Republic Act No.

6735 August 4, 1989

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
I. — General Provisions
Section 1. Title. — This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act."
Section 2. Statement of Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose,
enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body
upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. — For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local
legislative body for action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the
purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof,
passed by Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance
enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.
(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the
people.
(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number of signatories. It shall be in a
form to be determined by and submitted to the Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang
Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon.
(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal Mayors and Punong Barangay, as the case
may be.
Section 4. Who may exercise. — The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised by all registered voters of the
country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
Section 5. Requirements. — (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the total
number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission.
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number
of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum
(3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed,
as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;

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 c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or
printed at the top of every page of the petition.
(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative assembly of an
autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition thereof is signed by at least ten per
centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or city, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein; Provided, however, That if the province or city is
composed only of one (1) legislative district, then at least each municipality in a province or each barangay in a city
should be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly initiated if the petition
therefor is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the municipality, of which every
barangay is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated if signed by at least ten
per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said barangay.
Section 6. Special Registration. — The Commission on Election shall set a special registration day at least three (3) weeks
before a scheduled initiative or referendum.
Section 7. Verification of Signatures. — The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of
voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
II. — National Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. — The Commission shall call and supervise the conduct of
initiative or referendum.
Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, upon determining the sufficiency of the
petition, publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the date
of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the
determination by the Commission of the sufficiency of the petition.
Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. — (a) The Proposition of the enactment, approval,
amendment or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a majority of the votes cast by all the
registered voters of the Philippines.
If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the national law
proposed for enactment, approval, or amendment shall become effective fifteen (15) days following completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by the
Commission, the proposition to reject a national law is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said national law
shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of
publication of the proposition and the certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines.
However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected or amended shall remain in full
force and effect.
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall
become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose
shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation by the Commission.
Section 10. Prohibited Measures. — The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in Congress by the
Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its effectivity.
Section 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file a petition for indirect
initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. The petition shall contain a summary of the chief
purposes and contents of the bill that the organization proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature.
The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any legislative measure before the
House of Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall have precedence over the pending legislative measures on
the committee.
Section 12. Appeal. — The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for
initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.

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III. — Local Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. — (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000) registered voters in case of
autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100) in case of municipalities, and
fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative body, respectively, proposing
the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days from its presentation, the
proponents through their duly authorized and registered representative may invoke their power of initiative, giving
notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned.
(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The Secretary of Local Government or his
designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition.
(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.
(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous regions, ninety (90) days in case of
provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays, from notice
mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required number of signatures.
(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated representative, in the presence of a
representative of the proponent, and a representative of the regional assemblies and local legislative bodies
concerned in a public place in the autonomous region or local government unit, as the case may be. Signature
stations may be established in as many places as may be warranted.
(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections, through its office in the local
government unit concerned shall certify as to whether or not the required number of signatures has been obtained.
Failure to obtain the required number is a defeat of the proposition.
(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall then set a date for the initiative at
which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned for their
approval within ninety (90) days from the date of certification by the Commission, as provided in subsection (g)
hereof, in case of autonomous regions, sixty (60) days in case of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case
of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after
which the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections.
Section 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. — If the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast, it shall take
effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the Commission as if affirmative action thereon had been made by the local
legislative body and local executive concerned. If it fails to obtain said number of votes, the proposition is considered defeated.
Section 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. — (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a
year.
(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the local legislative bodies to
enact.
(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the proposition presented,
the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may, if they so desire, apply for initiative in the
manner herein provided.
Section 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. — Any proposition or ordinance or resolution approved through the
system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative
body concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the local
legislative body within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided, however, that in
case of barangays, the period shall be one (1) year after the expiration of the first six (6) months.
Section 17. Local Referendum. — Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof, any local legislative body may submit
to the registered voters of autonomous region, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection, any
ordinance or resolution duly enacted or approved.
Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission within sixty (60) days in case of provinces
and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.
The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.
Section 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and
void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative
body to enact the said measure.
IV. — Final Provisions
SECTION 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. — The Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all initiatives and referenda.

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Section 20. Rules and Regulations. — The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Section 21. Appropriations. — The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial implementation of this Act shall be
charged against the Contingent Fund in the General Appropriations Act of the current year. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the full implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 22. Separability Clause. — If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or
provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.
Section 23. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 7941

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM,
AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Party-List System Act."
Section 2. Declaration of part y. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or
coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards
this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadcast possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for
and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may
participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies
for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the
regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of
the cities and provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical
attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for
political and/or election purposes.
Section 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System. Any party, organization, or coalition already registered with
the Commission need not register anew. However, such party, organization, or coalition shall file with the Commission, not
later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system.
Section 5. Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the
party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its
president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That
the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted
for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

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 (1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether
directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the
votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
Section 7. Certified List of Registered Parties. The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a
certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have manifested
their desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all precincts for posting in the polling
places on election day. The names of the part y-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list.
Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the
COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list
representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list.
The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the
immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same
shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination,
becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral
representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year
immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which
he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of
age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the
day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term.
Section 10. Manner of Voting. Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first is a vote for candidate for member of the
House of Representatives in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the party, organizations, or coalition he wants
represented in the house of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not
entitled to be voted for shall not be counted: Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list system shall be held in
May 1998.
The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information campaign for purposes of educating the electorate on the matter of
the party-list system.
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of
the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-
list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes : Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the
parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate
party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or
coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.

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Section 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC
based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC according to their
ranking in said list.
Section 14. Term of Office. Party-list representatives shall be elected for a term of three (3) years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No party-list representatives shall
serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral
affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation
within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party
or organization.
Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list representatives, the vacancy shall be
automatically filled by the next representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted to the COMELEC by the same
party, organization, or coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party, organization coalition
concerned shall submit additional nominees.
Section 17. Rights of Party-List Representatives. Party-List Representatives shall be entitled to the same salaries and
emoluments as regular members of the House of Representatives.
Section 18. Rules and Regulations. The COMELEC shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Section 19. Appropriations. The amount necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be provided in the regular
appropriations for the Commission on Elections starting fiscal year 1996 under the General Appropriations Act.
Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby authorized to utilize savings and other available funds for purposes of its information
campaign on the party-list system.
Section 20. Separability Clause. If any part of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof
shall remain valid and effective.
Section 21. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.
Section 22. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Approved, March 3, 1995.

Tobias v. Abalos
FACTS:
Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized
City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. A
plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said conversion. The plebiscite was
only 14.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes” whereas “7, 911” voted “no”.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1)
HELD/RULING:
For the purposes of discussion, let’s breakdown all of the claimed violations to the 1987 Constitution.
Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
conversion. Moreover, a liberal construction of the “one-title-one-subject” rule has been liberally adopted by the court as to not
impede legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec).
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
members, unless otherwise provided by law. The emphasis on the latter clause indicates that the number of the House of
Representatives may be increased, if mandated via a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation is not unconstitutional.

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Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standard provided in this section.
The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd since it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon
and enacted the assailed law.
The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS. COMELEC

342 SCRA 247, October 6, 2000 (Constitutional Law – Party List Representatives, 20% Allocation)
FACTS: Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering the proclamation of 38 additional party-list
representatives to complete the 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987
Constitution and RA 7941.
On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties, avers that the filling up of the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory,
wherein the twenty (20%) percent congressional seats for party-list representatives is filled up at all times.
ISSUE: Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory.
HELD: No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same declared therein a policy to promote
“proportional representation” in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them.

It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least
two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than
this percentage could have “additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.”
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of Representatives (sec
11(b) RA 7941).
Note:
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the number of seats
allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise “twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party-list.” We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
———————————- x .20 = No. of party-list

.80 representatives
This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily
result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district
representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as
follows:
208

——– x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic question, however, is this: Does
the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is
“No.”

Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]

Facts:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the total number of votes
cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon petition for respondents, who were party-list
organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list representatives although they obtained less than 2% of the total number of
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votes cast for the party-list system on the ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members
of the House of Representatives come from the party-list representatives.

Issue:
Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution,
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up
completely and all the time?

Held:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives. The Constitution
vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representatives. In the
exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain
at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that
only those parties having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress.

FORMULA FOR

determination of total number of party-list representatives = #district representatives/.80 x .20

additional representatives of first party = # of votes of first party/ # of votes of party list system

additional seats for concerned party = # of votes of concerned party/ # votes of first party x additional seats for
concerned party

Issue:
Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

Held:
Yes. In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations and coalitions
having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be
gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the
framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative
state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have
meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a
legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of
contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative
districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local representation.

Issue:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

Held:
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as well as the members of this
Court that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they each received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total
votes cast for all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are guaranteed
one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional seats. The party receiving the highest
number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the “first” party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for
the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other
parties cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on
proportional representation.

G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001

BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec

Facts

Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of 154 organizations
and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private
respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the

8
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on
their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.
Issue:

1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.

2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

RULING:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the issue raised is one
purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." Tha facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable.
2. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the requirements laid down in
the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the
ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representative may “be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations”. It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented”, the criteria for participation in relation to the cause of the party lsit applicants so as to avoid desecration of
the noble purpose of the party-list system.
3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No.
3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of
facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Consitution, the Court decided
to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Consitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the
petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists

BANAT VS COMELEC

Nature: Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes
cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;

In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation of the
winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.

In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:

1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from party-list
representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);

2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total votes cast
in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;

3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is
pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.

4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the party-list
election (3 seat cap rule, same case).

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the
proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void
because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-
list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20%
party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.

9
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote,
there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT
also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA
7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is
the said elections limited to sectoral parties.

ISSUES:

I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?

II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.

III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.

IV. How are party-list seats allocated?

V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.

VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

HELD:

I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be one
seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250
members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list
representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as
in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there
were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list
representatives.

How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:

(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List
Representatives

Hence,

(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list
representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it is not
mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which
garnered 2% of the votes cast a requalified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the
2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the
party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further
assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because
of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to
60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent
of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as
the two percent threshold is present.

10
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.”

IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat, and not
“qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get a seat.

But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:

RANKING: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.

2% GUARANTY. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

ADDITIONAL SEATS 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

LIMITATION. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are
the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the
absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which garnered at
least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these
two-percenters are then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner
2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full
text of the case for the tabulation).

The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first, the
additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of
the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.

How is this done?

Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The
product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3
seat limit rule shall still be observed.

Example:

In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for the
party-list elections (15,950,900).

Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional seat

Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79

Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it has a
guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast,
it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.

Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats, those
seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats
are occupied.

V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN,
etc)from participating in the party-list elections.

11
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA 7941
against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and that even
the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list
elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno,
in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the
Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution – and the will of the people is that only
the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot
participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list system

BAI SANDRA SEMA VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

558 SCRA 700 – Political Law – Municipal Corporation – Creation of LGUs by Autonomous Regions (ARMM) – Population
Requirement
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not part of
ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative
districts. The 1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities,
cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato
City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only made of Cotabato City
(because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained; however, just for the purposes of
the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a decisive
declaration from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later,
Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded
in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning – in fact he won). She contended that
under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative
representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in
the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the
legislative district is not affected and so is its representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three
conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second,
such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units
affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to
regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers,
Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards
and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and
city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence,
ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.

12
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province, once created,
should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there must at least
be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable.
On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But
this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what
ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.

COMELEC en banc V AKB, et. al April 2, 2013

FACTS:
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and BANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013 party-list
elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented
sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD:
No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However, the
Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which
abandoned some principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do
not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political
constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The
sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies”
include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must
belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees
of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack
“well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy
for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of
such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified,
provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating in the party-
list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the “marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack well-defined
political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they were drafting the
party-list system provision of the Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties

13
into the party-list elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice
Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in
ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and
underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional parties. It is
also for small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack “well-defined political constituencies”. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike major political parties, to field or
sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the
party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly excludes other cause-
oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to include only labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by
their nature are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among
others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but
are still qualified as “marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies” as they are
ideologically marginalized.

Aquino vs. Comelec

Relevant Provisions:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on
the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives,
a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election.

Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for
the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated
that he was a resident of the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10 months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati
City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one year
preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year
and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to
run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order
suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections
found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Issue:
1. Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from
the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence (not in the sense of the COC)in the
district he was running in.

Held:
1. Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile” not only under the
previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court cited the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than

14
one year immediately preceding the day of elections.
…
What is the Committee’s concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or
constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973
constituition, the interpretation given to it was domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
…
Mr. De los Reyes
So we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence.
Therefore, the framers intended the word “residence” to have the same meaning of domicile.
The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at
any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it
speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.
The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking
advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.
While there is nothing wrong with the purpose of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements,
this defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to
the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify.
Which brings us to the second issue.

2. No, Aquino has not established domicile of choice in the district he was running in.
The SC agreed with the Comelec’s contention that Aquino should prove that he established a domicile of choice and not just
residence.
The Constitution requires a person running for a post in the HR one year of residency prior to the elections in the district in
which he seeks election to .
Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (May 11, 1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter
of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. His birth certificate indicated that Conception as
his birthplace and his COC also showed him to be a registered voter of the same district. Thus his domicile of origin
(obviously, choice as well) up to the filing of his COC was in Conception, Tarlac.
Aquino’s connection to the new Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the
area. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of
buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his
claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not
to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati
City.
Aquino’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by
the facts in the case at bench. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections due to his lack of one year residence in the district.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest
number of votes in the congressional elections of Second district of Makati City made permanent.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and
graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St.
Paul’s College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the
House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos
Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San

15
Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and
registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila
during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections.
Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed
a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency,
which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on
March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven
months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First
District of Leyte.
HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency
in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of law when her father
brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence
of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the
same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely
gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the
death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of
origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while
living in her brother’s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the
House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11,
and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

CO V. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE

Doctrine: citizenship
Facts:

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar
for voting purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and

16
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its
resolution dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
Issue:

WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:

The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te
established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the
year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.

As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and
practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao.
The two fell in love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was born in 1948.
Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the
vicissitudes of life in Samar.

The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime,
Jose Ong Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of
First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong
Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued
to him. During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old, finishing his elementary education in the province of
Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local
populace were concerned.

After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to
acquire his secondary and college education.
Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations. Since employment
opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines
as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.
In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born
citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given
to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full
brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship
since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

17
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February
2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in
question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was
automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still
have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of
Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized
when the respondent was only nine (9) years old.
He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to
have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957.
In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a
citizen since he was nine years old

In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises
constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of
citizenship.

SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping respondent’s father of his citizenship after his death. An
attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare
the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondent’s father as null and void would run against the principle of due process
because he has already been laid to rest

DIMAPORO V. MITRA
202 SCRA 779 / G.R. No. 96859

FACTS:

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the
1987 congressional elections. On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in the immediately following elections. Upon
being informed of this development by the COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives
excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the
Omnibus Election Code which states:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent
capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.

Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed his
intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected Member of Congress. He maintains that he did not thereby
lose his seat as congressman because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution,
being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.

In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of Representatives, as well

18
as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2,
Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected
under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992," while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House
of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election. He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a
congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution.
Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it is only when a congressman holds another office or
employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or
employment.

ISSUE:

1. IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION?

2. COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY, 'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT',
EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM
FROM EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS
SUCH?

HELD:

The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

1. The officials running for office other than the ones they are holding will be considered resigned not because of abuse of
facilities of power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we have this …chapter on
accountability of public officers (both in the 1973 and 1987 constitution). Section 1 of Article XI (1987) on "Accountability of
Public Officers" states that:

Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

Under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers must serve their principal, the people,
not their own personal ambition. Petitioner failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public
officials, this statutory provision (Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire
term of office by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it
clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the
constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they
have received from their constituents.

Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, an
overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office presently being held, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut
short his tenure, not his term. Forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy
for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited
and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. The law does not make the forfeiture
dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable.

That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of
shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to present members of Congress.
Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment … All other public
officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. Such constitutional
expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a
Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. The expression in the constitution of the circumstances which shall bring
about a vacancy does not preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds

19
Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To justify the
nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
2. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions; It was their duty to
remove petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the
COMELEC communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional
governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the
statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these
officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon
them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest
are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.

In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and benefit of the
people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose and he cannot
complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his office.

NOTES:

- In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to
confuse "term" with "tenure" of office: The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by
the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by
circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These
situations will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76 Phil 12).

- 4 grounds found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened:

a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.

JIMENEZ v CABANGBANG

17 SCRA 876 – Political Law – Freedom of Speech and Debate

Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense.
In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that
there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some
civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense,
Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez,
among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet
such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case
against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous.
Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the lower house, he is immune from
suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of Congress.
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the
sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be
questioned in any other place.”
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the
performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress,
while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their

20
duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time
of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same time
he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published,
he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof. Hence,
contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.

PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a
motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions
and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of
popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and
rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of
the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a
special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years
is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions
and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to
his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be
a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

anterro

Cesar Bengzon vs Franklin Drilon

208 SCRA 133 – Political Law – Veto Power of the President

In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were “repealed” during the time of former
President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of
the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among
government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law
should not give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.

Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking the court to readjust their
pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those
unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non
publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted
additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in the following manner: Congress made
an item entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances of
the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in
the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the constitutionality of the veto made
by the President. The President was represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.

21
 ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic
Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court
neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the
repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or
items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said
item. It appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done.
The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or
not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the
portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations to the other
departments of the government.

EUGENIO PUYAT VS SIXTO DE GUZMAN, JR.

113 SCRA 31 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Appearance in Court

In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries. The election was
subsequently questioned by Eustaquio Acero (Puyat’s rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted – hence he filed
a quo warranto case before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to Acero’s filing of the
case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from a
member of Acero’s group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979)
to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected
as he argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body
(such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an
Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said SEC case for him to intervene, not as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares
and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion and in effect
granting Fernandez leave to intervene.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC case without violating
the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies?
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a counsel. Even
though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He bought
the stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly
stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented himself as a party of interest – which is clearly a
workaround and is clearly an act after the fact. A mere workaround to get himself involved in the litigation. What could not be
done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.

SANTIAGO VS. GUINGONA, JR.

o While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half
of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the
“minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.
o Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President and House Speaker
o Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature
o Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation, modification and waiver by the
body adopting them

FACTS:

During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen. Tatad were both nominated to the position of
Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate President. Thereafter, Sen. Tatad
manifested that, with the agreement of Sen. Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming
position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen. Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only those
22
who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.” However, senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus, Petitioners filed
this case for quo warranto.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the selection of respondent as Senate minority
leader
o Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative procedure

RULING:

The petition fails.

The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority

The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or
aggregate, it simply “means the number greater than half or more than half of any total.” The plain and unambiguous words of
the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the
senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the “majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said
body. And there is no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.

In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than
one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute
the “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.

xxx

Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,” not necessarily more than one half.
This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is “a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or
adherents than the majority.” Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would
obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is
not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a government with a
multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority
parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as the “dominant minority party” for purposes of the general
elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are
independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or a
combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.

Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other than Senate President and House Speaker

While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead
silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that “[e]ach
House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such
other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power “to determine the rules of its proceedings.” xxx

Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of legislature

Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither is there an open
clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At
any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal
affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the words of
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to
exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement
them, before the courts may intervene.

Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are subject to revocation, modification and waiver by the

23
body adopting them

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during
their effectivity. In fact, they “are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.”
Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.

In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is
certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court
has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles
that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that justifies the Court’s being. Constitutional respect and a becoming
regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. To
repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and
majesty of the law.

To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would easily fail.

SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR. VS SALIPADA PENDATUN

109 Phil. 863 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Parliamentary Immunity
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”. In the said speech, he
disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the
lower house in order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his allegations were found to
be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the lower house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court. Osmeña avers that the resolution
violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer
where he averred that the Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline its
members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon members of the legislature
which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum
outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body whenever his
words and conduct are considered disorderly or unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed.

CEFERINO PAREDES, JR. VS SANDIGANBAYAN

252 SCRA 641 – Political Law – The Legislative Department – Suspension of a Member of Congress – RA 3019
In January 1990, Teofilo Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a case against Ceferino
Paredes, Jr. (who was then the governor of the same province), Atty. Generoso Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and Mansueto
Honrada (a clerk of court). The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment notice had ever been issued against him in a criminal
proceeding against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from the judge handling the case himself that the criminal
case against him never reached the arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on his part
maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes claimed that Sansaet
only changed his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended that
Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed but was eventually denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, may be suspended by order of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan, despite
his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress. The SC ruled:
“x x x. Petitioner’s invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution – which deals with the power of each House of
Congress inter alia to ‘punish its Members for disorderly behavior,’ and ‘suspend or expel a Member’ by a vote of two-thirds of
all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty days – is

24
unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty
but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for
misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.”

UNITED STATES VS JUAN PONS

34 Phil. 729 – Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Journals

Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila from
Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5
barrels to Pons’ house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record
were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation
thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the act of trading and dealing opium is
against Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband
material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was approved while the Philippine Commission
(Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914
while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381
should be null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a law on
February 28, 1914.

HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the recitals in
the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the
Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit
of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons’ witnesses
cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that
the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining
to go beyond these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC. VS PEDRO GIMENEZ

7 SCRA 347 – Political Law – Journal – Conclusiveness of the Enrolled Bill

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (Casco) was engaged in the production of synthetic resin glues used primarily in the
production of plywood. The main components of the said glue are urea and formaldehyde which are both being imported
abroad. Pursuant to a Central Bank circular, Casco paid the required margin fee for its imported urea and formaldehyde.
Casco however paid in protest as it maintained that urea and formaldehyde are tax exempt transactions. The Central Bank
agreed and it issued vouchers for refund. The said vouchers were submitted to Pedro Gimenez, the then Auditor General, who
denied the tax refund. Gimenez maintained that urea and formaldehyde, as two separate and distinct components are not tax
exempt; that what is tax exempt is urea formaldehyde (the synthetic resin formed by combining urea and formaldehyde).
Gimenez cited the provision of Sec. 2, par 18 of Republic Act No. 2609 which provides:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the
sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
“XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-
users.
Casco however averred that the term “urea formaldehyde” appearing in this provision should be construed as “urea and
formaldehyde”. It further contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction “and” between the
terms “urea” and, “formaldehyde”, and that the members of Congress intended to exempt “urea” and “formaldehyde”
separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called “urea formaldehyde”, not the latter a
finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the
bill before said House, by members thereof.
The enrolled bill however used the term “urea formaldehyde”
25
ISSUE: Whether or not the term “urea formaldehyde” should be construed as “urea and formaldehyde”.
HELD: No. Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from
definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction.
“Urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from “urea” and “formaldehyde”, as
separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as “urea formaldehyde”.
The opinions or statements of any member of Congress during the deliberation of the said law/bill do not represent the entirety
of the Congress itself. What is printed in the enrolled bill would be conclusive upon the courts. The enrolled bill — which uses
the term “urea formaldehyde” instead of “urea and formaldehyde” — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it
was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which the SC cannot speculate, without
jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

ARROYO VS DE VENECIA GR NO 127255 14 AUGUST 1997

Facts: RA 8240 which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called ”sin taxes” on
the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes were challenged by Representative Joker Arroyo. The bicameral committee
after submitting its report to the House, the chairman of the committee proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech and was
interpellated. Arroyo also interrupted to move to adjourn for lack of quorum. His motion was defeated and put to a vote. The
interpellation of the sponsor proceeded and the bill was approved on its third reading.

Issue: Whether or not Arroyo should have been heard for his call to adjourn for lack of quorum?
Decision: Petition dismissed. It is unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department of the Court either to set
aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure or to allow
those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when the petitioners can find their remedy in their
own department.

CARMELO LAZATIN VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

157 SCRA 337 – Political law – The Legislative Department – Electoral Tribunals – HRET’s Jurisdiction over Electoral Protests
Carmelo Lazatin questioned the jurisdiction of the (Commission on Elections) COMELEC to annul his proclamation after he
had taken his oath of office, assumed office, and discharged the duties of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga.
Lazatin claims that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all
election contests.
Francisco Buan, Jr., and Lorenzo Timbol (Lazatin’s opposition), alleged that Lazatin’s petition had become moot and academic
because the assailed COMELEC Resolution had already become final and executory when the SC issued a TRO on October
6, 1987. In the COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the petition should be given due course because the proclamation
was valid. The order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim the winner if warranted under
Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code,” was in effect a grant of authority by the COMELEC to the canvassing board, to
proclaim the winner. A Separate Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was illegal
and void because the board simply corrected the returns contested by Lazatin without waiting for the final resolutions of the
petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin himself, against certain election returns.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRET’s jurisdiction.
HELD: Yes. The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to the petition. The petition is
impressed with merit because Lazatin has been proclaimed winner of the Congressional elections in the first district of
Pampanga, has taken his oath of office as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. The alleged invalidity of the
proclamation (which had been previously ordered by the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection
therewith, and despite the pendency of the protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the
premises, to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal.

EMIGDIO BONDOC VS MARCIANO PINEDA

26
201 SCRA 792 – Political Law – HRET – Removal of a Member
Separation of Powers
Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4th District of Pampanga. Pineda was a
member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). While Bondoc was a member of the Nacionalista Party (NP). Pineda
won in that election. However, Bondoc contested the result in the HRET (House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal).
Bondoc won in the protest and he was subsequently declared as the winner by the HRET.
Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito Camasura, Jr. who was a member of LDP confessed to Rep.
Jose Cojuangco (LDP’s leader) that he voted for Bondoc even though Bondoc was a member of the NP. He confessed that he
believed in his conscience that Bondoc truly won the election. This resulted to Camasura’s expulsion from the LDP. Pineda
then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. They further prayed that a new election be held and that the new
LDP representative be appointed in the HRET. This new representative will be voting for Pineda in the reopening of the
election contest. Camasura was then removed by HRET’s chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera. Naturally, Bondoc
questioned such action before the Supreme Court (SC).
Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because Camasura’s removal is an
official act of Congress and by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary may not interfere.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of the said act of the HRET without violating the
doctrine of separation of powers.
HELD: Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the legislature
particularly a part thereof, HRET. The issue here is a judicial question. It must be noted that what is being complained of is the
act of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been
made, members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein
Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached a decision.
They cannot hold the same election since the issue has already become moot and academic. LDP is merely changing their
representative to change the outcome of the election. Camasura should be reinstated because his removal was not due to a
lawful or valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. Expulsion of
Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from the SC. 5 coming from the majority party (LDP). And 1 coming
from the minority.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
“Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be members of the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.”

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

211 SCRA 315

Facts: On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a Resolution in GR No. 104704, disqualifying Melchor Chavez, private respondent
therein, from running for the Office of Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner filed an urgent motion with the
Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate through the fastest available means this Court’s Resolution dated May 5, 1992 to all
regional election directors, provincial election supervisors, city and municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors,
the six (6) accredited political parties and the general public; and (2) order said election officials to delete the name of Melchor
Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and to count all votes cast for the disqualified
Melchor, Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez. On May 8, 1992, the Comelec issued Res. No. 92-1322 which resolved to
delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all “Chavez”
votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez’ name in the list of qualified candidates.

Issue: Whether or not the law allows pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of the members of the Senate.

27
Held: A simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has no cause of action, the controversy presented
being one in the nature of a pre-proclamation.

While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local elective officials (Sec.
242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections for President, Vice-President,
Senator and Member of the House of Representatives. Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides: “For purposes of the elections
for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be
allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the
certificate of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body
motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election
returns before it.

PIMENTEL VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GR No 141489 29 November 2002

Facts: On 03 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect and election on 1998 was held in accordance to this.
Proclaimed winners were fourteen party-list representatives from thirteen organizations. This was assailed by Senator
Pimentel. He contend that party-list representatives should conform with Article 6 Section 17 – 18 of the 1987 Constitiution.

Issue: Whether or not Party-list System Act should be null and void?

Decision: Petition dismissed. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits to choose from among its members those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in
Electoral Tribunal.
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CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR. V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

G.R. No. 189506, February 11, 2010

FACTS:

In the 2007 elections, Bantay party-list group received the sufficient voting percentage entitling it to a seat in the House of
Representatives in which Petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the said party-list group.
Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr. , Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes. Jr. ,ErlindaCadapan, Antonia Flores, and
JoselitoUstarez are members of the other party-list groups filed with the HRET a petition for quo warrantoagainst Bantay and
its nominee, Palaparan. They alleged that Palapran is not eligible to sit in the House of Representative because he did not
belong to a marginalized and nderreprsented sectors which then are the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Forces
Geographical Units (CAFGUs), security guards and former rebels.
Palaparan claimed that he was just Bantay’s nominee and that HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually
the party-list that was elected to assume membership in the House of Representatives. Furthermore, he said that such
question should be raised before the party-list group, not before the HRET.
On July 23, 2009 HRET issued an order upholding its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner Palparan’s qualifications.
Palparan filed a motio for reconsideration but the HRET denied it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009.
ISSUE:

Whether the HRET has the jurisdiction concerning the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the
lower house of Congress.
HELD:

YES. Under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, the members of the Housse of Representatives are of two kinds:
“members who shall be elected from legislative districts” and “those who shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations”. Thus, it is the part-list representatives who are “elected”
into office, not their parties or organizations. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not
the organization that sits as and becomes member of the House of Representatives.

28
As contemplated in Section 17 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution , the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since the party-list representatives
and districts representatives are treated in like manner, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.
Once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and
assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

BELLO V. COMELEC

G.R. No. 191998, G.R. No. 192769, G.R. No. 192832

FACTS:

Ang Galing Pinoy Party-List (AGPP) on November 29, 2009, AGPP filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) its
Manifestation of Intent to participate in the May 10, 2010 elections. In order not to be disqualified, they must prove that the
party-list group and the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, and to the sectoral party,
organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent.

Mikey Arroyo was one of the party’s nominees. Here arose several questions regarding his qualification for, he is not only a
member of the First Family, but is also (a) an incumbent member of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Arroyo duly represents the marginalized sector he is representing; and
Whether the HRET has jurisdiction over the question of Arroyo’s qualifications as AGPP’s nominee after his proclamation and
assumption to office as a member of the House of Representatives.
HELD:

1. It held, among others, that a Filipino citizen, in order to qualify as a party-list nominee, only needs to be a bona fide
member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent, for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and must likewise be at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. The COMELEC en banc also
held that Section 6 of Resolution No. 8807 is ultra vires, since the requirement that a nominee belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector he seeks to represent is not found in RA 7941.Thus, it concluded that Arroyo possessed all the
requirements mandated by Section 9 of RA 7941.
2. This issue is far from novel and is an issue previously ruled upon by this Court. The consistent judicial holding is that the
HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office;
they are, for all intents and purposes, "elected members" of the House of Representatives although the entity directly voted
upon was their party. What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.
Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the
district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of
district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has
taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

DAZA VS SINGSON

G.R. No. 86344 December 21 1989

FACTS:

The HoR proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the CoA among several political parties represented in that chamber in
accordance with Art. VI Sec 18. The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in
the HoR. 24 members of the Liberal Party joined the LDP, reducing their former party to only 17 members.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the CoA by withdrawing the seat
occupied by Daza and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5th, the chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein Luis C. Singson as the additional
member from the LDP.

29
Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the CoA and the assumption of his seat by the Singson.
Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, SC issued a TRO that same day to
prevent both Daza and Singson from serving in the CoA.

Daza contented that he cannot be removed from the CoA because his election thereto is permanent. He claimed that the
reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment because the
LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability.
ISSUE: Whether or not the question raised by the Daza is political in nature and is beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.
RULING:

No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a discretionary act of the House of
Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the
wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments.
The term political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch
of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.
Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the Commission on Appointments
HELD:
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows:

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the
basis of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-
list system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The
Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their
submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.

The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at
any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must
be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or
formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.

The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled
to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.

COSETENG V MITRA

30
G.R. No. 86649 | July 12, 1990 | J.Griño-Aquino
Facts:

Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of Representatives under KAIBA, wrote to Speaker Ramon
Mitra to appoint her as a member of the Commission on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal – a request backed by nine
congressmen.
Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12 congressmen to the CA and later on, added
Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth member, representing the Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was
also organized as a party, prompting the revision of the House majority membership in CA due to political realignments and
the replacement of Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP).

Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for Extraordinary Legal Writs (considered as petition for
quo warranto and injunction) praying that the Court declare the election of respondent Ablan, Singson and the rest of the CA
members null and void on the theory that their election violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation
because the New Majority (LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members must be nominated and elected by their parties. She
further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of the support of 9 other congressmen from the Minority.

The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political question, hence outside the jurisdiction of the
Court, was in consonance with the “proportional representation” clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that petitioner was
bound by the Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the Coalesced Majority.
Issue:

W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional representation.

Held:

Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a political question but because revision in House
representation in CA was based on proportional representation.
The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP members in the House, comprising 79% of the
House membership. This granted them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two to LP and KBL as the next
largest parties. KAIBA, being a member of the Coalesced Majority, is bound by the majority choices. Even if KAIBA were an
opposition party, its lone member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the House membership and, hence, does not entitle
her a seat in the 12 House seats in CA.
Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and they signed
identical endorsements for her rival, Cong. Verano-Yap.
There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that CA members should have been nominated and elected by their parties
because of members were nominated by their floor leaders and elected by the House.

Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in Daza vs Singson in that the Constitution conferred the Court with
expanded jurisdiction to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been
committed by the other government branches.

TEOFISTO GUINGONA VS NEPTALI GONZALES

HRET’s Composition – Rounding Off

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators,
and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the
parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected.
The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD,
and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he
rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant
to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight
LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said
compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the CoA.

31
HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule
on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the
Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of
the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one
senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other party’s fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional
representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate
that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The election of
Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the
LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA.
Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a
seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation
especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.

BENGZON VS SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE EN BANC

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991 [Section 21, Article 6: Aids in Legislation: On Legislative Investigation]
FACTS:

PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan against Benjamin Romualdez, et al for engaging in devices, schemes and stratagems to
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of plaintiff and the Filipino people.
The Senate Minority Floor Leader Enrile delivered a speech before the Senate on the alleged take-over personal privilege
before the Senate on the alleged "takeover of SOLOIL Inc," the FlagShip of the First Manila Management of Companies or
FMMC by Ricardo Lopa and called upon the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case with regard to RA
3019 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public Officers [SBRC]) started its investigation on the
matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the SBRC to appear before it and testify on what they know
regarding the sale of 36 corporations belonging to Benjamin Romualdez. Lopa and Bengzon refused to testify, invoking their
rights to due process, and that their testimony may unduly prejudice the defendants and petitioners in case before the
Sandiganbayan.
SBRC rejected the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying and the SBRC continued its investigation of the matter.
The petitioners filed for prohibition with a prayer for TRO and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the SBRC in requiring their
attendance and testimony, acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose.

The Supreme Court intervened upon a motion for reconsideration filed by one of the defendants of the civil case.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction over the case.

2. Whether or not the SBRC's inquiry has valid legislative purpose.
3. whether or not the civil case of Sandiganbayan is beyond the power of the SBRC to inquire into.
4. Whether or not the inquiry violates the petitioners' right to due process.
RULING:

1. Yes. In Angara vs Electoral Commission, the Constitution provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. The Court has provided that the allocation
of constitutional boundaries is a task which the judiciary must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent
case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the
1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private affairs in purported aid of
legislation.
2. No.

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The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in
connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters
vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.
It appears, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" because it is
not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the
relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act",
a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature.
3. No. It cannot be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e.,
the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be
conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly,
neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.
4. Yes. The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.

It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the banning or prohibition of investigations where a
violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in the course of the proceedings, the right of persons should be
respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness testifying at all, simply because he is already
facing charges before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Constitution allows him to interpose objections whenever an
incriminating question is posed or when he is compelled to reveal his court defenses, but not to refuse to take the witness
stand completely.

CAMILO SABIO VS RICHARD GORDON

504 SCRA 704 – Political Law – Inquiry in aid of legislation – public officers
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 “directing an inquiry in aid of
legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC),
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the
alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator
Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public
meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of
E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s
unhampered performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he
threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The
Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of
inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the
operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of
inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional
rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government
policies and their effective implementation.

33
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA

495 SCRA 170 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Legislative Branch – Question Hour – Constitutionality of E.O. 464

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This
prompted the Senate to conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the
NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to speak before
the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said
hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon,
the senate president, excepted the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and
scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the
department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National
Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the
PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from
appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the president’s approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except
themselves. Despite EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying President
Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and
Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s
constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of Congress to conduct investigation in
aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought
to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly
recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing
either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words,
the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information –
which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power,
and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet
would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section
22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which
anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus
made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the
question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and
complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates
to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation,
while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section
21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by
refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that
they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on
her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which
is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is
only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the

34
appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to
appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the
refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the
President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its
right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads
must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires
their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in
Arnault.
NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The rest invalid.

On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking Executive Order No. 464 and
Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution,
existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative
inquiries in aid of legislation.

GUDANI VS. SENGA

GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22: Congress' Power of Inquiry; Legislative Investigation]
FACTS:

The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing of the “Hello
Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment from
appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting
Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two
appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their
assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen.
Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior
officer.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing them from testifying
before a legislative inquiry.
RULING:

Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that
as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of
Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate
remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be
compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to
compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has
the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials
summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations
on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of
the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief
Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s
prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to
judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did
not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware
that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces,
the clash may soon loom or actualize.
35
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers
before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to
testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

ROMULO NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

549 SCRA 77 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The Legislative Department – Inquiry in aid of legislation – Executive
Privilege
Legislative (Sec 21) & Oversight (Sec 22) Powers
In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00 (approximately
P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions
relative to the NBN deal. On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive officials and
power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he
was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange
for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that
she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, Neri
refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the SBRC averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The
SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls under executive privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in
pursuit of legislation.

The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner
can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And

3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability
of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

ROMERO V. ESTRADA (2009)

G.R. No. 174105
FACTS

Petitioners Romero II and other members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders, Inc., were invited on an investigation with
regards to the investment of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project. The
said investigation will aid the Senate in determining possible amendments of Republic Act 8042 other known as the Migrant
Workers Act.
ISSUE

Whether the Senate Committee’s inquiry is sub judice to the subject raised at hand?
HELD

YES. As briefly stated in Arnualt vs. Nazareno;

The power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
36
intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not
infrequently true recourse must be had to others who possess it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

ARTURO TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE

235 SCRA 630 (1994) – 249 SCRA 635 (1995) – Political Law – Origination of Revenue Bills – EVAT – Amendment by
Substitution
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax
(EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as
required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3
readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate
Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what
Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way “the
bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. (It’s ironic however to note
that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.

HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the
power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply
means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances
before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are
concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a
mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has
been done.

HEHERSON ALVAREZ VS TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR.

252 SCRA 695 – Political Law – Municipal Corporation – LGU Requirement – Income – Inclusion of IRAs
In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City to be
known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the House of Representatives.
In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817 was introduced in the Senate.
In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the Senate conducted a public hearing on SB
1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it
was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720).
Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the ground that the bill creating the
law did not originate from the lower house and that City of Santiago was not able to comply with the income of at least P20M
per annum in order for it to be a city. That in the computation of the reported average income of P20,974,581.97, the IRA was
included which should not be.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.
2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGU’s income.
HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows. Further, the Senate held in abeyance
any hearing on the said SB while the HB was on its 1st, 2nd and 3rd reading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its 1st
hearing on the said SB one month after the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well).
2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGU’s average annual income as was done in the case at bar. The
IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs
regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government
unit. They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.

37
To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or
transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that
unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of “funding support from the
national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations.

GARCIA VS MATA

G.R. No. L-33713 July 30, 1975

Facts:

The donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact
that the law was passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that
the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public
purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to
be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null
and void.
Issue:

Whether RA 1600 is valid. Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?

Held:

The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation
item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental
policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP.
Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of the
constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated
provision attached to the GAA.
It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title of the act. When
an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions
are void, inoperative and without effect.
SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

DEMETRIO DEMETRIA VS MANUEL ALBA

148 SCRA 208 – Political Law – Transfer of Funds – Power of the President to Realign Funds
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then Minister of
the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria
assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that:
“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or
activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.”
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

38
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under the Constitution. It empowers
the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to
any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved
after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which
the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to
be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the
provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GAA may be allowed by law
in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.

PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ

G.R. No. 113105 August 19 1994 [Article VI Section 25 - Appropriations]

FACTS:

Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations Act of 1994.

GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress the REalignment of Allocation for Operational
Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives are the ones authorized
under the Constitution to realign savings, not the individual members of Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imposed certain provisional conditions: that the AFP
Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the pension funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits of the
AFP.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.
RULING:

Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowed to approve the realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned are actually savings, and 2) the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said transfer to be made.
As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative of of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. the AFP Chief of Staff may not be given
authority.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC. VS PEDRO GIMENEZ

15 SCRA 479 – Political Law – Salaries of the Members of Congress – Other Emolument
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of Republic Act No. 3836 insofar as the same allows
retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives. PHILCONSA now seeks to
enjoin Pedor Gimenez, the Auditor General, from disbursing funds therefor.
According to PHILCONSA, the provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase
of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution. The same provision constitutes “selfish class legislation” because it allows members and officers of Congress to
retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service,
which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the
government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one
month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick
leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the
legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.

39
The Solicitor General, arguing for Congress, averred that the grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No.
3836 to the officers does not constitute “forbidden compensation” within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and
sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely “in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member”
and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional.
HELD: No, the said law is unconstitutional. Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, provides:

The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual
compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and
exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from their respective district in the case of Members of the House of
Representatives and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress.
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.

When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it
was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National
Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase.
In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the
salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly
elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation “other
emoluments”.
“Emolument” is “the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is
annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.”

It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services
of one possessing any office.
RA 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect
upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder,
without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving
such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is
hereby declared unconstitutional by the SC.

VALENTIN TIO VS VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD

151 SCRA 208 – Political Law – The Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill
Delegation of Power – Delegation to Administrative Bodies

In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” was enacted which gave
broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to minimize the economic
effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The
proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss
may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the
LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the
law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body, because the law allowed the VRB to
deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said PD.

40
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are correct.
HELD: No.

1. The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof”
is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to
achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in
its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply
one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was conferred to
the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and implementation of the law.
Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and limited
period” with the deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the direction and control of the [VRB].”

PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS PETE PRADO

227 SCRA 703 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection – Franking Privilege of the Judiciary
Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to withdraw franking privileges from
certain government agencies. Franking privilege is a privilege granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal
service free of charge.
In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the postal service comes from the
judiciary’s use of the postal service (issuance of court processes). Hence, the postal service recommended that the franking
privilege be withdrawn from the judiciary. AS a result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said franking privilege.
The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity of Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA
claimed that the said provision is violative of the equal protection clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking
privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need is the high expense allotted to the judiciary’s franking
needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in
order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking
privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the
problem is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the
government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from
others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the
Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction (it
is true that the postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from other agencies of the government but still, the judiciary is
different because its operation largely relies on the mailing of court processes). This might in fact sometimes result in unequal
protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of
the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and
different from all others in these same particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the
courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the
members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater
need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.

ARTURO TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE

235 SCRA 630 (1994) – 249 SCRA 635 (1995) – Political Law – Origination of Revenue Bills – EVAT – Amendment by
Substitution

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Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax
(EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as
required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3
readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate
Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what
Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way “the
bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. (It’s ironic however to note
that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.

HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with the
power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply
means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances
before where Senate passed its own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are
concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a
mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has
been done.

TAN V DEL ROSARIO

Facts:

1. Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which
amended certain provisions of the NIRC, as well as the Rules and Regulations promulgated by public respondents pursuant to
said law.
2. Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it allegedly violates the following provisions of the Constitution:
-Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.

- Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive
system of taxation.
- Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

3. Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded their rule-making authority in applying SNIT to general
professional partnerships. Petitioner contends that the title of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for being merely
entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their
Profession" (Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when the full text of the title actually reads,
'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed and Professionals Engaged In The
Practice of Their Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code,' as amended. Petitioners
also contend it violated due process.

5. The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public respondents.

6. The Court has given due course to both petitions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the tax law is unconstitutional for violating due process
NO. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only when there is a clear contravention of inherent or constitutional
limitations in the exercise of the tax power. No such transgression is so evident in herein case.

1. Uniformity of taxation, like the concept of equal protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly
situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities. Uniformity does not violate classification as long as: (1) the
standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative
purpose, (3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the classification applies
equally well to all those belonging to the same class.

42
2. What is apparent from the amendatory law is the legislative intent to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the
schedular approach in the income taxation of individual taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the present global treatment
on taxable corporations. The Court does not view this classification to be arbitrary and inappropriate.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not public respondents exceeded their authority in promulgating the RR

No. There is no evident intention of the law, either before or after the amendatory legislation, to place in an unequal footing or
in significant variance the income tax treatment of professionals who practice their respective professions individually and of
those who do it through a general professional partnership.

TOLENTINO V. SECRETARY OF FINANCE

Facts:

The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or
exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various
grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of
the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is
also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.
Issue:

Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) ofthe Constitution
Held:

The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the
Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny
the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution
simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills
and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the
Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as
action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the
Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had
certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a billby the President the requirement of 3 readings on
separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weigh tof legislative practice.

NEPTALI GONZALES VS MACARAIG

Political Law – Veto Power – Inappropriate Provision in an Appropriation Bill

Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations
Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY ’90). Gonzalez
averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover
provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are
provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but
should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that
would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI,
Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the
prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the
President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.

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HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in
separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as “item,” which can be
vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules that even assuming
arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section 16 (FY ’90) were not
“provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are “inappropriate provisions” that should be treated as “items” for the
purpose of the President’s veto power.

CESAR BENGZON VS FRANKLIN DRILON

208 SCRA 133 – Political Law – Veto Power of the President

In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were “repealed” during the time of former
President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of
the constitutional commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among
government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law
should not give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.

Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking the court to readjust their
pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was one of those
unpublished PDs which were subject of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non
publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted
additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in the following manner: Congress made
an item entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances of
the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in
the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the constitutionality of the veto made
by the President. The President was represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic
Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court
neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the
repeal of existing laws.

The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or
items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said
item. It appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done.
The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or
not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the
portion which pertained to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations to the other
departments of the government.

KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAGLILINGKOD SA PAMAHALAAN NG PILIPINAS, INC., HERMINIGILDO C. DUMLAO,

GERONIMO Q. QUADRA, and MARIO C. VILLANUEVA v. HON. BIENVENIDO TAN G.R. No. 81311. June 30, 1988
FACTS:

The four consolidated cases questions the validity of the VAT (Executive Order 273) for being unconstitutional in that its
enactment is not allegedly within the powers of the President; that the VAT is oppressive, discriminatory, regressive, and
violates the due process and equal protection clauses and other provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
The Solicitor General prays for the dismissal of the petitions on the ground that the petitioners have failed to show justification
for the exercise of its judicial powers. He also questions the legal standing of the petitioners who, he contends, are merely
asking for an advisory opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable controversy for resolution.
ISSUE: Whether VAT is unconstitutional.

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RULING:
No. First, the Court held that the President had authority to issue EO 273 as it was provided in the Provisional constitution that
the President shall have legislative powers.

Second, petitioners have failed to show that EO 273 was issued capriciously and whimsically or in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It appears that a comprehensive study of the VAT had been extensively
discussed by this framers and other government agencies involved in its implementation, even under the past administration.
Lastly, petitioners also failed to prove that EO 273 is oppressive, discriminatory, unjust and regressive, in violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners merely rely upon newspaper articles which are actually hearsay and have evidentiary value. To
justify the nullification of a law. there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication. As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax.

PROVINCE OF ABRA VS HAROLD HERNANDO

107 SCRA 104 – Political Law – Exemption From Taxes – The Church
The Province of Abra sought to tax the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop, Inc. of Bangued. Judge Harold Hernando
dismissed the petition of Abra without hearing its side. Hernando ruled that there “is no question that the real properties
sought to be taxed by the Province of Abra are properties of the respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc.”
Likewise, there is no dispute that the properties including their produce are actually, directly and exclusively used by the
Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. for religious or charitable purposes.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties of the church (in this case) is exempt from taxes.
HELD: No, they are not tax exempt. It is true that the Constitution provides that “charitable institutions, mosques, and non-
profit cemeteries” are required that for the exemption of “lands, buildings, and improvements,” they should not only be
“exclusively” but also “actually” and “directly” used for religious or charitable purposes. The exemption from taxation is not
favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. However, in this case,
there is no showing that the said properties are actually and directly used for religious or charitable uses.

ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE VS AQUINO (G.R. NO. L-39086)

FACTS: Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the Securities and
Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul and declare void the “Notice of Seizure’ and the “Notice of Sale” of
its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said
“Notice of Seizure” by respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the
satisfaction of the said taxes thereon.

The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in its questioned decision. The trial court
ruled for the government, holding that the second floor of the building is being used by the director for residential purposes and
that the ground floor used and rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the property
is not being used exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal, petitioner availed of the instant petition
for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August
1974.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational purposes.
HELD: Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, expressly grants exemption from realty
taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements
used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes.ﾝ Reasonable emphasis has always been made that the
exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes.
The use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case
at bar, the lease of the first floor of the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination
be considered incidental to the purpose of education. The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for
purposes mentioned in the Constitution.

45
The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification that half of the assessed tax be returned to the
petitioner. The modification is derived from the fact that the ground floor is being used for commercial purposes (leased) and
the second floor being used as incidental to education (residence of the director).

WENCESLAO PASCUAL VS SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS

110 Phil. 331 – Political Law – Appropriation For Private Use Not Allowed
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 “for the construction, reconstruction, repair,
extension and improvement Pasig feeder road terminals”. Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of
the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals sought to be
improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a member of
the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact
that he owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA
would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications be restrained from releasing
funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.
HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The subsequent donation of the property
to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when
the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be
exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for the
advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged
then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.

AGLIPAY V. RUIZ, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937

Facts:

Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent Ruiz, the Director of
Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress
organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the
Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose – for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.
Issue:

Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held/Reason:

The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not contemplate any favor
upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the
government just took advantage of an event considered of international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its
provision on the separation of the Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional
mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’. Emphasizing
that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby manifested reliance upon Him who guides
the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact,
certain general concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.’

GUINGONA, JR. VS. CARAGUE

G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991

FACTS:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion
appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the
appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177,
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entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD
No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its
Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.”

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the
budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest
budgetary priority to education.”
ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education.
HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the highest
budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the
power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can
reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More
especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt
service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby
assailed as unconstitutional

OSMEÑA vs. ORBOS

220 SCRA 703

" To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of the power to tax, there must be a standard which implies that the legislature
determines matter of principle and lays down fundamental policy."
FACTS: Senator John Osmeña assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956, as amended by EO 137, empowering
the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the increase of fuel prices or impose additional amounts on petroleum
products which proceeds shall accrue to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) established for the reimbursement to ailing oil
companies in the event of sudden price increases. The petitioner avers that the collection on oil products establishments is an
undue and invalid delegation of legislative power to tax. Further, the petitioner points out that since a 'special fund' consists of
monies collected through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to
the special purpose/objective for which it was created. It thus appears that the challenge posed by the petitioner is premised
primarily on the view that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation
power of the State.
ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation?
HELD: None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the
police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It
is segregated from the general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund
nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the
constitutional description of a "special fund." With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds
that the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides a
sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to protect the local
consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional
amounts to augment the resources of the Fund.

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. V. CA

G.R. No. 110571. October 7, 1994.

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Second Division sustaining the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
over appeals from the decisions of the Board of Investments and, consequently, dismissing the petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by petitioner.

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ISSUE:

WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from the decisions of the Board of Investments.
RULING:

Yes. The authority of the Court of Appeals to decide cases appealed to it by the BOI must be deemed to have been conferred
by B.P. Blg. 129, Sec. 9, to be exercised by it in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Circular No. 1-91

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996

FACTS:

On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which created the
Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic
military reservation into alternative productive uses.
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippines government.
Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport,
buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy.
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993,
expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone
and submitted such to the Office of the President.
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993.

The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economi
Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.
The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993,
requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.

On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject thereof was merely a
resolution and not an ordinance.
On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein
the portion of the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.
On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local
referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum.

On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public
respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law.
Issue:

1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the
referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10
2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powersof the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such
initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."
Ruling:

1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a
REFERENDUM only.
In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below,the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times,
but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was
entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum

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Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description"referendum". To repeat, not once was the word
"initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.
As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws,and to enact or reject them at the polls independent
of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or
measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors
become a law.
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over
the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or
change the substance or the content of legislation.

2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage and not yet an approved
law.
The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there
would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved
ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a
proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may
decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.
In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the
commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative
since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that
matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the
pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no
decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction
over, in the exercise of its review powers.

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