2022 NEW POINTERS

DEAN RODERICK E. MANZANO

COLLEGE OF LAW

Labor law
Cases Penned by Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa
(2022 Bar Examinations Chair)
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Atty. Voltaire T. Duano
Chairperson, Labor Law Department

State Solicitor Ruben S. Ayson, Jr.

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Prof. Jose Ortiz, Jr.

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Chief City Prosecutor Aldrin P. Evangelista

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Dean Salvador Moya

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Dean Aristeo R. Cruz

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Kim A. Domingo
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DEAN RODERICK MANZANO

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Legal Aid Clinic’s Staff
 Table of Contents
Yialos Manning Services, Inc. vs. Borja
871 SCRA 67, 4 July 2018 ………………………………………………………………….. . 1

Rickmers Marine Agency Phils., Inc. vs. San Jose

872 SCRA 557, 23 July 2018 …………………………………………………………….. 2

Menez vs. Status Maritime Corporation

878 SCRA 421, 29 August 2018 ………………………………………………………………. 3

Cariño vs. Maine Maritime Phils., Inc.

884 SCRA 56, 17 October 2018 ……………………………………………………………….. 3

Henry Esposo vs. Espilon Maritime Services

884 SCRA 629, 7 November 2018………………………………………………..…………… 4

Daquinol vs. Southgate Foods, Inc.

894 CRA 172, 20 February 2019 ……………………………………………………………… 5

Bigg’s Inc. vs. Boncasas

895 SCRA 178, 6 March 2019 ………………………………………………………………… 6

Pardillo vs. Bandojo

899 SCRA 161, 27 March 2019 ………………………………………………………….….. . 6

Airbone Maintenance and Allied Services, Inv. vs. Egos

900 DCRA 72, 3 April 2019 ………………………………………………………………….. 7

Beltran vs. AMA Computer College

900 SCRA 85, 3 April 2019 …………………………………………………………………… 8

Elpidio Que vs. Asia Brewery, Inc.

901 SCRA 1, 10 April 2019 …………………………………………………………………… 8

Jebsens Maritime, Inc. vs. Mirasol

905 SCRA 112, 19 June 2019………………………………………………………………….. 9
Jose Malicdem vs. Asis Bulk Transport Phils., Inc.
905 SCRA 243, 19 June 2019 ………………………………………………………………… 10

Arnulfo Fernandez vs. Kalookan Slaughterhouse, Inc.

905 SCRA 271, 19 June 2019 ………………………………………………………………… 11

The Heritage Hotel, Manila vs. Lilian Sio

906 SCRA 167, 26 June 2019 ………………………………………………………………… 12

Rodessa Rodriguez vs. Orient Line Philippines, Inc.

910 SCRA 498, 24 July 2019 …………………………………………………………………. 12

Efren Julleza vs. Orient Line Philippines, Inc.

911 SCRA 96, 29 July 2019 …………………………………………………………………… 13

Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, Princess Cruises Lines Ltd. vs. Buico

G.R. No. 230901, 927 SCRA 287, 5 December 2019 …………………………………………. 14

Neren Villanueva vs. Ganco Resort and Recreation, Inc.

G.R. No. 227175, 928 SCRA 265, 8 January 2020 …………………………………………… 15

Evic Human Resources Management, Inc. vs. Panahon

G.R. No. 206890, 833 SCRA 404, 31 July 2017 ……………………………………………… 16

San Fernando Coca-Cola Rank-and-File Union vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc
G.R. No. 200499, 842 SCRA 1, 4 October 2017 ……………………………………………… 17

Symex Security Services, Inc. vs. Magdalino Rivera

844 SCRA 416, 8 November 2017 ……………………………………………………………. 17

Julieta Verzonilla vs. Employee’s Compensation Commission

G.R. No. 232888, 914 SCRA 182, 14 August 2019 ………………………………………..… 18

Pacific Ocean Manning, Inc. vs. Salacilo

G. R. No. 217431, 933 SCRA 1, 1 February 2020 …………………………………………… 19
Ventis Maritime Corp. vs. Salenga
G.R. No. 238578, 936 SCRA 623, 8 June 2020 ………………………………………………. 20

Henry Espiritu Pastrana vs. Bahia Shipping Services

G.R. No. 227419, 937 SCRA 301, 10 June 2020 ………………………………………………20

Zaldy Razonable vs. Maersk

937 SCRA 421, 10 June 2020 ………………………………………………………………… 21
 Consolidated Distillers of the Far East, Inc. vs. Zaragoza
867 SCRA 355, June 20, 2018

Problem: Condis filed a petition assailing the Court of Appeals' decision, which affirmed the
resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission. The said resolution found it liable for
illegal dismissal and ordered it to pay respondent Zaragoza back wages and separation pay,
reckoned from the time of illegal dismissal until the finality of the decision awarding the
separation pay. Condis argued that the reckoning point should be up until the happening of the
supervening event in 2007 which made it impossible for Zaragoza to reinstate from his former
position.

Is Condis liable for back wages and separation pay only until the year 2007?

Suggested Answer: No. The computation of back wages and separation pay shall be until the
finality of the decision awarding the separation pay. The finality of the decision cuts off the
employment relationship and represents the final settlement of the rights and obligations of the
parties against each other.

In this case, Condis contends that it is only liable only up until 2017, the time of the supervening
event, and the legal impossibility to reinstate Rogel.

Hence, Condis is liable for back wages and separation pay not only until the year 2007 but until
the finality of the decision awarding the separation pay.

Yialos Manning Services, Inc. vs. Borja

871 SCRA 67, July 04, 2018

Problem: Borja was employed as an oiler by Yialos Manning Services Inc. (YMSI). After doing
maintenance work and lifting a metal plate, he felt "pain in the buttocks radiating down the back
of his leg” which resulted in his repatriation in 2010. Borja claims that his disability is total and
permanent, as certified by his appointed physician. On the other hand, petitioners claim that
Borja's ailment is only "Grade 11" as diagnosed by the company-designated physician. Borja
refused to submit to a third doctor and demanded the payment of total permanent disability
benefits. He reasoned that he was not obliged to comply with the conflict-resolution procedure
under Section 20 (B)(3) of the POEA-SEC because he is already considered totally and
permanently disabled by operation of law because the company-designated physician did not
declare him fit to work within the 120-day and 240-day periods.

Is Borja entitled to total permanent disability benefits?

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Suggested Answer: No. In case there is a conflict between the medical findings of the company-
designated physician and the seafarer-appointed physician as to the disability rating of the
seafarer, the parties must comply with the conflict-resolution procedure mandated under the
POEA-SEC. The duty to signify the intention to resolve the conflict by referral to a third doctor
is upon the seafarer as he is the one contesting the findings of the company-designated physician.

In this case, the petitioner did not comply with the conflict-resolution procedure under Section
20 (B)(3) of the POEA-SEC.

Hence, Borja is not entitled to total permanent disability benefits.

Rickmers Marine Agency Phils., Inc. vs. San Jose

872 SCRA 557, July 23, 2018

Problem: Respondent San Jose is a wiper/seafarer under a local manning agency, Rickmers
Marine. Upon waking up, he complained of loss of/impaired vision in his left eye and was
diagnosed with retinal detachment/tear affecting the macula and was ordered for medical
repatriation. Upon arrival in Manila on March 3, 2011, he underwent eye surgery recommended
by his designated physician and was confined for a period of three days. Respondent's condition
necessitated two operations on the affected eye, which he underwent on March 16, 2011 and
September 18, 2011. On November 21, 2011, or 263 days after repatriation, the company-
designated physician issued a medical report declaring him "fit to work." On February 14, 2012,
the respondent instituted a complaint before the LA for total permanent disability benefits.

Is respondent San Jose entitled to total permanent disability benefits?

Suggested Answer: Yes. It is mandatory for a company-designated physician to issue his

assessment within the 120/240-day period. Otherwise, the seafarer's illness shall be deemed total
and permanent disability.

In the instant case, the respondent was repatriated on March 3, 2011, and had undergone his
second operation 199 days from repatriation which justified the 120-day extension for further
treatment. However, the company-designated physician's assessment of fitness to work was
issued only 263 days from repatriation. Thus, the medical assessment of the respondent was made
beyond the maximum 240-day period prescribed under the POEA-SEC. As such, the disability
of the respondent is deemed total and permanent.

Hence, San Jose is entitled to total permanent disability benefits.

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 Menez vs. Status Maritime Corporation
878 SCRA 421, August 29, 2018

Problem: Petitioner is the surviving spouse of the deceased seafarer, Jonathan. Jonathan was
employed under the Status Maritime as a 2nd engineer deployed and embarked on the M/V
Naftocement. Due to long hours of duty in the engine room, Jonathan felt dizzy and nauseous;
however, he just ignored it. Jonathan disembarked from M/V Naftocement II and arrived in the
Philippines on September 12, 2009. He did not submit to a post-employment medical
examination. Later, he was diagnosed with leukemia and died thereafter. Petitioner claims for
death benefits. On the other hand, Status Maritime contends that the deceased seafarer died after
the effectivity of his employment contract with private respondents. The illness which caused the
seafarer's demise was not proven to be work-related; and cancer is judicially ruled to be not a
work-related disease and that the seafarer failed to comply with the mandatory post-employment
medical examinations. Hence, this petition.

Is Jonathan's death compensable under the 2000 POEA-SEC?

Suggested Answer: No. In order for the beneficiaries of a seafarer to be entitled to death
compensation from the employer, it must be proven that the death of the seafarer (1) is work-
related; and (2) occurred during the term of his contract. The seafarer shall also submit himself to
a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working
days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so.

In this case, Jonathan was repatriated on September 11, 2009 due to the completion of his contract;
he died on November 11, 2009, or two (2) months after his repatriation. Petitioner failed to prove
by substantial evidence the causal connection between Jonathan's death and the nature of his work.
Moreover, he did not submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-
designated physician upon his return.

Hence, Jonathan’s death is not compensable under the 2000 POEA-SEC,

Cariño vs. Maine Marine Phils., Inc.

884 SCRA 56, October 17, 2018

Problem: Petitioner Carino is a seafarer under employment with Maine Marine. While
performing his duties, he accidentally slipped into a manhole and sustained multiple fractures on
his right fibula and a malleolar fracture of his right ankle. On August 17, 2013, he was repatriated
for medical reasons. He was then referred to Dr. Tacata and was scheduled for a follow-up.
Carino has been requesting approval of further treatment and release of his sickness allowance;
as a result of the respondents' continuing refusal to provide him medical attention, he was
constrained to consult an independent doctor. On the other hand, respondents argued that they
provided the necessary medical attention but the complainant no longer reported back for further
treatment and that he abandoned his medical treatment with the company-designated physician.

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Is Carino entitled to disability compensation?

Suggested Answer: Yes. If the condition of the seafarer still requires medical attention arising
from the injury after his repatriation, he shall be provided at cost by his employer until such time
he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated
physician. In addition, the seafarer shall also receive a sickness allowance from his employer in an
amount equivalent to his basic wage, computed from the time he signed off until he is declared fit
to work.

In this case, even though the company-designated physician scheduled a check-up, Cariño's failure
to attend the same was not because he abandoned his treatment; rather, it was because Maine
Marine had not approved his medical examination and the reimbursement of expenses. Cariño is
entitled to a sickness allowance for 120 days, as after the lapse thereof, his disability became total
and permanent because of the company-designated physician's failure to issue an assessment of
his fitness to work or degree of permanent disability.

Hence, he is entitled to disability compensation.

Henry Esposo vs. Epsilon Maritime Services

884 SCRA 629, November 07, 2018

Problem: Henry Esposo had been continuously hired by respondent Epsilon as Chief Engineer.
Esposo underwent a Pre-Employment Medical Examination wherein he was declared fit to work
albeit with the recommendation, "Hypertension Controlled with medication." Later, he was
repatriated due to the termination of his contract and was diagnosed with Coronary Heart Disease
by an independent physician. Without submitting himself for mandatory post-employment medical
examination within three days from his arrival in the Philippines, Esposo filed the present
complaint.

Is Esposo entitled to disability benefits?

Suggested Answer: No, Esposo is not entitled to disability benefits.

For a disability to be compensable, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be
work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the
seafarer's employment contract. Cardio-vascular diseases are explicitly listed as occupational
diseases when the heart disease was known to have been present during employment and there
must be proof that an acute exacerbation was clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons
of the nature of his work.

In this case, there was no proof presented that such illness subsisted prior to the expiration of his
employment contract or even up to the day of his repatriation. Much as he claimed that during his

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employment, he was already feeling severe chest pains and other discomforts, Esposo never
presented any written note, request, or record about any medical condition to that effect or any
medical check-up, consultation, or treatment prior to his repatriation.

Hence, Esposo is not entitled to disability benefits.

Daguinod vs. Southgate Foods, Inc.

894 SCRA 172, February 20, 2019

Problem: Daguinod was assigned as counter crew/cashier of a Jollibee franchisee pursuant to a

Service Agreement between Generation One and the franchise operator Southgate. Under the
Service Agreement, Generation One was contracted by Southgate to provide "specified non-core
functions and operational activities" for its Jollibee Alphaland branch. Daguinod also executed a
Service Contract with Generation One where specific work responsibilities to be performed by
Daguinod were left blank. Later, he was alleged to have committed theft and was illegally
dismissed by Southgate. Generation One and Southgate averred that Generation One is a
legitimate labor contractor and that the Service Agreement between the two companies was valid.

Is Generation One a legitimate labor contractor?

Suggested Answer: No. The ownership of substantial capital in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries, work premises, and other properties, by the contractor is a factor in establishing
whether it is legitimate.

In this particular case, Generation One submitted only one Income Tax Return (ITR) for the year
ended December 2010 and can hardly be considered substantial evidence to prove that it has
substantial capital. Generation One likewise did not submit any Audited Financial Statements
(AFS) which does not show a complete picture of its financial standing. Further, registration with
DOLE as an independent contractor does not automatically vest it with the status of a legitimate
labor contractor, it is merely presumptive proof.

Hence, the totality of circumstances reveals that Generation One, despite its Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) registration, is not a legitimate labor contractor.

Bigg's, Inc. vs. Boncasas

895 SCRA 178, March 06, 2019

Problem: Petitioner Bigg’s alleged that on February 16, 1996, around 50 union members staged
an illegal "sit-down strike" in Bigg's restaurant. The union did not comply with the requirements
of sending a Notice of Strike to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Neither
did the union obtain the "strike vote" from its members and belatedly filed a Notice of Strike with

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the NCMB on the same day to conceal the illegality of the sit-down strike. The employees were
placed under preventive suspension. For failure to comply, they were sent employment
termination letters on February 19, 1996. On the other hand, the union members accuse Bigg's of
interfering with union activities. Allegedly, in February 1996, union members were asked to
withdraw their membership under threat of losing their employment. On the other hand, the union
members filed a complaint before the NCMB for unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal, and
damages. Upon compliance with the procedures of a valid strike, the union conducted another
strike on March 5, 1996. However, the union members were disruptive and violent.

Were the strikes held on February 16, 1996, and March 5, 1996, illegal?

Suggested Answer: Yes. The Labor Code and the IRR limit the grounds for a valid strike to (1) a
bargaining deadlock in the course of collective bargaining, or (2) the conduct of unfair labor
practices by the employer. In both instances, the union must conduct a "strike vote” which
requires notification to the regional branch of the NCMB of the conduct of the strike vote at least
24 hours before the conduct of the voting. Thereafter, the union must furnish the NCMB with the
results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout. This seven-day period
has been referred to as the "seven-day strike ban" or "seven-day waiting period.

In this case, the union did not file the requisite Notice of Strike and failed to observe the cooling-
off period. In an effort to legitimize the strike on February 16, 1996, the union filed a Notice of
Strike on the same day. This cannot be considered as compliance with the requirement, as the
cooling-off period is mandatory. Further, on the illegality of the strike on March 5, 1996, despite
the compliance with the procedural requirements of a valid strike, it was established that the
striking union members committed acts of violence, aggression, vandalism, and blockage of the
free passage to and from Bigg's premises which is prohibited under the Labor Code. Hence, the
strikes on both dates were illegal.

Pardillo vs. Bandojo

899 SCRA 161, March 27, 2019

Problem: Pardillo was a business office manager of E & R Hospital and Pharmacy owned and
managed by spouses Bandojo. Later, she received a Notice of Termination due to loss of
confidence, habitual tardiness, texting insulting words to the employer, uttering offensive words
against the employer, and texting and threatening to kill the employer and his family. Dr. Bandojo
alleged that Pardillo's termination was brought about by several infractions she committed and
her habitual tardiness. Pardillo, on the other hand, claims that she did not receive any notice to
explain prior to receiving the notice of termination.

Is Pardillo’s dismissal valid?

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Suggested Answer: No. The employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for
a just or authorized cause.

Anent the procedural aspect, the employer must comply with the two-notice rule. The employer
must serve the erring employee a first notice which details the ground/s for termination, giving the
employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side. The second notice pertains to the written
notice of termination indicating that upon due consideration of all circumstances, the employer
has decided to dismiss the employee.

Pardillo was served with a Notice to Explain (NTE) that charged her only with tardiness on two
dates. However, the notice of termination charged her with additional and more serious grounds
of loss of trust and confidence, habitual tardiness, texting insulting words and uttering offensive
words to Dr. Bandojo, and threatening to kill Dr. Bandojo and her family. The additional grounds
cited in the notice of termination which were not mentioned in the NTE violated Pardillo's right to
be informed of the administrative charges against her. The NTE and the notice of termination did
not state the specific acts that constituted a breach of company policies resulting in loss of trust
and confidence and the specific company policies that were violated. Hence, Pardillo’s dismissal
is not valid.

Airborne Maintenance and Allied Services, Inc. vs. Arnulfo Egos

900 SCRA 72, April 03, 2019

Problem: Airborne Maintenance and Allied Services, Inc. hired Arnulfo Egos as a janitor who
allegedly has a heart ailment. 20 years thereafter the contract between Airborne and Meralco-
Balintawak Branch expired and a new contract was awarded to Landbees Corporation, and the
latter absorbed all employees of Airborne except Egos. According to the doctor, Egos is fit to work
but Airborne ignores the result. Egos filed a complaint about constructive/illegal dismissal.

Was Egos constructively dismissed?

Suggested Answer: Yes, Egos was constructively dismissed.

In employees’ termination cases, the well-entrenched policy is that no worker shall be dismissed
except for just or authorized cause provided by law and after due process. Dismissal of employees
have two facets: first, the legality of the act of dismissal, which constitutes substantive due process;
and second, the legality in the manner of dismissal, which constitutes procedural due process.
Clearly, the failure to observe the twin requisites of notice and hearing not only makes the
dismissal of an employee illegal regardless of his alleged violation but is also violative of the
employee's right to due process.

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 Beltran vs. AMA Computer College-Biñan/AMA Education System
900 SCRA 85, April 03, 2019

Problem: Quintin Beltran started as Mathematics and CAD Instructor at AMA Education System's
Quezon City Campus and was promoted as School Registrar in Binan Branch. Petitioner filed a
request for early retirement manifesting his desire to reside abroad with his family. His request
was however disapproved. Before the denial could be communicated to him, Petitioner had already
left the country. Petitioner failed to submit his resignation letter and to follow the standard
company policy on proper turnover of work and accomplishment of clearance. Private respondents
further contended that they were willing and ready to release to Petitioner his last
salary/incentive/allowance/recurring income and 13th-month pay in the total amount of PHP
28,046.34. According to Private Respondents, the PHP 21,223.02 deduction from his pay pertained
to the unliquidated budget received by Petitioner on 17 April 2008 for the graduation and
baccalaureate mass.

Petitioner also claimed that his basic monthly salary was PHP 51,310.00 and not PHP 25,000.00.
There was also no evidence that he received the unliquidated budget for the 2008 graduation. While
there was no written retirement plan, AMA has a long-standing practice of granting early
retirement, separation pay, or cash gift or benefit to those who have not reached the compulsory
retirement age or mandatory twenty (20) years of service.

Is Beltran entitled to the retirement benefits?

Suggested Answer: Yes, Beltran is entitled to the Retirement benefits.

The Court ruled that while the employer is free to grant retirement benefits and impose different
age or service requirements, the benefits should not be lesser than those provided in Article 287 of
the Labor Code. The Retirement Pay Law does not bar a retired employee from pursuing a
livelihood or practicing a profession after receiving retirement benefits

In this case, petitioner was able to prove the existence of an established company practice of
granting early retirement to its employees who have rendered at least 10 years of service, regardless
of age, with substantial evidence.

Elpidio Que vs. Asia Brewery, Inc., 901

SCRA 1, April 10, 2019

Problem: Elpidio Que had been the Regional Sales Manager RSM of Asia Brewery Inc. for eight
years and was stationed in Northern Luzon. His compensation package consisted of a monthly
salary amounting to P67, 000.00 and P250.00 a day per diem allowance. The management of

8
private respondents split the said region into two to spur a better growth rate in its income and to
give more direct and focused handling of the areas covered by these sales offices.

One year and three months after the split of the NCLR, Raymundo T. Gatmaitan, the vice president
for sales of private-respondent made an evaluation of the experimental split of the NCLR and
recommended the reversion to the old setup of putting the NCLR under one RSM. He opined that
the decision did not achieve any gain. He further recommended that since the re-merger would
result in redundancy in the office of a Regional Sales Manager, the office of the petitioner should
be abolished on the ground of redundancy.

Was Que validly terminated on the ground of redundancy?

Suggested Answer: Yes, Que was validly terminated on the ground of redundancy.

Redundancy exists when the service of an employee is in excess of what is reasonably demanded
by the actual requirements of the business.

A redundant position is one rendered superfluous by any number of factors, such as over-hiring of
workers, decreased volume of business, dropping of a particular product line previously
manufactured by the company, or phasing out of a service activity formerly undertaken by the
enterprise. For a valid implementation of a redundancy program, the employer must comply with
the following requisites: (1) written notice served on both the employee and the DOLE at least one
month prior to the intended date of termination; (2) payment of separation pay equivalent to at
least one month pay or at least one-month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher, as
reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant. Among the
accepted criteria in implementing a redundancy program, are (1) preferred status; (2) efficiency;
and (3) seniority.

Necessarily, the position of one of the two RSMs will become an excess of what is reasonably
required by Que’s company. Hence, the employment of the excess RSM has to be terminated on
the ground of redundancy, subject to the payment of separation pay as mandated by law.

Jebsens Maritime, Inc. vs. Edgardo Malate Mirasol

905 SCRA 112, June 19, 2019

Problem: Edgardo Malate Mirasol filed a complaint wherein he alleged the following: he is
entitled to total permanent disability benefits of US$60,000.00 under the POEA Standard
Employment Contract; his illness is work-related as it was sustained in the course of his duties;
said illness was not pre-existing since he underwent the mandatory pre-employment medical
examination before he was employed by the respondents, and was found to be fit and given a clean
bill of health; the law does not require that a seafarer be totally paralyzed in order to claim total
permanent disability benefits; he is entitled to moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees;

9
respondents/petitioner must be ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of Php500,000.00; in
addition to his sickness/loss of right testicle, he also suffered serious anxiety, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings and loss of appetite; respondents must likewise be ordered to pay him exemplary
damages of Php500,000.00; and since it was respondents' act of refusing to pay his disability
benefits which forced him to litigate, they must likewise be ordered to pay attorney's fees of ten
percent (10%) of the total award in his favor.

Are Jebsens Maritime Inc., and Star Clippers LTD. liable to pay?

Suggested Answer: Yes, they are liable to pay.

The labor arbiter found that the respondent acquired epididymitis and testicular cancer while he
was on board the vessel because he was declared fit to work during his pre-employment medical
examination. The LA also found that the respondent was subjected to enormous stress and
constantly exposed to dust, chemical irritants, and/or natural elements such as harsh sea weather.

A final, conclusive, and definite medical assessment must clearly state whether the seafarer is fit
to work or the exact disability rating, or whether such illness is work-related, and without any
further condition or treatment. It should no longer require any further action on the part of the
company- designated physician and it is issued by the company-designated physician after he or
she has exhausted all possible treatment options within the periods allowed by law.

Jose Malicdem vs. Asia Bulk Transport Phils., Inc.

905 SCRA 243, June 19, 2019

Problem: Jose Aspiras Malicdem was hired by respondent local manning agent Asia Bulk
Transport Phils, Inc. prior to embarkation, Malicdem underwent a Pre-Employment Medical
Examination (PEME) where it was noted that he had a medical history of high blood pressure and
hypertension. Nevertheless, he was declared "fit to work." On the second week of his duty on
board MV Yushio Princess II, Malicdem suffered from blurring vision and headache.

A medical report was issued by Dr. Salvador stating that Malicdem was under medical treatment
and recommended a surgical procedure. However, the report clarified that Malicdem's glaucoma
was not work-related. According to Malicdem, while on board MV Nord Liberty, he was exposed
to psychological stress from being away from his family for months; to consumption of fatty,
cholesterol, and sodium-rich food which were part of the provisions in the vessel; to heat in the
engine room emitted by ship equipment and to frequent inhalation of diesel and hydrocarbons used
as fuel for the vessel. In October 2012, he suffered episodes of dizziness and blurring vision. He
reported these ailments to the Ship Captain but was not referred to a doctor because the vessel was
then at sea.

Is the company liable to pay him total and permanent disability benefits?

10
Suggested Answer: No, Malicdem cannot be awarded the total and permanent disability benefits.

He breached his contractual obligation to submit to a company-designated physician within the

required period and failed to prove, by substantial evidence, the compensability of his illnesses.

For the seaman's claim to prosper, however, it is mandatory that he should be examined by a
company-designated physician within three days from his repatriation. Failure to comply with this
mandatory reporting requirement without justifiable cause shall result in forfeiture of the right to
claim the compensation and disability benefits provided under the POEA-SEC.

Arnulfo Fernandez vs. Kalookan Slaughterhouse, Incorporated

905 SCRA 271, June 19, 2019

Problem: Arnulfo Fernandez was hired as Butcher by Kalookan Slaughterhouse, Inc. He claimed
that he worked from Monday to Sunday, from 6:30 P.M. to 7:30 A.M., with a daily wage of
₱700.00, which was later reduced to ₱500.00. The next day, however, he was shocked when he
only received ₱200.00 due to his previous undertime and was informed that he could no longer
report for work due to his old age. Kalookan Slaughterhouse alleged that it imposed policies on
entry to the premises, which applied to employees, dealers, independent butchers, hog and meat
dealers, and trainees. Also, according to them, Fernandez violated the policies and he misconstrued
the disallowance to enter the slaughterhouse as an act of dismissal.

Is there an Employee-Employer relationship in this case?

Suggested Answer: Yes, there is an Employee-Employer relationship between Fernandez and

Kalookan Slaughterhouse.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) found that the requisites of an employer-employee relationship were
established as follows: petitioner was hired by Kalookan Slaughterhouse through Tablit and
petitioner was paid his daily wage for his butchering services. Further, Kalookan Slaughterhouse
had the authority to discipline the petitioner as regards his work activities through Kalookan
Slaughterhouse's personnel named Noelberto De Guzman. Kalookan Slaughterhouse also
exercised control over the conduct of the petitioner in the performance of his work and
implemented policies regulating his rendition of services. In fact, De Guzman admitted to the strict
policies imposed by Kalookan Slaughterhouse such as the requirement of I.D.s, uniforms, and even
where butchering knives are inserted. According to De Guzman, the petitioner violated all of these.
The policies implemented showed that the petitioner could not render butchering services
following his own ways and means.

The LA also found that the petitioner presented his I.D. issued by Kalookan Slaughterhouse, which
proved that he was an employee of Kalookan Slaughterhouse.

11
 The Heritage Hotel, Manila vs. Lilian Sio
906 SCRA 167, June 26, 2019

Problem: The Heritage Hotel Manila employed Lilian Sio as a Service Agent on September 1,
1995. She was last assigned at the hotel’s restaurant, Le Cafe. Her tasks included assisting in the
serving of food and beverages to Heritage’s guests. In two separate incidents, Sio allegedly
exhibited behavior not inimical to the hotel’s image wherein she disrespected and showed
discourtesy to guests. Complaints were formally filed before the human resource department of
the hotel against Sio and she was heard, later on, penalized for suspension from work with the 2nd
penalty indicating a warning that repetition of the same act would warrant dismissal. Aggrieved
by the decision, she filed a complaint before the arbitration branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP), illegal suspension, and other monetary
claims.

Is the suspension valid and legal in this case?

Suggested Answer: Yes, Sio’s suspension is valid.

It is axiomatic that appropriate disciplinary sanction is within the purview of management

imposition. What should not be overlooked is the prerogative of an employer company to prescribe
reasonable rules and regulations necessary for the proper conduct of its business and to provide
certain disciplinary measures in order to implement said rules to assure that the same would be
complied with. An employer has free reign and enjoys wide latitude of discretion to regulate all
aspects of employment, including the prerogative to instill discipline in its employees and to
impose penalties, including dismissal, upon erring employees.

Rodessa Rodriguez vs. Sintron Systems, Inc.

910 SCRA 498, July 24, 2019

Problem: Rodessa Rodriguez was hired by respondent Sintron Systems, Inc. as a sales
coordinator. She attended the training in the USA without any condition imposed upon her
attendance. However, when she returned to work on November 7, 2013, SSI asked her to sign a
training agreement that required her to remain with SSI for three years, otherwise, she was to pay
a penalty of P275, 500.00. She refused to sign the agreement, arguing that she should have been
informed of the same prior to her departure for the training. Thereafter, in a meeting held on
November 18, 2013, Capaque humiliated Rodriguez and shouted at her vindictive words such as
"mayabang" and "mahadera." She took leave, and when she returned, she was surprised to learn

12
that Capaque sent emails to clients stating that Rodriguez had abandoned her job and accused her
of intentionally hurting the reputation of SSI to the latter's clients.

Rodriguez failed to prove by substantial evidence the unbearable working environment that
supposedly forced her to go on several absences. Hence, there was no constructive dismissal.
Instead, it appeared that Rodriguez simply did not want to report to the newly appointed EA.

Was Rodessa Rodriguez’s dismissal valid?

Suggested Answer: Yes, Rodessa Rodriguez’s dismissal was valid.

In illegal dismissal cases, before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal
was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from
service. Obviously, if there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to its legality or
illegality. As an allegation is not evidence, it is elementary that a party alleging a critical fact must
support his allegation with substantial evidence. Bare allegations of dismissal, when
uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence. Moreover, the evidence to
prove the fact of dismissal must be clear, positive, and convincing.

In this case, Rodriguez's prolonged absences without turning in vital information and deleting the
files from her company-issued computer and email account, causing injury to clients and SSI,
constituted gross negligence which would have been a valid ground for her termination.

Efren Julleza vs. Orient Line Philippines, Inc.,

911 SCRA 96, July 29, 2019

Problem: Efren Julleza was employed by the respondent as a bosun on board MV Orient Phoenix.
After the required Pre-employment medical examination period of nine months. The aforesaid
employment was covered by the IBF-JSU/PSU-IMMAJJ Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA). On the 19th of December 2012, the petitioner allegedly slipped while cleaning the cargo
hold under bad weather conditions. AB Magalona wanted to bring him to the hospital for medical
attention. The Shipmaster advised the petitioner to just wait until his extended contract ends on the
25th of December 2012. He was given medication to alleviate the pain in his lower back. Several
tests and therapy sessions were done when the company physician certified that private respondent
was suffering from bilateral nephrolithiasis and lumbar spondylosis. Such illness is Grade 8 or loss
of 2/3 lifting power of the trunk. After which, he seeks the expertise of his own doctor in the person
of Dr. Catapang Jr., and he concluded that the petitioner is unfit for strenuous duties.

The private respondent claimed that the bilateral nephrolithiasis is not work-related as certified by
the company physician and the lumbar spondylosis was classified as grade 8 disability, and it did
not result from an accident since there was no confirmation or validation under the Ship master’s
reports but only based on the written testimony of the petitioner and unnotarized statement of the
accident by AB Magalona.

13
Is Julleza entitled to the permanent disability benefits under CBA?

Suggested Answer: No, Julleza is entitled to the permanent disability benefits under CBA.

The petitioner did not observe the conflict resolution procedure under the CBA where it was stated
that in case of accidents, arising on board the ship, such entitlement for the permanent disability
must be based on the determination of the company physician; and if not in agreement with the
latter, one can seek for a third doctor, which should be agreed upon by the employee and the
company. However, in this case, petitioner did not do so, hence he is not entitled to the benefits.

Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, Princess Cruise Lines Ltd. vs. Allan Buico
G.R. No. 230901, 927 SCRA 287, December 05, 2019

Problem: Allan Buico was a second pantryman in one of Princess Cruise Line’s “hotel vessels”
through an agency called Magsaysay Maritime Corporation. While on board, he had an accident that
caused injury to his leg and ankle. He was repatriated to the Philippines for treatment. The company-
designated physician diagnosed him with a Grade 10 disability. Not satisfied, Buico consulted his
own physician who assessed him as “unfit to perform sea duties, with permanent disability.”

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Magsaysay Maritime since Buico failed to follow the third
doctor rule, and the company-designated physician had knowledge of his actual medical condition,
hence, he was more qualified to assess his disability.

Did the LA err when it ruled that Buico is only entitled payment of benefits from Grade 10
disability?

Suggested Answer: No. The LA did not err when it ruled that Buico is only entitled to payment
of benefits from Grade 10 disability.

When a seafarer suffers a work-related injury, the employer is obligated to refer the seafarer to a
company-designated physician who has to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer’s fitness
or degree of disability within a period of 120 days from repatriation. However, if there is no
definitive declaration because the seafarer required further medical attention, then the period may
be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within
this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists.

In the instant case, after the company-designated physician gave a final Grade 10 disability
assessment, Buico consulted his own physician who opined that he was unfit to perform sea duty
in whatever capacity with a permanent disability status. Thereafter, Buico filed a complaint against
his employers without first expressly requesting the company for the referral of the matter to a

14
third doctor. The LA correctly awarded Grade 10 disability benefits to Buico based on the
disability grading given by the company-designated physician.

Neren Villanueva vs. Ganco Resort and Recreation, Inc.,

G.R. No. 227175, 928 SCRA 265, January 08, 2020

Problem: Neren Villanueva was the head of the Front Desk Department at La Luz Resort owned
by Ganco Resort and Recreation, Inc. (GRRI). Villanueva violated several company policies, like
abuse of authority for rejecting guests and by threatening a person in authority with physical harm.
When GRRI implemented a reorganization in the Resort, Villanueva was transferred to the Storage
Department without diminution in rank and benefits. However, Villanueva refused to sign the
Notice to Transfer, which eventually led to her termination.
Villanueva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims before the LA, which ruled in
her favor. So GRRI appealed with the NLRC which affirmed the earlier ruling. Aggrieved, GRRI
filed a petition before the CA which upheld the validity of Villanueva’s dismissal because her
refusal to sign the Notice to Transfer amounts to insubordination or willful disobedience, plus her
previous infractions were also taken into account. Hence, this Petition.

Was Villanueva illegally dismissed by GRRI?

Suggested Answer: Yes, Villanueva was illegally dismissed.

Although the dismissal of employees on the basis of the principle of the totality of infractions is
justified and may be applied to Villanueva, the court found her termination to be illegal.

In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that the employee’s
dismissal was for a valid cause. Insubordination or willful disobedience requires the concurrence
of the following requisites: (1) the employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful or
intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a “wrongful and perverse attitude” and (2) the
order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain
to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. Both requirements are not present in this
case.

While Villanueva’s refusal to sign the Notice of Transfer was willful and intentional, it is far from
being “wrongful and perverse.” So, there is no basis to dismiss her on the ground of
insubordination.

15
 Evic Human Resources Management, Inc., Free Bulkers S.A. vs. Rogelio Panahon
G.R. No. 206890, 833 SCRA 404, July 31, 2017

Problem: Evic Human Resources (EVIC), in behalf of Free Bulkers S.A., hired Rogelio Panahon
as the Chief Mate onboard the vessel M/V Free Lady. Panahon got repatriated to the Philippines
without completing his contracted period of employment. He alleged that the vessel's Captain
Edgar Buton developed a hostile attitude towards him and recommended for his immediate
replacement for drinking alcohol onboard.

Panahon filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with damages against EVIC with the LA. It was
dismissed because of his failure to perform duties and to adhere to company policy against
intoxication. Aggrieved, he appealed to the NLRC, which modified the previous ruling by
awarding him payment for nominal damages. Unsatisfied, Panahon elevated the matter to the CA.
The CA ruled that there was no just cause for his dismissal as it was not supported by substantial
evidence. EVIC now filed a petition before this Court.

Was Panahon’s termination accorded with due process?

Suggested Answer: No, Panahon was not accorded due process.

Not only there was a lack of just or valid cause for his dismissal, but EVIC also failed to afford
him procedural due process.

The "two-notice rule" is indicated under Section 17 of the POEA-SEC. An erring seaman is given
written notice of the charge against him and is afforded an opportunity to explain or defend
himself. Should sanctions be imposed, then a written notice of penalty and the reasons for it shall
be furnished to the erring seafarer, supported by substantial evidence.

EVIC failed to show any evidence proving that Panahon was given written notice of the charges
against him, or that he was given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. Neither is there
proof that Panahon was furnished with written notice of the penalty imposed against him and the
reasons for its imposition. Ergo, the petition is denied.

16
 San Fernando Coca-Cola Rank-And-File Union (SACORU) vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc. (CCBPI)
G.R. No. 200499, 842 SCRA 1, October 04, 2017
Problem: In 2009, Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines., Inc. (Coca-Cola) issued notices of termination
to 27 rank-and-file employees/union members on the ground of redundancy of their positions due
to the removal of two selling and distribution systems.

To SACORU, the newly implemented systems would result in the diminution of the union
membership amounting to union-busting. Hence they filed a Notice of Strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on the ground of unfair labor practice. Thereafter,
SACORU conducted a strike.

The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. While the case is pending,
SACORU filed a motion for execution praying for the cancellation of the dismissal of the union
members to follow the DOLE Secretary’s directive not to commit any act that would exacerbate
the situation. The NLRC dismissed the complaint for unfair labor practice and declared valid the
dismissal of the employees due to redundancy.

Did the NLRC err by not enjoining the effectivity of the employees’ termination when the
DOLE assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute?

Suggested Answer: Yes, the NLRC erred by not enjoining the effectivity of the employees’
termination, when the DOLE assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Coca-Cola violated the
return-to-work order directed by the DOLE Secretary.

As jurisprudence dictates, from the date the DOLE Secretary assumes jurisdiction over a dispute
until its resolution, the parties have the obligation to maintain the status quo while the main issue
is being threshed out in the proper forum, which could be with the DOLE Secretary or with the
NLRC.

Symex Security Services, Inc. and Rafael Arcega vs. Magdalino Rivera, Jr. and Roberto Yago
(Corporation Law)
844 SCRA 416, November 08, 2017
Problem: Magdalino Rivera and Roberto Yago are security guards employed by Symex Security
Services, Inc. (Symex) engaged in the business of investigation and security services. They filed a
complaint for underpayment/nonpayment of wages and damages among others, against Symex and
its president Rafael Arcega.

17
Captain Cura (Head/Captain) told them that they were relieved from their posts and had to wait
for further assignment because the guards on duty were reduced. But later, they were told that they
would not receive an assignment unless they withdrew their complaint before the LA. Hence,
Rivera and Yago amended their complaint to include illegal dismissal.

Were the respondents illegally dismissed?

Suggested Answer: Yes, the respondents were illegally dismissed.

In cases of illegal dismissal, employees must first establish by substantial evidence that they were
dismissed. If there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to the legality or illegality
thereof.

The one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. The respondents had substantially
discharged this burden. Apart from their sworn declarations, respondents offered the sample
affidavit of desistance given to them by Capt. Cura to support their narration that Capt. Cura
threatened to terminate them unless they executed such an affidavit of desistance.

Julieta Verzonilla vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission

G.R. No. 232888, 914 SCRA 182, August 14, 2019
Problem: Reynaldo Verzonilla was employed as a Special Operations Officer in the Quezon City
Department of Public Order and Safety from 1999 until his death in 2012 due to cardiopulmonary
arrest. His Discharge Summary/Clinical Abstract shows that he complained of abdominal pain and
chest pain. Records show that Reynaldo was previously diagnosed with hypertension in 2002.

Julieta Verzonilla (Julieta), the surviving spouse of Reynaldo, filed a claim for compensation
benefits before the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) under PD No. 626, which was
denied on the ground that Reynaldo’s ailment was not connected to his work and that no evidence
was found that his duties increased the risk of contracting the said ailment.

Whether or not Julieta Verzonilla can claim compensation benefits for the death of her late
husband Reynaldo?

Suggested Answer: Yes, Julieta Verzonilla can claim compensation benefits based on the
principle of social justice.

18
The constitutional guarantee of social justice towards labor demands a liberal attitude in favor of
the employee in deciding claims for compensability. Hence, the liberality of the law in favor of
the working man and woman still prevails, and the official agency charged by law to implement
the constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee
in deciding claims for compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy towards
labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances.

Pacific Ocean Manning, Inc. and/or Industria Armamento Meridionale and/or Capt. Amador
Servillon, petitioners, vs. Roger P. Solacito
G.R. No. 217431, 933 SCRA 1, February 19, 2020
Problem: Pacific Ocean Manning, Inc. hired Roger Solacito as a Seaman on board M/V Eurocardo
Salerno on behalf of its principal, Industria Armamento Meridionale, and was repatriated because
of an ear infection diagnosed by a company-designated physician from Vizcarra Diagnostic
Center. After a surgical procedure at St. Luke's Medical Center, Solacito was declared fit to work.
Therefore, based on his latest hearing evaluation Mr. Solacito does not have a hearing disability.

In 2010, Solacito filed a complaint for total and permanent disability benefits, sickness pay,
damages, and other benefits before the Labor Arbiter, based on the medical certificate issued to
him by his personal physician which diagnosed him as “unfit to work as a seafarer.” The CA
reduced Solacito’s award coverage to permanent partial disability benefits because he did not
submit himself to the assessment of a third doctor.

Did the CA err when it ruled that the company-designated physician’s medical assessment
should prevail?

Suggested Answer: No, the CA was partially right. Solacito’s failure to obtain an assessment by
a third doctor will be taken against him.

Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC requires that, after medical repatriation, the company-
designated physician must assess the seafarer’s fitness to work or the degree of his disability.
Thereafter, the seafarer may choose his own doctor to dispute the findings of the company-
designated physician. If the findings of the company-designated physician and the seafarer’s
doctor of choice are conflicting, the matter is then referred to a third doctor, whose findings shall
be binding on both parties

In this regard, jurisprudence is likewise settled that non-referral to a third doctor, whose decision
shall be considered final and binding, constitutes a breach of the POEA-SEC and the assessment
of the company-designated physician shall prevail.

19
 Ventis Maritime Corporation, K-Line Shipmanagement Co., Ltd., Jose Ramon Garcia, and
Capt. Wilfred Garcia vs. Edgardo Salenga
G.R. No. 238578, 936 SCRA 623, June 08, 2020
Problem: Edgardo Salenga was the Chief Cook onboard the vessel MT Viking owned by Ventis
Maritime Corporation for its principal K-Line Shipmanagement. Back in the Philippines, he went
to Ventis to get his unpaid wages and asked for a company physician for medical consultation. He
was diagnosed by the company physicians with Type II Diabetes and Hypertension. When he
started to suffer from dizziness and chest pains, Salenga consulted a private physician who
diagnosed him with cardiovascular disease and Type II Diabetes, and that he was permanently
unfit to sea duties. Hence, he was considered permanently unfit to sea duties and entitled to the
benefits under POEA Disability Grade 1.

Salenga filed a complaint for disability benefits and damages among others. The Labor Arbiter
(LA) ruled in Salenga’s favor and awarded him permanent and total disability benefits.

Whether or not Salenga is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.

Sug gg

Suggested Answer: No, Salenga is not entitled to disability benefits.

The general rule is that Section 20(A) of the POEA-SEC is irrelevant if the seafarer did not suffer
from an illness or injury during the term of his contract. Salenga did not suffer any illness while
he was on board the ship, and in fact, he failed to present any proof that his illnesses manifested
while he was on board the vessel. Hence, Section 20(A) of the POEA-SEC does not apply to him.

Henry Espiritu Pastrana vs. Bahia Shipping Services, Carnival Cruise Lines, et. al.
G.R. No. 227419, 937 SCRA 301, June 10, 2020
Problem: Henry Pastrana was an Environmental Team Leader onboard the vessel Carnival
Fascination owned by Bahia Shipping Services. He experienced lower back pain after lifting a
heavy waste bin. He was repatriated back to the Philippines for medical treatment.

Pastrana reported to the company-designated physician, who diagnosed him to be “fit to work”.
In another assessment, he was declared “unfit to work” since he still had a stiff trunk and painful
gait. Then, another company-designated physician diagnosed him with Herniated Disc. According
to the doctor, he is entitled to benefits covering a disability grading of Grade 11.

However, a private doctor declared him "permanently unfit in any capacity” so he demands for
total and permanent disability benefits from Bahia in a complaint before the LA

Whether or not Pastrana is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits?

20
Suggested Answer: Yes, Pastrana is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.

Under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, only those injuries or disabilities that are classified as Grade
1 may be considered total and permanent. However, if those injuries or disabilities with a disability
grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and permanent, would incapacitate a seafarer from performing
his usual sea duties for a period of more than 120 or 240 days, depending on the need for further
medical treatment, then he is, under legal contemplation, totally and permanently disabled.

The company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's

fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. If he failed to do so
and the seafarer's medical condition remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and
permanently disabled. The company physician was unable to timely issue a final assessment of
Pastrana's disability. Such failure rendered his opinion on Pastrana's disability irrelevant. The law
had already stepped in and considered Pastrana permanently and totally disabled.

Zaldy Razonable vs. Maersk-Fili-Pinas Crewing, Inc. and/or A.P. Moller A/S
937 SCRA 421, June 10, 2020
Problem: In 2015, Zaldy Razonable was hired as a seaman by Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc. On
board the vessel, Razonable felt moderate pain upon carrying a heavy motor. He was diagnosed
with Prolapse Lumbar Disc and eventually got repatriated back to the Philippines. He was placed
in the care of company-designated physicians, which declared him unfit for work with Disability
Grade I (partial disability) and was offered disability benefits. However, Razonable insisted on
obtaining total and permanent disability benefits. So, he consulted another orthopedic expert, Dr.
Magtira, who diagnosed him “permanently unfit in any capacity” to resume his sea duties as a
seaman. Razonable filed a complaint before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB), claiming total and permanent disability benefits plus damages.

Was Razonable entitled to total and permanent disability benefits?

Suggested Answer: Yes, Razonable is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.

The company-designated physicians failed to issue a valid medical assessment within the
prescribed period under the law.

The POEA-SEC governs the procedure for his claim of disability benefits and provides for the
period when the company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment. Despite the

21
issuance of a purportedly "final disability grading" in the Disability Report, Razonable was still
required to return almost a month later for "re-evaluation with results" in the Medical Report issued
on the same day. Taking these two documents together, the medical assessment was clearly not a
final one because it still required further action on the part of the company-designated physicians.
Without such valid final and definitive assessment from the company-designated physicians, the
law already steps in to consider the seafarer's disability as total and permanent. Hence, Maersk is
ordered to pay Razonable his total and permanent disability benefits.

22
 College of Law, New Era University
Professional Schools Building, No. 9 CentralAve., New Era, Quezon City, Philippines, 1107

The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, and knowledge of the Holy One is
understanding.
(Proverbs 9:10)