2023 Jurists Last Minute Tips On Criminal Law

JURISTS™ BAR OPS 2023
LAST MINUTE TIPS ON CRIMINAL LAW

1. Theft
Liability of finders in law for theft of found property. A "finder" under Article 308, par.
2(1) of the RPC is not only limited to the actual finder of the lost property44 since the gist of the
offense is the furtive taking and misappropriation of the property found 45 Though not the actual
finder, there is no dispute that Pante knew for a fact that his two co-accused minor did not own
the subject money. He knew for a fact that his co-accused minor merely found the money along
the road while the latter was delivering bread.46 Instead of returning the money, Pante convinced
his co-accused minors not to return the money and to divide it among themselves. At that
moment, Pante placed himself precisely in the situation as if he was the actual finder. Otherwise
stated, petitioner was a "finder in law," if not in fact; and his act in appropriating the money was
of precisely of the same character as if it had been originally found by him.47 His criminal intent
to commandeer the money found was altogether clear at that point. The rationale for the "finder
in law" concept is not difficult to fathom. It is precisely to protect the owner of the lost property
in the event the lost property is transferred from one individual to another and to prevent the
"finder in law" from escaping liability by claiming that he was not the actual finder thereof but
was merely entrusted custody thereof by someone who had no intention to appropriate the same.
(Pante v. People, G.R. No. 218969, January 18, 2021, Hernando, J.)
The possession of an employee over the payments made by her employer’s customers is
only physical or material possession. Her act of taking them away constitutes Qualified Theft,
not Estafa. (People v. Santos, G.R. No. 237982, October 14, 2020, Peralta, CJ)
Presumed constructive possession of an item is not sufficient to establish delivery of the

latter and its subsequent unlawful taking away by the accused. To establish the element of
taking, actual or constructive possession of personal property must be proven- first, by its owner
or lawful possessor and second, the subsequent unlawful acquisition of thereof by the accused. In
the case of Roque v. People, the Court citing an earlier case, noted that the crime of theft as
defined by the RPC lays great stress on the first element, "which is the taking away, that is,
getting possession, laying hold of the thing...without the consent of the owner." Thus, when the
delivery of a thing did not have the effect of transferring possession, it is regarded that
possession remains with the owner and the act of disposing such thing without the latter's
consent constitutes the crime of theft. Conversely, when delivery to another was made with the
intention of transferring ownership or possession, the subsequent disposition by the transferee
does not constitute theft. (The main witness for the prosecution, Lorilla affirmed that the
purchase order for the missing Royal Cord was given to Bantillo and the item subsequently
purchased was brought inside the NTC-MPC premises, not by the petitioner but by Bantillo.
Petitioner did not acquire actual possession of the same. The parties admitted and the petitioner
affirmed that he directed Bantillo to place the Royal Cord in the Mazda pick-up, the company
service vehicle, which the latter accomplished. At the point relevant to this controversy, records
established that this vehicle was not used nor assigned only to the petitioner. In short, petitioner
did not have exclusive access to or control over the vehicle, as to render any item inside it
within his constructive possession. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot exclude the
possibility that some other person may have committed the alleged theft against the
company. The rule in circumstantial evidence cases is that to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, the evidence offered by the prosecution must exclude the possibility that some
2023 Jurists Last Minute Tips on Criminal Law. For the exclusive use of Jurists bar reviewees. © 2023
by Jurists Review Center, Inc. Unauthorized copying, dissemination, sharing, uploading, downloading,
and storage are strictly prohibited and will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law, including the filing of
administrative complaints with the Office of the Bar Confidant, IBP, and SC as well as the filing of criminal
charges. Page 1 of 18
other person committed the crime.] Failure to do so is tantamount to reasonable doubt that
warrants acquittal. In this case, the inference that the missing Royal Cord was taken by the
petitioner was based on the fact that he gained control and possession over the same, which was
not proven. Clearly, the corpus delicti in the crime of theft was not proven and the petitioner
must be acquitted.) (Imperial v. Respondent, G.R. No. 230519. June 30, 2021, Gaerlan, J.)
Intent to gain is not limited to pecuniary benefit. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an
internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as
the important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not merely limited to
pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or
expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken
without the owner’s consent constitutes gain. (People v. Bustinera, G. R. No. 148233, June 8,
2004, Carpio Morales, J.; People v. Donio, G.R. No. 212815. March 01, 2017, Peralta, J.)
Carnapping or the theft or robbery of motor vehicle is consummated the moment the
accused took possession of the vehicle. Essentially, carnapping is the robbery or theft of a
motorized vehicle. Significantly, the taking of the motor vehicle is deemed complete from the
moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of
the same. The intent to gain or the animus lucrandi, being an internal act, is presumed from the
unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Notably, " [a]ctual gain is irrelevant as the important
consideration is the intent to gain." Likewise, the term gain is not limited to a pecuniary benefit,
but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or expected from the act
which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owner's consent
already constitutes gain. (People v. Cariño, G.R. No. 232624. July 09, 2018, Reyes, Jr., J.)
Remember: The act of the accused taking the motor vehicle from Bulacan to Caloocan, did not
make the crime a continuing one. Carnapping was consummated the moment the accused took
away the vehicle; and thus, the criminal case should be filed in the proper court of the place
where it was taken only.
2. Estafa
When is the misrepresentation of the ownership of real property considered a crime of

Estafa under Article 316 paragraph 1, and not Article 315 paragraph 2(a)? While the subject of
the estafa involves real property, the offense committed does not automatically pertain to Article
316 (1) of the RPC. In the old case of People v. Suratos, the Court had occasion to distinguish
between estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC and other forms of swindling under Article
316(1) of the same code: xxx we do not mean, however, that Art. 315 par. 2(a) covers only cases
where the property involved is real property. Both personal and real properly may be the subject
of the crime under the law. But although Art. 316, par. 1 refers only to real property, its violation
is confined to certain instances not common with those of Art. 315, par. 2 (a). As we see it, Art.
316, par. 1 covers a specific situation where the offended exercises or executes, as part of
the false representation, some act of dominion or ownership over the property to the
damage and prejudice of the real owner of the thing. On the other hand, this circumstance
need not be present for a crime to be committed under Art. 315, par. 2 (a). (Note: In the case at
bar, the evidence does not disclose that the appellant had exercised certain acts of ownership or
dominion beyond his mere pointing of the property to the offender party and his claim that he
was the owner thereof. This is, therefore, a proper case for the application of Art. 315, par. 2
(a).) (Spouses Dulay III v. G.R. No. 215132, September 13, 2021, Hernando, J.)
Take note of the case of Osorio v. People, G.R. No. 207711. July 02, 2018. In this case,
private complainant accepted the investment opportunity offered by petitioner due to the promise
that her money would be invested in Philam Life, a company with which she had existing
insurance policies, with the assurance that her money would earn specified interest per month.
However, respondent did not give her any interest nor returned her money. It turned out that the
same was not invested at all with the company. The Supreme Court clarified that the crime is
Estafa committed thru other deceits under Article 318 and not Article 315, paragraph 2(a).
According to the Supreme Court: The false representations committed by petitioner in this case
fall beyond the scope of "other similar deceits" under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal
Code. The phrase "other similar deceits" in Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code has
been interpreted in Guinhawa v. People as limited to acts of the same nature as those specifically
enumerated. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "other similar deceits" cannot be construed
in the broadest sense to include all kinds of deceit. Nevertheless, petitioner may be held
criminally liable for other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 318 of the
Revised Penal Code is broad in application. It is intended as a catch-all provision to cover all
other kinds of deceit not falling under Articles 315, 316, and 317 of the Revised Penal Code. For
an accused to be held criminally liable under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, the
following elements must exist: (a) [The accused makes a] false pretense, fraudulent act or
pretense other than those in [Articles 315, 316, and 317]; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act
or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice. All the elements of
Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code are present in this case.
An accused who received money as payment for the job performed by him and his
company did not receive it in trust for another company claiming payment for the same job. The
elements of estafa by misappropriation are: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return it; (2) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3)
that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is
demand by the offended party to the offender. (Note: The first element is not present in this case.
There is no question that Vicente had an agreement with Roxaco. Vicente presented a letter dated
May 20, 2008 to Roxaco regarding his proposal for the supply of the creative design and printing
of the Palm Estates and The Orchards' marketing materials. Roxaco's Vice-President, Mr.
Santiago Elizalde, wrote "OK" and signed the letter. The parties likewise admitted that Roxaco
issued checks to Vicente as payment for the billboards. However, respondent failed to prove that
Winner was a party to this contract or that there was a contract between Winner and Roxaco.
Liwanag testified that Roxaco informed her that its contract was only with Snydesign and Winner
was not a party to it. In addition to Liwanag's testimony, respondent also presented the Price
Quotation supposedly showing the conformity of Roxaco to Winner's proposal for the digital
print on block-out tarpaulin. Liwanag said that it was Gamboa who signed the Price Quotation
for Roxaco but it was never proven that he was duly authorized by Roxaco to be its
representative.) (Vicente v. People, G.R. No. 246700, March 03, 2021, Carandang, J.)
Lending money to non-members of the paluwagan without specific prohibition to do so is

not estafa. It must be noted at the outset that petitioner did not commit abuse of confidence or
misrepresentation to dupe the private complainants into giving her their money. Rather, the
private complainants, along with the petitioner mutually created the paluwagan for the purpose
of extending loans to other borrowers, and charging interest thereon. Each member willingly
gave their money, knowing that it will be lent to others. More so, the members of the paluwagan
appointed the petitioner as their secretary and treasurer, and authorized her to lend their money
and collect it from the borrowers. In line with the paluwagan 's nature and purpose, petitioner
lent the private complainants' money to interested borrowers. Clearly, petitioner did not
misappropriate the funds as if they were her own, or gain any personal advantage from said
funds. Her failure to return the money upon demand was due to the fact that the borrowers failed
to pay their loans. Interestingly, when the prosecution failed to prove the element of
misappropriation, it alternatively argued that petitioner is liable for conversion because she lent
the funds to non-members, allegedly in violation of the paluwagan 's rules. Unfortunately, the
prosecution miserably failed to prove the said allegation. It could not point to a specific rule
prohibiting the lending of funds to non-members. (Cheng v.People,G.R. No. 207373, March 23,
2022, Gaerlan, J.)
3. Robbery
Remember the following principles:
a. Robbery is consummated the moment the robbers got hold the thing subject of robbery even
if they left them behind after being assaulted by one of their victims. In Poquiz v.
People, G.R. No. 238715, January 11, 2021, three suspects declared a holdup in a passenger
bus. They snatched the backpack of one of the passengers with great difficulty because the
latter struggle with them for its possession. He later identified himself as a police officer but
one of them replied “walang pulis-pulis sa amin.” Then, they assaulted the police officers by
punching and kicking him after the attempt to stabbed him failed. At his instance, the police
officer took his service pistol and fired at the feet of his two attacker. Then, the three
suspects quickly fled and left behind their knives and the bag of the police officer. In
affirming the conviction of the accused for Robbery, the Supreme Court said: A careful
review of the records and the testimony of Belver shows that Belver's bag was already
forcibly taken and Belver was dispossessed of the same when Poquiz and Valencia left the
scene of the crime. Poquiz and Valencia fled in fear and dropped the bag after Belver fired
his gun. When Poquiz and Valencia unlawfully took Belver's bag, the crime of Robbery
had been fully consummated. It is of no moment that Belver was able to subsequently
recover the items forcibly taken from him. Such instance does not preclude the
presence of intent to gain on the part of Poquiz and Valencia. Hence, all the
aforementioned elements of Robbery under Article 293 of the RPC are present: (1) the
subject property involved is one of the bags which Belver had with him when he alighted
from the bus; (2) Poquiz and Valencia unlawfully took the bag from Belver; (3) there
was animus lucrandi or intent to gain on the part of Poquiz and Valencia in taking Belver's
bag; and (4) Poquiz and Valencia used violence by throwing punches and lunging a knife on
Belver to perpetrate the crime. Accordingly, the crime of Robbery was committed by Poquiz
and Valencia. (Poquiz v. People, G.R. No. 238715, January 11, 2021, Delos Santos, J.)
b. Robbery is committed by the accused who demanded money on threat of publishing

provocative photos of the victim. In Asa v. People, G.R. No. 236290, January 20, 2021, the
victim met with the accused on account of his threats that he would post her compromising
pictures in the social media if she would not have sex with him. The victim said that she
could not have sex with him, but if he would agree, she could give him Php5,000.00 in
exchange for the memory cared instead. The accused agreed and received the Php5,000.00
from her. Then, he was arrested by the police officers who were just waiting for his receipt
of the money. According to the Supreme Court, the accused is criminally liable for Robbery
with Intimidation of Persons. The fourth element of the crime charged is present anent the
presence of intimidation of persons, as petitioner's threat to post the subject private photos
on Facebook if his demand is not met produced fear in the mind of his victim, private
complainant, so that the latter was forced to give to petitioner the amount of P5,000.00,
against or without her consent. (Asa v. People, G.R. No. 236290, January 20, 2021,
Caguioa, J.)
c. The term "homicide" in paragraph 1 of Article 294 is used in its generic sense, that is, any
act that results in death. Any other act producing injuries short of death is integrated in the
"homicide" committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery, assuming, of course, that
the homicide is consummated. If no death supervenes, the accused should be held liable
for separate crimes of robbery and frustrated or attempted homicide or murder
(provided that there was intent to kill) if the latter offenses were not necessary for the
commission of the robbery, or for a complex crime of robbery and frustrated or
attempted homicide or murder under Article 48 of the Code if the latter offenses were
the necessary means for the commission of robbery. (People v. Labuguen, et. al., G.R. No.
223103, February 24, 2020, Hernando, J., citing People v. Tidong, 296-A Phil. 323, 339
[1993])
d. A conviction for Robbery with Homicide requires that Robbery is the main purpose and
objective of the malefactors and the killing is merely incidental to the Robbery. If, originally,
the malefactors did not comprehend Robbery, but Robbery follows the Homicide either as an
afterthought or merely as an incident of the Homicide, then the malefactor is guilty of two
separate crimes, that of Homicide or Murder and Robbery, and not of the special complex
crime of Robbery with Homicide. (People v. Natindim, et. al., G.R. No. 201867, November
04, 2020, Hernando, J.)
e. For the crime of robbery with rape, the law does not distinguish whether the rape was
committed before, during, or after the robbery, but only that it punishes robbery that was
accompanied by rape. The facts do not out that the robbery was a mere afterthought
considering that the victim testified that the accused took time to disable her and then got
away with her personal belongings.(People v. Salen, G.R. No. 231013, January 29, 2020,
Leonen, J.)
f. The first part of Article 294 (1) deals with the commission of homicide "by reason or on
occasion of the robbery" without any qualification as to who committed the homicide or
when the homicide was committed. However, the second part of paragraph I involves the
commission of robbery "accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson." The use of
the words "accompanied by" suggests that for the accessory crimes of rape, mutilation
and arson, the robbers themselves must have committed such crimes. (People v.
Casabuena and Formaran, G.R. No. 246580, June 23, 2020, Lazaro-Javier, J.)
4. Republic Act 9262
Psychological violence. To be punishable by Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, it must ultimately

be proven that the accused had the intent of inflicting mental or emotional anguish upon the
woman, thereby inflicting psychological violence upon her, with the willful denial of financial
support being the means selected by the accused to accomplish said purpose. This means that the
mere failure or one's inability to provide financial support is not sufficient to rise to the level of
criminality under Section 5(i), even if mental or emotional anguish is experienced by the woman.
In other words, even if the woman were to suffer mental or emotional anguish due to the lack of
financial support, but the accused merely failed or was unable to so provide support, then
criminal liability would not arise. A contrary interpretation to the foregoing would result in
absurd, if not outright unconstitutional, consequences. (Acharon v. People, G.R. No. 224946,
November 9, 2021, Caguioa, J.)
Economic violence. The denial of financial support must be wilful to be punishable under
Section 5(e) of Republic Act 9262 as economic violence.The language of Section 5(e) is clear:
the denial of financial support, to be punishable, must have the "purpose or effect of controlling
or restricting the woman's x x x movement or conduct." To be sure, Section 5(e) uses the word
"deprive" which, like the use of the word "denial" in Section 5(i), connotes willfulness and
intention. The denial or deprivation of financial support under Section 5(e) is, therefore, an
intentional act that has, for its purpose, to control or restrict the woman's movement or conduct.
The willful deprivation of financial support, therefore, is the actus reus of the offense, while the
mens rea is the intention to control or restrict the woman's conduct. Thus, similar to the
discussion in Section 5(i), Section 5(e) cannot be read as punishing the mere failure or one's
inability to provide financial support, which is what happened in this case. (Acharon v. People,
G.R. No. 224946, November 9, 2021, Caguioa, J.)
5. Bigamy
Note: Do not forget the case of Pulido v. People, G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021, where
the Supreme Court, Enbanc, declared: After a careful consideration, this Court is constrained to
abandon our earlier rulings that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first, and/or
second marriages cannot be raised as a defense by the accused in a criminal prosecution for
bigamy. We hold that a judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not necessary to prove a void ab
initio prior and subsequent marriages in a bigamy case. Consequently, a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of the first and/or second marriages presented by the accused in the prosecution
for bigamy is a valid defense, irrespective of the time within which they are secured. The
aforesaid conclusion is anchored on and justified by the retroactive effects of a void ab initio
marriage, the legislative intent of Article 40 of the Family Code and the fundamental, rules of
construction governing penal laws. (Pulido v. People, G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021,
Hernando, J., Enbanc)
6. Offending Religious Feelings
Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to the religious feelings of the
Catholics, is a question of fact which must be judged only according to the feelings of the
Catholics and not those of other faithful ones, for it is possible that ce1iain acts may offend the
feelings of those who profess a certain religion, while not otherwise offensive to the feelings of
those professing another faith.(Celdran v. People, G.R. No. 220127, March 21, 2018, citing
People v. Baes, G.R. No. L-46000, May 25, 1939)
Remember: The offensive act must be done in a place devoted to religious worship or
during the celebration of any religious ceremony.
7. Grave Coercion
The elements of Grave Coercion are as follows: "(l) that a person is prevented by another
from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it
right or wrong; (2) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats, or
intimidation; and (3) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to
do so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of
any lawful right." (People v. Arnado, G.R. Nos. 250100-02,March 21, 2022, Zalameda, J.)
Mere presence of security guards posted by the lessor in the leased property after
electricity was cut-off by the latter is insufficient to cause intimidation to the tenants. (Alejandro,
et. al. v. Bernas, et. al., G.R. No. 179243, September 7, 2011, Peralta, J.).
8. Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
Leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the
freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty.
Under such a situation, the child's freedom remains at the mercy and control of the abductor
Leaving a minor in a place from which she or he did not know the way home, even if she or he
had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of
liberty. Under such a situation, the minor's freedom remains at the mercy and control of the
abductor. (People v. Fabor or Manalastas, G.R. No. 208441, July 17, 2017, Tijam, J.)
9. Perjury
Executing a false Complaint-Affidavit is perjury. The elements of perjury under Article

183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are (a) that the accused made a statement under oath or
executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) that the statement or affidavit was made before
a competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that in the statement or
affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and (d) that the
sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose.
The first element of the crime of Perjury was sufficiently proven by the prosecution. The term
"material matter" under the first element pertains to the main fact subject of the inquiry, or any
circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends to
corroborate or strengthen the testimony related to the subject of the inquiry, or which
legitimately affects the credence of any witness who testified. Saulo executed a Complaint-
Affidavit charging Alberto with Qualified Theft. The allegations in the subject Complaint-
Affidavit have the material effect or tendency to influence the Prosecutor in the determination of
the existence of probable cause for the filing of information before the court of justice. Saulo
asserted therein, among others, that Alberto surreptitiously and unlawfully took five (5) checks
drawn against Khumbmela's account and thereafter illegally filled them up to defraud the
company. (Saulo v. People, G.R. No. 242900, June 08, 2020, Reyes, J. Jr., J.)
Remember: Since the filing of a Counter-Affidavit is entirely within the prerogative of a

respondent, stating a deliberate falsehood in such affidavit will not give rise to perjury.
10. Falsification
As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, it is

important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private
document or with estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to
commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed
without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa.
(Butalanon v. People, G.R. No. 139857, September 15, 2006, Ynares-Santiago, J.)
In the crime of use of falsified document, the person who used the forged document is
different from the one who falsified it such that "[i]f the one who used the falsified document is
the same person who falsified it, the crime is only falsification and the use of the same isnot a
separate crime." Falsification of a public document and use of false document by the same
person who falsified it constitute but a single crime of falsification. (Jayme v. People, G.R. No.
248827, August 27, 2020, Reyes, J., Jr., J.)
Offenders are considered to have taken advantage of their official position in falsifying a
document if (1) they had the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of
the document; or (2) they had official custody of the falsified document. (Malabanan v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 186329, August 2, 2017, Velasco, Jr., J.)
11. Malversation of Public Funds or Property
If the public officer have only a qualified charge of property without the right to part with
physical possession of it unless upon written orders from his immediate superiors, the person
accountable for it to the government, and improperly disposes of it without orders, he commits
the crime of theft. (US v. Webster, G.R. No. 2732, August 23, 1906, Tracey, J.)
12. Direct Bribery
The principal distinction between the two offenses is that in bribery the transaction is
mutual and voluntary; in the case of robbery the transaction is neither voluntary nor mutual, but
is consummated by the use of force or intimidation. In other words, if the offended party had
voluntarily paid the accused a sum of money the transaction would have constituted bribery. But
if the accused demanded the payment of a sum of money accompanying the demand with threats
of prosecution and arrest, the crime committed is robbery. (People v. Francisco, G.R. No. 21390,
March 26, 1924, Ostrand, J.)
13. Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray
Art. 251 has the following elements: (a) That there be several persons; (b) That they did
not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally; (c) That these several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a confused
and tumultuous manner; (d) That someone was killed in the affray; (e) That it cannot be
ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (f) That the person or persons who inflicted
serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified.
Note: This article does not apply if there is concerted fight between two organized
groups. Also, if the one responsible for the killing is known, Art. 249 applies. If he is not known
nor the one who inflicted serious physical injuries or violence, then no one will be held
responsible for the death of the victim.
14. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances
The killing or inflicting of serious physical injures must be (1) in the act of sexual
intercourse, or (2) immediately thereafter.
Immediately thereafter means that from the discovery, to the escape and the killing, there
must be no interruption or interval of time, and all must form part of one continues act. In the
case of U.S. v. Vargas, 2 G.R. No. 1053, May 7, 1903, Willard, J., the escape of the victim, the
pursuit by the accused, and the killing of the victim by the accused were all parts of one
continuous act.
15. Exemptions from criminal liability
Persons exempt from criminal liability: (1) Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or
relatives by affinity in the same line; (2) The widowed spouse with respect to the property which
belonged to the deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of
another; and (3) Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sister-in-law if living together. The
exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the
commission of the crime. Note: The language of Article 332(1) which speaks of relatives by
affinity in the same line is couched in general language. The legislative intent to make not
distinction between the spouse of one’s living child and the surviving spouse of one’s deceased
child (in case of a son-in-law or daughter in law with respect to his or her parents-in-law) can be
drawn from Article 332(1) of the Revised Penal Code without doing violence to its language.
(Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. de Carungcong v. People, G.R. 181409, February
11, 2010, Corona, J.).
16. Libel
To stress, the perspective of the reader — or how the words are used in their entirety and
taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning, as they would naturally be understood by
persons hearing or reading them — remain the judicial guidepost in determining whether an
utterance is libelous. Applying the foregoing in this case, the subject article was a mere
replication — a plain report that "a person said this" — albeit inadvertently attributed to the
wrong person. Hence, it is certainly not libelous. (Philippine Daily Inquirer v. Enrile, G.R. No.
229440, July 14, 2021, Caguioa, J.)
There is publication if the material is communicated to a third person. It is not required

that the person defamed has read or heard about the libelous remark. What is material is that a
third person has read or heard the libelous statement, for "a man's reputation is the estimate in
which others hold him, not the good opinion which he has of himself." Simply put, in libel,
publication means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other
than the person against whom it has been written."The reason for this is that [a] communication
of the defamatory matter to the person defamed cannot injure his reputation though it may
wound his self-esteem. A man's reputation is not the good opinion he has of himself, but the
estimation in which others hold him."
On the other hand, to satisfy the element of identifiability, it must be shown that at least a
third person or a stranger was able to identify him as the object of the defamatory statement. It is
enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of
description or reference to facts and circumstances from which others reading the article may
know the person alluded to; or if the latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that
those knowing such person could and did understand that he was the person referred to. (Manila
Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. G.R. No. 170341, July 05, 2017, Martires, J.)
It has been held that a public officer should not be too onion-skinned and should be
tolerant of criticism. The doctrine, nevertheless, would only apply if the defamatory statement
was uttered in connection with the public officer's duty. (De Leon v. People, G.R. No. 212623,
January 11, 2016, Mendoza, J.)
17. Dolo vis-a-vis Culpa
An accused charged of a crime by dolo may be convicted of a culpable felony. With the
permission of the victim's parents, accused, together with the other accusedproceeded to subject
the boy to a "treatment" calculated to drive the "bad spirit" from the boy's body. Unfortunately,
the strange procedure resulted in the death of the boy. Thus, accused had no criminal intent to kill
the boy. Their liability arises from their reckless imprudence because they ought that to know
their actions would not bring about the cure. They are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and not of murder. (People v. Carmen, G.R. No. 137268, March 26, 2001,
Mendoza, J.)
Quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the RPC are distinct and separate crimes and not a
mere modality in the commission of a crime. In Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, the Court explained
that: Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of
crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.
As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by
rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampangathe proposition that "reckless imprudence
is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x" on three points of analysis: (1)
the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative
intent to treat quasi crimes as distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the
mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-
crimes and intentional crimes. (Sevilla v. People, G.R. No. 194390, August 13, 2014, Reyes, J.)
The Supreme Court declared that the I’vler Doctrine is the prevailing principle now. We
rule that Ivler is a good law, notwithstanding the few stray cases that allowed the "complexing"
of the effects of a single quasi-offense. Forbidding the application of Article 48 of the RPC to
quasi-offenses and their resultant acts/effects preserves the conceptual distinction between quasi-
crimes and intentional felonies under the RPC. We thus declare that De los Santos is abandoned.
We agree with Our pronouncements in Ivler. Article 48 does not apply to quasi-offenses under
Article 365 because reckless imprudence is a distinct crime and not a mere way of committing a
crime. Simple or reckless imprudence does not strictly fall under the term "felonies" or acts or
omissions committed by fault or culpa. (Morales v. People, G.R. No. 240337. January 04, 2022,
Delos Santos, J., Enbanc)
18. Mala prohibita crimes
The crime of transporting prohibited drugs is malum prohibitum. The very act of
transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum punishable under RA 9165.
In People v. Morilla, the Court held that the fact of transportation of the bags containing volumes
of marijuana bricks need not be accompanied by proof of appellant's criminal intent, motive, or
knowledge of the contents thereof. Similarly, People v. Noah ordains that proof of ownership and
intent are not essential elements of the crime of illegal transporting of dangerous drugs. (People
v. Baterina, G.R. No. 236259, September 16, 2020, Lazaro-Javier, J.)
Here, the police officers flagged down appellant's vehicle at a checkpoint. When PSI
Soria approached the owner-type jeepney, he readily smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana.
Notably, an owner-type jeepney has no windows or glass-enclosures. He was then prompted to
inspect the vehicle where he saw one (1) bag slightly opened. When he looked inside the bag, he
saw marijuana bricks wrapped with a yellow tape. On further search, the police officers found
four (4) more plastic bags containing the same dangerous drugs. At that moment, the police
officers had probable cause to search appellant's vehicle and seize the marijuana bricks found
therein. For appellant was (1) caught in the act of committing the crime of transporting
dangerous drugs, and (2) his vehicle contained contraband items pertaining to the offense
committed. In this regard, the evidence obtained from a valid search of appellant's vehicle and
the consequent seizure of the marijuana bricks found inside are not fruits of a poisonous
tree. They are in fact the corpus delicti itself. Appellant's warrantless arrest as a consequence
thereof was lawful. (People v. Baterina, G.R. No. 236259, September 16, 2020, Lazaro-Javier,
J.)
Take note: The Court now holds that the cases adhering to the doctrine that exclusive
reliance on an unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender probable cause that permits a
warrantless search of a moving vehicle that goes beyond a visual search - which include both
long-standing and the most recent jurisprudence - should be the prevailing and controlling line of
jurisprudence. (People v. Sapla,G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020, Caguiao, EnBanc, J.)
19. Bongalon Doctrine
Defenses in Section 10(a) Article VI, RA 7610 cases. A prosecution for child abuse
under Section 10(a) in relation to Section 3(b)(2) requires the presence of a specific intent to
debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being.
Such specific intent may be refuted by proof that the acts were merely offshoots of emotional
outrage in the spur of the moment and/or that the accused merely intended to discipline the child.
In the case where the defense of disciplining a child is advanced, the Court may likewise
consider if the disciplining acts are commensurate to, and may reasonably address, the
misbehavior of the child being dealt with. If the alleged disciplinary measures are excessive and
run counter to the purpose of disciplining a child, then the defense will be rejected and the
accused may be held liable for child abuse.. (Asela Brinas v. People, G.R. No. 254005, June 23,
2021, Caguioa, J.)
The evidence presented shows that Briñas' acts were only done in the heat of anger, made
after she had just learned that the private complainants had deceivingly used her daughter's name
to send a text message to another student, in what Briñas thought was part of a bigger and
harmful scheme against the student body. She had also then just learned that the mother of the
student who received the misleading text message had confronted the private complainants for
quarreling with the former's daughter. It appears, thus, that Briñas' acts were fueled by her anger
and frustration at the private complainants' mischief which caused distress not only to her and
her daughter but also to another student and parent. (Brinas v. People, G.R. No. 254005, June
23, 2021, Caguioa, J.)
Masturbation in the presence of a child is psychological child abuse.The effect of

masturbation on the minor victim or the "audience" is far from only evoking emotions of
irritation or annoyance. In this case, the lascivious act of masturbating caused the minor victim to
suffer anxiety and trauma. This specie of psychological abuse is basically one of the acts aimed
to be punished under R.A. No. 7610. (De Vera v. People, G.R. No. 246231, January 20, 2021,
Delos Santos, J.)
20. Republic Act 11648
Republic Act 11648 amended Article 266-A, paragraph d, to read as follows: (d)
When the offended party is under sixteen (16) years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present: Provided, That there shall be no criminal liability
on the part of a person having carnal knowledge of another person under sixteen (16) years of
age when the age difference between the parties is not more than three (3) years, and the sexual
act in question is proven to be consensual, non-abusive, and non-exploitative: Provided, further,
That if the victim is under thirteen (13) years of age, this exception shall not apply. As used in
the Act, non-abusive shall mean the absence of undue influence, intimidation, fraudulent
machinations, coercion, threat, physical, sexual, psychological, or mental injury or maltreatment,
either with intention or through neglect, during the conduct of sexual activities with the child
victim. On the other hand, non-exploitative shall mean there is no actual or attempted act or acts
of unfairly taking advantage of the child's position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust
during the conduct of sexual activities.
The last proviso implies that there is no criminal liability if:

a. the accused is 18 years of age and the victim is 15 years of age or over, provided
that sexual act in question is proven to be consensual, non-abusive, and non-
exploitative;
b. the accused is 17 years of age and the victim is 14 years of age or over, provided
that the sexual act in question is proven to be consensual, non-abusive, and non-
exploitative; and
c. the accused is 16 years of age and the victim is 13 years of age or over, that the
sexual act in question is proven to be consensual, non-abusive, and non-
exploitative.
21. Aberratio Ictus
Aberratio ictus may result in the crime of child abuse. Criminal liability shall be incurred
by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended. (Mabunot v. People, G.R. No. 204659. September 19, 2016, Reyes, J.)
The ruling in the case of People v. Adriano, G.R. No.205228, July 15, 2015, was
reiterated in the case of People v. Nestor Bendecio, G.R. No. 235016, September 08, 2020,
Lazaro-Javier, J.. In this case, the accused shot at his intended victim who was closing the front
door of his house but instead, the bullets hit a seven-year old girl and her sister. In upholding the
conviction of the accused for the death of the girl, the Supreme Court held that what happened to
this seven (7)-year-old was a clear case of aberratio ictus or mistake in the blow.
22. Desistance as an absolutory cause
The spontaneous desistance of the offender from the commission of the crime exempts
him from criminal liability. First, the character of an attempt is lost when its execution is
voluntarily abandoned. There is no conceivable overt act to which the abandoned purpose
could be attached. Secondly, the policy of the law requires that the offender, so long as he is
capable of arresting an evil plan, should be encouraged to do so, by saving him harmless in case
of such retreat before it is possible for any evil consequences to ensue. Neither society, nor any
private person, has been injured by his act. There is no damage, therefore, to redress. To punish
him after retreat and abandonment would be to destroy the motive for retreat and abandonment."
It must be borne in mind, however, that the spontaneous desistance of a malefactor exempts him
from criminal liability for the intended crime but it does not exempt him from the crime
committed by him before his desistance. (People v. Lizada, G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January 24,
2003, Callejo, Sr., J., Enbanc)
TAKE NOTE: If A shot B with a revolver, with intent to kill, but the latter was hit by the
bullet in his arm only, and then, A desisted from his original intention of killing B by just
walking away, his spontaneous desistance would only make him liable for the crime he actually
committed before the desistance. Considering the language of the Supreme Court that, “the
character of an attempt is lost when its execution is voluntarily abandoned,” he should be
liable only for slight or less serious physical injuries, and not for attempted homicide.
23. Presumed Conspiracy
Presumed conspiracy. The Supreme Court reiterated its ruling in the case of Dungo v.
People.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015, that (T)he presence of any person, even if such person is
not a member of the fraternity, sorority, or organization, during the hazing is prima
facie evidence of participation therein as a principal unless such person or persons prevented the
commission of the acts punishable herein or promptly reported the same to the law enforcement
authorities if they can do so without peril to their person or their family. (Fuertes v. The Senate,
et. al., G.R. No. 208162, January 07, 2020, Enbanc, Leonen, J.)
24. No ex post facto conspiracy can give rise to criminal liability as a principal
There can be no ex post facto conspiracy to do that which has already been done and
consummated. (Benito v. People, G.R. No. 204644, February 11, 2015, Leonen, J.)
Case law has it that one who joins a conspiracy while the felony subject thereof is being
committed or before the said felony is committed and performs overt acts to achieve the common
design or purpose, is criminally liable for said felony. On the other hand, one who joins a
conspiracy after the felony subject of the conspiracy has been completed or consummated is not
criminally liable as a conspirator. There can be no ex post facto conspiracy to do that which has
already been done and consummated. When a crime has been fully committed, one not already
guilty is too late to be a sharer in it, though if it is a felony, he or she may become an accessory
under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. (Preferred Homes Specialties, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. NO. 16359, December 16, 2005, Callejo, Sr.)
Mere presence as indicative of conspiracy? Consider…
Mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission is not, by itself,
sufficient to establish conspiracy. To establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather
than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required. Nevertheless, mere knowledge,
acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not
enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation
in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. The fact that
petitioner accompanied her husband at the restaurant and allowed her husband to place the
money inside her bag would not be sufficient to justify the conclusion that conspiracy existed. In
order to hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he or she must be shown
to have performed an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of conspiracy. (Rimando v. People,
G.R. No. 229701, November 29, 2017, Velasco, J.)
While it is true that mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission,
without actively participating in the conduct thereof, is insufficient to prove that the accused
conspired to commit the crime, Wenefredo and FFF's act of standing near the victims and Benito,
while wielding bolos, does not partake of this nature. To Our mind, their overt act of staying in
close proximity while Benito executes the crime served no other purpose than to lend moral
support by ensuring that no one could interfere and prevent the successful perpetration thereof.33
We are sufficiently convinced that their presence thereat has no doubt, encouraged Benito and
increased the odds against the victims, especially since they were all wielding lethal weapons.
(People v. Lababo, G.R. No. 234651, June 06, 2018, Velasco, J.)
25. Wheel and Chain Conspiracy
Wheel conspiracy. The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group
(the hub) dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke
typically interacts with the hub rather than with another spoke. In the event that the spoke shares
a common purpose to succeed, there is a single conspiracy. However, in the instances when each
spoke is unconcerned with the success of the other spokes, there are multiple conspiracies
(Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538; Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 220598-220593, July19, 2016).
Chain conspiracy. Chain conspiracy exists when there is successive communication and
cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer
and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer. This involves
individuals linked together in a vertical chain to achieve a criminal objective (see Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538; Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 220598-220593, July19, 2016).
26. Suspension of sentence
Suspension of sentence is applicable even if the accused who committed the crime in his
minority had reached the age of beyond 21 years old. What matters is that the offender
committed the offense when he/she was still of tender age. Accused may be confined in an
agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of Republic Act No.
9344. (People v. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015, Peralta, J. 543-544;People v.
Sisracon, et. al., G.R. No. 226494, February 14, 2018, Peralta, J. )
27. Principal
An accused may be considered a principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by

indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate
in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and cooperation in the
commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished. Nothing in the evidence presented by the prosecution does it show that the acts
committed by appellant are indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape. The events
narrated by the CA, from the time appellant convinced AAA to go with her until appellant
received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of
rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange for
money and AAA could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own services in
exchange for monetary consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this disproves the
indispensable aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be remembered that in the
Information, as well as in the testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a fee by
appellant, thereafter, she was raped by "Speed." (People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 193854, September
24, 2012, Peralta, J.)
NOTE: Nevertheless, the accused in People v. Dulay was convicted under Section 5(a)
of Republic Act 7610 as a procurer. It must be remembered that the character of the crime is not
determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, they may be conclusions of law, but by the recital
of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information. The sufficiency of an
information is not negated by an incomplete or defective designation of the crime in the caption
or other parts of the information but by the narration of facts and circumstances which
adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprises the accused of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. (People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 193854, September 24, 2012, Peralta, J.)
28. Complex Crimes
The single act of the accused burning the house of the victim, with the main objective of
killing the latter and his daughter, resulting in their deaths resulted in the complex crime of
double murder. Under Article 248 of the RPC, murder is committed by means of fire. (People v.
Gaffud, Jr., G.R. No. 168050, September 19, 2008, Puno, CJ, Enbanc)
When the assault results in the killing of an agent or of a person in authority for that
matter, there arises the complex crime of Direct Assault with murder or homicide. Here,
treachery qualified the killing of Mayor Arcillas and PO2 Rivera to murder. Treachery also
attended the shooting of PO3 Almendras. There is treachery when the following essential
elements are present, viz.: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods
or forms of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery lies in the suddenness of the attack
by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself
and thereby ensuring the commission of the offense without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. (People v. Vidal, Jr., et. al., G.R. No. 229678, June
20, 2018, Peralta, J., Enbanc)
29. Doctrine of Absorption
The doctrine of absorption is applicable to crimes mala prohibita. The doctrine of

absorption is a principle peculiar in criminal law. In order for the doctrine to apply, the crimes
must be punished by the same statute and the trial court must have jurisdiction over both
offenses. Likewise, in relation to the previous disquisition, the acts must not constitute separate
counts of violation of the crime. In applying the doctrine of absorption, although there have been
multiple violations, that crime that is ascertained to be an inherent part, an element, or that is
made in furtherance of the other crime is not treated as a separate offense but is deemed included
in the other crime. The crime which the offender originally or primarily intended to commit
absorbs the offense which is executed in its furtherance. (People v. Ramoy and Padilla, G.R. No.
212738. March 09, 2022, Gaerlan, J.)
30. Republic Act 9344 (Juvenile Justice Act)
Three systems of diversion under Republic Act 9344. Children above fifteen (15) but
below eighteen (18) and who acted with discernment shall be referred to appropriate diversion
program (see sec. 22, RA 9344).
a. Where the imposable penalty for the crime committed is not more than six (6)
years imprisonment, the diversion program shall be conducted by the law
enforcement officer or punong barangay with the assistance of the local social
welfare or development office.
b. In victimless crimes where the imposable penalty is not more than six (6) years
imprisonment, the diversion shall be conducted by the local social welfare or
development officer.
c. Where the imposable penalty for the crime exceeds six (6) years imprisonment,
diversion may be resorted to only by the court (see sec. 23, RA 9344).
Take note: Rehabilitation programs are mandated by the law for children below 15 years
of age and those above but below 18 years of age. Meanwhile, diversion programs are only
available to CICL above 15 years of age who acted with discernment.
31. Cyber Crimes
Sharing or liking defamatory post in facebook is not punishable. The crime of cyber
aiding in and abetting the crimes of libel, unsolicited commercial communications and child
pornography is unconstitutional. Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its
vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect
on the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the
actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal
crimes such as libel are not punishable unless consummated. In the absence of legislation tracing
the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other countries, Section 5,
in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny. (Disini v.
Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014, Abad, J.)
32. Presence of witnesses during buy-bust operations
It is necessary that the witnesses be present not only in the marking but during the arrest
of the accused as well. The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the
inventory but more importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which
the presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure
and confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized
drug. If the buy-bust operation is legitimately conducted, the presence of the insulating witnesses
would also controvert the usual defense of frame-up as the witnesses would be able to testify that
the buy-bust operation and inventory of the seized drugs were done in their presence in
accordance with Section 21 of RA 9165. (Acibo v. People, G.R. No. 228132, March 11, 2020,
Caguioa, J.)
It has been stressed that the presence of the key witnesses is required to ensure the
preservation of the corpus delicti and remove suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination
of evidence. If the presence of the required witnesses could not be obtained, "the prosecution
must establish not only the reasons for their absence, but also the fact that serious and sincere
efforts were exerted in securing their presence. Failure to disclose the justification for non-
compliance with the requirements and the lack of evidence of serious attempts to secure the
presence of the necessary witnesses result in a substantial gap in the chain of custody of evidence
that shall adversely affect the authenticity of the prohibited substance presented in court. (CICL
XXX, CICL YYY, Solina, Barba v. People, GR No. 230964, 2 March, 2022, Hernando, J.)
33. Probation
Application for probation cannot be denied solely on the basis of the recommendation of
the Probation Office. The Court agrees with the RTC's finding that the MeTC gravely abused its
discretion when it denied petitioner's application for probation and issued a warrant for his arrest
based solely on the recommendation of the PPO-Manila as indicated in the PSIR without
conducting its own investigation on the matter. It is settled that the grant of probation is
discretionarv upon the court, and in exercising such discretion, it must consider the potentiality
of the offender to reform, together with the demands of justice and public interest, along with
other relevant circumstances. It should not limit the basis of its decision to the report or
recommendation of the probation officer, which Is at best only persuasive. Otherwise stated, in
determining whether or not to grant the application for probation, the court must not merely rely
on the PSIR - as what the MeTC did in this case - but rather, it must make its own findings as to
the merits of the application, considering that the Probation Law vests upon it the power to make
a final decision on the matter. Had the MeTC thoroughly evaluated the merits of the application,
it would have determined that petitioner is not a disqualified offender under the Probation Law
and that there is a possibility that he can be reformed outside of a correctional institution. (Ching
v. Ching, G.R. No. 240843. June 03, 2019, Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
An accused may still apply for probation in spite of the finality of judgment after the
court modified the judgment previously entered. At this juncture, it is well to stress that in Bigler
v. People (Bigler), the Court ruled that notwithstanding the finality of a criminal conviction, it
still has the power to correct the penalty imposed against an accused-convict, if it finds the same
to be outside the range prescribed by law. In this regard, the Court further elucidated that "a
sentence which imposes upon the defendant in a criminal prosecution a penalty in excess of the
maximum which the court is authorized by law to impose for the offense for which the defendant
was convicted, is void for want or excess of jurisdiction as to the excess." Thus, in view of the
Court's pronouncement in Bigler, the provisions of RA 10951, the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
and considering further the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the proper
penalty to be imposed on petitioner should be four (4) months and twenty (20) days of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years, eleven (11) months, and ten (10) days of prision
correccional, as maximum. In sum, the Court deems it proper to lift the Entry of Judgment dated
January 14, 2019 in order to modify the penalty imposed on petitioner as explained above.
Notably, this reduction of penalty entitles petitioner to apply for probation, pursuant to RA
10707, which allows an accused-convict to apply for probation in the event that he/she is
sentenced to a non-probationable penalty by the trial court but subsequently modified by the
appellate court to a probationable penalty, (Aguinaldo, IV v. People, G.R. No. 226615, January
13, 2021, Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
It is the individual penalties, not their aggregate terms, which should be considered in
determining whether an application for probation can be granted. Fixing the cut-off point at a
maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for probation is based on the assumption that those
sentenced to higher penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of their
demonstrated capability for serious wrongdoing but because of the gravity and serious
consequences of the offense they might further commit. The Probation Law, as amended,
disqualifies only those who have been convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation
to Art. 25 of The Revised Penal Code, and not necessarily those who have been convicted of
multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less perverse. Hence, the basis of
the disqualification is principally the gravity of the offense committed and the concomitant
degree of penalty imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not exceeding six (6) years are
not generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail of probation. To
demonstrate the point, let us take for instance one who is convicted in a single decision of, say,
thirteen (13) counts of grave oral defamation (for having defamed thirteen [13] individuals in one
outburst) and sentenced to a total prison term of thirteen (13) years, and another who has been
found guilty of mutilation and sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
minimum as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as
maximum. Obviously, the latter offender is more perverse and is disqualified from availing of
probation. (Francisco v. People, G.R. No. 108747, April 6, 1995, Bellosillo, J., Enbanc)
34. Subsidiary imprisonment
An accused who has been sentenced by final judgment to pay a fine only and is found to
be insolvent and could not pay the fine for this reason, cannot be compelled to serve the
subsidiary imprisonment provided for in article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. (People v. Alapan,
G.R. No. 199527, January 10, 2018, Martires, J.)
35. Republic Act 11362 (Community Service Act)
Take note of the amendment to Article 88 of the Revised Penal Code, as follows:
"ART. 88a. Community Service. - The court in the discretion may, in lieu of service in
jail, require that the penalties of arresto menor and arresto mayor may be served by the
defendant by rendering community service in the place where the crime was committed,
under such terms as the court shall determine, taking into consideration the gravity of
offense and the circumstances of the case, which shall be under the supervision of a
probation officer: Provided, That the court will prepare an order imposing the
community service, specifying the number of hours to be worked and the period within
which to complete the service. The order is then referred to the assigned probation
officer who shall have responsibility of the defendant.
"The defendant shall likewise be required to undergo rehabilitative counseling under the
social welfare and development office of the city or municipality concerned with the
assistance of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). In requiring
community service, the court shall consider the welfare of the society and the reasonable
probability that the person sentenced shall not violate the law while rendering a public
service.
"Community service shall consist of any actual physical activity which inculcates civic
consciousness, and is intended towards the improvement of a public work or promotion
of a public service.
"If the defendant violates the terms of the community service, the court shall order
his/her re-arrest and the defendant shall serve the full term of the penalty, as the case
may be, in jail, or in the house of the defendant as provided under Article 88. However,
if the defendant has fully complied with the terms of the community service, the court
shall order the release of the defendant unless detained for some other offenses.
Good luck!!!

2023 Jurists Last Minute Tips On Criminal Law

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

2023 Jurists Last Minute Tips On Criminal Law

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

JURISTS™ BAR OPS 2023

LAST MINUTE TIPS ON CRIMINAL LAW

Presumed constructive possession of an item is not sufficient to establish delivery of the

When is the misrepresentation of the ownership of real property considered a crime of

Lending money to non-members of the paluwagan without specific prohibition to do so is

Remember the following principles:

b. Robbery is committed by the accused who demanded money on threat of publishing

4. Republic Act 9262

Psychological violence. To be punishable by Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262, it must ultimately

6. Offending Religious Feelings

8. Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention

Executing a false Complaint-Affidavit is perjury. The elements of perjury under Article

Remember: Since the filing of a Counter-Affidavit is entirely within the prerogative of a

As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document, it is

11. Malversation of Public Funds or Property

12. Direct Bribery

13. Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray

14. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances

15. Exemptions from criminal liability

There is publication if the material is communicated to a third person. It is not required

18. Mala prohibita crimes

19. Bongalon Doctrine

Masturbation in the presence of a child is psychological child abuse.The effect of

20. Republic Act 11648

The last proviso implies that there is no criminal liability if:

21. Aberratio Ictus

22. Desistance as an absolutory cause

23. Presumed Conspiracy

Mere presence as indicative of conspiracy? Consider…

25. Wheel and Chain Conspiracy

26. Suspension of sentence

An accused may be considered a principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by

28. Complex Crimes

29. Doctrine of Absorption

The doctrine of absorption is applicable to crimes mala prohibita. The doctrine of

30. Republic Act 9344 (Juvenile Justice Act)

31. Cyber Crimes

32. Presence of witnesses during buy-bust operations

34. Subsidiary imprisonment

35. Republic Act 11362 (Community Service Act)

You might also like