document. The elements of falsification by a public officer or employee or notary public
are that: (1) the offender is a public officer or employee or notary public; (2) the offender takes advantage of his
official position; and (3) he or she falsifies a document by committing any of the acts mentioned in Art. 171
of the RPC. The act of “altering true dates” requires that: (a) the date mentioned in the document is essential;
and (b) the alteration of the date in a document must affect either the veracity of the document or the effects
thereof. The principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed. Hence, the changing of the date in the subject PO was not a mere correction but an act of
falsification to make it appear that a bidding was conducted prior to ordering the medicines (Typoco, Jr. vs. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 221857, August 16, 2017).
Falsification by Private Individual and Use of Falsified Documents
D applied for a salary loan from XYZ Cooperative by misrepresenting himself to be an employee of the
City’s Engineer’s Office by using the name “T” to the loan clerk of said cooperative. Likewise, he presented
his employee’s I.D. from the City Engineer’s Office bearing the name of T. He also gave supporting
documents which are the certification from the City Human Resource, Certificate of Employment,
service record and promissory note. All such documents reflected the name of “T” as the loan applicant
and debtor. Through his misrepresentation, the loan clerk gave him the cash advances. However, the real
T was informed that his name was used to applied for a salary loan. If you were the lawyer of the real T,
what crime will you file against D? Explain.
D is liable for the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents. The elements of the crime of
falsification of commercial documents under Article 172(1) are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) the
offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and, (3) the act of
falsification is committed in a commercial document. D’s, a private individual, act of causing it to appear that T
had participated in the act of applying for a loan, in fact, he did not do so in a loan application and a promissory
note which are all commercial documents satisfies the elements. It must be emphasized anew that when the
offender commits on a public, official, or commercial document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in
Article 171 of the RPC as a necessary means to commit another crime like estafa, the two crimes form a complex
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crime (Desmoparan v. People, G.R. No. 233598, March 27, 2019 citing De Castro v. People, G.R. No. 171672,
February 2, 2015).
Crimes against Public Morals
Grave Scandal
P, a bold actress living on the top floor of a plush condominium in Makati City sunbathes naked at
its penthouse every Sunday morning. She was unaware that the business executives holding office at
the adjoining tall buildings reported to office every Sunday morning and, with the use of powerful
binoculars, kept on gazing at her while she sunbathed. Eventually, her sunbathing became the talk of
the town.
1. What crime, if any, did P commit?
P did not commit any crime. The felony closest to making P criminally liable is Grave Scandal, but then her
act is not to be considered as highly scandalous and offensive against decency and good customs. In order to be
convicted of grave scandal, the following elements must concur: (1) that the offender performs an act or acts;
(2) that said act is highly scandalous as offending against decency or good customs; (3) that highly scandalous
conduct is not expressly falling within any article of the Code; and (4) that the act or acts complained of be
committed in a public place of within public knowledge or view. P did not know that in a nearby building,
business executives reported to office every Sunday. She cannot be held liable for grave scandal as such is not
committed in a public place or within public knowledge or view (U.S. v. Samaniego, G.R. No. 5115, November
29, 1909).
2. What crime, if any, did the business executives commit? Explain. (1996 Bar)
The business executives cannot be charged with any crime. They cannot be charged with acts of lasciviousness
as Art. 336 requires an act of lewdness committed against another person. They cannot also be held liable for
Libel under Art. 353 as it requires that the source of the derogatory remark be known and it be committed in
a public and malicious manner. In this case, P becoming the talk of the town cannot be directly imputed to
the business executives.
Crimes Committed by Public Officers
Direct Bribery
Distinguish direct bribery from indirect bribery.

In direct bribery, there is an agreement between the public officer and the giver of the gift or present, while in
indirect bribery, usually no such agreement exists. In direct bribery, the offender agrees to perform or performs an
act or refrains from doing something because of the gift or promise; while in indirect bribery, it is not necessary
that the officer should do any particular act or even promise to do an act, as it is enough that he accepts gifts offered
to him by reason of his office (Pozar vs. CA, G.R. No. L-62439, October 23, 1984).
X, a Japanese national, was accused of being a member of the Yakuza. Y, a Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) agent, took custody of the passport of X, supposedly as a guarantee for X’s appearance
in the BID office. However, Y demanded Php1,000,000.00 pesos for the release of the passport and X
paid a down payment of Php25,000.00. What crime is committed?
Y is liable for the second kind of direct bribery under Art. 210 of the RPC, the elements of which are: 1) the offender
was a public officer, 2) who received the gifts or presents personally or through another, 3) in consideration of an
act that did not constitute a crime, and 4) that act related to the exercise of official duties. The prosecution proved
all the elements. First, there is no question that the offense was committed by a public officer, Y being a BID Agent
extorted money from the Aoyagi spouses for the return of the passport. Second, the Y received the money as payoff.
Third, the money was given in consideration of the return of the passport, an act that did not constitute a crime.
Fourth, both the confiscation and the return of the passport were made in the exercise of official duties (Acejas III
v. People, G.R. No. 156643, June 27, 2006).
CRIMINAL LAW
Corruption of Public Officials
One Sunday afternoon, Mr. X, President of ABC Corp., happened to bump into the Labor Arbiter
assigned to the illegal case filed by certain employees against his company. During their encounter,
Mr. X promised the Labor Arbiter a luxury car in exchange for a favorable ruling. The Labor Arbiter
immediately rejected the offer and walked away. What crime did Mr. X commit under the RPC? (2019
Bar)
Mr. X committed the crime of Attempted Corruption of a Public officer. Art. 212 of the RPC states that any person
who shall have made the offers or promises or given the gifts or present to a public officer is guilty of corruption
of public officer. In this case, Mr. X, by making an offer already commenced the performance of material acts
of execution in corrupting the Labor Arbiter. He was not able to perform all the material acts of execution only
because the Labor Arbiter refused to accept the offer. Thus, Mr. X is liable of the crime of Attempted Corruption
of a Public officer (Pozar v. CA, G.R. No. L-62439, October 23, 1984).
Malversation
T is the principal of Vigan National High School. He ordered L, the school’s collection and disbursing
officer, to prepare checks representing the teachers’ salaries and allowances after which he endorsed it
to T as the latter will be the one to encash it. However, T never returned to the school and delivered the
money to L. Who is an accountable public officer under Article 217 of the RPC and may T be held liable
for malversation?
An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article 217 of the RPC, is one who has custody or control
of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office. The nature of the duties of the public officer or
employee, the fact that as part of his duties he received public money for which he is bound to account and failed
to account for it, is the factor which determines whether or not malversation is committed by the accused public
officer or employee. Hence, a school principal of a public high school, such as T, may be held guilty of malversation
if he or she is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates the same. (Torres v. People, G.R. No 175074, August
31, 2011).
What is/are the effect/s of restitution of the amount in the crime of malversation?
Full restitution of the amount malversed will not in any way exonerate an accused, as payment is not one of the
elements of extinction of criminal liability. Under the law, the refund of the sum misappropriated, even if made
before the commencement of the criminal prosecution, does not exempt the guilty person from liability for the
crime. At most, then, payment of the amount malversed will only serve as a mitigating circumstance akin to
voluntary surrender, as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 13 in relation to paragraph 10 of the same article of
the RPC (Manuel, et.al. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158413, February 8, 2012).
AAA was the Municipal Mayor of Pozorrubio when a group of auditors conducted an investigation of
the accounts of C and discovered a shortage of Php2,872,808.00 on the joint accounts of C and V. The
auditors discovered that the seventeen (17) cash advances made by AAA were illegal. AAA was likewise
not authorized to receive cash advances. BBB confirmed that the signatures appearing on sixteen (16) of
the seventeen (17) illegal disbursement vouchers belonged to AAA. X, Officer in Charge in the Municipal
Treasurer’s Office, testified that the receipts presented by AAA, did not actually reflect the payments
claimed by AAA. The receipts were issued to different persons, in different amounts and for different
purposes. What crime is committed by AAA? Explain.
AAA committed Malversation of Public Funds. The elements of malversation are: (1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) those funds or property
were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (4) he appropriated, took, misappropriated or
consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. AAA was a public
officer, being the mayor in the period relevant to the time of the crime charged. During his term, he incurred
unliquidated cash advances amounting to Php2,872,808.00 that constituted funds belonging to the Municipality
of Pozorrubio and earmarked for use by the said municipality. Finally, anent the last element for the crime of
malversation of public funds, AAA failed to return the amount of Php2,572,808.00, upon demand. His failure or
inability to return the shortage upon demand created prima facie evidence that the funds were put to his personal
use, which AAA failed to overturn (Venezuela vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 205693; February 14, 2018).
CRIMINAL LAW
Conniving with or Consenting to Evasion
J, an assistant provincial warden, received a note allegedly written by Governor A. The note stated that
the governor is asking J to send five inmates to work in the construction of a fence at his house then
leased by the province and used as an official guest house. Notwithstanding the fact the J was unsure as
to the genuineness of the note, he complied with the request. Consequently, Prison Guard E picked five
men to work on the fence and he was designated to supervise and monitor the prisoners while working.
However, P, one of the prisoners, was able to run away and escape. Believing that the escape of P was
made possible by the note of Gov. A to J, an information for the crime of conniving with or consenting
to evasion was filed against Gov. A. Will the charge prosper? Explain.
No. In order to be guilty under Art. 223 of the RPC, it is necessary that the public officer had consented to, or
connived in, the escape of the prisoner under his custody or charge. Connivance in the escape of a prisoner on the
part of the person in charge is an essential condition in the commission of the crime of faithlessness in the custody
of the prisoner. If the public officer charged with the duty of guarding him does not connive with the fugitive, then
he has not violated the law and is not guilty of the crime. No connivance in the escape of P from the custody of
the accused E can be deduced from the note of Gov. A to J, it appearing that the note does not mention the names
of the prisoners to be brought to the guest house; and that it was the E himself who picked the men to compose
the work party municipality of Canaman, province of Camarin (Alberto v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. L-31839, June 30,
1980).
The fugitive, then he has not violated the law and is not guilty of the crime. No connivance in the escape of P from
the custody of the accused E can be deduced from the note of Gov. A to J, it appearing that the note does not
mention the names of the prisoners to be brought to the guest house; and that it was the E himself who picked the
men to compose the work party municipality of Canaman, province of Camarin (Alberto v. De la Cruz, G.R. No.
L-31839, June 30, 1980).
Crimes against Persons
Parricide
A heated argument ensued between H and W over the former’s womanizing. H then punched W, who
was then six and a half months pregnant, on the head. The impact of the blow made W lose her balance.
She fell hard on the floor, hitting her head. The fall caused her death and the premature delivery of her
child. Both were brought to the hospital, but W was pronounced dead on arrival, while the child went
on to live for thirty-six (36) more hours before eventually losing breath.
1. What crime(s) did H commit?
With respect to the killing of the wife, parricide under Article 246 of the RPC is committed because of the
qualifying circumstance of relationship. With respect to the killing of the child, H is liable for infanticide
under Article 255 of the RPC because his child was born alive and was already viable or capable of independent
existence and the child’s age is less than three (3) days for the latter died after thirty-six (36) hours from
expulsion. He shall incur criminal liability for parricide and infanticide although these crimes committed are
different from his criminal intention of maltreating his wife (Article 4, RPC). This is a complex crime because
the single act of punching the victim constitutes two grave felonies (Article 48, RPC).
2. Assuming W was only six months pregnant when the incident occurred, and that when she died, the
fetus inside her womb also died, will your answer be different? Explain.
The crime committed is complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. Killing the unborn child as
a result of the violence employed against the mother without intent to abort is unintentional abortion. Since
the child died inside the womb of the mother, unintentional abortion is committed regardless of viability of
the victim. Because the same violence that killed the mother also caused unintentional abortion, the crime
committed is a complex crime (People v. Pacayna, Jr., G.R. No. 179035, April 16, 2008).
3. If X, a stranger, cooperated in the killing of W, what will be his liability?
A stranger who cooperates and takes part in the commission of the crime of parricide, is not guilty of parricide,
but only homicide or murder as the case may be (People v. Patricio, G.R. No. L-20651, October 25, 1923).
CRIMINAL LAW
Distinguish parricide from infanticide.

Parricide (Art. 246) Infanticide (Art. 255)
As to Basis of the Crime
Relationship of the offender and the victim The age of the child. He/she must be less than
three (3) days old. Otherwise, the crime is parri-
cide.
As to the Victim
May be committed not only against a child Only against a child less than three (3) days old
three (3) days old or over but also against other
relatives.
As to the Offender
Committed only by the relatives enumerated Committed by any person
As to Application of the Rule on Conspiracy
Does not apply as the basis is the relationship of Applicable. Only one Information is filed against
the offender and the victim. Separate Informa- all offenders.
tion must be filed for the murder or homicide
committed by the non-relative conspirator.
As to the Mitigating Circumstance of Concealment of Dishonor
Concealment of dishonor of the mother is not Concealment of dishonor of the mother (and ma-
mitigating. ternal grandparents) is mitigating.
Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted under Exceptional Circumstances
X and A’s wife, J, had an illicit relationship. A arrived at his residence at the V & G Subdivision in
Tacloban City at around 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon. Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife,
J, and X in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and X noticed A, the wife pushed her paramour,
who got his revolver. A who was then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room, jumped and ran
away.
A went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the house of a PC soldier arriving there at
around 6:30 p.m. He got the soldier’s firearm and went back to his house. He was not able to find his
wife and X there. He proceeded to the “mahjong session” as it was the “hangout” of X. A found X
playing mahjong. He fired at X three times with his rifle. X was hit. Y and Z, who were occupying a
room adjacent to the room where X was playing mahjong, were also hit by the shots fired by A. X died
instantaneously. Y and Z were brought to the hospital due to the less serious physical injuries sustained.
The Solicitor General recommends that Article 247 of the RPC defining death inflicted under exceptional
circumstances, complexed with double frustrated murder should be applied. Is the OSG correct? Decide.
The OSG is not correct in designating the crimes as double frustrated murder. Under the RPC, Article 247
prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately
thereafter.
These elements are present in this case. Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the
time the accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was
actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-
appellant.
CRIMINAL LAW
As to the finding of double frustrated murder, the accused-appellant was not committing murder when he
discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. The court
cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by Y and Z. Nonetheless,
there is negligence on his part. Accordingly, he should be held liable under Article 365 for less serious physical
injuries through simple imprudence or negligence (People v. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, September 14, 1987).
Murder
A and his friends were talking when B suddenly sneaked behind A, grabbed his neck with his left arm,
and drove a knife at his side. A was able to push away B causing both of them to fall down. A got off his
feet and ran away but B caught up with him and stabbed him twice in the chest. A was brought to the
hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. B narrates that he followed A to the store intending
to hurt him because of the threats he made to him. He tried to grab the knife from A and when he got
hold of it, he stabbed the right side of A’s body. What crime/s is B liable for?
B is liable for murder qualified by treachery. To warrant a conviction for the crime of murder, the following
essential elements must be present: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the
killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248 of the RPC; and (4) that the
killing is not parricide or infanticide. Here, A was killed by B. Also, B surreptitiously sneaked behind A and gave
him a headlock that restrained his movement, thus denying him the chance to defend himself; therefore, treachery
is present. Considering that the elements of treachery attended the killing of A, B committed the crime of murder
(People v. Advincula, G.R. No. 218108, April 11, 2018)
A, a 76-year-old woman, was brought to the hospital in a coma with slight cerebral hemorrhage. An
endotracheal tube was inserted in her mouth to facilitate her breathing. B, a hospital janitor, removed
the tube. A doctor saw him and told him to get out of the room. But when the doctor was gone, B came
back and removed the tube. The victim started to convulse and bleed in the mouth. Only the timely
arrival of the nurse prevented the patient’s death. The patient was then transferred to another hospital
where she died the next day of cardio-respiratory arrest. Is B criminally liable? If so, what crime was
committed? (1991 Bar)
Yes, B is criminally liable for murder qualified by treachery. In People v. Umaging, the Supreme Court ruled that
removal of the endotracheal tube is attempted murder, qualified by treachery, because the patient did not die.
Here, the overt acts of B appear to be the proximate cause of the death of A. A died of cardio-respiratory arrest
which evidently was brought about by the convulsion and bleeding in the mouth of the victim due to the removal
by B of the endotracheal tube twice. The two acts of B can be considered as the result of one criminal design.
Therefore, B is liable for murder.
One day, while Y’s wife was quietly minding her own business, X suddenly barged into their house
looking for Y. X ran into Y’s room. Y’s wife shouted at Y to close his room. However, X immediately
stabbed Y with a bladed weapon while uttering the words “Papatayin kita”, in which he eventually
succeeded. Z, Y’s friend, was able to pull him out of the room. Not contented, X went back and stabbed
Y again. X was charged and convicted of the crime of murder. X insisted on appeal that treachery cannot
be appreciated since Y’s wife was able to warn her husband that he was approaching their room with a
bladed weapon. Is X liable for murder?
Yes, he is liable for murder. The fact that Y’s wife was able to shout at the former to close his room does not rule
out the presence of treachery. It has been ruled that while a victim may have been warned of possible danger to his
person, there is treachery nonetheless when the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it impossible for
the victim to retaliate. The present case typifies this doctrine for the victim had no opportunity to defend himself
precisely because it was simply unexpected to be the subject of an attack right inside his own abode and he was
unarmed, with no opportunity to put up a defense (People v. Soriano, G.R. No. 216063, June 5, 2017).
Homicide
In a free-for-all brawl that ensued after some customers inside a nightclub became unruly, guns were fired
by a group, among them A and B, that finally put the customers back to their senses. Unfortunately, one
customer died. Subsequent investigation revealed that A’s gunshot had inflicted on the victim a slight
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wound that did not cause the deceased’s death nor materially contribute to it. It was B’s gunshot that
inflicted a fatal wound on the deceased. A contended that his liability should, if at all, be limited to slight
physical injury. Would you agree? Why? (2003 Bar)
No, I disagree with A’s contention that his liability should be limited to slight physical injury under Article 263
of the RPC. The gunshot wound inflicted by petitioner A was a slight wound which did not cause the death of
the victim nor materially contributed to it in order that he may be held liable for homicide. His liability should
therefore be limited to the slight injury he caused. However, the fact that petitioner A inflicted a gunshot wound
on the victim shows the intent to kill. The use of a gun fired at another certainly leads to no other conclusion than
that there is intent to kill. He is therefore liable for the crime of attempted homicide and not merely for slight
physical injury. (Araneta, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43527, July 3, 1990).
Prosecution witness, A, testified that while inside their family home she heard a man outside their house
shouting “Get out” to which her father responded to and stepped out of their house. After hearing three
gunshots, she went outside and saw X running away with a gun in his hand. A’s father was later found
dead. The autopsy and death certificate revealed that his death was due to a gunshot wound in his left
eyebrow caused by a bullet fired from a caliber .25 firearm. What crime/s is X liable for?
X shall be liable for homicide. Under Article 249 of the RPC, the elements of the crime of homicide are: (1)
a person was killed; (2) the accused killed that person without justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the
intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of
murder, or that of parricide or infanticide. Here, a man was killed. There is no showing that any of the qualifying
circumstances was present. According to the Certificate of Death of the victim, it was showed that the underlying
cause of his death was a gunshot wound. X was seen holding firearms immediately after the victim was shot and
his fatal injury was caused by a bullet fired from one of the firearms of petitioner. Petitioner’s criminal intent is
conclusively presumed due to the death of the victim. In the absence of any of the qualifying circumstances of
murder, the crime committed by petitioner was homicide (Barbosa v. People, G.R. No. 207193, July 24, 2017).
The victim, A, is a friend of X, the accused. One afternoon, X was in the house of A waiting for the
latter. Not long enough from the time A went home, X and A left the house. Later that evening, A and
accused rented a room in an apartelle. When A started to fall asleep, X tied A, and struck him with a
piece of wood on his head, causing his death. Is the conviction of attempted kidnapping with murder
proper in this case?
No, the crime committed is only homicide. The intent to deprive liberty was not proven to qualify the offense
as kidnapping. There is no treachery to qualify the killing as murder. The essence of the crime of kidnapping is
the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the intent of the offender to that effect. Both act and
intent must be proven. The fact alone of waiting for the victim to fall asleep and then and there tying him was
not determinant of intent to actually detain the victim or deprive his liberty. Therefore, X cannot be liable for
kidnapping. There was nothing in the facts that show that the accused’s manner of attack was consciously and
deliberately adopted. Considering that none of the qualifying circumstances was proven during the trial, the same
cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing into murder. Hence, the crime committed is only homicide (People v.
Villanueva, G.R. No. 218958, December 13, 2017).
At around 5:00 p.m., a drinking spree took place at G’s house for his birthday celebration. Just as when
A and his wife was about to leave, G, annoyed at their early bow out, suddenly took his gun and shot A,
in the presence of A’s wife. The RTC and the CA ruled that the killing of A was treacherous qualifying
the crime to murder. Is the ruling correct? Explain.
No, G is liable only for homicide. The RPC provides that there are two requirements in order that treachery
may be appreciated: (1) the victim was in no position to defend himself or herself when attacked; and, (2) the
assailant consciously and deliberately adopted the methods, means, or form of one’s attack against the victim. In
this case, while G suddenly attacked A, there was no showing that he deliberately and consciously adopted such
mode of attack to facilitate the killing without any risk to himself arising from any defense that A might have
adopted. G suddenly shot A in the presence of his wife and other party guests. If G deliberately intended to kill
A risk free, he could have chosen another time and place to attack. The attack was a spur of the moment decision
caused by sheer annoyance when A and his wife left while the party was still ongoing. The attack was a spur of the
moment decision. As such, in the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed was
only homicide (People v. Abina, G.R. No. 220146, April 18, 2018).
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Infanticide
A woman gave birth to a child born dead and lifeless. On account of the darkness of the night, instead
of a grave being dug to bury it, the lifeless body was deposited by the accused in a hole one meter deep.
Is the woman liable for infanticide?
No, she is not. The elements of infanticide are: (1) That a child was killed; (2) That the deceased child was less
than three days (72 hours) of age; and (3) That the accused killed the said child. Here, the child was born dead and
lifeless. No crime of infanticide is committed where the child was born dead, or although born alive, it could not
sustain an independent life when it was killed. Therefore, the woman is not liable for infanticide (U.S. v. Vedra,
G.R. No. 4779, November 20, 1908).
Serious Physical Injuries
X, accused, allegedly attacked and assaulted A. A sustained physical injuries on different parts of his
body which required medical attendance for the period of 25 days and caused him to be incapacitated
to perform his customary labor for the same period of time. A, as alleged in the complaint, also lost the
power to hear of his right ear. What crime(s) did X commit? Explain.
X is guilty of serious physical injuries under Article 263, paragraph 3 of the RPC. Under the RPC, it should be
considered serious physical injuries when the injured person becomes ill or incapacitated for labor for more than
30 days (but must not be more than 90 days), as a result of the physical injuries inflicted. Here, A required medical
attendance for only 25 days. However, he lost the power of his right ear. Article 263, paragraph 3 applies when the
person injured shall have lost “the use of any other part of his body.” Since A in this case was deprived of the use of
his right ear, a part of his body, such offense accurately falls under such aforementioned provision. Therefore, X is
liable for serious physical injuries (People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-4213, November 28, 1953).
Less Serious Physical Injuries
A was roused from her sleep upon hearing some noise from a neighbor’s house and then darted through
her main door. B, mother of A, followed the latter, but as they were about to step out of the house they
were met by X who was already in a belligerent mood. X suddenly stabbed A. Thereupon, X turned his
wrath on B and stabbed her on the ear with a kitchen knife. A was able to evade further harm by seeking
refuge inside her house. In the medical certificate issued by a physician to B, it was stated that the
estimated healing period would be one (1) month. What crime was committed by X with respect to B?
X committed the crime of less serious physical injuries. Taking into account the medical certificate issued to B, the
estimated healing period for her wounds was one (1) month. Article 265 of The RPC, in relation to par. (4), Art.
263 thereof, provides that where the incapacity of the victim or his required medical attendance is from ten (10)
to thirty (30) days the offense would be less serious physical injuries, and if for more than thirty (30) days, it would
be serious physical injuries.
Article 13 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that when the law speaks of months it shall be understood that
they are of thirty (30) days. Applied in the present case, the one (1) month healing period provided in B’s medical
certificate should thus be interpreted as referring to thirty (30) days of incapacity. The liability therefore of the
accused for the wounding of B should fall under Art. 265 of The RPC for less serious physical injuries, and not
under par. (4), Art. 263, of the aforesaid law (People v. Gutierrez, G.R. Nos. 144907-09, September 17, 2002).
Slight physical injuries
Distinguish serious, less serious, and slight physical injuries.

Gravity Injury Days
Serious Incapacity from habitual work Permanent
(Art. 263) Illness/ incapacity from habitual work Over 90 days (91 or over)
Illness/ incapacity from labor 31 to 90 days
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Gravity Injury Days

Less Serious Incapacity from labor labor/medical attendance required 10 to 30 days
(Art. 265)
Slight Incapacity from labor/medical attendance required 1 to 9 days
(Art. 266)
Rape: When and How Committed
At around 3:30am, AAA was sleeping beside her two-year old nephew, BBB, on the floor of her sister’s
room, when P, AAA’s brother-in-law, hugged and kissed her nape and neck. AAA cried, but P covered
her and BBB with a blanket. P went on top of AAA and held her hands. AAA resisted, but P parted
her legs using his own legs then tried to insert his penis into her vagina. P stopped when AAA’s cry
got louder. AAA kicked P’s upper thigh as he was about to stand up. He threatened to kill AAA if she
disclosed the incident. P left the room. AAA covered herself with a blanket and cried. Later, AAA’s
siblings discovered the incident and reported it to the police. The RTC convicted P of rape, which the
CA affirmed, explaining that slight penetration of the labia is sufficient to commit the crime, which
occurred when P’s penis touched AAA’s vagina while trying to penetrate. Are the RTC and CA correct?
No, the RTC and CA are not correct. P is liable for attempted rape only. Under Article 266-A of the RPC, one
of the elements of rape is that the offender had having carnal knowledge with a woman. Carnal knowledge is
defined as the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with a woman. The Supreme
Court held that there must be proof that the penis touched the labias or slid into the female organ and not merely
stroked the external surface thereof. The facts did not show that there was penile penetration. All acts of execution
were not performed by reason of a cause not his spontaneous desistance, i.e., the victim’s loud cries and resistance.
Therefore, P is only liable for attempted rape (People v. Pareja, G.R. No. 188979, September 5, 2012).
Note: Under Section 1, RA 11649, the age of consent under Art. 266-A 1(d) has been raised from twelve (12) to
under sixteen (16) years of age. As a general rule, statutory rape is committed by a person who shall have carnal
knowledge of another person, when the offended party is under sixteen (16) years of age. An exception to this rule
is that there shall be no criminal liability on the part of a person having carnal knowledge of another person under
sixteen (16) years of age when the age difference between the parties is not more than three (3) years, and the sexual
act in question is proven to be consensual. However, if the victim is under thirteen (13) years of age, this exception
will not apply. This is NOT covered by the cut-off for the 2022 Bar Exam.
What constitutes force, threat or intimidation in rape cases?

Force employed against a victim of rape need not be of such character as could not be resisted. It is enough that
the force used is sufficient to consummate the culprit’s purpose of copulating with the victim (People v. Savellano,
G.R. No. L-31227, May 31, 1974).
The test remains to be whether the threat or intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the mind of the victim that
if she resists or does not yield to the desires of her attacker, the threat would be carried out. It is thus not necessary
for the victim to have resisted unto death or to have sustained physical injuries in the hands of the accused. So long
as the intercourse takes place against the victim’s will and she submits because of genuine apprehension of harm to
her and her family, rape is committed. (People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 248016, December 2, 2020, Caguioa Case).
Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the rape and not
by any hard and fast rule. It is enough that it produces fear — fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial
demands of the accused, something would happen to her at the moment or thereafter (People v. Martinez, G.R.
No. 248016, December 2, 2020, Caguioa Case).
AAA, of legal age, was watching people sing at a birthday party, when she was told by B to go to CCC’s
house. Upon arrival, B and P undressed AAA. B showed her his penis, inserted it into her vagina,
and moved in a pumping motion. P also did the same. CCC saw AAA raising her shorts with a male
companion, and informed AAA’s parents. When confronted, AAA replied that she was with B. Her
parents then reported the incident. The doctor examining AAA found clear evidence of penetration
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witing the time of the reported incident. AAA was also referred for psychiatric evaluation as she
“suspected” of having Down Syndrome. BBB testified that her daughter, AAA, was mentally retarded
since birth. CCC, also testified that he has been a neighbor of AAA for ten (10) years and has known
AAA to be mentally retarded, who goes to a special education school.
The RTC convicted B of the crime of rape, reasoning that AAA was mentally retarded and incapable of
giving consent when B abused her. The CA affirmed the conviction, carnal knowledge of a woman who
is a mental retardate is rape under Art. 266-A of the RPC as a mentally deficient person is presumed
to be incapable of giving consent. The appellate court noted that proof of force or intimidation is not
necessary. What needs to be proven are the facts of sexual congress between the accused and the victim,
and the mental retardation of the latter. Is B’s conviction of rape under Art 266-A correct?
No, B is not guilty of the crime of rape for the failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt. For the charge of rape under Art. 266-A to prosper, the prosecution has the
burden to conclusively prove the two elements of the crime: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman, and (2) he accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.
Here, the records of the present case are likewise bereft of any evidence conclusively establishing AAA’s mental
retardation. If at all, the only evidence offered to prove the said fact were: (1) BBB’s testimony that AAA has had
mental retardation since birth and the doctor’s testimony that AAA “probably” has Down Syndrome. BBB and
CCC’s testimonies are but mere conclusions that do not establish the fact of AAA’s mental retardation. Likewise,
the doctor’s testimony cannot be the basis for such, as the said findings were inconclusive. The prosecution failed
to establish her mental retardation beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the second element of the crime charged —
that the victim be “deprived of reason” — was not established beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, B is acquitted of
the crime charged (People v. Padilla, G.R. No. 234947, June 19, 2019, Caguioa Case).
AAA, a 14-year-old, asked permission from her mother to visit R, as they were going to cook gelatin for
their school Christmas party. Before leaving, AAA bumped into N on her way down, who persuaded her
to go inside his apartment on the pretext that he would show her something. Once inside, N grabbed
her, hugged her, and made her lie down and remove all her clothing. Frightened, because AAA knows
that he has a bladed weapon inside his room, she allowed him to mount her and insert his penis into her
vagina. N removed his penis from AAA’s vagina and AAA felt his semen coming out. He ordered AAA
to clean and to not squeal about what happened. AAA followed his orders.
In another incident, AAA asked permission from her mother to go to a computer shop. On her way
out, she met N who demanded her to board his motorcycle and brought her to Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Arriving there, they went inside a hotel. AAA was again raped by N. Before leaving the hotel premises,
N showed AAA his gun and she became afraid.
RTC and CA convicted N for the crime of rape. Is the conviction proper?
Yes, N is guilty of the crime of rape. The gravamen of the crime of rape under Art. 266-A (1) is sexual intercourse
with a woman against her will or without her consent. Jurisprudence is settled that in rape, the force and
intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of
the crime and not by any hard and fast rule.
Here, AAA was a 14-year-old who was tricked into being alone in a room by someone she thought she could
trust. She was alone in a locked room with a fully grown man, overcome by the strength of his embrace, with
the knowledge that the same man had in his possession — or at least owned — a bladed weapon. AAA was in
an environment where there was sufficient intimidation that would cow her to submit to the sexual act without
offering tenacious resistance (People v. Nievera, G.R. No. 242830, August 28, 2019, Caguioa case).
NNN noticed blood in the undergarments of CCC, the two (2)-year-old daughter of MMM and FFF,
when she was doing the laundry. NNN asked CCC if she was “touched” by G. She suspected G to have
something to do with the blood stains found on the undergarments because of his close familiarity with
the child — him being a distant relative of FFF and hired by the latter to feed his flock of fighting cocks
on several occasions, and him residing in the house of the spouses. CCC answered in the affirmative and
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demonstrated a push-and-pull movement of her index finger. NNN told spouses FFF-MMM and showed
them the undergarments with blood stains. CCC was then brought to the municipal hospital for physical
examination. Thereafter, spouses FFF-MMM brought her to the Women and Children Protection Desk
of the PNP, where a police blotter of the incident was made. What crime(s) did G commit? Explain.
G is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section
5 (b), Article III of RA 7610. The elements of Rape by Sexual Assault are as follows: (1) that the offender commits
an act of sexual assault; (1), That the offender commits an act of sexual assault; (2), that the act of sexual assault is
committed by any of the following means: (a) by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice; or
by inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; (3), That the act of sexual
assault is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:, (a) by using force and intimidation; (b) when
the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c), by means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority; or (d), when the woman is under 12 years of age or demented.
In this case, G inserted his finger in the genital area of CCC, who was then under twelve (12) years of age. The
nomenclature of the offense committed is modified following the recent ruling in People v. Macapagal. Therein, the
original conviction for Rape through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC was modified to
Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610. Thus, if
the victim of lascivious conduct is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should be “Acts
of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.”
Hence, G is guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III
of RA 7610. (Granton v. People, G.R. No., October 10, 2018, Caguioa Case)
Note: In the Granton case, the Court reasoned that the rule on the proper designation of the offense is applied to
give effect to RA 7610 as “it was not the intention of the framers of RA 8353 to disallow applicability of RA 7610
to sexual abuses committed to children.” Thus, despite the passage of RA 8353, RA 7610 is still good law, which
must be applied when the victims are children or those persons below eighteen (18) years of age or those over, but
are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from sexual abuses because of a physical or mental
disability or condition.
AAA, four (4) months pregnant, was a street sweeper along a railroad track. One day, D approached her,
blocked her path, and hugged her. AAA started shouting and begged D to let her go, but D refused and
threatened to kill her if she continues to resist. D then dragged AAA towards the railroad track, pinned
her down along the track, removed her uniform and sucked on her nipples. He removed his t-shirt and
laid on top of AAA, who kept on hitting him while begging him to stop. D, however, continued, inserting
his penis into AAA’s vagina. AAA kept resisting but D only repeated his threats to kill her. AAA later
gave up on freeing herself and D eventually ran away. In trial for rape, D claimed that AAA’s failure to
resist him more vigorously, considering AAA wields a dustpan, broom, and heavy boots, debunks the
claim of rape against him. Is D’s argument correct?
No, the law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. The Court has explained that
resistance is not an element of rape and lack thereof does not lead to an acquittal of the accused. Here, even where
the aggressor is unarmed, the victim is not required to put up a struggle nor will such failure defeat her case for
rape. The Court has long recognized the lack of uniformity in the manner of behavior of rape victims during or
after a rape incident (People v. Dechoso, G.R. No. 248530, March 3, 2021, Caguioa Case).
AAA is a member and a full-time worker of Jesus the Anointed One Church. F was the driver of the
church’s Bishop. F was tasked to retrieve soap bars and asked AAA where the storage was located. As
AAA was explaining that an inventory is required before the items can be disposed of, F suddenly
grabbed her breasts. Out of shock, AAA shouted. F immediately grabbed the front of AAA’s pants
directly over her private part. She was shouting in pain as F dragged her further inside the bodega. F
then used his body to block and keep the door shut behind him as he fondled her breasts and tried to
unzip her pants. F inserted his fingers in and out of her vagina. All the while, AAA resisted and tried to
protect herself by crossing her arms in front of her in an “X” position thereby incurring bruises in the
process. F pressed her onto the wall causing her to bump her head which left her disoriented and dazed.
She also felt weakened by the pain that she was feeling all over her body. The last thing she saw was the
accused pulling out his penis and she heard him saying “tumuwad ka.” When she regained composure,
AAA realized that she was already seated on the floor. She saw that her pants as well as her underwear
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were pulled down to her knees, but the F was nowhere to be found. The RTC found F guilty of the crime
of rape by carnal knowledge to which F appealed to the CA but the same affirmed the said decision.
What crime(s) did F commit?
F is guilty of sexual assault under Article 266-A (2) of the RPC, not rape by carnal knowledge under Article 266-
A (1)(b). AAA testified that F was moving his finger in and out of her private part through the opening of her
pants’ zipper, he took out his penis and massaged the same. AAA lost consciousness and when she woke up, she
was seated on the floor with her underwear and pants pulled down to her knees. Based on the foregoing, the crime
committed by F is sexual assault. Although it is possible that F had carnal knowledge of AAA while the latter was
unconscious, he cannot be convicted of the crime of rape by carnal knowledge based on a mere possibility (People
v. Fruelda y Anulao, G.R. No. 242690, September 3, 2020, Caguioa Case)
AAA, who was a boarder in a boarding house, slept alone in the room she shares with the daughter of the
building’s owner. She was awakened and found three men inside the room, who she recognized as M, R
and T. R approached her and covered her mouth with his palm. T poked the right side of her body with
a short bolo. Being pinned at this position, M undressed AAA and began kissing her. M then inserted
his penis into her vagina. Afterwards, T took his turn. T kicked AAA in the stomach several times and
then inserted his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, AAA became unconscious. AAA was awakened when
she felt T bit her arm. It was then that R took his turn in raping her. T and R were charged under three
separate Informations for three counts of rape. During the arraignment, only T appeared and pleaded
not guilty while the two other accused remained at large. The RTC and the CA found T guilty of one
count of rape. Is the conviction proper? Explain.
No, accused-appellant is guilty of three counts of rape. Proof of conspiracy need not even rest on direct evidence,
as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the
crime indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense.
Here, the evidence presented by the prosecution fully support the charge that M, R and T conspired to rape AAA.
The act of R in approaching and covering AAA’s mouth, the act of T in poking a bolo at her side, the act of M
in having sexual intercourse with AAA and then later on followed by R and accused-appellant, all point to their
unified and conscious design to sexually violate AAA. Accordingly, T should be held liable not only for the act of
rape he perpetuated against AAA, but also for the rape committed by his co-accused (People v. Villanueva, G.R.
No. 211082, December 13, 2017).
From the time AAA was in Grade 1, B would often ask her for favors, like buying food or kerosene for
him. It was also then that he would usually abuse her. While they were celebrating the New Year, B, who
was under the influence of liquor, called AAA in his room. When they were inside, he locked the door,
grabbed her hand and laid her down. He undressed her, fondled her breast, and licked her vagina. He
then undressed his lower garment and inserted his penis inside her vagina. After the act, he gave her
Php50.00 to not tell anyone. The second incident happened on another date when he called her and he
was able to suck her breast, lick her vagina and insert his penis into her vagina. Finally, another incident
happened when B called AAA inside the comfort room while his live-in partner was in their room and
put down her undergarments to her knees, licked her vagina and touched his penis to her vagina. The
RTC, as affirmed by the CA, found B guilty of three counts of rape, particularly: 1) Statutory rape, 2)
rape through intimidation, and 3) rape through force. Is the conviction of Martinez for rape through
force proper? Explain.
The conviction for the crime of statutory rape is proper. The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual congress with
a woman by force and without consent. If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force is not an element, as
the absence of a free consent is conclusively presumed as the law supposes that a woman below this age does not
possess discernment and is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. Conviction will therefore lie,
regardless of proof of force or intimidation provided sexual intercourse is proven. Force, threat, or intimidation are
not elements of statutory rape, therefore proof thereof is unnecessary. But if the woman is 12 years of age or over
at the time she was violated, sexual intercourse must be proven and also that it was done through force, violence,
intimidation or threat.
In this case, the fact that AAA was Grade 1 and under 12 years of age, and the fact of carnal knowledge was
established.
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The conviction for the crime of rape through intimidation was proper. Intimidation in rape cases is not calibrated
or governed by hard and fast rules. Since it is addressed to the mind of the victim and is therefore subjective. Where
such intimidation exists and the victim is cowed into submission as a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance
futile, It would be extremely unreasonable, to say the least, to expect the victim to resist with all her might and
strength. If resistance would nevertheless be futile because of a continuing intimidation, then offering none at all
would not mean consent to the assault as to make the victim’s participation in the sexual act voluntary.
In this case, AAA testified that when she refused to obey B, B would get angry, and create trouble at their residence.
She said that when she did not follow him, B would get angry and she would see him watching her such that she
could not sleep at night. AAA unequivocally stated that she did not tell her parents because B threatened that he
would kill her and her family. AAA unequivocally testified that B called her inside the comfort room, removed her
clothes, kissed her vagina, and inserted his penis into her vagina.
The conviction for the crime of rape through force was not correct. The absence of external signs of physical
injuries does not prove that rape was not committed, for proof thereof is not an essential element of the crime of
rape and that the force employed in rape need not be irresistible so long as it is present and brings the desired result.
All that is necessary is that the force be sufficient to fulfill its evil end, or that it be successfully used; it need not be
so great or be of such a character that it could not be repelled. While force need not be irresistible however, it must
still be present and such presence must be sufficiently alleged and proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the testimonial evidence offered to prove force under this particular charge is definitely inadequate
and grossly insufficient to establish the guilt of B with the required quantum of evidence. There is no testimony
whatsoever about the nature of the force employed, or about any struggle, or even resistance however slight. (People
v. Martinez, G.R. No. 248016, December 2, 2020, Caguioa Case)
In the early stage of their marriage, X treated KKK well and she, of course, responded with equal
degree of enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove
her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking
was physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush, but he would threaten her into
submission. One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her
reclusive behavior prompted X to ask angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to instantaneously
order: “You transfer here to our bed.”
KKK insisted to stay on the cot. X got angry and rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against
the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow
and transferred to the bed.
The accused then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by
tapping his fingers on her lap. When KKK tried to resist by holding on to her panties, X pulled them
down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs. What crime(s)
did the accused commit? Explain.
The accused is liable for rape. In People v. Jumawan (G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014), the Supreme Court held
that husbands do not have property rights over their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of
marriage, if not consensual, is rape. In relation to the equal protection of the law clause, the Court ruled that to
treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime
and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause. Further, the Court found that there is no
rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. In this case, X had carnal knowledge
with KKK by forcing himself onto her despite her efforts to resist and defy his sexual advances, making the sexual
congress non-consensual equal to rape. Their relation by marriage is not a defense. Thus, X is liable for rape.
Qualified Rape
AAA lives with EEE, her aunt and guardian, who raised her as a daughter. GGG requested FFF, EEE’s
friend, to get from X’s boarding house an electric fan and a transformer. After giving the requested
items, X ordered FFF to leave AAA behind.
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When FFF brought the items back to GGG, she requested FFF to fetch AAA. FFF called out to AAA
to go home. AAA came out fixing her short pants. AAA told FFF that X pulled her inside the room,
removed her shorts and panty, told her to lie down on the floor and inserted his penis into her vagina
without her consent. The genital exam of AAA revealed old hymenal lacerations only. Her psychiatric
evaluation revealed that she was suffering from mild retardation with the mental age of a 9-12 year-old
child. Her IQ was 53, below the average of 71 and was within the defective level of a normal intelligence
scale.
X testified that he knew AAA and that he even used to reside with her and her relatives. He was treated
as family and he regarded AAA as his niece. He also admitted that AAA was known to be mentally
retarded in their community. What crime(s) is X liable for? Explain.
X is liable for qualified rape. For the charge of rape under Art.266-A to prosper, it must be proved that (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, (2) through force or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years old or was demented. In People v. Suansing, the Supreme
Court held sex with one who is intellectually weak to the extent that she is incapable of giving consent to the carnal
act is rape without needing proof that there was force or intimidation. Only the fact of sex and the victim’s mental
retardation need be proved.
Here, the fact of sex and victim’s mental condition were proved. Also, the facts show that X was aware of the mental
retardation of AAA. Therefore, X is liable for qualified rape (People v. Suansing, G.R. No. 189822, September 2,
2013).
What are the effects of pardon or subsequent valid marriage between the offender and the offended
party?
Art. 266-C, RPC provides that the subsequent valid marriage between the offender and the offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed. In case it is the legal husband who is the offender,
the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty:
Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage be void ab
initio. (RA 8353, September 30, 1997)
Crimes against Personal Liberty and Security
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
In 1999, T went with C, then 2 years of age, and her elder sister Z to a McDonald’s outlet in the KP
Tower in Binondo, Manila. Barely had C gone from his mother’s sight when she realized that he had
disappeared. T and her sister looked for him to no avail. They reported the incident. In 2001, T received
a call from a woman who claimed to have custody of C. The caller asked for Php30,000 in exchange for
the boy. T sought the help of the police and PO3 J was designated to act as T’s niece.
In the designated pay-off place, X and Y came. T told them that they were waiting for a certain Bato. X
said she knew Bato. X told T that she would ask a cousin of Bato if Bato was already in Kapatagan. She
turned to Y, supposedly Bato’s cousin. Y informed T and J that she had C and asked them to come with
her. T refused. Y reluctantly agreed to leave X and fetched C.Y returned and told them that Cwas in a
nearby ice plant. T insisted on the agreement that the boy be handed over at the carinderia. Y relented,
left, and came back with C. C no longer recognized T. X and Y demanded the ransom money. She said
that J had it. J boarded a jeepney outside. J there handed the money to X. J gave the signal and the
PAOCTF team arrested X and Y.
RTC convicted them of kidnapping for ransom, but only imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as
it held that the Php30,000 was to measly to be a ransom and considered it as the amount actually spent
for the care of Christopher during the two years he was with the sisters. But the CA considered the
Php30,000 as a qualifying circumstance, thus imposing death with the penalty of RP to death. Decide.
X and Y are liable for kidnapping for ransom. Under the RPC, If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention
is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the
duration of his detention becomes inconsequential. The crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even
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if none of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 of the RPC is present. Here, C is two
years of age. X and Y took C for the purpose of extorting Php30,000.
Ransom means money, price, or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that will
release him from captivity. No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for
ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victim’s freedom. The amount of
and purpose for the ransom is immaterial. Here, the accused asked for P30,000 in exchange for the boy. Therefore,
X and Y are liable for kidnapping for ransom. (People v. Mamantak, G.R. No. 174659, July 28, 2008)
While walking alone on her way home from a party, M was seized at gun point by F and taken on board
a tricycle to a house some distance away. F was with J, R, and L, who drove the tricycle. At the house,
F, J, and R succeeded in having sexual intercourse with M against her will and under the threat of F’s
gun. L was not around when the sexual assaults took place as he left after bringing his colleagues and
M to their destination, but he returned everyday to bring food and bring the news in town about M’s
disappearance. For five days, F, J and R kept M in the house and took turns in sexually assaulting her. On
the 6th day, M managed to escape; she proceeded immediately to the nearest police station and narrated
her ordeal. What crime/s did F, J, R, and L commit and what was their degree of participation?
F, J, R and L are all liable for the special complex crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with Rape. It
was sufficiently proved that the 4 accused kidnapped M and held her in detention for 5 days and sexually abused
her. Since it is a special complex crime, no matter how many times the victim had been raped, the resultant crime is
only one kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape. The composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible
offense with only one penalty. It is illegal detention and not forcible abduction since it was evident that the intent
was to detain the victim. As to the degree of their participation, F, J, R and L are all liable as principals. There was
implied conspiracy as they acted toward a single criminal design or purpose. Although L was not around when the
sexual assaults took place, there is complicity on his part as he was the one who drove the tricycle at the time the
victim was seized and he returned everyday to bring food and news to his conspirators (People v. Mirandilla, Jr.,
G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011).
Can kidnapping and murder or homicide in the course of detention of the person kidnapped, be
complexed under Article 48 or be treated as separate crimes? Explain.
No. The rule now is where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the
killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer
be complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime
under the last paragraph of Article 267, as amended by RA 7659 (People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 118570, October 12,
1998).
X and her friend, Y, were walking along Agham Road, Diliman, Quezon City. Suddenly, a man who was
later identified as PO3 Z, grabbed X by her right forearm and forcibly took her inside a gray van where
three (3) other men were waiting. Both X and Y shouted for help, but no one came to their rescue. Y
managed to escape and immediately reported the incident to X’s mother, A. Meanwhile, PO3 Z and his
companions drove the van around Quezon City. One (1) of X’s abductors, a certain Major C, asked for
her relatives’ contact numbers. X gave the number of her brother, E.
A received a phone call from one (1) of the kidnappers, who demanded Php200,000.00 in exchange for
X’s liberty. A informed him that their family could not afford to pay the ransom due to their financial
condition. Suddenly, the caller hung up. E thereafter arrived and negotiated for a reduced ransom
when one (1) of the kidnappers called again. The kidnappers acceded and lowered their demand to
Php100,000.00. What crime(s) did the Z and his companions commit? Explain.
Z and his companions are liable for kidnapping for ransom. Under the RPC, a conviction for the crime requires
the concurrence of the following elements: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) that individual kidnaps
or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is
illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping
or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by one who simulates public authority. (c) any
serious physical injury is inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or any threat to kill that person is made.
(d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, a female or a public officer.
In this case, (1) a public official may be prosecuted under Article 267 of the RPC if it is shown that he committed
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acts unrelated to the functions of his office. (2) the accused kidnapped X as stated in the facts. (3) the accused
deprived the victim of her liberty to extort money, and therefore illegal. (4) the victim X is a woman. Hence, the
accused are liable for kidnapping for ransom (People v. Borja, G.R. No. 199710, August 2, 2017).
Slight Illegal Detention
X about to go inside her home a drunken Y intercepted her at the garage area, held a knife to her back
and dragged her to his room. Y raped X. Shortly, the Chief of Police came and called on Y to release X.
Y refused and demanded the appearance of Z. Upon arrival, Y asked Z, his girlfriend, to admit that she
has been raped. Z admitted but Y still refused to release X. Y then again raped X while holding a knife
to her neck. In order to prevent persons from entering the room, Y installed electric wires on the door.
Still, the police was able to enter the room and arrest Y. Y argued that he detained X only to extract an
admission of rape from his girlfriend and to expose alleged perpetrators. Absent proof that he abducted
X with lewd designs, Y argued that he could not be convicted of forcible abduction under Art. 342 of
the RPC. Further, he insisted that there was no proof that he raped X. The judge found Y liable only for
rape, as the crime of rape absorbed the act of illegal detention. Is judgment correct?
No, the judgment is not correct. Slight illegal detention has four elements: (1) that the offender is a private
individual; (2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives him of his liberty; (3) the act of
kidnapping or detention is illegal; (4) that the crime is committed without attendance of any circumstances
enumerated in Art. 267.
The elements of slight illegal detention are all present here. After raping X, Y continued to detain her and to deprive
her of her liberty. The detention was illegal and not attended by circumstances that would render it serious illegal
detention. Thus, although the initial abduction of X may have been absorbed by the crime of rape, the continued
detention of AAA after the rape cannot be deemed absorbed in it. Likewise, since the detention continued after
the rape had been completed, it cannot be deemed a necessary means for the crime of rape. Hence, the court is not
correct in holding Y guilty of rape absorbing illegal detention. Y should be held guilty of two separate crimes: rape
and slight illegal detention. (People v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 214886, April 4, 2018).
Trespass to Dwelling
What is dwelling?
Dwelling is any building or structure exclusively devoted for rest and comfort. The determining factor of whether
a building is a dwelling is the use to which it is put (REYES, Book Two, supra at 768).
At about 11:00 in the evening, D forced his way inside the house of M. J, M’s son, saw D and accosted
him. D pulled a knife and stabbed J on his abdomen. M heard the commotion and went out of his room.
D, who was about to escape, assaulted M. J suffered injuries which, were it not for the timely medical
attendance, would have caused his death. M sustained injuries that incapacitated him for 25 days. What
crime/s did D commit?
D committed qualified trespass to dwelling, frustrated homicide for the stabbing of J, and less serious physical
injuries for the assault on M. The crime of qualified trespass to dwelling should not be complexed with frustrated
homicide because when the trespass is committed as a means to commit a more serious crime, trespass to dwelling is
absorbed by the greater crime and the former constitutes an aggravating circumstance of dwelling. The stabbing of
J and the assault on M were merely an afterthought, hence D is liable for the separate crimes of trespass to dwelling,
frustrated homicide, and less serious physical injuries (People v. Medina, G.R. No. L-38417, December 16, 1933).
Grave Coercion
AAA was brought to the police headquarters, where he was tortured and maltreated by agents of the
law in order to compel him to confess a crime imputed to him. However, the agents failed to draw from
AAA a confession which was their intention to obtain. The agents later related AAA. What crime was
committed by the agents of the law?
They are guilty of the crime of grave coercion. The agents tortured and maltreated AAA with the intent of
obtaining a confession from him, without AAA being arrested or confined in jail. AAA was merely “brought” to
the police headquarters and is thus not a detention prisoner. Had he been validly arrested, the crime committed
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would be maltreatment of prisoners (U.S. v. Cusi, G.R. No. L-3699, March 18, 1908).
Under Republic Act 9745 or Anti-Torture Act of 2009, any confession, admission or statement obtained as a
result of torture shall be inadmissible in evidence in any proceedings, except if the same is used as evidence against
a person or persons accused of committing torture.
Crimes against Property
Robbery in General
Who are guilty of robbery?

Art. 293 provides that any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another,
by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything, shall be guilty of robbery.
Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons
X, a police officer, was assigned to investigate a vehicular collision between a jeepney and a taxi. X
confiscated the license of TD, the driver of the taxi, and demanded from the latter the amount of
Php5,000 in exchange for his license. On the thought of not having his driver’s license back and the
possibility that he might not be able earn a living for his family prompted him to give the amount
demanded. Feeling aggrieved, TD instituted an action against X allegedly for the crime of simple robbery.
During the trial, it is established by the prosecution that whenever a license was confiscated due to a
traffic violation, the same must be claimed from the office of the MMDA or City Hall, and not from the
officer who confiscated his license as the case may be. What crime did X commit?
X is liable for committing simple robbery against the taxi driver. Simple robbery is committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, but the extent of the violation or intimidation does not fall under paragraphs
1 to 4 of Article 294 of the RPC. The following elements must be established: 1) that there is personal property
belonging to another; 2) that there is unlawful taking of that property; 3) that the taking is with intent to gain;
and 4) that there is violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. TD’s money was unlawfully
taken by petitioner from with intent to gain and through intimidation. X is not authorized to keep an offender’s
license and receive any payment for its return. Likewise, intense fear produced in the mind of TD that restricted or
hindered him to exercise his will as X succeeded in forcing TD to choose between parting with his money or have
his driver’s license completely confiscated or cancelled (Flores v. People, G.R. No. 222861, April 23, 2018).
C and K flagged down and boarded a jeepney going to G-Mall. E and R also boarded the vehicle. K saw E
giving a signal to R and heard him say “tirahi na nang babaye bai.” R snatched the necklace of C, and
both disembarked the jeepney. What crime(s) did R commit?
The crime committed by R is only theft, not robbery. The distinguishing element between the crimes of robbery
and theft is the use of violence or intimidation as a means of taking the property belonging to another; the element
is present in the crime of robbery and absent in the crime of theft.
Here, the snatching of the necklace was without violence against or intimidation of persons or with force upon
things. The fact that the necklace was “grabbed” did not automatically mean that force attended the taking. In the
strikingly similar case of Ablaza v. People, the Court clarified that “for the requisite of violence to obtain in cases
of simple robbery, the victim must have sustained less serious physical injuries or slight physical injuries in the
occasion of the robbery.” Here, there was no such degree of injuries (Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No 235739, July
22, 2019, Caguioa Case).
X and Y were playing a game of poker with their friend, A. After 3 deals, X and Y went home with
their total winnings of Php12,000. On their way home, they were suddenly ambushed by accused A
by indiscriminately firing against them. Y was shot, which led to his death, but X was able to evade the
shooting by jumping into a canal. A then took the money and fled the crime scene. Is A liable for the
separate crime of attempted murder/homicide with respect to X?
No, as A committed the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The crime of attempted murder with
respect to X is not a separate crime but is absorbed in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Attempted homicide or attempted murder committed during or on the occasion of the robbery, as in this case, is
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absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide which is a special complex crime that remains fundamentally
the same regardless of the number of homicides or injuries committed in connection with the robbery (People v.
Cabbab Jr., G.R. No. 173479, July 12, 2007).
X, Y and Z went to a gasoline station and pretended to be customers. While the gasoline boy was filling
up their tank, X, Y and Z declared a hold up. X, Y, and Z then proceeded to the station’s convenience
store and took the employees’ personal belongings who can only submit to their demands as guns were
poked at them. They shot the station’s security guard which caused his death, and also took the gasoline
station’s profits.
1. When prosecuted for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, X, Y, and Z contend that
they shot the security guard accidentally. Will their defense prosper?
No, their defense of having shot C by accident is untenable. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide
through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere
accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are
killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed
by reason or on the occasion of the crime. All of them are still liable for the special complex crime of Robbery
with Homicide. When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took
part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of
robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless one of them clearly
endeavored to prevent the same in which case he is liable only for Robbery. Thus, even if the killing of the
security guard was only accidental, X, Y and Z are still liable for robbery with homicide (People v. De Leon,
G.R. No. 179943, June 26, 2009).
2. Assuming it was Z (not the security guard) who was accidentally killed by X and Y during the
robbery, will the charge of robbery with homicide still prosper?
Yes, immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers. The felony would still be robbery
with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed
is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are
integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. X and Y are still liable for the special
complex crime of Robbery with Homicide (People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 179943, June 26, 2009).
While outside her house, L saw A and 3 other men. A introduced herself as an employee of the POEA
and upon such pretension, L offered A to talk to her inside her house. At this juncture, one of the men
suddenly declared a hold-up, poked a gun at L’s neck, slapped her, and tied her hands. The men then
proceeded to rob the house taking with them valuables and a vault containing dollar currencies, and
thereafter left the crime scene. What crime/s is/are committed?
The crime committed is the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house under Art. 299 of the RPC and
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under Art. 294 of the RPC. The elements of robbery
with force upon things under Subdivision A applicable in the case are:(1) the offender entered an inhabited place;
(2) the entrance was effected by using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority; (3) once
inside the building, the offender took personal property belonging to another with intent to gain. One the other
hand, robbery with violence against and intimidation of persons under Art. 294 has the elements applicable in the
case which are: (1) any of the physical injuries defined in pars. 3 and 4 of Art. 263 was inflicted in the course of
robbery; (2) any of them was inflicted upon any person not responsible for the commission of the robbery.
The accused, after entering the residential house of L took away valuables, including the vault containing US dollar
currencies, and in the process committed acts of violence against and intimidation of persons during the robbery
by slapping, threatening and tying the victim. Furthermore, A pretended to be from the POEA (paragraph a(4)
of Art. 299) and also took the vault (paragraph b(2) of Art. 299). Hence, they are liable for the complex crime of
robbery in an inhabited house by armed men under Article 299 of the RPC and robbery with violence against and
intimidation of persons under Article 294 of the RPC (Fransdilla v. People, G.R. No. 197562, April 20, 2015).
O and P became friends when they met on the streets collecting plastic bottles and scrap materials. As
homeless people, they just put their makeshift beds along the streets or sleep inside their carts to spend
the night. One day, O earned Php300 after selling the plastic bottles he collected all day and he put this
money inside his car. During the night, while P was on his way back, he saw C stab O while the latter was
still sleeping. When P came to rescue O, the latter was already dead and upon checking, the Php300 O
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had made that day was nowhere to be found. An information for robbery with homicide was instituted
against C. Will the case prosper? Discuss.
No, the case of robbery with homicide filed against C will not prosper. In order to sustain a conviction for the crime
of robbery with homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be proven as conclusively as any other essential
element of the crime. In order for the crime of robbery with homicide to exist, it must be established that a robbery
has actually taken place and that, as a consequence or on the occasion of robbery, a homicide be committed. For
robbery to apply, there must be taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person or by using force upon things. In robbery with homicide, the intent
to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. The
mere fact that 300 pesos earned by the victim was missing cannot be served as basis that robbery was the intent of
C to commit in killing O (People v. Domasig, G.R. No. 217028, June 13, 2018).
In the middle of the night, spouses W and H were alone in their house when they heard someone was
outside their door. Feeling alarmed, H got up to double check the lock of their doors. Suddenly, four
armed and masked men, A, B, C, and D barged into their kitchen and pointed a gun at H demanding
to surrender jewelries and cash. H refused to give the money, so he was dragged to the bedroom. Upon
seeing W, one of the armed men, A, said, “Akin na ‘to pre” and brought W outside the room where A
forced her to have carnal knowledge with him. Thereafter, the armed men fled the crime scene taking
with them 3 gold necklaces and cash amounting to Php23,000. What is the criminal liability of each of
the accused?
All are liable for the special complex crime of robbery with rape. The elements of robbery with rape are: (a) the
taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (b) the property taken
belongs to another; (c) the taking is done with animus lucrandi; and (d) the robbery is accompanied by rape.
The original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and
rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime, and not the other way around. It is
established that all the accused barged into the victims’ house and threatened to kill them if they do not give into
their demands showing their original intent to rob the spouses (People v. Bragat, G.R. No. 222180, November 22,
2017). Furthermore, whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or on the occasion of a robbery, all those
who took part therein are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with rape, although not all of them took part
in the rape. Once conspiracy is established, they would be both equally culpable for the rape committed by one
of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the other from
committing the rape. Therefore, although only A raped W, all of them are liable for the special complex crime of
robbery with rape (People v. Belmonte et. al., G.R. No. 220889, July 5, 2017).
Theft
H was a pawnshop employee that was given the authority to manage the same. He had also the set of
keys and access to the vault. One night, T, a bystander, saw H outside the pawnshop and talking to B
and T. Then, H unlocked the gate of the shop and together with B they entered the shop. T served as
the lookout. After several minutes, they came out carrying the contents of the vault and H put a tape
plaster in his mouth trying to declare that he was robbed inside the shop. What is the criminal liability
of H, T and B?
H committed qualified theft while T and B committed simple theft. The elements of theft under Art. 308 of
the RPC are: (1) there was a taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was
without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking was done with intent to gain; and (5) the taking was accomplished
without violence or intimidation against the person or force upon things. The crime of theft here became qualified
because it was committed with grave abuse of confidence. Grave abuse of confidence must be the result of the
relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the accused-appellant and the offended
party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the accused-appellant abused. H could
not have committed the crime had he not been holding the position of the trusted employee which gave him not
only sole access to the pawnshop’s vault but also control of the premises (People v. Sabado, G.R. No. 218910, July
5, 2017). Then, T and B are only liable for the crime of simple theft as the qualifying circumstance of grave abuse
of confidence does not apply to an offender who was not in confidential relations with the complainant (People v.
Valdellon, G.R. No. 21487, September 27, 1924).
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J was a loan bookkeeper of CCS Bank, thus, she is authorized to collect and accept loan payments of the
bank’s clients and issue provisional receipts therefor. Likewise, she is also authorized to accomplish a
cash transfer slip at the end of each banking day detailing the amounts of money that she has received,
and remit such payments to her supervisor. However, CCS Bank discovered the non-remittance of some
loan payments received from its clients. Based on the audit, 853 provisional receipts amounting to
Php500,000.00 were issued by J but were unreported and the corresponding payments were unremitted.
Dissatisfied with her explanation about the unremitted payments, an Information for estafa through
misappropriation was filed against her. Will the case prosper? Discuss.
No, the case will not prosper. One of the elements of Estafa through misappropriation is that the offender’s receipt
of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same. Under this, the offender acquires both material
or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession
which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. Hence,
conversion of personal property in the case of an employee having mere material possession of the said property
constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical possession have been
transferred, misappropriation of the same property constitutes estafa. J was merely a collector of loan payments
from CCS Bank’s clients, and just being a mere custodian of the missing funds, she had only acquired material
and not juridical possession of such funds and consequently, cannot be convicted of the crime of Estafa as charged
(Benabaye v. People, G.R. No. 203466, February 25, 2015).
Distinguish robbery from theft.

Theft (Art. 308) Robbery (Art. 293-294)
As to Presence of Violence
The offender does not use violence or intim- There is violence or intimidation or force upon
idation or does not enter a house or building things.
through any of the means specified in Art. 299
or Art. 302 in taking personal property of an-
other with intent to gain.
As to Consent of the Owner
It suffices that consent on the part of the owner It is necessary that the taking is against the will of
is lacking. the owner.
Estafa/Swindling
B was engaged in the business of buying-and-selling of appliances, furniture, and other products. Z
would buy from B’s business once a month. Because she had become a regular customer, she and B had
an agreement that her store would be used to establish A’s Polangui and that she would be its branch
manager.
B visited A’s Polangui one time and he did not find any cash there. The preliminary audit revealed a
shortage. He confronted Z about this, and she allegedly promised to pay the shortages back within 15
days. The RTC found Z guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as defined and penalized
under par. 1(b), Article 315 of the RPC. This was affirmed by the CA. Is Z guilty of estafa? Explain.
No, the first and second elements of estafa were not established. The elements of estafa through conversion or
misappropriation, punished under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC are: (1) that personal property is received in
trust, on commission, for administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of
or to return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (2) that there is conversion or diversion
of such property by the person who has so received it or a denial on his part that he received it; (3) that such
conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another; and (4) that there be demand for the return of the
property.
Here, there is no evidence pointing to an existence of agency between Z and B. While Z was the branch manager,
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there was no written agreement as to what Z’s responsibilities were. Moreover, Z directly reported to B about
the operation of business. Thus, B had control over the operations and Z was not an agent of B or A’s Polangui
nor was there proof that Z received the items delivered to A’s Polangui on consignment basis, or that any title
passed to her by virtue of the said delivery. As to the second element, the words “convert” and “misappropriate”
connote an act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or
use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate to one’s own use includes, not only conversion to one’s
personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. The Court finds
that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of misappropriation beyond reasonable doubt (Layson Vda.
de Manjares v. People, G.R. No. 207249, May 14, 2021, Caguioa Case)
C, P, A, S, T, H and M established the HRem Network Corporation, an association operating on funds

solicited from the public. They made representations having the business, property and power to solicit
and accept investments and deposits from the general public and capacity to pay guaranteed monthly
interest on investment from 5% to 6% and commissions. Upon hearing these, A, B, C, D and their other
seven (7) friends decided to become investors thus giving several amounts of cash to the corporation as
payment. After several months, no money was given to the investors despite repeated demands. Then,
they found out that HRem Network used their money for their own personal benefits. What is the
crime committed? Discuss.
C, P, A, S, T, H and M committed the crime of syndicated estafa. The elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa
or other forms of swindling, as defined in Arts. 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or swindling
is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c) the defraudation results in the misappropriation of
moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, “samahangnayon(s),” or farmers’
associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public. They used deceit and
falsely pretended to have the authority to solicit investments from the general public when, in truth, they did
not have such authority. Investors were induced to invest because of the representations and promise of lucrative
income. Their false pretenses and representations made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud
and reliance thereon by aggrieved parties constitute the element of defraudation in the crime of syndicated estafa
(People v. Baladjay, G.R. No. 220458, July 26, 2017).
MMM and DDD left their savings account passbooks with C who is a bank teller of XYZ when they
went to the bank to transact on their accounts. MMM, in particular, withdrew the sum of Php500.00
and left her passbook with the C upon the latter’s instruction. She had to return two more times before
the bank manager D sensed that something wrong was going on. D reviewed MMM’s account and found
three (3) withdrawal slips containing signatures radically different from the specimen signatures of
the depositor and covering a total of Php65,000.00. C intervened in the posting and verification of
the withdrawal slips affixing her initials thereto. Since C’s co-bank teller saw her initials on the slips
attesting to having verified the signature of the depositor, the bank teller presumed that the withdrawal
was genuine. She posted and released the money to C. However, MMM insisted that the signatures in
the slips were not hers, forcing C to admit that the passbook was still with her and kept in her house.
What crime did C commit? Explain.
C is liable for the crime of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. As a bank teller, she took
advantage of the bank depositor who had trusted in her enough to leave their passbooks by filling out withdrawal
slips that she signed, and misrepresenting to her fellow bank employees that the signatures had been verified in due
course. Her misrepresentation to her co-employees enabled her to receive the amounts stated in the withdrawal
slips. She thereby committed two crimes, namely: estafa, by defrauding XYZ Bank, her employer, in the various
sums withdrawn from the bank account of MMM; and falsification of a commercial document, by forging
the signature of MMM in the withdrawal slips to make it appear that the depositor concerned had signed the
respective slips in order to enable her to withdraw the amounts. Such offenses were complex crimes, because the
estafa would not have been consummated without the falsification of the withdrawal slips (De Castro v. People,
G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015).
May the crime of estafa be complexed with falsification of a private document?

No, there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of a private document considering that the damage
essential to both is the same. As a result, having such offenses compounded or complexed in accordance with
Article 48 of the RPC is inherently disallowed.
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Note: The Court held in Batulanon v. People that “as there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of
private document, it is important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private
document or with estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa,
the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a
document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa (Co v. People, G.R. No. 233015, October 16, 2019).
A went to P persuading the latter to buy her ten (10) checks at a rediscounted rate of ten percent (10%)
of the total aggregate amount. She, likewise, assured Peter that the checks were hers and duly funded.
However, unknown to P, A actually knew that she had no sufficient funds to cover the amount of the
checks. After P agreed to buy the checks, A affixed her signature on the face of the checks. When the
checks become due, P tried to deposit the checks to his bank account but the drawee bank refused payment
because the account was already closed thus the bank returned the said checks to P. He immediately
demanded from A the equivalent amount of said checks giving her 5 days to comply. However, A still
failed to pay P. An Information for estafa was filed against A. Will the case prosper? Explain.
Yes, A is liable for the crime of estafa by postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation. Such
estafa consists of the following elements: (1) the offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said
check, the offender has no funds in the bank or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded. It is necessary the check should have been issued as an inducement for
the surrender by the party deceived of his money or property and not in payment of a preexisting obligation. It is
established that A induced P to buy her checks after she mispresented that she had enough funds in her account.
Moreover, when informed by P of the dishonor of the checks, A still failed to pay within period given to her (Batac
v. People, G.R. No. 191622, June 6, 2018).
AAA introduced herself as the head of a company, MMG, to private complainant to solicit investments.
The Articles of partnership showed AAA as its general partner. The other 4 accused were shown to
be limited partners. The complainants, after investing, received several post-dated checks supposedly
covering their investments with interest. However, when they tried to deposit the checks, their banks
informed them that these were dishonored because MMG’s accounts were already closed. AAA insists
that he may not be found guilty of violating PD 1689 in relation to estafa under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the
RPC as the element of fraud or deceit is absent. Is AAA correct?
No, AAA’s contention is untenable. One of the elements of estafa by means of deceit is that there must be a
false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his business. In the case at hand, such element of fraud or
deceit is apparent because the incorporators/directors of MMG comprising more than five (5) people, including
herein accused, made false pretenses and representations to private complainant regarding a supposed lucrative
investment opportunity with MMG in order to solicit money from them. Furthermore, the said false pretenses
and representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud; relying on the same, private
complainants invested their hard-earned money into MMG; and the incorporators/directors of MMG ended up
running away with the private complainants’ investments, obviously to the latter’s prejudice (People v. Mateo et al.
G.R. No. 210612, October 9, 2017).
AAA was alleged to have recruited and promised employment or job placement to and collected fees from
16 contract workers, without first obtaining any license/authority from the POEA or by the DOLE to
recruit workers for overseas employment. AAA denied the charges against her and argued that she was
an auditor of PET Plans, Inc. from March 23, 2000 to August 31, 2005, making it highly unlikely for
her to have engaged in the business of recruitment and promised employment abroad. What crime/s did
AAA commit? Explain.
AAA is liable for the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa. Illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction.
In the second, such intent is imperative. Estafa by means of deceit is committed when these elements concur:
(a) the accused used fictitious name or false pretense that he possesses power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or other similar deceits; (b) he used such deceitful means prior
to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; (c) the offended party relied on such deceitful means to part
with his money or property; and (d) the offended party suffered damage(People v. Racho G.R. No. 227505, October
2, 2017).
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J is a businessman and wanted to buy dollar checks that he will use to buy the machines for his business.
Then, he was able to meet A representing herself having fully funded dollar checks. Then, upon
agreement to buy the checks, A issued Check No. 9999 drawn by and against Brooklyn Bank in New
York. As payment, J gave a cashier’s check in favor of A. A was able to encash the cashier’s check, however,
when J deposited the dollar check he was notified that the dollar check was spurious.
1. What is the crime committed by A?
A is liable of estafa through falsification of commercial documents. The essential elements of estafa Art.
315, par. 2(a) of the RPC are: a) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; b) such
false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud; c) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or
fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; d) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. A falsifying
the dollar check and misrepresenting to J that it was genuine and sufficiently funded in exchange therefor
the cashier’s checks constitute the fraud. Furthermore, A encashing the check and appropriated the proceeds
thereof to the damage and prejudice of J seals her liability (Serrano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123896, June
25, 2003).
2. Assuming A argued that J accepted her promise to novate the transaction into ordinary creditor-
debtor relationship, thus, extinguishing her criminal liability. Is her defense proper? Explain.
No. Criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise or novation of contract, for it is a public offense
which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own motion though complete reparation
should have been made of the damage suffered by the offended party. Criminal offense is committed against
the People and the offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for
the commission of the offense (Serrano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123896, June 25, 2003 citing People v.
Nery, G.R. No. L-19567, February 5, 1964).
Arson
XX and YY had a heated argument involving a parcel of land. YY said hurtful words against XX causing
the latter to throw punches against YY. Before falling on the floor, he hit his head at the sink causing his
instant death. Realizing what he had done, XX grabbed some stored gasoline in the YY’s kitchen and
set the house on fire. Then, two Informations were filed against XX for the separate crimes of homicide
and arson. XX contends that he may be convicted only of the crime of homicide and not both homicide
and arson. Is XX correct?
No. Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by RA 7659, contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both
public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or
commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. In order to determine whether the crime committed
is arson only, or murder, or arson and homicide or murder, as the case may be, the main objective of the accused is
to be examined. If the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so,
but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed
— homicide/murder and arson. XX burned the house of the victim in order to hide or conceal the commission of
the crime. It was established that he first beat the victim causing his death before setting the latter’s house on fire.
Therefore, two separate crimes were committed by XX, homicide and arson (People v. Cacho y Songco, G.R. No.
218425, September 27, 2017).
Spouses E and B were living in an apartment complex together with their two children. One night, after
E and B had an altercation causing his wife and children to leave, B brought an LPG gas tank outside their
apartment unit causing the gas to leak. This scene was seen by C, their neighbor. C immediately went to
D, who was already holding a match, the former was able to stop him and turned off the regulator of the
tank bringing it with him for safekeeping. After past midnight, the apartment complex started to catch
fire resulting in the complex to be completely burned down and three (3) persons to die. D was convicted
for the complex crime of arson with multiple homicide. Is D’s conviction correct?
No, there is no complex crime of arson with (multiple) homicide. In the classification of crimes committed by fire,
attention must be given to the intention of the author. When fire is used with intent to kill a person who may be
in shelter, and that objective is secured, the crime is murder. Murder or homicide in a juridical sense would exist if
the killing were the objective of the malefactor and the burning of the building was resorted only as the means of
accomplishing his purpose. The rule is otherwise when arson is itself the end and death is a mere consequence. The
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crime in such a case would be arson only, absorbing the homicide.
In this case, D’s intent was merely to destroy his family’s apartment through the use of fire. The resulting deaths
that occurred, therefore, should be absorbed by the crime of arson and only increases the imposable penalty to
reclusion perpetua to death, pursuant to Section 5 of PD 1613 (People v. Cedenio, G.R. No. 93485, June 27, 1994).
Crimes against Chastity
Note: For Articles 337 and 338 of the RPC on Qualified and Simple Seduction, Sections 2 & 3 of RA 11648
changed the age of sexual consent from over twelve (12) but under eighteen (18) years of age, to sixteen (16) years of
age and over but under eighteen (18) years of age. RA 11648 also amended Section 5(b) of RA 7610 on lascivious
conduct from twelve (12), to sixteen (16) years of age. This is NOT covered by the cut-off for the 2022 Bar Exam.
Acts of Lasciviousness
What is lascivious conduct?

Lascivious conduct means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of
any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area
of a person (Section 2, RA 7610).
AAA, only five (5) years old at the time of the rape incidents, testified that she was repeatedly molested
by L who is always carrying a bolo during the molestations. AAA – who was already twelve (12) years
old at the time – again encountered Ladra at their house’s kitchen where the latter allegedly suddenly
squeezed her vagina. L denied the charges and claimed that AAA’s family were merely angry at him when
he left their house, leaving no one to attend to their errands. He further argues that he could not have
committed the rape in the presence of AAA’s younger brother, who slept beside her. What crime(s) did
L commit? Explain.
L is liable for acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC, in relation to Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610. An accused
can be held criminally liable for lascivious conduct under Sec. 5 (b) of RA 7610, provided the requisites of the
crime of Acts of Lasciviousness as penalized under Art. 336 of the RPC are met and, in addition: (1) the accused
commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) that the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of
age (People v. Ladra, G.R. No. 221443, July 17, 2017).
In the case at bar, AAA was then twelve (12) years old at the time of the commission of the lascivious act.
Therefore, accused-appellant, an adult who exercised influence on the victim, committed a lewd and lascivious act
by “squeezing” AAA’s vagina. Thus, accused-appellant L is found guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336
of the RPC, as amended, in relation to Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 (Id).
Note: The elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336 as ruled by the court in the case of People v. Ladra
require clarification. The ruling in the case as to the elements of the crime was made in reference to Section 5(b) of
RA 7610. The elements of Acts of Lasciviousness based solely on Art. 336 are as follows:
1. The offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
2. The act of lasciviousness is committed against a person of either sex; and
3. It is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By Force or intimidation
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or
d. When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented (Reyes, Book Two, p. 1142-1143).
Three separate charges of qualified rape were filed against X for three separate occurrences. First, one
evening, while X, drunk, was sleeping in one bed with her daughter AAA, 14 years old, he undressed
her, touched her vagina, held her breast, and afterwards he inserted his penis in her vagina. Due to
threats, AAA merely cried—she did not shout, resist, or ask her father to stop. Second, the same series
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of acts were done by X to AAA early dawn the next day. And third, later in the evening, X once more
held AAA’s breasts and vagina and placed himself on top of her. X denied having any carnal knowledge
of AAA. However, in view of the failure of the prosecution to prove the fact of penile penetration with
regard to the alleged rape, the appellate court downgraded the offense to acts of lasciviousness.
1. Is accused guilty of qualified rape? If so, what is its effect as to X’s eligibility for parole?
Yes, X is guilty of two (2) counts of qualified rape under Art. 266-A in relation to Art. 266-B (1) of the
RPC. As to the penalty for qualified rape under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, Article 266-B (1)
of the RPC provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is the parent. Applying RA 9346, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua but it should
be specified that it is without eligibility for parole. This is pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC which states
that “when circumstances are present warranting the imposition of the death penalty, but this penalty is not
imposed because of RA 9346, the qualification ‘without eligibility for parole’ shall be used to qualify reclusion
perpetua in order to emphasize that the accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death penalty had it
not been for RA 9346.”
2. Is the CA correct in convicting the accused with acts of lasciviousness considering that there was
no penetration?
No, the proper nomenclature for the third charge is sexual abuse under RA 7610 or the Special Protection of
Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, not of acts of lasciviousness. The following
guidelines must be followed in determining the proper nomenclature of the crime committed:
a. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating the offense, and in determining the
imposable penalty.
b. If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should be “Acts of
Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC in relation to Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.
c. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve (12) but below eighteen (18) years of
age, or is eighteen (18) years or older but is unable to fully take care of herself/himself or protect herself/
himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition, the crime should be designated as “Lascivious Conduct or Sexual Abuse under
Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.”
Considering that the victim in this case was 14 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, accordingly, X
should be convicted of sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b), Art. III of RA 7610, and not just acts of lasciviousness under
Art. 336 of the RPC, in relation to the same provision of RA 7610 (People v. Ursua, G.R. No. 218575, October 4,
2017.
Prosecution of the Crimes of Adultery, Concubinage, Seduction, Abduction, and Acts of Lasciviousness
Define adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, and acts of lasciviousness.

1. Adultery is committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her
husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage
be subsequently declared void (Art. 333, RPC).
2. Concubinage is committed by any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or shall have
sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with
her in any other place (Art. 334, RPC).
3. Seduction is the offense that occurs when a man entices a woman of previously chaste character to have
unlawful intercourse with him by means of persuasion, solicitation, promises, or bribes, or other means not
involving force (Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed).
4. Abduction is the taking away of a woman from her house or the place where she may be for the purpose of
carrying her to another place with intent to marry or corrupt her (People v. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-19034,
February 17, 1923).
5. Acts of lasciviousness is committed by an offender who commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness
against a person of either sex, and is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or
intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (c) by means of
fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or when the offended party is under 12 years of age or
is demented.
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X and Y were charged with the crime of adultery by A, the husband of X and the offended party
in this case. The trial court rendered its decision convicting the two of the crime charged with its
corresponding penalty. After the case had been submitted, a motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of
the appellant predicated on an affidavit executed by A, in which he pardoned his guilty spouse X for
her infidelity. Will the alleged act of pardon extinguish the crime charged against X and Y?
No. The second paragraph of article 344 of the RPC reads: “The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders.” This provision means that the pardon afforded the offenders must come
before the institution of the criminal prosecution, and means, further, that both the offenders must be pardoned
by the offended party. The pardon given by the offended party again constitutes a bar to the prosecution for
adultery. Once more, however, it must be emphasized that this pardon must come before the institution of the
criminal prosecution and must be for both offenders to be effective — circumstances which do not concur in
this case (People v. Infante, G.R. No. 36270, August 31, 1932).
Distinguish seduction and abduction.

Seduction (Arts. 337 and 338) Abduction (Arts. 342 and 343)
As to the Nature of the Crime
Crime against chastity.
As to Types
Simple Seduction, Qualified Seduction Forcible Abduction, Consented Abduction
As to Elements
Simple Seduction Forcible Abduction
1. That the offended party is a virgin; 1. That the person abducted is a woman regardless of
2. She must be over twelve (12) and under eigh- her age, civil status, or reputation;
teen (18) years of age; 2. That the abduction is against her will; and
3. That the offender had sexual intercourse with 3. The abduction is with lewd designs.
her; and
4. That there is abuse of authority, confidence or Consented Abduction
relationship on the part of the offender.
1. That the offended party must be a virgin;
2. That she must be over twelve (12) and under eigh-
Qualified Seduction teen (18) years of age;
1. That the offended party is over twelve (12) and 3. That the taking away of the offended party must be
under eighteen (18) years of age; with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from
2. That she must be of good reputation, single, or the offender; and
widow; 4. That the taking away of the offended party must be
3. That the offender has sexual intercourse with with lewd designs.
her; and
4. That it is committed by means of deceit.
Distinguish adultery and concubinage.

Adultery (Art. 333) Concubinage (Art. 334)
As to the Nature of the Crime
Crime against chastity.
As to Persons Liable
Married woman Married man
As to Manner of Commission
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Adultery (Art. 333) Concubinage (Art. 334)

Having sexual intercourse with a man not her hus- 1. Keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling;
band and the man knows her to be married 2. Having sexual intercourse under scandalous cir-
cumstances with a woman who is not his wife; or
3. Cohabiting with her in any other place and the
woman knows him to be married.
Crimes against the Civil Status of Persons
Bigamy
Note: Pulido v. People established a new doctrine on bigamy, wherein the accused was exonerated of criminal
liability for bigamy when during the pendency of the bigamy case, a judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage was entered. Previous decisions had held that a person who contracts a second marriage without a prior
court declaration of nullity of his first marriage was liable for bigamy even if the first marriage was subsequently
declared void by a court. The Court ruled that the requirement of a prior judicial declaration of nullity under
Article 40 of the Family Code, which is for purposes only of remarriage, should not have been extended to criminal
cases. This was decided outside the cut-off of the 2022 Bar Examinations and is therefore NOT COVERED.
If you were the judge in a bigamy case where the defense was able to prove that the first marriage was
null and void or a nullity, would you render a judgment of conviction or acquittal? Explain your answer.
If I were the judge, I would render a judgment of conviction. Proof that the first marriage is null and void or a
nullity is not a defense in bigamy. Article 349, RPC is clear: Any person who contracts a second marriage without
first having a judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, albeit on its face void and inexistent, is
guilty of bigamy. Parties to the marriage are not permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must
be submitted to the judgment of competent courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared by the
court can it be held as void. As long as the previous marriage was not lawfully dissolved or judicially declared void,
contracting a new marriage constitutes bigamy (Lasanas v. People, G.R. No. 159031, June 23, 2014).
Assuming a first marriage existed at the time a second marriage was contracted and there is a subsequent
judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, would
you render a judgment of conviction or acquittal? Explain your answer. (2012 Bar)
If I were the judge, I would still render a judgment of conviction. A subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is absolutely of no moment in so far as the State’s penal
laws are concerned. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void for
being bigamous, the nullity of the second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability
for bigamy (Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004). It is a settled rule that criminal
culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense. Hence, the crime of bigamy is committed
by a person from the time he contracts the second marriage while his first marriage exists. The finality of the judicial
declaration of nullity of his second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him
(Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013).
Crimes against Honor
Libel
How is the crime of libel committed?

The elements of the crime of libel are as follows: (1) there must be an imputation of a crime, or a vice or defect, real
or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance; (2) the imputation must be made publicly;
(3) it must be malicious; (4) the imputation must be directed at a natural personal or a juridical person, or one who
is dead; and (5) the imputation must tend to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the person defamed
(REYES, Book Two, p.1239).
B wrote two (2) articles for the Manila Bulletin. The first article dealt with a letter complaint of the
Waray employees of the DTI which accused D of dereliction of duties. B’s second article contained
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statements of the alleged lousy performance of respondent. Finding these articles offensive, D filed a
complaint for libel against petitioners. B contended that his work is an exposé, a product of investigative
work. Likewise, he claimed that he only came to know of D when he received several letter-complaints
against respondent. He presumed that the copies of the complaints were those already filed before the
CSC and Ombudsman and found them to be of public interest which caused him to write about it in his
articles. Does the writing of the said articles against a public figure constitute the crime of libel?
No, the two articles written by B are qualifiedly privileged and hence, cannot constitute the crime of libel. Qualifiedly
privileged communications are those which contain defamatory imputations but which are not actionable unless
found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive, and to which “private communications”
and “fair and true report without any comments or remarks” belong.
Here, the statements on the “lousy performance” and “mismanagement” of D are matters of public interest as
these relate to his moral conduct, his capacity to lead the employees, and to manage and supervise the affairs of
the office. These statements are fair and true reports without any comments or remarks and undoubtedly are
qualifiedly privileged communication and thus, would require actual malice to be actionable. In this case, there
was no proof of actual malice on the part of B (Manila Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Domingo, G.R. No. 170341,
July 5, 2017).
A is the incumbent City Mayor of Cadiz City and is popularly known by the nickname “Bading.” X, the
accused, calls A “Bading.” A, while exercising his official duties, saw billboards with the printed phrase
“CADIZ FOREVER” with a blank space before the word “NEVER” directly under said phrase. Some
days later, A received a phone call relating that the blank space preceding the word “NEVER” was filled
up with the added words “BADING AND SAGAY.” The next day, he saw the billboards with the phrase
“CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER” printed in full. Reacting and feeling that he
was being maligned and dishonored with the printed phrase and of being a “tuta” of Sagay, A caused
the filing of a complaint for libel against X. X admitted having placed all the billboards because he is
aware of all the things happening around Cadiz City. He mentioned “BADING” because he was not in
conformity with the many things the mayor had done in Cadiz City. He insisted that he has no intention
whatsoever of referring to “Bading” as the “Tuta” of Sagay. Does the controversial phrase “CADIZ
FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER” imputes derogatory remarks on A’s character, reputation
and integrity and thus, sufficient to convict X of the crime of libel?
No, it does not. An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the
possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends
to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. Here,
the phrase “CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER” does not tend to induce suspicion on private
respondent’s character, integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City.
There are no derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance
tending, directly or indirectly, to cause his dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its entirety, employ any unpleasant
language or somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would reflect on private respondent’s integrity. Obviously, the
controversial word “NEVER” used by petitioner was plain and simple. In its ordinary sense, the word did not cast
aspersion upon private respondent’s integrity and reputation much less convey the idea that he was guilty of any
offense. Hence, X is not liable for libel (Lopez y Aberasturi v. People, G.R. No. 172203, February 14, 2011).
In her weekly gossip column in a tabloid, G wrote an unflattering article about P, a famous singer, and
his bitter separation from his wife. The article portrayed P as an abusive husband and caused him to lose
lucrative endorsement contracts. P charged G with libel. In her defense, G countered that she did not
commit libel because P has attained the status of a public figure so that even his personal life has become
a legitimate subject of public interest and comment. Is G correct?
No, G is not correct. Although wider latitude is given to defamatory utterances against public figures in relation to
matters of public interest involving them, such defamatory utterances for not automatically fall within the ambit
of constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public figure’s work,
the same may give rise to criminal liability (Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008). Any attack upon
the private character of the public figure on matters which are not related to their works may constitute libel under
Article 355 (Sazon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120715, March 29, 1996). Here, G was attacking the personal life
of P as a husband and not his public life as a famous singer.
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How is malice in law distinguished from malice in fact?

Malice in law is a presumption of law. It dispenses with the proof of malice when words that raise the presumption
are shown to have been uttered. It is also known as constructive malice, legal malice, or implied malice. On the
other hand, malice in fact is a positive desire and intention to annoy and injure. It may denote that the defendant
was actuated by ill will or personal spite. It is also called express malice, actual malice, real malice, true malice, or
particular malice (Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation, G.R. No. 1843155, November 25,
2009).
In this jurisdiction, malice in law is provided in Article 354 of the RPC which also enumerates the exception
thereto: (1) a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or
social duty; and (2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
There is, thus, a presumption of malice in the case of every defamatory imputation, where there is no showing of a
good intention or justifiable motive for making such imputation. The exceptions provided in Article 354 are also
known as qualifiedly privileged communications (Id.).
What is the Doctrine of Fair Comment?

The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed
false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is
deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public
capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is
an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken,
as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts (Tulfo v. People, G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008).
Slander
L and M are candidates in the local elections. In his speeches, L attacked his opponent M alleging that
he is the son of N, a robber and a thief who amassed his wealth through shady deals. May M file a case
against L for grave oral defamation? State your reasons.
M cannot file a case for grave oral defamation. If at all, he may file a case for light slander. The gravity of the oral
defamation depends not only (1) upon the expressions used, but also (2) on the personal relations of the accused
and the offended party, and (3) the circumstances surrounding the case. It is a doctrine of ancient respectability
that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense, grammatical
significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of
the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to prove the
intention of the offender at the time. Therefore, M cannot file a case for grave oral defamation (Pader v. People,
G.R. No. 139157, February 8, 2000).
Quasi-Offenses
Imprudence and Negligence
What are the acts punishable under Article 365 of the RPC?
The punishable acts under Article 365 of the RPC are as follows: (1) committing through reckless imprudence
any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave or less grave felony; (2) committing through
simple imprudence or negligence an act which would otherwise constitute a grave or less serious felony; (3) causing
damage to the property of another through reckless imprudence or simple imprudence or negligence; and (4)
causing through simple imprudence or negligence some wrong which, if done maliciously would have constituted
a light felony (Article 365 of the RPC).
How is imprudence distinguished from negligence?

As to effect, both are not crimes and merely determine a lower degree of criminal liability - they are means of
committing crime. As to nature, imprudence pertains to deficiency of action and failure in precaution, while
negligence pertains to deficiency in perception and failure in advertence. As to exemption from liability, in
imprudence, one must take the necessary precaution once they foreseen while in negligence, paying proper
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attention and using due diligence in foreseeing them would exempt one from liability (REYES, Book Two, (2021)
p. 1320).
O caught a cold and was running a fever. His doctor prescribed paracetamol. O went to a drug store with
the prescription, and the pharmacist sold him three (3) tablets. Upon arriving home, he took a tablet.
One hour later, he had a seizure and died. The autopsy showed that the tablet he had taken was not
paracetamol but a pill to which he was allergic. The pharmacist was charged with murder. Is the charge
proper? If not, what should it be? (2013 Bar)
The charge was improper. The pharmacist should be charged with criminal negligence, or reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. Under Article 365 of the RPC, this crime may be committed by committing through
reckless imprudence any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave or less grave felony or light
felony. For there to be reckless imprudence the offender must do an act which is voluntary but must be without
malice. Such act must result to a material damage. There must also be an inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the offender taking into account his occupation, degree of intelligence and other personal circumstances.
Here, the pharmacist is expected to exercise due care and have the necessary skills and knowledge in dispensing
various drugs to purchasers. While it is true that the pharmacist had no intent to kill O, the pharmacist inexcusably
lacked precaution in failing to dispense the proper medicine to the O which caused his death hence, the pharmacist
should be held for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
X, a septuagenarian, was walking with his ten-year old grandson, Y, along Paseo de Roxas and decided to
cross at the intersection of Makati Avenue but both were hit by a speeding van and were sent sprawling
on the pavement a meter apart. The driver, Z, stopped his car after hitting the two victims but then
reversed his gears and ran over Mang J’s prostrate body anew and third time by advancing his car
forward. The grandson suffered broken legs only and survived but Mang J suffered multiple fractures
and broken ribs, causing his instant death. The driver was arrested and charged with Murder for the
death of Mang J and reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. Is the charge of reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with respect to the grandson correct? (2001 Bar)
Yes, the charge is correct. Under Article 365 of the RPC, quasi-offenses may be committed by committing through
reckless imprudence any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute grave or less grave felony or light
felony. For there to be reckless imprudence the offender must do an act which is voluntary but must be without
malice. Such act must result to a material damage. There must also be an inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the offender taking into account his occupation, degree of intelligence and other personal circumstances
(Caminos, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 147437, May 8, 2009). Here, the serious physical injuries sustained by Mang J’s
10-year-old grandson, as a result of having been hit by the speeding vehicle of said driver, was the result of reckless
imprudence which is punishable as a quasi-offense.
X brought his son Y to a local faith healer known as “Mother Himala.” He was diagnosed by the
faith healer as being possessed by an evil spirit. X thereupon authorized the conduct of a “treatment”
calculated to drive the spirit from the boy’s body. Unfortunately, the procedure conducted resulted in
the Y’s death. What crime or crimes did the faith healer committed? (2007 Bar)
The crime committed was Reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. Under Article 365 of the RPC, quasi-
offenses may be committed by committing through reckless imprudence any act which had it been intentional,
would constitute grave or less grave felony or light felony. For there to be reckless imprudence the offender must
do an act which is voluntary but must be without malice. Such act must result to a material damage. There must
also be an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender taking into account his occupation, degree
of intelligence and other personal circumstances (Jarcia, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 187926, February 15, 2012). Here,
it is clear from the facts that the faith healer had no intention of killing Y. The faith healer merely conducted a
treatment in a reckless or negligent manner which resulted to Y’s death hence, the faith healer should be charged.
Is quasi-offense a crime in itself or merely a mode of committing an offense?

A Quasi-offense is a crime in itself. Article 365 of the RPC provides for a penalty for the said offense. What is
principally punished in quasi-offenses is not the act itself but the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness or the lack of care or foresight (Ivler v. M-San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010).
Ryan was involved in a vehicular collusion causing him to be charged with two separate offenses namely:
1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical for injuries sustained by Lisa; and 2) Reckless
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Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of Jennie’s husband, Paul
and damage to the spouses’ vehicle. Then, Ryan pleaded guilty to the first charge and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. May Ryan be held guilty for the second charge? Explain.
No, Reckless Imprudence is a single crime, its consequences on persons and property are material only to determine
the penalty. The two charges against Ryan, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision
of the RPC, as amended, namely, Art. 365. Reckless imprudence under said article is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense
bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense.
And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions (Ivler
v. M-San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010).
Special Penal Laws
Anti-Child Pornography Act
Define the terms “Child,” “Child Pornography,” and “Explicit Sexual Activity” under RA 9775 or the
Anti-Child Pornography Act.
1. “Child” refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or over, but is unable to fully take care of
himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition.
A “child” also refers to: (1) a person regardless of age who is presented, depicted or portrayed as a child as
defined herein; and (2) computer-generated, digitally or manually crafted images or graphics of a person
who is represented or who is made to appear to be a child as defined herein (RA 9775, Sec. 3 (a)).
2. “Child pornography” refers to any representation, whether visual, audio, or written combination thereof,
by electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means, of child engaged or involved in real
or simulated explicit sexual activities (RA 9775, Sec. 3(b)).
3. “Explicit Sexual Activity” includes actual or simulated -

a. As to form
i. Sexual intercourse or lascivious act including, but not limited to, contact involving genital to
genital, oral to genital, anal to genital, or oral to anal, whether between persons of the same or
opposite sex;
b. Bestiality;
c. Masturbation;
d. Sadistic or masochistic abuse;
e. Lascivious exhibition of the genitals, buttocks, breasts, pubic area and/or anus; or
f. Use of any object or instrument for lascivious acts (RA 9775, Section 3(C))
X received a friend request from A, a minor, on his Facebook Messenger. X and A then started talking
and at some point, X asked A to send him pictures of her private parts. A submitted to the request of X.
B, A’s mother, filed a complaint against X. They presented screenshots of the chat thread between A and
X. The photos and the chat thread were obtained since X gave A his password. Should X be held liable
under RA 9775?
Yes. it is decisively clear that the crime of child pornography as defined and penalized under RA 9775 should
be classified as a crime mala in se. As parens patriae, this act of grooming minors for sexual abuse should not
be tolerated. We should not be complicit in reinforcing this belief upon the minors that sex with children is
acceptable and thereby fuel a pedophile’s fantasies prior to committing sexual abuse, which clearly happened in
the instant case. (Cadajas y Cabias v. People, G.R. No. 247348, November 16, 2021)
Note: In the Cadajas Case, Justice Caguioa, as seen in his separate opinion, supports the stance that a violation
of Section 4 (c) (2) of RA 10175, in relation to Sections 4 (a), 3 (b) and (c) (5) of RA 9775 falls under the class
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of offenses known as mala in se, where criminal intent must be proven by proof beyond reasonable doubt. This
case, however, is NOT covered in the 2022 Bar Examinations as the decision was promulgated outside the cut-off
date.
X induced A and B, both minor, to perform sexual acts in front of web camera. As their “reward” X
gives them chocolates and new toys. Once recorded, X sends these pornographic videos online to her
foreigner patrons in exchange of dollars. What offense/s is/are committed by the offender, and what
penalty should be imposed?
The offender is guilty of Section 4 (a) RA 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act, for inducing the two
children to perform in the creation of production of any form of child pornography. Moreover, the offender
committed this through a computer system, in violation of RA 10175 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act. Under
the latter law, the unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punished under RA 9775 is punishable by one degree
higher than that it provides (RA 10175, Section 4 (c) (2)).
A was caught in possession of five (5) DVDs containing music videos of him and two (2) children showing
explicit sexual activities including bestiality, masturbation, sadistic or masochistic abuse, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals, buttocks, breasts, pubic area and/or anus. When charged for violations of Sec.
4(c) and 4(d) of RA 9775, A alleges that he may not be charged under Sec. 4(c) for he had no intention to
sell, distribute, publish or broadcast the said music videos. Comment on A’s contention.
A’s contention is untenable. Possession of three or more articles of child pornography of the same form shall be
prima facie evidence of the intent to sell, distribute, publish or broadcast (RA 9775, Sec. 4(d)). Hence, A’s mere
possession of five (5) DVDs creates a disputable presumption of his intent to sell the same. A may however present
sufficient evidence to overcome this presumption.
Define conspiracy to commit child pornography and syndicated child pornography.

Conspiracy to commit any form of child pornography shall be committed when two (2) or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of any of the said prohibited acts and decide to commit it (RA 9775, Sec.
4(k)). The crime of child pornography is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or
more persons conspiring or confederating with one another (RA 9775, Sec. 5).
Anti-Fencing Law
Define “fencing” and “fence” under PD 1612 or the Anti-Fencing Law

“Fencing” is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess,
keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object
or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft (PD 1612, Section 2 (a)). Meanwhile, a “fence” includes any person, firm, association
corporation or partnership or other organization who/which commits the act of fencing (PD 1612, Section 2(b)).
Enumerate the elements of fencing

The elements of the crime of fencing are the following:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft,
buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals
in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft;
3. The accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another (Cahulogan v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No.225695, March 21, 2018).
Note: Fencing is a malum prohibitum, and PD 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of Fencing from evidence
of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject of
robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property another (Cahulogan v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No.225695, March 21, 2018).
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Farrowing crates and assorted lengths of G.I. pipes were found and displayed in shelves in the premises
of A, a storeowner. C, an employee of B, positively identified that they were the missing pipes of B. A
claims that a person aboard a jeep unloaded the pipes in front of his establishment and left them there.
A further argues that he did not have any intent to gain, hence, he cannot be punished for fencing. Can
A be made liable under PD 1612?
Yes, A may be held liable for violation of PD 1612 or the Anti-Fencing Law. First, intent to gain need not be proved
in crimes punishable by a special law such as PD 1612. Secondly, the law does not require proof of purchase of
the stolen articles by petitioner, as mere possession thereof is enough to give rise to a presumption of fencing. It
was incumbent upon A to overthrow this presumption by sufficient and convincing evidence. When a storeowner
displays articles, it is assumed that he is doing so with the intention of selling them (Dunlao v. CA, G.R. No.
111343, August 22, 1996).
A sold to F cases of soft drinks, without authority and consent from his employer, C, abusing the trust
and confidence reposed upon him as a truck helper. F bought the subject items from A for a discounted
price. Their transaction did not have any accompanying delivery and official receipts, and A did not
demand that such items be replaced with empty bottles, contrary to common practice among dealers of
soft drinks.
1. May F be convicted for a violation of the Anti-Fencing Law?
Yes, F may be held liable for violation of PD 1612. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows:
(a) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (b) the accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice
in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (c) the accused knew or should have known
that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; and (d) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another. Here, F
should have been forewarned that the subject items came from an illegal source, as his transaction with A did
not have any accompanying delivery and official receipts, and that the latter did not demand that such items be
replaced with empty bottles, contrary to common practice among dealers of soft drinks; F’s intent to gain was
made evident when he bought the subject items for just a price lower than their value (Cahulogan v. People,
G.R. No. 225695, March 21, 2018).
2. May F raise the defense of good faith?
No, he may not raise the defense of good faith. Notably, fencing is a malum prohibitum, and PD 1612 creates
a prima facie presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item,
object or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft (Cahulogan v. People, G.R. No.
225695, March 21, 2018). Since fencing is a malum prohibitum, good faith may not be used as a defense.
What needs to be to be overcome is the presumption of fencing (Dunlao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111343,
August 22, 1996).
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
What are the prohibitions for certain individuals under RA 3019?

1. Prohibition on private individuals
It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize
or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business,
transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official has to intervene.
Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The
word “close personal relation” shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and
professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the
offenses defined in Section 3 hereof (RA 3019, Sec 4).
2. Prohibition on certain relatives

It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree
of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the
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Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction,
contract or application with the Government.
This section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials
to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor
to any transaction, contract or application already existing or pending at the time of such assumption of
public office, nor to any application filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of
the official or officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or rules or
regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise
of a profession. (RA 3019, Sec. 5).
3. Prohibition on Members of Congress

It shall be unlawful hereafter for any Member of the Congress during the term for which he has been elected,
to acquire or receive any personal pecuniary interest in any specific business enterprise which will be directly
and particularly favored or benefited by any law or resolution authored by him previously approved or adopted
by the Congress during the same term.
The provision of this section shall apply to any other public officer who recommended the initiation in
Congress of the enactment or adoption of any law or resolution and acquires or receives any such interest
during his incumbency
It is also unlawful for such member of Congress or other public officer, who, having such interest prior to
the approval of such law or resolution authored or recommended by him, continues for thirty days after such
approval to retain such interest (RA 3019, Sec. 6).
What is the rule for the Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SALN) under RA 3019?
Every public officer, within thirty days after the approval of this Act or after assuming office, and within the
month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his
resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department Head,
or in the case of a Head of Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, or in
the case of members of the Congress and the officials and employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary of the
corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including: (1) a statement of the
amounts and sources of his income and (2) the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year.
For public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their statements
in the following months of January (RA 3019, Sec. 7).
What is the difference between gross excusable negligence and evident bad faith under Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019?
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or
manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence.99 The two modalities
of violating Section 3 (e) are distinct in their nature of commission: “evident bad faith” entails the willfulness to
do something wrong, whereas “gross inexcusable negligence” entails failure to exercise the required diligence that
either results in a wrong or in the failure to prevent the occurrence of a wrongdoing.
Thus, “gross inexcusable negligence” and “evident bad faith” are separate and distinct modalities, and a charge of
one in an Information may not be considered extendible to a conviction for the other. Petitioner here, therefore,
may not be convicted based on gross inexcusable negligence, since the said modality was not included in the charge
levelled against him on both counts (Buencamino v. People, G.R. Nos. 216745-46. November 10, 2021, Caguioa
case).
Can there a charge for a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 absent the presence of bad faith?
No. In order to convict an accused for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, each of the following essential elements
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: 1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative,
judicial, or official functions; 2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, or evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
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negligence; and 3) his action caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his functions (Macairan v. People, G.R. No.
215104, March 18, 2021, Caguioa case).
Note: To constitute evident bad faith or manifest partiality, it must be proven that the accused acted with malicious
motive or fraudulent intent. It is not enough that the accused violated a law, committed mistakes or was negligent
in his duties. There must be a clear showing that the accused was spurred by a corrupt motive or a deliberate intent
to do wrong or cause damage. Mere bad faith or partiality per se is not enough for one to be held liable under the
law since the act of bad faith or partiality must in the first place be evident or manifest (Macairan v. People, G.R.
No. 215104, March 18, 2021, Caguioa case).
X, the DOTC Secretary was charged with violation of Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019 or Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Later on, Y, a private individual was also impleaded on the basis of conspiracy. Y contended
that it was an error to charge him, because he was not a public officer – a necessary element of the crime.
May a private individual be held liable under this Act?
Yes, Y may still be held liable for violation of RA 3019. That one of the elements of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 is
“that the accused is a public officer” does not necessarily preclude its application to private persons who are being
charged with conspiring with public officers in the commission of the offense thereunder. Section 9(a) of RA
3019 buttresses the conclusion that the anti-graft law’s application extends to both public officers and private
persons which provides that any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or omissions
enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished (Go v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April
13, 2007).
Charina, Clerk of Court of an RTC Branch, promised the plaintiff in a case pending before the court
that she would convince the Presiding Judge to decide the case in plaintiff ’s favor. In consideration
therefor, the plaintiff gave Charina Php20,000.00. Charina was charged with violation of Section 3 (b) of
Republic Act No. 3019, prohibiting any public officer from directly or indirectly requesting or receiving
any gift, present, percentage, or benefit in connection with any contract or transaction x x x wherein
the public officer, in his official capacity, has to intervene under the law. Charina was acquitted from
the charge under RA 3019. The Ombudsman filed another information against Charina for Indirect
Bribery under the RPC. Charina claims that she can no longer be charged under the RPC after having
been acquitted for the same act under RA 3019. Is Charina correct? Explain. (Modified 2009 Bar)
No. It is undisputed that the two charges stemmed from the same incident. However, it is well-settled that the
same act may give rise to two or more separate and distinct charges. Further, because there is a variance between the
elements of the two offenses charged, Charina cannot safely assume that her innocence in one case will extend to
the other case even if both cases hinge on the same set of evidence. The acquittal of petitioner in the anti-graft case
is not a bar to her conviction for indirect bribery under the RPC given the differences between the elements of the
two offenses (Lumauig v. People, G.R. No. 166680, July 7, 2014).
S, a sole proprietor of various businesses, filed for a renewal of Business Permit for her ships handling
operations in the Port of Sta. Ana. M, then Mayor, refused to sign S’s Business Permit, despite compliance
with all the other requirements. All other businesses of S have been previously issued with Business
Permits by the LGU. Initially, S was able to carry out its operations despite the lack of the said Permit
by securing temporary permits. However, S’s operations were shut down when the Bureau of Customs
issued a Cease and Desist Order after receiving M’s unnumbered Memorandum alleging that S was
involved in smuggling and drug trading. Despite all her pleas, no Business Permit was issued for S,
causing losses for her business. Does M’s refusal to issue a business permit to S amount to a violation of
Section 3(e), RA 3019, as amended?
Yes. The elements of violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019, as amended, are present in this case. M is a public officer
who acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith causing undue injury on the part of S. If M truly believed
that S was indeed engaged in illegal smuggling and drug trading, then he would not have issued Business Permits
to the latter’s other businesses. Under these questionable circumstances, M’s refusal to issue a Business Permit to S
was committed with manifest partiality against the latter, and in favor of the other ships handling operators in the
Port of Sta. Ana. As regards the issue of bad faith, while it is within the municipal mayor’s prerogative to suspend,
revoke, or refuse to issue Business Permits, it must nevertheless be emphasized that the power to refuse issuance is
premised on non-compliance with the pre-requisites for said issuance. It is clear that S had complied with all the
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prerequisites for the issuance of a Business Permit. As to the third and last element, M’s acts of refusing to issue
a Business Permit, coupled with his issuance of the unnumbered Memorandum which effectively barred S from
engaging in its ship handling operations without such Business Permit, caused some sort of undue injury on the
part of S (Fuentes v. People, G.R. No. 186421, April 17, 2017).
Anti-Hazing Act of 2018
Define Hazing under the Anti- Hazing Act of 2018

Under the Anti-Hazing Act of 2018, Hazing is defined as any act that results in physical or psychological suffering,
harm, or injury inflicted on a recruit, neophyte, applicant, or member as part of an initiation rite or practice made as
a prerequisite for admission or a requirement for continuing membership in a fraternity, sorority, or organization
including, but not limited to paddling, whipping, beating, branding, forced calisthenics, exposure to the weather,
forced consumption of any food, liquor, beverage, drug or other substance, or any other brutal treatment or forced
physical activity which is likely to adversely affect the physical and psychological health of such recruit, neophyte,
applicant, or member.
This definition also includes any activity, intentionally made or otherwise, by one person alone or acting with
others, that tends to humiliate or embarrass, degrade, abuse, or endanger, by requiring a recruit, neophyte,
applicant, or member to do menial, silly, or foolish tasks (RA 8049, Sec. 1 as amended by RA 11053, Sec. 2).
X aspires to be a member of Alpha Phi Omega. As a pre-condition of his membership, X was subjected
to paddling and whipping by V and W, both members of the fraternity. As a result, X died from the
injuries he sustained. When charged with violation of the Anti-Hazing Act of 2018, V and W raised the
defense that they are not liable because of lack of intent to kill X. Rule on their contention.
V and W cannot invoke lack of intent to kill X to be relieved from the crime. The special law on hazing is founded
upon the principle of mala prohibita; hence the existence of criminal intent is immaterial in the crime. Accordingly,
the elements of the crime of hazing are:
1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity,
sorority or organization;
2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or organization; and
3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as
forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to
physical or psychological suffering or injury (Dungo v. People, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015).
In the present case, all the requisites to constitute the crime of hazing were met. The paddling and whipping were a
pre-condition for X’s membership, X was also an applicant for Alpha Phi Omega, and X was also suffered physical
injuries due to the paddling and whippping, which eventually led to his death. As such, V and W may be held liable
under the Anti-Hazing Act. In the given case, the act of paddling and whipping of X which caused his subsequent
death, was a pre-condition to enter the fraternity. Thus, V and W are both guilty of Anti-Hazing Act.
Assuming that in the above problem, V and W were members of the Philippine National Police, what
must be met in order for them to be exempted from the operation of RA 8049, as amended by RA
11053?
In order for the acts to be exempted from the definition of hazing under RA 8049 as amended by RA 11053, it
must be shown that the paddling and whipping were only part of the physical, mental, and practices to determine
and enhance the physical, mental, and psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the AFP and the
PNP as approved by the Secretary of National Defense and National Police Commission, duly recommended by
the Chief of Staff of the AFP and Director General of the PNP (RA 11053, Sec. 3).
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Zambales issued a Resolution finding probable cause to charge
the B,C,D, E as principals to the crime of hazing of A, a student of PMDA. The Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor also endorsed to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military the finding of probable cause to
charge F, G, H, who were school authorities as accomplices to hazing. The Ombudsman Investigator
agreed with the findings of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.
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Meanwhile, the RTC–Zambales issued an Order dismissing the Information against the B,C, D, E, the
principals accused. F, G, H then argued that since the case against the principal accused had already
been dismissed with finality by the RTC. There being no more principals with whom they could have
cooperated in the execution of the offense, they asserted that the case against them must be dismissed.
Does the dismissal of the principal accused relieve the accomplices?
No. The dismissal of the principal accuses does not relieve the accomplices. It is a settled rule that the case against
those charged as accomplices is not ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the
dismissal of the case against the latter; or even the latter’s acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has
in fact been established. The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct
from each other. If the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the
liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal (People v. Bayabos, G.R.
No. 171222, February 18, 2015).
Note: In People v. Bayabos, the SC merely presented the Order of Entry of Judgment dismissing the case against
Alvarez et al. Nowhere is it mentioned in the order that the case was dismissed against the alleged principals because
no crime had been committed.
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001
Define “Money Laundering” and enumerate cases considered as “Money Laundering Offenses” under
RA 9160 or Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001.
“Money laundering” is a crime whereby the proceeds of an unlawful activity are transacted, thereby making them
appear to have originated from legitimate sources (RA 9160, Section 4).
Under the law, the following acts are considered Money Laundering Offenses:
1. Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to, the
proceeds of any unlawful activity, transacts or attempts to transact said monetary instrument or property.
2. Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property involves the proceeds of any unlawful
activity, performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he facilitates the offense of money
laundering referred to in paragraph (a) above.
3. Any person knowing that any monetary instrument or property is required under this Act to be disclosed
and filed with the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), fails to do so (RA 9160, Sec. 4).
What is the effect of the bank deposit secrecy laws on the implementation of AMLA?
The bank deposit secrecy laws will still be upheld, but the AMLC may investigate a specific deposit provided there
is an order of any competent court and probable cause has been found.
Section 11 of RA 9160 provides that: Notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as amended;
Republic Act No. 6426, as amended; Republic Act No. 8791, and other laws, the AMLC may inquire into or
examine any particular deposit or investment with any banking institution or non-bank financial institution upon
order of any competent court in cases of violation of this Act when it has been established that there is probable
cause that the deposits or investments involved are in any way related to a money laundering offense (RA 9160,
Sec. 11).
Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act
Define “Photo or Video Voyeurism under RA 9995 or the Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009.
“Photo or video voyeurism” means the act of taking photo or video coverage of a person or group of persons
performing sexual act or any similar activity or of capturing an image of the private area of a person or persons
without the latter’s consent, under circumstances in which such person/s has/have a reasonable expectation of
privacy, or the act of selling, copying, reproducing, broadcasting, sharing, showing or exhibiting the photo or
video coverage or recordings of such sexual act or similar activity through VCD/DVD, internet, cellular phones
and similar means or device without the written consent of the person/s involved, notwithstanding that consent to
record or take photo or video coverage of same was given by such person’s (RA 9995, Sec. 3d).
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Define “broadcast” and “capture” under RA 9995, or the Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009.
“Broadcast” means to make public, by any means, a visual image with the intent that it be viewed by a person or
persons (RA 9995, Sec. 3a). “Capture” with respect to an image, means to videotape, photograph, film, record by
any means, or broadcast (RA 9995, Sec. 3b).
What are the punishable acts under RA 9995?

The punishable acts under RA 9995 are the following:
1. To take photo or video coverage of a person or group of persons performing sexual act or any similar
activity or to capture an image of the private area of a person/s such as the naked or undergarment clad
genitals, public area, buttocks or female breast without the consent of the person/s involved and under
circumstances in which the person/s has/have a reasonable expectation of privacy;
2. To copy or reproduce, or to cause to be copied or reproduced, such photo or video or recording of sexual
act or any similar activity with or without consideration;
3. To sell or distribute, or cause to be sold or distributed, such photo or video or recording of sexual act,
whether it be the original copy or reproduction thereof; or
4. To publish or broadcast, or cause to be published or broadcast, whether in print or broadcast media, or
show or exhibit the photo or video coverage or recordings of such sexual act or any similar activity through
VCD/DVD, internet, cellular phones and other similar means or device.
Note: The prohibition under paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) shall apply notwithstanding that consent to record or
take photo or video coverage of the same was given by such person/s. Any person who violates this provision shall
be liable for photo or video voyeurism as defined herein (RA 3019, Sec 4).
Are there any exemptions to Section 4 with regard to the aforementioned punishable acts?
Yes. The exemption can be found under Section 6 of RA 9995 which provides for authorized usage of the recording
upon written order of the court. The said section provides that: Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall
render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of the court, to use the
record or any copy thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of the crime of photo or video
voyeurism.
Such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he/she may produce, and upon showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that photo or video voyeurism has been committed or is about to be committed, and that the
evidence to be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution or prevention of such,
crime
L, lessor, set up hidden cameras inside of the apartment being leased to D. When D discovered one of the
hidden cameras in the bathroom, she reported L to the police. During a valid raid of his house, L was
caught watching a VHS entitled “bathroom D 143”. The video showed D undressing and taking a bath.
1. Did L commit photo or video voyeurism?
Yes, L committed the crime of photo or video voyeurism. “Photo or video voyeurism” includes the act of
capturing an image of the private area of a person or persons without the latter’s consent, under circumstances
in which such person/s has/have a reasonable expectation of privacy. In the given case, the act of L in installing
hidden camera inside the bathroom to take videos of D in undressing and taking a bath is constitutive of the
crime (RA 9995, Sec. 3d).
2. May L invoke that since he was the owner of the apartment and D was a mere lessee, the latter
cannot expect a reasonable privacy?
No, such contention of L is not a ground to exempt him from liability. The law does not contemplate that
the crime be committed in the victim’s house or abode. It also contemplates circumstances in which such
person/s has/have a reasonable expectation of privacy or a belief that he/she could disrobe in privacy, without
being concerned that an image or a private area of the person was being captured; or circumstances in which a
reasonable person would believe that a private area of the person would not be visible to the public, regardless
of whether that person is in a public or private place (RA 9995, Sec. 3 (f)). In the given case, D has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the apartment where she lives, even if she is a mere lessee.
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XY and XX have been dating for three months. On their third monthly anniversary, XY secretly recorded
their sexual activities. A month later, XX broke up with XY. XY was so heartbroken that he publicly
posted the video online out of anger. XY was charged with violations of Secs. 4(a) and 4(d) of RA 9995.
1. Will the case prosper?
Yes. XY’s act of taking a video coverage of their sexual act without consent of XX is a prohibited act under Sec.
4(a). Posting the video online constituted broadcasting or making the video public which is a prohibited act
under Sec. 4(d) (RA 9995, Secs. 4(a) and (d)).
2. Assuming XY asked XX if he could record them making love with each other for their third (3rd)
monthsary and XX agreed. May XY claim that he may not be held liable because XX gave her
consent to record the video?
XY may still be held liable for violation of Sec. 4 (d), but not Sec. 4 (a) of RA 9995. For the violation of Sec.
4(a), the consent of XX may be raised as a defense because what the law prohibits is photo or video voyeurism
of a person or group of persons performing sexual act or any similar activity without their consent. For the
violation of Sec. 4(d), the consent of XX may not be raised as a defense. The last paragraph of Sec. 4 provides
that “The prohibition under paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) shall apply notwithstanding that consent to record
or take photo or video coverage of the same was given by such person/s (RA 9995, Sec. 4). Thus, even if XY
cannot be prosecuted for taking a video of his sexual act with XX, his subsequent act of publicly posting the
video is punishable under the said law.
Anti-Plunder Act
In an information filed by the Ombudsman, it alleged that former President X and PCSO Budget and
Accounts Manager Y, together with some public officers, conspired with one another to commit plunder.
X filed her demurrer to evidence averring that the prosecution did not establish a case for plunder
for failing to allege in the information who the main plunderer or mastermind was. Must there be a
determination of a main plunderer or mastermind to be convicted for plunder?
Yes, the main plunderer or mastermind must be specifically alleged in the information. The law requires in the
criminal charge for plunder against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators,
who may be members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons. Such identification is essential not for the sufficiency of the information as to the allegation of conspiracy,
but rather as an element of the crime of plunder. The identification is not only necessary because the law required
such identification, but also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all the accused to be properly
informed of the charges they were being made answerable for. In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege
the main plunderer should be fatal to the cause of the State against President X, for violating her right to be
informed of the charge against her (Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016).
What is ill-gotten wealth?

“Ill-gotten wealth” means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within
the purview of Section 2 hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of
pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project
or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of asset belonging to the National Government or
any of its subdivision, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries;
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including promises of future employment in any business enterprise undertaking;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6. By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines (RA 7080, Sec. 1(d)).
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How is the crime of plunder committed?

The crime of plunder is committed when the following elements are: (a) the offender is a public officer who acts
by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons; (b) he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination
or series of the following overt or criminal acts described in Section 1(d) of RA 7080 as amended by RA 7659; and
(c) the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired ihps at least Php
50,000,000.00 (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001).
Is plunder considered malum in se or malum prohibitum?

In the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, it was held that plunder is considered malum in se. The legislative
declaration in RA 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are malum in se and it does not matter that such acts
are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly malum in se
(Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001).
Anti-Torture Act
What is torture as defined by RA 9745? What constitutes “other cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment”?
“Torture” refers to an act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him/her or a third person information or a confession; punishing
him/her for an act he/she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or intimidating
or coercing him/her or a third person; or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a person in authority or agent
of a person in authority. It does not include pain or Buffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions (RA 9745, Sec. 3, par. a).
Other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment refers to a deliberate and aggravated treatment or
punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a person
in authority against a person under his/her custody, which attains a level of severity causing suffering, gross
humiliation or debasement to the latter (Sec. 3, par. b).
Is torture a separate and independent crime or an aggravating circumstance?

Both. Under RA 9745, torture as a crime shall not absorb or shall not be absorbed by any other crime or felony
committed as a consequence, or as a means in the conduct or commission thereof. In which case, torture shall be
treated as a separate and independent criminal act whose penalties shall be imposable without prejudice to any
other criminal liability provided for by domestic and international laws (Sec. 15, RA 9745). Under the same law,
if crimes against persons, personal liberty and security under the Revised Penal Code is attended by any of the
acts constituting torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as defined herein, the
penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum period (Sec. 22, RA 9745)
X was arrested and imprisoned for his alleged ties with NPA. To elicit information about his involvement
and divulge the names of his superiors in the organization, X was subjected to torture by Y and Z, both
military personnel. Thereafter, X admitted the allegation and named several names as members of the
subversive group. May the information obtained through torture be used against X or a third person?
No, the information elicited from X through torture cannot be used against him or a third person. RA 9745
strengthens the right of an arrested person not to be subjected to physical or mental torture while under detention.
This law provides that, the freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and
punishment is an absolute right, even during a public emergency. As in RA 7438, any confession, admission, or
statement obtained as a result of torture shall be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding, except if the same
is used as evidence against a person or persons accused of committing torture (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No.
231658, July 4, 2017).
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Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act
What constitutes trafficking in person?

Trafficking in Persons refers to the recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer,
maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse
of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation
which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation
or when the adoption is induced by any form of consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be considered as
‘trafficking in persons’ even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph (RA 9208,
Sec. 3, par. a, as amended by RA 7659).
Due to financial difficulties and to help her parents, as well as to buy some gadgets for herself, AAA,
then 17 years old, requested X for a raket. The following day, AAA was booked to a British National. X
delivered AAA to a condominium in Makati City. Thereat, AAA had sexual intercourse with the said
man and thereafter, she was paid the amount of Php 5,000.00. When prosecuted for qualified trafficking,
X maintained that it was AAA who asked for a raket. Further, she averred that she is not aware that
AAA is still a minor. Is the defense tenable?
No, contrary to the X’s submission, the fact that AAA had asked her for a raket does not negate her criminal
liability. Trafficking in persons may be committed with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge. The victim’s
consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of
human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not given
out of his or her own free will.
Under Section 6(a) of RA 9208, Trafficking in Persons automatically becomes qualified upon proof that the
trafficked person is a minor or a person below 18 years of age. Evidently, knowledge of the X with regard to AAA’s
minority is inconsequential with respect to qualifying the crime of Trafficking in Persons (People v. Bandojo, G.R.
No. 234161, October 17, 2018).
AAA, BBB, and CCC are the minor children of spouses XXX and YYY. AAA claimed that when she
was just 13 years old, her mother XXX brought her to a hotel in Makati to meet with a certain John
who proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. AAA further alleged XXX ordered her to engage
in cybersex for three (3) to four (4) times a week in pornographic websites where AAA was shown
in her underwear and made to do sexual activities in front of the computer. For their part, BBB and
CCC corroborated AAA’s statements, both averring that XXX ordered them to dance naked in front
of the computer with internet connectivity while facilitating the webcam sessions and chatting with
a certain “Sam,” their usual client. BBB and CCC alleged that during those sessions, their father YYY
would be outside the room or fixing the computer. The children all claimed that they were made to do
sexual activities to earn money for their household expenses which were collected by YYY in remittance
centers. XXX and YYY were charged with qualified trafficking in persons under RA 9208. Is the charge
proper?
Yes, XXX and YYY is liable for Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 in relation to Section 6 of RA
9208. Section 4 provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide,
or receive a person by any means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or
training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage and to maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography.
Furthermore, Section 6 also provides that trafficking is qualified when the trafficked person is a child or offender is
an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercises authority over the trafficked person or when the
offense is committed by a public officer or employee (Section 4 (a) to (e) in relation to Section 6 (a) to (d), RA 9208,
as amended by RA 10364; People v. XXX and YYY, G.R. No. 235652, July 9, 2018).
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Anti-Violence against Women and their ChilD
Define “Violence Against Women” under RA 9262.

“Violence against women and their children” refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm
or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty (Section 3(a), RA 9262).
A was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 after B, his former girlfriend accused him
of pulling her hair, punching her back, shoulder and left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading her
intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being. In his defense, A averred that at the time of the alleged
incident, he was no longer in a dating relationship with B; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.
1. Will the defense prosper?
No, the defense was not valid. Dating relationship contemplates a situation wherein the parties are romantically
involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship (RA 9262, Sec. 3, par. e). For
RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of such relationship.
It is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past
or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was
committed (Dabalos v. RTC Angeles City G.R. No. 193960, January 07, 2013). In the given case, even if A and
B were no longer romantically involved when the incident happened, the fact that B was his former girlfriend
and that he inflicted physical suffering which demeans and degrades the latter’s intrinsic worth and dignity, is
constitutive of the crime.
2. Is it required that the complainant bore a child with the accused to be able to charge him with
violation of RA 9262?
No, as long as the woman had sexual relations with the accused, which may or may not result in the bearing
of a common child (RA 9262, Sec. 3, par. f). Thus, B was not excluded from the coverage of the law even if she
did not bear any child from A.
What are the remedies available to victims of acts of “violence against women and their children?
There are three distinct remedies available: first, a criminal complaint; second, a civil action for damages; and
finally, a civil action for the issuance of a protection order. A criminal complaint may be resorted to when the act
of violence against women and their children is committed through any, some, or all of the nine (9) means which
Sec. 5 of the Anti-VAWC Law specifies as constitutive of “the crime of violence against women and their children.
A civil action for damages may be resorted to pursuant to Sec. 36 of the Anti-VAWC Law. A protection order is
issued “for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child and granting other
necessary relief;” thereby “safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim’s
daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over her life
(Pavlow v. Mendenilla, G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017).
X married Y in 2006. Thereafter, Y started to work in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent
resident status in 2008. X claimed that Y stopped supporting their children, compelling her to take
additional job to augment her income. X also alleged of Y’s virtual abandonment, mistreatment, and
physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse, Y has been allegedly living with a Singaporean
woman. The alleged marital infidelity caused X mental and emotional anguish, prompting her to file a
case against Y for violation of Sec. 5 (i) of RA 9262 before the Family Court of Pasig. The Family Court
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, because the alleged illicit relationship occurred outside
the country. Is the ruling of the court correct?
No, the ruling of the Family Court is incorrect. Contrary to the interpretation of the court, what RA 9262
criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering
on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw.
Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological violence may be committed.
Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the commission of
the offense. And Sec. 7 of RA 9262 provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any of its elements
was committed at the option of the complainant. While the psychological violence as the means employed by the
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perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally essential also is the element of mental or
emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant (AAA v. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018).
Define Battered Woman Syndrome and its phases.

Battered Woman Syndrome refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms
found in women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse (Sec. 3(c), RA 9262)
The battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of violence, which has three phases: First, the
tension-building phase, wherein minor battering occurs that could be verbal or slight physical abuse or another
form of hostile behavior. Second, the acute battering incident, which is said to be characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and sometimes, death. During this phase, the woman has no control; only the batterer may put
an end to the violence. Finally, the tranquil, loving, or at least nonviolent phase, wherein the couple experience
profound relief. The batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has
been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again.
On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that
her partner will change for the better; and that this “good, gentle and caring man” is the real person whom she
loves. (People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004).
When can Battered Woman Syndrome be invoked as a defense?

The defense of Battered Woman Syndrome can be invoked if the woman in marital relationship with the victim
is subjected to cumulative abuse or battery involving the infliction of physical harm resulting to the physical and
psychological or emotional distress. Cumulative means resulting from successive addition. In sum, there must be
“at least two battering episodes” between the accused and her intimate partner and such final episode produced
in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she
needed to use force in order to save her life (People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004).
During her marriage with Y, X suffered maltreatment for over five years. In one instance, she was rushed
to the hospital after passing out when Y beat his badly. She was confined for almost a week, because of
the severity of physical injuries she sustained. She does not talk to anyone and refuses to eat her meals
nor takes her medicine. Hence, her husband requests one of the psychiatrist in the hospital to conduct
an examination on her, wherein it was later found out that X has manifestations of Battered Woman
Syndrome. Y felt sorry for what he did to his wife and asked for a last chance. One night, when Y arrived
at the hospital to visit X, without any provocation on his part, X suddenly attacked and wounded
him which caused his instant death. When prosecuted, X invoked self-defense, testifying that she was
afraid that Y would hurt her again. However, the prosecution rebut X’s claim contending that unlawful
aggression, an essential element of self-defense is absent in the case. May the claim for self-defense lie
even if there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased husband?
Yes, the claim for self-defense may still lie. Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from
battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the
elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the RPC (RA 9262, Sec. 26). Hence, even if there was
no unlawful aggression on the part of Y when X attacked him, the latter may still invoke self-defense on the basis
of the finding of the psychiatrist that X is suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. Thus, she may not be held
liable for the death of Y.
Anti-Wire Tapping Act

It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word:
1. To tap any wire or cable, or
2. By using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication
or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding
sentence:
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1. To knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof,
of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or
2. To replay the same for any other person or persons; or
3. To communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or
4. To furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person.
Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of
offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition (RA 4200, Sec. 1).
In what instances may wire-tapping be allowed?

Wire-tapping is permitted when by written order of the court, any peace officer is authorized to commit the same
in the following cases:
1. During times of war, those that involve crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty; or
2. When it involves the crimes of piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition.
The written order shall only issue and be granted upon written application and the examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce, who should show reasonable grounds that the
enumerated crimes has been, about to be, or is being committed (RA 4200, Sec. 3, par. 1).
Note: In cases involving the second set of crimes mentioned above, such authority shall be granted only upon prior
proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed; (2) that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for,
or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available
for obtaining such evidence (Id.).
What shall be specified in the written order of the court allowing wire-tapping?
The order granted or issued shall specify:
1. The identity of the person or persons whose communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words
are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or telephonic communications,
the telegraph line or the telephone number involved and its location;
2. The identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the communications,
conversations, discussions, or spoken words;
3. The offense or offenses committed or sought to be prevented; and
4. The period of the authorization. The authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the order
which shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed
by the court upon being satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest (RA 4200, Sec. 3,
para. 2).
Bouncing Checks Law
What is the gravamen of B.P. 22?

The gravamen of the offense under this law is the act of issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentment for payment. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bum check a malum prohibitum,
an act proscribed by legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare (People v. Chua, G.R.
No. 130632, September 28, 1999).
What are the punishable acts under B.P. 22?

1. Issuing a check without sufficient funds (Sec. 1, par. 1, B.P. Blg. 22). The elements are as follows:
a. That a person makes or draws and issues any check;
b. That the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value;
c. That the person who makes or draws and issues the check knows at the time of issue that he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment;
d. That the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit,
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or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment.
2. Failing to keep sufficient funds (Sec. 1, par. 2, B.P. Blg. 22). The elements are as follows:
a. That a person has sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and
issues a check;
b. That he fails to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if
presented within a period of 90 days from the date appearing thereon;
c. That the check is dishonored by the drawee bank
Distinguish B.P. 22 and estafa by issuing a worthless check under Art. 315, para. 2(d).
In estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, as amended by RA 4885, the act constituting the offense is postdating
or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank or his funds deposited
therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The mere fact that the drawer had insufficient or no
funds in the bank to cover the amount of the check at the time he postdated or issued it, is sufficient to make him
liable for estafa. Deceit is an element of estafa and may be presumed from the failure of the drawer to deposit the
amount necessary to cover the check within three days from receipt of notice of dishonor for lack or insufficiency
of funds in the bank. Deceit is not required in B.P 22 (REYES, Book Two, (2021) p. 871).
What is deemed a complete defense against B.P. 22?

The full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a
complete defense (Lao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119178, June 20, 1997).
X, a Filipino entrepreneur, issued a check to Y which was post-dated to December 25, 2019. But before
issuance, X requested B not to present the check until December 31, 2019 by which time the check
would be fully funded. Y agreed to the condition. On January 1, 2020, Y presented the check but was
later on dishonored by the bank for lack of funds. After one month and despite receiving the notice
of dishonor from the bank, X still failed to fund the checks. He averred that he did not anticipate an
economic loss due to Christmas expenses he incurred in his company, including the payment of 13th
month pay to his employees.
1. May X be held liable for violation of B.P. 22?
Yes. There is a of violation of B.P. 22 when the accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account, or
for value, with the knowledge at the time of issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with,
drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment and that the check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or if without any valid reason, the accused
ordered the bank to stop payment (Lim v. People, G.R. No. 224979, December 13, 2017). Here, X is fully
aware that the check he issued in favor of Y was unfunded. Even if both parties agreed to present the check at
a later date, X cannot still abscond his liability for failure to make good the check within 5-working days after
receiving the notice of dishonor.
2. Supposing that X averred that he had no knowledge that the check he issued in favor of Y was
unfunded. Will the defense prosper?
No, the defense will not prosper. In B.P. Blg. 22 cases, it must be shown that the accused issued the check
knowing at the time of issuance the insufficiency of funds in the bank. Because this element involves a state of
mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge
when it is shown that the accused received a notice of dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed
to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment (King v. People, G.R. No. 131540,
December 2, 1999). Here, even assuming that X had no knowledge of the unfunded check he issued in favor of
Y, the subsequent notice of dishonor from the bank and his failure to fund his account beyond the 5-working
day period, created a presumption that X had already knowledge of the insufficiency of funds.
3. If you were the judge, what penalty should be meted out to X?
Any person found guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 shall be meted out a penalty of imprisonment of not less
than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the
amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Php200,000, or both such fine and imprisonment at
the discretion of the court (B.P. Blg. 22, Sec. 1). The judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion,
and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of
a fine alone would best serve the interest of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would
depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the
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imperatives of justice (Administrative Circular 13-2001). Some factors that may be considered by the court in
the imposition of penalty are X’s good faith or lack of intention to commit the offense and his first-time being
an offender. Thus, the imposition of a fine only within the limits prescribed by law may be in order.
X enticed Y to invest in her business under the assurance that it is stable and that their money would
earn 8% monthly interest. Convinced, Y gave X a check in the amount of P500,000.00 as investment in
her business. In turn, X gave Y 3 postdated checks and made Y sign an investment contract with Multitel
International Holding Corporation (Multitel). Upon maturity of the checks, Y attempted to encash the
same but were dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds. This prompted Y to demand X
to make good the said checks, but to no avail. Y filed a criminal complaint for estafa and violation of
B.P. 22 against X. The trial court acquitted X in the B.P. 22 cases on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Meanwhile, X was also acquitted from the estafa case but was held civilly liable to Y. X now contends
that her acquittal and exoneration from civil liability in the B.P. 22 case should have barred Y from
claiming civil liability from her in the estafa case. Is X’s contention correct?
No, X’s acquittal and subsequent exoneration in the B.P. 22 case had no effect in the estafa case, even if both
cases were founded on the same factual circumstances. Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be
rooted from an identical set of facts, they nevertheless present different causes of action, which, under the law, are
considered “separate, distinct, and independent” from each other. Therefore, both cases can proceed to their final
adjudication – both as to their criminal and civil aspects – subject to the prohibition on double recovery. Perforce,
a ruling in a BP 22 case concerning the criminal and civil liabilities of the accused cannot be given any bearing
whatsoever in the criminal and civil aspects of a related estafa case, as in this instance (Rimando v. Sps. Aldaba,
G.R. No. 203583, October 13, 2014).
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
What are the twin conditions to justify a procedural lapse under Section 21 of RA 9165?
In a case, the Supreme Court mentioned that for justifiable reasons, non-compliance with the procedure under
Section 21 of RA 9165 may be justified provided that the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved
(People v. Crispo, G.R. No. 230065, March 14, 2018).
Additionally, in a case, it was emphasized by the Supreme Court that the justifiable ground for non-compliance
must be proven as a fact and cannot be presumed by the Court (People v. De Guzman, G.R. G.R. No. 186498,
March 26, 2010).
Discuss the mandatory policy enumerated by the SC in relation to the Chain of Custody Rule.
The mandatory policy in relation to the Chain of Custody Rule are as follows:
1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state their compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 (1) of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, and its IRR.
2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must state the justification or
explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized/ confiscated items.
3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn statements or affidavits, the
investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case before the court. Instead, he or she must refer the case
for further preliminary investigation in order to determine the (non) existence of probable cause.
4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may exercise its discretion to either refuse
to issue a commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 112, Rules of Court (People v. Lim, GR No. 231989, September 4, 2018).
Is the provision against plea-bargaining application in this Act constitutional?

No, it is not constitutional. The SC deemed it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining
on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly
issued for the purpose (Estipona v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017).
What is the role of prosecutors in applying the saving clause found under Section 21 of RA 9165?
In the People v. Ga-a, it was ruled by the Court that in the course of proving such compliance before the trial
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courts, prosecutors must have the initiative to not only acknowledge, but also justify, any perceived deviations
from the procedural requirements of Section 21 (People v. Ga-a, G.R. No. 222559, June 6, 2018).
Note: If, from such full examination of the records, there appears unjustified failure to comply with Section 21, it
becomes the appellate court’s bounded duty to acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction (People v.
Ga-a, G.R. No. 222559, June 6, 2018).
Acting on an anonymous report, the police authorities served a search warrant to B’s apartment.
Thereafter, the police officers found out that the house is being used for shabu sessions. The officers
were able to apprehend B together with 3 other individuals, including his girlfriend A who was caught
in a room with scattered sachets of shabu. In her defense, A claims that she is a mere tenant and has
been sharing with his common-law husband a place raided by the authorities wherein illegal drugs were
confiscated. She denies knowledge of the rooms being used to store the said drugs. Can A be convicted
for possession under Section 11 of RA 9165?
Yes, A may be convicted for violation of Sec. 11 of RA 9165. The essential elements of the crime of illegal
possession of regulated drugs are the following: (1) the actual possession of an item or object which is identified
to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely or consciously
possessed (intent to possess) the said drug. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also
constructive possession. There is constructive possession when the drug is under the dominion and control of
the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive
possession or control is not necessary. The finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building owned
or occupied by a particular person raises the presumption of knowledge and possession thereof which, standing
alone, is sufficient to convict (People v. Santos, G.R. No. 223142, January 17, 2018, Caguioa J.).
A is charged with illegal sale of marijuana. PO1 X testified that it was the evidence custodian who marked
the items, and that he bought four teabags of suspected marijuana from A. PO1 Z, however, claimed that
it was him who marked the items sold by A, and that there were only two teabags of suspected marijuana.
A now raises the inconsistencies to dismiss the charge against him. The prosecution, however, stressed
that PO1 X clearly testified that he bought 4 teabags of suspected marijuana from A which was listed,
together with the marked money and their serial numbers, in the Receipt of the Property Seized. Rule
on the issue of inconsistency of testimonies of PO1 X and PO1 Z.
The mere inconsistencies on the testimony of PO1 X and PO1 Z are not sufficient to dismiss the charge against
A. In every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, the following elements must be proved: (1) the identities
of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction
or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. As long as the
testimony of PO1 X who acted as the poseur-buyer is consistent with the evidence on record, the inconsistencies
do not warrant dismissal of the charges. Thus, A’s defense of denial which is unsupported and unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence becomes negative and self-serving, deserving no weight (People v. Mendoza, G.R.
No. 220759, July 24, 2017).
X was apprehended through a buy-bust operation, and thereafter charged with a violation of RA 9165,
for the sale of prohibited shabu. He protests that the buy-bust did not adhere to the requirements
because the photographing, marking, and inventorying were done at the POEA station instead of the
site of the arrest; and that the barangay officials in attendance were not from the barangay where the
arrest was made. Answering X’s contention, the police officers averred during trial that the team had
to immediately leave the place of arrest to avoid a commotion or reprisal inasmuch as the accused, who
was a notorious person, could have cohorts around. That officials were not from the barangay were
arrest was made to avoid the buy-bust operation being leaked to X’s cohorts. Is the accused entitled to
an acquittal on the ground that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable due to substantial lapses in
the chain of custody?
No. The non-compliance with the requirements provided under RA 9165 under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/
team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. The law does not expressly
require that the marking, photographing and inventorying be always made at the site of the buy-bust operation,
and that the elected officials be always from the place where the buy-bust arrest occurred (People v. Lamama, G.R.
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No. 188313, August 27, 2017). In the given case, the non-observance of the proper place where photographing,
marking, and inventorying should take place was justified given the circumstance that the apprehending officers
wanted that the buy-bust operation be unknown to X’s cohorts.
Police officers received a tip that there are various drug users in one of the bars in Makati. Acting on
such tip, a search warrant was served to the owner of the restau-bar. Among apprehended was X who
was caught holding a sachet of shabu intended for consumption at that night. The police officers filed
an information, charging X of two crimes – use and possession of illegal drugs. Does X committed two
separate crimes?
No, X should have been charged with only one crime. Possession is part of illegal use because the latter necessarily
requires the former and the law is compassionate with users. He is presumed to be a user than a possessor. Only
one information will be made. But if the quantity is such as to show that it is not only for use, prosecution will be
for illegal possession (RA 9165, Sec. 11 in relation to Sec. 15). In the case at hand, X’s intention was to consume the
illegal drug recovered from him. Hence, only one information should have been filed.
During a buy-bust operation, B came, carrying with him a black traveling bag. B approached Police
officer A and demanded for the payment of the marijuana but the latter insisted that she should see
the narcotics first. B acceded to the request and opened the black traveling bag. Police officer A and
the CI inspected the bag and saw three (3) bundles of marijuana stalks and leaves inside. Wasting no
time, Police officer A made the pre-arranged signal, by executing a “missed call” to Police officer P, and
the rest of the team rushed to their location. Police officer P arrested B after apprising the latter of his
constitutional rights and the nature of the crime he had just violated. Police officer P then got hold of
the black traveling bag, together with three (3) bundles of marijuana inside. The team then brought B
to their station with Police officer P in possession of the traveling bag and the illegal narcotics in going
thereto. Was B Guilty of the offense Attempted illegal sale of dangerous drugs?
Yes. B should have been convicted of the offense of attempted illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Under the rule on
variance, while B cannot be convicted of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs because the sale was never
consummated, he may be convicted for the attempt to sell as it is necessarily included in the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. In the present case, B attempted to sell marijuana and commenced by overt acts the commission of the
intended crime however, the sale was aborted when Police officer A, upon confirming that B had with him the
marijuana, made a “miss-call” to Police officer P, the pre-arranged signal, and the rest of the team rushed to the area
and placed B under arrest. Thus, B may only be held liable for attempted illegal sale of dangerous drugs. (People v.
Bunia y Mercadera, G.R. No. 217661, June 26, 2019, Caguioa case)
N was apprehended through a buy-bust operation. Upon a tip to the desk officer regarding drug-related
activities, Sta. Barbara Police Station was instructed to conduct a buy-bust operation. The police told
the bystanders that he wanted to buy shabu. N, one of the bystanders, obliged, going in and coming
out of his house carrying 2 plastic sachets. After which, N was arrested. On the other hand, N’s version
was that a group of 7-8 men, later identified as police officers, barged into a house, dragged, and frisked
them, but produced nothing. Was N properly convicted of violation of illegal sale and illegal possession
of dangerous drugs?
No for both charges. To convict a person charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section
5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution is required to prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
On the other hand, illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 has the following
elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
In the present case, there was no showing that there was proper identification of the object. Absent this requisite,
there can be no conviction for the illegal sale. Additionally, under jurisprudence, it has been repeatedly held that
he accused need not present a single piece of evidence in his defense if the State has not discharged its onus. The
accused can simply rely on his right to be presumed innocent (People v. Narvas y Balosoc, G.R. No. 241254; July 8,
2019, Caguioa case).
CRIMINAL LAW
Cybercrime Prevention Act
Mr. Prejudice, the secretary of Ms. Pride, accessed the latter’s personal laptop without authority. Because
Ms. Pride did not approve his request for a vacation leave, Mr. Prejudice intentionally deleted all the
computer files and introduced virus to the computer system. What crime did Mr. Prejudice commit?
Mr. Prejudice committed data interference which is a violation of Sec. 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Prevention
Act. Data interference is the intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer
data, electronic document, or electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission
of viruses. Under the said Act, “without right” refers to either (i) conduct undertaken without or in excess of
authority; or (ii) conduct not covered by established legal defenses, excuses, court orders, justifications, or relevant
principles under the law (RA 10175, Sec. 3(h)). Here, even if Mr. Prejudice is the secretary of Ms. Pride, he had no
authority to interfere with the personal laptop of his superior. The act of introducing virus and deleting all the files
constitute data interference (RA 10175, Sec. 4(a)(3)).
Note: A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision
of the RPC, as amended, or special laws (RA 10175, Sec. 7). However, an offender cannot be charged (1) with
both online libel under Sec. 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 and Art. 353 of the RPC or (2) with both child pornography
committed online under Sec. 4(c)(2) of RA 10175 and RA 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009
as these constitute violations of the proscription against double jeopardy (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 11, 2014).
What are the punishable Acts under the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012?
Cybercrime Offenses can be found under Section 4 of RA 10175, categorized as (a) offenses against the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computer data and systems, (b) computer-related offenses, (c) content-
related offenses and (d) libel. Offenses under this Act are not limited to those which are expressly stated, since the
Act also contemplates other crimes and offenses defined and penalized by the RPC, as amended, and special laws,
if committed by, through and with the use of information and communications technologies shall be covered by
the relevant provisions of this Act. The penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for
by the RPC, and special laws, as the case may be.
Note: As for Liability under Other Laws, a prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability
for violation of any provision of the RPC, as amended, or special laws (Section 7, RA 10175).
New Anti-Carnapping Act
Define Motor Vehicle provided by Anti-Carnapping Law?

Motor vehicle refers to any vehicle propelled by any power other than muscular power using the public highways,
except road rollers, trolley cars, street sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, forklifts, amphibian
trucks, and cranes if not used on public highways; vehicles which run only on rails or tracks; and tractors, trailers
and traction engines of all kinds used exclusively for agricultural purposes. Trailers having any number of wheels,
when propelled or intended to be propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be classified as a separate motor
vehicle with no power rating (RA 10883, Sec. 2(e))
What are the elements of Carnapping under RA 10883?

The elements of carnapping are: (i) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (ii) the taking is without
the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things;
and (iii) the taking is done with intent to gain (People v. Bustinera, G. R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004).

The following are the punishable acts under RA 10883:
1. Concealment of Carnapping (Sec. 4, RA 10883)
2. Non-Registration of Motor Vehicle, Motor Vehicle Engine, Engine Block and Chassis. (Sec. 6, RA 10883)
3. Defacing or Tampering with Serial Numbers of Motor Vehicle Engines, Engine Blocks and Chassis. (Sec.
14, RA 10883)
4. Identity Transfer. (Sec. 15, RA 10883)
5. Transfer of Vehicle Plate. (Sec. 16, RA 10883) It shall be unlawful for any person, office or entity to buy
and/or sell any second-hand spare parts taken from a carnapped vehicle (Sec. 17, RA 10883).
CRIMINAL LAW
What are the instances under which the crime of carnapping is considered aggravated under RA 10883?
Sec. 3 of the New Anti-Carnapping Act provides that the crime of carnapping is aggravated when committed
under the following circumstance:
1. Carnapping committed by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and
2. Owner, driver, or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the commission of the
carnapping.
X, a Grab driver, traversed his usual route using his Toyota Vios car. One night, Y booked him through
the application, putting Tondo, Manila as his point of destination. While traversing the dark road,
Y poked his gun at X and instructed him to park the car. Thereafter, Y shot X causing the latter’s
instantaneous death. Y then pushed X out of the car and drove the car away. Acting on an information
for violation of RA 10883 or the New Anti-Carnapping Act of 2016, police officers conducted a man-
hunt operations and Y was apprehended at his friend’s house (Z). The officers were able to recover the
car belonging to X, including the gun used by Y to kill X.
1. Assuming Y file a motion for bail, should it be granted?
No, Y’s motion for bail should be denied. When the crime of carnapping is committed by criminal groups,
gangs or syndicates or by means of violence or intimidation of any person or persons or forced upon things;
or when the owner, driver, passenger or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped in the course of
the carnapping, the accused shall be denied bail when the evidence of guilt is strong (Sec. 3, RA 10883). In the
given case, aside from taking away the car which does not lawfully belong to him, Y also shot X which caused
the latter’s death. The evidence of Y’s guilt was also strong, considering that the car of X including the gun
used to kill the victim were recovered from the accused’s possession.
2. Assuming the police officers found out that Z, after learning of Y’s commission of the crime,
intentionally offered his “secret garage” for Y to hide the stolen car, may Z be held liable under RA
10883?
Yes, Z may be held liable for concealment of the crime carnapping. Any person who conceals carnapping
shall be punished with imprisonment of six (6) years up to twelve (12) years and a fine equal to the amount
of the acquisition cost of the motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or any other part involved in the violation
(RA 10883, Sec. 4). In this case, Z’s act of offering his own garage for Y to be able to conceal the stolen car is
constitutive of the said crime.
Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act
Note: RA 11648 has amended the age of the child victim in Sections 5(b), and 7 of RA 7610, which respectively
pertain to Child Prostitution and other Sexual Abuse, and Child Trafficking, respectively, the age of the victim
referred to in the provisions is now under sixteen (16) years old. As for the Section 9 of RA 7610, which pertains
to children exposed to “Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows,” the age of the victim referred to is now under
eighteen (18) years old. Lastly, as to Section 10(b) of the same, which refers to other acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty,
or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child’s Development, the age of the victim is now a
minor sixteen (16) years old or under or who is ten (10) years of more junior of the accused. RA 11648, however,
became effective on March 4, 2022, and is NOT covered by the 2022 Bar Examinations.
The minor victim (AAA) was only fourteen (14) years old when petitioner, O, a teacher and CAT
Commandant of AAA’s school, allegedly molested her by kissing her on the lips and sucking her breast.
In the guise of an initiation to become an officer, petitioner made her come to his house to which the
former took advantage of AAA. What crime is committed by O?
O should be convicted of lascivious conduct under Sec. 5 (b) of RA 7610. The requisites for sexual abuse under
Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 are as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) that
the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. Considering that the victim was only 14 years of age at
the time of the commission of the crime, O is guilty under said law (Orsos v. People, G.R. No. 214673, November
20, 2017).
AAA, a minor of about 16 years of age at the time was sexually harassed three times by XXX. The first
incident was when the appellant then went on top of AAA and forcibly had carnal knowledge with her
CRIMINAL LAW
and mashed her breast. The second incident happened when AAA was playing with her siblings, he
directed AAA inside a house and forced her to have carnal knowledge. The last instance was when AAA
was alone and XXX forced her to have carnal knowledge with him but this time, AAA already informed
her parents about the incident. XXX alleged that the carnal knowledge in those three instances were
consensual because they were sweethearts. May X be held criminally liable under Section 5(b) of RA
7610?
Yes, XXX may be held liable under Section 5(b) of RA 7610. The present case has similar factual circumstances
with that of People V. Bobonga. In the case of People v. Bobonga, the Court ruled that the essential elements of
Section 5(b) are:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
In the case at bar, all the elements were established. As such, XXX may be held liable under Section 5(b) of RA
7610. (People v. Bobonga, G.R. No. 214771, August 9, 2017).
A complaint was filed against XXX for refusing to provide financial for his child, CCC. This has caused
mental anguish to his wife, AAA. Such refusal was proven through several witnesses and the number of
complaints filed against XXX in barangay conciliation proceedings. XXX was also seen at a restaurant
with another woman, Can XXX be held liable under RA 7610?
Yes, XXX may be held liable under RA 7610, specifically, section 5(i) of RA 7610. In the case of XXX v. People,
the Court discussed the elements of Section 5(i) under RA 7610:
1. The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;
2. The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is & woman with whom the offender has
or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child. As
for the woman’s child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without the
family abode;
3. The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
4. The anguish is caused through denial of financial support
In the given case, the filiation and marriage of AAA and CCC to XXX were established. The mental anguish which
AAA is experiencing was brought about their worsening financial situation and XXX’s refusal to provide, and
such refusal was provenn through several witnesses and their testimonies, as well as the number of the complaints
filed before the barangay as against XXX (XXX v. People, G.R. No. 241390, October 7, 2021).
B, the directress and owner of Challenger Montessori School (Challenger) was charged with the crime of
Child Abuse in relation to under Section 10 (a) of RA 7610 in relation to Section 3 (b) (2). The situation
arose when the private complainants, both 16 years old, who were fourth year high school students at
Challenger sent a text message to a certain C, one of their classmates. The message said: “Hi cha ate Gale
to kumusta na?” Apparently, the person named Gale mentioned in said message was B’s daughter. C’s
mother arrived and got angry at the private complainants and their classmates who sent the message for
allegedly quarreling with her daughter. B called the private complainants and their six other classmates
to the faculty room. There, in front of the teachers and other students, B shouted at them and inquired
as to who sent the text message which contained her daughter’s name. The private complainants and
their classmates admitted that they all planned to send the text message to C and that the sim card
which was used to send the same was owned by M. B then threatened to sue M and said harsh words
in a derogatory tone. These actions by N resulted in M having sleepless nights, fear, and symptoms of
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Is B liable for child abuse under Section 10 (a) in relation to Section 3
(b) (2) of RA 7610?
No. B may not be held liable for child abuse under Section 10 (a) in relation to Section (b) (2) of RA 7610.
Jurisprudence has consistently held that a specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth of a
child as a human being is required for conviction under Section 10 (a) of RA 7610 in relation to Section 3 (b) (2).
“Debasement” is defined as the act of reducing the value, quality, or purity of something; “degradation,” on the
other hand, is a lessening of a person’s or thing’s character or quality while “demean” means to lower in status,
condition, reputation, or character. In the present case, B acts were only done in the heat of anger, made after she
had just learned that the private complainants had deceivingly used her daughter’s name to send a text message
CRIMINAL LAW
to another student. She had also then just learned that the mother of the student who received the misleading
text message had confronted the private complainants for quarreling with the former’s daughter. The specific
intent required for conviction under Section 10 (a) in relation to Section 3 (b) (2) of RA 7610 was not proven
by the prosecution. Thus, it can be readily said that B had no intent to debase, degrade, or demean the private
complainants and may not be convicted for the crime of child abuse. (Brinas v. People, G.R. no. 254005, June 23,
2021, Caguioa case)
Marley, a 16-year-old barrio lass, was invited by Charlie, a 60-year-old man, to keep him company in
Lights On Lights Off, a beerhouse in the red light district of Malate. May Charlie be charged for a
violation of RA 7610? Explain.
Yes, Charlie may be charged for violation of Sec. 10 (b) of RA 7610. The said provision punishes other acts of
neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development committed by
any person who shall keep or have in his company a minor, twelve (12) years or under or who in ten (10) years or
more his junior in any public or private place, hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension house, sauna
or massage parlor, beach and/or other tourist resort or similar places. It further provides, that this provision shall
not apply to any person who is related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity or any bond recognized
by law, local custom and tradition or acts in the performance of a social, moral or legal duty. Here, Marley is a minor
and is also ten years younger than Charlie. They are strangers to each other and Charlie is not in the performance of
any moral duty when they hung out together in a public beerhouse. Thus, Charlie committed other acts of neglect
and exploitation punished under Sec. 10 (b) of RA 7610 (RA 7610, Sec. 10 (b)).
Swindling by Syndicate
What are the elements of the syndicated estafa as provided by PD 1689?

The elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of
the RPC, is committed; (b) the Estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c)
defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperative, “samahang nayon(s),” or farmers’ associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations
from the general public. (People v. Tibayan, G.R. Nos. 209655-60, January 15, 2015, J.)
Can a charge of syndicated estafa prosper without the general public element?
Under Section 1 of PD No. 1689, there is syndicated estafa if the following elements are present: 1) estafa or
other forms of swindling as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC was committed; 2) the estafa or swindling
was committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and 3) the fraud resulted in the misappropriation of
moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, “samahang nayon[s],” or farmers
associations or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public. (Hao v. People, G.R. No.
188345, September 17, 2014).
X Network Inc. (XNI) claiming to do business under the name S Philippines applied for an Omnibus
Credit Line for various credit facilities with Philippine Bank (PB). To induce PB to extend the Omnibus
Credit Line, XNI, through its directors and officers, presented its Articles of Incorporation with its
400 million capitalization and its congressional telecom franchise. XNI was represented by the officers
and directors occupying the positions, G as the Director, P as Managing Director, K as the treasurer.
Satisfied with the credit worthiness of XNI, PB granted it a ₱250 Million Omnibus Credit Line, under
the name of SN Philippines, PB’s Division. Prior to this major transaction, however, and, unknown to
PB, while XNI was doing business under the name of S Philippines, and that there was a division under
the name S Philippines, G, et al. formed a subsidiary corporation, the SPI with a paid-up capital of only
₱62,500.00. Believing that SPI is the same as S Philippines granted them another Credit Line. When
XNI’s obligation remained unpaid. XNI denied liability contending that the transaction was incurred
solely by SPI, a corporation which belongs to the G Group of Companies, but which has a separate and
distinct personality from XNI. XNI further claimed that while S Philippines is an XNI division, SPI,
is a subsidiary of XNI, and hence, is a separate entity. Is G, P, and K liable for the crime of syndicated
estafa under PD No. 1689.
No, they should be charged for syndicated estafa in relation to Section 1 of PD No. 1689. The elements of
syndicated estafa are: (a) estafa or other forms of swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of the RPC is
committed; (b) the estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and (c) defraudation
CRIMINAL LAW
results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives,
“samahang nayon(s),” or farmers’ associations or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general
public. The SC also ruled that swindling syndicate used the association that they manage to defraud the general
public of funds contributed to the association. Indeed, Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1689 speaks of a
syndicate formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful scheme for the misappropriation of the money
contributed by the members of the association. In other words, only those who formed and manage associations
that receive contributions from the general public who misappropriated the contributions can commit syndicated
estafa. In this case, G, P, and K, however, are not in any way related either by employment or ownership to PB.
They are outsiders who, by their cunning moves were able to defraud an association, which is the PB. Theirs would
have been a different story, had they been managers or owners of PB who used the bank to defraud the public
depositors. (Galvez v. CA, G.R. No. 187919, February 20, 2013).
CRIMINAL LAW
Practical Exercises
Drafting of Complaint, Information, Affidavits of Desistance, Etc.
Draft a Criminal Complaint.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
Branch 45, City of Manila
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Plaintiff,
-versus-
PEDRO SANTOS,
Accused.
Criminal Case No. 1234567

For: Simple Seduction
x------------------------x
COMPLAINT
The undersigned, JOANNA DELA CRUZ, accuses PEDRO SANTOS of the crime of Simple
Seduction, committed as follows, to wit:
That on or about the 17th day of April, 2022, in the City of Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and by means of deceit, had sexual intercourse with the undersigned, JOANNA DELA CRUZ, 16
years of age, unmarried and of good reputation, inside undersigned’s room when her parents were still at work.
Prior consent from the undersigned was secured through deceit when accused promised to marry her.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
City of Manila, Philippines, April 18, 2022
(sgd.) JOANNA DELA CRUZ

Complainant
VERIFICATION
A preliminary investigation has been conducted in this case under my direction, having been examined
the witnesses under oath.
(sgd.) ANGEL REYES

MTC Judge
CRIMINAL LAW
Draft an Information.

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT

Plaintiff,
-versus-
PEDRO SANTOS,
Accused.

For: Serious Physical Injuries
x------------------------x
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor, upon sworn certification originally filed by the offended party, accuses
PEDRO SANTOS of the crime of Serious Physical Injuries, committed as follows:
That on or about February 14, 2022, in the City of Manila, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and used personal violence upon JUAN DELA CRUZ
by then and there stabbing him with a fan-knife, thereby inflicting upon the latter lacerated wounds on the left ear and left
forearm, which caused the illness of said victim for more than 30 days, and incapacitated him from performing his customary
labor for the same period of time.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
City of Manila, Philippines, April 20, 2022
(sgd.) ANGEL CRUZ

Assistant City Prosecutor
Witnesses:
(sgd.) Nathaniel Bonifacio (sgd.) Anne Andrada

Bail Recommended: ₱30,000.00
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that: the preliminary investigation in this case has been conducted; I have examined
the complainant and his witnesses and on the basis of their sworn statements and other evidence sub-
mitted before me there is reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged has been committed;
the accused was informed of the complaint and was given an opportunity to submit controverting
evidence and that the filing of this information was with the authority of the City Prosecutor.
(sgd.) ANGEL CRUZ

Assistant City Prosecutor
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 20th of April, 2022, in the City of Manila.
JOSE BUSTOS
Assistant State Prosecutor
APPROVED:
(sgd.) City Prosecutor
CRIMINAL LAW
Note: In the case of People v. Solar (Caguioa Case), the Supreme Court stressed that any Information which
alleges that a qualifying or aggravating circumstance — in which the law uses a broad term to embrace various
situations in which it may exist, such as but are not limited to (1) treachery; (2) abuse of superior strength; (3)
evident premeditation; (4) cruelty — is present, must state the ultimate facts relative to such circumstance.
Otherwise, the Information may be subject to a motion to quash under Section 3 (e) (i.e., that it does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or a motion for a bill
of particulars under the parameters set by said Rules.
Draft an Affidavit of Desistance.
Republic of the Philippines )

City of Marikina ) S.S.
Criminal Case no. 1234567
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
I, Billy Aylis, of legal age, and with residence at 10 Bernadette Street, Malanday, Marikina City, after having
been duly sworn in accordance with law, do hereby depose and state that:

1. I am the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 1234567 for Grave Oral Defama-
tion entitled “People of the Philippines v. Lorde Devera”;
2. I have recently come to an amicable settlement with the accused pertaining to the civil
aspect of the case, as I have no longer any intention to pursue my claim against the
accused, and wish to move on from the tragic event which gave rise to the criminal case;
and
3. As such, I have decided to formally withdraw my complaint and hereby execute this
Affidavit of Desistance to effect the same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 7th day of March 2022, in the City of
Marikina.
(Sgd.) Billy Aylis

Affiant
JURAT
CRIMINAL LAW
Draft a Motion for Bail.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

Plaintiff,
-versus-
PEDRO SANTOS,
Accused.

For: MURDER
x------------------------x

MOTION FOR BAIL
The accused in the above-entitled case, thru counsel, unto this Honorable Court, respectfully states:
1. That the accused is in custody for the alleged commission of a capital offense;
2. That no bail has been recommended for his temporary release, on the assumption that the evidence of
guilt is strong;
3. That the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong is on the prosecution, and unless this fact
is satisfactorily shown, the defendant may be bailed at the court’s discretion.
WHEREFORE, upon prior notice and hearing, it is respectfully prayed that the defendant be admitted to bail
in such amount as this Honorable Court may fix.

City of Manila, Philippines, June 15, 2022
(Signature of counsel)
REQUEST FOR & NOTICE OF HEARING
(Copy furnished)
PROOF OF SERVICE
EXPLANATION (if served by registered mail)
CRIMINAL LAW
Draft a Motion to Quash.


Plaintiff, ,
-versus-
AKUSADO MARUDO,
Accused.

For: MURDER
x------------------------x
MOTION TO QUASH
ACCUSED, through the undersigned counsel, respectfully moves to quash the information filed against him
on the ground that that the court has no jurisdiction to try the present case.
ARGUMENTS:
1. The accused Akusado Marudo is a minor.
2. The proper court to try the present case would be a Family Court.
3. The crime was committed in Quezon City. Pursuant to the Rules of Court which provide that venue
is jurisdictional in criminal cases, the venue lies therein.
WHEREFORE, the accused respectfully prays that the information filed against him be quashed by the Hon-
orable Court.
City of Manila, Philippines, May 20, 2022
(Copy furnished)
PROOF OF SERVICE
CRIMINAL LAW
Draft a Demurrer to Evidence for Criminal Cases.


Plaintiff,,
-versus-
AKUSADO MARUDO,
Accused.

For: MURDER
x------------------------x
DEMURRER TO PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE
ACCUSED, by counsel, with leave of court previously sought and obtained, respectfully submits this Demur-
rer to the Prosecution’s Evidence on the ground that the prosecution has failed to adduce sufficient evidence of
his guilt to overcome the presumption of innocence and shift the burden of proof.
(State the details why the prosecution’s evidence failed to overcome the presumption of innocence)
WHEREFORE, the accused respectfully prays that the information against him be DISMISSED and that he
be ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

City of Manila, Philippines, March 3, 2022
(Copy furnished)
PROOF OF SERVICE
CRIMINAL LAW
Draft a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence.


Plaintiff,,
-versus-
AKUSADO MARUDO,
Accused.

For: MURDER
x------------------------x
MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE

DEMURRER TO PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE
ACCUSED, through counsel, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully states:
1. That the prosecution in the above-entitled case has already rested its case; and
2. (Specifically state the grounds relied on for motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence e.g. That
the defense believes that the evidence of the prosecution against the accused is insufficient to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt), thus, the defense prays for leave to file demurrer to evi-
dence in accordance with Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing considerations and in the highest interest of justice, it is most re-
spectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the aforesaid motion be granted.
City of Manila, Philippines, March 3, 2022
(Copy furnished)
PROOF OF SERVICE
CRIMINAL LAW
Draft a Judicial Affidavit.
CRIMINAL LAW
Notes:
1. The first paragraph should introduce the affiant.
2. The second part is the offer of testimony.
3. Include a preliminary statement, which is a standard format in every judicial affidavit.
4. Do not include questions answerable by mere “Yes” or “No” in the offer of testimony because they will
amount to leading questions.
5. Do not include questions which already assume a fact not yet established because they will amount to
misleading questions.
6. The testimony proper should be signed by affiant at the end.
7. There should be a lawyer’s attestation which is also in the form of an affidavit.
8. Since this is an affidavit, a jurat is required NOT an acknowledgment.
CRIMINAL LAW
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines

AMLA Anti-Money Laundering Act
AMLC Anti-Money Laundering Council
CA Court of Appeals
DFA Department of Foreign Affairs
PNP Philippine National Police
MTC Municipal Trial Court
PD Presidential Decree
RTC Regional Trial Court
SC Supreme Court
VAWC Violence Against Women and Children

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SAN BEDA UNIVERSITY

Sinjin Joshua M. Taloma

Arabella Matheia M. Adriano

Angela Michaella S. Yumul

Gilda Francesca G. Flores

Academics Core Members

Gabrielle Anne S. Endona

Electronic Data Processing

I. PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL LAW (REVISED PENAL CODE -

II. CRIMES UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE (REVISED PENAL

III. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

IV. PRACTICAL EXERCISES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 104

Principles of Criminal Law (Revised Penal Code – Book 1)

Mala in se v. Mala Prohibita

Applicability and Effectivity of the RPC

While on board a Malaysian-owned, MARINA-registered merchant vessel, I, an Indonesian crew,

Who are bound to follow the Philippine penal laws?

When can penal laws be applied retroactively?

Interpretation of Penal Laws

not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable considerations. They

What is the purpose of the liberal construction in favor of the accused?

What is the rule of lenity?

Criminal Liabilities and Felonies

Classify felonies according to gravity and explain each.

When is fine considered afflictive, correctional or light penalty?

for frustrated murder?

Give examples of crimes which do not have a frustrated stage.

Circumstances Affecting Criminal Liability

When is there a justifying circumstance of self-defense?

When is the means employed in the act of self-defense considered reasonable?

What are the circumstances absorbed by treachery?

When is the use of a loose firearm considered an aggravating circumstance?

Distinguish Instigation from Entrapment.

Persons Liable and Degree of Participation

How may conspiracy be proved?

Differentiate Multiple Offenders.

As to Period of Time the Crimes are Committed

As to Number of Crimes Committed

What are the cases when destierro is imposed?

Distinguish a privileged mitigating circumstance from an ordinary mitigating circumstance as to

When is the Indeterminate Sentence Law inapplicable?

What is subsidiary imprisonment?

The rules in applying subsidiary imprisonment are the following:

Execution and Service of Sentence

What are the rules of community service in lieu of imprisonment?

Juvenile Justice Welfare Act (RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630)

Good Conduct and Time Allowance (RA 10592)

Extinction of Criminal Liability

What are the causes of total extinguishment of criminal liability?

How is criminal liability partially extinguished?

Civil Liability in Criminal Cases

Crimes against National Security and Laws of Nations

Piracy and Qualified Piracy

Crimes against the Fundamental Law of the State

Crimes against Public Order

Evasion of Service of Sentence

Crimes against Public Interest

Falsification by Public Officer, Employee, or Notary, or Ecclesiastical Minister

Falsification by Private Individual and Use of Falsified Documents

Crimes against Public Morals

Crimes Committed by Public Officers

Distinguish direct bribery from indirect bribery.