Ponencias of J. Caguioa in REMEDIAL LAW 2022

Case Digests
Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Remedial Law

By: USTFCL Dean’s Circle for AY 21-22
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

Case Digests
REPUBLIC v. CAPITAL RESOURCES CORPORATION

G.R. No. 217210. November 7, 2016, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Section 121 of the Public Land Act pertains to acquisitions of public land by a
corporation from a grantee. In this case, the original grantee was Dumuk and he subsequently
transferred the subject property to spouses Milo. In turn, the spouses were the ones who sold
the subject property to Capital Resources and Romeo Roxas. Evidently, Capital Resources did
not acquire the subject property from the original grantee.
As to the provision of the 1973 Constitution proscribing corporations from acquiring

"alienable lands" of the public domain, the consistent ruling of the Supreme Court is that the
prohibition will not apply if the property acquired by the corporation is private property and
not alienable lands of the public domain. The rule is that once a patent is registered and the
corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land covered by it ceases to be part of the public
domain and becomes private property.
FACTS
A Homestead Patent was granted to Dumuk which resulted in the issuance of an OCT.
The OCT was superseded by a TCT in the name of spouses Milo. Capital Resources
Corporation and Romeo Roxas (defendants-appellants) acquired the subject property from
spouses Milo resulting in the cancellation of the TCT and the issuance of a new one.
Defendants-appellants then caused the subdivision of the subject property via the
subdivision plan prepared by Engr. Mercado and it was subdivided into several blocks,
among which are Block 35 (18,079 sq.m.) and Block 36 (16,856 sq.m.). The plan indicated
that Block 35 is a "salvage zone" while a portion of Block 36 appeared to overlap a portion
of the China Sea. The subdivision plan was approved but was subsequently cancelled
pursuant to an Order of Cancellation issued by the DENR.
Based on the Cadastral Survey, Block 35 and Block 36 were projected therein as part
of the identified foreshore land and seabed, respectively. The DENR Committee investigated
and concluded that the submission by defendants-appellants of subdivision plan is
tantamount to an admission that the northwestern portion of the subject property was eaten
up and eroded due to the adverse effects of sea waters. It pointed out that Capital Resources
may not validly acquire the subject property pursuant to Section 119 of Act No. 2874 and the
1973 Constitution.
Consequently, the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed a Complaint for
Cancellation of Title and Reversion against defendants-appellants and the Register of Deeds
of La Union before the Regional Trial Court. The Republic alleged that from the time that
Homestead Survey Plan was approved until the cadastral survey, the northwestern portion
of the subject property had been washed out and eaten up by the sea waters. Per the ocular
inspection, Blocks 35 to 36 formed part of the public domain. This fact is clearly supported
1 of 578
Case Digests
by subdivision submitted by defendants-appellants wherein the area already consumed by

the sea has already been demarcated or isolated. Thus, the Republic prayed for judgment:
(a) declaring the TCT and its derivative titles as null and void; (b) ordering defendants-
appellants to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT for cancellation; (c) ordering the
defendants, their heirs, agents, assigns or anyone acting in their behalf to cease and desist
from exercising acts of ownership over the subject property and to vacate the same, if they
are in possession thereof; and (d) ordering the reversion of the subject land to the public
domain.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Court may consider the issues raised by petitioner Republic;
and
2. Whether or not the remaining portion of the Subject Property (being foreshore
and salvaged zones) may be reverted to the public domain.
RULING
1. NO. Petitioner Republic does not dispute the fact that it failed to raise the contested
issues in its Complaint and pre-trial brief. Instead, petitioner Republic argues that such
issues are "within the of the initial issues", being "germane to the sole purpose of cancelling
the TCT in its entirety". Petitioner Republic's contention is not well-taken.
While petitioner Republic's Complaint prayed for the reversion of
the entire Subject Property, the allegations are predicated merely on their assertion
that Blocks 35 and 36 have become foreshore lands. In this regard, basic is the rule that it
is the allegations of the complaint and not the prayer that determines the basis of the
plaintiff's relief. In the same vein, the prayer will not be construed as enlarging the
complaint so as to embrace a cause of action not pleaded therein.
While the Complaint prayed for the reversion of the entire Subject Property, the
allegations contained therein pertained only to Blocks 35 and 36. Hence, considering that
the body of the Complaint merely supported the reversion of Blocks 35 and 36, it is of no
moment that there was a general prayer for the reversion of the entire Subject Property.
Any relief granted beyond the allegations of the Complaint would be baseless and would
amount to grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, contrary to the asseverations of
petitioner Republic, the issues raised in its Motion for Partial Reconsideration cannot be
considered as "within the bounds of the original issues".
Moreover, considering the non-inclusion of the contested issues in the Pre-Trial
Order, such delimitation made by the RTC had effectively barred the consideration of the
said issues, whether during the trial or on appeal. Where the petitioners failed to have the
issue of prescription and laches included in the pre-trial order despite having raised it in
their Answer, this Court held that such issues could no longer be considered on appeal, the
parties being bound by the stipulations made during pre-trial.
2. NO. Petitioner Republic insists that the CA erred in ordering only the reversion of
the portion of the Subject Property pertaining to Blocks 35 and 36, on the ground that: (i)
there are inconsistencies in the land area of the Subject Property, specifically between the
2 of 578
Case Digests
TCT and subdivision plan; and (ii) respondent CRC is ineligible to be a "transferor" of a
homestead patent.
Anent the first issue, petitioner Republic makes much of the fact that the land area
of the Subject Property reflected in TCT is 158,345 square meters, while in subdivision
plan, the land area is 165,582 square meters. However, aside from such observations,
petitioner Republic failed to allege any legal basis that would warrant the outright
cancellation of the TCT and correspondingly, the reversion of the entire Subject Property.
With respect to the second issue, petitioner Republic insists that respondent CRC
is ineligible to acquire the Subject Property under the Public Land Act, which was the law
in force at the time the OCT was issued. Further, petitioner Republic argues that the
transfer of the Subject Property to respondent CRC is violative of Section 11 of the 1973
Constitution, which prohibits private corporations from holding alienable lands of the
public domain except through a lease agreement. Petitioner Republic is mistaken.
Section 121 of the Public Land Act pertains to acquisitions of public land by a
corporation from a grantee. In this particular case, the original grantee was Vitaliano
Dumuk and he subsequently transferred the subject property to spouses Cecilio and
Laura Milo. In turn, the spouses were the ones who sold the subject property to Capital
Resources and Romeo Roxas. Evidently, Capital Resources did not acquire the subject
property from the original grantee. Even if We were to assume that Capital Resources is
ineligible to be a transferee, the fact remains that the subject property was purchased by
Capital Resources and Romeo Roxas and the latter is an individual who is not barred from
acquiring the subject property.
As to the provision of the 1973 Constitution proscribing corporations from
acquiring "alienable lands" of the public domain, the consistent ruling of the Supreme
Court is that the prohibition will not apply if the property acquired by the corporation
is private property and not alienable lands of the public domain. The rule is that once a
patent is registered and the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land covered by it
ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes private property. In the present case,
the subject property became private property upon the issuance of the OCT to Vitaliano
Dumuk. Necessarily, when the defendants-appellants acquired the subject property in
1982, the same was no longer a part of the alienable lands of the public domain but a
private property. Hence the prohibition will not apply.
While petitioner Republic was able to show its entitlement to the reversion of
Blocks 35 and 36 to the public domain, it failed to do the same with respect to the remaining
portion of the Subject Property.
3 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ANTONIO DACANAY y TUMALABCAB

DOCTRINE
A confession made before news reporters, absent any showing of undue influence from
the police authorities, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for the crime confessed to by the
accused. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual
and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The
prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents.
FACTS
Norma E. Dacanay, the wife of Antonio, was found lifeless with several puncture
wounds on the bathroom floor of their home by their son, Quinn, who was then coming home
from school. Quinn likewise observed that the rest of the house was in disarray, with the
clothes and things of Norma scattered on the floor, as if suggesting that a robbery had just
taken place. At that time, Antonio had already left for work after having allegedly left the
house at around six in the morning.
Antonio was then interviewed by PO3 Santos, during which interview, Antonio
informed PO3 Santos that P100,000.00 in cash and pieces of jewelry were missing. Antonio
alluded to a certain "Miller" as an alleged "lover" of Norma who may have perpetrated the
crime. While at the precinct, Barangay Kagawad Antonio I. Nastor, Jr. informed PO3 Santos
that Antonio was already willing to confess to killing Norma. Accordingly, PO3 Santos
proceeded to contact a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office. In the meantime, PO3 Santos
apprised Antonio of his constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent. However,
as determined by both the RTC and the CA, despite having been apprised of his rights,
Antonio nonetheless confessed to the crime before the media representatives, who
separately interviewed him without PO3 Santos.
The reporters were presented by the prosecution during trial, wherein both testified
that Antonio voluntarily admitted his complicity in the crime without any intimidation or
coercion exerted on his person. As a result of the interview, a news article entitled "Mister
timbog sa pagpatay sa asawa" was published in the October 10, 2007 issue of Tanod Diyaryo
Bayan. Moreover, it was later confirmed by PO3 Santos during a follow-up operation that
the missing jewelry (e.g., a pair of gold earrings, a necklace with a cross pendant, a necklace
with an oval pendant) were indeed stored in Antonio's locker at PHIMCO, consistent with
the latter's extrajudicial confession before the press. Likewise, based on a medico-legal
report the cause of Norma's death was due to multiple puncture wounds on the body, and
that the weapon used could have been a round instrument (e.g., an ice pick). Upon
arraignment, Antonio entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged.
ISSUE
Whether the CA, in affirming the RTC, is correct in finding Antonio guilty of the crime
of Parricide on the basis of his extrajudicial confession.
4 of 578
Case Digests
RULING
YES. In his Appeal, Antonio insists that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible on
the ground that it was given under a "coercive physical or psychological atmosphere." To
support his claim, Antonio underscores the fact that he was inside a detention cell with two
(2) or three (3) other detainees when he allegedly confessed to the crime before the media.
We are not persuaded.
During the separate occasions that Antonio was interviewed by the news reporters,
there was no indication of the presence of any police officers within the proximity who could
have possibly exerted undue pressure or influence. As recounted by both reporters during
their testimonies, Antonio voluntarily narrated how he perpetrated the crime in a candid
and straightforward manner, "with no trace of fear, intimidation or coercion in him." Accused
remained consistent in admitting that he was the one who killed his wife. A confession made
before news reporters, absent any showing of undue influence from the police authorities, is
sufficient to sustain a conviction for the crime confessed to by the accused. The news
reporters were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They did not force
appellant to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they
asked his permission before interviewing him.
Appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and
(3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation
between a private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the
individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and
its agents.
The fact that the extrajudicial confession was made by Antonio while inside a
detention cell does not by itself render such confession inadmissible. The details
surrounding the commission of the crime, which could be supplied only by the accused, and
the spontaneity and coherence exhibited by him during his interviews, belie any insinuation
of duress that would render his confession inadmissible. Notably, while Antonio's testimony
is replete with imputations of violence and coercion, no other evidence was presented to
buttress these desperate claims. Neither was there any indication that Antonio instituted
corresponding criminal or administrative actions against the police officers allegedly
responsible. Where the accused fails to present evidence of compulsion; where he did not
institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators for
maltreatment; and where no physical evidence of violence was presented, all these will be
considered as factors indicating voluntariness.
Under Article 246 of the RPC, the crime of Parricide is committed when: (1) a person
is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other
descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. Undoubtedly, all elements are present
in this case.
5 of 578
Case Digests
To begin with, the fact that Norma was the spouse of Antonio was sufficiently proven
by the prosecution through their Marriage Contract. Next, as a rule, an extrajudicial
confession, where admissible, must be corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti in order to
sustain a finding of guilt. In this connection, extrajudicial confessions are presumed
voluntary until the contrary is proved. Considering that Antonio failed to rebut such
presumption of voluntariness regarding the authorship of the crime, coupled with the fact of
death of his wife, Norma, we find Antonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
Parricide.
6 of 578
Case Digests
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v POTENCIANO A. LARRAZABAL, SR., VICTORIA

LARRAZABAL LOCSIN and BETTY LARRAZABAL MACATUAL
G.R. No. 204530, July 26, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of
the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the
time of the filing of the complaint.
FACTS
Sometime in November 1991, heavy rains in Ormoc City caused the Malbasag River
to overflow resulting in a flashflood throughout the city. To avoid a similar tragedy, the
petitioner, through the Department of Public Works and Highways, undertook a massive
flood mitigation project at the Malbasag River, which required a right of way.
On September 15, 1999, petitioner filed a Complaint with the RTC for expropriation
of portions of three parcels of land that respondents Potenciano, Victoria, and Betty owned.
Respondent Potenciano's commercial property is Lot No. 844 located at Poblacion,
Municipality of Ormoc, Leyte. Respondents Victoria's and Betty's residential properties are
Lot No. 1 located at Barangay Can-adieng, Ormoc City, Leyte and Lot No. 2 in the same
barangay. Petitioner sought to expropriate 1,027 square meters of respondent Potenciano's
property, 575 square meters of respondent Victoria's property, and 4,638 square meters of
respondent Betty's property. Based on Resolution No. 8-98, the properties were appraised
at P1,000.00 per square meter for commercial lots and P800.00 for residential lots.
After the filing of the Complaint, petitioner was allowed to enter the properties,
demolish the improvements thereon, and to deposit the amounts corresponding to the
provisional payments for the properties. Subsequently, respondents filed their Answer
where they prayed that the just compensation for respondent Potenciano's property be fixed
at P25,000.00 per square meter, and P15,000.00 per square meter for respondents Victoria's
and Betty's properties.
The RTC appointed a set of Commissioners to evaluate and recommend the amount
of just compensation for the properties. On November 20, 2001, the Commissioners
submitted their Report with the estimated fair market values of the properties. The
Commissioners considered the three properties as commercial lots and found that one real
estate transaction — sale of the property of William Gothong and Aboitiz where the lot was
sold at P30,000.00 per square meter — nearly reflected the fair market value of commercial
lots in Ormoc City. The Commissioners found that the estimated fair market value of
Potenciano's property was P10,000.00 per square meter, and P4,000.00 per square meter
for Betty's and Victoria's properties.
Petitioner then filed its Comment on the Commissioners' Report stating that the
appraisal values as stated in Resolution No. 8-98 should be applied instead of the just
compensation determined by the Commissioners.
In its Decision, the RTC approved the value of the properties as fixed by the
Commissioners in their Report. The RTC ruled that in eminent domain cases, the value of
7 of 578
Case Digests
the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint is generally determinative of the just
compensation. The RTC further ruled that "sales so taken in the neighborhood of the same
year of taking, have been considered fair enough as to reflect fair market value of the
property." As basis for approving the value fixed by the Commissioners, the RTC relied on
the sales of properties that were made on November 14, 1997 involving the property of
William Gothong and Aboitiz and on July 10, 2000 involving the property of Mariano Tan.
The CA in its Decision and Resolution affirmed the RTC Decision. The CA made an
extensive discussion on why the RTC correctly disregarded Republic Act (RA) No. 8974,
entitled An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-Of-Way, Site or Location for National
Government Infrastructure Projects and for Other Purposes and its IRR in determining the just
compensation to be paid to respondents for their properties. The CA ruled that RA No.
8974 was not applicable since it only applies prospectively. Since the Complaint was filed as
early as September 15, 1999, RA No. 8974 was not applicable because it was signed into law
on November 7, 2000 and became effective only on November 26, 2000.
ISSUE
1. Whether RA No. 8974 is applicable to the determination of the just compensation
to be paid to respondents for their properties, and
2. Whether the CA acted correctly in affirming the RTC Decision on the just
compensation for the properties.
RULING
1. NO. RA No. 8974 cannot be made to apply retroactively since it is a substantive law. There
is nothing in RA No. 8974 which expressly provides for retroactive application; and
retroactivity could not necessarily be implied from RA No. 8974. Here, since the complaint
for eminent domain was filed on September 15, 1999, or prior to the effectivity of RA No.
8974 on November 26, 2000, then RA No. 8974 and the standards indicated therein are not
applicable in determining the just compensation in the present case.
2. NO. The Court is constrained to order the remand of this case to the RTC for the proper
determination of just compensation.
The RTC's reliance on the sale of the properties of William Gothong and Mariano
Tan deviated from the settled rule that just compensation should be determined as of
the time of the taking. Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking,
which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where
the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.
Since the Complaint in this case was filed on September 15, 1999, with petitioner
being allowed entry to the property thereafter, the just compensation should therefore be
reckoned as of the time of the filing of the Complaint. The two sales relied upon by the RTC
were made on November 14, 1997 and July 10, 2000. These sales — the first being almost 2
years prior to, and the second, being 10 months after, the filing of the Complaint on
September 15, 1999 — were not and could not have been proper bases for determining the
just compensation for the properties. The same is true for the sale between Emmanuel Antig
and Marie Paz Kathryn Porciuncula as the sale was made on December 28, 1995, or almost
four years before the filing of the Complaint. Sales around the time of September 15, 1999,
8 of 578
Case Digests
or the year 1999, are the proper bases for determining the just compensation for the
properties, especially considering that no reasons can be found in the records as to
why no such sales during this period were considered by the Commissioners or the RTC.
More than this, however, the error of the RTC was exacerbated by its reliance solely
on comparative sales of other properties. Just compensation cannot be arrived at arbitrarily;
several factors must be considered such as, but not limited to, acquisition cost, current
market value of like properties, tax value of the condemned property, its size, shape, and
location. But before these factors can be considered and given weight, the same must be
supported by documentary evidence. The amount of just compensation could only be
attained by using reliable and actual data as bases for fixing the value of the condemned
property. A commissioners' report of land prices which is not based on any documentary
evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court.
Here, the records reveal that the RTC's determination of just compensation did not
consider any of the foregoing factors. The RTC Decision miserably failed to even explain how
the amounts of P10,000.00 per square meter for respondent Potenciano's property, and
P4,000.00 per square meter for respondents Victoria's and Betty's properties were arrived
at. There was no consideration made of the acquisition cost, current market value of like
properties, the tax value of the properties of respondents, and the size, shape and location of
the properties. Clearly, in the absence of any actual and reliable data — and the abject failure
to explain this absence — there can be no other conclusion that can be drawn except that the
RTC's determination of just compensation was arbitrary.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is left with no option except to reverse and set
aside the CA Decision and Resolution that affirmed the RTC Decision. The Court, however, is
not in a position to fix the amount of just compensation for indeed, a review of the records
shows that there is no sufficient evidence to allow any determination of the proper just
compensation. In this regard, the Court cannot also rely only on Resolution No. 8-98 as this
cannot substitute for the judicial determination of just compensation, based on all the factors
mentioned above as jurisprudentially mandated.
9 of 578
Case Digests
AMA LAND, INC., v WACK WACK RESIDENTS' ASSOCIATION, INC.

G.R. No. 202342. July 19, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The temporary easement of right of way under Article 656 of the Civil Code, similar to
the permanent easement of right of way pursuant to its Articles 649 and 650, can only be
granted after proof of compliance with the prerequisites set forth in the articles duly adduced
during a full-blown trial.
FACTS
A commercial and residential building project located at EDSA corner Fordham Street
in Wack Wack Village, Mandaluyong City, was proposed by AMALI in the mid-1990s. The
latter proceeded to secure the needed licenses and permits for the construction of the
project. On March 18, 1996, AMALI notified WWRAI — a registered homeowners'
association of Wack Wack Village — of its intention to use Fordham Street as an access road
and staging area of the project. As AMALI received no response from WWRAI, the former
temporarily enclosed the job site and set up a field office along Fordham Street. WWRAI
claimed, however, that AMALI already converted part of the said street as barrack site and
staging area even before March 18, 1996. All subsequent attempts of WWRAI to remove the
said field office proved futile.
AMALI then filed a petition before the RTC, wherein it seeks the temporary use of
Fordham Street belonging to WWRAI as an access road to AMALI's construction site of its
AMA Tower project pursuant to Article 656of the Civil Code, and to establish a permanent
easement of right of way in its favor over a portion of Fordham Street pursuant to Article
649 of the Civil Code. The RTC granted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
"directing WWRAI to allow AMALI to use Fordham Street through a temporary easement of
right of way." The CA granted WWRAI's application for a temporary restraining order, and,
accordingly, AMALI was commanded to cease and desist from further committing the act
complained of, which is the construction of the commercial and residential condominium
project located along EDSA corner Fordham Street in Wack Wack Village.
ISSUE
1. Whether WWRAI is entitled to enjoin the construction of the AMA Tower pending
determination of the original petition for the declaration of temporary and permanent
easements of right of way over a portion of Fordham Street.
2. Whether AMALI, as owner of the dominant estate, may validly claim against
WWRAI a compulsory permanent right of way under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code,
or, a temporary right of way under Article 656 of the Civil Code.
RULING
1. NO. To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the petitioner must show that: (1) there exists a
clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by the act
sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there
is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.
10 of 578
Case Digests
The grant or denial of the injunctive relief rests on the sound discretion of the court
taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that
end involves findings of fact left to the conclusive determination by such court; and the
exercise of judicial discretion by such court will not be interfered with, except upon a finding
of grave abuse of discretion. In the issuance of the injunctive writ, grave abuse of discretion
implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or
the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or
personal aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Guided by the foregoing principles, the CA erred in finding that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Orders, denying WWRAI's application for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. WWRAI's allegation
that its members' right to live in a peaceful, quiet and safe environment will be violated in
the event that the condominium project of AMALI will be erected is untenable. The alleged
noise and dust that may be caused by the construction is the natural consequence thereof.
However, this annoyance that may be brought by the construction is not permanent in nature
but is merely temporary and once the building is completed, said members' right to live in a
peaceful, quiet and safe environment will be restored without noise and dust. As to the
allegations that said members' privacy may be invaded for the reason that they may be
photographed or videotaped without their knowledge, these fears are merely speculative
and cannot be taken into consideration. As admitted by WWRAI's witness, the construction
activity is suspended, hence, there is nothing to restrain. There is no urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Indeed, WWRAI was unable to convincingly demonstrate a clear and unmistakable
right that must be protected by the injunctive writ. The apprehensions of its members are,
as correctly ruled by the RTC, speculative and insufficient to substantiate the element of
serious and irreparable damage.
2. NO. The denial of WWRAI's application for a writ of preliminary injunction against the
construction of the AMA Tower does not necessarily translate to AMALI's entitlement to a
temporary easement of right of way over a portion of Fordham Street belonging to WWRAI
for use as an access road and staging area of its AMA Tower project before the resolution of
its petition for declaration of easement of right of way (original petition) by the RTC. WWRAI
cannot be compelled at this stage of the proceedings to grant AMALI a temporary legal
easement of right of way over a portion of Fordham Street.
The question of whether or not AMALI, as owner of the dominant estate, may validly
claim against WWRAI a compulsory permanent right of way under Articles 649 and 650 of
the Civil Code, will depend on a finding that AMALI has established the existence of the
following requisites, namely: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables;
(2) it is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (3) after the proper indemnity has been
paid; (4) the isolation was not due to the proprietor of the dominant estate's own acts; and
(5) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. A sixth
requisite is that the right of way must be absolutely necessary for the normal enjoyment of
the dominant estate by its owner. There must be a real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity
for the right of way, and the right cannot be claimed merely for the convenience of the owner
11 of 578
Case Digests
of the enclosed estate. The burden of proving the existence of the foregoing requisites lies
on AMALI, being the owner of the dominant estate. This issue has been correctly
recognized by the CA as still pending determination by the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City assigned in San Juan (Metropolitan Manila) Branch 264, in Civil Case No.
65668.
In turn, as regards the question of whether AMALI is entitled to a temporary
easement of right of way, Article 656 of the Civil Code provides that this can be granted only
after the payment of the proper indemnity by AMALI, the owner of the dominant estate; and
only if AMALI has established that the easement is indispensable for the construction of its
AMA Tower Project.
The RTC did not even factor in its Order "directing WWRAI to allow AMALI to use
Fordham Street through a temporary easement right of way and set the compensation for
the use of Fordham Street to P50,000.00 per month of use" the fact that the front portion of
AMALI's property where the proposed AMA Tower project is situated is facing EDSA, which
AMALI describes as a main thoroughfare. The said Order also fails to identify the specific
portion of Fordham Street that would be subject to the temporary easement of right of
way. The RTC erred and/or gravely abused its discretion when it granted AMALI's
application for preliminary mandatory injunction because, in so doing, it prematurely
decided disputed facts and disposed of the merits of the case without the benefit of a full-
blown trial wherein testimonial and documentary evidence could be fully and exhaustively
presented, heard and refuted by the parties. As such, the RTC Order insofar as it granted a
temporary easement of right of way over Fordham Street in favor of AMALI is concerned is
declared void and of no force and effect. The RTC lacked jurisdiction to declare a temporary
easement of right of way arising from Article 656 of the Civil Code without a full-blown trial.
Article 656 requires proof of indispensability and receipt of payment of the proper
indemnity for the damage caused by the owner of the dominant estate before the owner of
the servient estate can be compelled to grant a temporary easement of right of way. AMALI
presented no witnesses to establish these prerequisites. Being preconditions, they are akin
to suspensive conditions that must be fulfilled before the obligation on the part of WWRAI
to allow the easements can arise. Until the preconditions are met, AMALI has no legal basis
to use a portion of Fordham Street as an access road and staging area of its AMA Tower
project. To allow AMALI to do so would be in contravention of the legal provisions on the
establishment and grant of the legal easement of right of way under the Civil Code.
To stress, the temporary easement of right of way under Article 656 of the Civil Code,
similar to the permanent easement of right of way pursuant to its Articles 649 and 650, can
only be granted after proof of compliance with the prerequisites set forth in the articles duly
adduced during a full-blown trial.
12 of 578
Case Digests
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v ALFREDO R. DE BORJA

G.R. No. 187448. January 9, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
In a demurrer to evidence, however, it is premature to speak of "preponderance of
evidence" because it is filed prior to the defendant's presentation of evidence; it is precisely the
office of a demurrer to evidence to expeditiously terminate the case without the need of the
defendant's evidence.
FACTS
The case stems from a Complaint filed by petitioner Republic, represented by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, for "Accounting, Reconveyance, Forfeiture,
Restitution, and Damages" (Complaint) before the SB (Civil Case) for the recovery of ill-
gotten assets allegedly amassed by the individual respondents therein, singly or collectively,
during the administration of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Geronimo Z. Velasco (Velasco), one of the defendants in the Civil Case No. 0003, was
the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Oil Company
(PNOC). Herein respondent De Borja is Velasco's nephew. PNOC, in the exercise of its
functions, would regularly enter into charter agreements with vessels and, pursuant to
industry practice, vessel owners would pay "address commissions" to PNOC as charterer,
amounting to five percent (5%) of the total freight. Allegedly, during the tenure of Velasco,
no address commissions were remitted to PNOC.
Instead, starting 1979, the percentage of the address commission no longer appeared
in the charter contracts and the words "as agreed upon" were substituted therefor, per
instructions of Velasco. As a result, the supposed address commissions were remitted to the
account of Decision Research Management Company (DRMC), one of the defendant
corporations in Civil Case No. 0003 and the alleged conduit for address commissions. Velasco
was likewise alleged to have diverted government funds by entering into several
transactions involving the purchase of crude oil tankers and by reason of which he received
bribes, kickbacks, or commissions in exchange for the granting of permits, licenses, and/or
charters to oil tankers to service PNOC.
Given the foregoing, petitioner Republic claimed that it was De Borja who collected
these address commissions in behalf of Velasco, basing its allegation on the testimony of
Verano, a witness for petitioner Republic. De Borja was further alleged to have acted as
Velasco's dummy, nominee, and/or agent for corporations he owned and/or controlled, such
as DRMC.
After the filing of the parties' responsive pleadings, trial on the merits ensued.
Subsequently, upon the conclusion of its presentation of evidence, petitioner Republic
submitted its Formal Offer of Evidence.
13 of 578
Case Digests
On April 15, 2005, respondent De Borja filed his Demurrer to Evidence of even date,
stating therein, among others: (i) that Verano, on two (2) occasions, testified that he
delivered an envelope to Velasco who, in turn, instructed him to deliver the same to De Borja;
(ii) that Verano admitted that the envelope was sealed; (iii) that Verano did not open the
envelope and therefore had no knowledge of the contents thereof; (iv) that Verano did not
deliver the envelope personally to De Borja; and (v) that Verano did not confirm whether De
Borja in fact received the said envelope.
The SB found that the evidence presented was insufficient to support a claim for
damages against De Borja, thereby granting respondent De Borja's Demurrer to Evidence.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the SB was correct in granting respondent De Borja's Demurrer to
Evidence.
2. Whether petitioner Republic was able to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the
alleged complicity of respondent De Borja with the required quantum of evidence.
RULING
1. YES. A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence. It is a remedy available to the defendant, to the effect that the evidence produced
by the plaintiff is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or
sustain an issue. The question in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff, by his
evidence in chief, had been able to establish a prima facie case.
In this regard, the Court emphasizes that factual questions are not the proper subject
of a petition for review under Rule 45, the same being limited only to questions of law. Not
being a trier of facts, the Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence
already considered in the proceedings below. For such reasons, the Court has consistently
deferred to the factual findings of the trial court, in light of the unique opportunity afforded
them to observe the demeanor and spontaneity of the witness in assessing the credibility of
their testimony.
Respondent De Borja points out the inadvertence of petitioner Republic, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, to submit proof of service on the Sandiganbayan of a copy of
the instant Petition and the preceding Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for
Review dated April 29, 2009. In this regard, the failure of petitioner Republic to strictly
comply with Section 5 (d), Rule 56 of the Rules of Court already renders its Petition
dismissible.
Further, anent the claim of respondent De Borja that the Petition had already been
rendered moot and academic due to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 0003 by the SB, the Court
finds the same lacking in merit. It is axiomatic that a dismissal on the basis of a demurrer to
evidence is similar to a judgment; it is a final order ruling on the merits of a case. Hence,
when petitioner Republic brought the instant appeal before this Court, the same was limited
14 of 578
Case Digests
to respondent De Borja's liability alone. In this regard, the propriety of the SB's granting of
respondent De Borja's Demurrer to Evidence, which is the subject matter of this case, is
separate and distinct from the subject matter of the appeal in G.R. No. 199323, i.e., liability
of Velasco, et al.
Thus, respondent De Borja's claim in his Motion to Dismiss that "the complaint
against [him] was dismissed not only once — but twice" is inaccurate and legally flawed.
Perforce, it is of no moment that the SB dismissed Civil Case as the same was merely with
respect to the respondents other than respondent De Borja who, by then, was already
confronted with the instant appeal brought by petitioner Republic.
2. NO. In a demurrer to evidence, however, it is premature to speak of

"preponderance of evidence" because it is filed prior to the defendant's presentation of
evidence; it is precisely the office of a demurrer to evidence to expeditiously terminate the
case without the need of the defendant's evidence. Hence, what is crucial is the
determination as to whether the plaintiff's evidence entitles it to the relief sought.
Specifically, the inquiry in this case is confined to resolving whether petitioner

Republic is entitled to "Accounting, Reconveyance, Forfeiture, Restitution, and Damages"
based on the evidence it has presented. As repeatedly stressed by respondent De Borja, the
only evidence presented with respect to his liability is the testimony of Verano and the
affidavit of one Jose M. Reyes. In the face of the foregoing testimony, the insinuations of
petitioner Republic in the instant Petition can best be described as speculative, conjectural,
and inconclusive at best. Nothing in the testimony of Verano reasonably points, or even
alludes, to the conclusion that De Borja acted as a dummy or conduit of Velasco in receiving
address commissions from vessel owners.
The Court joins and concurs in the SB's observations pertaining to Verano's want of
knowledge with respect to the contents of the envelopes allegedly delivered to respondent
De Borja's office, which remained sealed the entire time it was in Verano's possession. As
admitted by Verano himself, he did not and could not have known what was inside the
envelopes when they were purportedly entrusted to him for delivery. In the same vein,
Verano did not even confirm respondent De Borja's receipt of the envelopes, despite
numerous opportunities to do so. Relatedly, it was further revealed during the cross-
examination of Verano that in the first place, Velasco did not even deal directly with brokers.
All told, the Court finds that the evidence adduced is wholly insufficient to support
the allegations of the Complaint before the SB. Thus, for failure of petitioner Republic to show
any right to the relief sought, the Court affirms the SB in granting the Demurrer to Evidence.
15 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ROQUE DAYADAY y DAGOOC

G.R. No. 213224, January 16, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Relationship by itself does not give rise to any presumption of bias or ulterior motive,
nor does it impair the credibility of witnesses or tarnish their testimonies.
FACTS
On the evening of October 27, 2005 at about 10 o'clock, Alex and his father, Basilio,
were walking home along the road in Barrio 3, Norala, South Cotabato after attending a
wedding celebration at the house of Rodolfo Dayaday, when suddenly, Roque shot the victim
in the back four (4) times, successively. Alex easily recognized Roque as the assailant because
the place was well lit and he was just about ten (10) meters away from Roque when the latter
fired his gun. For fear of his life, Alex ran away from the place of incident. He reported the
incident to his uncle Petring Pinuela and to the police officers of Norala.
The prosecution presented Alex Gallenero, the son of the victim, and Dr. Lanelita
Lanaria-Amido,the Municipal Health Officer of Norala, South Cotabato, as witnesses. The
postmortem report of Dr. Amido showed that the victim suffered four (4) gunshot wounds
and one (1) stab wound and died due to cardio-pulmonary arrest, probably secondary to
multiple injuries caused by the gunshot and stab wounds.
ISSUE
Whether Alex is a biased witness considering his relationship with the victim.
RULING
NO. Roque essentially questions the credibility of Alex and the veracity of his
accusations. Roque insists that Alex is a biased witness considering his relationship with the
victim. He further avers that Alex exhibited a propensity to lie when he stated in his affidavit
that there were other witnesses who saw the commission of the crime, and later admitted in
open court that he was the sole witness to the crime. Roque also claims that the testimony of
Alex that his father had been shot four (4) times runs counter to the postmortem report of
Dr. Amido, which indicates that there were seven (7) gunshot wounds.
When the issues involve matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial
court, its calibration of the testimonies, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof,
as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not
conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the
truth. Hence, it is a settled rule that appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of
the trial court unless there is a showing that the latter overlooked facts or circumstances of
weight and substance that would affect the result of the case. The foregoing rule finds an
even more stringent application where the findings of the RTC are sustained by the CA.
16 of 578
Case Digests
In the present case, both the RTC and CA found the testimony of Alex straightforward
and worthy of belief. Alex identified Roque as the one who shot his father at the back and his
positive declaration was never destroyed even after cross-examination in court.
For his part, Roque failed to identify any significant fact or circumstance which would
justify the reversal of the RTC's and CA's findings on Alex's credibility.
The imputation of bias to Alex because of his relationship with the victim must
necessarily fail. Relationship by itself does not give rise to any presumption of bias or ulterior
motive, nor does it impair the credibility of witnesses or tarnish their testimonies. The
relationship of a witness to the victim would even make his testimony more credible, as it
would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to charge and
prosecute another person other than the real culprit. Relatives of victims of crimes have a
natural knack for remembering the faces of the attacker and they, more than anybody else,
would be concerned with obtaining justice for the victim by having the felon brought to
justice and meted the proper penalty. Where there is no showing of an improper motive on
the part of the prosecution's witnesses for testifying against the appellant, their relationship
to the victim does not render their testimony less credible. In this case, since there is no
showing of any ill or improper motive on the part of Alex to testify against the accused, his
relationship with the victim even made his testimony more credible and truthful.
Furthermore, the alleged discrepancy between Alex's testimony and the postmortem
report of Dr. Amido as to the number of gunshot wounds is more imagined than real. As
correctly pointed out by the CA, the postmortem report showing that there are four (4) entry
gunshot wounds and three (3) exit wounds, which means that there are three (3) perforating
gunshots and one (1) penetrating gunshot, coincides with Alex's declaration that his father
was shot four (4) times.
The Court also agrees with the CA that the inconsistency between Alex's affidavit and
his testimony in open court as to whether there are other witnesses to the crime is
immaterial to affect his credibility, because it does not detract from the fact that Alex saw
and identified Roque as the assailant of his father.
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), murder is committed when: (1) a
person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any
of the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Article 248; and (4) the killing neither
constitutes parricide nor infanticide.
All elements of the crime of murder have been established in this case beyond
reasonable doubt. Through the testimony of Alex, the eyewitness to the crime, it was
established that Basilio was killed and it was Roque who had killed him. As to the presence
of qualifying circumstances, the Court sustains the CA's finding that treachery attended the
killing of Basilio. There is treachery when a victim is set upon by the accused without
warning, as when the accused attacks the victim from behind, or when the attack is sudden
17 of 578
Case Digests
and unexpected and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, or is, in any
event, so sudden and unexpected that the victim is unable to defend himself, thus insuring
the execution of the criminal act without risk to the assailant.
Here, the evidence unequivocally shows that the attack against Basilio, which came
from behind, was sudden, deliberate and unexpected. The victim was completely unaware of
any threat to his life as he was merely walking home with his son. The use of a firearm
showed deliberate intent to kill Basilio and the location and number of gunshot wounds
rendered him defenseless and incapable of retaliation. Hence, treachery was evident in the
case at bar, sufficient to qualify the crime to Murder.
18 of 578
Case Digests
PRUDENTIAL BANK (now BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS) v RONALD RAPANOT

and HOUSING & LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD
DOCTRINE
Only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review on certiorari brought before
this Court under Rule 45, since this Court is not a trier of facts. While there are recognized
exceptions which warrant review of factual findings, mere assertion of these exceptions does
not suffice. It is incumbent upon the party seeking review to overcome the burden of
demonstrating that review is justified under the circumstances prevailing in his case.
FACTS
Golden Dragon is the developer of Wack-Wack Twin Towers Condominium, located
in Mandaluyong City. On May 9, 1995, Rapanot paid Golden Dragon the amount of
P453,329.64 as reservation fee for a 41.1050-square meter unit in said condominium (Unit
2308-B2)
On September 13, 1995, the Bank extended a loan to Golden Dragon amounting to
P50,000,000.00 to be utilized by the latter as additional working capital. To secure the loan,
Golden Dragon executed a Mortgage Agreement in favor of the Bank, which had the effect of
constituting a real estate mortgage over several condominium units owned and registered
under Golden Dragon's name. Among the units subject of the Mortgage Agreement was Unit
2308-B2. The mortgage was annotated on CCT No. 2383 on September 13, 1995.
On May 21, 1996, Rapanot and Golden Dragon entered into a Contract to Sell covering
Unit 2308-B2. On April 23, 1997, Rapanot completed payment of the full purchase price of
said unit amounting to P1,511,098.97. Golden Dragon executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of Rapanot of the same date. Thereafter, Rapanot made several verbal demands for the
delivery of Unit 2308-B2.
Prompted by Rapanot's verbal demands, Golden Dragon sent a letter to the Bank
dated March 17, 1998, requesting for a substitution of collateral for the purpose of replacing
Unit 2308-B2 with another unit with the same area. However, the Bank denied Golden
Dragon's request due to the latter's unpaid accounts. Because of this, Golden Dragon failed
to comply with Rapanot's verbal demands.
Thereafter, Rapanot, through his counsel, sent several demand letters to Golden
Dragon and the Bank, formally demanding the delivery of Unit 2308-B2 and its
corresponding CCT No. 2383, free from all liens and encumbrances. Neither Golden Dragon
nor the Bank complied with Rapanot's written demands.
On April 27, 2001, Rapanot filed a Complaint with the Expanded National Capital
Region Field Office of the HLURB. The Field Office then scheduled the preliminary hearing
19 of 578
Case Digests
and held several conferences with a view of arriving at an amicable settlement. However, no
settlement was reached.
Despite service of summons to all the defendants named in the Complaint, only the
Bank filed its Answer. Thus, on April 5, 2002, the Arbiter issued an order declaring Golden
Dragon and its President Maria Victoria Vazquez in default, and directing Rapanot and the
Bank to submit their respective position papers and draft decisions (April 2002 Order).
Copies of the April 2002 Order were served on Rapanot and the Bank via registered mail.
However, the envelope bearing the copy sent to the Bank was returned to the Arbiter,
bearing the notation "refused to receive."
Rapanot complied with the April 2002 Order and personally served copies of its
position paper and draft decision on the Bank on May 22, 2002 and May 24, 2002,
respectively. In the opening statement of Rapanot's position paper, Rapanot made reference
to the April 2002 Order
On January 16, 2003, the Bank filed a Petition for Review with the HLURB Board of
Commissioners (HLURB Board) alleging, among others, that it had been deprived of due
process when the Arbiter rendered a decision without affording the Bank the opportunity to
submit its position paper and draft decision.
The Bank appealed the decision of the HLURB Board to the Office of the President.
The OP issued a resolution denying the Bank's appeal. In so doing, the OP adopted the
HLURB's findings.
The Bank filed a Petition for Review with the CA on April 17, 2006 assailing the
resolution and subsequent order of the OP. The Bank argued, among others, that the OP erred
when it found that the Bank (i) was not denied due process before the HLURB, and (ii) is
jointly and severally liable with Golden Dragon for damages due Rapanot. The CA dismissed
the Bank's Petition for Review.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA is correct when it affirmed the resolution of the OP finding that
the Bank had been afforded due process before the HLURB.
RULING
YES. Time and again, the Court has emphasized that review of appeals under Rule 45
is "not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion." Thus, a petition for review
on certiorari shall only be granted on the basis of special and important reasons.
As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in petitions filed under Rule
45. However, there are recognized exceptions to this general rule, namely:
(1) when the findings, are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension
20 of 578
Case Digests
of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record;
and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
The Bank avers that the second, fourth and eleventh exceptions above are present in
this case. However, after a judicious examination of the records of this case and the
respective submissions of the parties, the Court finds that none of these exceptions apply.
The Bank asserts that it never received the April 2002 Order. It claims that it was
taken by surprise on July 25, 2002, when it received a copy of Rapanot's Manifestation
alluding to the issuance of the Arbiter's Decision on July 3, 2002. Hence, the Bank claims that
it was deprived of due process, since it was not able to set forth its "valid and meritorious"
defenses for the Arbiter's consideration through its position paper and draft decision.
The Court finds these submissions untenable.
"The essence of due process is to be heard." In administrative proceedings, due
process entails "a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal
or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not strictly
applied."
As correctly pointed out by the CA in the questioned Decision, the Bank was able to
set out its position by participating in the preliminary hearing and the scheduled conferences
before the Arbiter. The Bank was likewise able to assert its special and affirmative defenses
in its Answer to Rapanot's Complaint.
The fact that the Arbiter's Decision was rendered without having considered the
Bank's position paper and draft decision is of no moment. An examination of the 1996 Rules
of Procedure of the HLURB then prevailing shows that the Arbiter merely acted in
accordance therewith when he rendered his decision on the basis of the pleadings and
records submitted by the parties thus far. The relevant rules provide: “If the parties fail to
settle within the period of preliminary conference, then they will be given a period of not
more than thirty (30) calendar days to file their respective verified position papers,
attaching thereto the affidavits of their witnesses and documentary evidence.”
In addition, as provided for by Executive Order No. 26, Series of 1992, the parties shall
be required to submit their respective draft decisions within the same thirty (30)-day
period. With or without the position paper and draft decision[,] the Arbiter shall
summarily resolve the case on the basis of the verified pleadings and pertinent
records of the Board.
Clearly, the Arbiter cannot be faulted for rendering his Decision, since the rules then
prevailing required him to do so.
21 of 578
Case Digests
The Bank cannot likewise rely on the absence of proof of service to further its cause.
Notably, while the Bank firmly contends that it did not receive the copy of the April 2002
Order, it did not assail the veracity of the notation "refused to receive" inscribed on the
envelope bearing said order.
22 of 578
Case Digests
SUSAN A. YAP v ELIZABETH LAGTAPON

G.R. No. 196347, January 23, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties is an aid to the
effective and unhampered administration of government functions. Without such benefit, every
official action could be negated with minimal effort from litigants, irrespective of merit or
sufficiency of evidence to support such challenge. To this end, our body of jurisprudence has
been consistent in requiring nothing short of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary to
overthrow such presumption.
FACTS
Respondent Lagtapon instituted a civil suit against petitioner Yap for a sum of money
with the Regional Trial Court. Summons was issued and as per return of service of summons
dated 4 November 1997 prepared by the process server of the respondent court in the
person of Ray R. Precioso, he served on November 4, 1997 the summons on petitioner Yap
who, however, refused to acknowledge receipt thereof, thus, compelling him to tender the
same and left a copy thereof for her. As no answer was filed, respondent Lagtapon filed a
motion to declare petitioner Yap in default. The said motion was granted by the respondent
court declaring [petitioner Yap] in default and allowing respondent Lagtapon to present her
evidence ex-parte. The respondent court rendered the challenged Decision in favor of
respondent Lagtapon and against petitioner Yap. Respondent Lagtapon filed a motion for
execution which was favorably acted upon by the respondent court.
The Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff for Negros Occidental issued a notice of sale setting
the auction sale of petitioner's property. The property of petitioner that was put up for
execution sale. Petitioner Yap filed the subject Petition for Annulment with the CA, assailing
the RTC Decision on the ground that Summons was not validly served on her, which thus
prevented the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over her person. In particular, petitioner Yap
alleged that at the time Summons was allegedly served on November 4, 1997 (as evidenced
by the Return of Service), she was not residing in either of the addresses supplied by
respondent Lagtapon in her Complaint, namely: (i) Herminia Street, Villa Valderama,
Bacolod City, and (ii) Frankfurt Street, Jesusa Heights, Bacolod City.
With respect to the first address, petitioner Yap claimed that while she used to reside
therein, she had already moved out from the said address sometime in June 1997 and started
leasing out the same on July 1998. Hence, the Summons could not have been served on her
on November 4, 1997, as she had already vacated from the said address by then.
Meanwhile, regarding the second address, petitioner Yap averred that she never
resided at any such place. Allegedly, at the time of the service of Summons, she was residing
somewhere else, specifically in "Frankfurt Street, Sunshine Valley Subdivision, Barangay
Estefania, Bacolod City" (as compared to "Frankfurt Street, Hesusa Heights, Bacolod City"),
which she started leasing from June 1997 (upon vacating the first address) until September
1999.
ISSUE
23 of 578
Case Digests
Whether the Petition for Annulment should be dismissed and that the RTC had validly
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Yap's person through service of summons.
RULING
YES. An appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules is limited in its scope —
the Court may only entertain questions of law as jurisdiction over factual questions has
been devolved to the trial courts as a matter of efficiency and practicality in the
administration of justice. As an arbiter of laws, the Court is not expected to recalibrate
the evidence already considered by inferior courts. The Petition, for raising factual
issues, may already be denied pursuant to the Court's discretionary appellate
jurisdiction.
Further, Respondent Lagtapon insists that the instant Petition should be
dismissed on the ground that the same is based on extrinsic fraud and that petitioner
Yap's failure to avail of the remedies of new trial or petition for relief from judgment on
such ground bars a resort to the remedy of annulment of judgment. Respondent
Lagtapon's argument is misplaced. In the Petition filed by petitioner Yap, she did not
specify her exclusive reliance on extrinsic fraud as basis of her Petition under Rule 47. To
be precise, petitioner Yap's claim of defective service of Summons brings to fore the lack
of jurisdiction of the RTC over her person.
Moreover, the Court agrees with the position of petitioner Yap that she
could no longer avail of the remedies of new trial or petition for relief from judgment
because she alleged to have become aware of the RTC Decision on October 11, 2000 at
the latest, at the time when a writ of execution had already been issued. Clearly, the
remedies of appeal or new trial were no longer available to petitioner Yap. Under the
Rules, execution shall issue upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom,
if no appeal has been duly perfected. In the same manner, a motion for new trial can only
be filed within the period for taking an appeal. Under the present circumstances, by the
time petitioner Yap acquired knowledge of the proceedings, the period for perfecting an
appeal had already lapsed. Likewise, the remedy of a petition for relief was no longer
available, considering that a writ of execution had already been issued as early as May
22, 1998, which was already more than six (6) months after petitioner Yap acquired
knowledge of the RTC Decision.
Be that as it may, even if the foregoing rules were to be relaxed, Summons had
been validly served on petitioner Yap.
A public official enjoys the presumption of regularity in the discharge of one's
official duties and functions. Here, in the absence of clear indicia of partiality or malice,
the service of Summons on petitioner Yap is perforce deemed regular and valid.
Correspondingly, the Return of Service of Precioso as process server of the RTC
constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts set out therein
Hence, as far as the circumstances attendant to the service of Summons are
concerned, the Court has the right to rely on the factual representation of Precioso that
service had indeed been made on petitioner Yap in person. A contrary rule would reduce
the Court to a mere fact-finding tribunal at the expense of efficiency in the administration
24 of 578
Case Digests
of justice, which, as mentioned earlier, is beyond the ambit of the Court's jurisdiction in
a Rule 45 petition.
In her Petition, petitioner Yap makes much of the failure of Precioso to include the
place of service in his Return, contrary to Section 18, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, while such detail was indeed lacking in the said Return, the Court cannot
ignore the fact that Precioso subsequently executed an Affidavit supplying the place of
service, which, to the mind of this Court, constitutes substantial compliance with the
Rules.
This presumption of regularity accorded to Precioso's Return of Service of
Summons was, however, according to Petitioner Yap, sufficiently rebutted by the
following pieces of evidence:
(i) Affidavits of her neighbors attesting to the fact that Yap had been residing in
"Frankfurt Street, Sunshine Valley Subdivision, Barangay Estefania,
Bacolod City" beginning June 1997;
(ii) Utility receipts bearing the name of her alleged landlord, Liberato Reyes;
(iii) Mail matters from the RTC (i.e., Orders dated January 12, 1998 and February
10, 1998) in envelopes which had handwritten notations reading
"UNCLAIMED".
The above evidence was insufficient to support the claim that petitioner Yap was
residing elsewhere at the time of the service of Summons and therefore inadequate to
overcome the presumption of regularity.
With respect to item (i), in the first place, the records are bereft of any lease
contract involving the residence in the Sunshine Valley address. While it is true that the
trial court cannot dictate what particular evidence the parties must present in order to
prove their respective cases, the fact remains that petitioner Yap is still bound to
present clear and convincing evidence to support her claims
As to item (ii), the Court finds the receipts severely lacking in establishing
petitioner Yap's residence in the Sunshine Valley address. First of all, both receipts do not
indicate any address corresponding to the purported utility expenses incurred by
petitioner Yap during the alleged lease. In the same manner, no address was mentioned
in the Letter what the Letter simply contained were vague statements regarding the
collection of rentals. Based on the said documents, it would be impossible for the Court
to determine where petitioner Yap had her residence at the time Summons was served
on her person. Granting that there was indeed a lessor-lessee relationship between
petitioner Yap and Liberato Reyes, there is no showing that the property subject of the
lease was "Frankfurt Street, Sunshine Valley Subdivision, Barangay Estefania, Bacolod
City" and no place else. While it may be true that Liberato Reyes was a lessor of petitioner
Yap, there is no way for this Court to know which address the latter was occupying
specifically, for it may very well be that Liberato Reyes had other properties at the time
the alleged lease was entered into. Moreover, that the handwritings thereon were indeed
those of Liberato Reyes was not even satisfactorily established. Most significant,
however, is the glaring fact that the Letter was dated several months after the service of
Summons on November 4, 1997. As pointedly stressed by the CA, that petitioner Yap was
25 of 578
Case Digests
residing in a place owned by Liberato Reyes on February 16, 1998 is immaterial in

proving her residence at an earlier time, i.e., November 4, 1997.
Finally, as regards item (iii), the Court finds that the mail matters from the RTC
bearing handwritten notations "UNCLAIMED" are highly inconclusive to establish her
non-residence at the Hesusa Village address, let alone her residence at the Sunshine
Valley address, considering that they involved orders dated after the service of
Summons on November of 1997. On the other hand, what is present in the records is
evidence of receipt of the Motion to Declare in Default dated December 16, 1997 via JRS
Express by a certain "Tommy Lim," albeit denied by petitioner Yap.
All told, the Court hereby upholds the finding of the CA in its questioned Decision
that petitioner Yap's evidence does not constitute clear and convincing evidence to
overturn the presumption of regularity attendant to the Return of Service.
26 of 578
Case Digests
SPOUSES MARCELIAN TAPAYAN and ALICE TAPAYAN, v PONCEDA M.

MARTINEZ
DOCTRINE
The best evidence rule requires that the original document be produced whenever its
contents are the subject of inquiry, except in certain limited cases laid down in Section 3 of Rule
130. However, to set this rule in motion, a proper and timely objection is necessary.
FACTS
The parties herein are relatives by affinity. Petitioner Alice Tapayan is the sister
of Clark Martinez's (Clark) wife. Clark is Respondent's son.
Respondent is the registered owner of the Pingol Property. Two mortgages were
constituted over this property — the first (PNB Mortgage), and the second (DBP
Mortgage).
Respondent agreed to constitute the DBP Mortgage upon Clark's request, and that,
in order to release the Pingol Property from the PNB Mortgage, the Petitioners and
Respondent agreed to utilize a portion of the proceeds of the DBP Loan to settle the
remaining balance of Respondent's PNB Loan (P65,320.55).
Subsequently, the parties executed a Deed of Undertaking in reference to the DBP
Mortgage that in the event the Petitioners could not pay the loan and consequently, the
property of the Respondent is foreclosed and is not redeemed the Petitioners shall
acknowledge as his indebtedness the amount due to the DBP upon foreclosure or the
amount paid by the Respondent in paying the loan, but in either case shall be deducted
therefrom the amount of P65,320.55 plus interests and fees. The DBP Loan was not paid
when it fell due.
Respondent filed a complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against Petitioners
before the RTC. The Complaint sought to compel Petitioners to constitute a mortgage
over their house and lot (Carangan Property), in accordance with the provisions of the
Deed of Undertaking.
Respondent averred that Petitioners used the proceeds of the DBP Loan
exclusively for their own purposes, and that since Petitioners failed to pay the DBP Loan,
she and her children were constrained to pay DBP the sum P1,180,200.10 to save the
Pingol Property from foreclosure. Notwithstanding this, Petitioners have neither paid
their indebtedness nor executed a mortgage over the Carangan Property to secure the
same.
The Petitioners denied Respondent's allegations and claimed that the Deed of
Undertaking "is a falsity." Petitioners argued that the proceeds of the DBP Loan were
primarily used as capital for the construction business that petitioner Marcelian put up
with Clark, Mario Delos Reyes, and Richard Sevilla (collectively, Joint
Venturers). Petitioners supposedly applied for the DBP Loan in furtherance of the verbal
agreement among the Joint Venturers, while Respondent freely agreed to constitute the
DBP Mortgage to secure said loan upon Clark's request. Petitioners further emphasized
that a portion of the proceeds of the DBP Loan was used to pay off the balance of
27 of 578
Case Digests
Respondent's PNB Loan Moreover, while the DBP Loan was in the nature of a renewable
credit line, it was not renewed since Respondent refused to give her written consent for
this purpose.
Petitioners pose that the CA erred when it affirmed the following factual findings
of the RTC:
1. The Deed of Undertaking presented by Respondent is genuine, and constitutes
a valid and binding contract enforceable against Petitioners;
2. Petitioners applied for the DBP Loan for their own interest and sole account;
3. Petitioners are bound to reimburse Respondent P1,180,200.10 representing
the amount she and her daughters paid to avert the foreclosure of the DBP
Mortgage; and
4. To secure the full amount due Respondent, Petitioners are bound to constitute
a mortgage over the Carangan Property, pursuant to the provisions of the
Deed of Undertaking.
ISSUE
Whether the Petitioners should be directed to execute a mortgage over the Carangan
Property in favor of Respondent.
RULING
YES. Petitioners waived their right to object to the admission of the Deed of
Undertaking on the basis of the best evidence rule.
Petitioners assert that the RTC and CA erred in ruling that the plain copy of the
Deed of Undertaking was admissible as proof of its contents, in violation of the best
evidence rule under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners' assertion is erroneous.
The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself except in
the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Nevertheless, evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly
considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. Courts are not precluded to
accept in evidence a mere photocopy of a document when no objection was raised
when it was formally offered.
In order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence must be
made at the proper time, and the grounds specified. Objection to evidence must be made
at the time it is formally offered. In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after
all the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying the
purpose for which the evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and not at
any other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be made. And when a
party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were
offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.
Petitioners failed to object to the admission of the plain copy of the Deed of
Undertaking at the time it was formally offered in evidence before the RTC. In fact, in
their Reply, Petitioners admit that they only raised this objection for the first time before
the CA. Having failed to timely raise their objection when the Formal Offer of Evidence
28 of 578
Case Digests
was filed in the RTC, Petitioners are deemed to have waived the same. Hence, they are
precluded from assailing the probative value of the plain copy of the Deed of Undertaking.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of regularity ascribed to the Deed of
Undertaking as a notarized public document.
Petitioners insist that the Deed of Undertaking is a falsity and should not be given
credence. The Court disagrees. The Deed of Undertaking became a public document by
virtue of its acknowledgment before a notary public. Hence, it enjoys the presumption of
regularity, which can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. It is a prima
facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption
of its existence and due execution. To overcome this presumption, there must be
presented evidence that is clear and convincing. Absent such evidence, the
presumption must be upheld.
While Petitioners vehemently deny participation in the execution of the Deed of
Undertaking, they did not present any evidence to support their claim that their
signatures thereon were forged. Hence, the presumption of regularity ascribed to the
Deed of Undertaking must be upheld.
Petitioners' claim that they are mere accommodation borrowers is not supported
by sufficient evidence.
Petitioners claim that they are mere accommodation borrowers who applied for
the DBP Loan for and on behalf of the Joint Venturers, in furtherance of the verbal
agreement between and among petitioner Marcelian and the Joint Venturers. Thus,
Petitioners aver that the liability arising from the non-payment of the DBP Loan should
be assumed not by Petitioners Marcelian and Alice, but by Petitioner Marcelian and the
rest of the Joint Venturers — Clark, Mario Delos Reyes and Richard Sevilla.
Apart from the statements in the Joint Affidavit affirmed solely by the testimony
of Mario Delos Reyes, which is in turn corroborated only by petitioner Marcelian's self-
serving declarations, the Court finds no other evidence on record to support the
existence of the alleged joint venture, and the verbal agreement of the Joint Venturers in
respect of the DBP Loan.
In fact, the theory that Petitioners acted as mere accommodation borrowers is
belied by their own allegations respecting the payment of fees relating to the DBP Loan.
Petitioners' payment of the interest on the DBP Loan, the insurance premiums
corresponding to the Pingol Property, and other incidental fees solely on their account,
without seeking reimbursement from the alleged Joint Venturers, establishes Petitioners'
direct interest in the DBP Loan, and negates the claim that they are mere accommodation
borrowers. Since the proceeds of the DBP Loan redounded to Petitioners' benefit, they
must bear the liability arising from its non-payment, and comply with the obligations
imposed by the Deed of Undertaking executed in connection therewith.
The amount paid to PNB must be deducted from Petitioners' total liability in
accordance with the provisions of the Deed.
Petitioners aver that the RTC's determination respecting the amount due
Respondent is erroneous, since it failed to consider the deductions stipulated in the Deed
of Undertaking. Hence, Petitioners submit that should the Court order the execution of a
mortgage over the Carangan Property, such mortgage should only be made to secure the
29 of 578
Case Digests
amount of P1,114,879.55, which represents the amount paid by Respondent to DBP to

avert the foreclosure of the DBP Mortgage, net of the deductions stipulated in the Deed of
Undertaking. The Court agrees.
The RTC Decision directed Petitioners to execute a mortgage in favor of
Respondent to secure the amount of P1,180,200.10, unless Petitioners reimburse
Respondent said amount in full. In so ruling, the RTC completely disregarded the fourth
paragraph of the Deed of Undertaking, which specifically requires Respondent to deduct
all prior payments made in favor of PNB from Petitioners' total liability,
30 of 578
Case Digests
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 218901. February 15, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
While it is a settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 will not
lie unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent court; there are well-
defined exceptions established by jurisprudence, such as “where the order is a patent nullity, as
where the court a quo has no jurisdiction.”
FACTS
This case originated from a Complaint for collection of a sum of money in the amount
of P8,971,118.06 filed by PBCOM against private respondents before the RTC. Private
respondents moved for the dismissal of the Complaint alleging that their obligation had
already been paid in full and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because PBCOM
failed to pay the correct docket fees. The RTC issued an Order directing PBCOM to pay
additional docket fees in the amount of P24,765.70. PBCOM paid the additional docket fees
but filed its Compliance with the RTC only on November 11, 2010. In the interim, however,
the RTC issued an Order dated November 4, 2010, dismissing PBCOM's Complaint. PBCOM
filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 22, 2010, stating that it had paid the
additional docket fees within the period prescribed by the court as evidenced by the Official
Receipt attached thereto. The RTC denied PBCOM's motion for reconsideration. Undaunted,
PBCOM timely filed a Notice of Appeal dated May 26, 2011. The RTC issued an Order
(Assailed Order), denying due course to PBCOM's Notice of Appeal on the ground that said
appeal is not the proper remedy. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, PBCOM filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with the CA. The CA issued the assailed Decision
denying PBCOM's Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and affirming the order of the RTC.
The CA reasoned that, apart from availing itself of a wrong mode of appeal, PBCOM failed to
comply with the mandatory requirement of a motion for reconsideration. The CA
emphasized that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for a
petition for certiorari to prosper.
ISSUE
Whether PBCOM availed itself of the correct remedy (petition for certiorari under
Rule 65) in questioning the disallowance of its notice of appeal.
RULING
YES. Prefatorily, the Court notes that PBCOM availed of the wrong mode of appeal in
bringing the case before the Court. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper
remedy to assail the July 31, 2014 Decision and May 5, 2015 Resolution of the CA. The proper
remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review
under Rule 45 which is not similar to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. As provided in Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of
the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings
involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a
31 of 578
Case Digests
continuation of the appellate process over the original case. On the other hand, a special civil
action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific grounds therein
provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an
ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45. Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper
remedy, his petition may be dismissed outright.
However, under exceptional circumstances, as when stringent application of the rules
will result in manifest injustice, the Court may set aside technicalities and proceed with the
appeal In the present petition, PBCOM is asking the Court to rule on the correctness of the
CA's dismissal of its Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus on the grounds that (1) a petition
for certiorari is a wrong mode of appeal and (2) in any event, PBCOM failed to comply with
the mandatory requirement of a motion for reconsideration.
PBCOM argues that the CA should have given due course to its Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus because it is the proper remedy to question the Order dated
June 2, 2011 of the RTC denying its Notice of Appeal and that a motion for reconsideration is
not required when the order assailed of is a patent nullity for having been issued without
jurisdiction.
The Court finds PBCOM's arguments impressed with merit.
The CA appears to have confused the RTC Order dismissing PBCOM's complaint with
the RTC Order denying PBCOM's notice of appeal, and mistakenly ruled that the petition
for certiorari and mandamus filed by PBCOM was a wrong mode of appeal.
PBCOM assailed the RTC Order denying due course to its notice of appeal. A trial
court's order disallowing a notice of appeal, which is tantamount to a disallowance or
dismissal of the appeal itself, is not a decision or final order from which an appeal may be
taken. The suitable remedy for the aggrieved party is to elevate the matter through a special
civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, contrary to the CA's finding, PBCOM availed itself of the
correct remedy in questioning the disallowance of its notice of appeal.
Moreover, while it is a settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent court; there
are well-defined exceptions established by jurisprudence, such as (a) where the order is a
patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions
raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower
court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is
an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice
the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be
useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting
of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court
are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the
petitioner had noopportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or
where public interest is involved.
The first exception applies in this case. The authority to dismiss an appeal for being
an improper remedy is specifically vested upon the CA and not the RTC. Unless the appeal
is abandoned, the only ground for dismissing an appeal in the trial court is the failure
32 of 578
Case Digests
of the appellant to file on time the notice of appeal, appeal bond, or record on appeal.
Dismissals of appeal may also be had upon the grounds specified by Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court; but it is the Court of Appeals, not the trial court, which is explicitly
authorized to dismiss appeals on said grounds. Generally, these grounds do not
include matters which go into the merits of the cause or to the right of the plaintiff or
defendant to recover.
The RTC Order, denying due course to PBCOM's notice of appeal on the ground that it
was a wrong remedy, is a patent nullity. The RTC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
33 of 578
Case Digests
SAN FRANCISCO INN vs. SAN PABLO CITY WATER DISTRICT

G.R. No. 204639, February 15, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The jurisdiction of the courts over a dispute involving the right or authority of a local
water utility or water district entity, like SPCWD, to impose production assessment against
commercial or industrial deep well users, like SFI, pursuant to Section 39 of PD 198 is settled.
The issue in such a dispute is a judicial question properly addressed to the courts.
FACTS
The petitioner [SFI] is a hotel business establishment situated at Brgy. San Francisco
Calihan, San Pablo City. In 1996, petitioner caused the construction of two (2) deep-well
pumps for the use of its business. The pumps, which have a production capacity of four (4)
liters per second each.
The respondent [SPCWD] is a local water utility organized under Resolution No. 309,
approved by the Municipal Board of the City of San Pablo, on December 17, 1973, absorbing
the former San Pablo Waterworks System and its facilities. Its operation is under the
National Water Resources Board, formerly Council (NWRB), which is the national agency
vested with authority to control and regulate the utilization, exploitation, development,
conservation and operation of water resources pursuant to Water Code and the "Local Water
Utilities Administration Law". The respondent [SPCWD] is managed by a Board of Directors.
In 1977, the respondent [SPCWD] promulgated the Rules Governing Groundwater

Pumping and Spring Development Within the Territorial Jurisdiction of the San Pablo City
Water District. The respondent's General Manager Roger F. Borja, invited petitioner and
other deep-well users in San Pablo City, to a meeting to discuss the imposition of production
assessment fees. The meeting proceeded with several deep-well owners present, among
which is the petitioner. No concrete agreement was reached except that the deep-well users
just agreed to submit a position paper either individually or collectively Deep-well users,
including petitioner submitted their position paper opposing the imposition of the
production assessment fee on the ground that the same "is inequitable and constitutes an
unjust discrimination against such users."
Petitioner [SFI] filed an application for water permit with the NWRB. The respondent
sent the petitioner a copy of a draft MOA, regarding the proposed imposition of production
assessment fee. The petitioner, however, did not sign the MOA. The respondent [SPCWD] in
a letter dated November 9, 1999, again wrote the petitioner asking the latter to approve
and/or sign the MOA. An investigating panel was created to investigate, hear and decide
violations of the Water Code was made by respondent. It directed the petitioner to appear
and submit evidence "WHY NO CEASE AND DESIST ORDER AND CLOSURE OF OPERATION
of the water well" should be issued against the petitioner.
34 of 578
Case Digests
On the power of the respondent local water utility [SPCWD] to impose production
assessment fees on deep well owners, the RTC, citing Section 39 of PD 198 and Section 11 of
the Rules, ruled that the respondent water utility has the power to impose production
assessment fees. The authority, however, shall be subject to notice and hearing, and
conditioned upon a finding that the appropriation of underground water by a person or
utility, as in the case of the petitioner "is injuring or reducing the district's financial
condition." Nothing in the records will show that the respondent [SPCWD] has come up with
a written finding that petitioner [SFI]'s appropriation of underground water is injuring or
reducing the respondent's financial condition.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in upholding the right of SPCWD to impose production
assessment in the clear absence of any findings/proof to support compliance that SFI's use
of ground water is injuring or reducing SPCWD's financial condition and impairing its ground
water source, pursuant to Section 39 of PD 198 and Section 11 of the Rules.
RULING
YES. The jurisdiction of the courts over a dispute involving the right or authority
of a local water utility or water district entity, like SPCWD, to impose production
assessment against commercial or industrial deep well users, like SFI, pursuant to
Section 39 of PD 198 is settled. The issue in such a dispute is a judicial question properly
addressed to the courts. Thus, the RTC correctly exercised its jurisdiction over the
dispute between SFI and SPCWD.
There being no ambiguity, the plain meaning of Section 39, PD 198 and Section
11 of the Rules is to be applied. A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the
law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for interpretation.
There is only room for application.
Under the law and the Rules, the requirements that must be complied with before
a water district entity may impose production assessment on the production of ground
water by commercial or industrial operators/users are:
1. A prior notice and hearing; and
2. A resolution by the Board of Directors of the water district entity: (i) finding that
the production of ground water by such operators/users within the district is
injuring or reducing the water district entity's financial condition and is
impairing its ground water source; and (ii) adopting and levying a ground water
production assessment at fixed rates to compensate for such loss.
The RTC correctly applied the clear text of the law and the Rules. The RTC also
correctly ruled that the preconditions for the levying of production assessment by
SPCWD on SFI had not been complied with. While there had been prior notice and
hearing, SPCWD's Board of Directors had not adopted the required resolution with a
definitive finding that the appropriation by SFI of its two deep well pumps was injuring
or reducing the SPCWD's financial condition and fixing the rate of production assessment
35 of 578
Case Digests
fees to be levied against SFI that would be adequate to compensate the financial loss it
stood to suffer.
It is well to note that, as astutely observed by the RTC, even the Report and
Resolution of the Investigating Board created by SPCWD made no mention about the
injurious effects, if any, of SFI's deep well operation upon the financial condition of
SPCWD. While SPCWD had drafted a MOA on the imposition of production assessment
fees upon deep well owners/users and provided copies thereof to them, including SFI,
the MOA was not supported by any resolution duly promulgated and approved by
SPCWD's Board of Directors or by any finding that there were injurious effects of SFI's
deep well operation upon the financial condition of SPCWD. For its part, SFI did not
execute the MOA.
A MOA or contract between the water district entity and the deep well
operator/user is not required under the law and the Rules. However, when a MOA is
voluntarily agreed upon and executed, the obligation to pay production assessment fees
on the part of the deep well operator/user and the right of the water district entity to
collect the fees arise from contract. The parties are, therefore, legally bound to comply
with their respective prestations.
Unlike a MOA, which creates contractual obligations, faithful compliance with the
requirements of Section 39 of PD 198 and Section 11 of the Rules creates binding
obligations arising from law. Thus, in the absence of the requisite board resolution,
SPCWD cannot legally impose any production assessment fees upon SFI.
The CA erred when it ruled that "there is no need to await the Board Resolution
expressly fixing the rate" because a board resolution, as described above, is a mandatory
prerequisite under the law and the Rules. The CA's invocation of "contemporaneous or
practical construction" and "interpretation by usage or practice" is unwarranted, Section
39 of PD 198 and Section 11 of the Rules being crystal clear and wholly unambiguous.
Furthermore, the CA's reliance on the El Niño phenomenon in 1997-1998, which

it took judicial notice of, to justify the imposition of production assessment fees by
SPCWD on SFI does not meet the clear parameters stated in the law and the Rules. What
is sought to be compensated by the production assessment fees is the financial loss that
the water district entity stands to suffer due to the production of the ground water by the
deep well operator/user. The law requires proof of a direct correlation between the
financial loss of the water district entity and the ground water production of the deep
well operator/user. In this case, with or without the El Niño phenomenon, such direct
correlation has not been preponderantly established as found by the RTC.
36 of 578
Case Digests
VICTORIA SEGOVIA vs. THE CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION

G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
A party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show that a
law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated. In this case, apart from repeated
invocation of the constitutional right to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology and
bare allegations that their right was violated, the petitioners failed to show that public
respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the
petitioners' right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in
nature, not those that are discretionary, and the official can only be directed by mandamus to
act but not to act one way or the other. The duty being enjoined in mandamus must be one
according to the terms provided in the law itself.
FACTS
To address the clamor for a more tangible response to climate change, Former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued AO 171 which created the Presidential Task
Force on Climate Change (PTFCC). This body was reorganized through EO 774, which
designated the President as Chairperson, and cabinet secretaries as members of the Task
Force. EO 774 expressed what is now referred to by the petitioners as the "Road Sharing
Principle” which provides that "those who have less in wheels must have more in road." For
this purpose, the system shall favor non-motorized locomotion and collective transportation
system (walking, bicycling, and the man-powered mini-train).
Later that same year, Congress passed the Climate Change Act. It created the Climate
Change Commission which absorbed the functions of the PTFCC and became the lead policy-
making body of the government which shall be tasked to coordinate, monitor and evaluate
the programs and action plans of the government relating to climate change
Herein petitioners wrote respondents regarding their pleas for implementation of the
Road Sharing Principle, demanding the reform of the road and transportation system in the
whole country within thirty (30) days from receipt of the said letter — foremost, through
the bifurcation of roads and the reduction of official and government fuel consumption by
50%. Claiming to have not received a response, they filed this petition.
Petitioners are Carless People of the Philippines, parents, representing their children,
who in turn represent "Children of the Future, and Car-owners who would rather not have
cars if good public transportation were safe, convenient, accessible, available, and reliable."
They claim that they are entitled to the issuance of the extraordinary writs due to the alleged
failure and refusal of respondents to perform an act mandated by environmental laws, and
violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health and property of all Filipinos.
Petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the certain laws and
executive issuances resulted in the continued degradation of air quality, particularly in
Metro Manila, in violation of the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology, and may even be tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land,
37 of 578
Case Digests
water, and air" by the government without due process of law. They also decry the "unequal"
protection of laws in the prevailing scheme, claiming that ninety-eight percent (98%) of
Filipinos are discriminated against by the law when the car-owning two percent (2%) is
given almost all of the road space and while large budgets are allocated for construction and
maintenance of roads, hardly any budget is given for sidewalks, bike lanes and non-
motorized transportation systems.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the petitioners have standing to file the petition;
2. Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for failing to adhere to the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts; and
3. Whether or not a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should issue.
RULING
1.YES. Citing Section 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases (RPEC), respondents argue that the petitioners failed to show that they have the
requisite standing to file the petition, being representatives of a rather amorphous sector of
society and without a concrete interest or injury. Petitioners counter that they filed the suit
as citizens, taxpayers, and representatives; that the rules on standing had been relaxed
following the decision in Oposa v. Factoran; and that, in any event, legal standing is a
procedural technicality which the Court may set aside in its discretion. 23
The Court agrees with the petitioners' position. The RPEC did liberalize the
requirements on standing, allowing the filing of citizen's suit for the enforcement of rights
and obligations under environmental laws. However, it bears noting that there is a difference
between a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the
person filing represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of
the writ; and a petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus, which is only
available to one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission.
2. NO. The magnitude of the ecological problems contemplated under the RPEC
satisfies at least one of the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when direct resort
is allowed where it is dictated by public welfare.
3. NO. Petitioners failed to establish the requisites for the issuance of the writs prayed
for. A party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show that a
law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated. In this case, apart from repeated
invocation of the constitutional right to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology and
bare allegations that their right was violated, the petitioners failed to show that public
respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the
petitioners' right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
While there can be no disagreement with the general propositions put forth by the
petitioners on the correlation of air quality and public health, petitioners have not been able
to show that respondents are guilty of violation or neglect of environmental laws that causes
or contributes to bad air quality. Notably, apart from bare allegations, petitioners were not
able to show that respondents failed to execute any of the laws petitioners cited. In fact, apart
from adducing expert testimony on the adverse effects of air pollution on public health, the
petitioners did not go beyond mere allegation in establishing the unlawful acts or omissions
on the part of the public respondents that have a causal link or reasonable connection to the
38 of 578
Case Digests
actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
of the magnitude contemplated under the Rules, as required of petitions of this nature.
On the other hand, public respondents sufficiently showed that they did not
unlawfully refuse to implement or neglect the laws, executive and administrative orders as
claimed by the petitioners. In fact, the same NAQSR submitted by the petitioners show that
the DENR was, and is, taking concrete steps to improve national air quality.
Similarly, the writ of continuing mandamus cannot issue. First, the petitioners failed
to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to the respondents to be
entitled to the writ. While the requirements of standing had been liberalized in
environmental cases, the general rule of real party-in-interest applies to a petition for
continuing mandamus.
Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated — a principle. It
cannot be considered an absolute imposition to encroach upon the province of public
respondents to determine the manner by which this principle is applied or considered in
their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely
ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary, and the official can only be directed
by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. The duty being enjoined
in mandamus must be one according to the terms provided in the law itself.
This Court cannot but note that this is precisely the thrust of the petition — to compel
the respondents to act one way to implement the Road Sharing Principle — to bifurcate all
roads in the country to devote half to sidewalk and bicycling, and the other to Filipino-made
transport — when there is nothing in EO 774, AO 254 and allied issuances that require that
specific course of action in order to implement the same. Their good intentions
notwithstanding, the petitioners cannot supplant the executive department's discretion with
their own through this petition for the issuance of writs of kalikasan and
continuing mandamus.
In this case, there is no showing of unlawful neglect on the part of the respondents to
perform any act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty — there being nothing in the
executive issuances relied upon by the petitioners that specifically enjoins the bifurcation of
roads to implement the Road Sharing Principle. To the opposite, the respondents were able
to show that they were and are actively implementing projects and programs that seek to
improve air quality. At its core, what the petitioners are seeking to compel is not the
performance of a ministerial act, but a discretionary act — the manner of implementation of
the Road Sharing Principle. Clearly, petitioners' preferred specific course of action (i.e., the
bifurcation of roads to devote for all-weather sidewalk and bicycling and Filipino-made
transport vehicles) to implement the Road Sharing Principle finds no textual basis in law or
executive issuances for it to be considered an act enjoined by law as a duty, leading to the
necessary conclusion that the continuing mandamus prayed for seeks not the
implementation of an environmental law, rule or regulation, but to control the exercise of
discretion of the executive as to how the principle enunciated in an executive issuance
relating to the environment is best implemented. Clearly, the determination of the means to
be taken by the executive in implementing or actualizing any stated legislative or executive
policy relating to the environment requires the use of discretion. Absent a showing that the
executive is guilty of "gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of
39 of 578
Case Digests
authority," the general rule applies that discretion cannot be checked via this petition for
continuing mandamus. Hence, the continuing mandamus cannot issue.
40 of 578
Case Digests
Philippine Ports Authority v. Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services,

Inc.
G.R. No. 214864, March 22, 2017, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The doctrine of the law of the case precludes departure from a rule previously made by
an appellate court in a subsequent proceeding essentially involving the same case.
A preliminary injunction is in the nature of an ancillary remedy to preserve the status

quo during the pendency of the main case. As a necessary consequence, matters resolved in
injunction proceedings do not, as a general rule, conclusively determine the merits of the main
case or decide controverted facts therein. Generally, findings made in injunction proceedings
are subject to the outcome of the main case which is usually tried subsequent to the injunction
proceedings.
FACTS
PPA is a government agency created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 505. It is
charged with the management and control of all ports in the Philippines. On the other hand,
NIASSI is a duly organized Philippine corporation engaged in the business of cargo handling.
Sometime in November 2000, PPA, through its Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards
Committee (PBAC) accepted bids for a 10-year contract to operate as the sole cargo handler
at the port of Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. Subsequently, PBAC issued Resolution No. 005-
2000 recommending that the 10-year cargo handling contract be awarded to NIASSI as the
winning bidder.
On November 20, 2000, the second highest bidder, Concord Arrastre and Stevedoring
Corporation (CASCOR) filed a protest with PPA’s General Manager, Sevilla, alleging that two
of NIASSI’s stockholders on record are legislators who are constitutionally prohibited from
having any direct or indirect financial interest in any contract with the government or any of
its agencies during the term of their office.
Notwithstanding the protest, PPA issued a Notice of Award in favor of NIASSI. PPA
received notice of NIASSI’s conformity to the Notice of Award.
Instead of formally executing a written contract, NIASSI requested PPA to issue a

Holdover Authority in its favor, in view of CASCOR’s pending protest. PPA granted NIASSI’s
request and issued a HOA dated August 1, 2001, effective until October 31, 2001, “or until
such time a cargo-handling contract shall have been awarded, whichever comes first.” The
HOA was subsequently extended several times upon NIASSI’s request. The last extension of
the HOA appears to have been issued on October 13, 2004, for a term of six months. However,
barely two months after the last extension of the HOA, PPA, through its Assistant General
Manager for Operations, Benjamin B. Cecilio, issued a letter revoking the extension.
41 of 578
Case Digests
In said letter, Cecilio advised NIASSI that PPA received numerous complaints regarding
the poor quality of its services due to the use of inadequately maintained equipment. Cecilio
further relayed that PPA would take over the cargo handling services at the Nasipit Port
beginning December 10, 2004.
On the scheduled date of the takeover, NIASSI filed with the RTC a Petition for Injunction
with Prayer for the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. The
petition was later amended to a Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. It prayed for the
issuance of a writ of mandamus directing PPA to formally execute a written contract, and a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing PPA to turn over the management and
operations of Nasipit Port’s cargo handling services back to NIASSI. The RTC issued a
resolution granting NIASSI’s prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
conditioned upon the posting of a P1,000,000.00 surety bond.
PPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, followed by a Supplemental Motion which

alleged that the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction should be quashed since its
corresponding surety bond designated NIASSI’s President Ramon Calo as principal, instead
of NIASSI itself.
The RTC Order immediately dissolved the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
and directed NIASSI to surrender the management and control of Nasipit Port’s cargo
handling operations to PPA. Prompted by the said RTC Order, NIASSI filed a Petition
for Certiorari before the CA and assailed the immediately executory nature of the RTC Order
and questioned the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction without prior hearing..
PPA argued that NIASSI was not entitled to the issuance of the injunctive writ because it had
no legal right to continue providing cargo handling services at Nasipit Port, considering that
PPA has no existing cargo handling contract with NIASSI.
The CA granted the petition observing that Presiding Judge Abul of the RTC
committed several procedural errors when he issued the RTC Order. According to the CA,
Judge Abul did not conduct a hearing on PPA’s Motion for Reconsideration nor did he direct
PPA to file a counter-bond before quashing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, in
violation of Section 6, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the CA directed the reinstatement
of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. This decision was later affirmed by this
Court in the case of Philippine Ports Authority v. Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring
Services, Inc
In view of the foregoing, the RTC directed the parties to submit their simultaneous
memoranda on the issue of whether the Amended Petition had been rendered moot and
academic. Judge Abul issued a Resolution dismissing the Amended Petition for being moot
and academic. The June 2011 RTC Resolution observed that since the CA had already made
a definitive ruling that a contract had been perfected between the parties, the RTC had
42 of 578
Case Digests
“nothing left to do” in respect of the Amended Petition. However, on NIASSI’s Motion for
Reconsideration, the RTC issued a Resolution dated reversing the June 2011 RTC Resolution.
PPA moved for the reconsideration of the September 2011 RTC Resolution. However, the
RTC denied PPA’s motion in an Order. Aggrieved, PPA filed an appeal before the CA, and
faulted the RTC for reversing the June 2011 RTC Order, insisting that the Amended Petition
had already become moot and academic. The PPA also alleged that the CA erred in directing
it to execute a written 10-year contract with NIASSI reckoned from the finality of the
September 2011 RTC Resolution, as this was tantamount to extending the original term of
the contract between the parties that was perfected on January 3, 2001, the date when PPA
received notice of NIASSI’s conformity to the Notice of Award.
The CA rendered a Decision granting PPA’s appeal in part (CA Decision) by annulling the
September 2011 RTC Resolution and December 2011 RTC Order insofar as they failed to
consider that the 10-year cargo handling contract had been partially fulfilled.
The CA issued its Amended Decision. The Amended Decision affirmed the RTC
Resolution and RTC Order directing PPA to execute the cargo handling contract in favor of
NIASSI for a full 10-year term from the finality of the Resolution, on the ground that NIASSI’s
operations for the period covered by the HOA and its extensions should not be deducted
therefrom.
ISSUE
Whether or not the doctrine of the law of the case is applicable to constitute the CA’s
finding in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 00214 as the law of the case in the present petition.
RULING
YES. In the instant Petition, PPA contends that the Amended Petition before the RTC
had been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the CA’s decision in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
00214. On this basis, PPA concludes that it can no longer be compelled to formally execute a
contract with NIASSI upon finality of the Amended Decision, since the term of the perfected
contract already expired on January 3, 2011, 10 years after PPA received notice of NIASSI’s
conformity to the Notice of Award.
The Court held that the CA’s findings in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 00214 constitute the law of
the case between the parties, and are thus binding herein. In its decision in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
00214, the CA held that (i) the 10-year cargo handling contract had already been
perfected, and (ii) the HOA and its subsequent extensions constituted partial
fulfillment thereof.
In turn, the Court’s decision became final and executory after the lapse of 15 days
from notice thereof to the parties. From such time, the Court’s decision became immutable
and unalterable.
43 of 578
Case Digests
The Court notes that C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 00214 and the instant Petition both stem from the
Amended Petition, and seek the same relief — the execution of a written contract in
accordance with the Notice of Award. Moreover, both cases involve the same facts, parties
and arguments. For these reasons, the Court believes that the doctrine of the law of the case
is applicable.
The doctrine of the law of the case precludes departure from a rule previously made by
an appellate court in a subsequent proceeding essentially involving the same case. Pursuant
to this doctrine, the Court, in De La Salle University v. De La Salle University Employees
Association (DLSUEANAFTEU), (DLSU) denied therein petitioner’s prayer for review, since
the petition involved a single issue which had been resolved with finality by the CA in a
previous case involving the same facts, arguments and relief.
In the cited case, the Court held that the law of the case has been defined as the
opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established
as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues
to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on
which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
In Heirs of Felino M. Timbol, Jr. v. Philippine National Bank, the Court held that,
“questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regarded as the
law of the case on a subsequent appeal, although the questions are not expressly treated in
the opinion of the court, as the presumption is that all the facts in the case bearing on the
point decided have received due consideration whether all or none of them are mentioned
in the opinion.”
The Court’s discussions in DLSU and Heirs of Timbol are in point here where the
allegations and reliefs prayed for in NIASSI’s Amended Petition show that their disposition
required the RTC to resolve a single issue — whether PPA is bound to formally execute the
10-year cargo handling contract pursuant to the Notice of Award.
Moreover, the Court discussed that a preliminary injunction is in the nature of an ancillary
remedy to preserve the status quo during the pendency of the main case. As a necessary
consequence, matters resolved in injunction proceedings do not, as a general rule,
conclusively determine the merits of the main case or decide controverted facts
therein. Generally, findings made in injunction proceedings are subject to the outcome of the
main case which is usually tried subsequent to the injunction proceedings.
In this case, however, no further proceedings were conducted after the Decision of the
Supreme Court relative to the injunction proceedings had become final. To be sure, the RTC
directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda on the issue of whether or not
the main case had become moot and academic because of the finality of said Decision and,
on the basis of the memoranda, the RTC resolved to dismiss the Amended Petition, as it had
nothing left to determine. As such, no evidence to controvert the findings of the CA in C.A.-
44 of 578
Case Digests
G.R. S.P. No. 00214 were presented in the main case. This being the case, the factual findings
of the CA in respect of the perfected cargo handling contract in the injunction proceedings
became conclusive upon finality of this Court’s decision affirming the same. These
circumstances thus render the application of the law of the case doctrine proper.
45 of 578
Case Digests
Jose M. Roy III v. Chairperson Teresita Herbosa, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The Court may exercise its power of judicial review and take cognizance of a case when
the following specific requisites are met: (1) there is an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (2) the petitioner has standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance, i.e., he has a personal and substantial interest in the case that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the act or issuance; (3)
the question of constitutionality is raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question is the very lis mota of the case.
FACTS
Petitioner Roy, as a lawyer and taxpayer, filed the Petition assailing the validity of
SEC-MC No. 8 for not conforming to the letter and spirit of the Gamboa Decision and
Resolution and for having been issued by the SEC with grave abuse of discretion.
In its Comment, PLDT posited that the Petition filed by Roy should be dismissed
because it violates the doctrine of hierarchy of courts as there are no compelling reasons to
invoke the Court’s original jurisdiction; it is prematurely filed because petitioner Roy failed
to exhaust administrative remedies before the SEC; the principal actions/remedies
of mandamus and declaratory relief are not within the exclusive and/or original jurisdiction
of the Court; the petition for certiorari is an inappropriate remedy since the SEC issued SEC-
MC No. 8 in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power; it deprives the necessary and
indispensable parties of their constitutional right to due process; and the SEC merely
implemented the dispositive portion of the Gamboa Decision.
Respondents Chairperson Teresita Herbosa and SEC filed their Consolidated

Comment and sought the dismissal of the petitions on the following grounds: (1) the
petitioners do not possess locus standi to assail the constitutionality of SEC-MC No. 8; (2) a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the appropriate and proper remedy to assail the
validity and constitutionality of the SEC-MC No. 8; (3) the direct resort to the Court violates
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts; (4) the SEC did not abuse its discretion; (5) on PLDT’s
compliance with the capital requirement as stated in the Gamboa ruling, the petitioners’
challenge is premature considering that the SEC has not yet issued a definitive ruling
thereon.
The Philippine Stock Exchange, Inc. (“PSE”) filed its Motion to Intervene with Leave
of Court and its Comment-in-Intervention alleging that it has standing to intervene as the
primary regulator of the stock exchange and will sustain direct injury should the petitions
be granted. The PSE further argued that adopting a new interpretation of Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution violates the policy of conclusiveness of judgment, stare decisis, and the
46 of 578
Case Digests
State’s obligation to maintain a stable and predictable legal framework for foreign investors
under international treaties.
ISSUE
Whether the SC can validly exercise its power of judicial review and take cognizance
of the case.
RULING
NO. (1) The Supreme Court held that the first two requisites of judicial review
are not met.
The Court may exercise its power of judicial review and take cognizance of a case
when the following specific requisites are met: (1) there is an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the petitioner has standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance, i.e., he has a personal and substantial interest in the
case that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
act or issuance; (3) the question of constitutionality is raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case.
The SC ruled that there is no actual controversy in the case at bar. The Court
in Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1 (2013), stressed anew that an actual case or controversy
is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference
or dispute since the courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory
opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions. Related
to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of “ripeness,” and a
question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it. Herein petitioners have failed to show that there is an actual
case or controversy which is ripe for adjudication. Petitioners’ hypothetical illustration as to
how SEC-MC No. 8 “practically encourages circumvention of the 60-40 ownership rule” is
evidently speculative and fraught with conjectures and assumptions.
The SC held that petitioners have no locus standi. The personal and substantial
interest that enables a party to have legal standing is one that is both material, an interest in
issue and to be affected by the government action, as distinguished from mere interest in the
issue involved, or a mere incidental interest, and real, which means a present substantial
interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest.
As to injury, the party must show that (1) he will personally suffer some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury
is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action. If the asserted injury is more imagined than real, or is merely superficial
and insubstantial, an excursion into constitutional adjudication by the courts is not
warranted.
47 of 578
Case Digests
In this case, to establish his standing, petitioner Roy merely claimed that he has
standing to question SEC-MC No. 8 “as a concerned citizen, an officer of the Court and as a
taxpayer” as well as “the senior law partner of his own law firm which is a subscriber of
PLDT.” On the other hand, intervenors Gamboa, et al.allege, as basis of their locus standi, their
“being lawyers and officers of the Court” and “citizens and taxpayers.”
The locus standi requisite is not met by the expedient invocation of one’s citizenship
or membership in the bar who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the
Philippine government are legally and validly issued as these supposed interests are too
general, which are shared by other groups and by the whole citizenry. Per their allegations,
the personal interest invoked by petitioners as citizens and members of the bar in the
validity or invalidity of SEC-MC No. 8 is at best equivocal, and totally insufficient.
A taxpayer’s suit is allowed only when the petitioner has demonstrated the direct
correlation of the act complained of and the disbursement of public funds in contravention
of law or the Constitution, or has shown that the case involves the exercise of the spending
or taxing power of Congress. SEC-MC No. 8 does not involve an additional expenditure of
public funds and the taxing or spending power of Congress.
(2) The SC held that the rule on the hierarchy of courts has been violated.
Petitioners’ invocation of “transcendental importance” is hollow and does not merit
the relaxation of the rule on hierarchy of courts. There being no special, important or
compelling reason that justified the direct filing of the petitions in the Court in violation of
the policy on hierarchy of courts, their outright dismissal on this ground is further
warranted.
(3) The SC ruled that the petitioners failed to implead indispensable parties.
Under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, an indispensable party is a party-in-
interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. Indispensable
parties are those with such a material and direct interest in the controversy that a final
decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the court cannot proceed without their
presence. Other than PLDT, the petitions failed to join or implead other public utility
corporations subject to the same restriction imposed by Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution. Public utility corporations other than PLDT are directly and materially affected
by the outcome of the petitions, their shareholders also stand to suffer in case they will be
forced to divest their shareholdings to ensure compliance with the said restrictive
interpretation of the term “capital.” This constitutes another fatal procedural flaw, justifying
the dismissal of petitioners’ petitions.
(4) As to the definition of “capital”, the SC held that its clear and unequivocal definition
in Gamboa has attained finality.
It is an elementary principle in procedure that the resolution of the court in a given issue
as embodied in the dispositive portion or fallo of a decision controls the settlement of rights
48 of 578
Case Digests
of the parties and the questions, notwithstanding statement in the body of the decision which
may be somewhat confusing, inasmuch as the dispositive part of a final decision is definite,
clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation or
construction. Petitioners cannot, after Gamboa v. Teves, 652 SCRA 690 (2011), has attained
finality, seek a belated correction or reconsideration of the Court’s unequivocal definition of
the term “capital.” At the core of the doctrine of finality of judgments is that public policy and
sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should
become final at some definite date fixed by law and the very objects for which courts were
instituted was to put an end to controversies. Indeed, the definition of the term “capital” in
the fallo of the Gamboa Decision has acquired finality.
Furthermore, as opined by Justice Bersamin during the deliberations, the doctrine of

immutability of judgment precludes the Court from reexamining the definition of “capital”
under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Under the doctrine of finality and
immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and even if the modification is made by the
court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act that violates the principle
must be immediately stricken down.
49 of 578
Case Digests
Jona Bumatay v. Lolita Bumatay

G.R. No. 191320, April 25, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
Doctrine
In criminal cases, the People is the real party-in-interest and only the OSG can represent
the People in criminal proceedings before this Court. Inasmuch as the private offended party is
but a witness in the prosecution of offenses, the interest of the private offended party is limited
only to the aspect of civil liability. It follows therefore that in criminal cases, the dismissal of the
case against an accused can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the
State.
Settled is the rule that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest[,]” who, in turn, is one “who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” Within this context,
“interest” means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. To be clear,
real interest refers to a present substantial interest, and not a mere expectancy, or a future,
contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.
FACTS
Lolita allegedly married a certain Amado Rosete on January 30, 1968, when she was
16 years old. The marriage was solemnized before Judge Delfin D. Rosario, in Malasiqui,
Pangasinan. Prior to the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Amado on September 20,
2005, Lolita married Jona’s foster father, Jose Bumatay on November 6, 2003. On August 17,
2004, Jona filed a Complaint-Affidavit for Bigamy against Lolita, alleging that when Lolita
Ferrer contracted her second marriage with Jose Bumatay, she knows fully well that her first
marriage with her first husband Mr. Amado Rosete, who is still living up to today, has not
been legally dissolved but existing.
In her Counter-Affidavit, Lolita claims that she learned from her children (with
Amado) that Amado had filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
Subsequently, sometime in 1990, she was informed by her children that Amado had died in
Nueva Vizcaya. She filed with the RTC of Dagupan City, Pangasinan a petition ofr declaration.
Of her marriage to Amado to which the latter court affirmed the nullity of said marriage. Shen
then filed a Motion to Quash the Information regarding the Bigamy case filed against her and
the RTC-San Carlos granted her motion and dismissed the complaint for Bigamy. The CA
affirmed RTC-San Carlos’ Order granting the Motion to Quash and dismissed Jona’s appeal.
Jona’s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in its Resolution. Jona, in
her personal capacity, filed the instant petition.
ISSUE
50 of 578
Case Digests
Whether or not Petitioner Jona has the legal capacity to assail the dismissal of the
criminal case for Bigamy filed against Respondent Lolita Bumatay.
RULING
NO. Based on the records, it appears undisputed that Petitioner has no legal
personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case. Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, dictates that all criminal actions commenced by complaint or
by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor. In
appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the State is
vested solely in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
This authority is codified in Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code, which provides:
SECTION 35. Powers and Functions.—The Office of the Solicitor General shall
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and
its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of the
office concerned, it shall also represent government-owned or controlled
corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the
Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer.
It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of

Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its
officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts
or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the
Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in criminal cases, the People is the real party-in-interest and only the OSG can
represent the People in criminal proceedings before this Court. Inasmuch as the private
offended party is but a witness in the prosecution of offenses, the interest of the private
offended party is limited only to the aspect of civil liability. It follows therefore that in
criminal cases, the dismissal of the case against an accused can only be appealed by the
Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.
While this Court is mindful of cases where the private offended party was allowed to
pursue a criminal action on his or her own behalf — such as when there is a denial of due
process — such exceptional circumstances do not exist in this case.
Jona’s personality to even institute the bigamy case and thereafter to appeal the RTC-
San Carlos’ Order dismissing the same is nebulous, at best. Settled is the rule that “every
51 of 578
Case Digests
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest[,]” who, in
turn, is one “who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.” Within this context, “interest” means material interest or an
interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved. To be clear, real interest refers to a present
substantial interest, and not a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or
consequential interest.
Here, the record is replete with indications that Jona’s natural parents are unknown
and she was merely raised as the “foster daughter” of Jose Bumatay, without having
undergone the process of legal adoption. It likewise does not escape the Court’s attention
that in the Petition for the Issuance of Letters of Administration filed by Rodelio Bumatay (Jose
Bumatay’s nephew), Jona was described as “claiming to be the adopted child of Jose but
cannot present legal proof to this effect.” Finally, even in her own Reply (to the comment to
the petition for review), Jona merely denotes herself as “the only child of the late Jose
Bumatay,” without, however, presenting or even indicating any document or proof to
support her claim of personality or legal standing.
52 of 578
Case Digests
Sumifru (Philippines) Corp v. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo Sa Suyapa Farm

(NAMASUFA-NAFLUKMU)
G.R. No. 202091, June 7, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
Doctrine
It is fundamental that in a petition for review on certiorari, the Court is limited to only
questions of law. As specifically applied in a labor case, the Court is limited to reviewing only
whether the CA was correct in determining the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the DOLE Secretary.
Findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies are entitled to great respect when they are
supported by substantial evidence and, in the absence of any showing of a whimsical or
capricious exercise of judgment, the factual findings bind the Court.
As defined, substantial evidence is “that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable,
might conceivably opine otherwise.”
FACTS
Sumifru is a domestic corporation and is the surviving corporation after its merger with
Fresh Banana Agricultural Corporation (FBAC) in 2008. FBAC was engaged in the buying,
marketing, and exportation of Cavendish bananas. Respondent Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa
Suyapa Farm (NAMASUFA-NAFLU-KMU) (NAMASUFA) is a labor organization affiliated with
the National Federation of Labor Unions and Kilusang Mayo Uno.
On March 14, 2008, the private respondent filed a Petition for Certification Election
before the DOLE, Regional Office No. XI in Davao City. NAMASUFA sought to represent all
rank-and-file employees, numbering around one hundred forty, of packing plant 90 (PP 90)
of Fresh Banana Agricultural Corporation (FBAC). NAMASUFA claimed that there was no
existing union in the aforementioned establishment.
On May 9, 2008 FBAC filed an Opposition to the Petition and argued that there exists no
employer-employee relationship between it and the workers involved. It alleged that
members of NAMASUFA are actually employees of A2Y Contracting Services, a duly licensed
independent contractor, as evidenced by the payroll records of the latter.
NAMASUFA, in its Comment to Opposition countered, among others, that its members
were former workers of Stanfilco before FBAC took over its operations sometime in 2002.
The said former employees were then required to join the Compostela Banana Packing Plant
Workers’ Cooperative before they were hired and allowed to work at the Packing Plant of
FBAC. It further alleged that the members of NAMASUFA were working at PP 90 long before
A2Y came.
53 of 578
Case Digests
In June 20, 2008, pending resolution of the petition, FBAC was merged with SUMIFRU, the
latter being the surviving corporation. The DOLE Med-Arbiter issued an Order granting the
Petition for Certification Election of NAMASUFA and declared that Sumifru was the employer
of the workers concerned.
Sumifru appealed to the DOLE Secretary and in a Resolution, the DOLE Secretary
dismissed the appeal. The DOLE Secretary ruled that Sumifru is the true employer of the
workers. Sumifru then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA raising the issue of whether
the DOLE Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring it as the employer of
the workers at PP 90 but the CA dismissed the petition. The CA ruled that the DOLE Secretary
did not commit grave abuse of discretion because the latter’s ruling that Sumifru was the
employer of the workers was anchored on substantial evidence. The CA, after reviewing the
records, accorded respect to the findings of facts of the DOLE Secretary, which affirmed the
Med-Arbiter, as they have special knowledge and expertise over matters under their
jurisdiction. Sumifru moved for reconsideration but the CA denied this in its Resolution.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA correctly found that the DOLE Secretary did not commit grave
abuse of discretion because the latter’s ruling that Sumifru was the employer of the workers
was anchored on substantial evidence.
RULING
YES. Sumifru’s arguments raise questions of facts. Indeed, it even submitted to this
Court, as annexes to its Petition, the very same evidence it had presented before the Med-
Arbiter, the DOLE Secretary, and the CA in its attempt to try to convince the Court that the
members of NAMASUFA are not its employees.
It is fundamental that in a petition for review on certiorari, the Court is limited to only
questions of law. In a labor case, the Court is limited to reviewing only whether the CA was
correct in determining the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the DOLE Secretary. Thus, in Holy Child Catholic School v. Sto. Tomas, the Court ruled that its
review is limited to the determination of whether the CA correctly resolved the presence or
absence of grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment, not on the basis of whether the latter’s decision on the merits of the case was
strictly correct. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion is not what is ruled
upon but whether it correctly determined the existence or want of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the SOLE.
In this regard, The Court in Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW v. Court of

Appeals held that findings of fact of quasi-judicial agencies are entitled to great respect
when they are supported by substantial evidence and, in the absence of any showing of a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment, the factual findings bind the Court and that
the factual findings by quasi-judicial agencies, such as the DOLE, when supported by
substantial evidence, are entitled to great respect in view of their expertise in their
54 of 578
Case Digests
respective fields. Thus, absent any showing of whimsical or capricious exercise of

judgment, and unless lack of any basis for the conclusions made by the appellate court be
amply demonstrated, we may not disturb such factual findings.
In this case, the CA was correct in finding that the DOLE Secretary did not commit any
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment when it found substantial evidence to support
the DOLE Secretary’s ruling that Sumifru was the employer of the members of NAMASUFA.
As defined, substantial evidence is “that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally
reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise.” Here, the Med-Arbiter found, based on
documents submitted by the parties, that Sumifru gave instructions to the workers on how
to go about their work, what time they were supposed to report for work, required
monitoring sheets as they went about their jobs, and provided the materials used in the
packing plant.
In turn, the CA, even as it recognized that the findings of facts of the DOLE Secretary and
the Med-Arbiter were binding on it because they were supported by substantial evidence,
even went further and itself reviewed the records — to arrive, as it did arrive, at the same
conclusion reached by the DOLE Secretary and Med-Arbiter: that is, that Sumifru exercised
control over the workers in PP 90.
55 of 578
Case Digests
People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Raytos Espino

DOCTRINE
Self-defense, like alibi, is a defense easy to concoct. Testimonial evidence, to be
believable, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible
following common experience and leading to the inference of its probability under the
circumstances. Here, it is difficult to imagine how Raytos, while attempting to escape, was
suddenly able to grab hold of Araza’s hand and after relieving the latter of the knife, proceeded
to stab him multiple times in quick succession.
FACTS
Before this Court is an appeal filed under Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court
from the Decision dated February 26, 2016 (questioned Decision) of the Court of Appeals,
19th Division (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01556. The questioned Decision affirmed the
Decision dated November 5, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Calbiga, Samar, Branch 33
(RTC), in Criminal Case No. C-2010-1748 (RTC Decision), finding herein accused-appellant
Lorenzo E. Raytos (Raytos) guilty of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).
The information charging Raytos with Murder alleged that accused, with deliberate
intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, which qualifies the offense to
murder, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and stab
David Araza with the use of a short bladed weapon, which accused had provided himself for
the purpose, thereby inflicting and hitting the victim fatal stab wounds on the different parts
of his body, which wounds caused his death.
Upon his arraignment, Raytos entered a plea of “not guilty,” and during the pretrial
conference, Raytos invoked self-defense.
Raytos alleged that he knew David Araza since birth. On February 1, 2020 at around
8:00 in the evening he was invited by Indo Sabio to partake on some leftovers from the fiesta
and to join them as a dance session was being held. He joined the table where Indo Sabio,
Anita Sabio, Kanor Sabio, Domingo Sabio, Romeo Nacase and Edgar Papiona were seated. At
around 11:30 in the evening, David Araza was approached by Edgar Papiona and the two
danced. After that, the victim approached the table where Anita Sabio was seated and invited
her to dance but she refused. Thereafter, the victim and Edgar Papiona danced again. After,
the victim approached Raytos’ table and asked who was brave enough while drawing a knife
tucked in the waistband of his pants. Raytos alleged that he tried to escape by moving
backwards and, while doing so, he got hold of the victim’s right hand. Raytos twisted the
victim’s arm, got hold of the knife and then stabbed the victim several times on the chest. He
delivered three (3) successive stabbing blows in a quick and swift manner because he
panicked. He ran away immediately and surrendered himself to the barangay
officials and they proceeded to the police station.
56 of 578
Case Digests
The RTC found Raytos guilty of Murder qualified by treachery. The CA affirmed
Raytos’ conviction while modifying the award of damages. On March 14, 2016, Raytos
brought the instant case before the SC via Notice of Appeal of even date.
ISSUE
Whether or not Raytos was able to establish the elements of self-defense based on
testimonial evidence.
RULING
NO. The Court finds the appeal lacking in merit. In this case, the opposing sides are
incessant on the truthfulness of their version of the story, which differ in material points of
fact; the State, on one hand, has successfully presented strong evidence of guilt for Murder,
while Raytos, on the other hand, maintains his innocence based on his plea of self-defense.
It bears noting that the issue of whether the accused acted in self-defense is essentially a
question of fact. The RTC’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses is accorded great
weight and respect, especially when affirmed by the CA. This is a rule borne out of necessity
given the distinct vantage point of the trial court in observing and assessing the witnesses
while undergoing the rigors of direct and cross-examination; it is only in the crucible of this
exercise that the trial court is able to extract incommunicable evidence from the witnesses
based on their demeanor on the stand. Hence, in the absence of a clear showing that the
lower courts erred in their appreciation of the facts, or in their application of the pertinent
laws and jurisprudence to such facts, their findings will no longer be disturbed on appeal.
Given the concurrent findings of guilt made by both the RTC and CA, the SC finds that no
cogent reason exists to reverse Raytos’ conviction.
A plea of self-defense admits the commission of the act charged as a crime; accordingly,
the onus probandi falls on the accused to prove that such killing was justified — failure to
discharge which renders the act punishable. To exonerate himself, the accused must
establish: (i) that there was unlawful aggression by the victim; (ii) that the means employed
to prevent or repel such aggression were reasonable; and (iii) that there was lack of sufficient
provocation on his part. Of the three, unlawful aggression is the foremost requirement;
absent such element, self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, cannot be appreciated.
The Court is convinced that Raytos failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim, David Araza. Necessarily, Raytos’ claim of self-defense has no more leg to stand
on. In his version of the incident, Raytos claimed that Araza drew a knife from his left waist
following a brief exchange of words between them. Raytos then moved back, allegedly
intending to escape, but instead ended up wresting possession of the knife from Araza. After
doing so, Raytos stabbed Araza numerous times, leading to the latter’s demise.
The Court finds this narration of events to be incredible. Self-defense, like alibi, is a
defense easy to concoct. Testimonial evidence, to be believable, must not only proceed from
57 of 578
Case Digests
the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible following common experience and
leading to the inference of its probability under the circumstances. Here, it is difficult to
imagine how Raytos, while attempting to escape, was suddenly able to grab hold of Araza’s
hand and after relieving the latter of the knife, proceeded to stab him multiple times in quick
succession.
58 of 578
Case Digests
AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents’ Association, Inc. (WWRAI)

DOCTRINE
To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the petitioner must show that: (1) there exists a
clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by the act
sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is
an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.
The grant or denial of the injunctive relief rests on the sound discretion of the court
taking cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that
end involves findings of fact left to the conclusive determination by such court; and the exercise
of judicial discretion by such court will not be interfered with, except upon a finding of grave
abuse of discretion. In the issuance of the injunctive writ, grave abuse of discretion implies a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise
of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal
aversion amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
FACTS
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 118994, granting the
petition filed by respondent Wack Wack Residents’ Association, Inc. (WWRAI), reversing and
setting aside the October 28, 2010 and February 23, 2011 Orders of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City assigned in San Juan (Metropolitan Manila), Branch 264 (RTC) in Civil Case No.
65668, ordering the RTC to issue the injunctive relief prayed for by WWRAI pending the
determination of the petition for the declaration of permanent easement of right-of-way, and
directing WWRAI to amend the title and the averments in the petition before the CA by
disclosing the names of its principals and bringing the action in a representative capacity.
A commercial and residential building project located at Epifanio Delos Santos

Avenue corner Fordham Street in Wack Wack Village, Mandaluyong City, was proposed by
AMA Land, Inc. (AMALI). On March 18, 1996, AMALI notified WWRAI, a registered
homeowners’ association of Wack Wack Village, of its intention to use Fordham Street as an
access road and staging area of the project. As AMALI received no response from WWRAI,
the former temporarily enclosed the job site and set up a field office along Fordham Street.
WWRAI claimed, however, that AMALI already converted part of the said street as barrack
site and staging area even before March 18, 1996. All subsequent attempts of WWRAI to
remove the said field office proved futile.
On May 8, 1996, AMALI then filed a petition before the RTC, wherein it seeks the
temporary use of Fordham Street belonging to WWRAI as an access road to AMALI’s
construction site of its AMA Tower project and to establish a permanent easement of right-
of-way in its favor over a portion of Fordham Street. AMALI also prayed for: (a) a TRO to
59 of 578
Case Digests
immediately enjoin WWRAI from demolishing and removing the temporary field office,
constructing a fence isolating Fordham Street, and preventing AMALI from gaining access to
the construction site; (b) a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing WWRAI to
allow AMALI to use Fordham Street as an access road and staging area; (c) an order making
the TRO and the aforesaid writ permanent; and (d) an order declaring a permanent right-of-
way in favor of AMALI.
The RTC granted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The construction
project was put on hold due to financial crisis and AMALI filed a petition for corporate
rehabilitation before the RTC which was later approved. As AMALI resumed the project,
WWRAI filed an “Urgent Motion to Set for Hearing” its application for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC ruled against the motion of WWRAI.
The CA granted WWRAI’s application for a TRO and accordingly, AMALI was commanded to
cease and desist from further committing the act complained of, which is the construction of
the commercial and residential condominium project located along EDSA corner Fordham
Street in Wack Wack Village. Then the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was
granted as well pending the resolution of the petition for certiorari before the CA. AMALI
then filed the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the SC.
ISSUE
Whether or not WWRAI is entitled to enjoin the construction of the AMA Tower
pending determination of the original petition for the declaration of temporary and
permanent easements of right-of-way over a portion of Fordham Street.
RULING
NO. AMALI’s petition is meritorious. The Court in Lukang v. Pagbilao Development
Corporation reiterated the purpose and grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, viz.:
A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which is adjunct to a

main suit, as well as a preservative remedy issued to maintain the status quo of
the things subject of the action or the relations between the parties during the
pendency of the suit. The purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to the parties before their claims can be
thoroughly studied and educated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status
quo until the merits of the case are fully heard. Under Section 3, Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court, an application for a writ of preliminary injunction
may be granted if the following grounds are established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole
or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;
60 of 578
Case Digests
(b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or

acts complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is
attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act
or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting
the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, the petitioner must show that: (1) there
exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly
threatened by the act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is material
and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious and irreparable damage.
The grant or denial of the injunctive relief rests on the sound discretion of the court taking
cognizance of the case, since the assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end
involves findings of fact left to the conclusive determination by such court; and the exercise
of judicial discretion by such court will not be interfered with, except upon a finding of grave
abuse of discretion.
In the issuance of the injunctive writ, grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or the exercise of power in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion
amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Guided by the foregoing principles, the CA erred in finding that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing its Orders, denying WWRAI’s application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
Indeed, WWRAI was unable to convincingly demonstrate a clear and unmistakable right
that must be protected by the injunctive writ. The apprehensions of its members are, as
correctly ruled by the RTC, speculative and insufficient to substantiate the element of serious
and irreparable damage.
61 of 578
Case Digests
People v. Gerola y Amar

FACTS
Three separate Informations for Rape under Art. 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised
Penal Code were filed in the RTC against Frederico. As alleged in the Informations, Frederico,
taking advantage of his moral ascendancy being the stepfather of herein victim AAA, a minor,
11, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
latter, against her will on three separate acts.
Like the other incidents, AAA did not tell her mother. Instead, AAA told her friend who
advised her to tell their teacher. AAA then narrated the incident to her teacher, Mrs. Rafil,
who summoned her mother and told her what happened. When her mother learned of her
daughter’s ordeal, she cried. AAA’s aunt Elen accompanied the victim to
the Barangay Captain and reported the rape incidents. Appellant was then fetched by
the Barangay Captain and thereafter brought to the police station where the appellant was
detained. AAA was examined by Dr. Medardo Estanda and the report indicated that there
were penetrations on the organ of the victim which had hymenal lacerations at 5, 6 and
12’oclock positions.
Appellant averred that AAA was living with the latter’s aunt Erlita Aguirre in a
separate house since 1998 up to 2000 because she was going to school in San Jose. He argued
that Dodoy Puertas, the brother-in-law of his wife, was not in favor of his marriage with
victim’s mother. He alleged that Dodoy Puertas initiated the filing of the criminal cases
against him because MMM, his wife and private complainant’s mother, and Puertas have an
illicit affair and both live together in Mirasol.
The RTC found the accused guilty of all charges filed against him and imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each charge, without eligibility for parole.
On appeal before the CA, Gerola assailed RTC’s appreciation of the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, which he claimed to be replete with inconsistencies and
contradictions. Gerola anchored his claim on the fact that AAA had difficulty recalling the
specific dates when the incidents occurred and that she failed to promptly report the same
to the proper authorities. However, the CA rendered the questioned decision, affirming the
judgment of RTC in toto.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s conviction of Federico for three
counts of Rape.
RULING
62 of 578
Case Digests
NO. The Supreme Court held that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a
task most properly within the domain of trial courts.
In People v. Gahi, the Court stressed that the findings of the trial court carry great
weight and respect due to the unique opportunity afforded them to observe the witnesses
when placed on the stand. Consequently, appellate courts will not overturn the factual
findings of the trial court in the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and substance
that would affect the result of the case. Said rule finds an even more stringent application
where the said findings are sustained by the CA.
Also the SC ruled, that a witness’ testimony contains inconsistencies or discrepancies

does not, by such fact alone, diminish the credibility of such testimony. In People v.
Esquila, the accused therein similarly cited contradictions and discrepancies in the victim’s
testimony in questioning his conviction for rape. Notably, as in the present Appeal, the
purported discrepancies consisted of statements relating to date of the commission of the
crime. In affirming the findings of the lower courts, the Court brushed aside such
inconsistencies and gave full weight and credit to the testimony of the victim, who was
likewise a minor.
Time and again, the Court has held that the date or time of the commission of rape is
not a material ingredient of the crime and need not be stated with absolute accuracy; where
the time of commission is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be
had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not
committed at the precise time alleged. It is well to stress that variance in minor details has
the net effect of bolstering instead of diminishing the witness’ credibility because they
discount the possibility of a rehearsed testimony. Instead, what remains paramount is the
witness’ consistency in relating the principal elements of the crime and the positive and
categorical identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the same.
Bearing the foregoing in mind, the Court finds that Federico’s guilt was proven
beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of the prosecution.
63 of 578
Case Digests
Denmark S. Valmores v. Dr. Cristina Achacoso, in her capacity as Dean of the College of
Medicine, and DR. GIOVANNI CABILDO, Faculty of the Mindanao State University
DOCTRINE
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a ministerial duty by a tribunal,
board, officer, or person. Case law requires that the petitioner should have a right to the thing
demanded and that it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
required; such duty need not be absolutely expressed, so long as it is clear. In this regard, a duty
is considered ministerial where an officer is required to perform an act not requiring the
exercise of official discretion or judgment in a given state of facts. Conversely, if the law imposes
a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is discretionary.
FACTS
Before the Court is a petition for mandamus filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeking the enforcement of Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Memorandum by
herein respondents, being sued as Dean and faculty members of the Mindanao State
University (MSU)- College of Medicine.
Petitioner Valmores is a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Chirch whose

fundamental beliefs include the strict observance of the Sabbath as a sacred day. He joins the
faithful worshipping and resting on Saturday, the seventh day of the week, and refrains from
nonreligious undertakings from sunset of Friday to sunset of Saturday. Prior to the
controversy, he was enrolled as a first year student at MSU-College of Medicine for A.Y. 2014-
2015. He wrote a letter to respondent Achacoso, requesting that he be excused from
attending his classes in the event that a regular weekday session is rescheduled to a
Saturday. He also expressed his willingness to make up for any missed activity or session due
to his absence. Some of his classes and examinations were moved to Saturdays and in one
instances, he was unable to take his Histo-Pathology laboratory examination. Despite his
request for exemption, no accommodation was given by either of the respondents. As a
result, petitioner Valmores received a failing grade of 5 for that particular module and was
considered ineligible to retake the exam.
Several pastors and officers of the Seventh-day Adventist Chruch sent a letter to
respondent Achacoso, requesting for a possible audience with the members of the MSU
school board. The church, through Pastor Hanani P. Nietes, issued a Certification in
connection with petitioner Valmores’ request for exemption. Petitioner Valmores again
wrote a letter to respondent Achacoso to seek reconsideration regarding his situation, but
his communications fell on deaf ears. Hence, petitioner elevated the matter to CHED.
In an indorsement, CHED Regional Office, Region X referred the matter directly to the
President of MSU and instructed respondent Achacoso to enforce the 2010 CHED
Memorandum. Yet, petitioner Valmores’ request still went unheeded. Thus, in a Letter ,
64 of 578
Case Digests
petitioner through his counsel on record sought reconsideration from respondent Achacoso
for the last time and manifested his intention to resort to appropriate legal action should no
action be taken. Notwithstanding the lapse of several months, no written or formal response
was ever given by respondent Achacoso.
Hence, the present Petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not mandamus lies to compel respondents to enforce the 2010 CHED
Memorandum in the case of petitioner Valmores.
RULING
YES. Under Rule 65 of the Rules, a petition for mandamus is directed against a
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person who unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act specifically enjoined by law or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. If the petition relates to an act
or omission of a board, officer, or person, the same must be filed with the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as may be defined by the Court.
Strict adherence to the judicial hierarchy of courts has been a long-standing policy of
the courts in determining the appropriate forum for initiatory actions. While this Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the inferior courts to issue corrective writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus, a party’s choice of forum is by no means absolute. Needless to
say, however, such rule is not without exception. Recently, in Maza v. Turla, 817 SCRA 494
(2017), the Court emphasized that it possesses full discretionary power to take cognizance
and assume jurisdiction over petitions filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling
reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues involved in the dispute. Citing The Diocese
of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 1 (2015), the Court held therein that a
direct resort is allowed in the following instances, inter alia: (i) when there are
genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate
time; (ii) when the questions involved are dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice; and (iii)
when the circumstances require an urgent resolution. The SC ruled that all are availing
in this case.
The Rules also require the exhaustion of other plain, speedy, and adequate remedies
in the ordinary course of law before a petition for mandamus is filed. In this case, petitioner
Valmores had exerted all efforts to obtain relief from respondents, as clearly evidenced by
the letters and other communications on record. Likewise, after respondents’ repeated
failure to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum, petitioner Valmores elevated the matter
before the CHED, which in turn directly indorsed the matter to the President of MSU. Thus,
prior to resorting to the instant Petition, the Court finds that petitioner Valmores had
satisfactorily complied with the requirement of availing himself of other remedies under
Rule 65.
65 of 578
Case Digests
On these premises, the Court finds sufficient bases to relax the foregoing procedural
rules in the broader interest of justice.
The SC also ruled that the enforcement of the 2010 CHED Memorandum is
compellable by writ of mandamus. Mandamus is employed to compel the performance of
a ministerial duty by a tribunal, board, officer, or person. Case law requires that the
petitioner should have a right to the thing demanded and that it must be the imperative duty
of the respondent to perform the act required; such duty need not be absolutely expressed,
so long as it is clear. In this regard, a duty is considered ministerial where an officer is
required to perform an act not requiring the exercise of official discretion or judgment in a
given state of facts. Conversely, if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him
the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary.
MSU is an Higher Educational Institution (HEI) created by legislative charter under

Republic Act No. 1387, as amended, and was established “to better implement the policy of
the Government in the intensification of the education of the Filipino youth, especially among
the Muslims and others belonging to the national minorities.” Thus, respondents herein, as
faculty members of MSU, fall under the policy-making authority of the CHED and therefore
bound to observe the issuances promulgated by the latter.
Furthermore, the SC held that a plain reading of the memorandum reveals the
ministerial nature of the duty imposed upon HEIs. Its policy is crystal clear: a student’s
religious obligations takes precedence over his academic responsibilities, consonant with
the constitutional guarantee of free exercise and enjoyment of religious worship.
Accordingly, the CHED imposed a positive duty on all HEIs to exempt students, as well as
faculty members, from academic activities in case such activities interfere with their
religious obligations.
Clearly, under the 2010 CHED Memorandum, HEIs do not possess absolute discretion
to grant or deny requests for exemption of affected students. Instead, the memorandum only
imposes minimum standards should HEIs decide to require remedial work, i.e., that the same
is within the bounds of school rules and regulations and that the grades of the students will
not be affected. In fact, that Dr. Muslim explicitly ordered respondent Achacoso to enforce
the 2010 CHED Memorandum further underscores the ministerial nature of the duty of HEIs
to exempt affected students.
Once the required certification or proof is submitted, the concerned HEI is enjoined
to exempt the affected student from attending or participating in school-related activities if
such activities are in conflict with their religious obligations.
For these reasons, the Court finds that respondents were duty-bound to enforce
the 2010 CHED Memorandum insofar as it requires the exemption of petitioner
Valmores from academic responsibilities that conflict with the schedule of his
Saturday worship. Their failure to do so is therefore correctible by mandamus.
66 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. RUBEN “ROBIN” BONGBONGA Y NALOS

G.R. No. 214771, August 9, 2017, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
It is settled that in assessing the credibility of a witness, the findings of the trial court
carry great weight and respect due to the unique opportunity afforded them to observe the
deportment of the witness while undergoing the rigors of examination. Hence, it is a settled rule
that appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court unless there is a
showing that the latter overlooked facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would
affect the result of the case. Such rule finds an even more stringent application where the
findings of the RTC are sustained by the CA, as in the case at bench.
It is well-settled that a conviction for a crime not sufficiently alleged in the Information
is proscribed by the fundamental requirement of due process and other rights granted to an
accused by the Constitution, particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
FACTS
Three separate Informations were filed in the RTC charging respondent Ruben with
two counts of Rape and one count of Acts of Lasciviousness. It was alleged that Ruben, armed
with a kitchen knife, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously had sexual intercourse with AAA, a minor, 11 years and 11
months of age against her will and without her consent to her damage and prejudice. In
another criminal case, Ruben committed the same criminal act of having sexual intercourse
with AAA, a minor, 12 years of age at the time, against her will and without her consent to
her damage and prejudice. In another criminal case, Ruben was alleged to have committed,
by means of force and intimidation with lewd design, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
perform lascivious conduct upon AAA by kissing her lips, mashing her private parts against
her will and without her consent to her damage and prejudice.
A medical examination conducted on AAA revealed deep healed lacerations in AAA’s

genitalia, which allegedly could have been caused by strenuous activities, the insertion of a
foreign body (e.g., a hardened penis) or a viral disease. Pleading his innocence, Ruben denied
the accusations against him on the claim that he and AAA were live-in partners and that their
sexual encounters were consensual. Respondent claimed that the charges against him were
filed at the instance of AAA’s Aunt, possibly due to feelings of disapproval as Ruben was still
married to another woman.
The RTC found Ruben guilty beyond reasonable doubt the crimes charged.
In Ruben’s appeal to the CA, the appellate court issued the questioned decision which
gave credence to the positive and specific testimony of AAA as against Ruben’s claims. It held
that although the evidence on record indicates that Ruben had carnal knowledge of AAA on
the third occasion, contrary to AAA’s Sinumpaang Salaysay which only described lascivious
67 of 578
Case Digests
conduct by Ruben, the fact of the matter is that the Information for Criminal Case No. U-
11326 only charged Ruben with Acts of Lasciviousness. Accordingly, the CA could only
convict Ruben for the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness.
In the instant appeal before the SC, Ruben argued that the RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
erred in giving weight to the testimony of AAA and in finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crimes charged.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the conviction of Ruben for two counts of
Rape and one count of Acts of Lasciviousness.
RULING
NO. It is settled that in assessing the credibility of a witness, the findings of the trial
court carry great weight and respect due to the unique opportunity afforded them to observe
the deportment of the witness while undergoing the rigors of examination. Hence, it is a
settled rule that appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court
unless there is a showing that the latter overlooked facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would affect the result of the case. Such rule finds an even more stringent
application where the findings of the RTC are sustained by the CA, as in the case at bench.
In this case, Ruben failed to show any misappreciation by the CA of the facts or
circumstances so as to warrant a reversal of the questioned Decision. As correctly observed
by the CA, Ruben’s flimsy defense of consensual sexual congress pales in comparison to the
testimony of AAA, which was delivered in a clear and straightforward manner.
Anent the charge for Acts of Lasciviousness, the SC affirmed the CA’s conclusion
that subsequent proof of suggested rape is immaterial where the allegations of the
Information only describe lascivious conduct. To convict an accused of a higher or
more serious offense than that specifically charged in the information on which he is
tried (e.g., Rape versus Acts of Lasciviousness) would be an outright violation of his basic
rights.
It is well-settled that a conviction for a crime not sufficiently alleged in the

Information is proscribed by the fundamental requirement of due process and other rights
granted to an accused by the Constitution, particularly the right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. In implementing such right, our Rules specifically
require that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense, including the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances, must be stated in ordinary and concise language
and in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense
is being charged and the attendant qualifying and aggravating circumstances present, so that
the accused can properly defend himself and the court can pronounce judgment.
68 of 578
Case Digests
The Rules impose restrictions in the amendment of an information to safeguard the

rights of the accused. Thus, an information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. However, after the plea and
during the trial, only a formal amendment may be made with leave of court and only if it can
be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. In the same vein, if it appears
at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the
court shall dismiss the original information upon the filing of a new one, provided the
accused would not be placed in double jeopardy.
In this case, there is no indication in the records that the Prosecution attempted to
have the Information in Criminal Case No. U-11326 amended at any stage of the proceedings
before the RTC. Hence, Ruben can only be convicted for Acts of Lasciviousness as described
in the Information, notwithstanding evidence of carnal knowledge during the trial proper.
69 of 578
Case Digests
Privatization and Management Office v. Edgardo V. Quesada, Ma. Grace

Quesada-Manalo, Elizabeth Quesada-Jose, Eugenio V. Quesada, represented by their
Attorney-in-Fact, Eugenio V. Quesada
G.R. No. 224507, September 20, 2017, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The SC agreed with the CA that there is sufficient justification that would merit a
deviation from the strict rule of procedure that the special civil action of certiorari is not and
cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available, as it was in this case.
The petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which to file
an appeal and the broader interests of justice justifies the relaxation of the rules.
FACTS
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner, Privatization and Management Office (PMO), through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Respondents filed a Petition to Surrender TCT No. 27090 pursuant to Sec. 107 of PD
No. 1529. It was alleged in the Petition that the Quesadas are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Quezon City under TCT No. 27090 and it was originally registered in the name of
respondents’ predecessor-in-interest and it was donated to them in 1997. The original copy
of the TCT was with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City but was destroyed when a fire
gutted the Quezon City hall in 1998. Thus, the respondents’ predecessor-in-interest filed a
Petition for Reconstitution of Title. The said original TCT, which has not been reconstructed,
may be reconstituted on the basis of the owner’s copy thereof. However, the said owner’s
copy of the TCT is presently in the possession of PMO. Petitioner PMO got hold of the owner’s
copy of the TCT because it was delivered in 1983 to Golden Country Farms, a defunct private
corporation which was later considered a crony corporation. To transfer the ownership of
the property to the Quesadas, they would need the duplicate certificate of title which is with
PMO. Depsite demands, PMO did not act upon such claims. Hence, the Quesadas filed a
petition to surrender the duplicate titles pursuant to PD No. 1529.
The RTC held that there is a need for a full-blown trial whereby both parties are
afforded the opportunity to present their evidence proving their respective claims.
PMO filed a motion for reconsideration, raising as issues the propriety of a petition
for certiorari as a remedy to question the denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order
of dismissal and the failure of the Quesadas to state a cause of action. The CA pointed out that
it was justified in giving due course to the petition and treating the same as an ordinary
appeal because it was filed within the prescribed 15-day period. It also invoked the liberal
spirit pervading the Rules of Court and substantial justice to justify the granting of the
petition for certiorari despite acknowledging that a decision dismissing the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction is a final decision.
70 of 578
Case Digests
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. PMO
insists that the RTC’s Order denying the motion for the reconsideration of the Order
dismissing the original petition was a final order and the remedy available to the Quesadas
would have been to appeal the questioned Order and not to resort to petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari when it is not
the proper remedy to seek a review from an order of dismissal.
RULING
NO. While the SC conceded, as did the CA, that the RTC’s Order dismissing the original
petition of the Quesadas on the ground of lack of jurisdiction is a final order that is normally
subject of an appeal, nevertheless the SC found that the CA did not commit reversible error
when it gave due course to the petition for certiorari and treated the same as an ordinary
appeal.
The SC in China Banking Corp. v. Cebu Printing and Packaging Corp., 628 SCRA 154
(2010), cited the several instances when the Court has treated a petition for certiorari as a
petition for review on certiorari and allowed the resort to the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari despite the availability of an appeal, viz.: It is true that in accordance with the
liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, this Court
has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari, particularly:
(1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within
which to file a petition for review on certiorari;
(2) when errors of judgment are averred; and
(3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.
The SC was also liberal in its treatment of a wrong mode of appeal in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. CA, wherein it was ruled that: x x x However, there are cases where the
[certiorari] writ may still issue even if the aggrieved party has a remedy of appeal in the
ordinary course of law. Thus, where the exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary
methods of appeal may not prove adequate either in point of promptness or
completeness so that a partial or total failure of justice may result, a [certiorari] writ
may issue.
The same was also applied in Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. LEYECO IV
Employees Union-ALU, thus: In addition, while the settled rule is that an independent action
for certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law and certiorari is not a substitute for the
lapsed remedy of appeal, there are a few significant exceptions when the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari may be resorted to despite the availability of an appeal, namely:
71 of 578
Case Digests
(a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate;
(b) when the broader interests of justice so require;
(c) when the writs issued are null; and
(d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority.
Given these pronouncements, the SC agreed with the CA that there is sufficient
justification that would merit a deviation from the strict rule of procedure that the special
civil action of certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter
remedy is available, as it was in this case. The petition for certiorari was filed within the
reglementary period within which to file an appeal and the broader interests of justice
justifies the relaxation of the rules.
72 of 578
Case Digests
G. Holdings, Inc. (GHI) v. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc. (CEPALCO) and
Ferrochrome Philippines Inc. (FPI)
DOCTRINE
Being a compulsory counterclaim, the CA was correct when it ruled that as of the filing
of CEPALCO’s Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-Claim on April 26, 2004, it was
not liable to pay filing fees on its compulsory counterclaim. Thus, the CA committed no
reversible error when it did not order the dismissal of CEPALCO’s counterclaim, which is
compulsory, for nonpayment of docket fees.
FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and the Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner, G. Holdings, Inc. (GHI). The CA Decision denied the appeal
and affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, 10th Judicial
Region, Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City.
CEPALCO supplied power to the ferro-alloy smelting plant of Ferrochrome

Philippines, Inc. (FPI) at the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental. FPI
defaulted in the payment of its electric power bills amounting to P16, 301, 588.06 and
CEPALCO demanded payment thereof. FPI left an unpaid balance of P2, 899, 859.15 and was
later increased to P29, 509, 240.89. CEPALCO then filed a collection suit against FPI before
the RTC of Pasig. The RTC of Pasig rendered a decision in favor of CEPALCO ordering FPI to
pay and later affirmed the award for basic cost of energy or energy differential and
surcharges, PHIVIDEC royalty and franchise tax. FPI appealed the decision of RTC-Pasig to
the CA. The RTC of Pasig granted CEPALCO’s motion for execution pending appeal and the
writ of execution was issued. FPI filed before the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for
TRO and preliminary injunction.
Sheriff Renato Baron of RTC-Pasig issued notices of levy upon personal and real
properties and notices of sale on execution of personal and real properties. In CEPALCO’s
execution case, the CA issued an initial TRO and then a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the pending appeal. GHI filed a case against the sheriff arguing that the levied ferro-
alloy smelting facility, properties and equipment are owned by it as evidenced by a Deed of
Assignment executed by FPI.
CEPALCO filed its answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim. In its
counterclaim, CEPALCO assailed the validity of the Deed of Assignment executed by FPI in
favor of GHI in payment of alleged advances from GHI. CEPALCO contended that the Deed of
Assignment was null and void for being absolutely simulated and, as a dacion en pago, it did
not bear the conformity of the creditor. GHI and FPI have substantially the same directors.
The Deed of Assignment was in fraud of FPI’s creditors as it was made after the RTC-Pasig
had already rendered a partial judgment in favor of CEPALCO and was, therefore, rescissible.
73 of 578
Case Digests
The RTC-CDO rendered in favor of CEPALCO and against GHI: (1) rescinding the Deed
of Assignment; (2) ordering GHI to pay CEPALCO actual and exemplary damages as well as
attorney’s fees; and (3) lifting the writ of preliminary injunction.
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the RTC-CDO Decision. Regarding GHI’s
contention that CEPALCO failed to pay the filing fees, the CA noted that CEPALCO filed its
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and Cross-claim on April 26, 2004. At that time, the
CA reasoned that CEPALCO was not yet liable to pay filing fees. Under Rule 141, Section 7, as
amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees were required to be paid for compulsory
counterclaims and cross-claims effective only on August 16, 2004.
GHI filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in not dismissing CEPALCO’s permissive counterclaim for
nonpayment of docket fees.
RULING
NO. CEPALCO’s counterclaim and prayer for rescission of the Deed of Assignment can
only be viewed, as it is indeed, a compulsory counterclaim because it “arises out of or is
connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing
party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.” Being a compulsory counterclaim, the CA was correct
when it ruled that as of the filing of CEPALCO’s Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and
Cross-Claim on April 26, 2004, it was not liable to pay filing fees on its compulsory
counterclaim. Thus, the CA committed no reversible error when it did not order the dismissal
of CEPALCO’s counterclaim, which is compulsory, for nonpayment of docket fees.
74 of 578
Case Digests
San Fernando Coca-Cola Rank-and-File Union, represented by its President, Alfredo

R. Marañon v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines , Inc. (CCBPI)
G.R. No. 200499, October 4, 2017, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or
contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. The Court further held in Banal
III v. Panganiban that: “By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of
law.”
FACTS
Petitioner San Fernando Coca-Cola Rank and File Union (SACORU) filed a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the Resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Second Division, which dismissed SACORU’s complaint against
respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (CCBPI) for unfair labor practice and
declared the dismissal of 27 members of SACORU for redundancy as valid.
CCBPI issued notices of termination to 27 rank-and-file employees and members of

SACORU on the ground of redundancy due to the ceding out of two selling and distribution
systems, the Conventional Route System (“CRS”) and Mini Bodega System (“MB”) to
the Market Execution Partners (“MEPS”), better known as “Dealership System.” SACORU filed
a Notice of Strike with the NCMB on the ground of Unfair Labor Practice, among others. They
conducted a strike vote where a majority decided on conducting a strike. Then Secretary of
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Marianito D. Roque, assumed jurisdiction
over the labor dispute by certifying for compulsory arbitration the issues raised in the notice
of strike.
Meanwhile, pending hearing of the certified case, SACORU filed a motion for execution
of the dispositive portion of the certification order praying that the dismissal of the union
members not be pushed through because it would violate the order of the DOLE Secretary
not to commit any act that would exacerbate the situation. However, the resolution of the
motion for execution was ordered deferred and suspended; instead, the issue was treated as
an item to be resolved jointly with the main labor dispute.
The NLRC dismissed the complaint for unfair labor practice and declared as valid the
dismissal of the employees due to redundancy.
75 of 578
Case Digests
SACORU filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the
CA. The CA, however, dismissed the petition and found that the NLRC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion.
SACORU moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision but this was denied. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA was correct in its determination that the NLRC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion.
RULING
YES. The Supreme Court ruled that although SACORU claims that its petition raises
only questions of law, a careful examination of the issues on the validity of the redundancy
program and whether it constituted an unfair labor practice shows that in resolving the
issue, the SC would have to reexamine the NLRC and CA’s evaluation of the evidence that the
parties presented, thus raising questions of fact. This cannot be done following Montoya v.
Transmed Manila Corp that only questions of law may be raised against the CA decision and
the it will be examined only using the prism of whether it correctly determined the existence
of grave abuse of discretion.
The SC held that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal
violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. The Court further
held in Banal III v. Panganiban, 475 SCRA 164 (2005), that: By grave abuse of discretion is
meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The reason for this limited review is anchored on the fact that the petition before the
CA was a certiorari petition under Rule 65; thus, even the CA did not have to assess and weigh
the sufficiency of evidence on which the NLRC based its decision. The CA only had to
determine the existence of grave abuse of discretion. As the Court held in Soriano, Jr. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 521 SCRA 526 (2007): As a general rule,
in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court does not
assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
based their conclusion. The query in this proceeding is limited to the determination of
whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in rendering its decision. However, as an exception, the appellate court may
examine and measure the factual findings of the NLRC if the same are not supported by
substantial evidence.
76 of 578
Case Digests
Here, the Court finds that the CA was correct in its determination that the NLRC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion.
77 of 578
Case Digests
DONALD FRANCIS GAFFNEY v. GINA V. BUTLER

G.R. No. 219408, November 08, 2017, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
A deceased person or his estate may not be impleaded as defendant in a civil action as
they lack legal personality. Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court unequivocally states
that "[o]nly natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil
action." When Anthony died, his legal personality ceased and he could no longer be impleaded
as respondent in the present ordinary civil suit for collection.
FACTS
Sometime between the years 2006 to 2007, petitioner Gina V. Butler and her husband
Anthony Richard Butler approached and invited private respondent Donald Francis Gaffney
to invest in ActiveFun Corporation, an entity engaged in the construction, operation and
management of children's play and party facilities. Private respondent advanced the
approximate amount of PhP12,500,000.00 representing his initial investment in ActiveFun.
However, petitioner's husband passed away sometime in December 2009. Consequently, the
proposed investment agreement did not materialize.
Private respondent then demanded the return of his investments from petitioner. However,
despite the lapse of a considerable period of time, petitioner was only able to pay private
respondent an initial amount of PhP1,000,000.00, receipt of which was duly acknowledged
in writing by private respondent. Several demands were made to petitioner but to no avail.
Private respondent filed a Complaint against Petitioner for sum of money.

In her Answer, petitioner denied any knowledge of private respondent's investment in
ActiveFun. She, however, admitted that she paid private respondent P1,000,000.00 with the
qualification that the same was an undue payment, having been misled and intimidated by
the latter into believing that she has an obligation to him.
When the parties were directed to have all their documentary evidence pre-marked, a
handwritten note signed by private respondent acknowledging receipt of P1,000,000.00
from petitioner was premarked by the petitioner. Unlike the Acknowledgement Receipt
attached to the Complaint stating it was a partial payment for monies invested in ActiveFun,
the handwritten note states that the partial payment was for money owed by petitioner's
husband.
Private respondent filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Complaint for the purpose of
impleading the estate or the heirs6of the late Anthony Richard Butler [as additional party-
defendant], allegedly represented by petitioner as his surviving spouse. Petitioner opposed
the motion primarily on the ground that "only natural or juridical persons may be parties in
an ordinary civil action."
The RTC granted private respondent's Motion and admitted the Amended Complaint. There
78 of 578
Case Digests
being no motion for reconsideration, an Alias Summons was served upon petitioner
purportedly as the representative of her late husband. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss
Ad-Cautelam, allegedly not as the defendant originally named in the complaint but as the
purported representative of her late husband, arguing that the death of her husband did
not ipso facto make her the representative of his estate, and a claim against the estate cannot
be consolidated with an ordinary civil action in which only natural or juridical persons may
be parties pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The RTC denied Gina's Motion
to Dismiss and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam, ruling that the
inclusion of the estate of the late Anthony Richard Butler, represented by his surviving
spouse Gina, is necessary for a complete relief on the determination or settlement of the
controversy raised in the case.
A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 (CA Petition) was filed by Gina seeking to nullify the
RTC Orders, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion on the RTC for allowing the estate of
Anthony to be named a defendant in this case. The CA, granted Gina's CA Petition, reversed
and set aside the RTC Orders and dismissed the entire complaint. The CA ruled that dismissal
of the case against Anthony's estate is warranted under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
which states that "only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be
parties in a civil action." The CA likewise ruled that based on the receipt stating that the
advanced amount of P1,000,000.00 is part payment of money owed by Anthony is
undisputed. Thus, Anthony is the one owing the money and is an indispensable party to the
case. Donald filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision, which the CA denied.
Hence, the present Petition.
ISSUES
1. Whether the estate or heirs of Anthony, represented by his surviving spouse Gina,
could be named as additional defendant in the present case?
2. Whether the CA correctly dismissed the entire complaint when dismissal of the
same was not raised as an issue nor prayed for in the petition before it?
RULING
1. NO. The deceased or his estate may not be named a defendant in the present case.
A deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a defendant
in a case. Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court unequivocally states that "[o]nly
natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action."
In Ventura v. Militante, the court ruled that,
Neither a dead person nor his estate may be a party plaintiff in a court action. A
deceased person does not have such legal entity as is necessary to bring action so
much so that a motion to substitute cannot lie and should be denied by the court. An
action begun by a decedent's estate cannot be said to have been begun by a legal
person, since an estate is not a legal entity; such an action is a nullity and a motion to
amend the party plaintiff will not likewise lie, there being nothing before the court to
amend. Considering that capacity to be sued is a correlative of the capacity to sue, to
79 of 578
Case Digests
the same extent, a decedent does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be
named a party defendant in a court action.
Hence, a deceased person or his estate may not be impleaded as defendant in a civil action
as they lack legal personality. Thus, when Anthony died, his legal personality ceased and he
could no longer be impleaded as respondent in the present ordinary civil suit for collection.
As such, the complaint against him should be dismissed on the ground that the pleading
asserting the claim states no cause of action or for failure to state a cause of action pursuant
to Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, because a complaint cannot possibly state a
cause of action against one who cannot be a party to a civil action.
Moreover, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person or estate of Anthony.
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him and
service thereof is the means by which the court acquires jurisdiction over his person. In the
present case, no valid service of summons upon the deceased Anthony was or could have
been made, precisely because he was already dead even before the complaint against him
and his wife was filed in court.
In sum, impleading the deceased Anthony or his estate in the present petition was improper.
The action against him must be dismissed and the same may just be filed as a claim against
his estate in a proper proceeding.
2. NO. The CA cannot validly dismiss the complaint against Gina in the instant action.
When the original complaint was amended by Donald to implead the estate of Anthony
as additional defendant, a Motion to Dismiss was filed by Gina, with the sole prayer that
the Amended Complaint, "insofar as the claim against the Estate of the Late Anthony Butler
is concerned," be dismissed. When the said motion was denied, Gina's CA Petition prayed
only that the RTC Orders be set aside and the case be dismissed "insofar as it relates to the
Estate of Anthony Richard Butler." It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed
for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party. Due process
considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the
scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an
opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief.
In the present case, clearly, no issue on, or prayer for, the dismissal of the entire case was
made in the Motion to Dismiss before the RTC and the corresponding CA Petition. The CA’s
reliance on the the handwritten receipt, executed by Donald, of the P1,000,000.00 amount
from Gina "as part payment of the money owed by the late Anthony Richard Butler to Don
Gaffney," is misplaced. It is clear from the pleadings that Donald actually disputes the
genuineness of the handwritten receipt insofar as the same shows the debt to be that of
Anthony's. Donald claims that he was merely forced to execute said handwritten receipt as
it was made a pre-condition for payment by Gina. He only impleaded the estate of Anthony
to obtain a complete relief should the same be necessary.
80 of 578
Case Digests
The determination of the authenticity of the handwritten receipts, and ultimately, which
party is liable for the debt, requires an examination of the evidence of the parties in a full-
blown trial on the merits. Dismissal of the entire complaint, including the action against the
main defendant Gina, is thus utterly premature and erroneous.
Thus, the complaint against the original defendant Gina should remain with the RTC for trial
on the merits.
81 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERATO PENTECOSTES Y CRONICO

DOCTRINE
Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not indispensable to criminal
prosecutions; a contrary rule would render convictions virtually impossible given that most
crimes, by their very nature, are purposely committed in seclusion and away from eyewitnesses.
Thus, our rules on evidence and jurisprudence allow the conviction of an accused through
circumstantial evidence alone, provided that the following requisites concur: i. there is more
than one circumstance; ii. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and iii.
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
FACTS
Liberato was having a drinking spree with his friends at the house of Angel Vargas,
the father of the seven year-old victim, Vivian Vargas.The drinking spree ended at around
2:00 in the afternoon. At that time, Angel asked Vivian to go to the house of a certain Auring
Habal, which was about 200 meters away, to return a chair that they borrowed. Vivian never
returned. Meanwhile, Liberato went home at 3:00 in the afternoon. At around 3:30 to
4:30p.m., Antonio Vargas, the cousin of Vivian, together with his friend, Jason Basagre,
encountered Liberato at Antonio's corn plantation, which is a kilometer away from the house
of Liberato. They saw Liberato carrying Vivian on his back and appeared to be headed
towards a nearby body of water. Jason greeted Liberato, who then merely looked back at
them angrily. Angel searched for Vivian, but to no avail. The following morning, Vivian's
lifeless body was recovered near the house of Joel Basagre, the father of Jason.
Immediately thereafter, the policemen investigated all those present at the drinking
spree in Angel's house. However, when Liberato's turn for questioning came, he ran away.
An autopsy later performed on Vivian's body revealed "asphyxia by submersion" or
drowning as the cause of death. On the other hand, Liberato, as sole witness for the defense,
denied knowing Vivian. He confirmed his presence at the drinking spree and claimed that he
went home alone at around 3:00 p.m. A few minutes later, Liberato claimed to have seen Joel
Basagre passing by his house with Vivian. Liberato admitted to running away from the
authorities but testified that it was because he was afraid of being shot by one of the
investigating officers.
The RTC found Liberato guilty of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, and
found that there was enough circumstantial evidence to produce a conviction and to
overcome Liberato's defense of alibi and denial. Liberato appealed to the CA, which affirmed
the RTC's conviction with modification only as to the damages awarded. Hence, this Appeal.
ISSUE
82 of 578
Case Digests
Whether Liberato can be convicted beyond reasonable doubt for murder based on
circumstantial evidence?
RULING
YES. The circumstantial evidence sufficiently proves Liberato's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder.
Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not indispensable to criminal prosecutions;

a contrary rule would render convictions virtually impossible given that most crimes, by
their very nature, are purposely committed in seclusion and away from eyewitnesses. Thus,
our rules on evidence and jurisprudence allow the conviction of an accused through
circumstantial evidence alone, provided that the following requisites concur: i. there is more
than one circumstance; ii. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and iii.
the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. Simply put, an accused may be convicted when the circumstances
established form an unbroken chain leading to one fair reasonable conclusion and pointing
to the accused — to the exclusion of all others — as the guilty person.
First, Liberato was positively identified as the last person seen with Vivian before she
disappeared on the afternoon of March 24, 2005. The concurring testimonies of Antonio and
Jason showed this. While Liberato strongly disputes this fact, pointing instead to Joel Basagre
as the last person he saw with Vivian, no independent testimony was ever presented to
corroborate Liberato's version of the facts. Hence, when weighed against Liberato's bare
allegations, the testimonies of Antonio and Jason placing Liberato near the scene of the crime
with the victim deserve more credit. Moreover, the fact that Liberato was the last person
seen with Vivian assumes significance in this case. In People v. Lagao, Jr., the Court convicted
the accused solely based on circumstantial evidence, among which was the fact that the
accused was identified as the last person seen with the deceased.
Second, the records disclose that Vivian's cause of death was "asphyxia by
submersion (drowning). Significantly, both Antonio and Jason testified to the fact that
Liberato, while carrying Vivian on his back, was headed towards a body of water within the
vicinity of Antonio's corn plantation. Furthermore, Vivian's body was later recovered in the
same corn plantation. These factual circumstances form an unbroken chain of events that is
consistent with the prosecution's theory that Vivian drowned to her death at the hands of
Liberato.
Also, the Court affirmed the RTC and CA’s findings that the inconsistencies in the
testimonies of Antonio and Jason pertained only to peripheral matters. The discrepancies
regarding the time they saw Liberato and regarding the terms they used to describe the body
of water where the accused proceeded i.e. creek and stream, in their testimonies are
inconsequential. Antonio only finished Grade VI while Jason did not even finish Grade II. At
the time of the incident, Antonio Vargas was only fourteen (14) years old while Jason Basagre
was only thirteen (13). It is settled that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses on
83 of 578
Case Digests
minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declarations, their
veracity, or the weight of their testimonies; slight contradictions in fact serve to strengthen
the sincerity of a witness and prove that his testimony is not rehearsed. The trial court is in
the most advantageous position to assess the credibility of witnesses as well as their
testimonies given its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses' behavior when placed on
the stand, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts. Hence, the trial court's
assessment is necessarily accorded great weight and respect by the Court, especially when
affirmed by the CA.
Lastly, flight of an accused may be taken as evidence to establish his guilt; "[t]he
wicked flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous are as bold as the lion." Liberato’s
explanation that he fled due to intimidation by the police officers is unmeritorious. His flip-
flopping testimony on this very matter drives the Court to conclude against the truthfulness
of his assertions
In criminal cases, "proof beyond reasonable doubt" does not entail absolute certainty
of the fact that the accused committed the crime, and neither does it exclude the possibility
of error. What is only required is that degree of proof which, after a scrutiny of the facts,
produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty of the culpability of the accused. While it
is true that no direct evidence was adduced by the prosecution, circumstantial evidence is
by no means a "weaker" form of evidence vis-a-vis direct evidence. Accordingly, to the mind
of the Court, the confluence of the established circumstances leads to the fair and reasonable
conclusion that Liberato was indeed responsible for the death of Vivian.
84 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PAUL DURAN, JR. y MIRABUENO

DOCTRINE
Generally, findings of fact of the trial courts are accorded great weight, particularly in
the determination of credibility of witnesses as said courts have the opportunity to observe the
witness and the manner in which they testified. However, this can be disregarded when it
appears on the record that the trial court may have overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied
some significant fact or circumstance which if considered, would have altered the result. This is
axiomatic in appeals in criminal cases where the whole case is thrown open for review on issues
of both fact and law, and the court may even consider issues which were not raised by the
parties as errors.
FACTS
Quilana testified that around 1:48 in the morning, she was awakened by someone
calling for her, uttering "Ninang". She recognized the voice of the person as her godson
named Gilbert Grimaldo. When she asked why, Grimaldo replied from outside saying,
"Ninang tulungan mo ako," "kinukursunada ako ng taong ito, me dala siyang baril". When she
opened the door for her godson, she saw the accused Paul Duran shot Grimaldo with a .38
caliber revolver from behind at a distance of 2 1/2 feet. Grimaldo was hit at the nape, and
then fell to the ground lying with his face down. Duran then left the place passing between
their houses. Moments later accused returned and shot Grimaldo three more times to make
sure that the latter was dead. Witness then started shouting and asking for help. Duran ran
away. Quilana further clarified that Grimaldo did not know that Duran was behind him
because he was surprised when he was shot. Quilana identified the accused in open court,
whom she is familiar with for they were neighbors for six (6) years.
The prosecution presented only three witnesses: Beverly C. Quilana, the eyewitness;
Berly L. Grimaldo, widow of the victim, who testified as to her claim for damages; and Dr.
Jocelyn Dignos, the municipal health officer who performed the autopsy on the victim. Duran
invoked self-defense. He testified that while on his way to buy fish in Parañaque, he was
blocked by two persons whose identity he did not know, one of these men who turned out
to be the victim Gilbert Grimaldo poked a gun at him, and said that they only needed his
money. They wrestled for the possession of the gun, and when Duran was able to take the
gun away from Grimaldo, he pulled the trigger of the gun and hit Grimaldo.
The RTC found Duran guilty of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, based on
the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses. The trial court ruled that Duran did not meet
the requisites of self-defense. The CA affirmed Duran's conviction in toto. Duran brought the
instant case before this Court via Notice of Appeal.
ISSUE
85 of 578
Case Digests
Whether Duran's guilt for the crime of Murder was proven beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING
NO. The Court affirmed the lower courts’ ruling that Duran did not meet the requisites
of self-defense because at the time that Duran shot Grimaldo, there was no unlawful
aggression on the part of the latter. However, the Court ruled that it was an error for the RTC
to rule that treachery was present as said finding is not supported by the evidence.
Generally, findings of fact of the trial courts are accorded great weight, particularly in
the determination of credibility of witnesses as said courts have the opportunity to observe
the witness and the manner in which they testified. However, this can be disregarded when
it appears on the record that the trial court may have overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied some significant fact or circumstance which if considered, would have altered
the result. This is axiomatic in appeals in criminal cases where the whole case is thrown open
for review on issues of both fact and law, and the court may even consider issues which were
not raised by the parties as errors.
The prosecution did not prove that Duran intentionally sought the victim for the
purpose of killing him. The confrontation between Duran and Grimaldo appears to have been
a chance encounter. It was also not proven that Duran deliberately and consciously
employed means, methods, or forms in the execution of the criminal act to ensure that
Grimaldo could not defend himself. Repeatedly upheld has been the rule that chance
encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the spur of the moment, are generally not
attended by treachery, for lack of opportunity of the accused deliberately to employ a
treacherous mode of attack. Notably, eyewitness Quilana only witnessed the moment of the
actual shooting but did not witness the inception of the fatal altercation. In this case,
Grimaldo was aware of the impending attack and was even able to seek help from eyewitness
Quilana.In fact, the location was disadvantageous to him, as it was right in front of the house
of Quilana, Grimaldo's godmother.
The prosecution had attempted to prove treachery with the testimony of Quilana who
stated that Duran had shot Grimaldo from behind. Quilana's testimony that Duran left and
"returned" after shooting Grimaldo is contradicted by her own testimony that Duran only
made one step. Duran could not have left the scene of the crime by only taking one step
backward. In this regard, Duran's testimony as to the manner in which he shot Grimaldo is
more credible as it is corroborated by the Post Mortem Report.
Hence, absent the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the Court only convicted
Duran beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, instead of Murder.
86 of 578
Case Digests
PUBLIC ATTORNEY'S OFFICE v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND ATTY. TERENCIA S.

ERNI-RIVERA
DOCTRINE
Probable cause does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require
an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it
is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Evidently in
this case, probable cause cannot exist where the acts which constitute the offenses charged are
not proven to have been committed by the respondent. The dismissal of the Criminal Complaints
was not prompted by PAO's failure to present evidence to establish Atty. Rivera's criminal
liability beyond reasonable doubt, but rather, on its failure to establish, by substantial evidence,
that Atty. Rivera committed the acts subject of the Criminal Complaints.
FACTS
Atty. Rivera is a Career Service Employee who joined the government service in 1978
as Trial Attorney II. Since then, Atty. Rivera had been promoted to several permanent
positions, until she was appointed to the position of Public Attorney V (PA5) for PAO
Regional Office No. III by virtue of a presidential appointment in March 2004. After Atty.
Rivera assumed her duties as PA5, PAO received a Letter and Affidavit in August 2004 from
Hazel F. Magabo.
Magabo alleged that contrary to PAO's internal rules, Atty. Rivera agreed to handle
the annulment case sought to be filed by her brother Isidro Fayloga, and received P93,000
as payment therefor. Magabo presented copies of bank slips showing that she made several
deposits in varying amounts to Atty. Rivera's account, and a summary of payments showing
that Atty. Rivera and her secretary also received cash on different dates.
Atty. Rivera averred that while she did receive such amount, it was merely entrusted
to her. Atty. Rivera explained that Magabo, her longtime friend, asked for her help in finding
a private practitioner to take on Fayloga's case, and that the money she received was meant
to cover the professional fees and litigation expenses that would be incurred in this
connection. Atty. Rivera further averred that she returned the money entrusted to her.
As Atty. Rivera subsequently assumed the position of Regional Public Attorney, PAO
referred the letter to the DOJ; thus the allegations in Magabo's Letter and Affidavit became
subject of a formal administrative complaint against Atty. Rivera for Grave Misconduct and
violation of Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Magabo submitted an Affidavit of Desistance
stating that she is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Nevertheless, the DOJ found Atty.
Rivera liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and was meted with
the penalty of suspension for 6 months and 1 day without pay.
87 of 578
Case Digests
During the pendency of the DOJ Proceeding, Atty. Rivera submitted a Certificate of
Service anent her attendance for November 2006. District Public Attorney Aclan (DPA Aclan)
submitted a subsequent Certification for Atty. Rivera’s reporting for work from November
13, 2006 up to November 24, 2006. Deputy Chief Public Attorney Mosing issued a
Memorandum requiring Atty. Rivera to explain why she should not be held administratively
and criminally liable for the "discrepancies" between her Certificate of Service and the
Certification issued by DPA Aclan.
The PAO Legal Research Division issued its Report and Recommendation recommending
that Atty. Rivera be held administratively liable for Falsification of Official Documents. While
Atty. Rivera is under another preventive suspension for 90 days that was issued by the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC), Atty. Recto (as PAO Designated Resident
Ombudsman), together with the NBI, filed the following Criminal Complaints against Atty.
Rivera.
1. Section 7(b)(2) and (d) of Republic Act No. (RA) 6713 which prohibits public officers
from engaging in the private practice of their profession while in the public service;
2. Section 3(e) of RA 30197 as amended, which prohibits public officers from causing
any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence; and
3. Article 171 (4) of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
which treats the crime of falsification by a public officer.
The Ombudsman issued the Assailed Resolution dismissing the Criminal Complaints. PAO
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, PAO filed the present Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65.
PAO asserts that:

1. The Ombudsman "overzealously exceeded its mandate by requiring more than the
quantum of evidence needed to support a finding of probable cause." PAO claims that the
Ombudsman effectively demanded it to present evidence sufficient to establish Atty. Rivera's
guilt for the offenses charged, instead of merely requiring such evidence necessary to sustain
a finding of probable cause to file a criminal information against her.
2. Anent the charge of Falsification under the RPC, Atty. Rivera untruthfully declared that she
reported for work for the entire month of November 2006, contrary to DPA Aclan's findings
that she only reported for work on November 13 to 24 of the same year.
ISSUES
88 of 578
Case Digests
1. Whether the Assailed Resolution and Order were issued within the bounds of the
Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial powers?
2. Whether the Ombudsman acted in grave abuse of its discretion when it found no
probable cause to charge Atty. Rivera with Falsification under the RPC?
RULING
1) YES. The plenary nature of the Ombudsman's powers does not place it beyond the scope
of the Court's power of review. Under its expanded jurisdiction, the Court may strike down
the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government, including the Ombudsman, on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion. However, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to
issue against the actions of the Ombudsman, the petitioner must show that the latter's
exercise of power had been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner. Such abuse of power
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
The Assailed Resolution and Order were issued within the bounds of the Ombudsman's
investigatory and prosecutorial powers. Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal
information, has been defined to constitute such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty
thereof. Probable cause does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute
certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged.
However, there is nothing in the Assailed Resolution and Order which suggests that the
Ombudsman dismissed the Criminal Complaints due to PAO's failure to offer such higher
quantum of evidence. Contrary to PAO's assertions, the Ombudsman did not impose a higher
quantum of proof. The dismissal of the Criminal Complaints was not prompted by PAO's
failure to present evidence to establish Atty. Rivera's criminal liability beyond reasonable
doubt, but rather, on its failure to establish, by substantial evidence, that Atty. Rivera
committed the acts subject of the Criminal Complaints. Evidently, probable cause cannot
exist where the acts which constitute the offenses charged are not proven to have been
committed by the respondent.
2) NO. The Ombudsman did not act in grave abuse of its discretion when it found no probable
cause to charge Atty. Rivera with Falsification under the RPC.
A careful reading of the certifications in question belies PAO's allegation. Notably, Atty.
Rivera's Certificate of Service states that "[she] reported for work and performed [her]
duties as Regional Public Attorney x x x for the month of November 2006."53 On the other
hand, DPA Aclan's Certification states that Atty. Rivera "reported for work in [the PAO Region
IV-B office] from November 13, 2006 up to November 24, 2006." Hence, while Atty. Rivera's
89 of 578
Case Digests
Certificate of Service attests to the performance of her duties as Regional Public Attorney for
the entire month of November, DPA Aclan's Certification merely certifies the dates when
Atty. Rivera physically reported to the PAO Region IV-B office to perform said duties.
In fact, in her Comment/Explanation, Atty. Rivera was able to account for all the other days
in November on which she allegedly did not report to work. Such days were either holidays,
weekends, filed leave days, or days set aside for official business.55 The supposed
discrepancies between said certificates are thus more apparent than real.
Proceeding from the foregoing, PAO's imputation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Ombudsman fails. Consequently, the findings in the Assailed Resolution and Order must
be respected.
90 of 578
Case Digests
ANGELINA CHUA AND HEIRS OF JOSE MA. CHENG SING PHUAN v. SPOUSES SANTIAGO
CHENG AND AVELINA SIHIYON
DOCTRINE
The Pre-Trial Order categorically stated that only Jose's testimony, and that of Petra's,
would be presented on Jose's behalf. Considering that petitioners’ lawyer did not take any steps
to amend the Pre-Trial Order, petitioners' additional witnesses are excluded from trial. The
exception under paragraph A(2)(d) of the Pre-Trial Guidelines (A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC) that
“evidence other than those that had been earlier identified and pre-marked during the pre-
trial” may be “allowed by the court for good cause shown” does not apply in this case.
Paragraph A(2) enumerates the matters which parties are required to state in the pre-trial
brief, and it does not prescribe the rules on admissibility and presentation of evidence. In
addition, paragraph (A)(2)(d) refers to documentary and object evidence, and not testimonial
evidence, which, in turn, are treated separately under paragraph (A)(2)(f). Accordingly, the
scope of the specific exception under paragraph A(2)(d) should not be unduly extended to cover
FACTS
Jose Ma. Cheng Sing Phuan, Santiago Cheng, and Petra Cheng Sing are siblings, and are
the registered owners of two parcels of land in Iloilo City, with a rice mill housing several
pieces of milling equipment. Respondent Spouses Santiago and Avelina Cheng sent Jose and
his wife Angelina several demands for the physical partition of the Iloilo Lands, the rice mill
and the equipment therein. As their repeated demands were left unheeded, Respondents
filed a complaint against Jose and Angelina for partition and damages before the RTC.
Jose and Angelina averred that respondents and Petra do not possess any right to
demand the partition because they failed to reimburse them for the funds that Jose and
Angelina advanced to acquire the properties. After submission of the parties' pre-trial briefs
and the conduct of a pre-trial conference, Judge Ruiz, then Presiding Judge of the RTC, issued
a Pre-Trial Order, stating that, “all evidence to be adduced and presented by both parties
shall be limited to those identified below,” with a colatilla that they should “take the
necessary steps to correct the same within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from
receipt of a copy thereof. Thereafter, no corrections will be allowed.” None of the parties
manifested any intent to revise the Pre-Trial Order. Thus, trial ensued. Jose passed away.
During the hearing, petitioners orally manifested in open court that they would be
presenting six additional witnesses in place of Petra, and sought leave for this purpose. These
additional witnesses were not among those listed in the Pre-Trial Order, nor were they
identified in Jose's Pre-Trial Brief. Respondents filed their written objection thereto. Judge
Maniba assumed the position of Presiding Judge of the RTC, issued the Resolution denying
the petitioners' oral motion and the Order denying the subsequent MR that the petitioners
filed.
91 of 578
Case Digests
Petitioners filed a Petition before the CA and argued that Jose, through counsel,
reserved the right to present additional witnesses in his Pre-Trial Brief. The CA issued the
Assailed Decision dismissing the CA Petition for lack of merit. Notwithstanding the
reservation in Jose's Pre-Trial Brief, the CA held that the Pre-Trial Order categorically stated
that only Jose's testimony, and that of Petra's, would be presented on Jose's behalf.
Considering that Atty. Leong did not take any steps to amend the Pre-Trial Order, petitioners'
additional witnesses are excluded from trial. Petitioners filed an MR, which the CA denied in
the Assailed Resolution. Hence, Petitioners filed the present Petition
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred when it affirmed the RTC Resolution and Order denying
Petitioners' oral motion to present witnesses not listed in the Pre-Trial Order?
RULING
NO. Paragraph A(2)(d) of A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, otherwise known as the Proposed
Rule on Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks of Court in the Conduct
of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures, states that, “no evidence shall be
allowed to be presented and offered during the trial in support of a party's evidence-in-chief
other than those that had been earlier identified and pre-marked during the pre-trial, except
if allowed by the court for good cause shown.”
Petitioners' reliance on the purported exception under paragraph A(2)(d) is

misplaced. Paragraph A(2) enumerates the matters which parties are required to state in the
pre-trial brief. Since paragraph A(2) does not prescribe rules on admissibility and
presentation of evidence, it should not be interpreted in this manner. In addition, paragraph
(A)(2)(d) refers to documentary and object evidence, and not testimonial evidence, which,
in turn, are treated separately under paragraph (A)(2)(f). Accordingly, the scope of the
specific exception under paragraph A(2)(d) should not be unduly extended to cover
Assuming arguendo that the exception under paragraph A(2)(d) may be invoked as
basis to allow the presentation of witnesses not listed in the pre-trial order, its application
remains contingent upon a showing of good cause sufficient to justify the same, which the
petitioners have not substantiated. Neither Jose nor his counsel Atty. Leong took the
necessary steps to cause the revision of the Pre-Trial Order to reflect the general reservation
in Jose's Pre-Trial Brief, notwithstanding the explicit directive to make such necessary
corrections in the Colatilla portion of the Pre-Trial Order. Petitioners neither furnished the
Court with copies of the judicial affidavits of their additional witnesses, nor make any
allegations detailing the substance of their respective testimonies. Hence, the Court is left
without any opportunity to determine if the presentation of said witnesses is indeed
necessary to "ferret out the whole truth.”
92 of 578
Case Digests
Time and again, this Court has recognized "the importance of pre-trial procedure as
a means of facilitating the disposal of cases by simplifying or limiting the issues and avoiding
unnecessary proof of facts at the trial, and to do whatever may reasonably be necessary to
facilitate and shorten the formal trial." However, the rules governing pre-trial should not be,
at all times, applied in absolute terms. While faithful compliance with these rules is
undoubtedly desirable, they may be relaxed in cases where their application would frustrate,
rather than facilitate, the ends of justice. The relaxation of these rules, however, is contingent
upon a showing of compelling and persuasive reasons to justify the same. Petitioners have
failed to sufficiently show that such compelling and persuasive reasons exist in this case.
93 of 578
Case Digests
GOV. AURORA E. CERILLES v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ANITA JANGAD-CHUA, MA.

EDEN S. TAGAYUNA, MERIAM CAMPOMANES,* BERNADETTE P. QUIRANTE, MA.
DELORA P. FLORES AND EDGAR PARAN
DOCTRINE
As a condition for the filing of a petition for certiorari, there must be no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. In this case, the CA
correctly observed that a Rule 43 petition for review was then an available mode of appeal from
the above CSC resolutions. Sec. 1 of Rule 43 of the RoC states that Rule 43 shall apply to appeals
from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi judicial
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, including the Civil Service Commission.
Further, Sec. 5 of Rule 43 states that the appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for
review in seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals. The extraordinary remedy
of certiorari under Rule 65 is a prerogative writ and never issues as a matter of right; thus, the
party availing thereof must strictly observe the rules laid down under the RoC.
FACTS
Due to the creation of the Province of Zamboanga Sibugay from the Province of
Zamboanga del Sur under RA No. 8973, the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of the latter
was reduced by thirty-six percent (36%). Consequently, petitioner Gov. Cerilles had to
reduce the workforce of the provincial government. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Zamboanga del Sur passed two resolutions approving the new staffing pattern of the
provincial government consisting only of 727 positions and authorizing Gov. Cerilles to
undertake the reorganization of the provincial government. Pursuant to said authority, Gov.
Cerilles appointed employees to the new positions in the provincial government.
The private respondents were among those who were occupying permanent
positions in the old plantilla and have allegedly been in the service for a long time but were
not given placement preference and were instead terminated without valid cause and
against their will. Private respondents filed their respective letters of appeal respecting their
termination with petitioner. However, no action was taken on the appeals made; hence,
private respondents brought the matter to public respondent CSC's Regional Office No. IX.
Upon review of the Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA) submitted by the provincial
government, the CSCRO found that the subject appointments violated Republic Act No. (RA)
6656 for allegedly failing to grant preference in appointment to employees previously
occupying permanent positions in the old plantilla. As a result, the CSCRO invalidated a total
of ninety-six (96) appointments made by Gov. Cerilles after the reorganization, and directed
the reinstatement of Respondents to their former positions. Gov. Cerilles sought
reconsideration with the CSCRO. Thereafter, the CSC informed Gov. Cerilles that her
reconsideration was treated as an appeal and was forwarded to it by the CSCRO. The CSC
upheld the CSCRO's invalidation of the subject appointments, and denied Gov. Cerilles’
subsequent motion for reconsideration
94 of 578
Case Digests
Gov. Cerilles elevated the matter to the CA through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 on the following grounds, inter alia: (i) that the CSC is without original jurisdiction
over protests made by an aggrieved officer or employee during government reorganization,
pursuant to RA 6656, and (ii) that the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming
the invalidation of the subject appointments. The CA ruled that Gov. Cerilles resorted to the
wrong mode of review, the proper remedy being an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules,
which governs appeals from judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the CSC. Nevertheless,
the CA upheld the CSCRO's jurisdiction to entertain the appeals of Respondents, and denied
Gov. Cerilles’ subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, this Petition.
In her Petition, Gov. Cerilles questions the CA Decision insofar as it considered her
petition for certiorari an improper remedy — the proper remedy being a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules. Gov. Cerilles claims that the two resolutions issued by the CSC
were non-appealable as the CSC rendered them in its "non-disciplinary" jurisdiction; thus,
she insists that the correct remedy was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE
Whether Gov. Cerilles correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules when she filed her petition before the CA questioning the CSC’s invalidation of the
subject appointments, there being no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law?
RULING
NO. It is well-established that as a condition for the filing of a petition for certiorari,
there must be no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available in the
ordinary course of law. In this case, the CA correctly observed that a Rule 43 petition for
review was then an available mode of appeal from the above CSC resolutions. Rule 43, which
specifically applies to resolutions issued by the CSC, is clear:
SECTION 1. Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final
orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of or authorized by any quasi judicial agency in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service
Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of the President, x x x.
SEC. 5. How appeal taken. — Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition
for review in seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of
service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. x x x
The extraordinary remedy of certiorari is a prerogative writ and never issues as a

matter of right. Given its extraordinary nature, the party availing thereof must strictly
observe the rules laid down and non-observance thereof may not be brushed aside as mere
95 of 578
Case Digests
technicality. Hence, where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the
ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. Applying the foregoing, the Court thus finds
Gov. Cerilles' failure to abide by the elementary requirements of the Rules inexcusable. That
she repeatedly invoked "grave abuse of discretion" on the part of the CSC was of no moment;
the records failed to demonstrate how an appeal to the CA via Rule 43 was not a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy as would allow a relaxation of the rules of procedure.
96 of 578
Case Digests
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALVIN C. DIMARUCOT AND NAILYN TAÑEDO-

DIMARUCOT
G.R. No. 202069, March 07, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINES
1. A prior motion for reconsideration is not necessary for a petition for certiorari to
prosper in cases where such motion would be useless.
2. The "strict and rigid application, of procedural rules which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed." Here, the State's policy of upholding the sanctity of marriage takes precedence over
strict adherence to Rule 15, for the finality of the RTC Decision necessarily entails the
permanent severance of Alvin and Nailyn's marital ties.
FACTS
Respondents Alvin and Nailyn Dimarucot wed in civil rights on May 18, 2003. The
respondents gave birth to two daughters, Ayla Nicole, and Anyelle. When respondents'
whirlwind romance resulted in a problematic marriage, Alvin filed a Petition for Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the
Family Code before the RTC .
The RTC, through Judge Casabar, rendered a Decision declaring Respondents'

marriage null and void. On July 27, 2010, the Republic, through the OSG, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (MR). However, the Notice of Hearing annexed to the MR erroneously set
the same for hearing on July 6, 2010 (instead of August 6, 2010 as the OSG later explained).
The RTC denied the Republic's MR through the August 2010 RTC Order, on the
ground that it is defective as to when the instant motion should be heard. The RTC treated it
as one which is not set for hearing and therefore, a mere scrap of paper, and as such it
presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the court.
The Republic filed a Notice of Appeal of even date, which was denied in the
September 2010 RTC Order ruling that the MR filed by the Republic did not interrupt the
running of the period of appeal. Hence, the RTC Decision attained finality.
The Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, which dismissed the Petition
because it was filed without the benefit of a motion for reconsideration. According to the CA,
the OSG should have filed first a motion for reconsideration of the September 2010 RTC
Order rather than merely presume that the trial court would motu proprio take cognizance
of its (the OSG's) alleged "typographical error". The CA denied the MR filed by the Republic.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
ISSUES
97 of 578
Case Digests
1. Whether the CA erred when it caused the outright dismissal of the CA Petition
because it was filed without the benefit of a prior motion for reconsideration of
the September 2010 RTC Order?
2. Whether the CA erred when it affirmed the August and September 2010 RTC
orders which denied the Republic's MR and subsequent Notice of Appeal on
procedural grounds?
RULING
1. YES. A prior motion for reconsideration is not necessary for a petition for certiorari
to prosper in cases where such motion would be useless.
While it is a settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 will not
lie unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent court; there are well-
defined exceptions established by jurisprudence, such as:
[i] where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; [ii] where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon
in the lower court; [iii] where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question
and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner
or the subject matter of the action is perishable; [iv] where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; [v] where petitioner was deprived of due
process and there is extreme urgency for relief; [vi] where, in a criminal case, relief from an
order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; [vii]
where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; [viii] where
the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
[ix] where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
In this case, the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the September 2010 RTC
Order would have been useless as it was based on the earlier August 2010 RTC Order. The
denial of the Republic's Notice of Appeal through the September 2010 RTC Order was
premised on the RTC's earlier finding that the MR was a pro-forma motion due to non-
compliance with Rule 15. Also, the September 2010 RTC Order explicitly states that the RTC
Decision had "attained finality" because the Republic's MR did not toll the Republic's period
to appeal. Clearly, the Republic's direct resort to the CA via certiorari was warranted under
the circumstances, as it was led to believe that seeking reconsideration of the September
2010 RTC Order would have been a useless exercise.
2. Strict compliance with Rule 15 should have been waived in the interest of
substantial justice.
The Republic is mistaken in thinking that its only defect is that it misstated the proposed
hearing date in the Notice of Hearing attached to its MR. The Republic also failed to comply
with the 3-day notice rule before the hearing date under Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15. Hence,
98 of 578
Case Digests
even if the RTC construed the Republic's typographical error to read August 6, 2010 instead
of July 6, 2010, the Republic would have still failed to comply with the 3-day notice rule.
[Note: Sec. 4 and some parts of Sec. 5 of Rule 15 have already been deleted in the 2019
Amendments of the RoC. This part was included in the digest to give context to the next
paragraph.]
Nevertheless, considering the nature of the case and the issues involved therein, the
Court finds that relaxation of the Rules was called for. It is well settled that procedural rules
may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice. Accordingly, the "strict and rigid
application, of procedural rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed." Here, the State's policy
of upholding the sanctity of marriage takes precedence over strict adherence to Rule 15, for
the finality of the RTC Decision necessarily entails the permanent severance of Alvin and
Nailyn's marital ties. Hence, the RTC should have exercised its discretion, as it did have such
discretion, and set the MR for hearing on a later date with due notice to the parties to allow
them to fully thresh out the Republic's assigned errors.
99 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HESSON CALLAO Y MARCELINO

DOCTRINE
Sario's testimony, although uncorroborated, can be relied upon. The testimony of a lone
eyewitness, if found positive and credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a conviction
especially when the testimony bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and had been delivered
spontaneously, naturally and in a straightforward manner. Witnesses are to be weighed, not
numbered. Evidence is assessed in terms of quality and not quantity. Corroborative evidence is
deemed necessary only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness
falsified the truth or that his observation had been inaccurate.
FACTS
Hesson Callao and Junello Amad were charged with Murder for the death of Fernando
Adlawan. Sario Joaquin, the lone witness for the prosecution, testified that he was at the flea
market with his friends Hesson, Junello, and Remmy, when Hesson and Junello discussed a
plan to kill the victim, Fernando Adlawan as ordered by Enrile Yosores. Sario was not part of
the planning and did not know why Enrile wanted to have Fernando killed. After they left the
market, they went to the house of Fernando. Sario tagged along because Hesson threatened
to kill him if he separated from the group.
Junello, upon seeing Fernando, approached the latter and asked for a cigarette lighter.
After Fernando gave Junello the lighter, the latter struck Fernando on the nape with a piece
of firewood. Junello then took a bolo and hacked Fernando's body on the side. Fernando lost
consciousness and as he laid motionless on the ground. Hesson stabbed him twice in the
chest using a knife. Hesson then sliced open Fernando's chest and took out the latter's heart
using the same knife. Junello followed and took out Fernando's liver using a bolo. Hesson and
Junello then fed Fernando's organs to a nearby pig after which they cut Fernando's neck and
sliced his body into pieces. Thereafter, the two (2) accused left the crime scene, followed by
Sario and Remmy. He and Remmy did not attempt to stop the two nor run away nor tell
anyone about it for fear that the two would kill them. Remmy was killed by Enrile during the
town fiesta.
Hesson and Junello went at large, but Hesson was arrested after a year. Hesson put
forth the defense of denial. He testified that he was resting in his house on the night of the
incident when Fernando arrived and invited him to the latter's house. While Hesson was
cooking rice inside Fernando's house, he heard a loud sound from the yard so he looked
through the window and saw Junello hacking Fernando on the chest. Hesson denied that
Sario was present during the incident but admitted that Remmy was there. He said he could
not have stabbed the victim because the latter was the son of his godfather. Hesson also
testified that he knew Remmy and Sario and that he was not friends with them but neither
did they have any misunderstanding or quarrel.
100 of 578
Case Digests
The RTC found Hesson guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of
Murder. Hesson appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the trial court's conviction. Hence, this
Appeal
ISSUE
Whether the prosecution’s lone witness sufficiently establish Hesson's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder?
RULING
YES. First, the testimony of Sario, the lone witness for the prosecution, suffices to
establish the culpability of Hesson for Murder qualified by treachery. Sario clearly narrated
the details of the incident and positively identified Hesson as one of the assailants.
Second, Sario's testimony, although uncorroborated, can be relied upon. Well-settled

is the principle that the testimony of a single witness, if straightforward and categorical, is
sufficient to convict.
As held in People v. Hillado, “the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if found positive and
credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a conviction especially when the testimony
bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and had been delivered spontaneously, naturally
and in a straightforward manner. Witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. Evidence is
assessed in terms of quality and not quantity. Therefore, it is not uncommon to reach a
conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a lone witness. For although the number
of witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance is
not necessarily with the greatest number and conviction can still be had on the basis of the
credible and positive testimony of a single witness. Corroborative evidence is deemed
necessary "only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified
the truth or that his observation had been inaccurate."
Moreover, the Certificate of Death of Fernando stating that he died of multiple stab
wounds corroborates Sario's testimony.
Third, there is no showing that the lone witness Sario was motivated by ill-will which
could have impelled him to falsely testify against Hesson. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, the presumption is that the witness was not moved by ill-will and was untainted
by bias, and thus worthy of belief and credence.
Fourth, Hesson's immediate departure from the scene of the crime and successful
effort to elude arrest until his apprehension almost two (2) years after is hardly consistent
with his claim of innocence. Flight from the scene of the crime and failure to immediately
surrender militate against Hesson's contention of innocence "since an innocent person will
not hesitate to take prompt and necessary action to exonerate himself of the crime imputed
to him."
101 of 578
Case Digests
Fifth, the Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of the witnesses, which findings were likewise affirmed by the CA. When it comes
to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and may even be conclusive
and binding, as it is in the best position to make such determination, being the one who has
personally heard the accused and the witnesses.
Sixth, Hesson's defense of denial cannot prevail over Sario's positive identification of
Hesson as one of the assailants. To be believed, denial must be buttressed by strong evidence
of non-culpability. Otherwise, it is purely self-serving and without merit. In the instant case,
Hesson failed to adduce evidence to support his denial and overcome the testimony of the
prosecution witness.
In sum, the prosecution more than sufficiently established the participation of Hesson in the
crime charged.
102 of 578
Case Digests
MA. SUGAR M. MERCADO AND SPOUSES REYNALDO AND YOLANDA

MERCADO, Petitioners, v. HON.JOEL SOCRATES S. LOPENA [PRESIDING JUDGE,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 33, QUEZON CITY], HON. JOHN BOOMSRI S.
RODOLFO [PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 38, QUEZON
CITY], HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY [PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 90, QUEZON CITY], HON. ROBERTO P. BUENAVENTURA [PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 86, QUEZON CITY], HON. JOSE L. BAUTISTA, JR.
[PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 107, QUEZON CITY], HON.
VITALIANO AGUIRRE II (IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE), BON. DONALD
LEE (IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF
QUEZON CITY), KRISTOFER JAY I. GO, PETER AND ESTHER GO, KENNETH ROUE I. GO,
CASEY LIM JIMENEZ, CRISTINA PALILEO, AND RUEL BALINO,
G.R. No. 230170, June 06, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The allegation of SLAPP is set up as a defense in those cases claimed to have been filed
merely as a harassment suit against environmental actions. The Court finds no occasion to
apply the rules on SLAPP as the Petition has no relation at all to "the enforcement of
environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights." R.A.
No. 9262, which involves cases of violence against women and their children, is not among those
laws included under the scope of SLAPP.
FACTS
The root of this controversy is a domestic dispute between estranged spouses
petitioner Mercado and private respondent Go. Sometime in October 2015, respondent Go
filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Custody of his children against petitioner Mercado.
Go with his parents also filed 10 criminal cases against petitioner for libel, child abuse among
others.
On the other hand, petitioner Mercado filed an Urgent Petition for Issuance of
Temporary and/or Permanent Protection Order (TPO/PPO) and alleged that several acts of
respondent Go constituted domestic violence. The RTC in the PPO case granted the petition
and forthwith issued a PPO in favor of petitioner Mercado. The CA and the SC affirmed the
order of the RTC. Petitioner Mercado also filed several other cases against private
respondents for indirect contempt and violation of RA No. 10175. Three VAWC cases filed by
Mercado were dismissed.
Petitioner also filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition arguing that the cases
filed by private respondents against them (the subject cases) are forms of SLAPP intended
to harass, intimidate, and silence them. Petitioners claim that the subject cases are false and
baseless complaints that were filed to emotionally, psychologically, and financially drain
them and ultimately to pressure them to give up custody of petitioner Mercado's minor
children.
103 of 578
Case Digests
Petitioners also aver that the filing of the subject cases falls within the definition of
"abuse" and "violence against women" under R.A. No. 9262. Petitioners thus pray that the
Court declare the subject cases as SLAPP and for the Court to issue a TRO/Writ of
Preliminary Injunction directing public respondents to desist from conducting further
hearings on the subject cases and for the immediate dismissal of the same.
Petitioners also seek the amendment of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC (Rule on Violence
Against Women and Children) to include provisions against SLAPP.
ISSUES
1. Whether a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 is the proper remedy
for the petitioners?
2. Whether the concept of SLAPP is applicable to cases of domestic violence against
women and children under R.A. No. 9262?
RULING
1. Whether the Petition for Certiorari or Prohibition under Rule 65 is the proper remedy for
the petitioners?
NO.
a) The filing of the instant Petition is premature.
For a petition for certiorari or prohibition to prosper, the Rules require that there be no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. Here, the
cases before the public respondents are still pending. Thus, there still exists in law a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy for petitioners which is to participate in said cases and await
the judgment of the RTC. And, if the RTC renders an unfavorable judgment against
petitioners, they may appeal the cases to the CA. Meanwhile, as to the complaints filed before
the OCP of Quezon City, the same may be elevated via petition for review before the Secretary
of Justice and thereafter to the Office of the President; if the prosecutor's finding of probable
cause is ultimately upheld, the case may then proceed to trial. In the same vein, petitioner
Mercado is also entitled to the appropriate relief under R.A. No. 9262 in case of a violation of
the PPO issued in Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-10201. Under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9262, a
violation of any provision of a PPO shall constitute Contempt of Court punishable under Rule
71 of the Rules. The Court is a court of last resort. The Court's original jurisdiction may only
be invoked when serious and important reasons exist that necessitate the same.
b) The public respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
The writs of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 are extraordinary remedies that may
be availed of when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of jurisdiction
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The term grave abuse of discretion connotes
104 of 578
Case Digests
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or a lack of

jurisdiction.
Based on the foregoing standards, the Court finds that petitioners herein utterly failed to
establish their entitlement to a corrective writ of certiorari or prohibition. A special civil
action for certiorari or prohibition seeks solely to correct errors of jurisdiction and not
merely errors of judgment made in the exercise of jurisdiction. In this case, petitioners failed
to demonstrate that the subject cases fell outside of the respective jurisdictions of public
respondents; there was no showing that the subject matters of the said cases were not
properly cognizable by the offices of public respondents. Instead, petitioners merely argue
that public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in the taking of cognizance of
the subject cases despite the issuance of the PPO in favor of petitioner Mercado.
While the PPO indeed enjoins private respondent Go from committing acts amounting to
physical, psychological, and emotional abuse, and from harassing, annoying, contacting, or
communicating with petitioner Mercado, such directive can hardly be construed to extend
to public respondents in their act of dispensing the functions of their office. There is
absolutely nothing that precludes public respondents from exercising their respective
jurisdictions over the complaints or cases filed before them; anything less would be
tantamount to an abdication of their public offices.
Further, neither does the issuance of the PPO prevent private respondents from seeking
redress from the courts for any alleged offense committed by petitioners against them. The
PPO granted in favor of petitioner Mercado does not and cannot insulate her from
prosecution for acts committed in violation of the law, even if the action is initiated by private
respondent Go. Granted, the PPO is a directive addressed to private respondent Go; however,
the latter is still entitled to redress and be granted the reliefs he sought so long as they were
based on legitimate grounds.
2. Whether the concept of SLAPP is applicable to cases of domestic violence against women
and children under R.A. No. 9262?
NO. The concept of SLAPP was first introduced to this jurisdiction under the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC). As defined therein, a SLAPP refers
to “an action whether civil, criminal or administrative, brought against any person,
institution or any government agency or local government unit or its officials and employees,
with the intent to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse that such
person, institution or government agency has taken or may take in the enforcement of
environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights.”
In application, the allegation of SLAPP is set up as a defense in those cases claimed to have
been filed merely as a harassment suit against environmental actions. The Court finds no
occasion to apply the rules on SLAPP as the Petition has no relation at all to "the enforcement
of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights."
105 of 578
Case Digests
R.A. No. 9262, which involves cases of violence against women and their children, is not
among those laws included under the scope of SLAPP.
SLAPP, as a defense, is a mere privilege borne out of procedural rules; accordingly, it may
only be exercised in the manner and within the scope prescribed by the Court as a rule-
making body. Here, petitioners cannot, under the guise of substantial justice, rely on a
remedy that is simply not available to them. In fact, by invoking the Court's rule-making
power in their Petition, petitioners have admitted that the instant action has no basis under
any of the rules promulgated by the Court. The Court takes this occasion to remind
petitioners that rules of procedure are not a "one-size fits-all" tool that may be invoked in
any and all instances at the whim of the litigant as this would be anathema to the orderly
administration of justice.
Further on this matter, it is highly improper for petitioners to invoke SLAPP as a defense in
an original action before a separate forum considering that the above rules clearly mandate
that such a defense can only be invoked in the same action and consequently, before the same
court. Here, petitioners essentially initiated an omnibus motion before the Court to dismiss
all cases pending elsewhere. Such maneuver is patently repugnant to established procedure
and thus cannot be sanctioned by the Court.
106 of 578
Case Digests
GOV. AURORA E. CERILLES v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ANITA JANGAD-CHUA, MA.

EDEN S. TAGAYUNA, MERIAM CAMPOMANES,* BERNADETTE P. QUIRANTE, MA.
DELORA P. FLORES AND EDGAR PARAN
DOCTRINE
As a condition for the filing of a petition for certiorari, there must be no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law. In this case, the CA
correctly observed that a Rule 43 petition for review was then an available mode of appeal from
the above CSC resolutions. Sec. 1 of Rule 43 of the RoC states that Rule 43 shall apply to appeals
from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi judicial
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, including the Civil Service Commission.
Further, Sec. 5 of Rule 43 states that the appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for
review in seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals. The extraordinary remedy
of certiorari under Rule 65 is a prerogative writ and never issues as a matter of right; thus, the
party availing thereof must strictly observe the rules laid down under the RoC.
FACTS
Due to the creation of the Province of Zamboanga Sibugay from the Province of
Zamboanga del Sur under RA No. 8973, the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of the latter
was reduced by thirty-six percent (36%). Consequently, petitioner Gov. Cerilles had to
reduce the workforce of the provincial government. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Zamboanga del Sur passed two resolutions approving the new staffing pattern of the
provincial government consisting only of 727 positions and authorizing Gov. Cerilles to
undertake the reorganization of the provincial government. Pursuant to said authority, Gov.
Cerilles appointed employees to the new positions in the provincial government.
The private respondents were among those who were occupying permanent
positions in the old plantilla and have allegedly been in the service for a long time but were
not given placement preference and were instead terminated without valid cause and
against their will. Private respondents filed their respective letters of appeal respecting their
termination with petitioner. However, no action was taken on the appeals made; hence,
private respondents brought the matter to public respondent CSC's Regional Office No. IX.
Upon review of the Report on Personnel Actions (ROPA) submitted by the provincial
government, the CSCRO found that the subject appointments violated Republic Act No. (RA)
6656 for allegedly failing to grant preference in appointment to employees previously
occupying permanent positions in the old plantilla. As a result, the CSCRO invalidated a total
of ninety-six (96) appointments made by Gov. Cerilles after the reorganization, and directed
the reinstatement of Respondents to their former positions. Gov. Cerilles sought
reconsideration with the CSCRO. Thereafter, the CSC informed Gov. Cerilles that her
reconsideration was treated as an appeal and was forwarded to it by the CSCRO. The CSC
upheld the CSCRO's invalidation of the subject appointments, and denied Gov. Cerilles’
subsequent motion for reconsideration
107 of 578
Case Digests
Gov. Cerilles elevated the matter to the CA through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 on the following grounds, inter alia: (i) that the CSC is without original jurisdiction
over protests made by an aggrieved officer or employee during government reorganization,
pursuant to RA 6656, and (ii) that the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming
the invalidation of the subject appointments. The CA ruled that Gov. Cerilles resorted to the
wrong mode of review, the proper remedy being an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules,
which governs appeals from judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the CSC. Nevertheless,
the CA upheld the CSCRO's jurisdiction to entertain the appeals of Respondents, and denied
Gov. Cerilles’ subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, this Petition.
In her Petition, Gov. Cerilles questions the CA Decision insofar as it considered her
petition for certiorari an improper remedy — the proper remedy being a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules. Gov. Cerilles claims that the two resolutions issued by the CSC
were non-appealable as the CSC rendered them in its "non-disciplinary" jurisdiction; thus,
she insists that the correct remedy was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE
Whether Gov. Cerilles correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules when she filed her petition before the CA questioning the CSC’s invalidation of the
subject appointments, there being no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law?
RULING
NO. It is well-established that as a condition for the filing of a petition for certiorari,
there must be no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available in the
ordinary course of law. In this case, the CA correctly observed that a Rule 43 petition for
review was then an available mode of appeal from the above CSC resolutions. Rule 43, which
specifically applies to resolutions issued by the CSC, is clear:
SECTION 1. Scope. — This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final
orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or
resolutions of or authorized by any quasi judicial agency in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service
Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of the President, x x x.
SEC. 5. How appeal taken. — Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition
for review in seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of
service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. x x x
The extraordinary remedy of certiorari is a prerogative writ and never issues as a

matter of right. Given its extraordinary nature, the party availing thereof must strictly
observe the rules laid down and non-observance thereof may not be brushed aside as mere
108 of 578
Case Digests
technicality. Hence, where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the
ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. Applying the foregoing, the Court thus finds
Gov. Cerilles' failure to abide by the elementary requirements of the Rules inexcusable. That
she repeatedly invoked "grave abuse of discretion" on the part of the CSC was of no moment;
the records failed to demonstrate how an appeal to the CA via Rule 43 was not a plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy as would allow a relaxation of the rules of procedure.
109 of 578
Case Digests
HILARIO B. ALILING v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE
While, indeed, the defense of denial or alibi can be easily fabricated, the same can be
said of untruthful accusations, in that they can be as easily concocted. Thus, if found credible,
the defenses of denial and alibi may be considered complete and legitimate defenses. The
burden of proof does not shift by the mere invocation of said defenses; the presumption of
innocence remains in favor of the accused.
FACTS
In the evening of April 18, 2010, Jerry Tumbaga was watching a basketball game in
Barangay Matingain, together with his uncle Jesus Marasigan. He then left the place and
proceeded to his motorcycle which was then parked at about 7-8 meters away. When he was
about to board his motorcycle, he was shot at the back and when he looked back, he
recognized accused Hilario Aliling as the one firing. The accused then fired again, and
Tumbaga was again hit at the back. Tumbaga ran away, felt dizzy and subsequently fell down
near the basketball court. Tumbaga was brought to Metro Lemery Hospital and after about
an hour, he was transferred to Batangas Regional Hospital where he underwent surgery.
Jesus Marasigan, the uncle of Tumbaga testified that he was at a basketball court, when he
saw accused Hilario Aliling arrived and fired twice at Tumbaga, who went towards his
parked motorcycle in front of the basketball court. Dr. Mark Louie M. Lanting, who conducted
the operation on Jerry Tumbaga, testified as to the medico-legal certificate that he issued.
Accused Hilario Aliling testified that on the same day of that night, they were from a
miting de avance of a certain Apacible when they proceeded to the house of Annie, their
coordinator, at Barangay Matingain. Thereafter, he took his motorcycle and went home. The
accused arrived at his house at around 1:30 o'clock. The next day, he went campaigning
again. Adrian Cabral Atienza also testified that they he was campaigning for Apacible with
Aliling on that night. The last defense witness was Michael Perez Bathan who testified that
he was at the same basketball court on that night and he saw that the private complainant
was about to ride his motorcycle when he was shot. Bathan testified that he did not see
accused Hilario Aliling at the place when the shooting happened and instead saw an
unidentified man shot the private complainant.
Aliling was charged with Frustrated Murder. The RTC found Aliling guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Frustrated Murder. The trial court gave more credence to the
testimonies of the victim, Tumbaga, and the other eyewitness Jesus C. Marasigan (Marasigan)
who both identified Aliling as the gunman, as against Aliling's defense of alibi. The RTC held
that the positive allegations of the prosecution witnesses prevailed over the negative
assertions of the defense witnesses. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision in its Assailed
Decision and denied Aliling’s MR. Aliling filed a Petition for Review before the SC arguing
that the testimonial evidence of the prosecution cannot be relied on as they were
inconsistent and incredible. According to him, the eyewitness, Bathan, friend of both Aliling
110 of 578
Case Digests
and Tumbaga, also testified that he witnessed the shooting incident and saw that the gunman
was not Aliling but an unidentified person.
ISSUE
Whether Aliling is guilty of frustrated murder beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING
NO. Positive testimony is generally given more weight than the defenses of denial and
alibi which are held to be inherently weak defenses because they can be easily fabricated.
While, indeed, the defense of denial or alibi can be easily fabricated, the same can be said of
untruthful accusations, in that they can be as easily concocted. Thus, if found credible, the
defenses of denial and alibi may be considered complete and legitimate defenses. The burden
of proof does not shift by the mere invocation of said defenses; the presumption of innocence
remains in favor of the accused.
In alibi, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time
the crime was committed, but that it was likewise physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime at the time thereof. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between
the place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was
committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places.
In this case, the Court found that Aliling's alibi was straightforward, credible, and
corroborated by an impartial witness. Furthermore, there was eyewitness testimony to the
effect that Aliling was not the gunman. Contrary to the findings of the RTC, there was no
inconsistency in Aliling's testimony as regards his use of his motorcycle.
There is no inconsistency in the testimony of Aliling when he testified that on April

18, 2010, he drove his motorcycle to the house of their campaign coordinator "Ate Annie" in
Brgy. Matingain II. The testimony of Atienza corroborates the testimony of Aliling as to his
whereabouts at the time of the incident and as to the use of their service vehicle. Atienza also
testified that he was beside Aliling during the miting de avance which coincided with the
time of the shooting incident. Atienza is the only one without any familial relationship with
Aliling or to the victim, Tumbaga. Atienza testified that he met Aliling only during the
campaign period. On the other hand, he had known Tumbaga for a long time because they
lived in the same barangay and Tumbaga's grandmother was their former neighbor. Hence,
Atienza's status as an impartial witness is beyond dispute, having no relationship with either
the accused or the victim. Atienza's testimony, on this score, is straightforward, credible, and
unbiased as, indeed, he has no reason to lie.
Bolstering the alibi of Aliling is the eyewitness account of Bathan who positively
testified that he witnessed the shooting incident and saw that the culprit was not Aliling.
Bathan testified that he saw the shooting incident and categorically stated that the shooter
was not Aliling. Bathan is familiar with the features of Aliling, having known him for a long
111 of 578
Case Digests
time as they are relatives. Thus, the eyewitness account of the shooting bolsters Aliling's
denial that he was not the gunman.
Self-contradictions and inconsistencies on a very material and substantial matter

seriously erodes the credibility of a witness. In the instant case, the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses are contradictory on a material point. Marasigan claimed that the
gunshots were successively fired. However, the victim, Tumbaga testified that there was a
pause between the shots. The manner of execution of the crime is of prime significance
especially in the testimony of Tumbaga, the victim himself, as he testified that the pause
between shots supposedly gave him the opportunity to turn his head and see the culprit after
he was shot for the first time in the back. Notably, the testimony of Marasigan as to the
continuous succession of shots is corroborated by the testimony of defense witness Bathan,
who also testified that the shots were fired one after another.
Furthermore, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Tumbaga attested that Aliling had a

companion that night at the basketball court. However, during his cross-examination, he
denied his statement. Minor inconsistent statements in a witness' affidavit and in his
testimony in court do not necessarily affect his credibility. However, in this case, the detail
as to whether the victim had seen the accused with or without a companion is a material
detail as it goes into the very execution of the crime.
The inconsistency in the statements of the prosecution witnesses on material points

significantly erodes the credibility of their testimonies, juxtaposed against the forthright and
consistent testimonies of the defense witnesses. With the probative value of the prosecution
witnesses' testimony greatly diminished, the alibi of the accused is given credence. In the
instant case, the prosecution failed to overcome the burden of proving the accused's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
112 of 578
Case Digests
LOLITA ESPIRITU SANTO MENDOZA AND SPS. ALEXANDER AND ELIZABETH

GUTIERREZ v. SPS. RAMON, SR. AND NATIVIDAD PALUGOD
DOCTRINE
The Deed of Absolute Sale (DAS) is itself the proof that the sale of the property is
supported by sufficient consideration. This is anchored on the disputable presumption of
consideration inherent in every contract under Article 1354 of the Civil Code, which has been
reiterated under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. While petitioner Lolita could not
present receipts to show her payments to the late Jasminia, her sworn testimony which in
certain portions were corroborated by pertinent documents, remains more credible than that
of respondent Natividad. Indeed, the lack of receipts may be explained by the "close friendship"
between petitioner Lolita and Jasminia.
FACTS
Petitioner Lolita Mendoza and Jasminia Palugod were close friends. Lolita was a
businesswoman engaged in selling commodities and houses and lots, while Jasminia was
then working as a Supervisor in the PLDT. In 1991, Lolita and Jasminia bought the subject
lot in Bacoor, Cavite. In 1995, Jasminia became afflicted with breast cancer. Sometime in
1996, Lolita and Jasminia constructed a residential house on the subject lot. Although Lolita
has no receipts, she shared in the cost of the construction of the house from her income in
the catering business and selling of various products. In May 2004, Jasminia executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale in favor of Lolita, who eventually mortgaged the subject property in
November 2004 to petitioner Elizabeth Gutierrez as a security for a loan in the amount of
Php800,000.00. Jasminia died on September 26, 2004 due to breast cancer.
Respondents spouses Ramon, Sr. and Natividad Palugod filed a complaint for the
Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over
the subject property with the RTC. They alleged that their daughter, the late Jasminia, was
the one who bought the property. Prior to and after the said acquisition of the subject
property, Jasminia was living with Lolita, a lesbian. Jasminia was an employee of PLDT who
rose to the rank of Traffic Supervisor before her separation from service. Lolita has no work
or means of livelihood of her own and was fully dependent on Jasminia. Lolita took advantage
of her relationship with Jasminia, and caused the latter to sign a Deed of Absolute Sale in her
favor. Thereafter, Lolita, aided by her brother Wilfredo Mendoza as witness, entered it for
registration with the Office of the Registry of Deeds.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents and held that the Deed of Absolute Sale is
void for being simulated, hence, the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed therein by Lolita
in favor of Spouses Gutierrez is likewise void, since, in a real estate mortgage.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and denied the petitioners’ subsequent MR. Hence,
the present Petition.
113 of 578
Case Digests
Petitioner Lolita conceded that she did not pay the consideration for the purchase of
the subject property at the date of the alleged simulated sale because the payment was made
prior to the notarization of the DAS as shown in her testimony. Petitioners argued that Lolita
has contributed to the subject property especially since Jasminia, based on a certification,
only received her retirement pay in the amount of P1,383,773.59 on January 18, 1999.
ISSUE
Whether respondents have overcome the presumption that the Deed of Sale is valid?
RULING
NO. The Deed of Absolute Sale (DAS) is itself the proof that the sale of the property is
supported by sufficient consideration. This is anchored on the disputable presumption of
consideration inherent in every contract under Article 1354 of the Civil Code, which has been
reiterated under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxxx
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract[.]
With the presumption in favor of petitioner Lolita who is the vendee, it became
incumbent upon respondents to present preponderant evidence to prove lack of
consideration. Respondents' mere assertion that the DAS has no consideration is inadequate.
The basic rule in civil cases is that "the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence." By "preponderance of evidence is meant
simply evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in
opposition to it." Since preponderance of evidence is the required quantum of proof in this
case, the evidence of respondents, who are the plaintiffs before the RTC, must be weighed
against the petitioners' evidence, and a determination of which one has superior weight must
be made.
In this case, petitioner Lolita disputed the assertion that she has no income and means
of livelihood, and presented documents in support thereof. Petitioner Lolita's proof of
payment of the DAS' consideration was her sworn testimony. Testimony, given under oath,
and subjected to cross-examination is proof. Unfortunately, both the CA and the RTC brushed
this aside only because the RTC zeroed in on the lack of receipts. Respondent Natividad's
account could not have happened because Jasminia received her retirement pay equivalent
to P1,383,773.59 on January 18, 1999 based on the Receipt, Release and Quitclaim that
Jasminia executed on even date, which was after the purchase of the subject lot and the
construction of the subject house.
114 of 578
Case Digests
Also, contrary to the respondents’ assertions, Dr. Ortin's categorically testified that
Jasminia was not physically incapable of traveling from Bacoor, Cavite to Makati Medical
Center and to Pasay City for the acknowledgment of the DAS before the Notary Public and
she was not mentally incapacitated to know the import thereof. In addition, the lower courts
misapprehended the admission by petitioner Lolita that she did not pay the consideration
before the Notary Public. What petitioner Lolita admitted was that the consideration was not
paid "before the Notary Public," and, as correctly pointed out by her, there is no legal
requirement that the consideration of a sale be paid in the very presence of the Notary Public
before whom the deed of sale is acknowledged.
Thus, respondents have not discharged their burden of proof to rebut either the
presumption of sufficient consideration of the DAS or the evidence of petitioner Lolita.
While petitioner Lolita could not present receipts to show her payments to the late Jasminia,
her sworn testimony which in certain portions were corroborated by pertinent documents,
remains more credible than that of respondent Natividad. Indeed, the lack of receipts may
be explained by the "close friendship" between petitioner Lolita and Jasminia.
Even from a pure evaluation of only the parties' testimonial evidence, wherein doubts
on the truthfulness of their respective narrations of the relevant facts are perceived and
there may be difficulty in determining who between respondent Natividad and petitioner
Lolita is the more credible witness and in which side the testimonial evidence
preponderates, the evidence of the parties should, at the very least, be held to be in equipoise.
That being the situation, respondents, who have the burden of proof in the present case, fail
upon their cause of action. Consequently, the DAS executed by Jasminia in favor of petitioner
Lolita over the subject property is valid, the presumption that it has sufficient consideration
not having been rebutted. The same holds true regarding the Real Estate Mortgage between
petitioner Lolita and petitioners spouses Alexander and Elizabeth Gutierrez.
115 of 578
Case Digests
SM INVESTMENTS CORPORATION v. MAC GRAPHICS CARRANZ INTERNATIONAL

CORPORATION
G.R. No. 224131-32, June 25, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Before a court grants injunctive relief, the complainant must demonstrate that: he is
entitled to the relief sought, the actual or threatened violation of complainant's rights, the
probability of irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of pecuniary compensation as relief.
FACTS
Respondent Mac Graphics Carranz International Corp. entered into a lease contract
with Pilipinas Makro, Inc. for exclusive use of the latter's billboard sites located at Makro
EDSA Cubao, Quezon City and Makro Makati City for a period of 20 years.
Mac Graphics and Makro implemented the lease contract at Makro- Cubao and Makro-
Makati for almost two years from its effectivity. Makro sent a letter dated October 6, 2008 to
Mac Graphics terminating the lease contract effective immediately because of the latter's
alleged failure to obtain the relevant MMDA and local government permits and to obtain a
comprehensive all-risk property insurance for the sites. Makro averred that the 90 days
"remedy period" of the lease contract does not apply because Mac Graphics' violation was
not remediable. Mac Graphics objected to the termination. Makro and SMIC then removed
Mac Graphics' billboards and other advertising media installed at Makro-Cubao and Makro-
Makati. They also prevented Mac Graphics from entering the leased premises.
Mac Graphics filed before the RTC a Complaint for Permanent Injunction and
Declaration of Subsistence of Contract; Damages with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Makro and SMIC. The RTC
issued an Order granting the application for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
(WPMI), upon the filing of a P5 million bond ruling that the evidence presented by Mac
Graphics initially showed that there was a breach of the lease contract with respect to the
period of its existence, and that the lease contract was pre-terminated by Makro without
giving Mac Graphics a chance to remedy any violation that Makro alleged to have been
committed by Mac Graphics.
SMIC filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. SMIC and PMI filed their
respective Rule 65 Petitions for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion. The CA affirmed
the RTC Orders granting the WPMI ruling that the issuance of a WPMI rests upon the sound
discretion of the trial court.
Mac Graphics admits its non-compliance with the licenses/permits and insurance
stipulations in the lease contract, but justifies such breach by invoking the presence of
circumstances that rendered it legally and physically impossible to comply therewith and
PMI's disregard of the 90-day "remedy period." On PMI's part, the outright pre-termination
of the lease contract is justified because Mac Graphics failed to obtain the stipulated
116 of 578
Case Digests
licenses/permits and insurance on the commencement date of the lease contract, which is
January 15, 2007. Also, the insurance obtained was not compliant and obtained beyond the
90-day "remedy period."
ISSUE
Whether the CA gravely erred in upholding the WPMI granted by the RTC.
RULING
YES. The SC held that before a court grants injunctive relief, the complainant must
demonstrate that: he is entitled to the relief sought, the actual or threatened violation of
complainant's rights, the probability of irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of pecuniary
compensation as relief.
The Court in Power Sites and Signs, Inc. v. United Neon stated a writ of preliminary
injunction should be issued only to prevent grave and irreparable injury, that is, injury that
is actual, substantial, and demonstrable. Here, there is no "irreparable injury" as understood
in law. Rather, the damages alleged by the petitioner, namely, "immense loss in profit and
possible damage claims from clients" and the cost of the billboard which is "a considerable
amount of money" is easily quantifiable, and certainly does not fall within the concept of
irreparable damage or injury.
In determining the propriety of the issuance of the WPMI in the instant case and
whether the courts below acted with grave abuse of discretion, an inquiry must be made on
whether Mac Graphics was able to demonstrate prima facie a right in esse or one that is clear
and unmistakable that the Court must protect via a WPMI.
The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that Mac Graphics has failed to establish
prima facie a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right, rendering the issuance of the
WPMI improper. Given the legal complexity of Mac Graphic's cause of action vis-à -vis PMI's
defenses, it is unclear at this point whether Mac Graphics can enforce the pre-terminated
lease contract as a matter of law. There are simply too many legal and factual sub-issues that
need to be threshed out before the pre-termination may be declared valid or invalid.
Going to the grave and irreparable requirement for the issuance of a WPMI, both the
CA and RTC found that the injuries which Mac Graphics might have sustained or would
sustain as a result of the act of PMI are irreparable and cannot be remedied by a simple
computation of damages. The impact of the pre-termination of the lease contract under
consideration to Mac Graphics is basically the reduction of its revenues. Thus, Mac Graphics'
injury, if any, is mainly loss of revenues and as such, the same can be measured with
reasonable accuracy, easily quantifiable or susceptible of simple mathematical computation.
The pecuniary value of such loss will fairly recompense Mac Graphics for which Mac Graphics
has put its initial value at P1 million in its Complaint. Also, the presentation of the Revenue
Opportunity for the Remaining Contract Period dated August 15, 2009, which represents the
alleged revenue opportunities that Mac Graphics was supposed to get from the sites in
117 of 578
Case Digests
dispute upon marketing to its clients based on the ongoing market rates of other billboard
sites in the same region, bolsters the finding that the damage, if any, that Mac Graphics stood
to suffer is reparable.
Consequently, the CA committed grave error for upholding the grant of the WPMI by
the RTC in favor of Mac Graphics given the patent absence of a clear and unmistakable right
of Mac Graphics and its injury, if any, that is easily quantifiable and reparable. The CA
Decision is based on a misapprehension of the facts and the legal ramifications of the pre-
termination by PMI based on the alleged non-compliance by Mac Graphics of the
licenses/permits and insurance stipulations of the lease contract vis-à -vis the defenses
interposed by Mac Graphics.
118 of 578
Case Digests
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES v. COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 213446, July 3, 2018, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The Court of Tax Appeals has undoubted jurisdiction to pass upon the constitutionality
or validity of a tax law or regulation when raised by the taxpayer as a defense in disputing or
contesting an assessment or claiming a refund. It is only in the lawful exercise of its power to
pass upon all matters brought before it, as sanctioned by Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, as
amended. This Court, however, declares that the Court of Tax Appeals may likewise take
cognizance of cases directly challenging the constitutionality or validity of a tax law or
regulation or administrative issuance.
FACTS
On June 20, 2014, respondent CIR issued the assailed RMO No. 232014, in furtherance
of Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 23-2012 dated February 14, 2012 on the
"Reiteration of the Responsibilities of the Officials and Employees of Government Offices for
the Withholding of Applicable Taxes on Certain Income Payments and the Imposition of
Penalties for Non-Compliance Thereof," in order to clarify and consolidate the
responsibilities of the public sector to withhold taxes on its transactions as a customer (on
its purchases of goods and services) and as an employer (on compensation paid to its officials
and employees) under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC or Tax Code) of 1997, as
amended, and other special laws.
This petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, with Application for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, seeks to: (a) issue a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the
implementation of Revenue Memorandum Order No. 232014 issued by the CIR; and (b)
declare null, void and unconstitutional paragraphs A, B, C, and D of Section III, and Sections
IV, VI and VII of RMO No. 23-2014. The petition in G.R. No. 213446 also prays for the issuance
of a Writ of Mandamus to compel respondents to upgrade the P30,000.00 non-taxable ceiling
of the 13th month pay and other benefits for the concerned officials and employees of the
government.
ISSUE
Whether the instant consolidated petitions are barred by the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts.
RULING
YES. It is an unquestioned rule in this jurisdiction that certiorari under Rule 65 will
only lie if there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law against the assailed issuance of the CIR. The plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy expressly provided by law is an appeal of the assailed RMO with the Secretary of
Finance under Section 4 of the NIRC of 1997.
119 of 578
Case Digests
The CIR's exercise of its power to interpret tax laws comes in the form of revenue
issuances, which include RMOs that provide "directives or instructions; prescribe guidelines;
and outline processes, operations, activities, workflows, methods and procedures necessary
in the implementation of stated policies, goals, objectives, plans and programs of the Bureau
in all areas of operations, except auditing." These revenue issuances are subject to the review
of the Secretary of Finance.
The premature invocation of the court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action.
If a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction, then such remedy must first be exhausted before the court's power of judicial
review can be sought. While there are recognized exceptions to this salutary rule, petitioners
have failed to prove the presence of any of those in the instant case.
Moreover, petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts as the petitions should
have been initially filed with the CTA, having the exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
determine the constitutionality or validity of revenue issuances.
The Court of Tax Appeals has undoubted jurisdiction to pass upon the
constitutionality or validity of a tax law or regulation when raised by the taxpayer as a
defense in disputing or contesting an assessment or claiming a refund. It is only in the lawful
exercise of its power to pass upon all matters brought before it, as sanctioned by Section 7
of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended. This Court, however, declares that the Court of Tax
Appeals may likewise take cognizance of cases directly challenging the constitutionality or
validity of a tax law or regulation or administrative issuance (revenue orders, revenue
memorandum circulars, rulings).
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, is explicit that, except for local taxes,
appeals from the decisions of quasi-judicial agencies (Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of Finance, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Secretary of Trade and Industry) on tax-related problems must be brought exclusively to the
Court of Tax Appeals.
In other words, within the judicial system, the law intends the Court of Tax Appeals
to have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all tax problems. Petitions for writs of certiorari
against the acts and omissions of the said quasi-judicial agencies should, thus, be filed before
the Court of Tax Appeals. A direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction should only be
allowed when there are special, important, and compelling reasons clearly and specifically
spelled out in the petition.
120 of 578
Case Digests
MICHAEL V. RACION v. MST MARINE SERVICES PHILIPPINES, INC.

G.R. No. 2192915, July 4, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they
are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not proportionate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
FACTS
Petitioner was hired as a GP1/MTM by respondent MST Marine Services Philippines,
Inc. During his employment, petitioner suffered an accidental fall and was found to have
suffered from a left knee ligament strain. Petitioner was subsequently repatriated on medical
grounds.
Petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits, refund of medical expenses, sickness
allowances, damages, and attorney's fees. The Labor Arbiter dismissed petitioner's
complaint for lack of merit. Petitioner then filed an appeal with the NLRC, which denied the
appeal but modified the LA's decision by directing MST Marine to pay petitioner the amount
P50,000.00 as financial assistance.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA questioning the NLRC's
decision. The CA dismissed the petition outright because it was petitioner's counsel who
signed the certificate on non-forum shopping, without authority from petitioner through a
Special Power of Attorney, and without any explanation for petitioner's failure to execute the
certificate. It ruled that petitioner failed to comply with paragraph 1, Section 3, Rule 46 of
the Rules of Court when he failed to indicate his own actual address and that of respondent
Del Castillo. The CA reasoned that a petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy and
that the party availing of the remedy must strictly observe the procedural rules laid down by
law.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. The CA ruled that the liberal
application of the rules may be done only if there are justifiable causes for non-compliance,
and that petitioner failed to show the existence of such justifiable cause as he only claimed
that his failure to comply was due to inadvertence. The CA also found that there was nothing
on record that constituted compelling reason for a liberal application of procedural rules.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari outright.
RULING
NO. The CA was correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari outright as it was
beset with procedural errors arising from violations of the Rules of Court.
121 of 578
Case Digests
First, petitioner failed to execute a certificate of non-forum shopping. Section 1, Rule

65 of the Rules of Court directs that a petition should be accompanied by a certificate of non-
forum shopping in accordance with Section 3, Rule 46 also of the Rules of Court. The
execution of the certificate by petitioner's counsel is a defective certification, which amounts
to non-compliance with the requirement of a certificate of non-forum shopping. This is
sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
The issue of a counsel executing a certificate of non-forum shopping has been settled
in Suzuki v. de Guzman, where the Court affirmed the CA's dismissal of a petition for
certiorari because the certificate was signed by counsel and not by the petitioners
themselves.
Second, petitioner also failed to comply with the requirement in Section 3, Rule 46
on alleging the actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents as he failed to indicate
his own actual address and that of respondent Del Castillo.
Once more, the CA was correct in citing Cendaña v. Avila, where the Court held that:
the requirement that a petition for certiorari must contain the actual addresses of all the
petitioners and the respondents is mandatory. Petitioner's failure to comply with the said
requirement is sufficient ground for the dismissal of his petition. Thus, the Court of Appeals
correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that the parties' actual
addresses were not indicated therein.
Petitioner cannot simply ask the Court to liberally apply the rules without providing
any justification for it. His claim of inadvertence is flimsy, not weighty and not persuasive as
to give it reprieve from the strict application of the rules. For indeed, procedural rules are
not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in
prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed
except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant
of an injustice not proportionate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying
with the procedure prescribed.
Finally, even if the Court were to gloss over the technical defects, petitioner has not
provided any basis for the Court to review the findings of the NLRC and LA as he failed to
attach the decisions of these tribunals. Thus, the Court can only but affirm the CA when it
applied the rules strictly. The CA was correct when it only applied the Rules of Court. For the
Court to find fault in this would not only render for naught the rules the Court had
promulgated but would also undermine its authority over the lower courts and even
demoralize them.
122 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. XXX

DOCTRINE
It is a long-standing rule that in rape cases, an accused may be convicted based on the
victim's sole testimony, provided that it is logical, credible, consistent, and convincing. The rule
becomes more binding where - as in the instant case - the victims are young and immature, not
only because of their relative vulnerability, but also because of the shame and embarrassment
which they stand to suffer during trial, if indeed the matters to be testified on were untrue.
FACTS
Four separate Informations for rape under Article 266-A, par. 1, in relation to Article
266-B, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code 4 were filed in the RTC against XXX for four counts
of rape committed against BBB.
"BBB" is the daughter of the accused, XXX. On four different occasions, her father
ravished her, inside their residence located at Valenzuela City. In 2004, when she was still
14 years old, the accused did the first horrid act of ravishing her. It was her narration that
when she arrived home from school, her father went inside her room and began to undress
her and made her lie down. He was naked and he went on top of her, inserted his penis to
her vagina, caressed her thigh and made a pumping motion. She accounted that her father
was then holding a knife and told her that if she would report what he did to her, he would
kill her mother. She felt not only pain. She was afraid and angry at the same time. She felt so
afraid that she was not able to fight back or even to shout for help.
The same bestial act of the accused towards her was repeated for the second time in
2005. After 4 months, she suffered the same fate in the hands of the accused once more. On
May 18, 2010, the accused repeated the same horrid act to her.
She attested that it took her a while before she was able to muster enough courage to
reveal to others her ordeal in the hands of her own father. She kept in silence for a long time,
not revealing to anyone what her father had been doing to her, afraid that if she would tell
anyone, her father would make good his threat to kill her mother and her family would be
saddled with problems.
In 2010 she decided not to go home anymore. She opted to stay in the house of a
friend, "CCC." Her friend “CCC” encouraged and helped her in filing a formal complaint
against her father. Her Sworn Statement was taken and she was subjected to medical
examinations.
In the RTC Decision, XXX was found guilty on all 4 counts of rape and was sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each charge. The RTC, in considering the
evidence on record, found BBB's testimony to be straightforward and credible as against
XXX's unsubstantiated defense of denial and alibi. Likewise, XXX's imputation of ill motive to
123 of 578
Case Digests
BBB was considered by the RTC as "too petty to merit belief." On appeal, the CA affirmed the
RTC Decision with modification.
ISSUE
Whether XXX's guilt for 4 counts of rape was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
YES. The evidence is sufficient to prove XXX's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It
is a long-standing rule that in rape cases, an accused may be convicted based on the victim's
sole testimony, provided that it is logical, credible, consistent, and convincing. The rule
becomes more binding where - as in the instant case - the victims are young and immature,
not only because of their relative vulnerability, but also because of the shame and
embarrassment which they stand to suffer during trial, if indeed the matters to be testified
on were untrue.
The Court has held on several occasions that when a rape victim's account is
straightforward and candid and is further corroborated by the medical findings of the
examining physician, such testimony is sufficient to support a conviction. As correctly
pointed out in the questioned Decision, BBB was able to describe in clear detail how each
incident of rape was committed by XXX. Moreover, the RTC, after observing BBB's manner
and demeanor firsthand during trial, was sufficiently convinced of her credibility and the
truthfulness of her testimony.
Delay, on its own, is open to many interpretations. Based on BBB's testimony, in all
the incidents of rape, XXX was armed with a deadly weapon and he would, on several
occasions, threaten BBB not to tell anyone of his acts. Thus, considering that XXX is the father
of BBB, his moral ascendancy was certainly more than enough to silence her, not to mention
the normal tendency of rape victims to conceal their humiliation and shame resulting from
the irrevocable violation of their honor.
XXX's defense of alibi and denial failed to overcome the prosecution's evidence.
The defenses of alibi and denial are generally viewed with disfavor by the courts due to their
inherent weakness. Hence, to be given evidentiary value, such defenses must be supported
by strong evidence of innocence independent of the accused's self-serving statements.
Moreover, for the defense of alibi to be considered, the accused must prove not only that he
was somewhere else when the crime was committed but that it was also physically
impossible for him to have been at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the
approximate time of its commission. Here, XXX flatly denied all the accusations against him
and never presented any documentary evidence nor did he present any of the alleged
witness to lend truth to his allegations. The records are bereft of any evidence, other than
XXX's bare testimony, that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at
the time the act complained of transpired. XXX's defense of alibi must therefore be rejected.
124 of 578
Case Digests
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINE, REPRESENTED BY THE DPWH v. ESTRELLA R.

DECENA, ET AL.
DOCTRINE
The rule that only questions of law are the proper subject of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court applies with equal force to expropriation cases.
Inasmuch as issues pertaining to the value of the expropriated property are questions of fact,
such issues are beyond the scope of the Court's judicial review in a Rule 45 petition, and, absent
a showing of exceptional circumstances that would warrant ruling otherwise, are final and
conclusive upon the Court.
FACTS
Petitioner, as part of its C5 Road Extension Road Widening Project, sought to acquire
Respondents' properties located along Old Balara, Quezon City. When attempts to obtain the
subject properties through negotiated sale failed, Petitioner instituted 5 separate complaints
for expropriation against Respondents.
Petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Possession with the
RTC, stating that it had deposited with the Land Bank an amount equivalent to 100% of the
current zonal valuation of the subject properties in compliance with Section 4 (a) of RA No.
8974. The RTC issued a Writ of Possession ordering the sheriff to place the Petitioner in
possession of the property. Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order of Condemnation
whereby the Petitioner has a lawful right to take the subject parcels of land and created a
Board of Commissioners.
The BOC submitted its report recommending an amount of P17,893.33 per square
meter as just compensation. The RTC, noticing that one year had already lapsed between the
filing of the complaints and the actual valuation made by the BOC, ordered the BOC to review
its valuation. Respondents submitted a valuation based on the Appraisal Report of the
Philippine Appraisal Company, Inc. The PACI report recommended a valuation of P30,000.00
per square meter. The RTC fixed compensation at P25,000.00 per square meter. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE
Whether the CA committed reversible error when it affirmed RTC's determination of
just compensation for Respondents' expropriated property at P25,000.00 per square meter.
RULING
125 of 578
Case Digests
NO. At the outset, the rule that only questions of law are the proper subject of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court applies with equal force
to expropriation cases. Inasmuch as issues pertaining to the value of the expropriated
property are questions of fact, such issues are beyond the scope of the Court's judicial review
in a Rule 45 petition, and, absent a showing of exceptional circumstances that would warrant
ruling otherwise, are final and conclusive upon the Court.
Here, in claiming that "evidentiary weight should be accorded by the RTC to the
recommendation of the BOC," Petitioner is asking the Court to recalibrate and weigh anew
the evidence already passed upon by the lower courts; yet, Petitioner has not alleged, much
less proven, the presence of any of the exceptional circumstances that would warrant a
deviation from the rule that the Court is not a trier of facts. On this ground alone, the denial
of the petition is warranted.
In the present case, the Court finds no abuse, arbitrariness, or error on the part of the
lower court. That the RTC found the amounts recommended by the BOC or the PACI to be, by
themselves, incomplete indication of the fair market value of the property cannot be
considered an indicium of arbitrariness. With both recommended valuations - a BOC
valuation of P17,893.33 per square meter and a PACI valuation of P30,000.00 - as guideposts,
the court determined the fair market value of the property to be P25,000.00, in the exercise
of its discretion to substitute its own estimate of the value of the property as gathered from
the records. Considering that the amount of just compensation was arrived at after due
consideration of the applicable statutory standards, the Court sees no cogent reason to
disturb the findings of the RTC, as wholly affirmed by the CA.
With respect to the issue of interest due on the compensation, although the initial
deposit made by Petitioner complied with R.A. 8974, Section 4 (a) it does not, by itself,
constitute "just compensation" as contemplated by Article III, Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution, as indeed it was subject to further proceedings before the RTC on the proper
or correct amount of just compensation. R.A. 8974 requires the government to pay at two
stages: first, immediately upon the filing of the complaint, the initial deposit which is 100%
of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR, and the
value of the improvements and/or structures sought to be expropriated; and second, the just
compensation as determined by the court, when the decision becomes final and executory,
in which case the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the just
compensation as determined by the court and the amount already or initially paid.
Accordingly, absent full payment of just compensation, interest on the unpaid portion
likewise runs as a matter of law and follows as a matter of course - in order to place the
owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking
occurred.
As to the specific date of taking, Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court clearly
provides that the value of just compensation shall be determined as of the date of the taking
126 of 578
Case Digests
of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. Thus, in a situation where
the property is taken for public use before the initial deposit is made - such as in this case -
interest must necessarily accrue from the time the property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court, to ensure that the owner is fully
placed in a position as whole as he was before the taking occurred.
EDITHA S. MEDINA v. SPS. NICOMEDES AND BRIGIDA LOZADA

G.R. No.185303, August 1, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court mandates that appeal is the remedy with respect
to a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case; and a petition for certiorari
is unavailable if there is appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law pursuant to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules. Also, it is basic in remedial law that
an order of dismissal of the complaint is a final order which is subject to appeal.
FACTS
A Complaint was filed by the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) against the defendants
(herein private respondents). Petitioners failed to append a copy thereof to their instant
Petition.
A Motion to Dismiss with Motion to Punish for Contempt was filed by the defendants
on the grounds that the cause of action is barred by prior judgment; plaintiffs have absolutely
no cause of action; the court has no more jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action;
plaintiffs and their counsel are guilty of blatant forum shopping; and the action has
prescribed. Plaintiffs filed their Vehement Opposition.
Respondent Judge Lorna Navarro Domingo issued the first assailed Order dismissing
the case on the ground of res judicata. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied for lack of merit.
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which was dismissed. The
CA ruled that the assailed Orders dismissing the Complaint on the ground of res judicata and
denying the Motion for Reconsideration are final orders and completely dispose of the case.
Appeal, and not a special civil action for certiorari, is the correct remedy to elevate said final
orders. The manner of appealing said final orders is provided under Rule 41 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The instant Petition for Certiorari cannot be used by
petitioners as a substitute for a lost appeal. Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper
remedy, the petition may be dismissed outright. The petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUE
127 of 578
Case Digests
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for review by certiorari via Rule 65.
RULING
NO. The Court totally agrees with the CA. The CA ruled that an order or a judgment is
deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can be done
with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or judgment ends the litigation in the lower
court. An order of dismissal, whether correct or not, is a final order. It is not interlocutory
because the proceedings are terminated; it leaves nothing more to be done by the lower
court. Therefore, the remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order.
Where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be
entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually
exclusive, not alternative, or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute
for an appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy
occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available
appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. The special civil action for certiorari is a
limited form of review and is a remedy of last recourse. Where an appeal is available,
certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
It bears emphasis that the general rule is that a writ of certiorari will not issue where
the remedy of appeal is available to the aggrieved party. The remedies of appeal in the
ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or cumulative. Time and again, the High Court has reminded members of the
bench and bar that the special civil action of Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for a
lost appeal.
Indeed, Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court mandates that appeal is the remedy
with respect to a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case; and a petition
for certiorari is unavailable if there is appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law pursuant to Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules. The petitioners filed
their Rule 65 certiorari petition before the CA on April 8, 2008 after they received a copy of
the RTC Order dated December 28, 2007 denying their Motion for Reconsideration thereof
on February 7, 2008. By the time they filed their CA petition for certiorari, the reglementary
period to appeal the RTC Order of dismissal of the petitioners' Complaint to the CA had
already lapsed. In fact, their CA petition for certiorari was even filed a day late, bearing in
mind that 2008 was a leap year and the period to file a Rule 65 certiorari petition is not later
than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution pursuant to Section 4, Rule 65
of the Rules. Also, it is basic in remedial law that an order of dismissal of the complaint is a
final order which is subject to appeal. Consequently, the CA committed no reversible error.
128 of 578
Case Digests
SHERWIN T. GATCHALIAN v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 229288, August 1, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
A thorough reading of the Morales decision, therefore, would reveal that it was limited
in its application - that it was meant to cover only decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases. Bearing in mind that Morales dealt with an interlocutory order in an
administrative case, it cannot thus be read to apply to decisions or orders of the Ombudsman
in non-administrative or criminal cases.
FACTS
Six different criminal complaints were filed by the Field Investigation Office of the
Office of the Ombudsman, Cesar V. Purisima, and Rustico Tutol against several individuals,
including petitioner Sherwin T. Gatchalian. Specifically, Gatchalian was one of the
respondents in OMB-C-C-13-0212, a complaint accusing the respondents therein of (a)
violation R.A. 3019; (b) Malversation under Article 217 of the RPC; and (c) violation of the
MORB in relation to Sections 36 and 37 of R.A. 7653. The said complaint arose from the sale
of shares in Express Savings Bank, Inc., in which Gatchalian was a stockholder, in 2009, to
Local Water Utilities Administration, a government-owned and controlled corporation.
In a Joint Resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Gatchalian

While it was the other respondents - members of the Board of Trustees of LWUA - who were
directly responsible for the damage caused to the government by the acquisition by LWUA
of ESBI's shares, the Ombudsman found that the latter's stockholders who sold their shares,
including Gatchalian, profited from the transaction. The Ombudsman held that in view of
ESBI's precarious financial standing at the time of the transaction, the windfall received by
Gatchalian, and the other stockholders must be deemed an unwarranted benefit, advantage,
or preference within the ambit of R.A. 3019.
The respondents in the Ombudsman cases, including Gatchalian, filed separate

motions for reconsideration of the Joint Resolution which were denied. Aggrieved,
Gatchalian filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and
sought to annul the Joint Resolution and the Joint Order of the Ombudsman for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion. He argued that the Ombudsman made a general
conclusion without specifying a "series of acts" done by him that would "clearly manifest a
concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime." Furthermore, he argued
that he was neither a director nor an officer of ESBI, such that he never negotiated nor was
he personally involved with the transaction in question. Ultimately, Gatchalian claimed that
there was no probable cause to indict him of the crimes charged. Procedurally, he explained
that he filed the Petition for Certiorari with the CA, and not with this Court, because of the
ruling in Morales v. Court of Appeals.
The CA issued a Resolution wherein it held that it had no jurisdiction over the case.
The CA opined that the Morales ruling should be understood in its proper context, i.e., that
129 of 578
Case Digests
what was assailed therein was the preventive suspension order arising from an
administrative case filed against a public official. Gatchalian sought reconsideration of the
CA's Resolution dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. The CA upheld its earlier Resolution.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in dismissing Gatchalian's Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
for its alleged lack of jurisdiction over the said case.
RULING
NO. The Morales decision should be read and viewed in its proper context. The Court
in Morales held that the CA had subject matter jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 filed therein because what was assailed in the said petition was a preventive
suspension order, which was an interlocutory order and thus unappealable, issued by the
Ombudsman. Consistent with the rationale of Estrada, the Court held that a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 was proper as R.A. 6770 did not provide for an appeal procedure
for interlocutory orders issued by the Ombudsman. The Court also held that it was correctly
filed with the CA because the preventive suspension order was an incident of an
administrative case. The Court in Morales was thus applying only what was already well-
established in jurisprudence.
It must likewise be pointed out that the Court, in arriving at the decision in Morales,
cited and was guided by the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong. In Capulong, a
preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman was questioned through a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the CA. Also, as aptly pointed out by the CA in its
assailed Resolution, "the Supreme Court never mentioned the proper remedy to be taken
from the Ombudsman's orders in non-administrative cases or criminal cases, such as the
finding of probable cause. In fact, this matter was not even alluded to in the Morales
decision."
A thorough reading of the Morales decision, therefore, would reveal that it was
limited in its application - that it was meant to cover only decisions or orders of the
Ombudsman in administrative cases. The Court never intimated, much less categorically
stated, that it was abandoning its rulings in Kuizon and Estrada and the distinction made
therein between the appellate recourse for decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in
administrative and non-administrative cases. Bearing in mind that Morales dealt with an
interlocutory order in an administrative case, it cannot thus be read to apply to
decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in non-administrative or criminal cases.
Gatchalian's contention that the unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 6770

declared in Morales equally applies to both administrative and criminal cases — and thus
the CA from then on had jurisdiction to entertain petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 to
question orders and decisions arising from criminal cases — is simply misplaced. Section 14
of R.A. 6770 was declared unconstitutional because it trampled on the rule-making powers
130 of 578
Case Digests
of the Court by 1) prescribing the mode of appeal, which was by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
for all cases whether final or not; and 2) rendering nugatory the certiorari jurisdiction of the
CA over incidents arising from administrative cases.
Following the principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere — or follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled — the Court therefore upholds the
abovementioned established rules on appellate procedure, and so holds that the CA did not
err in dismissing the case filed by petitioner Gatchalian for lack of jurisdiction.
131 of 578
Case Digests
JOSE A. BERNAS and the WHARTON RESOURCES GROUP INC. v. THE ESTATE OF
FELIPE YU HAN YAT, represented by HERO T. YU
DOCTRINE
Forum shopping where there exist: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed
for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party
is successful would amount to res judicata.
FACTS
Yu Han Yat subdivided the subject property into 60 lots as part of his plan to develop
and convert the subject property. As a consequence, derivative titles were issued in his name.
Yu Han Yat applied for loans with several banks using some of the Yu Han Yat TCTs as
security. However, when the mortgage instruments were presented for registration, the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City refused to record the same on the ground that the Yu Han
Yat TCTs overlapped with the boundaries covered by another title registered in the name of
Esperanza Nava. However, the Land Registration Authority reversed the action taken by the
Register of Deeds, and ordered the registration of the mortgage instruments on Yu Han Yat's
TCTs.
Meanwhile, petitioners Jose A. Bernas and Felomena S. Mejia claimed ownership over
the subject property. They claim that Nava was the registered owner of a parcel of land until
she sold parts of the said lot to Mejia and Gregorio Galarosa. Mejia executed with Nava a Deed
of Sale with Right of Redemption by virtue of which Mejia acquired the real property, subject
to Nava's right to redeem the same. When Nava failed to redeem the property, Mejia then
filed a petition for consolidation of title under her name. The petition was granted.
On February 21, 1992, Bernas, for and on behalf of Wharton entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement with Mejia whereby the latter agreed to sell to Wharton the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 336663. Bernas discovered that there was another title
covering about three hectares which overlapped a portion of the property. Bernas filed an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim on Yu Han Yat's TCTs, claiming that a Deed of Sale was executed
between himself, for and on behalf of Wharton, and Mejia over the realty covered by TCT No.
336663 which overlaps portions covered by Yu Han Yat's TCTs.
On the basis of this adverse claim filed by Bernas, the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City refused to record the subject mortgages affecting the Yu Han Yat TCTs. This prompted
Yu Han Yat to file another consulta with the LRA which ordered the registration of the
mortgage to the properties.
Afterwards, on September 18, 1992, Yu Han Yat filed a Petition for Quieting of
Title before the RTC of Quezon City. Bernas also filed an Answer with Application for
132 of 578
Case Digests
Injunctive Relief to restrain Yu Han Yat from undertaking development works on the subject
property.
On December 20, 1993, the RTC issued an Order granting Bernas' application for
preliminary injunction. On August 12, 1994, Yu Han Yat filed an Amended Petition to implead
Wharton, in view of the fact that the latter was the beneficial owner of the subject property
and that Bernas was only its agent. Trial ensued, and on March 15, 2004, the RTC issued a
Decision ruling in favor of the Estate of Nava, et al., and Wharton. In its Decision, the CA
granted Yu Han Yat's appeal. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES
1) Whether petitioners complied with Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure;
2) Whether the filing of the Petitions constituted forum shopping; whether Petitions
are barred by res judicata.
RULING
1. YES. As a general rule, the Court is not a trier of facts, and that petitions under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court should only raise questions of law. This rule, however, is subject to
the following exceptions:
(1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the

interference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) the judgement is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are
based; (7) the findings of absence of fact are contradicted by the presence of evidence on
record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and such
(11) findings are contrary to the admission of both parties.
Some of the exceptions are present in this case. The rulings alone of the RTC and the
CA were contradictory to the point that they differ on their rulings on each of the issues
presented in this case. Further, and as will be discussed in detail later on, the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion in arriving at certain factual findings and legal conclusions. The
Court must perforce conduct a judicious examination of the records to arrive at a just
conclusion for this case.
2. NO. Petitioners did not commit forum shopping by filing separate appeals. In
Young v. Spouses Sy, the Court held that there is forum shopping where there exist:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful would amount to res
judicata.
133 of 578
Case Digests
While there was identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, there was no identity
of parties in the case at bar. Granted that both Mejia and Bernas trace their title from Nava,
this does not, by itself, make their interests identical. Bernas' and Mejia's interests remain
separate, and a judgment on one will not amount to res judicata on the other as, for instance,
Bernas could, and did, raise the defense that he was an innocent purchaser for value of the
subject property and thus should not be bound by any adverse judgment should Mejia's title
be found defective. The same reasoning applies to respondent's assertion that Mejia's and
Bernas' claims were now barred by res judicata because the Heirs of Nava did not appeal.
The heirs of Nava hold an interest separate from Mejia's and Bernas', and the latter could not
be adversely affected by the fact that the Heirs of Nava no longer filed an appeal.
134 of 578
Case Digests
BENEDICTO V. YUJUICO v. FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY

DOCTRINE
The party, who is barred from appealing and claiming that he has not recovered enough,
must have recovered a judgment upon a claim which is indivisible and, after its rendition, has
coerced by execution full or partial satisfaction. Thus, having elected to collect from the
judgment by execution, he has ratified it, either in toto or partially, and should be estopped from
prosecuting an appeal inconsistent with his collection of the amount adjudged to him.
FACTS
On May 14, 1993, appellant then Far East Bank and Trust Company approved the
renewal of GTI Sportswear Corporation's Omnibus Credit Line. This was secured by a
Comprehensive Surety Agreement executed by appellee Benedicto V. Yujuico in his personal
capacity. He was also the president of appellee GTI.
Negotiations were undertaken to settle GTI's trust receipt obligation under the OCL.
During these negotiations, GTI made known to appellant bank its request for the conversion
of its peso loan to US dollar-denominated loan. An exchange of communications concerning
the conversion transpired but no definite agreement on the said conversion was put into
writing.
Thereafter, Yujuico, on behalf of appellee GTI and in his personal capacity as surety,
and appellant's First Vice President Ricardo G. Lazatin, on behalf of appellant bank, signed a
Loan Restructuring Agreement (LRA), the subject of which was appellee GTI's outstanding
balance on its Omnibus Credit Line in the amount of P25,208,874.84. The agreement
expressly stated that the restructured loan continues to be secured by the Comprehensive
Surety Agreement previously executed by appellee Yujuico in favor of appellant bank.
After the signing of the restructuring agreement, appellee GTI, reiterated its request
for the re-denomination of its loan obligation to US dollars. Appellant bank, however, denied
the request and informed appellees that the conversion was not deemed workable in view
of the following considerations: appellant bank requires long-term FCDU loans to be fully
collateralized and appellee GTI, as borrower, must have adequate FCDU placements with
appellant bank as well as maintain substantial deposit ADB levels.
In a letter, appellant bank demanded that GTI update all its unpaid amortizations on
the outstanding restructured loan with a principal balance of P11,376,666.25 not later than
September 30, 1997, and to settle all its other past due obligations to avert any legal action.
The appellees filed against appellant bank a Complaint for Specific Performance with
Preliminary Injunction with the RTC. They also prayed for exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.
135 of 578
Case Digests
By way of counterclaim, appellant bank prayed that appellees be ordered to jointly

and severally pay their obligations under the loan restructuring agreement amounting to
P15,798,642.39 as well as appellees' other obligations under the Export Packing Credit
Facility in the amount of P2,333,531.11 and Trust Receipt Agreements in the amount of
P1,922,646.60.
The court a quo ruled that appellant bank indeed agreed to convert to US dollar
appellee GTI's peso loan obligation. The conversion also resulted in the novation of appellee
GTI's loan obligation. As a result, appellee Yujuico was accordingly released from his
obligations as surety pursuant to Article 1215 of the New Civil Code in conjunction with
paragraph 1 of Article 1291 of the same Code. In addition, the court a quo dismissed without
prejudice appellant bank's counterclaims for failure to pay the required filing fees.
Appellant bank then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The appellant bank
manifested that anent the first ground, defendant hereby manifests its acceptance of and
willingness to abide by the decision of the RTC. As mandated by the RTC, defendant
acknowledges and confirms its obligation to convert the restructured Omnibus Line of
plaintiff GTI Sportswear from a peso account into a US Dollar denominated loan obligation.
The motion for reconsideration was denied. Aggrieved, appellant bank filed an appeal before
the CA. The CA partially granted the appeal. Hence, the present Rule 45 Petition filed by
petitioner Benedicto V. Yujuico.
ISSUE
Whether the CA has legal basis to entertain the appeal as respondent had already
performed a partial execution of the Decision of the RTC which prevents respondent from
appealing the Decision of the RTC.
RULING
The party, who is barred from appealing and claiming that he has not recovered
enough, must have recovered a judgment upon a claim which is indivisible and, after its
rendition, has coerced by execution full or partial satisfaction. Thus, having elected to collect
from the judgment by execution, he has ratified it, either in toto or partially, and should be
estopped from prosecuting an appeal inconsistent with his collection of the amount
adjudged to him.
In fine, the claim must be one which is indivisible and there must be an execution of
the judgment, either partially or fully. Indeed, the claim of respondent against GTI and
petitioner Yujuico is indivisible since it cannot be split up and made the basis for several
causes of action. However, there is yet no execution of the RTC Decision, either fully or
partially. Respondent merely acceded to the directive of the RTC "to acknowledge and
confirm its obligation to convert the restructured Omnibus Credit Line of GTI from Philippine
Peso loan account into a US Dollar denominated loan obligation." In fact, the RTC, while it
recognized that GTI is indebted to respondent, ruled that "the liquidation of this obligation
is however subject to a condition that the bank respondent must first comply with its
136 of 578
Case Digests
obligation to convert the Peso loan account into a US Dollar denominated loan and thereafter
compute the outstanding obligation of GTI and petitioner Yujuico to it."
Even in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent wherein it manifested its
acceptance of and willingness to abide by the RTC directive, respondent alleged that "with
the submission of the computation of the outstanding obligation of GTI and petitioner
Yujuico pursuant to the Statement of Account it attached as Annex 'A' thereof, they should
now be directed to pay respondent under the restructured Omnibus Line the amount of
US$1,132,795.31 plus the stipulated interests and penalty charges thereon from October 31,
2004 until the same is fully paid in US dollar currency." Thus, GTI or petitioner Yujuico has
not been coerced by execution to satisfy the RTC judgment; and respondent is not precluded
to appeal the resolution of the RTC that there is novation and petitioner Yujuico is released
from his obligation as a surety. Additionally, respondent questioned the release of petitioner
Yujuico as surety and the ruling on the presence of novation in the said Motion for
Reconsideration.
Tañada v. Court of Appeals cited by petitioner Yujuico is not persuasive. In that
case, the assailed order of the lower court dated April 8, 1941, which was subsequently
opposed by Narcisa Mendoza, the defendant therein, "had become final and executory, and
it could no longer be disturbed, not even by the very court which rendered it" because
"Mendoza did not question the reasonableness of said order before the court, much less did
she interpose an appeal therefrom." The actuations of Mendoza after the issuance of the said
order — surrender to the Register of Deeds the certificates of title covering the lands
involved for annotation of therein petitioners' lien; delivery to the petitioners their one-half
share of the yearly produce from 1941 to 1958 — were tantamount to virtual acquiescence
to the assailed order and she could not subsequently be allowed to repudiate her
representations or assume an inconsistent posture. It is within this context that the principle
being raised by petitioner Yujuico was invoked by the Court.
137 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE v. XXX
G.R. Nos. 205888, August 22, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
In determining the admissibility of evidence as part of the res gestae, the test is whether
the act or declaration was made as a spontaneous reaction and is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of
the transaction itself and whether it negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture
testimony.
FACTS
4 separate Informations for Rape and 1 Information for Attempted Rape were filed in
the RTC against XXX. In her direct testimony, AAA testified that the accused is her father. At
the hearing on January 20, 2003, Public Prosecutor Marites Macarubbo informed the court
that AAA died. Ms. Welgieta Banzuelo, a social worker at the DSWD, presented to the court
the Death Certificate of AAA. Upon motion by the defense, the direct testimony of AAA was
ordered expunged from the records on grounds that AAA was not subjected to cross-
examination. However, despite the death of AAA and her direct testimony having been
expunged from the records, the prosecution presented other prosecution witnesses: Gelmie
Calug, EEE, Lovella Opada and Vicente Tiengo. The prosecution adduced evidence of res
gestae through the testimonies of its witnesses, Gelmie Calug and EEE.
EEE, an aunt of AAA, testified that at noontime on April 16, 2001, AAA arrived at her
house. She noticed that AAA was sad and crying. Upon her inquiry, AAA told her that she was
raped by her father on April 8, and 3 times hours ago on April 15, 2001. During the few days
of AAA's stay at her house, she often saw AAA crying. A few days after, AAA went to the house
of Pedro de los Santos to work as a house helper. Her employer, Pedro de los Santos, helped
her in instituting these rape cases, and EEE and de los Santos accompanied AAA to report the
incident to the police.
Gelmie Calug testified that on April 18, 2001, AAA reported for work for the first time
as a house helper in the house of Pedro de los Santos. He noticed that AAA was sad and lonely,
and often saw her crying. She confided to him her problems and revealed to him that she was
raped by her own father on April 8 and 15 of that year 2001. He noticed that AAA had told
their employer, Pedro de los Santos, of what had befallen to her. After 8 months, she left the
de los Santos household, and he did not know anymore of her whereabouts and only to hear
from the radio broadcast that AAA was dead.
The RTC found XXX guilty only for 3 counts of Rape committed on April 15, 2001. The
RTC, despite the lack of AAA's testimony due to her intervening death, mainly relied on the
separate testimonies of Gelmie Calug and EEE in finding XXX guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
The RTC found that the utterances made by AAA to them, while not made immediately or
simultaneous to the rape incidents, could still be considered part of the res gestae as they
were "so connected with it as to make the act or declaration and the main fact inseparable,
138 of 578
Case Digests
or be generated by an excited feeling which extends, without break or let down, from the
moment of the event they illustrate." The CA upheld the RTC decision.
ISSUE
Whether the testimonies of Calug and EEE pertaining to the statements of AAA can be
considered part of the res gestae and thus produce a conviction.
RULING
YES. It is well entrenched that a witness may only testify on facts derived from his
own perception and not on what he has merely learned or heard from others. Hence, as a
general rule, hearsay evidence is inadmissible in courts of law. As an exception, however,
Section 42 of Rule 130 allows the admission of hearsay evidence as part of the res gestae.
The following requisites must, thus, be satisfied for the exception to apply: (i) that the
principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (ii) that the statements were made
before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (iii) that the
statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.
In determining the admissibility of evidence as part of the res gestae, the test is
whether the act or declaration was made as a spontaneous reaction and is so intimately
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded as a part of the transaction itself and whether it negates any premeditation or
purpose to manufacture testimony.
The Court in People v. Manhuyod, Jr. laid down several factors in determining
whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have satisfied the
requirement of spontaneity: It goes without saying that the element of spontaneity is critical.
The following factors are then considered in determining whether statements offered in
evidence as part of the res gestae have been made spontaneously, viz., (1) the time that
lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement; (2)
the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made
the statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence
and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement
itself.
EEE's testimony places AAA's utterances only several hours from the time the
disputed incidents took place on April 15, 2001. Based on EEE’s testimony, it is clear that at
the time AAA uttered her statements to EEE - a few hours after the incidents - the effect of
the occurrence on her mind still continued. Her demeanor, as narrated by EEE, showed that
she was still suffering as a result of the violation of her person and honor by her father, herein
accused-appellant XXX. Moreover, following the standard in Manhuyod, Jr. while the
utterances were not made contemporaneous to the act described, the Court finds that they
remained to be "so connected with it as to make the act or declaration and the main fact
139 of 578
Case Digests
particularly inseparable." More importantly, the Court finds nothing on the records that
would show an intervening event between the time of the rape incidents and the time of
AAA's revelation to EEE that would indicate a restoration of her mental balance as in fact,
she was still under distress when she arrived at EEE's home.
Meanwhile, with respect to Calug's testimony, which consisted of statements given by

AAA on April 18, 2001, or 3 days after the April 15, 2001 incidents, the Court finds that the
RTC and CA incorrectly considered the same as part of the res gestae. In this light, the Court
finds that the utterances made to Calug are far too removed from the event described as to
form part of the res gestae.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court finds that the critical element of carnal
knowledge through force was sufficiently established by the evidence on record. The clear
and straightforward testimony of EEE, together with the medico-legal findings consistent
with the facts described, produces a conviction beyond reasonable dou bt that XXX is guilty
for the repeated defilement of his own daughter, AAA.
140 of 578
Case Digests
PNP-CIDG v. P/SUPT. VILLAFUERTE

G.R. Nos. 219771 & 219773, September 18, 2018, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
As a rule, questions of fact are proscribed in Rule 45 petitions. A question of fact exists
when doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the resolution of
the issue raised requires a calibration of the whole evidence. As a trier of laws, the Court is not
duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence already considered in the proceedings
below. As an exception, however, the Court may resort to a factual inquiry in case there are
conflicting findings between or among the tribunals' ruling on certain questions of fact.
FACTS
In 2009, the PNP programmed to purchase 3 fully equipped helicopters with a budget
of Php105,000,000.00 which was modified from 3 to 1 fully equipped and two 2 standard
helicopters. MAPTRA and BEELINE participated in the public bidding. The Bids and Awards
Committee of the PNP resolved to award the contract to MAPTRA.
The head of BAC, PSSUPT. Detran, instructed Villafuerte to prepare the necessary
documents pertaining to the award of the contract to the winning bidder MAPTRA.
Villafuerte prepared the Supply Contract and the Notice to Proceed signed by then PNP Chief
Jesus Versoza.
After securing a performance bond from the AFP General Insurance Corporation in
favor of the PNP, two light operational helicopters were delivered at the PNP Air Unit Hangar
in Pasay City. After inspection, the PNP released 50% of the contract price to MAPTRA. In
2010, a fully equipped Robinson R44 Helicopter was delivered to PNP and a certification of
inspection was issued. Thus, the PNP released to MAPTRA the remaining 50% balance.
Later on, an investigation was conducted regarding the procurement of the said
helicopters and the investigating body allegedly found that the helicopters that were subject
of the procurement were not brand-new contrary to the requirement of the PNP
procurement.
A Complaint was filed by the OMB-Field Investigation Office, charging several public
and private respondents, including respondent Villafuerte, with various criminal and
administrative offenses. Villafuerte claimed that his only participation in the procurement
process was the drafting of several documents under the instruction of P/Supt. Lurimer B.
Detran. The OMB concluded that the procurement process was marred with irregularities
and found substantial evidence to hold respondent Villafuerte guilty of Serious Dishonesty
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
On appeal, the CA reversed the OMB Resolution and exonerated respondent

Villafuerte from the administrative charges. Hence this appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court questioning the Decision and Resolution of the CA.
141 of 578
Case Digests
ISSUE
Whether the CA committed reversible error in reversing the OMB Resolution finding
respondent Villafuerte liable for Serious Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service.
RULING
NO. As a rule, questions of fact are proscribed in Rule 45 petitions. A question of fact
exists when doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the
resolution of the issue raised requires a calibration of the whole evidence. As a trier of laws,
the Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence already considered in
the proceedings below. As an exception, however, the Court may resort to a factual inquiry
in case there are conflicting findings between or among the tribunals' ruling on certain
questions of fact.
In this case, the Court thus finds occasion to apply the exception considering the
different factual conclusions of the OMB and the CA regarding respondent Villafuerte's
administrative liability.
142 of 578
Case Digests
JOANNE KRISTINE G. PIMENTEL v. REYNALDO ADIAO, ET. AL.

DOCTRINE
Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules mandates that "these Rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding."
FACTS
Joanne filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against respondents Reynaldo,
Christian, and Cristy. Joanne alleged that she entered into a Construction Agreement with
Reynaldo and Christian whereby Reynaldo, as contractor, agreed to undertake the
renovation of Joanne's bungalow house situated for P1,150,000.00 with a completion period
of 180 working days. If Reynaldo defaulted, Christian was designated as the successor with
the obligation to finish the renovation. Joanna paid P1,200,000.00 and an additional amount
of P30,000.00 for the repair of her other house. Cristy allegedly conformed with the
obligations of Reynaldo and Christian by signing her name in the acknowledgment receipt of
the P30,000.00.
Reynaldo, did not complete the renovation of Joanna's house and left the project
unfinished. Joanna wrote a demand letter to Reynaldo to complete the work, but the latter
refused to do so. She also made verbal demands upon Cristy and Christian but was left
unheeded. Joanna took the position that their failure to complete the renovation and repair
of her houses constitutes a breach of the construction agreement, and having incurred in
delay, Reynaldo, Christian and Cristy are to indemnify her P1,000.00 per day.
The RTC issued a Notice of Preliminary Conference which set the case for preliminary
conference on February 14, 2014 and required the parties to file their respective pre-trial
briefs and serve the same on the adverse party in such manner as to ensure the latter's
receipt thereof at least three days before the scheduled date. A Notice of Pre-Trial was also
issued on January 30, 2014, setting the case for PT on March 17, 2014 and the directive anent
the filing of the PT brief was reiterated.
On February 12, 2014, Cristy filed her PT brief and furnished Joanna a copy thereof
by registered mail. During the PC held on February 14, 2014, all the parties and their
counsels appeared. Reynaldo and Christian filed their PT brief and furnished Joanna a copy
thereof on the said date. The parties pre-marked their respective exhibits.
On March 17, 2014, the PT hearing was held and attended by the parties and their
respective counsels. Joanna filed her PT brief, which was objected to by the counsels of the
other parties for being filed late. Atty. Edwin V. Patricio, Joanna's counsel, explained that the
pre-marking of exhibits was done only on February 14, 2014, and was of the belief that the
pre-marking of exhibits was not yet terminated. He also said that he planned to file a motion
for extension of time to submit the PT brief.
143 of 578
Case Digests
The RTC dismissed the case because Atty. Patricio violated the mandate found in
Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules in relation to Section 5 of the same Rule, and in view of the
manifestations by the other counsels that they would no longer pursue the counterclaims of
their clients.
Joanna filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that her counsel received on
February 12, 2014, a copy of the Notice of PC and the Notice of PT and it was improbable for
Joanna's counsel to submit the PT brief at least three days prior to February 14, 2014. While
Joanna was unable to file her PT brief on the said date, she and her counsel were present and
actively participated therein with her counsel provisionally marking the photographs to be
presented as evidence subject to her counsel's request to mark the originals thereof on
March 17, 2014. Given the circumstances, Joanna's counsel honestly believed that the pre-
marking of exhibits or the PC was not yet terminated and planned to submit a motion for
extension of time to file the PT brief. On March 17, 2014, Joanna filed with the RTC her PT
brief and furnished the other parties’ copies thereof. Joanna claimed that given the foregoing
series of events, she did not willfully commit an act that constituted an utter disregard of the
Rules or orders of the RTC. Joanna pleaded that the rule on the timely submission of the PT
brief be interpreted liberally in her favor and that the adverse parties also violated Section
6, Rule 18 in that they failed to attach relevant documents thereto and were late in filing their
PT briefs.
The RTC denied Joanna's motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
RTC Order. Hence, the instant Petition.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the complaint for Joanna's failure to file her PT
brief on time, given that respondents also violated Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 18.
RULING
YES. Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules mandates that "these Rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding."
The Court in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Dando held that the Court is fully
aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded for these prescribed
procedures insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. However, it is equally
true that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to
courts the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most
mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to
litigation speedily and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard.
This is not to say that adherence to the Rules could be dispensed with. However,
exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility in their application. 49 In not
144 of 578
Case Digests
a few instances, the Court relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the
parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merit. This is in line with the time-
honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties the chance to
argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should, thus, not
serve as basis of decisions. In that way, the ends of justice would be better served. For,
indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival
claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to
promote the administration of justice.
Given the realities obtaining in this case, the liberal construction of the Rules will
promote and secure a just determination of the parties' causes of action against each other.
As the court of the last resort, justice should be the paramount consideration when the Court
is confronted with an issue on the interpretation of the Rules, subject to the petitioner's
burden to convince the Court that enough reasons obtain to warrant the suspension of a
strict adherence to procedural rules.
The Court is convinced with the explanations of Joanna for her plea to relax the
application of the Rules in her case. The Court notes that, like BPI, the untimely filing of
her PT brief was so far the only procedural lapse that she committed. She had been diligent
in the prosecution of her cause against respondents and had not demonstrated a proclivity
to delay the proceedings. As she pointed out, several matters that would be taken up in the
PT hearing had already been accomplished in the PC. In fact, even the trial dates had been
agreed upon by the parties. In turn, as Joanna correctly observes, respondents were
themselves not fully compliant with the Rules as observed by the RTC, and to the Court's
mind, they will not suffer substantial prejudice if the case is litigated on the merits.
Adopting the language of BPI, accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would be
best served if the parties are given the full opportunity to thresh out the real issues and
litigate their claims in a full-blown trial. Besides, respondents would not be prejudiced
should the RTC proceed with the hearing on the merits, as they are not stripped of any
affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of law.
145 of 578
Case Digests
INDUSTRIAL PERSONNEL AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. v. COUNTRY BANKERS

INSURANCE CORPORATION
DOCTRINE
[T]he instant case resolved by the Court is not a claims adjudication case. The subject
Resolution and Order of the IC that was concurred in by the DOF and OP, which the Court now
reinstates, were issued in the IC's capacity as a regulator and not as an adjudicator of
claims, as admitted by the IC itself. Hence, while the Court herein reinstates the IC's Resolution
finding that disciplinary action is warranted in the eventuality that respondent Country
Bankers continues to delay settling the claims of petitioner IPAMS, the matter should be
referred back to the IC so that it could determine the remaining amount and extent of the
liability that should be settled by respondent Country Bankers in order to avoid the IC's
disciplinary action.
FACTS
In 2000, petitioner Industrial Personnel and Management Services, Inc. (IPAMS)
began recruiting registered nurses for work deployment in the U.S. Since it takes eighteen
(18) to twenty four (24) months for the entire immigration process to complete, huge
amounts of money are necessarily advanced to the nurse applicants. By reason of the
advances, the nurse applicants were required to post surety bonds to guarantee that they
will comply with certain conditions during the immigration process.
The respondent Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (Country Bankers) and

IPAMS agreed to provide the bonds for the nurses. Under the agreement between Country
Bankers and IPAMS, the former will provide surety bonds and the premiums were paid by
IPAMS on behalf of the nurse applicants. The surety bonds issued by Country Bankers state
that the liability of the surety company shall be limited only to actual damages arising from
Breach of Contract by the applicant.
A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was later executed by the parties on Feb. 1,

2002, stipulating the various requirements for collecting claims from Country Bankers
on the surety bond. These include two demand letters, an affidavit stating the reason of any
violation to be executed by a responsible officer of the recruitment agency, a statement of
account including detailed expenses and a transmittal claim letter.
On the basis of the MOA, IPAMS submitted its claims under the surety bonds issued
by Country bankers. For its part, Country Bankers, upon receipt on the aforementioned
documents stipulated under the MOA, paid the claims to IPAMS. However, according to
IPAMS, starting 2004, some of its claims were not settled by Country Bankers. The claims
were not denied by Country Bankers, but it alleged to be cash-strapped that time. In the
meantime, the unpaid claims accumulated to P11,309,411.56.
146 of 578
Case Digests
IPAMS took the matter up with the General Manager of Country Bankers, Mr. Ignacio
Ong (Ong). In a letter-response, Ong acknowledged the obligations of Country Bankers,
apologized for the delay in payment, proposed to amortize the settlement of claims by paying
a semi-monthly amount and promised to pay future claims within a 90-day period. However,
this commitment was not fulfilled, and IPAMS had to deal with the new General Manager of
Country Bankers, Ms. Tess Valeriano (Valeriano), who assured IPAMS that the obligations
would be paid promptly.
Despite this, the counsel of Country Bankers, Atty. Marisol Caleja, started to oppose
the payments and insisted on the production of official receipts of IPAMS. IPM opposed this,
insisting that the production of official receipts was not contemplated in the MOA and that
this was impossible since U.S. authorities did not issue official receipts.
For its part, Country Bankers alleged that due to the remarkable high loss ratio of
IPAMS, the latter's accounts were audited by Country Bankers. It alleged that IPAMS insisted
that the supporting documents could not be produced.
Due to the unwillingness of Country Bankers to settle the claims of IPAMS, the latter
sought the intervention of the Insurance Commission (IC) through a letter-complaint. As a
series of conferences proved unfruitful, the IC ordered the parties to submit their position
papers. The Claims Division of the IC later on issued a resolution in favor of IPAMS, ruling
that there is no ground for the refusal of Country Bankers to pay the claims of IPAMS.
Specifically, the IC ruled: "[W]e find the insurance company liable to settle the subject claim
otherwise, this Commission shall be constrained to take disciplinary action pursuant to
Sections 241 and 247 of the Insurance Code, as amended."
After the denial of its motion for reconsideration, Country Bankers made an appeal
before the Department of Finance (DOF), which affirmed the orders of the IC and denied the
subsequent motion to reconsider. The Office of the President (OP) affirmed the ruling of the
DOF and likewise denied a subsequent motion to reconsider. As such, Country Bankers filed
a petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule 43.
The CA reversed and set aside the rulings of the IC, DOF and the OP, holding that
respondent Country Bankers was justified in delaying the payment of the claims because of
the lack of submission by petitioner IPAMS of official receipts and other competent proof of
on the expenses it incurred. As a result, IPAMS sought direct recourse to the Supreme Court.
In the instant petition, petitioner IPAMS prays for the reversal of the CA's decision,
the suspension/revocation of the license of Country Bankers due to its commission of an
unfair claim settlement practice, the awarding of a total amount of its claim of
P21,230,643.19 and 20% thereof, as well as the awarding of moral and exemplary damages,
as well as attorney's fees and judicial costs.
ISSUES
147 of 578
Case Digests
(1) Are the suspension/revocation of Country Bankers' license, award of IPAMS' total
claim amount and damages proper in the present petition? (NO.)
(2) Was Country Bankers' refusal of IPAMS' groundless, therefore exposing it to

disciplinary action? (YES.)
RULING
(1) NO. It must be stressed that the instant case resolved by the Court is not a claims
adjudication case. The subject Resolution and Order of the IC that was concurred in by the
DOF and OP, which the Court now reinstates, were issued in the IC's capacity as a regulator
and not as an adjudicator of claims, as admitted by the IC itself. Hence, while the Court herein
reinstates the IC's Resolution finding that disciplinary action is warranted in the eventuality
that respondent Country Bankers continues to delay settling the claims of petitioner IPAMS,
the matter should be referred back to the IC so that it could determine the remaining
amount and extent of the liability that should be settled by respondent Country Bankers
in order to avoid the IC's disciplinary action.
(2) YES. It is elementary that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be no
evidence on such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. Further, when
the terms of the contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting
parties, the stipulations of the parties are controlling.
In the case at hand, respondent Country Banker failed to present any compelling
evidence that convinces the Court that the parties had the intention of adding requirements
other than the five requirements for payment of claims enumerated in the Requirements for
Claim Clause. On the contrary, several circumstances show that the submission of official
receipts was really NOT intended by the parties to be a precondition for the payment of
claims.
Country Bankers "knew as a matter of IPAMS' regular course of business that these
covered transactions are generally not issued official receipts by US government and its
agencies and the US based professional organizations and institutions involved to complete
the requirements for the issuance of an immigrant visa." Further, […] Country Bankers had
previously admitted liability and promised to make payment on similar claims under the
surety agreement even without the submission of official receipts.
As the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the contracting parties shall be

principally considered in determining the intention of the parties, and that, by virtue of
estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it
and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon, the prior actuations
of respondent Country Bankers clearly establish that it did not intend the submission of
official receipts to be a prerequisite for the payment of claims. Respondent Country Bankers
is therefore estopped from claiming that the submission of official receipts and other
"competent proof" is a further requirement for the payment of claims.
148 of 578
Case Digests
The submission of official receipts and other pieces of evidence as a prerequisite for
the payment of claims is excused by stipulation of the parties; and in lieu thereof, the
presentation of statement of accounts with detailed expenses, demand letters, and affidavits
is, by express stipulation, sufficient evidence for the payment of claims.
The law is clear and unequivocal when it states that one is entitled to adequate
compensation for pecuniary loss only for such losses as he has duly proved EXCEPT: (1)
when the law provides otherwise, or (2) by stipulation of the parties. Otherwise stated,
the amount of actual damages is limited to losses that were actually incurred and proven,
except when the law provides otherwise, or when the parties stipulate that actual damages
are not limited to the actual losses incurred or that actual damages are to be proven by
specific documents agreed upon.
[I]t is crystal clear that the petitioner IPAMS and respondent Country Bankers, by
express stipulation, agreed that in order for the former to have a valid claim under the surety
bond, the only requirements that need to be submitted are the two demand letters, an
Affidavit stating reason of any violation to be executed by responsible officer of the
Recruitment Agency, a Statement of Account detailing the expenses incurred, and the
Transmittal Claim Letter. Evidently, the parties did not include as preconditions for the
payment of claims the submission of official receipts or any other more direct or
concrete piece of evidence to substantiate the expenditures of petitioner IPAMS.
Section 92 of the Insurance Code […] states that all defects in the proof of loss, which
the insured might remedy, are waived as grounds for objection when the insurer omits to
specify to him without unnecessary delay. It is the duty of the insurer to indicate the defects
on the proofs of loss given, so that the deficiencies may be supplied by the insured. When the
insurer recognizes his liability to pay the claim, there is waiver by the insurer of any defect
in the proof of loss.
In the instant case, it must be emphasized that respondent Country Bankers, through
its General Manager […] readily acknowledged the obligations of Country Bankers under the
surety agreement, apologized for the delay in the payment of claims, and proposed to
amortize the settlement of claims by paying a semi-monthly amount of P850,000.00. Country
Bankers, after undergoing an evaluation of the total number of claims of petitioner IPAMS,
undertook the settlement of such claims even WITHOUT the submission of official receipts.
In fact, respondent Country Bankers raised up the issue on the missing official
receipts and other evidence to prove the expenses incurred by petitioner IPAMS only when
the latter requested the intervention of the IC in 2007.
Accordingly, under Section 92 of the Insurance Code, the failure to attach official
receipts and other documents evidencing the expenses incurred by petitioner IPAMS, even
149 of 578
Case Digests
assuming that it can be considered a defect on the required proof of loss, is therefore
considered waived as ground for objecting the claims of petitioner IPAMS.
150 of 578
Case Digests
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HEIRS OF ELIGIO CRUZ

DOCTRINE
Once approved by the court, a judicial compromise is not appealable and it thereby
becomes immediately executory but this rule must be understood to refer and apply only to
those who are bound by the compromise and, on the assumption that they are the only parties
to the case, the litigation comes to an end except only as regards to its compliance and the
fulfillment by the parties of their respective obligations thereunder.
FACTS
In 1977, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), then the Ministry
of Public Highways, conducted a widening of Visayas Avenue in Quezon City. The
construction encroached upon a 4,757-square meter portion of Lot 643. The disputed
portion was subdivided, and thereafter registered in the name of the Republic, but no
payment of just compensation was made.
Later, a certain Crisanta Oliquino filed with the DPWH a claim for just compensation
for and on behalf of several heirs of Eligio Cruz (the Oliquino group), the registered owner of
a portion of Lot 643, specifically, Lot 643-B. Oliquino engaged the services of Atty. Maximo
Borja to facilitate the claim, in exchange for the assignment of Php14,000,000 out of the
Php71,355,000.00 which Oliquino expected to receive from the Republic. However, Oliquino
later repudiated this assignment, prompting the Republic to release the partial payment of
Php39,533,239.13 in Oliquino's favor.
The Republic was later faced with conflicting claims of ownership over the disputed
portion of Lot 643 who were left unpaid. As such, the Republic withheld further payments
and demanded that the claimants settle their opposing claims through litigation.
Since the claimants filed to do so, the Republic filed an action for interpleader with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, impleading as defendants the following
claimants: (1) The Oliquino group; (2) Emilia Cruz-Agalabia, represented by Diosdado C.
Agalabia, as heirs of Eligio Cruz (the Agalabia group); (3) The estate and/or heirs of Virginia
Uichanco (Estate of V. Uichanco); and (4) Atty. Borja. Subsequently, Inisetas De Leon et al.
(the De Leon group) was also allowed by the RTC to intervene.
The case was later referred to the Philippine Mediation Center. After termination of
the mediation, the Oliquino group presented before the RTC a Compromise Agreement for
approval. While said agreement allocated the remaining balance of just compensation among
the defendants in the Interpleader, only the Oliquino and Agalabia groups agreed upon
the allocation. Thus, the approval of the agreement was opposed by the De Leon group and
Atty. Borja.
151 of 578
Case Digests
Notwithstanding such opposition, the RTC issued a Partial Judgment Based on

Compromise Agreement approving the terms of the Compromise Agreement. The De Leon
group and Atty. Borja thus filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Partial
Judgment, while the Oliquino and Agalabia groups moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Oliquino and Agalabia groups and granted their motion
for execution. Aggrieved, the Republic filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for
certiorari. The Republic argued that the orders directing the execution of the Partial
Judgment was premature and were issued without legal basis, since such judgment did not
adjudicate or settle the conflicting adversarial claims of the other impleaded defendants
who are not parties to the compromise agreement, namely, Atty. Borja and the De Leon
group.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. It ruled that since the Partial Judgment
had become final, it may neither be amended or corrected. According to the CA, it is
"immaterial" that the issue raised in the Interpleader has yet to be resolved, as "[t]his does
not derogate the judgment's susceptibility to execution."
ISSUE
Did the CA err in affirming the RTC's execution of its partial judgment based on the
compromise agreement?
RULING
YES. The immediate execution of the Partial Judgment approving the Compromise
Agreement facilitates the premature distribution of the Republic's remaining balance
without affording the De Leon group and Atty. Borja of the opportunity to establish their
entitlement, if any, to compensation beyond the amounts unilaterally set by the Oliquino
and Agalabia groups. This defeats the very purpose for which the Republic's Interpleader
had been filed, as it opens the portals to protracted litigation not only among the opposing
claimants, but also between said claimants and the Republic.
A compromise intended to resolve a matter under litigation is referred to as a judicial

compromise. It has the effect and authority of res judicata, although no execution may issue
until it would have received the corresponding approval of the court where the litigation
pends and its compliance with the terms of the agreement is thereupon decreed. [C]ourts are
thus bound to strictly scrutinize the same to ensure that the compromise and its execution
are compliant with the law and consistent with procedural rules.
[O]nce approved by the court, a judicial compromise is not appealable and it thereby
becomes immediately executory but this rule must be understood to refer and apply only
to those who are bound by the compromise and, on the assumption that they are the only
parties to the case, the litigation comes to an end except only as regards to its compliance
and the fulfillment by the parties of their respective obligations thereunder.
152 of 578
Case Digests
Where there are, along with the parties to the compromise, other persons involved in
the litigation who have not taken part in concluding the compromise agreement but are
adversely affected or feel prejudiced thereby, should not be precluded from invoking in the
same proceedings an adequate relief therefor. A motion to set aside the judgment to the
extent he might feel aggrieved, or might justifiably fear to be at risk by acquiescence unless
timely invoked, is such a remedy. A denial of the motion to set aside the judgment on the
compromise agreement opens the door for its possible elevation to a higher court. If the
motion is denied, he may, considering the special finality feature of the compromise
judgment, albeit partial, and its susceptibility to execution, take an appeal from the order of
denial under Rule 45 or even, when circumstances particularly warrant, the extraordinary
remedy prescribed in Rule 65, of the Rules of Court. That appeal notwithstanding, the main
case still subsists allowing him to have continued locus standi.
To recall, the Compromise Agreement divides the Republic's entire remaining

balance between and among the defendants, in accordance with the terms agreed upon by
the Oliquino and Agalabia groups. The allocation of the remaining balance was determined
without the participation of all other claimants who likewise stand as parties to the
Interpleader.
153 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PATRICK JOHN MERCADO y ANTICLA

G.R. No. 218702. October 17, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
For a "dying declaration" to be admissible in court, the following requisites must concur:
a. That the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death;
b. That at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness
of an impending death;
c. That the declarant is competent as a witness; and
d. That the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or
parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.
FACTS
An information was filed against accused-appellant Patrick John Mercado for the
murders of his aunt Alicia Mercado-Lusuriaga (Alicia) and her live-in partner, Evelyn Santos
(Evelyn). The information accused Patrick of hitting Alicia and Evelyn with a baseball bat,
pouring gasoline into their bodies and lighting them up, causing third degree burns and their
instantaneous death.
At about 2 a.m. on Oct. 15, 2007, the Bulacan house where Patrick, Alicia and Evelyn
stayed was reported to be on fire. Evelyn and Patrick were eventually brought out of the
burning house, with the former looking weak, unable to walk, badly burnt and had blood
oozing out the right side of her head.
Prosecution witnesses testified that as soon as Evelyn was carried out to safety, she
promptly accused and pointed to Patrick as the person responsible for attacking her and
Alicia as well as for setting the house on fire. Several witnesses heard the statements "ilayo
ninyo sa akin yang si Patrick [Mercado] dahil siya ang pumalo sa aking ulo at nagsunog ng
bahay," "Kuya, wag mo akong iwan papatayin ako ng pamangkin ko," and "Ilayo nyo sa akin
yan bata na yan. Yan ang papatay sa akin. Yan ang sumunog sa amin. Yan ang pumalo sa ulo
namin." While on board the ambulance, Evelyn repeated the name of Patrick as culprit and
uttered: "Te, si Patrick [Mercado] ang may gawa," "Si Patrick [Mercado] sinunog kami," and
"Si Patrick ang pumalo sa akin. Si Patrick [Mercado] ang sumunog sa amin, pati sa bahay."
Evelyn eventually died at the UST Hospital despite medical attention. Based on her
declarations, Patrick was charged for the killing of Evelyn and Alicia.
Meanwhile, Patrick offered denial as a defense, claiming that he was inside his room
reviewing for his final examination when the fire broke out. A neighbor of Patrick, Dan
Dacallos, testified that he was Patrick and an unidentified bloodied man coming out of the
house when the same was burning.
154 of 578
Case Digests
After trial, the RTC convicted Patrick Mercado of Double Murder and sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It ruled that he testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were admissible as dying declarations of Evelyn under Sec. 37 [now Sec. 38] of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and as part of the res gestae under Sec. 42 [now Sec. 44] of the
Rules.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that Mercado was the perpetrator and the
trial court's ruling that the prosecution evidence were admissible. The CA likewise held that
the RTC correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of the use of fire was sufficiently
alleged in the information. The CA, however, modified the penalty from a single count of
reclusion perpetua to two counts of reclusion perpetua for each of the murders.
ISSUES
1. Whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were admissible as Evelyn's
dying declarations;
2. Whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were admissible as part of the
res gestae;
3. Whether the qualifying circumstance of the use of fire was correctly appreciated; and
4. Whether the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing two counts of reclusion
perpetua on the appellant.
RULING
(1) YES. For a "dying declaration" to be admissible in court, the following requisites
must concur:
a. That the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of
the declarant's death;
b. That at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness
of an impending death;
c. That the declarant is competent as a witness; and
d. That the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or
parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.
The first and fourth requisites are undoubtedly present in this case. With regard to
the third requisite, since there was no evidence presented to show that Evelyn could not
have been competent to be a witness had she survived, the presumption that she would
have been competent would be sustained. The Court holds, therefore, that the third requisite
is sufficiently met.
With regard to the second requisite, the Court in [People v.] Umapas considered the
severity of the declarant's wounds to reasonably presume that she uttered her words under
the belief that her own death was already imminent. The Court therein held that "[t]here is
ample authority for the view that the declarant's belief in the imminence of her death can be
shown by the declarant's own statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the
155 of 578
Case Digests
nature of her wounds, statements made in her presence, or by the opinion of her
physician."
In the present case, Evelyn made the declarations just as she was pulled out of the fire,
with blood coming out of her forehead, when she was having difficulty breathing, and with
second and third degree burns affecting 74% of the total surface area of her body.
Considering the foregoing facts — along with the principle enunciated in Umapas that the
declarant's belief in the imminence of her death can be shown by the nature and severity of
the declarant's wounds — then the Court is convinced that the second requisite for a dying
declaration is sufficiently met.
(2) YES. A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as

part of the res gestae when (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2)
the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the
statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether
the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the
principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction
itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony.
Applying the foregoing to the present case, the statements of Evelyn were clearly part
of the res gestae. The fire — which caused severe injuries on her body, destroyed her house,
and killed her live-in partner — was undeniably a startling occurrence. Evelyn's statements
were made immediately after she was rescued, and when she was clearly suffering from
the pain caused by her injuries, thereby negating any possibility of her contriving or
manufacturing a lie.
(3) YES. The Information is sufficient as long as the qualifying circumstance is recited
in the Information, regardless of whether designated as aggravating or qualifying, or
whether written separately in another paragraph or lumped together with the general
averments in a single paragraph.
[T]he Information readily reveals that while the "use of fire" was not explicitly
mentioned as a qualifying circumstance, the Information nevertheless narrate with
sufficiency that Mercado was being accused of "causing x x x third degree burns [against the
victims] which directly caused their instantaneous death." It escapes the mind of the Court
how one could be accused of "causing x x x third degree burns" without necessarily saying
that he or she used fire in the process.
(4) NO. The correct penalty on Mercado was imposed by the RTC as the crime
committed is a complex crime, there being only a single criminal act that resulted in the
commission of multiple crimes. In a complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually
156 of 578
Case Digests
committed, they constitute only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience
of the offender. Hence, there is only one penalty imposed for the commission of a complex
crime.
[T]he CA thus incorrectly modified the penalty to impose on Mercado two counts of
reclusion perpetua because there were two victims. The Court must perforce modify the
penalty once again to conform with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Mercado is thus
liable only for a single count of reclusion perpetua for both of the deaths of Evelyn and Alicia.
157 of 578
Case Digests
JAMES PFLEIDER v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS-CEBU CITY, et al.

DOCTRINE
An appeal under Rule 41 taken from the RTC to the CA raising only questions of law shall
be dismissed, as issues purely of law are not reviewable by the said court. Similarly, an appeal
by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the appellate judgment of an RTC shall
be dismissed. The Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal, using mandatory language, in
establishing the rule that an appeal raising pure questions of law erroneously taken to the
CA shall not be transferred to the appropriate court, but shall be dismissed outright.
FACTS
Petitioner James Pfleider (Pfleider) and respondent Atty. Marie Luise Pfleider-Alba
are siblings and among the compulsory heirs of Fred and Luisa Pfleider. During his lifetime,
Fred acquired various pieces of real property in Bacolod. All the aforementioned parcels of
land were used as collaterals in the real estate mortgage in favor of the PNB executed by Fred
during his lifetime, which were later foreclosed.
On 1987, respondent Pfleider-Alba allegedly called up petitioner Pfleider and

informed him that she would redeem the foreclosed properties. Relevant thereto, Pfleider-
Alba informed Pfleider that he should accomplish a quitclaim over the foreclosed properties
since PNB required its execution. After Pfleider-Alba’s reassurance that he would not be
prejudiced by the quitclaim, Pfleider signed the same.
However, Pfleider was shocked when he learned that TCT No. T-207001
consolidating the entire Lot No. 3829, part of which he inherited from Fred pursuant to a
deed of partition, was registered in the name of Pfleider-Alba. Pfleider maintained that
Pfleider-Alba's action was not only tainted with fraud but also violated the implied trust
created between Pfleider-Alba and her siblings.
Pfleider thus filed a complaint against Pfleider-Alba and the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Though Pfleider-Alba raised several defenses, she essentially sought the dismissal of
Pfleider's complaint on the ground of litis pendentia. She contended that there is another case
pending between them, which is an action for damages and injunction, involving the same
issues, the same properties and even the same pieces of documentary evidence.
The RTC, granting a motion for preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses filed
by Pfleider-Alba, rendered its order finding that litis pendentia did not obtain. However, the
RTC granted Pfleider-Alba’s motion for reconsideration and ruled that there is litis pendentia
in the case.
158 of 578
Case Digests
When Pfleider’s motion for reconsideration was denied, he filed a notice of appeal
appealing the RTC’s order before the Court of Appeals (CA) under Rule 41.
The CA dismissed Pfleider’s appeal outright, ruling that the appeal raised pure
questions of law, involving the application of the concept of litis pendentia in the instant case
due to the pendency of Civil Case No. 00-11070 being heard before the RTC, Bacolod City.
Hence, in accordance with Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, which states that an appeal
under Rule 41 taken from the RTC to the CA raising only questions of law shall be dismissed,
the CA dismissed the instant appeal. Pfleider’s motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied by the CA.
Hence, the instant petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUES
(1) Whether Pfleider’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court
was proper. (NO.)
(2)Whether the CA erred in dismissing Pfleider’s appeal outright. (NO.)
RULING
(1) NO. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there is no available appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Jurisprudence has held that where an appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground raised is grave abuse of
discretion. Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be
dismissed outright.
In assailing the Decision and Resolution of the court a quo, Pfleider had the available
remedy of appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. A simple
perusal of the instant Petition would reveal that the ultimate issue raised is not jurisdictional
in nature, but is centered on the supposed errors of the CA in dismissing Pfleider's appeal
outright.
Under prevailing procedural rules and jurisprudence, mere errors of judgment are
not proper subjects of a special civil action for certiorari. Where the issue or question
involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, and not the jurisdiction of the
court to render said decision, the same is beyond the province of a special civil action for
certiorari.
(2) NO. Under Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, there are two (2) modes of
appealing a judgment or final order of the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction:
(a) If the issues raised involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the
proper recourse is an ordinary appeal to the CA in accordance with Rule 41 in relation
to Rule 44 of the Rules of Court; and
159 of 578
Case Digests
(b) If the issues raised involve only questions of law, the appeal shall be to the Court
by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
Corollary, under Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, an appeal under Rule 41 taken from
the RTC to the CA raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, as issues purely of law are
not reviewable by the said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by
petition for review from the appellate judgment of an RTC shall be dismissed.
The Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal, using mandatory language, in
establishing the rule that an appeal raising pure questions of law erroneously taken to
the CA shall not be transferred to the appropriate court, but shall be dismissed
outright.
Time and again, the Court has distinguished cases involving pure questions of law
from those of pure questions of fact in the following manner — a question of fact exists when
a doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts. If the query requires a
re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses or the existence or relevance of surrounding
circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual.
On the other hand, there is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as
to what the law is on certain state of facts and which does not call for an existence of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. In a case involving a
question of law, the resolution of the issue rests solely on what the law provides on the given
set of circumstances.
Ordinarily, the determination of whether an appeal involves only questions of law or

both questions of law and fact is best left to the appellate court. All doubts as to the
correctness of the conclusions of the appellate court will be resolved in favor of the CA unless
it commits an error or commits a grave abuse of discretion.
Pfleider is primarily appealing before the CA the propriety of RTC, Kabankalan City's
dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of litis pendentia. A dismissal based on this ground
does not involve a review of the facts of the case but merely the application of the law and
the applicable jurisprudence on litis pendentia.
Even if the Court does away with the procedural error committed by Pfleider when
he filed the instant Petition for Certiorari and deemed this Rule 65 Petition as an appeal
under Rule 45, it has previously held that such an appeal before the Court is limited to errors
of the appellate court and not the trial court.
Jurisprudence dictates that the errors which the Court may review in a petition for
review on certiorari are those of the CA, and not those of the trial court which rendered the
decision in the first instance. It is thus imperative that the Court refrains from conducting
160 of 578
Case Digests
further scrutiny of the findings of the trial court. To be sure, the Court's review here is limited
only to the errors of law committed by the CA and not the RTC.
161 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BENIE MON y ABARIDES

DOCTRINE
While positive testimony is generally given more weight than the defenses of denial and
alibi which are held to be inherently weak defenses because they can be easily fabricated, this
does not mean that the defense of denial and alibi should be easily dismissed by the
Court as untrue. [I]f found credible, the defenses of denial and alibi may, and should, be
considered complete and legitimate defenses. The burden of proof does not shift by the mere
invocation of said defenses; the presumption of innocence remains in favor of the accused.
FACTS
Benie Mon (Benie) was charged for the crime of murder of one Uldarico Arroyo
(Uldarico) in an amended information.
According to the prosecution, on May 2, 2010, at around 3 a.m., Manolo Guevarra and
Uldarico, both Bantay Bayan members, were having coffee in a store near their outpost
in Brgy. Addition Hills, Mandaluyong City when Benie arrived and proceeded to the back of
Uldarico. Benie then pointed and fired a gun at the right side of Uldarico's neck, causing the
latter to fall from his seat. While Uldarico was on the ground, Benie fired three more gunshots
at him and fled the place carrying said gun. Uldarico was rushed to the Mandaluyong City
Medical Center, where he was confined for 11 days and later on died.
Upon autopsy examination, a medico-legal officer noted that the cause of Uldarico's
death was a gunshot wound. The officer noted that the gunshot wound on Uldarico's lumbar
region was the fatal one as it caused lacerations in his big organs.
Meanwhile, Benie denied the allegations and testified that on May 2, 2010, at around
3 a.m. he was sleeping at his residence in San Fernando, Pilar, Capiz, located in the Visayas
Region and far from Metro Manila. He alleged that when he was arrested on July 12, 2012,
he did not think that his arrest was due to the crime of murder until he learned that he was
being arrested for Uldarico's murder.
Benie claimed to know Uldarico only as a barangay tanod of Welfareville Compound

when he studied from second year until he graduated. Prior to his arrest, Benie was arrested
on March 14, 2010 by Uldarico for violating curfew hour and brought him to jail. After
posting bail, Benie went to the province and did not see Uldarico again. Benie thought he was
being charged due to Uldarico's belief that he would take revenge on the latter for sending
him to jail.
Further, Benie presented a certification from the punong barangay of Brgy. San
Fernando certifying that Benie was a resident of said barangay from 2008 until 2012, when
162 of 578
Case Digests
he was arrested by authorities. He also presented Ricky Villa, operator of the tricycle driven
by him, who testified that Benie had been driving the tricycle since March 30, 2010 until he
was apprehended by the PNP. Ricky narrated that Benie never took a leave of absence from
driving the tricycle.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Benie guilty of murder, finding that the
prosecution was able to establish that it was Benie who killed the victim. Further, it ruled
that the shooting was attended by treachery because Benie suddenly appeared and fired at
the victim, who was unarmed and unaware of the attack.
The Court of Appeals (CA)affirmed in toto the conviction by the RTC, stressing that
the witness Manolo positively identified Benie as the perpetrator, and that alibi is an
inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused.
ISSUE
Did the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, err in giving more weight to the positive
identification of the accused over the latter's alibi?
RULING
YES. While positive testimony is generally given more weight than the defenses of
denial and alibi which are held to be inherently weak defenses because they can be easily
fabricated, this does not mean that the defense of denial and alibi should be easily
dismissed by the Court as untrue. [I]f found credible, the defenses of denial and alibi may,
and should, be considered complete and legitimate defenses. The burden of proof does not
shift by the mere invocation of said defenses; the presumption of innocence remains in favor
of the accused.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at
the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility "refers to the distance between the place
where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as
well as the facility of access between the two places.
In the instant case, the RTC and CA erred when it failed to appreciate that it was
physically impossible for Benie to commit the crime due to the distance between his
whereabouts and the place where the crime was committed. To better gauge the distance
between Capiz and Manila, Ricky testified that it would take one day and one night via
ship to travel from Capiz to Metro Manila.
In addition, even if there is another available mode of transportation, which is via an

airplane, Benie testified that he has never ridden one. Even assuming that he had ridden an
airplane on the said date, the travel time is still long, ranging from 45 minutes to one hour,
and this estimation still does not include the minutes or hours he would have had to spend
going in and out of the airport and travelling via land to Mandaluyong. The sheer distance
between these two places and the time it will take to traverse these two places makes it well
nigh impossible for Benie to commit the crime he is accused of.
163 of 578
Case Digests
In this regard, the RTC and CA failed to appreciate and give weight to the testimony
of Ricky, the operator of the tricycle driven by Benie. Ricky testified that the latter had been
driving the tricycle since March 30, 2010 until the time Benie was apprehended by the CIDG.
Ricky would have known if Benie took a leave of absence on the day the crime was committed
since one of his functions as a tricycle operator is to hand over the tricycle key to Benie in
the morning and receive it in the afternoon together with the boundary. Had Benie not been
in Capiz on the said day, Ricky would have noticed it immediately.
[There are also] [i]nconsistencies in the testimony of the lone eyewitness to the
crime[.] The Court has held that "[s]elf-contradictions and inconsistencies on a very material
and substantial matter seriously erode the credibility of a witness." [T]he testimony of
Manolo, the lone eyewitness presented by the prosecution, contains contradictions on
material points.
The shooting incident happened at the early hours of the morning, at 3:00 a.m. to be
exact, which means that it was still dark when the victim was shot. In this regard, Manolo
was not even sure as to the lighting condition during the shooting incident[.] Also, contrary
to his statement in his Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay, Manolo's testimony in open court
was that he did not actually witness the poking of the gun at the neck of Uldarico[.]
The Court has previously held that minor inconsistent statements in a witness'
affidavit and in his testimony in court do not necessarily affect his credibility. However, in
this case, the detail as to whether the witness had actually seen Benie poke the gun at the
victim's neck is a material detail as it goes into the very execution of the crime. Indeed,
based on the foregoing sworn testimony of Manolo, he did not see the shooting — all that he
saw was Uldarico falling to the ground.
In addition, Manolo's testimony as to the position of the assailant is also inconsistent

with the testimony of the expert witness, PCI Dela Cruz. Manolo testified that he and Uldarico
were seated adjacently and they were facing the same direction. The inconsistency in the
statements of the lone prosecution witness vis-a-vis the expert testimony given is an
inconsistency on a very material point.
This inconsistency, together with his admission, on cross-examination, that he really

did not see the shooting of Uldarico, significantly shows that his identification of Benie as the
perpetrator of the crime cannot be relied upon — especially in the face of Ricky's testimony
that Benie was in Capiz at the time of the shooting of Uldarico.
With the probative value of the prosecution witness' testimony greatly diminished,
the alibi of Benie is given credence. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to overcome
the burden of proving Benie's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acquittal therefore, is in order.
164 of 578
Case Digests
PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT TWO (SPV-AMC), INC. v. HON. BERNABE MENDOZA

A.M. No. RTJ-18-2538, November 21, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
A trial court may issue a temporary restraining order even without a prior hearing for
a limited period of 72 hours "if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer
grave injustice and irreparable injury." In this instance, a summary hearing, separate from the
application of the preliminary injunction, is required only to determine if a 72-hour TRO should
be extended.
A trial court may also issue ex parte a TRO for 20 days "[i]f it shall appear from facts
shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result
to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice." The trial court has twenty (20) days
from its issuance to resolve the application for preliminary injunction. If no action is taken on
the application for preliminary injunction during this period, the temporary restraining order
is deemed to have expired.
FACTS
Philippine Investment Two, Inc. (PI TWO) is a corporation operating as a special
purpose vehicle empowered to acquire or purchase assets from banking and financial
institutions. One of the properties it acquired from the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP) was covered by TCT No. T-374946 (Subject Property).
On April 20, 2015, PI TWO filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of
Possession over the subject property before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela, which
was granted. The Clerk of Court issued a writ of possession in favor of PI TWO.
On Aug. 10, 2017, the Heirs of Wilson Nuesa (Heirs of Nuesa) filed a complaint against
Adelaine Samonte (Samonte), PI TWO and DBP among others for quieting of title. The Heirs
of Nuesa alleged that the subject property belonged to their father, Wilson Nuesa (Nuesa).
They alleged that Nuesa sold the property in favor of his common-law spouse, Samonte, who
in turn mortgaged the property for a loan obtained from the DBP. The Heirs of Nuesa claimed
that the sale was null and void for lack of consideration and for being prohibited by law.
On Aug. 29, 2017, the Heirs of Nuesa informed the sheriff that they were availing of
the remedy of terceria in the Writ of Possession Case. The sheriff, in turn, informed PI TWO,
in a letter of the Heirs of Nuesa's intention to avail of the remedy of terceria and directed PI
TWO to put up a bond, pursuant to Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
On Sept. 18, 2017, respondent Judge Bernabe Mendoza issued an order admitting the
amended complaint filed by the Heirs of Nuesa in the quieting of title case and on the same
day issued an order directing the issuance of a 72-hour temporary restraining order (TRO)
upon the posting of a P500,000 bond.
165 of 578
Case Digests
On Sept. 20, 2017, respondent Judge issued the disputed TRO, which was received by
the sheriff. The sheriff is the subject of the TRO and is being enjoined from implementing the
aforementioned writ of possession. On Sept. 25, 2017, the respondent issued an order
extending the validity of the TRO until Oct. 12, 2017 after one of the Heirs of Nuesa testified
on the contents of his judicial affidavit.
PI TWO then filed a manifestation raising its objections to respondent Judge

Mendoza's Orders issuing the TRO and extending its validity. PI TWO averred that the lower
court did not have jurisdiction over PI TWO because PI TWO never received the summons
for the Quieting of Title Case. PI TWO only learned of the case when they received a pleading
titled, "Prayer for Leave of Court to Serve Summons by Publication" from a certain Atty.
German M. Balot, where the caption of the Motion states PI TWO as one of the defendants in
the case.
Meanwhile, PI TWO also alleged that the lower court irregularly extended the TRO.
The TRO was issued on September 20, 2017; thus, pursuant to the Rules, the TRO may only
be valid up to October 12, 2017, or twenty (20) days after its issuance.
On Oct. 18, 2017, or nearly a month after the issuance of the TRO, PI TWO was finally
served with the summons and a copy of the complaint in the quieting of title case. Six days
later, PI TWO received a Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) dated October 12, 2017 issued
by respondent Judge Mendoza in the Quieting of Title Case.
On Nov. 24, 2017, the Heirs of Nuesa filed a motion to substitute cash bond with an
injunction bond, which was granted prior to a scheduled hearing for the same.
On Dec. 21, 2017, PI TWO filed the instant administrative complaint for Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment, assailing the
judiciousness of the following orders issued by respondent Judge Mendoza: September 20,
2017 TRO, September 25, 2017 Order extending the TRO up to October 12, 2017; and the
November 29, 2017 Order granting Heirs of Nuesa's Motion to Substitute Cash Bond with an
Injunction Bond.
In his comment, respondent Judge Mendoza prayed that he be exonerated from the
administrative charges, averring that he immediately issued the 72-hour TRO because he
honestly believed that there appeared an extreme urgency and that the Heirs of Nuesa would
suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury since they were the present possessors of the
property subject of the writ of possession.
He further insisted that after the hearing on September 25, 2017, sufficient evidence
was established for the extension of the life of the TRO up to October 12, 2017, twenty (20)
days from September 22, 2017, the day the sheriff received the 72-hour TRO dated
September 20, 2018.
166 of 578
Case Digests
Anent his order immediately granting the motion to substitute the bond from cash to
surety, respondent Judge Mendoza admitted that he honestly overlooked that it was set for
hearing.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found that the Judge took missteps in the
assailed orders and recommended that respondent Judge Mendoza be found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and be fined in the amount of Twenty- Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or any similar infraction shall
be dealt with more severely.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the fact that the TRO was received by the sheriff cured the failure to have
the summons served on PI TWO. (NO.)
(2) Whether the respondent judge was justified in extending the TRO due to extreme
urgency. (NO.)
RULING
(1) NO. In this case, the OCA correctly observed that respondent Judge Mendoza's
failure to serve the summons on PI TWO after the issuance of the assailed 72-hour TRO
cannot be cured by his claim that it was received by the sheriff, the person enjoined from
implementing the writ of possession. The previous summons received by the sheriff was also
no longer valid considering that the complaint was amended and admitted by virtue of
respondent Judge Mendoza's Order dated September 18, 2017. Section 5, Rule 58 of the
Rules, as bolstered by Administrative Circular No. 20-95, is explicit that the adverse party
should be immediately served with the summons and a copy of the complaint.
A temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte “to preserve the status quo
until the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction[,] which cannot be issued ex
parte.” Otherwise stated, a trial court may issue a temporary restraining order even without
a prior hearing for a limited period of 72 hours "if the matter is of extreme urgency and the
applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury." In this instance, a summary
hearing, separate from the application of the preliminary injunction, is required only to
determine if a 72-hour TRO should be extended.
A trial court may also issue ex parte a TRO for 20 days "[i]f it shall appear from facts
shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would
result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice." The trial court has twenty
(20) days from its issuance to resolve the application for preliminary injunction. If no
action is taken on the application for preliminary injunction during this period, the
temporary restraining order is deemed to have expired.
(2) NO. The supposed extreme urgency of the issuance of the 72- hour TRO was belied
by respondent Judge Mendoza's setting of summary hearing for the extension of the same,
five (5) days after the issuance thereof. Section 5, Rule 58 clearly states that such summary
167 of 578
Case Digests
hearing must be conducted within the 72-hour period. Instead, respondent Judge Mendoza
set the hearing on September 25, 2017, two (2) days beyond the effectivity of the 72-hour
TRO.
To make matters worse, respondent Judge Mendoza extended the 72-hour TRO,
which had already expired, into a full 20-day TRO. An already expired TRO can no longer be
extended. The TRO was issued on September 20, 2017. Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules clearly
provides that "[i]n no case shall the total period of effectivity of the [TRO] exceed twenty (20)
days, including the original seventy-two hours provided." The effectivity of the 72- hour TRO
issued by respondent Judge Mendoza on September 20, 2017 therefore could only be
extended until October 10, 2017, twenty (20) days after its issuance. Thus, respondent Judge
erroneously extended the effectivity of the 72-hour TRO until October 12, 2017, two (2) days
beyond the period of effectivity of a TRO explicitly provided by the Rules.
168 of 578
Case Digests
HEIRS OF GEMINIANO FRANCISCO v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS SPECIAL FORMER

TWENTY SECOND (22nd) DIVISION
DOCTRINE
Filing via private courier or courier service is NOT a manner of filing allowed or
recognized by the Rules of Court.
FACTS
On August 1, 1995, the petitioners Heirs of Geminiano Francisco filed a complaint for
annulment of title, reconveyance of real property and damages before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) against respondents Wellington Velasco and Dr. Emiliano Torralba. The RTC
granted the respondents' demurrer and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals, in its
decision dated August 13, 2013, dismissed the petitioners' appeal for lack of merit.
The petitioners Heirs of Francisco claimed they received a copy of the CA's decision
dated August 19, 2013 on September 30, 2013 and as such, they only had until October 16,
2013 to file a Motion for Reconsideration. They maintain that they were able to serve and
file their Motion for Reconsideration dated October 15, 2013 via courier service on October
16, 2013.
The CA denied outright the Motion for Reconsideration for being filed out of time,
finding that the same was filed only on December 6, 2013. Consequently, the CA directed
the Division Clerk of Court to issue an entry of judgment for the case.
ISSUE
Did the CA gravely err when it denied outright the Motion for Reconsideration of
petitioners Heirs of Francisco for being filed out of time?
RULING
NO. [U]nder Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, there are only two (2) modes by
which a party may file a pleading before the courts: (1) by personal filing — presenting the
original copies thereof personally to the clerk of court, or (2) by registered mail.
The petitioners Heirs of Francisco admit that they did not file their Motion for
Reconsideration through personal filing, but by or through private courier/courier service.
Filing via private courier or courier service is NOT a manner of filing allowed or
recognized by the Rules of Court. On this point alone, the instant Petition merits dismissal.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the Court could accept the petitioners Heirs
of Francisco's act of filing by private courier as an alternative mode of filing, it must be
stressed that […] a party may file a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
169 of 578
Case Digests
resolution issued by the appellate court only within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof,
with proof of service on the adverse party.
However, the CA found that the petitioners Heirs of Francisco only filed their Motion
for Reconsideration almost two (2) months after October 16, 2013, or on December 6, 2013.
[T]he petitioners Heirs of Francisco had the burden to refute the CA's finding that the
Motion for Reconsideration was filed out of time on December 6, 2013 and substantiate their
claim that the said pleading was filed on October 16, 2013.
However, in the instant Petition itself, the petitioners Heirs of Francisco failed to
present even a shred of evidence, aside from their own self-serving allegation, to prove that
they indeed couriered their Motion for Reconsideration on October 16, 2013.
[NOTE: The ruling in this case may have been amended by the 2019
amendments to the Rules on Civil Procedure, which explicitly allow service by
accredited courier service.]
170 of 578
Case Digests
NARCISO MELENDRES, et al. v. ALICIA CATAMBAY, et al.

DOCTRINE
The Court has recognized several exceptions to the rule that only questions of law can
be raised in a Rule 45 petition. Questions of fact may be revisited by the Court: (1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of
the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent;
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.
FACTS
The instant case involves a 1,622-square-meter property located in Tanay, Rizal
described as Lot No. 3302. Petitioner Narciso Melendres (Narciso) claimed that he inherited
the subject property from Ariston Melendres (Ariston). He likewise alleged that respondent
Alicia Catambay's (Catambay) predecessor-in-interest, Alejandro Catambay (Alejandro) had
previously attested that he and Ariston owned the subject property and that Narciso and
Ariston were actually, publicly, openly, adversely and continuously in possession of the
subject property for more than thirty (30) years.
Narciso alleged that the Bureau of Lands committed a gross error in the survey of the
subject property, resulting in the reduction of the original area of the subject property from
13,742 square meters to 4,762 square meters. He argued that an OCT for the lot which covers
the subject property was mistakenly issued in favor of Alejandro, which was later sold by
Catambay in favor of the respondents Spouses Edmundo (Edmundo) and Lorenza (Lorenza)
Benavidez.
[DENR Case]
On November 24, 1989, a petition for reinvestigation was filed by Narciso before the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR in Taytay,
Rizal. Narciso claimed that a serious error was committed by the Cadastral Survey Team of
the Bureau of Lands in the conduct of the cadastral survey of the Tanay Cadastre.
171 of 578
Case Digests
According to petitioner Narciso, in spite of his written advice to respondents

Catambay and Edmundo to desist from any untoward action or from performing any act that
would disturb or alter the status quo condition of the subject property, respondents Sps.
Benavidez proceeded with the possession and occupation of the subject property by putting
filling materials on it and converting it into a commercial area[, specifically a gasoline station.
The DENR Regional Office denied the petition, and the Office of the Secretary of the
DENR denied the appeal. The Office of the President reversed the decisions of the Regional
Office and the Office of the Secretary and ordered the DENR to institute reversion
proceedings.
[Forcible Entry Case]
During the pendency of the above DENR case, Narciso sued Edmundo for forcible
entry before the Municipal Trial Court of Tanay, Rizal (MTC). The MTC declared Ariston as
the rightful possessor of the land in controversy and ordering respondent Edmundo to
remove the improvements introduced on the property and to vacate and restore petitioner
Narciso to its physical possession.
The case reached the Supreme Court, which affirmed the ejectment of respondent
Edmundo from the subject property. In the said case, the Court, in sustaining the CA, Special
Twelfth Division's Decision affirming the ejectment of respondent Edmundo from the subject
property, upheld the MTC's finding that Ariston Melendres is the rightful possessor of the
subject property.
[DARAB Case]
Narciso and his tenant Felino Mendez (Mendez) filed a complaint for illegal
conversion against respondents Catambay and Benavidez before the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The DARAB found Edmundo guilty of illegal
conversion and ordered the payment of damages to him and Mendez. The DARAB Decision
became final and executory and a writ of execution was issued on August 24, 1992.
[The Instant Complaint for Annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale with Reconveyance]
On Nov. 6, 1992, Narciso filed before the RTC a complaint for annulment of deed of
sale with reconveyance against respondents Catambay and Sps. Benavidez and the Register
of Deeds of Rizal, Morong Branch. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of cause of action. The
Court of Appeals initially denied the ensuing appeal, but later reversed the RTC’s dismissal
and remanded the case to the lower court for reception of evidence.
The RTC dismissed Narciso’s complaint for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the decision
dismissing the complaint.
172 of 578
Case Digests
ISSUES
Whether the Supreme Court should dismiss the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 for failure to raise pure questions of law.
RULING
NO. Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is unequivocal in stating that an appeal
via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall raise only questions of law which
must be distinctly set forth. The Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake
the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of
the case considering that the findings of facts of the lower courts are conclusive and binding
upon the Court.
However, the Court has ruled in a catena of cases that such rule is not inflexible. The
Court has recognized several exceptions to the rule that only questions of law can be raised
in a Rule 45 petition. Questions of fact may be revisited by the Court: (1) when the findings
are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed
by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.
Here, the Court exercises its discretion in delving into the questions of fact involved
in the instant Petition. Here, the findings of facts of the courts and various administrative
bodies are in conflict with each other.
Further, the findings of fact made by the RTC in its Decision that are adverse to
petitioners, as concurred in by the CA in its Assailed Decision and Resolution, are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence presented by petitioners. However, a careful re-
examination of the records sheds some light on the possibility that such conclusion made by
the lower courts are contradicted by the available evidence on record.
Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the Court exercises its discretion in setting aside the
general rule that only pure questions of law may be examined by the Court in assessing the
instant Petition.
173 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NILA MALANA y SAMBOLLEDO

DOCTRINE
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and
photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) that the physical inventory and
photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or
counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a
representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Section 21 of RA 9165 further requires the apprehending team to conduct a physical

inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after seizure
and confiscation. The said inventory must be done in the presence of the aforementioned
required witness, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.
FACTS
An information was filed against accused-appellant Nila Malana (Malana), accusing
her of selling shabu to a poseur buyer. Malana pleaded not guilty and thereafter, pre-trial and
trial of the case ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented police officers as witnesses who testified that
Malana was arrested pursuant to an entrapment operation involving a poseur buyer. Malana
was arrested in a second entrapment operation after the first one conducted a day before
failed to materialize since Malana did not appear.
For documentation, the police officers sought the assistance of Brgy. Captain Philip
Arce, and kagawads Wilma Gonzaga and Perlita Arellano, who witnessed the inventory as
evidenced by the Confiscation Receipt and photographs on record. Representatives of the
media and the Department of Justice were absent during the entire course of the entrapment
operation.
On the other hand, Malana offered the defense of denial and frame-up.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Malana of the crime charged (selling of
dangerous drug) and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and to pay a
fine of Five Hundred Thousand (Php500,000.00) pesos. The RTC ruled that what was
conducted was a valid buy-bust operation. It further ruled that "[c]redence was properly
accorded to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who are law enforcers. When
police officers have no motive to testify falsely against the accused, courts are inclined to
uphold this presumption."
174 of 578
Case Digests
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction, ruling that the elements of illegal
sale of dangerous drugs were properly established as "RA 9165 and its implementing rules
do not require strict compliance with the rule on chain of custody."
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Malana of the crime charged.
RULING
YES. The Court acquits accused-appellant Malana for failure of the prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of
the alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain
the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires that:
(1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or
confiscation;
(2) that the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence
of:
(a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel,

(b) an elected public official,
(c) a representative from the media, and
(d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ),
…all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
This must be so because with "the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need
for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which
sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting
provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of
abuse is great."

required witness, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.
The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical
inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately
after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable that the
175 of 578
Case Digests
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allow the inventory and
photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team reaches the nearest police station or
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. In this connection, this also means that
the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of
apprehension — a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team
considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity. Verily, a
buy-bust team normally has enough time to gather and bring with them the said witnesses.
In the present case, none of the three required witnesses was present at the time
of seizure and apprehension, and only one of them was present during the conduct of the
inventory.
It bears emphasis that the presence of the required witnesses at the time of the
inventory is mandatory, and that the law imposes the said requirement because their
presence serves an essential purpose. Using the language of the Court in People v. Mendoza,
without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the DOJ and any
elected public official during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the evils of switching,
"planting" or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under
the regime of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to
negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the subject sachet that
was evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the
incrimination of the accused.
It is important to point out that the apprehending team in this case had more than
ample time to comply with the requirements established by law. As SPO1 Urian himself
testified, they received the tip from their confidential informant at around 1:00 p.m. on
October 18, 2011. They then planned to immediately conduct the buy-bust operation more
or less an hour later, but accused-appellant Malana supposedly failed to deliver the shabu.
Thus, they planned to conduct another buy-bust operation the next day.
The officers, therefore, had one whole day to secure the attendance of all the
required witnesses. They could thus have complied with the requirements of the law had
they intended to. However, the apprehending officers in this case did not exert even the
slightest of efforts to secure the attendance of any of the three required witnesses.
It is true that there are cases where the Court had ruled that the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165
does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid. However,
this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there
is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
prosecution should explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses.
176 of 578
Case Digests
Moreover, courts cannot rule, as the RTC and the CA did in this case, that the presence
of the three elected officials in the inventory (as opposed to the media person and the DOJ
official) constitutes substantial compliance with the requirements of RA 9165. Section 21,
RA 9165 was unequivocal in its requirement: that the inventory must be done "in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
[DOJ], and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof." The law is plain and clear.
In this connection, it was error for both the RTC and the CA to convict accused-
appellant Malana by relying on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
supposedly extended in favor of the police officers. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor
of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined
right to be presumed innocent.
What further militates against according the apprehending officers in this case the
presumption of regularity is the fact that even the pertinent internal anti-drug operation
procedures then in force were not followed.
At this juncture, it is well to point out that while the RTC and the CA were correct in
stating that denial is an inherently weak defense, it grievously erred in using the same
principle to convict accused-appellant Malana. Both courts overlooked the long-standing
legal tenet that the starting point of every criminal prosecution is that the accused has the
constitutional right to be presumed innocent. And this presumption of innocence is
overturned only when the prosecution has discharged its burden of proof in criminal cases
and has proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, with each and every
element of the crime charged in the information proven to warrant a finding of guilt for that
crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. Differently stated, there must exist
no reasonable doubt as to the existence of each and every element of the crime to sustain a
conviction.
It is worth emphasizing that this burden of proof never shifts. Indeed, the accused
need not present a single piece of evidence in his defense if the State has not discharged its
onus. The accused can simply rely on his right to be presumed innocent.
In this connection, the prosecution therefore, in cases involving dangerous drugs,

always has the burden of proving compliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21.
To stress, the accused can rely on his right to be presumed innocent. It is thus
immaterial, in this case or in any other cases involving dangerous drugs, that the
accused put forth a weak defense.
177 of 578
Case Digests
Concededly, Section 21 of the IRR of RA 9165 provides that "noncompliance of these

requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items." For this provision to be effective,
however, the prosecution must (1) recognize any lapse on the part of the police officers and
(2) be able to justify the same. In this case, the prosecution neither recognized, much
less tried to justify, its deviation from the procedure contained in Section 21, RA 9165.
To warrant the application of this saving mechanism, however, the Prosecution must
recognize the lapse or lapses, and justify or explain them. Such justification or explanation
would be the basis for applying the saving mechanism.
A sheer statement that representatives were unavailable — without so much as an

explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives,
given the circumstances — is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse. We stress that it is the
prosecution who has the positive duty to establish that earnest efforts were employed in
contacting the representatives enumerated under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165, or that there
was a justifiable ground for failing to do so.
In sum, the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for the apprehending
team's deviation from the rules laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165. The integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti has thus been compromised. In light of this, accused-
appellant Malana must perforce be acquitted.
178 of 578
Case Digests
REYNALDO ABBAS RECTO v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 236461, December 5, 2018, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The "evidence of guilt is strong" standard should be applied in relation to the crime as
charged. A person charged with a criminal offense will not be entitled to bail even before
conviction only if the charge against him is a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt of said
offense is strong. As such, a trial court errs if it simply determines if the evidence that an accused
was responsible for a person's death was strong, rather than determining whether the evidence
of guilt is strong for murder, a capital offense.
FACTS
An information for murder was filed against petitioner Reynaldo Arbas Recto (Recto)
for the death of Margie Carlosita (Carlosita). Recto's former counsel then filed a Petition for
Bail with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC denied the petition, giving credence to the
testimony of prosecution witness Joshua Rabillas (Rabillas), the son of Carlosita, that Recto
was the one who killed his mother. In denying the petition for bail, the RTC noted that it is of
the impression that the evidence of guilt is strong and that it is incumbent for the accused to
take the stand to show otherwise.
Trial on the merits then ensued. After the prosecution rested its case, Recto filed a
Demurrer to Evidence for insufficiency of evidence to hold him guilty for the crime of murder.
The RTC denied the same, similarly giving credence to Rabillas' testimony.
Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion to Fix Bail, alleging that the prosecution was
able to show that the crime charged should be homicide only and not murder. He argued hat
Rabillas, who was five (5) years old at the time of the incident, testified that Carlosita was hit
by the bottle during a quarrel over money. Citing People v. Rivera, a case involving
substantially the same facts wherein the common-law wife was killed by the common-law
husband during a heated argument, Recto argued that the case established was merely
Homicide due to the absence of treachery.
The RTC denied the Motion to Fix Bail, prompting Recto to file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the denial of the motion and
ultimately dismissed the case, deferring to the RTC's assessment of the credibility of Rabillas'
testimony, and relied on the RTC's judgment that the evidence of guilt was strong.
ISSUE
Did the CA err in affirming the RTC's denial of Recto's Motion to Fix Bail?
RULING
YES. [A]s a rule, all persons charged with a criminal offense have the right to bail.
However, persons charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua cannot avail of
this right if the evidence of guilt is strong.
179 of 578
Case Digests
In the present case, Recto was charged with Murder — an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua. Thus, the RTC was acting within its powers or jurisdiction when it denied
Recto's initial Petition for Bail. The RTC possesses sufficient discretion to determine, based
on the evidence presented before it during the bail hearing, whether the evidence of guilt is
strong.
However, after the prosecution had rested its case, Recto filed a Motion to Fix Bail on
the ground that bail had become a matter of right as the evidence presented by the
prosecution could only convict Recto of Homicide, not Murder. This Motion to Fix Bail was
denied by the RTC, reiterating its earlier finding that, in its judgment, the evidence of guilt is
strong. This is where the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion, and the CA thus erred in
upholding the RTC's Order denying the Motion to Fix Bail.
As correctly pointed out by Recto, the evidence of the prosecution could, at best, only
convict him of Homicide and not Murder. The testimony of the main prosecution witness,
Rabillas, was to the effect that his mother and Recto had an argument prior to her death.
Jurisprudence provides that treachery cannot be appreciated if the accused did not
make any preparation to kill the deceased in such manner as to insure the commission of
the killing or to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to retaliate or defend
himself. Mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present,
where the mode adopted by the aggressor does not positively tend to prove that they thereby
knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any
risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer.
[T]he Court in People v. Rivera concluded that treachery is not present when the
killing was preceded by a heated argument. [T]here is thus merit in Recto's claim that the
evidence presented by the prosecution could, at most, convict him only of Homicide and not
Murder. The RTC thus gravely abused its discretion when it denied Recto's Motion to Fix
Bail.
In the case of Bernardez v. Valera, the Court emphasized that the "evidence of guilt is
strong" standard should be applied in relation to the crime as charged. Thus: It must be
observed […] that a person charged with a criminal offense will not be entitled to bail even
before conviction only if the charge against him is a capital offense and the evidence of his
guilt of said offense is strong.
[T]he RTC should have determined whether the evidence of guilt is strong for
Murder, as opposed to simply determining if the evidence that he was responsible for
Carlosita's death was strong. As previously illustrated above, the evidence of Recto's guilt —
for Murder — was not strong. In sum, the RTC should have granted Recto's Motion to Fix
Bail.
180 of 578
Case Digests
VDM TRADING, INC., et al. v. LEONITA CARUNGCONG, et al.

G.R. No. 206709, February 6, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
As a prerequisite to its admission in evidence, the identity and authenticity of a private
document must be properly laid and reasonably established. According to Section 20, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court, the identification and authentication of a private document may only be
proven by either: (1) a person who saw the execution of the document, or (2) a person who has
knowledge and can testify as to the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
The rule on admission by silence applies to adverse statements in writing if the party
was carrying on a mutual correspondence with the declarant. However, if there was no such
mutual correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the theory that while the party would have
immediately reacted by a denial if the statements were orally made in his presence, such prompt
response can generally not be expected if the party still has to resort to a written reply.
FACTS
On Aug. 21, 2002, petitioner VDM Trading, Inc. (VDM) and the petitioners Spouses
Luis and Nena Domingo (Luis and Nena, collectively Sps. Domingo) filed before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) a complaint for damages against respondents Leonita Carungcong
(Carungcong), Wack Wack Twin Towers Condominium Association, Inc. (Wack Wack), and
Hak Yek Tan (Tan).
According to the complaint, VDM is the owner of Unit 2208B-1 (the Unit) located at
Wack Wack Twin Towers Condominium at Wack Wack Road, Mandaluyong City. Petitioner
Nena, the majority stockholder of VDM, and his husband Luis, are the actual occupants of the
unit.
In 1998, while the Sps. Domingo were in the US, Nena’s sister Nancy Lagman-Castillo
(Lagman-Castillo) discovered that soapy water was heavily penetrating through the ceiling
of the unit. Lagman-Castillo reported the matter to the Sps. Domingo and their attorney-in-
fact Atty. William Villareal (Atty. Villareal), as well as Wack Wack’s building administrator.
Later, Atty. Villareal met with Wack Wack’s Acting Property Manager, Arlene Cruz
(Cruz) who supposedly revealed that she previously conducted an inspection which showed
that the leak came from Unit 2308B-1, owned by Carungcong and leased by Tan at the time.
Cruz explained that the unit was being used as a laundry area and had unauthorized piping
and plumbing works therein in violation of Wack Wack’s rules and regulations. Atty. Villareal
conducted his own inspection and noted certain damages.
As such, Atty. Villareal, on behalf of the Sps. Domingo, sent a letter demanding that
Wack Wack and Carungcong restore or pay for damages on the unit. When no action was
taken on the same for a considerable length of time, Atty. Villareal allegedly sent another
letter 6 dated September 1, 1999 to respondents Wack Wack, Carungcong, and Tan, as well
181 of 578
Case Digests
as Golden Dragon Real Estate Corporation (Golden Dragon), the developer of the
Condominium, demanding that repairs be made on the Unit.
Subsequently, repair works on the Unit were referred to M. Laher Construction (M.
Laher) for a quotation. In its letter dated September 1, 2000 addressed to petitioner Luis, M.
Laher stated that the estimated cost in repairing the Unit's balcony, master bedroom, dining
and living room, and the children's room amounted to P490,635.00.
When several other demand letters were similarly unheeded, the petitioners Sps.
Domingo filed their complaint. Subsequently, respondent Wack Wack filed an Answer with
Counterclaim and Crossclaim against respondent Carungcong and Tan. Wack Wack
contended contention that the responsibility of enforcing and monitoring the policies on the
use and occupancy of condominium units lied solely with Golden Dragon, as embodied in the
Amended Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of Wack Wack Twin Towers.
For her part, respondent Carungcong filed her Answer with Third Party Complaint
against Golden Dragon and its specialty contractor, Stalwart Builders Corporation.
Carungcong argued that the soapy water which seeped through the ceiling of the Unit did not
come from the balcony of her unit, Unit 2308B-1. Also, the installation of piping and
plumbing works done by Stalwart was done with the permission and approval of Golden
Dragon.
The RTC ruled granted the complaint and ruled against Carungcong, ordering her to
pay damages. The petitioners VDM and Sps. Domingo filed their Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, praying that respondent Wack Wack be held solidarily liable with
respondent Carungcong pursuant to the provisions of the Amended Master Deed. The RTC
granted the same and modified its judgment.
The Court of Appeals (CA) granted the appeal of Carungcong and Wack Wack,
reversing the RTC’s decision. The CA found that the records are bereft of any evidence
showing that the damage to the petitioners' Unit was caused by the plumbing works done on
the balcony of Unit 2308B-1. Further, the CA took cognizance of an already settled case
previously initiated by the petitioners before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) concerning the Unit. The said case decided by the HLURB found that water leakage
in the Unit was caused by the defective and substandard construction of the Unit by Golden
Dragon, and not the plumbing works on the balcony of Unit 2308B-1.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the petition warrants dismissal for raising pure questions of fact. (YES.)
(2) Whether the extent of the damage was sufficiently proven by petitioners. (NO.)
RULING
(1) YES. A question of facts exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth
or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering
182 of 578
Case Digests
mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of
the situation. That is precisely what the petitioners are asking the Court to do — to reassess,
reexamine, and recalibrate the evidence on record.
A catena of cases has consistently held that questions of fact cannot be raised in an
appeal via certiorari before the Court and are not proper for its consideration. 30 The Court
is not a trier of facts. It is not the Court's function to examine and weigh all over again the
evidence presented in the proceedings below.
(2) NO. As a prerequisite to its admission in evidence, the identity and authenticity of
a private document must be properly laid and reasonably established. According to Section
20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the identification and authentication of a private document
may only be proven by either: (1) a person who saw the execution of the document, or (2) a
person who has knowledge and can testify as to the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
The petitioners maintain that the letter-quotation from M. Laher, a private document,
proves the full extent of the damage caused to the Unit.
In the instant case, with Atty. Villareal having not seen the execution of the
document, and having no personal knowledge whatsoever as regards the execution of
the document, the letter-quotation from M. Laher was not deemed to have been properly
identified and authenticated, thus making it inadmissible in evidence. The petitioners should
have instead presented a witness from M. Laher who actually executed the letter-quotation,
or any other witness who saw the actual execution of the document or can testify as to the
signatures and handwritings found on the document. Therefore, the petitioners cannot rely
on M. Laher's letter-quotation to prove their claims for damages.
The petitioners also heavily rely on the handwritten report of the petitioners' sister,
Lagman-Castillo, which purportedly show the extent and location of the damage caused to
the Unit.
Atty. Villareal's testimony on the observations contained in the handwritten report of

Lagman-Castillo is inadmissible. Atty. Villareal is not competent to testify on the veracity of
the observations contained in the said handwritten report because he may only testify to
those facts which he has personal knowledge, and derived from his own perception. Simply
stated, as to the contents of the handwritten report of Lagman-Castillo, Atty. Villareal's
testimony is hearsay. The petitioners should have instead presented Lagman-Castillo
herself to testify on her own observations, which was not done.
The petitioners argue that the presentation of Lagman-Castillo was not needed
anymore due to certain stipulations made by the respondents. But it must be stressed that
[t]here was no stipulation made as to the accuracy and veracity of the contents of the
183 of 578
Case Digests
handwritten report. Hence, it was still incumbent upon the petitioners to present Lagman-
Castillo to prove the truthfulness of the contents of her handwritten report.
The principle of admission of silence does not apply.

As correctly cited by respondent Wack Wack in its Comment, jurisprudence holds that
the rule on admission by silence applies to adverse statements in writing if the party was
carrying on a mutual correspondence with the declarant. However, if there was no such
mutual correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the theory that while the party would have
immediately reacted by a denial if the statements were orally made in his presence, such
prompt response can generally not be expected if the party still has to resort to a written
reply.
In the case at hand, it is not disputed that Lagman-Castillo's handwritten report was
not addressed to the respondents. Instead, the report was addressed to Atty. Villareal.
Hence, the rule on admission on silence is negated.
Aside from the foregoing, the petitioners likewise rely on the supposed statements
made by Cruz, the Acting Property Manager of respondent Wack Wack, who supposedly
intimated that the strong leak apparently came from Unit 2308B-1, which is located directly
above the Unit. However, it must be emphasized that Cruz herself was not presented as a
witness. Atty. Villareal was not competent to testify as to the truth of Cruz's supposed
observations and findings because, to reiterate, Atty. Villareal may only testify to those
facts which he has personal knowledge, and derived from his own perception. Hearsay
evidence such as this, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence for it has no
probative value.
Lastly, the petitioners cite the various demand letters as evidence of the supposed
damage caused to their Unit. It goes without saying that these letters are self-serving
documents that deserve scant consideration in the determination of damages. As
previously held by the Court, one cannot make evidence for himself by writing a letter
containing the statements that he wishes to prove. He does not make the letter evidence by
sending it to the party against whom he wishes to prove the facts stated therein.
184 of 578
Case Digests
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF SAN MATEO, ISABELA, et al. v. ESTEFANIA MIGUEL VDA. DE

GUERRERO
G.R. No. 214262, February 13, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of courts should become final and executory at some definite time fixed by law; and
this rule holds true over decisions rendered by administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial
powers.
The Court's jurisdiction in a petition for review is limited to reviewing or revising errors
of law allegedly committed by the appellate court.
FACTS
In 1924, respondent Estefania Miguel Vda. de Guerrero (Estefania) filed an undated
homestead application over a parcel of land Lot No. 7035 in San Mateo, Isabela. On 1946,
Andres Guerrero (Andres), common-law husband of Estefania, relinquished his rights over
a one-hectare portion of the lot in favor of the petitioner Municipality of San Mateo.
On 1948, allegedly under threat and intimidation by the municipal officials of San
Mateo, the Guerreros executed a waiver over the remaining portions of the lot in favor of
Angel Madrid (Madrid). Later, Lot No. 7035 was subdivided by the Bureau of Lands into Lots
7035-A to 7035-F.
On 1953, Estefania filed a protest against any and all applications in conflict with her
homestead application. On 1967, she filed an application for registration of title before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) acting as cadastral court. The application for registration was
denied. However, years passed but there was no official action on her protest.
It was only in 2000 when her grandson Romeo Guerrero (Romeo) filed a letter-
protest, that there was movement in the case. Romeo reiterated Estefania’s plea for the
approval of her homestead application and protest against the fraudulent issuance of patents
in conflict with her homestead application. The DENR Secretary created a special team to
investigate the claim of fraud.
After various investigations, the DENR Secretary dismissed the petition finding that
Estefania and Andres executed documents waiving their rights to the land subject of their
application.
The DENR, however, granted the Guerreros’ motion for reconsideration in an order
dated Oct. 26, 2006, finding that there was fraudulent issuances of homestead patents and
accordingly ordered the Regional Executive Director to initiate cancellation and reversion
proceedings. It also found that Estefania had preferential right and interest over the lot. The
185 of 578
Case Digests
Municipality of San Mateo moved for reconsideration, which was dismissed by the DENR
Secretary. The dismissal became final and executory on July 30, 2008.
More than four months after the finality of the DENR Order, petitioner Municipality
filed a motion to stay execution, and later a motion for ocular inspection. The DENR informed
the municipality that it has no more jurisdiction to act on the motions.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA).
The CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUES
Whether the DENR was correct in denying the motion to stay execution filed by
petitioner Municipality.
RULING
YES. It is not disputed by any party that the aforesaid Orders of the DENR, the
execution of which are sought to be enjoined by the petitioners, have already attained
finality, with the petitioners failing to timely appeal the same.
Hence, the DENR did not commit any whimsical or capricious act in holding in its
Letter dated February 10, 2009 that its previous Orders are "already final and executory
there being no appeal or motion for reconsideration that was filed by the aggrieved party as
per Certification dated July 3, 2008 issued by the DENR Records Management &
Documentation Division. Precisely the complete records of the case were already forwarded
to the Regional Office for proper implementation and execution."
According to jurisprudence, "[p]ublic policy and sound practice demand that, at the
risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final and executory at some
definite time fixed by law; and this rule holds true over decisions rendered by
administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial powers." Thus, as correctly held by the
CA in its assailed Decision, as the Orders of the DENR had already become final and
executory, there is no valid reason for the DENR to stay their execution.
Moreover, a perusal of the grounds and issues raised in the instant Petition reveal
that, in alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DENR in issuing its Letter dated
February 10, 2009, the petitioners are raising factual matters, asking the Court to rule on
the factual circumstances surrounding the DENR's final and executory Orders dated
October 26, 2006 and April 24, 2008. The Court cannot take cognizance of such issues.
Foremost, it must be stressed that the subject matter of the instant case, as made
manifest in the petitioners' Certiorari Petition, 27 is the purported grave abuse of discretion
committed by the DENR in issuing its Letter dated February 10, 2009, and not its Orders
dated October 26, 2006 and April 24, 2008.
186 of 578
Case Digests
To be sure, the Court's jurisdiction in a petition for review is limited to reviewing or

revising errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. Hence, any issue
beyond the scope of the CA's assailed Decision and Resolution, such as the issues raised by
the petitioners in the instant Petition concerning the DENR's other Orders, are not
reviewable by the Court.
The factual findings of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of
expertise, such as the DENR, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of
substantial showing that such findings were made from an erroneous estimation of the
evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental
structure, should not be disturbed.
In the instant case, the records show that the factual findings of the DENR in its final
and executory Orders dated October 26, 2006 and April 24, 2008, the execution of which
were not allowed to be stayed by the DENR in the assailed Letter dated February 10, 2009,
were reached after a protracted, comprehensive and exhaustive investigative procedure
conducted by the DENR. The Court does not see any cogent reason to reverse the DENR's
factual findings.
In any case, the issues raised by the petitioners in the instant Petition, which, in
essence, delve into why the certificates of title covering the subject lots should not be
cancelled, should be raised instead in the proper cancellation and reversion proceedings, and
not in the instant case.
187 of 578
Case Digests
PILLARS PROPERTY CORPORATION v. CENTURY COMMUNITIES

CORPORATION
DOCTRINE
Appeal is not available as a remedy to question either the grant or denial of a motion to
dismiss based on improper venue. If the motion is denied, the order of denial is interlocutory
since it does not completely dispose of the case and is not appealable. If the motion is granted,
the order of dismissal is one without prejudice since the complaint can be re-filed and is not
appealable under Section 1(g) of Rule 41.
FACTS
Pillars Property Corporation (PPC) filed a Complaint for sum of money against
respondent Century Communities Corporation (CCC) for unpaid progress billings in
connection with a construction contract. The case was assigned to the RTC of Paranaque City.
PPC also sued People's General Insurance Corporation (PGIC), which issued the bonds in
favor of CCC to guarantee the performance of PPC's obligations, to exculpate PPC from any
liability under the bonds since PPC intended to prove that it was not at fault in the
performance of its obligations under the construction contract.
CCC filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the venue is improperly laid
pursuant to Section 1(c), Rule 16 of the ROC, averring that under the Contract, it is provided
that in case of litigation, the Parties agree that the venue of each action as the “Proper Court
of Makati to the exclusion of others.”
PPC opposed the Motion, arguing that the inclusion of PGIC as co-defendant of CCC
took away the case from the jurisdiction of Makati courts because the general rule on venue
should then apply, PGIC not being a party to the Contract.
The RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss and the corresponding Motion for
Reconsideration filed by PPC was denied. PPC then filed before the CA a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules seeking the setting aside of the RTC Orders for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction
and there being no appeal, or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
The CA dismissed PPC's petition outright. The CA reasoned that PPC availed of the
wrong remedy since it is the settled rule that an order of dismissal, whether correct or not,
is a final order and the remedy of the plaintiff is to appeal the order. The MR. filed by PPC
was also denied.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in concluding that the remedy availed of by PPC is erroneous
188 of 578
Case Digests
RULING
YES. Rule 41 provides the rules regarding appeal from the Regional Trial Courts.
Section 1 of Rule 41 provides what judgments or orders are subject of appeal and those
where no appeal may be taken from, viz.:
SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these
Rules to be appealable.
xxx
(g) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
xxx
In any of the foregoing circumstances, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action as provided in Rule 65. An order dismissing an action without prejudice
is, thus, not subject to appeal but is reviewable by a Rule 65 certiorari petition.
In this case, there was no trial on the merits as the case was dismissed due to
improper venue and respondents could not have appealed the order of dismissal as the same
was a dismissal, without prejudice. Section 1(h), Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states
that no appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an action without prejudice. Indeed,
there is no residual jurisdiction to speak of where no appeal has even been filed.
We distinguish a dismissal with prejudice from a dismissal without prejudice. The

former disallows and bars the refiling of the complaint; whereas, the same cannot be said of
a dismissal without prejudice. Likewise, where the law permits, a dismissal with prejudice is
subject to the right of appeal.
Dismissals that are based on the following grounds, to wit: (1) that the cause of action
is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; (2) that the claim or demand
set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished; and (3) that the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under
the provisions of the statute of frauds, bar the refiling of the same action or claim. Logically,
the nature of the dismissal founded on any of the preceding grounds is with prejudice
because the dismissal prevents the refiling of the same action or claim. Ergo, dismissals
based on the rest of the grounds enumerated under Section 1, Rule 16, are without prejudice
because they do not preclude the refiling of the same action.
Indeed, appeal is not available as a remedy to question either the grant or denial of a
motion to dismiss based on improper venue. If the motion is denied, the order of denial is
interlocutory since it does not completely dispose of the case and is not appealable. If the
189 of 578
Case Digests
motion is granted, the order of dismissal is one without prejudice since the complaint can be
re-filed and is not appealable under Section 1(g) of Rule 41.46
Consequently, PPC availed of the correct remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules.
Nonetheless, PPC's Petition must fail because it has not convinced the Court that the
RTC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing its Complaint for improper venue.
In essence, PPC was arguing that the stipulation on venue in case of an action in the
Contract did not apply in this case because the inclusion of PGIC, a non-party thereto, made
the general rule on venue applicable. Since the RTC applied the exclusive venue rule, PPC
took the position that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or
excess of jurisdiction.
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules sets forth the general rule regarding the venue of
personal actions:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. — All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant
or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. (2[b]a)
The exceptions are provided in Section 4, Rule 4, viz.:
SEC. 4. When Rule not applicable. - This Rule shall not apply -
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of the action on
the exclusive venue thereof. (3a, 5a)
Given the stipulation on venue in the Contract, where exclusivity is provided, the RTC
had enough legal basis to apply Section 4(b), Rule 4 and not Section 2, Rule 4.
190 of 578
Case Digests
CONCEPCION y TABOR v. PEOPLE

DOCTRINE
The perceived discrepancy neither affects the truth of the testimony of the prosecution
witness nor discredits his positive identification of appellant. The supposed inconsistency
regarding the exact time the search warrant was implemented is, if at all, minor and without
consequence.
It does not go unnoticed that strict compliance with the mandatory procedure under
R.A. No. 9165 was achieved by the apprehending officers; there was no record of any deviation
from the requirements under the law. Hence, absent contrary proof to the facts established,
Concepcion's conviction must follow.
FACTS
Concepcion was charged with Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. The prosecution
presented four witnesses.
Witness PCI Tugas, the forensic chemist, testified that on November 15, 2012, she
received a request from IO2 Abina for the laboratory examination of the subject specimens.
After the necessary examination, it was found that the submitted specimens are positive for
the presence of methamphetamine hydrocholoride or shabu. She further confirmed that she
had reduced her findings in the document denominated as Chemistry Report No. D-89-12.
Witness IO2 Abina, in turn, narrated that on November 15, 2012, he participated in
the implementation of the search warrant dated November 14, 2012 issued against the
appellant. He recounted that at around 4:30 a.m., after being given the go signal, he
conducted the search for illegal drugs and was able to recover twelve (12) pieces of small
heat-sealed plastic sachets containing crystalline substance that they suspected to be shabu.
The plastic sachets were found inside the matchbox placed in a plastic Orocan or cabinet
located just beside the bedroom door leading to the kitchen. The witness affirmed that
during the conduct of the search, the barangay captain, DOJ representative Lladoc, Mr. Ricky
Pera from the media, and one barangay kagawad and the appellant were present.
Witness IO2 Abina further testified that he put markings on each of the twelve (12)
sachets. The inventory was then prepared. After the necessary documentation, he proceeded
to the crime laboratory and submitted the request for laboratory examination together with
the specimens. He also identified a series of photographs depicting the scenes during the
implementation of the search warrant against the appellant, and the affidavit he executed in
connection with this case.
SO2 Viana, in turn, testified that he was assigned as the arresting officer in the
enforcement of the search warrant against the appellant. He personally saw it when IO2
Abina found the subject items inside the Orocan cabinet. After seeing the seizure of the
191 of 578
Case Digests
suspected illicit drugs, he arrested the appellant, brought the latter to the Provincial Office,
and then submitted him for medical examination. He also identified appellant in open court
as the accused in the present case.
On the other hand, the testimony of witness Lladoc, a representative of the DOJ, was
stipulated upon by the public prosecutor and the defense. Both parties admitted that: (a) the
witness is one of the witnesses in the conduct of the inventory seized from the appellant; and
(b) said witness, as one of the witnesses in the preparation of the inventory process, had
affixed his signature in the Certificate of Inventory.
For the defense, the sole testimony of the appellant was presented in evidence.
Appellant categorically denied the charges against him. He claimed that in the morning of
November 15, 2012 at around 4:30 a.m., he was awakened by 3-4 men knocking at his door.
Said men asked him why the lights in his house were switched off and instructed him to turn
on the lights in his living room. He then switched on the light, after which the said
unidentified men barged into his house. The door had been forcibly opened with a bolt cutter.
The RTC found the accused guilty. On appeal, the CA ruled just the same.
ISSUE
Whether the CA gravely erred in affirming Concepcion's conviction despite the
inconsistencies between the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the affidavit of
searcher
RULING
NO. Concepcion's main defense consists of his claim that an inconsistency in the
testimony of IO2 Abina, one of the police officers present in the search, places his conviction
in doubt as it goes into the mandatory witness requirement under Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165. In effect, Concepcion is implying that the prosecution failed to establish compliance
with the three-witness rule mandated by R.A. No. 9165.
Concepcion is gravely mistaken. In the first place, aside from the overwhelming
documentary evidence establishing compliance with the procedure, the presence of DOJ
representative Lladoc was already admitted by Concepcion when he stipulated on such
matter during trial.
The fact that IO2 Abina's affidavit neglects to categorically mention the presence of
DOJ representative Lladoc during the search operation does not run counter to his testimony.
The perceived discrepancy neither affects the truth of the testimony of the prosecution
witness nor discredits his positive identification of appellant. Besides, apart from the duly
signed Certificate of Inventory and Certificate of Orderly Search, it had already been
stipulated and admitted by the parties that Lladoc was indeed a witness in the conduct of the
search and inventory of the confiscated drugs. For this reason, such stipulation is already a
judicial admission of the facts stipulated. Appellant is clearly beyond his bearings in
192 of 578
Case Digests
disputing this judicially admitted fact. What is more, photographs were offered in evidence
to prove that the necessary witnesses, including Lladoc, had been present during the search
operation.
Further, Concepcion casts doubt on the validity of the search conducted in that the
implementation of the search warrant was documented to begin at 4:30 A.M. while the
seizure of the drugs was made at around 6:30 A.M. Such interval, Concepcion claims, gave
the police officers an opportunity to fabricate evidence against him.
In the same vein, the supposed inconsistency regarding the exact time the search
warrant was implemented is, if at all, minor and without consequence. As argued by the
appellee, the team had arrived at appellant's house to implement the search warrant at 4:30
a.m. The police officers did not immediately search the residence because they still had to
wait for the barangay officials and the media representatives. Such minor inconsistency does
not warrant the reversal of appellant's conviction.
Grasping at straws, Concepcion attempts to absolve himself from liability by claiming

that the integrity of the corpus delicti was compromised in that the chain of custody of the
seized drugs was broken. Without more, such empty claims, being unsupported by the
records, deserve scant consideration. On the contrary, the movement of the confiscated
contraband from the point of seizure until its presentation in court was duly established by
both testimonial and documentary evidence.
As a final point, it does not go unnoticed that strict compliance with the mandatory
procedure under R.A. No. 9165 was achieved by the apprehending officers; there was no
record of any deviation from the requirements under the law. Hence, absent contrary proof
to the facts established, Concepcion's conviction must follow.
193 of 578
Case Digests
HEIR OF CARDENAS v. THE CHRISTIAN AND MISSIONARY ALLIANCE CHURCHES

OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
DOCTRINE
While Tax Declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership, at the very least they are
proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property and serve as sufficient basis for
inferring possession. Hence, the burden has then shifted to CAMACOP to prove that while the
certificate of title covering the subject property is still registered in the names of the Sps.
Cardenas, the ownership of the subject property had not remained with the Sps. Cardenas and
had been validly transferred to it through a contract of sale in 1962.
FACTS
Remedios, heir of Sps. Cardenas, represented by her daughter and attorney-in-fact,
Janet, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Use of Real Property and Damages
against The Christian and Missionary Alliance Churches of the Philippines, Inc. (CAMACOP).
In her Complaint, Janet alleged that her mother Remedios is the heir of the late Sps.
Cardenas, who are the registered owners of a parcel of land in Midsayap, Cotabato, covered
by a TCT and with Tax Declaration; and that the subject property is adjacent to a lot owned
by CAMACOP where its church is located and constructed.
Janet further alleged that sometime in the year 1962, CAMACOP unlawfully occupied
the subject property for their church activities and functions; that CAMACOP continues to
unlawfully occupy the subject property to the damage and prejudice of Janet despite
repeated demands to vacate.
Respondents admitted in their Answer that Cardenas is the registered owner of the
subject property, which is adjacent to the lot owned by the CAMACOP. However, they aver
that their occupation of the subject property is not illegal since they had lawfully purchased
it from its registered owners (referring to Pastora), who surrendered the owner's duplicate
copy to the representative of the church.
Respondents alleged that on May 31, 1962, Atty. Rodofolo T. Calud (Calud), counsel
and representative of CAMACOP, sent the owner's duplicate copy of the subject property to
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and four (4) copies of the Deed of Sale,
signed by the registered owners, for the Secretary's prior approval, pursuant to
Commonwealth Act 141. They further asseverate that their continued occupation of the
subject property for a period of forty-seven (47) years had reduced the claim as barred by
prescription and the inaction of Janet for such period of time had rendered their claim as a
stale demand which is barred by laches.
The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that CAMACOP was able to provide sufficient
documentary and testimonial evidence that the subject property was indeed sold to it by
194 of 578
Case Digests
Pastora, the predecessor-in-interest of Janet and Remedios. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
RTC and denied the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE
Who between the Heir of Sps. Cardenas (Remedios, as represented by Janet) and
CAMACOP has a better right to possess the subject property?
RULING
Remedios. It is an admitted fact that the subject property is still registered in the
names of Pastora T. Cardenas and Eustaquio Cardenas." It is also an admitted fact that "the
same lot is still declared for tax purposes in the name of the plaintiffs Pastora Cardenas and
Eustaquio Cardenas." While Tax Declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership, at the
very least they are proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property and serve as
sufficient basis for inferring possession. Hence, the burden has then shifted to CAMACOP to
prove that while the certificate of title covering the subject property is still registered in the
names of the Sps. Cardenas, the ownership of the subject property had not remained with
the Sps. Cardenas and had been validly transferred to it through a contract of sale in 1962.
In asserting that the subject property was sold by Pastora to CAMACOP, the latter
relies on the existence of a Deed of Sale purportedly executed in 1962. CAMACOP however
maintains that, since all of the copies of this alleged Deed of Sale had been supposedly lost, it
had to resort to the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the existence of this Deed
of Sale.
According to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, when the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof
of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part,
may prove its contents by presenting secondary evidence: (1) a copy of the lost document,
(2) by a recital of the contents of the lost document in some authentic document, or (3) by a
testimony of a witnesses, in the order stated.
CAMACOP was not able to provide any sufficient secondary evidence to establish the
existence and contents of the supposed 1962 Deed of Sale covering the subject property.
First, CAMACOP was not able to present even a photocopy or any other copy of the purported
Deed of Sale. Second, according to CAMACOP, the purported Deed of Sale is recorded in the
Notarial Register of Atty. Calud. If this is true, then Atty. Calud would have easily been able
to produce a copy of the purported Deed of Sale. Third, the secondary evidence presented
by CAMACOP are all unavailing.
None of these documents contains a recital of the contents of the purported Deed of
Sale, as required under the Revised Rules on Evidence. At most, the documents presented
merely mention that copies of the purported Deed of Sale were supposedly transmitted to
the DANR.
195 of 578
Case Digests
As for the several letters of Atty. Calud addressed to the DANR Secretary, such
documents are grossly insufficient to prove both the existence and contents of the purported
Deed of Sale. These letters are completely self-serving documents. A man cannot make
evidence for himself by writing a letter authored by himself containing the statements that
he wishes to prove.
As to the Letter authored by one Marcos, Assistant Chief Legal Officer for the DANR
Secretary, addressed to the then Director of Lands, there is nothing in the said document that
mentioned or acknowledged the transmittal of the documents to the DANR Secretary. The
letter merely showed that the DANR Secretary asked the then Director of Lands to look into
the matter. In fact, this letter is unsigned, creating much doubt as to its authenticity.
With respect to the Sworn Affidavit of Madrigal and Letter of Repollo addressed to
Pabrua, EVP-DAF, not only are they in the nature of self-serving statements coming from
representatives of CAMACOP, it must also be stressed that they are clearly hearsay evidence
with respect to the purpose of proving the existence and contents of the purported Deed of
Sale. These individuals have absolutely no personal knowledge as to the preparation and
execution of the purported Deed of Sale itself.
To make matters worse, the secondary evidence presented by CAMACOP are all
inauthentic and inadmissible documents. The records show that the secondary evidence
presented by CAMACOP are all mere photocopies. According to the Revised Rules on
Evidence, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. CAMACOP
did not provide any sufficient justification as to its failure to present the original copies of
the documents.
Furthermore, the documents were not properly authenticated. All of CAMACOP's

documentary evidence were identified and authenticated by its first witness, Repollo, who is
a member of CAMACOP.
According to Section 20, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity
must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document executed or written or (b) by
evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
In the instant case, it is readily admitted that Repollo did not personally witness the
execution of any of the documents he identified. In fact, Repollo testified that these
documents were merely turned over to him by his mother. Nor was Repollo knowledgeable
as to the genuineness of the signatures or handwritings found in the documents. Otherwise
stated, Repollo was totally incompetent to present and testify on these documents. Hence,
without proper identification and authentication, the documentary evidence of CAMACOP
should not have been admitted into evidence by the RTC.
196 of 578
Case Digests
Thus, without any copy of the purported Deed of Sale and any authentic document
containing a recital of the contents of the purported Deed of Sale, CAMACOP should have
provided a credible, convincing witness to prove the existence and contents of the purported
Deed of Sale. No such witness was provided by CAMACOP.
197 of 578
Case Digests
SPOUSES POZON v. LOPEZ

DOCTRINE
An action for specific performance is an action in personam. An action for specific
performance praying for the execution of a deed of sale in connection with an undertaking in a
contract, such as the contract to sell, in this instance, is an action in personam. Being a
judgment in personam, it is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded therein and duly
heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, it cannot bind respondent since he was
not a party therein.
It is an elementary rule that since the only issue for resolution in an ejectment case is
physical or material possession, where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of
ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue only for the purposes of determining who
between the parties has the better right to possess the property. Where the issue of ownership
is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of ownership is not final and binding,
but merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession.
FACTS
Diana Jeanne Lopez (Lopez) filed a petition for quieting of title and damages before
the RTC of Makati against petitioners.
Lopez, as assisted by her business associate, Rodolfo Cuenca, purchased from Mr.
Enrique Zobel the subject property. Lopez and Cuenca then sought the assistance of Beltran
Cuasay Law Office regarding the documentation of the sale and the transfer of the title from
Mr. Zobel to Lopez. The Law Office was instructed by them to organize a corporation named
Paraiso Realty Corporation (Paraiso) which is to be owned by Lopez with the end in view of
reflecting that Paraiso acquired the subject property from Mr. Zobel.
However, the Law Office, acting thru Beltran, Sr. and Evangelista, organized Paraiso
but they made themselves and their nominees as the exclusive stockholders thereof, totally
excluding Lopez from ownership over the subject property. The Law Office made it appear
that the subject property was acquired by Raymundo, the broker, instead of Paraiso, from
Mr. Zobel. Thereafter, Raymundo purportedly sold and transferred the title of the subject
property to Paraiso. Subsequently, the Law Office, thru Evangelista, who was acting on behalf
of Paraiso, prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property to one Lino
Nepomuceno, said to be another collaborator of Beltran, Sr. Later, another Deed of Sale was
executed where Nepomuceno sold to Tradex the subject property, resulting to the issuance
of a TCT in the name of the latter.
Lopez was informed that the petitioners Sps. Pozon wanted to inspect the subject
property. Later, she discovered that the title of the subject property was in the name of
Tradex and was never transferred in her name. She also learned that Raymundo was
brokering the sale of the subject property to petitioners Sps. Pozon on behalf of Tradex.
198 of 578
Case Digests
Despite Lopez's warning, Tradex, thru Diomampo, sold the subject property to petitioners
Sps. Pozon. Nonetheless, Tradex could not deliver possession of the subject property, as
respondent Lopez was still in possession of the subject property, prompting the petitioners
Sps. Pozon to file an action for Specific Performance with Damages. Lopez was not impleaded
as a party thereto.
The RTC declared Lopez as the lawful owner of the subject property. The CA affirmed
the same.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in disregarding the previous rulings of this Honorable Court on
the same subject matter
RULING
NO. It is argued that the CA, in affirming RTC decision granting of respondent Lopez's
Petition for Quieting of Title, committed a grave error in disregarding two previously decided
cases resolved in favor of them that supposedly touched upon the same subject matter as in
the Quieting of Title case. In essence, petitioners Sps. Pozon posit that the two decided cases
they cited are conclusive upon the court a quo with respect to their ownership over the
subject property.
Such argument is erroneous. The final and executory decisions identified by them are
not in any way conclusive as to the issue of ownership over the subject property.
In the first case, a Specific Performance Case, by virtue of a contract to sell titled
Agreement to Purchase and to Sell entered with Tradex, petitioners Sps. Pozon prayed that
the subsequent Deed of Sale entered into by Tradex with another purchaser, i.e., J.H. Pajara
Construction Corporation, be declared null and void.
The RTC granted petitioners Sps. Pozon's prayer for specific performance. This was
affirmed by the CA. Petitioners Sps. Pozon maintain that the resolution of the Specific
Performance Case in their favor should have compelled the CA to deem them as the owners
of the subject property.
The argument is mistaken. At the outset, a perusal of the RTC’s Decision reveals that
the issue of ownership was not discussed and resolved; the right of ownership over the
subject property was not at all an issue in the Specific Performance Case. In fact, in the said
Decision, it was made clear that petitioners Sps. Pozon did not pray that they be declared the
owners of the subject property. Further, it must be emphasized that the Specific Performance
Case did not dwell whatsoever on the issues surrounding respondent Lopez's claim of
ownership over the subject property. In fact, it must be stressed that respondent Lopez was
not even impleaded in the Specific Performance Case.
199 of 578
Case Digests
This leads the Court to its second point on the Specific Performance Case. Even
assuming arguendo that the Specific Performance Case had dwelled on the issue of
ownership over the subject property, which it did not, such case cannot bind respondent
Lopez as she was not impleaded therein.
The Court's pronouncement in Spouses Yu v. Pacleb is instructive:
Petitioner spouses argue that the decision of the RTC as to the rightful owner of the
Property is conclusive and binding upon respondent even if the latter was not a party thereto
since it involved the question of possession and ownership of real property, and is thus not
merely an action in personam but an action quasi in rem.
In Domagas v. Jensen, we distinguished between actions in personam and actions

quasi in rem.
Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is

determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is
based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise
of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in
accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to
impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the
person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically
perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is
said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from
a judgment against the property to determine its state. It has been held that an action in
personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought
against the person.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking
to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action
quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to
subject his interests therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi
in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are
intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the
proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants.
The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.
An action for specific performance is an action in personam. An action for specific

performance praying for the execution of a deed of sale in connection with an undertaking
in a contract, such as the contract to sell, in this instance, is an action in personam.
Being a judgment in personam, it is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded
therein and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Therefore, it cannot bind
respondent since he was not a party therein.
200 of 578
Case Digests
As to the second case invoked by petitioners Sps. Pozon, the they filed a Complaint
for Ejectment against respondent Lopez. The MeTC ruled that petitioners Sps. Pozon were
entitled to the possession of the subject property based on the sale entered into by Tradex
with them. This was affirmed by the CA.
Petitioners Sps. Pozon assert that the fact that the Ejectment Case was successfully
resolved in their favor should have convinced the CA that they are the true owners of the
subject property.
As well, this argument is unmeritorious. It simply does not follow that since the
Ejectment Case was ruled in favor of petitioners Sps. Pozon, the latter are conclusively
deemed the owners of the subject property.
It is an elementary rule that since the only issue for resolution in an ejectment case is
physical or material possession, where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of
ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue only for the purposes of determining who
between the parties has the better right to possess the property. Where the issue of
ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of ownership is not final
and binding, but merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession.
201 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE v. LUMAHANG y TALISAY

DOCTRINE
The Court has oft pronounced that denial is an inherently weak defense which cannot
prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused
committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has the ring of truth on
one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.
FACTS
Two Informations were filed against Lumahang for killing Rodel Velitario (Velitario)
and stabbing Augusto Pornelos (Pornelos).
The version of the prosecution is as follows: On December 14, 2008, around nine
o'clock in the evening, Alberto Poraso, Rodel Velitario and Augusto Pornelos were attending
a wake in Novaliches, Quezon City when appellant appeared fuming mad. Suddenly,
appellant approached Pornelos from behind and stabbed him in a hook motion with knife in
his left hand. Pornelos, who was hit on the buttocks, quickly ran towards an alley. Without
warning, appellant then turned his ire on Velitario and stabbed him repeatedly on different
parts of his body.
Dr. Joseph Palmero, medico-legal examiner of Velitario, determined that the cause of
Velitario's death was the multiple stab wounds he sustained on the abdomen, which among
others, hit his left kidney. On the other hand, Dr. Engelbert Ednacot, examining physician of
Pornelos, found a stab wound on the latter's right buttocks, which he concluded to be a non-
fatal wound that required treatment for around seven (7) days. In his medical opinion, the
victim was attacked from behind.
For its part, the version of the defense is as follows: On December 14, 2008, at around
9:00 o'clock in the evening, the accused and his cousin LL were on their way home when five
(5) bystanders who were under the influence of alcohol blocked their way. The bystanders
approached Larry and LL. Suddenly, two (2) of them touched the hands, shoulders and
breasts of LL while the others laughed. The the accused asked them to stop and told them
that if they like LL, they should do it the right way and go to their house to court her. Upon
hearing that, the bystanders approached the accused and one of them punched him while
another pulled out a knife. The person who drew the knife stabbed the accused but he was
able to thwart the thrust.
He identified Augusto Pornelos as one of the bystanders who blocked their way. When
the BPSO went to his aunt's house looking for him, he voluntarily surrendered, after which,
he was brought to the hospital and thereafter, to Camp Karingal. He was surprised of the
charges of murder and attempted murder against him because he only grappled with the
knife and did not stab anyone. When he voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities, no
knife was recovered from him.
202 of 578
Case Digests
The RTC convicted Lumahang on the basis of the testimony of the prosecution
eyewitness Poraso who positively identified him as the assailant. The RTC held that the
stabbing of Pornelos and the killing of Velitario were attended by treachery. However, as to
the attack on Pornelos, the RTC only convicted Lumahang of less serious physical injuries.
On appeal, the CA affirmed with modifications the RTC's conviction of Lumahang on the basis
of Poraso's testimony. It reiterated the rule that the testimony of a lone witness, if found by
the trial court to be positive, categorical, and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction.
The CA held that Lumahang's defense of denial could not prevail over the positive and
categorical testimony of the eyewitness who identified him as the assailant of Velitario and
Pornelos. While the CA upheld Lumahang's conviction for Murder it did, however,
downgrade Lumahang's conviction to only Slight Physical Injuries, as Pornelos needed only
seven days of confinement in the hospital to recover from the injury.
ISSUE
Whether Lumahang’s conviction should be upheld
RULING
YES. In questioning his conviction, Lumahang again reiterates his argument that he
cannot be convicted on the basis of a single, uncorroborated testimony of an eyewitness. He
argues that the prosecution was unable to present evidence that was contrary to his version
of the facts, and this supposedly raises reasonable doubt on his guilt.
The arguments deserve scant consideration. Lumahang raises the same issues as
those raised in — and duly passed upon by — the CA. It is well-settled that in the absence of
facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case,
appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court. Thus, when the case
pivots on the issue of the credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses, the findings of the
trial courts necessarily carry great weight and respect as they are afforded the unique
opportunity to ascertain the demeanor and sincerity of witnesses during trial. Here, the
Court finds no cogent reason to vacate the RTC's appreciation of the testimonial evidence,
which was affirmed in toto by the CA.
Of marked relevance is the failure of appellant to impute and show ill-motive on the
part of Porazo to wrongly implicate him in the present criminal cases. The rule is that when
there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive for a prosecution
witness, like to testify falsely against an accused, his testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit.
As against the positive identification by an eyewitness, Lumahang could only

interpose the defense of denial and a blanket claim of defense of relative. The Court has oft
pronounced that denial is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the positive
203 of 578
Case Digests
and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime.
Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has the ring of truth on one hand, and a mere
denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.
In this case, Lumahang simply denies that he stabbed the victims, and, at the same
time, claims that he was just protecting his cousin. The Court, however, cannot give more
weight to Lumahang's denial over the testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution.
204 of 578
Case Digests
HUN HYUNG PARK v. EUNG WON CHOI

DOCTRINE
In considering motions for postponements, two things must be borne in mind: (1) the
reason for the postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of the movant. Unless grave abuse
of discretion is shown, such discretion will not be interfered with either by mandamus or appeal.
Because it is a matter of privilege, not a right, a movant for postponement should not assume
beforehand that his motion will be granted.
There is no deprivation of due process when a party is given an opportunity to be heard,

not only through hearings, but even through pleadings, so that one may explain one's side or
arguments.
FACTS
Park extended a loan to Choi in the amount of P1,875,000.00. As payment for the loan,
Choi issued a PNB Check in the same amount dated in favor of Park. The check, however,
was dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account. With the loan remaining
unpaid despite several demands, Park instituted a complaint against Choi for Estafa and
violation of B.P. 22. Choi filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence along
with his Demurrer. In his Demurrer, Choi asserted that the prosecution failed to prove that
he received the notice of dishonor. Thus, Choi argued that since receipt of the notice of
dishonor was not proven, then the presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds — an
element for conviction of violation of B.P. 22 — did not arise.
The MeTC granted Choi's Demurrer. In his appeal to the RTC, Park contended that the
dismissal of the criminal case should not carry with it the dismissal of the civil aspect of the
case.
The RTC granted Park's appeal holding that while the evidence presented was
insufficient to prove Choi's criminal liability for B.P. 22, it did not altogether extinguish his
civil liability.Choi filed a Motion for Reconsideration and as a result, the RTC ordered the
remand of the case to the MeTC so that Choi may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case.
Meanwhile, aggrieved by the remand of the case to the MeTC, Park elevated the
matter to the CA. The CA, however, dismissed Park's petition on procedural grounds.
Unsatisfied with the CA's dismissal of his petition on procedural grounds, Park assailed the
CA dismissal of his petition before the Court. In said case, the Court ruled that the remand of
the case to the MeTC for reception of Choi's evidence on the civil aspect of the case was
proper.
With the proceedings now before the MeTC, the MeTC ordered the presentation of
Choi's evidence on the civil aspect of the case. However, in the course of the proceedings
205 of 578
Case Digests
before MeTC, Choi repeatedly moved for several postponements, which postponements
eventually led the MeTC to issue its Order declaring that Choi had waived his right to present
evidence. The RTC affirmed the MeTC Decision and denied Choi's appeal. The CA, however,
reversed the same.
ISSUE
Whether the CA committed any reversible error in the issuance of the assailed
Decision
RULING
YES. The totality of circumstances painstakingly detailed above reveals that Choi was
not deprived of due process. First, the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC, was correct in ruling
that Choi had waived his right to present evidence.
Choi argues that any grant of postponement must take into consideration the reason
for the postponement and the merits of the case of the movant. However, Choi had been
provided with more than ample opportunity to present his case.
To begin with, the grant or denial of a motion - or, in this case, motions - for
postponement is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which should always be
predicated on the consideration that the ends of justice and fairness are served by the grant
or denial of the motion. In considering motions for postponements, two things must be borne
in mind: (1) the reason for the postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of the movant.
Unless grave abuse of discretion is shown, such discretion will not be interfered with either
by mandamus or appeal. Because it is a matter of privilege, not a right, a movant for
postponement should not assume beforehand that his motion will be granted. In the absence
of any clear and manifest grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or in excess of
jurisdiction, We cannot overturn the decision of the court a quo.
Rules governing postponements serve a clear purpose — to avert the erosion of

people's confidence in the judiciary. Consequently, in granting or denying motions for
postponements, courts must exercise their discretion constantly mindful of the
Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases.
Here, Choi bewails the MeTC Order dated March 7, 2011 in which the court, after
several warnings, declared Choi to have waived his right to present evidence. The facts
leading up to the MeTC Order dated March 7, 2011, however, clearly show that the MeTC had
been very liberal in granting Choi's numerous motions for postponement, each time
reminding Choi to come prepared to present his evidence. In all these, Choi's propensity to
disregard the opportunity given to him to present his evidence is palpable.
While the lower court granted Choi's by then sixth postponement, it did so with a
stern warning that his failure to present evidence on the scheduled date would result in his
right to present evidence being deemed waived. Yet, on November 23, 2010, Choi again
206 of 578
Case Digests
moved for postponement on the excuse that the Korean Interpreter who was present to
assist him had an erroneous certification. Using the certification issue as reason, Choi again
asked that the trial be postponed to March 7, 2011. On that day, Choi's counsel moved for
another postponement on the ground that Choi's previous counsel was retiring and this new
counsel was not prepared to present evidence that day.
Choi had been given several opportunities — spanning almost three (3) years — to
present his evidence. There is no deprivation of due process when a party is given an
opportunity to be heard, not only through hearings, but even through pleadings, so that one
may explain one's side or arguments. Inasmuch as Choi had been given more than enough
opportunity to present his case, the Court agrees with the MeTC and the RTC that Choi had
waived his right to present evidence. In this regard, Choi cannot claim that he was "prevented
from testifying" by the trial court, considering that all the postponements in the proceedings
were at the instance of Choi.
207 of 578
Case Digests
PUERTO DEL SOL PALAWAN, INC v. GABAEN

DOCTRINE
According to Section 97, Rule XVII of the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure, the provisions
of the Rules of Court shall apply in an analogous and suppletory character.
While the general rule dictates that it must be first shown that all the administrative
remedies prescribed by law have been exhausted before filing an extraordinary action for
certiorari under the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, there are however
exceptions to this rule, such as where the issue is purely a legal one or where the controverted
act is patently illegal.
The Court is not unaware that jurisprudence has held that the Neypes Rule strictly
applies only with respect to judicial decisions and that the said rule does not firmly apply to
administrative decisions. However, in the cases wherein the Court did not apply the Neypes Rule
to administrative decisions, the specific administrative rules of procedure applicable in such
cases explicitly precluded the application of the Fresh Period Rule.
FACTS
Abis filed with the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples Regional Hearing
Officer IV (NCIP RHO IV) a Complaint entitled "Andrew Abis v. Puerto Del Sol Resort/Michael
Bachelor".
Abis alleged that he and his predecessors-in-interest, who are all members of the
Cuyunen Tribe, have been occupying and cultivating the subject property as their ancestral
land since time immemorial. It is claimed that Puerto del Sol Palawan (PDSPI), through
Michael Batchelor, entered the Cuyunen ancestral land and the Puerto del Sol Resort was
subsequently developed thereon.
In its Answer, PDSPI maintained that the Puerto del Sol Resort is not in conflict and
does not overlap with any ancestral domain.
NCIP RHO IV, through Gabaen, rendered its Decision in favor of Abis. PDSPI received
a copy of the Decision dated November 22, 2012 on November 29, 2012. A Motion for
Reconsideration dated December 10, 2012 was filed by PDSPI fourteen (14) days from
November 29, 2012 or on December 13, 2012, which was eventually denied by the NCIP RHO
IV in its Order dated December 18, 2012.
PDSPI received the NCIP RHO IV's Order denying its Motion for Reconsideration on
December 21, 2012. Unsatisfied, PDSPI filed a Memorandum on Appeal with the NCIP RHO
IV on Monday, January 7, 2013, considering that the fifteenth (15th) day from December 21,
2012, i.e., January 5, 2013, fell on a Saturday. In its Order dated January 14, 2013, the NCIP
208 of 578
Case Digests
RHO IV, through Gabaen, denied due course the Memorandum on Appeal of PDSPI for being
filed beyond the reglementary period.
According to the NCIP RHO IV, since PDSPI filed its Motion for Reconsideration a day
before the end of the reglementary period to file an appeal of the NCIP RHO IV s Decision,
PDSPI had only one (1) day remaining to file an appeal upon receipt of the NCIP RHO IV's
Order denying its Motion for Reconsideration.
Feeling aggrieved, PDSPI filed its Petition for Certiorari dated March 4, 2013 before
the CA. PDSPI alleged that grave abuse of discretion was extant in the issuance of the NCIP
RHO IV’s Order dated January 14, 2013.
The CA denied outright the Petition, invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of

administrative remedies. According to the CA, instead of filing a petition for certiorari, PDSPI
should have first filed a motion for reconsideration of the NCIP RHO IV's Order dismissing
outright its Memorandum on Appeal. Hence, the CA held that there was a plain, adequate,
and speedy remedy available to PDSPI that precluded the institution of a Certiorari Petition.
ISSUES
1. Whether the CA was correct in holding that PDSPI supposedly had the available
remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration against the NCIP RHO IV's Order
dismissing outright PDSPI's Memorandum on Appeal
2. Whether the CA was correct in invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies to deny PDSPI's Certiorari Petition
3. Whether the Neypes Rule or Fresh Period Rule should be granted in an
administrative case as in the case at bar
RULING
1. NO. According to the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure, only one motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained before the RHO. In the instant case, PDSPI had already
filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 10, 2012, barring it from filing another
similar motion before the NCIP RHO IV.
Neither can it be validly argued that the NCIP RHO IV’s Order denying due course to
PDSPI's Memorandum on Appeal should have first been appealed before the NCIP En Banc.
According to Section 97, Rule XVII of the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure, the provisions of the
Rules of Court shall apply in an analogous and suppletory character. Hence, following Section
1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which states that an appeal may be taken only from a
judgment or final order that completely disposes the case, and that an appeal may not be
taken from an order disallowing an appeal, the NCIP RHO IV s Order denying due course to
PDSPI's appeal cannot be subject of an appeal before the NCIP En Banc.
2. NO. While the general rule dictates that it must be first shown that all the
administrative remedies prescribed by law have been exhausted before filing an
209 of 578
Case Digests
extraordinary action for certiorari under the principle of exhaustion of administrative

remedies, there are however exceptions to this rule, such as where the issue is purely a legal
one or where the controverted act is patently illegal.
Applying the foregoing to the instant case, the issue raised by PDSPI in the instant
Petition, i.e., the correct reglementary period applicable with respect to appeals of RHO
decisions before the NCIP En Banc, is a purely legal one.
3. YES. Section 46, Rule IX of the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure states that a
judgment rendered by the RHO shall become final only when no appeal is made within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the assailed decision or, when a motion for reconsideration was
filed by the party, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the order denying such motion
for reconsideration. If the 15th day falls on a Saturday, Sunday or a Holiday, the last day shall
be the next working day.
PDSPI received a copy of the assailed Decision dated November 22, 2012 issued by
the NCIP RHO IV on November 29, 2012. Within fourteen (14) days from such date, or on
December 13, 2012, a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 10, 2012 was filed by
PDSPI on December 12, 2012. The said Motion was eventually denied by the NCIP RHO IV in
its Order dated December 18, 2012. PDSPI received the NCIP RHO IV's Order dated
December 18, 2012 denying its Motion for Reconsideration on December 21, 2012.
With the fifteenth (15th) day from December 21, 2012, i.e., January 5, 2013, falling on
a Saturday, according to Section 46, Rule IX of the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure, PDSPI had
until Monday, January 7, 2013, to file its appeal. This is exactly what PDSPI did on such date.
Section 97, Rule XVII of the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure states that the rules of
procedure under the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily with respect to cases heard
before the NCIP. Under the Rules of Court, with the advent of the Neypes Rule, otherwise
known as the Fresh Period Rule, parties who availed themselves of the remedy of motion for
reconsideration are now allowed to file an appeal within fifteen days from the denial of that
motion.
The Court is not unaware that jurisprudence has held that the Neypes Rule strictly
applies only with respect to judicial decisions and that the said rule does not firmly apply to
administrative decisions. However, in the cases wherein the Court did not apply the Neypes
Rule to administrative decisions, the specific administrative rules of procedure applicable in
such cases explicitly precluded the application of the Fresh Period Rule.
In the instant case, there is no similar provision in the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure
which states that in case the aggrieved party files a motion for reconsideration from an
adverse decision of the RHO, the said party has only the remaining balance of the period
within which to appeal, reckoned from receipt of notice of the RHO's decision denying the
motion for reconsideration.
210 of 578
Case Digests
211 of 578
Case Digests
YU v. MIRANDA
DOCTRINE
Jurisprudence has made it clear that "intervention can no longer be allowed in a case
already terminated by final judgment." Moreover, a writ of preliminary attachment is only a
provisional remedy issued upon order of the court where an action is pending; it is an ancillary
remedy. Therefore, it can have no independent existence apart from a suit on a claim of the
plaintiff against the defendant. Any relief against such attachment could be disposed of only in
that case.
FACTS
Miranda alleged in his Complaint that Morning Star sought to establish a housing
project to be financed by Pag-IBIG through the Group Land Acquisition and Development
(GLAD) Financing Program. Miranda entered into a contract with Morning Star for the supply
and financing of the backfilling material for the latter's housing project. However, it was
alleged that Morning Star defaulted on its obligation to pay Miranda. Miranda also prayed
for the issuance of preliminary attachment over parcels of land registered under the name
of respondent Morning Star. This case was docketed as Civil Case B-8623.
On March 12, 2012, the RTC granted Miranda's prayer for preliminary attachment.
Sometime in March 2013, the petitioners Yu became aware of the action. On April 29,
2013, they filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene, claiming that they have legal interest in
the properties subject of the preliminary attachment. They claimed that Morning Star is a
mere nominal owner of the subject properties since they were the real owners; and that they
had transferred the titles covering the subject properties to Morning Star only to facilitate
the latter's loan with HDMF under the GLAD program. The petitioners Yu further averred
that the Deed of Absolute Sale which they executed in favor of respondent Morning Star was
null and void ab initio for lack of consideration.
On May 19, 2013, the RTC, through public respondent Presiding Judge Marino E.
Rubia, rendered its Decision granting the respondent Miranda's Complaint. The said
Decision eventually became final and executory. Thereafter, the RTC denied the petitioners
Yu's Motion for Leave to Intervene, stating that they are not the registered owners of the
properties, and that their rights may be protected in a separate proceeding.
Petitioners Yu filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari before the CA which was
dismissed. Such was the ruling because the issue has already been rendered moot and
academic in view of the fact that the Decision dated May 19, 2013 of the RTC already became
final and executory. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
212 of 578
Case Digests
Whether the petitioners Yu may still be allowed to intervene despite the unassailable
fact that the case has already been decided upon with finality
RULING
NO. The Civil Case B-8623 has already been decided with finality; the RTC's Decision
dated May 19, 2013 is already final and executory. The case where the petitioners Yu seek to
intervene in has already ceased. Jurisprudence has made it clear that "intervention can no
longer be allowed in a case already terminated by final judgment."
Further, it must be noted that Civil Case No. B-8623 is centered on the recovery of
sum of money pursued by respondent Miranda against respondents Morning Star, Timmy,
and Lilibeth on the basis of the contract entered by them. The petitioners Yu have no
participation whatsoever in the transaction entered into by the respondents Morning Star,
Timmy, and Lilibeth with respondent Miranda. The said case does not concern itself with the
question of ownership over the subject properties.
The only involvement of the petitioners Yu in Civil Case No. B-8623 is their claim over
the subject properties registered in the name of respondent Morning Star, which were
subjected to preliminary attachment to secure the judgment debt. The issue on the
ownership of the subject properties and the propriety of their inclusion in the preliminary
attachment is not determinative whatsoever as to whether respondent Miranda has a cause
of action for recovery of money against respondents Morning Star, Timmy, and Lilibeth. In
other words, the petitioners Yu are not parties in interest without whom no final
determination of the recovery of sum of money case can be had - they are not indispensable
parties. At most, the petitioners Yu may only be considered necessary parties. It must be
stressed that the non-inclusion of necessary parties does not prevent the court from
proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to
the rights of such necessary party.
In fact, under the Rules of Court, the filing of a motion for intervention was not even
absolutely necessary and indispensable for the petitioners Yu to question the inclusion of
the subject properties in the coverage of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment. Under Rule 57,
Section 14 of the Rules of Court, if the property attached is claimed by any third person, and
such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto, or right to the possession thereof, stating
the grounds of such right or title, and serves such affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter
has possession of the attached property, and a copy thereof upon the attaching party, the
sheriff shall not be bound to keep the property under attachment, unless the attaching party
or his agent, on demand of the sheriff, shall file a bond approved by the court to indemnify
the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the value of the property levied upon. No such
affidavit was filed by the petitioners Yu.
Moreover, a writ of preliminary attachment is only a provisional remedy issued upon

order of the court where an action is pending; it is an ancillary remedy. Therefore, it can have
no independent existence apart from a suit on a claim of the plaintiff against the defendant.
213 of 578
Case Digests
Any relief against such attachment could be disposed of only in that case. Hence, with the
cessation of Civil Case No. B-8623, with the RTC's Decision having attained the status of
finality, the attachment sought to be questioned by the petitioners Yu has legally ceased to
exist.
214 of 578
Case Digests
DIZON v. MATTI, JR.

DOCTRINE
Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption
of regularity, it is not the intention nor the function of the notary public to validate and make
binding an instrument never, in the first place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon
the parties thereto. The intention of the parties still and always is the primary consideration in
determining the true nature of a contract. Notarization per se is not a guarantee of the validity
of the contents of a document. The presumption of regularity of notarized documents cannot
be made to apply and may be overthrown by highly questionable circumstances, as may be
pointed out by the trial court.
FACTS
Respondent Matti, Jr. purchased a townhouse from petitioner Dizon. Prior to the sale,
Matti, Jr. conducted a physical inspection of said property where he was shown all the
original documents of said townhouse including the original Owner's Duplicate Certificate of
Title registered in the name of Dizon.
A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Dizon in favor of Matti, Jr. The same was also
notarized and the purchase price was paid in full. Matti, Jr then personally went to the Las
Piñas City Assessor's Office to update the real estate taxes and to get a new Tax Declaration
only to be told that all of the documents that were in Matti, Jr.'s possession were falsified.
Matti, Jr. went back to the RD to have the Owner's Duplicate copy of the title authenticated
by the said office, registered in Dizon’s name. Thereafter, he was told verbally that said title
is fake. A certificate was then issued by attesting that said title in Matti, Jr.'s possession is
fake.
Despite oral and written demand, Dizon has not rectified her alleged wrongdoings by
delivering the authentic Owner's Duplicate Copy of the title. Thus, a case was filed against
Dizon.
For his part, Dizon alleged that Matti, Jr. has no cause of action against her because
she did not encumber and/or transfer ownership of her property to Matti, Jr.; that she did
not execute nor signed the Deed of Absolute Sale presented by Matti, Jr. Finally, Dizon stated
that she does not know Matti, Jr.
The RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the CA held that since
a notarized document enjoys the presumption of regularity, and only clear, strong, and
convincing evidence can rebut such presumption, the evidence presented by petitioner
Dizon was not enough to refute the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. The subsequent Motion
for Reconsideration filed by Dizon was denied. Hence, this petition.
215 of 578
Case Digests
ISSUES
1. Whether the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the instant Petition is
valid
2. Whether the CA was correct in dismissing outright Dizon’s Motion for
Reconsideration due to the fact that the said pleading was left unsigned by petitioner
Dizon's counsel
3. Whether the CA was correct in upholding the sale covering the subject property
purportedly entered into by petitioner Dizon and respondent Matti, Jr. on the basis of
the presumption of regularity of the supposedly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale
RULING
1. YES. A perusal of the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached
to the instant Petition reveals that it was the brother of petitioner Dizon, Wilfredo V. Dizon,
and not petitioner Dizon herself, who executed the Certification.
According to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, it is the plaintiff or principal party
who should execute the certification of non-forum shopping under oath. However, if, for
reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign the certification,
another person may be authorized to execute the certification on his or her behalf through a
Special Power of Attorney. Petitioner Dizon claims that she, a senior citizen, was suffering
from sickness while in London, United Kingdom at around the time of the filing of the instant
Petition, disabling her from traveling to the Philippine Embassy to personally execute a
certification of non-forum shopping. She presented a Medical Certificate to show that she
was in poor medical condition, preventing her from personally executing the Certification at
the Philippine Embassy.
While it is true that at the time of the filing of the instant Petition, a Special Power of
Attorney authorizing Wilfredo to execute the Certification was not attached, petitioner Dizon
was able to belatedly submit before the Court a Special Power of Attorney fully signed by
petitioner Dizon and duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy in London. The Court has
held that the belated submission of an authorization for the execution of a certificate of non-
forum shopping constitutes substantial compliance with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court.
2. NO. In the assailed Resolution, citing Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the CA
held that every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him and that
an unsigned pleading produces no legal effect.
While the CA is correct in invoking the aforesaid Rule, the rest of Section 3, Rule 7
elucidates that the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall
appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. In the instant
case, the Court accepts petitioner Dizon's explanation that the failure of her counsel to affix
his signature in the Motion for Reconsideration was due to an honest inadvertence without
any intention to delay the proceedings.
216 of 578
Case Digests
3. NO. In Suntay v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that though the notarization of the
deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the intention
nor the function of the notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in
the first place, intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The
intention of the parties still and always is the primary consideration in determining the true
nature of a contract.
Notarization per se is not a guarantee of the validity of the contents of a document. The
presumption of regularity of notarized documents cannot be made to apply and may be
overthrown by highly questionable circumstances, as may be pointed out by the trial court.
In the instant case, the RTC, found that Dizon has sufficiently proven that she was not
here in the Philippines for the whole month of February 2000. Dizon could not have signed
the said Deed of Absolute Sale. A Certification dated March 21, 2011 with an attached Travel
Record with Control No. 0322201105P1017G42 establishes that since her departure from
the Philippines on October 20, 1999, petitioner Dizon only went back to the Philippines on
November 9, 2000, completely belying respondent Matti, Jr.'s claim that he personally met
up with petitioner Dizon in the Philippines in February 2000 and executed the Deed of
Absolute Sale together with her and other witnesses before a notary public.
According to Rule 132, Section 23 of the Rules of Court, documents consisting of entries
in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated.
Hence the official travel record issued by the Bureau of Immigration is prima facie
evidence of the fact that petitioner Dizon was abroad in February 2000, the time she
supposedly personally transacted with respondent Matti, Jr. in the Philippines. This was
further corroborated by the passport43 of petitioner Dizon, a public document, which bears
official stamps made by the Bureau of Immigration proving her absence from the Philippines
during the time alleged by respondent Matti, Jr. that she was in the Philippines.
217 of 578
Case Digests
FILIPINAS ESLON MANUFACTURING CORP v. HEIRS OF LLANES

DOCTRINE
An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is to nullify the
title, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is
direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On
the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief,
an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
An action to annul and enjoin the enforcement of the judgment presupposes that the
challenged judgment exists to begin with.
An action for reversion involves property that is alleged to be of State ownership, aimed
to be reverted to the public domain. Jurisprudence has held that there is no merit to the
contention that only the State may bring an action for reconveyance with respect to property
proven to be private property. The State, represented by the Solicitor General, is not the real
party-in-interest; inasmuch as there was no reversion of the disputed property to the public
domain, the State is not the proper party to bring a suit for reconveyance of a private property.
FACTS
Petitioner Filipinas Eslon Manufacturing Corp. (FEMCO) has its manufacturing plant
on a land in Iligan City, known as Lot B-2, covered by TCT T-17460 (a.f.).
Atty. Alfredo Busico, counsel for respondents Heirs of Basilio Llanes, wrote a Letter
to the management of FEMCO informing them that its plant site may have encroached into
his clients' properties, known as Lot 1911-B-4, Lot 191 l-B-3, and Lot 1911-J, covered by TCT
No. T-29,635 (a.f.), TCT No. T-31,994 (a.f.) and TCT No. T-21573 (a.f.), respectively.
Atty. Gerardo Padilla, counsel for FEMCO, replied that his client's property is covered
by a valid certificate of title - TCT No. T-17460 (a.f.).
Subsequently, FEMCO management received a Letter from a certain Atty. Dulcesimo

Tampus, the new counsel for the Heirs of Basilio Llanes, informing them that that they had
erroneously fenced a portion of his clients' lot, known as Lot 1911. The letter demanded that
the fence be removed immediately and for FEMCO to pay the amount of Php 2,000.00 as
rental fee, until the fence shall have been removed.
Two days later, Atty. Padilla wrote Atty. Tampus a Letter informing him that per
cadastral record, Basilio Llanes never claimed or filed an answer to said lot. Also, per Form
No. 36, Record of Cadastral Answer, Lot 1911 is not yet decreed in favor of any person, let
alone in the name of Basilio Llanes.
218 of 578
Case Digests
FEMCO then filed a Complaint against respondents for quieting of title and damages.
The RTC ruled in favor of FEMCO. It held that NO decision was signed and rendered by the
detailed presiding judge of the then CFI of Lanao del Norte adjudicating Cad. Lot No. 1911 in
favor of Basilio Llanes on April 17, 1968.
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC for three reasons: First, since it is evident from
FEMCO's assertions, allegations, and reliefs sought in its Complaint for Quieting of Title that
it is actually an indirect action for annulment of title, the Complaint must be dismissed in
accordance with the doctrine that a certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack.
Second, since the title of the respondents is sourced from Decree No. N-182390 supposedly
issued by the then CFI of Lanao del Norte, an action for quieting of title is not the appropriate
remedy where the action would require the modification or interference with the judgment
or order of another co-equal court. Lastly, the CA held that petitioner FEMCO had no
personality to institute the Complaint for Quieting of Title because if petitioner FEMCO's
prayer in its Complaint would be granted, Lot 1911 would be reverted to the government.
Hence, only the government, through the Solicitor General, can institute a reversion case.
ISSUES
1. Whether FEMCO's Complaint for Quieting of Title is a prohibited collateral attack
on a certificate of title
2. Whether FEMCO, in filing its Complaint, resorted to a wrong remedy since a
separate action would require the modification or interference with the judgment
or order of another co-equal court
3. Whether FEMCO had no personality to institute the Complaint
RULING
1. NO. An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is to

nullify the title, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the title was
decreed. The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such judgment,
or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when,
in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made
as an incident thereof.
In an action to quiet title, a court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the
complainant and other claimants. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two
indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a
legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
FEMCO sufficiently proved these two requisites for quieting of title: that petitioner
FEMCO has a legal right in the subject property by virtue of TCT No. T-17460 (a.f.);
219 of 578
Case Digests
and that the deed claimed to be casting a cloud on the title of petitioner FEMCO, i.e.,
OCT No. 0-1040 (a.f.) based on Decree No. N-182390 dated April 17, 1968, is invalid,
null, and void.
2. NO. The CA is correct in saying that it is the CA, and not the RTC, which has exclusive
jurisdiction over actions for annulment of trial court decisions. A trial court has no
authority to annul the final judgment of a co-equal court. However, the aforesaid
doctrine does not apply in the instant case.
An action to annul and enjoin the enforcement of the judgment presupposes that the
challenged judgment exists to begin with.
In the instant case, there is no final judgment that must be subjected to an action for
annulment with the CA because Decree No. N-182390 supposedly issued by the then
CFI of Lanao del Norte is non-existent to begin with. The RTC did not invalidate or
nullify Decree No. N-182390; what it decreed is that Decree No. N-l82390 does not
exist at all.
3. NO. An action for reversion involves property that is alleged to be of State ownership,
aimed to be reverted to the public domain. Jurisprudence has held that there is no
merit to the contention that only the State may bring an action for reconveyance with
respect to property proven to be private property. The State, represented by the
Solicitor General, is not the real party-in-interest; inasmuch as there was no reversion
of the disputed property to the public domain, the State is not the proper party to
bring a suit for reconveyance of a private property.
In the instant case, contrary to the CA's belief, the granting of the Complaint for
Quieting of Title filed by petitioner FEMCO did not have the effect of reverting the
subject property into public land because, to begin with, petitioner FEMCO is the
registered private owner of the subject property, having TCT No. T-17460 (a.f.)
registered in its name.
220 of 578
Case Digests
FAJARDO v. CUA-MALATE
DOCTRINE
Under Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, there is nothing in said section from which
it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the
partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.
FACTS
Respondent Belen filed an Amended Complaint for Partition and Accounting with
Damages (Amended Complaint) against her siblings.
In the Amended Complaint, Belen alleged that she did not receive her lawful share
from the estate of their mother, Ceferina. She prayed that judgment be issued: 1) ordering
the partition and distribution of Ceferina's entire estate; 2) ordering that she (respondent
Belen) be awarded her lawful share; 3) and ordering the defendants siblings to pay
respondent Belen moral damages, exemplary damages, contingency fee, and litigation
expenses.
Defendants Ramon, Adelaida, Emelita, and Elena filed their Answer, alleging that they
were willing to settle the partition case amicably. Meanwhile, petitioner Victoria filed an
Answer alleging that she is in favor of the partition and accounting of the properties of
Ceferina.
The parties agreed to refer the case to mediation. Hence, the RTC referred the case to
mediation through the PMC. Because of the agreement reached upon by the parties, the
mediator required Belen's counsel to draft a written compromise agreement. A meeting was
then scheduled on April 8, 2010 for the signing of the document entitled Compromise
Agreement, which reduced into writing the prior agreement reached by the parties during
the mediation conferences.
On said date, petitioner Victoria did not appear, while all her other siblings appeared.
It was subsequently explained by petitioner Victoria's counsel that petitioner Victoria was
not able to attend the meeting as she did not have enough money to travel from Manila to
Calabanga, Camarines Sur. Respondent Belen and the other siblings proceeded to sign the
Compromise Agreement and submitted the same before the RTC for approval.
The RTC rendered a Decision issuing a judgment on compromise. Petitioner Victoria

then alleged before the CA that the Compromise Agreement cannot be binding as to her
considering that she did not sign it and supposedly did not consent to its execution. The CA
denied Victoria’s appeal.
ISSUE
221 of 578
Case Digests
Whether the RTC erred in rendering its Decision based on the compromise agreement
entered into by the parties during the mediation conferences before the PMC
RULING
NO. Aside from Victoria’s self-serving assertion, there is absolutely no evidence
substantiating her claim that she did not come to an agreement with her siblings as to the
partition of the estate of their late mother, Ceferina.
A review of the parties' evidence show that they entered into a valid oral partition.
This fact was also found out by the RTC and the CA. The parties, assisted by their respective
counsel on several dates, negotiated the terms and provisions of the Compromise Agreement
so they could settle this case amicably.
As a rule, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, the Court does not pass upon
questions of fact as the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are binding on the
Court. The Court is not a trier of facts. Hence, to disprove the factual findings of the RTC and
CA, it was incumbent on Victoria to provide clear and convincing evidence to substantiate
her claim. However, the Court finds that Victoria failed to do so. Aside from her mere self-
serving statements, no other evidence was provided to support her claim.
The fact that Victoria failed to sign the written document bearing the terms of the
parties' agreement is of no moment. An oral partition may be valid and binding upon the
heirs; there is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid. Under
Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, there is nothing in said section from which it can be
inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the
partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid. Partition among heirs or renunciation of an
inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property because it does not
involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification
of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and
receiving the inheritance. Hence, an oral partition is not covered by the Statute of Frauds.
In fact, the Court has likewise previously held that, independent and in spite of the
statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been completely
or partly performed.
222 of 578
Case Digests
DAVAO ACF BUS LINES, INC v. ROGELIO ANG

DOCTRINE
Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of
judgment. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error was committed. Otherwise,
every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous
judgment would be a void judgment. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action of
certiorari. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the
case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari.
It is established that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable. While it is true that the rule on the immutability and finality of judgments admits
of certain exceptions, such as when the questioned final and executory judgment is void, a
catena of cases has held that a mere erroneous judgment, though rendered according to the
course and practice of the court is contrary to law, is not a void judgment. A wrong judgment
is not a void judgment, provided the court which renders it had jurisdiction to try the case.
FACTS
The present controversy is a consequence of the execution of judgment in the case of
People vs. Rodolfo Borja Tanio for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Serious Physical Injuries,
wherein the MTCC convicted Tanio and awarded in favor of Ang damagesand attorney’s fees.
The decision became final and executory. In view of its finality, the prosecution filed a Motion
for Execution against the accused Tanio which was granted. However, the writ was returned
unsatisfied as the latter had allegedly no properties that can be levied to satisfy the money
judgment. Hence, upon motion, the MTCC issued a writ of execution against ACF being the
employer of accused Tanio.
Consequently, ACF filed a Motion to Recall and/or Quash The Writ of Execution which
was, however, denied. In view of the denial, petitioner filed before RTC a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 65 but was also denied. On appeal, the CA held that the RTC did not
err in holding that the MTCC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing its Order
denying ACF's Motion to Recall and/or Quash The Writ of Execution and ordering the
conduct of a hearing to determine whether ACF should be held subsidiarily liable under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code for the civil liability ex delicto of its employee, accused
Tanio.
ISSUE
Whether the CA was correct in affirming the RTC's holding that the MTCC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
RULING
223 of 578
Case Digests
YES. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not
errors of judgment. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so
engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error was
committed. Otherwise, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction
and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. Consequently, an error of
judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible
through the original civil action of certiorari. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect,
as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province
of certiorari.
In the instant case, the primary argument of ACF is centered on the supposed
erroneous award of damages against the ACF's employee, accused Tanio, made by the MTCC
in its Judgment dated December 27, 2005 convicting the latter. But such supposed errors
merely pertain only to mistakes of law and not of jurisdiction, thus putting them beyond the
ambit of certiorari.
Furthermore, ACF's act of assailing the award of damages made by the MTCC in its
Judgment dated December 27, 2005 is tantamount to an attack against a final and executory
judgment, being a clear violation of the doctrine of immutability of judgment. Hence, ACF
cannot now assail the MTCC's Judgment lest the elementary principle of immutability of
judgments be disregarded. It is established that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby
becomes immutable and unalterable. While it is true that the rule on the immutability and
finality of judgments admits of certain exceptions, such as when the questioned final and
executory judgment is void, a catena of cases has held that a mere erroneous judgment,
though rendered according to the course and practice of the court is contrary to law, is not a
void judgment. A wrong judgment is not a void judgment, provided the court which renders
it had jurisdiction to try the case.
To reiterate, ACF merely questions the issuance of the MTCC's Judgment dated
December 27, 2005 mainly on the basis of the supposed erroneous awarding of civil
indemnity. Hence, assuming arguendo that the MTCC's act of awarding damages was wrong,
such does not make the Judgment void as an exception to the principle of immutability of
judgments, considering that the court indisputably had jurisdiction to try the case.
Lastly, ACF argues that the MTCC was supposedly divested with jurisdiction to render
judgment on the damages considering that the aggregate amount of damages is P900,000.00
which amount is way beyond the jurisdiction of the MTCC to grant. It is a basic rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint, it is an
established principle that jurisdiction is not determined by the amount ultimately
substantiated and awarded by the trial court.
224 of 578
Case Digests
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK v. SPS. SY

DOCTRINE
According to the Rules of Court, the summons shall be served by handling a copy thereof
to the defendant in person. Only in instances wherein, for justifiable causes, the defendant
cannot be served within a reasonable time, may summons be effected through substituted
service, i.e., (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person
of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's
office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. With respect
to parties that are domestic private juridical entities, service may be made only upon the
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house
counsel.
A special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary
appearance when the defendant explicitly and unequivocably poses objections to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person.
FACTS
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) filed a Complaint for sum of money and/or
damages with prayer for the ex parte issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against
Nation Granary, Inc. (NGI), the spouses Alison Ang-Sy and Guillermo Sy, Renato Ang, Nena
Ang, Ricky Ang, Derick Chester A. Sy (collectively, respondents Sps. Sy, et al.), and Nation
Petroleum Gas, Inc. (NPGI).
The RTC granted UCPB's prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment. Summonses and
copies of the order granting the writ were served on the defendants.
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss with Manifestation alleging that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons. Where a defendant is a corporation, service of
summons may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary or in-house counsel. This list is exclusive and does not include a mere employee
like Charlotte Magpayo, NPGI's Property Supply Custodian (OIC). The RTC did not also
acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the spouses Allyson Ang-Sy and Guillermo Sy, Renato
Ang, Nena Ang, Ricky Ang and Derick Chester Sy as personal service of summons was not
first resorted to before substituted service was effected. Defendants thus prayed for the
dismissal of the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction, the discharge of the writ of attachment on
their properties, and the suspension of further proceedings because a Stay Order had been
issued against NGI and NPGI.
UCPB opposed the motion insisting that there was valid service of summons or, at the
very least, substantial compliance of the rules. If not, defendants are deemed to have
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC when it prayed for an alternative relief
other than dismissal in its Motion to Dismiss.
225 of 578
Case Digests
The RTC granted the suspension of proceedings with respect to defendants NGI and
NPGI. Hence, the Sps. Ang-Sy, et al. filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule
65 of imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it denied their Motion
to Dismiss. On appeal, the CA held that the RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the persons
of the therein defendants due to improper service of summons. Hence, “all proceedings
before the RTC are void.
ISSUES
1. Whether the service of summons to defendants was defective thereby depriving the
RTC of jurisdiction to hear UCPB’s Complaint
2. Whether there was voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC on the part of
respondents Sps. Sy, et al.
RULING
1. YES. According to the Rules of Court, the summons shall be served by handling a copy
thereof to the defendant in person. Only in instances wherein, for justifiable causes, the
defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time, may summons be effected through
substituted service, i.e., (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof. With respect to parties that are domestic private juridical entities, service
may be made only upon the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
In the absence of service of summons or when the service of summons upon the
person of the defendant is defective, the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and
the proceedings and any judgment rendered are null and void. The Sheriff's Report
indubitably shows that the established jurisprudential doctrine on the prerequisites for valid
substituted service was not observed, i.e., for substituted service of summons to be available,
there must be several attempts by the sheriff, which means at least three tries, preferably on
at least two different dates. It is crystal clear that there were no several attempts made to
effect personal service in the instant case; there was only a single day's effort to personally
serve summons upon the therein defendants.
Further, the Sheriff's Report miserably failed to indicate that the person who received
the summons was a person of suitable age and discretion residing in the residence of the
therein defendants. It is an ironclad rule that such matters must be clearly and specifically
described in the Return of Summons.
As regards the service of summons undertaken with respect to the therein defendant
corporations, i.e., NGI and NPGI, the CA was also not mistaken in holding that since the
summons were served on a mere OIC property supply custodian, the services of summons
undertaken were defective. Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court sets out an exclusive
enumeration of the officers who can receive summons on behalf of a corporation. Service of
226 of 578
Case Digests
summons to someone other than the corporation president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, and in-house counsel is not valid.
2. NO. According to the Rules of Court, the defendant's voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of summons. However, the inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
Both petitioner UCPB and the RTC posit the view that since respondents Sps. Sy, et al., in
their Motion to Dismiss, included a plea to suspend the proceedings. They thus sought an
affirmative relief which should be deemed a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
court. Such view is mistaken.
A special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary

appearance when the defendant explicitly and unequivocably poses objections to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person. The Court in Interlink Movie Houses, Inc., et.al v. CA
explained that while at first glance, the therein respondents may be seen to have submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the RTC by praying for an affirmative relief, there was an
explicit objection made by the parties, in an unequivocal manner, to the jurisdiction of the
court on the ground of invalid service of summons.
Applying the foregoing, while it is true that respondents Sps. Sy, et al. did pray in their
Motion to Dismiss for a suspension of the proceedings due to a Stay Order issued by a
different court, which is an affirmative relief, such was not tantamount to a voluntary
appearance as respondents Sps. Sy, et al., in an explicit and unequivocal manner, posed
vehement objections to the jurisdiction of the RTC over their persons due to improper
service of summons.
227 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOVO TANES y BELMONTE

G.R. No. 240596, April 3, 2019, Second Division, J. CAGUIOA
DOCTRINE
There being non-compliance with the rule on chain of custody of the drug seized during the
buy-bust operation, the evidence of guilt for the crime of illegal sale of drugs against Tanes is
deemed not strong. Accordingly, he is entitled to bail.
FACTS
On April 6, 2011, an Information was filed against Tanes for violating Section 5, Article
II of R.A. 9165, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about December 14, 2010, at about 8:20 P.M. in DARBCI Subdivision,
National Highway, General Santos City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell for Five Hundred Pesos (Php500.00) to poseur
buyer, one sachet containing 0.0296 grams (sic) of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug. CONTRARY TO LAW.
Tanes pleaded not guilty to the charge. On April 10, 2015, he filed a Petition for Bail.
The RTC conducted 3 hearings for the bail application. The RTC issued an Order granting
Tanes' application for bail. The RTC ruled that the failure of the prosecution to show that the
three witnesses (i.e., media representative, DOJ representative, elected official) were also
present in the actual buy-bust operation and not only during the inventory negated the
requirement of strong evidence of the accused's guilt to justify a denial of bail. The CA
affirmed the RTC decison. According to the CA, petitioner failed to show that the RTC's
exercise of discretion in granting the application for bail was unsound and unguided by
jurisprudence.
Petitioner's MR was denied by the CA; hence, this Petition. In its Rule 45 Petition,
petitioner argues that the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court when the latter granted the petition for bail based solely on the case of Jehar
Reyes. In particular, petitioner claims that R.A. 9165 only requires the presence of the three
witnesses during the conduct of the inventory, and not during the actual buy-bust operation.
Also, petitioner avers that the CA erred in affirming the trial court's ruling despite the latter's
failure to appreciate the evidence of the prosecution.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming the Order of the RTC which granted Tanes'
application for bail.
RULING
NO. Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
228 of 578
Case Digests
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. - No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Thus, before conviction, bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. Bail becomes a matter of
discretion if the offense charged is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment that is, bail will be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong.
In this case, Tanes was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165
which carries the penalty of life imprisonment. Hence, Tanes' bail becomes a matter of
judicial discretion if the evidence of his guilt is not strong.
To determine whether evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the conduct of bail
hearings is required where the prosecution has the burden of proof, subject to the right of
the defense to cross-examine witnesses and introduce evidence in rebuttal. The court is to
conduct only a summary hearing, consistent with the purpose of merely determining the
weight of evidence for purposes of bail. The court's grant or denial of the bail application
must contain a summary of the prosecution's evidence. On this basis, the judge formulates
his or her own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of
the accused.
Applying the abovementioned standards to the present case, the Court finds that,
contrary to petitioner's assertions, the trial court did observe the rules to be followed in
granting or denying the bail application. Records show that the RTC conducted hearings for
the application of bail on October 7, 2015, November 4, 2015, and February 3, 2017. In all
these hearings, petitioner was duly represented by its prosecutors.
Likewise, in the present case, it appears that the buy-bust team committed several
procedural lapses concerning the chain of custody of the seized drug. In particular, the RTC
and the CA found that: (1) there was no representative from the DOJ present during the buy-
bust operation and the inventory; (2) the two other witnesses (i.e., the media representative
and the elected public official) were not present during the apprehension and seizure of the
illegal drug but were merely called to sign the inventory sheet; and (3) no photograph was
presented showing the inventory of the seized shabu in the presence of Tanes and the
witnesses. These lapses in the chain of custody created doubt as to the identity and integrity
of the seized drug. Consequently, the evidence as to Tanes' guilt cannot be characterized as
strong.
The RTC cannot also be faulted for relying on the clear and unequivocal ruling made
in Jehar Reyes because unless overturned, the same remains good case law. To the contrary,
Jehar Reyes has even been cited by the Court in at least six cases subsequent to it, one of
which is People v. Sagana, wherein the Court made similar findings regarding the three-
229 of 578
Case Digests
witness rule. There being non-compliance with the rule on chain of custody of the drug
seized during the buy-bust operation, the evidence of guilt for the crime of illegal sale of
drugs against Tanes is deemed not strong. Accordingly, he is entitled to bail.
The present ruling, however, should not prejudge the RTC's ruling on the merits of
the case. Indeed, there are instances when the Court had ruled that failure to strictly comply
with the procedure in Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure
and custody over the items void. In such cases, the prosecution must still satisfactorily prove
that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved. The prosecution must be able to adequately
explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses.
230 of 578
Case Digests
Valencia (Bukidnon) Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. v. Heirs of

Cabotaje
DOCTRINE
A motion for reconsideration is not pro forma just because it reiterated the arguments
earlier passed upon and rejected by the appellate court. A movant may raise the same
arguments precisely to convince the court that its ruling was erroneous. As found by the CA,
"[a] thorough examination of the Motion for Reconsideration reveals that [respondents Heirs
of Cabotaje] had stressed the issue on [petitioner] FACOMA's legal capacity to sue them which
[was] not discussed in the Decision dated December 3, 2010. This alone would readily tell Us
that [respondents Heirs of Cabotaje's] Motion for Reconsideration was not pro forma."
FACTS
Petitioner FACOMA, represented by its Directors Sergio Belera and Pedro Pagonzaga
instituted an action for quieting of title and recovery of ownership and possession of parcel
of land, and damages against respondents Heirs of Cabotaje and Francisco Estrada.
The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the
Annulment and Cancellation of the Deed of Sale executed by Francisco Estrada in favor of
Amante Cabotaje and all the Transfer Certificates of Titles issued. The RTC likewise denied
the respondent heirs’ motion for reconsideration. Thus, respondents Heirs of Cabotaje filed
the Notice of Appeal. Incidentally, petitioner FACOMA filed a Motion to Dismiss the Notice of
Appeal averring that the Motion for Reconsideration earlier filed by respondents Heirs of
Cabotaje did not toll the running of the reglementary period to appeal for the reason that the
Motion was but pro forma and raised no new issue. The RTC issued a Resolution which
denied the Notice of Appeal for being filed out of time. The RTC deemed the respondents
Heirs of Cabotaje's Motion for Reconsideration as a pro forma motion, failing to toll the
reglementary period to file an appeal. Hence, respondents Heirs of Cabotaje filed a Petition
for Certiorari (Certiorari Petition) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. During the pendency
of the Certiorari Petition before the CA, petitioner FACOMA filed a Motion for Execution of
Judgment, which was initially denied by the RTC. Unsatisfied, petitioner FACOMA filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC's denial of its Motion for Execution of Judgment. On
December 13, 2011, the RTC issued a Resolution granting petitioner FACOMA's Motion for
Execution of Judgment. The CA granted the Certiorari Petition filed by respondents Heirs of
Cabotaje. Consequently, the CA ordered the RTC to give due course to the respondents Heirs
of Cabotaje's Notice of Appeal. The CA found that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
respondents Heirs of Cabotaje is not a pro forma motion. Hence, the Notice of Appeal filed by
the latter, having been filed three days after receipt of the RTC's Resolution, was not filed out
of time.
ISSUE
231 of 578
Case Digests
1. Whether the CA erred in holding that what was assailed by the Certiorari Petition
instituted by the respondents Heirs of Cabotaje was the RTC's Resolution dated April
4, 2011, which denied the latter's Notice of Appeal;
2. Whether the CA erred in holding that Notice of Appeal filed by the respondents Heirs
of Cabotaje was wrongfully denied by the RTC, considering that the respondents'
Motion for Reconsideration was not a pro forma motion
RULING
(1) NO. The CA found as a fact that the Certiorari Petition filed by respondents Heirs of
Cabotaje was centered on the RTC's Resolution dated April 4, 2011, which denied the
Notice of Appeal filed by the latter due to the respondents' Motion for Reconsideration
supposedly being pro forma. Well-settled is the rule that the Court is not a trier of facts.
When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and
binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court. The Court finds no cogent
reason to reverse the factual finding of the CA that the Certiorari Petition filed by
respondents Heirs of Cabotaje, as a fact, assailed the RTC's Resolution dated April 4, 2011.
To be sure, a simple perusal of the Certiorari Petition reveals that respondents Heirs of
Cabotaje allege in their Petition that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its Resolution dated April 4, 2011.
(2) NO. In its Resolution dated April 4, 2011, the RTC found the respondents Heirs of
Cabotaje's Motion for Reconsideration a pro forma motion because it did not raise any
new arguments. However, the Court has decided in a catena of cases that the mere
reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed
upon by the court does not make a motion pro forma. It is evidently settled that the
respondents Heirs of Cabotaje's Motion for Reconsideration is not a pro forma motion. It
is not alleged to be a second motion for reconsideration. It is not contended that the said
Motion failed to specify the findings and conclusions contained in the RTC's Decision that
the respondents Heirs of Cabotaje opined were contrary to law or not supported by the
evidence. It is likewise not alleged that the said Motion merely alleged that the Decision
in question was contrary to law without making any explanation.
In addition, the CA was correct in invoking the Court's Decision in Department of

Agrarian Reform v. Uy, citing Security Bank and Trust Company, Inc. v. Cuenca, which
held that a motion for reconsideration is not pro forma just because it reiterated the
arguments earlier passed upon and rejected by the appellate court. A movant may raise
the same arguments precisely to convince the court that its ruling was erroneous. As
found by the CA, "[a] thorough examination of the Motion for Reconsideration reveals
that [respondents Heirs of Cabotaje] had stressed the issue on [petitioner] FACOMA's
legal capacity to sue them which [was] not discussed in the Decision dated December 3,
2010. This alone would readily tell Us that [respondents Heirs of Cabotaje's] Motion for
Reconsideration was not pro forma." Hence, the Court upholds the CA's finding that
respondents Heirs of Cabotaje's Motion for Reconsideration on the RTC's Decision dated
December 3, 2010 is not a pro forma motion that prevented the tolling of the
232 of 578
Case Digests
reglementary period to file an appeal. Hence, the Court sustains the CA's order upon the
RTC to give due course to the Notice of Appeal filed by respondents Heirs of Cabotaje.
233 of 578
Case Digests
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC

WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) v. ROGUZA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
DOCTRINE
It bears emphasizing that the foregoing Decision rendered by the CA 7th Division in CA-
G.R. SP No. 104920 had become final on July 30, 2011, during the pendency of DPWH's Motion
for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 107412, which the CA Special 17th Division later denied
through the assailed Resolution. Thus, there was, at the time of the issuance of the assailed
Resolution, already a final judgment on the merits concerning the very same facts, issues and
parties — a judgment which could not have been disturbed, let alone reversed, by a co-equal
division of the same court.
FACTS
RDC was awarded the construction of the Rosario-Pugo-Baguio Road Rehabilitation
Project, Contract Package I by [DPWH]. The project, with a contract duration of 12 months,
is a 2.10 kilometer diversion road. Accordingly, the Notice to Proceed (NTP) was issued by
DPWH to RDC on May 15, 1997. Thereafter, RDC mobilized its manpower, equipment and
other resources necessary for the project and eventually, RDC actually commenced
construction activities on May 24, 1997. However, the project was suspended effective June
4, 1997 due to DPWH's failure to secure the required Environmental Clearance Certificate
(ECC) and to settle the attendant right of way (ROW) problems. The suspension lasted for
almost 32 months up until the [RDC] was furnished by [DPWH] with the Resume Order. The
project was finally accomplished and completed by [RDC] on September 6, 2001.
Meanwhile, RDC made its claim upon DPWH for the idle time of equipment and other
expenses incurred due to the suspension of work on the project in the amount of
P93,782,093.64 pursuant to Clause 42.2 in relation to Clause 54.1 of the Conditions of
Contract Volume III, Part I (FIDIC) Essentially, the equipment rental component of the
foregoing claim was based on the equipment guidebook published by the Association of
Carriers and Equipment Lessors, Inc. [ACEL]. Consequently, DPWH created an Ad Hoc
Committee to evaluate the foregoing claim of The Ad Hoc Committee recommended payment
of RDC's claim but only in the reduced amount of P26,142,577.09 and subject to the condition
that [RDC] should waive or no longer claim the balance of its claim including damages. The
Ad Hoc Committee's recommendation was eventually approved by DPWH's then Acting
Secretary Florante Soriquez. Notably, the computation for the idle time of equipment
component in the above-mentioned recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee was based
on [the lower bare rental rate submitted by RDC in its detailed unit price estimate which
forms part of the parties' contract, and not the higher ACEL rates.
RDC was purportedly constrained to accept the amount tendered by DPWH through
a Letter-Waiver because it was already in financial distress at that time. Subsequently, RDC
made various representations and demands, both oral and written, upon DPWH for the
234 of 578
Case Digests
payment of the balance of its entire claim, the final notice of claim having been served upon
DPWH on January 14, 2008. However, DPWH denied RDC's claim.
Prompted by DPWH's repeated refusal to heed its demand for additional

compensation, RDC filed a Complaint against the DPWH before the CIAC (CIAC Complaint)
demanding payment of P67,639,576.55, representing the balance of its original claim for idle
time compensation corresponding to four (4) bulldozers, two (2) backhoes and two (2)
payloaders which were left idle during the suspension of the project. After due proceedings,
the CIAC rendered its Arbitral Award. The Arbitral Tribunal held that RDC sufficiently
established that it was in financial distress at the time DPWH offered to pay the reduced
amount of P26,142,577.09, and that it was constrained to execute the Letter- Waiver to
facilitate payment. On this basis, the Arbitral Tribunal declared the Letter-Waiver
"inefficacious".
DPWH filed with the CA a petition for review (DPWH's CA Petition) under Rule 43
seeking the reversal of the Arbitral Award. Aggrieved, RDC filed a petition for review before
the CA via Rule 43 (RDC's CA Petition). Said petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 107412, was
filed sometime in March 2009. Notably, RDC's CA Petition proceeded independent of DPWH's
CA Petition, which had already been pending with another division of the same court. The
CA Special 17th Division issued the assailed Decision granting RDC's CA Petition.
ISSUE
Whether the CA Special 17th Division erred when it directed DPWH to pay RDC
additional compensation amounting to P61,748,346.00, representing the difference between
its original claim, and the payment it previously accepted from DPWH under the Letter-
Waiver.
RULING
YES. On October 29, 2010, or months prior to the issuance of the assailed Decision,
the CA 7th Division already issued its own Decision granting DPWH's CA Petition.
RDC filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA 7th Division on
July 5, 2011. This denial was no longer appealed by RDC. Hence, the Decision of the CA 7th
Division became final. Despite the outcome of DPWH's CA Petition, the CA Special 17th
Division and Former Special 17th Division later issued the herein assailed Decision and
Resolution granting RDC's CA Petition and essentially reversing those rendered by their co-
equal division. For reasons unknown to the Court, the assailed Decision and Resolution failed
to refer to the resolution of DPWH's CA Petition, despite the identity of issues and parties
involved.
Res judicata is commonly understood as a bar to the prosecution of a second action

upon the same claim, demand or cause of action.43 The principle of res judicata precludes
the re-litigation of a conclusively settled fact or question in any future or other action
between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any
235 of 578
Case Digests
other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action.
For the principle to apply: (i) the issue or fact sought to be precluded must be identical to the
issue or fact actually determined in a former suit; (ii) the party to be precluded must be party
to or was in privity with a party to the former proceeding; (iii) there was final judgment on
the merits in the former proceedings; and (iv) in compliance with the basic tenet of due
process, that the party against whom the principle is asserted must have had full and fair
opportunity to litigate issues in the prior proceedings. All the foregoing requisites are
present.
As between CA-G.R. SP No. 104920 (DPWH's CA Petition) and CA-G.R. SP No. 107412
(RDC's CA Petition) which has given rise to the present case, there is an identity of facts,
issues and parties. There is likewise no allegation on the part of RDC that it had been
deprived of a fair and full opportunity to litigate the issues in CA-G.R. SP No. 104920. That
due process had been afforded both parties is evident from the CA 7th Division's Decision
which exhaustively resolved the substantive issues in dispute. It bears emphasizing that the
foregoing Decision rendered by the CA 7th Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 104920 had become
final on July 30, 2011, during the pendency of DPWH's Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R.
SP No. 107412, which the CA Special 17th Division later denied through the assailed
Resolution. Thus, there was, at the time of the issuance of the assailed Resolution, already a
final judgment on the merits concerning the very same facts, issues and parties — a judgment
which could not have been disturbed, let alone reversed, by a co-equal division of the same
court.
236 of 578
Case Digests
NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATIONv. BERMUDA DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION
G.R No. 214782, April 03, 2019, Second Division, J. CAGUIOA
DOCTRINE
Given that BDC filed before the MTC a complaint for unlawful detainer against TransCo,
which erected and then energized a 230 KV transmission traversing the whole extent of the
subject property, the MTC should have found or taken judicial notice that TransCo is a public
service corporation with the power to expropriate. Upon such finding, the MTC, pursuant to the
aforecited prevailing jurisprudence, should have then ordered the dismissal of the unlawful
detainer case without prejudice to BDC's right to recover the value of the land actually taken,
or ordered TransCo to institute the proper expropriation or condemnation proceedings and to
pay the just compensation and damages assessed therein.
FACTS
Respondent Bermuda Development Corporation (BDC) filed a case for Unlawful
Detainer against Petitioner National Transmission Corporation [TransCo] with the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabuyao. On 23 January 2009, [TransCo] filed its Answer with
Affirmative and Compulsory Counterclaim. After due proceedings, on 24 August 2009, the
MTC rendered a Decision in favor of plaintiff. Petitioner [TransCo] then interposed an appeal
before the RTC. Respondent BDC, on the other hand, filed an Urgent Motion for Execution of
the aforesaid 24 August 2009 Decision of the MTC of Cabuyao. The RTC granted Respondent
BDC's Urgent Motion for Execution. A Writ of Execution Pending Appeal was then issued by
the said court. Proceeding from the immediately cited Writ of Execution, the trial court a
quo issued a Notice of Garnishment against Petitioner [TransCo's] account with the Land
Bank of the Philippines. Petitioner [TransCo] filed an Omnibus Motion asking for the
reconsideration of the trial court granting Respondent BDC's Urgent Motion for Execution.
Petitioner likewise prayed for the quashal of the 30 October 2009 Writ of Execution and 06
November 2009 Notice of Garnishment. In the meantime, Petitioner [TransCo] filed a
Complaint for Expropriation of the parcel of land, which was the same property subject of
the Unlawful Detainer Case before the RTC of Biñan, Laguna. Subsequently, Petitioner
[TransCo] filed with RTC Branch 25 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession. Petitioner [Transco] then deposited the amount of P10,704,000.00 with the
Landbank of the Philippines, purportedly representing the provisional value of the property
sought to be expropriated. Consequently, on 29 March 2010, RTC Branch 25 issued an Order
granting Petitioner's Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession.
Meanwhile, on 29 July 2010, RTC, Branch 24 dismissed Petitioner [TransCo's] appeal in the
unlawful detainer case for being "moot and academic". Petitioner [TransCo] seasonably
sought for a reconsideration of the adverse ruling but the same was denied by RTC Branch
24. Hence, the Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules before the CA. The CA dismissed
TransCo’s petition. TransCo filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the CA.
Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition.
ISSUE
237 of 578
Case Digests
Whether the RTC erred in dismissing TransCo's appeal allegedly because it has
become moot and academic with the filing of the expropriation complaint involving the same
property subject of the unlawful detainer case.
RULING
YES. In a line of cases, it is clear that recovery of possession of the property by the
landowner can no longer be allowed on the grounds of estoppel and, more importantly, of
public policy which imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services to
the public. The non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return
of the property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is the right of compensation.
Thus, it is well-settled that a case filed by a landowner for recovery of possession or

ejectment against a public utility corporation, endowed with the power of eminent domain,
which has occupied the land belonging to the former in the interest of public service without
prior acquisition of title thereto by negotiated purchase or expropriation proceedings, will
not prosper. Any action to compel the public utility corporation to vacate such property is
unavailing since the landowner is denied the remedies of ejectment and injunction for
reasons of public policy and public necessity as well as equitable estoppel. The proper
recourse is for the ejectment court: (1) to dismiss the case without prejudice to the
landowner filing the proper action for recovery of just compensation and consequential
damages; or (2) to dismiss the case and direct the public utility corporation to institute the
proper expropriation or condemnation proceedings and to pay the just compensation and
consequential damages assessed therein; or (3) to continue with the case as if it were an
expropriation case and determine the just compensation and consequential damages
pursuant to Rule 67 (Expropriation) of the Rules of Court, if the ejectment court has
jurisdiction over the value of the subject land. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9136 or the
Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001, the National Transmission Corporation
(TransCo or TRANSCO), a government agency, was created to assume the electrical
transmission functions of the National Power Corporation and is vested with the power of
eminent domain subject to the requirements of the Constitution and existing laws.
Given that BDC filed before the MTC a complaint for unlawful detainer against
TransCo, which erected and then energized a 230 KV transmission traversing the whole
extent of the subject property, the MTC should have found or taken judicial notice that
TransCo is a public service corporation with the power to expropriate. Upon such finding,
the MTC, pursuant to the aforecited prevailing jurisprudence, should have then ordered the
dismissal of the unlawful detainer case without prejudice to BDC's right to recover the value
of the land actually taken, or ordered TransCo to institute the proper expropriation or
condemnation proceedings and to pay the just compensation and damages assessed therein.
The MTC could not have proceeded to determine just compensation given that the value of
the subject property is clearly beyond its jurisdiction. Further, the award of rental in arrears
by the MTC is improper because BDC is only entitled to the just compensation of the subject
land and consequential damages as determined pursuant to Sections 5 and 6, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court. While the award of rental in arrears is proper in an unlawful detainer action,
238 of 578
Case Digests
its award in the present case cannot be upheld since an unlawful detainer action is not a
sanctioned remedy in case a public service or utility corporation, endowed with the power
of eminent domain, like TransCo in this case, has occupied privately-owned property without
first acquiring title thereto by negotiated purchase or expropriation proceedings.
The MTC being bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the unlawful detainer case, its
Decision mandating TransCo to vacate the subject property and remove all structures
thereon and to pay BDC P10,350,000.00 as reasonable rental computed from December 13,
2008 is without legal basis. The subsequent filing by TransCo of the expropriation
proceedings could not have rendered the unlawful detainer case moot and academic
inasmuch as the MTC erred in proceeding with the unlawful detainer case and not dismissing
it following the prevailing jurisprudence.
239 of 578
Case Digests
WILFREDO CABUGUAS, RENATO CABUGUAS, ALEJANDRO "TABOY" CANETE AND

ELEAZAR MORTOS, v. GALLANTS. TAN NERY, REPRESENTED BY KATHERINE TAN
NERY-TOLEDO
DOCTRINE
The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of authority to the
[CA] to receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a
court may, motu proprio, direct a reference to a commissioner when a question of fact, other
than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying
a judgment or order into effect. The order of reference can be limited exclusively to receive and
report evidence only, and the commissioner may likewise rule upon the admissibility of
evidence. The commissioner is likewise mandated to submit a report in writing to the court
upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference. In Republic, the commissioner's
report formed the basis of the final adjudication by the Court on the matter. The same result
can obtain herein. Hence, pursuant to Rules 32 and 46 of the Rules of Court, and consistent with
the Court's ruling in Manotok, this case is remanded to the CA in order to: (i) allow petitioners
to present proof of the status of the CLOA of the 4,204-square meter land located in Barangay
San Jose, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon; and (ii) allow respondent to present controverting
evidence, if there be any.
FACTS
Gallant S. Tan Nery [(respondent)] filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession of
Real Propetiy and Ejectment before the DARAB, Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, against petitioners, involving a parcel of land
situated in Barangay San Jose, Malaybalay, Bukidnon, with an area of Four Thousand Two
Hundred Four (4,204) square meters, more or less, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. AT-15991 with Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00318948 issued
by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) on December 22, 2000, in favor of
[respondent] and registered on April 23, 2001.
In his complaint, [respondent], represented by his sister, Eden Tan Nery Mamawag, alleged,
among others, that: sometime on August 16, 2001, [respondent], through his niece, Cecilia
Ellen Mamawag, looked for laborers to conduct the act of brushing and land preparation of
his landholding for the purpose of planting yellow corn; his niece contacted and eventually
contracted the labor services of respondent Wilfredo Cabuguas (Wilfredo for brevity) to
perform the desired land preparation for a fee; astonishingly, after the land preparation and
after having been paid, Wilfredo, without hesitation and through stealth and evil
machination, immediately occupied the subject land and planted it with various agricultural
crops such as bananas, cassavas, coconuts and fruit trees; Wilfredo even built a house
thereon upon his assumption that the land area is an excess, hence untitled, and could be
occupied and tilled for purposes of agricultural production and eventually could be applied
for titling; Wilfredo even invited other persons, to also build a house thereon while he works
at the sawmill of Eleazar; this prompted [respondent], through his representative, to report
240 of 578
Case Digests
and bring the issue to the Office of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC) Chairman
and to the DAR Legal Office of Malaybalay City for a possible amicable settlement but all these
efforts failed.
The Provincial Adjudicator ruled in favor of respondent. On appeal, the DARAB-

Central then rendered its Decision reversing the Provincial Adjudicator and ruling that the
DARAB has no juisdiction over the complaint since it involves an administrative
investigation of whether respondent's CLOA was valid given the claim of petitioners that
they were the actual tillers and occupants of the land for a long period of time. Respondent
appealed to the CA, which reinstated the Provincial Adjudicator's Decision and reversed and
set aside the DARAB-Central's Decision. The CA ruled that a reading of respondent's
complaint showed that it involved an agrarian dispute that was well within the jurisdiction
of the DARAB.
ISSUE
W/N DARAB has jurisdiction over the instant case.
RULING
NO. The [CA] generally has the authority to review findings of fact. Its conclusions as
to findings of fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court. It is a body that is fully
capacitated and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating factual matters, including
documentary evidence. In fact, the Court had actually resorted to referring a factual matter
pending before it to the [CA]. In Republic v. [CA], this Court commissioned the former
Thirteenth Division of the [CA] to hear and receive evidence on the controversy, more
particularly to determine "the actual area reclaimed by the Republic Real Estate Corporation,
and the areas of the Cultural Center Complex which are 'open spaces' and/or 'areas reserved
for certain purposes,' determining in the process the validity of such postulates and the
respective measurements of the areas referred to." The [CA] therein received the evidence
of the parties and rendered a "Commissioner's Report" shortly thereafter. Thus, resort to the
[CA] is not a deviant procedure.
The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of

authority to the [CA] to receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2, Rule 32 of the
Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct a reference to a commissioner when a
question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion or otherwise, in any stage
of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect. The order of reference can be limited
exclusively to receive and report evidence only, and the commissioner may likewise rule
upon the admissibility of evidence. The commissioner is likewise mandated to submit a
report in writing to the court upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference.
In Republic, the commissioner's report formed the basis of the final adjudication by the Court
on the matter. The same result can obtain herein. Hence, pursuant to Rules 32 and 46 of the
Rules of Court, and consistent with the Court's ruling in Manotok, this case is remanded to
the CA in order to: (i) allow petitioners to present proof of the status of the CLOA of the 4,204-
square meter land located in Barangay San Jose, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon; and (ii) allow
241 of 578
Case Digests
respondent to present controverting evidence, if there be any. In view of the foregoing, the
case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in furtherance of the
foregoing purposes and to forthwith submit its resolution to the Court for appropriate action.
242 of 578
Case Digests
GENEROSO SEPE v. HEIRS OF ANASTACIA* KILANG, REP. BY HER CHILDREN MARIA,

DONATA, FELICIANA, DOMINGA AND SEVERO ALL SURNAMED SOLIJON
DOCTRINE
Given the foregoing, the Court is not persuaded by the CA's postulation that the oral
refutation by respondents Feliciana and Maria of the consideration stated in the DOS has
reached the threshold of the required quantum of proof of clear and convincing evidence. Their
mere oral declaration that no consideration was paid to their mother Anastacia is simply not
enough given the presence of the following notarized and public documents in petitioner's
favor.
FACTS
Respondents Heirs of Anastacia Kilang, represented by her children Maria, Donata,
Feliciana, Dominga and Severo Solijon (respondents), sought the nullification of: (1) Deed of
Sale of a Registered Land8 dated November 18, 1992 (DOS) executed by Anastacia Kilang
(Anastacia) with marital consent of Fabian Solijon (Fabian) in favor of spouses Generoso
Sepe (Generoso or petitioner) and Gaudencia D. Sepe (spouses Sepe); (2) Confirmation of
Sale9 dated December 17, 1992 (COS) executed by respondents, except Dominga; and (3)
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) T-3536710 registered in the names of spouses Sepe;
and for recovery of title, possession with damages.
The complaint alleged that the late Anastacia, who was then an 84-year old, illiterate,
rheumatic and bedridden mother, agreed to the offer of petitioner to undertake the
subdivision of her land in Cabawan District, Tagbilaran City under TCT T-1006913 in
consideration for one lot in the subdivision and a first preference to buy any portion that
might be for sale; but taking advantage of the ignorance of respondents' family, petitioner
managed to have the DOS executed and misled Feliciana and Donata into believing that the
document was the instrument of subdivision. By the DOS, which was executed and notarized
on November 18, 1992, Anastacia, with her husband's consent, purportedly sold her
paraphernal property — a lot located at Barrio Gaboc, Tagbilaran City with an area of 18,163
square meters (subject lot) and covered by TCT T-10069 — to spouses Sepe for P15,000.00.
Anastacia executed a notarized Notice of Adverse Claim, wherein she claimed that
"the second duplicate copy of [TCT T-10069] was lost was found in the possession of one
Generoso Sepe without the knowledge and consent of the owner" and the "parcel of land was
never sold nor encumbered to anybody else." Respondents, save Dominga, executed the COS
for a consideration of P40,000.00, wherein they confirmed absolutely and irrevocably the
sale of the subject lot situated at Barrio Gaboc (now Cabawan District) made and executed
by their parents, Anastacia and Fabian, in favor of spouses Sepe, and warranted to defend
their rights and peaceful possession of the subject lot. Anastacia executed a notarized Notice
of Withdrawal of Adverse Claim, wherein she alleged that she was made to sign an Adverse
Claim by Dominga and Donata; she did not understand its contents; and she remembered
that she had "already sold the same land to [spouses Sepe] on November 18, 1992 before
243 of 578
Case Digests
Atty. Gaspar S. Rulona " the Adverse Claim was an error; and she wanted "the same
withdrawn, so that the DEED OF SALE OF THE LAND COVERING TCT NO. T-10069, [would
push] through, and the title so issued in favor of the [vendees spouses Sepe].
On the same day, January 14, 1993, TCT T-10069 in the name of Anastacia was
cancelled and TCT T-35367 was issued in the names of spouses Sepe. On October 20, 1993,
Anastacia died.
On November 17, 1998, Maria wrote the Regional Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) seeking assistance relative to this case in a letter of even date. Her
statements were taken by the NBI Investigator on August 30, 2000. On December 21, 1998,
respondents, represented by Maria, filed a case (Civil Case No. 6703) for nullification of the
sale and the TCT issued to petitioner. Respondents failed to prosecute the case for some time
resulting in its dismissal without prejudice on February 26, 2002. On May 16, 2002,
respondents refiled the case by filing the Complaint25 dated March 25, 2002.
After the RTC admitted respondents' offer of documentary evidence, counsel for
petitioner manifested that he was opting to file a demurrer to evidence. On July 13, 2006,
petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence, interposing the grounds of ratification and
prescription of action.29 Petitioner argued that if Feliciana's testimony would be given
consideration that Anastacia and her family were mistaken into executing the DOS as they
were made to believe that it pertained to the subject lot's subdivision, then the action to
nullify a voidable contract had prescribed, the four-year prescriptive period being reckoned
from January 14, 1993 when the TCT was issued in petitioner's name. He also argued that
with the execution of the COS, the voidable DOS was ratified.
The RTC issued an Order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the case.
However, the CA reversed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC erred in granting petitioner's demurrer to evidence.
RULING
NO. Petitioner's reliance on the DOS as proof that the sale contemplated therein was
supported by sufficient consideration is not without legal basis. The disputable presumption
of existence and legality of the cause or consideration60 inherent in every contract supports
his stance. Article 1354 of the Civil Code provides: "Although the cause is not stated in the
contract, it is presumed that it exists and is lawful, unless the debtor proves the contrary."
Otherwise stated, the law presumes that even if the contract does not state a cause, one exists
and is lawful; and it is incumbent on the party impugning the contract to prove the
contrary.61 If the cause is stated in the contract and it is shown to be false, then it is
incumbent upon the party enforcing the contract to prove the legality of the cause.
244 of 578
Case Digests
This disputable presumption is also provided in Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules,
which provides: SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. - The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: (r)
That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
In Mangahas v. Brobio, the Court stated that the presumption of sufficient

consideration can be overcome by preponderance of evidence and that mere assertion that
the contract has no consideration is not enough. Aside from the presumption of sufficient
consideration working in favor of petitioner, the acknowledgment of the DOS before a notary
public makes it a public document.
According to Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules, documents acknowledged before a
notary public, except last wills and testaments, and public records, kept in the Philippines, of
private documents required by law to be entered therein, are public documents. The
certificate of acknowledgment in a notarial document is prima facie evidence of the
execution of the instrument or document involved. On the other hand, documents consisting
of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein; and all other public documents are evidence, even
against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the
latter. Being a public document, the evidence to be presented to contradict the facts stated
in the DOS, which include the payment of the consideration, must be more than merely
preponderant. Given the foregoing, the Court is not persuaded by the CA's postulation that
the oral refutation by respondents Feliciana and Maria of the consideration stated in the DOS
has reached the threshold of the required quantum of proof of clear and convincing evidence.
Their mere oral declaration that no consideration was paid to their mother Anastacia is
simply not enough given the presence of the following notarized and public documents in
petitioner's favor.
The Court moreover agrees with the RTC's observation that respondents should have
questioned the DOS during the lifetime of their mother Anastacia given that she was the only
person who could confirm or refute its genuineness and contents. Indeed, the most credible
person who could attest that no consideration was paid by spouses Sepe in connection with
the DOS was Anastacia. Where a document, like a deed of sale, duly acknowledged before a
notary public is disputed, the parties thereto are in the best position to refute its execution
and contents. Their testimonies are crucial in order to establish the required proof of clear
and convincing evidence to overcome the presumptions in favor of public documents. Oral
declarations by non-parties which contradict the contents of notarial documents should be
evaluated and admitted with extreme caution in order not to erode their status and
significance as public documents. Furthermore, the COS executed by 4 of the 5 children of
Anastacia, which is supported by a valuable consideration, bolsters petitioner's cause. It is
noted that Dominga, who is not a signatory to the COS, did not testify for respondents.
Indeed, respondents have ratified and confirmed the sale of the subject lot by their parents
to spouses Sepe. Again, their claim that the amount they received from spouses Sepe was a
Christmas gift to them, aside from being incredible as held by the RTC, is not clear and
245 of 578
Case Digests
convincing evidence to overcome the facts stated in the COS. Given the failure of respondents
to adduce clear and convincing evidence to support their cause and overcome the
presumptions granted by law in favor of the public documents above-enumerated, the RTC
did not err in granting petitioner's demurrer to evidence.
246 of 578
Case Digests
PERLY TUATES Y CHICO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE
The presumption of regularity is merely just that — a mere presumption disputable by
contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding
truth." Verily, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the
stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty cannot arise in the present case because Bundang did not follow the
prescribed procedure in searching or frisking Tuates.
FACTS
The prosecution's version, as summarized by the CA, is as follows: Katehlene Bundang
(Bundang), a Jail Guard at the Provincial Jail of Zambales, was assigned to frisk women
visitors at the jail. At around 1:40 o'clock in the afternoon of 2 March 2012, TUATES, a former
detainee, went to the Provincial Jail to visit her boyfriend, Samuel Elamparo (Elamparo), who
was charged with Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Bundang conducted a body search
on TUATES, and while searching the lower part of her body, Bundang found a plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance tucked on the left side of the latter's waist. Bundang
took the sachet and went to the Office of the Jail Warden to report the matter. Thereat,
Bundang wrote her initials "KAB" on the sachet in the presence of another Jail Guard, a
certain Randy, as well as Police Officer 2 Virgilio Fennolar (Fennolar). Forthwith, Bundang
and Fennolar went to the crime laboratory to have the seized specimen examined. The plastic
sachet with markings "KAB" was found positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.
On the other hand, the version of the defense, as likewise summarized by the CA, is as
follows: Professing her innocence, TUATES vehemently denied the accusation against her,
asseverating that on 2 March 2012, she went to the Provincial Jail of Zambales to visit her
live-in partner, Elamparo, who was sick. She was let in by a male jail guard who told her to
wait as the lady jail guard, Bundang, was not yet around.
After waiting for 30 minutes, Bundang arrived and brought her to the search room.
Bundang frisked her for more than five minutes. She was baffled why it took long for
Bundang to search her. In her previous visits, it lasted only for less than two minutes and
that there were two to four guards in the search room. However, on that day, the search was
not merely casual. Bundang placed her hand on her (TUATES') pocket as well as inside her
pants. When Bundang took out her hand from her pants, she was surprised when something
fell out. Bundang then shouted, "O meron Ho. Hulihin na ito." Thereafter, the other jail guards
came and brought her to the office where they asked her name and purpose in visiting the
jail. Subsequently, TUATES was brought to the crime laboratory for urine examination which
yielded a negative result.
247 of 578
Case Digests
Upon arraignment, Tuates pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, pre-
trial and trial ensued. The RTC convicted Tuates Violation of Section 11 of R.A. 9165. the CA
affirmed the RTC's conviction of Tuates, holding that the prosecution was able to prove the
elements of the crimes charged. The CA also held that the prosecution was able to present an
unbroken chain of custody in handling the confiscated item.
ISSUE
W/N the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Tuates of the crime charged.
RULING
YES. To convict a person under this charge, the prosecution must prove the following:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or
regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the drug. There is reasonable doubt, however, in the presence of the
third element in this case — that the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
Tuates' defense is essentially that the seized item was merely planted on her by the
jail guard who frisked her. Bundang, the jail guard, however, claims otherwise. Bundang
avers that she found the seized item tucked in Tuates' underwear as she frisked the latter.
Considering the conflicting statements of the parties, the lower courts resolved the case in
favor of the prosecution in light of (1) the presumption of regularity in the performance of
duties accorded to Bundang, and (2) lack of showing that the police officers had ill motive in
imputing the crime to Tuates.
The presumption of regularity is merely just that — a mere presumption disputable

by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding
truth." Verily, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the
stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. The presumption of regularity in
the performance of duty cannot arise in the present case because Bundang did not follow the
prescribed procedure in searching or frisking Tuates.
A pat/frisk search is defined by BJMP-SOP 2010-05 as "a search wherein the officer
pats or squeezes the subject's clothing to attempt to detect contraband/s. For same gender
searches the Pat/Frisk search is normally accomplished in concert with Rub Search."23 In
turn, a rub search is defined as "a search wherein the officer rubs and/or pats the subject's
body over the clothing, but in a more intense and thorough manner. In a rub search, the
genital, buttocks, and breast (of females) areas are carefully rubbed-areas which are not
searched in a frisk/pat search. Rub searches shall not be conducted on cross-gender
individuals." In the present case, the above guidelines were not followed.
Finally, it should likewise be emphasized that it is highly doubtful that an inventory

of the seized item was conducted. Both the RTC31 and the CA32 recognized that the
prosecution witnesses, particularly Bundang and PO2 Fennolar, testified that, after
confiscation, they immediately submitted the seized item to the crime laboratory for forensic
248 of 578
Case Digests
examination. PO2 Fennolar then testified that "after turning over the specimen to the crime
laboratory, they delivered it to the police station for investigation and preparation of the
documents such as the sworn statements and the receipts of the inventory." The foregoing
raises a question regarding the veracity of the conduct of the inventory, for how could the
police officers conduct an inventory of the seized item when they had immediately turned
over the same to the crime laboratory. What further militates against the veracity of the
inventory was the fact that Bundang was a signatory to the Inventory Receipt as the Seizing
Officer, and yet she testified that she did not know whether an inventory was conducted.
It was therefore error for the CA to convict Tuates by principally relying only on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duties extended in favor of the police
officers. It bears emphasis that the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise,
a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed
innocent. In this case, the presumption of regularity cannot stand because of the police
officers' blatant disregard of the established procedures under BJMP-SOP 2010-05 and
Section 21 of RA 9165 on the conduct of inventory.
249 of 578
Case Digests
SEBASTIAN M. QUINOL,* ALIMITA RENDAL-QUINOL, PORFERIA QUINOL-

MACATIGUIB, MARCELO MACATIGUIB, BALTAZAR QUINOL, ELAINE KILAPKILAP-
QUINOL, AND PATRICIA QUINOL v. LORENZA INOCENCIO, EPIFANIA POA, JIMMY POA,
ARTEMIO QUINOL, AND JESUS QUINOL
DOCTRINE
appeal via certiorari before the Court and are not proper for its consideration. The Court is not
a trier of facts. It is not the Court's function to examine and weigh all over again the evidence
presented in the proceedings below. It must likewise be stressed that factual findings of the trial
court its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of their probative
weight are given high respect, if not conclusive effect unless it ignored, misconstrued,
misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance, which, if
considered, will alter the outcome of the case The trial court is in the best position to ascertain
and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through its actual observation of the
witnesses' manner of testifying, demeanor and behavior while in the witness box. After a careful
review of the records of the instant case, the Court does not find any cogent reason to stray
away from the aforesaid elementary principles. As found by both the RTC and CA, the totality
of evidence on record shows that the respondents' title, i.e., OCT No. FV-34211, which was
derived from Free Patent No. (VII-3) 11112, was validly issued in their favor and does not
encroach on the property of the petitioners. Fraud cannot be presumed and must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence.
FACTS
Nona Japa and Consorcio Japa (the Japa siblings) sold to Pedro Macatisbis (Pedro) for
P90.00 a portion of a land located in Intosan, Poblacion, Siaton Negros Occidental [(subject
property)]. An unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 31, 1958 was entered into
between the Japa siblings and Pedro, which described the parcel of land where the subject
property is located. The Deed of Absolute Sale executed by [the Japa siblings] was notarized
by one Vicente Kinilitan and recorded in his books as Document 28 found on Page 17 of Book
IV for the year 1958. The Deed of Absolute Sale does not specify the lot number of the subject
property. The petitioners allege that the subject property sold to their predecessor-in-
interest, i.e., Pedro, by the respondents' predecessors-in-interest, i.e., the Japa siblings, by
virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale refers to Lot 584. On the other hand, the respondents
maintain that the subject property subject of the sale actually refers to Lot 585.
As alleged by the petitioners, since 1958, Pedro had been in possession of Lot 584 in
the concept of an owner, planting coconut trees, bananas, and buri trees therein. It is likewise
alleged that Pedro's daughter and the petitioners' mother, Felisa Macatisbis Quinol (Felisa),
continued to possess the land and transferred the old tax declaration of the subject property
in her name, continuing to pay realty taxes since 1958 up to the present. The petitioners also
allege that Sebastian was able to put up a house inside Lot 584, while respondent Jesus
250 of 578
Case Digests
Quinol (Jesus), the sibling of Sebastian, mortgaged his share over the subject property to a
certain Magdalena Quilinguen.
The petitioners claim that in 2000, respondent Lorenza Inocencio (Lorenza), who is
an heir of Nona Japa, offered to sell the subject property to Sebastian, claiming that she has
title over the subject property in her name. Sebastian refused as the land was already sold to
his grandfather, Pedro in 1958 This prompted the petitioners to verify with the Register of
Deeds, wherein they discovered that on June 14, 1982, the Register of Deeds had issued in
the name of Hrs. of Nona Japa Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. FV-34211 under Free
Patent No. (VII-3) 11112 for Lot No. 584, Pls-659-D, having an area of one thousand one
hundred forty-two (1,142) square meters. Upon discovery of OCT No. FV-34211 under Free
Patent No. (VII-3) 11112, on 18 June 2001, some of [Pedro's] grandchildren and their
spouses, namely: the petitioners Sebastian, Alimita, Porferia, Marcelo, Baltazar, Elaine,
Patricia,] Carlita Quinol and Fernando Alzarro, filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title,
Declaration of Inexistence of Instrument, and Damages.
Trial on the merits then ensued, The RTC issued a Decision, dismissing the
petitioners' complaint for lack of cause of action; it also dismissed the respondents'
counterclaims for lack of merit. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed an appeal before the CA,
alleging, in the main, that the RTC erred in not finding any factual or legal basis for the
declaration of OCT No. FV-34211 as null and void, in finding that the petitioners were not
able to demonstrate a legal or equitable title to or interest in Lot 584, and in finding that the
petitioners were not able to substantiate by sufficient evidence their claim of possession. The
CA denied the petitioners' appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the CA was correct in sustaining the RTC's dismissal of the petitioners'
Complaint for Quieting of Title, Declaration of Inexistence of Instrument, and Damages.
RULING
YES. In other words, in the main, the petitioners argue that both the RTC and CA
misevaluated the evidence on record and erroneously concluded that OCT No. FV-34211 was
validly issued in favor of the respondents. Simply stated, the petitioners raise in the instant
Petition pure questions of fact.
appeal via certiorari before the Court and are not proper for its consideration. The Court is
not a trier of facts. It is not the Court's function to examine and weigh all over again the
evidence presented in the proceedings below. It must likewise be stressed that factual
findings of the trial court its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its
assessment of their probative weight are given high respect, if not conclusive effect unless it
ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of
substance, which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case The trial court is in the
best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through
251 of 578
Case Digests
its actual observation of the witnesses' manner of testifying, demeanor and behavior while
in the witness box.
After a careful review of the records of the instant case, the Court does not find any
cogent reason to stray away from the aforesaid elementary principles. As found by both the
RTC and CA, the totality of evidence on record shows that the respondents' title, i.e., OCT No.
FV-34211, which was derived from Free Patent No. (VII-3) 11112, was validly issued in their
favor and does not encroach on the property of the petitioners. Fraud cannot be presumed
and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. As appreciated by both the CA and the
RTC, the testimony of Record Officer of the DENR City Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) II of Dumaguete City, Segundino Lambayan, proved that all the requirements
for the issuance of OCT No. FV-34211 covering Lot 584 were duly complied without any kind
of irregularity. This testimony was further corroborated by Nicolasito Lopez, the land
investigator who issued the final investigation reports for both Lots 584 and 585, whose
testimony confirms the validity of Free Patent No. (VII-3) 11112 and OCT No. FV-34211.21
At this juncture, the Court stresses that findings of fact by administrative agencies are
generally accorded by the courts great respect, if not finality, by reason of the special
knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies over matters falling under their
jurisdiction.
Moreover, the RTC and CA also gave credence to the testimony of Epifania,
corroborated by both the testimonies of Jesus and Artemio, which prove that the mother of
the petitioners, Felisa, was actually the one who advised Epifania to apply for the issuance of
a certificate of title covering Lot 584 because it belonged to the Japas. In fact, Felisa herself
accompanied Epifania to Dumaguete City to have Lot 584 registered in the name of the
respondents. Clearly, the acts of the petitioners' own mother, as corroborated by the
petitioners' two brothers, belie the petitioners' stance that Lot 584 was the property sold to
their predecessor-in-interest.
Lastly, the petitioners placed much reliance on the tax declarations showing their
payment of real property taxes covering Lot 584. First and foremost, tax declarations and tax
receipts as evidence of ownership cannot prevail over a certificate of title which, to reiterate,
is a presumptive proof of ownership. In any case, as correctly found by the CA, the tax
declarations presented by the petitioners fail to fortify the petitioners' stance that the
property owned by them is Lot 584. From the testimony of the petitioners' own witness,
Roily Macahig (Macahig), the Municipal Assessor of Siaton, the descriptions regarding the
land covered by the tax declarations are not reliable because such descriptions were '"only
declared by the owner and no actual geodetic survey of that property at that time,' and
categorically stated that the areas in TDs 11549 and 31949 are not reliable."
Therefore, premises considered, the Court does not find any cogent reason to
overturn the RTC's and CA's factual findings that the respondents' title covering Lot 584, i.e.,
OCT No. FV-34211, which was derived from Free Patent No. (VII-3) 11112, was validly issued
252 of 578
Case Digests
in their favor and does not encroach whatsoever on the property belonging to the
petitioners, i.e., Lot 585.
253 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO ASENIERO

DOCTRINE
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and
specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. To qualify an offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the
assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods
or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. The essence of
treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission
without risk of himself.
FACTS
Accused Romeo was charged for the crime of Murder under the following
Information:
"That on or about the 24th day of August 2003, in the Municipality of Bato, Province
of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with deliberate intent to kill employing treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack, stab DOMINADOR RANES with
a long bolo which the accused had provided himself for the purpose, thereby causing and
inflicting upon the victim multiple stabbed and hacked wounds on the different parts of his
body causing the immediate death of Dominador Ranes."
Upon arraignment, Romeo pleaded not guilty. The RTC found Romeo guilty of Murder.
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling but modified his civil liability. The CA held that the accused's
attack on the victim was treacherously carried out. At the time of the attack, the victim was
just walking with his girlfriend and companions when he was suddenly hacked from behind
by the accused.15 It further held that the testimony of Analyn Gomez (Analyn), the victim's
girlfriend, is credible and sufficient as it is corroborated by the other witnesses in some
material points.16 Lastly, it held that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
should be considered in the imposition of the penalty.
ISSUE
W/N the CA erred in affirming Romeo's conviction for Murder despite the fact that
the prosecution failed to establish his guilt for Murder beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
The Court affirms the conviction of Romeo, but only for the crime of Homicide,
instead of Murder, as the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not proven in the killing
254 of 578
Case Digests
of the victim. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons, employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to
directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make. To qualify an offense, the following conditions must
exist: (1) the assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal
act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2)
said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the
assailant. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on
the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby
ensuring its commission without risk of himself.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove the presence of the elements of
treachery in the killing of the victim. To start, based on the testimonies of the two defense
witnesses the attack was preceded by an altercation between Romeo and the victim. Both
Loreto and Gregorio testified that it was the victim who first assaulted the accused. This
should prevail over the testimony of the prosecution witness, Analyn, that Romeo
immediately stabbed the victim, more so considering that Analyn's testimony is
uncorroborated by the other prosecution witness, Roel Pilo (Roel), who testified that he did
not see how the attack began she was walking in front of the victim.
Certainly, the attack made by the accused was not sudden or unexpected as it was the
victim who first attacked the former. Even assuming that the version of the events as
narrated by Analyn is to be considered, she also narrated that she was pushed by the accused
prior to his attack on the victim. Thus, this event should have made the victim aware that
there was an impending attack on him. In addition, the victim was able to defend himself
from the initial stabbing act as he had his own weapon and was able to run away from the
accused. The only reason why he was not able to escape was because he stumbled down and
the accused caught up with him.
For voluntary surrender to mitigate the penal liability of the accused, the following
requisites must be established: first, the accused has not been actually arrested; second, the
accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and third, the
surrender is voluntary. The said requisites were sufficiently proven by the defense. SPO3
Wilfredo Vargas testified that the accused voluntarily surrendered at the Matalom Police
Station on August 24, 2003. This was corroborated by Analyn who admitted that indeed
Romeo immediately surrendered to the authorities after the incident. Roel likewise testified
that he accompanied the accused to the police station. Thus, the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender should be considered in the imposition of the penalty.
255 of 578
Case Digests
256 of 578
Case Digests
MA. LUISA A. PINEDA v. VIRGINIA ZUÑIGA VDA. DE VEGA

DOCTRINE
To justify the Court's review of the CA's factual findings, petitioner cites the following
exceptions to the general rule: (1) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (2) the
inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) the findings of the CA are contrary
to those of the trial court; (4) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed
facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (5) the findings of
the CA are contrary to the admission of the parties.
The admission by respondent of Annex "C" is at most an admission of the demand letter's
existence and due execution. Since there was no allegation of receipt by respondent of Annex
"C" in the complaint, such fact had to be established by petitioner. [Respondent] properly
opposed the said evidence as it does not prove that she, in fact, received the letter. We have
thoroughly reviewed her formal offer as well and found no reference to the registry receipt card
or any other competent proof i.e., postman certificate or the testimony of the postman, that
respondent actually received the said demand letter. Petitioner could have simply presented
and offered in evidence the registry receipt or the registry return card accompanying the
demand letter. However, she offered no explanation why she failed to do so. There is, thus, no
satisfactory proof that the letter was received by respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner filed a complaint dated June 10, 2005 against respondent, praying for the
payment of the latter's principal obligation and the interest thereon or, in default of such
payment, the foreclosure of the property subject of a real estate mortgage.
In her complaint, petitioner alleged that, on March 25, 2003, respondent borrowed
from her P500,000.00 payable within one year with an interest rate of 8% per month. To
secure the loan, respondent executed a real estate mortgage (2003 Agreement) over a parcel
of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-339215, together with all the buildings
and improvements existing thereon (Property), in petitioner's favor. On the loan's maturity,
respondent failed to pay her loan despite demand. As of May 2005, the unpaid accumulated
interest amounted to P232,000.00.
In her answer, respondent denied petitioner's material allegations and countered

that the complaint was dismissible for lack of prior barangay conciliation proceeding and for
failure to join her husband as a party. She also argued that the interest rate agreed upon was
excessive and unconscionable, thus illegal. She further denied receiving P500,000.00 from
petitioner and claimed that the said amount was the accumulated amount of another
obligation she earlier secured from petitioner.
The RTC rendered a Decision finding that (1) the existence of the loan and the real
estate mortgage had been established and, thus, judicial foreclosure would be proper given
257 of 578
Case Digests
respondent's non-compliance therewith; (2) since the undated Agreement had no provision
on the payment of interest, the legal interest of 12% per annum should be imposed; (3) the
2003 Agreement's interest rate was unconscionable; (4) the non-joinder of respondent's
husband was not a jurisdictional defect and did not warrant the complaint's dismissal; and
(5) the non-referral to the barangay conciliation proceeding did not prevent the court from
exercising its jurisdiction given that the parties had already undergone several conciliation
and mediation proceedings. The CA reversed the RTC ruling.
ISSUE
(1) Whether the case at bar may be raised in a Rule 45 certiorari petition.
(2) Whether a demand letter was sent by petitioner to respondent and was it received by
the latter.
RULING
(1) YES. Petitioner recognizes that only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45
certiorari petition, and factual issues are entertained only in exceptional cases. To
justify the Court's review of the CA's factual findings, petitioner cites the following
exceptions to the general rule: (1) the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) the
findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; (4) the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; and (5) the findings of the CA are contrary to
the admission of the parties.
Respondent in her Comment prays for the outright dismissal of the Petition based on
these procedural matters: (1) the belated filing of the Petition, and (2) the failure of
petitioner to pose a question of law. As to the first ground raised by respondent, the Petition
was seasonably filed within the 30-day extension that the Court granted in its September 27,
2017 Resolution. Petitioner's motion for extension of time to file the Petition was filed within
the 15-day period provided in Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules.
As to the second ground, even if it is conceded that the exceptions cited by petitioner
are applicable, the Court is not persuaded by her argument that respondent had admitted in
her answer and pre-trial brief that respondent received on September 3, 200436 the demand
letter dated August 4, 2004.
(2) NO. The admission by respondent of Annex "C" is at most an admission of the
demand letter's existence and due execution. Since there was no allegation of
receipt by respondent of Annex "C" in the complaint, such fact had to be
established by petitioner. [Respondent] properly opposed the said evidence as it
does not prove that she, in fact, received the letter. We have thoroughly reviewed
her formal offer as well and found no reference to the registry receipt card or any
other competent proof i.e., postman certificate or the testimony of the postman,
that respondent actually received the said demand letter. Petitioner could have
258 of 578
Case Digests
simply presented and offered in evidence the registry receipt or the registry
return card accompanying the demand letter. However, she offered no
explanation why she failed to do so. There is, thus, no satisfactory proof that the
letter was received by respondent.
After the CA found that petitioner failed to prove that extrajudicial demand
was made upon respondent as required by law and after it had observed that
petitioner had not asserted any of the exceptions to the requisite demand under
Article 1169 of the Civil Code, the CA concluded that respondent could not be
considered in default. Necessarily, petitioner's case should fail. While delay on the
part of respondent was not triggered by an extrajudicial demand because petitioner
had failed to so establish receipt of her demand letter, this delay was triggered when
petitioner judicially demanded the payment of respondent's loan from petitioner.
While the CA was correct in observing that default generally begins from the moment
the creditor demands the performance of the obligation, and without such demand,
judicial or extrajudicial, the effects of default will not arise, it failed to acknowledge
that when petitioner filed her complaint dated June 10, 2005, such filing constituted
the judicial demand upon respondent to pay the latter's principal obligation and the
interest thereon. Respondent, having thus incurred in delay (counted from the filing
of the complaint), is liable for damages pursuant to Article 1170 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, the reversal of the assailed CA Decision and Resolution is justified and
to that extent, the Petition is meritorious.
259 of 578
Case Digests
260 of 578
Case Digests
TRANQUILINO AGBAYANI v. LUPA REALTY HOLDING CORPORATION

G.R. No. 201193, June 10, 2019, Second Division, J. CAGUIOA
DOCTRINE
The admission by Nonito's counsel during the pre-trial proceedings before the RTC that
there was no sale between Tranquilino and Nonito qualifies as a judicial admission because the
statement is a deliberate, clear, unequivocal statement of a party's attorney during judicial
proceedings in open court about a concrete or essential fact within that party's peculiar
knowledge. Since such statement is a judicial admission, it does not require proof according to
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS
Tranquilino, who was by then already residing in America, filed a Complaint for
Reivindicacion, Cancellation of Title and Document with Damages against Lupa Realty
Holding Corporation (Lupa Realty), through his brother, Kennedy Agbayani, and his nephew,
Vernold Malapira (Vernold). We note that Vernold is also written as "Bernold" in other parts
of the record, and is admitted to be the same "Bernard" referred to in the Complaint and in
the Special Power of Attorney as having been authorized by Tranquilino to file the instant
case.
The Complaint alleged that sometime in April 1999, [Vernold] went to the Office of
the Municipal Treasurer of Sta. Ana, Cagayan to pay the real estate taxes on the subject
property, but was told that Lupa Realty was already the new owner thereof and that the tax
declaration had already been transferred to its name. Tranquilino further alleged that upon
verifying with the Registry of Deeds for Cagayan, [Vernold] discovered that the subject
property was already registered in the name of Lupa Realty under TCT No. T-109129
pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale purportedly executed by Tranquilino on 29 October
1997 in favor of Lupa Realty, in consideration of the sum of P425,500.00. In his complaint,
Tranquilino denied having executed said Deed of Absolute Sale, insisting that his signature
thereon must be a forgery because he was in America on 29 October 1997. Accordingly, [he]
prayed for the cancellation of Lupa Realty's TCT No. T-109129 and the reinstatement of OCT
No. P-46041 in his name, plus damages.
In its Answer, Lupa Realty countered that contrary to the allegation of Tranquilino
that he never sold the subject property, he sold the same to his brother, Nonito Agbayani
(Nonito), as shown by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed on 21 January 1992. In
turn, Nonito sold the subject property to Moriel Urdas (Moriel) in a notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale, dated 30 May 1997. According to Lupa Realty, it acquired the subject property
not from Tranquilino but from Moriel by way of a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 29
October 1997.
The RTC rendered a decision that OCT No. P-109129 in the name of Lupa Realty is
null and void. The CA in its Decision dated September 14, 2011 granted the appeal. The CA
held that the conclusions reached by the RTC are not in accord with law and the evidence on
261 of 578
Case Digests
record; therefore, the reversal of the trial court's decision is warranted. The CA ruled that
Tranquilino failed to discharge his burden to present clear and convincing evidence to
overthrow the presumption of regularity in the execution on January 21, 1992 of the Deed
of Absolute Sale (1992 DAS) in favor of his brother Nonito and to prove his allegation of
forgery regarding his signature. According to the CA, Tranquilino's insistence that he could
not have signed the 1992 DAS because he was in America at that time was insufficient.
ISSUE
W/N the CA erred in reversing the RTC Decision that declared the nullity of TCT No. T-
109129 in the name of Lupa Realty.
RULING
YES. While only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 certiorari petition, there
are admitted exceptions, which includes the instance when there is conflict in the findings of
fact of the trial court and the CA. The instant case falls under this exception. The RTC found
that the 1992 DAS between Tranquilino and Nonito was established by preponderance of
evidence to be a falsified document; the 1997 DAS between Tranquilino and Lupa Realty was
also falsified; and Lupa Realty was not an IPV. On the other hand, the CA ruled that the 1992
DAS was valid because Tranquilino was unable to prove that his signature therein was
forged. The CA did not, however, rule squarely on whether the 1997 DAS was falsified24 and
whether Lupa Realty was an IPV. Given the conflict in the findings of the RTC and the CA, a
review of the facts is justified. Article 1409(2) of the Civil Code provides that contracts
"which are absolutely simulated or fictitious" are inexistent and void from the beginning. It
is also provided in Article 1346 that "[a]n absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void."
Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa discusses the concept and requisites of simulation in the
following manner: Simulation is the declaration of a fictitious intent manifested deliberately
and in accordance with the agreement of the parties in order to produce for the purpose of
deceiving others the appearance of a transaction which does not exist or which is different
from their true agreement. Simulation involves a defect in the declaration of the will. x x x
Simulation requires the following: (1) A deliberate declaration contrary to the will of the
parties; (2) Agreement of the parties to the apparently valid act; and (3) The purpose is to
deceive or to hide from third persons although it is not necessary that the purpose be illicit
or for purposes of fraud. The above three requisites must concur in order that simulation
may exist.
The three requisites are present in the 1997 DAS. There is a deliberate declaration
that Tranquilino sold the subject land to Lupa Realty, which is contrary to their will. The
agreement appears on its face to be a valid act. The purpose is to deceive third persons into
believing that there was such a sale between Tranquilino and Lupa Realty. The purpose, in
this case, is evidently tainted with fraud. Since the 1997 DAS is void, its registration is
likewise void pursuant to Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529 (the Property
262 of 578
Case Digests
Registration Decree), which provides that "any subsequent registration procured by the
presentation of a forged duplicate certificate of title, or a forged deed or other instrument,
shall be null and void." The registration of the 1997 DAS being null and void, it follows that
TCT T-109129 in the name of Lupa Realty is also null and void. Being null and void, it should
be cancelled.
With the declaration by the Court that the 1997 DAS is sham or spurious and the TCT
in the name of Lupa Realty is null and void, does it follow that the sale of the subject land to
Lupa Realty is also null and void? In other words, can Lupa Realty be nonetheless declared
as the lawful owner of the subject land despite the finding that the TCT issued in his favor is
void?
The admission by Nonito's counsel during the pre-trial proceedings before the RTC
that there was no sale between Tranquilino and Nonito qualifies as a judicial admission
because the statement is a deliberate, clear, unequivocal statement of a party's attorney
during judicial proceedings in open court about a concrete or essential fact within that
party's peculiar knowledge. Since such statement is a judicial admission, it does not require
proof according to Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course
of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
Moreover, there was no palpable mistake on the part of Nonito's counsel in making
the admission because in the offer of Nonito's testimony on December 2, 2008, he stated that
"the land was the property in suit was never sold to him [Nonito] by his brother Tranquilino
Agbayani." That is not all. The admission by Nonito himself, on cross-examination by
Tranquilino's counsel, that Tranquilino was in the United States at the time of the purported
transaction supports the statement of the counsel of Nonito that there was no sale between
Tranquilino and Nonito. Since there is judicial admission that there was no sale of the subject
land between Tranquilino and Nonito, affirmed anew during oral testimony by Nonito
himself, then there is no question that the 1992 DAS is void. The three requisites of a
simulated contract are existent. There is a deliberate declaration that Tranquilino sold the
subject land to Nonito, which is contrary to their will because there was no sale between
them. The agreement appears on its face to be a valid act. The purpose is to deceive third
persons into believing that there was such a sale between them. Consequently, the CA
committed egregious error when it made the finding that the 1992 DAS is valid. Given that
Tranquilino did not sell the subject land to Nonito, it could not have been sold by Nonito to
Moriel and Moriel could not, in turn, have sold it to Lupa Realty.
263 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EVANGELINE GARCIA Y SUING

G.R. No. 215344, June 10, 2019, Second Division, J. CAGUIOA
DOCTRINE
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving these
elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug cases, the
dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law. While it is true that a
buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for
apprehending drug peddlers and distributors, the law nevertheless also requires strict
compliance with procedures laid down by it to ensure that rights are safeguarded. In all drugs
cases, therefore, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any prosecution that
follows such operation.
FACTS
On January 26, 2009, an Information was filed against Garcia, the accusatory potion
of which reads as follows
That on or about the 8th day of January 2009 in the City of San Fernando, Province of
La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, for and in consideration of the sum of P500.00 did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, sell and deliver one (1) plastic sachet containing ZERO POINT
ZERO ONE HUNDRED FORTY NINE (0.0149) gram of Methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, to IO1 LANIBELLE C. ANCHETA who posed as [a] buyer thereof using
marked money, ONE (1) piece of FIVE HUNDRED [P]eso bill bearing a [S]erial No. XW759507
without the necessary authority or permit from the proper government authorities.
Upon arraignment on February 17, 2009, Garcia pleaded not guilty to the charge. The
RTC convicted Garcia of the crime charged. According to the RTC, "[a]fter carefully assessing
the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution and the defense, the court finds the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible. IO1 Ancheta and IO2 Gayuma testified
convincingly that there was indeed a buy bust operation conducted by them on January 9,
2009 outside the residence of [Garcia] in Ilocos Norte, San Fernando City, La Union. On the
other hand[,] the accused failed to present any convincing evidence to overturn the
presumption that the arresting officers regularly performed their duties. The allegation of
the accused that IO1 Ancheta was not present at the time of her arrest and instead pointed
to one PO3 Abang and one Major De Vera as her arresting officers cannot be given credence
in the absence of any showing on the part of IO1 Ancheta and IO2 Gayuma of any ill motive
in falsely testifying against her or against PO3 Abang and Major De Vera for arresting her
without any case at all. These are serious accusations which could not have been ignored if
indeed true. In the assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Garcia. The CA
stressed on the presumption of regularity on the part of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) agents who conducted the supposed buy-bust operation, holding that
"credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary in
264 of 578
Case Digests
suggesting ill-motive on the part of the police officers or deviation from the regular
performance of their duties. In this case, there was no evidence showing that the prosecution
witnesses[,] IO1 Ancheta and IO[2] Gayuma[,] were impelled by improper motive in
testifying against [Garcia] or that they deviated from the regular performance of their duties.
Hence, the instant appeal.
ISSUE
W/N the RTC and CA erred in convicting Garcia for violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
RULING
YES. Under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution is required to prove the
following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving these
elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug cases, the
dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law. While it is true that
a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for
apprehending drug peddlers and distributors, the law nevertheless also requires strict
compliance with procedures laid down by it to ensure that rights are safeguarded. In all
drugs cases, therefore, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in any prosecution
that follows such operation.
In this connection, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of
the commission of the alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must
follow to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision
requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after
seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in
the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public
official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department
of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof. Section 21 of RA 9165 further requires the apprehending team to conduct a
physical inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after
seizure and confiscation. The said inventory must be done in the presence of the
aforementioned required witness, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
According to the prosecution, the said photograph allegedly depicts the exact moment
when the inventory was supposedly being conducted at the place of arrest. However, upon
simple perusal of the said photograph, it appears that the supposed taking of inventory was
not conducted outside the house of Garcia, as alleged by the prosecution. The photograph
depicts three persons situated inside a room enclosed by a wall. The photograph also shows
that the two women depicted therein were sitting on a furniture situated in this room. The
photograph does not show that the seized items were placed on the cemented floor, as
265 of 578
Case Digests
testified by IO1 Ancheta. Instead, the photograph shows a small table or cabinet being
utilized by the PDEA agents. Simply stated, the photograph submitted by the prosecution
does not show that the alleged inventory was conducted at the yard outside the house of
Garcia, the alleged place of arrest. Therefore, based on the evidence on record, the Court
seriously doubts that the physical inventory of the seized illegal drugs and the
photographing of the same were conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation at the
place of the apprehension, as mandated by Section 21 of RA 9165.
Even assuming that convincing evidence was produced by the prosecution

substantiating the claim that an inventory was conducted immediately after the
apprehension of Garcia at the place of arrest, the prosecution's main witness, IO1 Ancheta,
testified that none of the witnesses required under Section 21 of RA 9165 was present at the
time of the seizure and apprehension and that only Garcia; Valdez, a media representative;
and Nisperos, a Brgy. Kagawad of Brgy. Sevilla were present during the conduct of the
inventory. There was no representative from the DOJ. Further, the elected public official and
representative from the media appeared and participated only after the transaction
occurred. None of the prosecution witnesses offered any explanation as to why a
representative from the DOJ was not present in the buy-bust operation conducted against
Garcia. The prosecution did not also address the issue in their pleadings, and the RTC and
the CA instead had to rely only on the presumption that the police officers performed their
functions in the regular manner to support Garcia's conviction.
Further, there is serious doubt that the inventory was conducted in the presence of
Garcia and/or her representative or counsel. To reiterate, under the Section 21 of RA 9165,
the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused
or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from
the media, and (d) a representative from the DOJ, all of whom shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. In the Certificate of Inventory, offered
into evidence by the prosecution as Exhibit "E," it is not disputed that only Valdez and
Nisperos signed the same. It must be stressed that the inventory was not signed by Garcia
nor her counsel as required by Section 21 of RA 9165. Moreover, in the case at hand, as
already explained, not only was the representative of the DOJ absent; Garcia or her
representative/counsel did not sign copies of the inventory. Further, the photograph
supposedly capturing the inventory does not show that the inventory was conducted
immediately after arrest at the place of the apprehension.
In this connection, it was an error for both the RTC and the CA to convict Garcia by
relying on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties supposedly extended
in favor of the police officers. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise,
a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed
innocent. In this case, the presumption of regularity cannot stand because of the buy-bust
team's blatant disregard of the established procedures under Section 21 of RA 9165.
266 of 578
Case Digests
267 of 578
Case Digests
Spouses Rodriguez v. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board

G.R. Nos. 183324 & 209748. June 19, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
For a writ of certiorari to issue, a petitioner must not only prove that the tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction. He must also show that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law against what he perceives to be a legitimate grievance. An available
recourse affording prompt relief from the injurious effects of the judgment or acts of a
lower court or tribunal is considered a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
There is absolutely no basis under the Rules of Court to support the Sps. Nicolas' theory
that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over a case for indirect contempt allegedly committed
against a quasi-judicial body just because the decision of the said quasi-judicial body is pending
appeal before the Court. To the contrary, the Rules of Court unambiguously state that it is the
regional trial courts that have jurisdiction to hear and decide indirect contempt cases involving
disobedience of quasi-judicial entities.
FACTS
A verified Complaint was filed by the Spouses Rustico and Erlinda Balbino (Sps.
Balbino) and the Sps. Nicolas against the Sps. Rodriguez before the Regional Field Office III
(RFO III) of the HLURB. The complainants therein filed an Amended Complaint. An
Order dated November 19, 2004 was issued by the HLURB-RFO III issuing a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction/Cease and Desist Order against the Sps. Rodriguez.
Another Complaint involving the same issues was filed by the Sps. Santiago, Rogano
and the Sps. Gamboa before the HLURB-RFO III. An Order was issued by the HLURB-RFO III
issuing a Temporary Restraining Order against the Sps. Rodriguez. Eventually, the two
Complaints, i.e., HLURB Case No. REM-03-04-0051 and HLURB Case No. REM-03-04-0055,
were consolidated by the HLURB-RFO III.
The aforementioned Complaints deal with the Ruben San Gabriel Subdivision (subject
subdivision), which is located at Barangay Wakas, Bocaue, Bulacan. The subject subdivision
consists of two (2) blocks with a total of twenty (20) residential lots and one (1) road lot
(subject road lot) which served as an access of the inner lots to the MacArthur Highway. In
1978, Ruben San Gabriel (San Gabriel), the owner of the subdivision, sold nine (9) lots to one
Renato Mendoza (Mendoza). Sometime in 1995, the Sps. Rodriguez acquired these nine (9)
lots from Mendoza. All in all, the Sps. Rodriguez acquired thirteen (13) lots from San Gabriel
and Mendoza.
On May 24, 1996, San Gabriel and Mendoza executed an Assignment of Right, wherein
the latter's interest in the subdivision road lot was assigned and transferred in favor of the
Sps. Rodriguez. Subsequently, Sps. Rodriguez applied for and was granted an approval for
Alteration of Plan that consolidated all their titles on January 21, 1998. On the basis of this,
268 of 578
Case Digests
the Land Management Services of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) subsequently approved the consolidation plan on February 2, 1998. Consequently,
the separate titles of the lots, including that of the subject road lot, were cancelled and in lieu
thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 336132 covering an area of 4,865 square
meters was issued in the name of the Sps. Rodriguez.
It was alleged by the complainants that they are residents of the subject subdivision.
They asserted that the subject road lot being claimed by the Sps. Rodriguez as their own
property cannot be closed or conveyed without the prior approval of the court because it is
an existing road lot subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 440. The complainants
alleged that the Sps. Rodriguez are taking control and possession of the subject road lot by
introducing diggings, construction for fencing, and closing the said road lot for the exclusive
use of the Sps. Rodriguez. The complainants prayed for the issuance of a permanent cease
and desist order preventing the Sps. Rodriguez from developing and fencing the subject road
lot, and for declaring the Assignment of Rights executed by San Gabriel null and void with
respect to the subject road lot.
The HLURB-RFO III found merit in the Complaint and held that "[t]here can be no
consolidation of the road lot with the other properties of the [Sps. Rodriguez.]" HLURB-RFO
III ordered the [Sps. Rodriguez] to cease and desist from further including the road lot in the
consolidation of their title. Also, HLURB-RFO III ordered and made permanent the cease and
desist (sic) of the development of the road lot.
The Sps. Rodriguez appealed the Consolidated Decision rendered by the HLURB-RFO
III before the HLURB, Board of Commissioners, First Division (Board). The HLURB Board
overturned the HLURB-RFO III's Consolidated Decision. The complainants filed a
reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision.The HLURB Board granted the complainants'
motion for reconsideration, reinstating HLURB-RFO III's Consolidated Decision.
Without filing an appeal before the Office of the President (OP), the Sps. Rodriguez
filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus (Rule 65 Petition) dated December
12, 2007 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA against the HLURB, the Sps.
Santiago, Rogano, and the Sps. Gamboa. the CA dismissed outright the Sps. Rodriguez' Rule
65 Petition for failing to exhaust available administrative remedies, as well as for not being
accompanied with the pertinent pleadings.
Sps. Nicolas filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt with the Supreme Court against the
Sps. Rodriguez and Manlulu, alleging that "despite vigorous protestation on the part of the
[Sps. Nicolas], and after having been warned of the existence of the Cease and Desist Order
[issued by the HLURB], [the Sps. Rodriguez], in complete defiance of the injunction issued by
the HLURB continuously, maliciously and feloniously dump[ed] filling materials that [would]
ultimately block the road lot leading to the inner lots of the subdivision."
ISSUES
269 of 578
Case Digests
(1) Whether the CA erred in dismissing the Sps. Rodriguez' Rule 65 Petition outright.;
and
(2) Whether the Petition for Indirect Contempt filed by the Sps. Nicolas is meritorious.
RULING
1. NO. For a writ of certiorari to issue, a petitioner must not only prove that the
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction. He must also show that there is no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law against what he perceives to be a legitimate
grievance. An available recourse affording prompt relief from the injurious effects of
the judgment or acts of a lower court or tribunal is considered a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy.
The Sps. Rodriguez do not dispute whatsoever that they have failed to appeal the
assailed Resolutions of the HLURB Board before the OP prior to filing its Rule 65 Petition
before the CA.
To emphasize, under the Rules of Procedure of the HLURB, "[a]ny party may, upon
notice to the Board and the other party, appeal a decision rendered by the Board of
Commissioners to the Office of the President within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof,
in accordance with P.D. No. 1344 and A.O. No. 18 Series of 1987."
In the instant Petition, the Sps. Rodriguez failed to provide any explanation
whatsoever to justify their failure to seek prior recourse before the OP.
Nevertheless, even if the Court entertains the Sps. Rodriguez' central argument in
their Petition, i.e., that the HLURB does not have jurisdiction over the subject road lot, the
instant Petition still fails to convince. The Sps. Rodriguez argue that "what is involved in this
case is a private titled land and definitely NOT a subdivision or condominium." Hence,
according to the Sps. Rodriguez' theory, since the subject road lot is private property owned
by a private lot owner, not being owned by the subdivision, the subject matter is within the
province of the regular courts.
This theory is directly belied by the factual findings of the HLURB, which found that
"[n]either the approved alteration plan nor the permit issued therefor indicated approval for
the consolidation of the road lot with the other lots of the subdivision, much less its
conversion into a regular lot." Time and again, the Court has ruled that in reviewing
administrative decisions, the findings of fact made therein must be respected as long as they
are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant. In the
instant case, as factually held by the HLURB, the subject road lot never became a "regular"
private lot that is beyond the scope of the HLURB's jurisdiction. There is no cogent reason to
overturn the HLURB's factual findings. In fact, in clear recognition of the HLURB's
jurisdiction over the subject road lot, it is not disputed that the Sps. Rodriguez themselves
270 of 578
Case Digests
filed a Motion and Manifestation before the HLURB praying that they be allowed to construct
and introduce developments with respect to the subject road lot.
2. NO. Sps. Nicolas allege that there is a case for indirect contempt against the Sps.
Rodriguez and Manlulu as the latter disobeyed and resisted the lawful order of a quasi-
judicial body, i.e., the HLURB.
There is absolutely no basis under the Rules of Court to support the Sps. Nicolas'
theory that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over a case for indirect contempt allegedly
committed against a quasi-judicial body just because the decision of the said quasi-judicial
body is pending appeal before the Court. To the contrary, the Rules of Court unambiguously
state that it is the regional trial courts that have jurisdiction to hear and decide indirect
contempt cases involving disobedience of quasi-judicial entities.
In the instant Petition for Indirect Contempt, the Sps. Nicolas pray that the Court
conduct a hearing and receive evidence on the supposed disobedience and resistance being
committed by the Sps. Rodriguez and Manlulu. In other words, the Sps. Nicolas would want
the Court to conduct a fact-finding hearing to determine whether the Sps. Rodriguez and
Manlulu committed indirect contempt. Obviously, such a prayer cannot be seriously
entertained. As held time and time again, it is elementary that the Court is not a trier of facts.
It is within the province of the lower courts, and not the Court, to receive evidence and to
make factual findings based on such evidence.
271 of 578
Case Digests
Prime Savings Bank v. Spouses Santos

G.R. Nos. 208283, June 19, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
It is a hornbook principle that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court governs appeals from
judgments or final orders, not interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order cannot be the subject
of appeal until final judgment is rendered for one party or the other. Further, the Court has
previously distinguished certiorari, as a mode of appeal under Rule 45, as a remedy that
involves the review of the judgment, award, or final order on the merits, as compared to the
original action for certiorari under Rule 65, which refers to a remedy that may be directed
against an interlocutory order. No appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order. Instead,
the proper remedy to assail such an order is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
FACTS
On January 20, 1999, the Sps. Santos filed a Complaint for Rescission of Sale and Real
Estate Mortgage with Prayer for Injunction (Complaint) with the Regional Trial Court of
General Santos City, Branch 36 (RTC) against one Engr. Edgardo Torcende (Torcende) and
Prime Savings Bank. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6492.
On January 7, 2000, or during the pendency of Civil Case No. 6492, the Monetary
Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued Resolution No. 22 which prohibited
Prime Savings Bank from doing business and placed it under receivership, with PDIC as the
designated receiver. On April 27, 2000, and by virtue of Resolution No. 664, the Monetary
Board placed Prime Savings Bank under liquidation with PDIC as the designated Liquidator.
On July 19, 2000, pursuant to Section 30 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7653, also known as the
New Central Bank Act, PDIC filed a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation (PAL) of Prime
Savings Bank, Inc. The case was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 11097 before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (Liquidation Court).
Meanwhile, on September 1, 2006, in Civil Case No. 6492, the RTC rendered a Decision
in favor of the Sps. Santos and against Engr. Torcende and Prime Savings Bank. On March 21,
2007, Prime Savings Bank received a Notice of Garnishmentvdated March 7, 2007. Attached
to the Notice of Garnishment were the Entry of Final Judgment dated February 13, 2007 and
Writ of Execution dated February 14, 2007.
Prime Savings Bank filed with the RTC a Motion to Lift (re: February 14, 2007 Writ of
Execution and March 7, 2007 Notice of Garnishment) with additional prayer that the Sps.
Santos be directed to file a judgment claim in the Liquidation Court.
On August 16, 2007, finding merit in the position of Prime Savings Bank, the RTC
issued an Order lifting the Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment. The RTC cited
Section 30 of RA 7653, which states that the assets of an institution under receivership or
liquidation shall be deemed in custodia legis in the hands of the receiver and shall be exempt
from any order of garnishment, levy, attachment, or execution. The RTC further explained
272 of 578
Case Digests
that the stay of the execution of the judgment is warranted due to the fact that Prime Savings
Bank was placed under receivership. To execute the judgment would unduly deplete the
assets of Prime Savings Bank to the prejudice of the other depositors and credits.
The Sps. Santos filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated August 30, 2007 assailing
the aforesaid Order of the RTC.
In its Order dated September 29, 2009, the RTC reversed itself and granted the Motion
for Reconsideration. The RTC ordered the enforcement of the Writ of Execution and Notice
of Garnishment against Prime Savings Bank. Hence, on November 3, 2009, Prime Savings
Bank received another Notice of Garnishment dated October 26, 2009 from the Sheriff of the
RTC, Alfredo T. Pallanan.
Hence, on December 19, 2009, Prime Savings Bank filed a Petition

for Certiorari under Rule 65 with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) (Certiorari Petition) before the CA. The
matter was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 03348-MIN.
The Certiorari Petition sought the reversal of the RTC's Order allowing the execution
and garnishment of Prime Savings Bank's assets, and that the RTC be enjoined from further
acting on the Notices of Garnishment dated March 7, 2007 and October 26, 2009, in
implementation of the Writ of Execution dated February 14, 2007.
On February 16, 2012, the CA issued the first assailed Resolution denying Prime
Savings Bank's application for TRO and/or WPI. The first assailed Resolution reads: “Acting
on the petitioner's application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ or (sic) preliminary injunction (WPI), and the Comment filed by respondents,
the Court resolves to DENY the petitioner's application for the issuance of a TRO and/or a
WPI for failure to demonstrate sufficiently that a clear legal right or an urgent necessity
exists to justify the issuance of an injunctive relief.”
Prime Savings Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated March 9, 2012, which
was denied by the CA in its second assailed Resolution.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari (Petition) under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court filed by Prime Savings Bank to challenge the denial of application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ or (sic) preliminary injunction
(WPI).
ISSUES
Whether the CA was correct in denying Prime Savings Bank's application for TRO
and/or WPI, which was ancillary to its Certiorari Petition.
RULING
273 of 578
Case Digests
NO. First and foremost, the instant Petition, filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
merits outright dismissal for having utilized the wrong remedy.
It is beyond argument that the assailed Resolutions rendered by the CA being

questioned before the Court are mere interlocutory orders, dealing with Prime Savings
Bank's application for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI, which is a mere ancillary prayer
attached to the main case of the Certiorari Petition, which seeks the reversal of the RTC's
Order allowing the execution and garnishment of Prime Savings Bank's assets.
It is a hornbook principle that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court governs appeals from
judgments or final orders, not interlocutory orders. An interlocutory order cannot be the
subject of appeal until final judgment is rendered for one party or the other. Further, the
Court has previously distinguished certiorari, as a mode of appeal under Rule 45, as a remedy
that involves the review of the judgment, award, or final order on the merits, as compared to
the original action for certiorari under Rule 65, which refers to a remedy that may be
directed against an interlocutory order. No appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order.
Instead, the proper remedy to assail such an order is to file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.
Hence, Prime Savings Bank erred in resorting to this Rule 45 Petition in seeking the
reversal of the CA's assailed Resolutions, which are mere interlocutory orders denying Prime
Savings Bank's ancillary application for TRO and/or WPI.
In any case, even if the Court exercises liberality and treats the instant Petition as a
Rule 65 Petition, the instant Petition still merits outright dismissal for having been
rendered moot and academic.
As borne by the records of the Court, the Certiorari Petition, which was previously
pending before the CA at the time of the filing of the instant Petition, was eventually decided
by the CA in favor of Prime Savings Bank in its Decision dated July 29, 2015 and Resolution
dated June 21, 2016. The Sps. Santos appealed the CA's unfavorable Decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 03348-MIN before the First Division of the Court. The appeal was docketed as G.R. No.
226193, entitled Spouses Roberto and Heide L. Santos v. Prime Savings Bank (PSB) represented
by its Statutory Liquidator, The Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). In its
Resolution dated October 12, 2016, the Court, First Division denied the Petition for Review
on Certiorari filed by the Sps. Santos. In its subsequent Resolution dated July 31, 2017, the
Court, First Division denied the Sps. Santos' Motion for Reconsideration with finality.
274 of 578
Case Digests
People v. Fulinara y Fabelania

DOCTRINE
In this connection, this also means that the two required witnesses should already
be physically present at the time of the conduct of the inventory of the seized items which,
again, must be immediately done at the place of seizure and confiscation — a
requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the
buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity. Verily, a buy-bust team normally
has sufficient time to gather and bring with them the said witnesses.
As earlier stated, following the IRR of RA 9165, the courts may allow a deviation from
the mandatory requirements of Section 21 in exceptional cases, where the following requisites
are present: (1) the existence of justifiable grounds to allow departure from the rule on
strict compliance; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending team. If these elements are present, the seizure
and custody of the confiscated drugs shall not be rendered void and invalid regardless of the
non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of Section 21. In this regard, it has also been
emphasized that the State bears the burden of proving the justifiable cause. Thus, for the said
saving clause to apply, the prosecution must first recognize the lapse or lapses on the part of
the buy-bust team and justify or explain the same.
The right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty is a constitutionally
protected right. The burden lies with the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
by establishing each and every element of the crime charged in the information as to warrant
a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. Reliance on
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty despite the lapses in the
procedures undertaken by the buy-bust team is fundamentally unsound because the lapses
themselves are affirmative proofs of irregularity The presumption of regularity in the
performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to
be presumed innocent.
FACTS
Jimmy was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165, in two
separate Informations.
Version of the Prosecution

On March 4, 2016, at around 3:00 p.m., PO2 Julius A. Congson ("PO2 Julius") and PO3
Socobos ("PO3 Socobos") were at the office of the Anti-Illegal Drugs, Special Operation Task
Group ("SAID-SOTG"), Valenzuela City Police Station when their regular confidential
informant ("RCI") arrived and informed them about the illegal drug activities of a certain
alias "Boyet" in Manggahan Street, Karuhatan, Valenzuela. Boyet was later identified as
Jimmy.
275 of 578
Case Digests
Upon informing their Unit Chief, PCI Ruba, about the information, they planned the
buy-bust operation. PO2 Julius, duly coordinated with Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
("PDEA") and prepared a Coordination Form and a Pre-Operation Report. PO2 Julius was
then assigned as the poseur-buyer since he was just transferred from another battalion,
making his identity more unknown to the target.
When the team arrived at the place of Jimmy, he was identified by the RCI. While at
the gate of the house of Jimmy, the RCI proceeded to call for Jimmy. Jimmy answered the call
and PO2 Julius was told by the RCI that he was the target.
The RCI then [told] Jimmy that the poseur-buyer, PO2 Julius, would like to
buy shabu worth Php 200.00. He used two (2) one hundred (100) peso bills, duly marked
with PO2 Julius' initials. After giving the marked money to Jimmy, the latter placed the said
money in his left pocket. Thereafter, Jimmy took out a black coin purse from his right side
pocket and pulled out one (1) plastic sachet containing shabu, which was handed over to PO2
Julius.
After receiving the plastic sachet, PO2 Julius made the pre-arranged signal for arrest
by lifting his cap and held the hand of Jimmy. The other operatives later handcuffed Jimmy.
PO2 Julius proceeded to frisk Jimmy and was able to recover from the latter's right pocket
the black coin purse, containing another plastic sachet of suspected shabu and two (2)
aluminum foil strips. PO2 Julius also recovered from Jimmy the marked money.
As people around the closely built houses were starting to gather and cause a
commotion, the buy[-]bust team was instructed by their lead operative to continue the
inventory of the confiscated items at PCP-9. PO2 Julius testified that he had the sachet
of shabu subject of sale in his right pocket while he was holding the black coin purse
containing the other sachet of suspected shabu.
In the police station, inventory was conducted in the presence of Kagawad Rommel
Mercado ("Kagawad Rommel"). The Department of Justice ("DOJ") Representative and Media
Representative were also called to witness the inventory, but their numbers were busy. PO2
Julius duly marked the sachet of suspected shabu from his pocket as JC-1, the sachet of
suspected shabu he recovered from the black coin purse as JC-2, the aluminum foils as JC-3
and JCV-5 and the coin purse itself as JC-4. PO2 Julius put all the evidence in a brown envelope
and sealed it. Subsequently, PO2 Julius turned over the pieces of evidence to the investigator-
on-case, [who], in turn, prepared the other pieces of evidence.
Meanwhile, PO3 Fortunato Candido ("PO3 Fortunato") prepared the following

documents: Memorandum Request for the Conduct of Inventory, Request for Examination,
Philippine National Police ("PNP") Arrest and Booking Sheet and the mug shot of Jimmy.
Version of the Defense
276 of 578
Case Digests
Jimmy denied the allegations against him. He testified that on March 4, 2016, he was
walking towards the pharmacy to buy Salbutamol since his son had an asthma attack. Jimmy
noticed that an Innova car was following him. Suddenly, two (2) men alighted and slammed
him to the wall. When Jimmy asked them if they were police officers, one of the men took out
a gun and pointed the same at his stomach. Jimmy was brought inside the car and [the
policemen] started to question him about a certain Sugar. Jimmy replied that he [does] not
know [Sugar] because many people eat at his "lugawan".
One of the officers demanded Php 10,000.00 if he could not point to them a certain
Sugar. Jimmy was brought to Total Gasoline Station in front of SM Valenzuela and boarded
in another vehicle.
Jimmy only had Php 170.00 in his pocket when he was arrested. He would use the
said amount to buy Salbutamol. The sachets of shabu recovered from Jimmy were not his.
Jimmy saw the said sachets for the first time when he was brought to Block 9.
On the other hand, Rosalinda Lague ("Rosalinda") testified that she is the live-in
partner of Jimmy. It was not true that Jimmy was involved in selling drugs. On March 4, 2016,
Rosalinda instructed Jimmy to buy Salbutamol because their son was experiencing an
asthma attack. Rosalinda wondered why it took Jimmy so long to buy the medicine. Rosalinda
learned about the arrest of Jimmy through a niece. At the precinct, Rosalinda told the police
officers that Jimmy was just tending to his "lugawan" and had never been involved in selling
drugs.
Ruling of the RTC

The RTC ruled that all the elements of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs were
established. Similarly, all the elements of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs were proven
by the prosecution. The RTC further ruled that the fact that the marking of the recovered
drugs was only done at the PCP-9 office and not immediately after their confiscation does
not in any way taint their weight as evidence against Jimmy. It held that the prosecution
substantially complied with the requirements under RA 9165 and sufficiently established
the crucial links in the chain of custody. Thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized shabu remained unimpaired.
Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed Jimmy's conviction.
ISSUES
Whether Jimmy's guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 was proven
RULING
1. NO. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, the applicable law
at the time of the commission of the alleged crimes, outlines the procedure which the police
277 of 578
Case Digests
officers must strictly follow to preserve the integrity of the confiscated drugs and/or
paraphernalia used as evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the seized items be
inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the
physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or
his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative
from the media or a representative from the National Prosecution Service (NPS) all of
whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same
and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four
(24) hours from confiscation for examination.
The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical
inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately
after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable that the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 allow the inventory and
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team.
In this connection, this also means that the two required witnesses should
already be physically present at the time of the conduct of the inventory of the seized
items which, again, must be immediately done at the place of seizure and
confiscation — a requirement that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team
considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity. Verily, a
buy-bust team normally has sufficient time to gather and bring with them the said witnesses.
The Court, however, has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance
with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible; and, the failure
of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA
9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid.
However, this is with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that:
(a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved. It has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court
that the prosecution has the positive duty to explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses Without any justifiable explanation, which must be proven as a fact, the evidence of
the corpus delicti is unreliable, and the acquittal of the accused should follow on the ground
that his guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt.
The buy-bust team failed to comply with the mandatory requirements under Section 21.
First, none of the two required witnesses was present at the time of arrest of the
accused and the seizure of the drugs. The barangay kagawad was merely "called-in" at the
police station as testified by PO2 Congson.
The presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory
but more importantly at the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the
presence of the three witnesses is most needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure
278 of 578
Case Digests
and confiscation that would belie any doubt as to the source, identity, and Integrity of the
seized drug. If the buy-bust operation is legitimately conducted, the presence of the
insulating witnesses would also controvert the usual defense of frame-up as the witnesses
would be able to testify that the buy bust operation and inventory of the seized drugs were
done in their presence in accordance with Section 21 of RA 9165.
Second, the police officers offered the flimsy excuse that an alleged commotion
occurred as the reason why they decided to conduct the marking, inventory, and
photography of the seized items at the police station instead of the place of arrest. The Court
points out that PO2 Congson's account of the events that transpired was full of
inconsistencies and is thus, hardly believable.
It bears stressing that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving their compliance
with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of non-
compliance. As the Court en banc unanimously held in the recent case of People v. Romy Lim:
“It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three witnesses to the physical
inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seize4 was not obtained due to reason/s such
as: (1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote
area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was
threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting
for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the
punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence
of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official within the period
required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of
the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary
detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often
rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the
presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.”
In the present case, the police officers' excuse for postponing the inventory, marking,
and photography of the seized items is weak and unbelievable.
Based on PO2 Congson's own account, the commotion only involved a group of 10
persons, who were five meters away from the buy-bust team. Also, although the accused
initially resisted, they were immediately able to subdue him by handcuffing him. It is thus
highly questionable as to why the buy-bust team of six members, five of whom were armed,
decided to vacate the place of arrest and proceed to the police station. Moreover, the Court
also points out that PO2 Congson expressly admitted himself that there was really no
compelling reason for them to transfer to the police station and that they did it merely
because they were instructed by their team leader to do so.
The saving clause does not apply to this case.

Following the IRR of RA 9165, the courts may allow a deviation from the mandatory
requirements of Section 21 in exceptional cases, where the following requisites are
279 of 578
Case Digests
present: (1) the existence of justifiable grounds to allow departure from the rule on
strict compliance; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending team. If these elements are present, the
seizure and custody of the confiscated drugs shall not be rendered void and invalid
regardless of the non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of Section 21. In this
regard, it has also been emphasized that the State bears the burden of proving the justifiable
cause. Thus, for the said saving clause to apply, the prosecution must first recognize the lapse
or lapses on the part of the buy-bust team and justify or explain the same.
Breaches of the procedure outlined in Section 21 committed by the police officers, left
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti would have been compromised.
In the present case, as admitted by PO2 Congson, the conduct of the marking,
inventory, and photography was not done in the presence of a representative of the
NPS or a media representative-it was only done before a Barangay Kagawad. Neither
can it be shown from the respective testimonies of the arresting officers that reasonable
efforts were exerted to contact these representatives. PO2 Congson merely mentioned that
they contacted the Barangay Kagawad only when they arrived at the police station. However,
when they tried calling the other mandatory witnesses, they received no answer.
The presumption of innocence of the accused vis-a-vis the presumption of regularity in

the performance of official duties.
The right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty is a
constitutionally protected right. The burden lies with the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt by establishing each and every element of the crime charged in the
information as to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily
included therein. Reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty despite the lapses in the procedures undertaken by the buy-bust team is fundamentally
unsound because the lapses themselves are affirmative proofs of irregularity The
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty cannot overcome the stronger
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will
defeat the constitutionally enshrined right to be presumed innocent.
280 of 578
Case Digests
Young Builders Corp. v. Benson Industries, Inc.

DOCTRINE
The complaint filed by YBC is an action for a sum of money arising from its main contract
with BII for the construction of a building. YBC's cause of action is primarily based on BII's
alleged non-payment of its outstanding debts to YBC arising from their main contract, despite
demand. If there was a written building or construction contract that was executed between
BII and YBC, then that would be the actionable document because its terms and stipulations
would spell out the rights and obligations of the parties. However, no such contract or
agreement was attached to YBC's Complaint.
For the Ernesto Letter to be given credence as an admission against BII's interest, it
should first be admissible as a documentary evidence. Like the Accomplishment Billing, which
is also a private document, the due execution and authenticity of the Ernesto Letter must be
proved by YBC. As a prerequisite to the admission in evidence of the Ernesto Letter, which is
private document, its identity and authenticity must be properly laid and reasonably
established. This is mandated by the afore-quoted Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules.
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b) When the original is in
the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the
latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and
the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and (d) When
the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
FACTS
Young Builders Corporation (YBC for brevity) filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) a complaint for collection of sum of money against Benson Industries, Inc. [(BII)]. In
its complaint, YBC claimed that it was contracted by [BII] sometime in 1994 for the purpose
of constructing [BII]'s commercial building located at Escario St., corner F. Ramos Extension,
Cebu City, pursuant to an accomplishment billing basis. As of 18 May 1998, YBC alleged that
it had accomplished works on the main contract amounting to Php54,022,551.39, of which
only Php40,678,430 was paid by [BII] leaving a balance of Php13,344,121.39. In addition,
[BII] required YBC to do extra works amounting to Php11,839,110.99 which, after deducting
Php350,880 for the water cistern, resulted in a total collectible of Php24,832,352.38 both on
the main contract and the extra works as per accomplishment billing dated 18 May 1998.
However, despite demand, BII failed to pay its account.
BII admitted that it contracted YBC to construct the former's building but denied that
it was on an accomplishment billing basis. BII averred that the construction was pursuant to
281 of 578
Case Digests
a timetable with which YBC failed to comply. Objecting to YBC's monetary claims, BII
asserted that YBC committed prior breaches in the agreement particularly the latter's delay
and eventual abandonment of the construction as well as its defective and inferior
workmanship and materials which unduly affected the usefulness and value of the building.
BII also denied YBC's claim for extra works, maintaining that those were remedial not
additional works. Even assuming that YBC still has a collectible, BII contended that the same
has been offset against YBC's liability as a result of the latter's default and its substandard
work. BII consequently prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.
After YBC rested its case and formally offered its exhibits, BII filed a Demurrer to
Evidence and a Supplemental Motion on Demurrer to Evidence. YBC, in turn, filed its
Opposition. The RTC denied BII's Demurrer to Evidence, ruling that there was an imperative
need for BII to present countervailing evidence against YBC.
The CA ruled that that YBC failed to prove that it was entitled to collect any balance
from BII. The CA noted that the only evidence showing YBC's alleged monetary claims against
BII was its Accomplishment Billing (Exhibit "B") which showed BII's purported balance of
₱13,344,121.39 on the main contract and ₱11,488,230.89 on the extra works. The CA ruled
that apart from the Accomplishment Billing, which was self-serving, YBC failed to submit
other credible evidence to prove the actual expenses and amount of work it claimed to have
accomplished such as receipts, payrolls or other similar documents. The CA further ruled
that the Accomplishment Billing, which was a private document, could not be given
probative weight considering that its due execution and authenticity was not duly proven in
accordance with procedural rules. The CA excluded Exhibit "B" as evidence because of YBC's
failure to authenticate it. With the exclusion of the Accomplishment Billing, the CA concluded
that YBC's cause of action for collection no longer had any leg to stand on.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not YBC's Accomplishment Billing dated May 18, 1998 (Exhibit
"B"/Exhibit "2") is admissible.
(2) Whether or not BII 's Letter dated May 7, 1998 (Exhibit "F") is admissible.
(3) Whether or not The Certification dated November 15, 1997 (Exhibit "E") is
admissible.
RULING
(1) NO. The Court finds that the subject Accomplishment Billing is NOT an actionable
document.
YBC is of the position that there is no longer the need to prove the genuineness and
due execution of the Accomplishment Billing because it is an actionable document that was
attached to the complaint and not specifically denied under oath by BII. YBC argues that BII's
denial in its Answer was insufficient because it did not specifically deny the genuineness and
due execution of the Accomplishment Billing.
282 of 578
Case Digests
The complaint filed by YBC is an action for a sum of money arising from its main
contract with BII for the construction of a building. YBC's cause of action is primarily based
on BII's alleged non-payment of its outstanding debts to YBC arising from their main
contract, despite demand. If there was a written building or construction contract that was
executed between BII and YBC, then that would be the actionable document because its
terms and stipulations would spell out the rights and obligations of the parties. However, no
such contract or agreement was attached to YBC's Complaint.
Clearly, the subject Accomplishment Billing is not an actionable document

contemplated by the Rules, but is merely evidentiary in nature. As such, there was no need
for BII to specifically deny its genuineness and due execution under oath.
Besides, even where the written instrument or document copied in or attached to the
pleading is the basis of the claim or defense alleged therein, if the party against whom the
written instrument or document is sought to be enforced does not appear therein to have
taken part in its execution, such party is not bound to make a verified specific denial. For
example, heirs who are sued upon a written contract executed by their father, are not bound
to make a verified specific denial; and the defendant, in an action upon a note executed by
him and endorsed by the payee to the plaintiff, is not bound to make a verified specific denial
of the genuineness and due execution of the indorsement. Since BII does not appear to have
taken part in the execution of the Accomplishment Billing, a verified specific denial of its
genuineness and due execution is therefore unnecessary.
Proceeding now to the probative value of the Accomplishment Billing, the Court
agrees with the CA's ruling that it should be excluded as evidence on the ground of YBC's
failure to authenticate the same. The annexation of an exhibit to a pleading, such as the
Accomplishment Billing in this case, does not amount to an allegation or averment that the
statements and recitals contained therein are true and correct or that the truth of the recitals
therein is tendered as an issue in the case; rather, the truth of such recitals must be expressly
alleged m the pleading in order to raise the issue.
The Accomplishment Billing, being a private document, was not admissible

considering that its due execution and authenticity were not duly proven in accordance with
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules. Under Section 20 of Rule 132, before a private document
is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated by any of the following: the person who
executed it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was
present and saw it executed, the person who after its execution, saw it and recognized the
signature, being familiar thereto or an expert, or the person to whom the parties to the
instrument had previously confessed execution thereof.
In this case, Alfredo Young (Young), the Chairman of the Board of YBC, who signed
the Accomplishment Billing, never testified in court. In his stead, Nelson Go Yu (Yu) merely
identified Exhibit "B" as the Accomplishment Billing which YBC submitted to BII. Yu did not
testify that he saw the execution of the Accomplishment Billing. Neither did Yu affirm the
283 of 578
Case Digests
genuineness of the signature of Young nor did he testify that Young previously confessed
execution of the same to him.
In the case of Chua v. Court of Appeals, it was held that before private documents can
be received in evidence, proof of their due execution and authenticity must be presented.
This may require the presentation and examination of witnesses to testify as to the due
execution and authenticity of such private documents. When there is no proof as to the
authenticity of the writer's signature appearing in a private document, such private
document may be excluded.
Thus, in line with prevailing jurisprudence, the subject Accomplishment Billing

should be excluded in evidence due to YBC's failure to comply with this rule on
authentication of private documents. Thus, it cannot be accorded any probative value.
With the exclusion of Exhibit "B" (Accomplishment Billing), the Court agrees with the
CA that YBC's cause of action for collection no longer has any veritable leg to stand on.
Even if its genuineness and due execution are conceded, the Accomplishment Billing
is, by itself, not worthy of full faith because it is self-serving. As observed by the CA, with
which the Court is in total agreement, YBC failed to submit credible evidence to prove the
actual expenses and amount of work it claimed to have accomplished such as receipts,
payrolls or other similar documents.
As to YBC's argument that BII adopted the Accomplishment Billing as its own Exhibit
2 and offered the same as BII's evidence and as such, it should be accorded probative value,
the exclusion of the Accomplishment Billing as evidence for YBC due to the failure to prove
its due execution and authenticity should likewise apply when the Accomplishment Billing
is considered as evidence for BII. It will indeed be an absurd situation if a private writing is
excluded as evidence for one party on the ground that its due execution and authenticity
have not been established and at the same time, it is accorded with some probative value in
favor of the opposing party which presupposes that it is admitted as the latter's evidence.
(2) NO. YBC claims that the CA erred in holding inadmissible the letter dated May 7,
1998 (Ernesto Letter), allegedly written by Ernesto Dacay, Sr. (Ernesto), who apologized to
YBC for BII's inability to fulfill its payment due to financial constraints. YBC reasoned that
the CA should have given credence to the Ernesto Letter because it is an admission against
BII's interest, admissible under the Rules.
For the Ernesto Letter to be given credence as an admission against BII's interest, it
should first be admissible as a documentary evidence. Like the Accomplishment Billing,
which is also a private document, the due execution and authenticity of the Ernesto Letter
must be proved by YBC. As a prerequisite to the admission in evidence of the Ernesto Letter,
which is private document, its identity and authenticity must be properly laid and reasonably
established. This is mandated by the afore-quoted Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules.
284 of 578
Case Digests
Here, the records of the case show that the Ernesto Letter was only entered into
evidence but was never actually identified in open court by YBC's witness, Yu. The CA thus
correctly ruled that the Ernesto Letter is inadmissible in evidence in view of YBC's failure to
authenticate the same. No probative value can be accorded to it.
(3) NO. YBC argues that the CA should not have disregarded the Certification dated
November 15, 1997 (Mary Certification), allegedly issued by BII's President, Mary Dacay,
affirming YBC's successful completion of the subject building even if YBC's witness, Yu,
allegedly admitted in his testimony that the subject building was not completed.
The Court notes that Exhibit "E" is a mere photocopy. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 130
of the Rules or the Best Evidence Rule:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases: (a) When the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror; (b)
When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice; (c) When the
original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the
general result of the whole; and (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office.
The records show that YBC did not invoke any of the foregoing exceptions to the Best
Evidence Rule to justify the admission of a secondary evidence in lieu of the original Mary
Certification. Having been admitted in violation of the Best Evidence Rule, Exhibit "E" should
have been excluded and not accorded any probative value.
Nonetheless, the Court agrees with the CA's findings that the veracity of the Mary
Certification no longer holds much significance since YBC's Yu openly admitted that YBC
failed to complete the building.
285 of 578
Case Digests
Picardal y Baluyot v. People

DOCTRINE
The factual findings of the CA, affirming that of the trial court, are generally final and
conclusive on the Supreme Court. The foregoing rule, however, is subject to the following
exceptions:
1. The conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
2. The inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
3. There is grave abuse of discretion;
4. The judgement is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. The findings of fact are conflicting;
6. There is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based;
7. The findings of absence of fact are contradicted by the presence of evidence on
record;
8. The findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court;
9. The CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
10. The findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case;
11. Such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.
FACTS
The instant case begins with the Information that was filed against the herein
petitioner, Ramon Picardal, for Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms. It appears that at 8
o’clock in the evening, PO1 Mark Anthony Peniano, together with his companions, PO1
Rodrigo Co and PO1 William Cristobal were on beat patrol back to the station when they
allegedly saw the petitioner urinating against the wall. The police officers then approached
the petitioner and invited him to the precinct. However, when PO1 Peniano was about to
handcuff him, the petitioner attempted to run but to no avail. Once he was caught, PO1
Peniano then proceeded to frisk him and consequently, a caliber .38 revolver was recovered
in his person. Hence the charge against the petitioner.
For his part, the Picardal merely offered a denial wherein he averred that he was just
buying viand at the wet market when he noticed three (3) armed police officers in uniform.
That two of these police officers called him for allegedly urinating at the side of the market.
Thereafter, upon denying the said act, the police officers got mad and frisked him, took his
cellphone, and brought him to the police precinct where he was detained overnight. Picardal
also averred that he was brought for inquest the following day and was surprised that he
was being charged for urinating and illegal possession of firearms. Finally, Picardal testified
that the case for urinating in public that was filed against him was eventually dismissed by
the MTC.
After the trial on its merits, the trial court convicted Picardal. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The CA gave credence to the testimonies of the police
286 of 578
Case Digests
officers as well as the certification that indeed, the petitioner was not licensed/registered to
hold firearms of any caliber. Hence the instant case.
ISSUES
Whether or not the trial court and the CA erred in convicting Picardal.
RULING
YES. The Court held that the instant case is meritorious. It elucidated that the factual
findings of the CA, affirming that of the trial court, are generally final and conclusive on the
Supreme Court. The foregoing rule, however, is subject to the following exceptions:
1. The conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
2. The inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
3. There is grave abuse of discretion;
4. The judgement is based on a misapprehension of facts;
5. The findings of fact are conflicting;
6. There is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are
based;
7. The findings of absence of fact are contradicted by the presence of evidence on
record;
8. The findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court;
9. The CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
10. The findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case;
11. Such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.
In the instant case, it appears that exception number 9 applies. As opined by

the Court, the CA manifestly overlooked the fact that, (1) the firearm subject of the case was
seized from Picardal after he was frisked by the police officers for allegedly urinating in
public, and (2) that the case for such alleged act was subsequently dismissed by the MTC.
The Court reasoned that the act of urinating in public places is punished by Section 2(a) of
MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 which provides, among others, that such act is punished with
a fine of five hundred pesos (P500) or community service for one (1) day. As such, the arrest
that was made by the police officers were unlawful since according to the regulation
punishing Picardal’s act, only a fine or community service serves as a punishment for the
same, and thus a subsequent search is unwarranted. Consequently, the Court cited Sindac v.
People where it was held therein that pursuant to Section 3(2) of Article III of the 1987
Constitution, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. As such, the Court ruled that the
discovered firearm in the person of the petitioner cannot be used in any prosecution against
him, thus as there is no longer any evidence against Picardal, he must be acquitted.
287 of 578
Case Digests
Pili, Jr. v. Resurreccion

DOCTRINE
It has long been settled that “in criminal cases, the People is the real party-in-interest
x x x [and] the private offended party is but a witness in the prosecution of offenses, the interest
of the private offended party is limited only to the aspect of civil liability.” While a judgment of
acquittal is immediately final and executory, “either the offended party or the accused may
appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. x x x The real
parties-in-interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused.”
However, the rules of pleadings require courts to pierce the form and go into the
substance, and not to be misled by a false or wrong name given to a pleading. The averments in
the complaint, not the title, are controlling. Although the general rule requires the inclusion of
the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint, the noninclusion of one or some of them
is not fatal to the cause of action of a plaintiff, provided there is a statement in the body of the
petition indicating that a defendant was made a party to such action.
FACTS
Respondent entered into an agreement with Conpil Realty Corporation (Conpil) for
the purchase of a house and lot and issued two checks in favor of the latter. When Conpil
deposited the checks, the same were dishonored and stamped as "Account Closed." On
February 4, 2000, a criminal complaint for violation of B.P. 22 was filed before the MTC. The
criminal case was titled, "People of the Philippines v. Mary Ann Resurreccion," and was
docketed as Crim. Case No. 35066. Although the checks were issued in favor of Conpil, the
criminal complaint for B.P. 22 was signed by petitioner Alfredo C. Pili, Jr. (petitioner) as
"Complainant." Petitioner was, at that time, the President of Conpil.
After trial, the MTC rendered a Judgment acquitting respondent. However, it ordered
respondent to pay the amount of ₱500,000.00 by way of civil indemnity.
Respondent appealed the MTC's ruling on her civil liability to the RTC under Rule 122
in relation to Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. The appeal that respondent filed was titled,
"People of the Philippines v. Mary Ann Resurreccion" and was docketed as Crim. Case No.
11-7661-SPL. The RTC, however, affirmed the Judgment of the MTC. Respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was, however, likewise denied.
Respondent thus filed a petition for review under Rule 122, Section 3(b) in relation
to Rule 42 of the Rules of Court with the CA, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 35178.
While the criminal case was originally captioned, "People of the Philippines v. Mary Ann
Resurreccion," respondent's petition for review was captioned by her as "Mary Ann
Resurreccion v. Alfredo Pili, Jr." Nevertheless, Paragraph 12 of petitioner's Memorandum
filed with the CA in the petition for review alleged that "Conpil authorized its President x x x
to file cases for violation of BP 22 x x x"in order to enforce its right.
288 of 578
Case Digests
In the CA, respondent claimed that petitioner "is not the real party in interest x x x
[and] cannot file the criminal complaint in his personal capacity." On the other hand,
petitioner claimed that "he did not sue in his personal capacity but as a President of Conpil."
The CA held that the criminal case was not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest
as Conpil was not included in the title of the case even if it was the party: 1) that signed the
contract and 2) in whose favor the checks were issued. On the other hand, it was petitioner
who signed the complaint and it was his name that appeared in the title of the case, even
though he was not a party to any of the documents or checks.
Petitioner now claims that the failure to include the name of the principal in the title
of the case is not fatal to its causes "the averments in the complaint, not the title, are
controlling." He insists that the records show that: 1) the Memorandum submitted by
petitioner before the CA indicates that "petitioner instituted the instant action in his capacity
as president of [Conpil]," 2) he was "properly equipped with the required Secretary's
Certificate dated 15 May 2000, issued by [Conpil's] Corporate Secretary Vivar Abrigo
authorizing the former to represent the corporation in all civil and criminal cases against
Resurreccion," 3) the Secretary's Certificate was formally offered for the purpose of proving
petitioner's authority to file the instant criminal complaint, and 4) the title of the case was
only changed by respondent (not petitioner) to "Mary Ann Resurreccion v. Alfredo Pili, Jr.''
when respondent (not petitioner) filed her petition for review with the CA.
ISSUES
Whether the CA erred in granting the appeal.
RULING
YES. It has long been settled that “in criminal cases, the People is the real party-in-
interest x x x [and] the private offended party is but a witness in the prosecution of offenses,
the interest of the private offended party is limited only to the aspect of civil liability.” While
a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, “either the offended party or the
accused may appeal the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. x
x x The real parties-in-interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the
accused.”
There is no doubt that the People is the real party-in-interest in criminal proceedings.
As the criminal complaint for violation of B.P. 22 was filed in the MTC, necessarily the
criminal case before it was prosecuted “in the name of the People of the Philippines.” This
very basic understanding of what transpired shows ineluctably the egregious error by the
CA in ruling that the Conpil should have been “included in the title of the case.” As discussed
in Magallanes, the private complainant is the real party-in-interest only as regards the civil
aspect arising from the crime. A review of the records of the instant case unequivocally
shows that the civil aspect of the criminal case was, in fact, appealed by respondent and that
it was Conpil, being the victim of the fraud, that was the private complainant therein. This is
clear from the following facts: 1) a Secretary’s Certificate, which stated that the Board of
Directors of Conpil resolved, at a special meeting on January 21, 2000, to initiate all legal
289 of 578
Case Digests
action against respondent and to authorize its President to represent the Corporation in all
civil and criminal cases against Ms. Mary Ann C. Resurreccion and to sign the Complaint,
Affidavit of Complaint and all necessary pleadings, 2) the Affidavit of Complaint subscribed
before the Office of the Prosecutor in February of 2000 concludes that the complaint affidavit
was filed because “Conpil Realty Corp. has extended its generosity and kind understanding
to the limit and cannot anymore extend its patience,” and 3) both the Affidavit and the
Secretary’s Certificate were formally offered as evidence for the purpose of proving that
Alfredo Pili was the authorized representative of the complainant corporation, and that he
was authorized to file the instant case, adduce evidence and testify on behalf of Conpil. This
same set of undisputed and admitted facts totally belies the CA’s claim that the criminal
complaint was not filed or prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest.
Even if the Court were to prescind from the foregoing, the Court cannot but fault the
CA for failing to follow a basic rule in the dispensation of justice: that is, “[p]leadings shall be
construed liberally so as to render substantial justice to the parties and to determine
speedily and inexpensively the actual merits of the controversy with the least regard to
technicalities.” Vlason Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 310 SCRA 26 (1999),
unequivocally states: The inclusion of the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint
is a formal requirement under Section 3, Rule 7. However, the rules of pleadings require
courts to pierce the form and go into the substance, and not to be misled by a false or wrong
name given to a pleading. The averments in the complaint, not the title, are controlling.
Although the general rule requires the inclusion of the names of all the parties in the title of
a complaint, the noninclusion of one or some of them is not fatal to the cause of action of a
plaintiff, provided there is a statement in the body of the petition indicating that a defendant
was made a party to such action.
290 of 578
Case Digests
Bernardo v. Soriano
DOCTRINE
The RTC and CA seem to have confused the right of a party to appeal and the right of
another party to file a motion for reconsideration. There is nothing in the Rules which makes a
party's right to appeal dependent or contingent on the opposing party's motion for
reconsideration. Similarly, a party's undertaking to file a motion for reconsideration of a
judgment is not hindered by the other party's filing of a notice of appeal. Jurisprudence holds
that "each party has a different period within which to appeal"and that "[s]ince each party has
a different period within which to appeal, the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration by
one party does not interrupt the other or another party's period of appeal."
that writ of certiorari will not issue where appeal is available. Appeal and
certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is
proper only if there is no plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Despite the remedy of assailing the RTC's judgment on the merits via an ordinary appeal being
available prior to the filing of her Certiorari Petition, she chose to focus her sight on ascribing
grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's Order denying Bernardo's Notice of Appeal.
FACTS
Bernardo filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus praying that Evangeline Lawas, Head
Social Worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development, be ordered to produce
her minor granddaughter, Stephanie Verniese B. Soriano (Stephanie), before the RTC.
According to Bernardo, Stephanie was deprived of her liberty while under custody of DSWD.
The RTC issued an Order dated 23 October 2009 stating therein that considering
[Bernardo's] failure to prove that the DSWD's custody over the minor is illegal, the Petition
filed was ordered to be converted into a case for custody.
[Soriano], the surviving parent of Stephanie, for her part, filed a Complaint-in-
Intervention seeking to be granted custody of her child, Stephanie.
The RTC, in its Decision dated 05 August 2010, upheld Soriano's right to
parental custody and parental authority but ruled that, in the meantime, it will be for the
minor to stay with Bernardo for the school year 2009-2010 while studying at Notre Dame of
Greater Manila. Thus, the RTC granted temporary custody to Bernardo.
Bernardo filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that Soriano is unfit to take
care of her child, who, allegedly, verbally maltreats Stephanie.
On 31 August 2010, the RTC issued an Order denying Bernardo's Motion for
Reconsideration. On the very same day, Soriano timely filed through registered mail
her Comment (With Motion for Partial Reconsideration) dated August 27, 2010. In
291 of 578
Case Digests
sum, Soriano asserted that the custody of Stephanie should be granted in her favor
immediately and not only after school year 2009-2010.
RTC's denial of Bernardo's Motion for Reconsideration on August 31, 2010

prompted [Bernardo] to file a Notice of Appeal on 08 September 2010. However, the
RTC, through the first assailed Order dated 09 September 2010 ruling therein that the
assailed 05 August 2010 Decision and the 31 August 2010 Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration have not yet attained finality, and thus, may not be the subject of an appeal.
Hence, the Notice of Appeal of Bernardo was denied. The RTC ratiocinated that Soriano,
who received a copy of the 05 August 2010 Decision on 13 August 2010, timely filed her
Comment (with Motion for Partial Reconsideration) dated 27 August 2010.
RTC rendered an Order dated 22 October 2010 granting Soriano's partial

reconsideration and allowing the her to take custody of her child immediately.
Bernardo filed her Motion for Reconsideration dated November 22, 2010, seeking a
reconsideration of the RTC's 09 September 2010 and 22 October 2010 Orders. However, it
was denied through the Order dated 31 January 2011. Thus, on March 15, 2011, Bernardo
filed a Petition for Certiorari (Certiorari Petition) under Rule 65, seeking the annulment
and setting aside, on the ground of the RTC's Orders denying Bernardo's Notice of Appeal.
The Ruling of the CA

The CA denied Bernardo's Certiorari Petition. The CA held that because Soriano
seasonably filed her own Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the RTC's Decision dated
August 5, 2010, the said Decision of the RTC is not an appealable judgment despite the denial
of Bernardo's Motion for Reconsideration. Bernardo's Notice of Appeal was premature
owing to the pendency of Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration. It will seem that the
Order dated 31 August 2010 denying Bernardo's Motion for Reconsideration, on the issue of
permanent custody, left nothing else for the court to do. However, said Order was issued
before the court a quo received Soriano's Comment (With Motion for Partial
Reconsideration) which was filed via registered mail on the very same day, 31 August
2010. The RTC's Decision cannot yet be considered a judgment that may be appealed due to
the filing of Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration because unlike a 'final judgment
or order, which is appealable, an 'interlocutory order may not be questioned on
appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final
judgment rendered in the case. Thus, when the said Comment (With Motion for Partial
Reconsideration) was filed, there remains something left for the court to do; to thresh out
the issue of whether or not to reverse the temporary custody given to Bernardo.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the RTC commited an error when the latter denied Bernardo's Notice of
Appeal due to the pendency of Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
(2) Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed in the CA should prosper.
292 of 578
Case Digests
RULING
(1) YES. According to Section 1, Rule 41, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or
final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared to be appealable. Further, according to Section 2(a), the appeal to the CA in cases
decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice
of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. In connection with the foregoing, Section 5 of
the same Rule states that the notice of appeal shall indicate the parties to the appeal, specify
the judgment or final order or part thereof appealed from, specify the court to which the
appeal is being taken, and state material dates showing timeliness of appeal.
With respect to the period for filing the notice of appeal, the appeal shall be taken
within 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. The period of
appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion
for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. When
a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed by the party, which was subsequently
denied by the court, there is a fresh period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the notice
of appeal, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. A party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him
upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time
The RTC rendered its Decision dated August 5, 2010, which resolved the merits of the
Custody case, upholding Soriano's right to parental custody and parental authority, albeit
ruling that it will be for the best interest of the child to stay with Bernardo first for the school
year 2009-2010 while studying at Notre Dame of Greater Manila.
An appealable judgment or final order refers to one that adjudicates the parties'
contention and determines their rights and liabilities as regards each other, disposing the
whole subject matter of the case.
The subject RTC Decision, having delved into the merits of the Custody case and
having fully disposed of the respective issues and causes of action raised by the parties, was
undoubtedly a judgment on the merits and not a mere interlocutory order. The RTC decided
on the subject matter of the case, i.e., the custody of Stephanie.
Being an appealable judgment on the merits, Bernardo had the right to appeal under
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court the RTC's Decision by filing a notice of appeal within 15 days
from receipt of the RTC's Order dated August 31, 2010 denying Bernardo's timely-filed
Motion for Reconsideration. This was exactly what Bernardo did. She timely filed a Notice of
Appeal, containing all the required contents of a notice of appeal under Section 5, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court and paid the corresponding appeal fees on September 8, 2010.
Assuming of course that the notice of appeal satisfies the content requirements set
under Section 5, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the approval of a notice of appeal becomes
293 of 578
Case Digests
the ministerial duty of the lower court, provided the appeal is filed on time. Hence, the RTC's
Order dated September 9, 2010 denying Bernardo's seasonably-filed Notice of Appeal was a
departure from the provisions of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. In accordance with the Rules,
Bernardo's Notice of Appeal should have been deemed perfected as to her.
In denying Bernardo's Notice of Appeal, RTC's contended that the pendency of the
Motion for Partial Consideration of Soriano precluded Bernardo from filing a Notice of
Appeal. The CA ratiocinated that the RTC's Decision dated August 5, 2010, despite being a
judgment on the merits, was not yet appealable, asserting that "a final order contemplates
one in which there is nothing more for the court to do in order to resolve the case." The RTC
believed that Bernardo could more appropriately file her Notice of Appeal only after
Soriano's Motion for Partial Consideration had been decided upon.
With respect to Bernardo, the RTC's Decision did not cease to be an appealable
judgment, transforming into a mere interlocutory order, for the sole reason that the
opposing party, Soriano, filed her own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. With
Bernardo's own Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the RTC, according to
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, Bernardo already had 15 days to file a Notice of Appeal
regardless of Soriano filing her own Motion for Reconsideration.
The RTC and CA seem to have confused the right of a party to appeal and the right of
another party to file a motion for reconsideration. There is nothing in the Rules which makes
a party's right to appeal dependent or contingent on the opposing party's motion for
reconsideration. Similarly, a party's undertaking to file a motion for reconsideration of a
judgment is not hindered by the other party's filing of a notice of appeal. Jurisprudence holds
that "each party has a different period within which to appeal"and that "[s]ince each party
has a different period within which to appeal, the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration
by one party does not interrupt the other or another party's period of appeal."
If the RTC granted Bernardo's Notice of Appeal, the RTC would not have been divested
of jurisdiction to decide Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration and that Soriano's right
to file her own Motion for Reconsideration would not have been defeated. Under Section 9,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over
the case only upon the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
(2) NO. Even with the RTC having committed an error in procedure when it denied
Bernardo's Notice of Appeal, the CA was not in error to deny Bernardo's Certiorari Petition.
First, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure mere errors in
proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact. Further, grave abuse of discretion
implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
RTC's act of denying Bernardo's Notice of Appeal was not borne out of a capricious,
whimsical, and arbitrary exercise of judgment. The RTC was motivated, albeit erroneously,
294 of 578
Case Digests
by practicality, wanting to first decide Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration and
avoid multiplicity of appeals before the CA.
Writ of certiorari will not issue where appeal is available. Appeal and certiorari under
Rule 65 are mutually exclusive. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only if there
is no plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In the RTC's Order dated September 9, 2010 denying Bernardo's Notice of Appeal, the
RTC did not completely preclude Bernardo from appealing the RTC's Decision dated August
5, 2010. What the RTC merely did was to deny the Notice of Appeal in the meantime and
order Bernardo to file her comment on Soriano's Comment (With Motion for Partial
Reconsideration), so that upon the RTC's disposition of the said Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, Bernardo and/or Soriano could file their notices of appeal.
The RTC issued its Order dated October 22, 2010 granting Soriano's Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, modifying the RTC's Decision dated August 5, 2010. Hence, Bernardo could
have appealed yet again by filing another notice of appeal assailing the RTC's Decision. In
fact, as a clear indication that Bernardo had an adequate and available remedy, Bernardo
was able to question the modification of the RTC's Decision and file a Motion for
Reconsideration on November 22, 2010, which was prior to the filing of
the Certiorari Petition on March 15, 2011. When such Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the RTC in its Order dated January 31, 2011, Bernardo had 15 days from the
receipt of the said Order to appeal the RTC's Decision dated August 5, 2010 before the CA.
Despite the remedy of assailing the RTC's judgment on the merits via an ordinary
appeal being available prior to the filing of her Certiorari Petition, she chose to focus her sight
on ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's Order denying Bernardo's Notice of
Appeal. Instead of fixating on the denial of her earlier Notice of Appeal, Bernardo could have
appealed the modified RTC Decision before the CA by filing anew another Notice of Appeal.
To reiterate, a petition for certiorari can be availed of only if the aggrieved party has no plain,
adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law.
295 of 578
Case Digests
296 of 578
Case Digests
BDO Leasing & Finance, Inc. v. Great Domestic Insurance Company of the Philippines,
Inc.
G.R. No. 205286. June 19, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Jurisprudence holds that “an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about
any event that would not constitute res judicata and litis pendencia is not fatal as to merit the
dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings, given that the evils sought to be prevented
by the said certification are not present
“The corporation, upon such change in its name, is in no sense a new corporation, nor
the successor of the original corporation. It is the same corporation with a different name, and
its character is in no respect changed. A change in the corporate name does not make a new
corporation, and whether effected by special act or under a general law, has no effect on the
identity of the corporation, or on its property, rights, or liabilities. The corporation continues,
as before, responsible in its new name for all debts or other liabilities which it had previously
contracted or incurred.”
As held by the court in Air Philippines Corp. v. Zamora, 498 SCRA 59 (2006), while it is a
general rule that a petition lacking copies of essential pleadings and portions of the case record
may be dismissed, such rule, however, is not petrified. As the exact nature of the pleadings and
parts of the case record which must accompany a petition is not specified, much discretion is
left to the appellate court to determine the necessity for copies of pleading and other
documents.
FACTS
Respondents spouses Kiddy Lim Chao and Emily Rose Go Ko (respondents Sps. Chao)
obtained from petitioner BDO loans evidenced by two promissory notes. Both loans were
payable starting in December 1998 in 60 equal monthly amortization payments with an
interest rate of 22.5% per annum. As security for the payment of these loans, respondents
Sps. Chao executed in favor of petitioner BDO a Chattel Mortgage covering 40 motor vehicles
and personal properties.
Starting August 1999 until December 1999, respondents Sps. Chao failed to fully pay
their monthly amortization payments. Despite demands made, respondents Sps. Chao failed
to settle their obligation. Hence, a Complaint for Recovery of Possession of Personal
Property, with an application for the issuance of a writ of replevin (Complaint) was filed by
petitioner BDO before the RTC against respondents Sps. Chao.
The RTC issued an Order allowing the issuance of a writ of replevin on the properties
of respondents Sps. Chao upon the posting of a bond by petitioner BDO in the amount of
₱10,000,000.00. Petitioner BDO posted the said bond and the writ of replevin was issued
against respondents Sps. Chao. Respondents Sps. Chao posted a counter-replevin bond
(counter-bond) also in the amount of ₱10,000,000.00 issued by respondent Great Domestic
297 of 578
Case Digests
Insurance Company of the Philippines, Inc. (respondent Great Domestic).On appeal before
the CA Special 20th Division, the latter rendered its Decision denying respondents Sps.
Chao's appeal for lack of merit. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 00551. The case
was further appealed before the Court's First Division in G.R. No. 178005. The appeal was
denied by the Court. In an Entry of Judgment, it was indicated that the Court's Resolution in
G.R. No. 178005 has attained finality.
Hence, BDO filed a Motion for Writ of Execution before the RTC, which was granted. The
Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC issued a writ of execution. The Sheriff's
Progress Report indicated that the writ of execution was not satisfied. Hence, petitioner BDO
filed a Motion to Order Sheriff to Serve Writ of Execution on the Counter Bond. This Motion
was opposed by respondent Great Domestic. The RTC granted petitioner BDO's Motion and
ordered the serving of the writ of execution. Respondent Great Domestic filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the said Order. The RTC denied respondent Great Domestic's Motion for
Reconsideration. However, the RTC clarified its earlier Order and stated that the liability of
respondent Great Domestic is only ₱5,000,000.00. Citing Section 20, Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court, the RTC held that the amount of the counter-bond is set at double the value of the
property stated in the affidavit as the excess or difference will have to answer for claims for
damages. The RTC found that the damages could not be recovered by petitioner BDO as the
same was never proven. Thus, the award of damages was not included in the judgment of the
RTC. Petitioner BDO filed its Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC.
BDO, still as PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc., filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court (Certiorari Petition) before the CA Special 18th Division, arguing that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that respondent Great Domestic's liability on
the counter-bond is only ₱5,000,000.00. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 04753.
The CA Special 18th Division dismissed the Certiorari Petition outright solely on procedural
grounds. First, in dismissing the Certiorari Petition outright, the CA Special 18th Division
held that petitioner BDO failed to satisfy the rule on filing the proper certification against
forum shopping, as the latter failed to disclose and mention the pendency of another case
involving petitioner BDO and respondents Sps. Chao, i.e., Civil Case No. CEB-24675 pending
before the RTC, Branch 51 for nullification of chattel mortgage with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Second, the CA
Special 18th Division found that petitioner BDO failed to attach vital pleadings and
documents needed in deciding whether to grant the Certiorari Petition. Important pleadings
and documents such as the Complaint, writ of replevin, writ of execution, and other issuances
and orders of the RTC were not attached. Lastly, the CA Special 18th Division held that
petitioner BDO had no legal capacity to file the Certiorari Petition, considering that when PCI
Leasing and Finance, Inc. changed its name to BDO Leasing and Finance, Inc. Petitioner BDO
should have sued under its new name "in order to avoid confusion and open door to frauds
and evasions and difficulties of administration and supervision."
ISSUES
298 of 578
Case Digests
(1) Whether petitioner BDO's failure to disclose Civil Case No. CEB-24675 in the
Verification/Certification accompanying the Certiorari Petition does not merit the outright
dismissal of the said Petition.
(2) Whether the change of name of petitioner BDO from PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc.
to BDO Leasing and Finance, Inc. affect its capacity to sue and be sued, and the authority of
its authorized signatory, Vicente C. Rallos (Rallos), to file the Certiorari Petition
(3) Whether the Certiorari Petition should dismissed outright because of the failure
of petitioner BDO to attach certain documents (issuances and orders of the RTC).
RULING
(1) NO. Certification Against Forum Shopping; According to Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court, the plaintiff or principal party shall certify in a sworn certification: (a) that he
has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that
the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact
within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory
pleading has been filed
While it is not disputed that petitioner BDO failed to disclose the pending case in its
Verification/Certification, it must be stressed that, despite involving the same parties, the
aforesaid case and the instant case involve two completely different issues. On one hand, the
pending case in RTC, the issue was on the validity of the chattel mortgage executed by BDO
and Sps. Chao. On the other hand, in the Certiorari Petition, the matter in focus is the
execution upon the counter-bond filed in lieu of the final and executory Decision of the RTC.
Jurisprudence holds that "an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about
any event that would not constitute res judicata and litis pendencia is not fatal as to merit
the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings, given that the evils sought to be
prevented by the said certification are not present."
(2) NO. “The corporation, upon such change in its name, is in no sense a new
corporation, nor the successor of the original corporation. It is the same corporation with a
different name, and its character is in no respect changed. A change in the corporate name
does not make a new corporation, and whether effected by special act or under a general
law, has no effect on the identity of the corporation, or on its property, rights, or liabilities.
The corporation continues, as before, responsible in its new name for all debts or other
liabilities which it had previously contracted or incurred.”
Hence, with petitioner BDO's change of name from "PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc." to
"BDO Leasing and Finance, Inc." having no effect on the identity of the corporation, on its
property, rights, or liabilities, with its character remaining very much intact, the Board
299 of 578
Case Digests
Resolution and Special Power of Attorney authorizing its Directors to institute the Certiorari
Petition did not lose any binding effect whatsoever.
(3) NO. As held by the court in Air Philippines Corp. v. Zamora, while it is a general
rule that a petition lacking copies of essential pleadings and portions of the case record may
be dismissed, such rule, however, is not petrified. As the exact nature of the pleadings and
parts of the case record which must accompany a petition is not specified, much discretion
is left to the appellate court to determine the necessity for copies of pleading and other
documents. There are, however, guideposts it must follow.
According to the aforementioned case, “x x x not all pleadings and parts of case
records are required to be attached to the petition. Only those which are relevant and
pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in question will
support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out a
prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due course to
the petition.”
The documents that petitioner BDO failed to attach in its Certiorari Petition, i.e., the
Complaint, the Writ of Replevin, and the Writ of Execution, are not documents that will make
out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion. The instant case is centered solely on the
alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC when it held that the liability of
respondent Great Domestic is only P5,000,000 citing Sec.20, Rule 57. Statements or details
found in the Complaint, the Writ of Replevin, and the Writ of Execution will not determine
whether grave abuse of discretion was present. Air Philippines Corp. v. Zamora likewise
holds that: “x x x even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be
appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also [be] found in another document
already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are
summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the
judgment is attached.” Here, the relevant portions of the Complaint, the Writ of Replevin, the
Writ of Execution, and other issuances of the RTC have been summarized and sufficiently
detailed in the various pleadings filed by both parties.
300 of 578
Case Digests
301 of 578
Case Digests
RCBC Bankard Services Corp. v. Oracion, Jr.

DOCTRINE
Estoppel bars a party from raising issues, which have not been raised in the proceedings
before the lower courts, for the first time on appeal.
According to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, “[a]n electronic

document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by
the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by these
Rules.”…In the absence of such authentication through the affidavit of the custodian or other
qualified person, the said annexes or attachments cannot be admitted and appreciated as
business records and excepted from the rule on hearsay evidence.
It is only when the original document is unavailable that secondary evidence may be
allowed pursuant to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules.
For the Supreme Court (SC) to exercise its equity jurisdiction, certain facts must be
presented to justify the same.
FACTS
Moises Oracion, Jr. (Moises) and Emily L. Oracion (Emily) (collectively, respondents)
applied for and were granted by petitioner credit card accommodations with the issuance of
a Bankard PESO Mastercard Platinum (credit card). Respondents on various dates used the
credit card in purchasing different products but failed to pay petitioner the total amount of
₱117,157.98, inclusive of charges and penalties or at least the minimum amount due under
the credit card. Petitioner attached to its complaint against respondents "duplicate original"
copies of the Statements of Account from April 17, 2011 to December 15, 2011 (SOAs,
Annexes "A", "A-l" to "A-8") and the Credit History Inquiry (Annex "B").The SOAs bear the
name of Moises as addressee and the Credit History Inquiry bears the name: "MR ORACION
JR M A" on the top portion. Despite receipt of the SOAs, respondents failed and refused to
comply with their obligation under the credit card. Petitioner sent a demand letter (Annex
"C" to the complaint) to respondents but despite receipt, respondents refused to comply with
their obligation. Hence, petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money 2012 before the MeTC.
The MeTC issued summons. The summons was duly effected to respondents through
substituted service. For failure of respondents to file their answer within the required
period, the MeTC pursuant to Section 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, considered the
case submitted for resolution.
The MeTC dismissed the case on the ground that petitioner failed to discharge the
burden of proof in a civil case. A perusal of the records shows that the signature in the
attachments in support of the complaint are mere photocopies, stamp mark in the instant
case. Such is in violation of the Best Evidence Rule.
302 of 578
Case Digests
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. Petitioner argued that it attached the "duplicate
original copies" and not mere photocopies. If for unknown reasons the Duplicate Original
Copies were no longer found in the record of the court or that the copy of the Complaint
intended for the court, where these Originals were attached, was not forwarded to the MTC,
petitioner submits that justice and equity dictates that the MTC should have required
petitioner to produce the same instead of immediately dismissing the case. This is especially
true considering that there were allegations in the complaint that the Duplicate Original
Copies were attached as annexes; and that the MTC motu proprio submitted the case for
decision. The fact that these documents are computer generated reports, petitioner could
simply present another set of printed Duplicate Original Copies.
The RTC found the appeal unmeritorious. It is up to petitioner to prove that

attachments in support of the complaint are originals. Petitioner's insistence that it attached
Duplicate Original Copies of the SOAs and the Credit History Inquiry as Annexes is entirely
for naught, as such documents could not be considered as original. A perusal of the said
annexes would show that there is a stamp mark at the bottom right portion of each page of
the said annexes, with the words "DUPLICATE ORIGINAL (signature) CHARITO O. HAM,
Senior Manager, Collection Support Division Head, Collection Group, Bankard Inc." Further
inspection of the said stamp marks would reveal that the signatures appearing at the top of
the name CHARITO O. HAM in the respective annexes are not original signatures but are part
of the subject stamp marks. Indeed, Annexes "A", "A-1" to "A-8" and "B", attached to the
complaint, cannot be considered as original documents. Even petitioner found the need to
stamp mark them as "DUPLICATE ORIGINAL" to differentiate them from the original
documents. The Court also noted the fact that petitioner filed a MANIFESTATION, attaching
as Annexes "A", "A-1" to "A-8" the Duplicate Original Itemized SOAs, and as Annex "B" the
Credit History Inquiry. Upon examination of these latter annexes, the Court observed that
they are merely photocopies of the annexes attached to the complaint, but with a mere
addition of stamp marks bearing the same inscription as the first stamp marks. These only
demonstrate that whenever petitioner describes a document as "DUPLICATE ORIGINAL", it
only refers to a copy of the document and not necessarily the original.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the RTC erred in affirming the MeTC's dismissal of petitioner's complaint
in that pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-
SC), an electronic document is to be regarded as an original thereof under the Best Evidence
Rule and thus, with the presented evidence in "original duplicate copies," petitioner has
preponderantly proven respondents' unpaid obligation.
(2) Invoking the rule that technicalities must yield to substantial justice, whether
petitioner must be afforded the opportunity to rectify its mistake, offer additional evidence
and/or present to the court another set of direct print-outs of the electronic documents.
RULING
303 of 578
Case Digests
(1) NO. On the first issue, petitioner invokes for the first time on appeal the Rules
on Electronic Evidence to justify its position that it has preponderantly proven its claim for
unpaid obligation against respondents because it had attached to its complaint electronic
documents. Petitioner argues that since electronic documents, which are computer-
generated, accurately representing information, data, figures and/or other modes of written
expression, creating or extinguishing a right or obligation, when directly printed out are
considered original reproductions of the same, they are admissible under the Best Evidence
Rule. Petitioner explains that since the attachments to its complaint are wholly computer-
generated print-outs which it caused to be reproduced directly from the computer, they
qualify as electronic documents which should be regarded as the equivalent of the original
documents pursuant to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence
Procedurally, petitioner cannot adopt a new theory in its appeal before the Court and
abandon its theory in its appeal before the RTC. Pursuant to Section 15, Rule 44 of the Rules,
petitioner may include in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been
raised in the court below and is within the issues framed by the parties.
In the Memorandum for Appellant which it filed before the RTC, petitioner did not
raise the Rules on Electronic Evidence to justify that the so-called "duplicate original copies"
of the SOAs and Credit History Inquiry are electronic documents. Rather, it insisted that they
were duplicate original copies, being computer-generated reports, and not mere
photocopies or substitutionary evidence, as found by the MeTC. As observed by the RTC,
petitioner even tried to rectify the attachments (annexes) to its complaint, by filing a
Manifestation wherein it attached copies of the said annexes. Unfortunately, as observed by
the RTC, the attachments to the said Manifestation "are merely photocopies of the annexes
attached to the complaint, but with a mere addition of stamp marks bearing the same
inscription as the first stamp marks" that were placed in the annexes to the complaint.
Because petitioner has not raised the electronic document argument before the RTC, it may
no longer be raised nor ruled upon on appeal.
Even in the complaint, petitioner never intimated that it intended the annexes to be
considered as electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence. If such
were petitioner's intention, then it would have laid down in the complaint the basis for their
introduction and admission as electronic documents.
Also, estoppel bars a party from raising issues, which have not been raised in the
proceedings before the lower courts, for the first time on appeal. Clearly, petitioner, by its
acts and representations, is now estopped to claim that the annexes to its complaint are not
duplicate original copies but electronic documents.
Even assuming that the Court brushes aside the above-noted procedural obstacles,
the Court cannot just concede that the pieces of documentary evidence in question are
indeed electronic documents, which according to the Rules on Electronic Evidence are
considered functional equivalent of paper-based documents and regarded as the equivalent
304 of 578
Case Digests
of original documents under the Best Evidence Rule if they are print-outs or outputs readable
by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.
For the Court to consider an electronic document as evidence, it must pass the test of
admissibility. According to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "[a]n
electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility
prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner
prescribed by these Rules."
Petitioner could not have complied with the Rules on Electronic Evidence because it
failed to authenticate the electronic documents through the required affidavit of evidence.
What petitioner had in mind at the inception was to have the annexes admitted as duplicate
originals as the term is understood in relation to paper-based documents. Thus, the annexes
or attachments to the complaint of petitioner are inadmissible as electronic documents, and
they cannot be given any probative value. Even the section on "Business Records as
Exception to the Hearsay Rule" of Rule 8 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence requires
authentication by the custodian or other qualified witness.
The lower courts correctly regarded the annexes to the complaint as mere
photocopies of the SOAs and the Credit History Inquiry, and not necessarily the original. The
Best Evidence Rule requires the presentation of the original document. With respect to
paper-based documents, the original of a document, i.e., the original writing, instrument,
deed, paper, inscription, or memorandum, is one the contents of which are the subject of the
inquiry.
Bakit Under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, an electronic document is regarded as

the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a
printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately. As
defined, "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information,
data, figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however
represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact
may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically; and it includes digitally signed documents and any
print-out or output, readable by sight or other means, which accurately reflects the
electronic data message or electronic document. The term "electronic document" may be
used interchangeably with "electronic data message"and the latter refers to information
generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means.
Section 4, Rule 130 of the Rules and Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence identify the following instances when copies of a document are equally regarded
as originals: [1] When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same
time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals. [2] When an
entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near
the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals. [3]
305 of 578
Case Digests
When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time with identical
contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the
same matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by
other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the original, such copies or
duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the original. Apparently, "duplicate original
copies" or "multiple original copies" wherein two or more copies are executed at or about
the same time with identical contents are contemplated in 1 and 3 above. If the copy is
generated after the original is executed, it may be called a "print-out or output" based on the
definition of an electronic document, or a "counterpart" based on Section 2, Rule 4 of the
Rules on Electronic Evidence. It is only when the original document is unavailable that
secondary evidence may be allowed pursuant to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules.
Going back to the documents in question, the fact that a stamp with the markings
("DUPLICATE ORIGINAL (signature) CHARITO O. HAM, Senior Manager, Collection Support
Division Head, Collection Group, Bankard Inc.") was placed at the right bottom of each page
of the SOAs and the Credit History Inquiry did not make them"duplicate original copies" as
described above. The necessary allegations to qualify them as "duplicate original
copies"must be stated in the complaint and duly supported by the pertinent affidavit
of the qualified person. Only the signature in the stamp at the bottom of the Credit History
Inquiry appears to be original. The signatures of the "certifying" person in the SOAs are not
original but part of the stamp. Thus, even if all the signatures of Charito O. Ham, Senior
Manager, Collection Support Division Head of petitioner's Collection Group are original, the
required authentication so that the annexes to the complaint can be considered as "duplicate
original copies" will still be lacking. If petitioner intended the annexes to the complaint as
electronic documents, then the proper allegations should have been made in the complaint
and the required proof of authentication as "print-outs", "outputs" or "counterparts" should
have been complied with.
The instant case was considered to be governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure,
which does not expressly require that the affidavits of the witness must accompany the
complaint or the answer and it is only after the receipt of the order in connection with the
preliminary conference and within 10 days therefrom, wherein the parties are required to
submit the affidavits of the parties' witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues
defined in the order, together with their position papers setting forth the law and the facts
relied upon by them. Given the nature of the documents that petitioner needed to adduce in
order to prove its cause of action, it would have been prudent on the part of its lawyer, to
make the necessary allegations in the complaint and attach thereto the required
accompanying affidavits to lay the foundation for their admission as evidence in conformity
with the Best Evidence Rule. This prudent or cautionary action may avert a dismissal of the
complaint for insufficiency of evidence, as what happened in this case, when the court acts
pursuant to Section 6 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, the judgment that is to be rendered
is that which is "warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint" and such facts must be duly
established in accordance with the Rules on Evidence.
306 of 578
Case Digests
Upon a perusal of the items in the SOAs, the claim of petitioner against respondents
is less than ₱100,000.00, if the late charges and interest charges are deducted from the total
claim of ₱117,157.98. Given that the action filed by petitioner is for payment of money where
the value of the claim does not exceed ₱100,000.00 (the jurisdictional amount when the
complaint was filed in January 2013), exclusive of interest and costs, petitioner could have
opted to prosecute its cause under the Revised Rules for Small Claims. Section 6 of the
Revised Rules for Small Claims provides: "A small claims action is commenced by filing with
the court an accomplished and verified Statement of Claim (Form 1-SCC) in duplicate,
accompanied by a Certification Against Forum Shopping, Splitting a Single Cause of Action,
and Multiplicity of Suits (Form 1-A-SCC), and two (2) duly certified photocopies of the
actionable document/s subject of the claim, as well as the affidavits of witnesses and other
evidence to support the claim. No evidence shall be allowed during the hearing which was
not attached to or submitted together with the Statement of Claim, unless good cause is
shown for the admission of additional evidence." If petitioner took this option, then it would
have been incumbent upon it to attach to its Statement of Claim even the affidavits of its
witnesses. If that was the option that petitioner took, then maybe its complaint might not
have been dismissed for lack of preponderance of evidence. Unfortunately, petitioner
included the late and interest charges in its claim and prosecuted its cause under the Rule on
Summary Procedure.
(2) NO. Firstly, petitioner cannot seek the review of its case by the Court on a pure
question of law and afterward, plead that the Court, on equitable grounds, grant its Petition,
nonetheless. For the Court to exercise its equity jurisdiction, certain facts must be presented
to justify the same. A review on a pure question of law necessarily negates the review of facts.
Secondly, petitioner has not been candid in admitting its error as pointed out by both
the MeTC and the RTC. After being apprised that the annexes to its complaint do not conform
to the Best Evidence Rule, petitioner did not make any effort to comply so that the lower
courts could have considered its claim. Rather, it persisted in insisting that the annexes are
compliant. Even before the Court, petitioner did not even attach such documents which
would convince the Court that petitioner could adduce the original documents as
required by the Best Evidence Rule to prove its claim against respondents.
307 of 578
Case Digests
People v. Nieves y Acuavera

DOCTRINE
The three (3) required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of
considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity.
FACTS
The prosecution's version, as summarized by the CA, is as follows:
PO1 Rudico D. Angulo ("PO1 Angulo"), Iba Municipality Station, testified that on 09
July 2013, their Office conducted a buy-bust operation for the arrest of Accused-Appellant,
who was infamous for being a drug pusher in Iba, Zambales. The operation was conducted
at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon along the road near Accused-Appellant's residence.
After the preparation of the Pre-Operation Report, Coordination Form, the Request for
Conduct of Dusting Powder on the money, and the marked bill worth Five Hundred Pesos
(Php500.00), PO1 Angulo, the designated poseur-buyer, along with the Confidential
Informant ("CI") and four (4) deployed personnel, carried out the said operation.
Upon identification of the Accused-Appellant, the CI and PO1 Angulo approached him.
CI introduced PO1 Angulo as the buyer of the drug after which the latter handed to Accused-
Appellant the marked money bearing his initials "RDA." Having received payment, Accused-
Appellant pocketed the same and in turn, handed to PO1 Angulo a small plastic sachet
containing a white crystalline substance. PO1 Angulo proceeded to perform the pre-
arranged signal which prompted the four (4) personnel, all of whom were waiting a few
meters away from the operation, to cause the arrest of Accused-Appellant. Subsequent to the
arrest, PO1 Angulo affixed his initials on the plastic sachet. Upon reaching the police station,
an inventory of the confiscated items were (sic) done in the presence of PO2 Wilfredo F.
Devera ("PO2 Devera"), one of the officers during the operation, Department of Justice
("DOJ") Representative Asst. State Prosecutor Olivia V. Non, and Elected Barangay Official
Bgy. Kagawad Victor Buenaventura.
To corroborate on the fact of the buy-bust operation, PO2 Devera narrates that on 09
July 2013, at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a buy-bust operation was conducted, specifically
targeting Accused-Appellant. As one of the designated back-up personnel, he was tasked to
proceed to the target area, wait for the execution of the pre-arranged signal, search the
suspect after the transaction is consummated, and thereby arrest him upon reading his
Constitutional rights. During the said operation, he confirms having personally seen the
transaction between the CI, PO1 Angulo, and Accused-Appellant. Upon the execution of PO1
Angulo of the prearranged signal, PO2 Devera, along with the other back-up personnel,
effected the arrest and frisked the suspect, finding the marked Five Hundred Peso
(Php500.00) bill, one (1) One Hundred Peso (Php100.00) bill, one (1) lighter and one (1)
flashlight in his possession. Accused-Appellant was subsequently brought to the police
station where the items taken from his person were inventoried.
308 of 578
Case Digests
Police Chief Inspector Vernon Rey Santiago ("PCI Santiago"), a forensic chemist from
the Zambales Provincial Crime Laboratory Office, affirms that their office had received a
written request for drug test, for the application of dust powder on one (1) Five Hundred
Peso (Php500.00) bill, for an ultraviolet test on the body of Accused-Appellant, and for a
laboratory examination on a certain specimen weighing .029 [gram] contained in a heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as "RDA." Aside from such written requests, the
office likewise received the specimen and the marked bill itself. Anent the results, PCI
Santiago attests that the results yielded positive for presence of ultraviolet fluorescent
powder and that the specimen weighing .029 [gram] tested positive for
MethylamphetamineHydrochloride.
On the other hand, the version of the defense, similarly summarized by the CA, is as follows:
Accused-Appellant alleges that on 09 July 2013, at around 1 o'clock in the afternoon,
he was alone at the backyard of his house sweeping. During that time, he saw certain police
officers coming towards him shouting "wag kang tumakbo Jun Jun Nieves!" He continued
sweeping, ignoring such warnings as they were referring to his brother, Jun Jun. When the
officers were near him, Accused-Appellant was surprised when they removed his belt, tied
both his hands, and dragged him towards their parked vehicle. He was brought to Camp
Conrado Yap where he was mauled. Also present in the Camp was the police officers' asset,
Armin Sarmiento. The latter questioned Accused-Appellant's arrest instead of his brother,
who was the actual perpetrator of the crime charged. Upon realizing their mistake, the police
officers returned to Accused-Appellant's house to look for Jun Jun, but failed to locate his
whereabouts.
Accused-Appellant was subsequently brought to the Iba Police Station where the
same officers forced him to admit that he was his brother.
Accused-Appellant's wife Sheila Lynn D. Nieves ("Shiela") affirms that on 09 July

2013, at around 9 o'clock in the morning, she awoke to find her husband cooking. After eating
breakfast and while sending her newborn to sleep, she recalls Accused-Appellant stepping
outside to sweep in the backyard. Upon hearing several police officers, and having been
informed by their neighbor Daisy Milano, she went outside of the house and saw them
stopping her husband from sweeping and making him kneel on the ground. They asked him
to remove his belt which they used to tie his hands. Alarmed, she went to her husband's side
and demanded a reason for such abuse. In response, one of them took out a cellphone from
his pocket and said that they were looking for a certain Jun Jun Nieves, to which she
responded, "hindi naman po si Jun Nieves ang kinukuha ninyo eh, si Edwin Nieves po yan, kaya
pakawalan po ninyo ang asawa ko." The officer replied, "sumunod na lang po kayo sa amin,
dun nalang kayo magpaliwanag." Shortly after Accused-Appellant and the police officers left,
Shiela rushed to the house of her parents-in-law to apprise them of her husband's arrest.
They went to the camp only to find out that Accused-Appellant was already brought to the
police station for further questioning.
309 of 578
Case Digests
Ruling of RTC:
RTC convicted Nieves of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, but acquitted
him of the case for Use of Dangerous Drugs. The RTC ruled that the prosecution proved that
the chain of custody rule in drugs cases was followed by the police officers involved in this
case. It also excused the absence of the media representative in the conduct of the inventory.
It reasoned: The absence of the media representative during the inventory was explained by
PO2 Devera. He stated that media practitioners executed a letter (Exhibit "Q") refraining
from any participation in the conduct of inventory of drugs. Nonetheless, the absence of the
media representative may be excused under the situation since the subject drug was already
marked right at the place of the incident and the inventory was done in front of the accused,
State Prosecutor Non-Finones, Kagawad Buenaventura and PO1 Angulo.
Ruling of the CA:

The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Nieves. The CA ruled that the chain of custody
of the dangerous drugs was sufficiently proven to be unbroken. Here, PO1 Angulo, as the
poseur-buyer, testified that immediately upon confiscation of the plastic sachet
containing shabu, he made the appropriate markings by placing his initials "RDA" on the
same. Upon arrival at the police station, an inventory report was conducted in the presence
of Accused-Appellant as well as a representative from the DOJ and the Barangay.
Subsequently, no less than PO1 Angulo himself turned over the marked sachet to the
Zambales Provincial Crime Laboratory together with a written request for its examination.
To fortify the establishment of the links in the chain of custody, PCI Santiago, the forensic
chemist of the said crime laboratory was presented in court and testified as to the fact of
examination. The prosecution likewise proffered into evidence the chemistry report on the
substance found in the marked sachet, yielding a positive result to the test for the presence
of shabu. Finally, the same sachet bearing the initials of PO1 Angulo was also presented; in
court and was identified by PCI Santiago during his direct examination.
ISSUES
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Nieves.
RULING
YES. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain
the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the
seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation;
and (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the
accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a
representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice
(DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof. This must be so because with “the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need
for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which
sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting
provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of
310 of 578
Case Digests
abuse is great.”Section 21 of RA 9165 further requires the apprehending team to conduct a

physical inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after
inventory and be given a copy thereof. The phrase “immediately after seizure and
confiscation” means that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were
intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. It is only
when the same is not practicable that the IRR of RA 9165 allows the inventory and
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. In this connection, this also means that
the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time of
considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned activity. Verily, a buy-
bust team normally has enough time to gather and bring with them the said witnesses.
It is true that there are cases where the Court had ruled that the failure of the
does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void and invalid. However,
this is with the caveat, as the CA itself pointed out, that the prosecution still needs to
satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for noncompliance; and (b) the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. The Court has
repeatedly emphasized that the prosecution should explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses. In the present case, a careful perusal of the records would reveal that the
supposed buy-bust operation was conducted without the presence of any of the three
insulating witnesses. In PO1 Rudico D. Angulo's (PO1 Angulo) and PO2 Wilfredo F. Devera's
(PO2 Devera) Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-Aresto, the aforementioned
apprehending officers claimed that they were only accompanied by "ilang operatiba ng
PIBZPPO at Hang meyembro ng Iba MPS [a few members of the PIBZPPO and other members
of the Iba MPS]." This fact was confirmed in both of their testimonies in court. Further, the
inventory was subsequently conducted at the police station without any explanation as to
why it was impracticable to do the same at the place of apprehension. More importantly, only
two of the three required witnesses — the DOJ representative and the elective official —
were present in the conduct of inventory, as evidenced by the signatures in
the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized. Curiously, PO1 Angulo testified that there was a
media representative present in the conduct of the inventory, only that he was unable to
remember his/her name. Upon continuation of the presentation of prosecution witnesses
two months later, PO2 Devera then testified that there was no media representative. He
explained, however, that this was because the media representatives in the area executed a
written manifesto requesting that they be excluded from anti-drug operations. The "written
manifesto" above, however, did not justify the police officers' deviation from the prescribed
procedure. First, the "written manifesto" was undated, and was never even mentioned in any
of the affidavits and documents related to the case prior to PO2 Devera's testimony. It was
only introduced after it was pointed out during PO1 Angulo's testimony that no media
representative was present in the inventory. Second, only seven (7) media practitioners
311 of 578
Case Digests
signed the "written manifesto" and it was indicated therein that it binds only "all mediamen
whose name and signature appears thereon." There is no proof, or even an intimation, that
these signatories constitute all of the media practitioners in Iba, Zambales.
The requirements of the law cannot be set aside by the simple expedient of a “written
manifesto.” It is important to stress that the presence of the required witnesses at the time
of the apprehension and inventory is mandatory, and that the law imposes the said
requirement because their presence serves an essential purpose. In People v. Tomawis, the
Court elucidated on the purpose of the law in mandating the presence of the required
witnesses as follows: The presence of the witnesses from the DOJ, media, and from public
elective office is necessary to protect against the possibility of planting, contamination, or
loss of the seized drug. Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media
or the DOJ and any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the drugs, the
evils of switching, “planting” or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts
conducted under the regime of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their
ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the
subject sachet that was evidence of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the
trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. The presence of the three witnesses
must be secured not only during the inventory but more importantly at the time of the
warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most
needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would belie any
doubt as to the source, identity, and integrity of the seized drug. If the buy-bust operation is
legitimately conducted, the presence of the insulating witnesses would also controvert the
usual defense of frame-up as the witnesses would be able to testify that the buy-bust
operation and inventory of the seized drugs were done in their presence in accordance with
Section 21 of RA 9165. To restate, the presence of the three witnesses at the time of seizure
and confiscation of the drugs must be secured and complied with at the time of the
warrantless arrest; such that they are required to be at or near the intended place of the
arrest so that they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized
and confiscated drugs “immediately after seizure and confiscation.”
It bears stressing that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving their compliance
with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of
noncompliance. The Court, in People v. Umipang, 671 SCRA 324 (2012), reminds: Indeed, the
absence of these representatives during the physical inventory and the marking of the seized
items does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. However, we
take note that, in this case, the SAID-SOTF did not even attempt to contact the barangay
chairperson or any member of the barangay council. There is no indication that they
contacted other elected public officials. Neither do the records show whether the police
officers tried to get in touch with any DOJ representative. Nor does the SAID-SOTF adduce
any justifiable reason for failing to do so — especially considering that it had sufficient time
from the moment it received information about the activities of the accused until the time of
his arrest. Thus, we find that there was no genuine and sufficient effort on the part of the
apprehending police officers to look for the said representatives pursuant to Section 21(1)
312 of 578
Case Digests
of R.A. 9165. A sheer statement that representatives were unavailable — without so much
as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other
representatives, given the circumstances — is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse.
313 of 578
Case Digests
Mandagan v. Jose M. Valero Corp.

DOCTRINE
In criminal cases, no rule is more settled than that a judgment of acquittal is
immediately final and unappealable. Such rule proceeds from the accused’s constitutionally-
enshrined right against prosecution if the same would place him under double jeopardy. Thus,
a judgment in such cases, once rendered, may no longer be recalled for correction or
amendment — regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness… The Court is not unaware
that, in some situations, it had allowed a review from a judgment of acquittal through the
extraordinary remedy of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. A survey of these exceptional
instances would, however, show that such review was only allowed where the prosecution
was denied due process or where the trial was a sham.
FACTS
JMV Corporation (JMV), granted an accommodation in favor of the accused by
allowing her to use its corporate name and account for a car loan intended for her personal
use. The accommodation was extended to accused when she still enjoyed the good graces of
company director, Mrs. Rosie V. Gutierrez (RVG), being her client. Upon full payment of [the]
car, the accused would in turn purchase the same from JMV Corporation. JMV Corporation,
represented by its executive officer, Ramon Ricardo V. Gutierrez, the son of RVG, entered into
a lease-to-own arrangement with BPI Leasing Corporation (BPI) covering a 2001 Kia Rio
sedan. Under the lease-to-own arrangement, BPI Leasing Corporation will remain the
registered owner of the vehicle until full payment by JMV Corporation. JMV paid the down
payment of Php87,922.00, guarantee deposit of Php3,078.00, initial rental of Php12,796.00
and notarial fee of Php200.00. Likewise, on July 28, 2001, JMV gave the possession and use
of the Kia vehicle to accused Maria Nympha Mandagan (Mandagan), who in turn, issued and
delivered to JMV 34 postdated checks against her bank account (Equitable-PCI). Said checks
were all payable to JMV representing Mandagan's monthly payment of P12,796.00. In
addition, Mandagan explicitly agreed that ownership over the Kia vehicle will only be
transferred to her after full payment of the costs of the vehicle to JMV.
11 checks, when deposited on their respective due dates were dishonored for reason
drawn against insufficient funds or account closed. BPI advised Ms. Marcelina Balmeo, JMV's
Treasury Head, every time the checks were dishonored, who in turn immediately
communicated the dishonor of said checks to Mandagan and demanded for payment which
were all unheeded.
JMV's General Account Supervisor, Ms. Rosemarie Edora, also started communicating
with Mandagan, repeatedly informing the latter of the dishonored checks and reminding her
of her outstanding obligations with JMV. Mandagan responded by requesting for photocopies
of the dishonored checks and gave assurance that she would replace them with new ones
and even promised that she will immediately settle her obligations with JMV by one-time
314 of 578
Case Digests
payment, after she acknowledged receipt of her requested photocopies of the dishonored
checks.
Meanwhile, all the checks issued by JMV to BPI as payment for its monthly
amortization of the Kia vehicle were all honored.
On June 30, 2003, JMV's counsel demanded from Mandagan the payment of the eleven
(11) checks that were dishonored plus 12.75% or to return the Kia vehicle, plus the amount
of Php119,434.67 to cover depreciation costs. Mandagan was given 5 days to comply with
the demands of JMV. This was unheeded.
Thus JMV was constrained to institute the corresponding legal action. The City
Prosecutor's Office of Manila found probable cause against Mandagan for 8 counts of
Violation of B.P. 22 and filed the corresponding informations before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC) of Manila. Charges representing the 3 other checks were dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
The MeTC found Mandagan guilty of eight counts of violation of BP 22. However, the
RTC reversed it and acquitted Mandagan. Nonetheless, the RTC held Mandagan to be civilly
liable to JMV. Aggrieved, JMV filed a Petition for Certiorari. In turn, the CA annulled the RTC
decision and reinstated the MeTC Decision. On review before the Supreme Court under Rule
45, Mandagan argued that CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it annulled the RTC
Decision acquitting her.
ISSUES
Whether the CA committed reversible error in annulling the Decision dated February
15, 2011 of the RTC.
RULING
(1) YES. In criminal cases, no rule is more settled than that a judgment of acquittal is
immediately final and unappealable. Such rule proceeds from the accused’s constitutionally-
enshrined right against prosecution if the same would place him under double jeopardy.
Thus, a judgment in such cases, once rendered, may no longer be recalled for correction or
amendment — regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness.
The Court is not unaware that, in some situations, it had allowed a review from a
judgment of acquittal through the extraordinary remedy of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
A survey of these exceptional instances would show that such review was only
allowed where the prosecution was denied due process or where the trial was a sham.
The office of a writ of certiorari is narrow in scope and does not encompass an error of law
or a mistake in the appreciation of evidence. As a corrective writ, the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari is reserved only for jurisdictional errors and cannot be used to correct a lower
tribunal’s factual findings. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors
committed in the exercise of its discretion is not reviewable via certiorari for being nothing
315 of 578
Case Digests
more than errors of judgment. Thus, the Court finds that the CA committed reversible error
when it annulled the RTC’s Decision based merely on errors of jurisdiction.
In cases for violation of B.P. 22, the following essential elements must be established:
(1) The making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) The
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there were no sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) The dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit or the dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the drawee bank to stop payment.
Here, the existence of the first and third elements are no longer in contention; there
being concurrent findings of fact between the MeTC, RTC, and CA on this score, the Court
finds no cogent reason to disturb such findings at this stage. Perforce, only the presence of
the second element remains disputed. he RTC found that the prosecution failed to present
any documentary evidence to prove receipt by petitioner Mandagan of the notice of dishonor
(i.e., the Letter dated June 20, 2003). The RTC found that the admissions relied upon by the
MTC in convicting petitioner Mandagan could not be used as specific admissions of her
receipt of a notice of dishonor. The CA, however, annulled the foregoing findings of the RTC
and instead found that the records showed that a notice of dishonor was in fact received by
Mandagan. In sum, the CA overturned the RTC's acquittal based solely on the following proof:
(i) a Reply-Letter dated June 27, 2003, purportedly written by petitioner Mandagan's
counsel in response to the Letter dated June 20, 2003, and (ii) an alleged admission by
petitioner Mandagan during a phone conversation with a certain Rosemarie Edora (Edora),
a representative of respondent JMV Corporation. Anent the Reply-Letter dated June 27,
2003, it was gross error for the CA to consider the same as it was not formally offered
by the prosecution in the first place. The MeTC admitted the evidence of the prosecution,
nowhere is such a letter found.
In this case, even assuming that the Reply-Letter dated June 27, 2003 was appended
to the records, the fact still remains that the court cannot consider evidence which was not
formally offered. As such, any statement allegedly made on behalf of petitioner Mandagan in
the said letter could not be considered an admission of receipt of a notice of dishonor as the
same has no evidentiary value whatsoever. Verily, the RTC could not be faulted, much less
accused of capriciousness, in appreciating the evidence without the Reply-Letter dated June
27, 2003. On the other hand, with respect to the alleged admission of petitioner Mandagan
over the phone, the Court notes that neither the MeTC nor the RTC considered the same as
evidence of receipt of a notice of dishonor. The Court thus finds the same severely deficient
to support a moral conviction that a crime had been committed; such self-serving and
uncorroborated statements hardly constitute an admission as they were based on the
representations of Edora in her affidavit, more so in the presence of contrary declarations
by petitioner Mandagan. Nonetheless, as already stressed above, it was still error on the part
of the CA to have entertained such issue as this merely involved the appreciation of the
evidence.
316 of 578
Case Digests
Time and again, it has been ruled that the prosecution has the burden of proving each
and every element of the crime with evidence sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merit; it cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Hence, if the evidence
falls short of such threshold, an acquittal should come as a matter of course.
317 of 578
Case Digests
Alvin De Leon v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.

DOCTRINE
De Leon's contention is bereft of merit. The Court's reading of the relevant rule from
PTC's Code of Conduct is that it is not vague, nor is it unreasonable. The fact that it did not
specify the origin of the gift or the purpose for which the gift was given did not automatically
mean that the rule was vague. It simply means that this "no gift" policy of PTC was absolute,
that is, the origin or the purpose of the gift was irrelevant. In simple terms, the mere act of
offering or receiving a gift constitutes a violation.
FACTS
De Leon filed a case for illegal dismissal against (PTC) with the Labor Arbiter.
However, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for lack of merit. De Leon thus filed an appeal
with the NLRC. The Third Division of the NLRC held that de Leon was illegally dismissed by
PTC. Aggrieved, PTC filed a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC. The NLRC issued a
Resolution reversing its earlier Decision.
De Leon then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. However, such
was dismissed by the CA. According to the CA, records reflect that petitioner received on
3 December 2014 a copy of the assailed Resolution of the NLRC. Conformably with
Sections 1 and 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner had 60 days
from 3 December 2014 within which to file his Petition for Certiorari, or, on 1 February
2015. As it happened, on 1 February 2015, the impugned Resolution became final and
executory and was ordered recorded in the NLRC Book of Entries of Judgment. Plain
as a pikestaff, when the instant Petition was filed on 2 February 2015, the
repugned Resolution had already attained finality.
ISSUE
Whether the Petition for Certiorari was filed out of time.
RULING
NO. De Leon received a copy of the NLRC Resolution on December 3, 2014.
Consequently, he had 60 days, or until February 1, 2015, to file the Petition for Certiorari.
However, February 1, 2015 fell on a Sunday, hence the deadline for filing the Petition for
Certiorari was until the next business day, or on February 2, 2015. De Leon therefore timely
filed the Petition for Certiorari.
318 of 578
Case Digests
People v. Buniag y Mercadera

G. R. No. 217661, June 26, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The Court has repeatedly held that Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law
at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, strictly requires that (1) the seized items
be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the
physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or
his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the
media, and (d) a representative from the DOJ.
While the Court has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with
the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. The failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 does not ipso
facto render the seizure and custody over the items void; and this has always been with the
caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground
for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.
FACTS
Buniag was charged for a violation of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165

On August 9, 2008 at around 4 P.M., PDEA Agent IO1 Rubylyn S. Alfaro (IO1 Alfaro),
together with her confidential informant, met with the accused-appellant Buniag outside the
vicinity of Bayabas High School, Cagayan de Oro City. It was agreed that IO1 Alfaro will
purchase Php5,000.00 worth of marijuana from Buniag and that the delivery will be made at
around 7:00 to 7:30 P.M. along the street of Olape, Zone 2, Bayabas, Cagayan de Oro City.
A briefing was conducted wherein IO1 Alfaro was designated as the poseur-buyer
while IO2 Neil Vincent Pimentel (IO2 Pimentel) was assigned as the back-up and arresting
officer. The buy-bust team arrived at the target area at around 7:10 P.M. IO1 Alfaro and the
CI were dropped off along Olape Street while the rest of the team were inside the vehicle,
which was parked from 5 to 7 meters away from IO1 Alfaro.
Minutes later, Buniag came, carrying with him a black traveling bag. Buniag
approached IO1 Alfaro and demanded for the payment of the marijuana, but the latter
insisted that she should see the narcotics first. Buniag acceded to the request and opened the
black traveling bag. IO1 Alfaro and the CI inspected the bag and saw three bundles of
marijuana stalks and leaves inside. Wasting no time, IO1 Alfaro made the pre-arranged
signal, by executing a "missed call" to IO2 Pimentel, and the rest of the team rushed to their
location. IO2 Pimentel arrested the accused-appellant after apprising the latter of his
constitutional rights and the nature of the crime he had just violated.
319 of 578
Case Digests
The team then brought Buniag to their station with IO2 Pimentel in possession of the
traveling bag and the illegal narcotics in going thereto. At the station, IO2 Pimentel marked
the black traveling bag with his initials "NVP" while the three bundles of marijuana were
successively marked with "NVP 1" to "NVP 3." IO2 Pimentel then prepared the Inventory of
Seized Items while their Regional Director made the Letter Request for Laboratory
Examination. Pictures were also taken of the accused-appellant and the seized items. IO2
Pimentel and IO1 Alfaro then brought Buniag and the seized items to the Regional Crime
Laboratory Office which received the seized items at 9:10 P.M. of the same day. Upon a
qualitative examination, the three bundles were found positive for marijuana, a dangerous
drug.

On August 8, 2008, Buniag went to Cagayan de Oro City pursuant to the request of his
brother to check the latter's house in Bayabas, Cagayan de Oro City. On the evening of the
next day, he went out of his brother's house to buy some food. Suddenly, a vehicle stopped
in front of him and two persons, whom he later recognized as IO2 Pimentel and IO1 Alfaro,
alighted therefrom and ran towards him. The two persons then handcuffed him and told him
that he is a suspect because there are plenty of marijuana in Wao, to which he replied that
such is not true.
After his arrest, Buniag was made to board a vehicle. While inside the vehicle, IO2
Pimentel asked for Php20,000.00 so that he will be released. He replied that he has no money
because his family is very poor. IO2 Pimentel continued to ask if he has a title to a lot or a
house, to which he replied that he has none. He said that during the course of his arrest and
at the laboratory, he was made to sign documents without knowing the contents therein.
Buniag vehemently denied that he owned the black traveling bag, as well as the three bundles
of marijuana inside it. He claimed that he did not even know what marijuana is.
The RTC ruled that the prosecution sufficiently discharged the burden of proving the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of attempt to sell and/or delivery
of a dangerous drug. There was a mere attempt to sell, as the consideration for the marijuana
had not yet been given when the arrest was made. Lastly, it ruled that the chain of custody
of the seized drugs was adequately established in the instant case.
The CA affirmed Buniag's conviction. Here, Buniag clearly intended to sell marijuana
and commenced overt acts in relation to it, however, the sale was aborted when IO1 Alfaro
made a "miss-call" to IO2 Pimentel and the rest of the team rushed to the area and placed
Buniag under arrest. It further ruled that the failure to conduct an inventory and to
photograph the confiscated items in the manner prescribed under Section 21 of RA 9165 is
not fatal to the prosecution's cause.
Hence, an Appeal under Section 13 (c), Rule 124 of the Rules of Court was filed.
ISSUE
320 of 578
Case Digests
Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 26 (b),
Article II of RA 9165.
RULING
NO. Buniag should be acquitted. The CA is correct in ruling that Buniag should have
been convicted of the offense of attempted illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Under the rule on
variance, while Buniag cannot be convicted of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
because the sale was never consummated, he may be convicted for the attempt to sell as it is
necessarily included in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Nevertheless, Buniag may still not be convicted of attempted illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. At this juncture, it is important for the Court to point out that for a successful
prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under RA 9165, which
necessarily includes attempted sale of illegal drugs, the following elements must be proven:
(1) the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was
presented as evidence; and (3) the buyer and the seller were identified. In cases involving
dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and
the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction.
In this case, due to the failure of the police officers to strictly comply with the
requirements laid down under Section 21 30 of RA 9165, the second element to convict
Buniag of the crime charged is still absent since the prosecution failed to establish the corpus
delicti beyond reasonable doubt. First, the police officers did not conduct the marking,
photography, and inventory of the seized items at the place of arrest. Without having any
valid excuse for the deferment of the conduct of the required procedure under Section 21 of
RA 9165, they brought the seized items to the police station. Second, although there was a
media representative who signed the inventory report at the police office, such is not enough
because the law requires that the mandatory witnesses should already be present during the
actual inventory and not merely after the fact. Moreover, there was no representative from
the Department of Justice (DOJ) or any elected official at the time of arrest of the accused and
seizure of the illegal drugs, and inventory and photography of the seized items at the police
station.
Furthermore, the Court has repeatedly held that Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the
applicable law at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, strictly requires that (1)
the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation;
representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the DOJ.
Verily, the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the
time of the conduct of the inventory of the seized items which, again, must be
immediately done at the place of seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can
321 of 578
Case Digests
easily be complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by
its nature, a planned activity.
In addition, while the Court has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict
compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible. The
failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21
does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void; and this has always
been with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved. However, in this case, it is obvious that the police
officers did not have a valid excuse for their deviation from Section 21 of RA 9165. Their
mere allegation that they feared that the people started coming out of the house is nothing
but a frail excuse since there were seven (7) of them and they were even armed.
The CA held that the police officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their official duties. However, the Court finds that this presumption does not
hold water in this case. The Court has repeatedly held that the fact that a buy-bust is a
planned operation, it strains credulity why the buy-bust team could not have ensured the
presence of the required witnesses pursuant to Section 21 or at the very least marked,
photographed and inventoried the seized items according to the procedures in their own
operations manual. As applied in this case, the presumption of regularity cannot stand
because of the buy-bust team's blatant disregard of the established procedures under
Section 21 of RA 9165. In this connection, the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duty cannot overcome the stronger presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused. The right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty is a
constitutionally protected right. Thus, it would be a patent violation of the Constitution to
uphold the importance of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
over the presumption of innocence, especially in this case where there are more than enough
reasons to disregard the former.
322 of 578
Case Digests
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION also known as PHILIPPINE

EXPORT-IMPORT CREDIT AGENCY v. PHILIPPINE VERTERANS BANK
DOCTRINE
Summary judgment is a device for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage
of the litigation, thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.
According to Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a party seeking to recover upon a
claim may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his/her favor.
According to Section 3 of the same Rule, the judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that,
except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
FACTS:
Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), together with other banking institutions, entered
into a Five-Year Floating Rate Note Facility Agreement(NFA) with debtor Philippine
Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation(PhilPhos) up to the aggregate amount of P5 billion. Under
said NFA, respondent PVB committed the amount of P1 billion.
To secure payment, petitioner Trade and investment Development

Corporatio(TIDCORP), with express conformity of PhilPhos, executed a Guarantee
Agreement whereby TIDCORP agreed to guarantee the payment of the guaranty obligation
to the extent of ninety(90%) of the outstanding Series A notes.
On November 08, 2013, Typhoon Yolanda caused devastation to Leyte, where

PhilPhos’ manufacturing facilities were situated, and as a consequence, PhilPhos failed to
resume its operation. Thereafter, PhilPhos filed a Petition for Voluntary Rehabilitation under
the Financial Financial Rehabilitation and Insolvency Act of 2010 (FRIA). The Rehabilitation
Court issued a Commencement Order, which included a Stay Order. Despite several demands
made by PVB pursuant to the Guarantee Agreement, TIDCORP maintained its position to
deny PVB’s claim due to the issuance of the Stay Order.
PVB filed a Complaint for Specific Performance before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
against TIDCORP asserting that under the Guarantee Agreement, TIDCORP agreed to
guarantee payment to PVB and other banking institutions without the benefit of excussion.
In its Answer, TIDCORP argued that the RTC cannot validly try the case because of the
Rehabilitation Court’s Stay Order, which enjoined the enforcement of all claims, actions and
proceedings against PhilPhos.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC erred in granting respondent PVB's Motion for Summary Judgment.
RULING
1. Procedural Issue - Correct Mode of Appeal
323 of 578
Case Digests
Before delving into the merits of the instant Petition, the Court first deals with the procedural
matter raised by respondent PVB in its Motion to Dismiss.
Respondent PVB argues that the instant Petition should be summarily dismissed because the
petitioner allegedly pursued the wrong mode of appeal, maintaining that the assailed Order
is a mere interlocutory order and not a final order subject of an appeal under Rule 45.
Respondent PVB's contention is incorrect.
An order or resolution granting a Motion for Summary Judgment which fully determines the
rights and obligations of the parties relative to the case and leaves no other issue unresolved,
except the amount of damages, is a final judgment.
As explained by the Court in Ybiernas, et al. v. Tanco-Gabaldon, et al., when a court, in
granting a Motion for Summary Judgment, adjudicates on the merits of the case and declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right,
such order or resolution takes the nature of a final order susceptible to appeal. In leaving
out the determination of the amount of damages, a summary judgment is not removed
from the category of final judgments.
In the instant case, it is clear that the assailed Order discussed at length the applicable facts,
the governing law, and the arguments put forward by both parties, making an extensive
assessment of the merits of respondent PVB's Complaint. The RTC then made a definitive
adjudication in favor of respondent PVB. As manifestly seen in the assailed Order, the RTC
categorically determined what the rights and obligations of the parties are, ruling in no
uncertain terms that respondent PVB's Complaint was meritorious and that petitioner
TIDCORP should be made liable under the Guarantee Agreement.
Hence, respondent PVB's argument in its Motion to Dismiss is unmeritorious.
II. Substantive Issue - The Propriety of the RTC's Summary Judgment
The solitary matter to be dealt with by the Court is the propriety of the RTC's Order granting
respondent PVB's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Summary judgment is a device for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of
the litigation, thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.
According to Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court, a party seeking to recover upon a claim
may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his/her favor.
According to Section 3 of the same Rule, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as
to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
The term "genuine issue" has been defined as an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is sham, fictitious,
contrived, set up in bad faith and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial. The court can determine this on the basis of the pleadings,
admissions, documents, affidavits and/or counter-affidavits submitted by the parties before
the court.
324 of 578
Case Digests
In re: Abellana v. Paredes

G.R. No. 232006, July 10, 2019, Second Division, CAGUIOA, J.:
DOCTRINE
The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ which furnishes an extraordinary
remedy; it may thus be invoked only under extraordinary circumstances. Indeed, the rule is
that when there is a deprivation of a person's constitutional rights, the court that rendered the
judgment is deemed ousted of its jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to
assail the legality of his detention. The inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus is addressed, not to
errors committed by a court within its jurisdiction, but to the question of whether the
proceeding or judgment under which the person has been restrained is a complete nullity. The
concern is not merely whether an error has been committed in ordering or holding the
petitioner in custody, but whether such error is sufficient to render void the judgment, order, or
process in question.
FACTS
A search warrant was issued against Michael Badajos also known as Michael Badayos
for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. When the team led by P/Supt. Labra arrived,
the accused was present. They identified themselves as police officers and informed the
accused of the existence of the search warrant. The search was done in the presence of the
accused and barangay tanods of Bgy. Suba. The sala of the 2-storey house was searched first.
Then they found the hanged pants of the accused in the window. There was no other male
person in the house. They found in the said front pocket of the accused a big transparent
plastic pack of white crystalline substance believed to be shahu. They marked it. They also
found shabu paraphernalia. Badayos was charged for violation of RA 9165. He pleaded not
guilty. He thereafter filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant, which was denied by the
RTC. He filed a Motion for Physical Re-examination and Re-weighing of the
alleged shabu confiscated from him, which was granted by the RTC. The Qualitative Report
revealed that the actual weight of the drugs seized was 4.4562 grams and not 6.89 grams.
As a result, petitioner was able to file a Petition for Bail, which was granted. Thus, he was
released from detention after furnishing the bail bond. After the prosecution rested its case,
petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence, which was denied.
Atty. Albura filed his Entry of Appearance as counsel for petitioner. RTC issued an
Order submitting the case for decision for failure of petitioner and his counsel to appear
during the scheduled hearing on even date for initial presentation of evidence for the
defense. Petitioner, through Atty. Albura, filed an Urgent Motion to Defer Promulgation of
Judgment.
RTC: found MICHAEL L. ABELLANA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
violation of Section 11, Art. II, RA 9165.
Petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration. He alleged that his rights
as an accused had been prejudiced by some irregularities committed during trial.
Specifically, he claimed that he had been deprived of his right to due process because he
had not been properly notified ever since Atty. Albura became his new counsel and that in
total, Atty. Albura received only two notices involving the case, which included the Notice of
325 of 578
Case Digests
Promulgation of Judgment. Petitioner also discussed the merits of his case, claiming that
there were errors of fact in the RTC Decision.
RTC issued an Order denying petitioner's Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration on
the basis of the last paragraph of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. The RTC held that
the accused invoked his right to be present. But after he posted bail, he became scarce
and failed to appear during the scheduled promulgation. The right to present evidence
may be waived. Contrary to the contention of counsel for movant, there was no conviction
without due process of law. Due process does not mean lack of hearing but lack of
opportunity to be heard. In this case, the accused was given opportunity to be heard.
Petitioner's third counsel, Atty. Acosta, filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment on
the ground that petitioner was "deprived of his constitutional right to be heard and to
present evidence in his behalf in view of the excusable negligence of Atty. Albura in not
appearing during the above-mentioned hearing and for failure of his bondsman or Atty.
Albura to inform him of the scheduled hearing." In his Affidavit of Merit, petitioner claimed
that he was neither notified of the schedule of the hearing on the initial presentation of
defense evidence nor was he notified of the promulgation of judgment.
RTC denied the petition for relief from judgment for lack of factual and legal basis.
The RTC ruled that relief from judgment was not a proper remedy. The accused is bound
by the negligence of his counsel. He cannot blame his bondsman because, as earlier
stated, he should have inquired from his lawyer, the bondsman or the court the
scheduled hearing. In fact, he knew the scheduled hearing.
CA: issued a Resolution dismissing the petition. The CA adopted the RTC's findings
that petitioner had due notices of the hearings set for defense evidence and promulgation of
judgment but failed to appear. The CA also agreed with the RTC that the petition for relief
was filed out of time and that the proper remedy should have been an appeal from the denial
of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus before the
Court. He claims that a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus may be availed
of as a post-conviction remedy in such cases when a person is deprived of his Constitutional
rights during the court proceedings. Specifically, he claims that he has been deprived of his
rights to due process and to competent counsel. Petitioner avers that he has been deprived
of his right to due process because of lack of notice of the proceedings in the RTC.
OSG: petitioner was afforded ample opportunity to be heard and to adduce his own
evidence. However, it was his and his counsel's negligence and fault that caused his current
predicament. The OSG notes that petitioner was represented by counsel when the
prosecution witnesses testified and he was able to cross-examine them. His failure to present
evidence in support of his defense was due to his negligence and that of his counsel for failing
to appear at the trial despite due notice.
ISSUE
Whether the petition for the writ of habeas corpus should be granted.
RULING
NO. The petition should be denied. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus is a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. It secures to a
prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of
326 of 578
Case Digests
justice and to have it ascertained whether he is held under lawful authority. Broadly
speaking, the writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person
is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, the most basic criterion for the issuance
of the writ is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of
movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. Concomitantly, if a person's liberty
is restrained by some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. The writ cannot
be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal which,
having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not ousted of this jurisdiction through some
irregularity in the course of the proceedings.
However, jurisprudence has recognized that the writ of habeas corpus may also be
availed of as a post-conviction remedy when, as a consequence sentence as to circumstance
of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: 1) there
has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; 2) the
court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or 3) the imposed penalty has been
excessive, thus voiding the sentence as such excess. Here, petitioner is invoking the first
circumstance.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that when the detention complained of finds its origin in what
has been judicially ordained, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is
considerably narrowed. Whatever situation the petitioner invokes from the exceptional
circumstances listed above, the threshold remains high. Mere allegation of a violation of
one's constitutional right is not enough. The violation of constitutional right must be
sufficient to void the entire proceedings. This, petitioner failed to show.
Conclusion
The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ which furnishes an extraordinary
remedy; it may thus be invoked only under extraordinary circumstances. Indeed, the rule is
that when there is a deprivation of a person's constitutional rights, the court that rendered
the judgment is deemed ousted of its jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate
remedy to assail the legality of his detention. The inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus is
addressed, not to errors committed by a court within its jurisdiction, but to the question of
whether the proceeding or judgment under which the person has been restrained is a
complete nullity. The concern is not merely whether an error has been committed in
ordering or holding the petitioner in custody, but whether such error is sufficient to render
void the judgment, order, or process in question.
Petitioner, however, failed to convince the Court that the proceedings before the trial
court were attended by violations of his rights to due process or competent counsel as to
oust the RTC of its jurisdiction. Thus, the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus is
unwarranted.
327 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE v. EDSON BARBAC RETADA

DOCTRINE
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, strictly requires that (1) the seized items be inventoried
and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory
and photographing must be done in me presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative
or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a
representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ).
FACTS
On April 7, 2012, after confirming that one Edson Retada (accused) is engaged in
illegal drug activities, Police Inspector Castro conducted a buy-bust briefing. It was agreed
that PO2 Catubig would act as poseur-buyer while PO2 Dela Peña and PO1 Dialemas were
the immediate back-up. PO1 Mansueto (who conducted the test buy), informed the team that
accused was in Chicken Inasal in Poblacion. Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to the
target area. Upon arrival thereat, PO2 Catubig saw accused standing near the Chicken
Inasal in front of MLhuillier. PO2 Catubig approached the accused and told the latter that he
was going to buy shabu. PO2 Catubig gave two (2) pieces of Php200.00 marked money to the
accused. In exchange thereof, accused gave one (1) plastic sachet of shabu to PO2 Catubig
and got the money. PO2 Catubig raised his right hand as the pre-arranged signal to inform
the other members of the team that the sale has been consummated. PO2 Dela Peña and PO1
Dialemas immediately approached them. PO2 Catubig arrested the accused and the latter
was apprised of his constitutional rights. Upon arrival at the police station, PO2 Catubig
made a thorough body search on the accused and recovered on the latter one (1) plastic
sachet of suspected shabu, buy-bust money, coins in different denominations and a
cellphone.
On April 7, 2012 accused was attending a procession together with his children.
During the procession, he saw the police officers involved in this case at the check point.
After the procession, he stood in a store named W. Singco. Without knowing, the police
suddenly arrived and invited him to the police station. He brought with him his 2-year old
child. When they arrived, the police immediately placed him inside the Chief of Police Office
and bodily searched him but he refused. The police then handcuffed him while his child was
brought outside the office. The police officers continued searching him until they showed
him two (2) sachets of shabu and money amounting to Php 44.75 allegedly from his pocket.
Thereafter, he was placed inside the detention cell and the barangay officials arrived and
signed the document.
RTC: ruled that the defense of alibi and frame-up of the accused must simply fail. It further
ruled that the prosecution was able to prove the arresting officers' compliance with the
procedural safeguards under RA 9165. The prosecution clearly established an unbroken
chain of custody.
328 of 578
Case Digests
CA: Affirmed Retada's conviction. The CA ruled that all the elements of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs were duly proven by the
prosecution. It further ruled that the prosecution established an unbroken chain of custody,
thus the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs were properly preserved. Lastly,
it ruled that since the police officers found one plastic sachet of shabu when they bodily
searched the accused, the presumption of animus possidendi exists.
ISSUE
Whether Retada's guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11(3) of RA 9165 was proven
RULING
NO. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the
very corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of
conviction. It is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs be
established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on their
identity, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and
account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to
their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.
In this connection, the Court has repeatedly held that Section 21, Article II of RA 9165,
the applicable law at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, strictly requires that
confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in me
presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public
of Justice (DOJ).
Verily, the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the time
of the conduct of the inventory of the seized items which, again, must be immediately done
at the place of seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can easily be complied with by
the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned
activity.
In this case, the police officers utterly failed to comply with the requirements of Sec.
21.
First, although there were two elected officials present during the inventory at the
police station, the two other mandatory witnesses were not present. In this case, only two
councilors were present. Thus, it is clear that they failed to comply with the mandatory
requirement of the law. Also, the mere fact that they tried to contact a media representative
and a DOJ representative when they arrived at the police station is not the earnest effort that
is contemplated by the law.
Second, they did not conduct the marking, inventory, and photography of the seized
items at the place of arrest. Instead, they delayed the proceedings and supposedly
accomplished them only at the police station. When asked why they did so, they offered a
flimsy excuse that there were several persons in the place where they conducted the buy-
bust operation.
It bears stressing that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving the police
officers' compliance with Section 21, RA 9165 and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in
329 of 578
Case Digests
case of non-compliance. It must be alleged and proved that the presence of the three
witnesses to the physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not
obtained due to reason/s such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their
safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an
immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her
behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be
apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative
and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being
charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug
operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from
obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.
Undeniably, none of the abovementioned circumstances was attendant in the case.
Their excuse for non-compliance is unconvincing. The police officers' mere allegation that
there were other people in the buy-bust area without any indication that these people posed
a threat to them or that such occurrence would substantially affect the success of their
operation is a frail justification.
All told, the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense of sale of
illegal drugs due to the multiple unexplained breaches of procedure committed by the buy-
bust team in the seizure, custody, and handling of the seized drug, thus the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drug have been compromised. Accordingly, Retada
should be acquitted of the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs. Moreover, considering
that the warrantless arrest of the accused was illegal, the subsequent warrantless search
resulting in the recovery of one more plastic sachet of shabu from Retada's possession is
invalid and the seized shabu is inadmissible in evidence being under the law, "fruit of the
poisonous tree." Even more telling is the fact that they only conducted the thorough body
search of the accused at the police station when they could have immediately done it at the
place of arrest. Thus, Retada must perforce also be acquitted of the charge of violating
Section 11 of RA 9165.
330 of 578
Case Digests
HEIRS OF TOMAKIN v. HEIRS OF CELESTINO NAVARES

DOCTRINE
A party cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the nature of the issue in the case.
When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in
the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal, because to permit him
to do so would be unfair to the adverse party.
FACTS
The property in dispute is Lot No. 8467 originally owned by the late Jose Badana who
died without issue. He was survived by his two sisters Quirina and Severina.
Heirs of Celestino Navares filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and Damages against
Heirs of Tomakin before the RTC. In their complaint, respondents Navares alleged that
Quirina, as heir of her brother sold ½ of Lot No. 8467 to the late spouses Remigio Navares
and Cesaria Gaviola, which portion, as claimed, is known as Lot No. 8467-B, and the
successors-in-interest of the late spouses Navares inherited Lot No. 8467-B. They and their
predecessors had been religiously paying realty taxes on Lot No. 8467-B. Most of them had
been occupying and residing on the property adversely and openly in the concept of an
owner. Severina Badana sold the other half of Lot No. 8467 known as Lot No. 8467-A to
spouses Aaron Nadela and Felipa Jaca, the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners Tomakin.
Lucas Nadela sold a portion of Lot No. 8467 out of what they inherited to spouses
Alfredo Dacua, Jr. and Clarita Bacalso. The sale was evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Respondents Navares alleged that on the basis of this Absolute Sale, Alfredo Dacua, Jr. caused
Lot No. 8467-A to be titled in his name. Respondents Navares further alleged that petitioners
Tomakin made it appear that one Mauricia Bacus (a complete stranger to the property)
executed a document denominated as Extra Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Jose Badana
with Confirmation of Sale; and that on the basis of this document, Dacua, Jr. maliciously
caused Lot No. 8467-B to be titled in the name of Leonarda Nadela Tomakin and Lucas J.
Nadela. Oral demands were made by respondents Navares upon petitioners Tomakin to
reconvey the title of Lot No. 8467-B which remained unheeded.
In their Answer, petitioners Tomakin claimed that they are the heirs of the late
Leonarda Tomakin; that Lot No. 8467 was purchased by spouses Aaron Nadela and Felipa
Jaca from Severina Badana, sister-heir of the late Jose Badana, as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale. The heirs of spouses Nadela and Jaca, executed a Deed of Partition conveying
Lot No. 8467 in favor of Leonarda N. Tomakin. Before Leonarda Tomakin died, she and her
brother Lucas sold the ½ portion of Lot No. 8467 in favor of spouses Dacua, Jr. as evidenced
by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Spouses Nadela and Jaca, their heirs have been exercising acts of
ownership over Lot No. 8467 and Lot No. 8467-B. Lastly, petitioners Tomakin averred that
respondents Navares are barred by prescription and laches – 49 years having elapsed since
the alleged sale of the ½ portion of the property in 1955.
RTC rendered the assailed Decision in favor of petitioners Tomakin and against
respondents Navares. It ruled that respondents Navares failed to prove that they are the
rightful owners of Lot No. 8467-B.
331 of 578
Case Digests
CA: granted the appeal. The CA held that the defense of prescription could not be
sustained. Respondents Navares' complaint for reconveyance was not barred by
prescription because of their actual possession of Lot No. 8467-B based on petitioners
Tomakin's admission that most of respondents Navares are living in the said Lot and leasing
portions thereof to tenants.
ISSUE
Whether the CA failed to appreciate that respondents Navares in not previously filing
a case for declaration of heirship as heirs of spouses Remegio Navares and Cesaria Gaviola
have no cause of action against petitioners Tomakin?
RULING
NO. This issue may no longer be raised by petitioners Tomakin on appeal. Review by
the Supreme Court via a Rule 45 certiorari petition is not a matter of right, but involves sound
judicial discretion because it will be granted only when there are special and important
reasons therefor. Petitioners Tomakin have failed to convince the Court that their Petition is
justified by special and important reasons to warrant the granting thereof.
The grounds relied upon by petitioners Tomakin in the Petition are the very same arguments
that they raised in their Motion for Reconsideration before the CA, which the latter found to
be without merit. Petitioners Tomakin belatedly raised the same in their Motion for
Reconsideration before the CA. They never raised in their Answer the ground that
respondents Navares have no cause of action against them because the former had not
previously filed a petition for declaration of heirship as heirs of spouses Remigio Navares
and Cesaria Gaviola.
This issue may no longer be raised by petitioners Tomakin on appeal.
Firstly, it is well-settled that a party may not change his theory of the case on appeal
and this is expressly adopted in Section 15, Rule 44 of the Rules, which provides:
"SEC. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. – Whether or not the appellant has
filed a motion for new trial in the court below, he may include in his assignment of
errors any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which
is within the issues framed by the parties."
Clearly, the third issue was not raised by petitioners Tomakin before the RTC. As such,
this may no longer be raised nor ruled upon on appeal.
Secondly, defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for the first time on
appeal. Citing CIR v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation, Remedial Law Author and Reviewer
Willard B. Riano explains:
A party cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the nature of the issue in the case.
When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory
in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal, because to permit
him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party. Accordingly, "courts of justice have no
jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in issue." Thus, a judgment that goes beyond
the issues and purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not hear the parties,
is not only irregular but also extrajudicial and invalid. The rule rests on the fundamental
tenets of fair play, justice and due process.
Thirdly, it is also well-settled that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not
raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel.
332 of 578
Case Digests
333 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE v. MARIO MANABAT Y DUMAGAY

DOCTRINE
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 lays down the procedure that police operatives must
requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure
or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence
of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a
representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ),
all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
FACTS
PCI Anne Aimee T. Pilayre is a Forensic Chemical Officer of the Z.N. Provincial Crime
Laboratory Office (ZNPCLO). Her office received a written request from PNP Dipolog for
laboratory examination and weighing of ten (10) small transparent plastic sachets
containing white crystalline granules believed to be shabu marked. She conducted the
required tests for determining whether the substance confiscated from the accused is an
illegal drug. In this case, they turned out POSITIVE. She then prepared Chemistry Report. The
remainder of the samples were then placed back to the original container and sealed.
POl Gilbert Daabay is a regular member of the PNP assigned as Officer-of-the-day in
ZNPCLO. He received requests for laboratory examination and weighing and accompanying
items involving Mario Manabat delivered personally by SPO2 Vertudes. He took the gross
weights of each item and recorded them on the logbook.
PO3 Michael Angcon is the Evidence Custodian responsible for the safekeeping of all
evidence and drug specimens submitted to their office for laboratory examination. He
testified that right after Pilayre conducted laboratory examination of drug specimens; he
received the drug specimens and documents in the instant case. The same pieces of evidence
were released to Pilayre for her Court duties.
PO2 Lord Jericho N. Barral is a regular member of the PNP. He received information
through a text message from a confidential informant that a certain alias Mario is engaged in
the selling of prohibited drugs. He and SPO2 Roy Vertudes referred the matter to the Chief
of Police, who instructed them to conduct a buy bust operation. They complied with such
directive. They monitored alias Mario's activities and planned to buy a sachet of shabu from
the suspect. They decided to conduct a buy bust operation because alias Mario arrived from
Ozamis and he had already stocks of shabu. They instructed the CI to negotiate with Mario
with Barral acting as the poseur buyer. The CI agreed. CI texted that he and Mario are
together and that Mario accepted the request. They agreed to meet at ABC Printing Press.
They called for witnesses to the inventory of items recovered from Mario. Representatives
from DOJ, media and the barangay of Miputak came. Barral conducted body search on Mario
in the presence of the witnesses. In Court, Barral identified Mario Manabat as well as the
items recovered from the latter.
SPO2 Roy P. Vertudes is a regular member of the PNP and presently assigned at the
Regional Police Holding Administrative Unit in Zamboanga City. He corroborated the
334 of 578
Case Digests
testimony of Barral that they received information that a certain Mario Manabat is engaged
in selling shabu in Estaka, Miputak and other parts in Dipolog City. They informed the Chief
of Police, who in turn instructed them to conduct buy bust operation. In Court, Vertudes
identified Mario Manabat, the items recovered from him and other documents.
Mario D. Manabat testified that there was no buy bust operation conducted against
him as he was just grappled by persons near Casa Jose. Thereafter, he was brought to the
boulevard then to the Fish Port then to the ABC Printing Press, the alleged place of arrest. He
said that he rode a multicab and he was seated behind the driver. There were five persons
inside the multicab. While on the way to boulevard, he was asked if he knows a friend or a
politician who is using shabu. He replied he does not know anyone because he does not know
about it. He was frisked and his short pants removed. His wallet and cellphone were taken.
They stayed there for more or less 2 hours. He was then brought to ABC Printing Press on
board a military jeep at 6 pm with three persons accompanying him. Upon arrival at ABC
Printing Press, he was seated and a table from El Garaje establishment was installed. They
returned the wallet in his pocket. He recalls that there were other persons who arrived after
30 minutes. He was searched. Upon their arrival, Mario was searched by a police officer. He
took his wallet and cellphone. He was surprised that they took "something contained in a
cellophane", nine (9) in total. They also took P500 from his pocket, which he denies owning.
He insists that he has only P70 in his possession.
RTC: In sum, the RTC ruled that the evidence on record was sufficient to convict
Manabat. The RTC did not give credence to Manabat's defense of frame-up as it deemed the
same self-serving and unsubstantiated. It held that the defense of a frame-up could not stand
against the positive testimonies of PO2 Barral and SPO2 Vertudes whose testimonies enjoy
the presumption of regularity. The RTC ultimately held that the prosecution sufficiently
discharged its burden of proving accused-appellant Manabat's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
CA: affirmed the RTC's conviction of Manabat, holding that the prosecution was able
to prove the elements of the crimes charged. The prosecution effectively established
compliance with the chain of custody rule. Verily, the prosecution, through testimonial and
documentary evidence, was able to account for the continuous whereabouts of the subject
saches of shabu, from the time they were seized during the buy-bust operation up to the time
it was presented before the court a quo as proof of the corpus delicti.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting Manabat of the crimes charged?
RULING
YES. This Court acquits Manabat for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 lays down the procedure that
police operatives must follow to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as
evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and
photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical
inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or
his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative
335 of 578
Case Digests
from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of
whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after
inventory and be given a copy thereof. The phrase "immediately after seizure and
confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were
intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension.
The Court holds that the buy-bust operation was not conducted in accordance with law.
First, it is not disputed whatsoever that the witnesses were called and eventually
arrived at the scene of the crime only after the accused-appellant was already
apprehended by PO2 Barral. In fact, the Court notes that the prosecution offered conflicting
testimonies as regards the time of arrival of the witnesses. Further creating doubt as to the
presence of the witnesses during the buy-bust operation is the admission of PO2 Barral on
cross-examination that the photographs of the inventory do not show the presence of the
witnesses, except for Councilor Woo. If the witnesses were indeed present during the entire
photographing and inventory of the evidence, obviously, it would have been easy and
effortless on the part of the buy-bust team to take photographs of the other witnesses. Yet,
this was not done, creating some doubt in the mind of the Court as to the presence of the
required witnesses during the buy-bust operation.
Second, the Certificate of Inventory that was produced by the prosecution was
irregularly executed. To reiterate, Section 21 of RA 9165 requires that the copies of the
inventory should be signed by all the following persons: (a) accused or his/her
representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media,
and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ).
The Certificate of Inventory itself reveals that the document was not signed by
accused-appellant Manabat or by his counsel or representative. Upon perusal of the
records of the instant case, the prosecution did not acknowledge such defect. Nor did the
prosecution provide any explanation whatsoever as to why accused-appellant Manabat was
not able to sign the Certificate of Inventory. Concededly, Section 21 of the IRR of RA 9165
provides that "noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over
said items." For this provision to be effective, however, the prosecution must first (1)
recognize any lapse on the part of the police officers and (2) be able to justify the same. In
this case, the prosecution neither recognized, much less tried to justify, the police
officers' deviation from the procedure contained in Section 21, RA 9165.
Third, the Court notes that the marking of the plastic sachets allegedly recovered was
irregularly done.
In the instant case, as incontrovertibly revealed by the photographs of the plastic
sachets allegedly retrieved from Manabat, only the date and initials of the seizing officers
were inscribed on the specimens. The time and place of the buy-bust operation were not
indicated in the markings, in clear contravention of the PNP's own set of procedures for
336 of 578
Case Digests
the conduct of buy-bust operations. In sum, the prosecution failed to provide justifiable
grounds for the apprehending team's deviation from the rules laid down in Section 21 of RA
9165. The integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have thus been compromised.
In light of this, accused-appellant Manabat must perforce be acquitted.
337 of 578
Case Digests
SPS. BELVIS v. SPS. EROLA

July 24, 2019, G.R. No. 239727, Second Division, CAGUIOA, J.:
DOCTRINE
The primordial objective of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules, is to reduce the
number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has
been brought about by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. To attain this objective,
Section 412(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process
before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a precondition to filing a complaint in court.
FACTS
The instant case stems from a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages filed by
respondents, as represented by their attorney-in-fact, Maureen Frias. In their complaint,
respondents alleged that they are owners of a 29,772 sq. m.-lot situated in Barangay Malag-
it, Pontevedra, Capiz. Lot 597 and a tax declaration, both in the name of respondent Conrado
Erola, who allegedly purchased the same in 1978. As the parties were close
relatives, i.e., petitioner Cecilia Erola-Bevis being the sister of respondent Conrado,
respondents allegedly allowed petitioners to possess the lot, subject to the condition that
they would vacate the same upon demand.
Respondents sent petitioners a letter requiring the latter to vacate the property
within 30 days from receipt of the letter. Petitioners, however, refused to comply. After
unsuccessful barangay conciliation proceedings, respondents filed the instant complaint.
On the other hand, petitioners claimed that in 1979, the subject property was
purchased by the late Rosario Erola, the mother of petitioner Cecilia and respondent
Conrado. Conrado, however, allegedly succeeded in registering the property solely in his
name. Hence, an implied trust was allegedly created over the ½ undivided hereditary share
of petitioner Cecilia. For over 34 years, petitioners alleged that they possessed and cultivated
the lot in the concept of an owner, believing in good faith that they were co-owners of the
subject lot. In the course of their possession, petitioners allegedly introduced various
improvements. In their Answer, petitioners further claimed that respondents failed to
personally appear during the barangay conciliation proceedings and that their
representative, Maureen, had no authority to appear on their behalf.
MCTC: After pre-trial and trial, the MCTC granted the complaint. MCTC held that
although petitioners claimed that respondents failed to personally appear during the
mandatory barangay conciliation proceedings, the Office of the Punong Barangay
nevertheless issued a Certification to File Action in accordance with Section 412 of Republic
Act No. (R.A.) 7160. Further, the case was referred to Philippine Mediation Center (PMC)
during pre-trial but the parties still failed to amicably settle the same.
RTC: In denying the appeal, it held that despite the non-appearance of respondents,
the parties failed to arrive at a settlement before the Office of the Punong Barangay, the PMC
and even before the court during Judicial Dispute Resolution (JDR) proceedings. In fact, the
Certification to File Action was issued upon agreement of the parties. Thus, the RTC relaxed
the technical rules of procedure and held that a remand of the case would be unnecessarily
circuitous.
338 of 578
Case Digests
CA: The CA denied the petition and found that respondents substantially complied
with R.A. 7160, that their failure to personally appear was a mere irregularity and that the
same did not affect the jurisdiction of the court. In either case, the CA held that it was not
disputed that the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement of the dispute.
ISSUE
Whether respondents complied with the mandatory conciliation proceedings under
R.A. 7160?
RULING
YES. Respondents substantially complied with the mandatory barangay conciliation
proceedings under R.A. 7160. Section 412 of R.A. 7160 requires, when applicable, prior
resort to barangay conciliation proceedings as a pre-condition for the filing of a complaint in
court. In Lumbuan v. Ronquillo, the Court explained:
The primordial objective of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules, is to reduce the number
of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice which has been
brought about by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. To attain this objective,
Section 412(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation
process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a precondition to filing a complaint in
court, thus:
SECTION 412. Conciliation. — (a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court. — No
complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority
of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government office
for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties before
the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has been
reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by
the lupon or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the
parties thereto.
In relation thereto, Section 415 of the same law holds that the parties must personally
appear in said proceedings, without the assistance of counsel or any representative. Failure
to comply with the barangay conciliation proceedings renders the complaint vulnerable to a
motion to dismiss for prematurity under Section 10), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
Although mandatory, the Court, in Lansangan v. Caisip, explained that "non-referral
of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in
nature, and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss
or in a responsive pleading."
In the instant case, it is undisputed that respondents failed to personally appear
during the conciliation proceedings as required by Section 415 of R.A. 7160. They were,
however, represented by Maureen. Although dismissible under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court, the Court finds that respondents have substantially complied with the law.
The CA, the RTC, and the MCTC unanimously found that petitioners and respondents'
representative underwent barangay conciliation proceedings. Unfortunately, they failed to
arrive at any amicable settlement. Thereafter, upon agreement of the parties, the Office of
the Punong Barangay issued a Certification to File Action. During pre-trial, the parties again
underwent mediation before the PMC and JDR before the court. Still, no settlement was
reached. Given the foregoing, the Court finds that the purposes of the law, i.e., to provide
339 of 578
Case Digests
avenues for parties to amicably settle their disputes and to prevent the "indiscriminate filing
of cases in the courts," have been sufficiently met. Considering that the instant complaint for
unlawful detainer, an action governed by the rules of summary procedure, has been pending
for 6 years, the Court finds it proper to relax the technical rules of procedure in the interest
of speedy and substantial justice.
340 of 578
Case Digests
HEIRS OF SPOUSES RAMIREZ v. JOEY ABON

DOCTRINE
Under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the remedy of annulment of judgment "is resorted
to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment,
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, and is
based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process."
FACTS
The petitioners Heirs of the Sps. Ramirez alleged that OCT. No. T-4480 is registered
in the names of the late Sps. Ramirez. Angel Abon, the father of respondent Abon, requested
the RD to issue a new owner's duplicate of the OCT on the basis of a document denominated
as "Confirmation of Previous Sale" (CPS) whereby Sps. Ramirez had allegedly sold the said
lot to Angel. Using the new owner's duplicate of the OCT, Angel was able to segregate a 135-
square meter portion from Lot 1748 and obtain title thereto. Heirs of the Sps. Ramirez were
furnished a copy of the CPS. Having been informed that respondent Abon would use the CPS
to transfer title to the rest of Lot, Heirs of the Sps. Ramirez filed a Complaint for Annulment
of Confirmation of Previous Sale.
Abon filed before the RTC a petition for reconstitution of the lost owner's duplicate
of the OCT. Abon alleged in his petition that his father, Angel Abon, acquired the lot covered
by said OCT under the CPS and caused the subdivision of 135 square meters of the subject
property. Respondent Abon further alleged that his mother left for Canada and entrusted to
him the owner's duplicate, which he kept in his cabinet. Abon then alleged that when his
mother arrived in the Philippines, she requested the former to bring out the owner's
duplicate for purposes of an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Angel. However, Abon
could not find the said owner's duplicate copy in his cabinets. Respondent Abon allegedly
exerted diligent efforts to look for the owner's duplicate copy to no avail. Respondent Abon
then executed an Affidavit of Loss and had the same registered with the RD. RTC issued its
Decision granting Abon's petition, ordering the RD to issue a new owner's duplicate copy in
lieu of the lost one. RTC’s aforesaid Decision was not subjected to appeal. Hence, as indicated
in the Certificate of Finality, it became final and executory.
Heirs of the Sps. Ramirez filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court before the CA, Former 14th Division. Heirs of the Sps. Ramirez further
allege that the CPS does not state the area bought by Angel Abon from the spouses Ramirez
and respondent Abon's claim that the lot is owned by his parents is belied by the OCT itself
which shows that the owners thereof are the spouses Ramirez. Heirs of the Sps. Ramirez
argue that if the intention under the CPS was to transfer the entire lot to Angel Abon then the
title should have been totally cancelled and a new one issued in lieu thereof; however, the
CPS was annotated on the OCT and the TCT was issued to cover only a 135-square meter
portion of the lot.
CA: CA, Former 14th Division held that there was no valid ground for the annulment of the
RTC, Branch 28's Decision dated October 4, 2013, finding that "the RTC-Br. 28 had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition in LRC No. 6748."
ISSUE
341 of 578
Case Digests
Whether the CA, Former 14th Division erred in denying the petitioners Heirs of the
Sps. Ramirez' Petition for Annulment of Judgment.
RULING
YES. Under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the remedy of annulment of judgment "is
resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from
judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner, and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or
denial of due process." According to Section 3 of Rule 47, if based on extrinsic fraud, the
action must be filed within 4 years from its discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction,
before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
In the instant case, the petitioners Heirs of the Sps. Ramirez maintain that the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over LRC Case No. 6847. It is not disputed that respondent Abon
sent a notice of loss of the owner's duplicate certificate of the subject OCT to the RD in the
form of an Affidavit of Loss executed by respondent Abon under oath, detailing the facts and
circumstances surrounding the loss of the owner's duplicate certificate. With the RD being
duly notified of respondent Abon's Affidavit of Loss, the fact of execution of the said notice
was entered into the Memorandum of Encumbrances.
With respect to the notice and due hearing requirement, it is likewise not disputed
that a copy of respondent Abon's Petition for Reconstitution, together with a copy of RTC
was publicly posted, as certified by the RTC's Office of the Clerk of Court in its Certification.
Moreover, it is not disputed that copies of the aforementioned documents were furnished to
the RD, the LRA, and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. A Notice of Hearing was likewise
issued by the RTC.
Nevertheless, it is also not disputed that the subject OCT remains to be registered
in the name of the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners Heirs of the Sps.
Ramirez. In other words, regardless of the sale of the subject property in favor of the father
of respondent Abon, Angel, the registered owners of the subject property remained to
be the Sps. Ramirez, aside from the 135-square meter portion of the subject property that
was subdivided and now covered by TCT No. T- 50359 registered in the name of Angel. It is
similarly not in dispute that the Notice of Hearing was not sent to the petitioners Heirs of
the Sps. Ramirez. Otherwise stated, the petitioners Heirs of the Sps. Ramirez were not
notified of the Petition for Reconstitution.
Persons registered as owners in a certificate of title, by their very status as registered
owners, are interested parties in a petition for the reconstitution of a lost or destroyed
owner's duplicate certificate of title because they are legally presumed to be the owners of
the property. To restate once more, while registration does not vest title and it is merely
evidence of such title, a Torrens certificate is still the best evidence of ownership over
registered land as compared to a mere deed evidencing a contract of sale. The registered
owner has a preferential right to the possession of the owner's duplicate than one whose
name does not appear in the certificate.
To restate, the instant ruling of the Court does not mean that respondent Abon cannot
successfully seek the reconstitution of the owner's duplicate certificate of the subject OCT.
He can. But the RTC hearing his application must notify the parties who appear on the OCT
to be the registered owners. And if the RTC, after such notice and hearing, is satisfied that
342 of 578
Case Digests
the Sps. Ramirez had truly divested all of their interest in the subject property, that
respondent Abon has sufficiently established his interest over the subject property, that the
owner's duplicate certificate of title was indeed lost, and that the jurisdictional requirements
under Section 109 of PD 1529 had been sufficiently met, then the Petition for Reconstitution
should be granted in favor of respondent Abon. However, without properly notifying the
estate of the Sps. Ramirez, who continue to be the registered owners of the subject property,
the RTC fails to acquire jurisdiction over the Petition for Reconstitution. Therefore, as the
RTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over LRC Case because of its failure to notify the petitioners
Heirs of the Sps. Ramirez, the latter's Petition for Annulment of Judgment is meritorious.
343 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE v. ALLAN CANATOY

DOCTRINE
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence will be sufficient
to convict the offender if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the
inference is derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction based on circumstantial evidence
can be upheld provided that the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others as the guilty person.
Extra judicial confessions, to be admissible in evidence, must be: 1) voluntary; 2) made
with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel; 3) express; and 4) in writing.
The Facts
Barbas was inside her room at Ziega Apartment. Tan, a tenant in the same apartment,
saw two men enter the apartment's gate. Afterwards, Soliman who was staying in the room
adjacent to Barbas, heard two men utter "Ayo, Ayo" in front of Barbas' room and told the
latter that they have something to deliver. Barbas told them to leave it beside the door but
they insisted for her to come out so that she could acknowledge the item. After a short while,
Tan and Soliman heard Barbas shouting "Ay!" three times. Soliman went out of the room and
saw two men fleeing from Barbas' room towards the gate. Soliman called after them who
looked back but then continued to run. Tan, who was on the terrace, also shouted "Hoy!" at
the two men who likewise looked back. Both Soliman and Tan later identified the two men
as Canatoy and Mabalato.
Soliman and Tan then checked Barbas' room and they found her lying face down,
bathed in her own blood. They saw a bloodied knife and grey t-shirt near Barbas' body. Tan
recalled that one of the two men whom she saw enter the apartment's gate was wearing a
grey t-shirt, but when she later saw him again fleeing from Barbas' room, he was already
wearing a white shirt. The police recovered, among others, the knife used in killing Barbas
from the crime scene.
In the meantime, the police officers conducted a follow-up operation, which led to the
arrest of Mabalato, Cartuciano and Sato. Several days later, they apprehended Canatoy by
virtue of a warrant of arrest. While in detention, Mabalato and Cartuciano expressed their
willingness to make a confession, after they were apprised of their constitutional rights.
Thereafter, they executed their extrajudicial confessions with the assistance of Atty. Truya.
In his sworn statement, Mabalato admitted that he and Canatoy were hired by
Cartuciano to kill Barbas for a consideration. He then narrated how they planned and
executed the killing. Cartuciano, on the other hand and in his own sworn statement,
implicated Sato, whom he claimed to be his lover, as the person who contacted him more
than a week from the incident. According to Cartuciano, Sato asked him to hire two men to
liquidate Barbas. Both sworn statements were signed by Mabalato, Cartuciano and their
lawyer, Atty. Truya. Later on, they were brought to the Office of the City Prosecutor, where
they subscribed to their respective affidavits in the presence of Atty. Truya and Pros. Dinoy,
344 of 578
Case Digests
after the latter asked them if they voluntarily executed their sworn statements to which they
answered in the affirmative.
RTC: found Mabalato, Cartuciano and Canatoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder.
CA: affirmed the trial court's conviction.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime
charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING
NO. The prosecution's case rests mainly on: 1) the testimonies of witnesses Soliman
and Tan; and 2) the extrajudicial confessions of Cartuciano and the deceased Mabalato. The
Court rules that these pieces of evidence were sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that Canatoy, along with his other co-accused are in conspiracy with one another, committed
the crime charged.
First, although the records show that there was no eyewitness to the actual killing of
Barbas, the testimonies of Soliman and Tan on collateral facts of the crime, were properly
given ample weight by the trial court and the CA. It is settled, that direct evidence is not
indispensable for conviction in criminal cases and that circumstantial evidence may be
enough to support a court's decision of guilt.
Circumstantial evidence, also known as indirect or presumptive evidence, consists
of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may
be inferred according to reason and common experience.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence will be
sufficient to convict the offender if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from
which the inference is derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the circumstances proved
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that
points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person.
Second, the extrajudicial confessions of Mabalato and Cartuciano were admissible in
evidence and were credible. For an extrajudicial confession to be admissible in evidence,
it must be satisfactorily shown that the same was obtained within the limits imposed by the
Constitution, specifically Sections 12 and 17, Article III thereof, which state:
SECTION 12: (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
345 of 578
Case Digests
These constitutional safeguards are reinforced in Republic Act No. 7438, to wit:
SEC. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public
Officers. –
a.) Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be
assisted by counsel.
b.) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who arrests,
detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter,
in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be
allowed to confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be
provided with a competent and independent counsel.
Thus, the Court, applying the foregoing standards, has settled that extra judicial
confessions, to be admissible in evidence, must be: 1) voluntary; 2) made with the assistance
of a competent and independent counsel; 3) express; and 4) in writing. All these
requirements obtain here.
First, the confessions were voluntarily and freely executed. The allegations that they
coerced Mabalato and Cartuciano are baseless and no evidence was presented to support
them. The rule is that where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where
he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators,
where no physical evidence of violence was presented, all these will be considered as
indicating voluntariness. Moreover, the confessions of Mabalato and Cartuciano are replete
with details which could possibly be supplied only by the perpetrators of the crime. They
dovetail in their material respects, from the time Cartuciano contacted Mabalato and
Canatoy, to the time they devised the plan to liquidate Barbas, to the time the plan was
realized. As held by the Court, this reflects spontaneity and coherence which psychologically
cannot be associated with a mind to which violence and torture have been applied. These
factors are clear indicia that the confessions were voluntarily given.
Second, Mabalato and Cartuciano, during the investigation, were duly assisted by
Atty. Truya - a competent and independent counsel, who informed them of their
constitutional rights and the consequences of their confessions. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against
the former' s appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter
subscribed to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.
Against the extrajudicial confessions and the testimonies of its witnesses as well as
the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution, the alibi of Canatoy cannot
prevail. In sum, the prosecution more than sufficiently established the guilt of accused-
appellant Canatoy of the crime of Murder. The Court affirms that the evidence proves beyond
reasonable doubt that Canatoy, Mabalato and Cartuciano, acting in conspiracy with one
another, perpetrated the killing of Barbas.
346 of 578
Case Digests
HEIRS OF ALFREDO CULLADO v. DOMINIC V. GUTIERREZ

G.R. No. 212938, July 30, 2019, En Banc, CAGUIOA, J.:
DOCTRINE
Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that the remedy of annulment by the CA
of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of the Regional Trial Courts can
only be availed of where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. Thus, a petition
for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a remedy granted only under exceptional
circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, had failed to avail of the ordinary or
other appropriate remedies provided by law; and such action is never resorted to as a substitute
for a party's own neglect in not promptly availing of the ordinary or other appropriate
remedies.
FACTS
The evidence on record shows that on May 10, 1995, OCT No. P-61499 which covered
a parcel of land measuring 18,280 m2 located at Isabela, was issued in Dominic Gutierrez's
favor. Dominic's father, Dominador, representing Dominic who was then still a minor, filed
before the RTC an action for recovery of ownership and possession against Cullado. Dominic
maintained that Cullado had been squatting on the parcel of land as early as 1977, and that
despite repeated demands, Cullado refused to vacate the said lot.
Cullado, in his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, interposed the special and affirmative
defenses of his actual possession and cultivation of the subject parcel of land in an open,
adverse and continuous manner. He likewise asked for the reconveyance of the property,
considering that Dominic and his father fraudulently had the subject property titled in
Dominic's name.
Dominic's counsel repeatedly failed to attend the scheduled hearings, and as a
consequence, the heirs of Cullado were eventually allowed to present their evidence after
Dominic was deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine the witness of the heirs of
Cullado.
Dominic filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment wherein he alleged, among others, that his
counsel's negligence in handling his case prevented him from participating therein and from
filing his appeal. However, the same was denied by the R TC for having been filed out of time.
Dominic filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction. The CA initially dismissed the petition but reinstated the same
upon Dominic's motion for reconsideration and gave it due course.
CA: granted the petition. In the action for recovery of possession filed by Dominic, the
heirs of Cullado in their Answer raised as affirmative defense and not as a counterclaim, and
asked for, the reconveyance of the lot in issue as the same was supposedly fraudulently titled
in Dominic's name, considering that neither Dominic nor his father actually possessed or
cultivated the same. These allegations constitute a collateral attack against Dominic's title,
which cannot be allowed in an accion publiciana. In sum, the defenses and grounds raised by
the heirs of Cullado ascribe errors in Dominic's title that would require a review of the
registration decree made in Dominic's favor. Clearly then, the court a quo had no jurisdiction
347 of 578
Case Digests
to resolve the twin issues of reconveyance and fraudulence raised by the heirs of Cullado
before the trial court.
Issue
Whether Dominic's availment of the exceptional remedy of annulment of judgment
before the CA was proper?
RULING
YES. Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that the remedy of annulment
by the CA of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of the Regional Trial
Courts can only be availed of where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner. Thus, a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a remedy granted
only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, had failed to
avail of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies provided by law; and such action is never
resorted to as a substitute for a party's own neglect in not promptly availing of the ordinary
or other appropriate remedies.
As to the grounds, Section 2, Rule 4 7 of the Rules of Court states that:
SEC. 2. Grounds for annulment. - The annulment may be based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of or could have been availed of,
in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
The applicable period for filing the petition for annulment of judgment depends upon the
ground. If based on extrinsic fraud, the petition must be filed within four years from its
discovery and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
The Court agrees with the CA that the RTC was bereft of jurisdiction to rule with
finality on the issue of ownership and consequently was without the power to order the
reconveyance of the subject land to the heirs of Cullado given the fact that the original
complaint was only an accion publiciana. Accordingly, the CA was correct in upholding
the remedy of a petition for annulment of judgment.
As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally occupying
his property. This right is imprescriptible and can never be barred by laches.
The Court notes that while the heirs of Cullado interposed the fraud purportedly
committed by Dominic and his father in the acquisition of Dominic's OCT and pleaded their
open, adverse and continuous possession and cultivation of the subject land as "special and
affirmative defenses," such allegations are, in reality, not affirmative defenses. As defined, an
affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting
the material allegations in the pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar
recovery. Such allegations do not "hypothetically admit" the material allegations of Dominic
in his complaint. Rather, such allegations are, in actuality, negative defenses. A negative
defense, as defined, is the specific denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the pleading
of the claimant essential to his cause or causes of action. Also, "special defenses" are not
expressly recognized by the Rules of Court. Section 5, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides
that defenses may either be negative or positive.
348 of 578
Case Digests
349 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE v. ROLANDO SOLAR Y DUMBRIQUE

G.R. No. 225595, August 06, 2019, En Banc, CAGUIOA, J.:
DOCTRINE
The credibility of the prosecution witnesses is not affected by their relationship with the
deceased. When there is no showing of improper motive on the part of the witness in testifying
against the accused, her relationship with the victim does not render her testimony less worthy
of full faith and credence. In fact, relationship itself could even strengthen credibility in a
particular case, for it is highly unnatural for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone
other than the actual culprit. The earnest desire to seek justice for dead kin is not served should
the witness abandon his conscience and prudence to blame one who is innocent of the crime.
FACTS
Version of the prosecution: Ma. Theresa testified that she decided to follow her
husband who left the house to get his cellphone from Rolando. Along the way, she saw
Rolando and Mark Kenneth hit Joseph with a baseball bat on his nape. When Joseph fell
down, the two simultaneously ganged up on him. She then shouted for help and the assailants
ran away. Immediately, Joseph was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced "dead on
arrival."
Version of the defense: Rolando denied the accusation and claimed that he was
attending a wake on the night of March 8, 2008, from 11:00 p.m. until 2:00 a.m. the following
day. Joseph was also there drinking and playing cara y cruz with his group. After a while,
Joseph approached him and offered to pawn a cellphone in exchange of cash. However, he
refused because he also needed money. On his way home, he met Joseph who, upon seeing
him, drew out a kitchen knife and tried to stab him thrice. Fortunately, he was not hit and he
immediately ran away.
RTC: convicted Rolando of the crime of Murder. The RTC found the testimony of Ma.
Theresa, the sole eyewitness of the prosecution, to be clear, positive, categorical, and credible
to establish Rolando's guilt for the crime charged. The RTC also held that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was present in the killing of Joseph, and hence, the crime
committed by Rolando was Murder.
CA: modified the RTC's conviction of Rolando. Similar to the findings of the RTC, the
CA found Ma. Theresa's testimony credible and sufficient to establish the identity and
culpability of Rolando. The CA also held that conspiracy may be deduced from the
conspirators' conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime indicative of a
joint purpose, concerted action and community of interests — that the facts of the present
case reveal such concerted action to achieve the purpose of killing Joseph. Nevertheless, the
CA downgraded the offense from Murder to Homicide, holding that the Information did not
sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended the
killing.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in convicting Rolando despite the prosecution's failure to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING
350 of 578
Case Digests
NO. The Court affirms the conviction of Rolando, not for the crime of Homicide as held
by the CA, but for the crime of Murder as found by the RTC.
Ma. Theresa was able to positively identify Rolando as one of the perpetrators of the
crime. She was only five meters away from the scene when it happened, and she knew
Rolando since he was a childhood friend of her siblings. That part of her testimony in which
she said that she initially did not see who attacked her husband because it was dark referred
to Mark Kenneth, not Rolando. Thus, there is no merit in Rolando's contention that the
prosecution failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the crime.
In any event, Rolando does not deny that he had an encounter with Joseph on the date
and at the place in question. The only difference between his version and that of the
prosecution's is that he claims that it was Joseph who attacked him first but that he was able
to run away. The Court follows the established doctrine that as between a positive and
credible testimony by an eyewitness, on the one hand, and a hollow denial, on the other, the
former generally prevails over the latter. The Court therefore upholds the credibility of Ma.
Theresa's testimony and declares it sufficient to establish the guilt of Rolando beyond
reasonable doubt.
The Court affirms the findings of both the RTC and the CA that Rolando failed to prove
any ill motive on the part of Ma. Theresa to implicate him. There is no evidence on record,
apart from the empty imputations of ill motive by Rolando, that shows that Ma. Theresa was
motivated by an improper motive to implicate Rolando for the crime.
The credibility of the prosecution witnesses is not affected by their relationship with
the deceased. Mere relationship with the victim does not necessarily tarnish the testimony
of a witness. When there is no showing of improper motive on the part of the witness in
testifying against the accused, her relationship with the victim does not render her testimony
less worthy of full faith and credence. In fact, relationship itself could even strengthen
credibility in a particular case, for it is highly unnatural for an aggrieved relative to falsely
accuse someone other than the actual culprit. The earnest desire to seek justice for a dead
kin is not served should the witness abandon his conscience and prudence to blame one who
is innocent of the crime.
To repeat, the testimony of Ma. Theresa deserves full faith and credit. It is thus
sufficient to establish the guilt of Rolando beyond reasonable doubt.
Finally, trial courts are likewise enjoined to ensure that the accused is furnished
a copy of the said resolutions finding probable cause against the accused. The trial
court, on its own initiative, shall thus order the production of the records of the preliminary
investigation in accordance with Section 8 (b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. These requirements are imposed to ensure that the accused is sufficiently
apprised of the facts and circumstances with which he is being charged, with the end in view
of respecting or fulfilling his right to be informed of the cause of the accusation against him.
In sum, the Court, continually cognizant of its power and mandate to promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, hereby lays down the following guidelines for the
guidance of the Bench and the Bar: Any Information which alleges that a qualifying or
aggravating circumstance — in which the law uses a broad term to embrace various
situations in which it may exist, such as but are not limited to (1) treachery; (2) abuse of
351 of 578
Case Digests
superior strength; (3) evident premeditation; (4) cruelty — is present, must state the
ultimate facts relative to such circumstance. Otherwise, the Information may be subject to a
motion to quash under Section 3 (e) (i.e., that it does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form), Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or a motion for a bill
of particulars under the parameters set by said Rules.
Failure of the accused to avail any of the said remedies constitutes a waiver of his right
to question the defective statement of the aggravating or qualifying circumstance in the
Information, and consequently, the same may be appreciated against him if proven during
trial.
352 of 578
Case Digests
REPUBLIC v. HEIRS OF PAUS

G.R. No. 201273, August 14, 2019, Second Division, CAGUIOA, J.:
DOCTRINE
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the tribunal has jurisdiction
over such action are to be determined from the material allegations of the complaint, the law
in force at the time the complaint is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims averred. Jurisdiction is not affected
by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant in an answer to the complaint or a motion to
dismiss the same.
FACTS
Private respondents, the Heirs of Ikang Paus represented by Elias Paus, filed a
petition for identification, delineation and issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title
(CALT) with respondent National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). They sought
confirmation of their right to the ancestral land at Baguio City and Witig Suyo, Tuba, Benguet,
with an area of 695,737 square meters. The Heirs of Mateo Cariño opposed the petition, and
prayed for its dismissal, cancellation and revocation. The said protest was dismissed for lack
of merit. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-CALT-37 covering the said lot
in Baguio City, was issued in the name of the Heirs of Paus.
The Heirs of Mateo Cariño filed a motion for reconsideration, but the NCIP denied it
in its Resolution. However, the Republic, through the OSG, questioned OCT No. 0-CALT-37 in
the name of private respondents, and filed a suit for Reversion, Annulment of Documents and
Cancellation of Title with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ
of Preliminary Injunction. It pointed out several irregularities in the issuance of the CALT in
favor of private respondents.
Private respondents answered the complaint denying all its material allegations. As
special and affirmative defenses, they averred lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action.
They pointed out that the complaint assailed the CALT and the OCT issued on the basis of the
CALT, which under the IPRA, falls within the jurisdiction of the NCIP, and not of the regular
courts. They asserted that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint; hence, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
RTC issued an Order directing the Republic to show cause why the complaint should
not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
In its Compliance, the Republic asserted that the RTC had jurisdiction over the
complaint. Citing B.P. Blg. 129, it maintained that the RTC had jurisdiction over all civil
actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein. The
actions for reversion, annulment of documents and cancellation of titles are rights of actions
or reliefs which are obviously neither within the exclusive nor concurrent jurisdiction of the
NCIP. It further asserted that it was never made a party to NCIP En Banc Resolution. Not
being a party to the proceeding, it could not avail of the remedy of filing a petition for review
with the CA. The Republic maintained that the CALT and the consequent OCT was null and
void. As such, they can be attacked either directly or collaterally.
The RTC, however, was not at all persuaded by Republic's arguments and rendered
the now challenged Order dismissing the complaint. It sustained private respondents that
353 of 578
Case Digests
the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. The RTC explained that
the CALT and the corresponding OCT were issued on the basis of the Resolution 060-2009-
AL of the NCIP. Thus, any challenge against the CALT and the OCT necessarily calls for a
review of the NCIP Resolution which was made as basis for the issuance of the CALT.
However, NCIP is a quasi-judicial body with a rank and stature equal to that of the RTC;
hence, it cannot review the Resolution of the NCIP or any document that flows from its
proceedings.
CA: On the procedural issue, the CA ruled that petitioner availed itself of the correct
remedy when it filed a Rule 65 petition to assail the RTC's dismissal without prejudice of the
Complaint. The CA ruled that the Complaint assails the validity of OCT No. 0-CALT-37 as well
as NCIP En Banc Resolution No. 060-2009-AL. Given this, the RTC does not have jurisdiction
to review the NCIP Resolution as under the IPRA, its IRR, and even the NCIP Rules on
Pleadings, Practice and Procedure all state that Decisions of the NCIP are reviewable by the
CA. For the CA, the NCIP and the RTC are co-equal bodies and the NCIP is therefore
beyond the control of the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the Republic's Complaint?
RULING
The Petition is partly meritorious. RTC has jurisdiction over cases for reversion and
cancellation of certificates of title. The RTC and the CA both ruled that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the Complaint because it sought a review of Resolution. This is error.
The Court has held in Republic v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila that "it is
axiomatic that the nature of an action and whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over such
action are to be determined from the material allegations of the complaint, the law in force
at the time the complaint is filed, and the character of the relief sought irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims averred. Jurisdiction is not
affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant in an answer to the complaint or a
motion to dismiss the same."
The Complaint seeks the nullification and cancellation of (a) OCT No. 0-CALT-37 and
any derivative title issued pursuant thereto; (b) CALT No. CAR-BAG-0309-000207; and (c)
the reconstructed and unapproved survey plan together with the technical description. Only
the last two reliefs emanated from Resolution No. 060-2009-AL. The Complaint also
impleaded the Register of Deeds of Baguio City, the NCIP, and the LRA.
To the mind of the Court, the case is not a review of the NCIP En Banc Resolution
because a subsequent event occurred that gave rise to a cause of action for reversion and
cancellation of a Torrens title, namely, the issuance of OCT No. 0-CALT-37. This is the reason
the Republic has impleaded the Register of Deeds of Baguio City and the LRA.
In fact, the Republic alleges that OCT No. 0-CALT-37 should not have been issued since
it is land of the public domain. This, in turn, requires a factual determination of whether the
land is indeed of public domain and whether OCT No. 0-CALT-37 embraces land inside the
BSF. This then raises the issue of whether a CALT may be issued over it, and whether an OCT
may be issued arising from the CALT. This is therefore a complaint for the reversion of a land
to the public domain and the cancellation of a Torrens title covering a public land, both
matters being within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
354 of 578
Case Digests
The allegations of the Republic in the Complaint squarely assert a reversion suit as
described above. It is attacking OCT No. 0-CALT-37 because it arose from Resolution No.
which the Republic claims was not validly rendered.
The Court is not unmindful that in ruling on the issue of the validity of OCT No. 0-
CALT-37, the Court will necessarily rule on the validity of CALT No. CAR-BAG-0309-000207,
and the reconstructed and unapproved survey plan together with the technical description,
both of which were issued and approved in the Resolution. This, however, does not remove
the Complaint from the RTC's jurisdiction, and as described above, even confirms it. Again,
the cause of action of the Republic is for the reversion to the public domain of the lot covered
by OCT No. 0-CALT-37 and the cancellation of the title. In ruling on this issue, the RTC may
dwell on the validity of the proceedings of the NCIP, which gave rise to the issuance of the
Torrens title.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed the Republic's Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The RTC's dismissal of the Complaint is a refusal to perform its duty enjoined by law
as it is the court that has jurisdiction over the Complaint. The CA therefore committed
reversible error in affirming the RTC's dismissal of the Complaint.
NCIP has no jurisdiction over Republic’s complaint. As further confirmation that
the RTC has jurisdiction over the case is the fact that the NCIP does not have jurisdiction over
issues involving non-Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs)/Indigenous Peoples (IPs).
Here, although the dispute involves the rights of the Heirs of Ikang Paus, who claim
to be members of the Ibaloi tribe, the Complaint involves non-ICCs/IPs such as the Republic,
the Register of Deeds of Baguio, and even the LRA. The NCIP cannot rule on the rights of non-
ICCs/IPs which should be brought before a court of general jurisdiction. Here, the dispute
was validly lodged with the RTC as discussed above.
Further, given the special limited jurisdiction of the NCIP, only those cases over which
the NCIP has jurisdiction may be a pealed to the CA. It was therefore error for the RTC and
the CA to treat the Complaint as an appeal from Resolution No. 060-2009-AL because based
on the allegations of the Complaint, the NCIP could not have jurisdiction over it. And in fact,
given that NCIP cases are limited to ICCs/IPs, it would even be legally impermissible for a
non-ICC/IP to appeal a decision of the NCIP.
This further confirms that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion because if the
RTC dismissal of the Complaint is not undone, the Republic will be denied any kind of remedy
to protect its rights and interest over the property.
355 of 578
Case Digests
HEIRS OF SATRAMDAS V. SADHWANI AND KISHNIBAI S. SADWHANI, represented by

RAMCHAND S. SADHWANI and RAJAN S. SADWHANI, v. GOP S. SAHWANI AND KANTA
G. SADHWANI, UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, and
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI
DOCTRINE
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to
dismiss a particular action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the
pleading, while the latter to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action. Dismissal for
failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of the proceedings through
a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, while dismissal for lack of cause of
action may be raised any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of
stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the plaintiff."
FACTS
On November 13, 2013, herein petitioners, the other legitimate children of Spouses
Satramdas and Kishinbai Sadwhani, filed a Complaint for Reconveyance, Partition,
Accounting, Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Injunction and Damages with Prayer for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against
herein respondents, praying that they likewise be declared lawful owners of the parcel of
land in Bel Air, Makati, as well as the condominium unit at the Ritz Tower, Makati City, as
heirs and legitimate children of the Sps. Sadhwani, in accordance with a purported express
trust agreement and the NCC provisions on succession.
Respondents Gop and Kanta moved to dismiss the Complaint, claiming that the same
had prescribed and was unenforceable; the petitioners had not capacity to sue; and that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action. Respondent Union Bank likewise filed a motion to
dismiss while PNB filed an answer. An amended complaint was filed by petitioner in view of
the sale of the parcel of land to Sefuel Siy Yap.
The RTC granted respondents’ motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of legal
capacity to sue, failure to state a cause of action, and lack of cause of action. It held that since
the Sps. Sadhwani, according to the death certificates attached, are Indian nationals,
prohibited under Article XII, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution from owning the subject
properties or transmitting any rights over the same to their children upon their deaths.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied.
Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the RTC Decision granting respondents’ motion to dismiss.
ISSUES
1. Whether petitioners availed of the correct remedy to challenge the dismissal of the
complaint;
356 of 578
Case Digests
2. Whether the Complaint was correctly dismissed

RULING
(1) NO, the petitioners availed of the wrong remedy and disregarded the
hierarchy of courts. Rule 41, Section 1 expressly states that no appeal may be taken from
an order dismissing an action without prejudice. In such cases, the remedy available to the
aggrieved party is to file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
A perusal of the Assailed Resolution unequivocally shows that the action was
dismissed without prejudice. Although respondents claimed in their motions to dismiss that
the action had prescribed and was unenforceable under Rule 16, Sections 1(f) and l(i)
respectively, the RTC's dismissal was premised on the finding that petitioners were suing as
heirs of the Sps. Sadhwani who, being Indian nationals, were prohibited from owning the
subject properties and therefore could not transmit rights over the same through succession.
In other words, the dismissal was based on Rule 16, Section 1(g), i.e., that the Complaint
states no cause of action.
As the dismissal was without prejudice (not having been premised on Sections 1(f),
(h) or (i) of Rule 16), the remedy of appeal was not available. Instead, petitioners should have
simply refiled the complaint.
Notably, the RTC also grounded the dismissal on petitioners' alleged lack of cause of
action. In Westmont Bank v. Funai Phils., Corp., the Court distinguished failure to state a cause
of action and lack of cause of action in this wise:
"Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to
dismiss a particular action. The former refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in
the pleading, while the latter to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the action.
Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of the
proceedings through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, while
dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time after the questions of fact
have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the
plaintiff."
Considering that, in this case, no stipulations, admissions, or evidence have yet been
presented, it is perceptibly impossible to assess the insufficiency of the factual basis on which
Sheriff Cachero asserts his cause of action. Hence, the ground of lack of cause of action could
not have been the basis for the dismissal of this action.
As applied to the instant case, lack of cause of action could not have been the basis for
the dismissal of the instant action considering that no stipulations, admissions or evidence
have yet been presented. The RTC's inaccurate pronouncement, however, should have been
challenged through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari and not through an appeal, as expressly
provided in Rule 41, Section 1. Moreover, the challenge should have been brought to the
357 of 578
Case Digests
Court of Appeals instead of filing the same directly with the Court, in accordance with the
rule on hierarchy of courts.
In view of the foregoing, the instant Petition must be dismissed as petitioners availed
themselves of the wrong remedy and violated the hierarchy of courts.
(2) YES, the Complaint was correctly dismissed for failure to state a cause of
action. The Court agrees with the RTC that petitioners failed to state a cause of action
because they premised their claim of ownership over the subject properties as heirs of the
Sps. Sadhwani who were unquestionably Indian nationals.
After a judicious examination of the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds that
petitioners failed to sufficiently allege the basis for their purported right over the subject
properties. Since the Sps. Sadhwani were prohibited from owning land in the instant case,
they were likewise prohibited from transmitting any right over the same through succession.
The complaint, however, was replete with allegations that the Sps. Sadhwani were the true
owners of the subject properties and that petitioners were suing respondent Gop, as heirs of
their parents.
It is undisputed that the Sps. Sadhwani were Indian nationals. Hence, they were
absolutely disqualified: 1) from owning lands in the Philippines, whether actually or
beneficially, or 2) from transmitting any right over the same to herein petitioners by
succession. As petitioners claim ownership over the Bel Air Property as purported heirs of
their parents, they failed to sufficiently allege the first element of a cause of action, i.e., a
"right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created." Even assuming therefore that respondent Gop committed the acts or omissions
complained of, said acts could not be considered a violation of a right which, as alleged in the
complaint, did not exist.
As the Sps. Sadhwani were Indian nationals, the laws of succession under the Civil
Code do not apply. Therefore, the complaint should have alleged, at the very least, that
petitioners were legal heirs of their parents and were entitled to inherit the Ritz
Condominium Unit under the laws of the Republic of India. In view of the foregoing provision,
the Court holds that petitioner cannot sidestep their burden of sufficiently pleading and
eventually proving a cause of action under foreign law even when claiming under Philippine
law may be more favorable or expedient. As they failed to sufficiently allege the basis for
their right under the national law of their parents, petitioners failed to state a cause of action
over the condominium unit.
In any event, the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action under
Rule 16, Section 1(g) is a dismissal without prejudice. Hence, petitioners are not barred from
refiling the same. Having passed upon the propriety of the dismissal, the Court finds no more
reason to rule upon the other issues raised in the Petition.
358 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALLAN NIEVERA

DOCTRINE
The Court has oft pronounced that both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses
which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that
the accused committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has the ring
of truth on the one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held
to prevail.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Nievera for the rape of AAA, which reads that on or
about December 17, 2014, accused Nievera, by means of force, threat and intimidation,
removed the garment and kissed AAA, then 14 years old, and had sexual intercourse with
her. Upon arraignment, Nievera pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial and trial ensued.
The prosecution narrated that on December 17, 2014, AAA asked permission from
her mother to visit certain Rachel. Before leaving, AAA went to the rooftop to call her brother,
and on her way down, she bumped into Nievera who persuaded her to go inside his
apartment on the pretext that he would just show her something, to which AAA heeded. Once
inside the apartment, Nievera grabbed her and then hugged her, uttering “Sandali lang to”.
Nievera, escorted AAA inside his room, made her lie down and removed all her clothing.
Frightened, she allowed him to mount her, kiss her and insert his penis into her vagina. After
succumbing to his bestial desires, Nievera removed his penis and AAA felt his semen coming
out. He then uttered, "Kahit anong mangyari wag kang magsusumbong," and ordered AAA to
clean up. On the same day, [Nievera] brought AAA to Rachel at Fortune 1 where they were
supposed to meet. AAA did not disclose what happened to anyone out of fear.
On December 29, 2014, AAA asked her mother for permission to go to the computer
shop, but on her way out, she again met Nievera. AAA was unaware that she would be
brought to Peach Blossom Hotel in Meycauayan. Bulacan. Nievera instructed AAA not to
remove her helmet and just proceed inside their room, where AAA was again raped by
Nievera. When she arrived home, AAA's mother asked about her whereabouts, to which she
replied that she just went to a computer shop. AAA's mother did not believe her because she
went to the said place but did not find her there. BBB, AAA's older sister, forced her to tell
the truth. AAA thus narrated to BBB the dastardly acts of Nievera.
For the defense, Nievera vehemently denied the imputations hurled against h, and
asserted that the court a quoi had no jurisdiction over the case because the alleged rape
incident happened in Meycauayan, Bulacan, and not Valenzuela.
The RTC convicted Nievera of the crime charged, as the prosecution was able to
establish all the elements of rape. The RTC did not give credence to Nievera’s defenses of
alibi and denial. Nievera appealed to the CA.
359 of 578
Case Digests
The CA affirmed Nievera’s conviction albeit with modification as to the amount of

damages. The CA held that AAA's testimony on the rape incident had the hallmarks of truth
and deserved full faith and credence. The CA added that AAA's demeanor after the rape
incident and her failure to immediately report to the authorities were irrelevant, especially
in light of the strength of her testimony in court which, in turn, was bolstered by the findings
of the medico-legal examination. The CA also ruled that Nievera's alibi and denial could not
prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of AAA that he committed the crime.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Nievera.
RULING
NO. The Court affirms the conviction of Nievera as the prosecution was able to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The two elements of rape — viz., (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of the
girl, and (2) that such act was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation — are
both present as duly proven by the prosecution in this case. AAA was able to testify in detail
how Nievera committed the rape. AAA's testimony, found to be clear, straightforward, and
believable, was given due weight and credence not just by the RTC, but also by the CA upon
appeal.
In rape cases, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone, uncorroborated
testimony of the rape victim, provided that her testimony is clear, convincing, and otherwise
consistent with human nature. This is a matter best assigned to the trial court which had the
first-hand opportunity to hear the testimonies of the witnesses and observe their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude during cross-examination. Such matters cannot be gathered from a
mere reading of the transcripts of stenographic notes. Hence, the trial court's findings carry
very great weight and substance.
Nievera, however, raises an issue out of the alleged improbability of AAA's testimony.
According to him, AAA testimony "fails to qualify as clear, positive, convincing, and otherwise
consistent." He argues that AAA clearly testified that she did not resist, and hence the
element of force or intimidation was not established. However, a perusal of AAA's testimony
revealed that there clearly was force or intimidation that enabled Nievera to consummate
the act.
While she admittedly did not offer strong resistance against the advances of Nievera,
she communicated to him that she was not giving her consent to what was being done to her.
This absence of consent was shown by (1) her saying "ayoko po," and (2) using one of her
hands to shove Nievera's body away from her. The sexual acts were, therefore, done to her
against her will and without her consent. It is important to stress that "[t]he gravamen of the
360 of 578
Case Digests
crime of rape under Art. 266-A (1) is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or
without her consent."
None of Nievera's arguments was able to convince the Court to discredit AAA's
credibility. The Court thus affirms the findings of both the RTC and the CA that AAA's
testimony deserves full faith and credit. Inevitably, Nievera's defense of alibi and denial
should fail in light of this finding. This must be so, for it is well-settled that the defenses of
alibi and denial cannot outweigh the candid and straightforward testimony of the private
complainant that the accused indeed had sexual intercourse with her through force,
intimidation, and against her will.
The Court has oft pronounced that both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses
which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness
that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which has
the ring of truth on the one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is
generally held to prevail.
Further, the continuing case law is that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused
must prove not only that he was at some other place when the crime was committed, but
also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime or its immediate
vicinity through clear and convincing evidence.
In the present case, Nievera was well within the immediate vicinity of the place of the
crime. In fact, the place where he was supposedly at during the time of the incident was just
beside the residential building where the rape incident happened.40 As it was not physically
impossible for him to be at the place of the crime, his defense of alibi must thus necessarily
fail. All told, the Court is therefore convinced of Nievera's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
361 of 578
Case Digests
DR. RUBEN C. BARTOLOME v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE
All changes sought by the petitioner fall within the ambit of R.A. 9048. Petitioner may
only avail of the appropriate judicial remedies when the changes/corrections sought through
the administrative proceeding are denied. By "appropriate," the Court holds that if the prayer
to administratively change petitioner's first name is denied, the same may be brought under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. If the prayers to administratively correct petitioner's middle
name and surname are denied, the same may be brought under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS
Petitioner Dr. Ruben Bartolome filed a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court before the RTC, seeking to correct the name ‘Feliciano Bartholome’ as
appearing in his birth certificate. He stated that he has been using the name ‘Ruben [Cruz]
Bartolome’ since his childhood.
Petitioner presented his Doctor of Medicine Diploma, CSC Certificate for Medical
Examiners Physician, PRC ID, Marriage Contract, Philippine Passport, Senior Citizens ID
Card, and NBI Clearance, all bearing the name “Ruben C. Bartolome”, to support his claim. It
appears from the records that although the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was notified
and the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque City was deputized to appear on behalf of
the State, no motion to dismiss was filed questioning the jurisdiction of the court or the venue
of the petition. In fact, the State did not present any controverting evidence nor file any
comment or opposition to the petition. It likewise appears from the records that petitioner's
father and siblings were never impleaded.
The RTC denied the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
insufficiency of evidence, and improper venue. As regards his first name, he should have filed
the petition in accordance with Republic Act (R.A.) 9048, which vested the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name with the city or municipal registrar
or consul general concerned. As regards his surname, the RTC denied the petition for
improper venue as the RTC of Manila where the corresponding civil registry is located was
the proper venue, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner appealed
to the CA, claiming that Rule 103 was the applicable remedy.
The CA denied the appeal. It noted that petitioner was seeking to change his first name
and to correct his surname as indicated in his birth certificate. Thus, the CA held that
petitioner should have filed a petition for the correction of entries in his birth certificate
under R.A. 9048, instead of a Rule 103 petition for change of name.
ISSUE
362 of 578
Case Digests
Whether the change/correction sought in petitioner's first name, middle name, and
surname, as appearing in his birth certificate, from "Feliciano Bartholome" to "Ruben Cruz
Bartolome" should be filed under R.A. 9048, Rule 103, or Rule 108 of the Rules.
RULING
NO. The CA and the OSG correctly found that the administrative proceeding under
R.A. 9048 applies to all corrections sought in the instant case.
In Republic v. Gallo, the Court outlined the difference between Rule 103 and Rule 108
of the Rules and the effects brought about by the enactment of R.A. 9048 as amended by R.A.
10172, on the aforementioned rules. The foregoing rules may be summarized as follows:
1. A person seeking 1) to change his or her first name, 2) to correct clerical or

typographical errors in the civil register, 3) to change/correct the day and/or month
of his or her date of birth, and/or 4) to change/correct his or her sex, where it is
patently clear that there was a clerical or typographical error or mistake, must first
file a verified petition with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality
where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept, in accordance with
the administrative proceeding provided under R.A. 9048 in relation to R.A. 10172. A
person may only avail of the appropriate judicial remedies under Rule 103 or Rule
108 in the aforementioned entries after the petition in the administrative
proceedings is filed and later denied.
2. A person seeking 1) to change his or her surname or 2) to change both his or her first
name and surname may file a petition for change of name under Rule 103, provided
that the jurisprudential grounds discussed in Republic v. Hernandez are present.
3. A person seeking substantial cancellations or corrections of entries in the civil

registry may file a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Rule 108.
As discussed in Lee v. Court of Appeals and more recently, in Republic v. Cagandahan,
R.A. 9048 "removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction
of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in
entries in the civil register."
In the instant case, petitioner seeks to change his first name, to include his middle,
and to correct the spelling of his surname, i.e., from "Feliciano Bartholome" as stated in his
birth certificate to "Ruben Cruz Bartolome". The Court agrees with the CA and the OSG that
the aforementioned changes and corrections are covered by Section 1 of R.A. 9048 as
amended by R.A. 10172.
While substantial corrections of entries in the civil register are still covered by Rule
108, typographical or clerical corrections must now be filed under R.A. 9048 as
amended. Section 2 of the said law defines clerical or typographical errors.
363 of 578
Case Digests
Evidently the test for whether a correction is clerical or substantial is found in the
provision itself. Misspelled names or missing entries are clerical corrections if they are
visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding and if they may be readily verified by
referring to the existing records in the civil register. They must not, however, involve any
change in nationality, age or status.
As regards petitioner's misspelled surname, it bears noting that in 1988 and prior to
the enactment of R.A. 9048 as amended, the Court, in Labayo-Rowe v. Republic, held that a
correction in the spelling of therein petitioner's surname from "Labayo/Labayu" to "Labayo"
was a mere clerical error that could be corrected through a summary proceeding under Rule
108.
In Labayo-Rowe, the Court defined clerical errors as "those harmless and innocuous
changes such as the correction of names clearly misspelled, occupation of parents, errors
that are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, errors made by a clerk or
transcriber, or a mistake in copying or writing." It can be readily seen that this
jurisprudential definition was expressly incorporated into R.A. 9048, which, as already
discussed, expressly removed the correction of clerical or typographical errors from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. To obviate any further confusion on the matter, the
Court categorically holds that typographical or clerical errors in a person's surname must
likewise be corrected through the administrative proceeding under R.A. 9048.
As herein petitioner's allegedly misspelled surname, "Bartholome," may be readily

corrected by merely referring to the existing records of the civil registrar, such as the
surnames of petitioner's parents and immediate family members, the petition should have
been filed under R.A. 9048 and not under Rule 103 of the Rules. It likewise follows that the
petition should have been filed with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality
where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept, in accordance with Section
3 of R.A. 9048 and not in accordance with the venue provided in Rule 103.
In sum, all changes sought by the petitioner fall within the ambit of R.A. 9048.
Petitioner may only avail of the appropriate judicial remedies when the changes/corrections
sought through the administrative proceeding are denied. By "appropriate," the Court holds
that if the prayer to administratively change petitioner's first name is denied, the same may
be brought under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. If the prayers to administratively correct
petitioner's middle name and surname are denied, the same may be brought under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.
364 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPUNES v. HILARIO DE CASTRO Y SANTOS ALIAS “DACOY”

DOCTRINE
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction. It
is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs must be established
with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on their identity, the
prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and account for each link
in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court
as evidence of the crime.
FACTS
Two separate Informations were filed against accused De Castro for violations of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. 9165. Upon arraignment, De Castro pleaded not guilty to
both charges.
For the prosecution, the witnesses narrated that on August 4, 2010, at around 2am,
PINSP Diaz instructed the police to conduct the buy-bust operation after receiving a tip from
the Informant that the appellant De Castro was selling shabu for P300.00. The police
prepared the Pre-Operational Report, and Coordination Form and PINSP Diaz signed these
two documents; the police brought the Pre-Operational Report, the Coordination Form, and
the Certificate of Coordination, to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency ("PDEA") to
comply with the requirement of a legitimate buy-bust operation; the police prepared the
buy-bust money consisting of three pieces genuine P100.00 bills, and recorded the operation
in the logbook; after the police accomplished the documents, the police and the Informant
went to Purok 2, Montillano Street, Alabang Muntinlupa City ("target site"). PO3 Amodia and
the Informant arrived at the target side at 3am.
There, they saw a shirtless man who turned out to be De Castro and approached them.
The Informant told De Castro that they wanted to buy P300.00 worth of shabu. Upon
consummation of the transaction, PO3 Amodia introduced himself to the appellant De Castro
as a policeman, and grabbed the appellant De Castro's right hand which was then holding the
plastic container; PO2 Hernaez frisked the appellant De Castro and recovered the buy-bust
money; PO3 Amodia retrieved from the appellant De Castro's plastic container, two more
plastic sachets; PO3 Amodia arrested the appellant De Castro, and informed the appellant De
Castro of his constitutional rights, and the reason for the appellant De Castro's arrest; at the
place of arrest and seizure PO3 Amodia marked the plastic container with "HDC," and the
transparent plastic sachets with "HDC-2" and "HDC-3;" the police brought the appellant De
Castro to the Crime Investigation Division Office ("CID Office") for proper inventory and
documentation, to avoid commotion; PO3 Amodia was in custody of the seized contraband
from the place of arrest, to the CID Office. At the CID Office, the police prepared the Certificate
of Inventory; several attempts to summon representatives from the media, the Department
of Justice ("DOJ"), and an elected public official were futile, thus, the police were forced to
365 of 578
Case Digests
proceed with the inventory even without the representatives from the media, the
Department of Justice ("DOJ"), and an elected public official.
The RTC ruled that the prosecution successfully proved the existence of all the
elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. It further ruled that the
buy-bust operation was well-documented, from the Pre-Operational Report, Coordination
with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), photocopying of the buy-bust money,
the briefing, and the actual operation. Accused appealed to the CA.
The CA affirmed De Castro’s conviction and ruled that all the elements of the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs and illegal sale of dangerous drugs were proven. It
further ruled that non-compliance with the requirements under Section 21 does not
invalidate the seizure and custody of the contraband. What is important is that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. Lastly, it ruled that De Castro failed
to show that the police officers deviated from the regular performance of their duties, hence
the presumption of regularity in performance by police officers was sustained.
ISSUE
Whether De Castro's guilt for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 was proven
RULING
NO. The appeal is granted. De Castro is accordingly acquitted.
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction.
It is essential, therefore, that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs must be
established with moral certainty. Thus, in order to obviate any unnecessary doubt on their
identity, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same and
account for each link in the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up
to their presentation in court as evidence of the crime.
In this connection, the Court has repeatedly held that Section 21, Article II of RA 9165,
the applicable law at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, strictly requires that
confiscation: and (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the
presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public
of Justice (DOJ).
Verily, the three required witnesses should already be physically present at the
time of the conduct of the inventory of the seized items which, again, must be
immediately done at the place of seizure and confiscation — a requirement that can
366 of 578
Case Digests
easily be complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation
is, by its nature, a planned activity.
While the Court has clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with
the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible; and the failure of the
does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items void, this has always been
with the caveat that the prosecution still needs to satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved.
However, in this case, it is evident that the police officers blatantly disregarded the
requirements laid down under Section 21 and they had no valid excuse for their deviation
from the rules.
It is true that the police officers marked the seized drugs at the place of arrest.
Thereafter, to avoid any possible commotion since they noticed that people were starting to
come out, they decided to bring the accused and the seized evidence to their office for proper
inventory. They also said that they did not have the necessary documents to conduct the
inventory at the place of arrest that is why they decided to move to the police office.
The Court points out that, as testified by PO3 Amodia, none of the three required
witnesses was present at the time of arrest of the accused and the seizure of the drugs.
Neither were they present during the inventory of the seized drugs at the police office.
Based on the testimony of PO3 Amodia, it is obvious that the police officers merely
tried to "call-in" the three witnesses after the conduct of the buy-bust operation already.
Indubitably, this is the very practice that the law seeks to prevent. The practice of police
operatives of not bringing to the intended place of arrest the three witnesses, when they
could easily do so — and "calling them in" to the place of inventory to witness the inventory
and photographing of the drugs only after the buy-bust operation has already been finished
— does not achieve the purpose of the law in having these witnesses prevent or insulate
against the planting of drugs. Also, that the police officers tried to call several persons and
nobody arrived without sufficient explanation of the attending circumstances is not
indicative that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the requisite regarding the
presence of the mandatory witnesses.
Verily, none of the abovementioned circumstances was attendant in the case. Their
excuse for non-compliance is hardly acceptable. Moreover, the buy-bust team could have
strictly complied with the requirements of Section 21 had they been more prudent in doing
what is required in their job. The integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have
thus been compromised, thus necessitating the acquittal of De Castro.
367 of 578
Case Digests
PNOC ALTERNATIVE FUELS CORPORATION v. NATIONAL GRID CORPORATION OF

THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
Section 4 of Rule 67 further states that a final order sustaining the right to expropriate
the property, such as the assailed Order of Expropriation, may be appealed by any party
aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just
compensation to be paid. It is clear from the foregoing that the proper remedy of a defendant
in an expropriation case who wishes to contest an order of expropriation is not to file a
certiorari petition and allege that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
order of expropriation. The remedy is to file an appeal of the order of expropriation.
FACTS
Respondent National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP) filed a Complaint for
Expropriation against petitioner PNOC Alternative Fuels Corporation (PNAC), Orica
Philippines, Inc. (Orica), Edgardo Manieda, Winy Manieda, Mercedes Manieda, Nemy
Manieda Amado, Danilo Manieda, Heirs of Leonardo Serios, and Cresencia Toribio Soriano,
represented by Imelda Villareal.
NGCP claims that it is a private corporation engaged in the business of transmitting

electric power from generating plants of power producers to distributors, who was granted
a "franchise to operate, manage and maintain, and in connection therewith, to engage in the
business of conveying or transmitting electricity through high voltage back-bone system of
interconnected transmission lines, substations and related facilities, system operations, and
other activities that are necessary to support the safe and reliable operation of the
transmission system and construct, install, finance, manage, improve, expand, operate,
maintain, rehabilitate, repair and refurbish the present nationwide transmission system of
the Republic of the Philippines" under Republic Act No. 9511. In order for it to construct and
maintain the Mariveles-Limay 230 kV Transmission Line Project, it sought to expropriate,
upon payment of just compensation, a certain area of a parcel of land situated at Barangay
Batangas II, Mariveles, Bataan and Barangay Lamao, Limay, Bataan. The subject property is
part of the Petrochemical Industrial Park, which was originally part of a parcel of land of the
public domain reserved by the government for the Lamao Horticultural Experiment Station
through E.O. No. 48, series of 1919.
In 1976, Presidential Decree No. 949 was issued, which transferred the
administration, management, and ownership of the parcel of land of the public domain
located at Lamao, Limay, Bataan covered by P.P. No. 361, as amended by P.P. No. 630, to the
Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).
In 2011, respondent NGCP filed its Complaint seeking to expropriate the subject
property from petitioner PAFC. According to respondent NGCP, it sought to exercise its right
of eminent domain over the subject property because negotiations conducted between
368 of 578
Case Digests
petitioner PAFC and respondent NGCP on the establishment of transmission lines on the
subject property were unsuccessful. Respondent NGCP invoked its general authority to
exercise the right of eminent domain under Section 4 of R.A. No. 9511. During the pendency
of the expropriation case, in 2013, R.A. No. 10516 was passed by Congress, which expanded
the use of the Petrochemical Industrial Park to include businesses engaged in energy and
energy-allied activities or energy-related infrastructure projects, or of such other business
activities that will promote its best economic use.
The RTC issued the assailed Order of Expropriation and ruled that respondent NGCP
has a lawful right to expropriate the subject property upon payment of just compensation.
The RTC held that nowhere in the annals of legislation and jurisprudence is it stated that a
property already devoted to public use or purpose is invulnerable to expropriation. PAFC
moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, this instant appeal under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
ISSUES
1. Whether petitioner PAFC was correct in filing its Rule 45 Petition directly before the
Court, and
2. Whether the RTC was correct in issuing the assailed Order of Expropriation, which
held that respondent NGCP is empowered to expropriate the subject property under
R.A. No. 9511.
RULING
(1) YES. Section 4 of Rule 67 further states that a final order sustaining the right to
expropriate the property, such as the assailed Order of Expropriation, may be appealed by
any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from
determining the just compensation to be paid. It is clear from the foregoing that the proper
remedy of a defendant in an expropriation case who wishes to contest an order of
expropriation is not to file a certiorari petition and allege that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the order of expropriation. The remedy is to file an appeal of
the order of expropriation.
Hence, under the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court, petitioner PAFC had
the right to appeal the assailed Order of Expropriation. The Court holds that the instant
appeal, although mistakenly worded by petitioner PAFC as a "Petition for Certiorari", is for
all intents and purposes a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. It must be noted
that petitioner PAFC repeatedly invoked Rule 45 in filing the instant appeal, alleging that the
instant appeal is "pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising a pure question of law to
set aside or nullify the [assailed Order of Expropriation]."
It can be surmised from the instant Petition that petitioner PAFC resorted to filing its
appeal directly before the Court instead of the Court of Appeals (CA) because it believed that
the instant Petition only involved pure questions of law. Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
in all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be filed
369 of 578
Case Digests
directly before the Court, not via a notice of appeal or record on appeal, but through a petition
for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
(2) YES. Upon a simple perusal of Section 4 of R.A. No. 9511, it states in no equivocal
terms that the Grantee (referring to respondent NGCP) may acquire such private property
as is actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is
granted." Section 4 of R.A. No. 9511 is clear, plain, and free from any ambiguity. Respondent
NGCP is allowed to exercise the right of eminent domain only with respect to private
property. The subject property, though owned by a State instrumentality, is
considered patrimonial property that assumes the nature of private property.
First and foremost, it is admitted by all parties that the subject property, sitting within
the Petrochemical Industrial Park, is an industrial zone. In fact, the crux of petitioner PAFC's
Petition is the argument that since the Petrochemical Industrial Park has been declared by
law as an industrial zone dedicated to the development of the petrochemical industry, it
should be deemed a land dedicated to public use, i.e., a land of public dominion.
However, in Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corp., the Court held that
when the subject property therein was classified by the government as an industrial
zone, the subject property therein "had been declared patrimonial and it is only then
that the prescriptive period began to run."
Further, it is apparent from R.A. No. 10516 and its IRR that the industrial estate is
being owned, managed, and operated by the State, not in its sovereign capacity, but rather in
its private capacity. Simply stated, the management and operation of the industrial estate is
proprietary in character, serving the economic ends of the State.
The defining characteristic of land of public domain is inalienability. To reiterate,

upon the explicit declaration of alienability and disposability, the land ceases to possess the
characteristics inherent in properties of public dominion, namely, that they are outside the
commerce of man, cannot be acquired by prescription, and cannot be registered under the
land registration law, and accordingly assume the nature of patrimonial property of the
State, that is property owned by the State in its private capacity. Hence, an express
declaration of alienability and disposability by the State negates the characterization of
property as land of public dominion.
Applying the foregoing in the instant case, the laws governing the subject property
have unequivocally declared that the subject property is alienable, disposable, appropriable,
may be conveyed to private persons or entities, and is subject to private rights.
Under P.D. No. 949, the Petrochemical Industrial Park was explicitly made alienable
and disposable for lease, sale, and conveyance to private entities or persons for the conduct
of related industrial activities. The alienable and disposable nature of the Petrochemical
Industrial Park was further expanded when P.D. No. 949 was subsequently amended by R.A.
370 of 578
Case Digests
No. 10516. The said law allowed the lease, sale, and conveyance of the Petrochemical
Industrial Park for purposes of commercial utilization by private sector investors
371 of 578
Case Digests
DANILO DE VILLA Y GUINTO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE
As a general rule, strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21, RA 9165 is
mandatory. It is only in exceptional cases that the Court may allow non-compliance with these
requirements, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of justifiable
grounds to allow departure from the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Danilo De Villa for violation of Section 11(3), Article
II of RA 9165, for having in possession four (4) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu", having a total
weight of 0.12 gram. Upon arraignment, Danilo pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
The prosecution witnesses PO1 Hamilton Salanguit and SPO1 Edward Plata narrated
that on May 4, 2011, at around 3:10pm, they were conducting a checkpoint in Barangay Rizal
when they flagged down a Green Honda Wave motorcycle driven by accused-appellant with
his wife Josefina Maria de Villa as backrider. Accused-appellant was not wearing helment
and shoes, and was only clad in sando. PO2 Salanguit approached accused-appellant and
thereafter noticed that the motorcycle did not have a license plate. He asked accused-
appellant to show his driver’s license, but the latter could not present the same. PO2
Salanguit then requested accused-appellant to show the registration papers. Accused-
appellant opened the motorcycle's utility box and took out a plastic containing the LTO -
issued license plate (WG-7720) as well as the photocopies of the motorcycle's expired
registration papers under the name of Alex Dayandayan which he handed to SPO1 Plata. At
this instance, PO2 Sanlanguit saw two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance inside the utility box which he confiscated. Immediately, the police officers bodily
searched accused-appellant and ordered him to empty the contents of his pocket. From
accused-appellant's right pocket, two (2) more plastic sachets were recovered. PO2
Salanguit then marked the confiscated sachets with "DGD-1, " ["]DGD-2, " "DGD-3, " and
"DGD-4, " which stands for the initials of "Danilo Guinto De Villa. "
Afterwards, accused-appellant and his wife, along with the seized items and the
motorcycle, were brought to the barangay hall where accused-appellant was photographed
with the seized plastic sachets; and an Inventory of the Property Seized/Confiscated was
prepared by PO2 Salanguit and signed by Department of Justice representative Benilda Diaz,
media representative Napoleon Cabral and Barangay Chairman Ramil Sanchez. In Chemistry
Report No. BD-119-2011 dated 05 May 2011 issued by P/Insp. Herminia Carandang Llacuna,
the test yielded a positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a prohibited drug.
Further investigation revealed that accused-appellant and his family were reportedly
involved in the illicit drug trade in Poblacion, Tuy, Batangas.
372 of 578
Case Digests
The defense, on the other hand, averred that on that same day, he and his wife went
to Balayan, Batangas – using the motorcycle of his friend Alexander Dayandayan -to
purchase goods. While they were traversing Barangay Rizal in Tuy, Batangas, they noticed a
police patrol car was tailing them, and eventually flagged them down. A police officer, whose
nameplate reads "SPO1 Buhay", alighted and asked him why the vehicle did not have [a]
license number. Accused-appellant answered that it was inside the utility box which he
immediately opened to retrieve the license plate and the registration papers. He handed
them to SPO1 Buhay, but a certain police officer named Romasanta approached and told
them that it is better to go to the police station for further investigation.
The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove the existence of all
the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.8 The apprehending officers properly
observed the legal requirements laid down under Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165.9
Lastly, it ruled that the defense of frame-up raised by the accused is without merit. Danilo
appealed to the CA.
The CA affirmed Danilo’s conviction and likewise ruled that all the elements of Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs were duly proven by the prosecution.15 It did not give any
merit to the argument of the accused that the arresting officers are not members of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and that the former did not coordinate with
said agency prior to his arrest. It further ruled that the police officers were able to follow the
procedure laid down in Section 21, and that the integrity of the evidence is presumed to have
been preserved. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the police officers sufficiently complied with Section 21 of RA 9165
RULING
YES, the Court likewise upholds the CA when it held that the police officers
substantially complied with the same.
As a general rule, strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21, RA 9165 is
mandatory. It is only in exceptional cases that the Court may allow non-compliance with
these requirements, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of
justifiable grounds to allow departure from the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team.
To recall, this case started with a checkpoint in Barangay Rizal, Tuy, Batangas where
the accused was caught in flagrante delicto possessing two (2) sachets of shabu. There was
no buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers, but a mere routine check. Thus, there
is sufficient justification for their slight deviation from the rules in Section 21.
Verily, the prosecution was able to establish the integrity of the corpus delicti and an
unbroken chain of custody. The Court has explained in a catena of cases the four (4) links
373 of 578
Case Digests
that should be established in the chain of custody of the confiscated item: first, the seizure
and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.28 In this
case, the prosecution was able to prove all the links that should be established in the chain
of custody.
The Court thus agrees with the CA that the police officers were able to strictly comply
with the requirements laid down in Section 21. The seized items were immediately marked
at the place of arrest by PO2 Salanguit. Since the arrest of the accused and seizure of the
dangerous drugs were merely a result of the routine checkpoint conducted by the police
officers and not because of a pre-planned buy-bust operation, they had a sufficient
justification to delay the conduct of the inventory and photography of the seized items at a
different venue. In addition, it is worthy to note that despite the fact that said arrest of the
accused and seizure of the illegal drugs was not planned, it is apparent that they exerted
enough reasonable efforts to ensure that the physical inventory and photography of the
seized items were conducted in the presence of the accused, a representative from the media,
a representative of the Department of Justice, and a barangay official immediately after the
arrest and seizure at the barangay hall - a requirement that many police officers normally
fail to comply with even in a planned buy-bust operation.
Unquestionably, the police officers sufficiently complied with the requirements laid
down in Section 21, thus preserving the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.
The defense further posits that the arresting officers are not members of the PDEA,
nor did they contact or coordinate with the latter in relation to the instant case.
However, as correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General and settled by
the CA, non-participation of the PDEA does not automatically affect the validity of a buy-bust
operation. Especially as in the case where there was no buy-bust operation, but an in
flagrante delicto arrest and seizure by reason of a routine checkpoint operation. Thus, there
is no expectation for the police officers to have pre-coordinated with the PDEA.
374 of 578
Case Digests
PAULO JACKSON POLANGCOS Y FRANCISCO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE
The Court thus stresses that any evidence seized as a result of searches and seizures
conducted in violation of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution is inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding" in accordance with the exclusionary rule in Section 3(2), Article III
of the 1987 Constitution.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Paulo Jackson Polangcos for violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165, for having in possession one (1) plastic sachet containing 0.05 grams
of white crystalline substance suspected as shabu. Upon arraignment, Danilo pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged. Pre-trial and tried on the merits ensued.
The prosecution witness, SPO2 Juntanilla, testified that on August 16, 2015, at around
6:40pm, he was on board a mobile patrol car with his team along J.P. Rizal St., Marikina City,
when they spotted a motorcycle without a plate number. They then pursued the motorcycle.
Issued a ticket to the accused-appellant for having no plate number and for driving with an
expired license. Upon the conduct of body frisk by SPO2 Juntanilla, a sachet of suspected
shabu, a dangerous drug, fell from accused-appellant’s cap. At that point, SPO2 Juntanilla and
his team arrested him and informed him of his rights under the Constitution.
The defense was unable to present any evidence, since Polangcos was absent during
the scheduled presentation of defense evidence.
The RTC convicted Polangcos of the crime charged. The RTC relied on the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty to hold that the prosecution
was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item were
preserved. It further held that the non-compliance with the procedure outlined in Section
21, RA 9165 did not render Polangcos' arrest illegal. It also ruled that while perfect
compliance with the chain of custody rule is the ideal, it was its view that it was impossible
to always obtain an unbroken chain of custody. It thus considered as not fatal the perceived
break in the chain of custody pointed out by the defense, i.e. the absence of the name of the
officer to whom the seized item was turned over in the Chain of Custody Form. Polangcos
appealed to the CA.
The CA affirmed Polangcos’ conviction, finding all the elements of the crime charged.
The CA also held that despite the fact that the police officers failed to strictly comply with the
chain-of-custody requirement, it was not fatal for the prosecution's cause as "what is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused." The CA further declared that Polangcos could no longer assail the validity of his
arrest because "any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before
375 of 578
Case Digests
the accused enters his plea on arraignment." Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was
denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
(1) Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Polangcos; (2) Whether there is
a valid consented search
RULING
(1) YES. The CA manifestly overlooked the undisputed fact that the seized item was
confiscated from Polangcos as he was being issued a traffic violation ticket. His violations
consisted of (1) not having a plate number, and (2) expired official receipt (OR) and
certificate of registration (CR) of the motorcycle he was riding.
Polangcos' main violation or the violation for which he was apprehended, which was
the lack of a plate number in his motorcycle, was punishable only by a city ordinance that
prescribes as penalty the fine of P500.00. Even SPO2 Rey J. Juntanilla (SPO2 Juntanilla), the
apprehending officer, recognized that he arrested Polangcos even though the penalty for his
violation was merely a fine.
Meanwhile, Polangcos' second violation - having expired OR and CR for the

motorcycle - is likewise punishable only by fine. Land Transportation Office (LTO)
Department Order No. 2008-39, or the "Revised Schedule of LTO Fines and Penalties for
Traffic and Administrative Violations," provides that the offense of "operating/allowing the
operation of MV with a suspended/revoked Certificate/Official Receipt of registration" is
punishable only with a fine of P1,000.00.
In view of the foregoing, SPO2 Juntanilla thus conducted an illegal search when he
frisked Polangcos for the foregoing violations which were punishable only by fine. He had no
reason to "arrest" Polangcos because the latter's violation did not entail a penalty of
imprisonment. It was thus not, as it could not have been, a search incidental to a lawful arrest
as there was no, as there could not have been any, lawful arrest to speak of.
The case of Cristobal squarely applies to this case. There was likewise no valid arrest
to speak of in this case - as Polangcos' violations were also punishable by fine only — and
there could thus be no valid "search incidental to lawful arrest." Ultimately, Polangcos must
be similarly acquitted, as the corpus delicti of the crime, i.e. the seized drug, is excluded
evidence, inadmissible in any proceeding, including this one, against him.
Parenthetically, it must be pointed out that the CA erred in equating the validity of the
arrest of Polangcos with the admissibility of the evidence used against him. While the CA was
correct in ruling that "any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made
before the accused enters his plea on arraignment," the said principle, however, would not
apply to Polangcos' contention that the evidence used to convict him was inadmissible.
Polangcos' argument was not only that he was illegally arrested, but that he was also
376 of 578
Case Digests
wrongfully convicted because the evidence used against him was inadmissible. The Court
thus stresses that any evidence seized as a result of searches and seizures conducted in
violation of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution is inadmissible "for any purpose in
any proceeding" in accordance with the exclusionary rule in Section 3(2), Article III of the
1987 Constitution.
(2) NO. In People v. Chua Ho San, the Court held that "to constitute a waiver [of the
constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches], it must first appear that the right
exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right."
Following the foregoing standard, there is no legitimate waiver of the constitutional

right against illegal searches because there is no proof of an actual intention to relinquish
the said right.
To recall, SPO2 Juntanilla admitted that he "immediately frisked the accused before
the issuance of the ticket and mentioned that he conducted the frisking due to his initial
traffic violation." It was a unilateral decision on the part of SPO2 Juntanilla to frisk Polangcos
even if he had no reason to because, as discussed, the penalty for the latter's violations was
only by fine. It was not intimated, much less was it proved, that Polangcos knowingly
consented to any search conducted on him by SPO2 Juntanilla. Thus, there could be no valid
consented search in this case.
It is also worth pointing out that the circumstances under which the seized item was
discovered appears to be dubious. SPO2 Juntanilla claims that the plastic sachet fell from
Polangcos' cap when the latter removed it as SPO2 Juntanilla was conducting a search on
him.
It bears emphasis, however, that "evidence to be believed must not only proceed from
the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself, such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances."
In contrast to this, the testimony of SPO2 Juntanilla as to the circumstances surrounding the
discovery of the seized item does not inspire belief.
377 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EMALYN N. MORENO

DOCTRINE
inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after seizure and
confiscation. The said inventory must be done in the presence of the aforementioned required
witnesses, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
FACTS
An Information was filed against Emalyn Moreno for violation of Section 5, Article 11
of Republic Act 9165, for selling one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
shabu weighing 0.016 grams. Upon arraignment, Moreno pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial and
trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution shows that on July 11, 2012, at around 9pm, Agent Marleo B. Sumale,
an agent of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) was informed by a fellow PDEA
agent that a certain person named “Ara”, a waitress at the WRJ Resto Bar in Barangay Salong,
Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, was peddling dangerous drugs in said establishment. Agent
Sumale, with other PDEA agents – formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation against
Ara. Agent Sumale was designated as the poseur-buyer while Agent Catain was assigned to
be the arresting officer. Agent Sumale and the informant proceeded to the establishment. At
12 midnight, a woman, later identified as “Ara, approached them. After the informant
introduced Agent Sumale to “Ara”, the latter handed to him a plastic sachet containing
suspected shabu. Upon receipt, Agent Sumale handed to accused-appellant the marked
P500.00 bill. Thereafter, Agent Sumale removed his baseball cap, signifying the completion
of the transaction. After which, the other agents converged on the scene and effected the
arrest of Moreno. Agent Citain frisked Moreno and found the marked bull. Agent Sumale then
placed the marking "SMB 12/07/12" on the sachet containing suspected shabu. The
apprehending team, along with the accused-appellant, then proceeded to the PDEA office
where the inventory of the confiscated arms was done. Agent Sumale personally brought a
letter-request from PDEA to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory for the conduct of
laboratory examination on the powdery white substance inside the sachet. Agent Sumale
endorsed the sachet to PO1 Alex Redruco, who, in turn, turned it over to PSI Eugenio Garcia,
a forensic chemist, for the conduct of chemical examinations. The white substance, as
determined by PSI Garcia in Chemistry Report No. D-065-12, was positive for shabu.
For the defense, it interposed the defense of alibi and frame-up. She alleged that on
that same day at around 6pm, she reported for work at the WRJ Resto Bar. Three (3) hours
later, she returned home to check on her child. At around 11pm, while on board a tricycle
returning to said establishment, a group of persons flagged down said tricycle and forced her
to alight. The group then asked if she was "for hire" in her workplace, to which she answered
in the negative. The group then forced accused-appellant into their vehicle and brought her
378 of 578
Case Digests
to the PDEA office. After twenty (20) minutes of waiting in said vehicle, the group brought
accused-appellant back to where she was taken. Upon arrival thereat, the group took
pictures of her, after which accused-appellant was again forced into the vehicle. At around
3:00 a.m., accused-appellant was brought to the PDEA office and was placed in a detention
cell.
The RTC convicted Moreno of the crime charged. It further ruled that although it may
be true that the inventory of the confiscated item was conducted at the PDEA office in
Calapan City, and not at the crime scene, the Court finds no sufficient reason to suspect that
the "shabu" and buy-bust money recovered from the accused were unduly compromised.
Besides, granting arguendo that the PDEA agents failed to strictly comply with Section 21(1),
Article II of R.A. No. 9165, such omission is not fatal and does not automatically render the
accused's arrest as illegal or the items seized/confiscated from her inadmissible. Moreno
appealed to the CA.
The CA affirmed Moreno’s conviction. Hence, the instant appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Moreno
RULING
YES. In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of
proving the elements of the crime charged, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body
of the crime. In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation
of the law. While it is true that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven
procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors, the law
nevertheless also requires strict compliance with procedures laid down by it to ensure that
rights are safeguarded.
In all drugs cases, therefore, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial in
any prosecution that follows such operation. Chain of custody means the duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of
seizure/confiscation, to receipt in the forensic laboratory, to safekeeping, to presentation in
court until destruction. The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug
confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as
exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude
as that required to make a finding of guilt.
In this connection, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of
the commission of the alleged crime, lays down the procedure that police operatives must
requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after
seizure or confiscation; and (2) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in
the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public
379 of 578
Case Digests
of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.

required witnesses, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.
In the present case, none of the three required witnesses was present at the time of
seizure and apprehension, and only two of them were present during the conduct of the
inventory. The testimony of Agent Sumale confirms that only the agents of the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) were present in the conduct of the buy-bust operation,
and that the inventory was not immediately conducted and was only done subsequently at
the PDEA office. Worse, only two of the three required witnesses — the media representative
and the elected official —were present in the conduct of the inventory done at the PDEA
office.
The records of this case are bereft of any explanation as to why no representative
from the DOJ was present in the inventory. The prosecution, despite its burden to prove the
officers' compliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21, did not address the issue in
their pleadings, and the RTC and the CA instead had to rely on supposed substantial
compliance with the rules to justify Moreno's conviction.
It is important to stress that the prosecution has the burden of (1) proving its
compliance with Section 21, RA 9165, and (2) providing a sufficient explanation in case of
non-compliance.
The Court emphasizes that while it is laudable that police officers exert earnest efforts
in catching drug pushers, they must always do so within the bounds of the law. Without the
insulating presence of the representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public
official during the seizure and marking of the sachets of shabu, the evils of switching,
"planting" or contamination of the evidence would again rear their ugly heads as to negate
the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the sachet of shabu that was
evidence herein of the corpus delicti. Thus, this failure adversely affected the
trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the insulating presence of such
witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody.
380 of 578
Case Digests
MARGARITA FERNANDO, et.al. v. ROSALINDA RAMOS PAGUYO, et.al.

DOCTRINE
According to jurisprudence, an annulment of decision may not be invoked (1) where the
party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other
appropriate remedy and lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies
through his own fault or negligence.
FACTS
Herein respondents and Lucena Ramos are the nine (9) children and heirs of the
spouses Dominador Ramos and Damiana Porciuncula (Spouses Ramos). On the other hand,
petitioner Margarita, Felix, and Remigia Fernando are the collateral heirs of Tomas
Fernando. The Spouses Ramos owned a piece of agricultural land located at Barrio,
Agricultura, Munoz, Nueva Ecija, with an area of 3.1541 hectares. In 1945, The Ramoses both
died intestate.
On October 30, 1952, Lucena unilaterally executed a Declaration of Heirship declaring

that she is the sole heir of spouses Ramos. Hence, Lucena was able to transfer the ownership
of the subject property in her name, and a TCT was issued in her favor. Lucena sold to Tomas
the subject property through a pacto de retro sale dated August 14, 1955, for P8.800.00, with
Lucena having been granted the right to redeem the subject property within three years from
the date of the sale.
Aggrieved, in 1955, the respondents filed a complaint against the spouses Lucena and
Alfredo Mateo before the CFI of Nueva Ecija. The CFI, in its January 25, 1961 Decision,
ordered the cancellation of the TCT in the name of Lucena and the issuance of a new title in
favor of all the legal heirs of the spouses Ramos. On appeal, the CA affirmed the CFI Decision
which became final and executory.
As a consequence of the final and executory CA Decision, the subject property was
subdivided by and among the heirs of the spouses Ramos, who are in open, continuous,
exclusive, adverse, and notorious possession in the concept of owners.
In 1993, the petitioners Fernandos learned of the January 25, 1961 Decision. Thus,
Margarita went to the residence of spouses Lucena and Alfredo to demand that the latter
comply with the said Decision. An alleged verbal agreement was entered into between the
petitioners Fernandos and spouses Lucena and Alfredo, wherein the latter were given more
time to pay or surrender the title of the subject property to the petitioners Fernandos. During
this time, the spouses Lucena and Alfredo were in possession of the 2-hectare portion of the
subject property while one Vicente Tobias was in the possession of the remaining 1 hectare.
In 1997, the petitioners Fernandos again demanded that the spouses Lucena and
Alfredo comply with their verbal agreement, which the spouses refused to pay nor surrender
381 of 578
Case Digests
the title. Hence, petitioners Fernandos filed a complaint for specific performance and
damages, docketed as Civil case No. 31-SD(97), to enforce the oral agreement covering the
entire subject property against the spouses Lucena and Alfredo. The RTC rendered its
Decision, (1) declaring and confirming consolidation of owners in Tomas of the real property
covered by TCT No. NT-12647; and (2) ordering the defendant-spouses Lucena and Alfredo
to pay petitioners Fernandos P20,000.00. The spouses Lucena and Alfredo appealed to the
CA, which was denied or failure to file appellants’ brief within the prescribed period.
On August 11, 2006, respondents filed a Petition for Annulment of Decision and
damages under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court before the CA. The CA found merit in the Petition
for Annulment of Decision. The CA held that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over Civil Case No.
31-SD(97) because of the undisputed fact that the respondents, who are indispensable
parties, were not impleaded in the said case. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which
was denied. Hence, the instant appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the CA gravely erred in giving due course to the Complaint for Annulment of
Decision filed by the respondents and declaring the Decision of the Regional Trial Court in
Civil Case No. 31-SD(97) annulled and set aside for lack of jurisdiction
RULING
NO. Under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the remedy of annulment of decision "is
resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from
judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner, and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or
denial of due process." According to Section 3 of Rule 47, if based on extrinsic fraud, the
action must be filed within four (4) years from its discovery; and if based on lack of
jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.
In the instant case, it goes without saying that in an action for specific performance
compelling the transfer of the subject property co-owned by nine heirs who have already
been adjudged by a final and executory decision as co-owners of the subject property, the
latter are indispensable parties in such an action. Jurisprudence has indubitably held that in
a suit involving co-owned property, all the co-owners of such property are indispensable
parties.
The petitioners Fernandos cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the respondents
have been declared with finality as the co-owners of the subject property, being the co-heirs
of the original owners of the subject property, i.e., the spouses Ramos. In fact, the petitioners
Fernandos themselves alleged that in the very verbal agreement they sought to enforce, they
agreed that the parties should "abide by the decision in CA-G.R. No. 20833-R (2146 of Nueva
Ecija)" and that "the decision in Civil Case No. 2146 x x x may be completely satisfied."
382 of 578
Case Digests
Therefore, with the joinder of all indispensable parties being a condition sine qua non
to the exercise of judicial power, the petitioners Fernandos' assertion that the RTC validly
acquired jurisdiction in Civil Case No. 31-SD(97) fails to convince.
The petitioners Fernandos likewise assert that the CA erred in granting the
respondents' Petition for Annulment of Decision because the said Petition is not a substitute
for a lost appeal.
According to jurisprudence, an annulment of decision may not be invoked (1) where

the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other
appropriate remedy and lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies
through his own fault or negligence.
It must be stressed that the respondents were not able to avail at all of the remedy of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or any other remedy against the RTC's Decision in Civil
Case No. 31-SD(97), not due to their own fault or negligence, but precisely because they were
not impleaded by the petitioners Fernandos.
383 of 578
Case Digests
ELMER MONTERO v. SANTIAGO MONTERO JR. and CHARLIE MONTERO.

DOCTRINE
"Title" is different from a "certificate of title" which is the document of ownership under
the Torrens system of registration issued by the government through the Register of Deeds.
While "title" gives the owner the right to demand or be issued a "certificate of title," the holder
of a certificate of title does not necessarily possess valid title to the real property. The issuance
of a certificate of title does not give the owner any better title than what he actually has in law.
Therefore, a plaintiff’s action for cancellation or nullification of a certificate of title may only
be a necessary consequence of establishing that the defendant lacks title to real property.
FACTS
Petitioner Elmer Montero filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Affidavit of
Adjudication, Cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 5289 and OCT No. P-14452, Reconveyance
and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction against herein respondents. The
Complaint averred the following:
Dominga Taeza was the second legal wife of Jose Montero. Their children were
Alfredo, Pacita, Marcela, and Ernesto. Petitioner Elmer was a surviving heir of Alfredo
Montero. Dominga died intestate and left a parcel of land situated in Pilar, Abra. Free Patent
No. 27941 under Dominga's name was issued over the land on January 11, 1939. Different
tax declarations in Dominga's name also showed that she was in actual possession of the
land. Upon Dominga's death in 1975, her actual, exclusive, open, continuous, and notorious
possession of the land was transferred to her successors-in-interest by operation of law.
In 1993, when Elmer was about to pay the real estate tax on the property, he was
informed by the Assessor’s Office of Pilar, Abra that the same was transferred in the name of
Santiago by virtue of an Affidavit of Adjudicaition dated June 13, 1989 upon the latter’s
representation that Santiago was an only heir of his father Santiago Sr. The latter, however,
was not related by blood to Dominga, but was the son of Jose Montero by his first marriage.
By virtue of the Affidavit of Adjudication, Tax Declaration No. 417 in Dominga’s name
was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 5289 in Santiago’s name. OCT No. P-14452 covering
the land was also issued in the latter’s name. In 2002, Santiago and his children threatened
Ernesto Montero with physical harm, to purposely acquire possession of a residential
portion of the land, and thereafter, respondent Charlie started dumping materials for the
house construction over the pleas of Ernesto Montero. Santiago, on the other hand, was also
renovating his house within the residential area of the land. The respondents wantonly
refused to reconvey the property to the surviving heirs of Dominga.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter, which was later dismissed. Respondents moved for reconsideration
384 of 578
Case Digests
which was also denied. Hence, respondents filed a Petition under Rule 65 before the CA,
alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their Motion to Dismiss.
The CA granted the respondents’ Rule 65 Petition, and held that the present action,
therefore, is not mainly about the declaration of nullity of the respondents' affidavit of
adjudication or the title they obtained based on said affidavit. The primary issue for
resolution is who between the contending parties is the lawful owner of the land, and thus,
entitled to its possession. The action is, therefore, one that involves title to, or possession of,
real property, jurisdiction over which is determined by the assessed value of the property in
question. Petitioner Elmer moved for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the subject matter of petitioner Elmer's Complaint involve the title to,
possession of, or interest in real property, or is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
RULING
NO. Petitioner Elmer's Complaint involves the title to, possession of, and interest in
real property, i.e., the subject property, which indisputably has an assessed value of below
P20,000.00. Hence, the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear case.
Jurisprudence has held that an action "involving title to real property" means that the
plaintiffs cause of action is based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the
legal rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same.
In connection with the foregoing, it is a hornbook doctrine that a court's jurisdiction

over the subject matter of a particular action is determined by the plaintiff’s allegations in
the complaint and the principal relief he seeks in the light of the law that apportions the
jurisdiction of courts.
Hence, the Court has held that even if the action is supposedly one for annulment of a
deed, the nature of an action is not determined by what is stated in the caption of the
complaint but by the allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Where the
ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the
proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof.
Applying the foregoing in the instant case, the Complaint itself unequivocally states
that petitioner Elmer, by filing the said Complaint, seeks to compel respondents Santiago and
Charlie "to respect the right of ownership and possession over the land in question by the
heirs of Dominga."
In fact, in the instant Petition, petitioner Elmer himself declares that "the narration
on the complaint would show that the petitioner was only establishing his rightful ownership
over the subject property." Simply stated, at the heart of petitioner Elmer's Complaint is his
assertion of the right of ownership and possession over the subject property as against
385 of 578
Case Digests
respondents Santiago and Charlie. Primarily, petitioner Elmer seeks to establish and confirm
his supposed "rightful ownership" over the subject property.
Further, the Complaint asks that the RTC order respondent Santiago "to reconvey the
above-described property of the deceased Dominga to her surviving heirs and to demolish
his house and any other structures erected therein and that respondent Charlie demolish his
house which has been constructed in bad faith within a portion of the residential area of the
land in question and any other structures erected therein."
Hence, more than asking for the nullification of documents, it is crystal clear that
petitioner Elmer asserts his alleged right of possession over the subject property by seeking
the reconveyance of the subject property. According to jurisprudence, "in a number of cases,
the Court has held that actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation of title to or to quiet
title over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve ‘title
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein.’" Hence, the instant case is clearly
one involving title to, possession of, and interest in real property.
In upholding the RTC's dismissal of the action due to lack of jurisdiction, the Court
therein explained that "title" is different from a "certificate of title" which is the document of
ownership under the Torrens system of registration issued by the government through the
Register of Deeds. While "title" gives the owner the right to demand or be issued a "certificate
of title," the holder of a certificate of title does not necessarily possess valid title to the real
property. The issuance of a certificate of title does not give the owner any better title than
what he actually has in law. Therefore, a plaintiff’s action for cancellation or nullification of
a certificate of title may only be a necessary consequence of establishing that the defendant
lacks title to real property.
Applying the foregoing in the instant case, the primary relief being sought by
petitioner Elmer is really the establishment and confirmation of his right of ownership and
possession over the subject property as against respondents Santiago and Charlie,
considering that the cancellation of the subject OCT would merely follow and would merely
be a consequence of the determination of petitioner Elmer's title over the subject property.
386 of 578
Case Digests
SIMEONA, GLORIA AND RODOLFO (ALL SURNAMED PRESCILLA), et.al., v. CONTRADO

O. LASQUITE and JUANITO L. ANDRADE
DOCTRINE
There is nothing in the Rules of Court that mandates, or even allows, the appellate courts
to suspend the resolution of a party's motion for reconsideration on account of a co-party's
appeal before the Court. Otherwise stated, when the trial court or appellate court issues a
judgment or final resolution in a case involving several parties, the right of one party to file a
motion for reconsideration or appeal is not hinged on the motion for reconsideration or appeal
of the other party.
FACTS
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and Damages against respondents,
where they claim to be the tillers of parcels of land designated as Lot No. 3050 (subject
property) and Lot No. 3052 located at Barrio Ampid, San Mateo. According to petitioners,
they have been in possession in concepto de dueno of the subject property since 1940,
planting and cultivating crops thereon. However, it was alleged that the respondents
Lasquite and Andrade were able to fraudulently obtain OCTs (OCT No. NP-198 and OCT No.
NP-197) covering the subject properties.
A second Complaint in Intervention for Annulment and Cancellation of Title,

Reconveyance and Damages was filed by Roberto and Raquel Manahan, Maria Gracia M.
Natividad, the heirs of Leocadio Manahan and the heirs of Joaquin Manahan (the Manahans)
against respondents Lasquite and Andrade on June 23, 1993.
The RTC rendered its Decision which, while upholding the petitioners’ right of
ownership over Lot No. 3052, upheld the respondents’ rights of ownership over the subject
property. Petitioners, the Manahans, and Victory Hills interposed their respective appeals
before the CA, who annulled and set aside the RTC Decision and declared Victory Hills the
owner of the subject property. Aggrieved, petitioners Prescilla, et.al. moved for
reconsideration. On the other hand, instead of filing a motion for reconsideration,
respondents resorted to a different remendy and decided to directly file a Petition for Review
on Certiorari before the SC. Upon knowledge of the respondents’ appeal before the Court, the
CA suspended the proceedings and the resolution of petitioners Prescilla, et.al.’s Motion for
Reconsideration until respondents’ appeal has been resolved by the Court.
The Supreme Court, through Justice Quisimbing, reversed the CA Eighth Division’s
Decision and held that Victory Hills failed to show its entitlement to a reconveyance of the
land subject of the action and that the CA, Eighth Division erroneously declared Victory Hills
as the absolute owner of the subject property.
387 of 578
Case Digests
On November 22, 2010, respondents filed a Motion for Execution before the RTC,
which the trial court granted and thereafter issued a Writ of Execution in the latter’s favor.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration which was denied by the RTC>
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the CA Seventh Division alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
a Writ of Execution against petitioners Prescilla, et al. The CA found that the RTC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when it granted the respondents’ Motion for Execution in
view of the finality of the Court’s Decision. Hence, the CA viewed that its execution could not
be postponed or deferred by the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a Writ of Execution
against petitioners Prescilla, et al.
RULING
YES, the CA, Seventh Division committed an error in not finding that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion in issuing a Writ of Execution against petitioners
Prescilla, et al.
It is not difficult to understand that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in the
instant case. To recall, in CA G.R. CV No. 77599, when the CA, Eighth Division issued its
Decision in favor of Victory Hills and against petitioners Prescilla, et al. and respondents
Lasquite and Andrade, it is not disputed whatsoever that petitioners Prescilla, et al. timely
filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
As stated earlier, upon knowledge of respondents Lasquite and Andrade's appeal

before the Court, the CA issued a Resolution dated December 22, 2006 suspending the
resolution of petitioners Prescilla, et al.'s Motion for Reconsideration until the respondents
Lasquite and Andrade's appeal had been resolved with finality by the Court.
It is not disputed that petitioners Prescilla, et al.'s Motion for Reconsideration is still
pending before the CA, Eighth Division and has not been resolved as of date. In the assailed
Decision, the CA, Seventh Division itself recognized that the resolution of petitioners
Prescilla, et al.'s Motion for Reconsideration is still suspended and has not yet been
resolved.23
In fact, the Court issued a Resolution dated March 4, 2019 directing the parties to
move in the premises by informing the Court as to whether the CA, Eighth Division had
already resolved petitioners Prescilla, et al.'s Motion for Reconsideration. In their
Compliance and Manifestation dated May 14, 2019, petitioners Prescilla, et al. informed the
Court that their Motion for Reconsideration before the CA, Eighth Division "remains unacted
upon and unresolved." On the other hand, respondents Lasquite and Andrade ignored the
directive of the Court.
388 of 578
Case Digests
Section 4, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal: the pendency of a
motion for reconsideration filed on time and by the proper party shall stay the execution of
the judgment or final resolution sought to be reconsidered.
Therefore, as to petitioners Prescilla, et al., whose Motion for Reconsideration is still

pending before the CA, Eighth Division, it must be stressed that the controversy has not been
resolved with finality.
Consequently, as far as petitioners Prescilla, et. al. are concerned, there is no judgment
that is already ripe for execution.
In believing that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing a Writ of
Execution against petitioners Prescilla, et al, in the assailed Decision, the CA, Seventh
Division hinged its theory on the bare fact that in G.R. No. 175375, i.e., Lasquite v. Victory
Hills, Inc., the Court ruled with finality in favor of respondents Lasquite and Andrade. The
CA, Seventh Division seriously erred in its appreciation of Lasquite v. Victory Hills, Inc.
The assailed Decision itself acknowledged that "the petitioners were not parties to
the petition for review filed by respondents Lasquite and Andrade to the Supreme Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 175375, when the latter appealed the CA, Eighth Division's decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 77599." To reiterate, in G.R. No. 175375, only respondents Lasquite and
Andrade as well as Victory Hills were the parties involved. Petitioners Prescilla, et al. were
not impleaded parties in the said case.he subject property.
The Court notes that this complication originated from the CA, Eighth Division's act
of suspending the resolution of petitioners Prescilla, et al.'s Motion for Reconsideration.
There is nothing in the Rules of Court that mandates, or even allows, the appellate courts to
suspend the resolution of a party's motion for reconsideration on account of a co-party's
appeal before the Court. Otherwise stated, when the trial court or appellate court issues a
judgment or final resolution in a case involving several parties, the right of one party to file
a motion for reconsideration or appeal is not hinged on the motion for reconsideration or
appeal of the other party. Effectively, by failing to resolve their Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioners Prescilla, et al. were prevented from exercising their right to appeal. Subjecting
petitioners Prescilla, et al. to a judgment that they had no opportunity to appeal from due to
no fault of their own smacks of violation of due process.
389 of 578
Case Digests
FRANCISCO C. DELGADO, REPRESENTED BY JOSE MARI DELGADO v. GQ REALTY

DEVELOPMENT CORP., MA ROSARIO G. MEYER, KURT EDWARD MEYER, and THE
REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF MAKATI CITY
DOCTRINE
According to Rule 6, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court, an affirmative defense is an
allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in
the pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. The
affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of
frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other matter by way of
confession and avoidance.
FACTS
Petitioner Francisco Delgado was married to Carmencita Chuidian-Delgado, where
they produced five children. On January 15, 1983, Carmencita passed away. Petitioner met
Victoria Quirino Gonzales. In their time together, petitioner Francisco learned that Victoria
was formerly married to Luis Gonzales, who passed away in 1984. Luis and Victoria
produced four children. Together with her children with Luis, Victoria started a corporation
– respondent GC Realty Development Corporation.
Petitioner Francisco alleged that despite respondent GC Realty’s decent capitalization

the same would not be enough for respondent GC Realty to successfully engage in the realty
business. Hence, petitioner Francisco offered to help Victoria by supposedly buying real
properties using his own money, but the naked title would be named after respondent GQ
Realty, to show potential investors that respondent GQ Realty had sufficient assets and
capital. Victoria supposedly agreed and suggested that petitioner Francisco buy a
condominium apartment, specifically addressed at Unit 12-C, Urdaneta Apartments
Condominium, 6735 Ayala Avenue, Makati City, which Francisco heeded. Petitioner
Francisco lived in the subject property even if the Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT)
was issued in the name of respondent GQ Realty. Following Victoria’s death in 2006,
petitioner Francisco learned that Victoria’s children with Luis distributed among themselves
the properties held in trust by Victoria’s corporations, including respondent GQ Realty.
For their part, respondents alleged that GQ Realty was established for the sole
purpose of holding Victoria’s properties, and not intended to invite or allow investors to
become a part of the corporation, nor did it need additional capital. They also added that
after the death of Luis in 1984, Victoria left their home in Forbes Park and transferred to Unit
12-B of the Urdaneta Apartments Condominium (Unit 12-B), which is the unit beside the
subject property.
Before Victoria and petitioner Francisco's marriage on June 20, 1987, the two
executed an Ante-Nuptial Agreement dated June 15, 1987 (Ante--Nuptial Agreement),
which states, among other stipulations, that their properties would be governed by
390 of 578
Case Digests
complete separation of properties. The Ante--Nuptial Agreement was allegedly drafted by

petitioner Francisco's own counsel, Romulo Mabanta Law Offices.
After Victoria and petitioner Francisco's wedding, the latter moved in with Victoria at
the subject property as Victoria felt more comfortable living there than in petitioner
Francisco's house. Respondent Rosario averred that they maintained a close happy, and
harmonious relationship with petitioner Francisco, not until when Victoria fell ill, where she
started to transfer or assign her properties to her children with Luis to ensure that the latter
would receive her assets. Victoria allegedly decided to transfer the subject property to
respondent Rosario.
After the death of Victoria in 2006, the children of petitioner Francisco and the
children of Victoria started falling apart and the farmer allegedly started filing cases against
the latter. It was further alleged by the respondents that since the death of Victoria,
respondent Rosario and her siblings were prohibited to enter the subject property.
On July 12, 2007, petitioner Francisco, through petitioner Jose Mari, filed a Verified
Complaint for Reconveyance, Declaration of Nullity of Sale, and Damages against
respondents, asserting his right over the subject property based on implied trust. The RTC
dismissed the Complaint based on the respondents’ affirmative defenses, i.e. prescription
and waiver, abandonment, and extinguishment.
Petitioner appealed before the CA, who later denied the same because petitioner
Francisco’s claim had already been waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished through
the execution of the Ante-Nuptial Agreement.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner Francisco, in executing the Ante-Nuptial Agreement, waived,
abandoned, or otherwise extinguished his alleged interest over the subject property.
RULING
YES, the RTC did not err in holding that petitioner Francisco waived his alleged
rights over the subject property by executing the Ante-Nuptial Agreement
According to Rule 6, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court, an affirmative defense is an

allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in
the pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. The
affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute
of frauds, estoppel, former recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other matter by way
of confession and avoidance.
Under Rule 16, Section 6, if no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds
for dismissal provided for in this Rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense in the answer
391 of 578
Case Digests
and, in the discretion of the court, a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion
to dismiss had been filed.
In the instant case, the respondents did not file any Motion to Dismiss. Instead, they
filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing so that the RTC could receive evidence and thereafter
decide whether the affirmative defenses raised by the respondents are meritorious.
According to the RTC, and as affirmed by the CA, after the preliminary hearing, the
respondents were able to prove their affirmative defense that, while hypothetically
admitting the material allegations in the Complaint, the alleged claim of petitioner Francisco
over the subject property has been deemed waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished
when petitioner Francisco and Victoria executed the Ante--Nuptial Agreement.
In this regard, the Court finds that the RTC and CA did not err. Hypothetically
admitting the material allegations in the Complaint, the Court holds that petitioner Francisco
indeed waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished his alleged rights over the subject
property.
Under the Ante-Nuptial Agreement, petitioner Francisco unequivocally discharged

any and all interest over all gifts that he had bestowed upon Victoria. Thus, even
hypothetically admitting as true petitioner Francisco's material allegations in the Complaint
that he had used his own money to buy the subject property, then this purchase of the subject
property, thereafter registered in the name of respondent GQ Realty, was, for all intents and
purposes, a gift bestowed upon Victoria.
As alleged by petitioner Francisco, he purchased the subject property in 1987 so "that

he could effectively express his support for the ailing Victoria." In the Complaint, petitioner
Francisco himself declared that "the best [way to provide for Victoria] that he conceived of
was to acquire real properties, although to have them registered in the name of respondent
GQ Realty."
Moreover, petitioner Francisco himself explained that he had no qualms in registering

the subject property in the name of respondent GQ Realty despite having the real intent of
providing real property for Victoria because the said corporation "was anyway headed by no
less than Victoria."
Taking into consideration the foregoing material allegations in the Complaint, despite
the subject property being registered in the name of respondent GQ Realty, petitioner
Francisco's act of purchasing the subject property using his own funds was a genuine act of
gratuity in favor of Victoria. Consequently, since petitioner Francisco declared in the Ante-
Nuptial Agreement, which was executed after the purchase of the subject property, that he
was explicitly discharging any and all interest in all gifts that he had theretofore bestowed
upon Victoria, petitioner Francisco's alleged interest in the subject property has been
completely waived in favor of Victoria.
392 of 578
Case Digests
393 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JEFFREY FAYO Y RUBIO A.K.A. “JEFF”

DOCTRINE
Jurisprudence has held that breaches of the procedure outlined in Section 21 committed
by the police officers, left unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti would necessarily have been compromised.
FACTS
Two Informations were filed against accused-appellant Jeffrey Fayo: one of rillegal
sale of shabu and one of illegal possession of the same. When arraigned, Fayo pleaded not
guilty to the offenses charged. Trial ensured.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses narrate that on May 27, 2015, at around
4:00 in the afternoon, Police Chief Inspector Renata B. Castillo conducted a meeting and
informed the operatives that a confidential informant can accompany any one of them to buy
illegal drugs from Fayo who a known drug pusher at Barangay Manggahan, Pasig City. A buy-
bust operation was planned against Fayo, where PO1 Bueno was tasked as the poseur-buyer,
who will buy illegal drugs from Fayo using a P1,000.00 bill with Serial No. FA131613 bearing
the marking “JPB” on its lower left corner. The agreed pre-arranged signal will be the act of
PO1 Bueno in scratching his head which will signify that the buy-bust transaction is already
consummated. The other operatives were tasked as perimeter back-ups, while PO1 Sanoy
was designated as the immediate back-up of the poseur-buyer.
The team met with the confidential informant, where the latter informed the former
that he and Fayo agreed to meet at Phoenix Gas Station, Amang Rodriguez Avenue, Barangay
Manggahan. PO1 Bueno and the confidential informant waited for Fayo while the other
members strategically positioned themselves. At around 6:30 in the evening, Fayo arrived
and the confidential informant greeted him and introduced PO1 Bueno as the person who
wanted to purchase illegal drugs.
Fayo then asked the confidential informant and PO1 Bueno how much they were
buying, to which PO1 Bueno responded P1,000.00 worth and immediately handed to Fayo
the marked money. Fayo took the marked bill and kept it in his left pocket. He then took
several sachets from his right pocket, choosing one and handing it to PO1 Bueno. PO1 Bueno
received the sachet from Fayo and executed the pre-arranged signal to alert his fellow
operatives. PO1 Bueno then introduced himself as a police officer. While being apprehended
Fayo tried to reach for something from his waistline, but was stopped by PO1 Sanoy. Upon
frisking Fayo, PO1 Sanoy discovered that Fayo was reaching for a calibre .45 gun, also, Fayo
had a grenade in his backpack.
PO1 Bueno confiscated from Fayo an additional four (4) transparent plastic sachets
all containing the same white crystalline substance believed to be shabu, as well as the
394 of 578
Case Digests
marked P1,000.00 bill. At the place of arrest, PO1 Bueno, in front of Fayo, marked the subject
of the buy-bust operation as 2JPB/FAYO/5-27-2015 to 5JPB/FAYO/5-27-2015, affixing his
signature in all of the specimens. The buy-bust operatives requested for the presence of
Punong Barangay Bobby L. Bobis (Bobis), but the latter advised them to just proceed to the
Barangay Hall of Manggahan. So, the team proceeded to the Barangay Hall where Bobis was
already awaiting their arrival. Upon arrival, Fayo was presented to Bobis, in whose presence
an inventory of the seized evidence was made, as well as the taking of photographs of the
confiscated items. Fayo denied the charges against him.
The RTC convicted Fayo for committing illegal sale and possession of dangerous
drugs under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165. The RTC gave full faith and credence to
the testimonies of the police officers over Fayo's bare denial and held that all the links in the
chain of custody of the seized drugs were established. Aggrieved, Fayo filed an appeal before
the CA.
The CA affirmed Fayo’s conviction. The CA held that the prosecution was able to prove
beyond moral certainty the elements of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting Fayo for violating Sections 5 and 11,
RULING
YES. The Court acquits Fayo for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
In cases involving dangerous drugs, the State bears not only the burden of proving
these elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. In drug cases,
the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.11 While it is
true that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law,
for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors, the law nevertheless also requires strict
compliance with procedures laid down by it to ensure that rights are safeguarded.
In this connection, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, which was amended by RA 10640
in 2014, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain the integrity
of the confiscated drugs used as evidence.
The said provision requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and
photographed at the place of seizure or at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable; (2) the physical
inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or
his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, and (c) a
representative of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) or the media; and (3) the
395 of 578
Case Digests
accused or his/her representative and all of the aforesaid witnesses shall be required
to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
The strict observance of the aforesaid requirements are a necessity because, with "the
very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of
shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin
can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that
inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great."
Concededly, however, Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended, provides that

"noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items."
In connection with the foregoing, jurisprudence has held that breaches of the
procedure outlined in Section 21 committed by the police officers, left unacknowledged and
unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against
the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti would necessarily
have been compromised.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that the authorities failed to comply with Section
21 of RA 9165 when they conducted the subject buy bust operation.
First, it is beyond dispute that there was no representative from the NPS or media
who witnessed the inventory of the alleged seized evidence and the photographing of
the same. As readily acknowledged by the RTC, "[n]o representative from the National
Prosecution Service and/or media came."23
To reiterate, under Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended, aside from an elected public

official, a representative of the NPS or the media should be there to witness the physical
inventory of the alleged seized items and photographing of the same.
A careful review of the records shows that the testimonies of the prosecution's
witnesses do not offer any justifiable reason why the presence of a representative from the
NPS or media was not obtained.
Second, it is also an admitted fact that the inventory and photographing of the
allegedly seized drug specimen were undertaken at the Barangay Hall of Manggahan
and not at the place of the seizure or the nearest police station/office of the
apprehending team.
Needless to say, the prosecution's sheer justification that the barangay captain
insisted that the inventory and photographing be done in the barangay hall is a lame and
unavailing excuse that deserves scant consideration. The elected Public official is merely a
396 of 578
Case Digests
witness to the inventory and photographing of the seized drug specimens. He/she does not
have the authority to prevail and dictate upon the apprehending team as to where the
inventory and photographing should take place.
397 of 578
Case Digests
SPOUSES REBAMONTE v. SPOUSES LUCERO

G.R. No. 237812, OCTOBER 2, 2019, Second Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Because of the elementary rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by
law, jurisdiction cannot be bargained away by the litigant-parties. Otherwise stated, as a
general rule, a party cannot be estopped in raising the ground of lack of jurisdiction. And such
ground may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, whether during trial or on appeal.
Nevertheless, it is well-established in our jurisprudence that, upon the existence of certain
exceptional circumstances, a party is deemed to have waived his or her right to raise the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. In the instant case, it is only before this Court, after almost three long
decades of active and participative litigation, that the issue on lack of jurisdiction was raised.
FACTS
On June 30, 1970, respondent Guillermo's parents, Marcos and Tomasa, obtained a
loan from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, now the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP). As security for the loan, Lot No. 1305-A was mortgaged. For their failure
to pay the loan obligation, DBP extrajudicially foreclosed the lot, wherein DBP, as the lone
bidder, purchased the lot in the public auction conducted. The period of redemption then
lapsed without Marcos and Tomasa redeeming the lot. Hence, ownership over the lot was
consolidated in favor of DBP.
Nonetheless, before TCT No. T-26792 was to be cancelled and a new TCT was to be
registered in the name of DBP, DBP entered into a repurchase agreement with Marcos and
Tomasa. The latter were able to repurchase the lot from DBP and regained ownership over
the lot. Afterwards, Marcos and Tomasa sold Lot No. 1305-A to respondent Guillermo thus
TCT No. T-26792 was consequently cancelled and TCT No. T-17712 was issued in the name
of respondent Guillermo. However, prior to the sale, three separate unregistered sales in
favor of Tomasa's cousin, petitioner Lino, allegedly took place covering certain portions of
Lot No. 1305-A.
As petitioner Lino took possession of the aforementioned portions of Lot No. 1305-A,
respondent Guillermo was unable to possess the entire lot. Respondent Guillermo repeatedly
made demands for petitioner Lino to vacate the aforementioned portions of the lot, but
petitioner Lino refused to do so. To recover possession, respondent Guillermo, together with
his wife Genoveva Lucero (respondents Sps. Lucero), instituted a Complaint for Recovery of
Real Estate Property, Recovery of Possession, Quieting of Title, Damages, and Attorney's Fees
against the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte before the RTC.
ISSUE
1. Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the Complaint filed by the respondents Sps.
Lucero, considering that the assessed value of the subject portions establish that the
jurisdiction of the Complaint falls within the MTC and not the RTC.
398 of 578
Case Digests
2. Whether there was defective service of summons and, consequently, whether all
the proceedings conducted by the RTC are considered null and void.
3. Whether the failure to effect substitution for the death of respondent Guillermo in
2000 violated Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court.
RULING
1. YES. While it is true that the Court has held that the jurisdiction of a court may be
questioned at any stage of the proceedings, and that lack of jurisdiction is one of those
excepted grounds where the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it appears
from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of those grounds exists, even if they
were not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss, nevertheless, the Court has likewise
pronounced that this general rule is not absolute. It is settled that, upon the existence of
certain exceptional circumstances, a party may be barred from raising lack of subject matter
jurisdiction on the ground of estoppel. In assessing whether the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte
have waived their right to question the jurisdiction of the RTC, the circumstances of the
instant case must be compared to the circumstances attendant in Tijam. The Court finds that
the circumstances attendant in the instant case are actually much more grave than those
present in Tijam.
Same as in Tijam, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte utterly failed to invoke the ground
of lack of jurisdiction despite having full knowledge of this ground, considering that the
assessed value of the subject lot was plainly indicated in the Complaint, a copy of which was
fully furnished to the petitioners. In fact, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte filed an Answer and
an Amended Answer in response to the categorical allegations in the Complaint. Yet, the
petitioners Sps. Rebamonte totally ignored the issue on jurisdiction in their responsive
pleadings. They even sought affirmative relief before the RTC by filing a counterclaim. A
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise filed by the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte before the
RTC. Analogous to the factual circumstances in Tijam, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte were
also able to file an appeal and a Motion for Reconsideration before the CA. Yet, even before
the CA, the ground of lack of jurisdiction was never invoked. Therefore, the petitioners Sps.
Rebamonte are estopped from invoking the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
2. NO. Under Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, "the defendant's voluntary
appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons.” After very actively
participating in the proceedings, and after almost three decades of litigation, the petitioners
Sps. Rebamonte cannot now allege for the first time that their right to be heard was
transgressed.
3. NO. Mere failure to substitute a deceased party is not sufficient ground to nullify a
trial court's decision. The party alleging nullity must prove that there was an undeniable
violation of due process. In the instant case, there is absolutely no allegation that the right to
due process of the respondents Sps. Lucero was violated due to the non-substitution of
respondent Guillermo after the latter's death. No one disputes that the respondents Sps.
Lucero were fully able to participate and present their evidence during the trial.
399 of 578
Case Digests
400 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMELO DORIA Y PEREZ

DOCTRINE
The mandatory requirements imposed under Section 21 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165
cannot simply be ignored and swept aside by the police without any justifiable reason.
Otherwise, Section 21 is reduced to an inutile provision of law. Unrecognized and unjustified
violations of Section 21 inevitably lead to the acquittal of the accused.
FACTS
Doria was charged in two (2) sets of Information both dated January 16, 2008 for
violation of Sections 5 (Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs), and 11 (Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs) of Article II of R.A. No. 91655.
The evidence of the prosecution established that on January 15, 2008, members of
the PNP of Dagupan City conducted a conference meeting about having a buy-bust operation
against a certain Marcelina Doris who was a known drug peddler, and was reportedly
residing in the house of Spouses Samuel and Melody Erguiza ("Sps. Erguiza") in Pantal
District, Dagupan City. PO2 De Vera was designated as the poseur-buyer, who was to use five
(5) pieces of One Hundred peso bills, which bore the markings, "MCV". At about fifty (50)
meters away from the target place, PO2 De Vera alighted from the vehicle and walked
towards the house of Sps. Erguiza. According to PO2 De Vera, he saw a male person standing
in front of Sps. Erguiza's house. PO2 De Vera approached Doria and looked for Marcelina who
was also known as Mamang. Doria replied that Marcelina was not around and suddenly told
PO2 De Vera in Pangasinan dialect, "Siak lay pangaliwan mo", which means "Just buy it from
me". Surprised, PO2 De Vera brought out the marked money, and said that he wanted to
buy shabu worth Five Hundred pesos. After PO2 De Vera handed the marked money, the
latter brought out two (2) plastic sachets of suspected shabu. As a result, PO2 De Vera
signaled to PO1 Lavarias in order to arrest Doria but he resisted the arrest and ran inside the
house of Sps. Erguiza. PO2 De Vera and PO1 Lavarias chased him inside the house. They were
able to arrest Doria. Afterwards, PO2 De Vera and PO1 Lavarias conducted a bodily search
on Doria. They were able to recover another three (3) plastic sachets of suspected shabu, two
(2) empty plastic sachets, one (1) small scissor, one (1) disposable lighter, and the marked
money. Later, Doria was brought to Dagupan City Police Station for recording and
disposition. PO2 De Vera marked the five (5) plastic sachets of suspected shabu with, "MCV-
1" to "MCV-5". PO2 De Vera said that he could not remember if he marked the other seized
items, but the police officers took photographs of the items and of Doria.
On the other hand, the defense testified that on January 15, 2008, he was in the house
of his wife. He went to the house of his brother-in-law Sammy Enriquez to borrow money
amounting to Php1,000.00 consisting of ten (10) pieces of One Hundred peso bill. Doria left
after an house. While waiting for a tricycle along the highway, about two (2) meters away
from the house of Enriquez, two (2) women approached him and asked for Mamang,
referring to Marcelina Doria who is his mother. He replied that he did not know where his
401 of 578
Case Digests
mother was. Afterwards, five (5) persons alighted from a tricycle. One of them immediately
poked a gun at him and they even boxed him on his stomach, restrained his hands, and
handcuffed him. They then grabbed his shirt and forced him to ride in the patrol car. He was
brought to the police station in Perez, Dagupan City. He also stated that the police officers
brought him to Region I Medical Center for medical examination. After he was checked by a
doctor if he was drunk, he was brought back to the police station. A police blotter was
recorded, and he was put in jail. The police officers showed him some pieces of evidence,
which were the alleged sachets of shabu. He told the police officers that those items were not
his. Despite telling them that the items were not owned by him, the police officers still asked
him to point at the evidence, and took photographs of him. He further testified that the police
officers confiscated his wallet and cellular phone. After several days, his wallet was returned
to him without the money he borrowed from Sammy, while his cellular phone was returned
to his wife. He said that PO2 De Vera was not present during the incident.
The RTC rendered its Decision convicting Doria on both charges. Doria filed an appeal
before the CA but the affirmed the RTC's conviction of Doria.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting Doria for violating Sections 5 and 11,
RULING
YES. The Court acquits Doria for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In order to convict a person charged with the crime of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution is required to prove
the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. On the other
hand, illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 has the
following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified
to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3)
the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the applicable law at the time of the commission of
the alleged crimes, lays down the procedure that police operatives must follow to maintain
the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence. The provision requires that: (1) the
seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation;
representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice
(DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof. In the instant case, it is beyond serious dispute that all of the mandatory procedures
required under Section 21 of RA 9165 have been violated by the buy-bust team.
402 of 578
Case Digests
First and foremost, not even one of the required witnesses witnessed the buy-bust
operation and the inventory and photographing of the alleged drug specimen supposedly
retrieved from Doria. The witnesses of the prosecution failed to testify as to the presence of
any of the required witnesses during the conduct of the inventory. Nor do the pieces of
documentary evidence presented by the prosecution show that the presence of the three
required witnesses was secured by the authorities. Astonishingly, both the RTC and CA failed
to appreciate the glaring and significant fact that there were no representatives from the
media, the DOJ, and an elective public official who witnessed the inventory and
photographing of the evidence.
Second, the inventory receipt produced by the prosecution, i.e., the handwritten
Confiscation Receipt dated January 15, 2008, contains the lone signature of PO2 De Vera. To
reiterate once more, Section 21 of RA 9165 requires the signatures of the accused and/or
his/her representative and the three required witnesses.
Third, while testifying that the Confiscation Receipt was prepared at the place of the
incident, in the same breath, the prosecution's main witness, PO2 De Vera, testified that the
recording, disposition, and inventory of the supposedly confiscated drug specimen were
conducted at the Dagupan City Police Station (DCPS) and not at the place of apprehension.
Fourth, in further engendering serious doubt as to the integrity of the specimen

allegedly retrieved from the person of Doria, PO2 De Vera himself acknowledges that with
respect to some of the plastic containers allegedly confiscated from Doria's left pocket, he
"did not place any marking, however we took pictures on the said recovered items, sir." In
fact, the CA itself factually found that PO2 De Vera "could not remember if he marked the
other seized items”.
In sum, the prosecution miserably failed to provide justifiable grounds for the
apprehending team's deviations from the rules laid down in Section 21 of RA 9165. The
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have thus been compromised. In light of
this, Doria must perforce be acquitted.
403 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CESARIA BASIO VERTUDES AND HENRY BASIO

VERTUDES
DOCTRINE
The three required witnesses by Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 should already be
physically present at the time of the conduct of the inventory of the seized items which, again,
must be immediately done at the place of seizure and confiscation. It should be emphasized that
the law requires the presence of an elected public official. A Barangay Tanod is not an elected
official; they are merely appointed by the Sangguniang Barangay.
FACTS
Due to the information about the illegal selling of drugs, a buy-bust team was
organized.
Upon arrival at a small wet market along Quirino Avenue, Baclaran, PO2 Ocampo and
the informant went toward Bagong Ilog Street, while the rest of the team discreetly followed.
There they spotted an elderly woman sitting outside of a house and a male person standing
along the street who were later identified respectively as herein appellants Cesaria and her
son, Henry. PO2 Ocampo and the informant proceeded to approach Henry to buy shabu. The
informant greeted Henry and introduced PO2 Ocampo as a businessman in need of shabu.
PO2 Ocampo then asked Henry if he has Php2,000.00 worth of shabu to which the latter
replied that he does not have any and asked them to wait as he will first ask his mother,
Cesaria, if she has some left. Henry then shouted to the latter, "Nay, meron ka pa ba diyan,
meron akong scorer dito," to which the latter replied, "meron pa ako at marami pa akong
hawak dito." Cesaria then stood up to approach them. PO2 Ocampo handed Henry the
marked money which the latter in turn handed to his mother. In return, Cesaria handed to
Henry two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance which he in turn handed
to PO2 Ocampo.
Upon receiving the sachets, PO2 Ocampo executed the pre-arranged signal by turning
his cap backwards to alert the rest of the team that the transaction has been completed. SPO1
Macaraeg then rushed to the scene and was able to arrest Henry. Cesaria, on the other hand,
was apprehended by PO2 Ocampo. They introduced themselves as police officers and
informed appellants of their constitutional rights. Upon instruction from PO2 Ocampo,
Cesaria brought out the contents of her pockets which revealed the marked money
previously given by PO2 Ocampo and another plastic sachet likewise containing a white
crystalline substance. PO2 Ocampo marked at the scene of the arrest the two plastic sachets
subject of the sale and the other one recovered from the pocket of Cesaria. However, since
there was already a crowd forming at the area, the team proceeded to the barangay hall of
Baclaran. There, PO2 Ocampo prepared an inventory of the recovered evidence which was
witnessed therein by Barangay Ex-O Jaime Marzan and Barangay Tanod Rene Eliserio.
Photographs of the inventory were also taken therein by PO2 Julaton. The team then
404 of 578
Case Digests
proceeded to their office to prepare the request for laboratory examination of the contents
of the recovered plastic sachets.
ISSUE
Whether the guilt of Henry for violation of Section 5 and of Cesaria for violation of
Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165 was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING
NO. The prosecution admittedly failed to prove that the buy-bust team complied with
the mandatory requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165, which thus results in their failure to
prove the guilt of Cesaria and Henry beyond reasonable doubt. Based on the narration of
facts by the prosecution, the police officers marked the seized items at the scene of the
arrest. However, they claimed that since there was already a crowd forming at the area, the
team proceeded to the Barangay Hall of Baclaran. There, PO2 Ocampo prepared an inventory
of the recovered evidence, which was witnessed by Barangay Ex-O Jaime Marzan and
Barangay Tanod Rene Eliserio. Photographs of the inventory were also taken therein by PO2
Domingo Julaton. The Court points out that, as testified by PO2 Ocampo, none of the three
required witnesses was present at the time of arrest of the accused-appellants and the
seizure of the drugs. Only two Barangay Tanods were present at the inventory of the seized
drugs at the Barangay Hall.
It is thus obvious that the police failed to comply with the three-witnesses
requirement under Section 21. Although there were two Barangay Tanods that were present
at the Barangay Hall for the inventory and photography of the seized items, they are not the
required witnesses contemplated by the law. It should be emphasized that the law requires
the presence of an elected public official. A Barangay Tanod is not an elected official; they are
merely appointed by the Sangguniang Barangay.
405 of 578
Case Digests

WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v. SPOUSES MARCELINO BUNSAY AND NENITA BUNSAY
G.R. No. 205473, DECEMBER 10, 2019, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
While the award of consequential damages equivalent to the value of CGT and transfer
taxes must be struck down for being erroneous, the Court deems it just and equitable to direct
the Republic to shoulder such taxes to preserve the compensation awarded to Spouses Bunsay
as a consequence of the expropriation.
FACTS
DPWH is the Republic's engineering and construction arm tasked to undertake the
"planning, design, construction and maintenance of infrastructure facilities, especially
national highways, flood control and water resource development system, and other public
works in accordance with national development objectives." Among DPWH's projects is the
C-5 Northern Link Road Project Phase 2 (Segment 9) connecting the North Luzon
Expressway (NLEX) to McArthur Highway, Valenzuela City (the Project).
In connection with the implementation of the Project, DPWH filed with the RTC a
Complaint for Expropriation with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession (Expropriation Complaint) against Spouses Bunsay, concerning the Disputed
Property. Spouses Bunsay did not file an Answer. The RTC later scheduled a hearing on the
issuance of the writ of possession prayed for. During the hearing, DPWH deposited checks in
the total amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php200,000.00), representing the sum
of the Disputed Property's zonal value and replacement cost of the improvements built
thereon. Thereafter, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession in favor of DPWH.
Later still, the RTC directed the parties to submit their respective nominees to the
Board of Commissioners for determination of just compensation. However, during the
subsequent hearing, DPWH manifested in open court that while all notices sent to Spouses
Bunsay were returned unserved, they already claimed the checks that DPWH deposited with
the RTC. Thus, DPWH moved that the amount received by Spouses Bunsay be deemed as just
compensation for the Disputed Property. The RTC granted DPWH's oral motion. DPWH
filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration (MPR), praying that the award corresponding to
the replacement cost of improvements, and equivalent value of CGT and other transfer taxes
be deleted.
The RTC did not order DPWH to pay the CGT and other transfer taxes. What was
ordered of DPWH is to pay the consequential damages constituting the value of CGT and
other transfer taxes. Aggrieved, DPWH filed the present Petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE
406 of 578
Case Digests
Whether the RTC erred in awarding consequential damages equivalent to the value
of CGT and transfer taxes in favor of Spouses Bunsay.
RULING
YES, but it just and equitable to direct the Republic to shoulder such taxes. It is
settled that the transfer of property through expropriation proceedings is a sale or exchange
within the meaning of Sections 24(D) and 56(A)(3) of the NIRC, and profit from the
transaction constitutes capital gain. Since CGT is a tax on passive income, it is the seller, or
respondents in this case, who are liable to shoulder the tax. In fact, the BIR, in BIR Ruling No.
476-2013 dated December 18, 2013, has constituted the DPWH as a withholding agent
tasked to withhold the 6% final withholding tax in the expropriation of real property for
infrastructure projects. Thus, as far as the government is concerned, the CGT in
expropriation proceedings remains a liability of the seller, as it is a tax on the seller's gain
from the sale of real property.
The Court's ruling in Spouses Salvador is clear—CGT may not be awarded in the form
of consequential damages since the term assumes a fixed definition in the context of
expropriation proceedings; it is limited to the impairment or decrease in value of the portion
which remains with the affected owner after expropriation. It must be clarified, however,
that the ruling in Spouses Salvador should not be interpreted to preclude the courts from
considering the value of CGT and other transfer taxes in determining the amount of just
compensation to be awarded to the affected owner.
CGT, being a tax on passive income, is imposed by the National Internal Revenue Code
on the seller as a consequence of the latter's presumed income from the sale or exchange of
real property. Notably however, the transfer of real property by way of expropriation is not
an ordinary sale contemplated under Article 1458 of the Civil Code. Rather, it is akin to a
"forced sale" or one which arises not from the consensual agreement of the vendor and
vendee, but by compulsion of law. Unlike in an ordinary sale wherein the vendor sets and
agrees on the selling price, the compensation paid to the affected owner in an expropriation
proceeding comes in the form of just compensation determined by the court. In turn, just
compensation is defined as the fair and full equivalent of the loss incurred by the affected
owner. Since just compensation requires that real, substantial, full and ample equivalent be
given for the property taken, the loss incurred by the affected owner necessarily includes all
incidental costs to facilitate the transfer of the expropriated property to the expropriating
authority, including the CGT, other taxes and fees due on the forced sale.
Here, Spouses Bunsay received, as just compensation, an amount equal to the sum of
the zonal value of the Disputed Property and the replacement cost of the improvements built
thereon. Evidently, the value of CGT and transfer taxes due on the transfer of the Disputed
Property was not factored into the amount paid to Spouses Bunsay, but instead, separately
awarded as consequential damages. While the award of consequential damages equivalent
to the value of CGT and transfer taxes must be struck down for being erroneous, the Court
deems it just and equitable to direct the Republic to shoulder such taxes to preserve the
407 of 578
Case Digests
compensation awarded to Spouses Bunsay as a consequence of the expropriation. To stress,

compensation, to be just, must be of such value as to fully rehabilitate the affected owner; it
must be sufficient to make the affected owner whole.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REMAR A. QUIÑONEZ

G.R. No. 237412, JANUARY 6, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court
before the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is resorted to, since a motion for reconsideration
is considered a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Nevertheless,
this general rule admits of well-established exceptions, one of which is when the Issue raised is
a pure question of law.
FACTS
Remar A. Quinonez and his wife Lovelyn met in Gamaon, Mangagoy, Bislig City when
Remar was in college and staying at his aunt's house. After eight months of being in a
relationship, they got married and fter their wedding, the couple stayed at the house of
Lovelyn's parents and they begot two (2) children. To support his family, Remar started
working as a security guard at the National Food Authority Warehouse, although later on, he
transferred to Cebu City for an opportunity to earn a bigger salary.
Sometime in 2001, when Lovelyn's father received his retirement pay, Lovelyn asked
her husband's permission to go on a three-month vacation in Manila to visit some relatives.
Despite Remar's reluctance, he agreed to his wife's request. During the first three months,
Lovelyn constantly communicated with Remar through cell phone. It was also at this time
that Remar resigned from his work in Cebu City and transferred to Surigao City, where he
worked as a security guard at the Surigao City Hall of Justice. Remar informed Lovelyn that
as soon as she arrived from Manila, they live together in Surigao City with their two children.
Thereafter, the calls and text messages tapered off until the communication between
the spouses ceased altogether. At first, Remar thought that his wife just lost her cellphone,
so he inquired about her from their relatives in Bislig City. Someone informed him that his
wife was then already cohabiting with another man and would no longer be coming back out
of shame. On February 27, 2013, after almost ten (10) years of trying to know about the
whereabouts of his wife from their relatives proved futile, Remar filed a Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death before the RTC. The RTC declared the absentee-spouse
presumptively dead. Subsequently, the Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA
seeking to annul the RTC Judgment for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE
408 of 578
Case Digests
Whether the CA erred when it found Republic's Petition for Certiorari was
procedurally infirm for two reasons — first, the Petition for Certiorari was filed with the CA
without a prior motion for reconsideration; and second, said petition raised questions of fact
and evidence which are not cognizable under a Rule 65 petition.
RULING
YES. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a special civil action that may be
resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed
with the lower court before the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is resorted to, since a
motion for reconsideration is considered a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Nevertheless, this general rule admits of well-established exceptions,
one of which is when the Issue raised is a pure question of law. There is a question of law in
a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the
falsehood of alleged facts.
Here, the Republic does not dispute the truthfulness of Remar's allegations,
particularly, the specific acts he claims to have done to locate Lovelyn. What the Republic
does question is the sufficiency of these acts, that is, whether they are sufficient to merit a
legal declaration of Lovelyn's presumptive death. Clearly, the Republic's Petition
for Certiorari raised a pure legal question. Hence, direct resort to the CA via Rule 65, without
filing with the RTC a prior motion for reconsideration, was proper.
As to the substantive issue, Remar failed to allege, much less prove, the extent of the
search he had conducted in the places where he claims to have gone. Remar also failed to
identify which of Lovelyn's relatives he had communicated with, and disclose what he
learned from these communications. Moreover, much like the respondent in Cantor, Remar
never sought the help of the authorities to locate Lovelyn in the course of her ten (10) year
disappearance. Finally, the allegations in Remar's Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death37 suggest that he is aware of the true cause of Lovelyn 's disappearance. His wife is
now cohabiting with another man and will not be going home because of shame. The Court
cannot uphold the issuance of a declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of
remarriage where there appears to be no well-founded belief of the absentee spouse's death,
but only the likelihood that the absentee spouse does not want to be found.
409 of 578
Case Digests
RICARIDO GOLEZ, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND HIS CHILDREN CRISPINO GOLEZ, ISIDRO
GOLEZ, EMMA G. DE LOS SANTOS, HELEN G. CABECO, VICTORIA G. NORBE, ANTERO
GOLEZ, SIMON GOLEZ AND GRACE G. BACLAY, IN SUBSTITUTION OF THE DECEASED
PRESENTACION GOLEZ v. MARIANO ABAIS
DOCTRINE
For a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites
must concur: (a) it must be a final judgment or order; (b) the court rendering the same must
have jurisdiction over the subject matter and over parties; (c) there must be between the two
cases identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of causes of action; and (d) it
must be a judgment or order on the merits.
FACTS
Presentacion Golez, the eldest daughter of the late Ireneo Deocampo, filed this case
against her brother-in-law, respondent Mariano, for ejectment from the disputed lots and for
recovery of damages. She alleged that she is the beneficiary of the disputed lots and
Mariano illegally possessed it and mortgaged it to a certain Enrique Pilla, after the death of
her sister. Presentacion's petition to be identified as qualified beneficiary and her petition
for re-allocation was granted in the Order of the DAR Regional Director; despite these
administrative resolutions, Mariano refused to vacate.
Provincial Adjudicator Erlinda S. Vasquez issued a Decision declaring Presentacion as

the lawful possessor and cultivator of the disputed lots as farmer-beneficiary. Accordingly,
PA Vasquez ordered Mariano and all his privies to peacefully vacate the disputed lots and
deliver them to Presentacion. Aggrieved, Mariano filed an appeal with the CA via Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court. Primarily, Mariano argued that the DARAB Decision is barred by res
judicata, inasmuch as two prior judgments of the RTC and another issued by the DARAB have
already upheld his right to possess and cultivate the disputed lots as tenant. In the interim,
Presentacion passed away. Hence, she was substituted by her husband Ricarido Golez and
their children.
The CA issued the assailed Decision granting Mariano's appeal in part. Contrary to the
DARAB Decision, the CA held that Mariano is entitled to possession of the disputed lots as co-
owner. The CA anchored its ruling on the principle of res judicata. Petitioners claim that the
CA erroneously applied the principle of res judicata.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred when it declared Mariano to be a lawful possessor of the
disputed lots as co-owner.
RULING
YES. Res judicata does not apply. For a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a
subsequent case, the following requisites must concur:
410 of 578
Case Digests
a. it must be a final judgment or order;

b. the court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and
over parties;
c. there must be between the two cases identity of parties, identity of subject matter
and identity of causes of action; and
d. it must be a judgment or order on the merits
To recall, the previous judgments which the CA recognized as basis to apply the
principle of res judicata are the October 1986 RTC Decision, the August 1996 PA Decision
and the Decision rendered by PA Vasquez from which this Petition stems. Close scrutiny of
the foregoing judgments confirms that they do not serve as proper basis to apply the
principle of res judicata. The October 1986 RTC Decision involved a different party-plaintiff
who asserted an entirely different cause of action. Moreover, while the August 1996 PA
Decision involved the same parties who raised issues similar to those raised in this case, said
Decision does not constitute a judgment on the merits which would operate to bar the
resolution of the substantive issues in a subsequent case, inasmuch as it was premised
primarily on lack of jurisdiction - recognizing, in fact, that the "question of who among the
heirs of the late tenant-beneficiary Ireneo should take over the disputed lots he left behind"
was an administrative concern cognizable only by the DAR Secretary.
As well, it is equally evident that the Decision rendered by PA Vasquez in DARAB Case
cannot prompt the application of res judicata. Considering that said Decision is the subject
of this present Petition, it cannot, by any means, be deemed a final judgment on the merits.
Hence, contrary to Mariano's insistence, res judicata does not apply in the present case.
411 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL DOLANDOLAN

DOCTRINE
In a criminal prosecution, the law always presumes that the defendant is not guilty of
any crime whatsoever, and this presumption stands until it is overcome by competent and
credible proof. Where two conflicting probabilities arise from the evidence, the one compatible
with the presumption of innocence will be adopted. It is therefore incumbent upon the
prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused with moral certainty or beyond reasonable
doubt as demanded by law.
FACTS
When AAA was 15 years old, she went with two of her friends to a peryahan. When
her friends went home, she was left alone in the peryahan playing games with bets and
promenading when accused-appellant, an employee of the peryahan and who she has not
met before, introduced himself to her. During her direct examination, she narrated that he
invited her to his place, and that he talked to her in a pleasant manner and she thought that
the intention of accused-appellant was just to befriend her. He forced her to walk with him
for more than an hour to his place then brought her to a sapaan, or a creek. He was holding
something which looked like a knife which he pointed at her. He then raped her by inserting
his private part to her private part. She cried because of too much pain. After that, her parents
saw her in the place where it happened and they took her to the police. Thereafter, her
mother accompanied her to the hospital because she was traumatized by the incident. She
presented a Medico-legal Certificate.
During her cross-examination, she averred that accused-appellant was just strolling
around the peryahan when, without talking to her, he kissed her and forced her to go with
him by threatening her with bodily harm. He used a weapon which looked like a stick or a
ballpen. Although there were many people at the peryahan, she did not scream, shout nor do
anything to alarm other people around her because she was already afraid. She could no
longer recall at what time they left or arrived in or for how long and for how far they walked.
She likewise did not resist while walking to because she was taken by fear. She could not say
if she was taken to a house but they met a few people. She denied being brought to a sapa or
a creek. She also could not say that the alleged attack happened in a house; in fact she could
not recall in what area she was raped, but it was a vacant lot and it was dark. He forced her,
kissed her while holding the stick, and then inserted his penis in her private part. It was at
the place of accused-appellant where her mother found her.
Private complainant's Sinumpaang Salaysay stated that while she was on her way to
a sayawan in accused-appellant pointed a ballpen-like knife at her, dragged her to a field.
Accused-appellant made her ride a tricycle. After that, he made her walk until they reached
a place beside a river where she was raped. He held both of private complainant's hands,
removed her shorts and panties. He then pulled down his pants and inserted his penis to her
private part. Because a ballpen-like knife was pointed at her, she just followed out of fear.
412 of 578
Case Digests
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of
Rape.
RULING
YES. There are substantial discrepancies between AAA's Sinumpaang Salaysay and
her testimony, both during her direct examination and her cross-examination, which
discrepancies were never reconciled, explained, corrected, or justified by the prosecution.
As a result, the Court doubts the credibility of AAA. Court notes that the claim that AAA was
threatened at knife-point while on her way to a sayawan is starkly different and absolutely
inconsistent with the claim that accused-appellant befriended her in a peryahan and
thereafter invited her to his house.
There were substantial discrepancies as to the place of the alleged rape. There were
also substantial discrepancies as to where AAA was found after the alleged rape. It bears
reiterating that the complainant's credibility is the single most important issue in a
prosecution for Rape. While the Court recognizes that a "truth-telling witness is not always
expected to give an error-free testimony, considering the lapse of time and treachery of
human memory" the prosecution bears the burden of reconciling and explaining any lapses,
errors, or inconsistencies in said testimony, in accordance with the principle that the
"evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.” In this instant case, the
prosecution never bothered to explain or reconcile the evident inconsistencies in AAA's
testimony. The prosecution was remiss in its duty and failed to sufficiently explain, reconcile,
or justify the many substantial inconsistencies in AAA's testimony. As such, and given the
particular nature of a charge of Rape, i.e., that the court is often called upon to determine the
innocence or guilt of an accused based solely on the conflicting testimony of two people, the
Court is constrained to acquit accused-appellant on the basis of reasonable doubt.
413 of 578
Case Digests
ATTY. AROLF M. ANCHETA v. FELOMINO C. VILLA

DOCTRINE
Due to the final, executory and unappealable nature of the Ombudsman's decision, a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43
is the proper remedy.
FACTS
According to Villa's complaint, he was the winning party in a case before the CA. On
May 12, 2010, he filed a Motion for Immediate Issuance of a Writ of Execution and Urgent
Manifestation before the DARAB-Talavera to implement said Decision. On June 23, 2010,
Villa filed an Urgent Manifestation with Motion for Early Resolution because the five-year
execution period for the CA Decision would expire in October 2010. On September 8, 2010,
Ancheta issued an Order granting Villa's motion for issuance of a writ of execution, which
was implemented. On November 23, 2010, the opposing party filed a Motion to Quash the
Writ of Execution. On December 6, 2010, the opposing party also filed a Complaint for
Enforcement of Judgment by Action/Revival of Judgment.
Subsequently, Villa learned from close friends and relatives that the opposing party
was allegedly boasting that the latter would soon recover the subject property after giving a
huge amount of money to Ancheta. He also learned that a resolution or order was already
issued and that the opposing party already went to DARAB-Talavera to get a copy of the
same. Villa further claimed that some employees of the DARAB-Talavera secretly told him
that there was indeed a resolution or order reversing the writ of execution earlier issued in
his favor. Thus, Villa was constrained to file an Urgent Motion for Inhibition against Ancheta.
Ancheta issued an Order granting the motion for inhibition and inhibited himself from
handling the case. Villa was surprised that a supposed Order dated May 18, 2011 by Ancheta
granting the quashal of the writ (subject Order) was added to the records of the case.
According to Villa, the subject Order might have been secretly put into the case records to
influence the Regional Adjudicator in resolving the case in favor of the other party. Thus,
Villa claimed that Ancheta's acts made him liable for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct and
for violation of R.A. 3019.
The Ombudsman found Ancheta guilty of simple neglect of duty and imposed a fine,
in lieu of suspension, equivalent to one (1) month of his salary. The Ombudsman found no
relevant and competent evidence linking Ancheta to the alleged inclusion of the subject
Order in the case records because the statements of Villa and his witnesses were all hearsay.
Aggrieved, Ancheta filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition
outright for the procedural defects.
414 of 578
Case Digests
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition outright, and in the affirmative,
whether Ancheta is administratively liable.
RULING
YES. To recall, the CA outrightly dismissed Ancheta's petition on the following
grounds: 1) failure to pay the correct docket fees; 2) failure to state the date of receipt of a
copy of the assailed decision; 3) filing before the Ombudsman of an Appeal to the Head of
Office which was treated as a second MR, a prohibited pleading; hence, the reglementary
period was not tolled; and 4) availing of the wrong remedy.
As regards the payment of the correct docket fees, the Court gives credence to
Ancheta's claim that there was no intention on his part to defraud the CA when he failed to
pay the full amount of docket fees. According to him, he immediately paid the correct amount
upon learning of the shortage, as evidenced by the postal money order. On Ancheta's failure
to state the date of receipt of the assailed decision and for his filing of a prohibited second
MR, while these are indeed procedural irregularities, the same do not warrant a dismissal of
the petition. Finally, as regards the propriety of the petition for certiorari, Ancheta correctly
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 43.
The Court had ruled in Fabian v. Desierto that appeals from the decisions of the
Ombudsman rendered in administrative disciplinary cases should be filed before the CA
through a Rule 43 petition. However, the CA's reliance on Fabian in dismissing Ancheta's
petition is misplaced. The CA failed to consider that Ancheta was meted the penalty of a fine
equivalent to one-month salary by the Ombudsman. Such penalty was final, executory, and
unappealable under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, issued by the
Ombudsman to implement Section 27 of R.A. 6770. Given the final, executory and
unappealable nature of the Ombudsman's decision, Ancheta's remedy is a Rule 65 Petition.
On Ancheta's administrative liability, the Ombudsman has already made a categorical

finding that "there is no relevant and competent evidence linking Ancheta into the alleged
inclusion of the unofficial order in the case records." Here, as demonstrated by the Court, the
evidence (or lack thereof) in support of the Ombudsman's findings failed to satisfy the
quantum of evidence required. There is simply not enough evidence to hold Ancheta liable
for simple neglect of duty.
415 of 578
Case Digests
CYNTHIA A. GALAPON v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE
Pursuant to the majority ruling in Manalo, Article 26(2) applies to mixed marriages
where the divorce decree is: (i) obtained by the foreign spouse; (ii) obtained jointly by the
Filipino and foreign spouse; and (iii) obtained solely by the Filipino spouse.
FACTS
Cynthia, a Filipina, and Park, a South Korean national, got married in the City of
Manila, Philippines on February 27, 2012. Unfortunately, their relationship turned sour and
ended with a divorce by mutual agreement in South Korea. After the divorce was confirmed
on July 16, 2012 by the Cheongju Local Court, Cynthia filed before the RTC a Petition for the
Judicial Recognition of a Foreign Divorce.
The RTC, finding the Recognition Petition sufficient in form and substance, issued an
Order setting the case for hearing. The said Order was then published once a week for three
(3) consecutive weeks in The Daily Tribune. Meanwhile, the Office of the Solicitor General
filed a Notice of Appearance as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines. The Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Baloc, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija was also deputized to assist the
OSG. During the presentation of evidence, Abigail Galapon, Cynthia's sister and attorney-in-
fact, testified in court. Abigail identified and affirmed her Judicial Affidavit, including the
contents thereof and her signature thereon. Furthermore, Abigail averred that Cynthia could
not personally testify because the latter's Korean visa expired upon her divorce with Park.
Nevertheless, Abigail alleged that she has personal knowledge of the facts alleged in the
Recognition Petition and claimed, among other things, that Park intended to marry his
former girlfriend and that Cynthia was forced to agree to the divorce because Park made a
threat to her life.
The RTC issued a Decision granting the Recognition Petition. The OSG filed a Motion
for Reconsideration but it was denied hence it appealed to the CA via Rule 41. The CA issued
the assailed Decision granting the OSG's appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in denying the recognition of the divorce decree obtained by
Cynthia and her foreign spouse, Park.
RULING
YES. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. In the recent case of Manalo, the Court en banc extended the scope of Article 26(2) to
416 of 578
Case Digests
even cover instances where the divorce decree is obtained solely by the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to
the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
Pursuant to the majority ruling in Manalo, Article 26(2) applies to mixed marriages
where the divorce decree is: (i) obtained by the foreign spouse; (ii) obtained jointly by the
Filipino and foreign spouse; and (iii) obtained solely by the Filipino spouse. Based on the
records, Cynthia and Park obtained a divorce decree by mutual agreement under the laws of
South Korea. The sufficiency of the evidence presented by Cynthia to prove the issuance of
said divorce decree and the governing national law of her husband Park was not put in issue.
In fact, the CA considered said evidence sufficient to establish the authenticity and validity
of the divorce in question.
The records show that Cynthia submitted, inter alia, the original and translated
foreign divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity. She also
offered into evidence a copy of the Korean Civil Code, duly authenticated through a Letter of
Confirmation with Registry No. 2013-020871, issued by the Embassy of the Republic of
Korea in the Philippines. These pieces of evidence may have been sufficient to establish the
authenticity and validity of the divorce obtained by the estranged couple abroad but the CA
agrees with the OSG that the divorce cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction insofar as
Cynthia is concerned since it was obtained by mutual agreement of a foreign spouse and a
Filipino spouse. In this light, it becomes unnecessary to delve into the admissibility and
probative value of Abigail's testimony claiming that Cynthia had been constrained to consent
to the divorce. As confirmed by Manalo, the divorce decree obtained by Park, with or without
Cynthia's conformity, falls within the scope of Article 26(2) and merits recognition in this
jurisdiction.
417 of 578
Case Digests

WORKS AND HIGHWAYS v. LEONOR A. MACABAGDAL, REPRESENTED BY EULOGIA
MACABAGDAL-PASCUAL
DOCTRINE
There is no provision in the Rules of Court which states that "the instrument cannot be
used to prove that one is an heir" due to the sheer fact that it was not registered before the
Register of Deeds.
FACTS
Petitioner Republic, represented by the DPWH, filed a Complaint seeking to
expropriate a parcel of land located in Valenzuela City. The expropriation was necessary for
the implementation of the C-5 Northern Link Road Project. However, the title and registered
owner of the subject property were not properly identified. The complaint initially
impleaded an unidentified owner named in the title as "John Doe YY.” The trial court directed
that the complaint be published in a newspaper of general circulation, petitioner Republic
filed a Motion for issuance of a writ of possession. The trial court issued an Order, granting
the motion, but holding in abeyance the implementation of the writ.
Atty. Conrado E. Panlaque appeared before the RTC, praying that Elena A. Macabagdal
be substituted as party defendant, alleging that she is the real party in interest, being the
registered owner of the subject property. Counsel also submitted a copy of a land title.
Petitioner then filed a Motion to set the case for hearing to enable Elena to substantiate her
claim. But on the day of the supposed hearing, neither Elena nor her counsel appeared.
Instead, Atty. Pilares filed an Omnibus Motion for Substitution of Party, Admission of Answer
and Hearing, averring that Elena already died on May 14, 1997 as shown in her death
certificate. He also prayed that the sole heir, Leonor A. Macabagdal. represented by Eulogia
Macabagdal-Pascual by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney, be substituted in Elena's place.
Respondent Leonor informed the RTC that she is the sole heir of her sister Elena as the latter
died single intestate without a husband and children.
The RTC, finding that Elena A. Macabagdal really owned the property, named her as
party defendant. Due to her death, however, the RTC ordered her to be substituted by
respondent Leonor, being her sole heir. Petitioner argued that the substitution was improper
was improper as the extrajudicial deed of partition, the evidence for allowing her to be
substituted as the sole heir, was neither registered in the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela
City nor published in a newspaper of general circulation. The petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA, but the CA denied the petition.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in allowing respondent Leonor's substitution as party defendant in the expropriation case.
418 of 578
Case Digests
RULING
NO. First and foremost, the Court does not find merit in petitioner Republic's
assertion that the only evidence of respondent Leonor in proving that she is the sole heir of
Elena is the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement. As noted by both the CA and RTC, respondent
Leonor was able to present two witnesses, i.e., Eulogia Macabagdal-Pascual and Nenita
Pascual Ramota, as well as other pertinent pieces of documentary evidence (which includes
the Death Certificate of Elena) establishing respondent Leonor's identity and interest over
the subject property. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the unregistered Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement was the only piece of evidence provided by respondent Leonor to
establish her interest over the subject property, the fact that the said Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement was not registered before the Register of Deeds does not strip away the
document's evidentiary value with respect to respondent Leonor's status and interest over
the subject property.
It must be stressed that the RTC appreciated the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement in
relation to respondent Leonor's claim that she is the only surviving sister of Elena and that
the latter had no other heirs, thus giving respondent Leonor sufficient standing to be a party
defendant in the expropriation case.
While petitioner Republic is correct insofar as saying that under Section 1, Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court an unregistered affidavit of self-adjudication or extrajudicial settlement
does not bind third ·persons with respect to the adjudication of property, the CA is also
correct in its holding that there is no provision in the Rules of Court which states that "the
instrument cannot be used to prove that one is an heir" due to the sheer fact that it was not
registered before the Register of Deeds. Furthermore, the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
was duly notarized. A notarized document, being a public document, is evidence of the fact
which gave rise to its execution.
Hence, the burden of disproving what is borne in the Deed of Extrajudicial

Settlement, i.e., that respondent Leonor is the sole surviving heir and sister of Elena, falls on
petitioner Republic. However, such burden was not met. Solely focusing on the non-
registration of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, petitioner Republic does not provide any
evidence, nor does it even make any allegation whatsoever, that respondent Leonor is not
the sole surviving heir and sister of Elena.
419 of 578
Case Digests
DANILO ROMERO, VICTORIO ROMERO AND EL ROMERO, REPRESENTING THEIR

DECEASED FATHER LUTERO ROMERO v. CRISPINA SOMBRINO
DOCTRINE
Security of tenure may be invoked only by tenants de jure and not by those who are not
true and lawful tenants but became so only through the acts of a supposed landholder who had
no right to the landholdings. Tenancy relation can only be created with the consent of the
landholder who is either the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land.
FACTS
In a civil case, it was alleged by the petitioners, i.e., Teodora, Presentacion, Lucita,
Gloriosa, and Mindalina, that Lutero merely held the subject property in trust for the benefit
of the heirs of his father Eugenio since the latter was actually the one who first applied for
the homestead, but such application was denied because Eugenio was already disqualified
to apply for a homestead, having previously applied for a homestead over another parcel of
land with the maximum limit of 24 hectares. Moreover, it was alleged that Lutero employed
fraud in procuring the homestead patent covering the subject property. In addition, the
petitioners also claimed that Lutero subsequently sold the subject property by allegedly
executing three affidavits of sale in favor of the respondents and alleged that Lutero no
longer has any claim over the subject property pursuant to these affidavits of sale.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Lutero, declaring the three affidavits of sale
null and void and ordering the respondents to surrender possession. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The consolidated cases were then resolved with finality by
the Court in De Romero v. CA. In the said case, the Court held that Lutero is the true and lawful
landowner of the subject property. The Decision likewise found that the family patriarch,
Eugenio, never owned the subject property.
After the Court's Decision in De Romero v. CA became final and executory, the
petitioners Heirs of Lutero filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the
RTC. The RTC issued a Writ of Execution. A Writ of Demolition was issued and respondent
Sombrino was ousted from the subject property. Complaint for Illegal Ejectment and
Recovery of Possession before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (PARAD). Respondent Sombrino alleged that she was the actual tenant-cultivator of
the subject property as she and her late husband Valeriano were installed as tenants over
the subject property in 1952 by the alleged original owners of the subject property, the Sps.
Romero, until the said spouses were succeeded by Lucita and her heirs as
landowners. Hence, respondent Sombrino asked that her security of tenure as tenant of the
420 of 578
Case Digests
subject property be upheld and that she be allowed to peacefully possess and cultivate the
subject property.
ISSUE
Whether there exists an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between the
petitioners Heirs of Lutero and respondent Sombrino.
RULING
NO. Respondent Sombrino failed to provide sufficient evidence that there was, in the
first place, an agricultural leasehold tenancy agreement entered into by herself and the
alleged landowners, the Sps. Romero. Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. An
assertion that one is a tenant does not automatically give rise to security of tenure. Nor does
the sheer fact of working on another's landholding raise a presumption of the existence of
agricultural tenancy. One who claims to be a tenant has the onus to prove the affirmative
allegation of tenancy. Hence, substantial evidence is needed to establish that the landowner
and tenant came to an agreement in entering into a tenancy relationship.
Jurisprudence has held that self-serving statements regarding supposed tenancy

relations are not enough to establish the existence of a tenancy agreement. Moreover,
certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant
are merely provisional, not conclusive on the courts, and have little evidentiary value
without any corroborating evidence. There should be independent evidence establishing the
consent of the landowner to the relationship. In this case, the pieces of documentary
evidence presented by respondent Sombrino do not provide proof that the latter and the Sps.
Romero came into an agreement as to the establishment of an agricultural leasehold tenancy
relationship. At most, the aforementioned Joint Affidavit merely establishes that respondent
Sombrino occupied and cultivated the subject property at some point in time.
Even assuming arguendo that the Sps. Romero indeed entered into a tenancy
agreement with respondent Sombrino in 1952, such agreement would not have created a
valid tenancy relationship. Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the
true and lawful landowner who is the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the
land. It cannot be created by the act of a supposed landowner, who has no right to the land
subject of the tenancy, much less by one who has been dispossessed of the same by final
judgment. In this case, Ibuna's institution of respondents as tenants did not give rise to a
tenure relationship because Ibuna is not the lawful landowner, either in the concept of an
owner or a legal possessor, of the properties. It is undisputed that prior to the filing of the
complaint with the DARAB, the transfers of the properties to Ibuna and his predecessor,
Andres Castillo, were declared void in separate and previous proceedings. Since the transfers
were void, it vested no rights whatsoever in favor of Ibuna, either of ownership and
possession.
Given the foregoing, with the absence of the first essential requisite of an agricultural
tenancy relationship, i.e., that the parties to the agreement are the true and lawful
421 of 578
Case Digests
landholders and tenants, respondent Sombrino cannot be considered a de jure tenant who
is entitled to security of tenure under existing tenancy laws.
422 of 578
Case Digests
THE HEIRS OF MARSELLA T. LUPENA (IN SUBSTITUTION OF MARSELLA T. LUPENA)

v. ASTORA MEDINA, JOVITO PAGSISIHAN, CENON PATRICIO, AND BERNARDO
DIONISIO
DOCTRINE
appeal via certiorari before the Court and are not proper for its consideration. The Court is not
a trier of facts. It is not the Court's function to examine and weigh all over again the evidence
presented in the proceedings below.
FACTS
The original plaintiff, Lupena, filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession of Real
Property against respondents before the RTC. While the case was pending before the RTC,
Lupena died but she was substituted by her heirs, represented by Hermogenes L. Jose.
Lupena was the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 180 square meters
located in Brgy. Bagumbayan, Taguig covered by a TCT. In or about 1985-1986, the
respondents entered the property of Lupena and unlawfully withheld and deprived the latter
of possession over a big portion thereof by force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth.
Lupena demanded that the respondents vacate the premises but they adamantly refused and
ignored her plea. Lupena thus hired a licensed surveyor, Engineer Oscar Tenazas to
determine the extent and exact area of the portion of lot individually encroached by each
respondent. After the survey, Engr. Tenazas prepared a Relocation Plan, which was duly
approved by the Land Management Bureau (LMB), Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and a Sketch Plan. The respondents were found to have encroached on
Lupena's lot as follows: 1) Medina occupied 34 square meters; 2) Pagsisihan occupied 61
square meters; 3) Patricio occupied 8 square meters; and 4) occupied 15 square meters.
During trial, Francisco Jose and Engr. Oscar Tenazas testified to prove the petitioners
cause of action. The RTC dismissed the Complaint because it found that the evidence
presented by the petitioners Heirs of Lupena failed to sufficiently establish that the lots
occupied by the respondents were actually part of or overlapped the property. Hence, the
petitioners Heirs of Lupena filed an appeal before the CA but it was denied for lack of merit.
ISSUE
Whether the CA misappreciated the evidence on record when it found that the
Relocation Plan approved by the LMB failed to show that the respondents encroached on the
subject property.
RULING
NO. The petitioners Heirs of Lupena maintain that the aforementioned Relocation
Plan that they presented during the trial is admissible and competent to show encroachment.
However, as stressed by the CA in the assailed Decision, the Relocation Plan heavily relied
423 of 578
Case Digests
upon by the petitioners Heirs of Lupena does not indicate whatsoever that the subject
property was encroached upon by the respondents. In fact, the petitioners Heirs of Lupena
themselves admit that while Section 643(d) of the Revised Manual for Land Surveying
Regulations in the Philippines requires geodetic engineers to indicate in the relocation plan
the positions of buildings, fences, walls, and other permanent improvements adversely
affected by the determination of the boundaries, in the Relocation Plan they offered as
evidence, it states therein that there are no such adverse buildings, fences, walls, and other
structures put up in the subject property. Curiously, the petitioners Heirs of Lupena even
unequivocally admitted that the respondents did not put up any structure on the subject
property.
The petitioners Heirs of Lupena now argue that the respondents encroached on the
subject property by erecting temporary structures and not permanent structures. The
petitioners Heirs of Lupena's new theory that the encroachment committed by the
respondents was by way of erecting temporary structures fails to convince. During the trial,
the petitioners Heirs of Lupena made it abundantly clear that, in their allegation, the
respondents encroached on the subject property by building houses and occupying them.
Hence, with the Relocation Plan submitted into evidence by the petitioners Heirs of Lupena
incontrovertibly showing that no buildings, enclosures, and other permanent structures
were put up by the respondents on the subject property, the CA did not commit any error in
holding that the petitioners Heirs of Lupena failed to sufficiently establish that the
respondents encroached upon the subject property.
424 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROBERTO REY E. GABIOSA

DOCTRINE
Since probable cause is dependent largely on the findings of the judge who conducted
the examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses, then
his findings deserve great weight. The reviewing court can overturn such findings only upon
proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason.
FACTS
Police Superintendent Leo Tayabas Ajero, the Officer-in-Charge of the Kidapawan
City, Police Station, applied for the issuance of a search warrant against petitioner before the
Executive Judge Arvin Sadiri B. Balagot. In support of his application, P/Supt Ajero attached
the Affidavit of his witness, PO1 Geverola, which states that their intelligence Section
received information from informant that Roberto Rey Gabiosa Alias Jojo is selling illegal
drugs particularly Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu in his house.
They conducted a test buy with the help of an Action Agent and eventually confirmed the
selling of illegal drugs.
Judge Balagot, then, issued a Search Warrant after finding a probable cause for such
issuance. Petitioner, however, questioned the validity of the search warrant issued against
him. Thus, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash and Suppression of Evidence claiming that the
issuance of the search warrant is grossly violative of his fundamental constitutional and
human right. The RTC denied the motion. Gabiosa then sought reconsideration but it was
denied by the RTC. Undeterred, Gabiosa filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, alleging
that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying his motion to quash. The CA granted
Gabiosa's Petition for Certiorari. The CA likewise ruled that the search warrant was invalid
because Judge Balagot, the judge who issued the warrant, supposedly failed to propound
probing and searching questions to the witness. The People of the Philippines, through the
OSG, filed a motion for reconsideration. However, in a Resolution, the CA denied the said
motion. Hence, the instant Petition.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in granting the Petition for Certiorari filed by Gabiosa.
RULING
YES. The CA's main basis for its ruling is the use of the word "and" in the constitutional
provision on searches and seizures. The reasoning of the CA is contrary to established
jurisprudence, and defeats the very purpose of the constitutional right involved in this case.
As early as 1937, in the case of Alvarez v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, the Court
explained that ultimately, the purpose of the proceeding is for the judge to determine that
probable cause exists. Thus, there is no need to examine both the applicant and the
witness/es if either one of them is sufficient to establish probable cause. If, despite the use
425 of 578
Case Digests
of "and," the examination of the applicant or complainant would suffice as long as probable
cause was established, then the Court does not see any reason why the converse - the judge
examined the witness only and not the applicant - would not be valid as well. Again, the
purpose of the examination is to satisfy the judge that probable cause exists. Hence, it is
immaterial in the grander scheme of things whether the judge examined the complainant
only, or the witness only, and not both the complainant and the witness/es. The primordial
consideration here is that the judge is convinced that there is probable cause to disturb the
particular individual's privacy. Therefore, to the mind of the Court, the CA erred in placing
undue importance on the Constitution's use of the word "and" instead of "or" or "and/or."
Since probable cause is dependent largely on the findings of the judge who conducted
the examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses,
then his findings deserve great weight. The reviewing court can overturn such findings only
upon proof that the judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of
reason. Given the foregoing, the CA thus erred in ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC in upholding the validity of the search warrant. Judge Balagot made sure that
the witness had personal knowledge of the facts by asking specifics, and asked how he
obtained knowledge of the same and how he was sure that the facts continue to exist. The
questions propounded by Judge Balagot, taken and viewed as a whole, were therefore
probing and not merely superficial and perfunctory. It was thus reversible error on the part
of the CA to have set aside the search warrant.
426 of 578
Case Digests
MANSUE NERY LUKBAN v. OMBUDSMAN CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES

DOCTRINE
Compliance with procedural rules is necessary for an orderly administration of justice.
Time and again, the Court has relaxed the observance of procedural rules to advance
substantial justice. The relaxation of procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice even
finds application in judgments that are already final and executory.
A final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be
modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land. However, this Court has
relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life, liberty,
honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the
case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
FACTS
This case arose from the so-called "chopper scam" that involved the procurement of
second-hand light police operational helicopters (LPOHs) for use of the Philippine National
Police (PNP). During the time material to this case, petitioner Lukban was the Chief of the
Management Division of the PNP Directorate for Comptrollership.
Lukban was charged with various criminal and administrative offenses in relation to
the procurement of the said helicopters because an investigation of the subject transactions
later revealed that the LPOHs did not meet specifications provided by the NAPOLCOM.
Further, during the course of the inquisition, it was discovered that the LPOHs were hardly
brand new and the choppers were actually pre-owned by then First Gentleman Mike Arroyo.
The Ombudsman found the respondents therein administratively liable and likewise
ordered the filing of Informations against them for crimes relative to the procurement
process. It held that there exists substantial evidence to show that Lukban, among others,
while in the exercise of their respective public duties and functions as participants to the
questioned PNP procurement, conspired with each other to falsify documents, skirt
procedures, circumvent rules, and defraud the government of millions of pesos in order to
ultimately ensure the unwarranted benefit and pecuniary gain in favor of private
respondents de Vera, MAPTRA, and FG [Arroyo]. The CA dismissed Lukban's petition for
review, and sustained his administrative liability,
Lukban filed his MR via private courier, which was denied for being filed out of time.
Lukban filed a Manifestation and Motion premised on an apparent oversight in the
computation of the reglementary period. Still, the CA denied the same. It appears that Lukban
had until September 25, 2015 to file the MR. However, the MR was filed only on September
28, 2015 thru private courier and the CA received the same only on October 2, 2015.
427 of 578
Case Digests
As a result, the CA ruled that the August 20, 2015 CA Decision had already become
final and executory on September 29, 2015. Hence, an Entry of Judgment was issued on
October 13, 2016. Lukban filed a Motion for Leave to File Attached Second Motion for
Reconsideration and a Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment, which were denied by the CA.
Lukban claims that the CA erred in denying his MR not on the merits but on sheer
technicality. His counsel admitted that he had made an honest mistake in the filing of the MR.
Hence, he pleads for compassion and liberality in the interest of substantial justice.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in denying Lukban's MR based on technicality.
RULING
YES. At the outset, it should be emphasized that compliance with procedural rules is
necessary for an orderly administration of justice. Based on the records, it appears that
Lukban received a copy of the CA Decision on September 10, 2015. Thus, he only had 15 days
from receipt of the CA Decision or until September 25, 2015 to file his MR. However, his MR
was filed by his previous counsel via private courier only on September 28, 2015 and was
received by the CA on October 2, 2015. As a result of the CA's denial of his MR, the CA Decision
was deemed final and executory on September 29, 2015 and an Entry of Judgment was issued
on October 13, 2016.
There is no dispute that Lukban belatedly filed his MR before the CA. Nevertheless,
there is merit to his contention that the CA should have granted his MR. Time and again, the
Court has relaxed the observance of procedural rules to advance substantial justice. The
relaxation of procedural rules in the interest of substantial justice even finds application in
judgments that are already final and executory.
A final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be
modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land. However, this Court
has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life,
liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the
merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
The instances for relaxation of the rules are present in this case. While Lukban admits
the belated filing, he has been able to give sufficient explanation as to why timeliness
requirements have not been complied with - his previous counsel miscalculated the period
of filing and misunderstood the rules therefor as he equated the effects of filing via private
courier with filing through registered mail. In fact, and as noted in the Comment, this mistake
had readily been acknowledged by his previous counsel when the handling lawyer filed a
manifestation to this effect before the CA, specifically imploring the Honorable Court to
exercise indulgence on account of his inadvertence.
428 of 578
Case Digests
The injurious effect of the counsel's blunder was made more palpable by the fact that
the Assailed Decision immediately caused Lukban's dismissal from service. That after thirty-
three (33) years of being a public servant-one with an unblemished service record at that -
Petitioner was immediately terminated with all his benefits reduced to nil. This immediate
deprivation of hard-earned benefits should have equally compelled the CA to reconsider.
Furthermore, the belated filing was not motivated by any malicious intent, as it was
apparent that the late filing was merely due to the previous counsel's gross and inexcusable
neglect of his client's cause. There was no ill will on the part of Lukban and the belated filing
was not a ploy to unduly prolong and delay the proceedings. There being no deliberate intent
to delay the proceedings, the Lukban's plea for the relaxation of the rules merits
consideration.
429 of 578
Case Digests
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JULIANA SAN MIGUEL VDA. DE RAMOS, ET. AL.
DOCTRINE
The sheer fact that there is a remaining portion of real property after the expropriation
is not enough, by and of itself, to be basis for the award of consequential damages. To be sure,
it must still be proven by sufficient evidence that the remaining portion suffers from an
impairment or decrease in value.
FACTS
In relation to the construction of the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) - Harbor Link
Project (Segment 9) from NLEX to MacArthur Highway, Valenzuela City, petitioner Republic,
as represented by the DPWH, sought to acquire the respondents' private property located at
Brgy. Gen. T. De Leon, Valenzuela City (subject property).
The Republic offered to purchase the subject property for an amount based on the
Schedule of Zonal Valuation issued by the Bureau or Internal Revenue (BIR), i.e., P2,100.00
per square meter or P457,800.00. The offer was rejected by the respondents. Hence, on
October 20, 2010, the Republic filed an action for expropriation (Expropriation Complaint)
before the RTC to expropriate the subject property by virtue of Republic Act No. (RA) 8974.
Afterwards, the Republic paid a deposit representing the 100% zonal value of the
subject property to the respondents. The respondents duly acknowledged the receipt of the
said deposit. Subsequently, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession in favor of the Republic.
The RTC found that the Republic has a lawful right to take the subject property, and
thus, it issued an Order of Expropriation. The RTC likewise found that "based on the evidence
on records, specifically the current zonal valuation issued by the BIR, it is clearly established
that the amount of P 2,100.00 per square meter or the total amount of P 457,800.00 is a just
compensation for the subject property with an area of 218 square meters.
The respondents did not question the RTC's determination of the amount of just
compensation. For their part, the Republic filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration arguing
that the RTC committed an error in imposing interest on the payment of just compensation
and imposing consequential damages.
ISSUE
Whether the Republic is required to pay consequential damages.
RULING
NO. Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governs expropriation proceedings. With respect to
consequential damages, Section 6 of Rule 67 states: “xxx The commissioners shall assess the
consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such consequential
damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public use or
430 of 578
Case Digests
purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the
carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking the property. But in no case
shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the
owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken.”
In Republic v. Soriano, the Court deemed the award of consequential damages

improper because "the subject property is being expropriated in its entirety, there is no
remaining portion which may suffer an impairment or decrease in value as a result of the
expropriation." The Republic chimes in by asserting that the award of consequential
damages is inapplicable because "the entire area of respondents' property was
expropriated."
The Republic's position is wrong. Only a portion, and not the entire area, of the
respondents' property was expropriated. As borne out by a perusal of the subject TCT, total
area of the subject property is 380 sq. m. As readily admitted by the Republic, however, the
affected area of the expropriation undertaken was only "218 sq. m." out of the total area of
380 sq. m.
Be that as it may, the Court deems the award of consequential damages in favor of the
respondents erroneous. The sheer fact that there is a remaining portion of real property after
the expropriation is not enough, by and of itself, to be basis for the award of consequential
damages. To be sure, it must still be proven by sufficient evidence that the remaining portion
suffers from an impairment or decrease in value.
A careful review of the records of the instant case reveals that the RTC's award of
consequential damages is not supported by any evidence establishing that the remaining 162
sq. m. of the subject property suffered from any impairment or decrease in value. Therefore,
the award of consequential damages must be deleted.
While the Court considers the payment of transfer taxes as not forming part of the
consequential damages allowed under the Rules of Court, it must be clarified, however, that
the courts are not precluded from considering the value of capital gains tax (CGT) and other
transfer taxes in determining the amount of just compensation to be awarded to the affected
owner.
Just compensation in expropriation cases is defined "as the full and fair equivalent of
the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The Court repeatedly stressed that
the true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word 'just' is used to modify
the meaning of the word 'compensation' to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given
for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample."
Here, the respondents received, as just compensation, an amount equal to the sum of
the subject property's current BIR zonal valuation. Evidently, the value of CGT and transfer
431 of 578
Case Digests
taxes due on the transfer of the subject property were not factored into the amount paid to
the respondents, but instead, separately awarded as consequential damages.
While the award of consequential damages equivalent to the value of CGT and
transfer taxes must be struck down for being without legal basis, the Court deems it just and
equitable to direct petitioner Republic to shoulder such taxes to preserve the compensation
awarded to the respondents as a consequence of the expropriation. To stress, compensation,
to be just, it must be of such value as to fully rehabilitate the affected owner; it must be
sufficient to make the affected owner whole.
432 of 578
Case Digests
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS v. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE

PROVINCE OF BENGUET
G.R. No. 222958, March 11, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
A Rule 65 petition for certiorari is not proper to challenge the dismissal of the second
petition on the ground of res judicata. If the reason for the dismissal is based on res judicata,
among others, the dismissal, under Section 5 of Rule 16, is with prejudice and the remedy of the
aggrieved party is to appeal the order granting the motion to dismiss
FACTS
The instant dispute involves two successive petitions for replacement of lost owner's
duplicate Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 21320.
On January 28, 2011, PBCOM filed a petition for issuance of the owner's duplicate
copy of TCT No. 21320 in lieu of the lost one (first petition), raffled to RTC, Branch 62, La
Trinidad, Benguet. PBCOM claimed to be the registered owner of the subject property, having
acquired it on March 2, 1985 through an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. The property was
allegedly not included in PBCOM's inventory of assets because the bank's La Union branch
failed to forward all the pertinent records of its acquisition to the Makati head office.
Although the property was registered in the bank's name, it only "got wind" of its existence
when it received a May 2010 Notice and Reminder to Real Property Tax Payers from the
Office of the Municipal Treasurer of La Trinidad, Benguet. It allegedly exerted all possible
efforts to locate the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 21320, but to no avail. It then filed an
affidavit of loss with the Registry of Deeds of Benguet.
After PBCOM's ex parte presentation of evidence, the RTC, Branch 62 issued its July
29, 2011 Order dismissing the first petition for insufficiency of evidence. It held that PBCOM
failed to prove that it had "exerted all efforts to determine the actual whereabouts of TCT No.
21320 from all its available records and the bank's past and present officers or employees
and legal counsel who could and should have knowledge of the bank's acquired property and
the documents relative thereto."
PBCOM filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration of the July 29, 2011 Order and
prayed that it be allowed to present additional evidence to prove the allegations in its first
petition. The RTC, Branch 62 gave PBCOM five (5) days to file a supplemental motion but
failed to comply and did not bother to set its foregoing motions for hearing. Thus, the RTC,
Branch 62 considered the omnibus motion for reconsideration as abandoned.
Instead of filing an appeal from the July 29, 2011 Order, PBCOM filed the second
petition, raffled to RTC, Branch 63. The allegations in the second petition were essentially
the same as that contained in the first petition.
433 of 578
Case Digests
In its April 27, 2012 Order, the RTC-Branch 63 dismissed the second petition, motu
proprio, on the ground of res judicata. As the first petition was dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence, i.e., an adjudication on the merits, the RTC-Branch 63 held that the second petition
involving the same parties and cause of action was barred by prior judgment.
PBCOM sought reconsideration of the aforementioned Order, which was, however,

denied. It then filed a notice of appeal, which it later withdrew. Thereafter, it filed a petition
for certiorari with the CA, claiming that the respondent judge therein committed grave abuse
of discretion (1) in dismissing the second petition on the ground of res judicata and (2) in
dismissing, without first determining, whether the evidence presented in the first petition
was identical to the evidence intended to be presented in the second petition.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and held that: (1) PBCOM availed of the
wrong remedy as the dismissal of the second petition on the ground of res judicata was a
complete disposition and was thus reviewable via appeal; and (2) all elements of res judicata
were attendant, given that PBCOM sought the issuance of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT
No. 21320 in both petitions.
ISSUE
(1) Whether PBCOM availed of the correct remedy to challenge the dismissal of the
second petition; and
(2) Whether the RTC-Branch 63 correctly dismissed the second petition on the
ground of res judicata.
RULING
(1) NO. PBCOM availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari to challenge the dismissal of the second petition on the ground of res
judicata.
An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action,

so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or
judgment ends the litigation in the lower court. An order of dismissal, whether correct or
not, is a final order. It is not interlocutory because the proceedings are terminated; it leaves
nothing more to be done by the lower court. Therefore, the remedy of the plaintiff, except
when otherwise provided, is to appeal the order.
Applying the foregoing, there is no question that (1) a dismissal on the ground of res
judicata is a final order that completely disposes of the case and leaves nothing more to be
done in the RTC, and (2) such dismissal does not fall within the enumeration of orders from
which no appeal may be taken. In fact, a dismissal on the ground of res judicata is expressly
declared to be appealable under Rule 16, Section 1 in relation to Section 5.
Evidently therefore, appeal — and not a special civil action for certiorari — was the
correct remedy to challenge the dismissal of the second petition on the ground of res
434 of 578
Case Digests
judicata. If the reason for the dismissal is based on res judicata, among others, the dismissal,
under Section 5 of Rule 16, is with prejudice and the remedy of the aggrieved party is to
appeal the order granting the motion to dismiss.
As appeal was available, PBCOM's Rule 65 petition would not prosper even if the
ground therefor was grave abuse of discretion. The Rules preclude recourse to the special
civil action of certiorari if appeal by way of a Notice of Appeal or a Petition for Review is
available, as the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative
or successive.
Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial justice, the Court finds it proper to relax
the technical rules of procedure if only to resolve the novel issue presented before the Court.
(2) NO. PBCOM, as the undisputed registered owner of the land covered by TCT No.
21320 on file with the Register of Deeds, cannot be barred by res judicata from
filing a second petition to replace its owner's duplicate certificate of title in case
of loss or destruction of the original duplicate.
Rule 1, Section 4 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the Rules of Court apply
to land registration cases only by analogy, in a suppletory character, and whenever
practicable and convenient.
As already explained, the nature and purpose of the Torrens system and the absolute
indispensability of the owner's duplicate certificate of title mandates that the Court give
primacy to the registered owner's substantive right to possess and accordingly, to seek a
replacement of an owner's duplicate certificate of title that has been lost or destroyed. When
there is a right, there must be a remedy.
Although admittedly, it "is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to
litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject once fully and fairly
adjudicated," it would be extremely impracticable, inconvenient, and unjust to perpetually
preclude the registered owner from registering any voluntary transaction, i.e., sale, donation,
mortgage, lease, etc., on his/her land simply because he/she failed to prove, to the
satisfaction of the court, that he/she, in fact, lost his/her title. If the Court were to uphold the
dismissal of the second petition on the ground of res judicata, PBCOM would be left with no
other remedy under the law to exercise full ownership rights over its own property.
This finds more importance in this case because PBCOM is a bank and is thus bound
to comply with Section 51 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8791 or the "General Banking Law”. In
other words, sustaining the dismissal and upholding the applicability of res judicata in the
instant case would not only perpetually prevent PBCOM from registering any voluntary
transaction over the parcel of land, but also perpetually prevent it from complying with its
obligations under the General Banking Law. This interpretation is absurd.
435 of 578
Case Digests
Res judicata has been defined as "'a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.' Res judicata lays the rule that an existing
final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court
of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights
of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial
tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit."
As in proceedings for the reconstitution of original certificates of title however,
proceedings for the replacement of owner's duplicate certificates of title only involve "the
re-issuance of a new [owner's duplicate] certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original
form and condition. It does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or
destroyed title." Strictly speaking therefore, there is no conclusive adjudication of rights
between adversarial parties in a proceeding for the replacement of a lost or destroyed
owner's duplicate certificate of title.
436 of 578
Case Digests
MERCEDES S. GATMAYTAN and ERLINDA V. VALDELLON v. MISIBIS LAND, INC.

DOCTRINE
Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court allows parties to plead as many separate claims
as they may have, provided that no rules regarding venue and joinder of parties are violated. A
complaint which contains two or more alternative causes of action cannot be dismissed where
one of them clearly states a sufficient cause of action against the defendant. This is hornbook
law. In determining the sufficiency of the Complaint and whether it should be allowed to
proceed to trial, analysis of each alternative cause of action alleged is necessary, as the
sufficiency of one precludes its outright dismissal.
FACTS
On December 9, 1991, petitioners Mercedes and Erlinda purchased from Oscar and
Cidra Garcia (Spouses Garcia) a parcel of land (disputed lot) in Misibis, Cagraray Island,
Albay. On April 6, 1992, Petitioners, armed with the original owner's duplicate copy of the
TCT, attempted to register the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 9, 1991
(1991 DOAS) with the Register of Deeds of Albay (RD). They were successful in having the
1991 DOAS duly annotated on the TCT, but they were not able to cause the transfer of the
Torrens title in their name since they lacked the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
clearance necessary to do so.
In 2010, when Petitioners resumed processing the transfer of the Torrens title to
their names, they discovered that the disputed lot had been consolidated by Misibis Land,
Inc. (MLI) with other adjoining lots in Misibis, and sub-divided into smaller lots covered by
several new Torrens titles. Upon further investigation, Petitioners learned that the TCT had
been stamped "cancelled", and replaced by subsequent Torrens titles issued on the basis of
the following transactions:
(1) Deed of Absolute Sale (1996 DOAS) between Spouses Garcia as sellers and DAA
Realty Corporation (DAA Realty) as buyer; and
(2) Deed of Absolute Sale (2005 DOAS) between DAA Realty as seller and MLI as
buyer.
With this discovery, Petitioners immediately caused, on September 1, 2010, the

annotation of their Affidavit of Adverse Claim on MLI's Torrens titles.
On December 10, 2014, Petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC (Complaint)
against Spouses Garcia, DAA Realty and MLI, as well as Philippine National Bank (PNB) to
whom the disputed lot had been mortgaged.
In their Complaint, Petitioners stated their causes of action, as follows:
(1) FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION – For: Declaration of Plaintiffs' Ownership and Nullity of
the 1996 DOAS, 2005 DOAS, and the April 21, 2005 MLI-PNB Mortgage;
437 of 578
Case Digests
a. FIRST ALTERNATIVE CAUSE OF ACTION – Re: Declaration of Nullity Based

on Double Sale of the 1996 DOAS and TCT Nos. T-97059 and T-138212
(subsequent TCTs) and Any and All Transfers and Dealings Thereafter;
b. SECOND ALTERNATIVE CAUSE OF ACTION – For: Quieting of Title;
(2) SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION – For: Accounting and Remittance, if any, of all of
MLI's Income and Profits vis-a-vis the disputed lot;
(3) THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION – For: Exemplary Damages;
(4) FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION – For: Moral Damages; and
(5) FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION – For: Attorney's Fees and Litigation Expenses.
MLI argued that Petitioners' cause of action is already barred by prescription since
an action for reconveyance of real property based on an implied constructive trust arising
from fraud prescribes ten (10) years after the issuance of title in favor of the defrauder. Here,
MLI stressed that the Complaint was filed in 2014, or more than ten (10) years after the
issuance of DAA Realty's Torrens title in 1996.
Finding merit in MLI's assertions, the RTC issued the First RTC Order dismissing the
Complaint on the ground of prescription of action and failure to pay the correct docket fees.
Petitioners' subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied through the Second RTC
Order.
ISSUE
Whether the allegations in the Complaint are sufficient to sustain any of the
alternative causes of action asserted therein.
RULING
YES. Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court permits the assertion of alternative causes
of action. Section 2, Rule 8 allows parties to plead as many separate claims as they may have,
provided that no rules regarding venue and joinder of parties are violated. A complaint
which contains two or more alternative causes of action cannot be dismissed where one of
them clearly states a sufficient cause of action against the defendant. This is hornbook law.
In determining the sufficiency of the Complaint and whether it should be allowed to proceed
to trial, analysis of each alternative cause of action alleged is necessary, as the sufficiency of
one precludes its outright dismissal.
Reconveyance based on the nullity of the 1996 DOAS in favor of DAA Realty
Whether an action for reconveyance prescribes or not is therefore determined by the

nature of the action, that is, whether it is founded on a claim of the existence of an implied or
constructive trust, or one based on the existence of a void or inexistent contract. Here,
Petitioners' action should be characterized primarily as one for reconveyance based on a
void contract, and thus, imprescriptible. Petitioners assert that the 1996 DOAS is void and
inexistent, as: (i) the purported sellers were no longer the owners of the disputed lot at the
time of execution; (ii) the signature of one of the sellers therein had been forged; and (iii) the
438 of 578
Case Digests
buyer-corporation was legally inexistent at the time of execution. Here, recovery of

ownership is not restricted to the mere fact that a Torrens title had been issued in favor of
DAA Realty, and later, MLI. The above allegations show that the recovery of ownership is
predicated on the nullification of the underlying mode of transfer of title of the disputed lot
— the issuance of the Torrens titles to DAA Realty and then to MLI being merely the result
of the 1996 DOAS sought to be nullified.
Hence, the material allegations in Petitioners' Complaint, including the possession by

Petitioners of the owner's duplicate title of Spouses Garcia's TCT and the annotation of the
1991 DOAS in both original and owner's duplicate title covering the disputed lot, are deemed
hypothetically admitted. Since the nullity of DAA Realty's Torrens title may be anchored on
the non-presentation of Spouses Garcia's owner's duplicate title, and MLI may not be
considered an innocent purchaser for value, then Petitioners' allegation for reconveyance
based on the nullity of the 1996 DOAS and the Torrens titles resulting therefrom was
sufficiently made.
Since the allegations in the Complaint point to the nullity of the 1996 DOAS — which
is the underlying transaction from which MLI derives its alleged right of ownership over the
disputed lot — such issue should have been resolved by the RTC instead of ordering the
Complaint's outright dismissal. The mere issuance of a Torrens title in favor of DAA Realty,
which the Complaint alleges as void, cannot, by itself, without the requisite determination of
the factual circumstances surrounding it, be accorded any probative weight to justify the
dismissal of the Complaint given that in addition to the invalidity of said Torrens title,
Petitioners also made allegations relating to the nullity of the underlying sale, which is the
substantive basis for its issuance.
Quieting of Title
Petitioners claim to have equitable title over the disputed lot based on the 1991 DOAS
registered with the RD and annotated on the original and owner's duplicate of Spouses
Garcia's TCT No. T-77703. In addition, they allege that the 1996 DOAS purportedly executed
between Spouses Garcia and DAA Realty, and all transactions subsequent thereto, cast a
cloud of doubt on such equitable title. Hence, the two requisites to sustain an action for
quieting of title have been met.
As stated, an action for quieting of title involving property not in the possession of the
plaintiff prescribes thirty (30) years after the cause of action accrues, which, in this case,
appears to have taken place on February 22, 1996, upon issuance of DAA Realty's Torrens
title. Hence, Petitioners' action for quieting of title has not prescribed, as the Complaint was
filed only eighteen (18) years thereafter, on December 10, 2014.
The outright dismissal of the Complaint is unwarranted
439 of 578
Case Digests
In ruling that Petitioners' action had already prescribed, it is clear that the RTC
treated the Complaint as an action for reconveyance based solely on implied constructive
trust. This is clearly grievous error, if not grave abuse of discretion, as the Complaint clearly
alleged Petitioners' other causes of action. In any case, even if the Complaint were to be
treated, for the sake of argument, as an action for reconveyance based solely on an implied
constructive trust, the Complaint should still be allowed to proceed, having been timely filed.
A Torrens title issued without prior presentation and cancellation of the existing
owner's duplicate title does not bind the property to which it pertains. The title so issued
does not produce the effects of a Torrens title contemplated under PD 1529, including the
effects of constructive notice. It is literally a scrap of paper.
On this basis, coupled with the fact that they were always in possession of the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. T-77703, Petitioners cannot be deemed to have been
constructively notified of the issuance of DAA Realty's TCT No. T-97059. The ten (10)-year
prescriptive period thus referred to in Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code must be reckoned
not from the issuance of DAA Realty's Torrens title, but rather, from Petitioners' actual
discovery of the fraud in 2010. The Complaint, having been filed barely four (4) years after,
or on December 10, 2014, was therefore timely filed.
Belated payment of docket fees may still be permitted
Apart from prescription, the RTC also anchored the outright dismissal of the
Complaint on Petitioners' alleged failure to pay the correct docket fees. Again, this is wrong.
Assuming that the payment made by Petitioners is in fact deficient, belated payment of the
difference may still be permitted consistent with the Court's ruling in Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd. v. Asuncion.
The 1991 DOAS in favor of Petitioners cannot be declared void without trial
Finally, the Court is not unaware of certain discrepancies between the allegations in
the Complaint and the statements appearing on the face of the supporting documents
attached thereto. However, and precisely to the point, matters relating to the validity of the
1991 DOAS cannot be resolved without presentation of evidence. Any finding to be made by
the Court here would amount to a prejudgment of the merits of the Complaint without trial,
and would constitute a violation of Petitioners' right to due process. To treat the 1991 DOAS
as void without the benefit of trial will contradict the hypothetical admissions made by MLI
when it filed its Motion for Preliminary Hearing.
In this regard, established jurisprudence dictates that in cases where there is a

conflict between the allegations in a complaint and its supporting documents, the
complainant must be given the opportunity to reconcile the same, consistent with the
fundamental principle of due process.
440 of 578
Case Digests
In sum, the resolution of the substantive issues raised in the Complaint, as discussed
herein, requires a full-blown trial. The issuance of the First and Second RTC Orders directing
the outright dismissal of the Complaint are not only grievously erroneous, but amount to
grave abuse of discretion, as they deprive Petitioners of the right to due process.
441 of 578
Case Digests
PETE GERALD L. JAVIER and DANILO B. TUMAMAO v. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES
DOCTRINE
Merely claiming that the case had voluminous records, without offering any proof as to
the said assertion or at least specifying how voluminous such records were is an
unsubstantiated claim which does not suffice to justify the inordinate delay in the resolution of
the case.
FACTS
In 2004, the Province of Isabela procured, by direct contracting, 15,333 bottles of
liquid organic fertilizer. The Commission on Audit (COA), found that the procurement was
done without open competitive bidding, and that the procured items were overpriced.
On July 4, 2011, the Task Force Abono of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman)
filed a complaint against the public officers involved in the subject transaction, including
Javier and Tumamao, who were the Provincial Accountant and Provincial Agriculturist of
Isabela, respectively.
After almost five years, or on September 19, 2016, the Special Panel on Fertilizer Fund
Scam of the Ombudsman issued its Resolution finding probable cause to indict Javier and
Tumamao, along with Provincial Vice- Governor Santiago P. Respicio (Respicio), for violation
of Section 3(e), of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. No. 3019). The Ombudsman approved the
Resolution on November 22, 2016. Thereafter, on October 3, 2017, an Information dated
June 14, 2017 was filed against Javier and Tumamao for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019.
The Sandiganbayan set the date of the supposed arraignment. Javier and Tumamao,
however, manifested that they were not ready for arraignment as they intended to file a
motion to quash on the ground of inordinate delay. They then filed the Motion to Quash on
November 24, 2017, arguing that the period constituting five years and four months from
the filing of the complaint to the approval of the resolution finding probable cause
constituted delay which violated their right to speedy disposition of cases. The Ombudsman
filed its Comment praying for the dismissal of the motion, arguing that the case had
voluminous records, and that there were an endless number of cases being filed in their
office.
The Sandiganbayan denied the Motion to Quash. While the Sandiganbayan conceded
the amount of time which constituted the delay, it simply held that the Ombudsman had valid
justifications for such delay. The Sandiganbayan adopted the Ombudsman's justifications,
despite the latter's failure to substantiate its claims.
442 of 578
Case Digests
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in denying the Motion to Quash filed by Javier and Tumamao.
RULING
YES. The right to speedy disposition of cases of both Javier and Tumamao were
violated by the Ombudsman's delay in concluding the preliminary investigation.
In resolving questions involving the right to speedy disposition of cases, the Court is
guided by its ruling in Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division (Cagang), wherein the
following guidelines were laid down:
First, the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right
to speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to
speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of
law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before
any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is that the
accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy
disposition of cases to be invoked.
Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal

complaint prior to a conduct of a preliminary investigation. This Court
acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods
for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and
nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken against the
prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the
filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of
whether there has been inordinate delay.
Third, courts must first determine which party carries the burden of
proof. If the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in
current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that
will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the
burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs
beyond the given time period and the right is invoked, the prosecution has
the burden of justifying the delay.
If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the
case is motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is
attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not
contribute to the delay.
443 of 578
Case Digests
Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution, the prosecution

must prove first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of
preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the
complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay
inevitable; and third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result
of the delay.
Fourth, determination of the length of delay is never mechanical.

Courts must consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of
evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.
An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution

of the case was solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically
motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite utter lack of
evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of the
prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious prosecution is properly
alleged and substantially proven, the case would automatically be dismissed
without need of further analysis of the delay.
Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to

speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that
the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be
invoked.
In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the

delays must be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court.
Fifth, the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy

trial must be timely raised. The respondent or the accused must file the
appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods.
Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition
of cases.
For purposes of computing the length of delay in the present case, the Cagang
guidelines will be followed, and the case against Javier and Tumamao would be deemed
initiated only upon the filing of the complaint, or on April 27, 2011. Javier and Tumamao
were given the opportunity to be heard, and were therefore able to file their counter-
affidavits on November 15, 2011 and November 22, 2011, respectively. After these dates, it
appears from the record that the case had become dormant until December 5, 2016 when
the Ombudsman approved the resolution finding probable cause against Javier and
Tumamao.
According to Cagang, if the delay is beyond the time periods provided in the rules to
decide the case, the burden of proof shifts to the State. Where the burden of proof has shifted
444 of 578
Case Digests
to the prosecution, the prosecution must be able to prove: First, that it followed the
prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of
the case; Second, that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay
inevitable; and Third, that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.
In this case, the prosecution justified the delay of five years by merely claiming that
the case had voluminous records, without offering any proof as to the said assertion or at
least specifying how voluminous such records were. The prosecution basically relied on such
unsubstantiated claim, and rested on the Court's recognition in a previous case that there is
a steady stream of cases that reaches their office.
Another requisite provided for in Cagang is the timely assertion of the right. Here, the
Court holds that Javier and Tumamao's acts, or their inaction, did not amount to
acquiescence. While it is true that the records are bereft of any indication that Javier and/or
Tumamao "followed-up" on the resolution of their case, the same could not be construed to
mean that they acquiesced to the delay of five years.
Considering the prosecution's failure to discharge its burden of proof, along with
Javier and Tumamao's timely assertion of their rights, the Sandiganbayan thus committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Quash.
445 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERRY SAPLA Y GUERRERO a.k.a. ERIC

SALIBAD Y MALLARI
G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Exclusive reliance on an unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender probable cause
that permits a warrantless search of a moving vehicle that goes beyond a visual search.
FACTS
On 10 January 2014, at around 11:30 AM, an officer on duty at the Regional Public
Safety Battalion (RPSB) Office received a phone call from a concerned citizen, who informed
the said office that a certain male individual would be transporting marijuana from Kalinga
and into the Province of Isabela. PO2 Mabiasan then relayed the information to their deputy
commander, PSI Ngoslab, who subsequently called Kalinga Police Provincial Office -
Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Group (KPPO-PAIDSOTG) for a
possible joint operation. Thereafter, as a standard operating procedure in drug operations,
PO3 Labbutan, an operative of KPPO-PAIDSOTG, coordinated with the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
The operatives of KPPO-PAIDSOTG arrived at the RPSB. PSI Ngoslab immediately

organized a team and as its team leader, assigned PO2 Mabiasan as the seizing officer, PO3
Labbutan as the arresting officer, while the rest of the police officers would provide security
and backup. The said officers then proceeded to the Talaca detachment.
At around 1:00 in the afternoon, the RPSB hotline received a text message which
stated that the subject male person who would transport marijuana was wearing a collared
white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and was carrying a blue sack on board a
passenger jeepney, with plate number AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela. Subsequently, a
joint checkpoint was strategically organized at the Talaca command post.
The passenger jeepney then arrived at around 1:20 in the afternoon, wherein the
police officers at the Talaca checkpoint flagged down the said vehicle and told its driver to
park on the side of the road. Officers Labbutan and Mabiasan approached the jeepney and
saw Sapla seated at the rear side of the vehicle. The police officers asked Sapla if he was the
owner of the blue sack in front of him, which the latter answered in the affirmative. The said
officers then requested Sapla to open the blue sack. After Sapla opened the sack, officers
Labbutan and Mabiasan saw four (4) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves, wrapped in
newspaper and an old calendar. PO3 Labbutan subsequently arrested Sapla, informed him
of the cause of his arrest and his constitutional rights in the Ilocano dialect. Sapla was
charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or Transportation of Dangerous
Drugs.
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the corpus
delicti of the crime and consequently, convicted Sapla of the crime charged. The CA then
446 of 578
Case Digests
affirmed the RTC Decision. The CA found that although the search and seizure conducted on
Sapla was without a search warrant, the same was lawful as it was a valid warrantless search
of a moving vehicle. The CA held that the essential requisite of probable cause was present,
justifying the warrantless search and seizure.
ISSUE
Whether or not the police can conduct a warrantless intrusive search of a vehicle on
the sole basis of an unverified tip relayed by an anonymous informant?
RULING
NO. As a general rule, a search warrant is required before the police may be allowed
to conduct searches and seizures. This is a right which is protected by the Constitution.
however, there are instances wherein searches are reasonable even in the absence of a
search warrant, taking into account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including the
purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in
which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured.
One of the said exceptions is the search of a moving vehicle – however, the same is
not applicable in the present case. Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are
allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances
as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where
the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection.
Extensive search of a vehicle is permissible, but only when "the officers made it upon
probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the
seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains an item, article or object which
by law is subject to seizure and destruction."
In People v. Comprado, the Court held that the search conducted "could not be
classified as a search of a moving vehicle. In this particular type of search, the vehicle is the
target and not a specific person."
Applying the foregoing to the instant case, it cannot be seriously disputed that the
target of the search conducted was not the passenger jeepney boarded by Sapla nor the cargo
or contents of the said vehicle. The target of the search was the person who matched the
description given by the person who called the RPSB Hotline, i.e., the person wearing a
collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a blue sack.
In any case, even if the search conducted can be characterized as a search of a moving
vehicle, the operation undertaken by the authorities in the instant case cannot be deemed a
valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle. Such type of search is only limited to a visual
search of the vehicle and a more extensive and intrusive search that goes beyond a mere
447 of 578
Case Digests
visual search of the vehicle necessitates probable cause on the part of the apprehending
officers.
In Cogaed, the Court stressed that in engendering probable cause that justifies a valid
warrantless search, "it is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a
reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion
initiated by another person. The police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must
observe the acts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act and not merely rely on the
information passed on to him or her. the matching of information transmitted by an
informant "still remained only as one circumstance” and is not enough to conduct a
warrantless search.
Exclusive reliance on information tipped by informants goes against the very nature
of probable cause. A single hint hardly amounts to the existence of such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place to be searched.
The mere reception of a text message from an anonymous person does NOT suffice
to create probable cause that enables the authorities to conduct an extensive and intrusive
search without a search warrant. Law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential
or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient
to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse
suspicion.
Here, there was no probable cause to justify the extensive and intrusive search. The
singular circumstance that engendered probable cause on the part of the police officers was
the information they received through the RPSB Hotline (via text message) from an
anonymous person. Apart from the information passed on to them, the police simply had no
reason to reasonably believe that the passenger vehicle contained an item, article or object
which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. Moreover, the information regarding the
description of the person alleged to be transporting illegal drugs, i.e., wearing a collared
white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a blue sack, was relayed merely
through a text message from a completely anonymous person. The police did not even
endeavor to inquire how this stranger gathered the information. Simply stated, the
information received through text message was not only hearsay evidence; it is double
hearsay.
Therefore, with the glaring absence of probable cause that justifies an intrusive
warrantless search, considering that the police officers failed to rely on their personal
knowledge and depended solely on an unverified and anonymous tip, the warrantless search
conducted on Sapla was an invalid and unlawful search of a moving vehicle. Applying the
Exclusionary Rule, the confiscated marijuana bricks are inadmissible as evidence against
448 of 578
Case Digests
Sapla. The prosecution is left with no evidence left to support the conviction of Sapla.
Consequently, Sapla is acquitted of the crime charged.
449 of 578
Case Digests
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF MALOLOS, INC. v. THE HEIRS OF MARIANO

MARCOS
DOCTRINE
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, in and of itself, is grounded on
practical reasons, including allowing the administrative agencies concerned to take every
opportunity to correct its own errors, as well as affording the litigants the opportunity to avail
of speedy relief through the administrative processes and sparing them of the laborious and
costly resort to courts. However, this principle is not inflexible, and admits of several exceptions
that include situations where the very rationale of the doctrine has been defeated. One of the
exceptions is that where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant.
FACTS
RCBMI is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of

Title No. 597. On October 21, 1972, upon the enactment of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 27,
otherwise known as the "Tenants Emancipation Decree," portions of said land were awarded
to Mariano Marcos (Marcos), now represented by his heirs (Heirs of Marcos).
On June 17, 1980, RCBMI sought the cancellation of the award of the above portions
to Marcos, mainly alleging that those lots were not devoted to rice production but to social
and humanitarian programs. Two years later, in an Order issued on June 29, 1982 [1982
Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) Order], then MAR granted RCBMI's petition and
cancelled CLT No. 0392296 on the ground that the lot it covered was vacant and uncultivated
upon P.D. 27's issuance. Marcos filed for a reconsideration of the same three years after, but
the same was denied for the reason that the order of cancellation had long become final and
executory, with Marcos faulted for laches. Despite said cancellation, however, the Heirs of
Marcos allegedly refused to surrender possession of the subject property.
Keen on recovering possession of the subject property, RCBMI filed a Complaint for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and damages on February 2, 1994 before the
Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Malolos, Bulacan. The
PARAD ruled in favor of RCBMI, and issued an order for the Heirs of Marcos to vacate the
subject property along with a declaration of nullity of any sale made by the Heirs of Marcos
involving the same. The Heirs of Marcos appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), which affirmed the PARAD's Decision and restated the order
for the Heirs of Marcos to vacate. The Heirs of Marcos filed a motion for reconsideration
which was similarly denied by the DARAB.
Still aggrieved, the Heirs of Marcos appealed the matter to the CA via a petition for
review under Rule 43 but the CA denied the petition. This CA Decision became final and
executory with an Entry of Judgment.
450 of 578
Case Digests
Yet even with an entry of judgment, as RCBMI alleged, the records of the case were
not remanded to the PARAD for purposes of execution. Met with this new delay, RCBMI filed
before the CA Fourteenth Division an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Remand. Over three years
later, a certification remanding records of the case to the PARAD for execution was finally
issued.
Thereafter, on March 10, 2008, RCBMI filed a Motion for the Issuance of Writ of
Execution before the PARAD, submitting that the 1982 MAR Order it sought to have executed
had long become final and executory, and that the writ of execution should have issued as a
matter of right.
This Writ of Execution, at the heart of the present controversy, would take a
staggering length of time to issue, or six years after it was prayed for, and a confounding 28
years after the 1982 MAR Order it sought to execute was promulgated. This astonishing
delay, as will be gleaned from the following narrative, is the height of legal irony, considering
that the order for execution involved a specialized quasi-judicial agency created precisely to
settle agrarian disputes with justice and dispatch.
The Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution was submitted for resolution on
April 21, 2008,1but the same would not be resolved for nearly two years, until after RCBMI
filed a Motion to Resolve which the PARAD granted. The Heirs of Marcos filed for a
reconsideration which RCBMI oppose. The suspensive condition concerning the DAR
Secretary's resolution occurred on May 5, 2011 when then DAR Secretary dismissed the
Heirs of Marcos' petition for coverage of the subject property under the CARP Law, declaring
the said parcel of land exempt from CARP coverage. With no more supervening circumstance
in the way of execution, RCBMI filed another Motion to Resolve the Heirs of Marcos' Motion
for Reconsideration.
On February 17, 2012, the PARAD issued an Order denying the Heirs of Marcos'
Motion for Reconsideration, and finally granting RCBMI's Motion for the Issuance of a Writ
of Execution. The PARAD finally issued a Writ of Execution on December 16, 2014.
Undaunted, the Heirs of Marcos filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution arguing
that the five-year period from the date of promulgation of the 1982 MAR Order within which
to execute the same, as required by Section 4, Rule 20 of the 1989 DARAB Revised Rules of
Procedure (1989 DARAB Rules) had already lapsed. This was opposed by RCBMI, claiming
that the delay of the execution of the decision could only be attributed to the Heirs of Marcos
themselves. The PARAD granted the Heirs of Marcos' Motion to Quash, chiefly ruling that due
to the lapse of the five-year period, RCBMI could only enforce the 1982 MAR Order sought to
be executed via an action.
451 of 578
Case Digests
Aggrieved, RCBMI filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 before
the CA, but the same was dismissed for its non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, noting
that RCBMI should have first filed an appeal before the DARAB.
ISSUE
(1) Whether the CA erred in dismissing RCBMI's petition for certiorari and
mandamus under Rule 65 for its non-exhaustion of administrative remedies; and
(2) Whether the PARAD acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted the Heirs of
Marcos' Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution and denied RCBMI's Motion for
Reconsideration.
RULING
(1) YES. The CA erred in dismissing RCBMI's petition outright on the ground of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies, as the narrative clearly illustrates how
RCBMI's action falls within the exemptions to the said principle.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, in and of itself, is grounded on

practical reasons, including allowing the administrative agencies concerned to take every
opportunity to correct its own errors, as well as affording the litigants the opportunity to
avail of speedy relief through the administrative processes and sparing them of the laborious
and costly resort to courts.
However, this principle is not inflexible, and admits of several exceptions that include
situations where the very rationale of the doctrine has been defeated. One of the exceptions
is that where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice
the complainant.
As applied to the present case, with the peculiar length of time with which this case
has lasted, this Court concludes that RCBMI's action falls within the temporal exempting
circumstance, or where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant. Specifically, the exempting circumstance is the suspension of
RCBMI's enjoyment of its legal victory, which was awarded to it by the MAR in 1982, but to
date, 37 years later, remains to be executed.
RCBMI's resort to the DARAB to appeal the PARAD's quashal would not only be time-
consuming but more so wasteful, as the relief it prays for the DARAB is not clothed with the
authority to grant. This is largely because the cases over which the DARAB has primary,
original and appellate jurisdiction, as enumerated in Section 1, Rule II of the 1989 DARAB
Rules, are more merit-focused in nature, with their application to the substantive issues of
an agrarian dispute. Therefore, a resort to it may only take more time, but ultimately not
grant for RCBMI the redress it seeks.
452 of 578
Case Digests
This is precisely the kind of long-drawn, circuitous, agrarian dispute, with high
human and economic costs, that the creation of the DARAB sought to remedy. This length of
delay for the DAR's decision, i.e., the 1982 MAR Order to be carried out in the case at bar is
baffling, ridicules the very logic underlying the creation of the DARAB and its adjudicators,
and therefore cannot be countenanced.
(2) YES. PARAD committed grave abuse of discretion through unjustified delay.
With regard to the decisive matter of the issuance of a writ of execution, the
provisions of Rule XII of the 1989 DARAB Rules are clear, to wit:
SECTION 1. Execution upon Final Order or Decision. - Execution shall issue

upon an order or decision that finally disposes of the action or proceeding.
Such execution shall issue as a matter of course after the parties have been
furnished with copies of the decision in accordance with these Rules and
upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been
duly perfected.
The Board or Adjudicator concerned may, upon certification by the proper

officer that a resolution, order or decision has become final and executory,
upon motion or motu proprio issue a writ of execution and order the DAR
sheriff or a DAR officer to enforce the same.
SECTION 2. Immediate Execution of Order or Decision. - The order or

decision of the Board or the Adjudicator shall be immediately executory,
regardless of any appeal, unless otherwise expressly provided therein:
except when execution is stayed in accordance with the provisions of the next
succeeding section.
SECTION 3. No Stay of Execution, Exception. - Any appeal taken from the

order or decision of the Board or the Adjudicator shall not stay the execution
of the same; except where the ejectment of the tenant farmer, agricultural
lessee or tenant tiller, settler or amortizing owner-cultivator and any other
beneficiary, is directed.
To recall, the CA Decision which upheld RCBMI's right to recover possession of the
subject property became final and executory with an Entry of Judgment on June 19, 2004.
RCBMI sought the execution of this final decision on March 10, 2008. In turn, PARAD,
contrary to the immediacy of execution as provided for in Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Rule XII of
the 1989 DARAB Rules, failed to immediately issue a writ of execution but instead ordered
the Heirs of Marcos to file a comment or opposition, and thereby patently prolonged the life
of this litigation which should have already terminated then.
453 of 578
Case Digests
This unfounded extension and delay of the issuance of the Writ of Execution dragged
on until February 17, 2012, by which time, the five-year period to execute had already long
lapsed, which in turn gave rise to the ground for the Motion to Quash the execution writ. The
stalling of execution is therefore attributable to both the PARAD's inaction and the Heirs of
Marcos' serial oppositions. The long delay, with no knowable basis in the records, is both
unexplained and unacceptable, and may not be taken against RCBMI, which did not fall short
in seeking the execution of the award in its favor through efforts within the permits of the
law.
454 of 578
Case Digests
NIEVES SELERIO and ALICIA SELERIO v. TREGIDIO B. BANCASAN

DOCTRINE
An interruption of the prescriptive period wipes out the period that has elapsed, sets the
same running anew, and creates a fresh period for the filing of an action. Thus, in Republic v.
Bañez, the Court held that a written acknowledgment of a debt by the debtor effectively restarts
the prescriptive period.
FACTS
Nieves Selerio (Nieves) is the claimant, occupant, and possessor of a parcel of land
located at Garcia Heights, Bajada, Davao City with an area of 600 sq. m. On September 18,
1993, Nieves executed a Deed of Transfer and Waiver of Rights, Interests and Improvements
(Deed) over the subject land in favor of Tregidio Bancasan (Tregidio) conveying, ceding, and
selling the property including all improvements found thereon.
Nieves supposedly sold the subject property to Tregidio for P 200,000.00; and the
former acknowledged to have received 50% of the amount from the latter. In the Deed, the
parties agreed that the fifty percent 50% balance of the total consideration shall be paid only
when Nieves and her family shall have vacated the subject premises which shall not go
beyond April 30, 1994.
After the supposed conveyance, however, Jose Selerio, and Cecilia Ababo filed a case
for Partition, Accounting of Property Income and Attorney's Fees against Nieves, Tregidio
and others. Jose Selerio and Cecilia Selerio Ababa claimed to be the illegitimate children of
Nieves' husband. In that case, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement on September
2, 1997 duly approved by the RTC wherein the parties agreed to proceed with the sale over
the subject property.
On February 2, 2007, Tregidio, through counsel, sent a letter to petitioners

demanding the latter to vacate the subject property. The demand remained unheeded.
Consequently, on February 28, 2007, Tregidio filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession
against petitioners Nieves and Alicia Selerio, alleging that he is entitled to the possession of
the property by virtue of the Deed executed in his favor.
The RTC dismissed respondent's Complaint and held that his cause of action had
prescribed. The RTC agreed with petitioners that although respondent filed a case for
recovery of possession, he actually sought to enforce the Deed in order to gain possession
over the property. As such, the action was actually one for specific performance based on a
written contract, which prescribes in 10 years pursuant to Article 1144 of the Civil Code. As
the case was filed only on March 14, 2007 or after almost 13 years from the time petitioners
were obliged to vacate the property on April 30, 1994, the action was already barred by
prescription. The CA reversed the order of the RTC and held that the action was filed within
the prescriptive period.
455 of 578
Case Digests
ISSUE
Whether or not Tregidio’s action for recovery of possession has prescribed.
RULING
NO. Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides that an action based on a written contract
must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.
A cause of action based on a written contract accrues when the right of the plaintiff is
violated. In this regard, the Court agrees with the RTC that Tregidio's cause of action to
obtain possession or to enforce the sale accrued on May 1, 1994, when petitioners breached
the Deed by failing or refusing to vacate the subject property on the date agreed upon, i.e.,
April 30, 1994. The allegations in the Complaint unequivocally show that respondent
anchors his purported right to own and to possess the property on the Deed. Indeed, even
the supposed constructive delivery of the subject property emanates from the said Deed.
Pursuant to Article 1144 of the Civil Code therefore, respondent had 10 years from May 1,
1994 to file the appropriate action.
Article 1144, however, must be read in conjunction with Article 1155 of the Civil
Code. Article 1155 states that "the prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed
before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when
there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor."
Jurisprudence holds that an interruption of the prescriptive period wipes out the
period that has elapsed, sets the same running anew, and creates a fresh period for the filing
of an action. Thus, in Republic v. Bañez, the Court held that a written acknowledgment of a
debt by the debtor effectively restarts the prescriptive period.
In fine, the period to enforce the Deed has not prescribed. The 10-year period, which
commenced on May 1, 1994, was interrupted when the parties executed the Compromise
Agreement on September 2, 1997. This interruption wiped out the period that already
elapsed and started a fresh prescriptive period from September 2, 1997 to September 2,
2007. Thus, the written extrajudicial demand sent by respondent on February 2, 2007 was
made within the prescriptive period. In fact, said written demand likewise interrupted the
prescriptive period, which commenced anew when petitioners received said demand.
Undoubtedly therefore, the Complaint filed on February 28, 2007 was made within the
prescriptive period.
456 of 578
Case Digests
MARIA AURORA G. MATHAY, et. al. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

ANDREA L. GANDIONCO
DOCTRINE
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court, but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime, but so intimately connected with
it that its ascertainment determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves facts intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of
the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily
be determined.
FACTS
Petitioners Maria Sonya M. Rodriguez (Maria Sonya), Ismael G. Mathay III (Ismael III),
Ramon G. Mathay (Ramon), and Maria Aurora G. Mathay (Maria Aurora) are siblings, whose
parents are the late Quezon City Mayor Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. (Ismael) and Sonya Gandionco
Mathay (Sonya).
On March 6, 1980, Sonya and her sons, Ismael III and Ramon, along with Sonya's
youngest sister, Andrea L. Gandionco, organized Goldenrod, Inc. During her lifetime, Sonya
managed and operated Goldenrod, Inc.
At the time of her death on November 22, 2012, Goldenrod, Inc.'s General Information
Sheet (GIS) dated April 4, 2012 reflected Sonya as having subscribed to 30,000 shares of
stocks in Goldenrod, Inc., equivalent to 60% of its total shareholdings.
On December 7, 2012, after Sonya's death, an amended GIS of Goldenrod, Inc. was
filed with the SEC. It was signed and attested by Aida, and showed a substantial reduction of
the shares of Sonya from 30,000 to 4,000, or from 60% to 8% ownership of Goldenrod, Inc.'s
outstanding shares. At the same time, the amended GIS showed that Andrea L. Gandionco
owned 26,000 shares or 52% of the shareholdings of Goldenrod, Inc.
The amendment of the GIS was prompted by the presentation of a Declaration and
Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) by Andrea L. Gandionco to Aida. The Declaration was
executed by Sonya, who acknowledged therein that Andrea L. Gandionco is the real owner of
the 60% shares of stock in Goldenrod, Inc. she (Sonya) held on record. Sonya, in said
Declaration, returned 52% of said shares of stock to Andrea L. Gandionco through the SPA.
The remaining 8% shares, upon the wishes of private respondent, were donated to
petitioners, but were placed under Sonya's custodianship until their actual distribution to
petitioners.
457 of 578
Case Digests
On February 5, 2013 and February 11, 2013, petitioners successively filed two (2) GIS
of Goldenrod, Inc. (both for the year 2013) with the SEC. These were signed and attested by
Ramon as the new Corporate Secretary. Both GISs showed an increase of Sonya's shares to
60% (30,000 shares) from the 8% shares (4,000 shares) reflected in the amended GIS dated
December 7, 2012. Andrea L. Gandionco's name as shareholder was likewise conspicuously
absent.
Goldenrod, Inc. executed the Deed of Absolute Sale of its real estate in favor of YIC Group of
Companies, Inc. for the sum of P8.1 Million.
On February 18, 2013, Andrea L. Gandionco filed a civil complaint for Injunction with
Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction, and Mandamus against petitioners. It was filed before the Quezon City
RTC, Branch 93. Andrea L. Gandionco claimed deprivation of 26,000 shares (52%) of
Goldenrod, Inc. belonging to her by virtue of the SPA she allegedly entered into with Sonya.
On April 23, 2013, Ismael filed a complaint against Andrea L. Gandionco to declare
null and void the SPA. It was filed before the Quezon City RTC, Branch 91. Ismael alleged that
the SPA lacks his written consent, in contravention of Article 124 of the Family Code.
On March 26, 2014, Andrea L. Gandionco filed a complaint against petitioners for
Qualified Theft through Falsification of Public Documents by a Private Individual.
ISSUE
Whether there is a prejudicial question which warrants the suspension of the criminal
proceedings against petitioners.
RULING
YES. Sections 6 of Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provide that a petition
for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a
civil action may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the
petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests. Sections 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the
elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court, but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is
a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime, but so intimately connected
with it that its ascertainment determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves facts
intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also
458 of 578
Case Digests
that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined.
Here, there are two pending civil cases which bear issues that, to the mind of the
Court, are determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioners in the instant criminal case.
Civil Case in Branch 93 is a complaint for nullity of the SPA filed by Ismael against
private respondent, attacking the validity of the SPA on the ground of his lack of consent
thereto. The Civil Case in Branch 91, on the other hand, involves Andrea L. Gandionco praying
for the return to her of 26,000 shares of stock in Goldenrod, Inc., among others. She claims
ownership over these shares on the basis of the SPA.
Firstly, petitioners, in their Reply, attached a Resolution from the trial court
reconsidering its previous dismissal of the complaint in the Civil Case in Branch 91. This has
not been disputed by the OSG. It would appear therefore that said Civil Case is still very much
alive.
Secondly, in the event that the trial court in the Civil Case in Branch 93 rules in favor
of petitioners or that the SPA is rendered void in the Civil Case in Branch 91, it would follow
that Andrea L. Gandionco is not entitled to 26,000 shares of stock of Goldenrod, Inc. As such,
a criminal case against petitioners for either a complex crime of Qualified Theft through
Falsification of Public Documents or any of such component crimes would have no leg to
stand on.
Should Andrea L. Gandionco be adjudged not entitled to the 26,000 shares of stocks
in the pending civil cases, there could have been no crime of qualified theft to speak of as the
elements of: (1) the property belonging to another; (2) the taking done with intent to gain;
(3) the taking done without the owner's consent; and (4) the taking done with abuse of
confidence would be absent.
In the same vein, there would be no crime of falsification to speak of, as well, because
there would be no perversion of truth and the statements in the two (2) GISs in 2013 would
neither be "untruthful statements in a narration of facts," nor "absolutely false."
459 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PETER LOPEZ y CANLAS

DOCTRINE
While Section 15 of R.A. No. 9165 penalizes a person apprehended or arrested for
unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and who is found to be positive for use of
any dangerous drug, a conviction presupposes the prior conduct of an initial screening test and
a subsequent confirmatory test both yielding positive results for illegal drug use. Thus, two
distinct drug tests are required: a screening test and a confirmatory test. A positive screening
test must be confirmed for it to be valid in a court of law.
FACTS
Lopez was charged with the crimes of illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs defined
under Sections 5 and 15, respectively, of Article II, R.A. No. 9165, under two separate
Informations.
On March 20, 2014, the intelligence operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Iriga City held a briefing in preparation for a buy-bust operation against Lopez. His identity
was confirmed by a confidential asset. PO1 Jonard Buenaflor was designated to act as a
poseur-buyer and tasked to use PhP2,000.00 as marked money consisting of four five-
hundred-peso bills during the operation.
The police asset informed PO1 Buenaflor that Lope] would meet them in front of
Trinidad Building, Tantiado Hardware at San Francisco, Iriga City. As they waited for Lopez,
the back-up operatives positioned themselves in the area. Lopez arrived on a motorcycle and
proceeded to ask the informant how much they would be buying. PO1 Buenaflor then handed
P2,000.00 to Lopez. In turn, the latter gave him a small heat-sealed transparent sachet
containing crystalline substance which the poseur-buyer suspected as shabu.
PO1 Buenaflor performed the pre-arranged signal by removing his cap to indicate a
positive buy-bust operation. He arrested Lopez, while the back-up operatives rushed to the
scene. Representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the media, and a Barangay
Councilor were also called to serve as witnesses to the body search, marking and
photographing of seized items. When they arrived, PO1 Buenaflor marked the plastic sachet
"JBB 22 3-30-14." Meanwhile, PO3 Ric Reginales searched the person of Lopez and recovered
from him the following items: (1) buy-bust money, (2) cellphone, (3) lighter, (4) twenty-peso
bill, and (5) coins.
Thereafter, the operatives headed to the police station with Lopez. The
Inventory/Confiscation Receipt was prepared by PO2 Joel Tabangan and signed by the DOJ
representative Doris Viñas, media representative Gloria Bongais, and Barangay Kagawad
Ramer Samantela. On the other hand, PO2 Roger Tuyay drafted the requests for laboratory
examination and drug test.
460 of 578
Case Digests
PO1 Buenaflor delivered the seized plastic sachet and Lopez to the provincial crime
laboratory for examination. Based on the Chemistry Report No. D-109-2014 and Chemistry
Report No. DTC-081-2014 prepared by the forensic chemist Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Jun
Malong, the contents of the plastic sachet and Lopez's urine tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Both the RTC found Lopez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC's Judgment finding Lopez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violations of Sections 5 and 15, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
RULING
YES. Insofar as the charge for violation of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under
Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is concerned, the Court finds no compelling reason to
deviate from the lower courts' findings that, indeed, the guilt of Lopez was sufficiently
proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
However, with respect to the charge for violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 on illegal use of dangerous drugs, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove
the conduct of a confirmatory test subsequent to the screening test as required by law.
Hence, to this charge, Lopez should be acquitted.
While Section 15 penalizes a person apprehended or arrested for unlawful acts listed
under Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous
drug, a conviction presupposes the prior conduct of an initial screening test and a
subsequent confirmatory test both yielding positive results for illegal drug use.
Thus, two distinct drug tests are required: a screening test and a confirmatory test. A
positive screening test must be confirmed for it to be valid in a court of law. The evidence for
the prosecution, however, shows the conduct of only one test.
PSI Malong conducted the examination on the urine sample taken from Lopez after
his apprehension. While PSI Malong mentions the conduct of a "screening test and a
confirmatory test" on the urine sample, his testimony on the actual test conducted on the
sample as well as the chemical laboratory report presented in court show otherwise.
The test conducted on the urine specimen of Lopez was a Thin Layer Chromatography
or TLC - a screening test. A screening test is statutorily defined as "[a] rapid test performed
to establish potential/presumptive positive result". It refers to the immunoassay test to
eliminate a "negative" specimen, i.e., one without the presence of dangerous drugs, from
further consideration and to identify the presumptively positive specimen that requires
confirmatory test. Under existing regulations of the Dangerous Drugs Board, the TLC is a
461 of 578
Case Digests
screening test that is subject to further confirmatory examinations if it yields a positive

result.
When the urine sample recovered from Lopez yielded a positive result, the specimen
should have been subjected to a second test - the confirmatory test. R.A. No. 9165 describes
the confirmatory test as "[a]n analytical test using a device, tool or equipment with a
different chemical or physical principle that is more specific which will validate and confirm
the result of the screening test." It is the second or further analytical procedure to more
accurately determine the presence of dangerous drugs in the specimen. The records are
silent on any reference to a second, more specific, examination on the urine sample.
Considering that Chemistry Report No. DTC-081-201487 merely contains the results
of the screening test conducted, the same cannot be valid before any court of law absent the
required confirmatory test report. Without the requisite confirmatory test, the Lopez cannot
be held criminally liable for illegal use of dangerous drugs under Section 15, R.A. No. 9165.
An acquittal for this charge follows as a necessary consequence.
462 of 578
Case Digests
USUSAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE
As laid down by the Court in Dimaapi, et al. v. Golden Bell Loans and Credit Corporation,
et al., the following four rigid parameters limit the giving of due course and granting of review
or appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules:
(1) Only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth in the petition, shall be
raised (Section 1, Rule 45);
(2) To avoid the outright dismissal of the petition, there must be compliance with the
payment of the docket and other required fees, deposit for costs, proof of proper
service of the petition, the required contents of the petition, and the required
documents that must accompany the petition (Sections 4 and 5, Rule 45);
(3) The Court may on its own initiative deny the appeal by certiorari on the ground that
it is without merit or is prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions therein
are too insubstantial to require consideration (second paragraph, Section 5, Rule
45); and
(4) A review by certiorari is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and
will be granted only where there are special and important considerations by reason
of substance -"when the court a quo has decided a question of substance, not
theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, or decided it in a way probably not in
accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court" - or
procedure - "when the court a quo has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower
court, as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision" (Section 6, Rule 45)
FACTS
Jose Carlos owned a 3,975 square meter parcel of land situated in Ususan, Taguig City.
Upon his death in 1948, Jose's daughter - Maria Carlos - inherited said property and later
declared the same in her name for taxation purposes and paid the realty taxes due thereon.
In 1968, Maria Carlos caused the survey of the lot under a conversion plan which was
approved by the Bureau of Lands.
On October 16, 1996, Maria Carlos sold subject lot to Ususan Development
Corporation (Ususan). Ususan (now DMCI Project Developers, Inc.). Wanting to have said
land titled in its name, Ususan filed an application for registration and confirmation of title
before the RTC asserting that the subject realty formed part of the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain as evidenced by a Certification dated June 6, 2007 of one Ali Bari,
then the Regional Technical Director of the Forest Management Service of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (RTD-FMS-DENR) as well as the Taguig City Land
463 of 578
Case Digests
Registration Case Map No. 2623 that was approved on January 3, 1968 and as confirmed by
a Decision of the Supreme Court dated August 31, 2005 in the registration suit earlier filed
by Maria Carlos over such lot. It also averred that said land, now classified as industrial, is
not located within any military or naval reservations, and that the same is not tenanted or
being claimed by any other persons or entity, and neither is it mortgaged or encumbered.
Ususan further averred that, along with its predecessors-in-interest, it has been in
open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of said realty in the
concept of an owner as early as June 12, 1945. To prove such claim, Maria Carlos' daughter,
Teresita Victoria testified that her deceased mother used to own and occupy said lot openly,
peacefully, exclusively and continuously since she acquired it from her father, which realty
she devoted to planting rice and other crops as well as to her piggery and poultry business.
In addition, the former adjacent owner Pilar Guillermo testified that everybody in their
community confirmed and recognized Jose and Maria Carlos' successive ownership and
possession of the subject realty. Hence, [applicant-]appellee contended that its total length
of possession of such land, tacked with that of its predecessors-in-interest, add up to over
sixty (60) years already.
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an
Opposition arguing that subject property cannot be owned by a private person nor can it be
registered to Ususan as it still remained part of the public domain that belonged to the State,
and thus, not subject to private ownership.
The RTC granting the application, and ordering the issuance of a decree of registration
over the subject property in the name of Ususan. The Republic appealed to the CA positing
that the RTC erred in granting the application for registration in the absence of competent
proof that the land applied for is within the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
The CA granted the appeal of the Republic. Ususan filed a Motion for Reconsideration
(MR) with the CA, which the CA denied. Thus, Ususan filed Petition for Review on Certiorari
(Petition) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Whether the CA committed an error of law in reversing the RTC Decision granting the
application for original registration of the subject lot.
RULING
NO. While Ususan has couched the issue as one involving an error in law, in reality it
wants the Court to review the factual findings of the CA, which is not permitted in a Rule 45
certiorari Petition.
464 of 578
Case Digests
As laid down by the Court in Dimaapi, et al. v. Golden Bell Loans and Credit Corporation,
et al., the following four rigid parameters limit the giving of due course and granting of
review or appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules:
(1) Only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth in the petition, shall be
raised (Section 1, Rule 45);
(2) To avoid the outright dismissal of the petition, there must be compliance with the
payment of the docket and other required fees, deposit for costs, proof of proper
service of the petition, the required contents of the petition, and the required
documents that must accompany the petition (Sections 4 and 5, Rule 45);
(3) The Court may on its own initiative deny the appeal by certiorari on the ground
that it is without merit or is prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions
therein are too insubstantial to require consideration (second paragraph, Section
5, Rule 45); and
(4) A review by certiorari is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and
will be granted only where there are special and important considerations by
reason of substance -"when the court a quo has decided a question of substance,
not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, or decided it in a way probably
not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court" - or
procedure - "when the court a quo has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower
court, as to call for an exercise of the power of supervision" (Section 6, Rule 45)
As pointed at the outset, Ususan did not even comply with parameter 1. The singular
issue raised in the Petition is not a pure question of law because its resolution requires a
review of the correctness of the factual determination of the CA that the three documents
which Ususan belatedly submitted to the CA are vague and inconclusive as to whether the
subject lot falls within the areas in Taguig City that have been declared AnD lands of public
domain.
Ususan anchors its application for original registration of title under Section 14(1)
and (2) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 152924 and claims that the subject lot is an AnD land
of public domain.
In the present case, Ususan does not claim that the subject lot is of private ownership.
On the contrary, Ususan claims that it is a land of public dominion that has been classified as
AnD. Consequently, the burden to prove its AnD classification rests with Ususan.
The CA found that Ususan was unable to do so. Not being a trier of facts and with no
additional evidence presented by Ususan to refute the CA's factual finding in respect of the
three documents that it submitted for the CA's consideration to convince the CA that the
465 of 578
Case Digests
subject lot has indeed been classified as AnD land of public domain, the Court is left with no
option but to deny its Petition. The failure of Ususan to prove the AnD status of the subject
lot renders the review of the finding of the CA that it has not substantiated its claim that it
and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the subject lot in the character and for the
duration required under Section 14(1) of PD 1529 superfluous.
NANCY A. CATAMCO v. SANDIGANBAYAN SIXTH DIVISION, et. al.

G.R. Nos. 243560-62 & 243261-63, July 28, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
While the Supreme Court has indeed recognized the reality and inevitability of
institutional delay, it does not, by itself, justify the Ombudsman's failure to comply with the
periods provided under the rules. No less than the Constitution mandates the Ombudsman to
act promptly on complaints filed before it, which duty was further reinforced by R.A. No. 6670
or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," to promote efficient government service to the people. Thus,
absent any proof of how the steady stream of cases or heavy workload affected the resolution
of a case, the Ombudsman cannot repeatedly hide behind this generic excuse.
FACTS
In 2004, based on a MOA between the Department of Agriculture and the Municipality
of Poro, P5,000,000.00 would be released to the municipality for the procurement of farm
inputs and implements for distribution to farmers. The municipality utilized the fund for the
purchase of biochemical fertilizers for farmer- beneficiaries under the plant now, pay later
scheme. Mayor Rama was authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan to directly purchase liquid
Vitacrop fertilizers from Perzebros Company, which was owned by herein petitioners Perez
and Catamco.
Sometime in 2006, based on an alleged finding of the Commission on Audit (COA) of

overpricing and irregularities in the procurement process, the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) launched Task Force Abono (TFA) to specifically conduct a fact-finding
investigation into the purported "fertilizer fund scam." A Complaint dated December 27,
2012 was thereafter filed by the TFA on June 21, 2013 against Perez, Catamco and the other
public officials involved in the transaction.
After more than two (2) years, or on July 17, 2017, the Ombudsman issued its
Resolution finding probable cause to indict Perez, Catamco and their co-respondents,
including Mayor Rama, for one (1) count of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019 and two (2) counts of Malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). Thereafter, petitioners Perez, Catamco, and two other co-respondents filed their
motions for reconsideration but these were denied. Four (4) months thereafter, the
corresponding Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan.
Before arraignment, Catamco and Perez each moved for the dismissal of the case
against them claiming that the Ombudsman's inordinate delay of more than twelve (12)
466 of 578
Case Digests
years, from the conduct of its investigation in 2006 until the filing of the Information in court,
violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases
The Ombudsman prayed for the dismissal of the motions, arguing that time it took to
conclude the investigation in the instant case, from the filing of the Complaint in 2013 until
the filing of the Information in 2018, cannot be considered as inordinate delay because of the
need to meticulously review and evaluate the numerous records and considering the fact
that a steady stream of cases reaches the Ombudsman.
The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners' respective motions to dismiss. Applying the
"Balancing Test," the Sandiganbayan found that petitioners' right to speedy disposition of
their case was not violated. While the Sandiganbayan conceded that there was a delay of four
(4) years and seven (7) months to issue a Resolution, it agreed with the Ombudsman's claim
that such delay was justified due to the voluminous records and number of respondents
involved. The Sandiganbayan further noted that jurisprudence has recognized that the
steady stream of cases reaching the Ombudsman would inevitably cause some delay.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in denying the motions to dismiss respectively filed by petitioners.
RULING
YES. In Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, the Court laid down the guidelines in resolving
issues concerning the right to speedy disposition of cases.
In assessing whether petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases was violated,

Cagang dictates that the Court first examine whether the Ombudsman followed the specified
time periods for the conduct of the preliminary investigation. If the Ombudsman exceeded
the prescribed period, the burden of proof shifts to the State. While the Rules of Procedure
of the Ombudsman does not provide a period within which the preliminary investigation
should be concluded, the periods provided under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, finds
suppletory application.
Section 3(f), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the
investigating prosecutor has ten (10) days "after the investigation x x x [to] determine
whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial." In addition,
Section 4 of the same rule states that "within five (5) days from his resolution, [the
investigating prosecutor] shall forward the record of the case x x x to the Ombudsman or his
deputy x x x, [who] shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof
and shall immediately inform the parties of such action." Thus, the investigating officer of
the Ombudsman, has ten (10) days from the termination of the investigation or the
submission of the case for resolution, to determine existence of probable cause to indict an
accused.
467 of 578
Case Digests
In the present case, the Ombudsman failed to observe the period prescribed under its
rules. Records show that on June 21, 2013, the Complaint was filed against petitioners and
other twelve (12) co-respondents. They were directed to file their respective counter-
affidavits on July 19, 2013. The respondents, together with petitioners, filed their respective
counter-affidavits from September 12, 2014 to May 20, 2015. However, from the date the
last counter-affidavit was filed, the case remained stagnant for two (2) years and two (2)
months, until the investigating officer issued a Resolution, on July 17, 2017, finding probable
cause against petitioners and their co-respondents.
In Cagang, the Court held that once the burden of proof shifts to prosecution, the
prosecution must prove the following: "first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the
conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second, that the
complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and third,
that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay."
To discharge its burden, the Ombudsman simply averred that: Based on the timeline
of events, the need to meticulously and assiduously review and evaluate the numerous
records, and the mathematical computations required to conclude the existence of probable
cause, the lapse of time in the resolution of the present cases can hardly be considered
inordinate delay resulting in a violation of the accused's right to speedy disposition of cases.
Any delay attendant to the resolution of the present cases was reasonable and normal in the
ordinary process of justice, and accused themselves contributed to the delay when they
asked for additional time to file counter-affidavits. It also averred the Court’s
pronouncement in Dansal v. Fernandez Sr. wherein the Court took judicial notice of the fact
that the nature of the Office of the Ombudsman encourages individuals who clamor for
efficient government service to freely lodge their Complaints against wrongdoings of
government personnel, thus resulting in a steady stream of cases reaching the Office of the
Ombudsman.
In other words, to justify the delay in the preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman
merely claimed that it needed time to meticulously evaluate and review numerous records
and relied heavily on this Court's recognition in a previous case of the steady stream of cases
handled by the Ombudsman. However, while this Court has indeed recognized the reality
and inevitability of institutional delay, it does not, by itself, justify the Ombudsman's failure
to comply with the periods provided under the rules. No less than the Constitution mandates
the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed before it, which duty was further
reinforced by R.A. No. 6670 or "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," to promote efficient
government service to the people. Thus, absent any proof of how the steady stream of cases
or heavy workload affected the resolution of a case, the Ombudsman cannot repeatedly hide
behind this generic excuse.
Here, despite the glaring lack of proof of any of these circumstances, the
Sandiganbayan still ruled that the delay in the resolution of the Complaint against petitioners
was reasonable. The Sandiganbayan blindly agreed with, and even justified, the
468 of 578
Case Digests
Ombudsman's unsubstantiated claims of "voluminous records" by taking notice that this

case is part of the "Fertilizer Fund Scam."
Lastly, the Court finds that petitioners timely asserted their rights at the earliest
possible time. In their motions for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's resolution finding
probable cause, petitioners already invoked their right to speedy disposition of cases.
Verily, by simply following the guidelines of Cagang, the Court is left with no choice
but to consider the prosecution's failure to prove sufficient justification for the delay. And, in
view of petitioners' timely invocation of their right to speedy disposition of cases, it is quite
evident that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motions
to dismiss the case.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SIXTO SUNDIAM, et. al.

G.R. No. 236381, August 27, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Only innocent purchasers for value (IPV) are afforded the right to raise the equitable
principle of estoppel by laches in their defense against the government to avoid injustice to
them. The party who claims the status of an IPV has the burden of proving such assertion, and
the invocation of the ordinary presumption of good faith, i.e., that everyone is presumed to act
in good faith, is not enough.
FACTS
The Republic field a complaint before the CFI Pampanga wherein it alleged that a
portion of the Fort Stotstenberg Military Reservation in Pampanga, now Clark Air Force Base,
was surveyed, segregated in favor of one Jose P. Henzon. It was further subdivided into seven
(7) lots, including Lot 727-G, allegedly without the approval or signature of the Director of
Lands. Lot No. 727-G was further subdivided into 63 lots. One of the registered owners
thereof, Sixto Sundiam (Sundiam), caused the registration of the lot. Later on, Sundiam sold
the said property to L & F Marketing, Inc. (L&F Inc.), which in turn sold the same, until the
property passed on to Liberty Engineering Corporation (Liberty Corp.). However, it was later
on discovered that the said lot is within the Clark Air Force Base, a military reservation,
prompting the Republic to file a reversion case to declare the titles on the said property null
and void.
After the CFI issued summons, the respondents, as transferees of the property, filed
an Urgent Motion praying that the court direct the Republic to furnish them a copy of the
sketch plan showing the disputed lot being within the Clark Air Force Base. The CFI granted
the same and suspended the filing of the Answer until the said sketch plan had been
furnished to the respondents.
469 of 578
Case Digests
The Republic, however, failed to comply, hence, the CFI ordered the case be sent to
the archives via an Order dated April 30, 1982. A year thereafter, the Republic filed a Motion
to Declare Defendants in Default but the CFI issued an Order holding in abeyance action
thereon pending motion from the Republic for the revival of the case.
Now, after twenty-four (24) years, the Republic, through the OSG, filed a
Manifestation and Motion before the RTC praying for the revival of the case and the service
of summons through publication on the respondents Sundiam and L & F, Inc.
Respondent Liberty Corp. filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the Republic's cause
of action was already barred by prescription and laches. Moreover, the disputed property
had already passed on to innocent purchasers for value, including Liberty Corp. The Republic
opposed the same and maintained that neither prescription nor laches would bar its claims.
The RTC dismissed the Complaint of the Republic. The Republic then appealed to the
CA, raising the sole issue that the RTC erred in applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel
against the Government to bar it from recovering land covered by a military reservation.
The CA denied the Republic's appeal. The CA agreed with the RTC's disquisition that
the Republic is guilty of laches. the CA pointed out that the disputed property, which the
Republic has alleged to be within the Clark Air Base, a military reservation, had already
passed on to several third persons. The CA stated that it is only fair and reasonable to apply
the equitable principle of estoppel by laches against the government to avoid an injustice to
innocent purchasers for value.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Republic is guilty of estoppel by laches.
RULING
NO. In a general sense, laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier. Stated differently, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within
a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based
upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement
of stale claims, and is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity
or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
When the government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding simply to assert
its own rights and recover its own property, there can be no defense on the ground of laches
or limitation.
However, in the case of Estate of the Late Jesus S. Yujuico v. Republic, the Court cited
the following instance when estoppel by laches may be raised as a defense against the State
or its agents:
470 of 578
Case Digests
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be
invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked
where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy
adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and
should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice
clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble
part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations x x x, the doctrine of
equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as
against private individuals.
Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities when as

in this case, the lot was already alienated to innocent buyers for value and the
government did not undertake any act to contest the title for an unreasonable
length of time.
From the foregoing, it thus is clear that only innocent purchasers for value (IPV) are
afforded the right to raise the equitable principle of estoppel by laches in their defense
against the government to avoid injustice to them.
However, it should be noted that the party who claims the status of an IPV has the
burden of proving such assertion, and the invocation of the ordinary presumption of good
faith, i.e., that everyone is presumed to act in good faith, is not enough. To be sure, proof of
good faith is, as it should be, required of the party asserting it. Stated differently, the party
who seeks the protection of the Torrens system has the obligation to prove his good faith as
a purchaser for value. This requirement should be applied without exception because only
the IPV is insulated from any fraud perpetrated upon the registered owner which results in
the latter being divested of his title (i.e., he loses ownership) to the contested property and
recognizing the same in the name of the IPV.
The determination of whether respondents are indeed IPVs can only proceed from a
factual inquiry to be conducted by the RTC. As the instant proceedings stand, no evidence
has been adduced by the parties on this factual issue because the Republic's complaint for
reversion was dismissed without reception of evidence. Without evidence proving that
respondents are indeed IPVs, laches cannot be applied to bar the Republic from pursuing the
present reversion case against them. A remand to the RTC for reception of evidence is thus
in order.
471 of 578
Case Digests
MARTIN ROBERTO G. TIROL v. SOL NOLASCO

G.R. No. 230103, August 27, 2020 (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the
proceedings, becomes a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to
protect or preserve a right or interest that may be affected by those proceedings. This remedy,
however, is not a right. Further, in the settlement of a deceased's estate, Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Rules of Court provides: "The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
FACTS
On October 10, 1991, Gloria Tirol (Gloria) died testate and she was survived by her
husband Roberto Tirol, Sr. (Roberto Sr.) and their six children namely: Ruth, Cecilia, Marilou,
Ciriaco, Anna and Roberto Jr. On April 16, 1995, Roberto Jr. died intestate, and was survived
by his four children from his marriage with Cecilia Geronimo, namely petitioner Martin,
Zharina, Francis and Daniel. At the time of his death, Roberto Jr.'s marriage with his wife had
been annulled.
On January 8, 2002, Roberto Sr. died testate and was survived by his remaining
children Ruth, Cecilia, Marilou, Ciriaco and Anna and his four grandchildren from Roberto Jr.
Subsequently, petitioner Martin, Cecilia and Ciriaco filed before the RTC a petition to probate
the wills of Gloria and Roberto Sr. The RTC admitted to probate the respective wills of Gloria
and Roberto Sr. and designated petitioner Martin as the Administrator of their estates.
Respondent Sol filed a Motion for Intervention stating that she has a legal interest in
the estate of Gloria and Roberto Sr. because she is the surviving spouse of Roberto Jr. having
married him on July 15, 1994. She also alleged that the late Roberto Jr., being one of the
children of Gloria and Roberto Sr., is entitled to at least 1/7 of the estate of his late mother
and as the surviving spouse, she is entitled to that portion belonging to Roberto Jr. which is
equivalent to the legitime of the legitimate children of the decedent. According to respondent
Sol, she is considered a compulsory heir pursuant to Article 887 of the Civil Code and has an
interest or claim in the estate of her late husband.
Petitioner Martin as well as the other heirs opposed the motion for intervention and
argued that respondent Sol has no legal interest in the probate of the wills of Gloria and
Roberto Sr. and could not represent Roberto Jr., not being a blood relative. The oppositors
also refused to recognize respondent Sol as the legal wife of Roberto Jr.
RTC of Quezon City Branch 218 (RTC-218) denied the motion to intervene filed by
respondent Sol stating that respondent has no legal interest in the case. Respondent Sol filed
with the CA a petition for certiorari questioning the decision of the RTC denying her motion
for intervention. The CA found respondent Sol's certiorari petition to be meritorious. The CA
stated that respondent Sol should be allowed to intervene because she is the widow of
472 of 578
Case Digests
Roberto Jr. and has an interest or claim in her husband's estate, which consists, in part, of the
latter's share in the estate of his deceased mother Gloria, and the extent or value of the share
of Roberto Jr. has not yet been determined. It clarified that respondent Sol does not anchor
her motion for intervention on her status as daughter-in-law but rather as an heir of Roberto
Jr.
Petitioner Martin filed a motion for reconsideration wherein he argued, among

others, that the intervention sought by respondent Sol should not be granted because any
interest she may allegedly have in the estate of her alleged husband, Roberto Jr., can be fully
ventilated in Spec. Proc. No. Q-95- 25497, which involves the judicial settlement of Roberto
Jr.'s estate, and her motion for intervention therein has been granted by RTC-101 in the
settlement of Roberto Jr.'s estate proceeding. The CA, however, did not traverse the said
argument of petitioner Martin. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
Whether the intervention of respondent Sol in the probate proceeding proper
RULING
NO. Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the
proceedings, becomes a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to
protect or preserve a right or interest that may be affected by those proceedings. This
remedy, however, is not a right. Further, in the settlement of a deceased's estate, Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides: "The court first taking cognizance of the settlement
of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
In this case, given the existence of the settlement of Roberto Jr.'s estate proceeding,
the intervention of respondent Sol in the probate proceeding is improper. Given the
exclusivity of jurisdiction granted to the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of a
decedent's estate, RTC-101 has the exclusive jurisdiction over the intestate estate of Roberto
Jr. while RTC-218 has exclusive jurisdiction over the testate estates of Gloria and Roberto Sr.
Thus, only RTC-101, the court where the settlement of Roberto Jr.'s estate proceeding is
pending, has jurisdiction to determine who the heirs of Roberto Jr. are.
RTC-218, where the probate proceeding is pending, cannot rule on the issue of who
are the heirs of Roberto Jr. even if the share of Roberto Jr. in the estates of Gloria and Roberto
Sr. is to be determined therein. The probate court must yield to the determination by the
Roberto Jr.'s estate settlement court of the latter's heirs. This is to avoid confusing and
conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate by co-equal courts.
Since intervention is not a matter of right but depends on the sound discretion of the
court, respondent Sol's intervention in the probate proceeding is unnecessary because her
right or interest in the estate of Roberto Jr. can be fully protected in a separate proceeding
— namely, the settlement of Roberto Jr.'s estate proceeding pending before RTC-101. The
second parameter to be considered in granting of intervention under Section 1, Rule 19 —
473 of 578
Case Digests
whether the intervenor's right may not be fully protected in a separate proceeding — is
wanting in the instant case.
474 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BAUTISTA, BUENCONSEJO and DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 218582, September 3, 2020, Caguioa, J.
DOCTRINE
Entries in official records are prima facie proof of the facts stated therein. The Equipoise
Rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional
presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.
FACTS
Accused-appellant Bautista with co-accused Buencosejo and De Guzman was charged
with 10 counts of estafa and one count of violation of R.A. 8042.
Private complainant Randy testified that he met Bautista sometime in 2008, when the
latter recruited him to work as a factory worker in Korea. That he paid Bautista P50,000.00
for the processing fee, in exchange for which Bautista issued a receipt under the name of
Baler Aurora Travel & Tours, Inc. Bautista was arrested following an entrapment operation.
Randy, along with other persons who were also recruited by Bautista were issued checks to
Randy's companions, equivalent to the monies they had given Bautista. Randy, for his part,
refused to accept a check as payment, suspicious that such would turn out to be unfunded.
The checks Buenconsejo issued later bounced, and Randy has since remained unable to
recover the money he parted with in favor of Bautista.
Private complainant Rolando testified that on the promise that he would be deployed
to South Korea, Rolando gave Bautista a total of P144,000.00 paid in seven installments, to
supposedly cover the swapping fee, the visa processing expenses, as well as airfare costs.
Rolando added that after submitting to Bautista his passport, NBI clearance, medical
certificate and a Certificate of Korean language proficiency, Bautista issued in his favor a
Standard Labor Contract.
Private complainant Efren testified that in order to be included among the list of
recruits, he gave Bautista a total of P159,000.00. Despite said payments, however, Bautista
failed to deploy Efren to South Korea as promised, and he later discovered that the
recruitment agency he paid fees to had already closed.
Bautista countered that he was merely an administrative assistant of Baler Aurora
Travel & Tours, Inc., which in turn is owned by his co-accused Buenconsejo and De Guzman.
He said that whenever he accepted money from the complainants, he merely did so in behalf
of his co-accused De Guzman, and that in cases when he accepted money on his own behalf,
he did so on the understanding that the money was for the payment of the tuition fee for the
Korean language classes he conducted.
Bautista also questioned the evidentiary merit of the POEA Certification, and argued
that the same only stated that he and his co-accused were not licensed or authorized to
recruit workers for overseas employment in their personal capacities, and that nowhere in
the certification was it said that the agency, Baler Aurora Travel & Tours, Inc., was similarly
without authority or license to recruit. Grounding his argument on the fact that the POEA
Certification did not say that the agency itself was not licensed to undertake recruitment,
475 of 578
Case Digests
then it followed that accused-appellant Bautista and his co-accused could not also be said to
be unauthorized to recruit for overseas employment on the agency's behalf.
He further proffered that under the Equipoise Rule, since the inculpatory
circumstance of his case admit of two explanations, one of which is consistent with his claim
of innocence, the prosecution must be deemed to have failed in hurdling the test of moral
certainty, and he should therefore be acquitted.
ISSUE
1. Whether the accused-appellant may question the admissibility in evidence of the
POEA Certification
2. Whether the Equipoise Rule applies to the defense of the accused-appellants
RULING
1. No. To overthrow the finding of guilt for this charge, accused-appellant Bautista
questions the admissibility of the POEA Certification which stated that he had no authority
or license to recruit for overseas employment, since said document was not authenticated in
court by the signatory thereto. Accused-appellant Bautista here misleads.
Bautista may not now turn back on their stipulations and question the admissibility
of a crucial document, the due issuance of which he stipulated and agreed on. In addition, the
probative value of the POEA Certification is covered by Section 44 of the Rules of Evidence,
which provides that entries in official records are prima facie proof of the facts stated therein.
Said POEA Certification, as stipulated on with respect to its due issuance, sufficiently
established that accused-appellant Bautista and his co-accused were neither licensed nor
authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment.
As testified to by the private complainants, the accused nevertheless engaged in
recruitment and placement activities without the requisite authority, and were therefore
properly charged with illegal recruitment.
3. No. Accused-appellant Bautista's reliance on the Equipoise Rule is misplaced. The
Equipoise Rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly
balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of
the accused. This Rule cannot find application in accused-appellant Bautista's case
because, contrary to his submission, the evidence submitted and evaluated by
both lower courts mount high against accused-appellant Bautista's denial and
ineffective and uncorroborated feigning of innocence. The total evidence
presented by both parties is asymmetrical, with the prosecution's submissions
indubitably demonstrating accused-appellant Bautista's guilt.
DEL ROSARIO v ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION
476 of 578
Case Digests
G.R. No. 202481, September 8, 2020, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
As a general rule, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition
for filing a special civil action for certiorari.
FACTS
This involves eight (8) consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court.
ABS-CBN, formerly known as ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, is a domestic
corporation that owns a wide network of television and radio stations. It was granted a
franchise to operate as a broadcasting company under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7966 and was
given a license and authority to operate by the National Telecommunications Commission.
This franchise, however, expired on May 5, 2020.
Upon their engagement, the workers were required to undergo various training
seminars and workshops to equip them with the skills and knowledge necessary in their
respective fields of assignment. Customarily, during the production of shows and the live
coverage of events, ABS-CBN hired three different groups of employees to work in such
productions. These consisted of the technical crew, production staff, and outside broadcast
(OB) van drivers and production assistance (PA) van drivers.
Specifically, the technical crew consisted of the cameramen, audio men, sound
engineers, VTR men, light men, and the camera control unit group, who were all under the
control and supervision of the technical director, production supervisor, and producer.
All members of the technical crew, production staff, and OB and PA van drivers
worked as one team, such that the outcome of the production depended on their combined
efforts. In exchange for the services they rendered, the workers were paid salaries twice a
month, as evidenced by pay slips bearing ABS-CBN's corporate name.
ABS-CBN adopted a system known as the Internal Job Market (IJM) System, a
database which provided the user with a list of accredited technical or creative manpower
and/or talents who offered their services for a fee. Due to the creation of the IJM System, the
workers were asked to sign a contract that would place them all under the IJM Work Pool.
They did not receive overtime pay, premium pay, and holiday pay for the work they rendered
during rest days, special holidays, and regular holidays
The workers claimed that ABS-CBN compelled them to sign a document denominated
as "Accreditation in the Internal [Job] Market System.". Meanwhile, the rest of the workers
persistently clamored for their recognition as regular employees. Allegedly, this incurred the
ire of ABS- CBN. Because the workers refused to comply, ABS-CBN effected a series of mass
dismissals of workers on various dates from June to September 2010. Those who refused to
sign the said contract were terminated from their employment.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitions should be dismissed on procedural grounds due to the
failure of the workers to file a motion for reconsideration against the NLRC ruling in G.R. No.
222057
RULING
477 of 578
Case Digests
NO. The failure to file a motion for reconsideration shall not be deemed fatal to the
cause of the workers. As a general rule, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an
indispensable condition for filing a special civil action for certiorari. The motion for
reconsideration is essential to grant the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its error,
if any, before resort to the courts of justice may be had. However, this rule is not iron-clad,
and is subject to well- known exceptions, such as:
Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court;
The issues raised before the NLRC, which pertain to the existence of an employment
relationship between ABS- CBN and the workers and the fact of illegal dismissal, were the
very same questions raised in the special civil action for certiorari before the CA. Certainly,
it would be futile to strictly require the filing of a motion for reconsideration when the very
issues raised before the CA were exactly similar to those passed upon and resolved by the
NLRC.
Moreover, in labor cases, rules of procedure shall not be applied in a rigid and
technical sense, as they are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Thus,
when their strict application would result in the frustration rather than the promotion of
substantial justice, technicalities must be avoided.
478 of 578
Case Digests
TREYES v LARLAR
G.R. No. 232579, September 8, 2020, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The Court stresses that Rule 74 pertains exclusively to the settlement of estates, which
is a special proceeding and NOT an ordinary civil action.
FACTS
Rosie Larlar Treyes (Rosie), the wife of petitioner Treyes, passed away. Rosie, who
did not bear any children with petitioner Treyes, died without any will. Rosie also left behind
seven siblings, i.e., the private respondents Antonio, Emilio, Heddy, Rene, Celeste, Judy, and
Yvonne.
At the time of her death, Rosie left behind 14 real estate properties situated in various
locations in the Philippines, which she owned together with petitioner Treyes as their
conjugal properties.
As alleged by the private respondents, they sent a letter dated February 13, 2012 to
petitioner Treyes requesting for a conference to discuss the settlement of the estate of their
deceased sister, Rosie.
The private respondents then alleged that sometime during the latter part of 2012,
they discovered to their shock and dismay that the TCTs previously registered in the name
of their sister and petitioner Treyes had already been cancelled, except the lot in Tanay, Rizal
and in Cabuyao, Laguna. Hence, the private respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint.
Petitioner Treyes, through counsel, then filed an Entry of Special Appearance and
Motion to Dismiss. Eventually, however, a re-service of summons was ordered by the RTC in
its Order. Petitioner Treyes then filed another Motion to Dismiss.
The RTC denied for lack of merit petitioner Treyes' second Motion to Dismiss.
Nevertheless, the RTC held that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the Complaint's third
cause of action.
Petitioner Treyes then filed before the CA a petition for certiorari; the CA denied
petitioner Treyes' petition for certiorari. Hence, the instant Petition.
Petitioner Treyes maintains that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying its second Motion to Dismiss, arguing,
in the main, that the RTC should have dismissed the private respondents' Complaint on the
basis of three grounds: a) improper venue, b) prescription, and c) lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter and, corrolarily, lack of real parties in interest. The Court discusses these
grounds ad seriatim.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA was correct in ruling that the RTC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied petitioner Treyes'
second Motion to Dismiss.
RULING
NO. Citing Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules, petitioner Treyes posits that the correct
venue for the settlement of a decedent's estate is the residence of the decedent at the time of
her death, which was at No. 1-C, Guatemala Street, Loyola Grand Villas, Loyola Heights,
Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City. Hence, petitioner Treyes maintains that the settlement of
479 of 578
Case Digests
her estate should have been filed with the RTC of Quezon City, and not at San Carlos City,
Negros Occidental. The Court finds and holds that the Complaint cannot be dismissed on the
ground of improper venue on the basis of Rule 73 because such Rule refers exclusively to the
special proceeding of settlement of estates and NOT to ordinary civil actions. Invoking Rule
73 to allege improper venue is entirely inconsistent with petitioner Treyes' assertion in the
instant Petition
Hence, under the Omnibus Motion Rule, when the grounds for the dismissal of a
Complaint under Rule 16, Section 1 are not raised in a motion to dismiss, such grounds,
except the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata,
and prescription, are deemed waived. In the instant case, prior to the filing of the second
Motion to Dismiss, the first Motion to Dismiss was already filed by petitioner Treyes asking
for the dismissal of the Complaint solely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person
of petitioner Treyes.
The basis of petitioner Treyes in arguing that the Complaint is already barred by
prescription is Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules which states that an heir or other persons
unduly deprived of lawful participation in the estate may compel the settlement of the estate
in the courts at any time within two years after the settlement and distribution of an estate.
The provisions of Rule 74, Section 4 barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an
extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition is
applicable only: (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the
extrajudicial partition, and (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly
complied with.
Both requirements are absent here as it is evident that not all the legal heirs of Rosie
participated in the extrajudicial settlement of her estate as indeed, it was only petitioner
Treyes who executed the Affidavits of Self- Adjudication.
480 of 578
Case Digests
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HEIRS OF BERNABE

G.R. No. 237663. October 6, 2020, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
As defined in Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a real party in interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Section 2 adds that unless otherwise authorized by law or the Rules of Court,
every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
FACTS
The CA Decision narrates the facts: A Complaint for Cancellation of Title and
Reversion was filed by the Republic through the OSG against respondent Ma. Teresita E.
Bernabe.
The Complaint alleges that then Governor General of the Philippines, James F. Smith,
issued an unnumbered proclamation reserving certain parcels of land in the province of
Pampanga for military purposes.
During the fact-finding investigation and relocation survey conducted by the Bureau
of Lands to determine the location of the subject property in relation to the perimeter area
of Clark Air Force Base, it was discovered that the subject property was neither occupied nor
cultivated by the claimants thereof. The subject property was found inside Fort Stotsenburg
Military Reservation which was being used as a target range by Clark Air Force Military
personnel.
While this case was pending, [respondents] Heirs of Bernabe mortgaged the subject
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 107736 to CRBB. After being informed
of the mortgage, the Republic, through the OSG, filed on December 5, 2011, an Amended
Complaint.
The OSG filed a Second Amended Complaint indicating the place of business of CRBB
as Cagayan Valley Road, Banga 1st Plaridel, Bulacan.
For its part, the OSG filed its Opposition contending that: the Republic is the real party
in interest, being the owner of all lands of the public domain under the concept of jura regalia.
The RTC rendered a Resolution, granting CRBB's Motion to Dismiss, and the CA
agreed with the RTC that the Republic is not the real party in interest. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC that the Republic is not the
real party in interest and cannot invoke imprescriptibility of action.
RULING
YES. As defined in Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a real party in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit. Section 2 adds that unless otherwise authorized by law or the Rules
of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest. To determine who is the real party in interest, the nature or character of the subject
property and who has present ownership thereof have to be inquired into.
Under that unnumbered Proclamation of the then Governor General of the
Philippines, James F. Smith, the lands which were reserved for Camp Stotsenburg and its
extension were all public lands subject to private rights. Later, Camp Stotsenburg became
481 of 578
Case Digests
Clark Air Base. As alleged in the Second Amended Complaint, during the fact-finding
investigation and relocation survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands, it was ascertained
that the subject property was inside the Fort Stotsenburg Military Reservation (now Clark
Air Base), which was being used as a target range by the Clark Air Force Military personnel,
that it was never occupied nor cultivated by the claimants thereof, and that there were no
monuments or markers existing thereon.
R.A. 7227 expressly provides that the BCDA is to own, hold and/or administer the
military reservations and other properties transferred to it. ETHIDa Given that, under Proc.
163, the CAB Lands were expressly transferred to the BCDA and the BCDA is empowered to
determine their utilization and disposition, and that under R.A. 7227, BCDA is to own, hold
and/or administer the properties transferred to it, it would seem that the Republic might
have divested its right of dominion over properties that had been transferred to the BCDA
and it would seem that BCDA would be the real party in interest in this case rather than the
Republic.
482 of 578
Case Digests
YON MITORI INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIES v. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 225538, October 14, 2020, Caguioa, J.
DOCTRINE
The filing of a civil action in the name of a single proprietorship is merely a formal, and
not a substantial defect. Substitution of the party in such cases would not constitute a change
in the identity of the parties and would not cause any prejudice on the adverse party.
FACTS
Tan, doing business under the name and style of Yon Mitori, is a depositor with the
Commonwealth, Quezon City branch of Union Bank. On November 12, 2007, Tan deposited
in said Union Bank account, the amount of P420,000.00 through a Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI) Check.
The BPI Check was drawn against the account of Angli Lumber & Hardware, Inc.
(Angli Lumber), one of Tan's alleged clients. The BPI Check was entered in Tan's bank record.
In the morning of November 14, 2007, Tan withdrew from the said account the
amount of P480,000.00. Later that day, the BPI Check was returned to Union Bank as the
account against which it was drawn had been closed. It was then that Union Bank discovered
that Tan's account had been mistakenly credited.
In its Complaint, Union Bank alleged that the value of the BPI Check had been
inadvertently credited to Tan's account due to a technical error in its system. For his part,
Tan alleged that the BPI Check had been given to him for value in the course of business. Tan
claimed that he should not be faulted for withdrawing the value of said check from his
account since Union Bank made the corresponding funds available by updating his account
to reflect his new balance.
The RTC ruled in favor of Union Bank. Tan filed an appeal via Rule 41 and named Yon
Mitori as co-appellant.
ISSUE
Whether the petition could be substituted under the name of Yon Mitori.
RULING
Yes. Every civil action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party
in interest, that is, the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
In turn, Section 1, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides that only natural and
juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. A single
proprietorship is not considered a separate juridical person under the Civil Code.
The Petition was filed solely in the name of Yon Mitori. As a single proprietorship, Yon
Mitori has no juridical personality separate and distinct from its owner and operator Tan.
Accordingly, the Petition should have been filed in Tan's name, the latter being the real party
in interest who possesses the legal standing to file this Petition.
483 of 578
Case Digests
Nevertheless, the Court permits the substitution of Tan as petitioner herein in the
interest of justice, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The filing of a civil action in the name of a single proprietorship is merely a formal,
and not a substantial defect. Substitution of the party in such cases would not constitute a
change in the identity of the parties, and would not cause any prejudice on the adverse party.
No prejudice will result from Yon Mitori's substitution. Tan has been consistently
named as owner and operator of Yon Mitori throughout the proceedings below. Moreover,
the fact that this Petition was filed in furtherance of Tan's interests is apparent from the
allegations in the pleadings filed before the Court and accordingly furnished to Union Bank.
484 of 578
Case Digests
LABUALAS B. MAMANSUAL and FRANCIS B. NADAR v. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (5TH

DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 240378-84, November 3, 2020, Caguioa, J.
DOCTRINE
Where there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, and where allegations of
grave abuse of discretion are made in the petition, the remedy of certiorari may lie.
FACTS
On December 9, 2011, a Complaint-Affidavit was filed by Maulana who was then the
incumbent Mayor of the Municipality of Palimbang, Province of Sultan Kudarat, with the
National Office of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Complaint-Affidavit charged petitioners
Mamansual, Nadar, Apil, and Makakua who were the former Mayor, Treasurer, Budget
Officer, and Accountant, respectively, of Palimbang, with Malversation of Public Funds under
Article 217 and Removal, Concealment, or Destruction of Documents under Article 226 of
the RPC.
The Complaint alleged that the Municipal Government of Palimbang maintains a
Current Account with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). From April 27, 2010 to June
29, 2010, before the term of office of Mamansual expired on June 30, 2010, seven LBP checks
naming Nadar as payee were signed and drawn by Mamansual against the said account,
amounting to a total of P13,003,776.71. The encashment of checks through the signatures of
Mamansual and Nadar did not represent any project or appropriation; nor were there any
liquidations made by them relative to the encashment of the checks.
On October 12, 2015, the OMB prepared a Resolution finding probable cause to file
Informations against the four respondents for violations of Articles 217 and 226 of the RPC.
On April 16, 2018, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash Informations and to Dismiss
the Above-Entitled Cases with Prayer to Cancel the April 28, 2018 Schedule Arraignment and
Pre-Trial and Suspension of Further Proceedings. Petitioners claimed therein that there was
inordinate delay in the conduct by the OMB of preliminary investigation and that the total
delay is at six years and one month (five years and eight months, if excluding the fact-finding
investigation).
The Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division denied petitioners' Motion finding that petitioners
merely enumerated material dates and were not able to establish the delay by the OMB.
ISSUE
Whether the Petition has become moot after the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division found
probable cause and issued warrants of arrest against petitioners.
RULING
No. In its Comment, the OMB cited the case of De Lima v. Reyes in arguing that, since
the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division already found probable cause for the purpose of issuing
warrants of arrest against petitioners, the petition for certiorari assailing the regularity of
preliminary investigation becomes moot and ceases to be the "plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy" under the law. The Court disagrees.
485 of 578
Case Digests
Where there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, and where allegations
of grave abuse of discretion are made in the petition, the remedy of certiorari may lie.
Thus, a direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari is an exception rather than
the general rule, and is a recourse that must be firmly grounded on compelling reasons. In
past cases, we have cited the interest of a "more enlightened and substantial justice"; the
promotion of public welfare and public policy; cases that "have attracted nationwide
attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof"; or
judgments on order attended by grave abuse of discretion, as compelling reasons to justify a
petition for certiorari. In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is appropriate if the
petitioner can establish that the lower court issued the judgment or order without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not
afford adequate and expeditious relief. The petitioner carries the burden of showing that the
attendant facts and circumstances fall within any of the cited instances.
486 of 578
Case Digests
FELIPA BINASOY TAMAYAO AND THE HEIRS OF ROGELIO TAMAYAO represented by

Felipa Binasoy Tamayao v LACAMBRA
DOCTRINE
The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the
evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or
delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked.
In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original.
FACTS
The instant Petition revolves around three sales between three families affecting the
same parcel of land, executed as follows: (1) an Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale dated
January 23, 1962 (first sale) by Tomasa and Jose Balubal (Jose), heirs of Vicente, of the entire
Lot No. 2930, 2) the sale made by some of the heirs of Juan of a 5/14 pro indiviso share of
Lot No. 2930 to Spouses Tamayao in a Deed of an Undivided Share in a Registered Parcel of
Land, and 3) the Extrajudicial Settlement of a Parcel of Land with Sale dated December 24,
1981.
During his lifetime, Vicente owned a parcel of land located in Libag, Tuguegarao City.
Upon his death sometime in 1944, Lot No. 2930 passed on to his only surviving heirs, Jose
and Tomasa, both surnamed Balubal, by intestate succession. Tomasa and Jose executed the
first sale, adjudicating unto themselves and subsequently transferring Lot to Juan for and in
consideration of P325.00.
When Juan died in 1979, Lot No. 2930 passed by intestacy to his heirs, Felipa,
Natividad, Francisco, Sotero, Catalino, and Cirilio, all surnamed Lacambra, and Basillo
Coballes (Basilio), (collectively referred to as heirs of Lacambra), son of Matilde, the
deceased daughter of Juan. The heirs of Lacambra continued possession of the property and
planted fruit trees thereon
Thereafter, although no formal partition took place, Rogelio and his wife, Felipa,
constructed their house on the eastern part of Lot No. 2930, after Sotero, Cirilio and Catalino
pointed to them the portion where they may do so.
Fearful that they might lose not only the land on which their house stood, but also the
very house they constructed on it, the Spouses Tamayao readily agreed to purchase from
Pedro, Tomasa, and Leandro.
For their part, the Heirs of Balubal argued that they are the original owners of the
subject property and that the same was never sold to Juan. They claimed that Tomasa was
illiterate while Jose was already bedridden on the day of the execution first sale and could
thus not have appeared before a notary public.
In affirming the validity of the first sale between Jose and Tomasa and Juan, the RTC
observed that the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale was a public document and was thus
presumed to have been duly executed. Although Tomasa and the other heirs of Balubal
subsequently claimed that the said deed was forged and that Jose and Tomasa never sold the
same, the RTC held that they failed to substantiate their claims with clear and convincing
evidence.
ISSUE
487 of 578
Case Digests
Whether the CA correctly held that the best evidence rule does not apply and
secondary evidence, such as the instant certified true copy, may be admitted even without
accounting for the original
RULING
YES. The existence and due execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale dated
January 23, 1962 may be proved without presenting the original. The best evidence rule
requires that the original document be produced whenever its contents are the subject of
inquiry, except in certain limited cases laid down in Section 3 of Rule 130.
Heirs of Prodon v. Heirs of Alvarez, explained: The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule
is to ensure that the exact contents of a writing are brought before the court, considering
that:
a. the precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of more than
average importance, particularly as respects operative or dispositive instruments,
such as deeds, wills and contracts, because a slight variation in words may mean a
great difference in rights;
b. there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by
handwriting or typewriting; and
c. as respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a writing,
there is a special risk of error, greater than in the case of attempts at describing other
situations generally.
The rule further acts as an insurance against fraud. Verily, if a party is in the possession
of the best evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its
place, the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for
fraudulent purposes that its production would expose and defeat. Lastly, the rule
protects against misleading inferences resulting from the intentional or unintentional
introduction of selected portions of a larger set of writings.
But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and misleading inferences arise
only when the issue relates to the terms of the writing. Hence, the Best Evidence Rule
applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be
introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the
writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such
a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original.
Consistent therewith, Skunac Corporation, et al. v. Sylianteng, et al., held:
The best evidence rule is inapplicable to the present case. The said rule applies only
when the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is
only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does
not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence
is likewise admissible without need to account for the original. In the instant case,
what is being questioned is the authenticity and due execution of the subject deed of
sale. There is no real issue as to its contents.
In this case, petitioners claim that no sale took place and that the Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale dated January 23, 1962 was forged, i.e., they question the authenticity
488 of 578
Case Digests
and due execution of the foregoing deed. Evidently, neither the contents of the document nor
the terms of the writing are at issue. As such, the CA correctly held that the best evidence
rule does not apply and secondary evidence, such as the instant certified true copy, may be
admitted even without accounting for the original.
It is appropriate to reiterate at this juncture that by virtue of its consensual nature, a
sale would be perfectly valid even if no deed whatsoever had been executed, subject only to
the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. As such, the parties may prove the existence of a
perfected or performed contract of sale through any competent evidence available, be it an
original deed, a copy thereof, a memorandum, or even testimony on the prior, subsequent,
and contemporaneous acts of the parties.
489 of 578
Case Digests
THE HEIRS OF INOCENTES MAMPO AND RAYMUNO A. MAMPO v. JOSEFINA MORADA

G.R. No. 214526, November 3, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The dismissal of all cases involved in forum shopping is a punitive measure against the
deplorable practice of litigants of resorting to different fora to seek similar reliefs, so that their
chances of obtaining a favorable judgment is increased. This results in the possibility of
different competent tribunals arriving at separate and contradictory decisions. Moreover, it
adds to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. To avoid this grave evil,
the Court has held that the rules on forum shopping must be strictly adhered to.
FACTS
Petitioners are the surviving wives and children of the deceased Inocentes Mampo
and Raymunod Mampo. Inocentes and Raymunod instituted a complaint before PARAD
against Nelida and Alex Severo for Recovery of Possession of parcels of land located in
Camarines Sur. The complaint was dismissed by the PARAD. However, on appeal, DARAB
Central Office’ on its 16 January 2008 decision, set aside the PARAD Decision and ruled in
favor of the Heirs of Mampo. The decision became final and executory, and a writ of execution
was issued by PARAD, upon motion of the petitioner.
However, respondent Josefina Mampo Morada filed a Third-Party Claim and was
granted by the PARAD. PARAD ordered the parties to respect Morada’s possession and the
recall of the writ of execution. Subsequently, PARAD also denied petitioners’ MR.
Petitioners then filed a Manifestation with the Motion for Implementation of the
Decision dated 16 January 2008. DARAB initially dismissed the manifestation, but
subsequently granted it upon petitioners’ MR. DARAB ordered the revival of the writ of
execution.
With this, Morada filed two actions before the CA, namely: (1) A Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules, where she sought the nullification of the DARAB decision for
allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of discretion; and (2) A Petition for Review
under Rule 43, where she prayed the reversal of the DARAB Decision. Petitioners opposed
to the actions of Morada for being a violation against the rule on forum shopping.
The CA 6th division dismissed the Rule 65 action on the ground of forum shopping.
However, the CA 12th division granted the Rule 43 action and nullified the DARAB decision.
MR was also denied.
Hence, this petition. Petitioners argue that since Morada committed forum shopping
as ruled by the CA 6th division, which decision has become final and executory, Morada's Rule
43 action should have been likewise dismissed.
490 of 578
Case Digests
Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that she did not violate the rules on forum
shopping because the two petitions she filed with the CA involved different issues and that
she has manifested the dismissal of the Rule 65 action to the CA 12th Division in the Rule 43
action, as well as her intention to pursue the latter case as a legal remedy.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in failing to dismiss the Rule 43 action for forum shopping
RULING
YES. There are two rules on forum shopping, separate and independent from each
other, provided in Rule 7, Section 5: 1) compliance with the certificate of forum shopping
and 2) avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself. To determine whether a party violated
the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor is whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another. Moreover, violation of the rule against forum shopping is a ground for summary
dismissal of both initiatory pleadings without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action
against the counsel or party concerned.
In the present case, the CA erred in not dismissing the Rule 43 division on the ground
of forum shopping. It is clear that Morada committing the two distinct acts of forum
shopping: (1) she willfully and deliberately instituted two actions in two different divisions
of the CA to avail of remedies founded on similar facts; and (2) she submitted false
certifications of non-forum shopping and did not observe the undertakings therein
mandated by Rule 7, Section 5.
As to the willful filing of two actions in two different divisions of the CA, the Court
found that Morada did not appeal on the CA 6th division’s decision where it was ruled that
she committed forum shopping. Her failure to appeal made the decision final and executory.
Hence, it is conclusive as to the issue of whether or not Morada committed forum shopping
in connection with her filing of the Rules 65 and 43 actions.
Moreover, res judicata has already set in. The parties to the present case and he Rule
65 action are the same, the issue of whether forum shopping was committed by Morada,
which was already decided with finality in the latter case, may no longer be re-litigated
herein. Nevertheless, even if the Court passes upon this issue, it will arrive at the same
conclusion as the CA did in the Rule 65 action — that Morada committed forum shopping.
Worse, the same was willful and deliberate.
Likewise, as earlier mentioned. the test for determining the existence of forum
shopping is whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment
in one case amounts to res judicata in another. Thus, there is forum shopping when the
following elements are present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as representing
the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
491 of 578
Case Digests
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars,
such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
In the present case, as to the first element, the Court found that the parties are
identical in both the Rules 65 and 43 actions, albeit in the former, the DARAB was added as
a public respondent. The Court has held that absolute identity of parties is not required, it
being enough that there is substantial identity of the parties or at least such parties represent
the same interests in both actions.
On the second element, while the remedies of petition for certiorari and appeal are
substantially different in that the former's purpose is to correct errors of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and the latter to correct
a mistake of judgement or errors of law or fact, a plain reading and comparison of Morada's
prayers in the two petitions she filed reveal that they involve the same rights asserted and
reliefs asked for. Both actions prayed for the reversal of the DARAB decision and prevent the
execution of the PARAD Decision, which awarded possession of the subject lots to the Heirs
of Mampo. Thus, there exists between the two actions, identity as to parties, rights asserted
and reliefs sought, to a degree that a judgment in either action will amount to res judicata in
the other.
As to Morada’s submission of false certifications of forum shopping, the Court found

that, first, in her Certification in the Rule 43 action, she falsely certified that she has not
previously commenced a similar action in another court. Second, in the same Rule 43
Certification, she did not disclose the pendency of the Rule 65 action — a prior action which
involved the same issues then pending with the CA Sixth Division. Third, in connection with
her Certification in her Rule 65 action, she did not report to the court her filing of the Rule
43 action with the CA 12th Division within five days therefrom. These acts violate the rule
on forum shopping under Rule 7, Section 5.
Hence, since Rules 65 and 43 actions, having been commenced in violation of the rules
on forum shopping, were both dismissible. This is so because twin dismissal is a punitive
measure to those who trifle with the orderly administration of justice.
Based on the previous pronouncements of the Court, the dismissal of all cases
involved in forum shopping is a punitive measure against the deplorable practice of litigants
of resorting to different fora to seek similar reliefs, so that their chances of obtaining a
favorable judgment is increased. This results in the possibility of different competent
tribunals arriving at separate and contradictory decisions. Moreover, it adds to the
congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts. To avoid this grave evil, the Court
has held that the rules on forum shopping must be strictly adhered to.
Therefore, the CA erred in not dismissing the Rule 43 action on the ground of forum
shopping. It is evident Morada committed forum shopping by deliberately filing two actions
492 of 578
Case Digests
before two different divisions of the CA and submitting falsified certifications of forum
shopping. Such violation of the rule against forum shopping is a ground for the dismissal of
both Rules 65 and 43 actions.
493 of 578
Case Digests
HERMIS CARLOS PEREZ v. SANDIGANBAYAN and the OMBUDSMAN

G.R. No. 245862, November 3, 2020 (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
In resolving issues concerning the prescription of offenses, the Court must determine the
following: (a) the prescriptive period of the offense; (b) when the period commenced to run;
and (c) when the period was interrupted.
FACTS
On April 27, 2016, a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds or Property, for
violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, and for violation of Sections
37 and 48 of R.A. No. 9003 was filed against petitioner Perez, in his capacity as the Mayor of
Biñan, Laguna. The complaint also impleaded Victor G. Rojo (Rojo), a private individual
connected with Etsaw Consultancy and Construction of Environmental Technologies
International Corporation of the Philippines (ECCE).
The complaint stemmed from a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed on

November 12, 2001, between the Municipality of Biñan, as represented by Perez, and ECCE,
as represented by Rojo, wherein the Municipality of Biñan agreed to use ECCE's Hydromex
Technology for its solid waste management program, and to obtain its services for project
management, documentation, as-built drawings, installation, testing, supervision, and
training. The complaint was filed 14 years after the execution of the MOA, and alleged that
there was no competitive bidding undertaken to procure ECCE's solid waste management
program and other services.
After more than four months from the filing of the complaint, the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) Graft Investigation & Prosecution Officer issued a report recommending
the assignment of the case to a member of the Environmental Ombudsman Team. Petitioner
Perez argued that the transaction between ECCE and the Municipality of Biñan was reviewed
by the Local Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC).
The OMB Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer found probable cause to charge
Perez with the violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. It held that the execution of the
MOA with ECCE was an act of manifest partiality on the part of Perez. ECCE was chosen
without the benefit of a public bidding, which was the default mode of procurement even
prior to the enactment of the Government Procurement Reform Act in 2003. Both the Local
Government Code and the Commission on Audit (COA) Circular No. 92-386 prescribe
competitive public bidding. The OMB also found that Perez was unable to substantiate his
defense that the MOA was reviewed by the Local PBAC of Biñan. Ombudsman Carpio-Morales
approved the Resolution finding probable cause against Perez.
Perez moved to quash the Information against him on the ground of prescription of
the offense. Perez pointed out that the alleged violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019
occurred on November 12, 2001 up to March 25, 2002. Under Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, all
494 of 578
Case Digests
offenses punishable under this law prescribe after 15 years. Since the Information was filed
with the Sandiganbayan only on October 5, 2018, or more than 16 years from the
commission of the offense, the criminal charges should be dismissed on the ground of
prescription. In addition, Perez invoked his constitutional right to the speedy disposition of
cases.
The People of the Philippines (People) opposed Perez's motion to quash. In its
comment, the People argued that the prescription of the offense charged against Perez
should be reckoned from the discovery of its commission. Even if the court were to reckon
the period of prescription from the commission of the offense on November 12, 2001, the
complaint against Perez was filed with the OMB on April 27, 2016, effectively tolling the
running of the prescriptive period. As regards the right to the speedy disposition of cases,
the People maintained that there was no delay, and even if there was any, the delay was not
inordinate.
The Sandiganbayan denied Perez's Motion to Quash for lack of merit, ruling that the
offense has not prescribed and there was no violation of Perez's right to the speedy
disposition of cases.
ISSUES
Whether the offense charged against Perez has prescribed
RULING
NO. In resolving issues concerning the prescription of offenses, the Court must
determine the following: (a) the prescriptive period of the offense; (b) when the period
commenced to run; and (c) when the period was interrupted.
Since Perez was charged with the violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, the
prescriptive period of the offense is found in Section 11 52 of the same law, which provides
that all offenses punishable under R.A. No. 3019 prescribes in 15 years. This provision was
later amended by R.A. No. 10910, increasing the prescriptive period from 15 to 20 years. The
amendatory law took effect on July 21, 2016. As such, this longer period of prescription may
not be retroactively applied to crimes committed prior to the passage of R.A. No. 10910. The
applicable prescriptive period of the offense charged against Perez is therefore 15 years.
R.A. No. 3019 does not explicitly provide when the period begins to run. For this
purpose, reference should be made to Act No. 3326, which governs the prescription of
offenses punished by special penal laws. As a general rule, Section 2 of Act No. 3326
prescribes that prescription is triggered by the commission of the crime.
Further, the running of the prescriptive period was tolled upon the filing of the
complaint with the OMB. Prescription is interrupted when the preliminary investigation
against the accused is commenced. In this case, the filing of the complaint with the OMB on
April 27, 2016 against Perez effectively commenced the preliminary investigation
495 of 578
Case Digests
proceedings. After the filing of the complaint, the OMB was duty-bound to determine
whether probable cause existed to charge Perez with the offenses stated in the complaint. It
was at that point that the prescriptive period was interrupted — approximately 14 years and
five months after the commission of the alleged offense.
Since the OMB carries the mandate of investigating acts or omissions of public officers
or employees, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the prescriptive period was
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the OMB. The OMB's conduct of a preliminary
investigation carries the same effect as that originally contemplated in Act No. 3326, which
is the institution of proceedings for the investigation and subsequent punishment of the
offender. Although the complaint was filed at the eleventh hour, so to speak, it was still made
within the 15-year period under Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019.
496 of 578
Case Digests
MARY BETH D. MARZAN v. CITY OF OLONGAPO, HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, ANGIE

SOCORRO S. BARROGA, AND ARCHITECT TONY KAR BALDE III
G.R. No. 232769, November 3, 2020, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed against an official or
government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. For a writ to
issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and there should be an
imperative duty on the part of respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated. In the
absence of a clear and unmistakable provision of a law, a mandamus petition does not lie to
require anyone to a specific course of conduct or to control or review the exercise of discretion;
it will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his
duty not to do or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by Jaw.
FACTS
Petitioner Mary Beth Marzan was appointed by Mayor Gordon as City Government
Department Head II of OCPD. It was subsequently approved by the CSC. Years later, a
Memorandum was issued by Mayor Gordon and appointed Marzan as the City Government
Department Head II of the CBO
Rolen Paulino was elected as mayor of Olongapo City and upon assumption into office,
he appointed Tony Kar Balde, III to replace Marzan’s former position as Department Head of
the CPDO.
However, CSC, through Director Rabang, disapproved Marzan’s appointment as City

Government Department Head II of the CBO. The ground for disapproval of her appointment
was the discrepancy between the date the appointment was signed by Mayor Gordon and its
approval by the Sangguniang Panlulungsod. Consequently, Barroga wrote a City Termination
Letter to Marzan informing her that the City of Olongapo will be terminating her service on
the basis of the letter of Director Rabang.
Marzan inquired to the CSC Regional Office III of the effect of the disapproval of her
appointment. In the meantime, she continued to go to work despite the directive for her to
cease working for the City of Olongapo. She informed Mayor Paulino and Barroga that status
quo will have to be observed while CSC Regional Office resolves her query.
Nevertheless, six men from the Civil Security Service Unit and Balde were in her office
one day. Balde insisted Marzan to remove her things and instructed the six men to evict her.
Marzan then opted to not to go to work the following day to avoid embarrassment.
Director Rabang, in relation to the query submitted by Marzan, told her that as a
matter of policy, he cannot render opinions or give categoricaln answers to queries which
may later be brought before it on appeal. Later, Marzan found that the cessation order issued
497 of 578
Case Digests
to Marzan was Mayor Paulino’s decision, but such decision was based on Barroga’s
recommendation.
Marzan then filed a Petition for Mandamus before the RTC against the City of
Olongapo, praying that the court order the respondents to reinstate her to her former
position. Respondents opposed to the petition and averred, among others, that the Marzan’s
resort to Mandamus is premature as she failed to exhaust the available administrative
remedies by seeking reconsideration of her termination before the Office of the City Mayor,
and subsequently, filing an appeal with the CSC Regional Office.
The RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus and held that Marza failed to exhaust
available administrative remedies. Moreover, mandamus cannot issue to compel Marzan’s
reinstatement as such act is discretionary on the part of Mayor Paulino as the appointing
authority. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE
1. Whether Marzan’s immediate resort to judicial remedies was proper.
2. Whether mandamus will lie to compel respondents to reinstate Marzan as the
Department Head of CPDO.
RULING
1. YES. As a general rule and in accordance with the Revised Omnibus Rules on
Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, Marzan should have questioned her
termination by filing an appeal before the CSC Regional Office. However, instead of
doing so, Marzan wrote a letter to Regional Director Rabang of the CSC.
Nevertheless, the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of exceptions.

A party may directly resort to judicial remedies if any of the following is present:
1. when there is a violation of due process;

2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;
6. when the respondent is a depaiiment secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
498 of 578
Case Digests
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention
In the present case, Marzan does not assail the disapproval of her appointment, but
questions the respondents’ refusal to reinstate her to her former position, claiming that such
reinstatement is mandated by Section 13, Rule IV of the Omnibus Rules. Clearly, Marzan
seeks judicial intervention in order to determine whether the Omnibus Rules applies. This
question is one that is purely legal, and thus constitutes an exception to the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies. In this light, the Court finds that Marzan's direct
resort to the courts may be permitted.
Therefore, Marzan’s resort ton judicial remedies was proper.
2. NO. According to Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus will lie when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of
an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled.
The writ of mandamus shall only issue to compel the performance of a ministerial act,
or "one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of
his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an act done." Thus, mandamus will
not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary act.
In the present case, since Section 13, Rule IV of the Omnibus Rules does not apply and
that Marzan freely and knowingly vacated her former position, Marzan's reinstatement
thereto constitutes a discretionary act which cannot be compelled through a writ of
mandamus. In this light, the Court finds no basis to grant Marzan's prayer for moral and
exemplary damages, litigation expenses and costs of suit.
Therefore, the mandamus will not lie in the case at bar since Marzan’s reappointment
is considered as a discretionary act. A writ of mandamus will lie only when the act of tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person being compelled to be performed is a ministerial act.
499 of 578
Case Digests
ALMA CAMORO PAHKIAT, MAHALITO BUNAYOG LAPINID, AND FE MANAYAGA LOPES

v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO AND COMMISSION ON AUDIT-XII
G.R. No. 223972, November 3, 2020, En Banc (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
If the criminal case will be prosecuted based on the same facts and evidence as that in
the administrative case, and the court trying the latter already squarely ruled on the absence
of facts and/or circumstances sufficient to negate the basis of the criminal indictment, then to
still burden the accused to present controverting evidence despite the failure of the prosecution
to present sufficient and competent evidence, will be a futile and useless exercise.
FACTS
Kidapawan State Auditor IV and Audit Team Leader Aspilla issued an order forming
a team to conduct a 10-day audit on the cash, accounts and financial transactions of Barangay
Poblacion after receiving information on the alleged falsification of disbursement vouchers
(DV), missing DVs, unrecorded check issuances and other irregularities in the financial
transactions of Barangay Poblacion
Based on the investigation conducted by the team, it recommended that criminal and
administrative proceedings be instituted against the persons named in the report, including
the petitioners. A criminal complaint for Complex Crime of Malversation of Public Funds
through Falsification of Public or Commercial Documents and Violation of Section 3 (e) of
R.A. No. 3019 was instituted, together with the administrative complaint for Dishonesty,
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
Tamayo, Sambuang, and the petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint as
it failed to specifically allege the acts or omissions constituting the crime charged. They cited
Section 14, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that no person shall be held
to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law and that the accused shall be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him or her. They posited that the
complaint failed to specifically establish their participation and that it merely concluded that
they conspired with barangay officials. They pointed out that COA-XII failed to establish the
elements of conspiracy against them.
The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued a resolution for the criminal charges,
and a decision with respect to the administrative charges. In the decision, the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao found substantial evidence establishing the charge against them. on
a motion for reconsideration, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao reversed its earlier
Decision insofar as petitioners were concerned and absolved them from liability. The Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao found that petitioners had no direct participation in the
anomalies.
500 of 578
Case Digests
As to the criminal charges, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao summarily denied

it on the ground that it had been filed beyond the five (5)-day reglementary period pursuant
to the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding probable cause to charge herein petitioners with Malversation of Public
Funds through Falsification of Public and Commercial Documents under Articles 217 and
171 of the RPC, and violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
RULING
YES. In cases where both an administrative case and a criminal case are filed against
a public officer for the same act or omission, the Court has consistently held that an
absolution from an administrative case does not necessarily bar a criminal case from
proceeding, and vice versa. An offense, for instance, may have been committed but the
evidence adduced to prove liability failed to obtain the threshold required by law in one case
— substantial evidence in administrative cases or proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal
cases — which would have established that the actor is either administratively or criminally
liable. For this reason, the parallel case should not be dismissed ipso facto without a showing
that its own threshold of evidence has not been reached as well.
However, in the case of People v. Sandiganbayan, the Court gave weight on the
dismissal of the administrative case, and it found that the criminal case should likewise be
dismissed. It held that if the criminal case will be prosecuted based on the same facts and
evidence as that in the administrative case, and the court trying the latter already squarely
ruled on the absence of facts and/or circumstances sufficient to negate the basis of the
criminal indictment, then to still burden the accused to present controverting evidence
despite the failure of the prosecution to present sufficient and competent evidence, will be a
futile and useless exercise. Hence, there being want of substantial evidence to support an
administrative charge, there could be no sufficient evidence to warrant a conclusion that
there is probable cause for a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Likewise, the Court, in the case of Constantino v. Sandiganbayan, held that the
dismissal of the administrative case based on the same subject matter and after examining
the same crucial evidence operates to dismiss the criminal case because of the precise finding
that the act from which liability is anchored does not exist.
The aforementioned rulings are applicable in the present case. The Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao itself had already determined, in no uncertain terms, that petitioners
had no participation in the alleged anomalies. In arriving at this conclusion, the Office of the
Ombudsman- Mindanao noted the comments of the COA and the Operations/Process Chart
governing the disbursement of barangay funds, which showed that the responsibilities of
501 of 578
Case Digests
petitioners entailed performing acts that transpired before and after the alleged anomalies
occurred.
The ruling of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, therefore, is much more than a
finding that there was "insufficient evidence" to hold petitioners administratively liable, but
rather, that petitioners did not commit anything at all which can potentially incriminate
them administratively or criminally.
Therefore, the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it
did not dismiss the criminal proceedings against the petitioners. While it is true that an
absolution from an administrative case does not necessarily bar a criminal case from
proceeding, the same is not true in the present case. The Court has held that if the
administrative and criminal proceedings pertain to the same evidence, then the principle
that the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal
prosecution for the same or similar acts subject of the administrative complaint, on which
its previous resolution was anchored, no longer applies. Hence, the criminal proceedings
must also be dismissed.
502 of 578
Case Digests
EDMUNDO BUENCAMINO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 216745-46, November 10, 2020, First Division (CAGUIOA, J.)
DOCTRINE
The Court finds that the prosecution failed to support a prayer of conviction. Reasonable
doubt has been cast on the culpability of petitioner for the crime charged. The prosecution was
unable to present sufficient evidence to prove that petitioner, in imposing the pass way fees,
was moved by a clear, notorious, evident bad faith to consciously inflict injury on RMDC.
Further, since there can be no presumption of bad faith, including cases involving violations of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, failure to adequately impute evident bad faith as
required by its Section 3(e) must result in finding petitioner innocent as he is constitutionally
presumed.
FACTS
In 2004, in the Municipality of San Miguel, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, accused
Edmundo Buencamino, a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of San Miguel, Bulacan,
caused undue injury to Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation by collecting "pass
way" fees, through a certain Robert Tabarnero, on all the delivery trucks of the Rosemoor
Mining and Development Corporation that pass within the territorial jurisdiction of San
Miguel, Bulacan.
Due to the alleged failure to pay the "pass way fee," Buencamino ordered the
apprehension and impounding of the delivery trucks of the Rosemoor Mining and
Development Corporation .
In his defense, petitioner testified that sometime in July 2004, Constantino went to
his office, to ask permission for the passing through of RMDC's delivery trucks along San
Miguel's municipal roads. Petitioner refused since the heavy load of the mining delivery
trucks would most likely destroy the water table of San Miguel.
Petitioner said that Constantino countered by recounting that during previous

administrations, the trucks of RMDC were allowed to pass through municipal roads in
exchange for a certain amount of fees.
To verify Constantino's claim, petitioner asked Marciano who, in tum, replied that a
certain amount of pass way fee was being collected, and that its basis was Sangguniang Bayan
Kapasiyahan Elg. 89A-055/Kautusang Bayan Elg. 029. He added that to further verify if the
imposition of the pass way fee had legal basis, he called upon the Sangguniang Bayan
Secretary Renato Magtalas and asked him if there was such a Kautusan, and the latter replied
that it was in force at that time.
Petitioner denied any knowledge that Kapasiyahan 89A-055/Kautusang Bayan 029

was subsequently declared void by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bulacan.
503 of 578
Case Digests
After trial on the merits, the Sandiganbayan found evident bad faith attributable to
petitioner, and found such bad faith as the direct and proximate cause of RMDC and
Constantino's undue injury.
In finding petitioner guilty, the Sandiganbayan found that all the elements of unlawful
acts penalized under Section 3(e) were proven by the prosecution, and held that petitioner
did cause undue injury to Constantino, RMDC, and the government, through acts that were
attended by evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence.
ISSUE
Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioner of two counts of violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
RULING
YES. In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following elements
must concur, to wit: ( 1) the offender is a public officer; (2) the act was done in the discharge
of the public officer's official, administrative or judicial functions; (3) the act was done
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (4) the
public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
The presence of the first and second elements are not disputed. The dispute lies in
whether the third element was proven, particularly whether his act of collecting the pass
way fees was done in evident bad faith and resulted in giving RMDC or the government
undue injury. The Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish beyond doubt the third
element of evident bad faith as charged under the Informations levelled against petitioner.
Even without the glaring variance between the modality of commission which
petitioner was charged with and the one he was convicted with, the Court remains
unconvinced that petitioner's conviction is in order. The prosecution alleges that petitioner
is guilty of evident bad faith. However, the Court agrees with petitioner and finds that there
is no sufficient evidence to prove the element of evident bad faith on either count.
The failure on the prosecution's collective evidence is two-tiered: (1) admissibility

and (2) probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of
evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether
the admitted evidence proves an issue. The prosecution's pieces of documentary evidence
failed on both, in that even if they hurdled the requirement of admissibility, they still would
fail when tested in the crucible of probative worth.
The Court finds that the prosecution failed to support a prayer of conviction.
Reasonable doubt has been cast on the culpability of petitioner for the crime charged. The
prosecution was unable to present sufficient evidence to prove that petitioner, in imposing
the pass way fees, was moved by a clear, notorious, evident bad faith to consciously inflict
504 of 578
Case Digests
injury on RMDC. Further, since there can be no presumption of bad faith, including cases
involving violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, failure to adequately impute
evident bad faith as required by its Section 3(e) must result in finding petitioner innocent as
he is constitutionally presumed.
505 of 578
Case Digests
EUFEMIA ABAD ET AL. v. HEIRS OF JOSE EUSEBIO ABAD GALLARDO, namely: Dolores
Lolita Gallardo, Jocelyn Gallardo, Judith Gallardo and Jonah Gallardo
G.R. No. 229070, November 10, 2020, First Division, (CAGUIOA, J.)
DOCTRINE
The requisites for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior
judgment are: (1) The former judgment or order must be final; (2) It must be a judgment on
the merits; (3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; and (4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties,
subject matter, and cause of action.
FACTS
The case involves a parcel of land, Lot 5826-B (subject lot), consisting of 5,000 square
meters situated in Capiddigan, Cordon, Isabela, which is a portion of a bigger parcel of land
with an area of 22,618 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) P-
2769 registered in the names of Spouses Miguel Abad and Agueda de Leon (Sps. Miguel and
Agueda). Subsequently, the OCT was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) T-
131684 was issued in the name of Enrique Abad (Enrique).
The Heirs of Jose Eusebio Abad Gallardo averred that upon the death of Sps. Miguel
and Agueda, the land covered by OCT P-2769 was inherited by their three children Dionisio,
Isabel and Enrique. They all took possession of the land as co-owners. The land became the
subject of Civil Case No. 0591 filed before the RTC for annulment of deed and TCT with
damages. Dionisio and Isabel alleged that an Extrajudicial Settlement and Waiver of Rights
was executed. Enrique manifested before RTC that he had entered into a compromise
agreement with his siblings Dionisio and Isabel.
On August 25, 1989, Civil Case No. 0591 was finally dismissed on the manifestation of
Dionisio and Isabel that a compromise agreement had been forged between them and
Enrique. A deed of partition was notarized and executed. However, the portions were never
actually segregated nor partitioned, leaving intact TCT T-131684 registered in Enrique's
name.
In 2004, Isabel died leaving Lot 5826-B to his son Jose Eusebio Abad Gallardo (Jose
Eusebio), married to Dolores Lolita Gallardo (Dolores Lolita), by virtue of a Deed of Donation
earlier executed by Isabel in favor of Jose Eusebio. On November 15, 2015, Jonah Gallardo,
one of respondents/Heirs of Jose Eusebio, caused the recording of a blotter at the Philippine
National Police, Cordon Police Station stating that his uncle, Pollie Cezar, entered and
cultivated the subject lot.
In the answer submitted by the Heirs of Enrique (petitioners), they admitted that TCT
T-131684 was registered in the name of Enrique and averred that the subject lot is
exclusively owned by them through hereditary succession.
506 of 578
Case Digests
In 2016, the RTC found that judgment on the pleadings was proper and res
judicata attached in the present case in view of the proceedings in the earlier Civil Case No.
0591, which the RTC took judicial notice of.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC erred in its application of res judicata or "bar by prior judgment"
because there was no final decision on the merits in Civil Case No. 0591, the amicable
settlement not having been submitted to the court.
RULING
YES. The doctrine of Res Judicata attaches in the present case. Res judicata embraces
two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules
of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).
The requisites for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior
judgment are: (1) The former judgment or order must be final; (2) It must be a judgment on
the merits; (3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and (4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity
of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.
In the present case, the defendants and the plaintiffs both raised the issue of
ownership over the said 5,000 square meters portion of land, although the Court notes that
the defendants did not present evidence to prove their defense of exclusive ownership other
than their assertion of inheritance of the land traceable to Enrique Abad. The same issue was
directly involved in the case filed in RTC Branch 21 which ended in a compromise agreement
executed between Enrique Abad and Isabel Abad and Dionisio Abad.
It cannot again be ventilated, and litigated between the parties and their privies,
whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
The RTC erred in finding that res judicata attached in the instant case because there
was no judgment on the merits in Civil Case No. 0591 (the prior case).
As aptly observed by petitioners, the prior case was dismissed twice, the first
dismissal based on the Order dated December 27, 1988 on the assumption that a
compromise agreement had been forged among the parties: "To date no answer was filed
such that the court can safely conclude that a Compromise Agreement was forged between
him [(the defendant)] and the plaintiffs because neither of them has done anything to
prosecute the complaint." This first Order of dismissal was reconsidered in the Order dated
February 3, 1989 and the complaint was reinstated "on the ground that contrary to the
presumption of the Court, no compromise [agreement] was entered into by them [(the
plaintiffs)] and the [defendant] and that they are ready and willing to pursue their
complaint."
507 of 578
Case Digests
Besides, there is also no identity of causes of action in the prior case and in the present
case. While the prior case concerned the ownership of the subject lot, the present case does
not only involve said cause of action, but also possession and consignation.
508 of 578
Case Digests
MARIO CHIONG BERNARDO, IN HIS BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF ALL THE HEIRS OF
THE LATE JOSE CHIONG v. JOSE C. FERNANDO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 211034, November 18, 2020, First Division, (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Demonstrably, the prescriptions governing the preparation and accomplishment of
birth certificates in the system of registry do not fall under any of the enumerated categories of
facts. At best, this allegation of a past protocol in the system of registry may fall under Section
2 of the same Rule, which provides for matters that the court may, in its sound discretion, opt
to take judicial notice of. Being discretionary, the Court may not take judicial notice thereof if
it is not convinced that the matter is of public knowledge, or capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or otherwise ought to be known by judges because of their judicial functions.
FACTS
Five parcels of land were left behind by the late Jose Chiong, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) (subject properties).
In 1925, the late Jose Chiong executed a Deed of Donation, bequeathing the subject
properties to Jose Chiong Fernando, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents.
Respondents executed an "Affidavit of Identity of Heirs" (Affidavit), where they claimed to
be the legal heirs of the late Jose Chiong. On the sole basis of the said Affidavit, respondents
caused the cancellation of the titles of the subject properties.
In 2003, Mario, on behalf of the heirs of the late Jose Chiong, filed a complaint for
Annulment, Reconveyance and Accounting with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with the
RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. Josefina, et al. and the heirs of Gregorio Domingo (Gregorio) as
unwilling co-plaintiffs (petitioners in G.R. No. 211076) filed a separate complaint for
Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Declaration of Heirship and Partition before the RTC
of Malolos Bulacan.
Arguing for his claim, Mario primarily alleged that his mother, Barbara Chiong
(Barbara), was born on December 4, 1912 in Manila, to spouses Jose Chiong and Ambrosia
Domingo (Ambrosia), as shown in the certified photocopy of her certificate of birth issued
by the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Manila. Also submitted was Barbara's Certificate of
Baptism dated January 13,2006 to prove that Barbara was baptized on March 2, 1913 at Our
Lady of Most Holy Rosary in Binondo, Manila. Mario submitted that he and his siblings,
namely Eduardo Bernardo (Eduardo), Felix, and Josefina are the children of Barbara. Hence,
being grandchildren of Jose Chiong, they are the ones who are entitled to the subject
properties.
In ruling that Barbara's birth certificate was authentic and legitimate, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) found that, on its face, the certificate showed that Barbara was born a
legitimate daughter of Jose Chiong.
509 of 578
Case Digests
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) via Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
In finding merit in the appeal, the CA held that in this case, petitioners bore the burden of
proving their claim as against respondents by a preponderance of evidence. The CA ruled
that it was unable to accept the RTC's conclusion on the legitimate status of Barbara and her
legitimate filiation to Jose Chiong. It observed that the RTC made a sweeping conclusion that
respondents failed to offer any evidence to refute the presumption of Barbara's legitimacy
as indicated in her birth certificate
ISSUE
Whether the Court should take judicial notice of when the signature of the father of
the child was or was not required in the certificate of birth.
RULING
NO. With respect to Barbara's baptismal certificate, as the CA correctly held, it may
only be considered evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so
specified, but is not persuasive in proving the veracities of the entries therein, including the
baptized child's paternity.
Having failed at discharging the burden of proof incumbent upon petitioners in

establishing Barbara's legitimate status, no legitimate filiation between Barbara and Jose
Chiong may be recognized. With no legitimate status for Barbara upon which petitioners
ground their entitlement to the subject properties, no such ancillary right arose for
petitioners, and no right to demand reconveyance and annulment of the subject TCTs may
be adjudged in their favor.
Petitioners' allegation that the Court should take judicial notice of when the signature
of the father of the child was or was not required in the certificate of birth is misplaced. The
additional argument that the baptismal certificate should be considered a certificate of birth
as it was executed prior to an established system of registry was also only alleged but not
proved. Mario extends this by analogy, arguing that since at the time of Barbara's baptism,
there was a strict prohibition in the Catholic religion against baptism of children born out of
wedlock, the baptismal certificate could further prove a legitimate marriage between Jose
Chiong and Ambrosia. This claim, both belated and unsubstantiated, cannot be considered
by the Court as sufficient basis to grant petitioners' claim.
Rule 129, Section 1 of the Rules provides for the facts which the court must take
judicial notice of without need of proof, to wit:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political
history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty
and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
510 of 578
Case Digests
Demonstrably, the prescriptions governing the preparation and accomplishment of

birth certificates in the system of registry do not fall under any of the enumerated categories
of facts. At best, this allegation of a past protocol in the system of registry may fall under
Section 2 of the same Rule, which provides for matters that the court may, in its sound
discretion, opt to take judicial notice of. Being discretionary, the Court may not take judicial
notice thereof if it is not convinced that the matter is of public knowledge, or capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or otherwise ought to be known by judges because of their
judicial functions.
511 of 578
Case Digests
HON. REYNALDO VILLAR, ET AL

G.R. No. 193143, December 01, 2020, En Banc, (CAGUIOA, J.)
DOCTRINE
Unquestionably, the 2002 COA Decision was rendered by the COA-CP. It is therefore of
no moment that the Petition for Review was denominated as such given that a "petition for
review" under Rule V of the 1997 COA Rules is appropriate only for final decisions or orders
issued by the Director. Thus, by filing the Petition for Review with the COA-CP - the very same
body that rendered the 2002 COA Decision Collado was actually seeking a reconsideration of
the 2002 COA Decision.
FACTS
In 1988, a contract was entered into by the PSHS, Diliman Campus, Quezon City and
N.C. Roxas, Inc., for the construction of the PSHS-Mindanao Campus Building Complex, which
was to be completed within 240 calendar days. Due to certain circumstances beyond its
control, the contractor requested an extension of the contract time, which the Department
of Science and Technology (DOST)-Wide Infrastructure Committee granted for 50 days, but
with a notification and reminder to the contractor that even considering the grant of
extension, the completion date of the project had elapsed and the same was already subject
to liquidated damages.
The then PSHS Auditor informed the COA, that even with the granting of the extension
of the contract time, the contractor had already incurred a negative slippage of 63.58%.
However, the DOST-Wide Infrastructure Committee decided to continue with the project as
it would entail a longer time to finish the project if they rescinded the contract and conducted
another bidding.
A Supplemental Contract was entered into by and between the PSHS and N.C. Roxas,
Inc. for the completion of the Academic Building (Phase 1), and concreting of the driveway,
etc., to be completed within 45 days. However, 1991, the PSHS Board of Trustees in its
Resolution, terminated the two Contracts for failure of the contractor to finish the projects.
Upon post-audit, the Auditor discovered that the liquidated damages imposed by PSHS
Management on the contractor was only P252,114.79 instead of P2,400,134.65 or a
difference of P2,148,019.86.
In a Letter dated September 17, 1998, Collado, together with Vasquez, sought
reconsideration of the Notices of Disallowance with the COA Auditor. The COA Auditor
denied reconsideration of the Notices of Disallowance and affirmed the OCA Auditor's
previous findings.
Collado and Vasquez appealed to the COA National Government Audit Office I (COA-
NGAO), which sustained the findings of the COA Auditors and affirmed the liability of Collado.
Collado and Vasquez subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On automatic review,
the COA-CP in the 2002 COA Decision denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
512 of 578
Case Digests
In the 2008 COA Decision, the COA-CP, treating the Petition for Review as a motion
for reconsideration of the 2002 COA Decision, affirmed the 2002 COA Decision with finality.
Unsatisfied, in a Letter dated June 10, 2008, Collado and Vasquez, purporting to question the
2008 COA Decision, again sought reconsideration.
The LSS-ALS denied due course to the Letter dated June 10, 2008 for being a second
motion for reconsideration of the 2002 COA Decision - a prohibited pleading under
Section 13, Rule IX of the 1997 COA Rules.
ISSUE
Whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in treating the Petition for Review as a first motion for reconsideration
RULING
NO. Respondents correctly treated the Petition for Review as a motion for
reconsideration. The Petition was filed out of time. Applicable to this case is Section 3, Rule
64 of the Rules, which specifically governs the mode of review from judgments, final orders,
or resolutions issued by the COA:
SEC. 3. Time to file petition. -The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days from notice
of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under
the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If
the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period,
but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.
The provision requires a petition for certiorari assailing a judgment of the COA to be
filed within 30 days from notice thereof, which period shall only be interrupted by the filing
of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. And, if such motion is denied, the aggrieved
party may only file the petition within the remainder of the 30-day period, which in any event
shall not be less than' five days from notice of such denial.
The timeliness of the instant Petition therefore hinges on the nature of the Petition
for Review. In their Comment, respondents repeatedly stress that the Petition for Review
was already the first motion for reconsideration of the 2002 COA Decision, which effectively
converted the Letter dated June 10, 2008 to a second motion for reconsideration of the said
decision. Respondents therefore assert that upon Collado's receipt of the 2008 COA Decision-
which contained the denial of the first motion for reconsideration of the 2002 COA Decision-
she should have already filed a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 64 of the Rules.
Hence, considering that a second motion for reconsideration is expressly prohibited by the
1997 COA Rules, the period for filing under Rule 64 could not have been interrupted by the
filing of the Letter dated June 10, 2008; in the meantime, the 2008 COA Decision had already
lapsed into finality.
513 of 578
Case Digests
Unquestionably, the 2002 COA Decision was rendered by the COA-CP. It is therefore
of no moment that the Petition for Review was denominated as such given that a "petition
for review" under Rule V of the 1997 COA Rules is appropriate only for final decisions or
orders issued by the Director. Thus, by filing the Petition for Review with the COA-CP - the
very same body that rendered the 2002 COA Decision Collado was actually seeking a
reconsideration of the 2002 COA Decision.
The records indicate that the 2008 COA Decision-the final dispositive act of the COA-
CP on the motion for reconsideration of the 2002 COA Decision-was received by Collado on
May 15, 2008. Following the last sentence of Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules, Collado had only
five days therefrom, or until May 20, 2008, within which to file the proper petition.
Considering therefore that the instant Petition was filed only on August 20, 2010, or more
than two years after Collado's receipt of the 2008 COA Decision, the Petition was perforce
filed out of time.
514 of 578
Case Digests
HEIRS OF CORAZON VILLEZA v. ELIZABETH S. ALIANGAN

G.R. Nos. 244667-69, December 02, 2020, First Division, (CAGUIOA, J.)
DOCTRINE
Section 8, Rule 89 presupposes a pending probate or administration proceeding for the
testate or intestate estate of a decedent. The heirs of Corazon have not initiated a special
proceeding for the settlement of her estate where an administrator has been appointed.
Without such special proceeding, respondents are not required to make an application to
authorize the administrator to convey the subject properties according to the contracts that
Corazon entered into but was unable to execute due to her death.
FACTS
In controversy are three (3) parcels of land with improvements located at Angadanan,
Isabela all registered under the name of Corazon Villeza (Corazon).
It is alleged that Corazon sold the subject properties to sisters Elizabeth Aliangan
(Elizabeth) and Rosalina Aliangan (Rosalina). However, Corazon died without executing any
deed of conveyance in respondents' favor. Respondents thus filed three (3) separate
Amended Complaints for Specific Performance and Damages to compel petitioners Heirs of
Corazon Villeza, legal heirs and collateral relatives of Corazon, to execute the subject deeds.
The RTC, in its Order dated May 19, 2011 consolidated [CV] Br. 20-3010 and Br. 20-
3011 with [CV] Br. 20-3009, but opted to render three (3) separate Decisions to obviate
confusion.
The Court of Appeals (CA) found the appeals without merit. It stated that the actions
for specific performance were not filed prematurely because probate courts or courts of
administration proceedings cannot determine questions arising as to the ownership of
property alleged to be part of the estate of the decedent but claimed by some other person
to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent, but by title
adverse to that of the decedent and the latter's estate.
As to petitioners' argument that respondents' cause of action, if any, is against the

estate of Corazon and not against them, the CA pronounced that Corazon died without issue,
leaving her collateral relatives, respondents herein, as heirs to her estate
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in not dismissing the cases for specific performance for lack
of cause of action.
RULING
Petitioners cited Rules 86 and 87 of the Rules of Court in the grounds of their Petition
in support of their claim that respondents should have filed their claim against Corazon's
estate. In the discussion portion, Rules 86 and 87 were not even mentioned. Rule 86 is on
515 of 578
Case Digests
"Claims Against the Estate," Rule 87 is on "Actions by and against Executors and
Administrators," while Rule 73 is on "Venue and Process" of the "Settlement of Estates of
Deceased Persons." There being no discussion in the Petition of the specific application of
Rules 73, 86 and 87 in the present cases, the Court will not argue for them and only consider
petitioners' argument in relation to Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 89.
Petitioners argue that the actions for specific performance should be filed against the
estate of Corazon because they were not privies to the contracts entered into by Corazon and
that whatever actions for the execution of deeds of conveyance over real property which the
decedent contracted prior to his or her death, or held in trust should be pursued in
accordance with Sections 8 and 9, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court.
Section 9 of Rule 89 finds no application in these cases inasmuch as the subject

properties located in Centro I, Bunay and Poblacion were not held in trust by Corazon for
respondents or any other person. Respondents have not even alleged any trust arrangement
in any of the three Amended Complaints.
Section 8, Rule 89 presupposes a pending probate or administration proceeding for

the testate or intestate estate of a decedent. The heirs of Corazon have not initiated a special
proceeding for the settlement of her estate where an administrator has been appointed.
Without such special proceeding, respondents are not required to make an application to
authorize the administrator to convey the subject properties according to the contracts that
Corazon entered into but was unable to execute due to her death.
The Court agrees with the CA that petitioners' invocation of Section 8, Rule 89 is
misplaced because that section presupposes that there is no controversy as to the contract
contemplated therein, and if objections obtain, the remedy of the person seeking the
execution of the contract is an ordinary and separate action to compel the same. This is so
given that, as correctly observed by the CA, subject to settled exceptions not present in the
instant three cases, the law does not extend the jurisdiction of a probate court to the
determination of questions of ownership, and similarly, a court of administration
proceedings cannot determine questions which arise as to the ownership of property alleged
to be part of the decedent's estate, but claimed by some other person to be his or her
property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent, but by title adverse to
that of the decedent and the latter's estate. The institution by respondents of the actions for
specific performance was thus the proper recourse because petitioners dispute the validity
of the conveyances over the contested properties.
516 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TEODORO ANSANO Y CALLEJA

G.R. No. 232455, December 02, 2020, First Division, (CAGUIOA, J.)
DOCTRINE
To reiterate, the totality of circumstances test requires the Court to look at the following
factors in weighing the reliability of the out-of-court identification: (1) the witness' opportunity
to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time;
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the length of time between
the crime and the identification; (5) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
FACTS
The complaining witness is AAA, 15 years old. She testified that she filed this case of
rape against accused Teodoro Ansano, whom she pointed to and identified in open court. She
stated that she did not know him at first, but when she went to the Municipal Building, she
came to know him because of his niece who is her friend.
On April 6, 2005, at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, she was going to fetch her
father. Accused Ansano was then carrying a bolo, wearing a long-sleeved shirt and long pants
used in the farm; Ansano poked his bolo at her and told her to go with him to the falls near
the Narra tree. Because she was afraid and he threatened to kill her if she does not go with
him, she went along. He then removed his clothes, undressed her, laid her down, kissed her
neck and placed his penis into her mouth.
Thereafter, accused inserted his penis into her vagina. It was painful. Accused rested
for a while, and then did it again. Thereafter, accused put on his clothes and directed her to
remain lying down until he left the place. He also told her not to tell anyone about the incident
because he knew her and her parents, he knew what time she went to church, what time she
went to bed and that she was always with her cousin.
At home, her mother asked her why she was crying and she told her that she was
raped. Her father reported the incident to the police station.
She came to know the name and identity of the accused on March 19, 2006 at 8:00
o'clock in the evening, when she saw him in their house having a drinking spree with her
father. She was able to recognize him ("namumukhaan"); he has a scar and "butil-butil" on
his face; he has a moustache and "medyo singkit". She came to know his name for the first
time when she went to the XXX Municipal Hall, where accused was detained because of the
case filed by BBB. She was shown a picture of the accused, which she examined clearly, and
she was sure that he was the one who raped her.
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted Ansano of the crime
charged. It convinced by the testimony of AAA identifying Ansano as the one who sexually
abused her. It found such testimony to be clear, consistent, spontaneous, and unrelenting,
517 of 578
Case Digests
thus establishing that it was Ansano who sexually abused her on April 6, 2005. The RTC
likewise found her testimony to be corroborated through the testimony of the medico-legal
who conducted a medical examination on AAA.
Thus, as between her credible testimony and Ansano's bare denial, the RTC ruled that
the evidence at hand established Ansano's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting the accused-appellant.
RULING
YES. The Court acquitted Ansano on the ground of reasonable doubt. The problem
with eyewitness testimony is that the human mind is not just limited in terms of perception,
but that human memory is also highly susceptible to suggestion. Hence, the jurisprudence
on the matter, like Biggers and Brathwaite, dealt with the propriety of police procedures
employed to arrive at the identification of the accused. The rule that was thereafter adopted
was that "convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial
identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic
identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." It was explained that
"suggestive confrontations are disapproved because they increase the likelihood of
misidentification, and unnecessarily suggestive ones are condemned for the further reason
that the increased chance of misidentification is gratuitous."
The totality of circumstances test requires the Court to look at the following factors
in weighing the reliability of the out-of-court identification: (1) the witness' opportunity to
view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time;
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the length of time between
the crime and the identification; (5) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
The first two factors are opportunity to view, and degree of attention. the Court
recognizes that the witness had a good opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the
crime, given that they spent considerable time together during the commission of the crime.
The witness also said that the crime happened around 5:00 in the afternoon, thus the lighting
conditions were well enough for her to see the face of her assailant. As well, it could be said
that AAA had a high degree of attention, especially on the identity of her assailant, during
this time as they were the only people in the crime scene.
The third factor is the accuracy of any prior description. AAA's description of her
attacker was general and related mostly to, not her assailant's physical features, but what he
was wearing at the time of the crime. In her direct testimony, the only descriptions that she
gave were that: "[h]e is taller than I am; he was carrying a bolo; he was wearing a long-sleeved
518 of 578
Case Digests
shirt; he was wearing long pants he used in the farm, sir.” These were her only descriptions of
her assailant as she was narrating the rape incident. The description that her assailant had a
scar on his face and that it had "butil-butil" came after, when she saw Ansano on March 19,
2006. More importantly, however, the records show that the additional description did not
match Ansano.
The fourth factor is the length of time between the crime and the identification. The
totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration of the length of time between the
crime and the identification made by the witness. 'It is by now a well-established fact that
people are less accurate and complete in their eyewitness accounts after a long retention
interval than after a short one.' Ideally then, a prosecution witness must identify the suspect
immediately after the incident. In the present case, there was, more or less, one year between
the time the crime was committed to the time of the identification.
The last two factors are the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification, and the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. The Court notes that
AAA did not show a high level of certainty in her initial identification of Ansano.
The foregoing testimony, apart from being an indication of AAA's level of uncertainty as to
her identification of Ansano, is more importantly an indication that the identification was
marred by improper suggestion.
The same thing can be said about AAA's identification of Ansano in this case. That she
was shown only one photograph, when considered with the other factual circumstances of
this case, only leads to the logical conclusion that the identification might have been marred
by improper suggestions.
519 of 578
Case Digests
ATTY. ALDO P. TURIANO v. TASK FORCE ABONO, FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE (FIO)
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 222998, December 09, 2020, First Division, (CAGUIOA, J.)
DOCTRINE
A question of law is one that does not call for the examination of the probative value of
the evidence presented by any of the litigants, or the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. It
concerns with the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The test to
determine whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such
question by the party raising the same. Instead, it is whether the appellate court can determine
the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of
law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.
FACTS
In 2004, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued a Special
Allotment Release Order with corresponding Notice of Cash Allocation for the
implementation of the Farm Inputs and Farm Implements Program (FIFIP) of the
Department of Agriculture (DA). The City of Iriga, Camarines Sur (Iriga City), then received
a P3,000,000.00 sub-allotment fund.
The Pre-qualification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) of Iriga City, chaired by
Atty. Aldo Turiano, held a meeting upon the request of the City Agriculturist Edwin Lapuz
(Lapuz) for the immediate purchase of fertilizers. The PBAC members approved the
immediate purchase of the fertilizers on the basis of a Certificate of Emergency Purchase that
was supposedly presented by Lapuz. On the same day, Iriga City purchased, through
negotiated sale, 789 liters/bottles of "Young Magic Foliar Fertilizer" from Madarca Trading
(Madarca) at P3,800.00 per liter/bottle, or for a total of P2,998,200.00.
On April 19, 2011, respondent Task Force Abono of the Field Investigation Office of
the Ombudsman filed a complaint charging Turiano, the PBAC members, and other local
government officials involved in the procurement of the fertilizers with various criminal and
administrative offenses.
The complaint alleged that: (a) the procurement procedure adopted by Iriga City was
designed to favor Madarca; (b) Iriga City did not conduct any public bidding or canvassing of
price for the said emergency purchase; (c) the purchase request accomplished and approved
by the late Mayor Emmanuel R. Alfelor (Alfelor) specified the fertilizer brand to be purchased
in violation of R.A. No. 9184; (d) the retail price for "Young Magic Foliar Fertilizer" at the
time of the procurement was only P125.00 per liter; (e) Iriga City failed to submit the
certificate of emergency purchase, invitation to bid, proof of posting, proof of canvass and
PBAC resolution of award; (f) Iriga City chose Madarca as its supplier despite its doubtful
eligibility; (g) the transaction between Iriga City and Madarca had already transpired even
before the latter submitted documents to prove its eligibility; and (h) therein respondents
conspired with each other in defrauding the government.
520 of 578
Case Digests
The Ombudsman found Turiano, Lapuz, and Aida V. Estonido (Estonido), the City
Accountant, administratively liable for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and meted them the penalty of dismissal from
service with the corresponding accessory penalties.
Aggrieved, Turiano appealed the ruling of the Ombudsman with the CA. However, the
CA denied the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE
Whether the Petition should be dismissed in accordance with Section 5, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, for raising questions of facts.
RULING
NO. Indeed, the Court is not a trier of facts. And in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, generally, only questions of law can be
raised. A question of law is one that does not call for the examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented by any of the litigants, or the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. It
concerns with the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The test to
determine whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such
question by the party raising the same. Instead, it is whether the appellate court can
determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is
a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.
Here, an examination of the Petition shows that it does not exclusively raise questions
of facts. It also challenges the legal conclusions arrived at by the Ombudsman and the court
a quo with respect to the observance of due process, the finding of conspiracy, and Turiano's
exercise of diligence and prudence, in light not only of the established facts, but also of the
prevailing law and jurisprudence on these matters. These are questions of law which the
Court has jurisdiction to entertain.
521 of 578
Case Digests
MARIO M. MADERA, BEVERLY C. MANANGUITE, CARISSA D. GALING, AND JOSEFINA O.

PELO vs COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) AND COA REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VIII,
G.R. No. 190207. June 30, 2021, Third Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Rule 65 applies to petitions questioning the judgments, final orders, or resolutions of the
COA only insofar as Rule 64 does not specifically provide the rules. Consequently, since Rule 64
explicitly provides the 30-day period for the filing of the petition, the same shall apply — not
the 60-day period provided in Rule 65.
FACTS
In December 2013, the Municipality of Mondragon, Northern Samar (the
Municipality) passed and approved Sangguniang Bayan (SB) Ordinance No. 08, and SB
Resolution Nos. 41, 42, 43, and 48, all series of 2013, granting various allowances to its
officials and employees. These allowances are: 1) Economic Crisis Assistance (ECA), 2)
Monetary Augmentation of Municipal Agency (MAMA), 3) Agricultural Crisis Assistance
(ACA), and 4) Mitigation Allowance to Municipal Employees (MAME).
On post audit, the Audit Team Leader (ATL) and the Supervising Auditor (SA) of the
Municipality issued a total of 11 Notices of Disallowance (NDs) for the grant of the ECA,
MAMA, ACA and MAME.
The ATL and SA disallowed the subject allowances on the ground that the grants were
in violation of the following: a) Section 12 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6758 or the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL)as regards the consolidation of allowances and compensation; b)
Item II of COA Circular No. 2013-003 dated January 30, 2013 which excluded the subject
allowances among the list of authorized allowances, incentives, and benefits; c) Items 4 and
5 of Section 1.a of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution No. 02- 0790 dated June 5,
2002, which provides that employees under contract or job order do not enjoy the benefits
enjoyed by the government employees
Petitioners filed their appeal with the COA Regional Director (RD). They argued that
the grant of additional allowances to the employees is allowed by R.A. 7160 or the Local
Government Code (LGC); hence, the LGC actually repealed Section 12 of R.A. 6758 because
the former law allows the municipality to grant additional allowances/financial assistance
should its finances allow.
Additionally, petitioners contended that the grant of additional allowances/financial
assistance in the Municipality was a customary scheme over the years. They also claimed
that the allowances were considered as financial assistance to the employees who suffered
the effects of Typhoon Yolanda.
Moreover, the RD ruled that petitioners cannot hide behind the claim that the grant
of such benefits was a customary scheme of the Municipality because practice, no matter
how long continued, cannot give rise to any vested right if it is contrary to law.
Lastly, petitioners cannot claim that the subject allowances were given as financial
assistance to the employees because good intention, no matter how noble, cannot be made
an excuse for not adhering to the rules.
522 of 578
Case Digests
The COA opined that, following applicable rules, the approving officer and each
employee who received the disallowed benefit or allowance are obligated, jointly and
severally, to refund the amount received.
ISSUE
Whether or not Rule 65 is applicable in the case
RULING
Rule 65 applies to petitions questioning the judgments, final orders, or resolutions of
the COA only insofar as Rule 64 does not specifically provide the rules. Consequently, since
Rule 64 explicitly provides the 30-day period for the filing of the petition, the same shall
apply — not the 60-day period provided in Rule 65 the same shall apply — not the 60-day
period provided in Rule 65. To recall, the COA Decision was promulgated on December 27,
2017 and petitioners received a copy of the Decision on February 23, 2018. Thus, the 30-day
period began to run from February 23, 2018. However, following Section 3, Rule 64 the
period was interrupted when petitioners filed an MR on February 28, 2018. Petitioners
received a copy of the Resolution denying their MR on November 12, 2018. Consequently,
they had 25 days from November 12, or until December 7, 2018 to file their petition before
the Court. However, petitioners only filed their petition on January 11, 2019 or 35 days after
the last day of filing.
From the foregoing, there is no dispute that petitioners belatedly filed their petition
before the Court. Nevertheless, the petition appears to be partly meritorious. Time and again,
the Court has relaxed the observance of procedural rules to advance substantial justice.
Moreover, the present petition provides an appropriate avenue for the Court to settle the
conflicting jurisprudence on the liability for the refund of disallowed allowances. Thus, the
Court opts for a liberal application of the procedural rules considering that the substantial
merits of the case warrant its review by the Court.
523 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. XXX

DOCTRINE
The elements of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 are the following: (1) the
offender has carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force,
threat, or intimidation, or when the victim is deprived of reason or unconscious, or when the
victim is under 12 years old.
In the instance case, considering that AAA is a mental retardate and Ms. De Guzman
determined that her mental age is equivalent to that of an eight-year-old child, the accused-
appellant should be guilty of the crime of Statutory Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d),
and not paragraph 1(b) of the RPC as held by the CA.
Based on recent jurisprudence, that if a mentally retarded or intellectually disabled
person whose mental age is less than 12 years old is raped, the rape is considered committed
under paragraph 1 (d), and not paragraph I (b) of Article 266-A of the RPC.
Thus, although AAA was already 23 years old at the time of the rape incidents, since it
was established that AAA is a mental retardate, and her mental age is equivalent to that of an
eight-year-old child, the accused-appellant should be held liable for Statutory Rape under
Article 266-A, paragraph l(d) of the RPC.
FACTS
At the time of the rape incidents, AAA, the 23-year-old victim, suffers from epilepsy
and mild mental retardation. Her highest educational attainment is Grade Six.
Sometime in February 2004, AAA’s siblings were out of the house when accused-
appellant XXX, told AAA: "para gumaling ang epilepsy mo, may gagawin Zang ako sa iyo." AAA
was perplexed and unwilling. However, the accused-appellant undressed her, took off his
own clothes, and inserted his penis inside her vagina while they were on a wooden bed.
The second rape incident happened sometime in July 2004 when XXX employed the
same pretext that AAA would be cured of her epilepsy once she allowed XXX to do something
to her. Inside the kitchen, XXX forcibly inserted his penis inside AAA’s vagina.
GGG, sister of AAA, also testified that around October 2004, she noticed that AAA’s
belly and hips started to become bigger. Upon a pregnancy test conducted, GGG was shocked
to discover that AAA was actually pregnant. When she asked AAA who sexually abused her,
AAA intimated that it was XXX who raped her saying that her illness would be cured if she
would “nagpagalaw” or in her own words: “inasawa”
XXX was charged with two counts of Qualified Rape.
XXX vehemently denied the charges against him, averring that he was working at
Cabiao, Nueva Ecija at the time of the incident, thus it was impossible for him to commit the
524 of 578
Case Digests
crimes imputed against him. Moreover, XXX moved that he and the child, BBB, should
undertake DNA Examination. The motion was granted by the Regional Trial Court(RTC) and
biological samples were taken of AAA and BBB inside the chambers and in the presence of
the RTC judge as witnessed by counsels of both parties. The prosecution presented PCI Dela
Torre who identified before the RTC the DNA Laboratory Report, she personally prepared
concluding that : “the DNA profile obtained from BBB is consistent with that of an offspring of
accused XXX.” PCI Dela Torre attested that it can be certain that XXX is the father of BBB.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found XXX guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two(2)
counts of Rape under Article 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The RTC held that
while paternity is not an element of the crime of Rape, the fact that the child born by AAA is
an offspring of XXX, bolstered by the fact of sexual congress between XXX and AAA,
sufficiently proves all elements of the crime of Rape.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC Decision and ruled that rape of a mental
retardate falls under paragraph 1 (b), not paragraph 1 (d), of Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as the same precisely refers to rape of a female "deprived of reason.
ISSUE
Did the CA correctly affirm the conviction of XXX?
RULING
YES. but considering that AAA is a mental retardate and Ms. De Guzman determined
that her mental age is equivalent to that of an eight-year-old child, XXX should be guilty of
the crime of Statutory Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d), and not paragraph 1(b) of
the RPC as held by the CA.
Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8353, provides:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. -Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d. When the offended party is udner twelve(12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present
xxxx
Article 266-B. Penalty.— x x x
xxxx
525 of 578
Case Digests
The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed

with any of the following aggravating or qualifying circumstances:
xxxx
10. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder
and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission
of the crime.
The elements of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 are the following: (1) the
offender has carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through
force, threat, or intimidation, or when the victim is deprived of reason or unconscious, or
when the victim is under 12 years old.
In the instance case, considering that AAA is a mental retardate and Ms. De Guzman
determined that her mental age is equivalent to that of an eight-year-old child, the accused-
appellant should be guilty of the crime of Statutory Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph
1(d), and not paragraph 1(b) of the RPC as held by the CA.
Based on recent jurisprudence, that if a mentally retarded or intellectually disabled
person whose mental age is less than 12 years old is raped, the rape is considered committed
under paragraph 1 (d), and not paragraph I (b) of Article 266-A of the RPC.
Here, as shown in the Psychological Report submitted, AAA was found to be suffering
from mild mental retardation with an IQ of 54. Her mental age equivalent to that of an eight-
year-old child. Further, AAA also suffers from a type of physiological disorder diagnosed as
Epilepsy, which hampers her intellectual, emotional and social adjustments.
Thus, although AAA was already 23 years old at the time of the rape incidents, since
it was established that AAA is a mental retardate, and her mental age is equivalent to that of
an eight-year-old child, the accused-appellant should be held liable for Statutory Rape under
Article 266-A, paragraph l(d) of the RPC.
Further, under Article 266-B, paragraph 10 of the RPC, the rape shall be qualified
"when the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical
handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime." Being in the
nature of a qualifying circumstance, this should be specifically alleged in the Information.
In this case, the Informations filed against the accused-appellant specifically alleged
this qualifying circumstance. This, in turn, was proved by the accused-appellant's own
admission in court. Thus, the accused-appellant should be convicted of Qualified Statutory
Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph l(d) of the RPC.
More importantly, the DNA examination conducted by PCI Dela Torre established that
XXX is the father of the child of AAA. While it is true that paternity is not an essential element
to prove the fact of rape, proof of paternity of a rape victim's child establishes the fact that
the accused-appellant, who is a biological match with the victim's child, had carnal
knowledge of the victim, which is an element of rape when it is done against the latter's will
and without her consent.
Under the Rules on DNA Evidence, if the value of the probability of paternity is 99.9%
or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity. Disputable presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence.
526 of 578
Case Digests
Based on the result of the DNA examination, the accused-appellant is disputably

presumed to be the father of AAA' s child. The DNA examination results revealed that “the
DNA obtained from BBB is consistent with that of an offspring of XXX and AAA”
All told, the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
Qualified Statutory Rape.
527 of 578
Case Digests
SPOUSES LITO AND LYDIA TUMON vs. RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. 243999, March 18, 2021, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINES
For a court to decide on the propriety of issuing a TRO and/or a WPI, it must only inquire
into the existence of two things: (1) a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and
(2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Under A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, a TRO/WPI may be issued if the debtor pays the mortgagee the legal
interest required interest on the principal obligation as stated in the application for foreclosure
sale, which shall be updated monthly.
FACTS
Sometime in or before September 2014, Spouses Tumon applied for a loan with
Radiowealth Finance Company, Inc. to finance their tokwa business. Radiowealth granted
them a loan in the total amount of P2,811,456.00, to be paid within 4 years. However, they
received only P1,500,000.00 after a processing fee/documentation expense of P100,000.00
and interest of P1,311,456.00 were charged by Radiowealth; the loan was secured by a real
estate mortgage constituted upon their real property covered by TCT No. 009-2010000083.
They paid the monthly amortizations amounting to P58,572.00 starting November

30, 2014, P27,322.00 or 87% of which went to Radiowealth as interest payment; the 87%
monthly interest rate is unconscionable, unreasonable, exorbitant and immoral; the
imposition of the 87% monthly interest is against the law; prior to and after the transaction,
Radiowealth did not furnish them a copy of a finance statement, in violation of the "Truth in
Lending Act"; as a result of the lack of a finance statement, petitioners did not immediately
realize that they were going to pay 87% in monthly interest and they did not know that they
were going to shoulder the P100,000.00 processing fee/documentation expense. They were
also not furnished with a copy of the Real Estate Mortgage and Promissory Note.
Subsequently, the spouses suffered losses due to intense market competition and
they failed to pay their monthly amortizations. The 11 monthly amortizations they paid from
November 2014 to September 2015 totaled P644,292.00. Representatives of Radiowealth
came to their residence and threatened that if they failed to pay 2 consecutive amortizations,
Radiowealth would have the right to take over their house, the property subject of the
mortgage
The spouses asked Radiowealth to lower the monthly amortization and to extend the
payment period, which they were promised; however, representatives of Radiowealth asked
petitioners to sign a Deed of Sale under Pacto de Retro instead. They allege that Radiowealth
defrauded them and took advantage of their ignorance of the law, low educational
attainment and dire need of funding; thus, for lack of consent and the presence of fraud, the
loan documents and the promissory note they signed are void ab initio.
528 of 578
Case Digests
Based on the above allegations, the spouses filed a Complaint for Nullification of
Mortgage Documents, Promissory Note, and Damages against Radiowealth Finance
Company, Inc.
Radiowealth filed before the Executive Judge of the RTC an Application for
Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage against the spouses’ property, stating that
the outstanding balance on the loan is P2,044,338.10, exclusive of penalty and other charges.
A Notice of Extrajudicial Foreclosure was issued, setting the public auction for April 26, 2016.
On April 11, 2016, the spouses filed with the RTC an Application for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or WPI to restrain Radiowealth and any person
acting in its behalf from foreclosing and selling their real property.
RTC - denied the spouses’ application for WPI

- The spouses did not deny their indebtedness with Radiowealth and initially did not
question the terms and conditions of the loan and they only started questioning the
amount of monthly amortization and the allegedly unconscionable interest when they
suffered business losses and they no longer had the ability to pay the monthly
amortizations.
Aggrieved, they filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the WPI and their Partial Motion for
Reconsideration.
CA - dismissed the petition for lack of merit, ruling that the RTC's orders refusing to issue
the WPI were not tainted with grave abuse of discretion
ISSUES
Whether or not it is proper to dismiss Spouses Tumon’s application for WPI?
RULING
YES. Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides the grounds for the issuance of
a preliminary injunction. This provision was explained in Borlongan v Banco de Oro as
follows:
"it is clear that a writ of preliminary injunction is warranted where there is a
showing that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which
the writ is to be directed violate an established right. Otherwise stated, for a
court to decide on the propriety of issuing a TRO and/or a WPI, it must only
inquire into the existence of two things: (1) a clear and unmistakable right that
must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage."
529 of 578
Case Digests
In addition to these requirements, the issuance of a WPI in the context of a judicial or

an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage requires compliance with the additional
rules in A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, as amended.
Rule 2 clearly states that, as a rule, no TRO/WPI shall be issued against the
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage on the allegation that the interest on the
loan is unconscionable. However, a TRO/WPI may be issued if the debtor pays the mortgagee
the 12% required interest on the principal obligation as stated in the application for
foreclosure sale, which shall be updated monthly. Digressing a bit, it should be noted that
when these guidelines were issued in 2007, the legal rate of interest was still twelve percent
per annum (12% p.a.). Pursuant to Circular No. 799, Series of 2013, which became effective
on July 1, 2013, the legal interest rate is now only six percent per annum (6% p.a.).
Accordingly, to be entitled to a TRO/WPI under Rule 2 of A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, as

amended, petitioners were required to pay at least 6% p.a. interest on the principal
obligation as stated in the application for foreclosure sale. However, there was no showing
that petitioners had complied with this requirement upon filing the application for
TRO/WPI.
To justify the issuance of WPI in their favor, it is incumbent upon petitioners to

positively show their clear and unmistakable right to be protected. Pertinently, Lerias v Court
of Appeals states that: "For the writ of preliminary injunction to issue, the applicant must
show a clear legal right to be protected. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of
the writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion."
It is also important to highlight that Rule 2 clearly conveys that the obligation to pay
at least the legal rate of interest to the mortgagee is reckoned from the time the applicant
asks for the issuance of a TRO/WPI, which obligation shall continue while the case is still
pending. Thus, any previous payments made by the applicant — or any "overpayment,"
assuming that the legal rate of interest is applied on the loan — shall not be deemed as
fulfillment of the condition to pay interest under Rule 2 of A.M. No. 99-10-05-0.
530 of 578
Case Digests
MARWIN B. RAYA and SHIELA C. BORROMEO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 237798, May 05, 2021 (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act." This is what is otherwise known as the right against double jeopardy.
The finality-of-acquittal doctrine, of course, is not without exception. The finality-of-

acquittal doctrine does not apply when the prosecution - the sovereign people, as represented
by the State - was denied a fair opportunity to be heard. Simply put, the doctrine does not apply
when the prosecution was denied its day in court - or simply, denied due process.
At the outset, it is important to point out that the Court agrees with the CA at least to
the extent that it held that the RTC should not have granted Raya and Borromeo's Demurrer.
Therefore, even if the RTC clearly erred in acquitting Raya and Borromeo by granting their
Demurrer, the CA could not, and should not have, granted the petition for certiorari for this was
in violation of their right against double jeopardy.
The grave abuses of discretion alleged by the People in its petition for certiorari
constituted, in reality, mere errors of judgment or misapprehension of evidence which do not
justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari. Ultimately, the CA erred in granting the petition for
certiorari and reinstating the proceedings against Raya and Borromeo.
FACTS
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by the petitioners Raya
and Borromeo assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which reversed
the of RTC Marikina, granting the demurrer to evidence filed by Raya and Borromeo.
The present case stemmed from an Amended Information filed against Raya and
Borromeo charging them with Qualified Trafficking in Persons.
In this case, after the prosecution rested its case, the defense filed a Motion for Leave
to File Attached Demurrer to evidence with attached Demurrer to Evidence. The RTC then
issued a Resolution granting the Demurrer on the ground that based on its assessment, the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were plagued with inconsistencies.
Disagreeing with the RTC, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA granted the petition for Certiorari and reversed
the acquittal made by the RTC.
The CA ruled that the RTC placed too much importance on inconsequential
inconsistencies - particularly in the conduct of surveillance prior to the actual entrapment
operation - which did not have anything to do with the elements of the crime. The CA pointed
531 of 578
Case Digests
out, however, that CCC admitted in her testimony that she was a prostitute, and that Raya
and Borromeo "pimped her to at least three customers per night, four nights a week, for
Pl,200.00 of which, she is given PS00.00."
The CA thus declared null and void the RTC’s Resolution granting the Demurrer, and
ordered the case reinstated for continuation of the proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in reversing Raya and Borromeo’s acquittal.
RULING
YES. Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act." This is what is otherwise known as the right against double
jeopardy.
The finality-of-acquittal doctrine, of course, is not without exception. The finality-of-

acquittal doctrine does not apply when the prosecution - the sovereign people, as
represented by the State - was denied a fair opportunity to be heard. Simply put, the doctrine
does not apply when the prosecution was denied its day in court - or simply, denied due
process.
At the outset, it is important to point out that the Court agrees with the CA at least to
the extent that it held that the RTC should not have granted Raya and Borromeo's Demurrer.
Therefore, even if the RTC clearly erred in acquitting Raya and Borromeo by granting their
Demurrer, the CA could not, and should not have, granted the petition for certiorari for this
was in violation of their right against double jeopardy.
The grave abuses of discretion alleged by the People in its petition for certiorari
constituted, in reality, mere errors of judgment or misapprehension of evidence which do
not justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari. Ultimately, the CA erred in granting the
petition for certiorari and reinstating the proceedings against Raya and Borromeo.
While the Court regrets that the wheels of justice were abruptly stopped by the grant
of the Demurrer, the Court is constrained to uphold, as it affirmatively does, the primacy of
the Constitutional rights of the two accused in this case.
532 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GABRIEL CAMPUGAN CABRIOLE.

G.R. No. 248418, May 5, 2021 (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
To underscore, this Court has already recognized the validity of pre-arranged signals as
a method of communicating the completion of a buy-bust transaction between the poseur-
buyer and the seller. Simply put, the giving of a pre-arranged signal is a form of communication
that the operation was successful, necessitating accused- appellant's subsequent arrest.
Marking of the seized dangerous drugs is the first and most crucial step in proving an
unbroken chain of custody in drug-related prosecutions. While marking is not mentioned in
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, the importance of immediate and proper marking of
the confiscated items has been affirmed in the Court’s string of cases.
Moreover, as shown by the prosecution, the police officers sufficiently complied with the
chain of custody rule, and they were able to preserve the identity, integrity, and evidentiary
value of the seized items subject of Criminal Case No. 2016-6623 for violation of Section 11 of
R.A. No. 9165, as amended.
FACTS
Accused-appellant Gabriel Campugan Cabriole and accused Daniel Gumanit Abad
alias Timoy were charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
In a briefing, PO1 Dofio was designated as poseur-buyer, P/Supt. Lami-ing gave him
a 500-peso bill with serial number EX265351 as buy-bust money which was recorded in the
police blotter.
A confidential agent would accompany PO1 Dono. It was agreed that the pre-arranged
signal would be the removal of his sunglasses.
In the place of the operation, POI Dofio gave the 500-peso bill to Daniel who in turn
gave it to accused- appellant as payment for one sachet of shabu. Accused-appellant handed
over the shabu to Daniel who in turn handed it over to POI Dofio.
Upon receiving the shabu, PO1 Dofio removed the sunglasses, the pre-arranged signal
for consummation of the sale ofdrugs. Immediately, the other police officers came in and
pursued Daniel and accused-appellant. Accused- appellant was arrested but Daniel got away.
PO3 Javier searched accused- appellant and found in his lower middle pocket three (3)
plastic sachets believed to contain shabu, a 500-peso bill with Serial Number EX265351, and
aluminum foil strips.
PO3 Javier conducted the inventory in the presence of accused- appellant, Rita
Endrina of Monitor Today, and Barangay Kagawad Judith Ratilla. PO3 Pensinabes took the
pictures. Thereafter, the witnesses signed the inventory, and accused-appellant was placed
under arrest and informed of his constitutional rights.
533 of 578
Case Digests
After the inventory, PO3 Javier took custody of the seized plastic sachets and went
back to the police station with the rest of the team.
There, PO3 Javier prepared a Memorandum requesting for a laboratory examination

of the seized plastic sachets containing suspected illegal drugs. The sachets were then
transmitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory which was received by PCI Esber. The laboratory
examination revealed that the said plastic schets seized from accused-appellant all yieleded
the presence of shabu.
The RTC found accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged, which in turn was
affirmed by the CA.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the removal of the poseur-buyer’s sunglasses is a reasonable
ground to make a valid warrantless arrest.
(2) Whether or not the CA erred in affirming accused-appellant’s conviction for
violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. 9165.
RULING
1.YES. To underscore, this Court has already recognized the validity of pre-arranged
signals as a method of communicating the completion of a buy-bust transaction between the
poseur-buyer and the seller. Simply put, the giving of a pre-arranged signal is a form of
communication that the operation was successful, necessitating accused- appellant's
subsequent arrest.
This Court acknowledges that in most buy-bust operations, only the poseur-buyer
and the confidential informant would be able to witness the actual sale of dangerous drugs.
As a result, even if the back-up law enforcement officers did not have a full ocular
view of the exchange, they could still make an arrest once the pre-arranged signal has been
communicated to them.
Consequently, any search resulting from a lawful warrantless arrest is also valid
because an accused committed a crime in flagrante delicto, that is, the person to be arrested
committed a crime in the presence of the arresting officers or the poseur-buyer.
2.
a. The Court acquits accused appellant for conviction of Sec. 5 of RA 9165,
as amended.
Marking of the seized dangerous drugs is the first and most crucial step in proving an
unbroken chain of custody in drug-related prosecutions. While marking is not mentioned in
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, the importance of immediate and proper marking
of the confiscated items has been affirmed in the Court’s string of cases.
534 of 578
Case Digests
Notably, the prosecution offered no reasonable explanation as to why the seized item
allegedly sold to POl Dofio was not immediately marked following its seizure. PO1 Dono even
admitted that he did not know he needed to mark the item he brought from accused-
appellant.
Thus, for the reasons mentioned above and with the integrity and evidentiary value
of the corpus delicti of the crime subject of the sale having been rendered compromised, it
necessarily follows that accused-appellant must be acquitted on the ground of reasonable
doubt for violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended.
b. The Court affirms the conviction of the accused-appellant for violation of

Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended.
The police officers were justified in arresting accused- appellant as he had just
committed a crime when he sold shabu to PO I Dofio and the confidential informant. Given
the legality of accused-appellant's warrantless arrest, the subsequent warrantless search
that resulted in the recovery of three plastic sachets of shabu found in his right lower middle
pocket is also valid.
Moreover, as shown by the prosecution, the police officers sufficiently complied with
the chain of custody rule, and they were able to preserve the identity, integrity, and
evidentiary value of the seized items subject of Criminal Case No. 2016-6623 for violation of
Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended.
535 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CAMILO CAMENFORTE and ROBERT LASTRILLA.

G.R. No. 220916, June 14, 2021, First Division (CAGUIOA, J.)
DOCTRINE
Prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which must precede the criminal
action, that which requires a decision before a final judgment is rendered in the principal action
with which said question is closely connected. Not all previous questions are prejudicial,
although all prejudicial questions are necessarily previous.
FACTS
The facts in brief show that the present controversy involves a sale of several parcels
of land owned by Aurora Granda in her lifetime. The spouses Aurora and Rafael Granda had
10 children, among them Silvina Granda, their youngest. On December 7, 1985, Sps. Granda
entered into three sale transactions with Necita Uy, Elsa Uy, Andres Uy, Tinong Uy, Rosa Uy
and Mary Uy-Cua (Uy siblings) and Lastrilla, covering several parcels of land.
Nearly 15 years after the execution of the Deeds of Sale, the first and second Deeds of
Sale (involving the properties covered by TCT Nos. T-1312, T-816 and T-249) were
annotated on the dorsal portion of their respective TCTs. As a result, TCT Nos. T-1312, T-816
and T-249 were cancelled, and TCT Nos. T-6696, T-54400 and T-54401 were issued in the
names of the respective vendees. Rafael and Aurora died in June 1989 and on September 16,
2000, respectively.
Five months after Aurora's death, Rafael A. Granda, the grandson and a legal heir of
Sps. Granda, filed a complaint for violation of Articles 171 and 172 of the RPC against Silvina,
respondent Camenforte, Norma Lastrilla, Mary Uy-Cua, Necita Uy, Elsa Uy, Andres Uy, Tinong
Uy and Rosa Uy. Private complainant Rafael claimed that a month after his grandmother
Aurora's death, he discovered that all of his grandparents' properties in Tacloban were
fraudulently sold to different vendees sometime in 1999-2000. He alleged that after
obtaining copies of the three Deeds of Sale, he observed that the signatures of his
grandparents were falsified, and that the same observation was confirmed by the PNP-Crime
Lab, which concluded that the signatures of his deceased grandfather and namesake Rafael
in the Deeds and the signature specimens "were not written by one hand and the same
person."
In their counter-affidavit, the Uy siblings submitted that they validly bought the
subject properties for a total consideration of Pl8,800,000.00, and that it was private
complainant Rafael who unjustly enriched himself when he received a portion of the
purchase price as heirs of Sps. Granda.
The Office of the City Prosecution of Tacloban subsequently filed criminal

informations against respondent Camenforte and Silvina for conspiring to falsify the subject
536 of 578
Case Digests
Deeds, but it dismissed the complaint in so far as respondent Lastrilla and the Uy siblings
were concerned.
While the criminal cases against Silvina and respondents were pending, Benjamin R.
Granda and Blanquita R. Serafica, children of Sps. Granda, filed a Complaint for Nullification
of Title and Deeds with Damages dated August 21, 2001 against the Uy siblings, Silvina and
Lastrilla before RTC. Benjamin and Blanquita alleged that they are the legal and compulsory
heirs of Sps. Granda, who in their lifetime owned the subject properties which were sold
through the three subject deeds. Similar with Rafael's submission in the earlier criminal
cases, Benjamin and Blanquita alleged that the subject Deeds were falsified and were null
and void. They submit that as a consequence of the nullity of the subject Deeds, the subject
properties should be reconveyed to Sps. Granda, as represented by them as the heirs.
On June 6, 2005, RTC-Branch 9 rendered its Decision dismissing the complaint in Civil
Case No. 2001-09-135. Benjamin and Blanquita interposed an appeal before the CA which
dismissed the same. An Entry of Judgment was thereafter issued.
ISSUES
Whether or not whether the instituted criminal cases are already barred by res
judicata.
RULING
NO, but barred by operation of the doctrine of a prejudicial question.
Although Criminal Case Nos. 2008-03-109 to 111 and 2001-07-482 to 484 are not barred
by res judicata, the innocence of respondents has nevertheless already been conclusively
found in the prejudicial factual finding made by a court of competent jurisdiction of the
genuineness of the signatures in question in Civil Case No. 2001-09-135. The continued
prosecution of the pending criminal cases is therefore barred by operation of the doctrine of
a prejudicial question.
Res judicata
Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." It rises from the underlying idea that parties
should not be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, and that a right or fact
that has already been judicially determined by a competent court should be conclusive as to
the parties.
The doctrine of res judicata remains inapplicable in the instant cases since there is no
identity of parties and cause of action. If the parties in the two separate actions are not
completely identical, res judicata may not lie.
Doctrine of Prejudicial Question

Prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which must precede the criminal
action, that which requires a decision before a final judgment is rendered in the principal
537 of 578
Case Digests
action with which said question is closely connected. Not all previous questions
are prejudicial, although all prejudicial questions are necessarily previous.
Chiefly, the doctrine of a prejudicial question serves the following purposes: (i) to
avoid multiplicity of suits; (ii) avoid unnecessary litigation; (iii) avoid conflicting decisions;
(iv) safeguard the rights of the accused; and (v) unclog the courts' dockets. It is worth noting,
however, that with the current Rules, as amended, the procedure provides that the criminal
case is the action that must be suspended to give way to the civil case in the event of a
prejudicial question.
Given the foregoing, the Court finds that although the facts of this case involve a
criminal action which preceded the institution of the civil action, a prejudicial question
nevertheless exists because a survey of the jurisprudential appreciation and application of
the doctrine of a prejudicial question demonstrably shows that the strict sequence of
institution of the two actions as provided for by Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure is more directory than mandatory, and must give way to the chief
litmus test of whether the two actions involve prejudicial issues and facts that are similar or
otherwise intimately related so that a resolution in one concludes the resolution in the other.
In sum, the prejudicial factual finding of genuineness of Sps. Granda's signatures on

the questioned Deeds of Sale in Civil Case No. 2001-09-135 must operate to bar the
prosecution of respondents for the falsification of the same signatures on the same
questioned Deeds of Sale. This is the heart of the doctrine of a prejudicial question, without
the appreciation of which the application of said doctrine may never come to be.
538 of 578
Case Digests
JUNEL ALASKA v. SPO2 GIL M. GARCIA, PO3 ROMY P. GALICIA and PO2 RUZEL S.
BRIONES
DOCTRINE
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the
wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative
liability. An action for each can proceed independently of the others.
FACTS
A robbery with homicide occurred at the Petron Gasoline Station in Palawan. An
employee working at the gasoline station sent messages to the cellphone number allegedly
in the possession of the culprits. Through the exchanges, the police officers were able to
locate the suspects. The police officers caught Alaska while talking on a cellphone with the
employee; they confirmed this from the call register of the cellphone, which they seized.
Alaska and Montesa were brought to the police station where witnesses supposedly
identified them as two of the men who robbed the gasoline station. They were brought to the
prosecutor for inquest proceedings, but they opted for preliminary investigation. Alaska and
Montesa were charged with Robbery with Homicide before the RTC. Prior to arraignment,
they filed an Omnibus Motion to Judicially Determine Probable Cause, Quash the Information
and Quash the Arrest Warrant arguing that their warrantless arrests were unlawful and that
there was no probable cause for the filing of the information.
In the meantime, Alaska and Montesa filed a Complaint-Affidavit for Misconduct

against the police officers before the Ombudsman. They also filed a Joint Complaint-Affidavit
for Arbitrary Detention before the same office.
The Ombudsman dismissed both the administrative case and the criminal case for
Arbitrary Detention saying that the crux of the complaints was the legality of Alaska's and
Montesa's warrantless arrests, which should be raised before the trial court prior to entering
their plea on arraignment. Since the criminal case for Robbery with Homicide was already
pending before the RTC, the legality of the arrest should be questioned before said court and
not by filing counter-charges for Arbitrary Detention and Misconduct. Furthermore, the
Ombudsman cited Section 20 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770 in saying that since Alaska and
Montesa had an adequate remedy before the RTC, it would then no longer conduct the
investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of in order not to preempt
the decision of the court.
Alaska and Montesa then assailed the Ombudsman’s findings through a petition for
review before the CA under Rule 43.
539 of 578
Case Digests
The RTC resolved Alaska and Montesa’s Omnibus Motion. It found that the
prosecution was not able to present sufficient evidence warranting the arrest, indictment,
and prosecution of Alaska and Montesa.
Subsequently, the CA dismissed Alaska and Montesa’s petition against the

Ombudsman’s findings. It ruled that resort to Rule 43 of the Rules of Court was erroneous as
the correct remedy was a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. It also held that Alaska and
Montesa had failed to raise any objection to the irregularity of their arrest before
arraignment and had therefore waived any defect therein, including the filing of an
administrative complaint.
ISSUE/S
1. Whether Alaska and Montesa availed of the proper remedy in assailing the
Ombudsman’s Resolution and Order.
2. Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the premise that Alaska and
Montesa raised no objections to their arrest prior to arraignment.
3. Whether questioning the legality of the arrest before the RTC bars the filing of
administrative and criminal cases with the Ombudsman
RULING
1. NO. The remedy against the Ombudsman's decisions in criminal cases is to file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before this Court. In this case, the Ombudsman's
decisions in both the criminal and administrative cases were assailed through a petition for
review under Rule 43 filed with the CA, clearly in contravention of the aforementioned rules.
However, if a strict and rigid application thereof would tend to obstruct and frustrate rather
than promote substantive justice, the Court may relax the same, in light of the prevailing
circumstances of the case.
Here, the Court finds that there are incidents which merit a relaxation of the rules.
Among these are: (a) the CA, despite acknowledging the erroneous remedy availed of by
Alaska and Montesa, proceeded to decide the case on the merits; (b) in its appreciation of the
merits of the case, the CA made conclusions which had no basis whatsoever in the facts and
antecedents of the case; and (c) there are serious indications, not only of unlawful arrest but
also of fabrication of evidence by respondents, which the CA and the Ombudsman refused to
tackle without proper legal basis. For these reasons, the Court resolves to take cognizance of
this case, lest a miscarriage of justice be allowed to occur.
2. YES. That Alaska timely and properly assailed the validity of his arrest through an
Omnibus Motion, which was heard and decided by the RTC in Alaska's favor, is clear from
the records. This fact is even admitted by respondents. Even the Ombudsman acknowledged
540 of 578
Case Digests
this in its Joint Order which Alaska assailed before the CA. Hence, there is simply no basis
whatsoever for the foregoing findings of the CA.
Even assuming that Alaska failed to question the validity of his arrest before the RTC,
the CA still grievously erred in holding that such a failure would have precluded the filing of
administrative and criminal charges against errant public officers.
3. NO. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6770 provides:
Section 20. Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the
necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes
that:
(1) The complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-
judicial body; xxx
Having the opportunity to raise objections against the legality of one's arrest is not
the "adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body" adverted to in Section 20 of
R.A. No. 6770. This is so because the supposed relief afforded by one recourse is not the same
as that afforded by the other. Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule,
which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil,
criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently of the
others.
The criminal case previously pending before the RTC against Alaska and Montesa, on
the one hand, was separate and distinct from the criminal case for Arbitrary Detention and
the administrative case for Misconduct against herein respondents, on the other hand. In the
former, what the RTC was tasked to resolve was whether Alaska and Montesa were guilty of
committing the crime of Robbery with Homicide corresponding to the incident at the Petron
Gasoline Station in Palawan. In the latter, the Ombudsman was tasked to determine whether
there was probable cause to file an Information for Arbitrary Detention against respondents,
or substantial evidence Misconduct, due to the arrest and detention purportedly without
legal ground.
For the Ombudsman, the purpose is determination of probable cause to file an

Information or to penalize for Misconduct. For the RTC, the purpose is to determine whether
it had properly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of Alaska and Montesa as therein
accused, and whether it was proper to quash the Information filed against them. The proper
course of action for the Ombudsman, therefore, was not to wash its hands clean of the cases
for Misconduct and Arbitrary Detention by dismissing the same, but to suspend the
proceedings before it pending the RTC's resolution of the Omnibus Motion.
Given the difference in nature and purpose of the criminal proceedings for Robbery
with Homicide against Alaska and Montesa, and the proceedings against respondents for the
purportedly illegal arrest, Section 20 (1) of R.A. No. 6770 cannot be invoked to validate the
541 of 578
Case Digests
discretionary dismissal by the Ombudsman of the charges of Arbitrary Detention and

Misconduct. The "adequate remedy" referred to in Section 20 (1) of R.A. No. 6770 can only
be construed as referring to, where proper, recourse to other proceedings or tribunals
whereby the erring official who committed the act or omission complained of may also be
made administratively liable. In other words, this refers to a situation where the
Ombudsman has concurrent administrative jurisdiction over the said act or omission.
Furthermore, upholding the Ombudsman's stance would wreak havoc upon the
criminal justice system. Precluding victims of illegal warrantless arrests from filing criminal
charges against the unscrupulous officers who arrested them, on the ground that their only
recourse is with the trial court before which their very own criminal cases are pending,
would prevent any prosecution of Arbitrary Detention from ever occurring, let alone
prospering. Needless to say, this would frustrate the law prohibiting such illegal arrests, and
the Court cannot support such an interpretation.
542 of 578
Case Digests
NORMAN ALFRED F. LAZARO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

DOCTRINE
When an accused files a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, the trial court is mandated to deny the motion and give the prosecution
an opportunity to amend the information.
FACTS
Galindez, a friend of Lazaro, purportedly jumped from the 26th floor of the
Renaissance 2000 Condominum to his untimely death. At the time of the incident, Galindez
was in the presence of Lazaro and a common friend of theirs, Escalona.
Galindez’s father filed a criminal complaint for Giving Assistance to Suicide against
Lazaro and Escalona. An information was then filed against Lazaro and Escalona before the
RTC. Escalona filed a Motion to Quash alleging that the facts charged in the Information do
not constitute an offense. The motion was granted by the RTC, the dispositive portion of
which, states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Quash is hereby GRANTED on

the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Accordingly, the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Pasig City is hereby directed to file an Amended Information in
the instant case within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
The OCP Pasig filed a Motion for Leave to admit the amended information 17 days
after the receipt of the RTC’s Order. The information dropped Escalona from the charges.
Lazaro filed a Motion to Expunge.
The OCP Pasig filed a Motion for Clarification pointing out that the dispositive portion
of the RTC’s Order contained contradictory statements, i.e., granting Escalona's Motion to
Quash, while at the same time giving the prosecution an opportunity to correct the defect in
the Information. Lazaro again filed a Motion to Expunge in opposition to this Motion for
Clarification, on the ground that the RTC's Order had already become final and immutable.
The RTC clarified that its intention is not really to order the quashal of the
information, but to give the prosecution an opportunity to correct the defect by way of an
amendment pursuant to Section 4, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It
then amended its dispositive portion to reflect its true intention.
Lazaro argued that the RTC's Order granting Escalona's Motion to Quash had already
become final and immutable when the prosecution did not file an Amended Information ten
days from receipt of said Order. Hence, it can no longer be amended or clarified by the RTC.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s revision of its earlier order.
543 of 578
Case Digests
ISSUE
Whether the CA committed a serious reversible error when it affirmed the RTC’s
modification/revision of its earlier Order.
RULING
NO. The Court is aware of the doctrine that where there is a conflict between the
dispositive portion or fallo of a decision and the opinion of the court contained in the body
of the decision, the fallo will prevail. However, this rule is not without exception. Where the
inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was a
mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail.
In People v. Andrade, the Court said: If the defect in the information is curable by
amendment, the motion to quash shall be denied and the prosecution shall be ordered
to file an amended information. Generally, the fact that the allegations in the information
do not constitute an offense, or that the information does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form, are defects curable by amendment. Corollary to this rule, the court should
give the prosecution an opportunity to amend the information.
In People v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that, “When a motion to quash is filed
challenging the validity and sufficiency of an Information, and the defect may be cured by
amendment, courts must deny the motion to quash and order the prosecution to file an
amended Information. Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure of an Information
to charge facts constituting an offense is one that may be corrected by an amendment.
In such instances, courts are mandated not to automatically quash the Information;
rather, it should grant the prosecution the opportunity to cure the defect through an
amendment.”
In sum, when an accused files a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense, the trial court is mandated to deny the motion and give the
prosecution an opportunity to amend the information.
The RTC, based solely on the vagueness of the fallo of its Order, cannot be presumed
to have dismissed the case in direct contravention of the foregoing provisions of the Rules
and relevant jurisprudence. This is especially so given the unequivocal language of the body
of its Order. The conclusion that must be made, therefore, is that the RTC never dismissed
the case against Lazaro and Escalona; hence, no such dismissal could have become final and
immutable. On this point, the CA is undeniably correct.
Necessarily, also, the CA was not in error when it upheld the RTC's First Assailed
Order (granting the prosecution's Motion for Clarification). As aptly observed by the CA, it
was well within the RTC's discretion to clarify the Order, the latter not being a dismissal of
the criminal case. Finding that there was an irreconcilable contradiction in the fallo of the
Order, the RTC merely exercised its inherent power to amend and control its processes and
544 of 578
Case Digests
orders to make the same conformable to law and justice, recognized in Section 5, Rule 135
of the Rules of Court.
Similarly, the Court agrees with the CA that the RTC was not in error when it allowed
the amendment of the information despite the belated filing by the prosecution of its
Compliance/Motion to Admit Amended Information. Section 11, Rule 11 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 11. Extension of time to plead. — Upon motion and on such terms as may be just,
the court may extend the time to plead provided in these Rules.
The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading to be filed after
the time fixed by these Rules.
It must immediately be noted that the Rules do not prescribe a period for filing an
amended information by the prosecution when so ordered by the trial court in response to
a motion to quash. In this case, the ten-day period was set by the RTC in its discretion.
Indeed, the RTC could also validly set a shorter or longer period within reason, in the sound
exercise of its discretion. All the more should the RTC be empowered to allow or admit the
amended information despite being filed beyond the period it initially fixed in its Order.
Courts are not precluded, in the sound exercise of their discretion, to subscribe to a
liberal construction of the rules where substantial justice may be served thereby, and where
no undue injury would be suffered by any party.
545 of 578
Case Digests
OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MELVIN T. VILLACORTA

DOCTRINE
Technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. Rule 50,
Section 1 (e) of the Rules expressly uses the permissive term "may" to emphasize that while
compliance with the prescribed periods is mandatory, the rules should not be construed so
strictly as to defeat the ends of justice.
FACTS
Melvin and Janufi were sweethearts but ended their relationship in 2000. They
reconciled afterwards. In April of 2001, Melvin learned that Janufi was already one month
pregnant which made him surprised because they had sexual intercourse only in March of
2001. Janufi gave birth to Mejan Dia on December 1, 2001. In 2004, Melvin and Janufi finally
got married.
Melvin took a DNA Parentage Examination. The results revealed that there was a
0.0% probability that Melvin was the father of Mejan Dia. He filed a petition for annulment
of marriage before the RTC.
The RTC annulled the marriage and held that Janufi fraudulently concealed to Melvin
that she slept with another man before her marriage and that it resulted in her pregnancy by
said man. The OSG appealed to the CA. On December 17, 2018, the OSG received a notice to
file its appellate brief within 45 days or until January 31, 2019. On January 30, 2019, the OSG
filed a motion for extension to file said brief.
The CA dismissed the OSG's appeal for failure to file appellate brief within a
reasonable period.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that it timely filed and served, by
registered mail, its motion for extension of time to file appellate brief on January 30, 2019 or
within the 45-day period. This was "x x x evidenced by OSG Registered Mail Bill Registry
Letter Nos. RE025331895ZZ, RE027141228ZZ, and RE027141231ZZ x x x" and a letter-
request sent to the Cebu City Central Post Office for a certification as to the disposition of the
mail containing its motion for extension. In said motion for extension, the OSG prayed for an
additional period of 90 days or until May 1, 2019 within which to file its appellate brief.
On April 30, 2019, the OSG filed and served its brief by registered mail. It also filed an
advanced copy of said brief via LBC, a private courier, which the CA received on May 2, 2019.
In its September 20, 2019 Resolution, the CA denied the OSG's motion for
reconsideration because it considered the brief, which was filed on May 2, 2019, as having
been filed out of time.
546 of 578
Case Digests
The OSG thus filed the instant Petition claiming that the CA erred in dismissing its
appeal on the ground that it failed to file its appellate brief within a reasonable period.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the OSG's appeal.
RULING
YES. When a pleading or motion is filed by registered mail, the date of the mailing, as
shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be considered
as the date of their filing in court. Although the OSG argues that it timely filed its motion for
extension on January 30, 2019, the Court finds that the evidence offered to prove the same
falls short of that required under Rule 13, Section 12:
SEC. 12. Proof of filing. — The filing of a pleading or paper shall be proved by its
existence in the record of the case. If it is not in the record, but is claimed to have been filed
personally, the filing shall be proved by the written or stamped acknowledgment of its filing by
the clerk of court on a copy of the same; if filed by registered mail, by the registry receipt and
by the affidavit of the person who did the mailing, containing a full statement of the date and
place of depositing the mail in the post office in a sealed envelope addressed to the court, with
postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender
after ten (10) days if not delivered. (n)
Rather than submitting the registry receipt and the affidavit required under the
foregoing section, the OSG submitted a 1) self-serving list prepared by its document
management division purportedly containing registry numbers, but without any legible
mark that it was indeed received by the post office on the day indicated, and 2) a letter-
request for certification sent to the Cebu City Central Post Office, but without the actual
certification that the motion was received on January 30, 2019 and delivered to the CA.
Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial justice, the Court finds it reasonable to

consider the OSG's motion for extension as timely filed, especially considering that, contrary
to the CA's September 20, 2019 Resolution, the OSG had timely filed its appellate brief within
the extended period requested.
Notably, the CA categorically stated that it received the OSG's appellate brief on May
2, 2019. As correctly argued by the OSG, Rule 22, Section 1 of the Rules holds that if the last
day of a period falls on a legal holiday, the time shall not run until the next working day. Since
May 1, 2019, the last day of the extended period requested was a legal holiday, the
reglementary period did not run until May 2, 2019. As such, the appellate brief sent by
private courier and received by the CA on May 2, 2019 was timely filed.
The Court takes this opportunity to remind the CA that technical rules of procedure
should be used to promote, not frustrate justice. Rule 50, Section 1 (e) of the Rules expressly
uses the permissive term "may" to emphasize that while compliance with the prescribed
547 of 578
Case Digests
periods is mandatory, the rules should not be construed so strictly as to defeat the ends of
justice. This is especially true in the instant case, considering that the RTC manifestly erred
in annulling Melvin and Janufi's marriage on the basis of Article 45 (3) in relation to Article
46 (2) of the Family Code.
548 of 578
Case Digests
HEIRS OF HENRY LEUNG, represented by his widow, MARILYN LEUNG v. HEIRS OF

MIGUEL MADIO, represented by EDDIE MADIO
DOCTRINE
As a rule, judgments are sufficiently served when they are delivered personally, or
through registered mail to the counsel of record, or by leaving them in his office with his clerk
or with a person having charge thereof. After service, a judgment or order which is not appealed
nor made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the prescribed 15-day period attains
finality. As applied to the instant case, without a valid service of the July 13, 1967 Order to
Madio, the same may not be considered to have become final and executory. More specifically,
the period to appeal or file a motion for reconsideration could not be deemed to have
commenced.
FACTS
An award was issued by the Director of Lands in favor of Henry Leung over a property
in Baguio City. Four years later, protestants Miguel Madio and others sought cancellation of
the award before the Bureau of Lands. Upon investigation, the Bureau of Lands found that
the property did have improvements introduced by protestants. The District Land Officer of
Baguio City forwarded the case to the Regional Land Office of Dagupan City for decision.
At the heart of this longstanding dispute was the Order dated July 13, 1967 (July
13, 1967 Order) by RLO-Dagupan Regional Director which dropped the protest and
claims of the protestants.
13 years after the 1967 Order, Madio filed another petition before the DENR for
reopening of case on the ground of his preferential right to acquire the subject property. The
DENR rendered a decision for Madio. The DENR found that there was no showing that Madio
actually received the 1967 Order and the same therefore did not become final and executory.
Leung appealed before the OP, which in turn dismissed the same.
The CA affirmed the OP and held that because no valid service of the July 13, 1967
Order of the Regional Land Director of Dagupan City was made upon respondent, the period
to appeal the same did not prescribe and the said issuance, therefore, had never attained
finality. Thus, the DENR Secretary was not divested of its power to review, reverse and
modify the same.
ISSUE
Whether the 1967 Order became final and executory despite its non-service to Madio.
RULING
NO. The July 13, 1967 Order did not become final and executory, on the ground of
non-service to Madio. Sections 9 and 10, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court on service of
judgments, orders, and decisions find particular relevance, to wit:
549 of 578
Case Digests
SEC. 9. Service of Judgments, Final Orders or Resolutions. Judgments, final orders or

resolutions shall be served either personally or by registered mail. When a party summoned by
publication has failed to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions against
him shall be served upon him also by publication at the expense of the prevailing party.
SEC. 10. Completeness of Service. - Persona! service is complete upon actual delivery.
Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless
the court otherwise provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the
addressee, or after five (5) days from the date he received the first notice of the postmaster,
whichever date is earlier.
As consistently found by the DENR and the OP, the records provide no proof that
proper service of the July 13, 1967 Order was ever made to Madio.
There being no valid service of the Order, the Order of July 13, 1967 has not become
final and executory and, therefore, the period to appeal and/or to file a motion for
reconsideration did not commence to run. Accordingly, the Order of Execution also is bereft
of legal and factual basis.
As a rule, judgments are sufficiently served when they are delivered personally, or
through registered mail to the counsel of record, or by leaving them in his office with his
clerk or with a person having charge thereof. After service, a judgment or order which is not
appealed nor made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the prescribed 15-day
period attains finality.
As applied to the instant case, without a valid service of the July 13, 1967 Order to
Madio, the same may not be considered to have become final and executory. More
specifically, the period to appeal or file a motion for reconsideration could not be deemed to
have commenced. Still consequently, the same was still reviewable, as it was in fact reviewed,
by the DENR Secretary.
550 of 578
Case Digests
DENNIS OLIVER CASTRONUEVO LUNA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 231902, June 30, 2021, First Division (CAGUIOA, J)
DOCTRINE
The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" in Sec. 21, Art. II of RA No. 9165
means that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to
be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension.
FACTS
The prosecution testified that PNP received an information concerning Peter Angeles
and his group are engaged in drug trafficking activities. A surveillance was conducted, and
the police decided to conduct a buy-bust operation.
Around 2pm in the afternoon, a certain “Sexy”, known as negotiator of Peter Angeles,
called the mobile number of the confidential informant and discussed the details regarding
the delivery of shabu at Kowloon house located at West Avenue, Quezon City. A police was
designated as poseur-buyer and disguised as “Mike.” At around 4:30 pm, Sexy called and told
them to proceed to Hap Chan restaurant and look for a silver-colored Toyota Revo. Sexy
instructed them to give the money to the driver and take the drugs found thereat. The buy-
bust team proceeded and instantly saw the subject vehicle. Mike walked towards the vehicle
and saw the driver to whom he asked where "Sexy" is. The driver asked the poseur-buyer if
he was Mike to which the latter answered in the affirmative. The driver told Mike to get the
blue bag at the back seat and leave the money there as instructed by "Sexy." Mike open the
bag and saw 6 brown envelopes containing a suspected shabu. He immediately gave the
signal and the buy-bust team apprehended the driver.
The defense denied the allegations as well as the ownership or knowledge of the
confiscated shabu. He stated that the car is owned by Susan Lagman and he is only a driver.
He also happened to drive several times for a certain "Sexy," who carried a handbag and
papers kept inside a brown envelope in all times. He averred that on the day of the incident,
he and sexy went to Icebergs and upon arrival, "Sexy" disembarked and went inside the
restaurant while he parked the vehicle and waited for "Sexy" until noon. When "Sexy" came
out of the restaurant, she directed him to drive towards Sandiganbayan along
Commonwealth Avenue. It was already 3pm when Sexy told him to proceed to Hap Chan
along Quezon Avenue by himself. Sexy instructed her that if "Mike," whom she was supposed
to meet, will arrive early at Hap Chan, he will have to tell "Mike" to get the bag at the rear
passenger's seat and if "Mike" has something to leave for "Sexy," he will just have to leave it
at the back of the Toyota Revo.
RTC convicted the petitioner. CA affirmed. The appellate court ruled that since
petitioner Luna was driving the vehicle where the bag was retrieved, he constructively
possessed the alleged packs of drug specimen. Further, the CA held that the chain of custody
rule was observed by the authorities despite failure of the police to strictly comply with the
procedure on the custody and handling of seized drugs under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
9165.
ISSUE
551 of 578
Case Digests
1) Whether Petitioner should be held criminally liable despite lack of intent to penetrate the
prohibited act.
2) Whether the chain of custody rule was observed.
RULING
1) NO. It is well-settled that criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution of
acts mala prohibita. But if he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature
of things, the crime itself, then he can be held liable for the malum prohibitum. In other
words, intent to commit the crime is not necessary, but intent to perpetrate the act
prohibited by the special law must be shown. Despite the offense of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs being malum prohibitum, this, however, does not lessen the prosecution's
burden because it is still required to show that the prohibited act was intentional.
The critical element of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs is the
element of intent to possess or animus possidendi. In criminal cases involving prohibited
drugs, there can be no conviction unless the prosecution shows that the accused knowingly,
freely, intentionally, and consciously possessed the prohibited articles in his person, or that
animus possidendi is shown to be present together with his possession or control of such
article. Stated differently, the concept of possession contemplated under Section 11 of R.A.
No. 9165 goes beyond mere actual and physical possession of the drug specimen. Otherwise,
an unsuspecting person who is victimized by the planting of evidence will be unjustly
prosecuted based on the sheer fact that illegal drugs were found to be in his possession. It
must be proven that the person in whose possession the drug specimen was found knew that
he/she was possessing illegal drugs.
Therefore, to prosecute an accused for illegally possessing illegal drugs, it is not
enough to show that the accused knowingly and intentionally possessed the bag or
receptacle that contained illegal drugs. The prosecution must go beyond and provide
evidence that the accused knowingly, freely, consciously, and intentionally possessed illegal
drugs.
In this case, there is a reasonable doubt t as to whether petitioner Luna possessed the
bag with any knowledge, consciousness, and awareness that the said bag contained the
allegedly seized packs of drug. He testified that he is engaged in a lawful livelihood as a driver
and on the day of the buy-bust he was engaged by Lagman to drive for her client, an unknown
woman with the alias Sexy. The testimony of petitioner Luna establishes that the bag
retrieved from the vehicle during the buy-bust operation did not come from and was not
owned by petitioner Luna. Neither has it been indubitably established that the said bag and
its contents were under the effective control and dominion of petitioner Luna. Also, the
prosecution unequivocally admitted that the Toyota Revo is registered under the name of a
certain Carol Bulacan and not petitioner Luna hence it cannot be presumed that things which
a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him.
2) NO. Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 requires that (1) the seized items be
inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) the physical
inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her
552 of 578
Case Digests
representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media,
and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required
to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The phrase "immediately after
seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs
were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of apprehension.
In the instant case, the inventory and marking of the evidence allegedly retrieved
were not done immediately after the seizure of the packs of drug specimen at the area
where the buy-bust operation was conducted. It was testified by the prosecution witness
that after the apprehension of petitioner Luna, the team proceeded to its office for proper
investigation and disposition. It also admits that there were no representatives from the
media, the DOJ, and an elected official who witnessed the inventory and marking of the
evidence seized.
553 of 578
Case Digests
GOLDEN BORACAY REALTY v. ANTONIO PELAYO

DOCTRINE
Section 8, Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a necessary party as "one who is
not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded as
to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of
the action." Necessary parties are those whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole
controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made in their
absence without affecting them, as in Gloria's case.
Jurisprudence instructs that the nonjoinder of an indispensable party is not a ground for
the dismissal of an action, as the remedy in such case is to implead the party claimed to be
indispensable, considering that parties may be added by order of the court, either on motion of
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action.
FACTS
The property in controversy is a portion of Lot 18 located in Manoc manoc, Malay,
Aklan which is identified in the Commissioners' Sketch Plan as Lot 18-A and Lot 18-B
(disputed lots).
Based on the evidence on record, the disputed [lots were] originally part of a big tract
of land consisting of 96,771 square meters which was initially owned by Calixto Pelayo
(Calixto), the father of Respondent Antonio (Antonio) and defendant Gloria Pelayo-Manong
(Gloria).
On April 21, 1976, Calixto sold the entire land to his children, dividing the whole
property into two and allocating the eastern side to Antonio and the western side to Gloria.
Gloria conveyed various portions of her property on four (4) separate occasions:
1) On September 30, 1982, she sold to Angelito Manuel (Manuel) 2,000 square
meters of her land in consideration of P10,000; -- On [uly 2, 1992, Manuel sold
to GBRI the 2,000-square meter portion he purchased from Gloria, in
consideration of [PI00,000.00].
2) On March 17, 1984, she renounced her interest over 1,000 square meters
of her property in favor of Luvisminda Diaz Mayr;
3) On June 20, 1991, she sold 40,000 square meters to defendant appellee
[GBRI] for the price of 2,000,000; and
4) On July 1, 1996, she sold to GBRI the assailed property (Lot No. 18-A)
consisting of 18,560 square meters for the price of 1,500,000.
On February 7, 2003, defendants-appellees Joseph Pelayo, John Pelayo, and Jamar

Pelayo (Pelayo brothers), together with their now deceased father Jorge Pelayo (Jorge),
executed a Waiver of Rights in favor of GBRI wherein they assigned and conveyed all their
554 of 578
Case Digests
rights, title and interest and participation over the property they were occupying in
consideration of P2,000,000.00. The property stated in the Waiver is designated as Lot No. 7
but in the Commissioners' Sketch Plan, the same is identified as Lot 18-B. [Lot 18-B is the
other disputed lot.
On July 9, 2003, Antonio filed before the RTC the present Complaint for "Annulment
of Documents, Ownership, Possession, Demolition of Improvements and Damages"
(Complaint) against Gloria and the defendants-appellees alleging that he is the declared
owner of the disputed lots under ARP/TD No. 1984/1985 but through fraudulent means,
Gloria was able to secure a tax declaration in her name which she then used to sell [Lot 18-
A] to GBRI. Since Lot 18-A does not belong to Gloria but to him, he averred that the Deed of
Sale should be annulled. Likewise, he maintained that the Waiver of Rights executed by the
Pelayo brothers [ and Jorge] should be annulled or cancelled since Lot 18-B also forms part
of the parcel of land sold to him by his father, Calixto. With respect to defendant-appellee
Esteban Tajanlangit (Tajanlangit), Antonio impleaded him as party defendant since the
former was the representative of GBRI in the Waiver of Rights wherein Tajanlangit bound
himself in a personal capacity to provide the relocation site for the Pelayo brothers.
On [August 26, 2003], Gloria filed her Answer with Motion to Dismiss and
Counterclaim. She asserted that what she sold to GBRI was her own land, albeit undervalued
by GBRI in the Deed [of Sale]. In his Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim,
Tajanlangit averred that Antonio had no cause of action against him since he was merely a
representative and agent of GBRI who is the real party in interest in the assailed Waiver of
Rights.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, GBRI maintained the validity of the sale covering
Lot 18-A, arguing that it was an innocent purchaser for value. With respect to the Waiver of
Rights executed by the Pelayo brothers [ and Jorge], G BRI claimed that such Waiver
concerned a different parcel of land separate from the property sold by Gloria.
The RTC gave the parties 30 days to discuss an amicable settlement and submit a
compromise agreement. And on April 15, 2005, Antonio filed a Manifestation and Motion
averring that during the conference between him and his sister Gloria, the latter made some
clarifications and declarations to the effect that the land claimed by him is not included in
the land she sold to GBRI particularly Lot 18-A as identified in the Commissioners' Sketch
Plan. With the foregoing assertions of Gloria, Antonio manifested that there was no more
need to implead the former as a defendant and consequently prayed for the court to drop
Gloria as party defendant. The RTC resolved to drop Gloria as a party defendant considering
her manifestation in open court that she has no more claim over the property claimed by
Antonio. There being no amicable settlement among the remaining parties, the RTC
proceeded.
GBRI filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Third Party Complaint against Gloria, in
view of the dropping of the latter as party defendant. GBRI argued that it is entitled to
555 of 578
Case Digests
reimbursement for the purchase price it paid to Gloria in the event the case would be
adjudged in favor of Antonio. This was denied. Trial on merits thereafter ensued.
The Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the trial court’s finding that plaintiff failed to
present preponderant evidence that the lots in question Lot 18-A and Lot 18-B belong to him
and that defendant GBRI was in bad faith when it bought these lots from [Gloria].
Hence the present Petition.
ISSUE
Whether Gloria is an indispensable party.
RULING
NO. Gloria could no longer be considered an indispensable party since she has lost
her interest in the said disputed lot. Gloria's presence in this case is only necessary such that
her non-inclusion herein would not prevent Antonio's complaint from prospering against
GBRJ as the buyer of Lot 18-A.
The CA did not err in reversing the Complaint's dismissal by the RTC given the fact
that Antonio's dropping of Gloria as a defendant was not fatal to the Complaint as she is not
an indispensable party whose absence in the case will result in the mandatory dismissal of
the case.
Section 8, Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defines a necessary party as "one who
is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be accorded
as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject
of the action." Necessary parties are those whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the
whole controversy, but whose interests are so far separable that a final decree can be made
in their absence without affecting them, as in Gloria's case.
As the CA also correctly observed, even on the assumption that Gloria may be
considered an indispensable party, jurisprudence instructs that the nonjoinder of an
indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, as the remedy in such case
is to implead the party claimed to be indispensable, considering that parties may be added
by order of the court, either on motion of party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action.
Given the foregoing, the CA was correct in ruling that the RTC "gravely erred in
dismissing Antonio's complaint based on [the] ground" 21 that Gloria is an indispensable
party and dropping her as a party, upon Antonio's initiative, results in the dismissal of his
complaint against GBRl.
556 of 578
Case Digests
PEOPLE v. AZURIN
G.R. No. 249322, September 14, 2021, First Division (Caguioa, J.)
DOCTRINE
The Sandiganbayan Rules prevail over the Rules as it is a later set of rules and a special
statute specifically providing for modes of review of judgments and final orders of the
Sandiganbayan.
FACTS
The Sandiganbayan in its Decision and Resolution found accused-appellant Juvenal
Azurin y Blanquera (Azurin) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Grave Threats
under Article 282, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Azurin filed an Appeal
pursuant to Section I (a), Rule XI of the 2018 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan
(Sandiganbayan Rules).
ISSUE
Whether Azurin availed of the correct mode of appeal from the Sandiganbayan to the
Court.
RULING
YES. The proper mode of appeal from the Sandiganbayan 's judgment of conviction in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court is via a Notice of Appeal
pursuant to the Sandiganbayan Rules. This is pursuant to Section I(a), Rule XI of the
Sandiganbayan Rules
Legal provisions vary as to the mode of appeal of criminal cases decided by the
Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Under the Sandiganbayan Rules, it
is by notice of appeal filed with the Sandiganbayan while under the Rules and P.D. 1606, it is
by petition for review on certiorari filed with the Court. Azurin took the former mode while
the People argues it should be the latter.
This issue is not novel as it was already settled in the case of People v. Talaue (Talaue)
involving similar procedural facts as the present case. Applying Talaue to the present case,
the mode of appeal taken by Azurin of filing a notice of appeal with the Sandiganbayan
pursuant to the Sandiganbayan Rules was proper. The Sandiganbayan Rules prevail over the
Rules as it is a later set of rules and a special statute specifically providing for modes of
review of judgments and final orders of the Sandiganbayan. It is a basic canon of statutory
construction that a special law prevails over a general law. As it is, the Sandiganbayan Rules
effectively amended the relevant provisions of the Rules and the latter apply only in a
suppletory manner. Neither may the People insist that P.D. 1606, as it provides for the
functional and structural organization of the Sandiganbayan, applies and could not have
been amended by the Sandiganbayan Rules. Talaue instructs that the procedural rules
provided in P.D. 1606 cannot prevail over those provided in the Sandiganbayan Rules by the
557 of 578
Case Digests
Court, which has the exclusive constitutional power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure.
558 of 578

Ponencias of J. Caguioa in REMEDIAL LAW 2022

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Ponencias of J. Caguioa in REMEDIAL LAW 2022

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Case Digests

Ponencias of J. Caguioa in Remedial Law

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS

REPUBLIC v. CAPITAL RESOURCES CORPORATION

As to the provision of the 1973 Constitution proscribing corporations from acquiring

by subdivision submitted by defendants-appellants wherein the area already consumed by

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ANTONIO DACANAY y TUMALABCAB

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v POTENCIANO A. LARRAZABAL, SR., VICTORIA

AMA LAND, INC., v WACK WACK RESIDENTS' ASSOCIATION, INC.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, v ALFREDO R. DE BORJA

2. NO. In a demurrer to evidence, however, it is premature to speak of

Specifically, the inquiry in this case is confined to resolving whether petitioner

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ROQUE DAYADAY y DAGOOC

PRUDENTIAL BANK (now BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS) v RONALD RAPANOT

SUSAN A. YAP v ELIZABETH LAGTAPON

residing in a place owned by Liberato Reyes on February 16, 1998 is immaterial in

SPOUSES MARCELIAN TAPAYAN and ALICE TAPAYAN, v PONCEDA M.

amount of P1,114,879.55, which represents the amount paid by Respondent to DBP to

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

SAN FRANCISCO INN vs. SAN PABLO CITY WATER DISTRICT

In 1977, the respondent [SPCWD] promulgated the Rules Governing Groundwater

Furthermore, the CA's reliance on the El Niño phenomenon in 1997-1998, which

VICTORIA SEGOVIA vs. THE CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION

Philippine Ports Authority v. Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services,

A preliminary injunction is in the nature of an ancillary remedy to preserve the status

Instead of formally executing a written contract, NIASSI requested PPA to issue a

PPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, followed by a Supplemental Motion which

Respondents Chairperson Teresita Herbosa and SEC filed their Consolidated

Furthermore, as opined by Justice Bersamin during the deliberations, the doctrine of

Jona Bumatay v. Lolita Bumatay

1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of

Sumifru (Philippines) Corp v. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo Sa Suyapa Farm

As defined, substantial evidence is “that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable

In this regard, The Court in Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW v. Court of

respective fields. Thus, absent any showing of whimsical or capricious exercise of

As defined, substantial evidence is “that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable

People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Raytos Espino

AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents’ Association, Inc. (WWRAI)

A commercial and residential building project located at Epifanio Delos Santos

A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which is adjunct to a

(b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or

People v. Gerola y Amar

Also the SC ruled, that a witness’ testimony contains inconsistencies or discrepancies

Petitioner Valmores is a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Chirch whose

Hence, the present Petition.

MSU is an Higher Educational Institution (HEI) created by legislative charter under

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. RUBEN “ROBIN” BONGBONGA Y NALOS

A medical examination conducted on AAA revealed deep healed lacerations in AAA’s

It is well-settled that a conviction for a crime not sufficiently alleged in the

The Rules impose restrictions in the amendment of an information to safeguard the

Privatization and Management Office v. Edgardo V. Quesada, Ma. Grace

CEPALCO supplied power to the ferro-alloy smelting plant of Ferrochrome

San Fernando Coca-Cola Rank-and-File Union, represented by its President, Alfredo

CCBPI issued notices of termination to 27 rank-and-file employees and members of

DONALD FRANCIS GAFFNEY v. GINA V. BUTLER

Private respondent filed a Complaint against Petitioner for sum of money.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERATO PENTECOSTES Y CRONICO

Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not indispensable to criminal prosecutions;

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PAUL DURAN, JR. y MIRABUENO

PUBLIC ATTORNEY'S OFFICE v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND ATTY. TERENCIA S.

PAO asserts that:

Petitioners' reliance on the purported exception under paragraph A(2)(d) is

GOV. AURORA E. CERILLES v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, ANITA JANGAD-CHUA, MA.

The extraordinary remedy of certiorari is a prerogative writ and never issues as a