REMEDIAL LAW Q&A

(J. Leonen Cases in Q&A Format from November 2012 – December 2019)

UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW

Q: On two separate occasions, 7 May 2003
and 17 May 2003, Jadewell Parking
discovered that private respondents have
forcibly removed the clamp it attached to the
vehicles owned by the latter for being
illegally parked and left unattended. This
resulted in the filing of two cases of robbery
on 23 May 2003. Despite of not finding a
probable cause for robbery, the prosecutor
found the private respondents to have
violated Section 21 of the Baguio City
Ordinance. Accordingly, he filed two criminal
informations for the aforesaid violation with
the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio on 2
October 2003. These were met by a Motion to
Quash on the ground of extinguishment of
criminal action or liability due to
prescription—which were later on granted by
the MTC and led to the dismissal of the case.
Not finding a favorable ruling from the lower
courts, Jadewell brought the case before the
Supreme Court to argue assuming arguendo
that the prescriptive period is indeed two
months, its filing of Complaint with the Office
of the City Prosecutor on 23 May 2003 tolled
the prescription period of two months. This is
because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provides that, in Manila and in other
chartered cities, the Complaint shall be filed
with the Office of the Prosecutor unless
otherwise provided in their charters. Should
SC find merit in the petitioner’s contention?
A: No. The procedural rules that govern this case
is the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. As provided in the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, only the filing of an
Information tolls the prescriptive period where
the crime charged is involved in an ordinance
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary
Procedure, "the complaint or information shall
be filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation." This provision does not prevent
the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary
investigation if he wants to. However, the case
shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed
in court, whether or not the prosecution decides
to conduct a preliminary investigation. This
means that the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is
actually filed in court and not on any date before
that. Unfortunately, when the Office of the
Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5,
2003, the period had already prescribed.
(Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation v. Hon.
Judge Nelson F. Lidua, G.R. No. 169588, October 7,
2013)
Q: Alejandro Tankeh filed several Complaints
against DBP, SSS Inc, Ruperto Tankeh and
among others, praying that the promissory
note he executed be declared null and void
and that he be absolved from any liability
from the previous mortgage of a vessel and
the note in question. The Regional Trial Court
ruled that the Promissory Note and the
Mortgage Contract are null and void and
released him from any obligation.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
RTC and ruled that there is no ground in
rendering the promissory note as null and
void. Hence, a Petition, allegedly filed under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, was filed by
Alejandro Tankeh. Collectively, respondents
argue that the Petition is actually one of
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
and not a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45. Thus, petitioner‘s failure to
show that there was neither appeal nor any
other plain, speedy or adequate remedy
merited the dismissal of the Complaint. Is the
argument correct?
A: NO. Contrary to respondent‘s imputation, the
remedy contemplated by petitioner is clearly
that of a Rule 45 Petition for Review. Certiorari is
a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure
Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the
simple reason for the rule in this light: When a
court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it
of the jurisdiction being exercised when the
error is committed. Consequently, an error of
judgment that the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctable
through the original civil action of certiorari. 
In this case, what petitioner seeks to rectify may
be construed as errors of judgment of the Court
of Appeals. These errors pertain to the
petitioner‘s allegation that the appellate court
failed to uphold the findings of facts of the lower
court. He does not impute any error with respect
to the Court of Appeals ‘exercise of jurisdiction.
As such, this Petition is simply a continuation of
the appellate process where a case is elevated
from the trial court of origin, to the Court of
Appeals, and to this Court via Rule 45. (Alejandro
Tankeh v. Development Bank of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 171428, November 11, 2013)
Q: On two separate occasions, 7 May 2003
and 17 May 2003, Jadewell Parking
discovered that private respondents have
forcibly removed the clamp it attached to the
vehicles owned by the latter for being
illegally parked and left unattended. This
resulted in the filing of two cases of robbery
on 23 May 2003. Despite of not finding a
probable cause for robbery, the prosecutor
found the private respondents to have
violated Section 21 of the Baguio City
Ordinance. Accordingly, he filed two criminal
informations for the aforesaid violation with
the Municipal Trial Court of Baguio on 2
October 2003. These were met by a Motion to
Quash on the ground of extinguishment of
criminal action or liability due to
prescription—which were later on granted by
the MTC and led to the dismissal of the case.
Not finding a favorable ruling from the lower
courts, Jadewell brought the case before the
Supreme Court to argue assuming arguendo
that the prescriptive period is indeed two
months, its filing of Complaint with the Office
of the City Prosecutor on 23 May 2003 tolled
the prescription period of two months. This is
because Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provides that, in Manila and in other
chartered cities, the Complaint shall be filed
with the Office of the Prosecutor unless
otherwise provided in their charters. Should
SC find merit in the petitioner’s contention?
A: No. The procedural rules that govern this case
is the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. As provided in the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, only the filing of an
Information tolls the prescriptive period where
the crime charged is involved in an ordinance
Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary
Procedure, "the complaint or information shall
be filed directly in court without need of a prior
preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation." This provision does not prevent
the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary
investigation if he wants to. However, the case
shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed
in court, whether or not the prosecution decides
to conduct a preliminary investigation. This
means that the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is
actually filed in court and not on any date before
that. Unfortunately, when the Office of the
Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5,
2003, the period had already prescribed.
(Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation v. Hon.
Judge Nelson F. Lidua, G.R. No. 169588, October 7,
2013)
Q: Alejandro Tankeh filed several Complaints
against DBP, SSS Inc, Ruperto Tankeh and
among others, praying that the promissory
note he executed be declared null and void
and that he be absolved from any liability
from the previous mortgage of a vessel and
the note in question. The Regional Trial Court
ruled that the Promissory Note and the
Mortgage Contract are null and void and
released him from any obligation.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
RTC and ruled that there is no ground in
rendering the promissory note as null and
void. Hence, a Petition, allegedly filed under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, was filed by
Alejandro Tankeh. Collectively, respondents
argue that the Petition is actually one of
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
and not a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45. Thus, petitioner‘s failure to
show that there was neither appeal nor any
other plain, speedy or adequate remedy
merited the dismissal of the Complaint. Is the
argument correct?
A: NO. Contrary to respondent‘s imputation, the
remedy contemplated by petitioner is clearly
that of a Rule 45 Petition for Review. Certiorari is
a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure
Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the
simple reason for the rule in this light: When a
court exercises its jurisdiction, an error
committed while so engaged does not deprive it
of the jurisdiction being exercised when the
error is committed. Consequently, an error of
judgment that the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctable
through the original civil action of certiorari.  amend the information. ABC filed Petition for
In this case, what petitioner seeks to rectify may
be construed as errors of judgment of the Court
of Appeals. These errors pertain to the
petitioner‘s allegation that the appellate court
failed to uphold the findings of facts of the lower
court. He does not impute any error with respect
to the Court of Appeals ‘exercise of jurisdiction.
As such, this Petition is simply a continuation of
the appellate process where a case is elevated
from the trial court of origin, to the Court of
Appeals, and to this Court via Rule 45.
Q: Company ABC entered into an agreement
with an LGU to reclaim foreshore lands.
Republic sued for the recovery of the
possession and damages. SC declared said
agreement null and void, and awarded ABC
compensation based on quantum meruit. An
Entry of Judgment was issued. Thereafter,
Company ABC filed a m otion for Execution
with adjustments of the compensation before
the RTC. RTC issued the Writ of Execution and
the Sheriff issued a Notice of Execution and
Notice to Pay against the Republic for a
higher value than what was ordered by the
SC. Is the Writ of Execution issued by the RTC
and Notice of Execution valid?
A: NO. Supreme Court’s decision cannot be
amended by the trial court or the sheriff. Absent
an order of remand, attempts to adjust or vary
the terms of the judgment of this court are not
allowed. Final and executory decisions cannot be
amended. It cannot be done by the trial court,
much less by its sheriff. Sheriffs have no capacity
to vary the judgment and deviate from judge’s
decision based on their own interpretation
thereof. When writs are placed in the hands of
sheriffs, it is their ministerial duty to proceed
with reasonable celerity and promptness to
execute them in accordance with their mandate.
(Atty. Romeo G. Roxas, v. Republic Real Estate
Corporation, G.R. No. 208205, June 01, 2016)
Q: ABC filed a complaint for Libel was filed
against XYZ. XYZ then moved to quash the
information arguing that the "facts charged
do not constitute an offense." CA ruled that it
dd not substantially constitute the offense
charged and directed the prosecutor to
Review on Certiorari asserting that
jurisdictional defects in an information are
not curable by amendment, even before
arraignment. Is the contention of ABC
tenable?
A: NO. Under Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court, if a motion to quash is based on a defect in
the information that can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order that an
amendment be made. Since ABC has not yet been
arraigned; thus, Rule 117, Section 4 of the Rules
of Court applies. If the information is defective,
the prosecution must be given the opportunity to
amend it before it may be quashed. (Virginia Dio
v. People of the Philippines and Timothy Desmond,
G.R. No. 208146, June 08, 2016)
Q: In the Complaint, denominated as one for
"Judicial Confirmation of the Territory and
Boundary Limits of Taguig and Declaration of
the Unconstitutionality and Nullity of Certain
Provisions of Presidential Proclamations
2475 and 518, with Prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order", Taguig asserted that the
areas comprising the Enlisted Men's
Barangays, or EMBOs, as well as the area
referred to as Inner Fort in Fort Bonifacio,
were within its territory and jurisdiction. The
Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Taguig.
As a result, Makati filed a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment alleging that said
decision was rendered without jurisdiction
and in violation of due process. Following the
same Decision, Makati likewise filed before
the same court a Motion for Reconsideration
Ad Cautelam. Is Makati guilty of an act of
forum shopping?
A: YES. Simultaneously pursuing an appeal (or
motion for reconsideration) and a petition for
annulment of judgment is an act of forum
shopping. This act, which heaps vexation upon
courts and parties-litigants. Forum shopping is
committed by a party who institutes two or more
suits in different courts, either simultaneously or
successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on
the same or related causes or to grant the same
or substantially the same reliefs, on the
supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition or increase a
party's chances of obtaining a favorable decision
or action. (City of Taguig v. City of Makati, G.R. No.
208393, June 15, 2016)
Q: Thomas Cleary, an American citizen with
office address in California, filed a Complaint
for specific performance. Cleary moved for
court authorization to take deposition. He
prayed that his deposition be taken before
the Consulate-General of the Philippines in
Los Angeles and be used as his direct
testimony. May the Court grant his Motion for
Court Authorization to Take Deposition?
A: Jurisprudence has discussed how "[u]nder the
concept adopted by the new Rules, the
deposition serves the double function of a
method of discovery — with use on trial not
necessarily contemplated — and a method of
presenting testimony." The taking of depositions
has been allowed as a departure from open-court
testimony.
"depositions may be taken at any time after the
institution of any action, whenever necessary or
convenient." There is no rule that limits
deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial
or before it; no prohibition against the taking of
depositions after pre-trial." There can be no valid
objection to allowing them during the process of
executing final and executory judgments, when
the material issues of fact have become
numerous or complicated.
In keeping with the principle of promoting the
just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding, depositions are allowed
as a "departure from the accepted and usual
judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in
open court where their demeanor could be
observed by the trial judge." Depositions are
allowed, provided they are taken in accordance
with the provisions of the Rules of Court (that is,
with leave of court if the summons have been
served, without leave of court if an answer has
been submitted); and provided, further, that a
circumstance for their admissibility exists.
(Ingrid Sala Santmaria and Astrid Sala Boza v.
Thomas Cleary, GR No. 197122, June 25, 2016)
Q: The trial court found Ariel Lopez guilty of
cattle-rustling. It gave credence to the
testimony of his errand boy that Lopez
ordered him to bring the carabao to another.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, it held
that the Certificate of Transfer of Large Cattle
and his errand boy’s testimony were
sufficient to prove the ownership of the lost
carabao. Hence, he filed before the Supreme
Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Should the Court deny the Petition for raising
questions of fact?
A: NO. The general rule is that a Rule 45 petition
for review on certiorari should only raise
questions of law. However, there are instances
when this Court allows questions of fact in a Rule
45 petition for review. One of the exceptions
among others is when the judgment of the Court
of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of
facts.
There is a question of law "when there is doubt
as to what the law is on a certain state of facts"
and there is a question of fact "when the doubt
arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts."
In this case, petitioner asks this Court to review
the evidence and argues that the prosecution
was unable to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, petitioner raises a question of fact.
Nevertheless, this Court gives due course to the
Petition because it falls under the exceptions as
to when this Court may entertain questions of
fact. A review of the record shows that the trial
court and the Court of Appeals misapprehended
the facts, and their findings are contradicted by
the evidence presented. (Ariel Lopez v. People of
the Philippines, GR No. 212186, June 29, 2016)
Q: The consortium of ALSONS Power Holdings
Corporation and TOMEN Corporation entered
into an Energy Conversion Agreement with
the National Power Corporation for a 50-
megawatt bunker- C fired diesel-generating
power project, which will convert the fuel
supplied by the National Power Corporation
into electricity that will, in turn, be delivered
to National Power Corporation. Thereafter,
Southern Philippines Power Corporation
assumed the obligations of the consortium to
the Energy Conversion Agreement through
the Accession Undertaking. Southern
Philippines Power Corporation consistently
nominated 50 megawatts of the Power
Station's capacity to the National Power
Corporation. However, in 2005, Southern
Philippines Power Corporation informed the
National Power Corporation that it installed
an additional engine with a five (5)-megawatt
generating capacity, thereby, guaranteeing a
total capacity of 55 megawatts, equivalent to
110% of the nominal capacity allowed under
the Energy Conversion Agreement.
Southern Philippines Power Corporation
requested payment in the amount of
P45,840,673.22, attributable to the
additional 10% capacity made available to
the National Power Corporation since 2005.
However, the National Power Corporation
manifested its refusal to pay for the
additional 10% capacity. The dispute was
then elevated to Energy Regulatory
Commission which ruled in favor of Southern
Philippines Power Corporation. It likewise
denied the National Power Corporation's
Motion for Reconsideration, which was filed
via private courier, for being filed out of time.
Can a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
filed by private courier and received four (4)
days after due date still be granted? 
A: YES. It is a basic tenet that procedural rules
are necessary to facilitate an orderly and speedy
adjudication of disputes. Thus, courts and
litigants alike are enjoined to strictly abide by
the rules. Nonetheless, this Court has, in
exceptionally meritorious cases, suspended the
technical rules of procedure in order that
litigants may have ample opportunity to prove
their respective claims, and that a possible denial
of substantial justice, due to legal technicalities,
may be avoided.
The Court cited Sanchez v. Court of Appeals
among other cases, which sets forth a number of
reasons to be considered in suspending
procedural rules:
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or
property which would warrant the suspension of
the Rules of the most mandatory character and
an examination and review by the appellate
court of the lower court's findings of fact, the
other elements that should be considered are the
following: (a) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the
case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing
that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby. (National Power
Corporation v. Southern Philippines Power, GR No.
219627, July 4, 2016)
Q: The National Bureau of Investigation
Director requested the prosecution of Janet
Lim Napoles for serious illegal detention. The
assistant state prosecutor recommended the
dismissal. However, upon review, Senior
Deputy State Prosecutor reversed the same
and recommended the filing of the
information. Hence, she filed before the Court
of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari alleging
grave abuse of discretion. She contended that
there was no probable cause to charge her
with serious illegal detention, and that the
RTC Judge Alameda erred in issuing the
arrest warrant despite the pendency of her
Motion for Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause. Is she correct?
A: No. With the filing of the Information before
the trial court, the trial court has then acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over the case, and the
determination of the accused’s guilt or innocence
rests within the sole and sound discretion of the
trial court. That Judge Alameda issued the arrest
warrant within the day he received the records
of the case from the prosecutor does not mean
that the warrant was hastily issued. "Speed in the
conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-
judicial officer cannot per se be instantly
attributed to an injudicious performance of
functions. For one’s prompt dispatch may be
another’s undue haste." Judge Alameda was
under no obligation to review the entire case
record as Napoles insists. All that is required is
that a judge personally evaluates the evidence
and decides, independent of the finding of the
prosecutor, that probable cause exists so as to
justify the issuance of an arrest warrant.
Moreover, Judge Alameda did not gravely abuse
his discretion in issuing the arrest warrant
despite the pendency of the Motions for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause filed by
Napoles and Lim. Hearing these Motions would
be a mere superfluity, for with or without such
motion[s], the judge is duty-bound to personally
evaluate the resolution of the public prosecutor
and the supporting evidence. In fact, the task of
the presiding judge when the Information is filed
with the court is first and foremost to determine
the existence or non-existence of probable cause
for the arrest of the accused. (Janet Lim Napoles
v. Hon. Secretary Leila De Lima et. Al, GR No.
213529, July 13, 2016)
Q: Soliva, Zingapan, Alvir, Feliciano, and
Medella were found guilty of murder and
attempted murder. Upon appeal to the CA, the
appellate court modified the decision of the
trial court. It found the accused-appellants
guilty of murder and slight physical injuries,
a lesser offense. Only Soliva, Zingapan, and
Alvir appealed the CA decision to the
Supreme Court. Upon appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed the modification of the
offense from slight physical injuries to
attempted murder. Is the higher penalty
imposed to accused-appellants applicable to
those who did not appeal?
A: NO. Since the decision of the Supreme Court
was unfavorable to the accused-appellant, those
who did not appeal must not be affected by the
Court’s judgment. The penalty imposed by the CA
to D and E still stands. (People v. Feliciano, G.R.
No. 196735, August 3, 2016)
Q: The Bureau of Treasury auctioned bonds
worth P30 billion and stated that the bonds
shall not be subjected to 20% final
withholding tax. RCBC won the auction and
subsequently, sold the government bonds to
Banco de Oro. Before the maturity date of the
bond, the BIR issued a ruling stating that the
said bonds shall be subjected 20%
withholding final tax. The petitioners filed a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or
Mandamus against the respondents. On the
other hand, respondent asserted that
petitioners should have first exhausted
administrative remedies by challenging the
BIR Rulings to the Secretary of Finance. Did
the petitioner violate the doctrine of
administrative remedies?
A: NO.  Interpretative rulings of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue are reviewable by the
Secretary of Finance under Section 4 of the
National Internal Revenue Code. However, the
Court held that because of the special
circumstances availing in this case—namely: the
question involved is purely legal; the urgency of
judicial intervention given the impending
maturity of the bonds; and the futility of an
appeal to the Secretary of Finance as the latter
appeared to have adopted the challenged Bureau
of Internal Revenue rulings—there was no need
for petitioners to exhaust all administrative
remedies before seeking judicial relief. (Banco de
Oro v. Republic, G.R. No. 198756, August 16, 2016)
Q: Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation mortgaged a parcel of land
twice: first, to Caltex Philippines Inc; second,
to DBP Bank and PNB Bank. The Marinduque
Mining and Industrial Corporation failed to
pay its loan. Thus, the DBP Bank and PNB
Bank foreclosed the property and was the
highest bidder but it was unable to redeem
the property because of the first mortgage to
Caltex Philippines Inc. Later on, the Caltex
Philippines Inc foreclosed the property. As
the second mortgagee, DBP Bank redeemed
the property. Subsequently, DBP Bank sold
the property to Clarges Realty Corporation.
The Deed of Absolute Sale stated that DBP
shall be liable for all the expenses incurred in
the transferring of title; and that the title is
free from any and all liens and
encumbrances. However, Clarges Realty
Corporation discovered that the title
contained annotations of mortgage lien and
tax lien. Thus, it filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against DBP Bank.
Trial on the merits ensued. Clarges Realty
Corporation had the mortgage lien cancelled
and the DBP Bank and the Asset Privatization
Trust had tax lien partially cancelled. When
Clarges Realty Corporation had already
rested its case, DBP Bank moved for leave of
court to file a third-part complaint
impleading the Asset Privatization Trust. DBP
Bank asserted that Asset Privatization Trust
had acquired the assets of Marinduque
Mining and Industrial Corporation.
Therefore, it assumed the obligations and
liabilities attached to those assets. Is the
filing of third-party complaint proper?
A: NO. The third-party complaint, is therefore, a
procedural device whereby a "third party" who is
neither a party nor privy to the act or deed
complained of by the plaintiff, may be brought
into the case with leave of court, by the
defendant, who acts as third party plaintiff to
enforce against such third party defendant a
right for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or
any other relief, in respect of the plaintiff's
claim.   motion to intervene proper in this case?
In this case, the Asset Privatization Trust had
acquired the Asset of Marinduque Mining and
Industrial Corporation. However, the DBP Bank
need not await for contribution from the Asset
Privatization Trust before it can fulfill its
obligation to deliver a clean title to the property
to Clarges Realty Corporation. DBP Bank, as
mortgagee of the property, can very well pay the
tax liability and cause the cancellation of the tax
lien. There was no legal impossibility to speak of.
(Development Bank of the Philippines v. Clarges
Corporation Realty, G.R. No. 170060, August 17,
2016)
Q:  E.I. Dupont Nemours filed a patent
application for losartan to in 1987. Thirteen
years after, it submitted an Petition for
Revival of their application. The patent
examiner denied such request on the ground
that the application was already declared as
abandoned when E.I. Dupont Nemours failed
to respond within the period prescribed in
Rule 112. In response, E.I. Dupont Nemours
averred that their counsel the late Atty.
Mapili failed to inform them of the
abandonment of the patent application. It
asserted that it had the actual notice of the
abandonment on January 30, 2002. The
Director of Patent denied the Petition for
Revival.
Hence, E.I. Dupont Nemours appealed to the
Court of Appeals. On the first instance, the
Court of Appeals granted the Petition for
Review on the ground that procedural aspect
should be relaxed and that E.I. Dupont
Nemours should not suffer from the
negligence of its counsel. However,
Therapharma Inc., filed a motion for leave to
intervene. It asserted that the decision of the
CA directly affects its vested right.
Therapharma Inc., alleged that on January 4,
2003 it filed an application for a losartan
product “Lifezar,” to the Bureau of Food and
Drugs which granted the same. The CA
granted the Motion for Leave to Intervene. It
stated that Therapharma Inc., had an interest
in the revival of patent application of E.I.
Dupont Nemours since it was the local
competitor for the losartan product. Is the
A: YES.  Therapharma, Inc. was able to show that
it had legal interest to intervene in the appeal of
petitioner's revival of its patent application.
While its intervention may have been premature
as no patent has been granted yet, petitioner's
own actions gave rise to respondent
Therapharma, Inc.'s right to protect its losartan
product. Accordingly, appeal is not a right but a
mere privilege granted by statute. It may only be
exercised in accordance with the law that grants
it. The Court of Appeals is not bound by the rules
of procedure in administrative agencies. The
procedural rules of an administrative agency
only govern proceedings within the agency. Once
the Court of Appeals has given due course to an
appeal from a ruling of an administrative agency,
the proceedings before it are governed by the
Rules of Court. (E.I. Dupont Nemours and Co. v.
Francisco, G.R. No. 174379, August 31, 2016)
Q: Respondents are stockholders of the
petitioner PASAR. Respondents demanded
their right to inspect the books and
confidential information of PASAR.  However,
PASAR denied such request. Instead, PASAR
filed for Petition for Injunction with prayer
for writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order to prohibit the
respondents from seeking any confidential
and inexistent information. The RTC granted
such petition and issued a writ of preliminary
injunction against the respondents. Upon
appeal to the CA, the CA reversed the decision
of the RTC. It held that a writ of preliminary
injunction is uncalled for and there is no
basis to issue an injunctive writ. Is an
injunction proper in this case?  Q: In its articles of Incorporation, Royal Ferry
A: NO.  The act of PASAR in filing a petition for
injunction with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction is uncalled for. The petition is a pre-
emptive action unjustly intended to impede and
restrain the stockholders' rights. If a stockholder
demands the inspection of corporate books, the
corporation could refuse to heed to such
demand. When the corporation, through its
officers, denies the stockholders of such right,
the latter could then go to court and enforce their
rights. It is then that the corporation could set up
its defenses and the reasons for the denial of
such right. Thus, the proper remedy available for
the enforcement of the right of inspection is
undoubtedly the writ of mandamus to be filed by
the stockholders and not a petition for injunction
filed by the corporation. (Philippine Associated
Smelting and Refining Corporation v. Pablito Lim,
G.R. No. 172948, October 5, 2016)
Q: Spouses Miano were users of the electric
service provided by Meralco. When Meralco
discovered that there were two jumpers on
their meter service connection, it
disconnected the electrical service serving
Spouses Miano and issued a billing
differential representing the unbilled amount
of electricity consumed due to the jumpers.
Meralco refused to reconnect Spouses Miano'
s electricity service due to their non-payment
of the billing differential. Spouses Miano filed
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 asking the Supreme Court to review the
billing differential. Is the remedy availed of
by Spouses Miano proper?
A: NO. The issue of the propriety of the order
directing Spouses Miano to pay the billing
differential is clearly factual in nature. Only
questions of law should be raised in petitions
filed under Rule 45, subject to certain exceptions.
Parties seeking a review of the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals must demonstrate and
prove that the case clearly falls under the
exceptions to the rule. Spouses Miano failed to
prove that a review of the factual findings of the
trial court and the Court of appeals is warranted.
(Sps. Miano v. Meralco, G.R. No. 205035,
November 16, 2016)
declared that its principal office was located
at Makati City. Subsequently, it transferred its
principal office to Manila without amending
its articles of incorporation. Due to severe
business losses, it filed a petition for
voluntary insolvency before the RTC-Manila. 
Pilipinas Shell, asserting that it was a creditor
of Royal Ferry, filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that that the venue was
improperly laid. It claimed that since the
Royal Ferry’s articles of incorporation had
not been amended, its residence remained at
Makati City and as such, RTC-Makati was the
proper venue. Was the venue properly laid
before RTC-Manila?
A: YES. Under the Insolvency Law, the proper
venue for a petition for voluntary insolvency is
the RTC of the province or city where the
insolvent debtor has resided in for 6 months
before the filing of the petition. Since Royal Ferry
held its principal office at Manila more than 6
months before the filing of the petition, the
proper venue is RTC-Manila. While it is settled
that a corporation is a resident of the place
where its principal office is located as stated in
the articles of incorporation, the same cannot be
used for the purposes of determining the venue
of the present action, since the rule on venue of
action is inapplicable in cases where a specific
rule or law provides otherwise. In other words, it
is the Insolvency Law, rather than the Rules,
which shall govern the venue of the present
action. (Pilipinas Shell v. Royal Ferry, G.R. No.
188146, February 1, 2017)
Q:  The Dolor Spouses filed against Gatmaytan
and Cammayo a Complaint for Reconveyance
of Property and Damages. On March 27, 2006,
the Quezon City Regional Trial Court
rendered a Decision ordering Gatmaytan to
convey the lot to the Dolor Spouses. On June
16, 2006, Gatmaytan filed her Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied by the
trial court on August 28, 2006.  Gatmaytan
then filed an Appeal with the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed
Gatmaytan's Appeal. It ruled that the
Regional Trial Court's March 27, 2006
Decision had already attained finality as
Gatmaytan filed her Motion for
Reconsideration beyond the requisite 15-day
period.  Gatmaytan insists that the Regional
Trial Court's March 27, 2006 Decision has not
attained finality as the April 14, 2006 service
was made to her counsel's former address (at
No. 117 West Avenue, Quezon City) as
opposed to the address (at Unit 602, No. 42
Prince Jun Condominium, Timog Avenue,
Quezon City) that her counsel indicated in a
June 8, 2004 Notice of Change of Address filed
with the Regional Trial Court. Gatmaytan
adds that the Regional Trial Court noted the
change of address in an Order of the same
date, and directed that, from then on, service
of papers, pleadings, and processes was to be
made at her counsel's updated address at
Unit 602, No. 42 Prince Jun Condominium,
Timog Avenue, Quezon City. Has the Regional
Trial Court's March 27, 2006 Decision already
attained finality thus, precluding the filing of
petitioner Mercedes S. Gatmaytan's appeal
with the Court of Appeals.  market prices, leading to a loss of
A: YES. When a party's counsel serves a notice of
change in address upon a court, and the court
acknowledges this change, service of papers,
processes, and pleadings upon the counsel's
former address is ineffectual. Service is deemed
completed only when made at the updated
address. Proof, however, of ineffectual service at
a counsel's former address is not necessarily
proof of a party's claim of when service was
made at the updated address. The burden of
proving the affirmative allegation of when
service was made is distinct from the burden of
proving the allegation of where service was or
was not made. A party who fails to discharge his
or her burden of proof is not entitled to the relief
prayed for.
In the case at hand, the service made on
Gatmaytan’s counsel's former address was
ineffectual. However, that Gatmaytan failed to
discharge her burden of proving the specific date
- allegedly June 1, 2006 - in which service upon
her counsel's updated address was actually
made. 
In Cortes v. Valdellon, this Court noted the
following as acceptable proofs of mailing and
service by a court to a party: (1) certifications
from the official Post Office record book and/or
delivery book; (2) the actual page of the postal
delivery book showing the acknowledgment of
receipt; (3) registry receipt; and (4) return card. 
Gatmaytan could have produced any of these
documents or other similar proof to establish her
claim. She did not. All she has relied on is her
bare allegation that delivery was made on June 1,
2006. (Mercedes Gatmaitan v. Franisco Dolor, GR
No. 198120, February 20, 2017)
Q: On November 5, 1993, Teresita C. Lagmay
(Lagmay), Eden Jane R. Intencion, and Mabini
S. Reyes of the Commission on Audit, Region
XI, Davao City, submitted a Joint-
Affidavit with an attached Special Audit
Report to the Commission on Audit Director,
Region XI, Davao City. The Special Audit
Report disclosed that the various school
forms and construction materials purchased
by the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports were priced above the prevailing
P613,755.36 due to overpricing. On July 25,
1996, the Office of the Ombudsman,
Mindanao, found that there was sufficient
evidence to indict several Department of
Education, Culture and Sports officials for
violating Section 3(g) and (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019.  Nava, Cabahug, Granada, and Dela
Cruz were subsequently charged with
Violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No.
3019. After trial on the merits, the
Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution
was able to prove the guilt of petitioners.
Nava filed a petition for certiorari while
Cabahug, Granada and Dela Cruz filed their
respective petitions for review of the
Sandiganbayan Decision and Resolution. Nava
asserts that his Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 was filed in lieu of an appeal under
Rule 45 because the latter, being only limited
to questions of law, was insufficient. Is Nava’s
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
65 the proper remedy?
A: NO.  Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
provides the mode of appeal from judgments,
final orders, or resolutions of the Sandiganbayan:
SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court.
- A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court
of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial
Court or other courts whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified
petition for review on certiorari. The petition
shall raise only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth.
Icdang v. Sandiganbayan, et al. emphasized that
the proper remedy to take from a judgment of
conviction by the Sandiganbayan is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. The assailed
Decision and Resolution convicted Nava and the
other petitioners of the crime of entering into a
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous contract
or transaction on behalf of the government. Thus,
the proper remedy to take is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. Nonetheless,
inasmuch as Nava's Petition was filed within the
15-day period provided under Section 2 of Rule
45, this Court treated it as an appeal and did not
dismiss it outright. While procedural rules
should be treated with utmost respect since they
serve to facilitate the adjudication of cases in
support of the speedy disposition of cases
mandated by the Constitution, "a liberal
interpretation . . . of the rules of procedure can be
resorted to only in proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances.” (Aquilina
B. Granada et al., v. People, GR No. 184092,
February 22, 2017)
Q: In an Information, Capistrano Daayata
(Daayata), Dexter Salisi (Salisi), and Bregido
Malacat, Jr. (Malacat) were charged with
frustrated murder for attacking, assaulting,
boxing and striking one Rolando Bahian with
a stone and hitting the latter's head and
several parts of his body, thereby inflicting
injuries upon him.  Upon arraignment, all
three accused pleaded not guilty. Trial then
ensued. The prosecution and the defense
gave different versions of the events that took
place. The Regional Trial Court found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
frustrated murder. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals sustained the Regional Trial Court's
conclusions. When their motion for
reconsiderarion was denied, the accused then
filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45, praying that the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals be reversed and set aside. The
accused insist on their version of events.
They emphasize several factual details and
maintain that they did not initiate an assault
on Bahian. They assert that Bahian sustained
the injury on his forehead through his own
fault; thus, they could not be held liable for
acting with intent to kill Bahian. Can the
Supreme Court re-evaluate the factual
findings of the lower courts in the context of a
Rule 45 petition?
A: YES.  It is basic that Rule 45 petitions may
only raise pure questions of law, and that the
factual findings of lower courts are generally
binding and conclusive on this Court. Still, there
are recognized exceptions permitting this Court
to overturn the factual findings with which it is
confronted. One of such exceptions is when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.
Specifically concerning criminal cases, it is
settled by Jurisprudence that in exceptional
circumstances, such as when the trial court
overlooked material and relevant matters, the
Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual
findings of the lower courts. 
In the case at hand, a careful review of this case
and of the body of evidence that was available for
the Regional Trial Court's perusal reveals that
there has been a gross misapprehension of facts
on the part of the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals. Thus, the Supreme Court can
re-evaluate the factual findings of the lower
courts even in a Rule 45 petition. (Capistrano
Daayata et al., v. People, GR No. 205745, March 8,
2017)
Q: Guillermo and AV Manila alleged that in
the last few months of the Arroyo
Administration, then Acting Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and Highways
Victor Domingo consulted and discussed with
Guillermo and AV Manila the urgent need for
an advocacy campaign. After meetings with
Acting Secretary Domingo and some
preliminary work, Guillermo and AV Manila
formally submitted in a letter-proposal the
concept of "Joyride," a documentary film
showcasing milestones of the Arroyo
Administration. Guillermo and AV Manila
allegedly worked on "Joyride" on a tight
schedule and submitted the finished product
on April 4, 2010. "Joyride" was aired on NBN-
Channel 4 on April 5, 2010. On April 20, 2010,
petitioners presented to respondent
Department of Public Works and Highways
the total consideration for the services to be
rendered and for the deliverable items
committed to be delivered at P25,000,000.00.
After all the deliverables had been delivered,
petitioners followed up on the payment.
Despite several demands, no payments were
made. Guillermo and AV Manila filed for a
collection of sum of money. Respondents filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action. Did
Guillermo’s and AV Manila’s complaint failed
to state a cause of action?
A: YES. A complaint states a cause of action if it
sufficiently avers the existence of the three (3)
essential elements of a cause of action,
namely: (a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; (b) an obligation on the part
of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (c) an act or omission on
the part of the named defendant violative of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of
the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages. If the allegations of the
complaint do not state the concurrence of these
elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to
state a cause of action. In this case, to support the
prayer of Guillermo and AV Manila, the
Complaint attempted to lay down the elements of
a contract between the petitioners on one hand,
and respondents on the other. Thus, it alleged a
series of communications, meetings, and
memoranda, all tending to show that petitioners
agreed to complete and deliver the "Joyride"
project, and that respondents agreed to pay
₱25,000,000.00 as consideration.
Assuming that the Complaint's factual allegations
are true, they are not sufficient to establish that
the Regional Trial Court could grant its prayer.
The Complaint attempts to establish a contract
that involves expenditure of public funds. As
pointed out by respondents, contracts involving
the expenditure of public funds have additional
requisites to be valid. Sections 46, 47, and 48 of
Book V, Title I, Subtitle B, Chapter 8 of the
Administrative Code provides for essential
requisites for the validity of contracts. Said
provisions of law expressly declares void a
contract that fails to comply with the two
requirements, namely, an appropriation law
funding the contract and a certification of
appropriation and fund availability. The
Complaint, however, completely ignored the
foregoing requisites for the validity of contracts
involving expenditure of public funds. Thus, the
Regional Trial Court could not order the
enforcement of the alleged contract on the basis
of the Complaint, and the Complaint was
properly dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action. (Miguel “Lucky” Guillermo and AV Manila
Creative Production Co., v. Philippine Information
Agency and Department of Public Works and
Highways, GR. No. 223751, March 15, 2017)
Q: Antonio Garcia and Ferro Chemicals, Inc,.
entered into a deed of absolute sale and
purchase of shares of stick from various
corporations. Later on, a deed of right of
repurchase over the same shares of stock was
entered into between Antonio Garcia and
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. whereby the former can
redeem the properties sold within 180 days
from the signing of the agreement. However,
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not agree to the
repurchase, which led Antonio Garcia to file
an action for specific performance and
annulment of transfer of shares. Thereafter,
the information based on the complaint of
Ferro Chemicals, Inc. was filed against
Antonio Garcia before the Regional Trial
Court whereby he was charged with estafa for
allegedly misrepresenting to Ferro
Chemicals, Inc. that the shares subject of the
contracts entered into were free from all
liens and encumbrances. However, Antonio
Garcia was acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence. Ferro Chemicals, Inc. filed a motion
for reconsideration, which was denied by the
Regional Trial Court. Hence, it appealed to
the Court of Appeals the civil aspect of the
case. The notice of appeal filed was entitled
"Notice of Appeal Ex Gratia Abudantia Ad
Cautelam.  Did the respondent commited
forum shopping?
A:  YES. There is no question that Ferro
Chemicals, Inc. committed forum shopping when
it filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals and
a petition for certiorari before this court
assailing the same trial court decision. This is
true even if Ferro Chemicals, Inc.’s notice of
appeal to the Court of Appeals was entitled
"Notice of Appeal Ex Gratia Abudantia Ad
Cautelam (Of The Civil Aspect of the Case)." The
"civil aspect of the case" referred to by Ferro
Chemicals, Inc. is for the recovery of civil liability
ex delicto. However, it failed to make a
reservation before the trial court to institute the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex
delictoor institute a separate civil action prior to
the filing of the criminal case. (Antonio M. Garcia
v. Ferro Chemicals, Inc., GR No. 220054, March 27,
2017)
Q: Labor organization Manggagawa ng
Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP), which
represented the employees of Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company, filed a
notice of strike with the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board.  MKP charged
Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company with unfair labor practice "for
transferring several employees of its
Provisioning Support Division to Bicutan,
Taguig." Another notice of strike was filed by
MKP. The labor organization accused PLDT of
unfair labor practice where PLDT's alleged
restructuring of its Greater Metropolitan
Manila Operation Services and its closure of
traffic operations at the Batangas, Calamba,
Davao, Iloilo, Lucena, Malolos and Tarlac
Regional Operator Services. These twin
moves unjustly imperil the job security of
503 of MKP's members and will substantially
decimate the parties' bargaining unit.
Secretary of Labor and Employment certified
the labor dispute at the PLDT to the NLRC
compulsory Arbitration pursuant to Article
263 (g) of Labor Code. All striking workers
are hereby directed to return to work within
twenty four (24) hours from receipt of this
Order, except those who were terminated due
to redundancy. The employer is hereby
enjoined to accept the striking workers
under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to the strike. The parties are
likewise directed to cease and desist from
committing any act that might worsen the
situation. Is the Redundancy program of
PLDT valid? 
A: YES.  The Court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it regarded the technological
advancements resulting in less work for the
redundated employees as justifying PLDT’s
declaration of redundancy. PLDT’s declaration of
redundancy was backed by substantial evidence
showing a consistent decline for operator-
assisted calls for both local and international
calls because of cheaper alternatives like direct
dialing services, and the growth of wireless
communication. Thus, the National Labor
Relations Commission did not commit grave
abuse of discretion when it upheld the validity of
PLDT's redundancy program. Redundancy is
ultimately a management prerogative, and the
wisdom or soundness of such business judgment
is not subject to discretionary review by labor
tribunals or even this Court, as long as the law
was followed and malicious or arbitrary action
was not shown. (Mangagawa ng Komunikasyon
sa Pilipinas v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company Inc., GR No. 190390, April 19, 2017)
Q: Municipal Ordinance No. 357 was passed,
prohibiting the "storing, displaying, selling,
and blowing up of those pyrotechnics
products allowed by law, commonly called
'firecrackers' or 'pabuto' within the premises
of buildings 1 and 2 of the Bansalan Public
Market. Then Bansalan Mayor Reyes
approved a permit allowing vendors to sell
firecrackers at the Bansalan Public Market
from December 21, 2009 to January 1, 2010. 
On December 27, 2009, a fire befell the
Bansalan Public Market. Subsequently,
private respondent Paul Jocson Arches
(Arches) filed a complaint against Reyes
before the Office of the Ombudsman,
Mindanao. Arches questioned the approval
and issuance of a mayor's permit agreeing to
sell firecrackers, in violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 357. He claimed that this
permit caused the fire the previous year.  Ombudsman properly performed its duty to
After concluding the preliminary
investigation, the Ombudsman issued the
assailed Resolution and found that probable
cause existed to charge Reyes and his co-
respondents a quo with violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Thus, an
Information was filed against Reyes, together
with his co-respondents a quo Domingo, de
Castilla, and Andres for violating Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019. Petitioner argues
that there was no probable cause, insisting
that there was not enough basis for the
finding of bad faith, manifest partiality, or
gross inexcusable negligence in this case.
Moreover, petitioner avers that during the
preliminary investigation, he was not clearly
informed of the nature of the charge against
him, in violation of his constitutional right to
due process. The findings of the Ombudsman
were confusing, and petitioner was not
provided a copy of co-respondent a
quo Andres' affidavit, upon which the
Ombudsman relied in its finding of probable
cause against petitioner.  of his co-respondents.  Thus, petitioner's non-
Is there probable cause to charge Reyes with
violation of Section 3(e) of Reublic Act No.
3019?  accorded due process in the preliminary
Is Reyes’ right to due process violated for not
being provided a copy of Andres’ affidavit?
A: YES. Probable cause exists to charge Reyes
with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
3019. The Court generally does not interfere
with the Ombudsman's findings of probable
cause. As an independent constitutional body,
the Office of the Ombudsman is "beholden to no
one, acts as the champion of the people, and is
the preserver of the integrity of the public
service." Thus, it has the sole power to determine
whether there is probable cause to warrant the
filing of a criminal case against an accused. This
function is executive in nature. The Office of the
Ombudsman is armed with the power to
investigate. It is, therefore, in a better position to
assess the strengths or weaknesses of the
evidence on hand needed to make a finding of
probable cause. As this Court is not a trier of
facts, we defer to the sound judgment of the
Ombudsman. In the case at hand, the
determine probable cause as to whether
petitioner and his co-respondents a quo violated
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Based on
opinion, reasonable belief, and the evidence on
record, the Ombudsman found that the elements
of the crime punishable under Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 existed.
NO. Reyes’ right to due process was not violated
despite nor being provided the copy of Andres’
affidavit. Preliminary investigation is not part of
trial and is conducted only to establish whether
probable cause exists. Consequently, it is not
subject to the same due process requirements
that must be present during trial. Under
procedural law, a respondent under preliminary
investigation has the right to examine the
evidence submitted by the complainant,  but he
does not have a similar right over the evidence
submitted by his or her co-respondents. This
Court has held that during preliminary
investigation, the Ombudsman is not required to
furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits
receipt of Andres' affidavit did not violate his
procedural rights during preliminary
investigation. Moreover, petitioner was fully
investigation proceedings. (Edwin Granada Reyes
v. The Office of the Ombudsman, The
Sandiganbayan, and Paul Jocson Arches, GR No.
208243, June 5, 2017)
Q: Workers instituted a class suit against
Chiquita Brands. The parties entered into a
compromised agreement before pre-trial.
Such agreement was approved by the RTC.
The claimants moved for the execution of the
compromised agreement. Chiquita Brands
opposed the execution on the ground of
mootness. RTC granted the motion for
execution because there was no proof that
they have fulfilled their obligation. Later, the
case was transferred to the jurisdiction of
RTC Davao. It likewise ordered the execution
of the compromised agreement. Aggrieved,
Chiquita Brands filed a petition for certiorari
even without a prior appeal to the CA. Is
elevation of the case to the Supreme Court
correct?
A: YES. The doctrine of hierarchy of courts
determines the proper venue or choice of forum
where petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus should be filed. Generally, the Court
will dismiss petitions that are directly filed
before it if relief can be obtained from the lower
courts. Nevertheless, a direct invocation of the
Court's original jurisdiction may be justified
"when there are compelling reasons clearly set
forth in the petition." The Court may take
cognizance of this case "in the interest of judicial
economy and efficiency." It is sufficient for the
Court to decide on the issues raised by the
parties. Any further delay would unduly
prejudice the parties. (Chiquita Brands, Inc. vs.
Hon. George Omelio, G.R. No. 189102, June 07,
2017)
Q: Veridiano was charged and convicted of
the crime of illegal possession of marijuana.
He appealed the decision asserting that he
was illegally arrested. He argued that the tea
bag containing the marijuana is inadmissible
in evidence for being the fruit of a poisonous
tree. He further argued that the police
officers failed to comply with the rule on
chain of custody. The CA affirmed his guilt. It
found that Veridiano was caught in flagrante
delicto of having marijuana in his possession.
Is there valid warrantless arrest?
A: NO. Veridiano’s arrest could not be justified as
an inflagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113,
Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court. He was not
committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner
was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any
unusual conduct in the presence of the law
enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting
the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied
solely on the tip they received. Reliable
information alone is insufficient to support a
warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the
person to be arrested indicating that a crime has
just been committed, was being committed, or is
about to be committed. The warrantless arrest
cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113,
Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal
knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating
that petitioner had just committed an offense.
(Mariano Veridiano vs. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017)
Q: Cruz was charged with violation of RA No.
8484. Trial on the merits ensued. Cruz filed a
Demurer to Evidence asserting that the card
was inadmissible. The RTC denied the
Demurer to Evidence and stated that the
credit card receipts were properly identified
by the witnesses. The alleged counterfeit
credit card was offered in evidence by the
prosecution. Despite notice, Cruz and his
counsel did not appear during the scheduled
hearings for the presentation of his defense.
Later, Cruz manifested to the trial court that
he was waiving his right to present
evidence. The trial court convicted Cruz of the
crime charged. Aggrieved, Cruz appealed to
the CA but it was denied. According to the CA,
the prosecution was able to establish that
Cruz had in his possession a counterfeit
access device. Cruz moved for
reconsideration, but the Motion was denied.
Can the counterfeit access device be
presented in trial despite not having been
presented and marked during pre-trial?
A: YES. A counterfeit access device is "any access
device that is counterfeit, fictitious, altered, or
forged, or an identifiable component of an access
device or counterfeit access device." Under
Section 9(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 8484, the
possession and use of an access device is not
illegal. Rather, what is prohibited is the
possession and use of a counterfeit access
device. The prosecution was able to present and
mark during pre-trial Citibank's certification that
the access device used was counterfeit. It is this
certification that makes the possession and use
of the access device illegal. Therefore, the trial
court determined that the access device could
still be presented at trial since it merely formed
part of an· exhibit that had already been
presented and marked during pre-trial. (Anthony
De Silva Cruz vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
210266, June 7, 2017)
Q: Armodia was charged with two counts of
rape of a minor under two separate
informations. Accused-appellant was
arraigned and pleaded “not guilty” to the
rape charges. The State moved for leave to
amend the informations and add the phrase,
“being the father of the victim.” The RTC
denied the State’s motion, ruling that the
quested amendment was substantial and
prejudicial to accused-appellant’s right to be
informed of the charges against him. The
criminal cases were tried jointly. RTC
convicted accused-appellant of two (2) counts
of simple rape. Citing People v. Ilao, it held
that the "accused cannot be convicted of
qualified rape, because of the prosecution's
failure to include the relationship in the
information." Should Armodia be convicted of
the two counts of simple rape?
A: YES. The prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of the victim against her will,
through force, threat, or intimidation. Accused-
appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA twice,
through force and intimidation. His moral
ascendancy also intimidated her into submission.
This ascendancy or influence is grounded on his
parental authority over his child, which is
recognized by our Constitution and laws, as well
as on the respect and reverence that Filipino
children generally accord to their parents.  In
addition, accused-appellant's relationship with
the victim was not duly alleged in the
informations. Thus, his relationship with the
victim cannot qualify the crimes of rape. Ruling
otherwise would deprive him of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against him. (People of
the Philippines vs. Pablo Armodia, G.R. No.
210654, June 7, 2017)
Q: Lolita filed a complaint before RTC for the
cancellation of the titles. In their Answer, the
Heirs of Pedro Bas claimed that "the sale
between Pedro Bas and Faustina Manreal was
fake, spurious and invalid because Pedro who
was an illiterate never learned how to write
his name so that the signature appearing
thereon could not have been made by Pedro
Bas. The RTC ruled in favor of Lolita. The
Heirs of Pedro appealed to the CA which
reversed the decision. According to the CA,
Lolita must first be declared as the sole heir
to the estate of Norberto in a proper special
proceeding. Is CA correct in dismissing the
case?
A: NO. The Court finds no need for a separate
proceeding for a declaration of heirship in order
to resolve petitioner's action for cancellation of
titles of the property. The ground relied upon by
the Court of Appeals is not one of the issues
raised in the appeal. Respondents never raised
their objection to petitioner's capacity to sue
either as an affirmative defense or in a motion to
dismiss. Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
states, "defenses and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived." Thus, it was erroneous for the
Court of Appeals to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that there was no prior judicial
declaration of petitioner's heirship to Norberto.
(Lolita Bas Capablanca vs. Heirs of Pedro Bas, G.R.
No. 224144, June 28, 2017) 
Q: A criminal complaint for simple arson was
filed against Bacerra and he was convicted. 
Bacerra then appealed. He argued that none
of the prosecution’s witnesses had positively
identified him as the person who burned the
nipa hut. CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC
in toto. Bacerra moved for reconsideration
but it was denied. Thus, Bacerra filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari. Bacerra
argues that the CA erred in upholding his
conviction based on circumstantial evidence,
which, being merely based on conjecture,
falls short of proving his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. No direct evidence was
presented to prove that he actually set fire to
Alfredo’s nipa hut. Moreover, there were two
(2) incidents that occurred, which should be
taken and analyzed separately. Is Bacerra
guilty of simple arson?
A: YES. The identity of the perpetrator of a crime
and a finding of guilt may rest solely on the
strength of circumstantial evidence. The
commission of a crime, the identity of the
perpetrator, and the finding of guilt may all be
established by circumstantial evidence. The
circumstances must be considered as a whole
and should create an unbroken chain leading to
the conclusion that the accused authored the
crime. The proven circumstances must be
"consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the
same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that
he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt." In this case, no
one saw petitioner actually set fire to the nipa
hut. Nevertheless, the prosecution has
established multiple circumstances, which, after
being considered in their entirety, support the
conclusion that petitioner is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of simple arson. (Marlon
Bacerra vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
204544, July 3, 2017)
Q: Turner filed a complaint against
Chinatrust before MeTC demanding the
refund of his telegraphic transfer. However,
MeTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. Thus, Turner filed an appeal. The RTC
reversed and set aside the decision of MeTC.
While it agreed with the MeTC's findings that
the funds had been deposited to the account
of the beneficiary as early as September 15,
2004, the RTC ruled that this was not
sufficient basis to absolve Chinatrust of any
responsibility. The trial court found
insufficient evidence to show that Chinatrust
was not negligent in the performance of its
obligation under the telegraphic transfer
agreement. It held that no "discrepancy
notice" from Citibank-Cairo was even
presented in evidence. Chinatrust filed a
motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.
Later, Chinatrust filed a Petition for Review
under Rule 42 before the Court of Appeals
(CA). CA dismissed the petition and upheld
the decision of the RTC. Was the petitioner’s
right to due process violated when the RTC
and CA  ruled on an issue that was not raised
by the respondent in the lower court?
A: YES. In Jose Clavano, inc. v. Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board, the Court held that it is
elementary that a judgment must conform to,
and be supported by, both the pleadings and the
evidence, and must be in accordance with the
theory of the action on which the pleadings are
framed and the case was tried. The judgment
must be secudum allegata et probat.
The case was decided by the MeTC pursuant to
the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. Accordingly, no trial was conducted
as, after the conduct of a preliminary conference,
the parties were made to submit their position
papers. There was, thus, no opportunity to
present witnesses during an actual trial.
However, Section 9 of the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure calls for the submission of
witnesses' affidavits together with a party's
position paper after the conduct of a preliminary
conference.
The determination of issues at the preliminary
conference bars the consideration of other
questions on appeal. This is because under
Section 9 above, the parties were required to
submit their affidavits and other evidence on the
factual issues as defined in the preliminary
conference order. Thus, either of the parties
cannot raise a new factual issue on appeal,
otherwise it would be unfair to the adverse
party, who had no opportunity to present
evidence against it. (China Trust Commercial
Bank vs. Philip Turner, G.R. No. 191458, July 3,
2017)
Q: There was a baptismal celebration held on
a vacant lot in Riverside, Manggahan,
Rodriguez, Rizal. Brothers Jilito, Carlito and
his friends were drinking when Jilito saw the
San Jose brothers enter the house. The San
Jose brothers then started punching Carlito,
who tried to run to a nearby store. Jonathan
embraced Carlito from behind and while
punching him, stabbed him on the side of his
body while Joseph stabbed Carlito in the
front. Carlito was brought to the hospital but
was pronounced dead on arrival. Joseph was
charged with the crime of murder. He
contended that in the course of the
proceeding by the trial court, Dr. Carpio, an
expert witness who conducted the autopsy
stated that the stabbing incident was unclear.
It likewise noted that the victim's sister was a
witness for the defense and the victim's late
father signed an affidavit of desistance in the
accused-appellants' favor. In addition, the
crime occurred on June 2, 2002 but Joseph
was only arrested on August 3, 2005, or about
three (3) years after the crime was
committed. Is Joseph liable?
A: NO. It is a basic right of the accused under our
Constitution to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven. Thus, the quantum of
evidence required to overcome this presumption
is proof beyond reasonable doubt. The burden of
proving the accused's guilt rests with the
prosecution. A guilty verdict relies on the
strength of the prosecution's evidence, not on the
weakness of the defense. In this case, the lower
court failed to establish proof beyond reasonable
doubt thus, Joseph is not liable for the crime of
murder (People v. Joseph San Jose y Gregorio, GR.
No. 206916, July 3, 2017)
Q: A temporary restraining order (TRO) was
filed by Custodio against Bro. Bernardo Oca
et. al. in the RTC to prevent another trustee
from calling a special membership meeting in
order to remove the complainant from the
Board of Trustees. The case was dismissed
and the petitioner was subsequently removed
from the Board of Trustees and as Curriculum
Administrator. Eventually, a complaint for
contempt of court was filed by the original
complainant against the adverse parties for
their alleged willful disobedience to the
various orders of the trial court. Are the
parties guilty of contempt of court?
A: YES. The purpose of the filing and the nature
of the contempt proceeding show that the
original complainant was seeking enforcement of
the trial court orders in the intra-corporate
controversy because the adverse parties refused
to comply. Hence, this is a civil contempt case,
which does not need proof beyond reasonable
doubt. This Court has ruled that while the power
to cite parties in contempt should be used
sparingly, it should be allowed to exercise its
power of contempt to maintain the respect due
to it and to ensure the infallibility of justice
where the defiance is so clear and contumacious
and there is an evident refusal to obey. (Bro.
Bernard Oca vs. Laurita Custodio, G.R. No. 199825,
26 July 2017)
Q: Julito was charged with 2 counts of rape
for his alleged willful, unlawful, felonious act
of having carnal knowledge with his 13-year
old daughter, against her will and consent.
The Regional Trial Court convicted Julito
based on the examination made by the
attending physician finding healed
lacerations which appears to have been
caused by penetration into the vagina.
Divingracia contends that there were several
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
witnesses which lessen their credibility as
witnesses. Is Divinagracia correct?
A: NO.  It is well-established that "physical
evidence is evidence of the highest order. It
speaks more eloquently than a hundred
witnesses."  The physical evidence of the healed
lacerations in AAA's vagina strongly
corroborates AAA and BBB's testimonies that
AAA was raped by their father.  It is well-
established that "physical evidence is evidence of
the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than
a hundred witnesses."  The physical evidence of
the healed lacerations in AAA's vagina strongly
corroborates AAA and BBB's testimonies that
AAA was raped by their father. (People v.
Divinagracia, Sr., G.R. No. 207765, July 26, 2017)
Q: Diego was killed by Rene Boy and three
others. The main witness was Diego’s live-in
partner Magdalena. The RTC gave credence to
Magdalena’s testimonies despite failing to
state in direct examination that she was
accompanied by Simeon (Diego’s brother)
when they found the deceased. Trying to
evade liability, Rene Boy asserts that the trial
court erred in automatically accepting
Magdalena's testimony as credible merely
because the defense allegedly failed to prove
that she had basis to falsely charge
him. Citing People v. Rodrigo, he concludes
that this assumption cannot apply to
Magdalena as it only applies to detached
third parties. Is Rened Boy guilty?
A: Yes. He was proven guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. The case of Rodrigo states that: “The
widow or the relatives are not detached or
disinterested witnesses; they are parties who
suffered and experienced pain as a result of the
killing. In fact, they are better characterized
as aggrieved parties as even the law recognizes
them as such through the grant of indemnities
and damages”. However, unlike the witness
in Rodrigo, Magdalena's testimony can stand on
its own. Her identification of Rene Boy
was unquestionable since she knew the accused
even before the incident happened. She even
referred to them as known troublemakers in
their place. (People v Dimapilit, G.R. No. 210802,
August 09, 2017)
Q: A buy-bust operation was conducted
wherein PO2 Montales was designated as the
poseur-buyer. The buy-bust team proceeded
to Saunar's residence. PO2 Montales
introduced herself as a buyer of shabu and
handed Saunar the marked money. After a
brief conversation, Saunar went inside the
house. She returned moments later "with two
(2) transparent plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance." PO2 Montales
examined the plastic sachets and gave the
pre-arranged signal by removing her
sunglasses. This indicated the consummation
of the transaction to the other members of
the buy-bust team. PO2 Montales brought the
seized items to the crime laboratory for
scientific examination. The contents of the
two (2) plastic sachets weighed 0.0496 grams
and 0.0487 grams. They tested positive for
shabu. Is Saunar liable even if only a
miniscule amount are alleged to have been
seized from him?
A: The prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the transaction actually
took place by establishing the following
elements: "(1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object and the consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment."
Aside from this, the corpus delicti must be
presented as evidence in court. In cases involving
dangerous drugs, "the corpus delicti is the
dangerous drug itself." Although strict
compliance with the chain of custody rule may
be excused provided that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are
preserved, a more exacting standard is required
of law enforcers when only a miniscule amount
of dangerous drugs are alleged to have been
seized from the accused.
In this case, only 0.0496 grams and 0.0487 grams
or a total of 0.0983 grams of shabu were
allegedly taken from accused-appellant. Such a
miniscule amount of drugs is highly susceptible
to tampering and contamination. A careful
review of the factual findings of the lower courts
shows that the prosecution failed to discharge its
burden of preserving the identity and integrity of
the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from
accused-appellant. The prosecution failed to
establish who held the seized items from the
moment they were taken from accused-appellant
until they were brought to the police station. The
designated poseur-buyer, PO2 Montales, did not
mention who took custody of the seized items for
safekeeping. (People v. Saunar, G.R. No. 207396,
August 9, 2017)
Q: Keihin-Everett entered into a Trucking
Service Agreement with Matsushita. These
services were subcontracted by Keihin-
Everett to Orient Freight. A truck has gone
missing, thus 218 cartons failed to arrive in
Japan, a fact which Orient tried to hide to
Keihin. When Matsushita terminated its
contract with Keihin, the latter filed a
complaint for damages. It was granted by the
RTC and the CA. Orient filed a Petition for
Review under Rule 45 before the Supreme
Court, but Keihin filed its Comment, arguing
that the petition does not contain the names
of the parties in violation of Rule 45, Section 4
of the Rules of Court. Is it a fatal defect to the
Petition?
A: NO. The petition does not violate Rule 45,
Section 4 of the Rules of Court for failing to state
the names of the parties in the body. The names
of the parties are readily discernable from the
caption of the petition, clearly showing the
appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse
party as the respondent. The Court of Appeals
had also been erroneously impleaded in the
petition. However, this Court in Aguilar v. Court
of Appeals, et al. ruled that inappropriately
impleading the lower court as respondent does
not automatically mean the dismissal of the
appeal. This is a mere formal defect. (Orient
Freight International, Inc., v. Keihin-Everett
Forwarding Company. G.R. No. 191937, August 09,
2017)
Q: Joson charged private respondents before
the Office of the Ombudsman for GROSS
VIOLATION OF RA 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT); and/or violation
of THE REVISED PENAL CODE because of the
alleged payment to a caterer that did not
provide meals for an event and the
consequent misappropriation of the amount
paid. Graft Investigation and Prosecution
Officer issued a Joint Resolution dismissing
all charges citing lack of probable cause for
dismissing the criminal charges and lack of
merit for dismissing the administrative
charge. Joson filed a Petition for Certiorai
before the Supreme Court citing grave abuse
of discretion. The respondent maintains that
petitioner should have elevated the
administrative case to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Is Joson
correct?
A: NO. Joson’s resort to Rule 65 instead of Rule
43 is improper. In Fabian v. Hon. Desierto, this
Court declared Section 27 unconstitutional for
increasing this Court's appellate jurisdiction in
violation of the proscription under Article VI,
Section 30 of the Constitution. This Court further
held in Fabian that "appeals from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of
Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43."
Further, although subject to judicial review if
they fail the test of arbitrariness, the correct
procedure is to file a petition for certiorari
before the CA to question the Ombudsman's
decision of dismissal of the administrative
charge. (Edward Thomas F. Joson, v. The Office of
the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 197433 and 197435,
August 09, 2017)
Q: As part of its invitation to prospective
contractors for the Gateway Mall, ACI
furnished bidders with Tender Documents.
The Tender Documents described the
project's contract sum to be a "lump sum" or
"lump sum fixed price" and restricted cost
adjustments. CECON submitted its bid,
indicating a tender amount of
P1,449,089,174.00. CECON offered the lowest
tender amount. However, ACI did not award
the project to any bidder, even as the validity
of CECON's proposal lapsed on November 29,
2002. But, CECON already started the project
in accordance with ACI’s instruction despite
many adjustments requested by the latter.
Exasperated, CECON served notice upon ACI
that it would avail of arbitration. CIAC
awarded a total of P229,223,318.69 to CECON,
inclusive of the costs of arbitration. The CIAC
Arbitral Tribunal found ACI liable for the
delays.
ACI filed before the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.The Court of Appeals
reduced the award in favor of CECON to
P114,324,605.00 and increased the award to
ACI to P31,566,246.20.
The Court of Appeals held as inviolable the
lump-sum fixed price arrangement between
ACI and CECON. It faulted the CIAC Arbitral
Tribunal for acting in excess of jurisdiction as
it supposedly took it upon itself to
unilaterally modify the arrangement between
ACI and CECON. Did CIAC exceed its
authority?
A: NO. Rule 43, Section 1 explicitly lists CIAC as
among the quasi judicial agencies covered by
Rule 43. However, in keeping with the
Construction Industry Arbitration Law, any
appeal from CIAC arbitral tribunals must remain
limited to questions of law. In this case, despite
the “lump-sum” nature of the Contract
Documents, the Court of Appeals failed to rule
that there was never a meeting of minds on the
price of P1,540,000,000.00. Thus, that stipulation
could not have been the basis of any obligation.
(CE Construction Corporation, v. Araneta Center,
Inc., G.R. No. 192925, August 09 2017)
Q: Sometime in 2008, PSALM drafted the
Operation and Maintenance Agreement for
NAPOCOR's acceptance. The contract
provided that NAPOCOR would perform "all
functions and services necessary to
successfully and efficiently operate, maintain,
and manage" power plants, generation assets,
or facilities until its transfer or turnover to
PSALM. On April 28, 2009, petitioners filed
this present Petition for Injunction with
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order or
Preliminary Injunction seeking to restrain
the implementation of the Operation and
Management Agreement for contravening the
provisions of EPIRA. In particular, they argue
that PSALM's ownership extends only to net
profits, and not to all revenues, of NAPOCOR
under Section 55(e) of EPIRA. Hence,
NAPOCOR's revenues should not be billed for
PSALM's account. Does the petitioners have a
cause of action?
A: NO. Actions must be instituted by the real
parties in interest. Otherwise, the action may be
dismissed for lack of cause of action.  A real party
in interest is defined under Rule 3, Section 2 of
the Rules of Court as:
Section 2. Parties in interest. A real party in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules,
every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest.
Petitioners, not being privy to the Operation and
Maintenance Agreement, have no cause of action
against respondents. They are not the real
parties in interest to question its validity. (Power
Generation Employees v NAPOCOR, G.R. No.
187420, August 09, 2017)
Q: Eliza voluntarily offered for sale to the
government, under Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program, a parcel of land. Pursuant to
E.O. No. 405, Landbank made a valuation of
the land. Eliza, thereafter, rejected
Landbank’s valuation. Thus, the matter was
endorsed to the Office of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) and
then was transferred to the Office of Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD). The
Regional Adjudicator (RA) fixed the
compensation. Not satisfied, Landbank filed a
petition for just compensation before the
RTC, acting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC).
Eliza filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment
before the Office of the RA. The RA granted
the motion for execution and issued an order
directing the issuance of a writ of execution
and an alias writ of execution since the
former was returned unsatisfied. Landbank
sought from the SAC the quashal of the writ
which the SAC denied. Hence, it filed before
the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) a petition for
certiorari. DARAB granted. Does DARAB has
jurisdiction in granting the petition for
certiorari?  heirs of Juliana for procrastination.
A: NO. Jurisprudence has settled that DARAB
possesses no power to issue writs of certiorari.
Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and
determine a cause or causes of action, must exist
as a matter of law. It is settled that the authority
to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus involves the exercise of original
jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred
by the Constitution or by law.As an
administrative agency exercising quasi-judicial
but not consummate judicial power, DARAB is
inherently incapable of issuing writs of
certiorari. This is not merely a matter of
statutorily stipulated competence but a question
that hearkens to the separation of government's
tripartite powers: executive, legislative, and
judicial. DARAB's exercise of the innately judicial
certiorari power is an executive encroachment
into the judiciary. It violates the separation of
powers; it is unconstitutional. With or without a
law enabling it, DARAB has no power to rule on
jurisdictional controversies via petitions for
certiorari. DARAB's self-serving grant to itself of
the power to issue writs of certiorari in the 1994
DARAB New Rules of Procedure is itself a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. It must be annulled for running
afoul of the Constitution. (Heirs of Eliza Q. Zoleta
v. Landbank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 205128,
August 9, 2017)
Q: Tantrade filed a Complaint for Collection of
a Sum of Money with Damages against the
original defendant, now deceased Juliana for
unpaid purchases of construction materials.
The MTC and RTC found Juliana liable. One
day before the lapse of the 15-day period to
file a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners
filed their Urgent Motion for Extension of
Time to File Petition for Review under Rule
42 (First Motion for Extension). They justified
their First Motion for Extension by citing
financial constraints. Despite their declared
financial difficulties, petitioners managed to
pay the docket and other fees and to make a
deposit for costs, as required for a Petition
for Review under Rule 42. These were done
alongside the filing of their First Motion for
Extension. The CA denied and faulted the
Subsequently, two days before the expiration
of the 15-day extension that petitioners
originally prayed for in the First Motion for
Extension, petitioners filed their Second
Urgent Motion for Extension of Time (Second
Motion for Extension). They sought another
15-day extension to file their Petition for
Review. Petitioners' counsel explained that
petitioners remained hardpressed with their
finances.
After which, a day before the end of the
second 15-day extension they prayed for,
petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals
their Petition for Review under Rule 42. It
was only on June 29, 2011 that petitioners
received a copy of the assailed Court of
Appeals Resolution which denied the First
Motion for Extension. On July 11, 2011, they
filed a Motion for Reconsideration. They
explained that the distance between
Tagbilaran City and Cebu City, the length of
time to prepare the main petition and the
certified copies of pleadings and other court
records, and the lack of money to finance the
filing of a Petition for Review hindered them
from immediately filing their appeal. The CA
denied the motion for reconsideration. Is the
denial of the extension and dismissal of
appeal proper?
A: NO. Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure governs appeals taken to the Court of
Appeals from decisions of Regional Trial Courts
rendered in the exercise of their appellate
jurisdiction. It is evident from the last two
sentences of Section 1 that motions for extension
to file Rule 42 petitions are permissible. Rule 42
enables not just one but two extensions of 15
days each. An initial extension may be given,
provided that it is sought through a proper
motion, docket and lawful fees are paid, and a
deposit for costs is made before the expiration of
the reglementary period. After this initial
extension, Rule 42 permits a second extension of
another 15 days. This second extension shall,
however, only be "for the most compelling
reason."
Save for the Court of Appeals' assertion of
procrastination, there is no intimation that
petitioners failed in any of these requirements.
No other technical defect has been attributed to
petitioners' First Motion for Extension. They also
timely paid the docket and other fees, and
deposited for costs.  It is true that by the time the
Second Motion for Extension was filed on June 6,
2011, the Court of Appeals had already denied
petitioners' First Motion for Extension in its
assailed May 31, 2011 Resolution. Petitioners,
however, would not be notified of that denial
until June 29, 2011. The most that petitioners
can be charged with is optimism that, barring
timely notification to the contrary, their First
Motion for Extension was granted. They may
have been guileless, but they were not malicious.
By the time they had been compelled to litigate,
Juliana's case was already in its advanced stages.
By then, pursuing an appeal literally entailed
crossing the sea to another island. The Court of
Appeals should have considered that the
required docket fees and deposit for costs under
Rule 42 were not all that petitioners had to
shoulder. There, too, was the need for proper
legal representation in the advanced stages of
litigation and having to bear the adversity of
having twice lost in lower courts. Petitioners
were simultaneously afflicted with the tragedy of
death and constrained by their means. These
were compelling reasons warranting a solicitous
stance towards them. Justice is better served by
extending consideration to them and enabling an
exhaustive resolution of the parties' claims.
(Mario Magat, Sr. et al. v. Tantrade Corporation,
G.R. No. 205483, August 23, 2017)
Q: DHLFMC and Asiamed entered into a
Contract of Sale. Asiamed filed a Complaint
against DHLFMC and Anthony for sum of
money. DHLFMC and Anthony (petitioners)
alleged that the purchase of the equipment
was conditioned on the approval of a loan
from Planters Development Bank (Planters
Bank). However, this loan was not approved.
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a
Decision finding that the parties had entered
into a Contract of Sale and that the pieces of
equipment subjects of the contract were
received by petitioners, who failed to pay the
balance of the contract. The Court of Appeals
(CA) denied the appeal in its Decision. The CA
also granted Asiamed's motion for
substitution, allowing it to procure the
appointment of an administrator for the
estate of petitioner Anthony, who passed
away during the pendency of the case. Is the
grant of Asiamed’s motion to procure the
appointment of an administrator for the
estate of the deceased Anthony Dee is
proper?
A: YES. The Court of Appeals' order that Asiamed
be allowed to procure an administrator for the
estate of petitioner Anthony was based on Rule
3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court. The
petitioners failed to show how the application of
the Rules of Court was an error of law. The only
basis for petitioners' objection to the order
requiring the appointment of an administrator
for the estate of petitioner Anthony is a liberal
interpretation of the rules. Thus, their argument
fails. (Dee Hwa Liong Foundation Medial Center v.
Asiamed, G.R. No. 205638, August 23, 2017)
Q:  A buy-bust operation was conducted
pursuant to an information that a certain
“Tatay” was selling illegal drugs. At about
7:00 p.m., the buy-bust team headed to Sitio
Sindulan in their service vehicle.  As the
designated poseur-buyer, PO1 Misa walked
towards Saragena’s house. SPO1 Paller and
SPO3 Magdadaro trailed behind him.
Saragena’s house was located at the back of a
stage. As PO1 Misa drew closer to the target
site, SPO1 Paler and SPO3 Magdadaro hid
themselves at the side of the stages beside the
basketball court. The distance between the
designated poseur-buyer and two back-up
officers were about five to eight meters.
Outside Saragena’s house, PO1 Misa
convinced the suspect to sell him shabu. PO1
Misa handed the P100.00 bill as payment, for
which he received a "pack of white crystalline
substance." SPO1 Paller and SPO3 Magdadaro
then rushed to the scene and introduced
themselves as police officers. SPO1 Paller
conducted a body search on accused-
appellant and recovered the buy-bust money.
Saragena was brought to the police station
and an Information was filed against him
stating that  with deliberate intent, and
without authority of law, did then and there
sell, deliver or give away to a poseur buyer:
one heat-sealed transparent plastic pocket
containing 0.03 grams of white crystalline
substance locally known as "SHABU"
containing methylamphetamine
hydrochloride. Is Saragena liable?
A: Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 penalizes
any person who sells a dangerous drug,
regardless of quantity. To successfully convict an
accused under this provision, the prosecution
must establish the identities of the buyer and the
seller, the item sold, and the consideration given
for it. There must be an actual sale,
consummated through delivery and payment.
Finally, the corpus delicti must be presented in
court as evidence.
It is unclear how SPO1 Paller and SPO3
Magdadaro allegedly witnessed the purported
sale. The alleged illegal drug was of very small
quantity, It weighed only 0.03 grams,
approximately as light as a grain of rice or an ant.
The alleged transaction between PO1 Misa and
accused-appellant happened five (5) to eight (8)
meters away from SPO3 Magdadaro. While PO1
Misa was allegedly buying shabu from accused-
appellant, SPO1 Paller and SPO3 Magdadaro
were hiding at the side of the stage. Accused-
appellant's house was at the back of this stage
where they hid. Likewise, it was already 7:00
p.m. and the night time would have impaired
their vision. (People v. Saragena, G.R. No. 210677,
August 21, 2017)
Q: Larrazabal Enterprises filed an Action for
Recovery of its three parcels of land against
the Department of Agrarian Reform and the
petitioners before the Office of the Regional
Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB). It alleged that
no price had been fixed, much less paid, for
the expropriation of its properties, in
violation of the just compensation
requirement under Presidential Decree No.
27, as amended. The Regional Adjudicator
noted that there was nothing in the records to
show that just compensation was fixed or
paid for the parcels. Hence, he ruled in favor
of Larrazabal Enterprises. The DARAB
reversed. Larrazabal filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (MFR). The DARAB reversed
its own decision and granted the MFR. 
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review
before the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals dismissed their Petition for the
following formal errors: First was an
inconsistency between the listing of
petitioners' names in their prior Motion for
Extension of Time and subsequent Petition
for Review, in which the accompanying
verification and certification of non-forum
shopping were laden with this same
inconsistency and other defects. Second was
the non-inclusion of the original Complaint
filed by the adverse party, now private
respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises,
before the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian
Reform. And last was petitioners' counsel's
failure to indicate the place of issue of the
official receipt of his payment of annual
membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
Is the dismissal justified by the errors
presented by the CA?
A: The Court of Appeals was harsh in denying
petitioners the opportunity to exhaustively
ventilate and argue their case. Rather than
dwelling on procedural minutiae, the Court of
Appeals should have been impelled by the
greater interest of justice. It should have enabled
a better consideration of the intricate issues of
the application of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law, social justice, expropriation, and
just compensation. The reversals of rulings at the
level of the DARAB could have been taken as an
indication that the matters at stake were far from
being so plain that they should be ignored on
mere technicalities. The better part of its
discretion dictated a solicitous stance towards
petitioners. The present Petition must be
granted. The Court of Appeals must give due
course to petitioners' appeal to enable a better
appreciation of the myriad substantive issues
which have otherwise not been pleaded and
litigated before this Court by the parties. (Cortal
et. al., v. Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises et.al., G.R.
No. 199107, August 30, 2017)
Q: Belo Medical Group received a
request from Santos for the inspection
of corporate records. However, Santos
was unsuccessful in inspecting the
corporate books. RTC of Makati, a special
commercial court, classified the dispute
as intra-corporate. Belo Medical Group
then filed an Omnibus Motion for
Clarificatory Hearing and for Leave to
File Consolidated Reply praying that the
case be tried as a civil case and not as
an intra corporate controversy. It
argued that the Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra Corporate
Controversies did not include special
civil actions for interpleader and
declaratory relief found under the
Rules of Court. Belo Medical Group
later on moved that Santos be declared
in default. Instead of filing an answer,
Santos filed a Motion to Dismiss. Is the
filing of the Motion to Dismiss proper?
A: NO. Under A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC, or the
Interim Rules of Procedure Governing
Intra-Corporate Controversies, Motion to
Dismiss is a prohibited pleading. It is
provided therein:
Section 8. Prohibited Pleadings. — The
following pleadings are prohibited:
(1) Motion to dismiss;
(2) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(3) Motion for new trial, or for
reconsideration of judgment or order, or
for reopening of trial;
(4) Motion for extension of time to file
pleadings, affidavits or any other paper,
except those filed due to clearly
compelling reasons. Such motion must be
verified and under oath; and
(5) Motion for postponement and other
motions of similar intent, except those
filed due to clearly compelling reasons.
Such motion must be verified and under
oath.
Thus, an intra-corporate dispute, Santos
should not have been allowed to file a
Motion to Dismiss. (Belo Medical Group, Inc.
vs. Santos and Belo, G.R. No. 185894, August
30, 2017)
Q: Stephen Huang and his parents filed
a complaint for damages based on
quasi-delict against Mercury Drug
Corporation and Rolando J. Del Rosario
due to an accident involving a six (6)-
wheeler truck owned by Mercury Drug
and driven by Del Rosario. As a result
of the tragic incident, Stephen suffered
serious spinal cord injuries. The trial
court awarded damages in favor of
Huang. This was later on affirmed by the
appellate court and the Supreme Court.
Stephen and his parents moved for the
execution of the judgment to which
Mercury Drug and Del Rosario filed an
opposition. The Regional Trial Court
granted the Motion for Execution and
the corresponding Writ of Execution
was then issued. Mercury Drug and Del
Rosario argued that the Regional Trial
Court committed grave abuse of
discretion in allowing the execution of
the judgment despite clerical errors in
the computation of life care cost and
loss of earning capacity. Can the
judgment still be modified?
A: NO. Under the Doctrine of Immutability of
Judgments, a judgment that lapses into
finality becomes immutable and unalterable.
It can neither be modified nor disturbed by
courts in any manner even if the purpose
of the modification is to correct perceived
errors of fact or law. Parties cannot
circumvent this principle by assailing the
execution of the judgment. What cannot
be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
The Court noted that the amendments
sought by petitioners affect the very
substance of the controversy. While it
appears on the surface of the Petition
that they merely seek the clarification of
the judgment, a careful review of
petitioners' assertions and arguments
reveal their true intention of appealing
the merits of the case. This cannot be
done without violating the doctrine on
immutability of judgments. A correction
pertaining to the substance of the
controversy is not a clerical error.
(Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Sps. Huang,
G.R. No. 197654, August 30, 2017)
Q: Francica was found guilty of three (3)
counts of statutory rape. The trial court
ruled that all the elements of statutory
rape were established with AAA's
credible and candid testimony,
corroborated by her grandmother BBB's
testimony. The trial court also held that
it was immaterial that the prosecution
failed to present the testimony of
medico-legal PSI Carpio, since "a
medical examination is not
indispensable to the prosecution of
rape as long as the evidence on hand
convinces the court that conviction for
rape is proper." Court of Appeals
rendered a decision affirming Francica's
conviction. It emphasized that a
conviction for rape based on the sole
testimony of the victim is possible, as
long as the victim's testimony is
competent and credible. It also asserted
that a medical examination of a rape
victim is not indispensable to the
prosecution of a rape case, as it is
merely corroborative in nature. Is
Francica’s guilt proven beyond
reasonable doubt?
A: YES. Despite the absence of the medico-
legal officer as a witness, the presence of
healed lacerations corroborates AAA's
testimony as it "is the best physical
evidence of forcible defloration. It is well-
established that “physical evidence is
evidence of the highest order. It speaks
more eloquently than a hundred
witnesses." The physical evidence of the
healed lacerations in AAA's vagina
strongly corroborates her testimony that
she was sexually abused by Francica.
Compared to AAA's candid and categorical
testimony, Francica's defense of denial
must fail. It was emphasized that the self-
serving defense of denial falters against
the "positive identification by, and
straightforward narration of the victim."
The Court has likewise repeatedly held
that the lone yet credible testimony of the
offended party is sufficient to establish
the guilt of the accused. (People of the
Philippines vs. Francica, G.R. No. 208625,
September 6, 2017)
Q: Mega Farm, through Erwin Bryan See
(President), and the then newly elected
Mayor Jaraula of Cagayan de Oro
executed the Build-Operate-Transfer
Contract for the Redevelopment of
Agora Complex (Agora Complex BOT
Contract). Petitioners, as public officers
and in their personal capacity,
questioned the execution and the
contents of the Agora Complex BOT
Contract. They alleged that it was
issued in bad faith and with fraudulent
maneuvers between Mega Farm and the
City Government of Cagayan De Oro. Do
the petitioners, as city councilors, have a
cause of action?
A: YES. The real party in interest which
may file a case, questioning the validity of
a contract entered into by the city mayor,
who is alleged to have no authority to do
so, is the city itself. It is the local
government unit which stands to be
injured or benefitted by any judgment that
may be made in this case. The city
councilors merely represent the city in the
suit.
Under Title III,Chapter III, Article I,
Section 455 (b) (1) (vi) of Republic Act
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, the city mayor may
sign all bonds, contracts, and obligations
on behalf of a city only upon authority of
the sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant
to law or ordinance.
The requirement of the sangguniang
panlungsod's prior authority is a measure
of check and balance on the powers of the
city mayor. As the City Council is the
source of the mayor's power to execute
contracts for the city, its members have
the authority, interest, and even duty to
file cases in behalf of the city, to restrain
the execution of contracts entered into in
violation of the Local Government Code.
Here, it is undisputed that petitioners are
members of the City Council of Cagayan
De Oro. Clearly, as they are part of the
very body in which authority is allegedly
being undermined by the city mayor, they
have the right and duty to question the
basis of the mayor's authority to sign a
contract which binds the city. (Lao, Jr. v.
LGU of Cagayan De Oro City, G.R. No.
187869, September 13, 2017)
Q: Republic of the Philippines, through
the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH), and
CMC/Monark/Pacic/Hi-Tri J.V. (the Joint
Venture) executed a contract for a road
project in Zamboanga del Sur. While the
project was ongoing, the Joint
Venture's truck and equipment were
set on fire. A bomb exploded at Joint
Venture's batching plant located at
Brgy. West Boyogan, Kumalarang,
Zamboanga del Sur. According to
reports, the bombing incident was
caused by members of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front.
The Joint Venture filed a Complaint
against DPWH before Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC).CIAC promulgated an Award
directing DPWH to pay the Joint
Venture its money claims plus legal
interest. CIAC, however, denied the
Joint Venture's claim for price
adjustment due to the delay in the
issuance of a Notice to Proceed under
Presidential Decree No. 1594.The Court
of Appeals sustained CIAC's Award with
certain modifications and remanded
the case to CIAC for the determination
of the number of days' extension that
the Joint Venture is entitled to and "the
conversion rate in pesos of the
awarded foreign exchange payments
stated." Should the findings of fact of the
CIAC be upheld?
A: YES. As a general rule, findings of fact
of CIAC, a quasi-judicial tribunal which
has expertise on matters regarding the
construction industry, should be respected
and upheld. CIAC's factual findings, as
armed by the Court of Appeals, will not
be overturned except as to the most
compelling of reasons. Indeed, settled is
the rule that findings of fact of
administrative agencies and quasi-judicial
bodies, which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is conned to
specific matters, are generally accorded
not only respect, but finality when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, the Court affirmed the findings of
CIAC and the Court of Appeals that
respondent is entitled to the foreign
component of the Contract. CIAC found
that petitioner was not justified in
withholding the payment for the dollar
component of the Contract. Further, it
found that respondent was justified and
not at fault for not reviewing the Letter
of Credit. (DPWH v. CMC, G.R. No. 179732,
September 13, 2017)
Q: Sulpicio insured its fleet of inter-
island vessels with Steamship. On July 7,
2005, M/V Princess of the World, owned
by Sulpicio, was gutted by fire while on
voyage from Iloilo to Zamboanga City,
resulting in total loss of its cargoes.
Sulpicio claimed indemnity from
Steamship under the Protection &
Indemnity insurance policy. Steamship
denied the claim and subsequently
rescinded the insurance coverage of
Sulpicio's other vessels. Sulpicio filed a
complaint against Steamship. Steamship,
on the other hand, filed its Motion to
Dismiss and/or to Refer Case to
Arbitration. The trial court, denied the
motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals
found no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court in denying
Steamship's Motion to Dismiss and/or
to Refer Case to Arbitration or any
convincing evidence to show that a
valid arbitration agreement existed
between the parties. Was there a valid
arbitration agreement?
A: YES. The arbitration clause is found in
Rule 47 of the 2005/2006 Club Rules.
Under Rule 47, any dispute concerning
the insurance afforded by Steamship must
first be brought by a claiming member to
the Directors for adjudication. If this
member disagrees with the decision of the
Director, the dispute must be referred to
arbitration in London. Despite the
member's disagreement, the Managers of
Steamship may refer the dispute to
arbitration without adjudication of the
Directors. This procedure must be
complied with before the member can
pursue legal proceedings against
Steamship.
Sulpicio's agreement to abide by
Steamship's Club Rules, including its
arbitration clause, can be reasonably
inferred from its submission of an
application for entry of its vessels to
Steamship "subject to the Rules, receipt of
which we acknowledge." In this case, by
its act of entering its fleet of vessels to
Steamship and accepting without objection
the Certificate of Entry and Acceptance
covering its vessels, Sulpicio manifests its
consent to be bound by the Club Rules.
Even if there are other defendants who
are not parties to the arbitration
agreement, arbitration is still proper.
Where a motion is filed in court for the
referral of a dispute to arbitration,
Section 24 of Republic Act No. 9285
ordains that the dispute shall be referred
"to arbitration unless it finds that the
arbitration agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being
performed." (Steamship Mutual
Underwriting Association (Bermuda)
Limited vs. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., G.R. No.
196072, September 20, 2017)
Q: A parcel of land owned by Capitol Hills
Golf and Country Club, Inc. was levied
by the Quezon City Treasurer on
account of unpaid real estate taxes. It
was subjected to a tax delinquency sale.
Alvarado was noted to have been the
highest bidder. Thereafter, a Certificate
of Sale of Delinquent Property was
issued in Alvarado's favor. Respondents
filed with the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court their Complaint assailing the
validity of the tax sale. In response to
respondents' Complaint, Alvarado filed
his Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim. After filing his Answer,
Alvarado filed his Motion to Dismiss.
Judge Payoyo-Villordon denied
Alvarado's Motion to Dismiss. She
noted that the Motion was filed out of
time as Alvarado already filed his
Answer and that "Alvarado was
considered estopped from filing the
subject Motion to Dismiss." Should the
Motion to Dismiss be granted?
A: YES. As a general rule, Rule 16, Section
1 is unequivocal: a motion to dismiss is
filed "within the time for but before filing
the answer." Rule 16, Section 4 states that
if a motion to dismiss is denied, the
defendant shall then file an answer within
the remaining period of the 15 days that
he or she originally had to file it but in
no case less than five (5) days. It is basic,
then, that motions to dismiss are not to
be entertained after an answer has been
filed.
This rule, however, admits of exceptions.
Out of Rule 16, Section 1's 10 grounds,
four (4) survive the anterior filing of an
answer: lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, litis pendentia, res
judicata, and prescription, as provided in
Rule 9, Section 1. Common to all these four
(4) grounds that survive the filing of an
answer is that they persist no matter the
resolution of the merits of the case by
the court.
The prior filing of an answer, therefore,
serves as a bar to the consideration of
Rule 16, Section 1's six (6) other grounds.
However, the grounds stated in a
belatedly filed motion to dismiss may still
be considered provided that they were
pleaded as affirmative defenses in an
answer. There is then no waiver of the
previously pleaded defenses.
Hence, it is error to assume that the
grounds pleaded by petitioner in his
Motion to Dismiss deserved no
consideration since it preceded his
Answer. When defenses and objections are
pleaded in an answer and thereafter are
restated in a motion to dismiss, the motion
to dismiss' recital of grounds may be
repetitive or superfluous, but no waiver
ensues.
In the present case, petitioner's pleaded
grounds in his Motion to Dismiss are a
restatement of previously pleaded grounds
in his Answer. Their reiteration in
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss did not
amount to the negation of their prior
expression. However, the Court still found no
merit in the grounds actually pleaded by
petitioner. Hence, it sustained Judge Payoyo-
Villordon's denial of petitioner's plea to
dismiss respondents' Complaint. (Alvarado v.
Ayala Land, Inc., G.R. No. 208426,
September 20, 2017)
Q: PO1 Carillo conducted a test-buy
operation on Pangan. After he bought a
sachet of shabu from Pangan, he
expressed his interest to buy more drugs.
Pangan instructed him to return in the
afternoon of that day as more shabu
would allegedly be delivered to her via
Fastpak. PO1 Carillo went back to the
Police Provincial Office to report the
information to P/S Insp. Batiles. P/S Insp.
Batiles and PO1 Carillo applied for a
search warrant before Judge Fantilanan,
who later issued Search Warrant. P/S
Insp. Batiles conducted a briefing with the
buy-bust team PO1 Carillo and PO1
Bernardez were tasked to ensure that
Pangan was in her store and to give the
needed pre¬arranged signal. Thereafter,
Pangan went out to get a delivery package
from Culili. She then returned to the store
and placed the delivered Fastpak pouch
on top of a table.
PO1 Carillo made the pre-arranged signal,
prompting P/S Insp. Batiles to advance to
the area where other members of the
buy-bust team followed. P/S Insp. Batiles
read the contents of the search warrant to
Pangan. Barangay Captain Andrada,
Barangay Kagawad Beluso, Barangay
Kagawad Lara, Rey Casumpang of Radio
Mindanao Network (RMN), Nimbe dela
Cruz and Ricardo Bulana of RMN-DYVR
also arrived. While inside the store, PO1
Carillo and SPO4 Revisa inspected the
Fastpak package on top of the table.
Pangan suddenly became unruly, trying
to grab the package from PO1 Carillo. The
police officers brought Pangan out of the
store to continue the search and to
prevent Pangan from harming herself.
SPO4 Revisa opened the sealed package
with a knife. He found a Noli Me Tangere
book, the pages of which were
intentionally cut to serve as
"compartments" for the three (3) big
sachets of suspected shabu. PO1 Carillo
searched the table's drawer where he
found another small pack of suspected
illicit drugs, magazines of a 0.45 caliber
pistol, ammunition, a magazine pouch,
and a holster. Members of the media and
barangay officials were present during
the entire course of the search and
seizure.
The confiscated items were turned over
to SPO1 Lebria for marking. He wrote
"EBP-1," "EBP-2," "EBP-3," and "EBP-4" on
the four (4) plastic sachets, which stood
for Emma Bofill Pangan. He also prepared
the inventory, which was signed by the
third-party witnesses, who were present
during the search. PO1 Carillo took
pictures of the premises and the seized
items. The arresting team brought
Pangan to the police station. The
confiscated articles were recorded in the
police blotter. P/S Insp. Batiles prepared
and signed the return of service to be
presented to the trial court which issued
the search warrant. The arresting team
then brought the return of service of the
search warrant and the seized items to
the court.
Later, P/S Insp. Batiles wrote a letter to
Judge Fantilanan, requesting to withdraw
the four (4) sachets of suspected shabu
for laboratory examination. The trial
court granted the request causing the
items to be forwarded to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory, Camp
Delgado, Iloilo City. P/C Insp. Baldevieso
issued Chemistry Report No. D-145, which
verified that the seized items tested
positive for shabu. Did the prosecution
establish an unbroken chain of custody
on the handling of the confiscated illicit
drugs?
A: YES. Prosecutions involving illegal
possession of dangerous drugs demand that
the elemental act of possession be proven
with moral certainty and not allowed by law.
The illicit drugs, itself, comprise the corpus
delicti of the charge and its existence is
necessary to obtain a judgment of conviction.
Therefore, it is important in these cases that
the identity of the illegal drugs be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution
must establish the existence of the illicit
drugs. It must also prove that the integrity of
the corpus delicti has been maintained
because the confiscated drug, being the proof
involved, is not promptly recognizable
through sight and can be tampered or
replaced.
In this case, the prosecution was able to
establish the necessary links in the chain of
custody from the time the sachets of illicit
drugs were confiscated until they were
forwarded to the laboratory for examination
and presented as evidence in court. After its
seizure, the four (4) plastic sachets were
immediately given to SPO1 Liberia for
marking. SPO1 Liberia also prepared the
inventory, which was duly signed by the
third-party witnesses present during the
search. PO1 Carillo took photographs of the
search and the confiscated articles.
Thereafter, the seized items were forwarded
to the trial court which issued the warrant.
Upon P/S Insp. Batiles' request, the trial
court released the seized items for
laboratory testing. The articles were
received by SPO1 Alberto Espura of the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
in Camp Claudio, Iloilo City. P/C Insp.
Baldevieso confirmed through a chemical
analysis that the contents of the sachets
yielded positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu as evinced by
Chemistry Report No. D-145. The confiscated
drugs which were examined in the
laboratory were offered as evidence in the
trial court and were identified by PO1
Carillo, Barangay Kagawad Beluso, and SPO4
Revisa as the same ones seized from Pangan
during the lawful search. (People v. Emma
Bofill Pangan, G.R. No. 206965, November 29,
2017)
Q: A petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals was filed by Atty. Dacalan in behalf of
HSY Marketing Ltd., Co., Wantofree Oriental
Trading, Inc., Coen Fashion House and
General Merchandise, Asia Consumer Value
Trading, Inc., Fabulous Jeans & Shirt &
General Merchandise, LSG Manufacturing
Corporation, Unite General Merchandise,
Rosario Q. Co, Lucia Pun Lin Yeung, and
Alexander Arqueza who are engaged in
manufacturing and selling goods under the
brand Novo Jeans & Shirt & General
Merchandise. The petition stemmed from the
illegal dismissal complaint filed by Novo
Jeans employers against Novo Jeans.  
The Verification attached to the Petition for
Certiorari was signed by Atty. Daclan and
attested that:
I caused the preparation of the foregoing
petition and attest that, based upon facts
relayed to me by my clients and upon
authentic records made available, all the
allegations contained therein are true and
correct.
Does the phrase in the verification which
reads: "based upon facts relayed to me by my
clients" be considered sufficient compliance? 
A: NO. Verification is not an empty ritual or a
meaningless formality. Its import must never be
sacrificed in the name of mere expedience or
sheer caprice. For what is at stake is the matter
of verity attested by the sanctity of an oath to
secure an assurance that the allegations in the
pleading have been made in good faith, or are
true and correct and not merely speculative.  
Thus, for verification to be valid, the affiant must
have "ample knowledge to swear to the truth of
the allegations in the complaint or petition."
Facts relayed to the counsel by the client would
be insufficient for counsel to swear to the truth
of the allegations in a pleading. Otherwise,
counsel would be able to disclaim liability for any
misrepresentation by the simple expediency of
stating that he or she was merely relaying facts
with which he or she had no competency to
attest to. For this reason, the Rules of Court
require no less than personal knowledge of the
facts to sufficiently verify a pleading.
In the case at hand, Atty. Dacalan, not having
sufficient personal knowledge to attest to the
allegations of the pleading, was not able to
validly verify the facts as stated. Therefore,
respondents' Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals should have been considered as
an unsigned pleading. (Charlie Hubilla, et. al. vs.
HSY Marketing Ltd., Co., et. al., G.R. No. 207354,
January 10, 2018)
Q: In lieu of the Duterte’s Administration’s
Build Build Build Program, the MRT's MRT-3
North Triangle Description Project was laid
out. Parsons was the Management Team
authorized to oversee the construction’s
execution. Gammon received from Parsons an
invitation to bid for the complete concrete
works of the Podium, a structure pursuant to
the project. Gammon won the bidding.
Gammon had already started its engineering
services pursuant to the Notice to Proceed
issued by Parsons. Later on, Gammon
received a Notice to Proceed amending the
prior Notices to Proceed. Gammon qualifiedly
accepted the Notice to Proceed.  MRT rejected
Gammon's qualified acceptance and informed
Gammon that the contract would be awarded
instead to Filsystems if Gammon would not
accept the Notice to Proceed within five (5)
days.  in a particular case, an appeal to a court of last
Gammon filed a Notice of Claim before CIAC
against MRT. MRT filed a Motion to Dismiss,
arguing that CIAC had no jurisdiction to
arbitrate the dispute. This Motion was denied
and this matter was elevated to this Court.
Meanwhile,  in Gammon v. Metro Rail Transit
Development Corporation, the Supreme
Court held that CIAC had jurisdiction over the
case.  differently in another appeal in the same case.
MRT assailed the CIAC Decision before the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the CIAC Decision. Thus, MRT filed
the instant Petition for Review. It argues that
Gammon was not entitled to CIAC's award
considering that there is no perfected
contract between MRT and Gammon.
Gammon filed its Comment, insisting that
there is a perfected contract between them
pursuant to Gammon v. Metro Rail Transit
Development Corporation.  In its Reply, MRT
argues that the doctrine of the law of the case
does not apply as the issue in Gammon was
CIAC's jurisdiction and not the existence of
the contract. It reiterates that no contract was
perfected because MRT withdrew its offer to
Gammon before Gammon returned the
contract documents.
What is the Doctrine of the law of the case?  Gammon Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 200401,
Does it apply in this case?  January 17, 2018)
A: YES. Law of the case has been defined as the
opinion delivered on a former appeal. More
specifically, it means that whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal
rule of decision between the same parties in the
same case continues to be the law of the case,
whether correct on general principles or not, so
long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case
before the court.
If an appellate court has determined a legal issue
and has remanded it to the lower court for
further proceedings, another appeal in that same
case should no longer differently determine the
legal issue previously passed upon. Similar to res
judicata, it is a refusal to reopen what has
already been decided.
The doctrine of the law of the case applies when
resort has resulted in a determination of a
question of law. The determined issue will be
deemed to be the law of the case such that it will
govern a case through all its subsequent stages.
Thus, after ruling on the legal issue and
remanding the case to a lower court for further
proceedings, the determined legal issue can no
longer be passed upon and determined
 
The doctrine of the law of the case applies in the
case at bar. While the Gammon case did not
expressly state that the contract was perfected, it
concluded that both the construction contract
and the arbitration contract existed between the
parties. 
The doctrine of the law of the case applies when
in a particular case, an appeal to a court of last
resort has resulted in a determination of a
question of law. The determined issue will be
deemed to be the law of the case such that it will
govern a case through all its subsequent stages.
Thus, after ruling on the legal issue and
remanding the case to a lower court for further
proceedings, the determined legal issue can no
longer be passed upon and determined
differently in another appeal in the same case. 
(Metro Rail Transit Development Corporation vs.
Q:  Rufina and Rafaela co-owned with their
other siblings two (2) parcels of land.  When
Rufina was still alive, she regularly collected
her respective shares in the income of the
two (2) properties. After her death, her
children continued to collect her mother’s
share.    Gomez should be discounted for he is a mere
Their cousin Emilio offered them a balato of
P50,000.00 for the sale of the first parcel to
the Department of Public Works and
Highways. Surprised, they asked why they
were not instead given their share in the
proceeds of the sale. To this, Emilio replied
that according to the children of Rafaela, the
two (2) properties had already been sold by
Rufina to Rafaela during their lifetime.  The
children of Rufina proceeded to the Office of
the Registry of Deeds to verify the supposed
sale. They learned that the title to the land
has been cancelled on account of a Deed of
Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Rufina
and Rafaela.  its execution. the heirs of Rufina successfully
The heirs of Rufina filed a complaint for
recovery of real property with damages. They
alleged that their mother was illiterate; and
she would only affixed her thumbmark on
documents, and whenever she did so, she was
always assisted by at least one (1) of her
children. To support their contention, they
presented as witness National Bureau of
Investigation fingerprint examiner Gomez,  of questioned document examiners is usually
who noted that he compared the questioned
thumbmarks with the genuine thumbmarks
of Rufina. Gomez noted that "the purported
thumbmarks of Rufina Casimiro in the
alleged Deed of Absolute Sale were not
identical with her standard thumbmarks”
and concluded that "the thumbmarks
appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale were
not impressed by Rufina Casimiro."  However,
in his Second Report, Gomez observed that
the thumbmarks on the standard documents
appeared to be "faint, blurred and lacking the
necessary ridge characteristics to warrant
positive identification."During a subsequent
hearing, however, he clarified that "while the
standard thumbmarks lack the 'necessary
ridge characteristics to warrant positive
identification, 'all the standard are all in the
same finger print pattern' and 'they are also
in agreement of the flow of ridges of all the
standard.  The trial court ruled in favor of the
heirs of Rufina. 
The heirs of Rafaela contended that the sale
was valid for the Deed of Absolute Sale was
notarized and the testimony of Examiner
employee. Are the contentions of the heirs of
Rafaela correct? Decide
A: NO. It is true that a notarized documents
enjoy the presumption of regularity. They are
accorded evidentiary weight as regards their due
execution. However, any such presumption is
disputable. It can be refuted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Here, the
contentious Deed of Absolute Sale in this case is
a notarized document. Thus, it benefits from the
presumption of regularity. The burden of proving
by clear and convincing evidence that
thumbmarks affixed on it by an ostensible party
is false and simulated lies on the party assailing
discharged this burden with the aid of an expert
witness. 
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by
expert testimonies, they may place whatever
weight they choose upon such testimonies in
accordance with the facts of the case.  Due to the
technicality of the procedure involved in the
examination of forged documents, the expertise
helpful. These handwriting experts can help
determine fundamental, significant differences in
writing characteristics between the questioned
and the standard or sample specimen signatures,
as well as the movement and manner of
execution strokes. (Teodoro Tortona, et. al. vs.
Julian Gregorio, et. al., G.R. No. 202612, January
18, 2018)
Q: The enactment of Republic Act No. 6657, or
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, has
placed suitable agricultural lands under the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program. The Heirs of Pilar, Raul,
Ramon, and Jugo  were the owners of four (4)
parcels of agricultural land planted with
rubber trees. In January 12, 1998, they
voluntarily offered their landholdings for
agrarian reform, proposing the selling price
of P100,000.00 per hectare to the
government. Land Bank gave a lower
counteroffer to respondents, ranging from
P26,412.61 to P66,118.06 per hectare. The
offer is pursuant to Administrative Order No.
05-98 issued by the Department of Agrarian
Reform which provides for the formula in
computing just compensation for rubber
lands under Republic Act No. 665. The heirs
refused to accept Landbank's counteroffer. In
view of the deadlock on the purchase price,
administrative cases for land valuation were
filed by respondents against Landbank and
DAR. Landbank recomputed the value of the
lands based on the factors provided by "the
latest guidelines on land valuation."
Respondents rejected the new valuation for
being too low and unreasonable. The
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board adopted Landbank and DAR's
revaluation, stating that this was done in
accordance with the relevant administrative
issuances on land valuations.
Aggrieved, the Heirs filed a complaint on
November 23, 1999 for judicial
determination and payment of just
compensation before the RTC Special
Agrarian Court. The appointed 3 The RTC is also correctly granted the motion for
commissioners to examine and ascertain the
valuation of the properties. Landbank
deposited the judgment award, through cash
and Landbank bonds, as provisional
compensation for the acquired properties.
Respondents later withdrew these amounts.
The commissioners also stated that
Landbank's valuation did not represent the
fair market value of the properties. It also
recommended that the amount of just
compensation be reckoned from the date the
properties were transferred to the Republic,
until fully paid, and that DAR and Landbank
pay all legal fees and costs of the case. In
2003, The RTC substantially adopted the
Consolidated Commissioners‘ Report.
Landbank filed a Petition for Review before
the CA. Meanwhile, respondents filed a
motion for execution pending appeal. The
RTC issued an Order granting the motion for
execution pending appeal. The Regional Trial
Court found good reasons for granting the
motion. It found that  petitioners were
virtually deprived not only of the beneficial
use and enjoyment of the property but also of
the fruits and income thereof since the land
was taken in 1999. While payment had
already been made as claimed by Land Bank
of the Philippines it was nothing but only
initial or preliminary in character.
In determining just compensation, can RTC
can simply adopt the Consolidated
Commissioners‘ Report? Is the RTC correct in
granting the motion for execution pending
appeal?
A:  YES.  The Regional Trial Court has the full
discretion to make a binding decision on the
value of the properties. Under Rule 67, Section 8
of the Rules of Court, the Regional Trial Court
may accept the Consolidated Commissioners'
Report, recommit it to the same commissioners
for further report, set it aside and appoint new
commissioners, or accept only a part of it and
reject the other parts.The final determination of
the Regional Trial Court sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court must be respected.The
determination of just compensation is a judicial
function which cannot be curtailed or limited by
legislation, much less by an administrative rule.
execution pending appeal. Execution of a
judgment pending appeal is governed by Sec 2(a)
of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. As provided,
execution of judgement or final order pending
appeal is discretionary. As an exception to the
rule that only a final judgment may be executed,
it must be strictly construed. Thus, execution
pending appeal should not be granted routinely
but only in extraordinary circumstances. 
The Rules of Court does not enumerate the
circumstances which would justify the execution
of the judgment or decision pending appeal.
However, we have held that "good reasons"
consist of compelling or superior circumstances
demanding urgency which will outweigh the
injury or damages suffered should the losing
party secure a reversal of the judgment or final
order. The existence of good reasons is what
confers discretionary power on a court to issue a
writ of execution pending appeal. These reasons
must be stated in the order granting the same.
Unless they are divulged, it would be difficult to
determine whether judicial discretion has been
properly exercised.
In this case, the RTC correctly found that the
complainants were deprived of their property
since 1999 and for reasons of equity, justice and
fair play, they should be paid to enable them to
cope up with the loss they sustained as a result of
the taking and for their economic survival.
Denying the execution pending appeal can also
stall the payment of properties through the filing
of frivolous motions and appeals. (Land Bank of
the Philippines vs. Raul Manzano, G.R. No. 188243,
January 24, 2018)
Q: In two (2) separate Informations, accused¬
appellant Que was charged with violating
Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act. Que filed a Motion to
Quash Information and Warrant of Arrest and
Admission to Bail. He pleaded not guilty to
both charges. During the hearings for the bail
petition, the prosecution presented three (3)
witnesses: the poseur-buyer, PO3 Lim; the
arresting officer, SPO1 Jacinto; and forensic
chemist P/C Insp. Diestro. According to PO3
Lim, an informant reported that a person
later identified as Que, was selling shabu.
Acting on this report, a buy-bust operation
was organized with PO3 Lim as poseur-buyer.
The informant then introduced PO3 Lim to
Que. PO3 Lim then told Que that he intended
to purchase P100.00 worth of shabu. Que
then handed him shabu inside a plastic
cellophane. In turn, PO3 Lim handed Que the
marked P100.00 bill and gave the pre-
arranged signal to have Que arrested.
After the arrest, the marked bill and another
sachet of shabu were recovered from Que,
who was then brought to the police station
where the sachets of shabu and the marked
bill were turned over to the investigator,
SPO4 Tubo. Then, SPO4 Tubo marked these
items with his initials and prepared the letter
request for laboratory examination of the
sachets' contents. Arresting officer SPO1
Jacinto then testified to the same
circumstances recounted by PO3 Lim. P/C
Insp. Diestro recounted their office's receipt
of a request for laboratory examination of the
contents of two (2) plastic sachets. She noted
that these contents tested positive for shabu.
Was Que's guilt proven beyond reasonable
doubt?
A: NO. Section 21 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Republic
Act No. 10640, spells out the requirements for
the custody and disposition of confiscated,
seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug
paraphernalia. Compliance with Section 21's
chain of custody requirements ensures the
integrity of the seized items. Non-compliance
with them tarnishes the credibility of the corpus
delicti around which prosecutions under the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act revolve.
Consequently, they also tarnish the very claim
that an offense against the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act was committed. 
This case is tainted with grave, gratuitous
violations of Section 21(1). There is no showing
that a proper inventory and taking of pictures
was done by the apprehending officers. The
marking of the sachets of shabu supposedly
obtained from accused-appellant was conducted
at a police station without accused-appellant, or
any person representing him, around. There was
not even a third person, whose presence was
required by Section 21(1) prior to its
amendment — "a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official." The prosecution here
failed to account for the intervening period
between the supposed handover of the sachet
from accused-appellant to PO3 Lim, to the
marking of the sachets by SPO4 Tubo. Likewise,
it absolutely failed to identify measures taken
during transit from the target area to the police
station to ensure the integrity of the sachets
allegedly obtained and to negate any possibility
of adulteration or substitution. (People v. Joshua
Que Y Utuanis, G.R. No. 212994, January 31, 2018)
Q: Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) entered into a lease agreement with
Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC) wherein PCSO will lease lottery
materials and equipments from PGMC for a
period of 8 years starting from August 2007
up to August of 2015. However, the Senate
Blue Ribbon committee conducted an
investigation and recommended that PCSO
renegotiate with PGMC. PGMC refused to give
a lower price for its equipment, thus PCSO
used the equipment of Pacific Online. PGMC
then filed a complaint against PCSO for
violation of its exclusive right to provide for
the  equipment used by online lottery in
Luzon. During the pendency of the cases, they
entered into a settlement agreement with a
status quo ante condition extending the lease
up to August 21, 2018. However, PCSO filed a
motion for reconsideration and alleged that
the settlement agreement between PCSO and
PGMC was null and void and it was still
pending with the International Chamber of
Commerce and  International Court of
Arbitration.  Meanwhile, the terms of the
Equipment Lease Agreement was about to
expire on August 2018 so PCSO started
preparations for the public bidding of the
Nationwide online lottery system.   On July
2017, PGMC filed a new application for the
issuance of a Temporary restraining order
and Writ of Preliminary Injunction for the
cessation of the nationwide bidding system
for the procurement of the Nationwide On-
line Lottery system with the RTC, which the
RTC granted to cover only areas in Luzon but
will not include the Visayas and Mindanao
Territories.  Did the RTC commit grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the injunctive writs?  Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code and
A: Respondent Philippine Gaming and
Management Corporation's claim of exclusive
rights, as stated in the Interim Settlement and
which was brought to arbitration, pertained to
its rights under the Amendments to Equipment
Lease Agreement, which will expire on August
21, 2018. It failed to provide proof that the
Amendments to Equipment Lease Agreement
was extended beyond August 21, 2018. It cannot
claim that it has alleged exclusive rights to be
protected and that it will suffer irreparable
injury if petitioner continued with the
Nationwide On-line Lottery System bidding
process. This is precisely because the bidding
was for the next supplier of the Nationwide On-
line Lottery System for a period of five (5) years
after August 21, 2018 or commencing on August
22, 2018.
Additionally, with the Regional Trial Court's
confirmation of the arbitral tribunal's Final
Award, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
deemed lifted and petitioner may now proceed
with the bidding process of the Nationwide
Online Lottery System for Luzon. (Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office vs. Philippine Gaming
Management Corporation, G.R. No. 236577 and
236597 August 15, 2018)
Q: The Sangguniang Bayan issued Resolution
authorizing Mayor Bendaña to enter into loan
agreement with Landbank for the
computerization of the municipality's
revenue collection system. Bendaña and
Amellar Solutions executed an agreement for
the computerization of Lemery's revenue
generation system. The COA disallowed the
municipality's direct procurement of
computer equipment and software from
Amellar Solutions. Ricalde and three others
filed a complaint affidavit before the Office of
the Ombudsman. They accused members of
the Sangguniang Bayan of violating Republic
Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 9148, or
the Government Procurement Reform Act,
when they authorized Bendaña to enter into a
direct contract with Amellar Solutions. The
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found the
Sangguniang Bayan members for violating
Section 3, paragraphs (e) and (g) of Republic
Act No. 3019. It also recommended that they
be found guilty of grave misconduct.
Petitioners Ornales, Eguia, Vergara, De
Castro, and Magnaye assailed the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman Order with a Petition for
Certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals.
CA dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction and averred that it only had
jurisdiction over issuances of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases and that jurisdiction over the Office of
the Ombudsman's issuances in criminal cases
lay with the Supreme Court. Petitioners
moved for the reconsideration before CA but
was denied. Petitioners filed Petition for
Review before SC and pointed out that the
Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their
case outright for lack of jurisdiction when it
actually had jurisdiction to determine the
other issue of whether there was substantial
evidence to hold petitioner Magnaye guilty of
grave misconduct, which is administrative in
nature. Is the dismissal of CA correct?
A: YES.  Orders and decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in criminal cases may be elevated to
the Supreme Court via a Rule 65 petition, while
its orders and decisions in administrative
disciplinary cases may be appealed to the Court
of Appeals via a Rule 43 petition.
The SC held that “[u]nder the present Rule 45,
appeals may be brought through a petition for
review on certiorari, but only from judgments
and final orders of the courts enumerated in
Section 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and
final orders of quasi judicial agencies are now
required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on
a verified petition for review, under the
requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which
was precisely formulated and adopted to provide
for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for
quasi-judicial agencies.” The Office of the
Ombudsman is a quasi-judicial agency  falling
under Rule 43. As the Court succinctly stated: “It
is suggested, however, that the provisions of Rule
43 should apply only to ‘ordinary quasi-judicial
agencies,’ but not to the Office of the
Ombudsman which is a ‘high constitutional
body.’ We see no reason for this distinction for, if
hierarchical rank should be a criterion, that
proposition thereby disregards the fact that Rule
43 even includes the Office of the President and
the Civil Service Commission, although the latter
is even an independent constitutional
commission, unlike the Office of the Ombudsman,
which is a constitutionally-mandated but
statutorily-created body.” (Ornales, et. al. v. Office
of Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, G.R. No. 214312,
September 05, 2018)
Q: Espinosa was shot by Samonte in Nueva
Ecija, causing his death. Samonte was caught
in flagrante de licto and was arrested. After
the inquest proceedings, an information for
murder was filed against him. Upon
arraignment, Samonte admitted to the killing
but pleaded self-defense. Trial on the merits
ensued. The witnesses against the accused
was duly presented through affidavits of
witnesses. According to one of the witnesses,
it was alleged that it was Corpuz who
instructed Samonte to Kill Espinosa. Thus,
probable cause was found to indict Corpus for
the murder of Espinosa and an amended
information before the RTC was filed
imputing conspiracy against Corpuz together
with Samonte for the murder of Espinosa. The
charge against Corpuz was however
dismissed. Subsequently, the Regional Trial
Court after personally examining the
amended information and its supporting
documents found probable cause and granted
the amended information issuing the warrant
of arrest against Corpus and denying the
motion to defer/suspend arraignment and
further proceedings.  Thus, a direct recourse
to this Court via a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.  Did the trial court correctly
admit the Amended Information in clear
defiance of law and jurisprudence, which
proscribes substantial amendment of
information prejudicial to the right of the
accused?
A: No. An allegation of conspiracy to add a new
accused without changing the prosecution's
theory that the accused willfully shot the victim
is merely a formal amendment. However, the
rule provides that only formal amendments not
prejudicial to the rights of the accused are
allowed after plea. The test of whether an
accused is prejudiced by an amendment is to
determine whether a defense under the original
information will still be available even after the
amendment is made and if any evidence that an
accused might have would remain applicable
even in the amended information. It is
undisputed that upon arraignment under the
original information, Samonte admitted the
killing but pleaded self-defense. While
conspiracy is merely a formal amendment,
Samonte will be prejudiced if the amendment
will be allowed after his plea. Applying the test,
his defense and corresponding evidence will not
be compatible with the allegation of conspiracy
in the new information. Therefore, such formal
amendment after plea is not allowed. (Samonte
vs. Pamular, G.R. 186403, September 5, 2018)
Q: The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Isabela file two (2) criminal Informations
against Marlon Caliguran (Caliguran), Alvin
Tamang, Concha and Managuelod, charging
them with two (2) counts of carnapping
under R.A. No. 6539 or the Anti-Carnapping
Act of 1972. On February 21, at the police
station, the police presented to Macutay
persons that they had apprehended. Macutay
pointed to Managuelod, Concha, and
Caliguiran as the persons who robbed him.
Concha and Managuelod both denied being
involved in the crime. The RTC rendered a
joint decision finding both Concha and
Managuelod guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of carnapping. Concha and Managuelod filed
an appeal before the CA. They argued that the
out-of-court identification was not valid as it
was conducted through a police show-up, not
a lineup, since only the four (4) suspects were
presented to Macutay for identification. The
CA affirmed the RTC decision. It held that
even without a police line-up, there could still
be proper identification as long as the police
did not suggest such identification to the
witnesses. Is the out-of-court identification of
Melky Concha and Romeo Managuelod
admissible?
A: No. The Supreme Court recognizes that the
“probative weight of an in-court identification is
largely dependent upon an out-of-court
identification”. As held in People v Teehankee, Jr.,
“ Out-of-court identification is conducted by the
police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups
where the suspect alone is brought face to face
with the witness for identification. It is done thru
mug shots where photographs are shown to the
witness to identify the suspect. It is also done
thru line-ups where a witness identifies the
suspect from a group of persons lined up for the
purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court
identification contaminates the integrity of in-
court identification during the trial of the case,
courts have fashioned out rules to assure its
fairness and its compliance with the
requirements of constitutional due process. In
resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-
of-court identification of suspects, courts have
adopted the totality of circumstances test where
they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the
witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the
time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of
attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any
prior description given by the witness; (4) the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the identification; (5) the length of time between
the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.”
CA erred in declaring that the out-of-court
identification conducted by the police was a
lineup. What was conducted was  a police show-
up, since only four (4) persons were shown to
the prosecution’s witness for the purpose of
identifying his four (4) assailants.  Purchase Orders, Hygienic should have first
The out-of-court identification of petitioners did
not satisfied the totality of circumstances test.
First, Macutay failed to provide descriptions of
his attackers when he reported the incident to
the police. Second, Macutay was admittedly
scared and confused, which reduced his degree
of attention. Third, it was not shown how certain
Macutay was in his identification of petitioners.
And finally, the out-of-court identification was
tainted with improper suggestion. To reiterate,
the police in Cabagan Police Station showed
Macutay only four (4) persons to be identified.
The Supreme Court holds that the gross
corruption of Macutay’s out-of-court
identification through improper suggestion of
police officers affected the admissibility of his in-
court identification. (Melky Concha vs People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 208114, October 03,
2018)
Q: From 1998 to 2009, Hygienic Packaging
Corporation (Hygienic) supplied Nutri-Asia
with KG Orange Bottles and Ratchet Caps with
Liners for its banana catsup products. Every
transaction was covered by a Purchase Order
issued by Nutri-Asia. Under the said Terms
and Conditions, arbitration of all disputes
arising in connection with this Contract shall
be referred to an Arbitration Committee, in
accordance with the Philippine Arbitration
Law, composed of three members: one
member to be chosen by the Buyer; another
member to be chosen by the Seller; and the
third member to be chosen by the other two
members. The decision of the Arbitration
Committee shall be binding upon the parties. 
From, 2007 to 2009, Nutri-Asia purchased
from Hygienic plastic containers. In 2009,
Hygienic filed a Complaint for sum of money
against Nutri-Asia. It instituted the case
before the RTC of Manila "pursuant to the
stipulation of the parties as stated in the Sales
Invoices submitting themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Courts of the City of Manila
in any legal action arising out of their
transaction." Nutri-Asia argued that the case
should be dismissed as Hygienic failed to
comply with a condition precedent prior to
its filing of the Complaint. It claimed that
under the Terms and Conditions of the
referred the matter to the Arbitration
Committee. Nutri-Asia alleged that the venue
was also improperly laid since the RTC of
Manila was not the proper venue for the
institution of Hygienic's personal action. The
Complaint should have been filed either
before the trial courts where the principal
places of business of Hygienic and Nutri-Asia
are located, respectively. The venue of
actions as stated in the Sales Invoices could
not bind Nutri-Asia since it did not give its
express conformity to that stipulation. Was
the venue improperly laid?  under Presidential Administrative Order No.
A:  Yes. Parties are allowed to constitute any
stipulation on the venue or mode of dispute
resolution as part of their freedom to contract
under Art 1306 of the Civil Code.
Here, however, the records lack any written
contract of sale containing the specific terms and
conditions agreed upon by the parties. The
parties failed to provide evidence of any contract,
which could have contained stipulations on the
venue of dispute resolution. Nonetheless,
petitioner and respondent both claim that the
Sales Invoices and the Purchase Orders,
respectively, contained a stipulation on where to
raise issues on any conflict regarding the sale of
plastic containers. Each party also insists that the
other party accepted the venue stipulation in the
Sales Invoices or the Purchase Orders when its
representative signed them.  The parties subsequently entered into a
Petitioner and respondent may have entered into
a contract of sale with respect to petitioner's
merchandise. However, the case records do not
show that they have a contract in relation to the
venue of any civil action arising from their
business transaction. Since there is no
contractual stipulation that can be enforced on
the venue of dispute resolution, the venue of
petitioner's personal action will be governed by
the Rules of Civil Procedure.  owns its funds and properties that were in
An action for collection of sum of money is a
personal action. Taking into account that no
exception can be applied in this case, the venue,
then, is "where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, ... at the election of the plaintiff." For a
corporation, its residence is considered "the
place where its principal office is located as
stated in its Articles of Incorporation." (Hygienic
Packaging Corporation, Petitioner v. Nutri-Asia,
Inc., G.R. No. 201302, January 23, 2019)
Q: Department of Public Works and
Highways, Region X took 569 square meters
from Benjohn Fetalvero's property to be used
in its flood control project. Fetalvero stated
that the project's construction on that portion
of land rendered the remaining part useless,
so he demanded payment for the entire area
at P15,000.00 per square meter. However,
50, series of 1999, the just compensation
Fetalvero was entitled to was only P2,500.00
per square meter, or a total of P1,422,500.00,
plus 10% thereof. The rate was based on the
Bureau of Internal Revenue zonal valuation
in 1999, when the property was taken.
Despite negotiations, the parties failed to
agree on the amount of just compensation.
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed before the Regional Trial Court a
Complaint for expropriation against
Fetalvero. It prayed "for the determination
and payment of the just compensation and
the entry of a judgment of condemnation of
the 569 square meters portion of
[Fetalvero's] property. The trial court issued
an Order and referred the case to the
Philippine Mediation Center for mediation.
Compromise Agreement. Meanwhile,
Fetalvero filed on July 20, 2009 a Motion for
the Issuance of an Order for a Writ of
Garnishment for the satisfaction of the trial
court's Order. The Republic opposed the
Motion, arguing that since the Compromise
Agreement was not legally binding, "it cannot
be the subject of a valid writ of execution or
garnishment." Moreover, the government still
official depositaries; thus, these cannot be
garnished or levied.  RTC held that
government funds in official depositaries
remain government funds only if there was
no appropriation by law. The trial court
found that funds were already appropriated
under SAA-SR 2009-05-001538 of the
Department of Public Works and Highways
"for payment of the road-rights- of-way."
Hence, Fetalvero's Motion should be granted.
May government funds be seized under a writ
of execution or a writ of garnishment in
satisfaction of court judgments?  flagrante delicto”
A: NO. The universal rule that where the State
gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit
claimant's action "only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution"
and that the power of the Courts ends when the
judgment is rendered, since government funds
and properties may not be seized under writs of
execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments, is based on obvious considerations of
public policy. Disbursements of public funds
must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law.  person of the accused must be made before he
The Court already settled that petitioner is
bound by the Compromise Agreement,
respondent is legally entitled to his money claim.
This Court notes that for almost 20 years now,
petitioner had been enjoying the use of
respondent's property without paying the full
amount of just compensation under the
Compromise Agreement. Respondent had been
deprived of his property for almost two (2)
decades. In keeping with substantial justice, this
Court imposes the payment of legal interest on
the remaining just compensation due to
respondent. However, he still has to go through
the appropriate procedure for making a claim
against the Government. The case is premature.
The money claim against the Republic should
have been first brought before the Commission
on Audit. (Republic v. Benjohn Fetalvero, G.R. No.
198008, February 4, 2019)
Q: The trial court found petitioner Lapi guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of having violated
RA 9165. It ruled that the warrantless arrest
against the petitioner was legal since he was
caught in flagrante delicto. Petitioner asserts
that while he failed to question the validity of
his arrest before entering his plea, his
warrantless arrest was illegal from the start.
Hence, any evidence obtained cannot be used
against him. He argues that PO2 Villeran
committed “a malevolent intrusion of
privacy” when he peeped through the
window; had he not done so, he would not see
what the people in the house did. He contends
that this intrusion into his privacy “cannot be
equated in plain view[;] therefore[,]
petitioner cannot be considered caught in
Is there a valid warrantless arrest?
A: YES. Petitioner admits that he failed to
question the validity of his arrest before
arraignment. He did not move to quash the
Information against him before entering his plea.
He was assisted by counsel when he entered his
plea. Likewise, he was able to present his
evidence. In People v. Alunday:”The Court has
consistently ruled that any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or the procedure for the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the
enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived. We have also ruled that an
accused may be estopped from assailing the
illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the
quashing of the information against him before
his arraignment. And since the legality of an
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the accused, any defect in the
arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when
he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the
trial court. We have also held in a number of
cases that the illegal arrest of an accused is not a
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial
free from error; such arrest does not negate the
validity of the conviction of the accused.” Herein,
accused-appellant went into arraignment and
entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, he
actively participated in his trial. He raised the
additional issue of irregularity of his arrest only
during his appeal to this Court. He is, therefore,
deemed to have waived such alleged defect by
submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court
by his counsel-assisted plea during his
arraignment; by his actively participating in the
trial and by not raising the objection before his
arraignment. (Mahipus v. People, G.R. No. 210731,
February 13, 2019)
Q: The Municipal Police Station of M'lang,
North Cotabato received a radio message
about a silver gray Isuzu pickup—with plate
number 619 and carrying three (3) people—
that was transporting marijuana from Pikit. 
At around 9:30 a.m., the tipped vehicle
reached the checkpoint and was stopped by
the team of police officers on standby. The
team leader asked the driver about
inspecting the vehicle. The driver alighted
and, at an officer's prodding, opened the
pickup's hood. Two (2) sacks of marijuana
were discovered beside the engine. An
Information was filed against Sison, Yanson,
and Bautista before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, Kabacan, Cotabato City, charging
them with violation of Section 4 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Is the search
and seizure made valid?
A: NO. Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution requires a warrant to be issued by a
judge before a search can be validly effected.
While there are exceptions to this rule,
warrantless searches can only be carried out
when founded on probable cause, or "a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to warrant a cautious man to believe that the
person accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged." There must be a confluence
of several suspicious circumstances. A solitary
tip hardly suffices as probable cause; items
seized during warrantless searches based on
solitary tips are inadmissible as evidence.
(People v Sison, G.R. No. 238453, July 31, 2019)