Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or

corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties “books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters,
and other documents showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarettes)” as the subject of the offense for violations of Central Bank
Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.

Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on the respective residences of
the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money and other records. Petitioners then were subjected to
deportation proceedings and were constrained to question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the
admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.

On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted the same on June 29,
1962 with respect to some documents and papers.

Held:

a. Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus, illegal or being general
warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did not particularly specify the things to be seized. The
purpose of the requirement is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.
b. Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a fruit of a poisonous tee.
However, they could not be returned, except if warranted by the circumstances.
c. Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of those taken from the
corporations for which they acted as officers as they are treated as personality different from that of the
corporation.
Facts:
1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against the petitioner and the
corporation to search persons and premises of several personal properties due to an alleged violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. As
a results, search and seizures were conducted in the both the residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's
premises.

2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution
and the Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus,he filed a petition with the Supreme Court
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects from being introduced as
evidence in the deportation cases against the petitioner. The court issued the writ only for those effects found in
the petitioner's residence.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and seizure in both
premises

RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those done in the corporation's
premises. The petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation since a corporation has a personality
separate and distinct from the personality of its officers or herein petitioner regardless of the amount of shares
of stock or interest of each in the said corporation, and whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose
rights has been impaired can validly object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be
exercised by a third party. The right to object belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st group of documents,
papers, and things seized from the offices and the premises).
 Stonehill vs. Diokno
20 SCRA 383 (GR No. L-19550)
June 19, 1967

CJ Concepcion

Facts:

Upon application of the prosecutors (respondent) several judges (respondent) issued on different dates a total of
42 search warrants against petitioners (Stonehill et. al.) and/or corporations of which they were officers to
search the persons of the petitioner and/or premises of their officers warehouses and/or residences and to seize
and take possession of the personal property which is the subject of the offense, stolen, or embezzled and
proceeds of fruits of the offense, or used or intended to be used or the means of committing the offense, which
is described in the application as violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
Code and the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus and
injunction and prayed that, pending final disposition of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
against the prosecutors, their agents and representatives from using the effect seized or any copies thereof, in the
deportation case and that thereafter, a decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring
the same null and void. For being violative of the constitution and the Rules of court by: (1) not describing with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) money not mentioned in the warrants were
seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases filed against the petitioner; (4) the
searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents paper and cash money were not
delivered to the issuing courts for disposal in accordance with law.

In their answer, the prosecutors (respondent) alleged; (1) search warrants are valid and issued in accordance
with law; (2) defects of said warrants, were cured by petitioners consent; and (3) in any event the effects are
admissible regardless of the irregularity.

The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction. However by a resolution, the writ
was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things seized from the offices of the corporations.

Issues:

1.) Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to assail the legality of search warrants issued against
the corporation of which they were officers.

2.) Whether or not the search warrants issued partakes the nature of a general search warrants.

3.) Whether or not the seized articles were admissible as evidence regardless of the illegality of its seizure.

Held:

Officers of certain corporations, from which the documents, papers, things were seized by means of search
warrants, have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in
pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and
distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest
of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled
that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

Officers of certain corporations can not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents,
papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their
individual capacity.

II

The Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2)
that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

Search warrants issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had
committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.

General search warrants are outlawed because the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication
and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers.

To prevent the issuance of general warrants this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the
former Rules of Court by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court that "a search warrant
shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this
qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than
one specific offense."

Seizure of books and records showing all business transaction of petitioners persons, regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal contravened the explicit command of our Bill of Rights - that the things to be
seized be particularly described - as well as tending to defeat its major objective the elimination of general
warrants.

III

Most common law jurisdiction have already given up the Moncado ruling and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully
acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the
action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer.
Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong will that wrong be repressed.

The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent
evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant
is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the
Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of
a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

The Court held that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the
warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29,
1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said
residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the
documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the
petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects
seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without
special pronouncement as to costs.