Posted on November 21, 2016
Arriola
Patricio VS. Dario, G.R. No. 170829
Patricio VS. Dario
G.R. NO. 170829 – FULL TEXT DECISION (CLICK HERE)
FACTS:
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife,
petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private
respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land
with a residential house and a pre-school building.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of
their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-
ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property hence petitioner
and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffled to
Branch 78.
Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly
constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a
minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the
grandson of the decedent.
ISSUE:
W/N the family home cannot be partitioned on the grounds that a minor-beneficiary
is still residing therein.
HELD:
No. Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the
benefits of Art. 159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code;
(2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon
the head of the family.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV satisfied the first two requisites. However, on the third
requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal
grandmother. Thus, the obligation to support under Art. 199 which outlines the
order of liability for support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives
and only in their default is the obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and so
on. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now
establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his parents, being
of legal age.
Arriola v.
G.R. No. 177703, 28 January 2008
FACTS:
Fidel Arriola who married twice died and is survived by his legal heirs: John Nabor
Arriola (respondent), his son with his first wife, and Vilma G. Arriola, his second wife
and his other son, Anthony Ronald Arriola (petitioners). On February 16, 2004, the
RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition of the parcel of land left by the
decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heir John, Vilma and Anthony in equal
shares of one-third each without prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees
thereon, if any. However, the parties failed to agree on how to divide the property
and so the respondent proposed to sell it through public auction. The petitioners
initially agreed but refused to include in the auction the house standing on the
subject land because it is a family home.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject house is a family home.
RULING:
Yes. The subject house is a family home that it cannot be sold through public auction.
Based on Article 152, the Family Home, constituted jointly by the husband and wife
or any an unmarried head of the family is the dwelling house where they and their
family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Article 153, the Family Home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time
it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as
any beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and
is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided
and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
Article 159, the Family Home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses
or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there
is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reason.
Applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the
subject land on which it stands is deemed constituted as a family home by the
deceased and the petitioner Vilma from the moment that began occupying the same
as a family residence 20 years back. Therefor the house cannot be forced to sale by
the respondent because family home is exempt on such sale.
April 11, 2011
Mondequillo vs Breva
Mondequillo vs Breva
GR. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao
del Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of
agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered
in the latter’s name. A motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the
residential land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior the
commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155
thereof, and that the judgment sought to be enforced against the family home is not
one of those enumerated. With regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is
still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and
applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential house in the
present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home.
HELD:
The petitioner’s contention that it should be considered a family home from the time
it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article
162 of the Family Code, it provides that the provisions of this Chapter shall govern
existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. It does not mean
that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the
execution for payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The
said article simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. The debt and
liability which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the
Family Code. This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in
the FC.
As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall
be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land. Petition was dismissed.
Ramos v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 185920, July 20, 2010
MissIdea Uncategorized November 4, 2014 2 Minutes
RAMOS etal. v. PANGILINAN (2010)
FACTS:
1. In 2003, herein respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
E.M. Ramos Electric Inc., a company owned by Ernesto Ramos, the father
of herein petitioners.
2. In 2005, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and ordered
Ramos and the company to pay respondents aggregate amount
representing backwages, separation pay and other incentive pay.
3. Having been final, the decision was served by the Labor Arbiter thru a writ
of execution on 08 September 2005 which the Deputy Sheriff of the NLRC
implemened by levying a property in Ramos’ name in Pandacan, Manila
(Pandacan property).
4. Alleging that Pandacan property is a family home, hence, exempt from
execution to satisfy judgment award, Ramos moved to quash the writ of
execution. However, respondents averred that the Pandacan Property is
not the Ramos family home and in fact served as the company’s business
address as borne by the company’s letterhead. Consequently, the Labor
Arbiter denied the motion to quash.
5. Ramos appealed to the CA but during the case’s pendency, Ramos died and
was substituted by herein petitioners. The latter filed before the NLRC, as
third party claimants, opposition to the case, however, the Labor Arbiter
later on denied it holding that petitioners’ substitution as compulsory heirs
will nullify the sale at auction of the Pandacan Property.
6. Petitioners alleged that the NLRC erred in including Pandacan property in
the execution, invoking that at the time Pandacan property was
constituted as family home in 1944, Art. 153 of the Family Code is
applicable, hence, no longer had to resort to judicial or extrajudicial
constitution and thus exempted from execution.
7. However, the appeallate court decided that the property in question is not
exempted from execution because Art 153 of the FC has no retroactive
effect to family homes deemed to have been constituted prior to the its
enactment,
ISSUE: WON the Pandacan Property is exempted frome execution?
RULING:
1. As a general rule, the family home is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it
is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such
 properties, which must remain with the person constituiting it and his
heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certin special cases.
2. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be
made as to what law applies.
3. Under the Family Code (Art 153), there is no need to constitute the family
home judicially or extra-judicially for family homes constructed after the
effectivity of the Family Code for they are already constituted by operation
of law. Also, exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and
lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides
therein.
4. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family
Code, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially
pursuant to the Civil Code.
5. In both rules, it is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely
alleges that such property is a family home. Such claim of exemption must
be set up and proved.
6. In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was
constituted prior to August 3, 1988, they must comply with the procedure
mandated under the Civil Code. Having no absolute proof that the
Pandacan property was judicially and/or extrajudicially constituted as
Ramos’ family home, the law’s protective mantle cannot be availed of by
petitioners.
PETITION DENIED.
DE MESA V. ACERO
G.R. No. 185064, [January 16, 2012]
DOCTRINE:
Rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution:
First, family residences constructed before theeffectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or
extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be
exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from
execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of
its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially orextrajudicially constituted as a
family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter,
are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to
the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the
Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it
must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the
property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption
merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must
be set up and proved to the Sheriff.
FACTS:
Araceli De Mesa is married to Ernesto De Mesa.They purcahsed a parcel of land
located in Meycauayan, Bulacan. A house was contracted in the said property, which
became their family home. A year after, Arceli contracted a loan in the amount of
P100,000 from Claudio Acero, which was secured by a mortgage on the said parcel
of land and house. Araceli issued a check for the payment of the loan.
When Aceropresented the check to the bank it was dishonored because the
checking account was already closed. Acero demanded payment. However, Spouses
De Mesa still failed to pay. Acero filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22 in the RTC.
The RTC acquitted the Spouses but ordered them to pay Acero P100,000 plus legal
interest. A writ of execution was issued to levy on the said property.
The house and lot was sold in the public auction and Acero was the
highest bidder. Acero leased the property to Juanito Oliva, who defaulted payment
for several years. Oliva contends that the Acero spouses are not the owners of the
property.
The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses Acero’s complaint and
ordering the Spouses De Mesa and Oliva to vacate the subject property. Spouses De
Mesa contend that they are the rightful owners of the property. The MTC also stated
that from the time a Torrens title over the subject property was issued in Claudio’s
name up to the time the complaint for ejectment was filed, the petitioners never
assailed the validity of the levy made by the Sheriff, the regularity of the public sale
that was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of Acero’s Torrens title that was
resultantly issued.
Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to Acero. Spouses De Mesa
contend that the subject property is a family home, which is exempt from execution
under the Family Code and, thus, could not have been validly levied upon for
purposes of satisfying the writ of execution. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA
affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject property, as a family home, may be subject to execution
in this case.
HELD:
YES, the subject property is family home but is subject to execution.In general, the
family home is exempt from execution. However, the person claiming this privilege
must assert it at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.
RATIO:
For the family home to be exempt from execution,distinction must be made as to
what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be
complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from
execution, could be summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or
extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be
exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from
execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of
its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a
family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter,
are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to
the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987
when Spouses De Mesa got married. There was no showing, however, that the same
was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus
prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting
that the subject property was a family home.
Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have
been exempt from execution, Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subject
property being a family home and its being exempted from execution at the time it
was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. They are stopped from claiming
the exemption of the property from execution.
Sunday, July 7, 2013
ARBOLARIO vs. CA 129163
ARBOLARIO vs. CA 129163
FACTS:
The petitioners claims that they are the legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of
the deceased, hence they are qualified to inherit from the latter. However, the birth
dates of the petitioner were earlier than the death of the original wife of their father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of the
deceased.
RULING:
No, they are not. The petitioners were born before 1951. Therefore, in the absence
of any fact that would show that conjugal union of Juan Arbolario and Catalina
Baloyo had been judicially annulled before 1951, or before Juan Arbolario cohabited
with Francisca Malvas, it would only be reasonable to conclude that the foregoing
union which resulted in the birth of the [Arbolarios] was extra-marital. And
consequently, Voltaire Arbolario, et al., are illegitimate children of Juan Arbolario.
As held by the appellate court, without proof that Catalina died in 1903, her marriage
to Juan is presumed to have continued. Even where there is actual severance of the
filial companionship between spouses, their marriage subsists, and either spouse’s
cohabitation with any third party cannot be presumed to be between “husband and
wife.”
Tan vs. Trocio
TAN vs. TROCIO
FACTS:
Tan filed a disbarment case against Atty. Trocio for allegedly raping her and as a
result, she bore a son named Jewel. She gave birth to Jewel during her marriage with
Tal Lee Pok.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jewel is the illegitimate son of Atty. Trocio.
RULING:
Jewel Tan was born during the wedlock of Complainant and her husband and the
presumption should be in favor of legitimacy unless physical access between the
couple was impossible. From the evidence on hand, the presumption has not been
overcome by adequate and convincing proof. In fact, Jewel was registered in his birth
certificate as the legitimate child of the Felicidad and her husband, Tan Le Pok.
Angeles vs. Maglaya
Facts:
Petitioner is the wife of the deceased while the respondent is the child of the
deceased in his first wife. Respondent seeks administration of the estate of the
deceased but opposed by the surviving wife (2nd wife) alleging that the respondent
is an illegitimate child of the deceased.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is illegitimate precluding her to become the Petitioners are allegedly the half-brothers, the half-sister-in-law, and the children of
administratrix. a half-brother of the deceased Pacita Gonzales. Respondents are heirs of
Villanueva and are represented by Melchor. The remaining respondents, Angelina
Villanueva and husband Victoriano de Luna, are allegedly the daughter and the son-
Ruling: in-law, respectively, of the late Villanueva. From 1927 until her death in 1980,
No, respondent is not illegitimate. Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of marriage because the
latter was married to one Amanda Musngi who died on April 20, 1963. In the course
 Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: of their cohabitation, they acquired several properties including the
“Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are properties contested in this case. Gonzales died on July 3, 1980 without leaving a
legitimate.” will. On August 8, 1980, Villanueva and respondent Angelina executed a deed of
 The issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. extrajudicial partition with sale, that is, an extrajudicial settlement of
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: Gonzales’ estate comprising a number of the aforementioned properties. In this
document, Villanueva, for the amount of P30,000, conveyed his interests in
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgments; or the estate to Angelina. Petitioners filed a case for partition of Gonzales’ estate and
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten annulment of titles and damages, with the RTC. In dismissing the complaint, the RTC
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. made two findings: (1) Gonzales was never married to Villanueva and (2) respondent
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: Angelina was her illegitimate child by Villanueva and therefore her sole heir, to
the exclusionof petitioners. The CA ruled that respondent Angelina was
1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or the illegitimate daughter of the decedent, based solely on her birth certificate.
2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. ISSUE:
WON Angelina is an illegitimate child of the deceased Villanueva.
SSS VS. AGUAS RULING:
SSS vs. Aguas No. The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the
supposed parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the
Facts: status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and even amounts to
SSS denied the benefit and pension claims of the Aguas on the grounds that: simulation of the child’s birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a
 The wife forfeited her right to be supported by the deceased when she public document. Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a
married and cohabitated with another man while being married to the prima face evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of
the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties.Following
deceased
the logic of Benitez case, respondent Angelina and her co-defendants in SD-857
 Janet and Jeylnn were not legitimate children of the decreased according
should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her birth
to the testimonies of the witnesses
certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such evidence. Under the
Issue:
circumstances, the Court ruled that it was not sufficiently established that
Whether or not the wife, Janet and Jeylnn are qualified to claim the benefits.
respondent Angelina was Gonzales’ biological daughter, nor even her adopted
Ruling:
daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from Gonzales. Since she could not have validly
Only Jeylnn is qualified because she was born while the marriage of the deceased
participated in Gonzales’ estate, the extrajudicial partition which she executed with
and the wife was subsisting. Furthermore, her birth certificate bears the signature of
Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was invalid.
the deceased. She is
SUNTAY VS. SUNTAY
Rivera v. Heirs of Villanueva
Suntay vs. Suntay
G.R. No. 141501, July 21, 2006
FACTS:
Facts:
Emilio I, who predeceased his parents, is a legitimate son of Federico and Cristina.
Emilio III is the illegitimate son of Emilio I. However, Emilio III was adopted by
Federico and Cristina.
Issue:

Whether or not Emilio III is allowed to inherit despite the prohibition of an

illegitimate grandson to inherit from the grandparents.
Ruling:

Yes, Emilio III is allowed to inherit from Federico because Emilio was adopted by
Federico making the former a legitimate heir of the later.