Agostinho Augusto Nhacula was born in In-

hambane, the Southern Province of Mozam-

bique in 1982. He attended his Primary Educa-
tion from 1990 to 1997. Thenceforth he en-
tered the secondary education (Escola
Secundária Emilia Daússe de Inhambane) HERMENEUTICS
which he finished successfully in 2002.
OF INTERPRETATION
In the following year he joined the Capuchins
and attended the Minor Seminary in Queli-
mane (Seminário S. Agostinho). In 2004 he
was admitted to the Postulancy. In 2005 he
entered in the Noviciate in Mocuba where he
made his first vows in January 2006.

Since then, he has been studying philosophy at

the Studium Philosophicum in Pretoria. He has
several fascicles published which include Re-
flecting Philosophically and In Search of man.

The nature of truth seen from the correlation between the

thought in the mind and the sensed object as it exists outside
the mind, points to two paradigmatic and contentious issues in
epistemology and hermeneutics, namely objectivity and uni-
versality. Taking into account the above definition of truth, we
can rightly say that any kind of truth is objective and univer-
sally accepted by any rational entity. This is justified by the
fact that the object outside the mind, exists inexorably as it is
independent of the observer’s thinking or not about it (Cf.
Mathew 2006: 22). This realist position can be illustrated by
the following example. When I say the dog is sleeping, any
person can attest the truth of this statement by looking at the
sleeping dog. Now whether I think or not about the dog, the AGOSTINHO AUGUSTO
truth is that the dog lies somewhere, motionless in a sleeping
state. Hence, we can objectively say that truth even if it is
highly differentiated in its many existential forms, tends to-
wards objectivity and universality.
 Index

Introduction…………………………………………….4
© Manjanguissa Publications
P.O. Box 11939, 0048, Pretoria
I. Philosophical Hermeneutics – an analysis ...………..4
Copyright : Hermeneutics of Interpretation
1.1. The nature and the problem of Hermeneutics………………..5
Agostinho Augusto 1.2. The Value of Hermeneutics………………………………….8
November 2009
II. Hermeneutics and the problem of Language……..10

2.1. Humboldt’s nature and conformation of language – a

summary…………………………………………………………….13
2.2. The subjective nature of Hermeneutics……………………..14
2.3. Truth and diversity in Hermeneutics………………………..16

III. Phenomenology and Fundamental Ontology ……18

3.1. The hermeneutics of ‘Dasein’………………………………...19

3.1.1. ‘Being’ as the correlate of the ‘there’……....21
3.2. Understanding as the primary awareness of Being…………...22

Conclusion……………………………………………….24

Bibliography……………………………………………..26

27
Bibliography

Mathew, J. 2006. Epistemology: Study guidelines. Kerala –

India: Unpublished

Muellerr-Vollmer, K. (Ed). 1986. The Hermeneutics reader. HERMENEUTICS

UK. Basil Blackwell Ltd.
OF INTERPRETATION
Ormiston, GL. & Schrift, AD. (Eds). 1990. The hermeneutic
tradition: from Ast to Ricoeur. New York: State University
of New York Press.

Peeters, L. 2009. Lectures on philosophical hermeneutics.

Pretoria: St. John Vianney Seminary. TO BEATRIZ COUTINHO
For love and Friendship
Stumpf, SM. & Fieser, J. 2003. Socrates to Sartre and be-
yond: a history of philosophy (7th Ed). New York: McGraw-
Hill.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermeneutics

AGOSTINHO AUGUSTO

26
 linked to human sciences while truth by virtue of its objec-
Introduction tivity is virtually accepted within the parameters of natural
sciences. Hence, truth and hermeneutical meaning are dis-
tinct and to a higher degree separate.
There is in almost all human beings a longing for mean-
ing. Our life is a web of complex facts teeming with Finally, Heidegger in his exposition presents Dasein as fun-
meaning, yet not all of us have the exact understanding damentally characterised by its ‘understanding’ and ‘state-
that is required to grasp the significance of life. Herme- of-mind’ which are conceived of as being equiprimordial to
neutics and perhaps more importantly, philosophical her- its Being. Moreover, it encompasses an existentiale prone of
meneutics is an attempt to assess this complex web of meaning, interpretation and facticity, which arise in relation
facts in order to provide the meaning that each one of us with other entities who are there for the sake of Dasein.
pursues. ‘Being-there’ is such that it is contained in the world and the
world contained in it.
In this essay I will examine several issues in Hermeneu-
tics, much of which were raised in class. In no more than
three chapters I will highlight in philosophical Hermeneu-
tics its nature, problem and value, not leaving behind its
subjective approach and the relation that exists between
hermeneutics and truth. Furthermore, I will discursively
analyse the concept of Dasein as advanced by Heidegger
by putting forward the disclosure of ‘understanding’,
‘meaning’ and ‘interpretation’ in the light of my personal
understanding of the reading of the Heideggarian Phe-
nomenology and Fundamental Ontology. Presented in a
linguistically simple style, the essay is mainly a personal
analysis on several hermeneutical concepts with a special
emphasis on language, which plays an indispensable role
in the development of hermeneutics.

I. Philosophical Hermeneutics – an analysis

The emergence of Hermeneutics in philosophical arena as

an art of interpretation appears as a great help in as much
as we observe certain problems and contradictions in phi-

4
25
ing present in the Being of Dasein. It is worthwhile consid-
ering the relation existing between the entity and Dasein.
Meaning appears only with reference to Dasein’s relation
with the existing entities. Thus, through the disclosedness of
entities, meaning arises in the Dasein as its mode of relating
to them.
Thus, meaning appears as a third-order faculty in the devel-
opment of the Dasein after ‘understanding’ and the ‘state-
of-mind’, however not equiprimordial with Being in as
much as meaning only arises from Dasein’s interaction with
other entities.
Conclusion
Philosophical Hermeneutics that arose with Heidegger was
intended to provide a meaning about man and the universe
through the interpretation of written texts. However as a hu-
man act of interpretation, it faces some obstacles, which ap-
pear in its relation to language as well as from its very na-
ture in so far as it is subjective and particular.
Notwithstanding these obstacles, hermeneutics has been of a
great value to both human and natural sciences in that it pro-
vides an interpretation of both written and spoken word. It
owes much of its achievements to language, which is a nec-
essary if not indispensable tool in the way towards a satis-
factorily personal meaning.
In a brief examination of the relation between truth and her-
meneutics we came to the conclusion that though both fields
have some relations, they have considerable differences of
nature and aim that makes it impossible to put them under
the same umbrella. While truth leans towards objectivity
and universality, hermeneutics explores more the subjective
and particular side of reality. Hermeneutics appears closely
24
losophy itself. Before settling an understanding and the
value of Hermeneutics, it is important to enter into a brief
exposition of the nature of philosophy and the dilemma
that the term represents to modern thinkers.
The etymology of the term “philosophy” goes back to the
Greek words “philein”, literally meaning “to love”, and
“sophia” often translated as “wisdom’. The philosophical
dilemma appears when we observe that the term “sophia”
has more than one meaning, since it can also mean
“cunning” or “to manipulate”. This explains then the exis-
tence of a philosophical current called Sophism in Ancient
Greece. From this observation it can be noted that philoso-
phy does not only serve one purpose “love of wisdom” but
also various others including the “art of manipulating or
convincing” as pointed out above. This opposing nature of
philosophy is cumbersome in the process of attaining the
truth that philosophy partially clings to.
The merging of hermeneutics with philosophy that re-
sulted in philosophical Hermeneutics represents a new
shift in the paradigm that attempts to spur a clear under-
standing of philosophical texts with their concepts and
problems, and whose example was clearly portrayed
above. Hermeneutics in its attempt to examine the mean-
ing through the interpretation of both written and some-
times spoken words fills the philosophy room with an-
other tool not less important in the difficult task of arriv-
ing at a fundamental knowledge about the nature of man,
the universe and God.
1.1. The nature and the problem of Hermeneutics
The definition of Hermeneutics is quite simple, yet its task
5

is clouded by doubts and uncertainties that have led some
people to view it as unimportant (cf. Mueller-Vollmer,
1986:73). Being an art of interpretation, the first question
arising thereof is: how many types of interpretation can
there be and among so many forms of interpreting a text,
which one can be regarded as accurate? To better under-
stand the extent of the problem let us imagine two family
members going to two different parishes for a Sunday
Mass where they hear the same Gospel reading. Back at
home; a discussion arises on how each Priest understood
the gospel. To their amazement, there were different inter-
pretations over the same gospel passage. Now, in this
problem, where does hermeneutics stand and what is its
value and aim in interpreting the text so differently? Will
each one claim that his interpretation is the most accurate
or will one give up his view for the other?
Another complex hermeneutical problem is posed by
Mueller-Vollmer who translated a book by Schleier-
macher from German to English. The point of contradic-
tion is where he remarks, “It is commonly believed that by
following general principles one can trust one’s common
sense. But if that is so, by following special principles, one
can trust one’s natural instincts (Mueller-Vollmer
1986:73). This passage differs considerably from the one
edited by Ormiston & Schrift where in reference to the
same original text by Schleiermacher they translated as
follows: “Usually one supposes that one could rely on a
healthy knowledge of human nature for formulating the
general principles of interpretation. But there is the dan-
ger that one would also tend to rely on a healthy feeling
about the exceptional qualities of a text in determining
what they meant (1990: 85).
6
fact that a person becomes conscious of himself as a consci-
entious entity in existence amidst other conscious and non-
conscious existents. The mere fact that Dasein becomes
conscious of its Being-in-the-world, as a thrown entity and
as that Being who is aware of the possibilities that lie ahead,
is understood as ‘understanding’.
Moreover, interpretation as a derivative of understanding is
viewed as the disclosure of the possibilities inherent in un-
derstanding (Op. cit 221). Interpretation is thus the act of
bringing forth the light from the primordial level of under-
standing which will open up a new horizon for discovering
further possibilities projected in understanding. That is why
the world when interpreted appears to the Dasein as the
‘ready-at-hand’ for its intended purpose already disclosed in
the interpretation. For example, while I understand (I am
aware) that I am surrounded by water, my interpretation will
suggest that this water can be used to quench my thirst, to
wash my body and clothes, or to be used for my general en-
tertainment. As a consequence, understanding does not sim-
ply entail Dasein’s self-awareness and vulnerability, but it
encompasses the awareness of other non-Dasein entities,
through which interpretation comes to give us the purpose
pertaining to every entity in their entirety.
Finally, meaning as related to interpretation and understand-
ing, is that by virtue of which something becomes intelligi-
ble as ‘something’, structured from a fore-having, fore-sight
and fore-conception (Op. cit 224). Meaning understood in
these terms pertains to the existential nature of the Dasein
and not as an appropriation of the entities (something). In
simple words, meaning is that which emerges from the
Dasein in its encounter with the entities and after it has con-
sidered its understanding and interpretation. An entity can-
not tell Dasein what it means, for in its existence alongside
Dasein it has no meaning, so far as it depends on the mean-
23
without the other. The ‘Being’ which is found ‘there’ corre-
sponds quite evidently to the throwness of the Dasein in the
world, which explains its relationship of a meaningful exis-
tence with other entities constitutive of the world. ‘Being-
there’ corresponds to the Being in the world, in which
Dasein is contained in the world and in turn the world in the
Dasein (Mueller-Vollmer 1986: 215). Quite often interpret-
ers tend to miss this correlation by reducing ‘Dasein’ to a
mere ‘there’ or simply a place. This reduction creates an
existential instability in the structures of the Dasein, since it
appears that what exists is simply the ‘there’ without the
‘Being’ or the ‘Being’ without its ‘there’. Even though I
have argued earlier on about the possibility of a world exist-
ing without the mind thinking of it, the Heideggarian con-
ception of the Dasein cannot be disassociated from its fun-
damental existential characteristics, viz. its being in the
‘there’. Hence, Dasein as ‘Being-there’ corresponds to an
intrinsic correlation of ‘Being’ with its place (there) without
which its existence would be inconceivable.
3.2. Understanding as the primary awareness of Being
Heidegger’s writings appear bewildering to many people,
and to some extent this is arguably evident in so far as we
observe that he tends to ascribe to some commonly known
words such as ‘understanding’, ‘interpretation’ and
‘meaning’ a signification of his own, thus rendering to the
reader an impression that the text is confused. The term
‘understanding’ looks quite intriguing to my mind as I
strive to understand what Heidegger meant by its applica-
tion in his writings. Thus, it appears to me that Heidegger
uses the term ‘understanding’ in its simplest form of acquir-
ing an elementary awareness of the facticity of the Dasein.
Heidegger does not seem to have used this term in his work
on ‘Being and Time’. My application of the word
‘awareness’ is due to the lack of better words to explain the
22
The two translations as we can observe differ from one
another, and in the second part there is an attempt at inter-
preting the original text which however led the translators
far from what the text meant. The first difference is found
in the first sentence where the translator one puts an em-
phasis on common sense, whereas the second stresses a
healthy human knowledge. When the first translator
speaks of “common sense”, he may want to infer to that
knowledge commonly held by the majority of people
while the second translator by referring to a “healthy
knowledge” he may mean a profoundly well balanced un-
derstanding of the basic principles underlying a specific
body of knowledge that does not necessarily require the
approval of the majority. This form of misinterpretation is
known in Hermeneutics as hineninterpretation (Peeters
2009).
These two problems are a clear example that leads herme-
neutics to be severely criticized especially on the matters
related with the reliability of its understanding and the in-
terpreted meaning deriving thereof. The common argu-
ment of hermeneutics in defence of its principles is that
there is no single or objective meaning in a text. But this
seemingly accommodative nature of hermeneutics is prob-
lematic by its very nature. In fact by allowing so many
forms of interpretation it will be very difficult to arrive at
an absolute certainty. Here we risk being thrown into the
assumption of allowing an endless regress of multitude
forms of interpretation, which may not have any thing in
common with the original text under study.
Furthermore, some texts such as constitutions are ex-
pected to be objectively understood in the same way by
people who are subject to them. Thus any attempt at inter-
7
preting the law may lead one to adopt a form of understand-
ing, which is far from what the law requires, and in such
circumstances incur the punishment prescribed by law. Any
form of understanding must be as much as possible in line
with what the text means, since the text has its meaning in-
dependent of the reader’s intention. We shall examine this
more extensively in the next chapter.
1.2. The Value of Hermeneutics
It is difficult to express in few words the extent of herme-
neutical value in assessing a written text or a spoken word.
This is due to the fact that these two-dimensional natures of
language (written and spoken) are problematic in their own
stance and always call for a clarification. Going deeper into
the problem that these two dimensions pose to human un-
derstanding, we discover that the fundamental problem lies
in the “meaning”. Our daily encounters and conversations
are only valuable if what we communicate is properly re-
ceived and understood by those who hear us. The lack of
understanding is often the root cause of disagreements and
conflicts in human relationships. Thus, many problems
could have been avoided if we had to involve ourselves seri-
ously in a continuous attempt to grasp the “meaning” inher-
ent in the message we perceive.
The thirst for meaning gave rise to hermeneutics, which is a
constant attempt at making sense out of the written text or a
spoken word under the premises of General Hermeneutics.
The art of interpretation furnishes us with the necessary
skills required in some daily encounters and conversations
to make sense of what we communicate and how we under-
stand others. Thus, it can rightly be said that Hermeneutics
is as old as the language although it is historically new. As
shown bellow, Hermeneutics can be analysed in terms of
spoken language and symbolic or written language.
8 21
latter cannot contain the former in its limited and existential
nature. The delicacy of Dasein, which is transmuted into its
throwness, reveals its limitation in understanding the com-
plexity of the universe at large. Understanding here is used
to refer to that condition of the human mind, which strives
to grasp a meaning, by the use of the synthetic method and
not in the way Heidegger used it in his writings. Hence, the
world cannot be contained in the Dasein in its entirety.
The third and last observation is that which concerns the
existentiality of the Dasein as ‘that which is not yet’ (Op. cit
218). It becomes apparent from a perusal reading of this
chapter that Dasein is sometimes presented as that which is
and sometimes as that which is not yet. How can Dasein be
that which is not yet? For that which is not is irreversibly
not, no matter how hard we may try to achieve it, since
Dasein will remain essentially that which is not yet. I mean
by this that ‘that which is not’ cannot be in any case. It re-
mains as it is, or simply nothing. Thus, Dasein is not; cannot
be thought of as Being, since it is simply non-Being. As it
appears in the text, Dasein is a project, a possibility; that
which is to come or something like a beacon that shows us
the direction, yet we cannot reach to it for as much as we
move faster, it fades away with the same velocity. In this
way, Dasein becomes a continuous motivator for our ongo-
ing self-realisation, self-consciousness and facticity. It is a
possibility that remains impossible, a project that never
ceases to be a project; an unachievable goal that draws us
away from our comfort zones.
3.1.1. ‘Being’ as the correlate of the ‘there’
It is quite evident from the definition of the ‘Being-there’
that there is an intrinsic relation between the subject ‘Being’
and the adverb ‘there’. Their correlation indicates their close
interdependence in a way that one cannot be thought of
‘understanding’ as a phenomenon with its own mood, yet
conceived as a basic mode of Dasein’s Being (Op. cit
215). It appears absurd to me that ‘understanding’ is here
assigned a primordial position with the Being of Dasein.
For how come ‘understanding’ occupies a prominent posi-
tion in a Being without consciousness? Can there be an
understanding in a Being that has not yet reached an ac-
ceptable level of mature consciousness? The term under-
standing as it is commonly conceived has always been a
later development in a person’s thinking process. We can-
not conceive of it as equiprimordial to Being, for by its
own nature it manifests itself in the Being only after a
hard won activity of cognition; a long process of synthe-
sizing and putting together different pieces and ultimately
formulate a set of ideas that are meaningful to the mind. If
‘understanding’ is primordial to Being, then all the strug-
gles of the mind that we experience in the attainment of a
meaning become absolutely meaningless.
The second observation refers to Heidegger’s assertion
that the world exists for the sake of Dasein who exists in
the world (Op. cit 215). The facticity of Dasein’s Being-
in-the-world is absolutely undisputable if we conceive it
as just Being-there. However, to aver that the world is
‘that for the sake of which Dasein is’ is paradoxical. The
world has since the dawn of the human mind been incom-
prehensible, even today when we have become highly spe-
cialised in our search for meaning and purpose. What we
have in mind concerning the world is a tiny portion com-
pared to the incommensurable dimensions of the Uni-
verse. Moreover, in the doctrinal teaching of Realism, al-
though a person might interact with the world, this inter-
action does not affect the world. “The world existed be-
fore mind was aware of it and will exist after mind ceases
to be aware of it (Mathew 2006:22)”. The extent of the
world surpasses Dasein’s intelligibility so greatly that the
20
In terms of a spoken language, hermeneutics constitutes
an aid in so far as it helps us to examine the meaning of
the words, the phrasal constructions and the train of
thought as carried out by the interviewee and the inter-
viewer in a given interview or in a normal daily conversa-
tion. Although it sounds paradoxical to apply the herme-
neutical method on spoken word, experience shows that
this is possible and necessary in our conversations. We
always ask questions about the meaning of the words and
statements in our mind whenever we are involved in a dia-
logue with others. Human language is a complex set of
sounds, metaphors and even symbols whose meaning and
knowledge is required if we are to understand others and
communicate our ideas to them. Thus, the moment we ap-
ply ourselves either in questioning or in asking people to
repeat what they have said we inevitably find ourselves at
the threshold of Hermeneutics.
On the other hand, hermeneutics has been applied in writ-
ten texts since long ago, having reached its highest point
in the seventeenth century when it was mainly applied in
the interpretations of sacred scriptures. Hermeneutics
owes its appearance in the philosophical arena to Heideg-
ger and was later popularized by Gadamer as Philosophi-
cal Hermeneutics. The use of hermeneutical method in
written texts was not only concerned with determining the
meaning of the text but it included various forms such as
the comparison of texts from different authors, the deter-
mination of linguistic and textual styles (e.g. poetry, litera-
ture and fiction) as well as the historical development and
modifications done to written texts from time to time. To-
day hermeneutics is applied in many different fields of
studies such as science, philosophy and religion. Its value
both in human and natural sciences is indispensable in
providing meaningful and coherent assertions in all facets
of human enquiry.
9
II. Hermeneutics and the problem of Language
Hermeneutics and Language are intrinsically related that
although they are distinct, are not separate. As an art of in-
terpretation, Hermeneutics cannot achieve its goal without
language. In fact we need language to express our opinions
and feelings, desires and beliefs, hopes and aspirations,
fears and needs. Thus language plays a very important role
in the development of Hermeneutics.
However, as I examine deeper the nature of language, I dis-
cover that it is fundamentally dialogical in the sense that
whenever two or more people come together, they may pos-
sibly enter into a conversation of some kind and thus ex-
press their view of the world as it was, as it is and as it will
be tomorrow. As we can observe here, on one hand there is
a clear example of interaction between hermeneutics and
language, which calls for a proper understanding of the na-
ture and function of both fields. But on the other hand, there
is a doubt, which sparks my mind as I put down this analy-
sis. The problem arises between the dialogical nature of the
language and the monological aspect of the text as it lies
before my eyes. In my attempt to understand it, I have been
clouded by many doubts, which the text, intact as it has al-
ways been, is unable to give me a solution to my problem.
Some suggestions arose in class, pointing to the need of re-
reading the text over and over again. The aim of this an-
tiphonal reading is to empower the reader with new insights
from the text, thus alluding to the idea that the text will pro-
vide a new and a clearer explanation. However, in my view
this is quite the opposite. Whenever I see a text, I am sure it
carries a meaning of its own as the writer, a meaning that is
independent of the reader’s attempt to interpret it, intended
it. This might sound as a sign of interpretive lassitude but I
10
there inactively, but it relates to the world in a particular
way that makes it raise an awareness or consciousness of its
very Being. Through understanding, which Heidegger com-
prehends as the ability to control or manage something,
Dasein comes to terms with its potentiality-for-Being.
But Heidegger goes further in his characterisation of the
Dasein as to compare it with other entities, which he calls
‘present-at-hand’. While in its essence Dasein remains a Be-
ing in potentiality, a projection or simply ‘that which is not
yet’ (Op. cit 216); the ‘present-at-hand’ is characteristically
contingent and hence dependent in a number of ways on the
Dasein for meaning and subsequently for its serviceability,
usability and detrimentality. The non-Dasein entities thus
appear only in relation to Dasein in so far as they constitute
a means by which the latter can realise its transparency for
itself, its throwness into existence, its freedom and possibili-
ties. Being-there has an inherent capability to understand
what it is and what is to be or the possibility of Being that
which is to be. By means of apprehending its facticity
(facticity here is meant the act of Dasein as it finds itself
thrown into existence, into the world; or simply as a Being-
there.), Dasein is capable of diverting its potentiality-for-
Being into a possibility of understanding.
3.1. The hermeneutics of ‘Dasein’
We have already laid down some basic characteristics in
terms of which Dasein is to be understood in the light of its
proponent. However, in their entirety such characteristics
seem to be haphazardly put together in a way that reveals
some incoherencies within the structure of the Dasein. One
of the observations pertains the equiprimordial aspect of
‘understanding’ with Being. Heidegger presents
19
sake.
In account of the above premises it can be deduced that
truth and hermeneutics may have a relation of some kind,
but cannot be thought of as being the same due to their
different characteristics and opposing degrees and aims.
The meaning pursued by hermeneutics through the inter-
pretation of texts is totally different from the truth, which
can be viewed from an objective and universal stand-
points. Although it is debatable whether we can objec-
tively pursue the truth, our attempt to use the object as the
fundamental element for examining the coherence and the
validity of statements, constitutes the reason why I aver
that truth is objective and universal. However, since the
primary aim of hermeneutics is to present a meaning pecu-
liar to a subject, it falls outside the parameters of truth
which is much wider or rather, universal and encompass-
ing.
III. Phenomenology and Fundamental Ontology
(Heidegger)
Heidegger, in his pioneering exposition of the phenome-
non of Being, has laid down the fundamental characteris-
tics of the ‘Dasein’ that constitute the focal point of his
discourses on Being and Time. Dasein, which is often
translated into English as the Being-there, is perceived by
Heidegger as constituted by two fundamental elements
namely, a State-of-mind and understanding, which are
both equiprimordial with Being (Cf. Mueller-Vollmer
1986:215). The Being-there is understood in its existen-
tiale as being there in the world and the world in it in a
way that suggests the world is that for the sake of which
Dasein exists. Furthermore, Dasein does not purely remain
18
am convinced that the text is its meaning regardless of our
varied forms of interpretations that we might draw from it.
This does not mean that we should abandon hermeneutics.
In fact, this art has enabled many to grasp the meaning of
a text as its author intended it. This happens for example,
when an author suggests the direction in which his text is
to be understood and the reader will in fact follow that
given path if he is to understand the text in that particular
way. However, very often our interpretations have mainly
turned away from it seeking new horizons which do not
have any relation with the text whose meaning we are try-
ing to apprehend, and instead of discovering the meaning,
we form a meaningless meaning of our own from the
meaningfulness of the original text. Needless to support
the idea, this has often been the effect of our attempt to
make sense of the text.
Going back to our topic, the text remains the same either
before or after I have assessed it. What changes is not the
meaning of the text as some people had erroneously sug-
gested, but my own attitude towards the text, motivated by
my constant search for newness and insatiable mental
search for knowledge. Heidegger explains this more em-
phatically when in his reference to ‘meaning’ asserts that
meaning arises in the Dasein in its relation to the entities
(in Muellerr-Vollmer 1986:224). From this affirmation
one can infer that the meaning lies on the reader as an in-
dependent interpreter and not on the text under examina-
tion Just to support this argument with an illustration, if
you read a text after you have had a strong discussion with
your partner you will certainly have a certain meaning,
while if you read the text after a lovely conversation you
are likely to have a completely different understanding of
the text. Although the text remains intact, our mental and
emotional variations influence us to view that same text
11
differently.
Thus, although language plays a tremendous role in life,
particularly in spoken language, its development and effect
on a written text is paradoxical and hence debatable. For
Humboldt, language is dialogical in the sense that the
speaker and the listener in a discussion interact with each
other socially, thus making language a productive medium
(in Muellerr-Vollmer 1986:101; 103). Unfortunately, this is
not the case with a written text where the reader has to find
his own way of interpreting it. Hence in the strictly dialogi-
cal sense of the word, the text does not provide a direct in-
teractive dialogue with the reader who finds himself mur-
muring alone.
The apparent influence it has occurs simply in the writer’s
use of language in composing a text and in the subject’s
view of the text. The use of a different linguistic style either
in writing or in accessing a written text brings a contrast be-
tween the two different worlds of the writer and that of the
reader. This explains why so many different forms of inter-
pretations have appeared over the same object, which is the
text under investigation. The language plays a twofold role
in the text. A positive role in so far as it permits us to grasp
the meaning of the text as intended by its writer and a nega-
tive role in the sense that it can lead us away from the mean-
ingfulness of the original text.
Language as it is understood in human terms can be used to
present the truth or it can be used as a tool to distort it de-
pending on the intention and mental conditions of both the
writer and the interpreter. Although the world is a common
object of knowledge in which the author, the text and the
reader interact with each other, individual view of it may
influence one to relate to the world in a completely different
12
server’s thinking or not about it (Cf. Mathew 2006: 22).
This realist position can be illustrated by the following
example. When I say the dog is sleeping, any person can
attest the truth of this statement by looking at the sleeping
dog. Now whether I think or not about the dog, the truth is
that the dog lies somewhere, motionless in a sleeping
state. Hence, we can objectively say that truth even if it is
highly differentiated in its many existential forms, tends
towards objectivity and universality.
Hermeneutics on the other hand lies in what is seemingly
the opposite side of the truth due to its particularity and
subjectivity. In hermeneutics an endless variety of inter-
pretations and meanings is accepted in line with the differ-
ent subject’s point of vie (Cf. Schleiermacher in Muellerr-
Vollmer 1988:77). The meaning of a text is as I personally
experience it, even if this goes against what the author in-
tended. Although there may be a form of discussion be-
tween two or more subjects over the same matter and who
may eventually arrive at the same meaning, individual in-
terpretation plays a role in determining the validity of a
meaning.
Another problem that arises in the relation between truth
and hermeneutics is with regard to “meaning.” The mean-
ing is the significance one gives to a given fact or reality,
the way one understands it and interacts with it in a par-
ticular way (Peeters 2009: Lectures). Although a meaning
might be shared by different personalities, it is not to be
equated to truth. Truth does not necessarily coincide with
the meaning. A fact may be true to everyone, yet mean-
ingful to some and nonsensical to others. Thus is the case
with knowledge. While it is true to everyone that human
beings are capable of knowing, for some knowledge is a
money generator and a doorway to success whilst for oth-
ers it may be something which must be sought for its own
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cal and emotional motivations and variations that trigger
him off to see the reality differently from others.
2.3. Truth and diversity in Hermeneutics
One of the most intriguing speculations in hermeneutics
has to do with the relation existing between truth and Her-
meneutics, and whether hermeneutics can lead us to truth.
The word truth is a difficult term to tackle, but for the
sake of simplicity we shall define it in its most generic
terms as the agreement of a statement or thought with re-
ality (Mathew 2006:6). Diversity in hermeneutics is an-
other problem that as we have already seen arises from the
unlimited forms of interpretations it allows in the process
of arriving at a meaningful conclusion.
In our attempt to examine the possibility of arriving at the
truth through hermeneutics, it is pertinent to stress not
only the definitional forms of these terms, but equally the
fields under which each term falls. Accordingly, truth by
its very nature falls under the flair of epistemology
(Mathew 2006: 3), whereas hermeneutics even though it
may be connected in some ways with epistemology, is a
field on its own. Hence, the relation between these two
concepts is much narrower and differential than we might
think of.
The nature of truth seen from the correlation between the
thought in the mind and the sensed object as it exists out-
side the mind, points to two paradigmatic and contentious
issues in epistemology and hermeneutics, namely objectiv-
ity and universality. Taking into account the above defini-
tion of truth, we can rightly say that any kind of truth is
objective and universally accepted by any rational entity.
This is justified by the fact that the object outside the
mind, exists inexorably as it is independent of the ob-
16
way, thus leading the reader to apprehend the meaning of
the text in a way that may differ from that of the author.
2.1. Humboldt’s nature and conformation of language –
a summary
In his attempt to investigate the nature and conformation of
Language, Humboldt focuses on two linguistic principles,
namely, phonetics and usage, which are the basis of any
language (Cf. Mueller-Vollmer 1986:99). In line with these
principles he classified language in individual idioms and in
general, corresponding to the usage and phonetic principles
respectively. Accordingly, the principle of usage being
common to all people, deals with the designation of the ob-
jects and association of ideas and it depends on the require-
ments of thinking. On the other hand, phonetics deals with
the guiding principles to variability of language (individual
idioms) and is closely related to the disposition of a nation.
Humboldt sees language as a product of intellectual activity
that forms – together with the latter – an indivisible unity,
which, when connected to thought, vocal apparatus and
hearing constitutes part of the origin of human nature.
Sound and idea become closely linked and clear. This
sound, which emanates from the interior finds in the exterior
phenome, the correlate of the intellect. Thus, phenome im-
posing itself on man is connected to the intellect by the
binding force of the sound and thus, form a comprehensible
unity understood to man. The sound of the human voice,
more than any other sensory effect, retains the distinctive-
ness of each object, thus connecting man to his different
sensory objects without confusing him. To the phenome,
man owes his erect position and the ability to speak.
Moreover, the relation between cogitation and language is
found in the synthetic combination of the activity of the
13
senses and the operation of the intellect. Only through this
relationship can an idea be expressed, however, originated
in the subject’s thinking activity. Being a phenomenon, lan-
guage can only develop through social interaction where the
objectivity and subjectivity is enhanced through the inter-
play of shared meaning of words. Thus, language is viewed
as a product and production whenever we find that it is not a
static body but an eternally productive medium both in the
intellectual life of man and in his social interaction. The
mind is not a receptacle of ideas, but a processing unit
where ideas enter the mind and are imparted to others in a
modified state, or as a new product.
Finally, we observe an admixture of subjectivity with objec-
tivity through language as a designate of objects. Through
language, the subjects’ personal view of the object is en-
hanced and broadened to a national level where everyone, to
some degree, share a common view of the world different
from other nations who speak a different tongue. To tran-
scend one’s language into another becomes a conquest of
others (Op. cit 105). People’s worldview however, is rooted
on the native linguistic standpoint, since their primary
thought was expressed in that tongue.
2.2. The subjective nature of Hermeneutics
The primary aim of hermeneutical enterprise is to provide a
meaning, a clarification and understanding of the text to the
subject reader. One uses hermeneutics because one wants to
make sense of what he is reading and thus quench his thirst
for knowledge. But as we examine this train of thought, we
are easily blocked by a question mark. Is my interpretation
really meaningful? Can my meaning drawn from the text be
meaningful to other readers? Or if we read the same text,
would we arrive at the same meaning?
14
These and other questions of this kind constitute a point of
discussion and of disagreement among hermeneutical ana-
lysts. The truth of the matter is that we do not necessarily
have to reach to the same meaning, although all of us may
share the same thing in common viz. ‘the search for mean-
ing”. This attitude of hermeneutics, which allows different
forms of meaning to be drawn from the same text, is what
I call “the subjective nature of hermeneutics”. I do not
however, discard the possibility of two or more people
arriving at the same meaning through the same or various
forms of interpretations. But often this is done through
consensus, where one gives up his opinion in order to ac-
commodate the most influential opinion. The danger of
consensus is that we get a meaning which is not our own.
This imposed meaning becomes a heavy burden that may
have a negative impact in our personal understanding,
since it will eventually distort or even destroy our knowl-
edge and leave us vulnerable to the inability of entertain-
ing a personal art of interpretation.
The text as it lies before my eyes, teams with a meaning of
its own that I must strive to understand. The existence of
other meaning seekers is necessary since one can easily
get lost in the labyrinth of meaning. We are all in search
for meaning, yet not all of us are able to apprehend it.
Very often, we become shocked when we realise that what
is meaningful to us is meaningless to others, or that which
was meaningful to me yesterday has turned piffle today. It
is under such difficult circumstances that we need to en-
gage in a dialogue with other people to check if we have
not gone astray in our search for meaning. However, it is
necessary to note that this dialogical engagement does not
necessarily make the hermeneutical interpretation objec-
tive. Hermeneutics will remain subjective by virtue of its
subject whose point of departure into meaning is shaped
by personal environmental circumstances; mental, physi-
15