A.

1. ARRICLE 327

MALICIOUS MISCHIEF

ELEMENTS

That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another.

That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction.

That the act damaging another’s property be committed merely for the sake of
damaging it.

Note:

1. Malicious mischief – willful damaging of another’s property for the sake of

causing damage due to hate, revenge or other evil motive

2. No negligence

3. Example. Killing the cow as revenge

4. If no malice – only civil liability

Meaning of “damage” in malicious mischief.

It means not only loss but a diminution of the value of one’s property. It includes
defacing, deforming or rendering it useless for the purpose for which it was made.

5. But after damaging the thing, he used it = theft

There is destruction of the property of another but there is no misappropriation.

Otherwise, it would be theft if he gathers the effects of destruction.

6. Damage is not incident of a crime (breaking windows in robbery)

a. CABALLES V. DAR 168 SCRA 247

YOLANDA CABALLES vs. DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. HEHERSON T.

ALVAREZ and BIENVENIDO ABAJON

G.R. No. L-7821405 December 1988

Petition for certiorari to review DAR order J. Sarmiento

Property involved is only 60-sq. m., which is part of a 500-sq. m. land

FACTS:

Macario Alicaba & Millenes family, predecessors-in-interest of petitioner,

agreed to lease to private respondent Abajon apportion of subject land to construct
the latter’s house & to plant corns & bananas. They agreed toa monthly rental
ofPHP2.00 & 50-50 share of crops.

Petitioner Caballes & her husband acquired, through a deed of sale, the whole land
which includes the portion occupied byprivate respondent. They informed private
respondent of their intention to build a poultry close to his house & persuadedhim to
transfer his dwelling to the opposite or southern portion of the land. On his part, private
respondent offered to pay rent on the land occupied by his house, but such offer was
not accepted.

Later, the spouses asked private respondent to vacate the premises, saying that they
needed the property. But he refused. Despite the confrontation before the Brgy.
Captain,
the parties failed to reach an agreement. All efforts by the land owners to oust private
respondent were in vain as the latter simply refused to budge.

Petitioner then filed a criminal case for malicious mischief against private respondent,
alleging that the latter maliciouslycut down the banana plants worth P50.00, (note: all
banana plants, were planted by Abajon).

Pursuant to PD 1038, the trial court ordered the referral of the case to the regional office
of Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) to determine the relationship of the parties. As a
result, MAR issued an order declaring the existence of a tenancy relationship between
Caballes & Abajon. It also declared the criminal case for malicious mischief filed by
petitioner against private respondent as not proper for trial; since such case is filed
patently to harass and/or eject the tenant from his farm.

On appeal, then DAR Minister Conrado Estrella reversed the certification and declared
the criminal case as proper for trial, since the land involved is a residential lot consisting
only of 60-sq. m.

On motion for reconsideration, herein respondent and new Minister of DAR, Heherson
Alvarez issued an order finding the criminal case as not proper for trial due to the
existence of tenancy relations between the parties.

Private respondent invoked Sec. 10 of RA 3844, which provided that new owners are
bound to respect the tenancy regardless of the size of the land being tilled.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Abajon is a tenant of spouses Caballes.

HELD:
 NO.

The Supreme Court held that Abajon only occupied a miniscule portion of the lot. RA
3844, as amended. The 60-sq. m. cannot be considered as an economic family-size
farm protected by the aforementioned law. Planting camote, bananas, &corn on a 60-
sq. m. land cannot produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard
of living to meet the farm family’s basic needs.

2 . ARTICLE 328

SPECIAL CASES OF MALICIOUS MISCHIEF

1. Obstruct performance of public functions.

2. Using poisonous or corrosive substances.

3. Spreading infection or contagious among cattle.

4. Damage to property of national museum or library, archive, registry, waterworks,

road, promenade, or any other thing used in common by the public.

The cases of malicious mischief enumerated in this article are so-called qualified
malicious mischief. The crime becomes qualified either because of the nature of the
damage caused to obstruct a public; or because of the kind of substance used to cause
the damage. The crime is still malicious mischief because the offender has no intent to
gain but derives satisfaction from the act because of hate, revenge or other evil motive.

Note: Qualified malicious mischief – no uprising or sedition (#1)

ARTICLE 329

OTHER MISCHIEF

ELEMENTS:

1. Not included in Art. 328

a. scattering human excrement

b. killing of cow as an act of revenge

The offender is punished according to the value of the damage caused to the offended
party. If the damages cannot be estimated, the minimum penalty is arresto menor or a
fine of not more than 200 pesos shall be imposed on the offender.

ARTICLE 330

DAMAGE AND OBSTRUCTION TO MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

done by damaging railways, telegraph, telephone lines, electric wires, traction cables,
signal system of railways
Notes:

1. removing rails from tracks is destruction (art 324)

2. not applicable when telegraph/phone lines don’t pertain to railways (example: for
transmission of electric power/light)

3. people killed as a result:

a. murder – if derailment is means of intent to kill

b. none – art 48

If the damage was intended to cause derailment only without any intention to kill, it will
be a crime involving destruction under Article 324. If the derailment is intentionally done
to cause the death of a person, the crime committed will be murder under Article 248.

4. circumstance qualifying the offense if the damage shall result in any derailment of
cars, collision or other accident – a higher penalty shall be imposed.

ARTICLE 331 and ARTICLE 332

DESTROYING OR DAMAGING STATUES, PUBLIC MONUMENTS OR PAINTINGS

EXEMPTION FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY

Persons exempt from criminal liability

1. Spouse, ascendants and descendants or relatives by affinity in the same line

2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property w/c belonged to the
deceased spouse before the same passed into the possession of another

3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together

Offenses involved in the exemption

1. Theft ( not robbery )

2. Swindling

3. Malicious mischief

Notes:
1. Exemption is based on family relations

For the exemption to apply insofar as brothers and sisters, and brothers-in-law and
sisters-in-law are concerned, they must be living together at the time of the
commission of the crime of theft, estafa or malicious mischief.
2. Parties to the crime not related to the offended party still remains criminally liable

3. Persons exempt include:

a. stepfather/mother (ascendants by affinity)

b. adopted children (descendants)

 c. concubine/paramour (spouse)

d. common law spouse (property is part of their earnings)

Only the relatives enumerated incur no liability if the crime relates to theft (not robbery),
swindling, and malicious mischief. Third parties who participate are not exempt. The
relationship between the spouses is not limited to legally married couples; the provision
applies to live-in partners.

ARTICLE 333

ADULTERY

ELEMENTS
1. That the woman is married (even if marriage subsequently declared void)

2. That she has sexual intercourse with a man not her husband.

3. That as regards the man with whom she has sexual intercourses, he must know her
to be married.

Note:

There are two reasons why adultery is made punishable by law. Primarily, it is a
violation of the marital vow and secondarily, it paves the way to the introduction of a
spurious child into the family.

Adultery is a crime not only of the married woman but also of the man who had
intercourse with a married woman knowing her to be married. Even if the man proves
later on that he does not know the woman to be married, at the beginning, he must still
be included in the complaint or information. This is so because whether he knows the
woman to be married or not is a matter of defense and it is up to him to ventilate that in
formal investigations or a formal trial.

If after preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor is convinced that the man
did not know that the woman is married, then he could simply file the case against the
woman.

The acquittal of the woman does not necessarily result in the acquittal of her co-
accused.

In order to constitute adultery, there must be a joint physical act. Joint criminal
intent is not necessary. Although the criminal intent may exist in the mind of one of the
parties to the physical act, there may be no such intent in the mind of the other party.
One may be guilty of the criminal intent, the other innocent, and yet the joint physical act
necessary to constitute the adultery may be complete. So, if the man had no
knowledge that the woman was married, he would be innocent insofar as the crime of
adultery is concerned but the woman would still be guilty; the former would have to be
acquitted and the latter found guilty, although they were tried together.

A husband committing concubinage may be required to support his wife

committing adultery under the rule in pari delicto.
 For adultery to exist, there must be a marriage although it be subsequently
annulled. There is no adultery, if the marriage is void from the beginning.

Adultery is an instantaneous crime which is consummated and completed at the

moment of the carnal union. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery.
Adultery is not a continuing crime unlike concubinage.

Illustration 1:

Madamme X is a married woman residing in Pasay City. He met a man, Y, at

Roxas Boulevard. She agreed to go with to Baguio City, supposedly to come back the
next day. When they were in Bulacan, they stayed in a motel, having sexual intercourse
there. After that, they proceeded again and stopped at Dagupan City, where they went
to a motel and had sexual intercourse.

There are two counts of adultery committed in this instance: one adultery in
Bulacan, and another adultery in Dagupan City. Even if it involves the same man, each
intercourse is a separate crime of adultery.

1. mitigated if wife was abandoned without justification by the offended

spouse (man is entitled to this mitigating circumstance)

Abandonment without justification is not exempting but only a mitigating

circumstance. One who invokes abandonment in the crime of adultery hypothetically
admits criminal liability for the crime charged. (U. S. vs. Serrano, et al., 28 Phil. 230)

While abandonment is peculiar only to the accused who is related to the offended
party and must be considered only as to her or him as provided under Article 62,
paragraph 3, nonetheless, judicially speaking, in the crime of adultery, there is only one
act committed and consequently both accused are entitled to this mitigating
circumstance. (People vs. Avelino, 40 O.G. Supp. 11, 194)

2. attempted: caught disrobing a lover

There is no frustrated adultery because of the nature of the offense.

In the case of People vs. Pontio Guinucud, et al., (58 Phil. 621), a private
agreement was entered into between the husband and wife for them to separate from
bed and board and for each of them to go for his and her own separate way. Thereafter,
the wife Rosario Tagayum lived with her co-accused Pontio Guinucud in a nearby
barangay. Their love affair ultimately embroiled the spouses conservative and reputable
families in a human drama exposed in legal battles and whispers of unwanted gossips.
In dismissing the complaint, the Court ruled that while a private agreement between the
husband and wife was null and void, the same was admissible proof of the express
consent given by the condescending husband to the prodigal wife, a license for her to
commit adultery. Such agreement bars the husband from instituting a criminal complaint
for adultery.

After filing the complaint for adultery and while the case is pending trial and
resolution by the trial court, the offended spouse must not have sexual intercourse with
the adulterous wife since an act of intercourse subsequent to the adulterous conduct is
considered as implied pardon. (People vs. Muguerza, et al., 13 C.A. Rep. 1079)
 It is seldom the case that adultery is established by direct evidence. The legal
tenet has been and still is circumstantial and corroborative evidence as will lead the
guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man to the conclusion that the criminal act
of adultery has been committed will bring about conviction for the crime. (U. S. vs.
Feliciano, 36 Phil. 753).

3. ARTICLE 334

CONCUBINAGE

ELEMENTS:

1. That the man must be married.

2. That he committed any of the following acts:

a. Keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling.

b. Having sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances with a woman who is

not his wife.

c. Cohabiting with her in any other place.

3. That as regards the woman she must know him to be married.

Note: Scandal consists in any reprehensible word/deed that offends public

conscience, redounds to the detriment of the feelings of honest persons and gives
occasions to the neighbors spiritual damage and ruin

With respect to concubinage the same principle applies: only the offended
spouse can bring the prosecution. This is a crime committed by the married man, the
husband. Similarly, it includes the woman who had a relationship with the married man.

It has been asked why the penalty for adultery is higher than concubinage when
both crimes are infidelities to the marital vows. The reason given for this is that when
the wife commits adultery, there is a probability that she will bring a stranger into the
family. If the husband commits concubinage, this probability does not arise because the
mother of the child will always carry the child with her. So even if the husband brings
with him the child, it is clearly known that the child is a stranger. Not in the case of a
married woman who may bring a child to the family under the guise of a legitimate child.
This is the reason why in the former crime the penalty is higher than the latter.

Unlike adultery, concubinage is a continuing crime.

If the charges consist in keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, there is no

need for proof of sexual intercourse. The conjugal dwelling is the house of the spouse
even if the wife happens to be temporarily absent therefrom. The woman however must
be brought into the conjugal house by the accused husband as a concubine to fall under
this article. Thus, if the co-accused was voluntarily taken and sheltered by the spouses
in their house and treated as an adopted child being a relative of the complaining wife,
her illicit relations with the accused husband does not make her a mistress. (People vs.
Hilao, et al., (C.A.) 52 O.G. 904).
 It is only when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere
that “scandalous circumstances becomes an element of crime.

For the existence of the crime of concubinage by having sexual intercourse under
scandalous circumstances, the latter must be imprudent and wanton as to offend
modesty and sense of morality and decency.

When spies are employed to chronicle the activities of the accused and the
evidence presented to prove scandalous circumstances are those taken by the
detectives, it is obvious that the sexual intercourse done by the offenders was not under
scandalous circumstances. (U.S. vs. Campos-Rueda, 35 Phil. 51)

Causal sexual intercourse with a woman in a hotel is not concubinage. Likewise,

keeping of a mistress in a townhouse procured and furnished by a married man who
does not live or sleep with her in said townhouse does not constitute concubinage since
there is no cohabitation.

The rule is that, if a married man’s conduct with a woman who is not his wife was
not confined to occasional or transient interview for carnal intercourse but is carried n in
the manner of husband and wife and for some period of time, then such association is
sufficient to constitute cohabitation. (People vs. Zuniga, CA 57 O.G. 2497)

If the evidence of the prosecution consists of a marriage contract between the offender
and the offended party, and the additional fact of the birth certificate of a child showing
the accused to be the father of the child with the alleged cocubine, the same will not be
sufficient to convict the accused of concubinage since the law clearly states that the act
must be one of those provided by law.

a. PILAPIL V. SOMERA DAR 174 SCRA 563

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SAMUEL “TIW-TIW” SANICO

G.R. No. L-208469

FACTS:

Plaintiff filed two separate information were filed against the accused-appellant before
the RTC, In Criminal Case No. 12021 for Acts of Lasciviousness:

That at more or less 1:00P.M. of April 19, 2006 the accused, with lewd design, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon the
person of AA, a twelve (12) year old minor, by touching her breast against her will, to
the damage and prejudice of the latter in such amount as may be prove in Court.

In Criminal Case No. 12022 for Rape

That sometime in the year 2005 the accused, by means of force, threat or intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one
AAA, a twelve (12) year old minor, against her will. AAA alleged that she was again
raped for six or seven times.
The accused-appellant testified that he had never inserted his penis in AAA’s vagina.
He admitted touching AAA on April 19,2006 but he did so only because the latter
initiated it. The accused-appellant woke up from slumber when AAA touched the
former’s pocket to search for money. She got some coins and bills. The accused-
appellant, in turn, touched AAA’s chest and asked the latter to remove her short pants.
AAA complied. As the accused-appellant then fled and went on holding.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the provisions for rape and acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610 shall
be applied.

DECISION:

Yes, Article III, Section 5, of RA 7610 reads:

Section 5. Prostitution and Other Sexual abuse, children, whether male or female, who
for money or profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

4. ARTICLE 335

RAPE

This has been repealed by Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of
1997. Rape is classified as a Crime against Person. (See notes on Special Laws).

Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the

following circumstances:

1. By using force intimidation

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise in conscious; and

3. When the woman is under 12 years of age even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next proceeding paragraphs shall be present.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion temporal.

5. ARTICLE 336

ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS

ELEMENTS:

1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness.

2. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:

a. by using force or intimidation, or

 b. when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or

c. when the offended party is under 12 years of age.

3. That the offended party is another person of either sex.

Note: There are two kinds of acts of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal Code: (1)
under Article 336, and (2) under Article 339.

1. Article 336. Acts of Lasciviousness

Under this article, the offended party may be a man or a woman. The crime committed,
when the act performed with lewd design was perpetrated under circumstances
which would have brought about the crime of rape if sexual intercourse was affected,
is acts of lasciviousness under this article. This means that the offended party is
either –

(1) under 12 years of age; or

(2) being over 12 years of age, the lascivious acts were committed on him or her
through violence or intimidation, or while the offender party was deprived of reason,
or otherwise unconscious.

2. Article 339. Acts of Lasciviousness with the Consent of the Offended Party:

Under this article, the victim is limited only to a woman. The circumstances
under which the lascivious acts were committed must be that of qualified seduction or
simple seduction, that is, the offender took advantage of his position of ascendancy
over the offender woman either because he is a person in authority, a domestic, a
house help, a priest, a teacher or a guardian, or there was a deceitful promise of
marriage which never would really be fulfilled.

Always remember that there can be no frustration of acts of lasciviousness, rape

or adultery because no matter how far the offender may have gone towards the
realization of his purpose, if his participation amounts to performing all the acts of
execution, the felony is necessarily produced as a consequence thereof.

Intent to rape is not a necessary element of the crime of acts of lasciviousness.

Otherwise, there would be no crime of attempted rape.

In the crime of acts of lasciviousness, the intention of the wrongdoer is not very
material. The motive that impelled the accused to commit the offense is of no
importance because the essence of lewdness is in the act itself.

What constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct must be determined from the

circumstances of each case. The demarcation line is not always easy to determine but
in order to sustain a conviction for acts of lasciviousness, it is essential that the acts
complained of be prompted by lust or lewd designs and the victim did not consent to nor
encouraged the act.

To be guilty of this crime however, the acts of lasciviousness must be committed

under any of the circumstances that had there been sexual intercourse, the crime would
have been Rape. Where circumstances however are such, indicating a clear intention
to lie with the offended party, the crime committed as Attempted Rape.
 This crime (Art. 336) can be committed by either sex unlike in Acts of
Lasciviousness with Consent under Article 339. Thus, a lesbian who toyed with the
private part of an eleven-year-old girl who enjoyed it since she was given $50 dollars
before the act, is guilty of Act of Lasciviousness under this Article as the victim is below
twelve year old; and had sexual intercourse been possible and done, the act would
have been Rape.

a. PEOPLE V. SANICO GR 208469

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SAMUEL “TIW-TIW” SANICO

G.R. No. L-208469

FACTS:

Plaintiff filed two separate information were filed against the accused-appellant before
the RTC, In Criminal Case No. 12021 for Acts of Lasciviousness:

That at more or less 1:00P.M. of April 19, 2006 the accused, with lewd design, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon the
person of AA, a twelve (12) year old minor, by touching her breast against her will, to
the damage and prejudice of the latter in such amount as may be prove in Court.

In Criminal Case No. 12022 for Rape

That sometime in the year 2005 the accused, by means of force, threat or intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one
AAA, a twelve (12) year old minor, against her will. AAA alleged that she was again
raped for six or seven times.

The accused-appellant testified that he had never inserted his penis in AAA’s vagina.
He admitted touching AAA on April 19,2006 but he did so only because the latter
initiated it. The accused-appellant woke up from slumber when AAA touched the
former’s pocket to search for money. She got some coins and bills. The accused-
appellant, in turn, touched AAA’s chest and asked the latter to remove her short pants.
AAA complied. As the accused-appellant then fled and went on holding.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the provisions for rape and acts of lasciviousness under RA 7610
shall be applied.

DECISION:

Yes, Article III, Section 5, of RA 7610 reads:

Section 5. Prostitution and Other Sexual abuse, children, whether male or

female, who for money or profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
 6. ARTICLE 337

SEDUCTION

QUALIFIED SEDUCTION OF A VIRGIN

Two classes of qualified seduction:

1. Seduction of a virgin over 12 and under 18 years of age by certain persons,
such as a person in authority, priest, teachers etc and

2. Seduction of a sister by her brother or descendant by her ascendant, regardless

of her age or reputation (incestuous seduction)

Elements:

1. That the offended party is a virgin, (presumed if she unmarried and of good
reputation.)

2. That she must be over 12 and under 18 years of age.

3. That the offender has sexual intercourse with her.

4. That there is abuse of authority, confidence or relationship on the part of the

offender ( person entrusted with education or custody of victim; person in public
authority, priest; servant)

Persons liable:
1. Those who abuse their authority:

a. persons in public authority

b. guardian

c. teacher

d. person who, in any capacity, is entrusted with the education or custody of

the woman seduced

2. Those who abused the confidence reposed in them:

a. priest

b. house servant

c.domestic

3. Those who abused their relationship:

a. brother who seduced his sister

b. ascendant who seduced his descendant

 This crime also involves sexual intercourse. The offended woman must be over
12 but below 18 years.

The distinction between qualified seduction and simple seduction lies in the fact,
among others, that the woman is a virgin in qualified seduction, while in simple
seduction, it is not necessary that the woman be a virgin. It is enough that she is of
good repute.

For purposes of qualified seduction, virginity does not mean physical virginity. It
means that the offended party has not had any experience before.

The virginity referred to here, is not to be understood in so material a sense as to

exclude the idea of abduction of a virtuous woman of a good reputation. Thus, when
the accused claims he had prior intercourse with the complainant, the latter is still to be
considered a virgin (U.S. vs. Casten, 34 Phil. 808). But if it was established that the girl
had a carnal relations with other men, there can be no crime of Seduction as she is not
a virgin.

Although in qualified seduction, the age of the offended woman is considered, if

the offended party is a descendant or a sister of the offender – no matter how old she is
or whether she is a prostitute – the crime of qualified seduction is committed.

Illustration

If a person goes to a sauna parlor and finds there a descendant and despite that,
had sexual intercourse with her, regardless of her reputation or age, the crime of
qualified seduction is committed.

In the case of a teacher, it is not necessary that the offended woman be his
student. It is enough that she is enrolled in the same school.

Deceit is not necessary in qualified seduction. Qualified seduction is committed

even though no deceit intervened or even when such carnal knowledge was voluntary
on the part of the virgin. This is because in such a case, the law takes for granted the
existence of the deceit as an integral element of the crime and punishes it with greater
severity than it does the simple seduction, taking into account the abuse of confidence
on the part of the agent. Abuse of confidence here implies fraud.

The fact that the offended party gave her consent to the sexual intercourse is not
a defense. Lack of consent on the part of the complainant is not an element of the
crime.

The term domestic refers to a person usually living under the same roof with the
offended party. It includes all those persons residing with the family and who are
members of the same household, regardless of the fact that their residence may only be
temporary or that they may be paying for their board and lodging.

A domestic should not be confused with a house servant. A domestic is not

necessarily a house servant.
 Where the offended party is below 12 years of age, regardless of whether the
victim is a sister or a descendant of the offender, the crime committed is rape.

If the offended party is married and over 12 years of age, the crime committed
will be adultery.

An essential element of a qualified seduction is virginity (doncella). It is a

condition existing in a woman who has had no sexual intercourse with any man. It does
not refer to the condition of the hymen as being intact.

One who is charged with qualified seduction can be convicted of rape. But one
who is charged with rape cannot be convicted of qualified seduction under the same
information. (People vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144).

Even if the woman has already lost her virginity because of rape, in the eyes of
the law, she remains a virtuous woman even if physically she is no longer a virgin.

a. PEOPLE V. FONTILLA 23 SCRA 1227

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MARIANO FONTANILLA

G.R. No. l. 25354 JUNE 1968 (23 SCRA 1227)

FACTS:

On September 1960, Fe Castro, a fifteen- year old virgin, was brought by her
mother to the house of Mariano Fontanilla and his second wife, Magdalena Copio, a
sister of Fe’s mother, to serve as a helper. Fe Castro testified that during her stay in the
house of Fontanilla for about number of times she could not recall. Prior to this incident,
the accused he made amorous overtures and advances toward her.

Fe Castro further testified that she subsequently repeatedly yielded to the carnal
desires of the accused, as she was induced by his promises of marriage and frightened
by his acts of intimidation. The accused made love to her during the day when his wife
was away and at night when the latter was already asleep. Their intimacies lasted for
almost three months three months until her aunt, the wife of the accused, caught them
in flagrante on the kitchen floor. The following day she returned to her parents, and
revealed everything to her mother two days later.

ISSUE:

Whether or not qualified seduction is present when there is no element of deceit

DECISION:

Yes,

While deceit is an essential element of ordinary or simple seduction, it does not have to
be proved or established in a charge of qualified seduction. It is replaced by abuse of
confidence. Under Article 337 of the Revised Penal Code, the seduction of a virgin over
twelve and under eighteen year of age, committed by any person in public authority,
priest, house servant, domestic guardian, teacher, or any person who, in any capacity,
shall be entrusted with the education of custody of the woman seduced is “constitutive”
of the crime of qualified seduction even though no deceit intervenes of even when such
carnal knowledge was voluntary on the part of the virgin.

b. PEREZ V. CA 168 SCRA 236

ELEUTERIO PEREZ V. COUR OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-80838 Nov. 1988 (168 SCRA 236)

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with and convicted of the crime of consented abduction. He was
later acquitted on appeal, the Court of Appeals ruling that he committed seduction and
not abduction. Subsequently, private complainant filed another criminal complaint
against him for qualified seduction.

Petitioner herein was initially charged with consented abduction in the CFI of
Pampanga. The accused pleaded not guilty, but the trial on the merits ensued and a
judgment of conviction was rendered against Perez.

On appeal, the CA reversed and acquitted Perez of the crime of Consented Abduction.

Subsequent to petitioner’s acquittal, complainant Yolanda Mendoza filed another

criminal complaint against Perez, but this time is for Qualified Seduction.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash involving double jeopardy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not subsequent filing of case in the form of qualified seduction after acquittal
to consented seduction constitutes double jeopardy.

DECISION:

No. In the case at bar, the issue posed by the petitioner relates to the identity of the two
offenses of Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction.

It is true that the two offenses for which the petitioner was charged arose from the same
facts. This however, does not preclude the filing of another information against him if
from those facts. two distinct elements, arose.

A single act may be an offense against two statutes and if each statutes requires proof
of an additional fact, which the other does not, and acquittal or conviction under either
statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and conviction under the other
The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two indictments
are perfectly distinct in point of law however closely they may appear to be connected in
fact.

The similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction.

1. That the offended part is a virgin

2. That she must be over twelve and under 18 years of age.

Consented Abduction requires that:

1. The taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after solicitation
or cajolery from the offender.

2. The taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs.

Qualified Seduction requires that:

1. The crime ben committed by abuse of authority, confidence or relationship.

2. The offender has sexual intercourse with the woman

7. ARTICLE 338

SIMPLE SEDUCTION

ELEMENTS

1. That the offended party is over 12 and under 18 years of age.

2. That she must be of good reputation, single or widow.

3. That the offender has sexual intercourse with her.

4. That it is committed by means of deceit.

Deceit generally takes the form of unfulfilled promise to marry. The promise of
marriage must serve as the inducement. The woman must yield on account of the
promise of marriage or other forms of inducement. (People vs. Hernandez, 29 Phil. 109)

Where the accused failed to have sex with this sweetheart over twelve (12) but
below eighteen (18) years old because the latter refused as they were not yet married,
and the accused procured the performance of a fictitious marriage ceremony because
of which the girlfriend yielded, he is guilty of Simple Seduction. (U.S. vs. Hernandez, 29
Phil. 109). Here, there was deceit employed. This act may now be considered Rape
under R.A. 8353, Sec. 2 par. 6.

A promise of material things in exchange for the women’s surrender of her virtue
does not constitute deceit.

If a woman under 18 years of age but over 12 agrees to a sexual intercourse with a
man who promised her precious jewelries but the man reneges on his promise, there is
no seduction that the woman is of loose morals. (Luis B. Reyes)

Promise of marriage must precede sexual intercourse.

 A promise of marriage made by the accused after sexual intercourse had taken
place, or after the woman had yielded her body to the man by mutual consent will not
render the man liable for simple seduction.
The offended woman must be under 18 but not less than 12 years old; otherwise,
the crime is statutory rape.

Unlike in qualified seduction, virginity is not essential in this crime. What is

required is that the woman be unmarried and of good reputation. Simple seduction is
not synonymous with loss of virginity. If the woman is married, the crime will be
adultery.

ARTICLE 339

ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS WITH THE CONSENT OF THE OFFENDED PARTY

ELEMENTS:

1. that the offender commits acts of lasciviousness or lewdness.

2. That the acts are committed upon a woman who is virgin or single or widow of good
reputation, under 18 years of age but over 12 years, or a sister or descendant
regardless of her reputation or age.

3. that the offender accomplishes the acts by abuse of authority, confidence,

relationship, or deceit.

When the acts of lasciviousness is committed with the use of force or intimidation
or when the offended party is under 12 years of age, the object of the crime can either
be a woman or a man.

Where the acts of the offender were limited to acts of lewdness or

lasciviousness, and no carnal knowledge was had; but had there been sexual
intercourse, the offense would have been Seduction, he is guilty of Acts of
Lasciviousness under this article.

The crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 339 is one that is done with the
consent of the offended party who is always a woman. The lewd acts committed against
her is with her consent only because the offender took advantage of his authority, or
there was abuse of confidence, or the employment of deceit, or the offender is related to
the victim.

In the commission of the acts of lasciviousness either by force or intimidation, or

with the consent of the offended party, there must be no sexual intercourse, or the acts
performed are short of sexual intercourse. In the first situation, the crime would either be
qualified seduction or simple seduction if the offender succeeds in having sexual
intercourse with the victim. In these two cases, there is consent but the same is
procured by the offender through the employment of deceit, abuse of confidence, abuse
of authority or because of the existence of blood relationship.
ARTICLE 340

CORRUPTION OF MINORS

Act punishable: by promoting or facilitating the prostitution or corruption of

persons underage to satisfy the lust of another.

It is not required that the offender be the guardian or custodian of the minor. It is
not necessary that the minor be prostituted or corrupted as the law merely punishes the
act of promoting or facilitating the prostitution or corruption of said minor and that he
acted in order to satisfy the lust of another.

A single act of promoting or facilitating the corruption or prostitution of a minor is

sufficient to constitute violation of this article.

What the law punishes is the act of pimp (bugaw) who facilitates the corruption of
a minor. It is not the unchaste act of the minor which is being punished. So, a mere
proposal to promote or facilitate the prostitution or corruption of a minor is sufficient to
consummate the crime.

Young minor should enjoy a good reputation. Apparently, a prostitute above 12

and under 18 years of age cannot be the victim in the crime of corruption of minors.

ARTICLE 341

WHITE SLAVE TRADE

Acts penalized:

1. Engaging in the business of prostitution

2. Profiting by prostitution

3. Enlisting the service of women for the purpose of prostitution

The person liable under Article 341 is the one who maintains or engages in the
trade of prostitution. A white slave is a woman held unwillingly for purposes of
commercial prostitution. A white slaver on the other hand is one engaged in white slave
traffic, procurer of white slaves or prostitutes.

The most common way of committing this crime would be through the
maintenance of a bar or saloon where women engage in prostitution. For each
intercourse, the women pay the maintainer or owner of a certain amount in this case,
the maintainer of owner of the bar or saloon is liable for white slave trade. (People vs.
Go Lo, 56 O.G. 4056).
B.

1. ARTICLE 342

FORCIBLE ABDUCTION

ELEMENTS:

1. That the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or
reputation.

2. That the abduction is against her will.

3. That the abduction is with lewd designs.

Note: Sexual intercourse is NOT necessary

Crimes against chastity where age and reputation of victim are immaterial: rape, acts of
lasciviousness, qualified seduction of sister/descendant, forcible abduction

Forcible abduction defined

It is the taking away of any woman against her will, from her house or the place
where she may be, for the purpose of carrying her to another place with intent to marry
or corrupt her. A woman is carried against her will or brought from one place to another
against her will with lewd design.

Unlike in Rape and Seduction, in the crime of Abduction, whether Forcible or

Consented, there is no sexual intercourse. The acts are limited to taking away from a
place the victim, but the same must be with lewd designs, that is, with unchaste design
manifested by kissing and touching the victim’s private parts.

If the element of lewd design is present, the carrying of the woman would qualify
as abduction; otherwise, it would amount to kidnapping. If the woman was only brought
to a certain place in order to break her will and make her agree to marry the offender,
the crime is only grave coercion because the criminal intent of the offender is to force
his will upon the woman and not really to restrain the woman of her liberty.

Where lewd design was not proved or shown, and the victim was deprived of her
liberty, the crime is kidnapping with Serious Illegal Detention under this Article 267,
RPC.

The element of lewd designs, which is essential to the crime of abduction through
violence, refers to the intention to abuse the abducted woman. If such intention is
lacking or does not exist, the crime may be illegal detention. It is necessary to establish
the unchaste design or purpose of the offender. But it is sufficient that the intent to
seduce the girl is present. The evil purpose of the offender may be established or
inferred from the overt acts of the accused.

If the offended woman is under 12 years old, even if she consented to the
abduction, the crime is forcible abduction and not consented abduction.

Where the offended woman is below the age of consent, even though she had
gone with the offender through some deceitful promises revealed upon her to go with
him and they live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, the
ruling is that forcible abduction is committed by the mere carrying of the woman as long
as that intent is already shown. In other words, where the man cannot possibly give the
woman the benefit of an honorable life, all that man promised are just machinations of a
lewd design and, therefore, the carrying of the woman is characterized with lewd design
and would bring about the crime of abduction and not kidnapping. This is also true if the
woman is deprived of reason and if the woman is mentally retarded. Forcible abduction
is committed and not consented abduction.

Lewd designs may be demonstrated by the lascivious acts performed by the

offender on her. Since this crime does not involve sexual intercourse, if the victim is
subjected to this, then a crime of rape is further committed and a complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape is committed.

Lewd design does not include sexual intercourse. So, if sexual intercourse is
committed against the offended party after her forcible abduction, the offender commits
another crime separate and distinct from forcible abduction. In this case, the accused
should be charged with forcible abduction with rape. (People vs. Jose, et al., 37 SCRA
450)

If the accused carried or took away the victim by means of force and with lewd
design and thereafter raped her, the crime is Forcible Abduction with Rape, the former
being a necessary means to commit the latter. The subsequent two (2) other sexual
intercourse committed against the will of the complainant would be treated as
independent separate crimes of Rape. (People vs. Bacalso, 210 SCRA 206).

If the main object of the offender is to rape the victim, and the forcible abduction
was resorted to by the accused in order to facilitate the commission of the rape, then
the crime committed is only rape. (People vs. Toledo, 83 Phil. 777)

Where the victim was taken from one place to another, solely for the purpose of
killing him and not detaining him for any legal length of time, the crime committed is
murder. (People vs. Ong, 62 SCRA 174)

True intention of the offender should be ascertained. If the detention is only

incidental, the same should be considered as absorbed. Otherwise, it should be treated
as a separate offense. When such a situation arises, we should consider the application
of Article 48 on complex crimes.

The taking away of the woman may be accomplished by means of deceit at the
beginning and then by means of violence and intimidation later.

The virginity of the complaining witness is not a determining factor in forcible

abduction.

In order to demonstrate the presence of the lewd design, illicit criminal relations
with the person abducted need not be shown. The intent to seduce a girl is sufficient.

If there is a separation in fact, the taking by the husband of his wife against her
will constitutes grave coercion.
Distinction between Forcible Abduction and Illegal Detention

When a woman is kidnapped with lewd or unchaste designs, the crime

committed is forcible abduction.

When the kidnapping is without lewd designs, the crime committed is illegal detention.

But where the offended party was forcibly taken to the house of the defendant to
coerce her to marry him, it was held that only grave coercion was committed and not
illegal detention.

Forcible abduction must be distinguished from the crime of kidnapping. When the
violent taking of a woman is motivated by lewd design, the crime committed is forcible
abduction. But if the motive of the offender is to deprive the woman of her liberty, the
crime committed is kidnapping. Abduction is a crime against chastity while kidnapping is
a crime against personal liberty.

a. PEOPLE V. SINPONGCO (163 SCRA 222)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SILVESTRE SUNPONGCO, HERMINIGILDO

SUNPONGCO and ARSENIO CALAYAG

G.R. No. L- 42665 June 1988 (163 SCRA 222)

FACTS:

Juanita Angeles is the complaint of the. This crime of forcible abduction with
rape. The complainant pointed three accused appellants together with Benjamin Gabriel
as the perpetrator of the crime.

That about or on the 23rd day of October, 1964, at around 9:00 o’clock in the morning,
Juanity Angeles, the offended party, left her residence at Hagony, Bulacan to get rice
from the RCA warehouse of Dr. Lansan at Guiguinto Bulacan. She was with one Benita
Fabian and they rode a passenger jeep driven by Virgilio Gan. As they reached the
south approach of Tabang Bridge, Guiguinto Bulacan, a car overtook them and stopped
right in front of their jeep, thus forcing them to stop. The car was being driven by
accused Arsenio Calayag, and the passengers were accused Silvestre Sungpongco,
Herminigildo Sunpongco and Benjamin Gabriel. Thereafter, the three passengers just
mentioned, alighted from the car and boarded the jeep, after which Silvestre Sunpongco
co ordered its driver to proceed to the old road. Silverstre Sunpongco sat at the back of
Juanita Angeles, Benjamin Gabriel sat behind the driver, and Herminigildo Sunpongco
forced himself at the left side of the driver, while Arsenio Calayag followed in the Car he
was driving.

Upon reaching an uninhabited placed on the old road, Silvestre Sunpongco ordered the
jeep to stop and the three accused got out. Silvestre tried to pull the offended party out
of the jeep, but she struggled and fought back so he ordered Benjamin Gabriel to help
him. Benita Fabian, meanwhile, embraced Juanita on the waist and pleaded with three
accused to leave Juanita alone, but Herminigildo Sunpongco separated them by force.
Despite her struggling and resisting, the accused were able to pull the offended party
out of the jeep, and although Juanita embraced Benita Fabian and asked the latter not
to leave her, Silvestre kept on pulling her into the car with the aid of a drawn gun. Then
Benita Fabian, who was able to free herself from Herminigildo Sunpongco, ran towards
the car but Silvestre closed its doors at once. Hten Herminilgdo pushed Benita and she
fell to the ground, after which the former got into the car and it sped away, in the
municipality of Guiguinto, Bulacan and within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
the said accused Silvestre Sungpongco, Benjamin Gabriel, Herminigildo Sungpongco,
and Arsenio Calayag did then and help one another willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously,
by means of violence, force intimidation and trickery and with lewd designs, abduct the
complaining witness Juanita F. Angeles.

ISSUE:

Whether Forcible Abduction with rape committed.

DECISION:

Yes.

Where, this court finds the accused Silvester Sungpongco, Heminigildo Sungpongco
and Arsenio Calayag guilty by reasonable doubt as principal of complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape, suffer the penalty of life imprisonment with accessory
penalties of the law to indemnify jointly.

b. PEOPLE V. JOSE 37 SCRA 350

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, AND

ROGELIO CAÑAL Y SEVILLA.

G.R. No. L-28232 June 1967 (37 SCRA 350)

FACTS:

On June 26, 1967, four principal- accused Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda Jr., Eduardo
Aquino and Rogelio Cañal conspired together, confederated with and mutually helped
one another, then and there, to willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design to
forcibly abduct Magdalena”Maggie” Dela Riva, 23 years old and single, a movie actress
by profession at the time of the incident, where the four principal accused, by means of
force and intimidation using a deadly weapon, have carnal knowledge of the complaint
against her will, and brought her to Swanky Hotel in Pasay City, and hence committed
the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape.

Having established the elements of conspiracy, the trail court finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime or forcible abduction with rape and sentences
each to the death penalty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court made a proper ruling of the case considering the element
of conspiracy.
DECISION:

No,

The trial court’s ruling was not proper. The SC ruled that since the element of
conspiracy was present, where the act of the one is the act of all, each of the accused is
also liable for the crime committed by each of the persons who conspired to commit the
crime. The SC modified the judgment as follows: appellants Jaime Jose, Basilio Pineda
Jr., and Eduardo Aquino are guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape
and each of them is likewise convicted with four death penalties and to indemnify the
victim of the sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes. The case against Rogelio
Cañal was dismissed only in so far as the criminal liability is concerned due to his death
in prison prior to promulgation of judgement.

2. ARTICLE 343

CONSENTED ABDUCTION

ELEMENTS:

1. That the offended party must be a virgin.

2. That she must be over 12 and under 18 years of age.

3. That the taking away of the offended party must be with her consent, after
solicitation or cajolery from the offender.

4. That the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs.

Virginity may be presumed from the fact that the offended party is unmarried and
has been leading moral life. Virginity or maidenhood should not be understood in such a
matter of fact as to completely exclude a woman who has had previous sexual
intercourse. If the previous sexual intercourse was the result of the crime of rape, the
intercourse committed with her against he will and over her violent objection should not
render her unchaste and a woman of bad reputation.

If the virgin is under 12 years old, the crime committed is forcible abduction
because of the theory that a child below 12 years of age has no will of her own.

The purpose of the law on consented abduction is to punish the offender for
causing disgrace and scandal to the family of the offended party. The law does not
punish the offender for the wrong done to the woman since in the eyes of the law, she
consented to her seduction.

The deceit which is termed by the law as solicitation or cajolery maybe in the
form of honeyed promises of marriage.

In consented Abduction, it is not necessary that the young victim, (a virgin over
twelve and under eighteen) be personally taken from her parent’s home by the accused;
it is sufficient that he was instrumental in her leaving the house. He must however use
solicitation, cajolery or deceit, or honeyed promises of marriage to induce the girl to
escape from her home.
 In consented abduction, the taking away of the virgin must be with lewd design.
Actual sexual intercourse with the woman is not necessary. However, if the same is
established, then it will be considered as strong evidence to prove lewd design.

a. PILAPIL V. IBAY SOMERA

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL V. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, HON LUIS C.

VICTOR AND ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING
G.R. No. 80116 June,1989.

FACTS:

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino citizen) and

respondent and respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, German national, were married at
Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila and had a child,
Isabella Pilapil Geiling.

The private respondent-initiated divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. The

local court in Germany promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouse.

On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in
Manila.

After the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed the complaint for
adultery before the prosecutor of Manila alleging that the petitioner had an affair William
Chia and Jesus Chua while they were still married.

Petitioner filed a petition with the Justice Secretary asking to set aside the cases filed
against her and be dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment
and to suspend further proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution
directing to move for the dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even
though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

DECISION:

Yes.

The crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be
prosecuted except upon sworn written filed by the offended spouse. Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the
time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. This is logical consequence
since the raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed
offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the
filing of the criminal case. It is indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. Thus, the divorce
decree is valid not only in his country, may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
private respondent is concerned – in view of the nationality principle under the Civil
Code on the matter of civil status of persons. Private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case. The
criminal case filed against petitioner is dismissed.

3. ARTICLE 344

PROSECUTION OF ADULTERY, CONCUBINAGE, SEDUCTION, ABDUCTION

RAPE AND ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS

1. Adultery and concubinage must be prosecuted upon complaint signed by the

offended spouse

2. Seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness must be prosecuted upon

complaint signed by:

a. offended party

b. by her parents

c. grandparents

d. guardians in the order in which they are named above

The crimes of adultery and concubinage must be prosecuted upon a complaint

signed by the offended spouse. In the complaint, the offended party must include both
guilty parties if they are both alive.

The word guardian as mentioned in the law refers to the guardian appointed by
the court. (People vs. Formento, et al., 60 Phil. 434)

What is the meaning of “shall have consented” which bars the institution of
criminal action for adultery or concubinage?

The term “consent” has reference to the tie prior to the commission of the crime.
In other words, the offended party gives his or her consent to the future infidelity of the
offending spouse. And so, while consent refers to the offense prior to its commission,
pardon refers to the offense after its commission. (People vs. Schnekenburger, et al., 73
Phil. 413)

Note:

Marriage of the offender with the offended party extinguishes the criminal action
or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. This applies as well to the accomplices,
accessories-after-the-fact. But marriages must be in good faith. This rule does not apply
in case of multiple rape

In the crimes involving rape, abduction, seduction, and acts of lasciviousness,

the marriage by the offender with the offended woman generally extinguishes criminal
liability, not only of the principal but also of the accomplice and accessory. However,
the mere fact of marriage is not enough because it is already decided that if the offender
marries the offended woman without any intention to perform the duties of a husband as
shown by the fact that after the marriage, he already left her, the marriage would appear
as having been contracted only to avoid the punishment. Even with that marriage, the
offended woman could still prosecute the offender and that marriage will not have the
effect of extinguishing the criminal liability.

Pardon by the offended woman of the offender is not a manner of extinguishing

criminal liability but only a bar to the prosecution of the offender. Therefore, that pardon
must come before the prosecution is commenced. When the prosecution is already
commenced or initiated, pardon by the offended woman will no longer be effective
because pardon may preclude prosecution but not prevent the same.

Pardon in crimes against chastity, is a bar to prosecution. But it must come

before the institution of the criminal action. (See the cases of People vs. Villorente, 210
SCRA 647; People vs. Avila, 192 SCRA 635) To be effective, it must include both
accused.

How about pardon declared by the offended party during the trial of the case?
Such a declaration is not a ground for the dismissal of the case. Pardon is a matter of
defense which the accused must plead and prove during the trial. (People vs. Riotes,
C.A., 49 O.G.3403).

a. PILAPIL V. IBAY SOMERA

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL V. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, HON LUIS C.

VICTOR AND ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING
G.R. No. 80116 June,1989.

FACTS:

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil (Filipino citizen) and

respondent and respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, German national, were married at
Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together in Malate, Manila and had a child,
Isabella Pilapil Geiling.

The private respondent-initiated divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. The

local court in Germany promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouse.

On the other hand, petitioner filed an action for legal separation before a trial court in
Manila.

After the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed the complaint for
adultery before the prosecutor of Manila alleging that the petitioner had an affair William
Chia and Jesus Chua while they were still married.

Petitioner filed a petition with the Justice Secretary asking to set aside the cases filed
against her and be dismissed. Thereafter, petitioner moved to defer her arraignment
and to suspend further proceedings. Justice Secretary Ordoñez issued a resolution
directing to move for the dismissal of the complaints against petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even
though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
DECISION:

Yes.

The crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be
prosecuted except upon sworn written filed by the offended spouse. Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the
time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. This is logical consequence
since the raison d’etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed
offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the
filing of the criminal case. It is indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. Thus, the divorce
decree is valid not only in his country, may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
private respondent is concerned – in view of the nationality principle under the Civil
Code on the matter of civil status of persons. Private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case. The
criminal case filed against petitioner is dismissed.

4. ARTICLE 345

CIVIL LIABILITY OF PERSONS GUILTY OF RAPE, SEDUCTION OR ABDUCTION

1. To idemnify the offended women

2. To acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so
3. In every case to support the offspring

The civil liability of the adulterer and the concubine is limited to indemnity for
damages caused to the offended spouse. The law does not mention the adulteress in
the crime of adultery such that only the adulterer shall be held civilly liable.

There is likewise no mention of the offender in the crime of acts of

lasciviousness, as being held liable for civil damages under Article 345, the law only
mentioned the crimes of rape, seduction and abduction.

Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in
seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts. The crimes of adultery and
concubinage are also included.

In the crimes of rape, abduction and seduction, if the offended woman had given
birth to the child, among the liabilities of the offender is to support the child. This
obligation to support the child may be true even if there are several offenders. As to
whether all of them will acknowledge the child that is a different question because the
obligation to support here is not founded on civil law but is the result of a criminal act or
a form of punishment.

It has been held that where the woman was the victim of the said crime could not
possibly conceive anymore; the trial court should not provide in its sentence that the
accused, in case a child is born, should support the child. This should only be proper
when there is a probability that the offended woman could give birth to an offspring.
ARTICLE 346

LIABILITY OF ASCENDANTS, GUARDIAN, TEACHERS OR OTHER PERSONS

ENTRUSTED WITH THE CUSTODY OF THE OFFENDED PARTY

The ascendants, guardian, curators, teachers, and any person who, abuse of
authority or confidential relationship shall cooperate as accomplices in the perpetration
of the crimes embraced in chapters second, third and fourth of this title, shall be
pinished as principals.

Teachers or other persons in any other capacity entrusted with the education and
guidance of youth, shall also suffer the penalty of temporary special disqualification in
its maximum period to perpetual special disqualification.

Any person falling within the terms of this article, and any other person guilty of
corruption of minors for the benefit of another, shall be punished by special
disqualification from filling the office of guardian.

ARTICLE 347

SIMULATION OF BIRTHS, SUBSTITUTION OF ONE CHILD FOR ANOTHER, AND

CONCEALMENT OR ABANDONMENT OF A LEGITIMATE CHILD

Acts Punished:
1. Simulation of births

2. Substitution of one child for another

3. Concealing or abandoning any legitimate child with the intent to cause such child to
lose its civil status

Requisites:
1. The child must be legitimate

2. The offender conceals or abandons such child

3. The offender has the intent to cause the child to lose its civil status

Elements of Simulation of Birth

1. Child is baptized or registered in the Registry of birth as hers

2. Child loses its real status and acquiires a new one

3. Actor’s purpose was to cause the loss of any trace as to the child’s true filiation

Simulation of birth takes place when a woman pretends to be pregnant when in

fact she is not and on the day of the supposed delivery, she takes the child of another
and declares the child to be her own. This is done by entering in the birth certificate of
the child that the offender is the alleged mother of the child when in fact the child
belongs to another.
 ARTICLE 348

USURPATION OF CIVIL STATUS

Committed by a person who represents himself as another and assumes the filiation or
rights pertaining to such person

Notes:
There must be criminal intent to enjoy the civil rights of another by the offender knowing he
is not entitled thereto

The term "civil status" includes one's public station, or the rights, duties,
capacities and incapacities which determine a person to a given class. It seems that
the term "civil status" includes one's profession.

Committed by asuming the filiation, or the parental or conjugal rights of another

Usurpation is committed by assuming the filiation or parental (when maternal,

paternal or conjugal) claim of another. To be liable for usurpation of civil status, the
offender must have the intent to enjoy the rights arising from the civil status of another.

Circumstances qualifying the offense: penalty is heavier when the purpose of the
impersonation is to defraud the offended party or his heirs.

5. ARTICLE 349

ELEMENTS:

1. That the offender has been legally married.

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the civil
code.

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.

Note:

1. The crime does not fall within the category of private crimes that can be
prosecuted only at the instance of the offended party PUBLIC CRIME

*For the crime of bigamy to prosper the first marriage must be valid. If the first
marriage is void from the beginning, such nullity of the marriage is not a defense in a
charge of bigamy. Consequently, when raised as a defense, the accused should be
convicted since until and unless annulled, the bond of matrimony remains or is
maintained.
 *Need for judicial declaration of nullity
*The second marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity were
it not for the existence of the first marriage.

2. A simulated marriage is not marriage at all and can be used as a defense for bigamy

Good faith is a defense in bigamy. One who, although not yet married before,
knowingly consents to be married to one who is already married is guilty of bigamy
knowing that the latter’s marriage is still valid and subsisting.

3. There must be a summary proceeding to declare the absent spouse presumptively

dead for purposes of remarriage

4. Failure to exercise due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of the 1 st wife is

bigamy through reckless imprudence

5. A judicial declaration of the nullity of marriage void ab initio is now required

60 One convicted for bigamy may be prosecuted for concubinage as both are distinct
offenses

7. One who vouches that there is no legal impediment knowing that one of the parties is
already married is an accomplice

Distinction between bigamy and illegal marriage

Bigamy is a form of illegal marriage. The offender must have a valid and
subsisting marriage. Despite the fact that the marriage is still subsisting, he contracts a
subsequent marriage.

Illegal marriage includes also such other marriages which are performed without
complying with the requirements of law, or such premature marriages, or such marriage
which was solemnized by one who is not authorized to solemnize the same.

a. PEOPLE V. MANUEL GR 165842

EDUARDO P. MANUEL V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 165842 November 2005

FACTS:

This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals
affirming the decisionof the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner
for the crime of bigamy. Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to
Rubylus Gaña on July 18, 1975, who, according to the former, was charged with estafa
in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen again by him after his last visit.
Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only21 years old.
Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in Baguio
City without Gandalera’s knowledge of Manuel’s first marriage. In the course of their
marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already
married when he married him. Shethen filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo
Manuel. The latter’s defense being that his declaration of “single” in his marriage
contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first
marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the
nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled
against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten
years, and an amount 0fP200,000.00 for moral damages. Eduardo appealed the
decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy
because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without
any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the
RTC’s decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years.
Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled
that petitioner’s wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil
Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under
Article 41 of the Family Code.

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it
affirmed the award ofPhp200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in
law.

DECISIONS:

1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with
malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule,
mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a
felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of
the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law.

Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period,
the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment
declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and
convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of
the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even
if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he
cannot be convicted of the crime. The court rules against the petitioner.

2. The Court rules that the petitioner’s collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during
and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with
malice and caused injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts
are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social
institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society. Because the
private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she is not barred
from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the
Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.
b. PEOPLE V. ARAGON 100 PHIL. 1033

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PROCESO S. ARAGON

100 Phil 1033 February 1957

FACTS:

Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with Gorrea. While his marriage with the
latter subsist, he contracted a canonical marriage with Faicol. Gorrea is staying in Cebu
while Faicol is in Iloilo. He was a traveling salesman thus, he commuted between Iloilo
and Cebu. When Gorrea died, he brought Faicol to Cebu where the latter worked as
teacher-nurse. She later on suffered injuries in her eyes caused by physical
maltreatment of Rosima and was sent to Iloilo to undergo treatment. While she was in
Iloilo, Rosima contracted a third marriage with Maglasang. CFI-Cebu found him guilty
of bigamy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the third marriage is null and void.

DECISION:

The action was instituted upon the complaint of the second wife whose marriage with
Rosima was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage
was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and prosecution against
Rosima for contracting marriage cannot prosper.

6. ARTICLE 350

MARRIAGE CONTRACTED AGAINST PROVISIONS OF LAWS

ELEMENTS:

1. That the offender contracted marriage.

2. That he knew at the time that

3. the requirement of the law were not complied with, or

4. The marriage was in disregard of a legal impediment.

Note: Circumstance qualifying the offense: if either of the contracting parties obtains
the consent of the other by means of violence, intimidation or fraud.

The requirements of the law for a valid marriage are:

1. The legal capacity of the contracting parties;

2. Their consent freely given;

3. Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

4. Marriage license, except in marriage under exceptional circumstances.

The law further provides that for accused to be liable under this article, he should not be
guilty of bigamy because otherwise, the crime punished under Article 350 is deemed
absorbed in the bigamy.

Marriages contracted against the provisions of laws

1. The marriage does not constitute bigamy.

2. The marriage is contracted knowing that the requirements of the law have not been
complied with or in disregard of legal impediments.

3. One where the consent of the other was obtained by means of violence, intimidation
or fraud.

4. If the second marriage is void because the accused knowingly contracted it without
complying with legal requirements as the marriage license, although he was
previously married.

5. Marriage solemnized by a minister or priest who does not have the required authority
to solemnize marriages.

ARTICLE 351

PREMATURE MARRIAGE

Acts punished:

A widow who within 301 days from death of husband, got married or before her delivery,
if she was pregnant at the time of his death

A woman whose marriage having been dissolved or annulled, married before her
delivery or within 301 days after the legal separation.

ARTICLE 352

PERFORMANCE OF ILLEGAL MARRIAGE CEREMONY

Act punished: Performance of any illegal marriage ceremony by a priest or minister of

any religious denomination or sect or by civil authorities.

Priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who

shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in
accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law.

Priest or minister of any religion denomination or sect, or civil authority who is

authorized to solemnize marriages and who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony is liable in this article.

7. ARTICLE 353
LIBEL

ELEMENTS:

1. That there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary,

or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstances.

2. That the imputation must be made publicly.

3. That it must be malicious.

4. That the imputation must be directed at a natural or juridical person, or one who is
dead.

5. That the imputation must tend to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the
person defamed.

Libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or a vice or defect, real or

imaginary or any act, commission, condition, status or circumstances tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.

a. MAGNO V. PEOPLE GR 133896

DOLORES MAGNO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L-133896

FACTS:

That on or about the 9th day of March 1991, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, the
above-named accused Dolores Magno, with deliberate and malicious intent and evil
motive of impeaching the reputation, virtue and integrity of Cercelito T. Alejandro, and
with malicious intent of exposing the said Cerelito Alejandro to public hatred, contempt,
ridicule, discredit and dishonor, without any justifiable motive, did then and there willfully
unlawfully and feloniously and criminally point with brush in bold letters at the wall of the
extension of her garage, the following defamatory words: “Huag Burahin Bawal Dumaan
and Suspetsosa Maniac at Magnanakaw ng Aso Katulad ni Cerelitio”, which aforesaid
defamatory, malicious and libelous statements have been read by the public, when in
truth and infact said accused well knew that the allegations are false virtue and
malicious, thereby causing dishonor, discredit, ridicule or contempt against the said
Cerelito Alejandro, to his damage and prejudice.

That on or about the 15th day of March 1991, in the City of Baguio, and with the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate and
malicious intent and evil motive of impeaching the reputation, virtue and integrity of
Cerelito t. Alejandro, a person of good standing in the community, and with malicious
intent of exposing the said Cerelito T. Alejandro.
ISSUE:

Whether Dolores Magno is guilty of Libel

DECISION:

Yes,

Dolores Magno is guilty of libel. As earlier recited, the information in Criminal Case No.
8806-R arose out of what Dolores wrote about the spouses Cerelito one Fe Alejandro
contained in an unsealed envelope and delivered, through Evelyn Arcartado, on March
15, 1991. Dolores contends that from the time Evelyn was physically handed the
unsealed envelope to the time the latter turned it over to Cerelito, no one opened or
read the offering letter contained therein. Presiding there from, Dolores argues against
the existence of libel citing, for the purpose, American jurisprudence holding the “where
libelous communication to others, the originator of the libel is not responsible for the
publication. She further declares that to call the husband (Cerelito) a thief connection
with a charge that he and his wife had stolen goods, is not peak words of defamation of
him alone so as to make the utterance in the presence of his wife a publication.

b. GANAAN V. IAC 145 SCRA 112

EDGARDO A. GAANAN VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (IAC)

GR NO. L-69809, October 1986 [145 SCRA 112]

FACTS:

A direct assault case against Leonardo Laconico was filed by complainant Atty. Tito
Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon. The said complainants made a telephone call to
Laconico to give their terms for withdrawal of their complaint. Gaanan vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court (IAC)

Laconico, later on, called appellant Gaanan, who is also a lawyer, to come to his office
to advise him about the proposed settlement. When complainant called up, Laconico
requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone
extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. After
enumerating the conditions, several calls were made to finally confirm if the settlement
is agreeable to both parties.

As part of their agreement, Laconico has to give the money to the complainant's wife at
the office of the Department of Public Highways. But he insisted to give the money to
the complainant himself. After receiving the money, the complainant was arrested by
the agents of the Philippine Constabulary, who were alerted earlier before the
exchange. Appellant stated on his affidavit that he heard complainant demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the
affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against the
complainant.

In defense, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act as the appellant heard the telephone conversation without
complainant's consent. Trial Court: both Gaanan and Laconico were guilty of violating
Sect. 1 of RA No. 4200.

IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Hence, this petition. The case at bar involves an interpretation of the Republic Act No.
4200 or also known as Anti-Wiretapping Act. Petitioner contends that telephones or
extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly known"
listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated
electronic devices contemplated by law.

However, respondent argues that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by

the term "device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or
portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of

the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful
interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.

DECISION:

No.
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to
any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a Dictaphone or
dictagraph or Dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described.

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts
penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire
record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication
or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That
the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by
this prohibition. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for
the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication.
There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate
installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the
spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a Dictaphone,

dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use
thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line.

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement", although not exclusive to that enumerated
therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature,
that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a
telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed
by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of
common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a
telephone conversation. Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

The petition is granted and the petitioner is acquitted of the crime of violation of
Republic Act No. 4200.

c. RAMIREZ V. CA 248 SCRA 590

RAMIREZ V. COURT OF APPEALS

(248 SCRA 590)

FACTS:

Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil
case filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private
respondent, Ester s. Garcia, Vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious
mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to
morals, good customs and public policy”. Private respondent filed a criminal case before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200 entitled “an Act
to prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other related violations of private
communications and other purposes.” Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the
Information. The trail court granted the said motion. The private respondent filed a
petitioner for review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to
the Court order as null and void, after subsequently denied the motion for
reconsideration by the petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the
tapping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.

DECISION:

No,
Petition denied, cost against petitioner. Legislative intent is determined principally from
the language of the statute. The unambiguity of the express words of the provision,
taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record,
therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks
the penalize even those privy to the private communications where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in section 1 of RA 4200

does not include “private communication” to a point of absurdity.

8. ARTICLE 354

Character of the words used to make it defamatory

Words calculated to induce suspicion are more effective in destroying reputation

than false charges directly made. Ironical and metaphorical language is a favored
vehicle for slander. A charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearer
to suppose and understand that the person against whom they are uttered is guilty of
certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach his honesty, virtue or reputation, or to hold
him up to public ridicule. (U.S. vs. O’Connell, 37 Phil. 767)

Malice has been defined as a term used to indicate the fact that the defamer is
prompted by personal ill or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure
the reputation of the person defamed.

Kinds of Malice

Malice in law. This is assumed and is inferred from the defamatory character of
an imputation. The presumption of malice attaches to the defamatory statement
especially if it appears to be insulting per se. The law presumes that the defamer made
the imputation without good intention or justifiable motive.

Malice in fact. This refers to malice as a fact. The presence and existence of
personal ill-will or spite may still appear even if the statement is not defamatory. So,
where the defamatory acts may be presumed from the publication of the defamatory
acts imputed refer to the private life of the individual, malice may be presumed from the
publication of the defamatory statement because no one has a right to invade another’s
privacy.

Distinction

Malice in fact is the malice which the law presumes from every statement whose
tenor is defamatory. It does not need proof. The mere fact that the utterance or
statement is defamatory negates a legal presumption of malice.

In the crime of libel, which includes oral defamation, there is no need for the
prosecution to present evidence of malice. It is enough that the alleged defamatory or
libelous statement be presented to the court verbatim. It is the court which will prove
whether it is defamatory or not. If the tenor of the utterance or statement is defamatory,
the legal presumption of malice arises even without proof.
 Malice in fact becomes necessary only if the malice in law has been rebutted.
Otherwise, there is no need to adduce evidence of malice in fact. So, while malice in
law does not require evidence, malice in fact requires evidence.

Malice in law can be negated by evidence that, in fact, the alleged libelous or
defamatory utterance was made with good motives and justifiable ends or by the fact
that the utterance was privileged in character.

In law, however, the privileged character of a defamatory statement may be

absolute or qualified. When the privileged character is said to be absolute, the
statement will not be actionable whether criminal or civil because that means the law
does not allow prosecution on an action based thereon. In libel cases, the question is
not what the offender means but what the words used by him mean. (Sazon vs. CA, 255
SCRA 692).

ARTICLE 355

LIBEL BY MEANS OF WRITING OR SIMILAR MEANS

A libel may be committed by means of – Writing; Printing; Lithography; Engraving;

Radio; Photograph; Painting; Theatrical exhibition; Cinematographic exhibition; or Any
similar means.
A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio,
phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar
means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or
a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may
be brought by the offended party.

ARTICLE 356

THREATENING TO PUBLISH LIBEL AND OFFER TO PREVENT SUCH

PUBLICATION FOR A COMPENSATION

Acts punished

1. Threatening another to publish a libel concerning him, or his parents, spouse, child,
or other members of his family;

2. Offering to prevent the publication of such libel for compensation or money

consideration.

It involves the unlawful extortion of money by appealing to the fear of the victim,
through threats of accusation or exposure. It contemplates of two offenses: a threat to
establish a libel and an offer to prevent such publication. The gravamen of the crime is
the intent to extort money or other things of value.

a. ERWIN TULFO V. PEOPLE GR 161032

 ERWIN TULFO V. PEOPLE of the Philippines,

G.R. No. L-161032 September 2008

FACTS:

Atty. Ding So of the Bureau of Customs filed four separate Informations against
Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo, And Philip Picay, Accusing
them of libel in connection with the publication of articles in the column “Direct Hit” of the
daily tabloid

Remate. The column accused So of corruption, and portrayed him as an extortionist

and smuggler.

After trial, the RTC found Tulfo, et al. guilty of libel. The CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:

Why was Borjal V. CA not applied to this case?

W/N the assailed articles are privileged.
W/N the assailed articles are fair commentaries.

DECISION:

Borjal was not applied to this case because:

Borjal stemmed from a civil action for damages based on libel, and was not a
criminal case.
The ruling in Borjal was that there was no sufficient identification of the
complaint.
The subject in Borjal was a private citizen, whereas in the present case, the
subject is a public official.
It was held in Borjal that the articles written by Art Borjal were” fair commentaries
on matters of public interest.”
No. the columns were unsubstantiated attacks on Atty. So, and cannot be
countenanced as being privileged simply because the target was a public official.
Even with the knowledge that he might be in error, even knowing of the
possibility that someone else may have used Atty. So’s name, as Tulfo surmised,
he made no effort to verify the information given by his source or even to
ascertain the identity of the person he was accusing.
Although falsity of the articles does not prove malice, the existence of press
freedom must be done” consistent with good faith and reasonable care.” This
was clearly abandoned by Tulfo when he wrote the subject articles. This is no
case of mere error or honesty mistake, but a case of a journalist abdicating his
responsibility to verify his story and instead misinforming the public.
Tulfo had written and published the articles with reckless disregard of whether
the same were false or not. The test laid down is the “reckless disregard” test,
and Tulfo failed to meet that test.
Evidence of malice: the fact that Tulfo published another article lambasting Atty.
So, after the commencement of an action. Tulfo did not relent nor did he pause to
consider his actions, but went on to continue defaming Atty. So. This is a clear
 indication of his intent to malign Atty. So, no matter the cost, and is proof of
malice.
No. Good faith is lacking, as Tulfo failed to substantiate or even attempt to verify
his story before publication.
The provided no details the acts committed by the subject. They are plain and
simple baseless accusations, backed up by the word of one unnamed source.

b. MALIT V. PEOPLE 114 SCRA 348

ALFREDO P. MALIT V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L- 58681 MAY 1982 (114 SCRA 348)
FACTS:

Petitioner Alfredo Malit was Ruth Fernandez’s counsel in an administrative case

filed against her by Dr. Corazon Macaspac. During the hearing, Dr. Macaspac identified
certain exhibits on the witness stand.

On cross-examination, petitioner asked Dr. Macaspac if she knew who “made” a

certain exhibit, to which she replied that she did not understand the word “made”.
Petitioner tried to explain that it meant “prepared”, but DR. Macaspac would not answer
and instead asked for clarification.

Petitioner then said, “I doubt how did you become a doctor.” Dr. Macaspac thus
instituted a complaint for slander against petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion to quash on
the ground that “the facts charged do not constitute an offense.”

Respondent judge denied the motion to quash, as well as the motion for reconsideration
raising the ground that the court has no jurisdiction because the facts charged in the
information are privileged communication.

Petitioner contended that the statement did not constitute an offense since it was
uttered during cross-examination, and that utterances made in the course of judicial
proceedings are absolutely privileged.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not statement’s uttered in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely
privileged and exempt from liability in libel or slander cases

DECISION:

Yes. Utterances made in the course of judicial or administrative proceedings are

absolutely privileged in aid and for the advantage of the administration of justice, so that
members of the legislature, judges, jurors, lawyers and witnesses may speak freely and
exercise their respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or
action for damages.

Absolute privilege is defined as “In this class of cases it is considered in the

interest of public welfare that all persons should be allowed to express their sentiments
and speak their minds fully and fearlessly upon all questions and subjects: and all
actions for words so spoken are absolutely forbidden, even if it be alleged and proved
that the words were spoken falsely, knowingly and with express malice

Where the libelous or slanderous words published in the course of judicial

proceedings are connected with, or are relevant, pertinent or materials to, the cause in
hand or subject of inquiry, they may be considered privileged communication, and the
counsel, parties or witnesses are exempt from liability.

The court is inclined to be liberal as to the degree of relevancy or pertinence

required to make the alleged defamatory matter privileged. For it not to be covered by
privileged, it must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the
controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevance and impropriety. In the
instant case, the utterance was made when Dr. Macaspac would not answer and
repeatedly evaded the question posed to her and thus is relevant.

c. MERCADO V. CFI 116 SCRA 93

RAFAEL S. MERCADO VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH V,

CITY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY

G.R. No. L-38753 (116 SCRA 93)

FACTS:

On October 14, 1972, petitioner filed a letter-complaint with the Chairman of the
Board of Transportation, against the private respondent, for alleged grave violations of
the Rep. Act No. 2260 and civil service rules;

Fourteen (14) days after the filing of the aforementioned administrative complaint
by petitioner against the private respondent, the said petitioner sent the subject libelous
telegram or communication to the Secretary of Public Works and Communication, which
was indorsed for investigation to the said Board of Transportation on October 31, 1972,
by first endorsement of the said Department Secretary, dated Oct. 31, 1972 to the
Chairman of the Board of Transportation;

On November 23, 1972, the petitioner filed an amended administrative complaint

against the private respondent with the same Board of Transportation docketed therein
as Adm. Case No. 72-1, charging the private respondent with dishonesty, pursuit of
private business or corrupt practices, and misconduct or discourtesy;

The private respondent, submitted her answer to the said administrative charges,
and after due hearing, the Board of Transportation rendered a decision on June 26,
1973, finding the herein private respondent as innocent of the charges, and dismissing
the complaint filed against her;

On July 17, 1973 petitioner, as complainant therein, filed a motion for

reconsideration of the decision of the Board of Transportation, but the said Board, in an
order issued on August 29, 1973, denied said motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit;
 While the Administrative Case No. 72-1 was pending determination before the
Board of Transportation, petitioner, to further harass and malign the good character and
reputation of the private respondent, filed with the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group
(CHPG), a complaint against the private respondent and her husband Lorenzo M.
Mercado accusing them of selling a Ford Willys engine, which was carnapped. The said
office, however, after due hearing, issued a resolution on February 9, 1973,
recommending that the said case be closed for lack of evidence;

Also during the pendency of the administrative complaint filed by petitioner

against the private respondent in the Board of Transportation, petitioner filed with the
Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), PC, Camp Crame, Quezon City, a complaint for
corrupt practices against the private respondent; and after due investigation the CIS, in
answer to the letter of private respondent's counsel, dated March 24, 1973. requesting
information about the result of the said investigation, sent a letter to said counsel, dated
March 27, 1973, advising him that the said case is considered closed for insufficiency of
evidence.

The comment was considered as answer and the case was set for hearing. Prior
to such hearing, there was a motion by petitioner to file memorandum in lieu of oral
argument. As the motion was not acted upon before the date set for hearing, the parties
appeared. Preliminary questions were asked. They were then required to file
simultaneously their memoranda. Instead of just filing a memorandum, petitioner had a
motion to admit amended petition enclosing with such motion the amended petition. The
memorandum filed by him was on the basis thereof. The amendments, however, did not
affect the fundamental question raised as to whether or not the telegram being
qualifiedly privileged should be the basis for the special civil action for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition. Respondents in due time, after seeking an extension, filed
their memorandum. Thereafter, petitioner even submitted a manifestation, in effect
reiterating contentions previously made.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the landmark case of United States v. Bustos, enunciating the doctrine
that the free speech and free press guarantees of the Constitution, constitute a bar to
prosecutions for libel arising from a communication addressed to a superior complaining
against the conduct of a subordinate, is impressed with significance

DECISION:

In the light of the above pleadings, this Court after a careful study, holds that certiorari
to annul the order denying the motion to quash as well as the motion for reconsideration
does not lie. Neither should respondent court be ordered to dismiss Criminal Case No.
Q-2936, the criminal complaint for libel against petitioner. Nor should the court be
prohibited from hearing the aforesaid criminal action. This petition lacks merit.

United States v. Bustos, as mentioned at the outset, is a landmark decision. It is to the

credit of the Supreme Court of the Philippines that such a ruling antedated by thirty-six
years, a similar doctrine announced by the United States Supreme Court, to the effect
that a libel prosecution must likewise survive the test of whether or not the offending
publication is within the guarantees of free speech and free press. To keep such
guarantees, if not inviolate, at the very least truly meaningful, certainly calls for such an
approach. The judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights. So, it has been before. It should continue to be so.

Justice Malcolm, however, is careful to point out that qualified privilege, and this is one
such instance, may be "lost by proof of malice." His opinion continues: " A
communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if
made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained
criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable. He
then gave what was referred to by him as a "pertinent illustration of the application of
qualified privilege, " namely, "a complaint made in good faith and without malice in
regard to the character or conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a
board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the statements are found
to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is
made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual.
But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive
is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary.

The tenacity with which petitioner had pursued a course of conduct on its face would
seem to indicate that a doubt could reasonably be entertained as to the bona fides of
petitioner. The prosecution should be given the opportunity then of proving malice.

d. AGBAYANI V. SAYO 89 SCRA 699

WILSON AGBAYANI VS. HONORABLE SOFRONIO G. SAYO

G.R. No. L- 47880 April 1979 (89 SCRA 699)

FACTS:

AGBAYANI, BAUTISTA, PASCUAL and DUGAY, petitioners, vs. HON. SAYO,

Presiding Judge of CFI Nueva Vizcaya, Branch I, the PEOPLE, and MAHINAN,
respondents. AQUINO, J.This case is about the venue of a criminal action for written
defamation. Mahinan, a lawyer, was the manager since 1973 of the Cagayan Valley
Branch of the GSIS. Among his subordinates int hat branch office was Agbayani, chief
of the investment unit; Bautista, chief of the production and premium unit; Pascual,
officer-in-charge of the legal and claims unit, and Dugay, an employee of the claim’s
unit. On March 8, 1976, Mahinan filed with the fiscal's office at Nueva Vizcaya a
complaint for written defamation against Agbayani, Bautista, Pascual and Dugay.Two
days later, the Board of Trustees of the GSIS in its Resolution considered Mahinan as
resigned from the service as of the close of business hours on that date. Mahinan
appealed to the CSC which later directed the GSIS Board of Trustees to reinstate him
and it was approved. On July 23, 1976, the provincial fiscal of Nueva Vizcaya filed in the
CFI an information for libel charging petitioners with having maliciously made
defamatory imputations against Mahinan onor about February 17, 1976 in Bambang,
Nueva Vizcaya. Joshua Tan made this digest. Quoted in the information were the
affidavits of Pascual and Bautista signed at Cauayan, Isabela on October 6, 1975;
Bautista's undated letter asking for Mahinan's dismissal, and Agbayani's" unusual
incident report" of October 3, 1975 enclosing evidence of malversation, and praying for
Manihan’s separation from the service, subscribed and sworn to before a Manila notary.

According to the information, all those documents allegedly depicated Mahinan "as an
incorrigible managerial misfit, despoiler of public office, spendthrift of GSIS funds,
inveterate gambler, chronic falsifier', and an unreformed ex-convict”. The four accused
filed a motion to quash. They contended that the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Vizcaya has no jurisdiction over the offense charged because Mahinan was a public
officer holding office at Cauayan, Isabela when the alleged libel was committed and,
under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense charged comes within the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Isabela. They argued that the provincial
fiscal of Nueva Ecija had no authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and to file
the information. It was denied by the trial court, on the ground that Mahinan was not a
public officer within the meaning of Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code since the
insurance business of the GSIS is not an inherently governmental function. As such, his
residence, Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, and not Cauayan, Isabela, where he had his
office, would be the criterion for determining the venue of the criminal action for libel.

ISSUE:

W/N the venue of the criminal action for written defamation filed by Mahinan is Nueva
Vizcaya or Isabela?

DECISION:

There is no issue as to whether Mahinan is a public officer. As GSIS branch manager,

he is unquestionably a public officer .Applying the foregoing rules, we hold that the
proper venue of Mahinan's criminal action for written defamation against the petitioners
is the CFI of Isabela, since as a GSIS branch manager, He was a public official
stationed at Cauayan, Isabela and the alleged libel was committed when he was in the
public service. Joshua Tan made this digest. The criminal action could have been filed
also in the Court of First Instance of the province or in the city court of the city where the
libel was printed and first published. In the instant case, the venue was laid in Nueva
Vizcaya. It was alleged in the information that the libel was committed in Bambang, a
town in that province. It was not alleged that at the time the libel was committed
Bambang was the actual residence of complainant Mahinan or that it was the place
where the libel was printed and first published or where Mahinan held his office.
However, the alleged defamatory documents quoted in the information do not justify the
filing of the information in the CFI of Nueva Vizcaya. The Unusual Incident Report
indicates Cauayan,Isabela as the place where Mahinan held office, and Bambang,
Nueva Vizcaya was not mentioned at all in those alleged defamatory documents. We
hold that the information in this case is defective or deficient because it does not show
tha the CFI of Nueva Vizcaya, where it was filed, has jurisdiction to entertain the
criminal action for written defamation initiated by Mahinan against the petitioners and
that the provincial fiscal of that province had the authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation. The allegation in the information that the libel was committed in Bambang,
Nueva Vizcaya is not sufficient to show that the CFI of that province has jurisdiction
over the case. The alleged libelous documents quoted in the information show that
Nueva Vizcaya is not the proper venue of the criminal action.

e. NEWSWEEK V. IAC 142 SCRA 171

NEWSWEEK, INC. V. IINTERMIDIATE APPELATE COURT

G.R No. L-63559 May 1986(142 SCRA 699)

FACTS:

The article “An Island of Fear” was published by Newsweek in its February 23,
1981 issue. It allegedly portrayed the island province of Negros Occidental as a place
dominated by big landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploited the
improvised worked, but also brutalized and killed them with impunity.

The complaint alleged the petitioner committed libel against them by the publication of
the article “An Island of Fear” in their magazine. The article supposedly portrayed the
islands as a place dominated by big landowners or sugarcane planters who exploited
the impoverished sugarcane laborers or brutalized and killed them with impunity. They
claim that the article showed a malicious use of falsehood, slanted presentation and
misrepresentation of facts, putting them in a bad light.

Newsweek filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that; the printed article sued upon is
not actionable in fact and in law; the complaint is bereft of allegations that state, much
less support a cause of action.

Trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Complaint on its face states a valid cause of
action; and the question as to whether the printed article sued upon its actionable or not
is a matter of evidence.

Petitioner complaint failed to state a cause of action because, complaint made no

allegation the article referred specifically to any one of the private respondents;

Libel can be committed only against individual reputation, in case where libel is claimed
to have been directed at a group, there is actionable defamation only if the libel can be
said to reach beyond the mere collectively to do damage to a specific, individual group
member’s reputation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not complaint of libel must be dismissed.

DECISION:

Yes.

In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is
not necessary that he be named
Defamatory remarks directed at a class or group of persons in general language only,
are not actionable by individual composing the class or group unless the statements are
sweeping.

The principle is important especially where a group or class of persons claim to have
been defamed because the larger the collectivity, the more difficulty it is for the
individual member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to him.

f. SANTOS V. CA 203 SCRA 110

NANERICO D. SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-45031 October 1991 (203 SCRA 170)

FACTS:

February 23, 1970, Nanerico Santos was a columnist of the Manila Daily Bulletin. He
wrote in his column an article entitled Charges Against CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc.´
which was quoted verbatim from an unverified complaint filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) on February 13 by Rosario Sandejas and her daughters
charging CMS Stock Brokerage Inc., particularly its board chairman and controlling
stockholder Carlos Moran Sison and its president- general manager Luis Sison, of
engaging in fraudulent practices in the stock market. That same day, Carlos Moran
Sison met with Santos so that he could submit to the columnist his reply which he
wanted published the next day and in the same column. However, since they met at
6:15 pm that day, the reply could be published, not on the next day, but on February 25
because it was already past the deadline for next day. The reply was not published on
Feb 25 as promised so Carlos Sison called Santos not to publish the reply anymore as
it would only rekindle the talks. Sison also informed Santos that he would be sued for
libel, to which Santos replied, ³Well, sue me for libel.´March 4 ± Complaint for libel was
lodged against Santos and other persons of the Manila Daily Bulletin by Carlos and Luis
Sison. (It’s interesting to note that a few weeks after the complaint, Santos weekly
column was stopped, ostensibly to cut down on overhead expenses brought about by
the adoption of the floating rate in foreign exchange) TC: convicted of libel CA: affirmed
conviction. The article in question is not a privileged communication. At the time the
complaint filed with SEC was published in the column of the accused, there was as yet
no proceeding at which both parties had an opportunity to be present and to be heard.
Publishing an article based upon a complaint filed in CFI before any judicial action is
taken thereon is not privileged as a report of a judicial proceeding. The article is
libelous. It imputes a crime to the private offended parties, that of µwillful violation of the
provisions of the Securities Act and the implementing Rules and Regulations issued by
the commission

ISSUES

1.WON the publication of a complaint filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission before any judicial action is taken thereon is privileged as a report of a
judicial proceeding (YES).
If it is privileged, WON prosecution was able to establish malice (NO)

DECISION:

The publication of a complaint, being a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding,
made in good faith and without comments or remarks, even before any judicial action, is
privileged.

YES. The applicable provision of law is Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code
which states as follows:
Art. 354.

Requirement for publicity

. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no

good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following
cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any

legal, moral or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are of confidential nature, or of
any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

g. SAZON V. CA 255 SCRA 692

FERNANDO R. SAZON v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 120715 March 1996(255 SCRA 692)

FACTS:

Private complainant and the petitioner ran in the election held by PML-Parang Bagong
Lipunan Community Association, Inc. (PML-BLCA), an association of homeowners of
PML Homes. The petitioner was elected as a director and president of the homeowners'
association. Unable to accept defeat, the private complainant contested the said
election. Private complainant also wrote his co-homeowners explaining to them his
election protest and urging them not to recognize the petitioner and the other members
who won in the election. A phrase "Sazon (petitioner), nasaan ang pondo ng
simbahan?" was seen boldly written on the walls near the entrance gate of the
subdivision. Thinking that only private complainant was responsible, petitioner Sazon
wrote in an issue of PML-Homemakers, in which he is the editor, an article against the
complainant using words such as"mandurugas," "mag-ingat sa panlilinlang," "matagal
na tayong niloloko," "may kasamang pagyayabang," "angating pobreng super kulit,"
"patuloy na kabulastugan," "mastermind sa paninirang puri," etc. to describe him.

ISSUE:

Whether the questioned article written by the petitioner is libelous.

HELD:
Petitioner concedes the existence of the third (it must be given publicity) and fourth (the
victim must be identifiable) requisites of Art. 353 in the case at bench. Accordingly, only
the first and second elements need to be discussed herein.

First requisite: It must be defamatory.

Test to determine the defamatory character of words:

A charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and
understand that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of
certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue, or reputation, or to
hold the person or persons up to public ridicule.

9. ARTICLE 357

PROHIBITED PUBLICATION OF ACTS REFERRED TO IN THE COURSE OF

OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS

ELEMENTS:

1. That the offender is a reporter, editor or manager of a newspaper, daily or magazine.

2. That he publishes facts connected with the private life of another.

3. Those facts are offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation of said person.

Note:

Even though made in connection with or under the pretext that it is necessary in
the narration of any judicial or administrative proceedings wherein such facts have been
mentioned.

With its provisions, Article 357 has come to be known as the Gag Law. It
prohibits reporters, editors or managers of newspapers from publishing articles
containing facts connected with the private life of an individual; facts which are offensive
to the honor, virtue and reputation of persons. But these must refer to facts which are
intimately related to the offended party’s family and home. Occasionally, it involves
conjugal troubles and quarrels because of infidelity, adultery or crimes involving
chastity.

10. ARTICLE 358

ORAL DEFAMATION / SLANDER

Two Kinds of Oral Defamation:

1. action of a serious and insulting nature (Grave slander)

2. light insult or defamation – not serious in nature (simple slander)

Factors that determine gravity of the offense:

a) expressions used

b) personal relations of the accused and the offended party

c) circumstances surrounding the case

Notes:

The gravity of oral defamation depends not only on the expressions but also on
the personal relation of the accused with the offended party. Other circumstances like
the presence of important people when the crime was committed, the social standing
and position of the offended party are factors which may influence the gravity and
defamatory imputation (Victorio vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 645).

Note that slander can be committed even if the defamatory remark was done in
the absence of the offended party. (People vs. Clarin, C.A., 37 O.G. 1106)

If the utterances were made publicly and were heard by many people and the
accused at the same time levelled his finger at the complainant, oral defamation is
committed (P v Salleque)

The word “puta ” does not impute that the complainant is prostitute. (People vs.
Atienza, G.R. No. L-19857, Oct. 26, 1968) It is a common expression of anger or
displeasure. It is seldom taken in its literal sense by the hearer. It is viewed more as a
threat on the part of the accused to manifest and emphasize a point. (Reyes vs. People,
27 SCRA 686).

a. REYES V. PEOPLE 27 SCRA 686

ROSAURO REYES V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. L- 21528 March 1969 (27 SCRA 686)

FACTS:

The petitioner herein, Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of the
Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City, whose services were terminated on May 6,
1961. In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group of about 20 to 30 persons in a
demonstration staged in front of the main gate of the United States Naval Station at
Sangley Point. They carried placards bearing statements such as, “Agustin, mamatay
ka;” “To, alla boss con Nolan;” “Frank do not be a common funk;” “Agustin, mamatay ka
rin”; “Agustin, Nolan for you:” and others. The base commander, Capt. McAllister, called
uo Col. Patricia Monzon, who as Philippine Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point was
in charge of preserving harmonious relations between personnel of the naval station
and the civilian population of Cavite City. Capt. McAllister requested Col. Monzon to join
him at the main gate of the base to meet the demonstrators. Col. Monzon went to the
place and talked to Rosaurio Reyes and one Luis Buenaventura upon learning that the
demonstration was not directed against the naval station but against Agustin Hallare
and a certain Frank Nolan for their having allegedly caused the dismissal of Rosauro
Reyes from the Navy Exchange, Col. Monzon suggested to them to demonstrate in
front of Hallare’s residence, but they told him that they would like the people in the
station to know how they felt about Hallare and Nolan. They assured him, however, that
they did not intend to use violence, as “they just wanted to blow off steam.”

The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Cavite accuses Rosauro Reyes was Charges
with grave threats and grave oral defamation, respectively.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused Rosauro Reyes is guilty of crime grave threat and oral
defamation against the offender

DECISION:

No,

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to both charges and the cases were
set for joint trial. On the day of the hearing the prosecution moved to amend the
information in Criminal Case No. 2594 for grave threats by deleting therefrom the word
“orally”.

The defense counsel objected to the motion on the ground that the accused had already
been arraigned on the original information and that the amendment” would affect
materially the interest of the accused.” Nevertheless, the amendment was allowed and
the joint trial proceeded.

From the judgement of conviction, the accused appeal to the Court of Appeals,
which returned a verdict f affirmance. A motion for reconsideration having been denied,
the accused brought this appeal by certiorari.

b. VICTORIO V. CA 173 SCRA 645

VICTORIO V. COURT OF APPEALS

(17 SCRA 645)

FACTS:

Atty. Vivencio Tuiz has been the attorney of petitioner Exequiel Victorio in certain civil
cases from 1953 until 1963 when petitioner decided to hire the services of another
lawyer, Atty. LK. Castillo in place of Atty. Ruiz and his wife afterwards filed an
administrative charge against Judge Guiang which was assigned to Judge Ramon
Avancena, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, for
investigation and disbarment proceedings against Atty. Ruiz, then pending in the Office
of the Solicitor General. Atty. Castillo, counsel of the Victorios, presently taken aback,
called down Atty. Castillo and gave him a lecture, while Atty. Ruiz, as counsel for
respondent Judge Guiang in the administrative case, moved that atty. Castillo be cited
for contempt of court. Petitioners were overheard by Emiliano Manuzon, a policeman of
Cabanatuan City and one of the witnesses for the prosecution, to have uttered the
defamatory words:

Daniel:”kayabang ng putang-inang abogadong Ruiz na iyan, tunaw naman ang utak,

suwapang at estapador.”

Exequiel:” lastog ta ukinananta abogadong Ruiz, suwapang, estapador, paltogak ta

ukinana ta abogado Ruiz, suwapang ken estapador.”

Both the accused were convicted of grave oral defamation

ISSUE:

Whether or not defamatory words constitute serious oral defamation or simply slight oral
defamation.

DECISION:

Yes.

Defamatory words uttered specially against a lawyer when touching on his profession
are libelous per se. thus, in Kleeberg v. Sipser, it was held that “where statements
concerning plaintiff in his professional capacity as attorney are susceptible, in their
ordinary meaning, of such construction as would tend to injure him in that capacity, they
are libelous per se and (the) complaint, even in the absence of allegation of special
damage, states cause of action.” Oral statements that a certain lawyer is ‘unethical,’ or
a false charge, dealing with office, trade, occupation, business or profession of a person
charged, are slanderous per se.

In the instant case, appellant-petitioner imputed the crime of estafa against a

prominent lawyer one-time Justice of the Peace and member of the provincial Board of
Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and for some time a president of the Nueva Ecija Bar
Association. As the Scurrilous imputation strikes deep into the character of the victim,
no special circumstance need be shown for the defamatory words uttered to be
considered grave oral defamation.

11. ARTICLE 359

SLANDER BY DEED

ELEMENTS:

1. That the offender performs any act not included in any other crime against honor.

2. That such act is performed in the presence of other person or persons.

3. That such act casts dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the offended party.

Notes:

Slander by deed is a defamation committed by the offender against the

complainant through the performance of any act which casts dishonor, discredit or
contempt upon another person. Slander by deed refers to performance of an act, not
use of words.

Two kinds of slander by deed

1. Simple slander by deed; and

2. Grave slander by deed, that is, which is of a serious nature.

Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes slander by deed of a serious nature

or not, depends on the social standing of the offended party, the circumstances under
which the act was committed, the occasion, etc. The acts of slapping and boxing the
woman, a teacher, in the presence of many people has put her to dishonor, contempt
and ridicule. (P v Costa). If the acts committed against the offended party caused her
physical injury which did not require medical attendance, then the crime would be
maltreatment which is classified as slight physical injuries.

Distinctions

a. Unjust Vexation-irritation or annoyance/anything that annoys or irritates

without justification.

b. Slander by Deed-irritation or annoyance + attendant publicity and dishonor or

contempt.

c. Acts of lasciviousness-irritation or annoyance + any of 3 circumstance

provided in Art335 of RPC on rape

*use of force or intimidation

*deprivation of reason or rendering the offended unconscious

*offended party under 12 years of age plus lewd designs

a. PEOPLE V. MOTITA 59 OG 3020

12. ARTICLE 360

PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR LIBEL

Who are liable?

a. person who publishes, exhibits or causes the publication or exhibition of any

defamation in writing or similar means(par.1)

b. author or editor of a book or pamphlet

c. editor or business manager of a daily newspaper magazine or serial

publication(par.2)
 d. owner of the printing plant which publishes a libelous article with his consent
and all other persons who in any way participate in or have connection with its
publication (US v Ortiz).

The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as
provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of
first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties
is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of
the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila,
or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in
case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time
of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first
published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall
be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at
the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and
first published: Provided, further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same court
where the criminal action is filed and vice versa: Provided, furthermore, That the court
where the criminal action or civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: And, provided, finally, That this amendment
shall not apply to cases of written defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions which
have been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this law.

Preliminary investigation of criminal action for written defamations as provided

for in the chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or
city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such action
may be instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article.

No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime

which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except at the instance of
and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party. (As amended by R.A.
1289, approved June 15, 1955, R.A. 4363, approved June 19, 1965).

ARTICLE 361

PROOF OF THE TRUTH

In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court
and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, moreover that it was
published with good motives and for justifiable end, the defendants shall be acquitted.

Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime

shall not be admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made against Government
employees with respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties.

In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall
be acquitted.
ARTICLE 362

LIBELOUS REMARKS

Libelous remarks or comments on privileged matters (under Art. 354) if made

with malice in fact will not exempt the author and editor.

(This article is a limitation to the defense of privileged communication)

ARTICLE 363

INCRIMINATING INNOCENT PERSON

ELEMENTS:

1. That the offender performs an act.

2. That by such act he directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent person the

commission of a crime.

3. That such act does not constitute perjury.

Two Kinds

a. making a statement which is defamatory or perjurious (if made under oath and is
false)

b. planting evidence

Note: article is limited to planting evidence and the like

This crime cannot be committed through verbal incriminatory statements. It is

defined as an act and, therefore, to commit this crime, more than a mere utterance is
required. If the incriminating machination is made orally, the crime may be slander or
oral defamation. If the incriminatory machination was made in writing and under oath,
the crime may be perjury if there is a willful falsity of the statements made. If the
statement in writing is not under oath, the crime may be falsification if the crime is a
material matter made in a written statement which is required by law to have been
rendered. As far as this crime is concerned, this has been interpreted to be possible
only in the so-called planting of evidence.

There is such a crime as incriminating an innocent person through unlawful

arrest. (People vs. Alagao, et al., G.R. No. L-20721, April 30, 1966).

ARTICLE 364

INTRIGUING AGAINST HONOR

How committed

By any person who shall make any intrigue which has for its principal purpose to
blemish the honor or reputation of another person

Notes:

The crime is committed by resorting to any form of scheme or plot designed to

blemish the reputation of a person. The offender does not employ written or spoken
words, pictures or caricatures to ridicule the victim. Rather, he uses some ingenious,
crafty and secret ploy which produces the same effect.

Intriguing against honor is referred to as gossiping. The offender, without

ascertaining the truth of a defamatory utterance, repeats the same and passes it on to
another, to the damage of the offended party. Who started the defamatory news is
unknown.

Where the source of polluted information can be traced and pinpointed, and the
accused adopted as his own the information he obtained, and passed it to another in
order to cause dishonor to the complainant’s reputation, the act is Slander and not
intriguing against Honor. But where the source or the author of the derogatory
information cannot be determined and the accused borrows the same, and without
subscribing to the truth thereof, passes it to others, the act is one of Intriguing against
Honor.

Distinction between Intriguing Against Honor and Slander

When the source of the defamatory utterance is unknown and the offender
simply repeats or passes the same, the crime is intriguing against honor. If the offender
made the utterance, where the source of the defamatory nature of the utterance is
known, and offender makes a republication thereof, even though he repeats the libelous
statement as coming from another, as long as the source is identified, the crime
committed by that offender is slander.

Distinction between Intriguing Against Honor and Incriminating an Innocent

Person

In intriguing against honor, the offender resorts to an intrigue for the purpose of
blemishing the honor or reputation of another person. In incriminating an innocent
person, the offender performs an act by which he directly incriminates or imputes to an
innocent person the commission of a crime.

13. ARTICLE 365

CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE

Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it
been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prison correctional in its medium period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of
arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.chanrobles virtual law
library

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in
damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging
from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which
shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.chanrobles virtual law library

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any
person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if
done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.chanrobles virtual law library

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion,
without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.chanrobles virtual law library

a. ELEMENTS OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE:

1. That the offender does or fails to do an act.

2. That the doing of or the failure to do that act is voluntary.

3. That it be without malice.

4. That material damage results.

5. That there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into
consideration

a. his employment or occupation

b. degree of intelligence, physical condition, and

c. other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

b. ELEMENTS OF SIMPLE IMPRUDENCE:

1. That there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender.

2. That the damage impending to be caused in not immediate or the danger is not
clearly manifest.
 c. WHEN PENALTIES PROVIDED FOR IN ART. 365 ARE NOT APPLICABLE

1. Committing through reckless imprudence any act which, had it been intentional,
would constitute a grave or less grave felony or light felony;

2. Committing through simple imprudence or negligence an act which would otherwise

constitute a grave or a less serious felony;

3. Causing damage to the property of another through reckless imprudence or simple

imprudence or negligence;

4. Causing through simple imprudence or negligence some wrong which, if done

maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

d. QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES

The provisions contained in article 365 shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in
the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty
next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may
deem proper to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to

death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an

act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration
his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which
the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed
upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties such help as may
be in this hand to give. (As amended by R.A. 1790, approved June 21, 1957).

e. PEOPLE V. CANO 17 SCRA 237

G.R. No. L-19660 (17 SCRA 237)

FACTS:

That on or about the 21st day of September, 1960, on the National Highway at

San Isidro, municipality of San Fernando, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused Ambrocio

Cano y Pineda, being then the driver and person in charge of La Mallorca Pambusco

bus with body No. 846, Plate No. TPU 23177 (Pampanga '60), in utter disregard of

traffic rules and regulations and without exercising due precaution to avoid accident to

persons and/or damage to property, and by driving at a speed more than that allowed

by law and on the wrong side of the road, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously drive, manage and operate said vehicle in a careless, negligent and

imprudent manner, causing, as a result thereof the said bus driven by him to hit and

bump a Philippine Rabbit Bus with body No. 257, bearing Plate No. TPU-25589 (Tarlac

'60), then driven by Clemente Calixto y Onia, thereby causing damages to the said

Philippine Rabbit Bus in the amount of P5,023.55, to the damage and prejudice of the

owner, the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., in the said amount of P5,023.55,

Philippines Currency, and on the same occasion inflicting physical injuries to the

passengers of said buses, namely, Francisco Feliciano, Hilario Pasamonte Linda

Ongria, Lorenzo Calixto, whose physical injuries, barring complications, required and

will require medical attendance for a period of not less than three (3) months; Regina

Mendoza de Gacuain, Virginia Camba, Francisco Guevarra, George Sebastian,

Francisco Rabago, Oscar Favorito, Lida Toledo, whose physical injuries, barring

complications, required and will require medical attendance for a period ranging from

one week to one month; Adelaida Buenconsejo Vda. de Shaup, Eulogio Catalico,

Marina Gonzales, Abraham Serrano, Epifanio Payas, Seprando Fontanilla, Pedro

Bingcang, Tomas Ortega, Mateo Estaris, Andres Espinosa, Ligaya Garcia, Romeo

Rivera, Mateo Estacio, Jaime Castillo, Clemente Calixto, Dedicacion San Juan, Antonio

Calixto, Teofilo Raon, Francisco Mallari, Alfonso Aquino, Esmeralda Cayasi, Salvacion

Vda. de Ortega, Patrocinio Caasi, Lily Ortarsa, Eulogio Canlas, Esperanza de la Cruz,

Benita Cesar, Laulita Batalia, Miguela Quilay, Benjamin Tiglao, Ligaya Garcia Bindua,

Marlita Balmonte, Geronimo Briones, Juan Velasco, Tomasa Mateo, and Bobby

Galhoun whose physical injuries, barring complications required and will require medical

attendance for a period ranging from seven to nine days, and incapacitate said injured

persons from performing their customary labor for the same period of time, respectively.
ISSUE:

Whether or not this particular misdemeanor of slight physical injuries — through

reckless imprudence is committed by the defendant.

DECISION:

On or about August 2, 1961, the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga filed with the said court

an information accusing defendant-appellee Ambrocio Cano y Pineda of the crime of

damage to property with multiple physical injuries, thru reckless imprudence.

it is clear that said misdemeanor cannot validly be complexed with grave or less grave

felonies", and, accordingly, granting the motion to quash and ordering the prosecution

"to amend the information within ten (10) days" from notice, by "deleting therefrom all

reference to slight physical injuries". A reconsideration of this order having been denied,

the prosecution interposed the present appeal.

The order appealed from is predicated upon the theory that the offense of slight physical

injuries thru reckless negligence cannot be complexed with that of damage to property

with multiple physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, because "misdemeanor" may

not, under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, be complexed with grave or less grave

felonies.

However, the information herein does not purport to complex the offense of slight

physical injuries with reckless negligence with that of damage to property and serious

and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. It is merely alleged in the

information that, thru reckless negligence of the defendant, the bus driven by him hit

another bus causing upon some of its passenger’s serious physical injuries, upon others

less serious physical injuries and upon still others slight physical injuries, in addition to

damage to property. Appellee and the lower court have seemingly assumed that said

information thereby charges two offenses, namely (1) slight physical injuries thru

reckless imprudence; and (2) damage to property, and serious and less serious physical

injuries, thru reckless negligence — which are sought to be complexed. This

assumption is, in turn, apparently premised upon the predicate that the effect or

consequence of defendants negligence, not the negligence itself, is the principal or vital

factor in said offenses. Such predicate is not altogether accurate.

All contrary to law.

Upon arraignment,1 defendant entered a plea of not guilty. Months later,2 he filed a
motion to quash the information upon the ground:

1. That the crime charged, slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence, has already

prescribed;

2. That this Honorable Court has no jurisdiction of the crime charged, slight physical

injuries thru reckless imprudence; and

3. That the crime of slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence cannot be

complexed with damage to property, serious and less serious physical injuries thru

reckless imprudence.

f. IVLER V. CA

IVLER VS. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses (1)
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries for injuries sustained by
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
damage to property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and
damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle.

On September 7, 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge in reckless imprudence

resulting in slight physical injuries and was meted out the penalty of public censure.
Invoking the conviction, Ivler moved to quash the information of reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide and damage to property for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

MeTC : denied the motion to quash

RTC: denied Ivler’s petition for Certiorari in dismissing his Motion to Quash

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ivler’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in the information charging him with reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property

DECISION:

the Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioner’s conviction in the case of
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical bars his prosecution in criminal reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property.

1. Reckless imprudence is a Single Crime; its consequences on Persons and

Property Are Material Only to Determine the Penalty
Quasi-offenses penalize “the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudence punible,”
unlike offense which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and
conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional
crimes.

2. Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent

Prosecution for the Same Quasi-offense
Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi-offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done,
would be punishable as a felony.

3. Article 48 Does not apply to acts penalized under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code.

************END********

Thank you po!

SUBMITTED BY:
BEVERLEE D. VALDEZ