Article MatthewR.
Auer
Risk Perception and International
Environmental Affairs: The Organochiorine
Debate between Sweden and Finland
It has been observed that successful cooperation among
states to protect the regional or global environment is
dependent on a high level of concern among the
participating nations. International decision-makers'
concern for the environment, in turn, depends partly on
their perception of ecological and human health risks. Risk
perception was analyzed in a negotiation between Sweden
and Finland to restrict emissions of organochlorines from
the sulfate pulp and paper industry. Data analysis from
participants' surveys indicated that Swedes and Finns
possessed significantly different views about the level of
environmental hazard posed by kraft mill-generated
organochlorines. The disagreement about environmental
risk was influenced more by historical, political,and market-
oriented forces than by disagreement over the technical
evidence in the case. These findings indicate that risk
perception is complex and that simple remedies, including
"Aeducating"decision-makers about relevant scientific
evidence, are not necessarily the best means for
harmonizing nations' concern for the environment.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, both the numberof critics and the range
of criticismsof internationalenvironmentallegal-policy arrange-
ments have grown (1, 2). The expertscomplainthatenvironmen-
tal treatiesand subsequentcooperationare often designed to sat-
isfy the requirementsof the least ambitiousparties;enforcement
mechanisms are lax; nonstate interest groups are under-
representedin negotiatingfora; and scientific informationabout
environmentalproblems tends to be underutilizedby decision-
makers(3-5). A recent analysis proposes that successful agree-
ments and cooperationamong states to protectthe environment
are dependenton a high degree of concernexpressedby the sig-
natorystates (6). Some observers(7, 8) have pointedto the Mon-
treal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (9)
as an example of an agreementwith relatively strongprovisions
for environmentalprotection,in partbecause of the compelling
natureof the evidence of environmentaldamage.
Implied in much of this literatureis the notion that decision-
makers' perceptionsof the intensity of risks in the environment
determinethe qualityof internationalenvironmentalcooperation.
When decision-makersdisagreeaboutrisk or are skepticalabout
dangersto humanhealthor ecosystems, environmentalcoopera-
tion tends to be weak. This study investigates how risk percep-
tion affectedeffortsof Swedes and Finnsto develop international
rules restrictingemissions of organochlorinesfrom the sulfate
pulp industry.This case is offered to advancediscussion among
policy analysts and practitionersabout the relationshipbetween
science and values in intemationalenvironmentaldecision-mak-
ing.
RISK PERCEPTION IN THE NORDIC
ORGANOCHLORINE CASE
Risk is the probabilityof an undesirableevent multipliedby the
consequencesof the hazardinvolved (10). Risk perceptionis the
valuation of these undesirable, probabilistic events, but the
Ambio Vol. 26 No. 6, Sept. 1997 ? Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 1997
"valuators"are laypeople; their perceptionsof risks are distin-
guished from the experts' more systematic and empirical,
(though not "value-free")risk assessments (1 1). The literature
on risk and risk perceptionin science policy is extensive (12,
13). Analyses of risk perceptionin internationalenvironmental
decision-makingfora are more uncommon(14).
Risk perceptionwas examined in the context of negotiations
between Sweden and Finland to restrict discharges of
organochlorinesfrom the sulfate (kraft)pulp and paper indus-
try to the Baltic Sea. Beginning in the late 1970s, Swedish in-
dustryexpertsconductedlaboratorystudiesof the effects of spent
pulp-bleachingliquorson fish (15). Swedish state-sponsoredre-
searchersconductedfield studies of the same phenomenonbe-
ginning in the early 1980s (16). The state-sponsoredteam found
fish suffering from a range of environmentalproblems,includ-
ing acutetoxicity,reproductiveeffects, liver enlargement,EROD
stimulation,alteredosmotic regulation,fin rot, and skeletal de-
formities (17-19). Organochlorines in mill wastewater were
identified as the likely culprits. Some of the most striking im-
ages of diseased and deformedfish were publicizedby environ-
mental organizationsin Sweden (20). Major Swedish custom-
ers for paperbegan demandingpaperproductswith no chlorine
(21), though industryinitially resistedthese demands(22).
By the late 1980s, Baltic Sea littoral states were well aware
of the Swedish public debateover organochlorines.Contracting
partiesto the Helsinki Convention(23) determinedto betterun-
derstandthe problem and devise recommendationsfor manag-
ing it. Negotiations over the recommendationstook place be-
tween 1985 and 1990 underthe auspices of the Helsinki Com-
mission (HELCOM).The negotiationsincludedall the Baltic Sea
states, but Sweden and Finlandwere the most avid negotiators,
since they are the majorpulp and paperproducersin the region.
Sweden and Finlandcarriedon a spiriteddebate duringthe ne-
gotiation of a 1988 HELCOMrecommendation(24) to reduce
emissions from the pulp and paperindustry(25, 26). These two
states, in conjunctionwith the other littoral states of the Baltic
Sea, acceded to a final recommendationin 1990 (27). The 1990
agreementspecified thatdischargesof chlorinatedorganiccom-
pounds from sulfate (kraft)mills, measuredwith the AOX indi-
cator,shouldnot exceed, on averagefor each nation,2.0 kg AOX
t- (t = tonnes) of softwood pulp; 1.0 kg AOX r' of hardwood
pulp; or 1.4 kg AOX r' of total pulp production.
Organochlorinesincludevarioushigh and low molecularmass
organic substances that are bound to chlorine. Many
organochlorinesemittedby pulp mills with bleacheriesare toxic,
persistent,and bioaccumulating(28). Chemical pulp mills pro-
ducingbleachedkraftpulp are the largeststationarysourceemit-
ters of organochlorinesto the Baltic Sea, though emissions of
these compoundshave decreasedsharplyin the 1990s (29). Dur-
ing the negotiationperiod (1985-1990) and among sulfate mills
in the region, Swedish and Finnish mills emitted the vast ma-
jority of chlorinatedorganic compounds (over 90%) measured
as AOX (30).
Evidence accumulatedduring the negotiation period by sci-
entistsin both Sweden andFinlandrevealedthatorganochlorines
in pulp wastewaterwere adversely affecting marinebiota (31-
33). In general,it can be said that Sweden's researchoutputwas
dominantduringthe negotiationperiod,as boththe Swedish state
359
and industry sponsored large research projects on organo- Figure 1. Location of mills
bleached kraft
chlorines.Finnishresearchendeavorswere smallerand less am- producing pulp in Sweden and
bitious (A. Langi, Finnish Pulp and Paper Research Institute, Finland.
pers. comm.). The disparitybetween Sweden's and Finland'sat-
tentionto organochlorinesis partlyexplained by the geography
of Swedish and Finnish kraft pulp industriesand the evolution
of industrial environmental policy in the two states (Fig. 1).
Through the late-1980s, Finnish authoritieswere preoccupied
SWEDEN FINLAND
with risks from oxygen-demandingpollutantsgeneratedby Fin- F g0
land's predominantlyinland kraft mills. The contaminantsof
highestimportin Finland'sofficial waterpol- : : . .: ,,,.
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lution policy were suspended solids, BOD, ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. . . .. .. -

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strictemissions of organochlorinesfrom pulp

mills beginningin 1987 (35), predatinga similaraction program risks from organochlorinesin mill wastewaterto be moderately
in Finlandby two years (36). Briefly, comparedto Finns, Swedes high (mean aggregatescore = 3.61) while the Finnish aggregate
had greaterexperiencewith organochlorinesin bothtechnicaland risk rankingwas moderatelylow (mean aggregatescore = 2.62).
regulatorycapacities throughthe late-1980s. The difference in mean aggregate scores between Swedes and
Finnswas significant(p < 0.001). For medium-sizedsamples(i.e.
where either or both n-Ior ni2are between 8 and 20), the power
RESULTSOF A SURVEY of the Mann-WhitneyU-test is approximately95% of the power
Twenty-sevenFinns and 21 Swedes who were participantsin the of the parametricStudentt-test (39). Hence, the finding of sig-
negotiationof HELCOMrecommendationsto reduce emissions nificantly different mean values between Swedish and Finnish
from kraft mills were surveyed for their perceptions of risks. samples is significantdespite the modest sample sizes.
More surveys were sent to Finns than to Swedes because more Anothertest of Swedish versusFinnishsamplemeans was run
Finns were involved in face-to-face negotiations at HELCOM excluding all seven industryrespondentsfrom the Finnish sam-
duringthe negotiationperiod.A total of 15 surveyswere returned ple. This analysis was undertakento control for the fact that the
by Swedes (71.4%returnrate)and 22 Finnsreplied(81.5%).One Swedish sample containedno industryofficials while the Finn-
of the 15 surveys from Sweden containedinvalid responses and ish sampleincludedseven industryofficials. Knowinglittle about
was not included in data analysis (37). Respondents were cat- the Finnish sample, one might expect Finnish industryofficials
egorized by profession based on each subject's responses to to mark lower risk scores than the Finnish sample as a whole.
questions about academic trainingand professionaloccupation. Hence, Finnish industryofficials might be expected to "weigh
Table 1 shows the distributionof professions of Swedish and down"the Finnishaggregatemean risk perceptionscore. Exclud-
Finnish respondents.One difference between the two samples ing industryofficials from the Finnish sample permits the ex-
is the absence of "industryofficials" in the Swedish group.This perimenterto test two national samples with similar total num-
is a reflection of the population from which the sample was bers of respondents(Swedish n = 14; Finnish n = 15) as well as
drawn:no Swedish industryofficials were involved in face-to- more even distributions of Swedish versus Finnish subjects
face negotiationsover the relevantHELCOMrecommendations. within professional subgroups.The Finnish aggregate mean in
Respondents were asked to rank environmental risks from a test excluding Finnish industryofficials produced a score of
organochlorinesin kraftmill wastewaterbased on the subject's 2.74-significantly differentfrom the Swedish aggregatemean
understandingof the scientific evidence available at the time of of 3.61 at p < 0.001. This exercise indicatedthat the additionof
the negotiations.Of the 10 questions, 9 requiredrespondentsto industry officials to the Finnish sample did not substantially
rank dangers to the naturalenvironmentfrom organochlorines, "weigh down" the Finnish aggregate mean score. When Finn-
while a 10th variable addressed risks to human health. A ish industryofficials are included in the Finnish sample, the ag-
nonparametrictest of means (Mann Whitney U-test), was used gregate mean risk perception score decreases by slightly more
to determinewhetherthe averagescores for the 10 risk variables than one-tenthof one point to 2.62.
were significantlydifferentbetween Swedes and Finns. Signifi-
cantly different risk scores were renderedfor 8 of the 10 risk
variables (p < 0.05). Figure 2 displays the frequency of Swed- FORCESDRIVINGRISKPERCEPTION
ish and Finnish responses to each response category for these 8 Differences in risk perceptionbetween Swedes and Finns were
variables.Finnish responses tend to cluster near the low to mid- driven by a range of forces. As described above, Swedish au-
dle range of the response categories, while Swedish responses thoritiespossessed a substantiallead over Finnish counterparts
are generally distributedhigher up the scale. Of the sample of in analyzingrisksfromorganochlorines.The Swedish state'sfirst
14 Swedes and 22 Finns (each who marked scores for 10 risk large research programon the ecotoxicology of bleached mill
variables),Swedes marked"1" (no risk) only twice, while Finns effluents predatedFinland'sby 7 years. Swedish authoritiesalso
marked"1" 37 times. The category with the largest numberof enjoyed a regulatorylead: by the time states acceded to the fi-
observations for Swedes was "4" (high risk) with 55 entries. nal HELCOMrecommendationin 1990, over half of Sweden's
Finns marked"2" (low risk) most often with 67 observations. 15 sulfate mills had licenses restrictingemissions of chlorinated
On an mean aggregate level, Swedes found environmental wastes. In Finland, only one mill was regulated for emissions

360 ? Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 1997 Ambio Vol. 26 No. 6, Sept. 1997
 Figure 2. Swedish and Finnish responses to ten questions about risks of Sweden's own pulp and paperproducts(44).
from organochlorines In bleached kraft effluents (38).
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this shortcomingwas not apparentin the Nordic organochlorine

case. Workinggroupsand official delegations to HELCOM,es-
pecially in Finland, were composed of diverse stakeholder
groups,includinguniversityexperts, industrialists,and environ-
mentalists.Haas proposes that in environmentalregimes, coali-
tions or "epistemiccommunities"of professionals may form to
advocate a particularview of issues and policy responses (45).
For example, communities of scientists or environmentalists
might be expected to form a coalition seeking relatively strong
environmentalaction. In the Nordic organochlorinecase, there
was substantialagreement among Swedish and Finnish indus-
try-sponsoredexperts that available evidence was not sufficient
to warranta ban on chlorine consumption or limits on AOX
emissions below 2.0 kg AOX t' of pulp (46, 47). However, no
partnershipformed among Swedish and Finnish environmental
groups to lobby for strict environmentalrules in the regime. In
fact, Finnish environmentalistsexpressed sympathyfor the po-
sition of Finnish industryduring the negotiation period, accus-
ing Swedish environmentalgroupsof environmentalextremism,
and arguingthat before tougherrules were adopted,more com-
pelling scientific evidence of risk was needed (42, 48).
CONCLUDINGREMARKS
Greatercompetence in technical facets of environmentalproc-
esses and problems will not necessarily lead to convergentper-
ceptions of risk among environmentaldiplomats. The Nordic
organochlorinecase indicatesthat differences in risk perception
are not necessarily rooted in differences over interpretationof
the physical evidence. A range of social, historical,and institu-
tional factors influence how science is interpretedby decision-
makers.Efforts to urge states to "sharea high level of concern"
abouttransboundary environmentalproblemsmust accommodate
this more complex understanding of risk perception. The
organochlorineproblem, for example, contains not only techni-
cal aspects-e.g. inputsof wood and chlorinatedchemicals;out-
puts of chlorinatedorganic wastes-but also, legal dimensions
(Sweden's regulatorylead over Finland);scientific/institutional

Ambio Vol. 26 No. 6, Sept. 1997 ? Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 1997 361
aspects (Sweden's lead in analyzingrisks from organochlorines;
experts' concerns about one anothers' "institutionalbiases");
technological concerns (pollution prevention versus pollution
control;nationalisticsentimentsvested in technology);and mar-
ket-orientedforces (fierce competitionamongNordic companies
for market share in pulp and paper; consumers' demand for
bleached paper).
Stakeholders'risk perceptionis influenced by norms. Hence,
decision-makersmust be cognizant of how key actors outside
the pool of technical experts influence decision-makers'under-
standingof science and risk. Imposing "more"or even "better"
science on decision-makersis not necessarily the best remedy
for realizing consensus among decision-makers,and elevating
the environmentalconcerns of laggard states. Clearly, it is im-
perative that decision-makers obtain, digest, and utilize high
quality scientific information.But it is equally urgent for envi-
ronmentaldiplomatsto learn how their perceptionsof scientific
evidence are shaped by other forces in the policy environment,
including, for example, market forces, political pressures, and
personaland professionalbiases.
In the organochlorinecase, divergentperceptionsof risk be-
tween Swedes and Finns did not preclude a successful policy
References and Notes
1. French,H. 1994. Makingenvironmentaltreatieswork. Sci. Am. 271, 94-97.
2. Palmer,G. 1992. New ways to make internationalenvironmentallaw. Am. J. Int'l Law
86, 259-283.
3. Sand, P. H. 1990. Lessons Learned in Global EnvironmentalGovernance.World Re-
sources Institute,Washington,DC, USA, 60 pp.
4. Susskind,L.E. 1994. EnvironmentalDiplomacy. Oxford University Press. New York,
USA, 201 pp.
5. Liftin, K. 1994. Playingtug of war with the nation-state.In: The State and Social Power
in Global EnvironmentalPolitics. Lipschutz,R.D. and Conca, K. (eds). ColumbiaUni-
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23.
8. Benedick,R. 1991. OzoneDiplomacy,HarvardUniversityPress.Cambridge,USA, 300
pp-
9. MontrealProtocol on Substancesthat Deplete the OzoneLayer. 1987. 26 IL.M. 1541.
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accountfor the pathologyobserved.
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362 X Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 1997
outcome. The frequentlyunproductiveHELCOMnegotiations
of the 1980s were redeemedby Sweden's and Finland's strong
efforts to reduceemissions of organochlorinesduringthe 1990s.
HELCOMrecommendationsgoverning AOX were satisfied by
Sweden and Finlandwell before theirtargetdates, aided by vig-
orous marketdemand in Europe for chlorine-freepulp and pa-
per products.Both nationsachievedand betteredthe 1.4 kg AOX
emissionlimit, so thatby the end of 1995, averageSwedishemis-
sions were below 0.2 kg AOX t' pulp (N. Jirvall,Swedish For-
est Industries Association, pers. comm.) and average Finnish
emissions were below 0.4 kg AOX t' pulp (E. Karhu,Finnish
EnvironmentalProtection Agency, pers. comm.). In addition,
Sweden and Finlandbecame leadersin the long-termBaltic Sea
JointAction Programmeto remediate132 "hotspots"in the Bal-
tic Sea catchmentarea.Among the first sites to be retiredfrom
the list were four Swedishkraftmills and fourFinnishkraftmills
(E. Karhu, Finnish Environmental Protection Agency, pers.
comm.). Sweden and Finland "agreedto disagree"about risks
from bleachedpulp effluents. In the 1990s, sustainedmarketde-
mand for chlorine-freepulp and the race among mills to reduce
emissionspermittedenvironmentaldiplomatsto spendmoretime
managingthe probleminsteadof managingconflict.
30. HELCOM, 1991. Backgrounddocuments for High Level Task Force. Technical Re-
port 215. Helsinki.
31. Sodergren,A., Bengtsson, B.-E., Jonsson, P., Lagergren,S., Larsson,A., Olsson, M.
and Renberg,L. 1988. Summaryof the resultsfrom the Swedish projectEnvironment/
Cellulose. Wat.Sci. Tech. 20, 49-60.
32. Sandstrom,O., Neuman, E. and KarAs,P. 1988. Effects of a bleachedpulp mill efflu-
ent on growth and gonad functionin Baltic coastal fish. Wat.Sci. Tech. 20, 107-118.
33. Tana, J. J. 1988. Sublethaleffects of chlorinatedphenols and resin acids on rainbow
trout(Salmo gairdneri). Wat.Sci. Tech. 20, 77-86.
34. Finnish Ministryof Environment.1988. EnvironmentalProtection in Finland. Report
no. 67. FinnishMinistryof Environment.Helsinki, Finland,361 pp.
35. National Swedish EnvironmentalProtectionBoard. 1987. ActionPlan for MarinePol-
lution. StatensNaturvArdsverk, Stockholm, Sweden, 67 pp.
36. Finnish Ministry of Environment.1989. WaterProtection Programme to 1995. Re-
port no. 14. FinnishMinistryof Environment.Helsinki, Finland,23 pp.
37. This particularcompleted survey was invalid because the respondentmarkedmultiple
responsesto individualquestions;(valid surveys containedone responseper question).
38. In referenceto the question about risk from organochlorinesand toxic effects on ma-
rine plants,some subjectsnoted thattheirresponsereferredto theirperceptionsof risks
from chlorate (C03-). Chlorateis known to have toxic effects on marine plants (see
e.g. Lehtinen,K.-J., Notini, M., Mattsson,J. and Landner,L. 1988. Disappearanceof
bladder-wrack(Fucus vesiculosus L.) in the Baltic Sea: relationto pulp-mill chlorate,
Ambio 17, 387-393). However, chlorate is not an organochlorine.Hence, some sub-
jects' responsesto this question are not consistent with the questionasked.
39. Siegel, S. 1956. NonparametricStatistics:for the Behavioral Sciences. McGraw-Hill,
New York, p. 126.
40. Based on survey data collected by the authorfrom Swedish and Finnish sulfate pulp
mills (1994) and from dataprovidedby the Swedish EnvironmentalProtectionAgency
and the FinnishEnvironmentAgency (1994-1995).
41. Instances in the professional or academic literaturewhere experts claim that one an-
other's methods or results are flawed or tainted by institutionalbias are uncommon,
but see Lehtinen,K.-J. 1992. Environmental effects of chlorine bleaching-facts ne-
glected? Paperi ja Puu 74, 715-719.
42. Granberg,K. 1989. Forest industry'schlorine emissions clo not have a one-way solu-
tion. In: What Will Happen to the Gulf of Bothnia. (Unpubl. seminar proceedings).
Suomen Lunatoand Naturoch Miljo. Helsinki, Finland.June 1988. (In Swedish).
43. Dumell, M. and Bruun,S. 1988. Swedish industryare rascals.Hufvudstadsbladet,Hel-
sinki, Finland,23 November,p. A14. (In Swedish).
44. Anonymous. 1988. Finnish forest industries:Swedes lie about Finnish chlorine dis-
charges.HelsinkiSanomat,Finland,29 October,p. A6.
45. Haas, P.M. 1989. Do regimes matter?Epistemiccommunitiesand Mediterraneanpol-
lution control.Int. Org. 43, 377-403.
46. Axegard,P., DahlmanO., HaglindI., JacobsonB., Morck,R. and Stromberg,L. 1993.
Pulp bleaching and the environment-the situation 1993. Nordic Pulp Paper Res. J. 4,
365-378.
47. Lehtinen, K.-J. 1989. Swedish investigationsregardingeffects of pulp mill effluents.
In: Seminaron EnvironmentalQuestionsin the Pulp and Paper Industry.Helsinki and
Paris Commissions,Helsinki. 4-5 April 1989, 133-144.
48. Rinne, P. 1990. Runningtoo slowly in the green race?Pulp Paper Int. 32, 53-54.
49. This work was supportedby the Nordic Council and the Lars-ErikThunholmsstiftelse.
Donald Green, Bengt Kristrom,and John Wargo provided helpful comments on ear-
lier draftsof this manuscript.
50. First submitted21 December 1995. Accepted for publicationafterrevision 24 October
1996.
MatthewR. Auer is an assistant professor at the School of
Public and EnvironmentalAffairs, Indiana University.
His major research interests include international
environmental cooperation, and the use of science in
policy-making. He received his PhD in forestry and
environmental studies from Yale University in 1995.
His address: School of Public and EnvironmentalAffairs,
Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana,47405, USA.
Ambio Vol. 26 No. 6, Sept. 1997