2022 NEW POINTERS FROM JUSTICE CAGUIOA CASES

2022 NEW POINTERS
DEAN RODERICK E. MANZANO

COLLEGE OF LAW
REMEDIAL LAW
Cases penned by Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa
(2022 Bar Chairperson)
Department Chairs
Dean Salvador N. Moya
Chairperson of Remedial Law Department
State Solicitor Ruben S. Ayson, Jr.

Political Law Department
Atty. Voltaire T. Duano

Labor Law Department
Prof. Jose R. Ortiz

Civil Law Department
Atty. Mark Anthony P. Tamayo

Taxation Law
Chief City Prosecutor Aldrin P. Evangelista

Criminal Law
Atty. Alma D. Lanzo

Legal Ethics Department
Dean Aristeo R. Cruz

Commercial Law Department
Bar Operations Committee
Political and International Law
Atty. Evangeline Omadto (Supervising Lawyer)
Del Agua, Athena - Team Leader; Balacanao, Hannah – Asst.
Members: Acosta, Pamela; Balan, Ailene; De La Rosa, Ma. Kathyrine Rose;
Felimon, Jean Lianne; Galdo, Arwin; Garil, Mary Ann; Grospe, Kathryne Joy;
Mirador, Jerome
Labor Law
Atty. Patrick Cortes (Supervising Lawyer)
Singson, Nikki – Team Leader; Santiago, Jullia Nicole – Asst.
Members: Andres, Alyssa Faith; Dimaculangan, Leila; Diomino, Katleen;
Marlin,Georgelyn; Orillosa, Mariel; Santoyo, Iralyn; San Pedro, Carmela; De
Chavez, Alvin
Criminal Law
Atty. Ellizar Castelltort (Supervising Lawyer)
Canoso, Marvic – Team Leader; Gonzales, Francheska Angela Louise – Asst.
Members: Abad, Samuel Edrian; Baldesco, Maria Monica; Cabading, Hyacinth
Anne; Garlitos, Victor; Gemoto, Joyce; Luisa, Andrea Mariz B. Padilla, Ruby;
Salazar, Franchesca
Commercial Law
Atty. Mark Angelo Reyes (Supervising Lawyer)
Tagumpay, Diwa – Team Leader; Alejos, Jenaline – Asst.
Members: Alipio, Mark; De Jesus, Ryan Joeferson; Medico, Irish
Civil Law
Atty. Randel Felismino (Supervising Lawyer)
Olalo, Lycel , Team Leader; Cabang, John Benedick P. - Asst.
Members: Agustin, Arvy; Bactin, April Joy; Dazo, Al Adrian; Doctor, Lorenz
Benedict; Guzman, Mariah Alliana; Vicedo, Lloyd David
Remedial Law
Atty. Katherine Macorol (Supervising Lawyer)
Jungco, Jericho – Team Leader; Pado, Maria Potenciana – Asst.
Members: Ampa, Monisah; Belleza, Jan Pauline; Datlan, Johayra; Dela Cruz,
Arthur Michael; Rodriguez, Jayra; Salvacion, Odette
Taxation Law
Atty. Ana Reyes (Supervising Lawyer)
Fuentes, Angelo – Team Leader; Sembrana, Jonel – Asst.
Members: Balero, Ma Lourdes; Cortes, Dann Philip; Domingo, Kim; Tagulob,
Gizella Kym
Legal Ethics
Atty. Leihriza Urban (Supervising Lawyer)
Ronquillo, Ian – Team Leader; Vertucio, Stella Anne Marie – Asst.
Members: Barrameda, Victorio III; Basal, Bernadeth; Espineli, Caryl; Ferrer, Karl
Mark
Executive Committee
Atty. Nery Aspili – Chairperson
Mark JR. Alipio – Asst.
Atty. Fitz Lexine Ayala – Co-Chair

Nikki Singson – Asst.
Kim A. Domingo – Secretary

Victorio D. Barrameda III – Asst.
Members
Atty. Jan Aldrin Afos Atty. Jastine Gaffuy
Atty. Kriska Antiojo Atty. Dwight Pilotin
Atty. Jay-R Arguelles Atty. Nikka Rabang
Atty. Rosana Berba Atty. Kenji Rangel
Atty.Cattleya Cañete Atty. Jethro Reales
Atty. Meriel Castillo Atty. Vanessa Realizan
Atty. Ryan Castillo Atty. Roca Regala
Atty. Allyzza Concepcion Atty. Bea Unas
Atty. Czarina Conson Atty. Rosebelle Vasquez
Atty. Albert James Dagsaan Atty. Roel Villaruz
Atty. Shiela Deimoy
Committee Heads
Atty. Wilson Legaspi – Proofreader
Kimberly Hazel Lazatin – Asst.
Samantha Siojo - Layout

Maria Potenciana Pado - Asst.
Adviser
DEAN RODERICK E. MANZANO
Administrative Officers
Brother Manuel F. Rufin, Jr
Ministrong Tagasubaybay
Atty. Wilson Legaspi

OIC-College Secretary
Atty. Gerald Villanueva

Director, Legal Aid Clinic
Atty. Wilson Legaspi

Supervising Lawyer-LAC
Staff
Ms. Analyn Rogel
Dean’s Office Staff
Ms. Eunice Nemenzo-Arenas

Dean’s Office Staff
Jayra Rodriguez
Staff
Mr. Loue Tolentino

Legal Aid Clinic’s Staff
Mr. Nikko Ysagun

MCLE’s Staff
Mr. Ravi Ysmael

Legal Aid Clinic’s Staff
Table of Contents
1. ................................................................................................................................................... S
pouses Marcelian Tapayan and Alice Tapayan vs. Ponceda M. Martinez ............................................. 1
2. ................................................................................................................................................... S
usan A. Yap vs. Elizabeth Lagtapon ................................................................................................... 1
3. ................................................................................................................................................... P
rudential Bank (Now Bank of the Philippine Islands) vs. Ronald Rapanot and
Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board ............................................................................................. 2
4. ................................................................................................................................................... P
eople of the Philippines vs. Roque Dayaday ....................................................................................... 3
5. ................................................................................................................................................... R
epublic of the Philippines vs. Alfredo R. De Borja .............................................................................. 3
6. ................................................................................................................................................... S
an Francisco Inn vs. San Pablo City Water District ............................................................................. 4
7. ................................................................................................................................................... P
hilippine Bank of Communications vs. Hon. Court of Appeals............................................................ 5
8. ................................................................................................................................................... S
egovia vs. The Climate Change Commission ...................................................................................... 5
9. ................................................................................................................................................... J
ona Bumatay vs. Lolita Bumatay........................................................................................................ 6
10. ................................................................................................................................................. S
umifru (Philippines) Corp. vs. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm
(NAMASUFA-NAFLU-KMU) .......................................................................................................... 7
11. ................................................................................................................................................. C
ity of Batangas vs. Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation ................................................................ 8
12. ................................................................................................................................................. A
MA Land, Inc. vs. Wack Wack Residents’ Association, Inc. ............................................................... 8
13. ................................................................................................................................................. P
eople of the Philippines vs. Federico Gerola ....................................................................................... 9
14. ................................................................................................................................................. D
enmark S. Valmores vs. Dr. Cristina Achacoso and Dr. Giovanni Cabildo ........................................ 10
15. ................................................................................................................................................. P
eople of the Philippines vs. Ruben "Robin" Bongbonga .................................................................... 11
16. ................................................................................................................................................. G
. Holdings, Inc. vs. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, Inc.
(CEPALCO) .................................................................................................................................... 11
17. ................................................................................................................................................. P
rivatization and Management Office (PMO) vs. Edgardo V. Quesada, et al. ...................................... 12
18. ................................................................................................................................................. G
MA Network, Inc. vs. National Telecommunications Commission.................................................... 13
19. ................................................................................................................................................. S
an Fernando Coca-Cola Rank-and-File Union (SACORU) vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc. (CCBPI)................................................................................................................. 13
20. ................................................................................................................................................. P
hilippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO),
Region 7 Chapter, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC)................................................... 14
21. ................................................................................................................................................. P
eople of the Philippines vs. Libera to Pentecostes ............................................................................. 15
22. ................................................................................................................................................. G
ov. Aurora E. Cerilles vs. Civil Service Commission ........................................................................ 16
23. ................................................................................................................................................. P
ublic Attorney’s Office vs. Office of the Ombudsman ...................................................................... 16
24. ................................................................................................................................................. A
ngelina Chua and Heirs of Jose Ma. Cheng Sing Phuan vs. Spouses Santiago
Cheng and Avelina Sihiyon .............................................................................................................. 17
25. ................................................................................................................................................. D
onald Francis Gaffney vs. Gina V. Butler ......................................................................................... 18
26. ................................................................................................................................................. E
ditha S. Medina vs. Sps. Nicomedes and Brigida Lozada .................................................................. 19
27. ................................................................................................................................................. H
eirs of Geminiano Francisco vs. Court of Appeals ............................................................................ 20
28. ................................................................................................................................................. P
eople of the Philippines vs. Mario Bulutano ..................................................................................... 21
29. ................................................................................................................................................. A
tty. Berteni C. Causing and Percival Carag Mabasa vs. Presiding Judge Jose
Lorenzo R. Dela Rosa ...................................................................................................................... 22
30. ................................................................................................................................................. T
ee Ling Kiat vs. Ayala Corporation .................................................................................................. 23
31. ................................................................................................................................................. R
epublic of the Philippines vs. Maria Lourdes Sereno (Dissenting Opinion) ........................................ 23
32. ................................................................................................................................................. C
onsolidated Distillers of the Far East, Inc. vs. Rogel N. Zaragoza ...................................................... 24
33. ................................................................................................................................................. S
tephen I. Juego-Sakai vs. Republic of the Philippines (Separate Concurring
Opinion) G.R No. 224015, July 23, 2018.......................................................................................... 25
34. ................................................................................................................................................. M
ichael V. Racion vs. MST Marine Services Philippines, Inc. ............................................................. 25
35. ................................................................................................................................................. P
eople of the Philippines vs. Nova De Leon ....................................................................................... 27
36. ................................................................................................................................................. S
M Investments Corporation vs. Mac Graphics Carranz International Corp ........................................ 28
37. ................................................................................................................................................. P
illars Property Corporation vs. Century Communities Corporation .................................................... 29
38. ................................................................................................................................................. A
suncion Y. Ariñola vs. Angeles D. Almodiel, Jr. ............................................................................... 30
39. ................................................................................................................................................. F
il-Estate Management, Inc., et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines ...................................................... 30
40. ................................................................................................................................................. P
az Mandin-Trotin vs. Francisco A. Bongo, et al. ............................................................................... 31
41. ................................................................................................................................................. D
.M. Consunji, Inc. vs. Republic of the Philippines............................................................................. 31
42. ................................................................................................................................................. V
ictoria T. Fajardo vs. Belen Cua-Malate ........................................................................................... 32
43. ................................................................................................................................................. H
eirs of Leonarda Nadela Tomakin vs. Heirs of Celestino Navares ..................................................... 33
44. ................................................................................................................................................. M
agsaysay Maritime Corporation, Princess Cruise Lines Ltd., and/or Gary M.
Castillo vs. Allan F. Buico ............................................................................................................... 34
45. ................................................................................................................................................. K
aren Nuñez Vito, Lynette Nuñez Masinda, Warren Nuñez, and Alden Nuñez vs.
Norma Moises-Palma....................................................................................................................... 35
46. ................................................................................................................................................. W
ilfredo Cabuguas, Renato Cabuguas, Alejandro "Taboy" Canete and Eleazar
Mortos vs. Gallants Tan Nery........................................................................................................... 35
47. ................................................................................................................................................. S
imeona Prescila, et. al. vs. Conrado Lasquite .................................................................................... 36
48. ................................................................................................................................................. R
epublic of the Philippines vs. Roguza Development Corporation ...................................................... 37
49. ................................................................................................................................................. P
rime Savings Bank vs. Spouses Roberto and Heidi L. Santos ............................................................ 38
50. ................................................................................................................................................. D
avao AFC Bus Lines Inc. vs. Rogelio Ang........................................................................................ 39
51. ................................................................................................................................................. S
pouses Edilberto & Eveline Pozon vs. Diana Jeanne Lopez............................................................... 40
52. ................................................................................................................................................. M
aria Nympha Mandagan vs. Jose M. Valero Corporation................................................................... 40
53. ................................................................................................................................................. P
eople of the Philippines vs. Cesar Villamor Corpin ........................................................................... 41
54. ................................................................................................................................................. A
lfredo Pili, Jr. vs. Mary Ann Resurreccion ........................................................................................ 41
55. ................................................................................................................................................. X
XX vs. People of the Philippines ...................................................................................................... 42
56. ................................................................................................................................................. C
arlos A. Catubao vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines .............................................. 43
57. ................................................................................................................................................. P
eople of the Philippines vs. Allan Canatoy........................................................................................ 44
58. ................................................................................................................................................. P
eople of the Philippines vs. Noel Dolandolan.................................................................................... 45
59. ................................................................................................................................................. A
tty. Arolf M. Ancheta vs. Felomino C. Villa ..................................................................................... 45
60. ................................................................................................................................................. T
he Heirs of Marsella T. Lupena vs. Pastora Medina, et al. ................................................................. 46
61. ................................................................................................................................................. R
epublic of the Philippines vs. Remar A. Quiñonez ............................................................................ 47
62. ................................................................................................................................................. R
epublic of the Philippines vs. Leonor A. Macabagdal ........................................................................ 48
63. ................................................................................................................................................. N
ancy A. Catamco vs. Sandiganbayan ................................................................................................ 49
64. ................................................................................................................................................. M
ercedes S. Gatmaytan and Erlinda V. Valdellon vs. Misibis Land, Inc. .............................................. 49
65. ................................................................................................................................................. T
he Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. and The Most. Rev. Bishop Jose F.
Oliveros, D.D. vs. The Heirs of Mariano Marcos .............................................................................. 50
66. ................................................................................................................................................. M
aria Aurota G. Mathay, et al. vs. People of the Philippines and Andrea L.
Gandionco ....................................................................................................................................... 50
67. ................................................................................................................................................. P
hilippine Bank of Communications vs. The Register of Deeds for the Province of
Benguet ........................................................................................................................................... 51
68. ................................................................................................................................................. U
susan Development Corporation vs. Republic of the Philippines ....................................................... 53
69. ................................................................................................................................................. S
pouses Romeo Anastacio, Sr. and Norma T. Anastacio vs. Heirs of the Late
Spouses Juan F. Coloma and Juliana Parazo ..................................................................................... 54
70. ................................................................................................................................................. M
artin Roberto G. Tirol vs. Sol Nolasco .............................................................................................. 55
71. ................................................................................................................................................. M
ario M. Madera vs. Commission on Audit ........................................................................................ 57
72. ................................................................................................................................................. T
he Heirs of Inocentes Mampo and Raymundo A. Mampo vs. Josefina Morada .................................. 58
73. ................................................................................................................................................. L
abualas B. Mamansual and Francis B. Nadar vs. Sandiganbayan ....................................................... 58
74. ................................................................................................................................................. H
ermis Carlos Perez vs. Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman ............................................................. 59
75. ................................................................................................................................................. A
tty. Turiano vs. Task Force Abono, et al. .......................................................................................... 60
76. ................................................................................................................................................. D
el Monte Land Transport Bus Company vs. Carlito T. Abergos ........................................................ 61
77. ................................................................................................................................................. H
eirs of Corazon Villeza vs. Elizabeth S. Aliangan & Rosalina S. Aliangan ........................................ 62
78. ................................................................................................................................................. S
ally Sarmienta vs. Edita A. Dizon ..................................................................................................... 63
79. ................................................................................................................................................. N
orman Alfred F. Lazaro vs. People of the Philippines ....................................................................... 64
80. ................................................................................................................................................. R
epublic of the Philippines vs. Avelino Manansala ............................................................................. 65
81. ................................................................................................................................................. M
arwin B. Raya and Shiela C. Borromeo vs. People of the Philippines ................................................ 66
82. ................................................................................................................................................. F
rancis Luigi G. Santos vs. Republic of the Philippines ...................................................................... 66
83. ................................................................................................................................................. J
unel Alaska vs. SPO2 Gil Garcia ...................................................................................................... 67
84. ................................................................................................................................................. R
epublic of the Philippines vs. Mel Via T. Villacorta .......................................................................... 68
85. ................................................................................................................................................. S
to. Nino Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. vs. Amado Lintag .................................................. 69
86. ................................................................................................................................................. G
olden Boracay Realty, Inc. vs. Antonio Pelayo ................................................................................. 70
87. ................................................................................................................................................. P
eople of the Philippines vs. Juvenal Azurin....................................................................................... 71
Spouses Marcelian Tapayan and Alice Tapayan vs. Ponceda M. Martinez
G.R. No. 207786, January 30, 2017
PROBLEM NO. 1:
Ponceda filed a complaint against Spouses Tapayan for Specific Performance with Damages
before the RTC. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Ponceda. During the appeal in the
CA, however, the spouses raised that the court a quo erred the admission of the plain copy of
the Deed of Undertaking at the time it was formally offered in evidence before the RTC. CA
affirmed the RTC’s decision and denied the Spouses Tapayan’s appeal.
Is the CA correct in affirming the decision of the RTC?
ANSWER:
YES. The CA correctly affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence is admissible other than the original document itself except in the instances
mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. As such, mere photocopies
of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule. Nevertheless, evidence
not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in
arriving at its judgment. Courts are not precluded to accept in evidence a mere
photocopy of a document when no objection was raised when it was formally offered.
Having failed to timely raise their objection when the Formal Offer of Evidence was filed in
the RTC, Spouses Tapayan are deemed to have waived the same. Hence, they are precluded
from assailing the probative value of the plain copy of the Deed of Undertaking.
Note: (i) As a rule, under Sec. 4(c) of Rule 130, a duplicate is admissible to the same extent
as an original, unless a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original, or in
the circumstances, it is unjust or inequitable to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. (ii)
Best Evidence Rule is now called Original Document Rule.
Susan A. Yap vs. Elizabeth Lagtapon

G.R. No. 196347, 803 Phil 652, January 23, 2017
PROBLEM NO. 2:
Lagtapon instituted a civil suit against Yap for a sum of money. Summons were issued and as
per return of service of summons prepared by the process server. Yap refused to
acknowledge receipt thereof. As no answer was filed, Lagtapon filed a motion to declare Yap
in default. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment in favor of Lagtapon. When execution of
the judgment was made, Yap filed Petition for Annulment of Judgment, contending that the
latter was never served with the summons on the indicated date. The CA dismissed
the petition and upheld the validity of the service of summons on Yap.
1
Is the CA correct in dismissing the Petition for Annulment of Judgment and ruled that
the RTC had validly acquired jurisdiction over Yap’s person through service of
summons?
ANSWER:
YES. The remedy of annulment of judgment, embodied in Rule 47 of the Rules, is

extraordinary in character, and does not so easily and readily lend itself to abuse by parties
aggrieved by final judgments. The grounds for a Rule 47 petition are: (i) extrinsic fraud and
(ii) lack of jurisdiction. Extrinsic fraud cannot be a valid ground if it had been availed of, or
could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief. On the other hand,
lack of jurisdiction means either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Thus, the CA is correct that Yap' s assertion of extrinsic fraud and/or lack of jurisdiction does
not constitute clear and convincing evidence as to overturn the presumption of regularity
attendant to the Return of Service.
Note: Aside from extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence added “lack of due
process” as another ground for annulment of judgment.
Prudential Bank (Now Bank of the Philippine Islands) vs. Ronald Rapanot and Housing
& Land Use Regulatory Board
G.R. No. 191636, 803 Phil. 294, January 16, 2017
PROBLEM NO. 3:
As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45. However,
there are recognized exceptions to this general rule, namely:
1. when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;

2. when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
3. when there is grave abuse of discretion;
4. when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. when the findings of facts are conflicting;
6. when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
7. when the findings are contrary to the trial court;
8. when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based;
9. when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
10. when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and
11. when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
2
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
People of the Philippines vs. Roque Dayaday

G.R. No. 213224, 814 SCRA 414, January 16, 2017
PROBLEM NO. 4:
Roque was convicted of the crime of murder. Since the witness and the victim are relatives,
he challenged the RTC's conviction on the ground of credibility. He likewise stressed that the
testimonies of the witness be dismissed because of the alleged inconsistencies. The CA,
however, upheld his conviction.
Is the CA correct in concurring the decision of the RTC on finding the witness’
credibility?
ANSWER:
YES. The CA is correct in upholding the decision.
When the issues involve matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court are
accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is because the trial court has the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern
whether they are telling the truth. Hence, the appellate courts will not overturn the factual
findings of the trial court, specially where the findings of the RTC are sustained by the CA.
Meanwhile, relationship by itself does not give rise to any presumption of bias or ulterior
motive, nor does it impair the credibility of witnesses or tarnish their testimonies. Finally,
inconsistency between the witness’ affidavit and his testimony in open court as to whether
there were other witnesses to the crime is immaterial to affect his credibility, because it does
not detract from the fact that the witness saw and identified Roque as the assailant of his
father.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Alfredo R. De Borja

G.R. No. 187448, 814 SCRA 10, January 09, 2017
PROBLEM NO. 5:
A complaint was filed before the Sandigan Bayan (SB) for the recovery of ill-gotten assets
allegedly amassed by De Borja during the administration of the late President Marcos.
During the trial, De Borja filed his Demurrer to Evidence of even date, stating factual
matters. SB granted the demurrer to evidence, finding that the RP failed to present sufficient
evidence to prove that De Borja is liable for damages as averred in the complaint. RP filed a
Petition for Certiorari in the SC.
Will the petition prosper?
3
ANSWER:
NO. The petition will not prosper. A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. The question in a demurrer to evidence is whether the
plaintiff, by his evidence in chief, had been able to establish a prima facie case.
In Felipe v. MGM Motor Trading Corp., wherein the propriety of the trial court's granting of
a demurrer to evidence was the crux of the controversy, the court held that a review of the
dismissal of the complaint naturally entailed a calibration of the evidence on record to
properly determine whether the material allegations of the complaint were amply supported
by evidence. This being so, where the resolution of a question requires an examination of the
evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and the relevance of surrounding
circumstances, and the probability of specific situations, the same involves a question of fact.
In this regard, the Court emphasizes that factual questions are not the proper subject of a
petition for review under Rule 45, the same being limited only to questions of law. Not being
a trier of facts, the Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence already
considered in the proceedings below.
San Francisco Inn vs. San Pablo City Water District

G.R. No. 204639, 817 SCRA 640, February 15, 2017
PROBLEM NO. 6:
“A” filed a petition to enjoin the Water District and its General Manager from further hearing
a case as its continuance will work injustice and/or irreparable damage or injury to “A” and
will mean closure of its business operation. The respondent on the other hand filed a motion
to dismiss anchored on the arguments that the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, and for lack of cause of action against the respondents. The petitioner filed its
opposition to the motion to dismiss, contending that the Court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case and that it has a valid cause of action against A.
The RTC dismissed the petition, thus, respondent appealed to the CA. The CA ruled that the
respondent Water District complied with the due process requirement for the effectivity and
enforcement of the law and the rules sought to be implemented.
Does the Court have jurisdiction over a dispute involving the right or authority of a
local water utility or water district entity?
ANSWER:
YES. The jurisdiction of the courts over a dispute involving the right or authority of a local
water utility or water district entity to impose production assessment against commercial or
industrial deep well users, pursuant to Section 39 of PD 198 is settled. The issue in such a
dispute is a judicial question properly addressed to the courts. Thus, the RTC correctly
exercised its jurisdiction over the dispute involving the right of a local water utility.
4
Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Hon. Court of Appeals
818 SCRA 68, February 15, 2017
PROBLEM NO. 7:
A complaint for collection of sum of money was filed by company A against company B
before the RTC. The respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint, alleging that they
had already paid their obligation and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because
company A failed to pay the correct docket fees.
The RTC directed company A to pay the additional docket fees within fifteen days from the
receipt thereof, or until October 22. Company A paid the additional docket fees on October
21 but filed “Compliance with the Order of the Court” only on November 11. The RTC
dismissed the complaint for failure of company A to comply with the order. Company A filed
a motion for reconsideration, stating that it had paid the additional docket fees within the
period prescribed by the court as evidenced by the Official Receipt. The RTC denied
company A’s motion and denied its subsequent notice of appeal on the ground that said
appeal is not the proper remedy. Thereafter, company A filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus with the CA but was denied.
Did the CA act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction?
ANSWER:
YES. Prefatorily, the Court notes that company A availed of the wrong mode of appeal in
bringing the case before the Court. However, under exceptional circumstances, as when
stringent application of the rules will result in manifest injustice, the Court may set aside
technicalities and proceed with the appeal. Considering that what is at stake in the present
case is PBCOM's statutory right to appeal and the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of its cause, the Court resolves to set aside PBCOM's procedural mistake and
give due course to its petition.
In this case, the RTC Order denying due course to PBCOM's notice of appeal on the ground
that it was a wrong remedy, is a patent nullity. Under Sec. 12 of Rule 41, the power of the
RTC to dismiss an appeal is limited “prior to the transmittal of the original record or the
record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may, motu proprio or on motion,
dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time or for non-payment of the docket and
other lawful fees within the reglementary period.” Meanwhile, the authority to dismiss an
appeal for being an improper remedy is specifically vested upon the CA, and not the RTC, as
provided for under Sec. 1 of Rule 50.
Segovia vs. The Climate Change Commission

819 SCRA 543, March 07, 2017
5
PROBLEM NO. 8:
The Congress passed the Climate Change Act creating a commission tasked to coordinate,
monitor, and evaluate the programs and action plans of the government relating to climate
change. A group called “Children of the future, filed a petition claiming that they are entitled
to the issuance of extraordinary writs due to the alleged failure and refusal of respondents to
perform an act mandated by environmental laws.
They cited several violations of the law and contend that respondents' failure to implement
the foregoing laws and executive issuances resulted in the continued degradation of air
quality, which a violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and may even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land,
water, and air" by the government without due process of law. Respondents filed their
Comment seeking the outright dismissal of the petition for lack of standing and failure to
adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Moreover, respondents argue that petitioners are
not entitled to the reliefs prayed for.
1. Do petitioners have legal standing in the case, and did they adhere to the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts?
2. What is the difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan
vis-à-vis petition for the issuance of a continuing mandamus?
ANSWER:
1. YES. The petitioners have legal standing in the case and adhered to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC) did liberalize
the requirements on standing, allowing the filing of citizen's suit for the enforcement of rights
and obligations under environmental laws.
Likewise, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not violated. At the very least, the magnitude
of the ecological problems contemplated under the RPEC satisfies at least one of the
exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when direct resort is allowed where it is
dictated by public welfare. Given that the RPEC allows direct resort to this Court, it is
ultimately within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept petitions brought directly
before it.
2. In a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, it is sufficient that the person
filing represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the writ,
whereas a petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus is only available to one
who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission.
Jona Bumatay vs. Lolita Bumatay

824 SCRA 149, April 25, 2017
6
PROBLEM NO. 9:
Who has the authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the SC?
Explain.
ANSWER:
The authority to represent the State is vested solely in the OSG. The rule can be found in
Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code, which
provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or
matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of the
office concerned, it shall also represent government-owned or controlled corporations. The
OSG shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties
requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall xxx represent the Government in the SC and the
CA in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the SC, the CA,
and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
Sumifru (Philippines) Corp. vs. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm

(NAMASUFA-NAFLU-KMU)
826 SCRA 438, June 07, 2017
PROBLEM NO. 10:
Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm (NAMASUFA-NAFLU-KMU), a legitimate labor

organization, filed a Petition for Certification Election before the DOLE. NAMASUFA
sought to represent all rank-and-file employees, numbering around 140 employees of packing
plant 90 (PP 90) of Fresh Banana Agricultural Corporation (FBAC). NAMASUFA claimed
that there was no existing union in the aforementioned establishment. FBAC objected and
argued that there exists no employer-employee relationship between it and the workers
involved. The CA affirmed the Resolution of the Secretary of the DOLE which, in turn,
affirmed the Order of DOLE Med-Arbiter on granting the petition for Certification Election.
FBAC argues that CA committed palpable mistake and ruled contrary to law and settled
jurisprudence when it affirmed the findings of DOLE.
Did the CA err in affirming the findings of DOLE?
ANSWER:
NO. Findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies are entitled to great respect when they are
supported by substantial evidence and in the absence of any showing of a whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment. The Court cannot re-calibrate the factual bases of the Med-
Arbiter, DOLE Secretary, and the CA, contrary to the provisions of Rule 45, especially
where a petition fails to show any whimsicality or capriciousness in the exercise of judgment
7
of the Med-Arbiter or the DOLE Secretary in finding the existence of an employer-employee
relationship.
City of Batangas vs. Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation

G.R. No. 195003, 826 SCRA 297, June 07, 2017
PROBLEM NO. 11:
A petition for review on certiorari was filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court against
CA’s Decision from an appeal from the RTC Decision declaring City Ordinance No. 3
enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Batangas City. The ordinance requires heavy
industries operating along the portions of Batangas Bay within the Batangas City to construct
desalination plants to facilitate the use of seawater as coolant for their industrial facilities. In
addition to the mandatory requirement, the City Government shall not grant permit or
clearance or its approval for any project involving construction of heavy industries along the
Batangas Bay.
PSPC filed for the Declaration of Nullity before the RTC. PSPC contented that the Assailed
Ordinance was not posted in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
In response, Batangas City and the Sangguniang Panlungsod maintained that they have the
power to enact the ordinance pursuant to the general welfare clause under the Local
Government Code of 1991.
RTC declared the ordinance null and void. On appeal before the CA dismissed the appeal
filed against PSPC and SPEX for lack of merit. MR denied.
Is the CA correct in affirming the RTC Decision which declared the Assailed Ordinance
invalid?
ANSWER:
YES. This Court, not being a trier of facts, accords the highest degree of respect to the
findings of fact of the trial court, especially where, as here, they have been affirmed by the
CA; accordingly, these findings will not be disturbed. To be sure, such findings are binding
and conclusive upon this Court, and it is not the Court's function in a petition for review on
certiorari to examine, evaluate or weigh anew the probative value of the evidence presented
before the trial court. Batangas City’s failure to prove the existence of factual basis to justify
the enactment of the Assailed Ordinance had already been passed upon by the lower courts.
While there are recognized exceptions to the rule above, the Court finds that none is present
in this case.
AMA Land, Inc. vs. Wack Wack Residents’ Association, Inc.

831 SCRA 328, July 19, 2017
8
PROBLEM NO. 12:
AMA Land, Inc (AMALI) proposed a commercial and residential building in Wack Wack
Village, Mandaluyong City. AMALI notified WWRAI, a registered homeowners’ association
in Wack Wack Village, of the former’s intention to use a particular road inside the village.
WWRAI contends that the notice was worthless because AMALI already occupied the said
road prior to the notification and that WWRAI can do nothing to remove the field office
erected by AMALI in that road. AMALI filed a petition before RTC for temporary use of the
road for their construction and for easement of right of way over that particular road. One of
the prayers of AMALI in its petition is for the RTC to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction directing WWRAI to allow AMALI to use the said road as an access road and
staging area. WWRAI argued that AMALI can utilize EDSA as the staging area of the
project instead of the road inside the village. RTC granted the writ of preliminary injunction
and ordered WWRAI to allow AMALI to use the road inside Wack Wack. However, due to
financial crisis, the project was put on hold. When AMALI resumed the construction,
WWRAI filed a petition for or temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. RTC denied WWRAI’s petition for lack of merit. On appeal, the CA reversed.
Hence, this petition.
Does the CA erred in reversing the decision of the RTC with regard to the granting of
WWRAI’s petition Writ of Preliminary Injunction?
ANSWER:
YES. In settling the issue, the Court ruled that to be entitled to the injunctive writ, the
petitioner must show that: (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2)
this right is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right
is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious and irreparable damage. In the case at bar, WWRAI was unable to
convincingly demonstrate a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected by the
injunctive writ. The apprehensions of its members are, as correctly ruled by the RTC,
speculative and insufficient to substantiate the element of serious and irreparable damage.
People of the Philippines vs. Federico Gerola

831 SCRA 469, July 19, 2017
PROBLEM NO. 13:
The RTC convicted Federico Gerola for a crime of rape. It was alleged that Gerola, through
superior force and intimidation, successfully had carnal knowledge with AAA, who is a
minor, in three different occasions. On appeal with CA, Gerola argued that RTC erred in
accepting the testimonies of AAA despite inconsistencies and contradictions. The CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Are inconsistencies and contradictions in testimonies of a witness in this case is a valid

ground to appeal the conviction of an accused?
9
ANSWER:
NO. In settling the issue, the Court ruled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is
a task most properly within the domain of trial courts. Further, the Court stressed that the
findings of the trial court carry great weight and respect due to the unique opportunity
afforded them to observe the witnesses when placed on the stand. Consequently, appellate
courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court in the absence of facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case. The rule finds
an even more stringent application where the said findings are sustained by the CA. In the
case at bar, since the RTC found the guilt of Gerola beyond reasonable doubt, and it was
affirmed by the appellate court, the notice of appeal before the SC should be dismiss for lack
of merit.
Denmark S. Valmores vs. Dr. Cristina Achacoso and Dr. Giovanni Cabildo
831 SCRA 442, July 19, 2017
PROBLEM NO. 14:
Valmores is a member of member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church and was enrolled as
a first-year student at the MSU. To avoid possible conflict with his academic schedule and
church activities, Valmores wrote a letter to Achacoso, requesting that he be excused from
attending his classes in the event that a regular weekday session is rescheduled to a Saturday.
Valmores stated in his letter that his religion refrains from non-religious undertakings from
sunset of Friday to sunset of Saturday. At the same time, Valmores expressed his willingness
to make up for any missed activity or session due to his absence. In one instance, Valmores
was unable to take the exam of his subject with Cabildo because it was moved on Saturday.
Despite his request for exemption, no accommodation was given by Cabildo. As a result,
Valmores received a failing grade of 5 for that module and was considered ineligible to
retake the exam. Valmores again wrote a letter to Achacoso seeking reconsideration
regarding his situation, reiterating his willingness to take make-up classes or their equivalent
in order to complete the requirements of his course, however, Valmores received no
response. Upon receiving no response from Achaposo, Valmores elevated the matter to the
CHED. The CHED issued a memorandum addressing the issue and ordered the Achapaso to
implement it. The school president ordered the Achapaso to enforce the CHED
Memorandum. Despite the order from the school president, Achapaso still take no action.
After Achapaso failed to act on the CHED memorandum, Valmores filed before the SC a
petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus against respondents and prayed for the
immediate resolution of the dispute. Respondents argued that MSU had other students who
were able to graduate from Med School despite being members of the same Church, thus,
Valmores' case was not unique to merit exceptional treatment.
Is the petition of Valmores before the SC a violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of

courts?
ANSWER:
10
NO. In settling the issue, the Court ruled that although there should be a strict adherence to
the doctrine of judicial hierarchy of courts, such rule is not without exception. A direct resort
before the SC is allowed in the following instances, inter alia: (i) when there are genuine
issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time; (ii) when the
questions involved are dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy or
demanded by the broader interest of justice; and (iii) when the circumstances require an
urgent resolution. In the case at bar, all the above exemptions are present, thus, the petition is
not a violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
People of the Philippines vs. Ruben "Robin" Bongbonga

836 SCRA 596, August 09, 2017
PROBLEM NO. 15:
Ruben Bongbonga was charged with two counts of rape and one count of acts of
lasciviousness for allegedly using force and intimidation to have carnal knowledge with
AAA, a minor. The information for the acts of lasciviousness was filed despite during that
instance, Ruben used force and intimidation to have carnal knowledge with AAA. RCT
found Ruben guilty beyond reasonable doubt on all the charges. On appeal, CA affirmed.
May the court can convict an accused of crime different crimes from the information?
ANSWER:
NO. The Court ruled that it is a basic constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him. In the case at bar, it would be a denial of
appellant's constitutional right to due process if he was charged with acts of lasciviousness,
but subsequent proof suggested rape.
G. Holdings, Inc. vs. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, Inc. (CEPALCO)
841 SCRA 234, September 27, 2017
PROBLEM NO. 16:
CEPALCO won a collection suit against FPI. Before the execution sale of real and personal
properties owned by FPI, GHI filed a civil case against Sheriff Baron, CEPALCO and FPI
for Nullification of Sheriffs Levy on Execution and Auction Sale, Recovery of Possession of
Properties and Damages. GHI claimed that the levied ferro-alloy smelting facility, properties,
and equipment are owned by it as evidenced by a Deed of Assignment. CEPALCO filed its
answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim but failed to pay docket fees. RTC
ruled in favor of CEPALCO. On appeal, GHI argued that CEPALCO failed to pay docket
fees and thus, CEPALCO’s compulsory and cross-claim should have been dismissed. CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC.
11
Will CEPALCO’s compulsory claim be dismissed for non-payment of docket fees?
ANSWER:
NO. In settling the aforementioned issue, the Court ruled that CEPALCO filed its Answer
with Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-claim on April 26, 2004. At that time, CEPALCO
was not yet liable to pay filing fees. Under Rule 141, Section 7, as amended by A.M. No. 04-
2-04-SC, docket fees were required to be paid for compulsory counterclaims and cross-
claims effective only on August 16, 2004.
Privatization and Management Office (PMO) vs. Edgardo V. Quesada, et al.

PROBLEM NO. 17:
Quesadas et. al. filed a petition to surrender a specified TCT over a parcel of land in Quezon
City against the PMO who is allegedly holding such titles. The PMO filed a motion to
dismiss against the petition, on the ground of prescription, among others, but it was denied by
the RTC. This prompted the PMO to file motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, the RTC
issued an order reversing their earlier order and dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Dissatisfied with the foregoing orders, the Quesadas filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
CA, arguing, among others, that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case contrary to its earlier order. The CA
granted the petition.
The PMO filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with the SC. It insisted that
the RTC's Order denying the motion for the reconsideration of the Order dismissing the
original petition was a final order and the remedy available to the Quesadas would have been
to appeal the questioned Order and not to resort to petition for certiorari. On the other hand,
the Quesadas contend that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case, giving them the right to file a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Is the CA correct in giving due course to the petition for certiorari?
ANSWER:
YES. While the Court concedes, as did the CA, that the RTC's Order dismissing the original
petition of the Quesadas on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is a final order that is normally
subject of an appeal, nevertheless the Court finds that the CA did not commit reversible error
when it gave due course to the petition for certiorari and treated the same as an ordinary
appeal.
The settled rule is that an independent action for certiorari may be availed of only when there
is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law and
12
certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal, there are a few significant
exceptions when the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be resorted to despite the
availability of an appeal, namely: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public
policy dictate; (b) when the broader interests of justice so require; (c) when the writs issued
are null, and (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.
Guided by these pronouncements, the Court agrees with the CA that there is sufficient
justification that would merit a deviation from the strict rule of procedure that the special
civil action of certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter
remedy is available, as it was in this case. The petition for certiorari was filed within the
reglementary period within which to file an appeal and the broader interest of justice justifies
the relaxation of the rules.
GMA Network, Inc. vs. National Telecommunications Commission

PROBLEM NO. 18:
Did the NTC commit grave abuse of discretion for imposing fines against GMA for
allegedly operating with an expired Provisional Authority?
ANSWER:
NO. The Court has held that the respondent NTC, being the government agency entrusted
with the regulation of activities coming under its special and technical forte and possessing
the necessary rule-making power to implement its objectives, is in the best position to
interpret its own rules, regulations, and guidelines. The Court has consistently yielded and
accorded great respect to the interpretation by administrative agencies of their own rules
unless there is an error of law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction, or grave abuse of
discretion clearly conflicting with the letter and spirit of the law.
San Fernando Coca-Cola Rank-and-File Union (SACORU) vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers

Philippines, Inc. (CCBPI)
842 SCRA 1, October 04, 2017
PROBLEM NO. 19:
Is the CA vested with the authority to review the factual findings of NLRC?
ANSWER:
YES. This limited review is anchored on the fact that the petition before the CA was a
certiorari petition under Rule 65. As the Court held in Soriano, Jr. v. National Labor
Relations Commission: As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the
13
Rules of Court, the appellate Court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence
upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusion. The query in this
proceeding is limited to whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering its decision. However, as an
exception, the appellate Court may examine and measure the factual findings of the NLRC if
the same is not supported by substantial evidence.
Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO), Region 7

Chapter, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
841 SCRA 524, October 03, 2017
PROBLEM NO. 20:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 challenging the validity of Section 2(e), Rule III
of COMELEC Resolution No. 10015 filed by petitioner PADPAO, which is an association of
licensed security agencies and company security forces under R.A. No. 5487 or the Private
Security Agency Law.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 10015, which outlined the rules and regulations governing
the prohibition on carrying, carrying, or transporting firearms and other lethal weapons, as
well as the employment, availment, or engagement of security personnel or bodyguards
during the election period for the May 2016 National and Local Elections, also known as the
"Gun Ban."
According to OSG, the petition is moot and academic considering Resolution No. 10015 is
no longer in effect since the election period ended on June 8, 2016. Furthermore, petition
under Rule 65 is the incorrect remedy since Resolution No. 10015 was issued in the exercise
of COMELEC's administrative function rather than its quasi-judicial jurisdiction. Even if the
petition for certiorari is valid, it was filed too late by the time. A certiorari petition must be
submitted within 30 days of receiving notice of a resolution, according to Section 3, Rule 64
of the Rules of Court. Resolution No. 10015 was issued on November 13, 2015 and was
published on November 14, 2015.
Is the case moot and academic?
ANSWER:
NO. The case is not moot and academic.
An action is considered “moot” when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because

the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already
been resolved. However, this court has taken cognizance of moot and academic cases when:
(1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involved a situation of
exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues raised required the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the
case was capable of repetition yet evading review.
14
This case falls under the fourth exemption: the case was capable of repetition yet evading
review. For this exception to apply, the following factors must be present: (1) the challenged
action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and
(2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected
to the same action.
People of the Philippines vs. Libera to Pentecostes

844 SCRA 610, November 08, 2017
PROBLEM NO. 21:
S1 had a drinking spree with F, S2, S3, S4 & S5 in the house of F, which lasted until 2 pm on
March 24, 2021. After the drinking, F asked her daughter D to return the borrowed chair to
the house of N1, 200 meters away. S1 went home at 3:00 pm. D was not able to return home.
From around 3:30 pm to 4:30 pm, W1, the 14-year-old cousin of D & W2, the 13-year-old
friend of W1, saw S1 carrying D at his back, heading towards the body of water on the
plantation of W1. W2 greeted S1, but S1 just looked back at them angrily. Later that day, D
was still missing; thus, her father sought the help of some relatives and barangay tanod. The
next day, the lifeless body of D was found near the house of W2. An autopsy performed by a
doctor revealed "asphyxia by submersion" or drowning as the cause of death. The policemen
investigated S1, S2, S3, S4, and S5, which were present in the drinking spree. When it was
S1's turn, he ran away, justifying that he thought the policemen would fire at him. Due to
inconsistent alibi and testimony of S1 on whether he knew or was able to talk with D, the
circumstantial evidence, and the testimonies of the two (2) witnesses, RTC ruled that S1 is
guilty of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery beyond reasonable doubt. It was also
found in S1's record that he was convicted of Robbery with homicide two years ago. RTC's
ruling was affirmed by the CA. S1 filed an appeal with the SC assailing the decisions of the
CA in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged (1)
based on devious circumstantial evidence and (2) despite the absence of motive in the
commission of the crime charged.
Was the CA correct? Decide on the case.
ANSWER:
YES. The CA was correct. The circumstantial evidence sufficiently proves S1's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder. Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is
not indispensable to criminal prosecutions; a contrary rule would render convictions virtually
impossible. By their very nature, most crimes are purposely committed in seclusion and away
from eyewitnesses. Thus, our rules on evidence and jurisprudence allow the conviction of an
accused through circumstantial evidence alone, provided that the following requisites concur:
(i) there is more than one circumstance; (ii) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (iii) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In criminal cases, "proof beyond reasonable doubt"
does not entail absolute certainty that the accused committed the crime, and neither does it
15
exclude the possibility of error. What is only required is that degree of proof which, after a
scrutiny of the facts, produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty of the culpability of
the accused.
Gov. Aurora E. Cerilles vs. Civil Service Commission

846 SCRA 15, November 22, 2017
PROBLEM NO. 22:
The Governor (petitioner) of the original province dismissed 96 tenured employees due to
reorganization when the province was split into two. Since there was no action taken on the
appeals made by the dismissed employees (respondents), they filed an appeal to the CSC
Regional Office. The CSC-RO ordered the reinstatement of the respondents to their former
positions. Unfazed, the Governor elevated the matter to the CA through a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 on the following grounds, inter alia: (i) that the CSC is without
original jurisdiction over protests made by an aggrieved officer or employee during
government reorganization, pursuant to RA 6656, and (ii) that the CSC committed grave
abuse of discretion in affirming the invalidation of the subject appointments. In the CA
Decision, the CA observed that the Governor resorted to the wrong mode of review, the
proper remedy being an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules, which governs appeals from
judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the CSC.
Was the CA correct? Decide on the case.
ANSWER:
YES. The CA is correct.
As a general rule, there must be no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
available in the ordinary course of law in order that petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may
succeed. Hence, where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground
therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
The CA correctly observed that Rule 43 was then an available mode of appeal from the
above CSC resolutions. Section 1 of Rule 43 provides that “this Rule shall apply to appeals
from xxx awards, judgments, final orders, or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-
judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the
Civil Service Commission, xxx. Applying the foregoing, the Court thus finds the Governor's
failure to abide by the elementary requirements of the Rules inexcusable. Repeated
invocation of "grave abuse of discretion" on the part of the CSC was of no moment since the
records failed to demonstrate how an appeal to the CA via Rule 43 was not a plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy as would allow a relaxation of the rules of procedure.
Public Attorney’s Office vs. Office of the Ombudsman

846 SCRA 90, November 22, 2017
16
PROBLEM NO. 23:
Atty. Rivera is a Career Service Employee who began working for the government on July
18, 1978, as Trial Attorney II. Rivera has been promoted to many permanent posts before
being designated Public Attorney V (PA5) for PAO Regional Office No. III as a result of a
presidential appointment on March 8, 2004.
Following Atty. Rivera took over as PA5, and PAO received a Letter and Affidavit dated
August 13, 2004, and August 17, 2004, respectively, from a certain Hazel F. Magabo.
Magabo asserted that, in violation of PAO's internal standards, Atty. Rivera consented to
handle the annulment lawsuit sought by her brother Fayloga and was paid in in staggered
installments for ₱93,000.00. This sum includes funds supplied from abroad by Fayloga as
well as funds directly advanced by Magabo to Atty. Rivera's assurance that these
advancements would hasten Fayloga's annulment. Magabo later found, however, that Atty.
Rivera did not submit a petition on behalf of Fayloga.
Magabo submitted copies of bank slips demonstrating that she made many transfers in varied
amounts to Atty. Rivera. Magabo also produced a payment detail demonstrating that Atty.
Rivera and her secretary both received cash on different dates. Thereafter, the allegations in
Magabo's Letter and Affidavit became subject of a formal administrative complaint filed on
September 28, 2005 against Atty. Rivera for Grave Misconduct and violation of Civil Service
Rules and Regulations (DOJ Proceeding).
Did the Ombudsman act in grave abuse of discretion in the dismissal of the Criminal
Complaints against Atty. Rivera for lack of probable cause?
ANSWER:
NO. The Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it directed the
dismissal of a criminal complaint. According to case law, the assessment of probable cause
against those in public office during a preliminary investigation is a function of the
Ombudsman's Office. The Ombudsman has the authority to decide whether to bring a
criminal prosecution based on the facts and circumstances. It is essentially his prerogative. If
he finds the complaint to be lacking in form or content, he may dismiss it immediately, or he
may proceed with the inquiry if he believes the complaint is in due and appropriate form and
substance.
Angelina Chua and Heirs of Jose Ma. Cheng Sing Phuan vs. Spouses Santiago Cheng and
Avelina Sihiyon
846 SCRA 437, November 22, 2017
PROBLEM NO. 24:
Petitioners orally manifested in open Court that they would be presenting six (6) additional
witnesses in place of replacing one of the two witnesses indicated in the Pre-trial order to
17
present testimonial evidence. These additional witnesses were not among those listed in the
Pre-Trial Order, nor were they identified in the petitioner's Pre-Trial Brief. The RTC issued a
resolution denying the oral motion, which the CA affirmed.
Is the CA correct in affirming the RTC resolution denying Petitioners' oral motion to
present witnesses not listed in the Pre-Trial Order? Decide on the case.
ANSWER:
YES. CA is correct in affirming RTC resolution. Unless the petitioners took the necessary
steps to cause the revision of the Pre-Trial Order to reflect the general reservation in the Pre-
Trial Brief, they are bound with the Pre-Trial Order. The rules governing pre-trial remain
controlling in this case. Under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC paragraph (A)(2)(f) is required to
furnish the Court with copies of the judicial affidavits of their additional witnesses or any
allegations detailing the substance of their respective testimonies. The Court should be
allowed to determine if the presentation of said witnesses is indeed necessary to "ferret out
the whole truth."
Donald Francis Gaffney vs. Gina V. Butler

844 SCRA 570, November 08, 2017
PROBLEM NO. 25:
Donald amended his complaint to implead the estate of Anthony as additional defendant in a
collection case. Elaine filed a Motion to Dismiss, insofar as it relates to the Estate of her late
husband. She added that a claim against an estate of a deceased person is governed by Rule
86 of the Rules of Court. Hence, it cannot be consolidated with an ordinary civil action in
which only natural or juridical persons may be parties pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court.
The RTC denied Elaine’s motion ruling that the inclusion of the estate of Anthony,
represented by Gina, is necessary for a complete relief on the determination of the
controversy, thus she sought relief with the CA. The CA granted Gina’s petition ruling that
the dismissal of the case against Anthony's estate is warranted under Section 1, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court.
Did the RTC err in ruling the case insofar that the inclusion of the estate of the late
Anthony Richard Butler represented by his surviving spouse Gina, is necessary for a
complete relief on the determination or settlement of the controversy raised in the case?
ANSWER:
NO. It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess
of what is being sought by the party. Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is
improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent
notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the
18
proposed relief.
In the present case, clearly, no issue on the dismissal of the entire case was made in the
Motion to Dismiss filed before the RTC and the corresponding petition with the CA. The sole
issue presented was confined to the propriety of the complaint being maintained as against
Anthony’s estate who was impleaded as an additional defendant through the Amended
Complaint.
The complaint against the estate of Anthony, which was impleaded as co-defendant, should
be dismissed. Any cause of action arising from the herein alleged debt against the estate of
Anthony may be brought as a claim against said estate in the proper settlement proceedings.
However, the complaint against the original defendant Gina should remain with the RTC for
trial on the merits.
Editha S. Medina vs. Sps. Nicomedes and Brigida Lozada

G.R No. 185303, August 1, 2018
PROBLEM NO. 26:
A complaint was filed by Mrs. E against Spouses Lozada, but Mrs. E failed to append a copy
to her instant petition. A motion to dismiss was filed by the defendant spouses on the grounds
that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment; plaintiffs have absolutely no cause of
action; the court has no more jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action; plaintiffs and
their counsel are guilty of blatant forum shopping; and the action has prescribed. Mrs. E filed
her opposition.
The RTC Judge ordered to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata. Thus, Mrs. E filed
a petition for certiorari before the CA but was dismissed ruling that an appeal is the proper
remedy to elevate final orders as provided under Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Did the CA err in dismissing the petition for review by certiorari under Rule 65?
Explain.
ANSWER:
NO. Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (Rules) mandates that appeal is the remedy
with respect to a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case; and a petit ion
for certiorari is unavailable if there is appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law pursuant to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules.
In the case at bar, the assailed Orders dismissing the Complaint on the ground of res judicata
and denying the Motion for Reconsideration are final orders and completely dispose of the
case. An appeal, and not a special civil action for certiorari, is the correct remedy to elevate
said final orders. The instant Petition for Certiorari cannot be used by petitioners as a
substitute for a lost appeal. Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, the
19
petition may be dismissed outright.
Note: Under Section 12(a), Rule 15 of the 2019 Amended Rules of Court, a motion to
dismiss is a prohibited pleading except on the following grounds: (i) lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter; (ii) res judicata; (iii) litis pendentia; and (iv) prescription.
Heirs of Geminiano Francisco vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 215599, November 28, 2018
PROBLEM NO. 27:
Hanabanana filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance of Real Property and
damages against Applepie before the RTC. The RTC dismissed the case due to insufficiency
of evidence and because the action filed is not the proper remedy available to the plaintiff
based on the facts and circumstances as presented. Thus, Hanabanana filed an appeal with the
CA. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. However, as claimed by Hanabanana,
he received the copy of the decision dated August 19, 2013 on September 30, 2013.
Therefore, they were only able to file their Motion for Reconsideration on October 15, 2013
via courier service. However, the CA found in the assailed Resolution that Hanabanana’s
Motion for Reconsideration was filed only on December 6, 2013.
The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration for being filed beyond reglementary period.
Thus, Hanabanana filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing
the resolution of the CA.
Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion?
ANSWER:
NO. Being a Rule 65 Petition, Hanabanana alleges that the CA acted in a capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. In order for a Certiorari petition to prosper, the abuse of discretion
alleged must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.
In this case, the CA did not commit a grave abuse of discretion. First and foremost, filing via
courier service is not allowed by the Rules of Court. Only two modes of filing are allowed by
the courts: by personal filing, or by registered mail. Moreover, according to Rule 52 of the
Rules of Court, as well as Rule 7 of the 2002 Internal Rules of the CA, a party may file a
motion for reconsideration on a judgment or final resolution issued by the appellate court
only within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof, with proof of service on the adverse party.
As they received the copy of the CA’s decision on September 30, 2013, he had until October
16, 2013 to file their Motion for Reconsideration. However, he only filed his Motion for
Reconsideration almost two (2) months after October 16, 2013.
20
Basic is the rule in evidence that the burden of proof lies upon him who asserts it. In this
case, the Heirs of Hanabanana had the burden to refute the CA’s finding that the Motion for
Reconsideration was filed out of time on December 6, 2013, and substantiate their claim that
the said pleading was filed on October 16, 2013. However, Hanabanana failed to present
evidence that supported his claim. Therefore, the CA merely followed the law in its ruling.
Note: Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the 2019 Amended Rules of Court, filing of pleadings and
other court submissions shall be made by: (a) personal filing; or (b) sending them by
registered mail; or (c) sending them by “accredited” courier; or (d) transmitting them by
electronic mail or other electronic means as may be authorized by the court in places where
the court is electronically equipped. To emphasize, the courier service is required to be
“accredited.”
People of the Philippines vs. Mario Bulutano

G.R. No. 232649, November 28, 2018
PROBLEM NO. 28:
Super Mario pleaded "not guilty" to the murder of Koopa during the arraignment while his
co-accused Luigi remained at large. He denied any involvement but claimed that his co-
accused is the sole proprietor. However, the RTC found Super Mario GUILTY Beyond
Reasonable Doubt of the crime of murder finding the positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses that Luigi hit Koopa on the head first, then Super Mario hit the said
victim on the head subsequently as he sprawled to the ground, sufficient to convict Super
Mario of the crime charged. The RTC also did not believe Bulutano's allegation that the
foregoing witnesses only testified because they harbored ill feelings against him for their
supposed basketball rivalry.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s conviction and held that the prosecution was able to sufficiently
prove the elements of the crime charged and the element of treachery were present in the
killing of Koopa. The CA held that the supposed inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies that Super Mario was harping on involved only trivial matters that were, by
themselves, insufficient to affect the finding of guilt as to the commission of the crime.
Did the CA err in convicting Super Mario?
ANSWER:
NO. It is well-settled that in the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and substance
that would affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings
of the trial court. Thus, when the case pivots on the issue of the credibility of the witnesses,
the findings of the trial courts necessarily carry great weight and respect as they are afforded
the unique opportunity to ascertain the demeanor and sincerity of witnesses during a trial.
While there appear to be some inconsistencies in the relevant portions of the testimonies of
the prosecution’s witnesses, which Super Mario claims to have impaired their credibility, a
21
simple review of the transcripts reveals that the alleged inconsistencies are trivial matters
pertaining to details of immaterial nature that do not tend to diminish the probative value of
the testimonies at issue.
Atty. Berteni C. Causing and Percival Carag Mabasa vs. Presiding Judge Jose Lorenzo R.
Dela Rosa
OCA IPI No. 17-4663-Rtj, March 07, 2018
PROBLEM NO. 29:
Atty. B and his client filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC of Manila presided
by Judge Y after the complainants alleged that the libel cases were dismissed by former
Judge X. Judge Y granted the motion for Reconsideration holding that the questioned order
has not attained finality so double jeopardy has not yet attached.
Atty. B and his client questioned Judge Y’s decision arguing that the granting the motion for
Reconsideration was tantamount to a violation of Atty. B’s client’s constitutional right
against double jeopardy. He also criticized Judge Y’s act of referring Atty B’s separate posts
on his social media accounts about the subject criminal cases to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Atty. B contended that Judge Y should have required Atty. B to show cause why
he should not be cited in contempt for publicizing and taking his posts to social media. He
also emphasized that the posts were presented using decent words thus it was incorrect for
Judge Y to refer his actions to a disciplinary body such as the IBP.
The OCA recommended that the administrative complaint against Judge Y be dismissed for
lack of merit. Although it also held that Judge Y cannot just exercise his contempt powers on
a whim, if not haphazardly, if he believes that he has other remedies to resort to.
Was the recommendation of the OCA correct?
ANSWER:
YES. In the case of Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management Association

of the Philippines, the judges’ power to punish contempt must be exercised judiciously and
sparingly and not for retaliation or vindictiveness, viz:
“The powers to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in order
to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. As
judges, we ought to exercise our power to punish contempt judiciously and sparingly, with
utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing the power for the correction and
preservation of the dignity of the Court, not for retaliation or vindictiveness.”
Judge Y’s act of referring the matter to the IBP, an independent tribunal who exercises
disciplinary powers over lawyers, was a prudent and proper action to take for a trial court
judge.
22
Tee Ling Kiat vs. Ayala Corporation
G.R. No. 192530, March 07, 2018
PROBLEM NO. 30:
XYZ Corporation instituted a Complaint for Sum of Money with an application for a writ of
attachment against the Spouses BC. The RTC of Makati ruled in favor of XYZ Corporation
and issued a writ of execution against the Spouses BC. A Notice of Levy on Execution was
issued to levy upon the rights, claims, shares, interest, title, and participation that the Spouses
BC may have in parcels of land. The parcels of land were registered in the name of Vonnel
Industrial Park, Inc. (VIP).
Mr. D, a Third-Party Claimant alleging that Mr. BC is no longer a stockholder of VIP and
that he acquired knowledge of the levy on the subject properties only through a newspaper
ad, as well as the photocopy of canceled checks issued by him on Mr. B’s favor as payment
for the purchase of the latter’s shares in the VIP. The RTC disallowed the third-party claim
because the alleged sale of shares of stock from Mr. BC to Mr. D was not proven since it was
not recorded in the stock and transfer books of VIP, as required by Sec. 63 of the Corporation
Code. Mr. D’s Motion for Reconsideration was also denied which prompted him to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, this was denied by the CA on the ground that
Mr. D is not a real party in interest.
Is Mr. D a real party-in-interest?
ANSWER:
NO. Mr. D is not a real party-in-interest. Under Section 2 of Rule 3, a real party in interest is
a party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party who is
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise allowed by law or these Rules, every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. In this case, the
records show that the purported transaction between Mr. D and Mr. BC has never been
recorded in VIP's corporate books. Even if it could be assumed that the sales of shares of
stock contained in the photocopies had indeed transpired, such transfer is only valid to the
parties there but is not binding on the corporation. The transfer, not having been recorded in
the corporate books in accordance with the law, is not valid or binding to the corporation or
third persons. Thus, he does not stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
nor the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Maria Lourdes Sereno (Dissenting Opinion)

G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
PROBLEM NO. 31:
The respondent argues that the Court has no jurisdiction to oust an impeachable officer
23
through a petition for quo warranto; that the official acts of the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) and the President involves political questions that cannot be annulled, absent any
allegation of grave abuse of discretion; that the petition for quo warranto is time-barred; and
that respondent is a person of proven integrity.
Does the SC have jurisdiction over the case?
ANSWER:
YES. Under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, the SC shall have the power to
exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus. Section 5 of Article VIII does not limit the Court's jurisdiction on quo warranto
petitions to certain enumerated public officials, hence it has jurisdiction over impeachable
officials like the respondent.
This is not the first time the Court took cognizance of a quo warranto petition against an
impeachable officer. In the consolidated cases of Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo and Estrada
v. Desierto, the Court assumed jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition that challenged
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's title to the presidency.
Consolidated Distillers of the Far East, Inc. vs. Rogel N. Zaragoza

G.R. No. 229302, June 20, 2018
PROBLEM NO. 32:
After the finality of the decision, Rogel moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution
against Condis for his reinstatement and payment of backwages, accrued salaries, and
allowances. The Labor Arbiter granted Rogel’s Motion and added additional amounts not in
the previous LA decision.
Did the LA’s award violate the rule on immutability of final judgments?
ANSWER:
YES. The Court held in the case of Bani Rural Bank, Inc. v. De Guzman that as a rule, a final
judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment
or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law and regardless of what court, be it the highest Court of the land, rendered it. Any attempt
on the part of the entities charged with the execution of a final judgment to insert, change or
add matters not clearly contemplated in the dispositive portion violates the rule on
immutability of judgments. Thus, having attained finality, the LA, during execution
proceedings, cannot add other incentives to the computation.
24
Stephen I. Juego-Sakai vs. Republic of the Philippines (Separate Concurring Opinion)
G.R No. 224015, July 23, 2018
PROBLEM NO. 33:
Stephen Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married in Japan pursuant to the wedding rites
therein. After 2 years, the parties, by agreement, obtained a divorce decree in said country
dissolving their marriage. Petitioner filed a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment before the RTC. The RTC granted the petition and recognized the divorce between
the parties as valid and effective under Philippine Laws. However, the CA held that said
foreign divorce shall not be recognized under the Philippine Law since the divorce herein
was consensual in nature, obtained by agreement of the parties, and not by Sakai alone, and
that the petitioner failed to present authenticated copies of the Civil Code of Japan, hence
fatal to her cause.
Is the failure of the petitioner to present authenticated copies fatal to her cause?
ANSWER:
YES. The Court held that the starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment
is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws. This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under
our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of
the judgment on the alien himself or herself. Since both the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be
official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court applies.
Thus, what is required is proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in
the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The OSG does not dispute the existence of the divorce decree, rendering the same
admissible. What remains to be proven, therefore, is the pertinent Japanese Law on divorce
considering that Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters
that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.
Note: Section 24, Rule 132 of the 2019 Amended Rules of Court further added that “a
document that is accompanied by a certificate or its equivalent may be presented in evidence
without further proof, the certificate being a prima facie evidence of the due execution and
genuineness of the document involved.
Michael V. Racion vs. MST Marine Services Philippines, Inc.

G.R. No. 219291, July 04, 2018
25
PROBLEM NO. 34:
Racion was hired by MST Marine. During his employment, Racion suffered an accidental
fall and was found to have suffered from a left knee ligament strain. He was subsequently
repatriated on medical grounds and filed a complaint. The NLRC directed the MST Marine
to pay Racion the amount of ₱50,000.00 as financial assistance. Racion then filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA questioning the NLRC's decision. But the CA outrightly
dismissed the petition on the ground that it was Racion’s Counsel who signed the certificate
on non-forum shopping, without authority from petitioner through a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA), and without any explanation for petitioner's failure to execute the certificate.
The CA also ruled that petitioner failed to comply with paragraph 1, Section 3, Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court when he failed to indicate his own actual address and that of respondent.
Is the CA’s outright dismissal, correct?
ANSWER:
YES. The Court ruled that certiorari is an extraordinary, prerogative remedy and is never
issued as a matter of right. Accordingly, the party who seeks to avail of it must strictly
observe the rules laid down by law.
Further, the acceptance of a petition for certiorari as well as the grant of due course thereto is,
in general, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Although the court has absolute
discretion to reject and dismiss a petition for certiorari, it does so only (1) when the petition
fails to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion by any court, agency, or branch of the
government; or (2) when there are procedural errors, like violations of the Rules of Court or
SC Circulars. The dismissal of petition for certiorari was correct as it was beset with
procedural errors arising from violations of the Rules of Court.
First, Racion failed to execute a certificate of non-forum shopping. Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court directs that a petition should be accompanied by a certificate of non-forum
shopping in accordance with Section 3, Rule 46. The execution of the certificate by Racion’s
counsel is a defective certification, which amounts to non-compliance with the requirement
of a certificate of non-forum shopping. Second, Racion also failed to comply with the
requirement in Section 3, Rule 46 when he failed to indicate his own actual address and that
of the respondent.
The Court reiterate that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because
their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all
rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not proportionate with the degree of
his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
Note: In the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 2019 Amended Rules of Court,
generally, failure to comply with the (certification against forum shopping) requirement shall
not be curable by mere amendment xxx but shall cause the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.
26
Compare this with the rule under the last paragraph of Sec. 3, Rule 46 that “the failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements (i.e. sworn certification that he
has not commenced any other motion involving the same issues) shall be sufficient ground
for dismissal.” This provision in Rule 46 does not require motion and hearing.
People of the Philippines vs. Nova De Leon

G.R. No. 214472, November 28, 2018
PROBLEM NO. 35:
The accused-appellant De Leon was charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. During their
operation, they approached the suspect and the exchange of the buy-bust money and illegal
drugs was successful. They subsequently arrested the suspect and recovered the money and
illegal drugs in the suspect’s possession. SPO1 Alegro placed the markings "AA" on the
recovered evidence in his custody, which stand for the initials of his name and the date of
arrest, and he likewise prepared the inventory of recovered/seized evidence, but he was not
able to include the buy-bust money in the inventory at the time the pictures were taken,
because he was focused on the shabu. This was signed by the Tanod as witness. The
prosecution argues that the police officers are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner.
Is the prosecution correct?
ANSWER:
NO. The prosecution was not able to overcome the presumption of innocence of accused-
appellant De Leon.
Section 21 Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must strictly follow to preserve
the integrity of the confiscated drugs and/or paraphernalia used as evidence. The provision
requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure
or confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the
presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official,
(c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice
(DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
The apprehending police officers failed to even acknowledge such procedural lapse and
provide a reasonable explanation why they did not proceed to the nearest police station for
the physical inventory and photographing of the illegal drug allegedly seized from accused-
appellant De Leon. Further, the police officers failed to comply with the mandatory three (3)-
witness rule. As SPO1 Lumabao, the poseur-buyer himself, testified, the marking, inventory
and photographing of the seized drug were witnessed only by a Barangay Tanod. Moreover,
27
records do not show that the prosecution was able to establish a justifiable ground as to why
the police officers were not able to secure the presence of the DOJ and media representatives.
The accused-appellant is acquitted of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Note: R.A. No. 9165, as amended, now requires the three-witness rule, namely: (a) accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, with (b) an elected public official and (c) a representative of the
National Prosecution Service or the media, who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
SM Investments Corporation vs. Mac Graphics Carranz International Corp

G.R. Nos. 224131-32, June 25, 2018
PROBLEM NO. 36:
Kool Brand, which is engaged in advertising and operation of billboards, entered into a
Contract of Lease with Carmine Corp for exclusive use of the latter's billboard sites for a
period of 20 years. The contract stipulates that should Kool Brand fail to obtain the necessary
permits and licenses to legally conduct its business in the leased premises, Carmine Corp
may pre-terminate the contract immediately. Carmine Corp sent a letter to Kool Brand
terminating the lease contract effective immediately because of the latter's alleged failure to
obtain the relevant MMDA and LGU permits and to obtain a comprehensive all-risk property
insurance for the sites.
Carmine Corp then removed Kool Brand’s billboards and other advertising media installed
and prevented Kool Brand from entering the leased premises. Kool Brand objected to this
and demanded for Carmine Corp to cease and desist from further infringing upon its rights
under the lease contract. Kool Brand then filed before the RTC a "Permanent Injunction and
Declaration of Subsistence of Contract; Damages with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction" against Carmine Corp. The RTC
granted the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, in favor of Kool Brand.
Is the RTC correct in granting the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction?

Explain.
ANSWER:
NO. As defined by Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary injunction is an

order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to judgment or final order,
requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts or
require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a
preliminary mandatory injunction. To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the petitioner must
show that: (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is
directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material
and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
28
serious and irreparable damage.
Here, any damage petitioner may suffer is easily subject to mathematical computation and, if
proven, is fully compensable by damages. Thus, a preliminary injunction is not warranted.
Given the foregoing, Kool Brand has failed to establish prima facie a right in esse or a clear
and unmistakable right, rendering the issuance of the writ improper. The non-compliance of
the licenses/permits and insurance stipulations by Kool Brand is undisputed. The right being
claimed by Kool Brand is substantially challenged or contradicted by Carmine Corp—a
doubt exists whether Mac Graphics is entitled to the final relief sought by it.
Pillars Property Corporation vs. Century Communities Corporation

G.R. No. 201021, March 04, 2019
PROBLEM NO. 37:
Pillars Property Corporation filed a Complaint for sum of money against Century
Communities Corporation in the amount of ₱6.7 million for unpaid progress billings in
connection with a construction contract where PPC agreed to deliver 210 housing units at
"Canyon Ranch" in Cavite, among others to CCC at an agreed total consideration of ₱77.5
million. CCC moved for the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground that the venue was
improperly laid. RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by PPC. PPC then filed
before the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules seeking the setting aside of
the Orders for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or
excess of jurisdiction and there being no appeal, or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. The CA dismissed PPC's petition outright.
The CA reasoned that PPC availed of the wrong remedy since it is the settled rule that an
order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order and the remedy of the plaintiff is to
appeal the order.
Is the remedy availed of by PPC erroneous?
ANSWER:
NO. PPC availed the correct remedy consequently the CA was not correct when it outrightly
dismissed the petition. Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an appeal may be taken from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein
when declared by these Rules to be appealable. An order dismissing an action without
prejudice is, thus, not subject to appeal but is reviewable by a Rule 65 certiorari petition.
Citing the case of Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Carpio, the Court held provides
that when the case was dismissed due to improper venue, the respondents could not have
appealed the order of dismissal as the same was a dismissal, without prejudice. Section 1(h),
Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that no appeal may be taken from an order
dismissing an action without prejudice. Indeed, there is no residual jurisdiction to speak of
29
where no appeal has even been filed.
Asuncion Y. Ariñola vs. Angeles D. Almodiel, Jr.

A.M. No. P-19-3925, January 07, 2019
PROBLEM NO. 38:
Four (4) months having lapsed since the MTCC issued the above order directing Respondent
Sheriff to proceed with the enforcement of the execution, no action had yet been taken.
Complainant sent a letter to the Judge of MTCC calling the attention of the court to
Respondent Sheriff’s inaction on the writ of execution. Notably, by then, two years had
already lapsed since Complainant had obtained a favorable judgment from the MTCC and
the Writ of Execution enforcing the judgment had been issued. Despite the letter, no action
was taken on the enforcement of the writ, leading Complainant to file the present
administrative complaint against Respondent Sheriff.
Is failure to comply with the rules on execution of judgment tantamount to neglect of

duty?
ANSWER:
YES. A judgment, if not executed, would be an empty victory on the part of the prevailing
party; and sheriffs are the ones primarily responsible for the execution of final judgments.
Thus, they are expected at all times to show a high degree of professionalism in the
performance of their duties. Accordingly, disregard of the rules on execution of judgment is
tantamount to neglect of duty.
Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court mandates the sheriff to make a return on the writ of
execution to the Clerk or Judge issuing the Writ. Specifically, a sheriff is required: (1) to
make a return and submit it to the court immediately upon satisfaction in part or in full of the
judgment; and (2) if judgment cannot be satisfied in full, to state why full satisfaction cannot
be made. As well, the sheriff is required to make a report every thirty (30) days in the
proceedings being undertaken by him until judgment is fully satisfied.
Respondent Sheriff failed to do both. He neither fully enforced the judgment nor submitted
his Sheriff’s Report.
Fil-Estate Management, Inc., et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 192393, March 27, 2019
PROBLEM NO. 39:
Petitioners want the Court to review the evidence that they adduced before the RTC on their
claim that the parcels of land applied for by the Spouses Go overlap with their Torrens titles.
In their comment, the OSG posits that the Rule 45 Petition is improper since it will make the
30
Court a trier of facts. The review of the issue of overlapping entails examination of facts or
the evidence on record.
Is the petition of the petitioners valid?
ANSWER:
NO. As provided in Section 6, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a review by the Court is not a
matter of right, but of its sound discretion, and will be granted only when there are special
and important reasons therefor. Petitioners have failed to convince the Court that the RTC
and the CA have decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the Court, or
have decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of
the Court, or have so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings
as to call for an exercise of the Court’s power of supervision.
Also, the Court cannot accord the desired review due to the failure of petitioners to cite the
applicable recognized exceptions to the settled rule that the Court, not being a trier of facts, is
under no obligation to examine, winnow, and weigh anew evidence adduced.
Paz Mandin-Trotin vs. Francisco A. Bongo, et al.

G.R No. 212840, August 28, 2019
PROBLEM NO. 40:
Rather than questioning the correctness of the CA’s ruling on its finding that the Deed of
Conditional Sale is a contract to sell and not a contract of sale, intervenor Trotin wants the
Court to consider the “relevant facts and documents” referred to and cited in her Affidavit of
Merit in support of her argument that the DCS was novated when the condition to pay the
balance within two months was changed to when the Adverse Claim of the Heirs of
Diosdado Bongo would be resolved and finally to after the civil case against respondents was
terminated.
Is the contention of the petitioners valid?
ANSWER:
NO. Intervenor Trotin is precluded in a Rule 45 certiorari petition to raise factual issues.
Section 1 of Rule 45 is unmistakable: “The petition shall raise only questions of law, which
must be distinctly set forth.” For her novation theory to be sustained, the Court will have to
do a factual review. While certain exceptions are allowed, intervenor Trotin unfortunately
fails to cite the relevant exceptions to sustain her plea for the Court to make a factual review.
D.M. Consunji, Inc. vs. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 233339 February 13, 2019
31
PROBLEM NO. 41:
D.M. Consunji, Inc. (DMCI) filed an application for registration of title over a parcel of land
which they averred to have been acquired from Filomena D. San Pedro by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale. Julian Cruz filed an opposition to the application claiming that he is the owner
of the subject parcel of land. The MeTC denied the application on the ground that DMCI
failed to prove its actual possession of the property and the possession of its predecessors-in-
interest. DMCI filed a MR and granted by MeTC.
On appeal to the CA, the CA held that DMCI failed to prove the following requisites under
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529 for land registration or judicial
confirmation of incomplete or imperfect title. Hence, DCMI filed the instant petition via Rule
45. However, DMCI has not directly pointed to any of the exceptions where the Court may
review the findings of fact of the CA in a Rule 45 certiorari.
Is the court allowed to make a fact-check?
ANSWER:
YES. Under the Rules, a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions
of law and a review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be
granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. DMCI has not directly
pointed to any of the exceptions where the Court may review the findings of fact of the CA in
a Rule 45 certiorari petition. However, based on its arguments, it appears that DMCI is
invoking the MeTC’s Order wherein it stated that the issue on the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession since June 12, 1945 by DMCI and its predecessors-in-
interest was testified on. But since the findings of fact of the trial court are at odds with those
of the CA, the Court is allowed to make a fact-check.
Victoria T. Fajardo vs. Belen Cua-Malate

G.R. No. 213666 March 27, 2019
PROBLEM NO. 42:
Belen filed an Amended Complaint for Partition and Accounting with Damages (Amended
Complaint) against her siblings praying for the partition and distribution of their mother’s
(Cerefina) entire estate.
The case was referred to mediation. They later arrived at an agreement on the manner of
partition of Cerefina’s estate. A meeting was then scheduled for the signing of the document
entitled Compromise Agreement, which reduced into writing the prior agreement reached by
the parties during the mediation conferences; however, petitioner Victoria did not appear,
while all her other siblings appeared. Respondent Belen and the other siblings proceeded to
sign the Compromise Agreement and submitted the same before the RTC which was
approved. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Victoria appealed the RTC's Decision before the CA.
Both the RTC and CA factually found that the parties most definitely came to terms as to the
32
partition of Ceferina's estate even prior to the translation of the agreement into written form.
There was already a valid and binding oral partition that was agreed upon by the parties.
The petitioner herein then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
Are the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts binding on the Court?
ANSWER:
YES. As a rule, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, the SC does not pass upon
questions of fact as the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are binding on the
SC. The Court is not a trier of facts. Hence, to disprove the factual findings of the RTC and
CA that there was already a valid and binding agreement that was entered into by the parties
during the mediation conferences before the PMC, it was incumbent on the part of petitioner
Victoria to provide clear and convincing evidence to substantiate her claim that she never
reached an agreement with her siblings as to the partition of their late mother’s estate during
the mediation conferences.
Heirs of Leonarda Nadela Tomakin vs. Heirs of Celestino Navares

G.R. No. 223624 July 17, 2019
PROBLEM NO. 43:
The heirs of Celestino Navares filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and Damages against the
heirs of Nadela Tomakin before the RTC for an alleged fraudulent issuance of title in favor
of the latter over a parcel of land. The trial court ruled in favor of Tomankin, finding that the
heirs of Navares failed to prove that they are the rightful owners of the property in dispute for
not showing if they complied with the condition set in the Deed of Sale.
The heirs of Navares filed an appeal with the CA which granted the same. It disagreed with
the trial court in that the Deed of Sale did not specifically provide that non-fulfillment of the
condition therein would prevent the transfer of ownership of the property to Navares. When
their MR was denied, the heirs of Tomankin filed a Rule 45 petition.
Is the petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court properly availed of in this case?
ANSWER:
NO. Review by the SC via a Rule 45 certiorari petition is not a matter of right but involves
sound judicial discretion because it will be granted only when there are special and important
reasons therefor. Petitioners Tomakin have failed to convince the SC that their petition is
justified by special and important reasons to warrant the granting thereof.
33
The grounds relied upon by petitioners Tomakin in the petition are the very same arguments
that they raised in their Motion for Reconsideration before the CA, which the latter found to
be without merit in its Resolution.
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, Princess Cruise Lines Ltd., and/or Gary M. Castillo vs.
Allan F. Buico
G.R. No. 230901, December 5, 2019
PROBLEM NO. 44:
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, a local manning agency, on behalf of its principal,

petitioner Princess Cruise Lines Ltd., entered into a contract of employment with respondent
Allan F. Buico as Second Pantryman aboard the vessel Star Princess. While on board, Buico
met an accident which caused him an injury on his right leg and ankle. He was repatriated to
the Philippines for further treatment. After examinations and undergoing several therapies,
Buico was diagnosed unfit to perform sea duty in whatever capacity with a permanent
disability status. Buico then filed a Complaint 16 with the Labor Arbiter (LA) against
petitioners for permanent and total disability benefits.
The LA rendered a decision, ordering petitioner Magsaysay Maritime Corp and Gary M.
Castillo to jointly and severally pay Buico disability benefit in the amount of US$10,075 or
in its Philippine Peso equivalent at the time of payment and all other claims were dismissed
for lack of merit.
Buico appealed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and reversed the
LA's findings; hence, petitioners filed a Rule 65 petition with the CA.
CA denied the petition and affirmed the NLRC rulings finding Buico entitled to permanent
and total disability benefits. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this was
denied; hence, they filed the instant Petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before the
Court.
Can the SC, in a petition under Rule 45, delve into factual questions or to an evaluation
of evidence submitted by the parties?
ANSWER:
YES. It is important to note that a Rule 45 review by the SC in labor cases generally does not
delve into factual questions or to an evaluation of the evidence submitted by the parties.
However, one exception to this rule is when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts.
Such exception applies in the instant case because, contrary to the findings of the NLRC and
the CA, the company-designated physician had issued a final, accurate, and precise disability
grading within the prescribed statutory periods. Hence, Buico is not entitled to the award of
total and permanent disability benefits.
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Karen Nuñez Vito, Lynette Nuñez Masinda, Warren Nuñez, and Alden Nuñez vs. Norma
Moises-Palma
G.R. No. 224466, March 27, 2019
PROBLEM NO. 45:
Vicentico Nuñez (Nuñez), due to suffering from diabetes, borrowed ₱30,000 from Rosita
Moises (Rosita) which was secured by a real estate mortgage of his property. Since Rosita
had no money, the funds came from Norma Moises-Palma (Norma), Rosita’s daughter. The
loan was subsequently paid.
When Nuñez died, the subject property was transmitted to his heirs. Norma thereafter was
able to acquire all, except Alden’s, signatures on a Deed of Adjudication and Sale (DAS)
over the heirs’ respective shares of the property. Norma paid using a promissory note.
Despite nonpayment of the purchase price and the absence of Alden’s signature on the DAS,
Norma was able to cause the registration of the document and was issued a TCT.
Thereafter, Alden instituted a case against respondent for Annulment of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-35460, Declaring Deed of Adjudication and Sale Null and Void, Partition,
Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of a Portion of Land with Damages with the
MTC, which ruled in their favor. Norma appealed to the RTC.
The RTC granted Norma’s appeal, so the heirs of Nuñez filed a petition for review under
Rule 42 before the CA, which affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification. The
matter was then elevated to the SC as a question of law under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
May the case be elevated before the SC as a question of law under Rule 45 because the
ruling of the RTC and the CA was contradictory?
ANSWER:
YES. The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 petition for
certiorari. There are, however, admitted exceptions. One of them is when the findings of the
CA are contrary to the trial court. Indeed, the findings of the CA and the RTC with respect to
the DAS dated June 28, 1995, are contradictory, requiring a review of their factual findings.
Wilfredo Cabuguas, Renato Cabuguas, Alejandro "Taboy" Canete and Eleazar Mortos vs.
Gallants Tan Nery
G.R. No. 219915, April 3, 2019
PROBLEM NO. 46:
Gallant S. Tan Nery filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession of Real Property and
Ejectment before the DARAB, Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator against
35
Wilfredo Cabuguas, Renata Cabuguas, Taboy Canete and Eleazar Mortus involving a parcel
of land. The adjudicator ruled in favor of Nery, but the DARAB-Central reversed the
decision on appeal.
Thus, Nery appealed the case to the CA which reinstated the Provincial Adjudicator's
decision. When the MR was denied, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court was filed with the SC.
However, it appears that the petitioners herein had commenced a separate action to assail the
CLOA of respondent Nery, and it would also appear that the action as decided in favor of
petitioners and that it has become final and executory. Since the Certificate of Finality
attached by the petitioners is not a certified true copy, the determination of its validity and its
effect on this case is a factual matter that the SC cannot determine. Thus, the case will be
remanded to the CA.
May the SC remand a case to the CA for determination of facts in a given case?
ANSWER:
YES. Generally, the CA has the authority to review findings of fact. Its conclusions as to
findings of fact are generally accorded great respect by the SC. It is a body that is fully
capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating factual matters, including
documentary evidence. Hence, pursuant to Rules 32 and 46 of the Rules of Court, and
consistent with the Court's ruling in Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, the current
case is remanded to the CA.
Simeona Prescila, et. al. vs. Conrado Lasquite

G.R. No. 205805, September 25, 2019
PROBLEM NO. 47:
Petitioners Prescilla, et al. claimed to be the tillers of parcels of land designated as Lot No.
3050 (subject property) and Lot No. 3052 located at Barrio Ampid, San Mateo. According to
petitioners Prescilla, et al., they have been in possession in concepto de dueno of the subject
property since 1940, planting and cultivating crops thereon. However, it was alleged that the
respondents Lasquite and Andrade were able to fraudulently obtain original certificate of
titles covering the subject properties.
The RTC rendered its Decision which, while upholding petitioners Prescilla, et al.'s right of
ownership over Lot No. 3052, upheld the respondents Lasquite and Andrade's rights of
ownership over the subject property. Petitioners Prescilla, et al., interposed their respective
appeals before the CA, Eighth Division. In its Decision, the CA, Eighth Division annulled
and set aside the RTC's Decision.
On the other hand, instead of filing a motion for reconsideration, respondents Lasquite and
Andrade resorted to a different remedy and decided to directly file a Petition for Review on
36
Certiorari before the Court. Upon knowledge of this fact, the CA, Eighth Division issued a
Resolution which suspended the proceedings and the resolution of petitioners Prescilla, et
al.’s Motion for Reconsideration until respondents Lasquite and Andrade’s appeal has been
resolved by the Court.
Was the CA correct in suspending of the MR of the petitioners?
ANSWER:
NO. There is nothing in the Rules of Court that mandates, or even allows, the appellate
courts to suspend the resolution of a party’s motion for reconsideration on account of a co-
party’s appeal before the SC.
Otherwise stated, when the trial court or appellate court issues a judgment or final resolution
in a case involving several parties, the right of one party to file a motion for reconsideration
or appeal is not hinged on the motion for reconsideration or appeal of the other party.
Effectively, by failing to resolve their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners Prescilla, et al.
were prevented from exercising their right to appeal. Subjecting petitioners Prescilla, et al. to
a judgment that they had no opportunity to appeal from due to no fault of their own smacks
of violation of due process. The present problem could have been avoided if only the CA,
Eighth Division expediently resolved petitioners Precilla, et al.’s Motion for Reconsideration,
which has already been languishing for decades. This would have allowed petitioners
Prescilla, et al., to appeal before the Court. Then, the Court could have consolidated the
appeals of petitioners Prescilla, et al., and respondents Lasquite and Andrade and the
question of ownership could have been settled comprehensively and definitively. The Court
stresses that the objective of the rules of procedure is to secure the just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Roguza Development Corporation

G.R. No. 199705, April 3, 2019
PROBLEM NO. 48:
A Complaint was filed by RDC before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC) demanding payment of ₱67,639,576.55, representing the balance of its original claim
against DPWH. CIAC rendered the Arbitral Award entitling RDC to recover additional
compensation amounting to ₱22,409,500.00. RDC filed first and second motions for
reconsideration, but both were denied.
Subsequently, DPWH filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43, seeking the
reversal of the Arbitral Award which was granted by the 7th Division of CA. Meanwhile,
RDC filed a petition for review before the CA via Rule 43. RDC’s CA Petition proceeded
independent of DPWH's CA Petition, which had already been pending with another division
of the same court.
37
The CA 17th Division granted RDC’s petition by affirming with modification the Arbitral
Ruling, requiring the DPWH to pay RDC the sum of ₱61,748,346.00. DPWH filed a motion
for reconsideration which was denied.
However, months prior to the issuance of the CA 17th Division’s assailed Decision, the CA
7th Division already issued its own Decision granting DPWH’s CA Petition, RDC filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA 7th Division. This denial was no
longer appealed by RDC.
Is the decision of the CA 17th Division correct? Explain.
ANSWER:
NO. The decision of the CA 17th Division is not correct. In this case, the decision of the CA
7th Division already became final even before the issuance of the assailed decision, which
reversed the earlier decision rendered by a coequal body. The assailed decision and
Resolution failed to refer to the resolution of DPWH’s CA Petition, despite the identity of
issues and parties involved.
Res judicata is commonly understood as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the
same claim, demand, or cause of action. The principle of res judicata precludes the re-
litigation of a conclusively settled fact or question in any future or other action between the
same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action. For the principle
to apply: (i) the issue or fact sought to be precluded must be identical to the issue or fact
actually determined in a former suit; (ii) the party to be precluded must be party to or was in
privity with a party to the former proceeding; (iii) there was final judgment on the merits in
the former proceedings; and (iv) in compliance with the basic tenet of due process, that the
party against whom the principle is asserted must have had full and fair opportunity to
litigate issues in the prior proceedings.
All the foregoing requisites are present in this case.
Prime Savings Bank vs. Spouses Roberto and Heidi L. Santos

G.R. No. 208283, June 19, 2019
PROBLEM NO. 49:
The Sps. Santos filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing an order of the RTC, which the
latter granted therefore allowing the execution and garnishment of Prime Savings Bank’s
assets. Prime Savings Bank then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with Prayer for
the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
(WPI) (Certiorari Petition) before the CA. When the CA denied the petition, a petition under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court was filed by the said bank.
Is Rule 45 the proper remedy?
38
ANSWER:
NO. It is a hornbook principle that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court governs appeals from
judgments or final orders, not interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order cannot be the
subject of appeal until final judgment is rendered for one party or the other. Further, the
Court has previously distinguished certiorari, as a mode of appeal under Rule 45, as a remedy
that involves the review of the judgment, award, or final order on the merits, as compared to
the original action for certiorari under Rule 65, which refers to a remedy that may be directed
against an interlocutory order. No appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order. Instead,
the proper remedy to assail such an order is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Davao AFC Bus Lines Inc. vs. Rogelio Ang

G.R. No. 218516, March 27, 2019
PROBLEM NO. 50:
The MTCC convicted Tanio and awarded damages for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Serious Physical Injuries. No appeal from the judgment was interposed, and in time, the
decision became final and executory. In view of its finality, the prosecution filed a Motion
for Execution against the accused Tanio, which was granted. However, the writ was returned
unsatisfied as the latter had allegedly no properties that can be levied to satisfy the money
judgment. Hence, upon motion, the MTCC issued a writ of execution against ACF, being the
employer of accused Tanio.
ACF filed a Motion to Recall and/or Quash The Writ of Execution against it which was,
however, denied by the MTCC. It was elevated to the RTC and was denied. CA affirmed the
decision of RTC. Thus, ACF filed the instant Petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Is the remedy availed of proper?
ANSWER:
NO. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error was committed. Otherwise,
every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. Even if the findings of the
court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally
beyond the province of certiorari.
In the instant case, the primary argument of ACF is centered on the supposed erroneous
award of damages against the ACF’s employee, accused Tanio, made by the MTCC in its
Judgment dated December 27, 2005 convicting the latter. But such supposed errors merely
pertain only to mistakes of law and not of jurisdiction, thus putting them beyond the ambit
of certiorari.
39
Spouses Edilberto & Eveline Pozon vs. Diana Jeanne Lopez
G.R. No. 210607, March 25, 2019
PROBLEM NO. 51:
Sps. Pozon file an ejectment case against Lopez for the possession of the property which was
granted by MeTC. Lopez filed a petition for quieting of title and damages before the RTC of
Makati. The RTC declared Lopez as the lawful owner of the subject property. The CA
affirmed the RTC.
Sps. Pozon argued that the CA committed a grave error in disregarding the ruling of the
MeTC which supposedly touched upon the same subject matter as in the Quieting of Title
case. Sps. Pozon posit that the decided case is conclusive upon the court a quo with respect to
their ownership over the subject property.
Is the CA correct? Explain.
ANSWER:
YES. The CA is correct. It is an elementary rule that since the only issue for resolution in
an ejectment case is physical or material possession, where the parties to an ejectment case
raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue only for the purposes of
determining who between the parties has the better right to possess the property. Where the
issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of ownership is
not final and binding, but merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession.
Maria Nympha Mandagan vs. Jose M. Valero Corporation

G.R. No. 215118, June 19, 2019
PROBLEM NO. 52:
The MeTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of BP 22. Aggrieved, the petitioner
appealed her conviction before the RTC, which reversed the MeTC Decision and acquitted
her of the charges, though she was found civilly liable to the respondent.
Respondent appealed the matter to the CA via Rule 65 petition for certiorari, claiming grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in acquitting petitioner. The CA granted this
petition and annulled the decision of acquittal.
May the CA annul the decision of acquittal based on grave abuse of discretion?
ANSWER:
40
NO. In criminal cases, no rule is more settled than that a judgment of acquittal is
immediately final and unappealable. Such rule proceeds from the accused's constitutionally
enshrined right against prosecution if the same would place him under double jeopardy.
Thus, a judgment in such cases, once rendered, may no longer be recalled for correction or
amendment -regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness.
The exception to this would be a review from a judgment of acquittal through the
extraordinary remedy of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. A survey of these exceptional
instances would, however, show that such review was only allowed where the prosecution
was denied due process or where the trial was a sham.
Since the CA’s overturning of the acquittal was based on a reply-letter and an alleged
admission, the totality of evidence is still insufficient to establish the critical element of the
crime, and so the CA erred in annulling the decision of the RTC based on grave abuse of
discretion.
People of the Philippines vs. Cesar Villamor Corpin

G.R. No. 232493, June 19, 2019
PROBLEM NO. 53:
Corpin hacked Paulo with a butcher’s knife giving the latter no opportunity to defend
himself, thereby inflicting upon said victim serious and mortal wound which directly caused
his death. The prosecution and the defense have different version of the facts. The RTC and
CA found Corpin guilty of murder.
Is the CA correct in affirming the RTC although the appealed criminal case covers the
issue of facts and law? Explain.
ANSWER:
YES. The CA is correct. It is settled that findings of fact of the trial courts are generally
accorded great weight; except when it appears on the record that the trial court may have
overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied some significant fact or circumstance which if
considered, would have altered the result. This is axiomatic in appeals in criminal cases
where the whole case is thrown open for review on issues of both fact and law, and the court
may even consider issues which were not raised by the parties as errors. The appeal confers
the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law.
Alfredo Pili, Jr. vs. Mary Ann Resurreccion

905 SCRA 205, June 19, 2019
PROBLEM NO. 54:
41
The MTCC acquitted Mary Ann of the criminal charge for violation of BP 22, but found her
civilly liable to Conpil. Mary Ann appealed the decision regarding her civil liability, but the
same was dismissed by the RTC. Hence, Mary Ann went up to the CA via petition for review
under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA granted her appeal, finding that the criminal
case was not prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest, Conpil.
Is Conpil a real party-in-interest in the civil aspect of the case?
ANSWER:
YES. Conpil is a real party-in-interest in the civil aspect of the case. It has long been settled
that “in criminal cases, the People is the real party-in-interest xxx [and] the private offended
party is but a witness in the prosecution of offenses, the interest of the private offended party
is limited only to the aspect of civil liability.” While a judgment of acquittal is immediately
final and executory, “either the offended party or the accused may appeal the civil aspect of
the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. xxx Thus, the real parties-in-interest in the
civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused.”
In the instant case, the civil aspect of the criminal case was indeed appealed by Conpil, being
the victim of the fraud, that was the private complainant therein. Thus, the CA erred in
saying that the criminal case was not prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest.
XXX vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 242101, September 16, 2019
PROBLEM NO. 55:
An Information was filed against XXX for committing lascivious acts against AAA. XXX
denied the allegations of AAA and declared that she made the said accusation only because
of a previous misunderstanding as he did not allow private complainant's boyfriend to spend
a night in their house after their family outing. The said incident angered private complainant
and she developed resentment against him. The RTC rendered a decision, finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Acts of Lasciviousness and found AAA to be consistent
and convincing in her testimony. XXX thereafter appealed his conviction to the CA which
affirmed XXX's conviction for Acts of Lasciviousness. XXX filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Decision, which was, however, denied by the CA. Hence, the instant
appeal.
Is the petitioner’s contention that AAA only concocted the story correct as there were
discrepancies between the affidavit of a witness and her testimony in court?
ANSWER:
NO. Under the Rules on Evidence (Testimonial Evidence), a victim cannot be expected to
mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying
42
experience she had undergone. Verily, no matter what she did subsequent to the events
narrated above is immaterial to the fact that the crime was already committed. In addition, it
is worth emphasizing that sexual abuse is a painful experience which is oftentimes not
remembered in detail. Such an offense is not analogous to a person’s achievement or
accomplishment as to be worth recalling or reliving. Rather, it is something which causes
deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for life
and which her conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a victim cannot
be expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and
horrifying experience she had undergone.
Carlos A. Catubao vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines

921 SCRA 311, October 02, 2019
PROBLEM NO. 56:
The Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the crime had been sufficiently proved by
the prosecution in this case, and so convicted Catubao for having solicited and received a gift
from Atty. Perito to expedite the resolution of the estafa cases of Ragasa pending before him.
Thus, Catubao received a gift in consideration for doing an act, though not constituting a
crime in itself, but was related to the exercise of his functions as a public officer.
Catubao filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the Sandiganbayan
through a Resolution. The case was then appealed to the SC.
Does the prosecution have the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
ANSWER:
YES. The burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt each element of crime is upon the
prosecution, as its case will rise or fall on the strength of its own evidence. Any doubt shall
be resolved in favor of the accused.
As the Court held in Patula v. People: in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the
burden to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this
burden, the Prosecution's duty is to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the
information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily
included therein.
The Prosecution must further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the
offense. In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and
not anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof
placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused
that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed. Conversely, as to his innocence, the
accused has no burden of proof, that he must then be acquitted and set free should the
Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. In other words, the
weakness of the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as
43
long as the Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission
of the crime charged and in identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it.
People of the Philippines vs. Allan Canatoy

G.R. No. 227195 July 29, 2019
PROBLEM NO. 57:
Soliman, who was staying in the room adjacent to Barbas, heard two men utter "Ayo, Ayo"
in front of Barbas' room. After a short while, Soliman and Tan, also a tenant in the same
apartment, heard Barbas shouting "Ay!" three times. Both Soliman and Tan later identified
the two men as Canatoy and Mabalato. Mabalato admitted that he and Canatoy were hired by
Cartuciano to kill Barbas for a consideration. Cartuciano claimed that Sato asked him to hire
two men to liquidate Barbas. Both sworn statements were signed by Mabalato, Cartuciano
and their lawyer, Atty. Truya.
The trial court found Mabalato, Cartuciano and Canatoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder and acquitted Sato for insufficiency of evidence. The CA affirmed the
trial court's conviction. Deceased Mabalato's criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished.
1. Were the pieces of evidence presented in the trial sufficient to establish

Canatoy's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder? Explain.\
2. May extrajudicial confessions be admissible in evidence? Explain.
ANSWER:
1. YES. The pieces of evidence are sufficient. Circumstantial evidence, also known as
indirect or presumptive evidence, consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from
which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common
experience. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence will be
sufficient to convict the offender if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from
which the inference is derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances proved constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person.
2. YES. Extrajudicial confessions may be admissible evidence. For an extrajudicial

confession to be admissible in evidence, it must be satisfactorily shown that the same was
obtained within the limits imposed by the Constitution, specifically Sections 12 and 17,
Article III thereof, which state: Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence,
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threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him.
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
People of the Philippines vs. Noel Dolandolan

G.R. No. 232157, January 8, 2020
PROBLEM NO. 58:
AAA, a minor, was kidnapped and raped by Dolandolan. Later, it was found that accused-
appellant was charged with another rape case filed by another minor woman. The accused-
appellant was arrested and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The RTC convicted
accused-appellant of the crime of rape. While there were contradictions in AAA's written
statement in relation to her testimony, the RTC held that said variance did not alter the
essential fact that AAA was raped. The CA held that although there were glaring
inconsistencies between AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay and her open court testimony, AAA
never wavered in her claim that accused-appellant inserted his private part into her private
part after pointing a ballpen-like knife at her. SC ruled that accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. Before the accused in a criminal case may be convicted,
the evidence must be strong enough to overcome the presumption of innocence and to
exclude every hypothesis except that of the guilt of the defendant.
Can the appellate courts review factual findings of the trial courts?
ANSWER:
YES. Appellate courts may review the factual findings of the trial court when the lower court
overlooked certain facts of substance and value or when the lower court’s findings of fact are
contradicted by evidence on record. The Court has held that “when the issue is the credibility
of witnesses and of their testimonies, the trial court is generally deemed to have been in a
better position to observe their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.”
However, appellate courts may review the factual findings of the trial court when the lower
court overlooked certain facts of substance and value or when the lower court’s findings of
fact are contradicted by evidence on record.
Atty. Arolf M. Ancheta vs. Felomino C. Villa

G.R. No. 229634, January 15, 2020
PROBLEM NO. 59:
An administrative complaint was filed by Villa against Ancheta for Grave Misconduct and
Dishonesty and for violation of R.A. No. 3019. According to Villa, the Order appended to the
records is to influence the Regional Adjudicator in resolving the case in favor of the other
party considering that initially, such Order was not attached to the records of the case during
45
the initial follow-up on the case.
Ancheta denied the charges against him, mainly arguing that Villa's claims were all hearsay
and unsupported by evidence. Ancheta claimed that if there was indeed a resolution on the
opposing party's motion, then the parties would have received it officially. The CA dismissed
the petition outright. Ancheta argues that the CA erred in ruling that a Rule 43 petition,
instead of a Rule 65 petition, was the proper remedy in questioning the Ombudsman's
Decision.
Did the CA err in dismissing the petition outright?
ANSWER:
YES. It should be emphasized that compliance with procedural rules is necessary for an
orderly administration of justice. As stated in the Rules of Court, these rules "shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."
The CA outrightly dismissed Ancheta's petition on the following grounds: 1) failure to pay
the correct docket fees; 2) failure to state the date of receipt of a copy of the assailed
decision; 3) filing before the Ombudsman of an Appeal to the Head of Office which was
treated as a second MR, a prohibited pleading; hence, the reglementary period was not tolled;
and 4) availing of the wrong remedy.
The Heirs of Marsella T. Lupena vs. Pastora Medina, et al.

G.R. No. 231639, January 22, 2020
PROBLEM NO. 60:
Medina, Pagsisihan, Patricio and Dionisio entered the property of Lupena unlawfully.
Lupena thus hired a licensed surveyor, to determine the extent and exact area of the portion
of lot individually encroached. Lupena filed a complaint Recovery of Possession of Real
Property against Medina, Pagsisihan, Patricio and Dionisio. While the case was pending
before the RTC, Lupena died but she was substituted by her heirs. The petitioners’ Heirs of
Lupena argue that the CA misconstrued the Relocation Plan when it ruled that, based on the
said document, there was no encroachment of the subject property. The Court is being asked
to reweigh and reassess the evidentiary value of the Relocation Plan.
When does a question of fact exist? Explain.
ANSWER:
A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of
46
the situation. - From a precursory reading of the instant petition, it becomes readily apparent
that the instant petition puts forward a purely factual issue.
A catena of cases has consistently held that questions of fact cannot be raised in an appeal via
certiorari before the Court and are not proper for its consideration. The Court is not a trier of
facts. It is not the Court’s function to examine and weigh all over again the evidence
presented in the proceedings below.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Remar A. Quiñonez

G.R. No. 237412, January 06, 2020
PROBLEM NO. 61:
Remar and his wife Lovelyn met when during college days. Thereafter, they got married. At
the outset, they constantly communicated with each other, however, when Remar transferred
to Surigao City Hall the communication between them ceased. He was informed that his wife
was already cohabiting with another man. Almost 10 years, Remar tried to locate the
whereabouts of his wife but to no avail. Thus, he filed a Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death before the RTC. The Republic filed this petition. The Republic insists
that Remar's efforts in locating his wife Lovelyn were insufficient to give rise to "well-
founded belief' that she is dead. The CA held that while the Republic resorted to the correct
remedy of certiorari under Rule 65, its Petition for Certiorari warranted outright dismissal for
failure to file a prior motion for reconsideration before the RTC — a prerequisite to the filing
of a petition for certiorari with the CA.
Was the Republic correct in directly resorting to the CA under Rule 65 without filing
with the RTC a motion for reconsideration? Explain briefly.
ANSWER:
YES. Direct resort to the CA via Rule 65, without filing with the RTC, a prior motion for
reconsideration, was proper. As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be
filed with the lower court before the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is resorted to, since a
motion for reconsideration is considered a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 “is a special civil action that may be
resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
Nevertheless, this general rule admits of well-established exceptions, one of which is when
the issue raised is a pure question of law. There is a question of law in a given case when the
doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and there is a
question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts.
Here, the Republic does not dispute the truthfulness of Remar’s allegations, particularly, the
specific acts he claims to have done to locate Lovelyn. What the Republic does question is
47
the sufficiency of these acts, that is, whether they are sufficient to merit a legal declaration of
Lovelyn’s presumptive death. Clearly, the Republic’s Petition for Certiorari raised a pure
legal question. Hence, direct resort to the CA via Rule 65, without filing with the RTC a prior
motion for reconsideration, was proper.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Leonor A. Macabagdal

G.R. No. 203948, January 22, 2020
PROBLEM NO. 62:
Petitioner, the Republic, represented by the DPWH, filed before the RTC a complaint against
an unknown owner for the expropriation of a 200 sq. m. lot located in Valenzuela City.
DPWH applied for, and was granted a writ of possession over the subject lot and was
required to deposit with the court the amount of ₱550,000.00. Respondent did not oppose the
expropriation, and received the provisional deposit. The RTC appointed a board of
commissioner to determine the just compensation for the subject lot, which thereafter
submitted its Commissioners' Report. RTC found the recommendation be reasonable and
just, and accordingly. Republic filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration arguing that the
substitution of respondent Leonor was improper as the extrajudicial deed of partition, the
evidence for allowing her to be substituted as the sole heir, was neither registered in the
Register of Deeds of Valenzuela City nor published in a newspaper of general circulation
pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. However, the RTC, in its Order dated
March 16, 2011, denied the motion.
Did the RTC commit a grave abuse of discretion in allowing respondent Leonor to
substitute Elena in the expropriation case? Explain briefly.
ANSWER:
NO. The RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in allowing respondent Leonor
to substitute Elena in the expropriation case, considering that respondent Leonor was able to
provide ample proof of her interest over the subject property.
Republic is correct insofar as saying that under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an
unregistered affidavit of self-adjudication or extrajudicial settlement does not bind third
persons with respect to the adjudication of property. The CA is also correct in its holding that
there is no provision in the Rules of Court which states that “the instrument cannot be used to
prove that one is an heir” due to the sheer fact that it was not registered before the Register of
Deeds.
Furthermore, it does not escape the attention of the Court that the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement, which states that Elena has no other heirs, and that respondent Leonor is Elena’s
only surviving sister, was duly notarized, the fact of notarization was not disputed by
petitioner Republic.
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Nancy A. Catamco vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 243560-62 / G.R. No. 243261-63, July 28, 2020
PROBLEM NO. 63:
Before arraignment, Catamco and Perez each moved for the dismissal of the case filed
against them claiming that the Ombudsman's inordinate delay of more than twelve (12)
years, from the conduct of its investigation in 2006 until the filing of the Information in
court, violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. The Sandiganbayan,
through its Resolution denied petitioners' respective motions to dismiss. Applying the
"Balancing Test," the Sandiganbayan found that petitioners' right to speedy disposition of
their case was not violated.
Did the Sandiganbayan gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying the motions to dismiss respectively filed by petitioners?
ANSWER:
YES. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners' respective
motions to dismiss for violation of their right to speedy disposition of cases. The case of
Cagang v. Sandiganbayan provides the guidelines provided by the Court to compel the grant
of these petitions. Applying the foregoing parameters to the present case, contrary to the
Sandiganbayan's ruling, petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases was violated by the
Ombudsman's delay in concluding the preliminary investigation.
Mercedes S. Gatmaytan and Erlinda V. Valdellon vs. Misibis Land, Inc.

G.R. No. 222166, June 10, 2020
PROBLEM NO. 64:
Petitioners filed a Complaint before the RTC against Sps. Garcia and MLI, and PNB to
whom the disputed lot purchased in 1991 had been mortgage. In the complaint stated are
multiple causes of action. Petitioners argue that their Complaint should be allowed to proceed
since its action “primarily for the declaration of nullity of the 1996 Deed of Absolute Sale
and alternatively, for quieting of title.”
Should Petitioners' Complaint be allowed to proceed for trial on the merits?
ANSWER:
YES. The Complaint should be allowed.
Under Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court permits the assertion of alternative causes of
action. Section 2, Rule 8 allows parties to plead as many separate claims as they may have,
provided that no rules regarding venue and joinder of parties are violated. A complaint which
contains two or more alternative causes of action cannot be dismissed where one of them
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clearly states a sufficient cause of action against the defendant. This is hornbook law.
In determining the sufficiency of the complaint and whether it should be allowed to proceed
to trial, analysis of each alternative cause of action alleged is necessary, as the sufficiency of
one precludes its outright dismissal.
The Roman Catholic Bishop of Malolos, Inc. and The Most. Rev. Bishop Jose F. Oliveros,
D.D. vs. The Heirs of Mariano Marcos
G.R. No. 225971, June 17, 2020
PROBLEM NO. 65:
Is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedy absolute?
ANSWER:
NO. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, in and of itself, is grounded

on practical reasons, including allowing the administrative agencies concerned to take every
opportunity to correct its own errors, as well as affording the litigants the opportunity to avail
of speedy relief through the administrative processes and sparing them of the laborious and
costly resort to courts.
In this case, with the peculiar length of time with which this case has lasted, SC concludes
that RCBMI's action falls within the temporal exempting circumstance, or where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant.
Specifically, the exempting circumstance is the suspension of RCBMI's enjoyment of its
legal victory, which was awarded to it by the MAR in 1982, but to date, 37 years later,
remains to be executed.
Note: This Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is not inflexible, and admits
of several exceptions that include situations where the very rational of the doctrine has been
defeated. Two-fold purpose of the doctrine of immutability of judgment: (a) to avoid delay in
the administration of justice; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of
occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist.
Maria Aurota G. Mathay, et al. vs. People of the Philippines and Andrea L. Gandionco
G.R. No. 218964. June 30, 2020
PROBLEM NO. 66:
The accused falsified two General Information Sheets (GIS). As result thereof, the accused
was able to dispose and sell a specific real property, to the damage and prejudice of
complainant. During the course of the trial, the RTC found that the allegations in the
Information and the affidavit-complaint, together with the documents submitted by the
prosecution, prima facie show all the elements of qualified theft through falsification of
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public documents. The accused, however, filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, alleging
among others that the RTC erred in not suspending the proceeding despite the existence of a
prejudicial question in a previously instituted civil case questioning the ownership of the
subject property. The CA rendered its decision and found no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court.
Is there a prejudicial question that may warrant the suspension of the criminal
proceedings against petitioners?
ANSWER:
YES. Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provide when a
criminal action may be suspended upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil
action, and what the elements of the prejudicial question are. The prejudicial question must
be determinative of the case before the court, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the
question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime, but so intimately connected with it that its ascertainment
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
Hence, should private respondent be adjudged not entitled to the 26,000 shares of stocks in
the pending civil cases, there could have been no crime of qualified theft to speak of as the
elements of: (1) the property belonging to another; (2) the taking done with intent to gain; (3)
the taking done without the owner's consent; and (4) the taking done with abuse of
confidence would be absent. In the same vein, there would be no crime of falsification to
speak of, as well, because there would be no perversion of truth and the statements in the
GISs in 2013 would neither be "untruthful statements in a narration of facts," nor "absolutely
false."
Philippine Bank of Communications vs. The Register of Deeds for the Province of Benguet
G.R. No. 222958, March 11, 2020
PROBLEM NO. 67:
PBCOM filed a petition for issuance of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 21320 in lieu
of the lost one (first petition), docketed as LRC Case No. 11-AD-1335, raffled to RTC,
Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet. PBCOM claimed that they have acquired it on March 2,
1985 through an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. The property was allegedly not included in
PBCOM's inventory of assets because the bank's La Union branch failed to forward all the
pertinent records of its acquisition to the Makati head office. It then filed an affidavit of loss
with the Registry of Deeds of Benguet.
After PBCOM's ex parte presentation of evidence, the RTC, Branch 62 issued its July 29,
51
2011 Order dismissing the first petition for insufficiency of evidence. It held that PBCOM
failed to prove that it had "exerted all efforts to determine the actual whereabouts of TCT No.
21320 from all its available records and the bank's past and present officers or employees and
legal counsel who could and should have knowledge of the bank's acquired property and the
documents relative thereto." Noting the testimony of one (1) of PBCOM's witnesses that it is
possible that the previous accountable officer did not turn over the title to the property or the
lawyer who handled the foreclosure proceeding failed to include the owner's copy of TCT
No. 21320 in the documents forwarded to their main office, the RTC, Branch 62 stressed that
PBCOM should have exerted efforts to verify from these persons the whereabouts of the
missing title because if any other person is known or suspected to be in possession of the
copy of the title, either lawfully or unlawfully, the petition would not be the appropriate legal
remedy.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and held that: (1) PBCOM availed of the wrong
remedy as the dismissal of the second petition on the ground of res judicata was a complete
disposition and was thus reviewable via appeal; and (2) all elements of res judicata were
attendant, given that PBCOM sought the issuance of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No.
21320 in both petitions.
Did the RTC-Branch 63 correctly dismiss the second petition on the ground of res
judicata?
ANSWER:
NO. The PBCOM, as the undisputed registered owner of the land covered by TCT No.
21320, on file with the Register of Deeds cannot be barred by res judicata from filing a
second petition to replace its owner's duplicate certificate of title in case of loss or destruction
of the original duplicate.
Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the Rules of Court apply to
land registration cases only by analogy, in a suppletory character, and whenever practicable
and convenient.
The nature and purpose of the Torrens system and the absolute indispensability of the
owner's duplicate certificate of title mandates that the Court give primacy to the registered
owner's substantive right to possess and accordingly, to seek a replacement of an owner's
duplicate certificate of title that has been lost or destroyed. When there is a right, there must
be a remedy.
It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties
and their privies over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated, it would be extremely
impracticable, inconvenient, and unjust to perpetually preclude the registered owner from
registering any voluntary transaction, i.e., sale, donation, mortgage, lease, etc., on his / her
land simply because he / she failed to prove, to the satisfaction of the court, that he / she, in
fact, lost his / her title. If the Court were to uphold the dismissal of the second petition on the
ground of res judicata. PBCOM would be left with no other remedy under the law to exercise
full ownership rights over its own property.
52
Sustaining the dismissal and upholding the applicability of res judicata in the instant case
would not only perpetually prevent PBCOM from registering any voluntary transaction over
the parcel of land, but also perpetually prevent it from complying with its obligations under
the General Banking Law.
Ususan Development Corporation vs. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 209462, July 15, 2020
PROBLEM NO. 68:
Jose Carlos owned a 3,975 square meter parcel of land situated in Ususan, Taguig City which
was inherited by her daughter Maria Carlos. This was subsequently sold by Maria to Ususan
Development Corporation (UDC) and filed for an application for the registration and
confirmation of title of the land asserting that this formed part of the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain but the State opposed to the application of the UDC claiming that
in the absence of sufficient and convincing proof that such realty is alienable and disposable
land of public domain, the possessor could not acquire ownership and right to seek fort the
registration of the land. The RTC ruled in favor of the UDC, and the oppositor-State
appealed to the CA positing that the trial court erred in granting the application for
registration in the absence of competent proof that the land applied for is within the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain which the CA granted and reversed the decision of
the trial court. UDC filed a review for petition on certiorari under Rule 45 to the SC to seek
for the review of the factual finding of the CA and contends that it committed an error of law
in reversing the RTC Decision granting the application for original registration of the subject
lot.
ANSWER:
NO. The petition of UDC will not prosper. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court the
following are the four rigid parameters which limit giving of due course and granting of
review or appeal by certiorari:
1. Only questions of law distinctly set forth in the petition shall be raised;
2. To avoid the outright dismissal of the petition, there must be compliance with the
payment of the docket and other required fees, deposit for costs, proof of proper service of
the petition, the required contents of the petition, and the required documents that must
accompany the petition;
3. The Court may on its own initiative deny the appeal by certiorari on the ground that it
is without merit or is prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions therein are too
insubstantial to require consideration; and
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4. A review by certiorari is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and
will be granted only where there are special and important considerations by reason of
substance - "when the court a quo has decided a question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the SC, or decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the
applicable decisions of the SC" - or procedure - "when the court a quo has so far departed
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such
departure by the lower court, as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision".
The SC is not a trier of facts and will not entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of
the appellate courts are final, binding or conclusive on the parties and upon this SC when
supported by substantial evidence. Thus, while petitioner has couched the issue as one
involving an error in law, in reality it wants the Court to review the factual findings of the
CA, which is not permitted in a Rule 45 Petition for Certiorari.
Spouses Romeo Anastacio, Sr. and Norma T. Anastacio vs. Heirs of the Late Spouses Juan
F. Coloma and Juliana Parazo
G.R. No. 224572, August 27, 2020
PROBLEM NO. 69:
Juan F. Coloma is the registered owner of the 19,247 square meters land situated in San Jose,
Tarlac which was inherited by their legitimate heirs, Rudy P. Coloma and Marcela C. Reyes.
Rudy and Marcela want to get the possession of the land from Anatacios and claimed that the
subject property is under the possession of Anatacios by mere tolerance of their parents. The
Anatacios presented the Absolute Deed of Sale executed by the late Juan Coloma, but Rudy
contented that it shall be declared as void on the grounds that the signature of Juan Coloma
was forged and there is no conformity or consent given by Juliana Coloma, wife of Juan, to
the alleged sale. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of the Anatacios taking that the
evidence on record failed to establish the alleged falsification of the Deed of Absolute Sale
and the subject land is an exclusive property of Juan. Rudy and Marcela filed their appeal to
the CA, which ruled in their favor stating that it is apparent that the signature of Juan in the
Deed of Absolute Sale is dissimilar from his customary signatures leading the CA to agree
with the handwriting expert that the signatures were not made by one and the same person
and likewise, to believe that signature is a forgery. Given the opposing factual findings of the
two courts, Anatacios filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to the SC and
raised four issues before the Court claiming that there is an error in the factual finding of the
CA.
May the Court take cognizance of the issues raised in the petition?
ANSWER:
NO. As a rule, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law must be distinctly
set forth in the petition, shall be raised. The four issues raised by the petitioners are not
purely questions of law. All involve a review of the factual findings by the lower courts
which formed their bases for the legal conclusions that they arrived at. Given that there is a
54
conflict in the factual findings of the RTC and the CA, which is an admitted exception to the
rule that only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 certiorari petition, the Court may
consider and rule on the other issues raised in the petition.
Martin Roberto G. Tirol vs. Sol Nolasco

G.R. No. 230103. August 27, 2020
PROBLEM NO. 70:
Gloria Tirol died testate. She was survived by her husband Roberto Sr. and their six children.
Roberto Jr., son of the late Gloria and Roberto Sr. died intestate, and was survived by his
four children including, among others, Martin Tirol. At the time of his death, Roberto Jr.'s
marriage with Cecilia Geronimo had been annulled. Roberto Sr. died testate and was
survived by his remaining children Ruth, Cecilia, Marilou, Ciriaco and Anna and his four
grandchildren from Roberto Jr.
Gloria Roberto
Tirol (♱) Sr. (♱)
Sol Nolasco Roberto Jr.

(SS) Ex-wife Ruth Cecilia Marilou Ciriaco Anna
(♱)
Martin
Tirol +3
Martin Tirol, Cecilia and Ciriaco filed a petition to probate the wills of Gloria and Roberto
Sr. to RTC-218 and admitted to probate the respective wills of Gloria and Roberto Sr. and
designated Martin as the Administrator of their estates. Sol Nolasco filed a Motion for
Intervention claiming that she has a legal interest in the estate of Gloria and Roberto Sr.
because she is the surviving spouse of Roberto Jr.
Likewise, Sol filed a motion for intervention in the probate proceeding of the Roberto Jr.'s
pending before the RTC-101 which granted the motion to intervene filed by Sol.
Subsequently, RTC-218 issued an Omnibus Resolution denying, among others, the motion to
intervene filed by Sol before the RTC-101 stated that she has no legal interest in the case.
Problems to be resolved in this case are the following:
1. Which has the proper jurisdiction over the probate proceeding of Roberto Jr.?
2. Who are allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding?
3. Given the pendency of the special proceedings on the wills of the spouses Gloria
and Roberto Sr. and the presence of an issue on the validity of her claim as an heir
of Roberto Jr., is the intervention of respondent Sol in the probate proceeding
proper?
55
ANSWER:
1. In the settlement of a deceased's estate, Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court

provides: "The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The court which has
jurisdiction to hear and decide any controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of Roberto Jr.
or as to the distributive shares to which each is entitled under the law is undoubtedly RTC-
101 because it is the court which has first taken cognizance of the settlement of the intestate
estate of Roberto Jr. This is to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's
estate by co-equal courts.
Given the exclusivity of jurisdiction granted to the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of a decedent's estate, RTC-101 has the exclusive jurisdiction over the intestate
estate of Roberto Jr.
RTC-218, where the probate proceeding is pending, cannot rule on the issue of who are the
heirs of Roberto Jr. even if the share of Roberto Jr. in the estates of Gloria and Roberto Sr. is
to be determined therein. The probate court must yield to the determination by the Roberto
Jr.'s estate settlement court of the latter's heirs. This is to avoid confusing and conflicting
dispositions of a decedent's estate by co-equal courts.
2. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a person who has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition
of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
3. NO. Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court provides: "For the recovery or
protection of the property or rights of the deceased, an executor or administrator may bring or
defend, in the right of the deceased, actions for causes which survive." The intervention of
respondent Sol in the probate proceeding will be superfluous because she has an available
remedy in the settlement of Roberto Jr.'s estate proceeding to question any action of the
administrator therein which is detrimental to the said estate.
Since intervention is not a matter of right but depends on the sound discretion of the court.
Intervention of Sol in the probate proceeding is unnecessary because her right or interest in
the estate of Roberto Jr. can be fully protected in a separate proceeding pending before RTC-
101. Likewise, Section 1, Rule 19 provides that the court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will cause undue delay or prejudice in the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties. An independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit by intervention.
The issue as to whether respondent Sol is a lawful heir of Roberto Jr. will definitely enlarge
the issues in the probate proceeding and involve determination of facts peculiar only to her,
which have nothing to do with the original parties. Thus, the intervention of respondent Sol
in the probate proceeding should be denied.
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Mario M. Madera vs. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 244128, September 8, 2020
PROBLEM NO. 71:
Madera, et. al contested the disallowances on post-audit of benefits and allowances which
were granted by the Municipality of Mondragon, Northern Samar to its officials and
employees. COA issued its Decision promulgated on December 27, 2017, which held the
petitioners liable, as the certifying officers and recipients of said benefits, under the Notices
of Disallowance (“NDs”) by the Audit Team Leader and the Supervising Auditor of the
municipality.
This decision of the COA was received by the petitioners on February 23, 2018. Petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on February 28, 2018, but were denied by the
Commission on its Resolution, which was received by the petitioner on November 12, 2018.
Subsequently, on January 11, 2019, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in
relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In assailing the Decision and Resolution issued by
the COA, petitioners maintain that the subject allowances were legal.
1. Was the petition timely filed from the notice of judgment?
2. Did the COA commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Decision and
Resolution?
ANSWER:
1. NO. The petition was filed out of time. Petitioners confused Rules 64 and 65 of the
Rules of Court when they erroneously claimed that their petition was timely filed within 60
days from notice of judgment. Rule 64 governs the review of judgments and final orders or
resolutions of the COMELEC and COA. Under Section 2 of this Rule, Rule 65 applies to
petitions questioning the judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the COA only insofar as
Rule 64 does not specifically provide under the rules.
The COA Decision was promulgated on December 27, 2017, and the petitioners received a
copy of the Decision on February 23, 2018. Thus, the 30 day-period began to run from
February 23, 2018. However, following Section 3, Rule 64, the period was interrupted when
petitioners filed an MR on February 28, 2018. Petitioners received a copy of the Resolution
denying their MR on November 12, 2018. Consequently, they had 25 days from November
12, or until December 7, 2018, to file their petition before the Court. However, petitioners only
filed their petition on January 11, 2019, or 35 days after the last day of filing.
2. NO. The COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
Decision and Resolution. The Constitution vests the broadest latitude in the COA in
discharging its role as the guardian of public funds and properties. In recognition of such
constitutional empowerment, the Court has generally sustained the COA's decisions or
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resolutions in deference to its expertise in the implementation of the laws it has been
entrusted to enforce. Thus, the Constitution and the Rules of Court provide the remedy of a
petition for certiorari in order to restrict the scope of inquiry to errors of jurisdiction or to
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the COA.
The petitioners failed to show that the COA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the
subject NDs, but their contention that they should not be held liable to refund the disallowed
amounts is meritorious.
The Heirs of Inocentes Mampo and Raymundo A. Mampo vs. Josefina Morada
G.R. No. 214526, November 3, 2020
PROBLEM NO. 72:
Morada filed two actions as a legal remedy before the CA after an unfavorable judgment
from the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), regarding five (5)
parcel of lands in Camarines Sur, which involves a Third-Party Claim she instituted against
Heirs of Mampos. Morada filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the
DARAB decision and a petition for review under Rule 43, praying that the DARAB decision
be reversed.
Is Morada correct in filing those two petitions?
ANSWER:
NO. Morada is mistaken. Whenever there is forum shopping, the penalty is dismissal of
both actions. This is so because twin dismissal is a punitive measure to those who trifle with
the orderly administration of justice. There exists, in forum shopping, the elements of litis
pendentia or a final judgement in one case, being res judicata to the other case. Consequently,
where there is forum shopping, the defense of litis pendentia in one case is a bar to the other;
and a final judgment in one would constitute res judicata and thus, would cause the dismissal
of the rest. In either case, forum shopping could be cited by the other party as a ground for
summary dismissal of the two (or more) complaints or petitions.
In the present case, applying either doctrine would still lead the Court to rule against Morada,
as it finds that she engaged in willful and deliberate forum shopping. Both the Rule 65 and
Rule 43 actions were dismissible. The CA 12th Division that was hearing the Rule 43
Petition erred in failing to dismiss the action before it, even as its attention was repeatedly
called to the existence of the Rule 65 action and its subsequent dismissal, with finality, on the
ground of forum shopping, not just by petitioners but also by Morada herself.
Labualas B. Mamansual and Francis B. Nadar vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 240378-84, November 3, 2020
PROBLEM NO. 73:
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On December 9, 2011, a Complaint-Affidavit was filed by Maulana, who was then the
incumbent Mayor of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat, with the National Office of the OMB. The
Complaint-Affidavit charged petitioners Mamansual and others, who were the former Mayor
and officers, respectively, of the said Municipality of Palimbang, with Malversation of Public
Funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and Removal, Concealment, or
Destruction of Documents under Article 226 of the RPC. Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan First
Division issued a resolution ordering the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the accused,
after the filing of two information against the same on August 3, 2016. Mamansual filed a
Motion to Quash on the ground that there was inordinate delay in the conduct by the OMB.
Is Mamansual correct?
ANSWER:
YES. Mamansual is correct.
Where there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, and where allegations of grave
abuse of discretion are made in the petition, the remedy of certiorari may lie. In grave abuse
of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the petitioner can establish that the lower court
issued the judgment or order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief. The
petitioner carries the burden of showing that the attendant facts and circumstances fall within
any of the cited instances. At any rate, nothing in the Petition nor in the records would
indicate that petitioners lost a potential defense due to the delay, or that the OMB's delay
caused them to no longer be able to acquire relevant evidence or testimonies in their favor.
While there was unexplained delay on the part of the OMB, in the peculiar circumstances of
this case, petitioners cannot invoke a violation of their right to speedy disposition of cases.
Note: The keyword here is “inordinate” delay.
Hermis Carlos Perez vs. Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 245862, November 3, 2020
PROBLEM NO. 74:
An information for Malversation of Public Funds or Property was filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Mayor Perez as Mayor of Biñan, 14 years after the execution of a
MOA between Perez and Etsaw Consultancy and Construction of Environmental
Technologies International Corporation of the Philippines (ECCE), to use ECCE's Hydromex
Technology for its solid waste management program, and to obtain its services for project
management, documentation, as-built drawings, installation, testing, supervision, and
training. The information alleged that there was no competitive bidding undertaken to
procure ECCE's solid waste management program and other services. Furthermore, it was
alleged in the information that ECCE is incapable of complying with its contractual
obligations under the MOA. The complaint further cited the harm and injury to residents near
the dumpsite operations of ECCE. Perez argued that the offense has prescribed and filed a
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motion to quash the Information against him. The Sandiganbayan denied Perez's motion for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period under the Revised Guidelines for
Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases.
Is the Sandiganbayan correct?
ANSWER:
NO. The Sandiganbayan is not correct. While Perez indeed belatedly moved for the
reconsideration of the denial of his motion to quash, the Court has, in some instances, liberally
applied procedural rules. This exception applies to meritorious cases, as when it would result
in the outright deprivation of the litigant's liberty or property.
Since Perez was charged with the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the prescriptive
period of the offense is found in Section 11 of the same law, which provides that all offenses
punishable under R.A. No. 3019 prescribes in 15 years. This provision was later amended by
R.A. No. 10910, increasing the prescriptive period from 15 to 20 years. The amendatory law
took effect on July 21, 2016. As such, this longer period of prescription may not be
retroactively applied to crimes committed prior to the passage of R.A. No. 10910. The
applicable prescriptive period of the offense charged against Perez is therefore 15 years.
Atty. Turiano vs. Task Force Abono, et al.

G.R. No. 222998, December 9, 2020
PROBLEM NO. 75:
On February 3, 2004, the DBM issued a Special Allotment Release Order for
₱728,000,000.00 with corresponding Notice of Cash Allocation amounting to
₱291,200,000.00 for the implementation of the Farm Inputs and Farm Implements Program
(FIFIP) of the Department of Agriculture (DA). The City of Iriga, Camarines Sur (Iriga
City), then received a ₱3,000,000.00 sub-allotment fund.
On April 26, 2004, the Pre-qualification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) of Iriga City,
chaired by Turiano, held a meeting upon the request of the City Agriculturist Edwin S. Lapuz
(Lapuz) for the immediate purchase of fertilizers. Allegedly, most of the farmers did not have
enough funds to buy the needed fertilizers, thereby causing them losses. The PBAC
members, with the exception of Fernando S. Berina, Jr., approved the immediate purchase of
the fertilizers on the basis of a Certificate of Emergency Purchase that was supposedly
presented by Lapuz.
On April 19, 2011, respondent Task Force Abono of the Field Investigation-OMB filed a
complaint charging Turiano, the PBAC members, and other local government officials
involved in the procurement of the fertilizers with various criminal and administrative
offenses, including: (1) violation of paragraphs (e) and (g), Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019, in
relation to R.A. No. 9184; (2) violation of Section 88 of the COA Circular No. 92-386; and
(3) dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
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under paragraphs 1, 3, and 20, Section 52(A) of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service (URACCS).
In a Decision dated April 26, 2013, the Ombudsman found Turiano, Lapuz, and Aida V.
Estonido (Estonido), the City Accountant, administratively liable for dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and meted them the
penalty of dismissal from service with the corresponding accessory penalties.
Turiano appealed the ruling of the Ombudsman with the CA. But the CA denied the petition
for raising questions of facts.
Was the CA correct in denying the petition filed by Turiano?
ANSWER:
NO. The CA's argument is erroneous. Indeed, the Court is not a trier of facts. And in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, generally, only
questions of law can be raised. A question of law is one that does not call for the examination
of the probative value of the evidence presented by any of the litigants, or the truth or falsity
of the alleged facts. It concerns with the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the
matter. The test to determine whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation
given to such question by the party raising the same. Instead, it is whether the appellate court
can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it
is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact. Here, an examination of the Petition
shows that it does not exclusively raise questions of facts. It also challenges the legal
conclusions arrived at by the Ombudsman and the court a quo with respect to the observance
of due process, the finding of conspiracy, and Turiano's exercise of diligence and prudence,
in light not only of the established facts, but also of the prevailing law and jurisprudence on
these matters. These are questions of law which the Court has jurisdiction to entertain.
Del Monte Land Transport Bus Company vs. Carlito T. Abergos

G.R. No. 245344, December 2, 2020
PROBLEM NO. 76:
Abergos was a bus driver hired by DLTB Co. Sometime on August 28, 2016, at around 11:00
p.m., he drove the DLTB Co. bus and arrived at Matnog Port, Sorsogon, en route to Southern
Leyte. The bus was arranged to be ferried by a FastCat Ferry at 3:00 a.m. but DLTB Co.'s
facilitator or fixer gathered all the passengers so they can ride the 9:00 a.m. trip instead. The
passengers got angry and confused and asked him why they were taking the later trip when
they could already board the 3:00 a.m. trip. Because of the confusion, they were forced to
take the 3:00 a.m. trip of Star Ferry.
Abergos alleged that on August 31, 2016, after he got back from the trip, he was summoned to
Mr. Sabino's office to explain why the passengers were not able to immediately board the
Star Ferry. After he submitted his written explanation, he was handed a memorandum
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suspending him for fifteen days, effective from September 1 to 15, 2016. When he reported
back for work on September 16, 2016, he was told by Mr. Sabino that he was already
dismissed from his employment. Hence, the instant complaint praying that he be declared as
illegally dismissed from work and that DLTB Co. and Morales be ordered to reinstate him
to his former position with payment of full backwages and other benefits, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. DLTB Co. failed to file their position paper to
contradict the above allegations. Thus, on October 19, 2016, the Labor Arbiter rendered
judgment in favor of Abergos. DLTB Co. sought a reconsideration of the above decision
which the NLCR decided in their favor. Without moving for reconsideration, Abergos filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA.
ANSWER:
NO. The petition will not prosper.
A motion for reconsideration is required before filing a petition for certiorari. The records
show that Abergos failed to file a Motion for Reconsideration prior to filing the petition for
certiorari assailing the NLRC's Resolution.
It is settled that a motion for reconsideration, when allowed to be filed, is an indispensable

condition to the filing of a petition for certiorari. Here, Abergos failed to provide any reason
in his petition for certiorari for his failure to file a motion for reconsideration. Curiously,
despite being apparent in the CA's narration of facts that Abergos did not file a motion for
reconsideration before filing the petition for certiorari, the CA did not discuss how the failure
to move for reconsideration affected the propriety of the petition for certiorari. The CA even
proceeded to rule on the merits and nullify the NLRC's Resolution. This is error.
Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants
alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. Although a relaxation of the rules may be
allowed, it was never intended that such relaxation benefit erring litigants who violate it with
impunity, much less without any explanation. And while litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is also true that each case must be prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure, especially here where Abergos sought to avail of an extraordinary
remedy of certiorari. His failure to comply with the requirements to avail of such remedy is
fatal to his petition.
Heirs of Corazon Villeza vs. Elizabeth S. Aliangan & Rosalina S. Aliangan

G.R. Nos. 244667-69, December 2, 2020
PROBLEM NO. 77:
It is alleged that Corazon, during her lifetime, sold three parcels of land with improvements
located at Angadanan, Isabela to sisters Elizabeth and Rosalina (respondents). On August 3,
2009, however, Corazon died without executing any deed of conveyance in respondents'
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favor. Respondents thus filed three separate Amended Complaints for "Specific Performance
and Damages," to compel Heirs of Corazon (petitioners), legal heirs, and collateral relatives
of Corazon, to execute the subject deeds. The RTC rendered its judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants Heirs of Corazon. Heirs of Corazon appealed to the CA
to dismiss the cases filed by respondents for lack of cause of action, because the plaintiffs
should have filed their claims against the estate of Corazon under Rules 86 and 87 of the
Rules of Court.
Are the arguments correct?
ANSWER:
NO. The arguments are not correct.
Petitioners argue that the actions for specific performance should be filed against the estate of
Corazon because they were not privies to the contracts entered into by Corazon and that
whatever actions for the execution of deeds of conveyance over real property which the
decedent contracted prior to his or her death or held in trust should be pursued in accordance
with Sections 8 and 9, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners' invocation of Section 8, Rule 89 is misplaced because that section presupposes

that there is no controversy as to the contract contemplated therein, and if objections
obtain, the remedy of the person seeking the execution of the contract is an ordinary and
separate action to compel the same. This is so given that, as correctly observed by the CA,
subject to settled exceptions not present in the instant three cases, the law does not extend the
jurisdiction of a probate court to the determination of questions of ownership, and similarly, a
court of administration proceedings cannot determine questions which arise as to the
ownership of property alleged to be part of the decedent's estate, but claimed by some other
person to be his or her property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent,
but by title adverse to that of the decedent and the latter's estate. The institution by
respondents of the actions for specific performance was thus the proper recourse because
petitioners dispute the validity of the conveyances over the contested properties.
Sally Sarmienta vs. Edita A. Dizon

G.R. No. 235424, February 3, 2021
PROBLEM NO. 78:
To sustain an action for unlawful detainer what are the following jurisdictional facts
needed by the plaintiff, having the burden of alleging and proving by preponderance of
evidence, to prove?
ANSWER:
An action for unlawful detainer is a summary action which may be filed for the purpose of
recovering possession against one who illegally withholds the same after the expiration or
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termination of his or her right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.
To sustain an action for unlawful detainer, the plaintiff bears the burden of alleging and
proving, by preponderance of evidence, the following jurisdictional facts:
1. Initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance

of the plaintiff;
2. eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
3. thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
4. within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
Norman Alfred F. Lazaro vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 230018, 23 June 2021
PROBLEM NO. 79:
Deceased Gian Dale Galindez’s father filed a criminal complaint for Giving Assistance to
Suicide against Lazaro and Escalona, friend of Gian Dale Galindez. After the information
was filed, Escalona filed a Motion to Quash alleging that the facts charged in the Information
do not constitute an offense. Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order which appears
contradictory, stating that: (1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense, and (2)
directing the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) to file an amended information within 10
days from the receipt of the Order.
The OCP Pasig filed a Compliance/Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information with
the Amended Information attached, notably dropping Escalona from the charges. Lazaro, on
the other hand, assailed the Compliance/Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information
via a Motion to Expunge, alleging among others that the Order had become final and
immutable since it was filed 17 days after the Order was received by the OCP.
The RTC resolved the issue by issuing another Order stating that the Court's intention is not
really to order the quashal of the information, but to give the prosecution an opportunity to
correct the defect by way of an amendment pursuant to Section 4, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Undeterred, Lazaro assailed the RTC's orders via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court before the CA. However, the CA found that the RTC's Order dated
October 23, 2013 must indeed be read as ordering the filing of an amended information
instead of a quashal of the original information.
Did the CA err in affirming the RTC's Order?
ANSWER:
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NO. The CA did not err in affirming RTC’s Order.
The Court is aware of the doctrine that where there is a conflict between the dispositive
portion or fallo of a decision and the opinion of the court contained in the body of the
decision, the fallo will prevail. However, this rule is not without exception. Where the
inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is as clear as to show that there was a
mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail.
The RTC's reference to Sections 4 and 5, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure further buttresses the conclusion that it never intended to dismiss the case pending
before it. These provisions states that “if the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of
the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an
amendment be made. If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by
amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or
the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment. If the
motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or information be
filed except as provided in section 6 of this rule xxx.”
In the present case, the RTC judge outrightly dismissed the cases without giving the
prosecution an opportunity to amend the defect in the information. In People v. Talao Perez,
this Court ruled that, "... even granting that the information in question is defective, as
pointed out by the accused, since it appears that the defects thereof can be cured by
amendment, the lower court should not have dismissed the case but should have ordered the
Fiscal to amend the information."
When there is any doubt about the sufficiency of the complaint or information, the court
should direct its amendment or that a new information be filed and save the necessity of
appealing the case on technical grounds when the complaint might easily be amended.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Avelino Manansala

G.R. No. 24189, May 3, 2021
PROBLEM NO. 80:
What is the required quantum of evidence to reconstitute a certificate of title?
ANSWER:
The required quantum of evidence to reconstitute a certificate of title is not a mere

preponderance of the evidence, but clear and convincing evidence producing in the mind of
the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established. In
this case, the RTC erred in granting the petition for reconstitution based on a mere
preponderance of evidence and the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision based on the
same quantum of evidence.
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Marwin B. Raya and Shiela C. Borromeo vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 237798, 5 May 2021
PROBLEM NO. 81:
Raya and Borromeo were charged with Qualified Trafficking in Persons. After the
prosecution rested its case, the defense filed a Motion for Leave to File Attached Demurrer to
Evidence. The RTC issued a resolution granting the Demurrer on the ground that, based on
its assessment, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were plagued with
inconsistencies. On the other hand, the OSG filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
which granted the same and reversed the decision of the RTC. The petitioners then elevated
the case to the Supreme Court.
Did the CA erred in reversing Raya and Borromeo's acquittal?
ANSWER:
YES. The Demurrer cannot be reversed without offending Raya and Borromeo’s
constitutional right against double jeopardy. In Sanvicente v. People, the Court has
categorically held that "once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an
acquittal and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy.” The finality-of-acquittal rule has the same animus as the
right against double jeopardy. Therefore, the petition the petition for certiorari should not
have been granted as it is violative of the constitutional right of Raya and Borromeo against
double jeopardy.
Francis Luigi G. Santos vs. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 250520, 5 May 2021
PROBLEM NO. 82:
Francis Luigi Santos filed a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court
seeking to change his surname from "Santos" to "Revilla" in his Certificate of Live Birth. His
reason was to show sincere and genuine desire to associate himself to his biological father,
Bong Revilla, and that he embraces his true identity. The RTC denied the petition and held
that a change of name was not a matter of right and could be granted only for compelling
reasons. Consequently, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and held that allowing a
change of name would create more confusion as to petitioner's status and filiation given that
he had already been legally adopted by Patrick Santos. It further held that the petitioner
should have availed himself of the adversarial proceeding under Rule 108 for cancellation
and/or correction of entries rather than the summary proceeding under Rule 103.
1. Is the petitioner correct in applying for change of name under Rule 103 instead of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court?
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2. Did the CA err in denying the petition to change petitioner's surname from Santos
to Revilla?
ANSWER:
1. YES. The petitioner correctly availed himself of the remedy under Rule 103 in order
to change his surname from "Santos" to "Revilla." Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial
petitions for change of given name or surname, where a person avails of a remedy to alter the
designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best
known. On the other hand, Rule 108 implements judicial proceedings for the correction or
cancellation of entries in the civil registry such as acts, events, and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons. Contrary to the findings of the CA, Rule 108 is
inapplicable as petitioner does not allege or identify any erroneous entry that requires
substantial rectification or cancellation.
2. NO. The petitioner failed to prove that there was any compelling reason to justify a
change in surname from "Santos" to “Revilla.” It bears emphasis that a change of name is a
privilege and not a matter of right. It is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Here,
petitioner prays that he be allowed to change his surname from "Santos" to "Revilla" to to
show sincere and genuine desire to associate himself to his biological father and to show that
he accepts and embraces his true identity are not enough reasons to justify, in law, the desired
change. Therefore, the Petition for change of name should be dismissed.
Junel Alaska vs. SPO2 Gil Garcia

G.R. No. 228298, June 23, 2021
PROBLEM NO. 83:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari, filed by petitioner Junel Alaska (Alaska) who
was charged with Robbery with Homicide before the RTC. Before arraignment, he filed an
Omnibus Motion to Judicially Determine Probable Cause, Quash the Information, and Quash
the arrest warrant arguing that his warrantless arrest was unlawful. He also filed a Complaint
for Misconduct before the OMB against the police officers who arrested him where,
Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution dismissing the case and invoking the provisions of
Section 20(1) of R.A. No. 6770. Thereafter, his motion for Reconsideration was subsequently
denied.
Can the provision of Section 20 (1) of R.A. No. 6770 be invoked by the Ombudsman to
validate discretionary dismissal?
ANSWER:
NO. Given the difference in nature and purpose of the criminal proceedings for Robbery with
Homicide against Alaska and Montesa, and the proceedings against respondents for the
purportedly illegal arrest, Section 20(1) of R.A. No. 6770 cannot be invoked to validate the
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discretionary dismissal by the Ombudsman of the charges of Arbitrary Detention and
Misconduct. The "adequate remedy" referred to in Section 20(1) of R.A. No. 6770 can only
be construed as referring to, where proper, recourse to other proceedings or tribunals
whereby the erring official who committed the act or omission complained of may also be
made administratively liable. In other words, this refers to a situation where the Ombudsman
has concurrent administrative jurisdiction over the said act or omission.
It must be noted as well that Section 20(1) of R.A. No. 6770 leaves no room for ambiguity as
regards what kind of charges or proceedings it would apply to - that is, in administrative,
and only in administrative cases. There is no similar provision granting the Ombudsman
discretionary authority to dismiss outright any criminal complaint filed before it. In fact, the
Court has said:
Jurisprudence has so far settled that dismissal based on the grounds provided under Section
20 is not mandatory and is discretionary on the part of the evaluating Ombudsman or Deputy
Ombudsman evaluating the administrative complaint. Clearly, as the law, its implementing
rules, and interpretative jurisprudence stand, the dismissal by the Ombudsman on grounds
provided under Section 20 is applicable only to administrative complaints. Its invocation in
the present criminal case is therefore misplaced.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Mel Via T. Villacorta

G.R. No. 249953, June 23, 2021
PROBLEM NO. 84:
Melvin and Janufi were married, and they begot two children, Dia and Javen. During their
marriage, the couple often quarreled about Dia's paternity. Melvin eventually took a DNA
test to determine Dia’s paternity. However, the test revealed that he was not the father of Dia.
Melvin then filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage before the RTC against Janufi. After
the trial, the RTC annulled their marriage and held that Janufi fraudulently concealed that she
slept with another man before her marriage to Melvin, which resulted in her pregnancy. The
Republic, through the OSG, received a notice to file its appellate brief within 45 days or until
31 January 2019. On 30 January 2019, the OSG filed a motion for extension to file said brief.
The CA dismissed the OSG’s appeal for failure to file an appellate brief within a reasonable
period. The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that it timely filed and served,
by registered mail, its motion for extension of time to file an appellate brief as evidenced by a
registered mail bill. In the said motion for extension, the OSG prayed for an additional 90
days (or until 1 May 2019), within which to file its appellate brief. The CA received the same
on 2 May 2019.
Did the CA err in dismissing the OSG’s appeal for failure to file an appellate brief
within a reasonable period?
ANSWER:
68
NO. When a pleading or motion is filed by registered mail, the date of the mailing, as shown
by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be considered the date
of its filing in court. Although the OSG argues that it timely filed its Motion for Extension on
30 January 2019, the evidence offered to prove the same falls short of that required under
Rule 13, Section 12 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial justice,
it is reasonable to consider the OSG’s Motion for Extension as timely filed, especially
considering that, contrary to the C.A.'s Resolution, the OSG had timely filed its appellate
brief within the extended period requested.
SEC. 12. Proof of filing. — The filing of a pleading or paper shall be proved by its existence
in the record of the case. If it is not in the record, but is claimed to have been filed personally,
the filing shall be proved by the written or stamped acknowledgment of its filing by the clerk
of court on a copy of the same; if filed by registered mail, by the registry receipt and by the
affidavit of the person who did the mailing, containing a full statement of the date and place
of depositing the mail in the post office in a sealed envelope addressed to the court, with
postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender
after ten (10) days if not delivered. (n).
Sto. Nino Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. vs. Amado Lintag

G.R. No. 228135, 16 June 2021
PROBLEM NO. 85:
Amado assailed the validity of Resolution No. 5, moving for the increase of water rates in
Sto. Niño Village, and Resolution No. 6 imposing a special assessment for a drainage fund.
Because of his obstinate refusal to pay the parking fines and special assessment, his payment
for association monthly dues, water, and electricity was not accepted by SNVHAI. Thus, he
was constrained to consign his payment with the Clerk of Court of the RTC. The HLURB
Regional Field Office rendered a decision in favor of Amado. Hence, the BODs of SNVHAI
filed an appeal before the HLURB-BOC.
Accordingly, the HLURB-BOC reversed the same. Aggrieved, Amado elevated the case to
the C.A., arguing that the BODs lacked the legal personality to file an appeal before the
HLURB-BOC since SNVHAI did not properly authorize them. The CA granted Amado’s
petition for review.
Should the appeal of the BODs redound to the benefit of SVNHAI?
ANSWER:
YES. As a general rule, a party’s appeal from a judgment will not inure to the benefit of a co-
party who failed to appeal. As against the latter, the judgment continues to run its course until
it becomes final and executory. As an exception, the appeal of one party is deemed to be the
vicarious appeal of the other where there is a commonality of interests between them.
In this case, the BODs assert that they have a commonality of interests with SVNHAI since
69
the disputed board resolutions, the subject of the HLURB Complaint, was issued by the
BODs in the exercise of their functions as members of the latter’s board. Foremost, SVNHAI
and the BODs ’rights and liabilities originate from only one source. Notably, the statutory
authority to issue the disputed board resolutions specifically pertains to SVNHAI. However,
as a juridical entity, SVNHAI exercises this authority through its BODs. Here, the BODs
stood as members of SVNHAI’s board members when the disputed board resolutions were
issued. The CA thus erred when it failed to recognize the BODs ’appeal as a vicarious appeal
that redounds to the benefit of SVNHAI.
Golden Boracay Realty, Inc. vs. Antonio Pelayo

G.R. No. 219446, July 14, 2021
PROBLEM NO. 86:
The facts of the case emerged when Calixto Pelayo who owns a tract of land located in Aklan
sold his land to his children, Gloria and Antonio, dividing the property into eastern and
western sides to Gloria. Subsequently, Gloria conveyed portions of her property on four
separate occasions, including her selling the property to GBRI. In 2003, Antonio filed a
complaint before the RTC alleging that Gloria fraudulently obtained a tax declaration to sell
part of his lot to GBRI and that the deed of sale between Gloria and GBRI should be
annulled. Gloria clarified during the conference that the subject land was not included in the
lot that Gloria sold GBRI.
In light of the foregoing, Antonio manifested and consequently prayed for the court to drop
Gloria as a party defendant. GBRI filed a petition averring that Antonio's dropping of Gloria
as a defendant was fatal to the Complaint because she is an indispensable party whose
absence will result in the mandatory dismissal of the case. RTC ruled in favor of GBRI and
subsequently dismissed the complaint of Antonio.
Did the RTC gravely erred in dismissing Antonio’s complaint on the ground that Gloria
is an indispensable party to the case?
ANSWER:
YES. The dropping of Gloria as a party defendant is not fatal to Antonio's complaint against
GBRI. Hence, the C.A. was correct in ruling that, having transferred all her rights and
obligations over (Art. 1311, NCC), Gloria could no longer be considered an indispensable
party since she had lost her interest in the dispute (Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. v.
Spouses Buenaventura).
Even on the assumption that Gloria may be considered an indispensable party, jurisprudence
instructs that the non-joinder of an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an
action, as the remedy in such case is to implead the party claimed to be indispensable,
considering that parties may be added by order of the court, either on motion of a party or on
its own initiative at any stage of the action (Pamplona Plantation Company, Inc. v. Tinghil).
70
People of the Philippines vs. Juvenal Azurin
G.R. No. 249322, 14 September 2021
PROBLEM NO. 87:
On 13 November 2013, Juvenal Azurin, Regional Director of PDEA of Tuguegarao,

threatened his subordinate Jaime J. Clave, uttering the following words during their
telephone conversation: Putangina mo Clave ha, putangina mo Bobot, papatayin kita", over
office conflict, causing the latter to fear for his life, believing that accused, as PDEA
Regional Director, has the capacity and means to carry out the threat.
Clave went to the police station to report the incident and filed an administrative complaint
against Azurin. The Sandiganbayan found Azurin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Grave Threats. Azurin then filed a Notice of Appeal to the Sandiganbayan pursuant
to Section 1(a), Rule XI of the Sandiganbayan Rules. People then argued that Azurin should
have filed a petition for review on Certiorari under P.D. 1606.
Did Azurin avail of the correct remedy?
ANSWER.
YES. Azurin resorted to the proper remedy of appealing the Sandiganbayan's Decision,
which was issued in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to the Court by filing a notice of
appeal with the former. This is pursuant to Section 1(a), Rule XI of the Sandiganbayan Rules.
Applying the doctrine in the case of People v. Talaue to the present case, the mode of appeal
taken by Azurin of filing a notice of appeal with the Sandiganbayan under the Sandiganbayan
Rules was proper. The Sandiganbayan Rules prevail over the Rules of Court because it is a
later set of rules and a special statute specifically providing for modes of review of
judgments and final orders of the Sandiganbayan. It is a basic canon of statutory construction
that a special law prevails over a general law. Moreover, the Sandiganbayan Rules
effectively amended the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court, and the latter applies only
in a suppletory manner. Hence, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, invoked by the People, is
unavailing.
71
College of Law, New Era University
Professional Schools Building, No. 9 Central Ave., New Era, Quezon City, Philippines, 1107
Godliness is the foundation of knowledge.

2022 NEW POINTERS FROM JUSTICE CAGUIOA CASES

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2022 NEW POINTERS FROM JUSTICE CAGUIOA CASES

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2022 NEW POINTERS

DEAN RODERICK E. MANZANO

State Solicitor Ruben S. Ayson, Jr.

Atty. Voltaire T. Duano

Prof. Jose R. Ortiz

Atty. Mark Anthony P. Tamayo

Chief City Prosecutor Aldrin P. Evangelista

Atty. Alma D. Lanzo

Dean Aristeo R. Cruz

Atty. Fitz Lexine Ayala – Co-Chair

Kim A. Domingo – Secretary

Samantha Siojo - Layout

Atty. Wilson Legaspi

Atty. Gerald Villanueva

Atty. Wilson Legaspi

Ms. Eunice Nemenzo-Arenas

Mr. Loue Tolentino

Mr. Nikko Ysagun

Mr. Ravi Ysmael

Is the CA correct in affirming the decision of the RTC?

YES. The CA correctly affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Susan A. Yap vs. Elizabeth Lagtapon

YES. The remedy of annulment of judgment, embodied in Rule 47 of the Rules, is

1. when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;

People of the Philippines vs. Roque Dayaday

YES. The CA is correct in upholding the decision.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Alfredo R. De Borja

Will the petition prosper?

San Francisco Inn vs. San Pablo City Water District

Segovia vs. The Climate Change Commission

Jona Bumatay vs. Lolita Bumatay

Sumifru (Philippines) Corp. vs. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm

PROBLEM NO. 10:

Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm (NAMASUFA-NAFLU-KMU), a legitimate labor

Did the CA err in affirming the findings of DOLE?

City of Batangas vs. Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation

PROBLEM NO. 11:

AMA Land, Inc. vs. Wack Wack Residents’ Association, Inc.

People of the Philippines vs. Federico Gerola

PROBLEM NO. 13:

Are inconsistencies and contradictions in testimonies of a witness in this case is a valid

PROBLEM NO. 14:

Is the petition of Valmores before the SC a violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of

People of the Philippines vs. Ruben "Robin" Bongbonga

PROBLEM NO. 15:

PROBLEM NO. 16:

Privatization and Management Office (PMO) vs. Edgardo V. Quesada, et al.

PROBLEM NO. 17:

Is the CA correct in giving due course to the petition for certiorari?

GMA Network, Inc. vs. National Telecommunications Commission

PROBLEM NO. 18:

San Fernando Coca-Cola Rank-and-File Union (SACORU) vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers

PROBLEM NO. 19:

Philippine Association of Detective and Protective Agency Operators (PADPAO), Region 7

PROBLEM NO. 20:

Is the case moot and academic?

NO. The case is not moot and academic.

An action is considered “moot” when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because

People of the Philippines vs. Libera to Pentecostes

PROBLEM NO. 21:

Was the CA correct? Decide on the case.

Gov. Aurora E. Cerilles vs. Civil Service Commission