Case Digests

Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics

By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

JUDGE GREGORIO D. PANTANOSAS, JR. v. ATTY. ELLY L. PAMATONG.

A.C. No. 7330, June 14, 2016, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
It cannot be overemphasized that it is the sworn duty of a lawyer to maintain towards
the Courts a respectful attitude, "not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." It is precisely for this reason that
the Lawyer's Oath enjoins all members of the bar to conduct themselves with good fidelity
towards the courts in order not to erode the faith and trust of the public in the judiciary.

FACTS
Complainant Judge Gregorio D. Pantanosas, Jr. was the presiding judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. Respondent Atty. Elly L. Pamatong was the counsel of
plaintiffs in Civil Case entitled Nick Otero, et al. v. Sheriff of the MTCC Branch 3, Cagayan de
Oro City, et al.

During the hearing of an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
in the said case, respondent Pamatong was allegedly asked by complainant Pantanosas to
remove his copia (a hat worn by Muslims) in open court. Respondent Pamatong requested
to be exempted allegedly due to religious grounds and embarrassment towards his "bald
pate". Complainant Pantanosas thereafter obliged with a caveat that at the next hearing, he
would no longer tolerate the wearing of the copia inside the courtroom.

Respondent Pamatong filed an Extremely Urgent Motion/Demand for Inhibition or

Recusal which contained the following remarks:

6. Finally, in my thirty (30) years of law practice, I never encountered a Judge who
appears to be as corrupt as you are, thereby giving me the impression that you are a
disgrace to the Judicial System of this land who does not deserved (sic) to be a member
of the Philippine Bar at all.

Complainant Pantanosas filed a Complaint for Disbarment dated September 15, 2006
against respondent Pamatong on the following grounds: (i) violation of Canon 8 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for the language employed by respondent Pamatong in the
Motion for Inhibition, and (ii) violation of Canons 1 and 11 of the CPR for engaging in
dishonest and deceitful conduct by supposedly causing the publication of an alleged bribe in
a local newspaper and maliciously imputing motives to complainant Pantanosas, thereby
casting dishonor to and distrust in the judicial system.

ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Pamatong violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and
his oath as a member of the bar

RULING

Page 1 of 81
 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

YES. It cannot be overemphasized that it is the sworn duty of a lawyer to maintain

towards the Courts a respectful attitude, "not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." It is precisely for this
reason that the Lawyer's Oath enjoins all members of the bar to conduct themselves with
good fidelity towards the courts in order not to erode the faith and trust of the public in the
judiciary.

It is not disputed that the Motion for Inhibition filed by respondent Pamatong
contained blatant accusations of corruption against complainant Pantanosas. As counsel for
the plaintiffs in Nick Otero, et al. v. Sheriff of the MTCC Branch 3, Cagayan de Oro City, et al., it
was incumbent upon Pamatong to observe and maintain respect towards the judicial office.
Instead of insisting on similar conduct from his clients, respondent Pamatong was the first
to cast doubt on the impartiality and independence of the court.

That the slanderous remarks cited above were inserted in no less than a public record,
i.e., Motion for Inhibition, makes matters even worse. Even granting that the bribery charges
were true, such personal attacks against the person of complainant Pantanosas should have
been reserved for a different forum. To be sure, a lawyer is obliged to abstain from
scandalous, offensive or menacing language before the courts.

The records also disclose that a news article detailing the events that precipitated the
bribery charge against complainant Pantanosas was published on September 15, 2006 with
the participation of respondent Pamatong. Here, respondent Pamatong had no reason to
divulge his grievances before the public as he had already lodged a complaint against
complainant Pantanosas with the OCA on September 12, 2006.

Page 2 of 81
 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

AURORA AGUILAR-DYQUIANGCO v. ATTY. DIANA LYNN M. ARELLANO

A.C. No. 10541, July 12, 2016, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
A lawyer, once he takes up the cause of his client, has the duty to serve such client with
competence, and to attend to his client's cause with diligence, care and devotion, whether he
accepts the engagement for free or for a fee. Moreover, lawyers should refrain from obtaining
loans from their clients, in order to avoid the perils of abusing the trust and confidence reposed
upon him by such client.

FACTS

Sometime in 2006, Complainant engaged Respondent's services for the purpose of

filing a case for collection of sum of money against a certain Delia Antigua, advancing
₱l0,000.00 for filing fees and ₱2,000.00 as part of the attorney's fees out of the agreed
amount of ₱20,000.00.

Three years later, Complainant, upon inquiry with the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, La Union, discovered that Respondent failed to file her case against Antigua.
Consequently, Complainant sent a letter to Respondent terminating Respondent's services
and demanding the return of the said money and documents she entrusted to Respondent,
who, in turn, refused to return Complainant's documents alleging that she was enforcing her
retainer's lien.

During the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between them, Respondent

frequently borrowed money from Complainant and her husband, Antonio Dyquiangco, for
which Respondent issued postdated checks in July 2008 as security. Complainant and
Antonio later stopped lending money to Respondent when they discovered that she was
engaged in "kiting", that is, using the newer loans to pay off the previous loans she had
obtained. These accumulated loans totaled ₱360,8l8.20.

Upon presentment by Complainant, all of the said checks were dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds and closure of accounts. Hence, Complainant filed complaints for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against Respondent. Complainant and her husband sent
a demand letter to Respondent for the payment of the dishonored checks. The Respondent's
failure to pay despite demand resulted in letter exchanges between the parties dated
September 28, 2009 and October 7, 2009. This exchange of letters, which the Respondent
believed to be libelous, led to the filing of two (2) complaints for Libel against Complainant,
both of which were eventually dismissed for lack of probable cause.

Based on the foregoing transactions and incidents between the parties, the
Complainant filed against the Respondent the instant administrative case for suspension and
disbarment with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Page 3 of 81
 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent violated Canon 16, Rule 16.02 and Canon 18, Rule
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

RULING
Yes. Respondent violated Canon 18 when she failed to file the collection case in court.
In this regard, Canon 18 of the CPR mandates, thus:
A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03 thereof emphasizes that:

A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

In this case, it is undisputed that after Complainant paid the filing fees and also part
of the acceptance fees, Respondent did not bother to file any complaint before the court.

Respondent violated Canon 16 when she obtained loans from a client. Pertinently,
Canon 16 of the CPR states:
A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into
his possession.

Moreover, Rule 16.02 provides that:

A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those
of others kept by him.

Finally, Rule 16.04 thereof commands that:

A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

In the instant case, there is no dispute that Respondent obtained several loans from
Complainant after they established a lawyer-client relationship, and before they terminated
the same, in violation of Rule 16.04 of the CPR.

Respondent even exacerbated her infractions when she issued worthless checks to
pay for her debts, the existence of which was admitted by Respondent. In Cuizon v. Macalino,
the Court said that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been
drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence
reposed on him, shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render
him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.

Regarding the issue of commingling of funds, the Court ruled in the case of Velez v. De
Vera, citing Espiritu v. Ulep, that using a client's funds for the lawyer's personal use and

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

depositing the same in his personal account is prohibited. In this case, Respondent admitted
that she commingled her money and those of the Complainant for the bracelet business by
opening an East West Bank joint account for the said purpose.
The Court notes, in addition, that the respondent's act of filing two (2) baseless
complaints for libel against Complainant in two (2) different venues is a clear violation of the
Lawyer's Oath - which states that a lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."

Page 5 of 81
 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

ARTHUR O. MONARES v. ATTY. LEVI P. MUÑOZ

A.C. No. 5582, January 24, 2017, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and
Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Omnibus Rules), requires government officers and
employees of all departments and agencies, except those covered by special laws, to render not
less than eight (8) hours of work a day for five (5) days a week, or a total of forty (40) hours a
week. The number of required weekly working hours may not be reduced, even in cases where
the department or agency adopts a flexible work schedule.

Additionally, a public officer cannot claim that he believed in good faith that the
authority to engage in private practice granted by a Governor suffices. As a local public official,
it is necessary to secure the proper authority from the Secretary of the DILG. His failure to do
so renders him liable for unauthorized practice of his profession and violation of Rule 1.01 of
the CPR.

FACTS
Monares is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 9923 filed against Ludolfo Muñoz. In his
complaint, Monares alleged that Muñoz represented his brother Ludolfo in the said case
during regular government hours while employed as Provincial Legal Officer of Albay City.

Under the chairmanship of Olaybal, Albay Electric Cooperative, Inc.’s old board of
directors engaged Muñoz as retained counsel sometime in June 1998. Olaybal averred that
Muñoz did not inform ALECO's old BOD that he was employed as Provincial Legal Officer at
such time. Olaybal raised that after its administrator, the National Electrification
Administration, deactivated the old BOD on the ground of mismanagement, Muñoz served as
retained counsel of the NEA-appointed team which took over the management of ALECO.
Moreover, Olaybal alleged that Muñoz illegally collected payments in the form of notarial and
professional fees in excess of what was agreed upon in their retainer agreement.

Constante is the Executive Assistant for Legal Affairs of Sunwest Construction and
Development Corporation. Constante claimed that Muñoz filed ten cases against Sunwest on
Ludolfo's behalf before the Office of the Ombudsman while he was serving as Provincial Legal
Officer.

All three complaints prayed that Muñoz be disbarred for unlawfully engaging in
private practice. In addition, Olaybal sought Muñoz's disbarment for acts of disloyalty,
particularly, for violating the rule against conflict of interest.

Muñoz claimed that he had requested Governor Al Francis C. Bichara for authority to
continue his private practice shortly after his appointment. This request was granted.
Thereafter, Muñoz submitted the same request to Rafael C. Alunan III, then Secretary of the

Page 6 of 81
 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

Department of the Interior and Local Government. Muñoz emphasized that his authority to
engage in private practice was renewed by Governor Bichara for his second and third terms.

ISSUE
Whether or not Munoz violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
engaged in private practice while being a public official and when he represented conflicting
interests

RULING
YES. Munoz's DILG authorization prohibited him from utilizing government time for
his private practice. However, he did not deny the allegations that he made at least eighty-
six (86) court appearances in connection with at least thirty (30) cases while he was a
Provincial Legal Officer. He merely alleged that his private practice did not prejudice the
functions of his office. Court appearances are necessarily made within regular government
working hours, from 8:00 in the morning to 12:00 noon, and 1:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon.
Additional time is likewise required to study each case, draft pleadings and prepare for trial.
The sheer volume of cases handled by Muñoz clearly indicates that government time was
necessarily utilized in pursuit of his private practice, in clear violation of the DILG
authorization and Rule 6.02 of the CPR.

Moreover, Acting Secretary Aguirre's grant of authority cannot be unreasonably

construed to have been perpetual. Muñoz should have requested for authority to engage in
private practice from the Secretary of DILG for his second and third terms. He also cannot
claim that he believed in good faith that the authority granted by Governor Bichara for his
second and third terms sufficed. The power to grant authority to engage in the practice of
one's profession to officers and employees in the public service lies with the head of the
department. As a local public official, it was incumbent upon Muñoz to secure the proper
authority from the Secretary of the DILG not only for his first term, but also his second and
third. His failure to do so rendered him liable for unauthorized practice of his profession and
violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

Lastly, Muñoz cannot elude Olaybal's allegations of disloyalty. To determine the

existence of conflict of interest, the test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client.
In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for
the other client. As Muñoz himself detailed in his Joint Petition, he acted as counsel for ALECO
under the management of the old BOD.

Muñoz thereafter served as retained counsel of ALECO under the direction of the NEA
management team. Muñoz could have easily anticipated that his advice would be sought with
respect to the prosecution of the members of the old BOD, considering that the latter was
deactivated due to alleged mismanagement. The conflict of interest between Olaybal's board
on one hand, and NEA and its management team on the other, is apparent. By representing

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

conflicting interests without the permission of all parties involved, Muñoz violated Rules
15.01 and 15.03 of the CPR.

Page 8 of 81
 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

ORLANDO S. CASTELO, ELENA C. CAMA, OSWALDO CASTELO, JOCELYN LLANILLO, AND

BENJAMIN CASTELO v. ATTY. RONALD SEGUNDINO C. CHING
A.C. No. 11165, February 06, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
Gross negligence on the part of a notary public encompasses the failure to observe any
of the requirements of a notarial act under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice which would
result in putting the rights of a person to his liberty or property in jeopardy. This includes,
among others, failing to require the presence of the signatories to a notarial instrument and
ascertaining their identities through competent evidence thereof, and allowing, knowingly or
unknowingly, people, other than the notary public himself, to sign notarial documents, affix the
notarial seal therein, and make entries in the notarial register.

FACTS
Complainants Orlando S. Castelo, Elena C. Cama, Oswaldo Castelo, Jocelyn Llanillo,
and Benjamin Castelo received summons from the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 22,
Manila for an ejectment case filed against them by Leonida Delen and Spouses Nestor Delen
and Julibel Delen, who alleged that they were the owners of the house and lot located at 2511
A. Sulu Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The subject property was then the residence of the Castelo
heirs, and was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 291223 of the Registry of Deeds
for the City of Manila (RD) in the name of the Delens.

Upon verifying the authenticity of TCT No. 291223 with the RD, the Castelo heirs
discovered that the previous title covering the subject property, TCT No. 240995 in the name
of the Castelo heirs' parents, had been cancelled by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
March 24, 2010. The Deed was purportedly executed by the Spouses Castelo and the Delens,
and was notarized by Respondent Atty. Ronald Segundino C. Ching, despite the fact that
Perzidia S. Castelo died on May 4, 2009, as shown in her Death Certificate. The Castelo heirs
also learned that the acknowledgment page of the Deed showed that only community tax
certificates had been presented to Atty. Ching, and not valid government issued identification
cards as required by the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

With this discovery, the Castelo heirs filed on June 2, 2014 with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) this administrative case against Atty. Ching based on the latter's gross
negligence in notarizing the Deed.

ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Ching was grossly negligent in notarizing the Deed

RULING
YES. Gross negligence on the part of a notary public encompasses the failure to
observe any of the requirements of a notarial act under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
which would result in putting the rights of a person to his liberty or property in jeopardy.

Page 9 of 81
 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

This includes, among others, failing to require the presence of the signatories to a notarial
instrument and ascertaining their identities through competent evidence thereof, and
allowing, knowingly or unknowingly, people, other than the notary public himself, to sign
notarial documents, affix the notarial seal therein, and make entries in the notarial register.

In this case, while Atty. Ching denied having notarized the Deed by showing the
discrepancy between his purported signature therein and the specimen signatures, he
miserably failed to explain how the Deed ended up in his notarial books.

While there may be reasons to give Atty. Ching the benefit of the doubt as to who
signed the Deed, the Court does not and cannot lose sight of the fact that Atty. Ching still
failed in ensuring that only documents which he had personally signed and sealed with his
notarial seal, after satisfying himself with the completeness of the same and the identities of
the parties who affixed their signatures therein, would be included in his notarial register.
This also means that Atty. Ching failed to properly store and secure his notarial equipment
in order to prevent other people from notarizing documents by forging his signature and
affixing his notarial seal, and recording such documents in his notarial books, without his
knowledge and consent. This is gross negligence.

Such gross negligence on the part of Atty. Ching in letting another person notarize the
Deed had also unduly put the Castelo heirs in jeopardy of losing their property.

As a final note, this case should serve as a reminder for notaries public, as well as for
lawyers who are applying for a commission, that the duty to public service and to the
administration of public justice is the primary consideration in the practice of law. This duty
to public service is made more important when a lawyer is commissioned as a notary public.
Like the duty to defend a client's cause within the bounds of law, a notary public has the
additional duty to preserve public trust and confidence in his office by observing extra care
and diligence in ensuring the integrity of every document that comes under his notarial seal,
and seeing to it that only documents that he personally inspected and whose signatories he
personally identified are recorded in his notarial books.

Page 10 of 81
 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

EMMA G. ALFELOR v. HON. AUGUSTUS C. DIAZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPOLITAN

TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 37, QUEZON CITY
A.M. No. MTJ-16-1883, July 11, 2017, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
While the Court agreed with the OCA that Judge Diaz was careless in convicting Alfelor
in the nine (9) BP Blg. 22 cases which were not raffled to his sala, it does not and cannot dismiss
this act as simple inadvertence. Such carelessness can only be considered as gross ignorance of
the law.

FACTS
Alfelor issued ten (10) postdated Land Bank checks in favor of Romeo, her brother,
for payment of a loan. Upon presentment for payment, the bank dishonored the checks for
having been drawn against insufficient funds and closed accounts, prompting Romeo to send
verbal and written demands to Alfelor. Despite this, Alfelor failed to pay the total amount of
the checks.

Upon Romeo’s complaint and recommendation of the OCP, nine (9) cases of Violation
of BP Big. 22 were field and raffled to the MeTC, Branch 43, Quezon City presided by Judge
Sta. Cruz. The OCP dismissed the complaint as to one check (subject check) on the ground
that it was presented for payment beyond the 90-day period from issuance. Upon the grant
of a petition for review filed with the DOJ Secretary, a separate Information for violation of
BP Blg. 22 as regards the subject check was ultimately filed against Alfelor (subject criminal
case) and raffled to MeTC 37 presided by Judge Diaz.

Judge Sta. Cruz, acquitted Alfelor in the nine (9) BP Big. 22 cases based on the
demurrer to evidence she filed, on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove that
Alfelor received the demand letter notifying her of the dishonor of the checks.

Subsequent to the acquittal, Alfelor also filed with MeTC 37 a Demurrer to Evidence
based on the same ground and the additional ground that she already settled the amount of
the subject check. However, Judge Diaz denied the demurrer on the ground that he wanted
to have "a better perspective" in the resolution of the case.

Thereafter, Judge Diaz convicted Alfelor of violation of BP Blg. 22 not only for the
subject check, but also for the nine (9) other checks which were the subjects of the BP Big.
22 cases raffled to MeTC 43, and where she was already previously acquitted by Judge Sta.
Cruz.

ISSUE
Whether Judge Diaz is guilty of gross ignorance of the law

RULING

Page 11 of 81
 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

YES. While the Court agreed with the OCA that Judge Diaz was careless in convicting
Alfelor in the nine (9) BP Blg. 22 cases which were not raffled to his sala, it does not and
cannot dismiss this act as simple inadvertence. Such carelessness can only be considered as
gross ignorance of the law, as defined by the Court, to wit:

“xxx when a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law.
"Anything less is gross ignorance of the law." There is gross ignorance of the law when an
error committed by the judge was "gross or patent, deliberate or malicious. It may also be
committed when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence
because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Gross ignorance of the law or
incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith”

Here, it is obvious that the subject criminal case pertained to only one (1) check. Had Judge
Diaz been more circumspect in reviewing the records of the case, he could have easily
noticed that glaring fact, as well as Judge Sta. Cruz's prior order acquitting Alfelor of the nine
(9) BP Blg. 22 cases, and promulgated a decision based only on that particular check. The
fact that he had served more than 21 years in the judiciary meant that he should have known
better than to haphazardly render a decision in a criminal case without regard to the specific
allegations in the offense charged and his jurisdiction, or lack thereof, to take cognizance of
the case. This is gross ignorance of the law.

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

SPOUSES FELIX AND FE NAVARRO, v. ATTY. MARGARITO G. YGOÑA

A.C. No. 8450, July 26, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
Notarization is not merely an empty or meaningless exercise. It is invested with public
interest, such that only those qualified and authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization
converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. A notarized document is, therefore, entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face, and the courts, administrative agencies, and the public at large must be
able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public. Corollary to this, notaries
public must observe utmost care and diligence in carrying out their duties and functions.

FACTS
Spouses Navarro were the owners of a parcel of land (subject property) located at
Barrio Panadtaran, San Fernando, Cebu. They obtained a loan from Grauel worth
P300,000.00. As collateral, the Spouses Navarro executed and signed a Promissory Note and
a Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property. In addition, Grauel proposed to the
Spouses Navarro the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying the subject property to
Grauel, in the event that the Spouses Navarro would fail to pay the loan to avoid the tedious
process of foreclosure. According to Grauel, the Spouses Navarro agreed to her proposal and
voluntarily signed the Deed of Absolute Sale.

Later on, according to Grauel, since the Spouses Navarro could no longer pay, Grauel
proposed that the Spouses Navarro convey to her the subject property to extinguish all their
obligations arising from the loan. Thereafter, Graul’s lawyer, Atty. Ygoña, notarized the Deed
of Absolute Sale which Grauel used to cause the transfer of the tax declaration over the
subject property to her name.

The Spouses Navarro also filed a criminal complaint against Grauel and Atty. Ygoña
for Estafa through Falsification of Public Document, and the instant administrative case
against Atty. Ygoña. They alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale was fictitious and that their
signatures therein were forged. They pointed out several irregularities, particularly, the
Community Tax Certificates (CTC) used and the Acknowledgment portion. In addition, the
Spouses Navarro presented a Certification issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court (Notarial
Section), Regional Trial Court of Cebu, 7th Judicial Region, confirming that Atty. Ygoña had
submitted his notarial report for the year 2004, but the subject Deed of Absolute Sale
notarized was not among the documents listed.

Commissioner Andres rendered a Report and Recommendation concluding that Atty.

Ygoña failed to diligently perform his notarial functions after notarizing the Deed of Absolute
Sale, when he should have already been aware of a possible badge of pactum commissorium
in the transaction. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the said
Report and Recommendation

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

ISSUE
Whether Atty. Ygoña is administratively liable for his failure to diligently perform his
notarial functions

RULING
YES. The Court did not entirely agree with the basis of Commissioner Andres in
finding Atty. Ygoña liable. The Court finds that the issue of pactum commissorium should be
resolved in a separate civil action.

Notarization is not merely an empty or meaningless exercise. It is invested with public

interest, such that only those qualified and authorized may act as notaries public.
Notarization converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in
evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarized document is, therefore,
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and the courts, administrative agencies, and the
public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public.
Corollary to this, notaries public must observe utmost care and diligence in carrying out their
duties and functions.

Here, Atty. Ygoña should have been more circumspect in notarizing the Deed of
Absolute Sale. Assuming that there is truth in Atty. Ygoña's assertion that the Spouses
Navarro freely and voluntarily signed and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Court
agrees with Commissioner Andres that the discrepancies in the CTCs used in the Deed of
Absolute are too glaring to ignore. Thus, serious doubt exists as to whether the Spouses
Navarro did indeed appear before Atty. Ygoña to have the Deed of Absolute Sale notarized,
as required by the Rules on Notarial Practice.

Moreover, the Court notes the Certification from the Office of the Clerk of Court
confirming that the notarial report submitted by Atty. Ygoña did not contain the subject Deed
of Absolute Sale. This failure on the part of Atty. Ygoña to record the transaction in his books
and include the same in his notarial register, as required by the Rules on Notarial Practice,
warrants a corresponding sanction.

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

FERDINAND E. TAURO v. RACQUEL O. ARCE

A.M. No. P-17-3731 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3871-P), November 8, 2017, Second
Division (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
Employees of the judiciary should be very circumspect in the way they conduct
themselves both inside and outside the office. Any scandalous behavior or any act that may
erode the people's esteem for the judiciary is unbecoming of an employee. Professionalism,
respect for the rights of others, good manners and right conduct are expected of all judicial
officers and employees. Any transgression or deviation from established norm of conduct, work
related or not, amounts to a misconduct.

FACTS
Tauro filed a complaint-affidavit charging Arce with serious misconduct. He claimed
that he was heckled by Arce who was looking for missing records, and shouted at Tauro,
"Ikaw ang kumuha, ikaw ang gumalaw ng mga records, sinungaling, sinungaling ka! Dapat sa
iyo mag-resign." Arce allegedly continued to throw slanderous and threatening remarks
against Tauro. When Tauro denied the accusations, Arce became furious and, seemingly
determined to kill Tauro, attacked him with a kitchen knife, which was timely prevented by
their fellow court employees.

In her defense, Arce narrated that while she was busy releasing orders and other
court processes, she noticed that two (2) important case folders, which bore a directive from
their judge to issue subpoenas were missing from her table. She was convinced that Tauro
had taken the case folders without permission, for he had the habit of taking case folders in
order to update the court calendar. Arce asked complainant about the missing records, but
complainant was evasive and kept deflecting every question respondent posed. Thereafter,
an argument ensued between complainant and respondent, causing respondent to say out of
anger, "pag hindi ka pa tumigil sa kadadaldal ng wala namang kinalaman sa tanong ko sa'yo,
sasaksakin na kita." As to the alleged threat to kill complainant, respondent denied aiming
the knife at complainant, and explained that she was merely overwhelmed with anger
because complainant was dishonest and kept evading her questions. Respondent also faulted
complainant for his inefficiency in performing his functions as court interpreter

The OCA recommended that complainant and respondent be both found guilty of
conduct unbecoming of court employees and fined in the amount of P5,000.00 each, with a
stern warning that repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more
severely. It claimed that it is unacceptable for court employees to allow themselves to be
swayed by their emotions and engage in a fight, physical or otherwise, especially in front of
their co-employees during office hours. This behavior can be classified as conduct
unbecoming a court employee categorized as a less grave offense under Section 52 (B) (2) of
the [Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service] which merits suspension for
one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense.

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Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

ISSUE
Whether the conduct of both complainant and respondent warrant the imposition of
administrative sanctions

RULING
YES. The Court fully adopted the OCA's factual findings and recommendations.
Employees of the judiciary should be very circumspect in the way they conduct
themselves both inside and outside the office. Any scandalous behavior or any act that may
erode the people's esteem for the judiciary is unbecoming of an employee. Professionalism,
respect for the rights of others, good manners and right conduct are expected of all judicial
officers and employees. Any transgression or deviation from established norm of conduct,
work related or not, amounts to a misconduct.

Fighting between court employees during office hours is a disgraceful behavior

reflecting adversely on the good image of the judiciary. It displays a cavalier attitude towards
the seriousness and dignity with which court business should be treated. Shouting at one
another in the workplace and during office hours is arrant discourtesy and disrespect not
only towards co-workers, but to the court as well.

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Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

EDGAR R. ERICE v. PRESIDING JUDGE DIONISIO C. SISON, RTC, BRANCH 125,

CALOOCAN CITY
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2407, November 22, 2017, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
Gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge. It requires the judge to perform his/her
duty to be acquainted with the basic legal command of law and rules. Consequently, a judge
becomes liable for gross ignorance of the law when there is a patent disregard for well-known
rules so as to produce an inference of bad faith, dishonesty and corruption.

FACTS
Complainant Erice, then Vice Mayor of Caloocan City, filed a complaint against then
Mayor Echiverri, et al. before the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of the
Government Service Insurance System Act. The Ombudsman issued an Order of Preventive
Suspension (Order of Suspension) against Echiverri, et al., to last until the administrative
adjudication is completed but not to exceed six (6) months. Upon elevation, the CA affirmed
the Order of Suspension.

Subsequently, Echiverri, et al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for
TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC. They prayed that the RTC make a
definite judicial declaration on the rights and obligations of the parties asserting adverse
legal interests with respect to the implementation of their suspension.

RTC Executive Judge Eleanor R. Kwong issued a 72- hour ex-parte Order to enjoin the
DILG and Erice from implementing the Order of Suspension. With the case re-raffled to Judge
Sison, Erice and the DILG reiterated their Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Dissolve. The
counsel for DILG also informed Judge Sison that the OSG was not informed that the summary
hearing would proceed. Nevertheless, Judge Sison proceeded with the hearing and allowed
Echiverri, et al. to present their evidence. The next day, the summary hearing continued. The
OSG invoked its right to cross-examine the witnesses earlier presented but Judge Sison
denied the same, allegedly without consulting the records from Branch 126 that would
indicate that the OSG had made reservations to this effect. Judge Sison issued an Order
extending the TRO to 20 days, inclusive of the 72-hour TRO earlier granted by Judge Kwong.

On the day scheduled for the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, Judge Sison stated that
he would hear evidence in support of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
This compelled Erice to file an Urgent Motion to lnhibit. Without ruling on the Motion to
Inhibit, Judge Sison granted the writ of preliminary injunction.

Erice filed an administrative case against Judge Sison for (i) gross misconduct
constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, (ii) knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding, and
(iii) gross ignorance of the law or procedure. The OCA recommended that Judge Sison be

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Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be fined an amount equivalent to one (1)
month's salary, with a warning that repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely.

ISSUE
Whether Judge Sison should be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and fined

RULING
YES. Gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge. It requires the judge to perform
his/her duty to be acquainted with the basic legal command of law and rules. Consequently,
a judge becomes liable for gross ignorance of the law when there is a patent disregard for
well-known rules so as to produce an inference of bad faith, dishonesty and corruption.

Against these parameters, Judge Sison failed to perform his basic duty to be
acquainted with the fundamentals of the very law he was tasked to uphold. The subsequent
declaration of the policy in Section 14(1) of RA 6770 as ineffective and of Section 14(2) as
invalid, does not serve to exonerate Judge Sison from administrative liability because he
failed to consider and act in accordance with the basic principle of judicial stability or non-
interference. Pursuant to this principle, where decisions of certain administrative bodies are
appealable to the CA, these adjudicative bodies are co-equal with the RTCs and their actions
are logically beyond the control of the RTC.

Notably, the Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases are appealable to the CA

under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, the RTC had no jurisdiction to interfere
with or restrain the execution of the Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases, more so,
because at the time Judge Sison issued the TRO on January 10, 2012 and proceeded with the
writ of preliminary injunction on January 17, 2012 against the enforcement of the
Ombudsman Order of Suspension, the CA had already affirmed that very same Order of
Suspension in its Decision dated January 2, 2012.

In any event, Judge Sison should have, at the very least, been aware that court orders
or decisions cannot be the subject matter of a petition for declaratory relief. This is anchored
on the principle of res judicata. Consequently, a judgment rendered by a court or a quasi-
judicial body is conclusive on the parties, subject only to appellate authority. The losing party
cannot modify or escape the effects of judgment under the guise of an action for declaratory
relief.

Here, Echiverri, et al.'s Petition for Declaratory Relief specifically prayed that the RTC
"make a definite judicial declaration on the rights and obligations of the parties asserting
adverse legal interests with respect to the implementation of the [order of] preventive
suspension," effectively putting into question the CA-affirmed Ombudsman Order of
Suspension - a matter clearly beyond the ambit of the RTC's jurisdiction. This, coupled with
the deference to the basic precepts of jurisdiction required of judges, leads to no other

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conclusion than that Judge Sison acted in gross ignorance of the law in proceeding with the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

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By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

PROSECUTOR LEO T. CAHANAP V. JUDGE LEONOR S. QUIÑONES, REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT, BRANCH 6, ILIGAN CITY, LANAO DEL NORTE.
A.M. No. RTJ-16-2470, January 10, 2018, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
The Court has time and again reminded the members of the bench to faithfully observe
the prescribed official hours to inspire public respect for the justice system. It has issued
Supervisory Circular No. 14 dated October 22, 1985, Circular No. 13 dated July 1, 1987, and
Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 to reiterate the trial judges' mandate
to exercise punctuality in the performance of their duties.

The OCA also correctly observed that respondent Judge failed to show compassion,
patience, courtesy and civility to lawyers who appear before her in contravention of the
mandates of the Code of Judicial Ethics, which sets the high standards of demeanor all judges
must observe.

FACTS
Complainant Prosecutor Leo T. Cahanap filed the instant administrative complaint
charging respondent Judge Leonor S. Quinoñ es with Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross
Misconduct and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

The following are alleged in the complaint: 1) in his last two (2) years as a prosecutor
in Branch 6, the complainant suffered unbearable and intolerable oppression in the hands of
respondent Judge, 2) complainant further accused respondent Judge of habitual tardiness
which delayed the start of court sessions, 3) in the proceedings for the case of People v. Heck
pending before respondent Judge's sala, respondent Judge, in open court and heard by the
public, asked private complainant, Hanna Mamad, to go to her house because she was
interested in buying jewelry items from her, 4) in proceedings in the case of People v.
Macapato, respondent Judge issued an Order directing the release of accused Dimaampao's
vehicle despite the prosecution's written opposition, 5) in the case of People v. Tingcang,
respondent Judge dismissed the case provisionally without prejudice to its refiling upon the
availability of the prosecution's witnesses on the ground of speedy trial, 6) in the case of
People v. Casido, respondent Judge dismissed a complaint for Attempted Murder due to the
absence of a fatal wound on the victim, which the prosecution believed to be misplaced in an
information for Attempted Murder, and 7) complainant averred that respondent Judge also
mistreated her court staff.

Respondent Judge, in her Comment, denied that she maltreated the prosecutors
assigned to her sala.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that the charges against
respondent Judge relative to the issuance of the (1) Order in the Macapato Case, (2) Order in
the Tingcang Case for the dismissal of the case on the ground of violation of the accused's

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By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

right to speedy trial, and (3) Order relative to the Casido Case, dismissing the same for lack
of probable cause, be dismissed for involving issues judicial in nature which are beyond the
purview of an administrative proceeding. With respect however to the other charges,
pertaining largely to the demeanor of respondent Judge, the OCA found that the same appear
to be serious. However, because of the conflicting versions presented by the parties, there
exist factual issues that cannot be resolved merely on the basis of the records at hand, and
can be ventilated only in a formal investigation where the parties can adduce their respective
evidence.

The OCA thus recommended that the remaining charges filed against respondent
Judge be referred to the Executive Justice of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City for
investigation, report and recommendation.

Investigating Justice Singh recommended that respondent Judge be held

administratively liable for Oppression with a fine oP40,000.00 and Habitual Tardiness with
a fine of P20,000.00. The Investigating Justice also recommended that respondent Judge be
transferred to a different court considering the irremediably strained relations between
respondent Judge and the court staff; and that the names of certain witnesses be blocked
from the decision that the Court will render in this case.

The OCA, in their Report, agreed and adopted the findings of the Investigating Justice.

ISSUE
Whether or not Judge Quinoñ es shall be held liable for the administrative charges
against her.

RULING
YES. The Court has time and again reminded the members of the bench to faithfully
observe the prescribed official hours to inspire public respect for the justice system. It has
issued Supervisory Circular No. 14 dated October 22, 1985, Circular No. 13 dated July 1,
1987, and Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999 to reiterate the trial
judges' mandate to exercise punctuality in the performance of their duties.

The aforesaid circulars are restatements of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which enjoin
judges to be punctual in the performance of their judicial duties, recognizing that the time of
litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of value, and that if the judge is not punctual in his
habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to create dissatisfaction in the
administration of justice.

The OCA aptly found that the testimonies of the prosecutors and the court staff
unquestionably proved that respondent Judge failed to observe the prescribed official hours
as repeatedly enjoined by the Court. Respondent Judge's own branch clerk of court even
testified that court sessions commenced between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. although the
Minutes of the Proceedings reflected the time at 8:30 a.m.

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By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

The OCA also correctly observed that respondent Judge failed to show compassion,
patience, courtesy and civility to lawyers who appear before her in contravention of the
mandates of the Code of Judicial Ethics, which sets the high standards of demeanor all judges
must observe.

The Court is convinced that respondent Judge is guilty of Oppression as shown in

several incidents of misbehavior by respondent Judge. The Court has previously ruled that
"[a] display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of trial is a norm of behavior
incompatible with the needful attitude and sobriety of a good judge.''

Thus, the Court finds the imposition of fines amounting to Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00) and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), appropriate given the prevailing
facts of the present case vis-a- vis respondent Judge's record for habitual malfeasance in
office.

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

ATTY. BERTENI C. CAUSING and PERCIVAL CARAG MABASA
v.
PRESIDING JUDGE

JOSE LORENZO R. DELA ROSA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Manila
OCA IPI No. 17-4663-RTJ, March 7, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence. A
judge may also be administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply settled law and
jurisprudence.

The Court however has also ruled that "not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his official duties renders him liable."

For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation
of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most
importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or
some other like motive. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption,
the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though
such acts are erroneous.

FACTS
Atty. Causing and his client, Mabasa charged respondent Judge Dela Rosa with gross
ignorance of the law, gross misconduct and gross incompetence for reversing the dismissal
of Criminal Cases for Libel wherein Mabasa was one of the accused.

Complainants alleged that the Libel Cases were dismissed by former Acting Presiding
Judge Disalo on the ground that the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated.
The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC Br. 4 Manila, now
presided by respondent Judge Dela Rosa. Respondent Judge Dela Rosa granted the
prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration in the assailed Resolution dated November 23,
2015.

Complainants questioned respondent Judge Dela Rosa's Resolution granting the

prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration because, according to them, it was elementary for
respondent Judge to know that the prior dismissal of a criminal case due to a violation of the
accused’s right to speedy trial is equivalent to a dismissal on the merits of the case and, as
such, granting the prosecution's Motion for Reconsideration was tantamount to a violation
of the constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Complainants also criticized respondent Judge Dela Rosa's act of referring to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Atty. Causing's two (2) separate posts on his
Facebook and blogspot accounts about the subject criminal cases. They reasoned that
respondent Judge Dela Rosa should have first required Atty. Causing to show cause why he
should not be cited in contempt for publicizing and taking his posts to social media.

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Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

OCA directed respondent Judge Dela Rosa to file his Comment. In his comment,
respondent Judge Dela Rosa averred that he had already reversed the November 23, 2015
Resolution as early as June 20, 2016 - or way before the filing of the Complaint. OCA then
recommended that the administrative complaint against Judge Dela Rosa be dismissed for
lack of merit.

ISSUE
Whether or not the OCA erred in recommending that the administrative complaint
against Judge Dela Rosa be dismissed for lack of merit.

RULING
NO. Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled
jurisprudence. A judge may also be administratively liable if shown to have been motivated
by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in ignoring, contradicting or failing to apply
settled law and jurisprudence.

The Court however has also ruled that "not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his official duties renders him liable."

For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation
of the judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most
importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred,
or some other like motive. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action
even though such acts are erroneous.

The Court agrees with the OCA that it would be absurd to hold respondent Judge Dela
Rosa liable for his November 23, 2015 Order when he had himself rectified this in his
subsequent June 20, 2016 Order. To rule otherwise would be to render judicial office
untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. To hold otherwise "would be nothing
short of harassing judges to take the fantastic and impossible oath of rendering infallible
judgments."

Furthermore, nothing in the records of the case suggests that respondent Judge Dela
Rosa was motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in
rendering his decision. Other than their bare assertions, Complainants failed to substantiate
their allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed and this Court cannot
conclude bad faith intervened when none was actually proven.

The Court likewise finds no merit in Complainants' allegation that respondent Judge
Dela Rosa should have first required Atty. Causing to show cause for his act of posting
matters pertaining to the pending criminal case on the internet. The Court agrees with the

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OCA that respondent Judge Dela Rosa's act of referring the matter to the IBP, an independent
tribunal who exercises disciplinary powers over lawyers, was a prudent and proper action
to take for a trial court judge.

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

ATTY. MELVIN M. MIRANDA, v. PRESIDING JUDGE WILFREDO G. OCA,

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, REAL, QUEZON (FORMER ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 71, PASIG CITY)
A.M. No. MTJ-17-1899, March 7, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
Since Judge Oca violated the Supreme Court rules and directives which is considered a
less serious offense under Section 9(4), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the applicable penalties
are those under Section 11(B) thereof, to wit: (a) suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of more
than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

FACTS
In his Complaint, Atty. Miranda alleged that during the case's initial trial hearing, he
appeared as private prosecutor before Judge Oca in a criminal case. Atty. Miranda presented
private complainant, Antonio L. Villaseñor, together with his Judicial Affidavit, and began to
state the purpose of the witness' testimony pursuant to Section 63 of the Judicial Affidavit
Rule (JAR). However, Judge Oca told Atty. Miranda that there was "no need for that" and then
directed the defense counsel, Atty. Placides, to proceed to cross-examination. Atty. Miranda
asked that he be allowed to state the purpose of his witness' testimony. Judge Oca asked Atty.
Miranda if he included the offer or statement of the purpose of the witness' testimony in the
Judicial Affidavit to which he replied in the negative.

Judge Oca then ordered the termination of the proceedings, and told Atty. Miranda
that he should have included the offer or statement of the purpose of the witness' testimony
in the Judicial Affidavit. Moreover, Judge Oca ordered Atty. Miranda to pay a fine of
P1,000.00, and he set the next hearing four (4) months thereafter. Atty. Miranda made an
oral motion for reconsideration however, Judge Oca denied outright the said oral motion,
excused the witness, and adjourned the proceedings.

Moreover, Atty. Miranda averred in his Complaint that, he received the Order dated
October 17, 2013 which stated that since the offer or statement of the purpose of the witness'
testimony was not included in the Judicial Affidavit, the same may be added thereto after
payment of a fine of P1,000.00 and "a copy thereof served upon the defense counsel five (5)
days before February 12, 2014 such that the cross-examination of Mr. Villaseñor shall
proceed promptly on said date." Thus, Atty. Miranda asserted that Judge Oca is grossly
ignorant of the law since the JAR neither requires the inclusion of the offer or statement of
the purpose of the witness' testimony in the judicial affidavit nor does it impose a fine on the
party for failure to do the same.

OCA directed Judge Oca to comment on the complaint. However, OCA noted that Judge
Oca failed to file his comment on the complaint, and thus directed the latter to comply with
the earlier directive otherwise the matter would be submitted to the Court without his
comment.

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In a Resolution the Court noted Atty. Miranda's Complaint and the above OCA Report,
and also adopted the recommendations therein.

In his Comment, Judge Oca pleaded for "mercy and compassion," stating that the filing
of the present complaint "caused him anguish and anxiety such that even the preparation of
his answer was felt as a torture." Moreover, Judge Oca explained therein that due to the heavy
case load of MeTC, Br. 71, Pasig City when he was then its acting presiding judge, he reminded
the lawyers appearing before him, including Atty. Miranda, and they all agreed, to
incorporate in their judicial affidavits all matters which they may cover in the direct
examination, as well as the preliminary questions such as the purpose of the witness'
testimony.

The OCA recommended that the administrative complaint against Judge Oca be re-
docketed as a regular administrative matter, and that he be found guilty of Violation of
Supreme Court Rules and Directives and fined in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00). In a Resolution dated July 12, 2017, the Court re-docketed the present
complaint as a regular administrative matter.

The OCA agreed with Atty. Miranda's assertion that the JAR does not require the
inclusion of the offer or statement of the purpose of the witness' testimony nor does it
impose a fine on a party for failure to include the same.

Moreover, the OCA stressed that the fine under Section 10 of the JAR is only imposable
in the following instances: (a) the court allows the late submission of a party's judicial
affidavit; and (b) when the judicial affidavit fails to conform to the content requirements
under Section 3 and the attestation requirement under Section 4. The OCA ratiocinated that
basic is the rule that the imposition of a fine, being penal in nature, must strictly comply with
the rule or law, calling for its imposition. Clearly, respondent Judge had no authority to add
to the list provided in Section 3 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule. Neither did he have the
authority to impose a fine for failure of complainant Atty. Miranda to include the additional
requirement he unilaterally imposed.

ISSUE
Whether or not Judge Oca is guilty of Violation of Supreme Court Rules and Directives.

RULING
YES. In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby adopts and approves the findings of
facts and conclusions of law in the above OCA report and recommendation. The OCA stated
therein that since Judge Oca violated the Supreme Court rules and directives which is
considered a less serious offense under Section 9(4), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the
applicable penalties are those under Section 11(B) thereof, to wit: (a) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months;
or (b) a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.The OCA recommended

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the imposition of P20,000.00 since the Court had previously found Judge Oca liable for undue
delay in rendering orders and for violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars
and imposed upon him a fine of P11,000.00 in a Minute Resolution dated September 2, 2015.

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Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

READY FORM INCORPORATED v. ATTY. EGMEDIO J. CASTILLON, JR.

A.C. No. 11774, March 21, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
While courts will not hesitate to mete out proper disciplinary punishment upon lawyers
who fail to live up to their sworn duties, they will on the other hand, protect them from the
unjust accusations of dissatisfied litigants. The success of a lawyer in his profession depends
most entirely on his reputation. Anything which will harm his good name is to be deplored.
Private persons and particularly disgruntled opponents, may not, therefore, be permitted to use
the courts as vehicles through which to vent their rancor on members of the Bar"

FACTS
Ready Form was one of the companies who participated in a public bidding conducted
by the NPO on October 17, 2008. Thereafter, the NPO Bids and Awards Committee required
all bidders to re-submit their eligibility documents, which includes the bidders' past ITRs
and financial documents stamp received by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). After
reviewing these submissions, the NPO-BAC imposed a suspension of one (1) year against
Ready Form effective from December 22, 2008 to December 21, 2009 due to the supposed
misrepresentation and misdeclaration it committed when it submitted alleged false ITRs and
financial statements for the calendar year 2007.

Subsequently, Eastland Printink Corporation (Eastland) filed a Petition for

Blacklisting with the NPO against Ready Form, wherein Eastland alleged that Ready Form
had committed other violations, such as (1) misrepresentation, when it also filed with the
NPO false ITRs for the year 2006, (2) unlawfully soliciting printing jobs and services from
various local government offices or agencies, and (3) undermining the authority and
jurisdiction of the NPO by disseminating letters which suggested that the NPO no longer has
exclusive jurisdiction over printing services. As Eastland's counsel, Atty. Castillon signed the
Petition on behalf of his client.

The NPO issued a Resolution suspending and blacklisting Ready Form for a period of
five (5) years after finding, among others, that respondent’s 2006 Financial Statement
contains false information and respondent intentionally reported the reduced amount of its
net sales for 2006 in its Financial Statement.

An appeal was filed by respondent to the Office of the Press Secretary. However, the
appeal was dismissed and the imposition of administrative sanction of one (1) year was
affirmed. The same has already become final and executory since respondent neither filed a
motion for reconsideration nor a Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals timely filed.

On April 4, 2014, Ready Form filed a Complaint-Affidavit (Complaint) before the CBD-
IBP praying that Atty. Castillon be disbarred due to allegedly violating Rules 1.01, 1.02, and
1.03 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, alleging as a ground therefor Atty.
Castillon's supposed unlawful use of Ready Form's ITRs. Complainant alleges that this is in

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Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

violation of Sections 4 and 278 of Republic Act No. 8424, otherwise known as the National
Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Complainant further alleges that Atty. Castillon's supposed
act was in violation of Section 30.1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic
Act No. 9184.

After due proceedings, Commissioner Maria Editha A. Go-Biñas rendered a Report

and Recommendation absolving Atty. Castillon from the charges filed by Ready Form.
Commissioner Go-Biñas found that Ready Form's claims were unfounded, as there is no
proof that Atty. Castillon procured Ready Form's ITR, or that he used it in the Petition for
Blacklisting.

On September 23, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution adopting the
findings of fact and recommendation of Commissioner Go-Biñas and resolved to dismiss the
complaint, thus: RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of fact and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner dismissing the complaint.

ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Castillon violated Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING
NO. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that audited financial statements
submitted by corporations, as required by Section 141 of the Corporation Code, are made
available to the public by the SEC. Hence, the Court fails to see how Atty. Castillon violated
any law when he attached a copy of Ready Form's audited financial statements in the Petition
for Blacklisting he filed with the NPO.

Thus, the Court agrees with Commissioner Go-Biñas when she correctly said: He who
alleges should prove his case in a very clear and convincing manner.

An individual should not be allowed to claim relief just because a lawyer is aiding or
was hired by an opponent. To do so would create more injustice and lead to an even more
erroneous practice.

"While courts will not hesitate to mete out proper disciplinary punishment upon
lawyers who fail to live up to their sworn duties, they will on the other hand, protect them
from the unjust accusations of dissatisfied litigants. The success of a lawyer in his profession
depends most entirely on his reputation. Anything which will harm his good name is to be
deplored. Private persons and particularly disgruntled opponents, may not, therefore, be
permitted to use the courts as vehicles through which to vent their rancor on members of
the Bar" (Santos vs. Dichoso, Adm. Case No. 1825, August 22, 1978).

All told, the Court finds that the evidence adduced is wholly insufficient to support
the allegations against Atty. Castillon. As such, the Court fails to see how Atty. Castillon had

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

violated Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Hence, the Court affirms the IBP's recommendation to dismiss the Complaint.

Page 31 of 81
 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

ATTY. MAKILITO B. MAHINAY v. HON. RAMON B. DAOMILAS, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE,

AND ATTY. ROSADEY E. FAELNAR-BINONGO, CLERK OF COURT V,
BOTH OF BRANCH 11, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CEBU CITY
A.M. No. RTJ-18-2527, June 18, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
Delay in the disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and
confidence in the judicial system, as judges have the sworn duty to administer justice without
undue delay. The delay of a judge of a lower court in resolving motions and incidents within the
reglementary period as prescribed by the Constitution is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency.

FACTS
Atty. Mahinay charged respondent Judge Daomilas, Jr. with gross inexcusable
negligence and gross ignorance of the law relative to SRC Case No. SRC-223-CEB, wherein
Atty. Mahinay is the counsel of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs in SRC-223-CEB filed their
complaint for Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Shareholdings with Prayer for Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and TRO. The case was raffled to RTC Branch 11, presided by
respondent Judge.

Atty. Mahinay alleged that respondent Judge violated the Interim Rules of Procedure
for Intra-Corporate Controversies when he failed to act on the Prayer for TRO and/or a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction despite the lapse of more than 2 years from the date it was
submitted for resolution sometime in March 2013.

On November 3, 2015, Atty. Mahinay wrote the OCA for assistance in the early
disposition of the pending prayer due to the protracted inaction of respondent Judge. On
November 6, 2015, Respondent Judge issued an Order granting plaintiffs' prayer for a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction conditioned upon posting of a bond. In a Motion, defendants sought
reconsideration and prayed that they be allowed to post a counter-bond. The motion was set
for hearing the next day.

In his Comment, respondent Judge admitted that he only had limited time to evaluate
motions and cases. Nonetheless, he claimed that he was performing his judicial functions to
the best of his abilities despite his heavy caseload, coupled with the fact that he was recently
designated as Assisting Judge in another branch.

The OCA recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of Undue Delay in
Rendering an Order, finding that the Order dated 6 November 2015 was issued more than 2
years after it was submitted for resolution and despite repeated demands for its early
resolution. The OCA however recommended that the penalty be reduced to a reprimand,
taking into account his unusually heavy caseload.

ISSUE

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

Whether respondent Judge is guilty of Undue Delay in Rendering an Order

RULING
YES. The Court finds that respondent Judge demonstrated inefficiency in handling the
pending incidents, which resulted in undue and inordinate delay in the resolution of the
application for a writ of preliminary injunction. The November 6, 2015 Order was rendered
beyond the 90-day period within which a judge should decide a case or resolve a pending
matter, reckoned from the date of the filing of the last pleading, in accordance with Section
15, paragraphs (1) and (2), Article 8 of the 1987 Constitution.

The Court has stressed the importance of reasonable promptness in relation to the
administration of justice as justice delayed is justice denied. This is more so the case with
trial judges who serve as the frontline officials of the judiciary expected to act all time with
efficiency and probity. Delay in the disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion of
public faith and confidence in the judicial system, as judges have the sworn duty to
administer justice without undue delay.

The delay of a judge of a lower court in resolving motions and incidents within the
reglementary period as prescribed by the Constitution is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency. Respondent Judge's cavalier treatment of the pending matters in his court
betrays the kind of management he instituted in his courtroom. A judge must at all times
remain in full control of the proceedings in his court and strictly observe the interdictions
against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases and pending incidents in order to
avoid a miscarriage of justice. The moment he dons the judicial robe, he is bound to strictly
adhere to and faithfully comply with his duties under the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary, particularly Section 5, Canon 6 which reads:

SEC. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.

Therefore, respondent Judge is administratively liable for Undue Delay in Rendering

an Order, punishable by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less
than 1 month or more than 3 months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding
P20,000.

Nevertheless, the Court has recognized the presence of mitigating circumstances that
may temper the penalty for the administrative infraction committed by an erring magistrate,
such as physical illness, good faith, first offense, length of service, admission of the offense,
or other analogous circumstances. Hence, the Court found that a fine of P5,000 would be
sufficient, considering the fact that respondent Judge is managing 2 court stations. As well,
the Court takes note that this is the first time that he is found guilty of an administrative
charge.

Page 33 of 81
 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

PELAGIO VICENCIO SORONGON, JR. v. ATTY. RAMON Y. GARGANTOS, SR.

A.C. No. 11326, June 27, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
The Court in several cases, in determining or tempering the penalty to be imposed, has
considered mitigating factors, such as the respondent's advanced age, health, humanitarian
and equitable considerations, as well as whether the act complained of was respondent's first
infraction. In this case, in view of the respondent's advanced age (being 82 years old, as stated
in his handwritten letter) and the fact that this is his first offense, respondent is suspended from
the practice of law for 6 months.

FACTS
Complainant Pelagio Sorongon, Jr. alleged that he gave respondent Atty. Ramon
Gargantos, Sr. P200,000 as full payment for his legal services, which covers the acceptance
fee, appearance fees, and other fees until the resolution of the cases. There was allegedly no
receipt or a formal MOA. They further agreed that if there would be court hearings outside
of Quezon City, complainant would provide respondent's plane ticket, meals, and hotel
accommodation, but, should the hearing be at the Sandiganbayan, they would just meet in
the court.

Complainant eventually called respondent regarding scheduled hearings at the

Sandiganbayan. Respondent instructed complainant to pick him up at his residence,
otherwise he would not attend. Complainant complied and they attended the first hearing.
Thereafter, respondent allegedly demanded "pocket money", otherwise, he would not
appear in the next hearing and he would no longer serve as complainant’s counsel.

The next day, complainant again went to respondent's residence to pick him up.
However, respondent allegedly asked him in a harsh voice if he had the money. When
complainant replied in the negative, respondent allegedly shouted at him, threatened to have
him jailed, and resigned.

He narrated this before the Sandiganbayan and informed the court that–being a
jobless senior citizen, he could not afford to hire a new lawyer. That same day, respondent
filed a letter informing the Sandiganbayan of his withdrawal as complainant's counsel. Thus,
complainant prayed for the refund of a portion of the amount paid to respondent so that he
might be able to hire a new counsel.

The Director for Bar Discipline directed respondent to submit his Answer. In a
handwritten letter, respondent, who stated that he is already 82 years old, requested for a
copy of the Affidavit Complaint.

The IBP-CBD Commissioner then issued a Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing

to the parties, requiring them to attend and submit their respective briefs. However, only the

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

complainant appeared. Respondent eventually failed to file his Answer, and failed to file any
pleadings, or to participate in the proceedings before the IBP-CBD.

In its Report and Recommendation, the CBD found respondent to have violated the
Lawyer's Oath and Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR),
holding that respondent abandoned complainant without good cause and failed to return the
documents despite demand. Thus, it recommended that he be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of 1 year and that he should return all documents and money in his
possession over and above his lawful and reasonable attorney's fee.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved said Report, but modified it by
ordering respondent to return the entire amount of P200,000.

ISSUE
Whether respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and Canon 16, Rule 16.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)

RULING
YES. Respondent failed to return, despite demand, complainant's documents after he
withdrew as his counsel–in violation of Canon 16, Rule 16.01 which provides that a lawyer
shall account for and hold in trust the money or property from the client. Moreover, despite
respondent's legal services having been allegedly paid in the amount of P200,000, which was
agreed to cover all fees until the resolution of the case, he abandoned his client when the
latter did not give him "pocket money" he had demanded. This is a serious charge which the
respondent should have addressed and answered during the IBP proceedings. However, he
failed to participate in the IBP proceedings.

Nevertheless, the Court in several cases, in determining or tempering the penalty to

be imposed, has considered mitigating factors, such as the respondent's advanced age,
health, humanitarian and equitable considerations, as well as whether the act complained of
was respondent's first infraction.

In this case, in view of the respondent's advanced age (being 82 years old, as stated
in his handwritten letter) and the fact that this is his first offense, respondent is suspended
from the practice of law for 6 months. Respondent should return the legal fees paid to him
in the amount of P200,000, as well as the documents which pertain to the case of
complainant.

Page 35 of 81
 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

CELESTINO MALECDAN v. ATTY. SIMPSON T. BALDO

A.C. No. 12121, June 27, 2018, Second Division (CAGUIOA, J.)

DOCTRINE
Canon 1 reads, “A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and
promote respect for law and legal processes.” Meanwhile, Rule 1.01 reads, “A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” Any act or omission that is
contrary to, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards
the law is unlawful.

FACTS
Malecdan filed a letter of complaint for Estafa, Breach of Contract, and Damages
against spouses Baldo, before the Lupon of Barangay. Atty. Baldo appeared as counsel of the
spouses during the hearing before the Punong Barangay.

Malecdan filed an Administrative Complaint before the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter

against Atty. Baldo, for violating Section 9 of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law),
which prohibits the participation of lawyers in the proceedings before the Lupon:
SEC. 9. Appearance of parties in person. - In all proceedings provided for herein,
the parties must appear in person without the assistance of
counsel/representative, with the exception of minors and incompetents who
may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.

The Complaint was endorsed to the Committee on Bar Discipline-IBP (CBD-IBP) after
the parties failed to agree on a settlement. In his Answer, Atty. Baldo admitted that he was
present during the proceedings but explained that he was permitted by the parties to
participate. Malecdan filed his Verified Supplemental Complaint Affidavit, insisting that he
vehemently objected to the presence of Atty. Baldo during the proceedings.

The Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report and Recommendation,

recommending that Atty. Baldo be given a warning, finding that the language of the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law is not that definite as to unqualifiedly bar lawyers from
appearing before the Lupon, nor is the language that clear on the sanction imposable.

The IBP Board of Governors reversed and set aside the said Report and
Recommendation, and instead recommended that Atty. Baldo be reprimanded.

ISSUE
Whether Atty. Baldo violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR in connection with Section 9 of P.D.
1508 when he appeared as counsel for spouses Baldo in a hearing before the Punong
Barangay

RULING

Page 36 of 81
 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

YES. The Court upheld the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors. The Court agreed that the language of P.D. 1508 is mandatory in barring lawyers
from appearing before the Lupon.

As stated in the case of Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, Section 9 of P.D. 1508 mandates
personal confrontation of the parties because "a personal confrontation between the parties
without the intervention of a counsel or representative would generate spontaneity and a
favorable disposition to amicable settlement on the part of the disputants.”

"To ensure compliance with the requirement of personal confrontation between the
parties, and thereby, the effectiveness of the barangay conciliation proceedings as a mode of
dispute resolution, the above-quoted provision is couched in mandatory language.”

Thus, Atty. Baldo's violation of P.D. 1508 falls squarely within the prohibition of Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR):
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and
promote respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

Any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in

defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is unlawful. Here, Atty. Baldo admitted that
he appeared and participated in the proceedings before the Punong Barangay in violation of
Section 9 of P.D. 1508. Therefore, Atty. Baldo violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR in connection
with Section 9 of P.D. 1508. He is then reprimanded with a stem warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

Page 37 of 81
 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

LUCIO L. YU, JR. v. PRESIDING JUDGE JESUS B. MUPAS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 112, PASAY CITY
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2491, July 04, 2018, Second Division, (CAGUIOA, J.)

DOCTRINE
Judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules and to apply them properly in all good faith. When a law or a rule is basic,
judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law. Anything less is gross ignorance of the law.

FACTS
In the subject case, which was presided by Judge Mupas, GSIS filed a Complaint for
Collection of Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Attachment, against
Mendoza, in connection with the latter's loan obligation which became due and demandable
upon his separation from service.

On August 3, 2007, Judge Mupas issued an Order, granting GSIS' prayer for the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. Mendoza’s Ford Explorer Pick-up was seized
by the Sheriff. Subsequently, GSIS filed a motion to declare Mendoza in default in view of his
failure to file an Answer within 15 days from the service of summons.

Mendoza filed an Omnibus Motion, with the belated Answer attached, arguing that
the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that the loan obligation has already been settled
due to involuntary surrender of the vehicle. On February 4, 2009, Judge Mupas issued an
Order, granting Mendoza's Omnibus Motion and dismissing the subject case.

Aggrieved, GSIS, through complainant Yu, Jr., commenced this administrative

proceeding alleging that Judge Mupas grossly ignored the rules when he disregarded his
September 5, 2008 Order. Complainant claims that the appropriate action was to issue an
order setting aside the order in default, pursuant to Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court;
that Judge Mupas' unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court constitutes gross ignorance thereof.
Further, Judge Mupas violated Canon 3, Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
mandates that "in every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the
applicable law."

In its Report, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommended that
respondent Judge be found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Violation of the New
Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. It found that he ignored the elementary rules of
procedure on setting aside an order of default under Section 3(b), Rule 9 and the procedure
when affirmative defenses are pleaded in the Answer pursuant to Section 6, Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court. Instead of dismissing the case, Judge Mupas should have issued an order
lifting the order of default, admitting the Answer, and setting the case for trial or preliminary

Page 38 of 81
 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

hearing to resolve the issue of whether the alleged surrender of the subject vehicle would be
deemed sufficient payment of Mendoza's loan obligation.

ISSUE
Whether Judge Mupas is guilty of gross ignorance of the law

RULING
YES. The Court adopted the OCA recommendation, finding Judge Mupas guilty of
gross ignorance of the law.

In Re: Anonymous Letter Dated August 12, 2010, complaining against Judge Ofelia T. Pinto,
RTC, Branch 60, Angeles City, Pampanga, the Court ruled that:
"To be able to render substantial justice and maintain public confidence in the
legal system, judges should be embodiments of competence, integrity and
independence. Judges are also expected to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules and to apply them
properly in all good faith."

When a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply
the law. "Anything less is gross ignorance of the law." There is gross
ignorance of the law when an error committed by the judge was "gross or patent,
deliberate or malicious." It may also be committed when a judge ignores,
contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence because of bad faith,
fraud, dishonesty or corruption.

Here, Judge Mupas hastily dismissed the subject case without regard to the basic rules
of procedure and the circumstances evident on records. The assailed February 4, 2009 Order
dismissed the case pursuant to Section l(h), Rule 16 and Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court. However, Section 2, Rule 16 provides that a dismissal of the case pursuant thereto
requires a hearing before the court may dismiss the action or claim.

In this case, instead of conducting a preliminary hearing, Judge Mupas dismissed the
case based on Mendoza's mere allegation that his loan obligation had been fully satisfied.
Moreover, records of the case negate dismissal under Section 3, Rule 17, because GSIS was
never remiss in its duty to prosecute the case. In fact, it earnestly availed itself of all legal
remedies available and proceeded to present its evidence ex parte upon the order.

Therefore, for dismissing the case in utter disregard of elementary rules of procedure,
Judge Mupas acted in gross ignorance of the law, which is a serious charge with a penalty
ranging from a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000 to dismissal. As this is
not the first time that Judge Mupas was held to be administratively liable, a fine of P35,000
would be more appropriate.

Page 39 of 81
 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

MARTIN J. SIOSON v. ATTY. DIONISIO B. APOYA, JR

A.C. No. 12044, July 23, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
A lawyer’s refusal to return a client’s money upon demand and his failure to respond to
calls, text messages and letters asking for a status update on the case is a failure to live up to
his duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of his oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

FACTS
Petitioner Sioson engaged the services of Atty. Apoya, Jr. in handling the petition for
review he had earlier filed before the DOJ, in connection with his complaint for Qualified
Theft. Atty. Apoya, Jr. required the payment of an acceptance fee of P10,000.00, appearance
fee of P2,500.00 per hearing and 15% of whatever amount collected from the case as success
fee. Atty. Apoya, Jr. also told Sioson that he would submit a manifestation before the DOJ to
correct the allegations stated in Sioson's petition.

After paying the acceptance fee, Sioson then sent a text message to Atty. Apoya, Jr.
inquired about the status of his case. Atty. Apoya, Jr. replied that he would first file first a
Notice of Entry of Appearance prior to the filing of the manifestation he and Sioson discussed
earlier. Sioson sent another text message to Atty. Apoya, Jr., requesting for a status update
on the case and was told by Atty. Apoya, Jr. to wait for the order of the DOJ notifying the latter
of the Notice of Entry of Appearance he had filed.

Sioson went to the DOJ to follow up on his case and discovered that Atty. Apoya, Jr.
had not filed a Notice of Entry of Appearance in relation to his case. Sioson called Atty. Apoya,
Jr. but the latter's phone could not be reached. Sioson averred that Atty. Apoya, Jr. thereafter
continued to ignore his text messages. Sioson requested Atty. Apoya, Jr. for a status update
on his petition for review but did not receive any response. Sioson wrote another letter to
Atty. Apoya, Jr., demanding him to return the P10,000.00 he had given the latter as
acceptance fee. Likewise, he asked for the return of all the documents he sent pertaining to
his case.

Sioson then filed a Verified Complaint before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (CBD-IBP), praying that Atty. Apoya, Jr. be disciplined and
be disbarred from the practice of law.

In his answer, Atty. Apoya Jr alleged that he does not know Sioson personally and
denied that Sioson was his client. He also denied receiving any amount and any documents
from the complainant and that no attorney-client relationship exists between them.
Consequently, Atty. Apoya Jr, filed a criminal complaint of grave threats and grave coercion
against Sioson.

Page 40 of 81
 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

After due proceedings, Investigating Commissioner Erwin L. Aguilera rendered a

report recommending that Atty. Apoya, Jr. be suspended from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months and that he be ordered to return the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) to Sioson. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating
Commissioner’s recommendation and denied respondent Atty. Apoya, Jr.'s Motions for
Reconsideration.

ISSUE
Whether Atty. Apoya Jr. violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

RULING
YES. Atty. Apoya, Jr.'s refusal to return Sioson's money upon demand and his failure
to respond to Sioson's calls, text messages and letters asking for a status update on the case
filed before the DOJ reveal Atty. Apoya, Jr.'s failure to live up to his duties as a lawyer in
consonance with the strictures of his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The acts committed by Atty. Apoya, Jr. thus fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule
1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 16.01 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 and Rule 18.04 of Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes.
A lawyer, to the best of his ability, is expected to respect and abide by the law, and thus, avoid
any act or omission that is contrary to the same. A lawyer's personal deference to the law not
only speaks of his character but it also inspires the public to likewise respect and obey the
law. Rule 1.01, on the other hand, states the norm of conduct to be observed by all lawyers.
Any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of,
disobedient to, or disregards the law is unlawful. To this end, nothing should be done by any
member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of
the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.

Rule 16.01, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, on the other hand,
requires the lawyer to account for all money or property collected or received for or from
his client. Where a client gives money to his lawyer for a specific purpose, such as to file an
action, appeal an adverse judgment, consummate a settlement, or pay the purchase price of
a parcel of land, the lawyer should, upon failure to take such step and spend the money for
it, immediately return the money to his client.

Here, the circumstances of this case indubitably show that after receiving the amount
of P10,000.00 as acceptance fee, Atty. Apoya, Jr. failed to render any legal service in relation
to the case of Sioson. Despite Sioson's repeated follow-ups, Atty. Apoya, Jr. unjustifiably failed
to update Sioson of the status of the case and to return to him the documents the latter gave
him in connection with the case pending before the DOJ. Atty. Apoya Jr. is SUSPENDED from

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

the practice of law for six (6) months and is ordered to return the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) to complainant Martin J. Sioson.

Page 42 of 81
 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

ATTY. CARLOS D. CINCO v. PRESIDING JUDGE ALFONSO C. RUIZ II

A.M. No. RTJ-16-2482, August 15, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
In administrative proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the complainant. The
complainant must be able to show this by substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, otherwise, the complaint
must be dismissed. While the matter denying the admission of the exhibits in the formal offer is
judicial in nature, it cannot be denied that respondent Judge incurred delay in resolving
complainant's formal offer. Good faith and lack of malicious intent cannot completely free
respondent Judge from liability. However, these exacting standards may be relaxed in order to
extend support and compassion to a seemingly well-meaning member of the Judiciary.

FACTS
Atty. Carlos D. Cinco filed a complaint against respondent Presiding Judge Alfonso C.
Ruiz II for allegedly acting with gross ignorance of the law, gross inefficiency, gross
misconduct and in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct for taking more than nine (9)
months to resolve Plaintiffs Additional Formal Offer of Evidence and for denying the
admission of Exhibits "E" and "H" to "W", which were attached to complainant's Amended
Judicial Affidavit for Rebuttal.

In his complaint he alleged that he was allowed by the trial court to file his Amended
Judicial Affidavit in lieu of direct examination in the presentation of rebuttal evidence for the
plaintiff which also included several motions to mark the attached exhibits and subsequently
filed the Formal Offer. However, the defendants filed their Comment/Opposition to the
Formal Offer on the grounds that the exhibits were not duly identified and authenticated,
and were not marked during the presentation of rebuttal evidence.

Atty. Cinco failed to attend the clarificatory hearing hence the respondent Judge
issued an order giving the complainant five (5) days to file a rejoinder to the defendants’
Comment/Opposition. Upon compliance with the order, Atty. Cinco filed his Plaintiff
Rejoinder with a prayer for the marking of the exhibits attached thereto and explaining that
his failure to attend the hearing was due to the late notice and that he was down in bed that
time.

Thereafter, Atty. Cinco filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Resolve the Formal Offer. The
respondent then issued an order denying the admission of the complainants exhibits on the
ground that these were not duly marked during the presentation of rebuttal evidence. Upon
receiving respondent's Order, Atty. Cinco filed the present complaint before the OCA.

In his Comment, respondent alleged that instead of denying outright the said Formal
Offer, the court wanted to give the complainant sufficient time and opportunity to rectify the
defect of not marking the documents being offered hence the clarificatory hearing, but
complainant filed a rejoinder asserting that the exhibits should have been considered

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marked already. Upon receipt of the complainant's Ex-Parte Motion, the court had no choice
but to resolve the formal offer and deny the admission of the exhibits and that the delay in
the resolution of the case cannot be attributed solely to the court.

The OCA found the respondent guilty of Undue Delay in Rendering a Decision/Order
and recommended that the administrative complaint against him be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter and be admonished with a stern warning that a repetition of the same
or any similar act shall be dealt with severely.

ISSUE
Whether Judge Alfonso Ruiz II may be held administratively liable for delaying the
resolution of complainant's formal offer of evidence and for not admitting the exhibits
attached to the amended judicial affidavit for rebuttal of complainant.

RULING
YES. The Court agrees with, and accordingly adopts and approves the findings of facts
and conclusions of law in the OCA Report, which found the respondent guilty of Undue Delay
in Rendering a Decision/Order and ratiocinated that in administrative proceedings, the
burden of proof rests on the complainant. The complainant must be able to show this by
substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, otherwise, the complaint must be dismissed.

In the case at hand, while the matter denying the admission of the exhibits in the
formal offer is judicial in nature, it cannot be denied that respondent Judge incurred delay in
resolving the complainant's formal offer. In fact, he categorically admitted the delay and
explained that he only wanted to give the plaintiff ample time to properly mark the exhibits
attached to its amended judicial affidavit for rebuttal.

It must be noted that respondent Judge acted immediately when a motion to resolve
the pending matter was filed by the complainant. Still, his claim of good faith and absence of
malice do not abate his consequent liability in light of the allegations of incompetence and
ineptitude against him. Good faith and lack of malicious intent cannot completely free
respondent Judge from liability. However, these exacting standards may be relaxed in order
to extend support and compassion to a seemingly well-meaning member of the Judiciary.

Under Section 9(1),52 Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a
decision or order is considered a less serious offense, and the applicable penalties are those
under Section 11(B)53 thereof, to wit: (a) Suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of more
than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. However, considering the circumstances of
the case, the OCA deemed it proper that the respondent be admonished instead, which
recommendation the Court hereby adopts.

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

ROLANDO N. UY v. ATTY. EDMUNDO J. APUHIN

A.C. No. 11826, September 05, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
The notarization of a document is vested with substantive public interest. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment
executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument. A notary public should not
notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed it and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein.

FACTS
Complainant Uy, an OFW in Taiwan, discovered that a Joint Waiver of Rights, Interests
and Ownership (Joint Waiver) covering a 600-square meter land he and his wife own, had
been ostensibly executed by him and his wife. It was made to appear that Uy and his wife had
conveyed the property to their son, Rick Rosner Uy. Attached to the Joint Waiver was an
application for a building permit also ostensibly signed by the spouses Uy. The document
was acknowledged before respondent Atty. Apuhin.

Knowing that he and his wife were both in Taiwan when the Joint Waiver was
executed and acknowledged before Atty. Apuhin, Uy filed a disbarment complaint against
respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD), charging the latter with falsity in the conduct of his duties as a notary public, and
for violation of Sections 3 and 5 of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and of the
Lawyers' Oath.

Atty. Apuhin claimed that it was not his task as a notary public to inquire into the
whereabouts of his clients and that he merely believed the representation of the parties that
they were members of the same family when the Joint Waiver was presented to him for
notarization. He also alleged that the Joint Waiver turned out to be harmless considering that
it was only used by Rick Uy to obtain a building permit and the ownership of the property
had not been transferred.

Finding Atty. Apuhin guilty of violating Section 2(b)(1) & (2), Rule IV of the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice, after failing to exercise the due diligence required of a good father
of a family in not determining the true identity of the persons who allegedly signed the Joint
Waiver, the IBP-CBD recommended that the disbarment case against Atty. Apuhin be upheld,
and that he be disqualified from his commission as a notary public for one (1) year and
suspended from the practice of law, also for one (1) year considering that this is the first time
respondent committed said violation and that he is in his senior years. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved IBP-CBD’s recommendation, with modification that he be
disqualified from being commissioned as a Notary Public for two (2) years and suspended
from the practice of law for six (6) months.

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ISSUE
Whether Atty. Apuhin violated the Rules on Notarial Practice
RULING
YES. The Court upholds and adopts the findings and recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors.

The notarization of a document is vested with substantive public interest. Courts,

administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
Consequently, acknowledgment of a document (i.e., the act of a person who executed a deed,
of going before a competent officer to declare the same to be his act or deed) must be done
in accordance with the requirements of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

Thus, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed
the same are the very same persons who executed it and personally appeared before him to
attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. In fact, Section 2(b), Rule IV of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice clearly requires, among others, that: "a person shall not
perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document is
not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization." The records disclose
that Atty. Apuhin indeed failed to observe the above Rules in notarizing the Joint Waiver as
the spouses Uy were in fact in Taiwan the day that Atty. Apuhin notarized the said document.

Atty. Apuhin also lacked due diligence in the performance of his duties as a notary
public as fortified by his own statements in his Counter-Affidavit. In it, Atty. Apuhin argued
not only that it was beyond his obligation as such Notary Public to investigate the identity of
his clients but that he relied solely on the representations made to him in his office.

Such reliance on mere representations made by parties, without requiring the

presentation of competent evidence of identity, clearly runs counter to the requirement of
Sections 12(1) and (2), Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, that evidence of
competent identity must be:
SEC. 12.
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing
the photograph and signature of the individual; or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally
knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the
instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows
to the notary public documentary identification.

The Court deems it proper that the notarial commission of Atty. Apuhin be revoked,
if still existing, and to disqualify him from appointment as a notary public for two (2) years.
He is also suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. Contrary, however, to the
complainant's position that Atty. Apuhin should be disbarred, the Court believes that

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disbarment is too severe a penalty and that the sanctions herein imposed already suffice.
Removal from the Bar should not be decreed when any punishment less severe —
reprimand, temporary suspension or fine — would accomplish the end desired.

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

GOV. EDGARDO A. TALLADO v. HON. WINSTON S. RACOMA, PRESIDING JUDGE

A.M. No. RTJ-18-2536, October 10, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
Not every error or mistake by a judge in the performance of his official duties renders
him administratively liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge
in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action.

FACTS
Punong Barangay Segundo filed a verified case against Mayor Agnes Ang, then
Municipal Mayor of Vinzons, Camarines Norte for Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office, Grave
Abuse of Authority and violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 91844 and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations alleging that Ang implemented the third phase of the rehabilitation of the
seawall of a barangay without first complying with the requirements set forth under R.A. No.
1984 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

Thereafter, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued a Resolution recommending that

Ang be put under preventive suspension for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days. Gov.
Tallado, herein complainant, issued a Notice of Preventive Suspension directing the same to
be served on Ang after which, then Vice-mayor Herrera took his oath as Municipal mayor.

Ang filed before the RTC a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a Prayer for
TRO/Preliminary Injunction. Presiding Judge Daing denied Ang’s application for TRO and
directed the case to be included in the regular raffle of cases. The case was raffled to Judge
Racoma, herein respondent, who issued a TRO against respondents ruling to maintain the
status quo prior to the occurrence of the act sought to be stopped—the preventive
suspension— in order to avert possible material injury on the petitioner while the Court is
in the process of hearing and examining more closely the issues of the case.

Furthermore, the court ruled that there exists sufficient showing that said petitioner
Ang is bound to suffer grave irreparable injury from the implementation of the assailed
preventive suspension order and as such, the suspension from office of an elective official,
whether as a preventive measure or as a penalty, will undeservedly deprive the electorate of
the services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.

Tallado then filed a complaint against Judge Racoma, praying that the latter be
disciplined and alleging that Judge Racoma grossly violated Section 4 (d) of Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court when the latter did not allow Tallado and his co-respondents to present their
evidence and that Judge Racoma acted with grave abuse of discretion when he issued the
questioned TRO without discussing the basis of its issuance.

Judge Racoma requested for an additional period of 20 days to file his comment,
which was granted, but Tallado withdrew the complaint in view of conciliatory efforts with
Ang. However, the OCA informed Tallado that the complainant in administrative cases is not

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given the option to withdraw once the matter has been raised before the court. In view of the
failure of Judge Racoma to file his Comment despite the lapse of the period granted to him,
the OCA reiterated its directive for Judge Racoma to file his comment within ten (10) days of
receipt. As of date, Judge Racoma has yet to file his comment on the instant complaint.

The OCA recommended that the administrative complaint against Judge Racoma be
dismissed for lack of merit. The OCA however recommended that Judge Racoma be found
guilty of Insubordination, and accordingly be fined in the amount of Eleven Thousand Pesos
(P11,000.00) for failure to file the required comment as directed by the OCA.

ISSUE
Whether Judge Racoma acted with grave abuse of discretion when he issued the
questioned TRO

RULING
NO. The Court upholds the findings and recommendation of the OCA. The OCA
correctly observed that the records of the case readily show that Judge Racoma followed the
standard procedure in hearing the injunction case filed by Ang by issuing a notice of hearing
and giving Tallado the opportunity to present his evidence. Judge Racoma also aptly
explained his legal basis for granting the TRO which finds support in jurisprudence.

Not every error or mistake by a judge in the performance of his official duties
however renders him administratively liable. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action.

Additionally, the Court held that the administrative case cannot be used as a remedy
to challenge the assailed order or decision rendered by the respondent judge nor can it be
used as a substitute for other judicial remedies. Errors committed by a judge in the exercise
of adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but
should be assailed through judicial remedies.

In this case, there was no evidence to show that Judge Racoma was motivated by bad
faith, fraud, or corruption when he granted the prayer for the issuance of a TRO. Considering
the circumstances of this case and the lack of malice and bad faith on the part of Judge
Racoma, the administrative complaint against Judge Racoma is dismissed for lack of merit.
The Court, however, agrees with the OCA that Judge Racoma's failure to submit the required
Comment reveals a failure to live up to the standards required of a government employee for
failing to comply with the Court's orders.

Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that violation of Supreme Court's
rules, directives and circulars is considered as a less serious offense. Since Judge Racoma has
been previously found guilty of Undue Delay in the Rendition of Judgment in two (2)
instances and has been fined in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) in each case,

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the Court agrees with the OCA that a fine in the amount of Eleven Thousand Pesos
(P11,000.00) is warranted under the circumstances.

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Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

CARLOS V. LOPEZ v. ATTY. MILAGROS ISABEL A. CRISTOBAL

A.C. No. 12146. October 10, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE

“A lawyer is duty-bound to competently and diligently serve his client once the former
takes up the latter's cause. The lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Hence, his neglect of a legal matter entrusted to
him amounts to inexcusable negligence for which he must be administratively liable.”

FACTS

Complainant Carlos V. Lopez alleged that sometime in May 2011, he engaged the
services of respondent Atty. Milagros Isabel A. Cristobal as his counsel, and pursuant to
this, he deposited P35,000.00 to Atty. Cristobal’s Metrobank Account as payment for the
latter’s acceptance fee.

Lopez averred that despite knowledge of the fact that the RTC issued an order
requiring the submission of a position paper, Atty. Cristobal failed to file the same. Lopez also
alleged that Atty. Cristobal misrepresented to him that she already filed their position paper
in court, and that she did not attend the hearings on the subject case and that she also
deliberately refused to communicate with Lopez.

Lopez then informed Atty. Cristobal of his decision to stop her engagement as his
counsel and demanded that she (1) prepare and file her withdrawal of appearance in the
subject case and provide Lopez with a copy thereof; (2) return the acceptance fee of Thirty-
Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00). However, despite the written demand made by Lopez,
Atty. Cristobal did not file her withdrawal as counsel of Lopez. Pursuant to this, Lopez filed
a verified complaint before the CBD – IBP praying that Atty. Cristobal be disciplined.

Atty. Cristobal then claimed that she was actually able to act as counsel for the
complainant and that whatever delays or postponements which had occurred during the
handling of the case was just the result of the usual vicissitudes of litigation and on, some
occasions, due to circumstances which are sometimes beyond respondent's control. In
addition, while Atty. Cristobal admitted that she was aware of the RTC’s directive to file a
position paper, she did not proceed to prepare and file the said position paper on account of
the continued refusal of Lopez to pay her accumulated legal fees. Atty. Cristobal claimed that
Lopez caused payment to be stopped on a P27,000.00 check that he had previously issued in
her favor as further payment of her legal fees.

The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP rendered a report stating that the
supposed “continued refusal” of the complainant to pay the accumulated legal fees should
have been a reason to withdraw from the case as the same is sanctioned under Rule 22.01(e)
of the CPR. However, the failure of the client to pay the agreed fees does not warrant the

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Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

lawyer’s abandoning his client’s cause. The failure of the respondent to file the required
position paper of her client, and her failure to properly withdraw from the case, should
render her liable. Pursuant to this, a recommendation that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for six (6) months was submitted, which was adopted and approved by
the IBP Board of Governors.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent’s failure to file the required position paper and her failure
to properly withdraw violate the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING

YES. The acts committed by Atty. Cristobal thus fall squarely within the prohibition
of Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 and Rule 22.01 of Canon 22 of the CPR, which provides:

CANON 18 — A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 18.03 — A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 — A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 22 — A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE
AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Rule 22.01 — A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply
with the retainer agreement;

Canon 18 clearly mandates that a lawyer is duty-bound to competently and diligently

serve his client once the former takes up the latter's cause. The lawyer owes fidelity to such
cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Hence, his
neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him amounts to inexcusable negligence for which he
must be administratively liable, as in this case.

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On the other hand, Rule 22.01, Canon 22 of the CPR, provides that an attorney may
only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by permission of the court
after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name of
the new lawyer is recorded in the case. A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without
the written consent of his client must file a petition for withdrawal in court. He must serve a
copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse party at least three (3) days before the
date set for hearing, otherwise the court may treat the application as a "mere scrap of paper.

The circumstances of the case show that Atty. Cristobal made no such move. The
Court agrees with the findings of the Investigating Commissioner that Atty. Cristobal's
defense of discharge as self-serving. Atty. Cristobal clearly disregarded the mandate of Rule
22.01, Canon 22 of the CPR. Atty. Cristobal never sought the written consent of Lopez, his
client or the permission of the court. Atty. Cristobal also did not file a petition for withdrawal
in court.

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT TWO (SPV-AMC), INCORPORATED, represented by

NICANOR M. COLLADO v. HON. BERNABE B. MENDOZA, PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 23, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC), ROXAS, ISABELA
A.M. No. RTJ-18-2538. November 21, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
“Judges should exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
procedural rules, and should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law and
jurisprudence. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court
proficiency in the law, and the duty to maintain professional competence at all times. When a
judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the confidence of the public
in the courts. A judge is expected to keep abreast of the developments and amendments thereto,
as well as of prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the
mainspring of injustice.”

FACTS
Philippine Investment Two Incorporated (PI TWO) filed an Ex-Parte Petition for
Issuance of a Writ of Possession over the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-374946 it acquired from Development Bank of the Philippines, which was
granted by the RTC.

The Heirs of Wilson Nuesa filed a complaint against the Sheriff Adelaine Samonte for
Quieting of Title, alleging that the subject property originally belonged to their father, Wilson
Nuesa. Nuesa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the Subject Property in favor of his
common-law spouse, Samonte. Samonte then used the Subject Property as collateral for the
loan she obtained from the DBP, which foreclosed the mortgage. After its ownership was
consolidated and a new TCT (TCT No. T- 374946) was issued in its favor, the DBP then sold
the same to PI TWO, in whose favor the subject Writ of Possession was issued. The Heirs of
Nuesa claimed that the Deed of Absolute Sale between their father and Samonte was null and
void for lack of consideration and for being prohibited by law.

The Heirs of Nuesa informed the sheriff that they were availing of the remedy of
terceria in the Writ of Possession Case. On September 18, 2017, respondent Judge Mendoza
issued an Order admitting the Amended Complaint filed by the Heirs of Nuesa in the Quieting
of Title Case. On the same day, respondent Judge Mendoza issued an Order, directing the
issuance of a 72-hour TRO, upon the posting of a bond of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) by the Heirs of Nuesa. On September 20, 2017, respondent Judge Mendoza
issued the disputed Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). On September 25, 2017,
respondent Judge Mendoza issued an Order13 extending the validity of the TRO until
October 12, 2017 after Winnie Omar C. Nuesa, one of the Heirs of Nuesa, testified on the
contents of his judicial affidavit.

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PI TWO filed an Ex Abundanti Ad Cautelam Manifestation raising its objections to

respondent Judge Mendoza's Orders issuing the TRO and extending its validity. PI TWO
averred that the lower court did not have jurisdiction over PI TWO because PI TWO never
received the summons for the Quieting of Title Case. It was only nearly after a month after
the issuance of the TRO when PI TWO was finally served with the summons and a copy of
the complaint in the Quieting of Title Case. PI TWO also alleged that the lower court
irregularly extended the TRO.

Pursuant to this, filed an instant administrative complaint for Gross Ignorance of the
Law and Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment, assailing the judiciousness of the
following orders issued by respondent Judge Mendoza: September 20, 2017 TRO, September
25, 2017 Order extending the TRO up to October 12, 2017; and the November 29, 2017 Order
granting Heirs of Nuesa's Motion to Substitute Cash Bond with an Injunction Bond.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.

RULING
YES. Though not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law or of the rules,
and that, when committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, the rule
applies only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. When the law or the
rule is so elementary, not to be aware of it or to act as if one does not know it, constitutes
gross ignorance of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public
and the court proficiency in the law, and the duty to maintain professional competence at all
times. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the
confidence of the public in the courts. A judge is expected to keep abreast of the
developments and amendments thereto, as well as of prevailing jurisprudence. Ignorance of
the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice.

Even granting that respondent Judge Mendoza had been motivated by good
intentions leading him to disregard the laws governing TROs, these personal motivations
cannot relieve him from the administrative consequences of his actions as they affect his
competency and conduct as a judge in the discharge of his official functions. Judges should
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules, and
should be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in law and jurisprudence.

When a law or rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law.
Anything less is ignorance of the law. There is gross ignorance of the law when an error
committed by the judge was "gross or patent, deliberate or malicious." It may also be
committed when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law and jurisprudence

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because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. Gross ignorance of the law or
incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith.
A temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte "to preserve the status quo
until the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction which cannot be issued ex
parte.” In this instance, a summary hearing, separate from the application of the preliminary
injunction, is required only to determine if a 72-hour TRO should be extended.

The OCA correctly observed that respondent Judge Mendoza's failure to serve the
summons on PI TWO after the issuance of the assailed 72-hour TRO cannot be cured by his
claim that it was received by the sheriff, the person enjoined from implementing the writ of
possession. Furthermore, the supposed extreme urgency of the issuance of the 72- hour TRO
was belied by respondent Judge Mendoza's setting of summary hearing for the extension of
the same, five (5) days after the issuance thereof. Section 5, Rule 58 clearly states that such
summary hearing must be conducted within the 72-hour period. Instead, respondent Judge
Mendoza set the hearing on September 25, 2017, two (2) days beyond the effectivity of the
72-hour TRO. In this case, respondent Judge Mendoza's failure to apply the settled laws and
jurisprudence on the issuance of TROs constitutes gross ignorance of the law which merits
administrative sanction.

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ROLANDO T. KO v. ATTY. ALMA UY-LAMPASA

A.C. No. 11584. March 6, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
“The act of notarization is impressed with public interest. As such, a notary public must
observe the highest degree of care in complying with the basic requirements in the performance
of his or her duties in order to preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity of the
notarial system.”

FACTS
Complainant Rolando T. Ko for filed an administrative compliant disbarment against
respondent. Atty. Alma Uy – Lampasa for alleged violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for Lawyers (CPR).

Ko claimed that respondent notarized two purported deeds of sale between a certain
Jerry Uy and the Sultan siblings over a parcel of land knowing that the two deeds of sale
were spurious. While the two deeds are similar with respect to the vendee, the property
covered, and the consideration, they differ as regards the name of the vendors. In addition,
on both deeds, not all vendors named signed the document. In this regard, complainant
claimed that an Extra-judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Sale covering the same
property was executed between his son, Jason U. Ko and all ten of the Sultan siblings. In
contrast with the deeds of sale notarized by respondent, this extra-judicial settlement
contains the signatures and thumbmarks of al the Sultan siblings. Ko likewise claimed that
respondent committed perjury by filing pleadings in court without the necessary Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) compliance number.

Respondent countered that she has not violated any provision of the CPR, arguing that
the matter of whether the deeds of sale were spurious is now the subject of separate cases
pending in court, and the she was exempted from MCLE requirements for the first up to the
third compliance period because she was a former judge, and that she is currently in the
process of complying with the requirement for the latest compliance period.

The Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued a

report finding respondent in violation of notarial law and that she failed to indicate her MCLE
Compliance Certificate Number in various pleadings, and recommended that she be
suspended as a notary public for a period of six (6) months. The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Board of Governors (IBP) adopted and approved the report and
recommendation but modified the penalty to immediate revocation of her notarial
commission and disqualification for re-appointment as notary public for two (2) years and
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

ISSUE
(1) Whether or not respondent non-compliant with respect to the MCLE
requirements.

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(2) Whether or not respondent was in violation of Notarial Rules when she notarized
the two deeds of sale without the presence of the parties named therein.
RULING

(1) NO. B.M. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal education
"to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence,
maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.”

Records show that respondent was exempted from the First, Second, and Third
Compliance Periods, and that respondent eventually completed the required units on May 9,
2012, which is still within the Fourth Compliance Period.

Moreover, an IBP member shall only be declared delinquent for failure to comply with
the education requirements "after the sixty (60)- day period for compliance has expired."
This 60-day period shall commence from the time such member received a notice of non-
compliance.

In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent had ever been issued a Notice
of Non-Compliance. On the contrary, the records show that for the first to third compliance
periods, she was exempted for being a member of the judiciary, and that she was able to
complete the requirements for the fourth compliance period.

(2) YES. The act of notarization is impressed with public interest. As such, a notary
public must observe the highest degree of care in complying with the basic requirements in
the performance of his or her duties in order to preserve the confidence of the public in the
integrity of the notarial system.

Section 6 of Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice states: SEC. 6. Improper
Instruments or Documents. — A notary public shall not notarize:

(a) a blank or incomplete instrument or document; or

(b) an instrument or document without appropriate notarial certification.

Respondent clearly violated this provision when she notarized the deeds of absolute
sale despite the incomplete signature and identification details of the vendors. In addition,
while there are some signatures that do appear on the instruments, the vendors therein
claimed that they did not actually sign the deeds.

Furthermore, respondent violated the Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule IV, Section 2 of
which provides:

SEC. 2. Prohibitions. — x x x
xxx xxx xxx
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document —
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1. is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
2. is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

The Notarial Rules clearly mandate that before notarizing a document, the notary
public should require the presence of the very person who executed the same. He or she
certifies that it was the same person who executed and personally appeared before him to
attest to the contents and truth of what were stated therein. The presence of the parties to
the deed is necessary to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature.

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

MARILYN PABALAN v. ATTY. ELISEO MAGNO C. SALVA

A.C. No. 9298. July 29, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
“Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits not only the actual
division of attorney's fees by a lawyer with a non-lawyer but also the mere stipulation of such
an agreement. The mere execution of the agreement is, thus, a violation of Rule 9.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.”

FACTS
Complainant Marilyn Pabalan filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) a Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Eliseo Magno
Salva (Salva) for unprofessional and immoral conduct. She alleged that among others, with
sweet words and promise of marriage," Salva deceived her into taking him in her condo unit
and induced her to advance the funding for his proposed law office and that she and Salva
entered into an agreement wherein she would solicit clients for Salva and they would evenly
divide the attorney's fees paid by the clients, not knowing that a partnership between a
lawyer and non-lawyer was illegal.

Pabalan also stated that she was a witness in another disbarment case filed by a
certain Daniel Benito against Salva in CBD Case No. 09- 2382. She claimed that she was
emboldened to file a separate case and not just be a witness when a certain Cherry Reyes-
Abastillas filed another disbarment case against Salva in CBD Case No. 11-3098.

In his Answer, Salva denied all the allegations against him. In addition, as an
affirmative defense, Salva argued that the case should be dismissed for forum shopping
because Pabalan already raised the same issues in the instant case in her Sinumpaang
Salaysay in the earlier disbarment case filed by Benito against Salva.

Salva filed a Motion to Dismiss (MTD) on the grounds of forum shopping, res judicata,
and double jeopardy. He informed the IBP-CBD that it had already issued a Report and
Recommendation in CBD Case No. 09-2382 which was adopted and approved by the IBP
Board of Governors, wherein he was admonished for entering into an agreement with
Pabalan for the solicitation of clients and division of attorney's fees.

ISSUE
(1) Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum
shopping.
(2) Whether or not respondent is guilty of entering into an agreement with a non-
lawyer for the sharing of attorney’s fees.

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RULING

(1) YES. The disbarment complaint should be dismissed in view of the ruling in A.C.
No. 9809. The IBP should have already dismissed the instant disbarment complaint because
the same grounds raised by Pabalan were already contained in her Sinumpaang Salaysay as
a witness in CBD Case No. 09-2382.

In such report, the IBP ruled that “Hence, except for the charge of entering into an
agreement with a non-lawyer for the sharing of attorney's fees, all the charges raised against
respondent are found to have no factual and legal basis. With respect to the charge of
entering into an agreement with a non-lawyer for the sharing of attorney's fees, respondent
is found guilty.”

The IBP had already considered the allegations of Pabalan against Salva when it ruled
on the disbarment complaint filed by Benito in CBD Case No. 09-2382.

(2) YES. The IBP ruled in CBD Case No. 09-2382 that the document identified by
complainant as "Annex-C (Mayie's Annexes IBP Complaint)" is clearly an agreement between
respondent and Pabalan, a non-lawyer, concerning the equal division of attorney's fees paid
by clients solicited by Pabalan.

While it is unclear if respondent and Pabalan actually divided for themselves the
attorney's fees paid to respondent, Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibits not only the actual division of attorney's fees by a lawyer with a non-lawyer but
also the mere stipulation of such an agreement. The mere execution of the agreement is, thus,
a violation of Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which it is proper to
suspend respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months.

As the allegations raised by Pabalan in this case have been previously ruled upon by
the IBP and the Court in A.C. No. 9809, and having already imposed a punishment on Salva
in the said case involving the same set of facts, the Court is thus constrained to dismiss the
instant complaint.

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By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

PRESIDING JUDGE AIDA ESTRELLA MACAPAGAL, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR. 195,
PARAÑAQUE CITY v. ATTY. WALTER T. YOUNG
A.C. No. 9298. July 29, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
“While lawyers have the right, both as officers of the court and as citizens, to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges, such
criticisms, no matter how truthful, shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.”

FACTS
Presiding Judge Aida Estrella Macapagal alleged in a letter-complaint that she
received a letter from respondent Atty. Walter T. Young, threatening her that an
administrative and a criminal complaint for "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment"
would be filed against her if the writ of possession/writ of demolition would be
implemented.

The letter states among others that, “with all due respect, but much to our regret, we
wish to make manifest that we will be compelled to file an administrative complaint against
you before the Office of the Court Administrator as well as a criminal complaint for
"knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" if you should persist in your stubborn actuation
of implementing the writ of possession/writ of demolition against non-parties to the
expropriation case.”

Atty. Young then submitted a letter-comment praying for the dismissal of the
administrative complaint contending that there was no intention to malign and
contumaciously threaten Judge Macapagal and that the sending of the letter was in fact an
act made to courteously warn and prevent Judge Macapagal into committing a judicial act
which would be a transgression of the basic rights of the informal settlers who were then my
clients to due process, thus making Judge Macapagal truly vulnerable to criminal as well as
administrative complaints.

The Investigating Commissioner Atty. Young's act of writing the subject letter to
Judge Macapagal is tantamount to simple misconduct and thus, he recommended the
imposition of the penalty of warning with a reminder that a repetition of the same or similar
act shall be dealt with more severely. However, the IBP Board of Governors reversed such
decision and ruled that Atty. Young committed a disrespectful and uncalled for act against
the judiciary and thus, recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for six
(6) months. The Board ruled that Atty. Young is guilty of violating Canon 11 and Rule 11.04
of the CPR for his "menacing language that imputes ill and corrupt motive to a member of
the judiciary."

ISSUE

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Whether or not the sending of the letter constitutes improper conduct and is a
violation of Canon 11 of the CPR.

RULING

YES. The Court finds Atty. Young's act of sending the subject letter to Judge Macapagal
highly improper. There is no question that Atty. Young did threaten to file administrative and
criminal complaints against Judge Macapagal if the writ of demolition was implemented.

Furthermore, while Atty. Young alleged in his Comment that he had no intention to
threaten Judge Macapagal in sending the subject letter, he also stated that she may be
"stubbornly pursuing" the demolition operations "because of her desire to please and
gratify" the Mayor of Parañ aque City. These statements, in the mind of the Court, indubitably
demonstrate how Atty. Young had failed to observe the respect due to the Courts and to
judicial officers.

The Court further ruled that while lawyers have the right, both as officers of the court
and as citizens, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the
acts of courts and judges, such criticisms, no matter how truthful, shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety.

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By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

CARMELITA CANETE v. ATTY. ARTEMIO PUTI

A.C. No. 10949, August 14, 2019, SECOND DIVISION, (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
While a lawyer, as an officer of the court, has the right to criticize the acts of courts and
judges, the same must be made respectfully and through legitimate channels

FACTS
Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Carmelita Canete (Canete)
against Atty. Artemio Puti (Atty. Puti) with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
In her complaint, Canete claimed that her husband was a victim in a criminal case for
kidnapping for ransom with double murder filed against Atty. Puti's client. Canete averred
that Atty. Puti had, in numerous occasions, appeared in court while he was intoxicated and
made discourteous and inappropriate remarks against the public and private prosecutors as
well as the judge
According to Canete, Atty Puti, also provoke the opposite counsel. The complainant
said that Atty. Puti provoked her lawyer by calling him “bakla” or gay. This was done in an
open court during a hearing last May 9, 2013.
He also insulted, the prosecutors. Inappropriate remarks against the Public
Prosecutor. Atty. Puti said “No Answer! Bakit 2 kayong prosecutor? Malaki siguro bayad sa
inyo. ” Atty. Puti alos uttered the words "to the handsome public prosecutor" with seething
sarcasm.
He likewise disrespected the court. Atty. Puti also bullied the judge who is handling
the case and threatened the same in open court. He claimed that the court is bias with our
evidence.
As per the defense of Atty. Puti, he denied ever appearing intoxicated in court. There
was no evidence of it. He also claimed that it was Atty. Tan (Canete’s counsel) who provoked
him when the latter made threats against him. According to him, it was his duty to call out
the judge for being biased and that he was only discharging his duties to his client by
representing him with zeal.
The Investigating Commissioner of the CBD issued a Report and Recommendation13
finding Atty. Puti liable for misconduct for violating the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommending his suspension for two (2) years from the
practice of law.
In a Resolution. the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, with modification: Atty. Artemio Puti
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.

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ISSUE
Whether Atty Puti failed to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues. Thus, violating Canon 8, Rule 10.01, 10.03, Canon 10 and
Canon 11 of CPR.

RULING
YES. On the allegation that Atty. Puti appeared intoxicated in court on numerous
occasions, Canete claimed that these were witnessed by several court personnel, his co-
counsels, and opposing counsels. Atty. Puti denied such claim and argued that there is no
evidence on record that he appeared in court while intoxicated.20 The Court agrees with
Atty. Puti. It was not sufficiently proven that Atty. Puti ever appeared at a court hearing while
he was intoxicated — despite Canete's claim that the same was witnessed by several persons.
Thus, Atty. Puti cannot be held liable on this ground.
Regarding the second ground, the TSN of the hearings held at the trial court plainly
show that Atty. Puti employed impertinent and discourteous language towards the opposing
counsels.
As regards the final ground, the TSN of the May 22, 2013 hearing shows that Atty. Puti
made several remarks against the judge. Specifically, Atty. Puti stated in open court that the
judge was abusing his discretion and implied that the judge was partial and biased.
Moreover, Atty. Puti threatened the judge that he would withdraw from the case and walk
out if his request was not granted. Again, such statements were improper.
While Atty. Puti is guilty of using inappropriate language against the opposing
counsels and the judge, such transgression is not of a grievous character as to merit his
suspension since his misconduct is considered as simple rather than grave. It’s also the first
administrative case against Atty. Puti in his more than three decades in the legal profession.
As applied to this case, the Court finds it best to temper the penalty for Atty. Puti's
infraction. The Court also takes into consideration that this is the first administrative case
against Atty. Puti in his more than three decades in the legal profession.

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Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

ZAMORA V. MAHINAY
A.C. No. 12622 February 10, 2020, First Division, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
It is fundamental that the quantum of proof in administrative cases such as disbarment
proceedings is substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds,
equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise
FACTS
This instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint for disbarment filed
by complainant Wilma L. Zamora (Zamora) against respondent Atty. Makilito B. Mahinay
(Atty. Mahinay) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Zamora, representing the PJH Lending Corporation, is the plaintiff in an action for
forcible entry entitled PJH Lending Corporation v. Jurisa Lariosa Tumog, et al. It was filed
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City.
The MeTC subsequently rendered a decision in favor of the PJH Lending Corporation.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, likewise affirmed the MeTC decision on
appeal, and the case was eventually remanded to the MeTC for proper disposition.
PJH Lending Corporation filed a motion for execution which the MeTC of
Mandaluyong City, through Assisting Judge John Benedict Medina, granted. Atty. Mahinay, on
behalf of his clients, filed a motion for reconsideration, where he pertinently alleged in part:
D. THE SUBJECT ORDER OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IF NOT RECONSIDERED
WOULD VIOLATE CANON 3 OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT [,] MORE
PARTICULARLY RULE 3.01 AND RULE 3.02.
14. Defendants honestly believe, that this Honorable Court is duty bound to consider
the following facts: (a) That [the] decision in this case has been already rendered moot and
academic[;] (b) That plaintiff has expressly waived the decision in this case and has
authorized this Honorable Court to release the supersedeas bond to herein defendants. (The
said supersedeas bond means a lot to the defendants and their respective families)[;] (c) The
lack of authority of Atty. Lim to file the motion for issuance of writ of execution[;] x x x (d)
The laws and jurisprudence cited by herein defendants that plaintiff[,] as a corporation, can
only act through its board[;] [and] (e) By provision of law, jurisprudence and specific
provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct, this Honorable Court [cannot] be partial to the
party which Atty. Lim represents.
15. Under Rule 3.01 of the [Code] of Judicial Conduct, it is provided that: "A judge shall
be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence." And under Rule 3.02, "In every
case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law, x x x."

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Zamora alleged further that this was not the first time that Atty. Mahinay had
threatened a judge with an administrative case if the motion he filed would not be resolved
in his favor. She cited another case pending before the RTC of Cebu, where Atty. Mahinay also
threatened Judge Generosa Labra with an administrative case if she would not resolve the
motion for reconsideration in his client's favor. Zamora concluded that Atty. Mahinay has the
propensity to threaten judges with administrative complaints should they rule against his
clients. She advocated that a lawyer such as Atty. Mahinay does not deserve to stay any
longer in the roll of attorneys and must, therefore, be disbarred immediately.
In his Answer, Atty. Mahinay essentially countered that the complaint of Zamora has
no factual and legal basis. He pointed out that said complaint was the fifteenth administrative
charge she filed against him at the instigation of her lawyer, Atty. Anthony Lim. He stood firm
in what he said therein that Judge Medina was duty bound to consider the facts of the case.
Atty. Mahinay believed it was his duty as an officer of the court to be forthright and candid
to Judge Medina on what he perceived as deviations from the Code of Judicial Conduct.
The Board of Governors (Board) of the IBP, in Resolution No. XXII-2016-26615 dated
April 29, 2016, resolved to adopt the findings of fact and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner dismissing the complaint.
On August 29, 2018, the Board issued a new Resolution granting the Motion for
Reconsideration of Atty. Mahinay and reinstating the earlier Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner to dismiss the Complaint. The Board ruled that Zamora did
not present substantial evidence to prove that Atty. Mahinay had violated Canon 11, Rule
11.03 of the CPR. It held that while Atty. Mahinay may have been strong and passionate in
expressing his views and legal arguments, there was nothing insulting or disrespectful in the
language that he used in the subject motion for reconsideration

ISSUE
Whether the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against Atty. Mahinay.

RULING
YES. The Court adopts the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and the
recommendation of the IBP Board to reinstate the earlier Resolution dismissing the
Complaint against Atty. Mahinay.
It is fundamental that the quantum of proof in administrative cases such as
disbarment proceedings is substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. While Zamora
is correct that the very pleading itself is the best piece of evidence to prove whether Atty.
Mahinay had, indeed, violated Canon 11, Rule 11.03 of the CPR, the Court finds that this
proffered evidence failed to reach the threshold of the quantum of proof required. The Court
does not find the language used in the subject motion for reconsideration to be offensive,
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abusive, malicious, or intemperate in any way. It did not spill over the walls of decency or
propriety.
A sober reading of the quoted portion, however, does not call to mind that Judge
Medina is being labelled as partial. It neither insinuates so in any way. It would be far too a
stretch to say that after enumerating all the points Judge Medina failed to consider, the above
statement is a conclusion of his partiality. There is no other statement to bridge such a
connection.
All told, the Court finds that Atty. Mahinay did not unfairly criticize or disrespect
Judge Medina in any way. On the contrary, Atty. Mahinay had, in fact, been circumspect in
choosing the language he used in crafting his motion for reconsideration. At most, he might
have been overzealous in defending his clients' cause, but this is not necessarily bad. The
Court has always been mindful of the lawyer's bounden duty to defend his client's cause with
utmost zeal for as long as he or she stays within the limits imposed by professional rules.
Atty. Mahinay did not overstep these limits.

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Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

CABARROGUIS V. BASA
A.C. No. 8789, March 11, 2020, First Division, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Lawyers must guard themselves against their own impulses of initiating unfounded
suits, they are equally bound to advise a client, ordinarily a layman on the intricacies and
vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his or her case. If the lawyer finds that his
or her client's cause is defenseless, then it is his or her bounden duty to advise the latter to
acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. Lawyers must resist the whims
and caprices of their clients and to temper their propensities to litigate.
FACTS
This instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint1 for disbarment
filed by complainant Atty. Honesto Ancheta Cabarroguis (Atty. Cabarroguis) against
respondent Atty. Danilo A. Basa (Atty. Basa) before this Court. Atty. Cabarroguis accuses Atty.
Basa of violations of Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.03;2 Canon 8, Rule 8.01;3 Canon 10;4 Rules
12.02 and 12.04;5 Rule 15.05;6 and Rule 19.017 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).
Atty. Cabarroguis alleged in his complaint that he was the retained legal counsel of
his friend, Godofredo V. Cirineo, Jr. (Godofredo), who filed an estafa case against his sister-
in-law, Erlinda Basa-Cirineo (Erlinda) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City.
Erlinda was represented by her brother, Atty. Basa.8 Atty. Cabarroguis accused Atty. Basa of
dilatory tactics when, after eight years of court trial, Atty. Basa asked for the inhibition of the
presiding judge, Hon. Renato Fuentes (Judge Fuentes). After Judge Fuentes inhibited himself,
all the other presiding judges of the other regular RTCs to whom the case was raffled, also
inhibited themselves one after the other and for one reason or another.
Atty. Cabarroguis further alleged that Atty. Basa exhibited his immaturity on two
occasions. First was through an omnibus motion filed by Atty. Basa in a civil case on behalf
of his clients, Raul and Evelyn Molabola (collectively, the Molabolas), where he repeatedly
spelled Atty. Cabarroguis' first name, Honesto, as "HONESTo." Second was through a demand
letter involving the same case in which Atty. Basa purportedly misspelled the first name of
Atty. Cabarroguis as "Honest."
Atty. Cabarroguis also alleged that in retaliation against him for being the private
prosecutor in the estafa case against Atty. Basa's sister, Erlinda, Atty. Basa filed numerous
administrative, civil, and criminal cases against him which were all malicious and unfounded.
In his Comment to the Complaint, Atty. Basa attempted to set the record straight
about the alleged numerous cases he filed against Atty. Cabarroguis. In CBD-ADM Case No.
6629, contrary to Atty. Cabarroguis' assertion that it was dismissed, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) found him guilty of ethical misconduct and
admonished him for preparing the affidavit-complaint for estafa against Erlinda, signing it
and swearing it before an administering officer despite having no personal knowledge of the
facts recited therein.
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Atty. Basa also cleared up that CBD-ADM Case No. 08-2223 was already decided by
the IBP-BOG, finding Atty. Cabarroguis guilty of violating Canon 10 of the CPR and meting
him with the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
Thus, according to Atty. Basa, Atty. Cabarroguis was then facing in court two counts
of Perjury and five counts of Falsification, together with administrative sanctions
recommended by the IBP-BOG in three separate administrative cases.15 He stressed that the
instant complaint against him was only filed by Atty. Cabarroguis after all the other cases
against the latter were filed. The truth then was that Atty. Cabarroguis was the one motivated
by vengeance in filing the instant disbarment suit against Atty. Basa.
Lastly, as to the voluminous evidence he offered in the complaint for malicious
prosecution that Atty. Cabarroguis filed against him, Atty. Basa maintained it was done in the
exercise of his right to defend himself and to disprove the several self-laudatory allegations
contained in the complaint.
After the mandatory conference and the submission of the parties' position papers,
the Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and Recommendation to suspend Atty. Basa
from the practice of law for one (1) year. The Investigating Commissioner found Atty. Basa
to have clearly breached his ethical duty towards his fellow lawyer under Canon 8 of the CPR
when he showed extraordinary zeal in representing his sister in the estafa case filed by Atty.
Cabarroguis' client, Godofredo.
The IBP-BOG, in Resolution No. XXI-2014-48420, resolved to adopt the findings of fact
and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration. Atty. Basa argued that
Atty. Cabarroguis was guilty of forum shopping, particularly insofar as CBD-ADM Case Nos.
6629, 07-2110, and 2223 were concerned. Atty. Cabarroguis, on the other hand, argued that
Atty. Basa's actions merited a disbarment and not just a suspension
In the Extended Resolution penned by Deputy Director Franklin B. Calpito for the
Board, the IBP-BOG found that although several cases against Atty. Cabarroguis were
dismissed, some were subsequently found to be substantiated. The IBP-BOG likewise
pointed out that there were only six cases which Atty. Basa filed in his name against Atty.
Cabarroguis. In all the other cases he filed as counsel, it cannot be immediately inferred that
Atty. Basa instigated the parties in filing them.
Atty. Cabarroguis thereafter filed the instant petition for review before the
Court where he maintained that Atty. Basa's act of filing and/or instigating the filing
of multiple cases against him clearly constitutes bad faith.
ISSUE
Whether the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against Atty. Basa.
RULING

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Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

NO. The Court reverses the findings of the IBP-BOG in Resolution No. XXII-2017-1238
and reinstates the previous Resolution No. XXI-2014-484. The Court finds that Atty. Basa
violated the Lawyer's Oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.03,25 Canon 8, Rule 8.01,26 Canon 12, Rules
12.02 and 12.04,27 and Canon 19, Rule 19.0128 of the CPR when he: (1) filed baseless
criminal suits against Atty. Cabarroguis; (2) poked fun at Atty. Cabarroguis by deliberately
misspelling his name in an omnibus motion; and (3) caused delay in the estafa case after
moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge after eight years in trial. The Court agrees
with the original findings of the IBP that Atty. Basa employed harassing tactics against Atty.
Cabarroguis after he, on behalf of his client, filed an estafa case against Atty. Basa's sister in
2002.
Firstly, the Court does not wholly agree with the more recent findings of the IBP in its
Resolution No. XXII-2017-1238 that Atty. Basa did not act with malice or bad faith in filing
all of the 17 complaints against Atty. Cabarroguis. True, the administrative cases were
proved to be substantiated as Atty. Cabarroguis was eventually disciplined in all three. Also,
the eight counts for falsification and perjury initiated by Atty. Basa's clients, the Molabolas,
were later filed in court. However, there are criminal complaints relative to, or were
offshoots of, the estafa case filed against Erlinda which were dismissed for lack of merit, and
which the Court believes were frivolous and had no other apparent purpose to serve but to
vex Atty. Cabarroguis.
Moreover, Atty. Basa initiated four more criminal complaints against Atty. Cabarroguis for
the same cause of action, in violation of Canon 12, Rule 12.02, and Canon 19, Rule 19.01 of
the CPR, to wit:
Canon 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY
TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
xxxx
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Canon 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE
BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.
The four criminal complaints were all in relation to the same affidavit-complaint Atty.
Cabarroguis filed as the attorney-in-fact of Godofredo in the estafa case against Erlinda. In
I.S. No. 2006-D-2748 for falsification, Atty. Basa accused Atty. Cabarroguis of making a false
allegation in paragraph 1 of said affidavit-complaint when he said that Godofredo inherited
his parents' part in the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-14402,
when in truth, Godofredo did not.

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

Two years after, the same cause of action in I.S. No. 2006-D-2748 and I.S. No. 2006-E-
3378 was again alleged in two more complaints for falsification under Article 172 of the RPC,
that is, the allegation in the affidavit-complaint of Godofredo against Erlinda in the estafa
case that he and his brother inherited the subject property from their parents was false.
The foregoing shows how Atty. Basa recklessly applied the same cause of action in
four different complaints that were all dismissed for lack of probable cause. He cannot validly
argue that it was not he who initiated I.S. No. 2008-G-5045 and I.S. No. 2008-G-5045-A but
his client, Erlinda. He cannot deny the fact that these complaints were filed two years after
similar complaints, which he personally filed himself, were already dismissed for lack of
probable cause. It is inexcusable for Atty. Basa to not be aware of his duty under his Lawyer's
Oath not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor
give aid nor consent to the same." This duty has also been expressly provided for in Rule
1.03, Canon 1 of the CPR, to wit:

Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
Hence, inasmuch as lawyers must guard themselves against their own impulses of
initiating unfounded suits,33 they are equally bound to advise a client, ordinarily a layman
on the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his or her case. If
the lawyer finds that his or her client's cause is defenseless, then it is his or her bounden duty
to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible.34
Lawyers must resist the whims and caprices of their clients and to temper their propensities
to litigate.35
Atty. Basa, by all means, is given the liberty to defend his client's cause with utmost
zeal.1âшphi1 This obligation, however, is not without reasonable limitations. The filing of
frivolous suits against his opposing counsel manifests, at the very least, his gross indiscretion
as a colleague in the legal profession and his malicious desire to vex Atty. Cabarroguis. Atty.
Basa's act ultimately exhibits his intent to paralyze Atty. Cabarroguis from exerting his
utmost effort in protecting his client's interest.36 Verily, the rendition of improper service
by lawyers which does not meet the strictest principles of moral law invites stern and just
condemnation from the Court because by doing so, they fail to advance the honor of their
profession and the best interests of their clients.
In a long line of cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers who resorted to clearly
derogatory, offensive, and virulent language against their opposing counsels, in violation of
Canon 8, Rule 8.01 of the CPR, viz.:
CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND
CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

While it may be argued that the omnibus motion did not use language that can easily
be characterized as such, the Court finds Atty. Basa's method underhanded, a subtle way of
name-calling, and was improperly offensive to Atty. Cabarroguis just the same.
Inasmuch as the Court has exhorted lawyers not to be too onion-skinned and should
be tolerant of criticisms (especially those which are fair or mild) against them as litigation is
inherently a hostile endeavor between adverse or contending parties,41 this has been
weighed against an oft-repeated similar exhortation of the Court to treat their opposing
counsels with courtesy, dignity and civility. To the mind of the Court, the act of Atty. Basa in
poking fun at the name of Atty. Cabarroguis has traversed these bounds and exhibited a
conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo A. Basa is hereby found GUILTY of violating
the Lawyer's Oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.03, Canon 8, Rule 8.01, Canon 12, Rule 12.02 and Rule
12.04, and Canon 19, Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon receipt of
a copy of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt
with more severely.

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

ORTENCIA R. CAYABYAB V. PRESIDING JUDGE IRINEO P. PANGILINAN, JR., REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 58, ANGELES CITY, PAMPANGA
A.M. No. RTJ-20-2584 July 28, 2020, First Division (J. CAGUIOA)

DOCTRINE
Article VIII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution expressly prescribes that all cases or
matters must be decided or resolved by the lower courts within three (3) months from date of
submission. In parallel, Canon 6, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges
to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and
with reasonable promptness.

FACTS
Complainant Hortencia R. Cayabyab (Cayabyab) was the private complainant in a
criminal case for Perjury filed before the court of Judge Irineo P. Pangilinan, Jr.

Cayabyab avers that the promulgation of judgment of the criminal case was originally
set on July 28, 2016. Despite no request for extension of time from Judge Pangilinan within
which to decide the case, the promulgation was reset thrice. It was only on October 20, 2016
when Judge Pangilinan handed down a decision acquitting the accused. In addition,
Cayabyab asserts that Judge Pangilinan exhibited gross ignorance of the law and prevailing
jurisprudence in his decision. Finally, Cayabyab relays to the Court the information she
received during the pendency of case that the accused and Judge Pangilinan belong to the
same church and that a pastor from their congregation interceded before Judge Pangilinan
on behalf of the accused.

In his Comment, Judge Pangilinan denies that there was delay in deciding the case,
because since the promulgation was originally scheduled on June 16, 2016, July 28, 2016 was
still within the 90-day period under the Constitution within which to decide a case. He
likewise denies knowing the accused personally or of having met her at all.

In its Report and Recommendation, the OCA found merit in the allegation that Judge
Pangilinan caused undue delay in rendering a decision only after four (4) months from the
time the case was submitted for decision. The OCA found his explanation of exerting efforts
to have the parties come to an amicable agreement untenable in light of this glaring proof
that there was delay in deciding the case within the period fixed by law. Noting the penalties
prescribed under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, the OCA saw it fit to temper
the penalty to a reprimand, considering that this is Judge Pangilinan's first offense for undue
delay in rendering a decision.

As with the charges of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and gross ignorance
of the law, the OCA recommended that these be dropped. The OCA held that Cayabyab failed
to discharge her burden to prove that Judge Pangilinan was moved by bad faith, dishonesty,
hatred, or some like motive when he ruled the case. In particular, Cayabyab failed to prove
that Judge Pangilinan acquitted the accused simply because they belong to the same church.

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

The OCA likewise held that the propriety of Judge Pangilinan's decision was a judicial
matter and beyond the mandate of this administrative proceeding. Even if the RTC had
reversed and set aside the criminal case for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion, the OCA held that a finding of grave abuse of discretion alone is not a ground for
disciplinary proceedings. A judge's failure to interpret the law or to properly appreciate the
evidence presented does not necessarily render him or her administratively liable, absent
any proof that his or her judicial errors are tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance,
bad faith, or deliberate intent to do injustice.

ISSUE
Whether Judge Pangilinan should be administratively held liable for undue delay in
rendering a decision, of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and gross ignorance of the
law. (YES)

RULING
YES. The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA, with a modification on the penalty
imposed on Judge Pangilinan.

Article VIII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution expressly prescribes that all cases or
matters must be decided or resolved by the lower courts within three (3) months from date
of submission. In parallel, Canon 6, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct requires
judges to perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently,
fairly and with reasonable promptness. Hence, in deciding Criminal Case No. 10-5530 four
(4) months after it was submitted for decision, Judge Pangilinan had clearly incurred delay.

Judge Pangilinan explains that the delay was due to his desire to have the parties
settle the case amicably. This justification, to the mind of the Court, is not reasonable under
the circumstances, considering that the criminal case of perjury was a case against public
interest which had already reached the conclusion of its trial proper. Also, in cases where a
judge is unable to comply with the reglementary period for deciding cases or matters, he or
she can, for good reasons, ask for an extension from the Court. As a general rule, requests for
extension are granted by the Court in cognizance of the heavy caseload of the trial courts.
Granting that Judge Pangilinan had good reasons for his delay, it remains a given fact that he
failed to ask for an extension of time from the. Judges, by themselves, cannot extend the
period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. As a result of his failure to ask for
extension, whether deliberate or not, Judge Pangilinan promulgated his decision beyond the
period allowed by law.

As with the other charges of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and gross
ignorance of the law, the Court affirms the recommendation of the OCA to dismiss these
charges. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are
erroneous. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his or her judgment.

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

ROMMEL N. REYES V. ATTY. GERALD Z. GUBATAN

A.C. No. 12839, November 03, 2020, First Division (J. CAGUIOA)

DOCTRINE
Indeed, a lawyer is entitled to protection against any attempt on the part of a client to
escape payment for legal services. However, any disagreement as regards professional fees is
not a matter that a lawyer could simply take into his own hands, for there are proper legal steps
to be followed in order to recover his just due. Lawyers are not entitled to unilaterally
appropriate their clients' money for themselves by the mere fact that the clients owe them
attorney's fees.

FACTS
Rommel N. Reyes (Reyes) alleged that he is the President and Chairman of Integra
Asia Konstruct, Inc. (CoRporation). He and Atty. Gerald Z. Gubatan (Atty. Gubatan) have been
friends since they were schoolmates in college and because of this friendship, he agreed to
lend money to Atty. Gubatan on six different occasions. The loans were evidenced by
promissory notes and an acknowledgment/agreement and were all duly signed and
executed by Atty. Gubatan. However, despite this, Atty. Gubatan failed and refused to pay his
obligations to Reyes and the Corporation.

Reyes sent a demand letter to Atty. Gubatan demanding the settlement of his loans
amounting to ₱769,014.00 inclusive of interest. Atty. Gubatan still failed to pay. Hence, Reyes
filed the instant complaint. In addition, Reyes and the Corporation also filed two complaints
against Atty. Gubatan for collection of sum of money with damages.

In his Answer, Atty. Gubatan claimed that he was employed by the Corporation and
retained as Legal Consultant and Special Assistant to the Chairman and President. By virtue
of said employment, Atty. Gubatan, who is based in Dagupan City, was required by Reyes to
be at the office of the Corporation in Quezon City at least once a week. Aside from his work
in the Corporation, Atty. Gubatan claimed that he was asked by Reyes to handle the latter's
numerous personal cases. He claimed that when these instruments of indebtedness were
signed, he and Reyes agreed that the amounts stated therein would set off against the
former's compensation and professional fees for services rendered to Reyes and the
Corporation.

In his Report and Recommendation, Investigating Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero

recommended that Atty. Gubatan be censured for violating Rule 16.04 of the CPR which
prohibits lawyers from borrowing money from their client unless the latter's interests are
fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. The IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of Cachapero.

Reyes moved to reconsider, and insisted that the IBP Board should have modified the
penalty imposed by the Investigating Commissioner from censure to disbarment. The IBP
Board granted Reyes' Motion for Reconsideration.

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

ISSUE
Whether Atty. Gubatan violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR which prohibits lawyers from
borrowing money from their client. (YES)

RULING
YES. The Court affirms the IBP's finding of administrative liability against Atty.
Gubatan, with modification as to the recommended penalty.

The rule prohibiting lawyers from borrowing from their clients is intended to prevent
the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over the client as the rule presumes that
the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all legal maneuverings to renege on
his obligation.

In this case, as correctly found by the IBP, there is no doubt that Atty. Gubatan
obtained several loans from Reyes and the Corporation, which are evidenced by promissory
notes and an acknowledgment/agreement. These loans appear to have been contracted
during the existence of a lawyer-client relationship among the parties, when Atty. Gubatan
was employed by the Corporation and retained as legal consultant and special assistant to
the president. Consequently, Atty. Gubatan clearly violated the following provisions of the
CPR:

CANON 16 — A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his
client that may come into his possession.

RULE 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is
handling for the client. (Emphasis supplied)

Further, in unduly borrowing money from Reyes and the Corporation and refusing to
pay the same, Atty. Gubatan abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients.
In doing so, he failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, in
contravention of Canon 7 of the CPR,32 which provides:

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar.

Indeed, a lawyer is entitled to protection against any attempt on the part of a client to
escape payment for legal services. However, any disagreement as regards professional fees
is not a matter that a lawyer could simply take into his own hands, for there are proper legal
steps to be followed in order to recover his just due. Lawyers are not entitled to unilaterally

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 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

appropriate their clients' money for themselves by the mere fact that the clients owe them
attorney's fees. Hence, regardless of the veracity of his claim of non-payment of professional
fees, Atty. Gubatan is not justified in refusing to pay his debts to Reyes and the Corporation.
In any event, the disposition of the instant administrative case is without prejudice to
any action that Atty. Gubatan may institute to collect his professional fees.

As for the penalty, the Court disagrees with the IBP Board that Atty. Gubatan be
reprimanded. The Court disagrees. Jurisprudence holds that the deliberate failure to pay just
debts constitutes gross misconduct for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension
from the practice of law. Lawyers are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but
also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people's faith
and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform
their duties to society, to the bar, the courts, and their clients, which include prompt payment
of financial obligations.

In the instant case, the Court finds it proper to impose on Atty. Gubatan the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for three (3) months. He is warned that a repetition
of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Page 79 of 81
 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

SUSAN ELGAR v. JUDGE SOLIMAN SANTOS, JR.

A.M. No. MT-16-1880, February 4, 2020, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)

DOCTRINE
While Judge Santos may have been impelled by good motives in encouraging the parties
to arrive at an amicable settlement, his acts particularly texting complainant's counsel and
convincing the oppositor to amicably settle during their accidental meeting, are not part of the
court's official proceedings and thus, cast doubt on the integrity and impartiality of the courts.

FACTS
Susan filed a petition for the allowance of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa,
however, an oppositor appeared and opposed the petition.

Judge Santos issued an Order directing the parties to submit position papers and to
propose specific terms and conditions for possible amicable settlement.

Susan alleged that she came to realize that Judge Santos had an ardent advocacy to
amicably settle and terminate cases considering the notices/writings posted on the walls,
both inside and outside of the courtroom, and even in the staff room, all promoting amicable
settlement.

She also alleged that Judge Santos continuously besieged her counsel with text
messages urging the latter to work out a settlement with oppositor. She further averred that
the series of acts done by Judge Santos in pressuring her to agree to an amicable settlement
against her will, and willfully disobeying and ignoring both substantial and remedial law in
the guise of equity, reflected badly on the judiciary.

Meanwhile, the oppositor accused Judge Santos of impropriety when the judge
insisted that the case be settled when they accidentally met in Naga City.

Judge Santos opined that the proceedings should not be confined to the determination
of the validity of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa since this could result in a bloody and
prolonged litigation.

He argued that he was not ignorant of the rules and that his persistence to arrive at
an amicable settlement was directed at both parties. He explained that his act of applying
some pressure was normal in any amicable settlement as long as it was not undue or
improper.

He admitted that he constantly texted complainant's counsel. However, he argued

that there was nothing unethical in his actions as he was merely trying to bring the parties
to a fair and just amicable settlement. The judge also admitted to accidentally meeting the
oppositor in Naga City. He claimed that he seized the rare opportunity to personally convey
his consistent message that the parties enter into an amicable settlement.

Page 80 of 81
 Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Legal Ethics
By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22

ISSUE
Whether Judge Santos predisposition to resolve the case by way of an amicable
settlement beyond court proceedings is proper

RULING
NO. While the courts are enjoined to make the parties agree on an equitable
compromise, the judges' efforts to make the parties agree should be within the bounds of
propriety and without the slightest perception of impartiality.

Notably, A.M. No. 03-1-09 SC, which was adverted to by Judge Santos to justify his
actions, mandates judges to persuade the parties to arrive at a settlement of the dispute, it
does not give the judge an unbridled license to do this outside the confines of the official
proceedings at the risk of putting into question the integrity of the judiciary.

While Judge Santos may have been impelled by good motives in encouraging the
parties to arrive at an amicable settlement, his acts, particularly texting complainant's
counsel and convincing the oppositor to amicably settle during their accidental meeting in
Naga City, are not part of the court's official proceedings and thus, cast doubt on the integrity
and impartiality of the courts.

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