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that Malolos City will have a population of at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, by May 10, 2010, the
legislative district of Malolos City as apportioned by Republic Act No. 9591 is invalid.
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA, representing the President of the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the
SENATE PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER; GOVERNOR
ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte; GOVERNOR
GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands
G.R. No. 180050,April 12, 2011, Nachura, J.

Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight in the criteria of income, population
and land area, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential consideration. Without doubt, the
primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a province, is economic viability. This
is the clear intent of the framers of the LGC.

Facts:

Petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte sought to nullify R.A. No.
9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12
square kilometers only failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the
LGC.

On February 2010, Supreme Court declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with
the land requirement of 2,000 sq. km. in the creation of a province under the LGC. Consequently, it declared the
proclamation of Dinagat and the election of its officials as null and void. The Decision likewise declared as null
and void the provision on Article 9(2) LGC-IRR, stating that the land area requirement shall not apply where
the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the
LGC, inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided in the law.

Issue:

Whether the creation of the Congress of the Island Province of Dinagat is valid even if it did not comply
with the land and population requirement under Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of
the LGC.

Ruling:

YES. It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local government
units are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their
constituents. The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to
accomplish these results. In this light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of
each of these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them should enjoy preferential consideration.
Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government units, particularly of a province, is
economic viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of the LGC.

The land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive
in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual income of
P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, which is four times more than the minimum requirement of
P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven
possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 elections as
mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s existence as a province, they must

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be seen from the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province. This Court should not
be instrumental in stunting such capacity.

ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008, Brion, J.

The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation,
division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite
requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.

Facts:

On August 10, 2006, Congressman Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859, entitled "An Act
Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro." The bill
eventually became a law, R.A. No. 9371. It increased Cagayan de Oro’s legislative district from one to two. For
the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro’s voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the
second district, depending on their place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect their own
representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. The COMELEC thereafter
promulgated Resolution No. 7837 implementing RA 9371. Rogelio Bagabuyo assails the COMELEC Resolution
as unconstitutional. According to him, RA 9371 cannot be implemented without conducting a plebiscite because
the apportionment under the law falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of cities under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:

Whether a plebiscite is necessary in case of apportionment of the legislative district of the City of
Cagayan De Oro.

Ruling:

NO. The pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the
requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to
carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In
contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.

Under the wordings of RA 9371 and Resolution 7837, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political
and corporate entity takes place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its
administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is
only the addition of another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of
representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution does not come
into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts

BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FORNATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers)
G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009, Carpio, J.

The two percent threshold in relation to the distribution of the additional seats is unconstitutional. It
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House
of Representatives.

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Facts:

In May 2007 elections, Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT)filed before the National Board of Canvassers(NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list
representatives provided by the Constitution; that Section 11(b) of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold
votes, should be harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of RA 7941 and
should be applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their
initial/first ranking; that the 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and that the
formula/procedure prescribed in the allocation of party-list seats, Annex A of Comelec Res. 2847 shall be used
for the purpose of determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-list groups are entitled to
representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat. However, COMELEC denied the same for being
moot and academic. It announced that it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party,
organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v.COMELEC formula.

Subsequently, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC to reconsider its decision to use
the Veterans formula because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI
of the Constitution mandatory.
2. Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional.
3. Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 in allocation of
additional seats is constitutional.

Ruling:

1. NO. Neither the Constitution nor RA. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of
party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely
a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent
the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled.

2. YES. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization
may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections.

3. NO. We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold
presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013, Carpio, J.

Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-
defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector.

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passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they
are considered nuisance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.

Ang Ladlad now argues that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using
religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also
claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and
assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines international
obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

Issue:

Whether the COMELEC can exclude Ang Ladlad as a party-list on moral grounds and for being violative
of public policy.

Ruling:

NO. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment
clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious
justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that
petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric
of society. We hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify
exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on
purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a
tool to further any substantial public interest.

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS

PARTY-LIST), represented herein by its Chairperson and First Nominee, FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr. v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. Nos. 206844-45, July 23, 2013, Leonardo-De Castro. J.

If the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it appears that
SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC En
Banc. There can be no disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from
carrying out their agreement.

Facts:

On May 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled Irrevocable Covenant,
which contains the list of their candidates and terms on sharing of their powers. It contained an agreement on
who among the candidates will serve the terms according to the power sharing agreement. By virtue of the
term-sharing agreement, the term of Kho as member of the HR was cut short to 1 yr and 6 mos. In line with
this, Kho tendered his resignation to be effective on December 31, 2011.

In the interim, COMELEC Resolution was promulgated on February 21, 2012. Pertinently, Section 7 of
Rule 4 thereof provided that filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing agreement among nominees of winning
party-list groups/organizations shall not be allowed. On March 12, 2012, the Board of Trustees of SENIOR
CITIZENS issued recalled the resignation of Kho and allowed him to continue to represent the party-list. Despite

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of the recall of resignation, COMELEC found the term-sharing agreement contrary to public policy and hence
resolved to CANCEL the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS under the Party-List System of Representation.

Issue:

Whether the COMELEC can disqualify and cancel the registration and accreditation of SENIOR
CITIZENS solely on account of its purported violation of the prohibition against term-sharing.

Ruling:

NO. There was no indication that the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less
succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing agreement. Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol
Group insist on this fact of non-implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho
continued to hold his seat and served his term as a member of the House of Representatives.

Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it
appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the
COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees,
in fact, desisted from carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an election law, rule, or
regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of its
registration and accreditation have no legal leg to stand on.

MILAGROS E. AMORES v. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010, Carpio Morales. J.

The law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25)
but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must be that a candidate who is more
than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee.

Facts:

In her Petition for Quo Warranto, petitioner alleged that private respondent was disqualified to be a
nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and
acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of RA No. 7941, the
Party-List System Act and that since his change of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas Filipino
workers and their families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections, he is
not qualified to represent the new sector pursuant to Section 15 of the same law. Public respondent countered
that the age limit applied only to those nominated as such during the first three congressional terms after the
ratification of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent, 31 years of age, can still be a nominee of a youth sector.

Ruling:

NO. The law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-
five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must be that a candidate
who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is
contained in RA No. 7941, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats. The
Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the youth sector or the overseas

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