Plurality and Precedence - Judicial Reasoning Lower Courts and T

Washington University Law Review
Volume 85 | Issue 6
January 2008
Plurality and Precedence: Judicial Reasoning,

Lower Courts, and the Meaning of United States v.
Winstar Corp
James A. Bloom
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Recommended Citation
James A. Bloom, Plurality and Precedence: Judicial Reasoning, Lower Courts, and the Meaning of United States v. Winstar Corp, 85 Wash.
U. L. Rev. 1373 (2008).
Available at: http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss6/4
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PLURALITY AND PRECEDENCE:
JUDICIAL REASONING, LOWER COURTS,
AND THE MEANING OF
UNITED STATES V. WINSTAR CORP.
INTRODUCTION
Plurality decisions of the United States Supreme Court have generated

nearly unanimous negative outcry.1 The reasons generally given for
decrying plurality decisions fall into two related categories. Some critics
argue that plurality decisions represent a failure of the Supreme Court to
fulfill its responsibility as lawmaker.2 Others argue that plurality decisions
create confusion and inefficiency in the lower courts.3 It seems unlikely,
1. Compare John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in
the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59, 86 (“[T]he evil inherent in decision by plurality is not a minor
one.”), and Douglas L. Whaley, Comment, A Suggestion for the Prevention of No-Clear-Majority
Judicial Decisions, 46 TEX. L. REV. 370, 370 (1967) (stressing the importance of preventing plurality
decisions and “eliminating the havoc they create in the judicial system”), and Note, Plurality
Decisions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1127 (1981) [hereinafter Harvard Note],
and Mark Alan Thurmon, Note, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of
Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419 (1992), and Ken Kimura, Comment, A
Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1593 (1992), and
Adam S. Hochschild, Note, The Modern Problem of Supreme Court Plurality Decision: Interpretation
in Historical Perspective, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 261, 287 (2000) (describing plurality opinions as
“inherently muddled and fragmented”), with Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme
Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756, 760 (1980) (characterizing plurality opinions
merely as Supreme Court admissions of uncertainty and as providing an opportunity for reasoned
development of the law in the lower courts), and Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority
Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 99, 155 (1956) [hereinafter Chicago Study]
(concluding neutrally that courts generally treat the lead opinion in a no-clear-majority decision with
the same precedential weight as simple majority opinions), and Saul Levmore, Ruling Majorities and
Reasoning Pluralities, 3 Theoretical Inquiries Into Law 87 (2002) (discussing how plurality voting,
which is given some precedential weight by courts, might be used in legislatures and referenda), and
Joseph M. Cacace, Note, Plurality Decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States: A
Reexamination of the Marks Doctrine After Rapanos v. United States, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 97, 99–
101 (2007) (arguing that a consistent method for interpreting plurality decisions can help harness the
value these opinions possess).
2. See Harvard Note, supra note 1, at 1128 (“[The Supreme Court] must provide definitive
statements of the law. . . . [W]ithout a majority rationale for the result, the Supreme Court abdicates its
responsibility to the institutions and parties depending on it for direction. Each plurality decision thus
represents a failure to fulfill the Court's obligations.”); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is.”) (emphasis added); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 124
(1921) (“[T]he power to declare the law carries with it the power, and within limits the duty, to make
law when none exists . . . .”).
3. See Davis & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 62 (describing how “a collective confusion” results
from plurality opinions); Thurmon, supra note 1, at 427 (asserting that plurality opinions “significantly
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however, that the Supreme Court will stop issuing opinions in which a
majority of Justices cannot agree on any one controlling rationale for the
decision.4 Many plurality decisions address fundamental—or even
politically charged—legal issues.5 Other pluralities address less headline-
grabbing issues, but can still be important in the day-to-day practice of
law.6 A consistent method for interpreting plurality opinions would reduce
some of the confusion pluralities generate. Not only would courts benefit
from such a consistent method, but ordinary people and businesses could
more effectively shape their behavior to avoid litigation if they had a
better sense of how these decisions would apply.7 Moreover, if lower
courts more fully analyzed the reasoning in plurality opinions, it would
help clarify and resolve the issues that split the Supreme Court in the first
place.
This Note examines both the main criticisms of plurality decisions and
the various methods of interpreting plurality decisions used by lower
courts—through the lens of how lower courts have addressed one
particularly complex plurality, United States v. Winstar Corp.8 Part I.A of
this Note examines the academic criticisms of plurality decisions and
increase[] the burden on lower courts that are required to follow its decisions”); Kimura, supra note 1,
at 1594–95 (“The Supreme Court’s failure to articulate a single rule of law creates confusion in the
lower courts as [to] how to interpret and weigh that decision.”); Whaley, supra note 1, at 371 (“[T]he
court’s inability to explain its decision in one majority opinion causes a breakdown in the judicial
system.”).
4. See Thurmon, supra note 1, at 427 (“[T]he Supreme Court has been unable to consistently
reach the consensus necessary to exploit [the] advantages [of clear-majority decisions].”). Especially if
plurality opinions represent irreconcilable differences between the Justices, the “practice” of issuing
plurality opinions is probably unintentional.
5. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553 (2007) (taxpayer
standing to challenge federal appropriations for religious charities under the establishment clause);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (“enemy combatants” and constitutional protections); City of
Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002) (free speech and pornography); Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (scope of civil action for deprivation of constitutional rights); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (abortion); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639
(1990) (the death penalty); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (affirmative
action). Others have compared plurality decisions to the “hard cases” described by Professor Ronald
Dworkin. Kimura, supra note 1, at 1594 & n.8.
6. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus., Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Solano County, 400 U.S. 102, 116–17 (1987)
(splitting in part over the meaning of sufficient minimum contacts).
7. Cf. Whaley, supra note 1, at 371 (arguing that when plurality opinions control the law in a
given area, “[p]otential litigants cannot safely formulate a policy that they know will conform with the
law, nor can the legal profession properly counsel them so as to avoid costly and unnecessary
litigation”); Harvard, Note, supra note 1, at 1128 (commenting that the Supreme Court “serves as a
guide for private parties,” who will presumably be unable to shape their behavior to the requirements
of the law if the Supreme Court issues a plurality opinion). If a more reliable method of predicting
lower court responses to plurality opinions were in place, these concerns would perhaps be alleviated.
8. 518 U.S. 839 (1996). See also infra note 46 (discussing why Winstar was selected for this
Note).
http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol85/iss6/4
2008] PLURALITY AND PRECEDENCE 1375
catalogues methods others have proposed for interpreting these decisions.

Part I.B describes the four opinions handed down by the Supreme Court in
Winstar. Part I.C examines six lower court cases where lower courts have
analyzed and applied Winstar. Part II discusses how examining these
methods and criticisms in light of how courts have applied plurality
opinions can clarify the strengths and weaknesses of this body of thought.9
Part III defines and defends two new methods for interpreting plurality
decisions—the simple reconciliation method and the policy space
method—and shows how lower court analysis that builds on the reasoning
of the Justices’ opinions in plurality decisions leads to better reasoned,
more helpful, and more persuasive results.
I. BACKGROUND
American courts are bound to follow two types of decisions: decisions

by higher courts in the same jurisdiction10 and their own past decisions.11
Courts are not merely required to follow the outcomes of these binding
prior decisions; they must also apply the reasoning articulated by the
earlier court.12 When the Supreme Court decides a case, the Court
9. See Chicago Study, supra note 1, at 101 (examining the way courts actually use “no-clear-
majority decisions as precedent,” and asking “whether or not [this use] is in accord with the theory put
forth in the texts”).
10. See Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 388 & nn.19–20 (2007)
(describing how lower courts are absolutely required to follow the decisions of superior courts in the
judicial hierarchy).
11. See, e.g., Thurmon, supra note 1, at 422 & n.17 (“Stare decisis is simply a jurisprudential
version of the common-sense notion that things decided should not be unsettled . . . [but] this doctrine
does not require or create an absolute obligation to follow [the same court’s own] earlier decisions.”)
(emphasis added). An obligation to follow the court’s own earlier decisions is created, but it is not
absolute. See infra note 12.
12. See RUPERT CROSS & J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 72 (4th ed. 1991) (“[The
binding] ratio decidendi of a case is any rule of law expressly or impliedly treated by the judge as a
necessary step in reaching his conclusion, having regard to the line of reasoning adopted by him, or a
necessary part of his direction to the jury.”).
When a case is factually distinguishable from an earlier case, stare decisis does not bind the court
to follow the earlier decision. These factually distinguishable cases are not exceptions to the rule of
stare decisis. The different facts create legal distinctions and the new case thereafter stands as
precedent restricting the applicability of the original precedent. However, there are limits to
differentiation based on facts. Professor Schauer commented that because “[n]o two events are exactly
alike,” an earlier case does not need to be totally identical to the present case. Frederick Schauer,
Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 577 (1987) (“Were [total identity] required, nothing would be a
precedent for anything else. . . . [I]t is clear that the relevance of the earlier precedent depends upon
how we characterize the facts arising in the earlier case.”). Otherwise, there would be no difference
between plurality opinions and clear-majority opinions: if the new case is factually indistinguishable
from the plurality, “result stare decisis” will control. See infra note 38. But if they are factually
distinguishable, not even a clear-majority decision would control. As such, we admit that even with
some degree of factual distinction, the earlier case controls. Nevertheless, because the earlier court did

generally accompanies its judgment with one or more written opinions

explaining why it reached that decision.13 As long as a majority of the
Justices join the lead opinion supporting the judgment,14 it is a clear-
majority opinion and its rationale is binding on lower courts. If none of the
opinions are joined by a majority, even though a majority agrees on the
outcome, the resulting decision is called a no-clear-majority decision.15 If
one of the opinions from a no-clear-majority decision commands more
support than the other opinions, it is a plurality opinion.16
But courts sometimes look to sources besides binding earlier decisions
for guidance in deciding cases, such as scholarly treatises, academic
articles, logical reasoning, intuition, norms, morals, or even religious
values.17 Courts also consider decisions from other jurisdictions that are
not agree on a single line of reasoning, extra doubt is thrown into the process of determining which
factual differences make a difference.
13. The practice of writing and supporting opinions by groups of Justices was instituted by Chief
Justice Marshall, replacing the earlier practice of filing opinions seriatim, or individually. Filing
opinions seriatim probably derived from the practice of the English common law courts. See
Hochschild, supra note 1, at 263; Whaley, supra note 1, at 372–73 & nn.21–24.
14. Justices who join the majority sometimes concur by writing their own separate opinion
explaining the judgment. Sometimes, however, a Justice will support the outcome reached by the
majority but not the reasoning, and will concur separately without joining the majority opinion. The
Court calls this practice “concurring in judgment.” See Sonja R. West, Essay, Concurring in Part &
Concurring in the Confusion, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 1953 (discussing the significance of the
phrases “concurring,” “concurring in part,” and “concurring in judgment”); Davis & Reynolds, supra
note 1, at 59 (noting that pluralities are introduced by some variation on “Mr. Justice A announced the
judgment of the Court and an opinion in which Mr. Justice B, Mr. Justice C and Mr. Justice D join”);
see also B. Rudolph Delson, Note, Typography in the U.S. Reports and Supreme Court Voting
Protocols, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1203, 1220–22 (2007). As long as five Justices “join” the majority
opinion, it is still a clear-majority opinion.
15. The Court still rules on the disposition of the appeal—affirming, denying, or altering the
decision of the lower court—but a majority of the Justices cannot agree on any one rationale for their
ruling. See Thurmon, supra note 1, at n.1.
16. It is important to distinguish between the terms “plurality,” “plurality opinion,” and “plurality
decision.” A “plurality decision” is a no-clear-majority decision where one of the opinions is supported
by a “plurality” of the Justices. A “plurality opinion” is an opinion joined by more Justices than any
other opinion, the outcome of which is joined by a majority. The Supreme Court sometimes refers to
plurality opinions as “principal” opinions, and others have referred to them as “lead” opinions.
Mathematically, on any nine-judge panel, there must be at least three opinions for a decision to
lack an opinion joined by a majority of the Justices—a no-clear-majority decision. No combination of
two numbers totaling nine will ever fail to produce a majority. See Kimura, supra note 1, at 1594 (“At
least three opinions, resting upon diverse legal theories, are present in a plurality decision.”). Of the
possible combinations of three numbers that add up to nine, 4–3–(2) creates a plurality opinion (the
number two in parentheses indicates two dissenting Justices). Other types of no-clear-majority
decisions are 3–3–(3) and 4–4–(1) splits. However, in neither of these cases is there a plurality
opinion. But in a 4–1–(4) case, the opinion supported by four Justices (not the dissent) would also be a
plurality opinion, as would the decision supported by three Justices in a 3–2–(4) decision.
Occasionally, three-member courts will be unable to decide on one controlling rationale,
producing a plurality decision. See, e.g., Kandies v. Polk, 385 F.3d 457 (4th Cir. 2004).
17. See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of
not binding on them, as well as concurring and even dissenting opinions

from earlier cases.18 These sources, and any nonbinding sources courts
consider, are called persuasive authorities. While courts are required to
consider and follow binding authorities, they are free to disregard
persuasive authorities, especially if they find them unpersuasive.
While courts and commentators generally agree that the results of no-
clear-majority and plurality decisions are fully binding,19 it is unclear
whether the rationale of plurality opinions is either merely persuasive, or
fully binding, or whether it exists at some level of authority between mere
persuasive guidance and full-fledged binding authority.20 While some have
argued that plurality opinions are merely persuasive,21 the more
compelling view is that the rationale of plurality opinions is more than
merely persuasive, even if it does not rise to the level of binding
precedent.
There is a variety of evidence to support this theory of intermediate
authority. First, the Supreme Court itself has asserted that lower courts
should give great weight to any opinion supported by several Justices,
even if it is merely a plurality opinion.22 Second, most courts confronted
Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491
(2004) (empirically testing and finding support for the hypothesis that judges’ religious backgrounds
influence their decisions about religious freedom).
18. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 414, 419 n.† (1908) (citing foreign statutes presented
by Louis Brandeis in the “Brandeis Brief” as persuasive authority for upholding an American state
statute as constitutional).
19. Thurmon, supra note 1, at 420 & n.3.
20. Without a majority of Justices supporting a particular rationale, the traditional precedential
value assigned to clear-majority opinions is absent. See, e.g., Novak, supra note 1, at 758; Chicago
Study, supra note 1, at 100 & n.10; Kimura, supra note 1, at 1596 (“The absence of a simple majority
creates precedential uncertainty in plurality decisions.”). In 1910, the Supreme Court ruled that any
opinion not supported by a majority was not binding. Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 213–14
(1910). However, Hertz is rarely cited for this proposition, and the way courts actually apply plurality
opinions belies the statement that they have no weight whatsoever.
21. Contra Davis & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 61 (arguing that plurality opinions are purely
advisory, “represent[ing] nothing more than the views of the individual justices who join in the
opinion . . . [and] do not, therefore, essentially differ in character from either a concurring opinion or a
dissenting opinion”).
22. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983) (plurality opinion) (holding that while one
particular plurality opinion was “not a binding precedent, as the considered opinion of four Members
of this Court it should obviously be the point of reference for further discussion of the issue”).
The Supreme Court’s most famous ruling about the precedential value of plurality opinions came
in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). In Marks, the Court ruled that some portions of
plurality opinions could be treated as binding. “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds.” Id. at 193. However, both the Supreme Court as well as other courts and commentators have
balked at treating the Marks approach as the default rule for interpreting pluralities. See, e.g., Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (“[The Marks] test is more easily stated than applied . . . .”

with plurality decisions accord them more weight than simple persuasive
authority, sometimes even applying the plurality’s reasoning as if it were
from a clear majority.23 Indeed, if courts do in fact give pluralities
precedential weight above mere persuasive guidance, at the very least this
internal valuation by courts indicates that the precedential authority of
plurality decisions deserves greater consideration.24
A. Academic Criticisms and Interpretive Methods for Plurality Decisions
Commentators have raised four primary criticisms of plurality

decisions.25 First, pluralities are often complex and can cost lower courts
resources in analyzing and applying them.26 Second, pluralities are an
abdication of the Supreme Court’s duty to make law.27 Third, pluralities
obstruct the predictive function of law, rendering it more difficult for
private parties to shape their behavior in order to avoid legal liability or to
settle to avoid costly litigation.28 Fourth, pluralities are symptoms of
(quoting Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994))); Hochschild, supra note 1, at 280–
81.
While Marks and Brown alone might not prove the middle ground of authority suggested above,
these cases are evidence that the Court takes these decisions seriously and wants other courts to do the
same.
23. See Chicago Study, supra note 1, at 154–55 (discussing the value of “understanding actual
citation practices” of lower courts regarding no-clear-majority decisions).
24. See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 11 (1930) (law is “[w]hat . . . officials do about
disputes”); JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH
TO LEGAL THEORY 25 (2001) (arguing that analytical models can fail if they “ignore[] . . . the actual
inferential practices of participants” in the relevant institutions). If courts and lawyers feel that
plurality decisions, and the opinions that comprise them, have some level of binding authority
independent of any narrowest grounds justification, why not create a system for interpreting these
decisions that preserves this unique status?
Of course, the mere fact judges give plurality opinions weight above that of mere persuasive
authority does not stand as sufficient normative, ethical, or moral justification for this practice. There
may be other reasons to apply the reasoning from plurality opinions as more than persuasive guidance.
Nevertheless, when lower courts value plurality opinions as more than persuasive authority, this
valuation is likely indicative of an implicitly perceived duty on the part of judges to apply these
opinions in this way. This Note explores this perceived duty.
25. A fifth criticism leveled by some commentators is that plurality opinions reduce the public’s
faith in the judicial system. See Davis & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 62 (“[T]he fact that an opinion is
supported by only a plurality of the Court may compromise its . . . public acceptance.”). But this seems
like an odd criticism, as probably only judges, lawyers, lawmakers, and certain academics are
consciously aware that plurality decisions exist. See, e.g., Bill Mears, A Mixed Verdict for the Terror
War, CNN.com, July 6, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/28/scotus.terror.cases/ index.html,
(using phrases like “verdict”, “ruled”, and “the Justices said in a ruling” to describe Hamdi, but not
mentioning that Hamdi was a plurality opinion joined by only four Justices).
26. See supra note 3.
substantive reasoning, as opposed to process-based reasoning, and as such

represent arbitrary, pathological decision making.29
Commentators and courts have devised several methods to interpret
plurality decisions. First, in Marks v. United States the Supreme Court
articulated the “narrowest grounds” approach.30 Under the narrowest
grounds approach, courts may find binding rationale in plurality opinions,
defined as “that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgment on the narrowest grounds.”31 There are at least two formulations
of the narrowest grounds approach.32 The first looks for the opinion
concurring in judgment that reached the judgment on the narrowest
grounds, according that opinion full precedential weight.33
The second formulation looks for particular reasoning within the
concurring opinions that a majority of the concurring Justices support,
giving that reasoning full precedential weight.34 However, neither
formulation is applicable to plurality decisions when the plurality and
concurrence agree on the judgment but disagree about how the law should
apply to reach that judgment. Sometimes one of the concurrences and the
dissent seem to agree about the reasoning and disagree only about the
29. Harvard Note, supra note 1, at 1128, 1140–46 (“[P]lurality decisions [are] symptomatic of a
fundamental flaw in the Supreme Court’s current approach to decisionmaking, which relies
excessively on value-laden ‘substantive reasoning.’”).
30. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). See also Novak, supra note 1, at 761–67
(describing the origins of the narrowest grounds test); Hochschild, supra note 1, at 280–81; supra note
24.
31. Kimura, supra note 1, at 1603–04; see also Novak, supra note 1, at 761–67; Thurmon, supra
note 1, at 420–22, 427–50. There are a number of reasons why courts and commentators have been
reluctant to accept the Marks approach as the final word on the subject of pluralities, not the least of
which is the Supreme Court’s own ambivalence about the Marks rule. See Thurmon, supra note 1, at
446 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s reluctance to apply the Marks rule renders the rule a “legal
fiction”). Moreover, the Marks rule cannot apply if none of the Justices concurring in judgment agrees
on any rationale.
For recent treatments of the Marks rule, see Audio file: How Should the Courts Interpret Split
Decisions?, teleconference panel held by the Federalist Society (June 21, 2007) (available at
http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/pubID.328/pub_detail.asp) (remarks of Sentelle, J.); Cacace,
supra note 1, at 113–21 (describing Marks in terms of social choice theory). While these
commentators address the benefits and problems with the Marks rule, the purpose of this Note is to
address the phenomena of Supreme Court plurality opinions more theoretically and offer an alternative
to the Marks rule for interpreting plurality opinions.
32. Others point out that the term “narrow” itself is ambiguous. See Novak, supra note 1, at 763–
65; Thurmon, supra note 1, at 428–42; Hochschild, supra note 1, at 279–81.
33. See infra notes 242–45 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 246–47 and accompanying text. The critical difference between this
formulation of the narrowest grounds approach and the dual majority method is that the dual majority
method allows reasoning supported by the dissent and one of the concurring opinions to be given
precedential weight. The narrowest grounds approach as articulated by the Supreme Court is
specifically restricted to opinions shared by Justices concurring in judgment.

particular outcome.35 If in such cases a total of five Justices joined the

dissent and concurrence, adherents of the dual majority method find two
majorities: an outcome majority of the plurality and concurrence, and a
reasoning majority of the concurrence and dissent.36 This method focuses
on numerical support and is typically applied so that any proposition of
law from any of the opinions supported by a numerical majority of
Justices is binding precedent.37 Like the narrowest grounds approach,
however, the dual majority method is only applicable in cases where the
different opinions seem to employ similar reasoning.
Third, courts sometimes cite pluralities for their results only or disavow
them as if they had never been decided. When a court cites a plurality for
its specific result only, the court explicitly declines to apply the underlying
reasoning and considers only the judgment.38 When a court disavows a
plurality decision, it rejects any application of the decision to facts beyond
those contained in the original opinion.39 Such open rejection is
extraordinarily rare.40
35. Novak, supra note 1, at 767 (“[If] the concurring and dissenting opinions share a common
line of reasoning, but differ in their application of the law to the facts . . there are in effect two
majorities: the plurality and concurrence agreeing on the result, and the concurrence and dissent
agreeing on the fundamental legal principals involved.”). See also Thurmon, supra note 1, at 453.
36. Kimura, supra note 1, at 1602 (defining the dual majority method as “recogniz[ing] a binding
legal rule . . . when the dissenting opinion and one of the concurring opinions advocate the same legal
rule”).
37. See id.
38. Novak, supra note 1, at 769 (defining the citation for specific result method as a resort to
“result stare decisis,” whereby the lower court “confin[es] the precedential value of a decision to its
specific result and declin[es] to regard any particular line of reasoning as authoritative”).
39. Id. at 773–74 & nn.80–84 (defining disavowal as a lower court’s decision “to follow the
dissenting rationale and come to a contradictory result on similar facts” when “faced with a plurality
decision presenting clear majority agreement on result”); see also Kimura, supra note 1, at 1618
(arguing that certain “complex” pluralities are “analytically incoherent and should be completely
disavowed”).
40. Novak, supra note 1, at 773 (noting that “it is rare for a lower court” to completely disavow
an on-point Supreme Court plurality). In writing this Note, I did not identify a single case that cited
Winstar yet explicitly refused to apply both the reasoning and the judgment because the decision was a
plurality. In fact, the commentators who have discussed the disavowal method have only identified one
case as explicitly disavowing a United States Supreme Court plurality. Id. at 773 (citing State v. Baker,
289 A.2d 348 (Md. 1972)).
It is also possible that the lower court might simply ignore the plurality entirely. Under these
circumstances, the court probably would not even cite to the plurality opinion. One possible example
of this might be Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 F.3d 729, 738 (8th Cir. 2005). In
Charleston, the Eighth Circuit discussed the unmistakability doctrine, but cited only to a Supreme
Court decision and an Eighth Circuit decision, both of which predated Winstar. See Charleston, 419
F.3d at 738 (citing Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 147 (1982) (an earlier Supreme
Court case discussed in Winstar)); id. (citing Parkridge Investors, L.P. v. Farmers Home Admin., 13
F.3d 1192 (8th Cir. 1994)).
Fourth, there are two methods that I will refer to as the persuasive
opinion methods. I group the persuasive opinion methods because they
measure the relative persuasive worth of each of the different opinions in
the plurality to determine which opinion controls as binding precedent.
First, the full precedential weight method cites the opinion of the plurality
as if it were a majority opinion, ignoring the fact that no numerical
majority of Justices supported it.41 Second, the persuasive effect method
treats one opinion from the no-clear-majority decision as binding based on
how persuasive the lower court finds that opinion to be.42 Any number of
factors can influence this decision—political, personal, the reputation of
the Justice who wrote the opinion, how well reasoned the opinion is, or
how applicable it seems.
Finally, courts could use either of two closely related methods that
commentators have not previously described. The first of these two
methods may be called the simple reconciliation method. If a lower court
applying a plurality decision decides that both the plurality and concurring
opinions would produce the same result in the case it is considering, it can
avoid the ambiguous precedential value of plurality opinions and simply
apply both the plurality and concurrence.
The second of these two methods is the policy space method, which the
lower court can use when the plurality would reach one result, but the
concurrence would reach a different result under the facts it is
considering.43 Under the policy space method, the lower court must
determine whether to apply the plurality opinion, even though the lead
concurrence would not have agreed.44 This determination is based on the
lower court’s evaluation of the factual similarity between the earlier
41. Novak, supra note 1, at 774 (“Sometimes . . . there is no apparent justification for choosing
one rationale over another other than the fact that it was contained in the plurality opinion.”); Kimura,
supra note 1, at 1600 (describing how courts sometimes look to “the concurring opinion that the
largest coalition of Justices supports . . . for affirmative precedential guidance”); Thurmon, supra note
1, at 450 (commenting that some lower courts use a “method of according plurality opinions full
precedential respect”); Chicago Study, supra note 1, at 155 (“[F]ew citing courts expressly note the
lack of a clear majority in . . . no-clear-majority decisions.”).
42. Kimura, supra note 1, at 1601 (describing how under the persuasive opinion method “a lower
court might decide that a particular opinion is the most persuasive for any number of reasons” and
award it full precedential status); Novak, supra note 1, at 774 (“In some instances, lower courts have
regarded as authoritative a rule of decision that has not received majority support, perhaps because the
opinion is particularly persuasive or is written by a prestigious Justice.”).
43. Theoretically, a lower court could apply either the narrowest grounds or dual majority
method in the second step if the simple reconciliation method does not produce agreement based on
both the plurality opinion and the lead concurrence.
44. If the court automatically applied the plurality opinion regardless of whether the lead
concurrence would have agreed, the policy space method would be indistinguishable from the full
precedential weight method.

plurality and its own case, and partially on why the lead concurrence
would not have agreed.45
To illustrate these methods, this Note analyzes how lower courts have
applied one particular plurality opinion, United States v. Winstar Corp.46
Looking at specific examples of how courts deal with plurality decisions
can shed light on how this process both does work and should work.47
B. United States v. Winstar Corp.48
The issue in Winstar was whether the federal government, as

sovereign, could be liable for breaching federal agency contracts that
promised special regulatory treatment to three savings & loans (“thrifts”),
when Congress subsequently prohibited this special treatment.49 The
Supreme Court ruled against the government 7–2, but none of the four
45. When the Supreme Court hands down a plurality decision, it grants the lower courts more de
facto discretion than existed previously or would have existed under a clear-majority decision. The real
issue is how lower courts should use that discretion. For an example of a constriction of lower court
discretion, see Kim, supra note 10, at 431 (“[W]hen the [Supreme] Court changes the governing legal
regime from an open-ended standard to a rule . . . the scope of the lower court’s discretion to decide
that particular issue is undeniably narrowed. Importantly, such an approach requires close attention to
the content of Supreme Court opinions . . . .”).
Thurmon’s “Hybrid Approach” is distinct from the policy space method. Thurmon, supra note 1,
at 451. Thurmon’s approach divides dicta from ratio decidendi, searching for one controlling rule for
each proposition of law. The policy space method, on the other hand, considers all of the tests put
forward by each Justice in comparison with one another.
46. 518 U.S. 839 (1996). Winstar is appropriate for this project for several reasons. First, Winstar
is complex and lengthy—ninety-nine pages in United States Reports. It would be disingenuous to talk
about how lower courts can and should interpret plurality opinions by picking a short or simple
plurality. Second, Winstar is now more than a decade old. This has given lower courts ample time to
confront the issues raised in Winstar, but the Supreme Court has not yet reexamined the issues to
provide firm resolution.
47. See Chicago Study, supra note 1, passim (empirically examining how lower courts make use
of no-clear-majority decisions).
48. 518 U.S. 839. This account, limited by length, is by no means an exhaustive look at the
Winstar decision. See also Joshua I. Schwartz, The Status of the Sovereign Acts and Unmistakability
Doctrines in the Wake of Winstar: An Interim Report, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1177 (2000); Joshua I.
Schwartz, Assembling Winstar: Triumph of the Ideal of Congruence in Government Contract Law?, 26
PUB. CONT. L.J. 481 (1997); Alan R. Burch, Purchasing the Right to Govern: Winstar and the Need to
Reconceptualize the Law of Regulatory Agreements, 88 KY. L.J. 245, 254 (1999); Jonathan R. Macey,
Winstar, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 173 (1998); Michael P. Malloy,
When You Wish Upon a Winstar: Contract Analysis and the Future of Regulatory Action, 42 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 409 (1998); Leo P. Martinez, Of Fairness and Might: The Limits of Sovereign Power to Tax
After Winstar, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1193, 1214 (1996); K. McKay Worthington, Note, Is Your
Government Contract Worth the Paper It’s Written On? An Examination of Winstar v. United States, 1
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 119, 125–29 (1996); Ling Ling Zou, Note, United States v. Winstar
Corporation: Implications for the Regulated Industries, 16 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 477 (1997).
49. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 843 (Souter, J., plurality opinion). See also Schwartz, Interim Report,
supra note 48, at 1184.
opinions was joined by a majority of five Justices.50 Justice Souter’s

plurality opinion was joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer, and in part by
O’Connor. No other Justices joined Justice Breyer’s concurrence. Justice
Scalia’s concurrence was joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas. Justice
Rehnquist’s dissent was joined in part by Justice Ginsburg.51
The dispute in Winstar was precipitated by high interest rates and high
inflation in the early 1980s, which rendered hundreds of thrifts insolvent.52
The crisis put mounting pressure on the government, which insured many
thrifts through the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC).53 In order to avoid having to bail out the insolvent thrifts,
FSLIC—and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Bank Board), which
administered FSLIC and oversaw all mergers within the thrift industry—
encouraged healthy thrifts to merge with failing thrifts.54 However, it
would have been singularly unattractive for a healthy thrift to take on the
liabilities of a failing thrift.55 To encourage the mergers, the Bank Board
entered into special agreements with the healthy thrifts. These agreements
granted regulatory exclusions—largely in the form of accounting
gimmicks—to the healthy, purchasing thrifts to make the mergers appear
profitable.56
50. See infra note 51; see also Schwartz, Interim Report, supra note 48, at 1184.
51. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 843, 910, 919, 924. The Justices aligned 4–1–3–(2). The plurality
opinion was joined by Justice O’Connor for parts I, II, III and IV-C. Id. at 843. Justice Ginsburg joined
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion for parts I, III, and IV. Id. at 924 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
52. Thrifts profit on the difference between the interest they earn on mortgage loans and the
interest they pay depositors. Many thrifts had written mortgages during the 1960s and 1970s when
interest rates were low. Rising interest rates meant that the thrifts had to pay their depositors more,
increasing expenses, while the fixed rate mortgages meant that the thrifts were generating steadily less
money. Four hundred thirty-five thrifts failed between 1981 and 1983 alone. Id. at 845 (plurality
opinion).
53. Id. at 846–47.
54. Id. at 847. Congress’s first response was to deregulate the thrift industry, allowing cash-on-
hand to fall from five percent to three percent, but loosening the investment discipline only deepened
the crisis. Id. at 845–46.
55. Id. at 848.
56. The agreements were executed and incorporated at the same time as the Bank Board’s formal
approval of the merger deals. Id. at 848–56. The thrifts could count “supervisory goodwill” as an asset
equal to the amount of insolvency on their financial statements. The thrifts amortized the supervisory
goodwill over a forty-year period. Because few mortgages had that duration, the acquiring thrifts
would seem increasingly profitable as the below-interest-rate mortgages were paid off and the
goodwill remained on the books. Even though these mergers saddled the acquiring thrifts with
substantial financial liability, these accounting gimmicks made the purchasing thrifts look more
financially secure than they had looked premerger.
The three plaintiff thrifts in Winstar—Winstar, Glendale, and Statesmen—all had similar
agreements with the Bank Board. Id. at 861–68. For example, after negotiating with FSLIC, Glendale
thrift submitted a proposal to merge with a failing thrift to the Bank Board. Id. at 861. The Bank Board

For a variety of reasons, the crisis deepened further,57 and in 1989

Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).58 FIRREA forbade the special
accounting gimmicks FSLIC and the Bank Board had granted to the
healthy thrifts.59 When FIRREA banned these gimmicks, many once-
healthy thrifts that had merged with failing thrifts were rendered
immediately insolvent.60 The government seized and liquidated many of
these now insolvent thrifts.61 Dozens of thrifts, including the three plaintiff
thrifts in Winstar, sued the government, claiming FIRREA breached the
government’s contractual obligation to give the thrifts special regulatory
treatment.62
The government denied liability, citing four defenses based on its
sovereign status.63 First, the government relied on the unmistakability
doctrine—a canon of contractual construction unique to government
contracts requiring surrenders of the government’s sovereign authority to
appear in unmistakable terms.64 Second, the government relied on the
express delegation doctrine—the rule that an agent’s authority to surrender
any sovereign authority must be delegated to the agent in express terms.65
approved the merger, or “Supervisory Action Agreement” (SAA), which incorporated Bank Board
Resolution No. 81-710, by which the Board ratified the SAA. Id. at 861–62. Resolution No. 81-710, in
turn, referred to a letter by Glendale’s independent accountant discussing the goodwill to be recorded
on Glendale’s books. Id. at 862. The letter referenced Bank Board Memorandum R-31b, which
permitted Glendale to recognize goodwill as an asset subject to amortization. Id.
The government did not contest that the parties understood that goodwill would satisfy regulatory
requirements. But the government claimed that the documents “simply reflect[ed] statements of then-
current federal regulatory policy,” not evidence that the government intended to be bound by the terms
of the merger plan. Id. The Supreme Court did not re-evaluate whether these documents, taken
together, created a contract, but instead relied on the Court of Federal Claims’s judgment that a
contract existed. See infra note 71.
57. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 856. By 1989, FSLIC itself was insolvent to the tune of $85 billion,
while in 1980 FSLIC had carried a positive balance of $6.46 billion. Id. at 847. By the time the
Supreme Court decided Winstar in 1996, the total cost of bailing out the thrift industry had grown to
$140 billion. Id.
58. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183. Among other things, FIRREA abolished FSLIC and the
Bank Board, merging the functions of these agencies into FDIC and the Treasury Department.
Winstar, 518 U.S. at 856.
59. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 856–57.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 857–58.
62. Id. Winstar itself represented the claims of three thrifts out of hundreds of similar claims
moving through the courts. See also Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 751,
769 (Fed. Cl. 2003) (“Winstar . . . was one (actually a trio) of many cases spawned when the Congress
enacted [FIRREA].”).
63. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 860; see also Schwartz, Interim Report, supra note 48, at 1184.
64. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 860.
65. Id.
Third, the government relied on the reserved powers doctrine—that certain

of its reserved powers may never be surrendered by contract.66 Finally, the
government relied on the sovereign acts defense—the principle that a
government's sovereign acts cannot give rise to a claim for breach of
contract.67 The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected the government’s
defenses,68 and the Supreme Court affirmed.69 The Court’s four published
opinions in Winstar, however, advanced not only different reasons for
denying or allowing the government’s proposed defenses, but they also
presented fundamentally different concepts of when and to what effect the
government’s defenses should apply.70
1. Justice Souter’s Plurality Opinion
The plurality began by noting that the agreements between the thrifts
and the Bank Board were contracts.71 Justice Souter argued that these
contracts did not bar the government from changing the way it regulates.72
Instead, the contracts merely bound the government to recognize the
accounting gimmicks it had approved.73 This was a promise to provide
something beyond the promisor’s control—that the government would
continue to recognize the gimmicks indefinitely.74 As such, the plurality
interpreted these agreements as risk-shifting agreements—promises to
insure the promisee against the risk of loss of nonoccurrence, or in this
case, the risk of loss from regulatory change.75
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 859–60.
69. Id. at 871.
70. See Schwartz, Ideal of Congruence?, supra note 48, at 487.
71. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 860. The plurality reconstructed the documents in the contracts in some
detail. Id. at 861–68; see also supra note 56. However, the plurality ultimately accepted the Court of
Federal Claims’s determination that these documents effectuated a contract without independently
finding the existence of a contract. Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist also apparently accepted
the characterization of the agreements as contracts. Id. at 919, 929. However, some have argued that
“Winstar avoids the logically prior issue in the case, whether the agreements involved are contracts,
and provides insufficient guidance for future problems involving regulatory action ostensibly cast in
the form of an ‘agreement.’” Malloy, supra note 48, at 410, 447–49. Indeed, whether the government
entered a contract has been an issue in several post-Winstar cases in which the unmistakability
doctrine has been discussed. See infra note 134.
72. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 868.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 868–69.
75. Id. In the three instances in Winstar, the government became liable for breach “[w]hen the
law as to capital requirements changed [rendering] the Government . . . unable to perform its promise
. . . . In the case of Winstar and Statesman, the Government exacerbated its breach when it seized and
liquidated [the] thrifts for regulatory noncompliance.” Id. at 870. The plurality argued that courts

The government first raised the unmistakability defense, arguing that to

hold it liable would threaten its sovereign authority.76 Specifically, the
government argued the agreements contained no unmistakable terms
promising that the government would not exercise its sovereign authority
to change the regulatory status of the accounting gimmicks.77 Rejecting
this argument, Justice Souter’s plurality opinion held that the
unmistakability defense was not available to the government in every
contract claim precipitated by a legislative act.78 After tracing the
unmistakability doctrine’s history,79 the plurality stated that the doctrine’s
application depends on whether enforcement of the contract would
actually inhibit the exercise of a sovereign power.80 As long as enforcing
typically regard promises to provide something outside of the promisor’s control as risk-shifting
agreements. Id.
76. Id. at 860.
77. Id. at 871. The government argued that “the agreements . . . should not be construed to waive
Congress’s authority to enact a subsequent bar to using supervisory goodwill . . . to meet regulatory
capital requirements.” Id.
78. Id. Arguing that the government mistook “the scope of the unmistakability doctrine,” Justice
Souter emphasized that the thrifts did not want to enjoin the government from changing the law. Id.
Instead, the thrifts “simply claim[ed] that the Government assumed the risk that subsequent changes in
the law might prevent it from performing, and agreed to pay damages in the event that such failure to
perform caused financial injury.” Id.
79. Id. at 871–78. Justice Souter explained that one of the fundamental differences between the
American and British parliamentary systems is the capability of the American Congress, under certain
circumstances, to bind its successors. This ideal of limited government is reflected in the Constitution.
Id. at 872–74. The unmistakability doctrine originated in Chief Justice Marshall’s application of the
Contract Clause to state governments’ own contracts and served two purposes: first, to protect state
sovereignty, and second to avoid constitutional issues about state authority to limit subsequent
exercises of its own sovereign power by contract. Id. at 875. In the early cases applying the
unmistakability doctrine, private parties who had contracted with states were suing to invalidate state
laws that abrogated their contracts. Id. Since in some of these earlier cases the federal government had
been deemed liable under its own contracts notwithstanding the unmistakability doctrine—which the
Court had imported into contract suits against the federal government in the 1930s—Justice Souter
concluded “it is clear that the National Government has some capacity to make agreements binding
future Congresses by creating vested rights.” Id. at 876.
80. Id. at 878. Justice Souter defined the doctrine as requiring that “a contract with a sovereign
government . . . not be read to include an unstated term exempting the other contracting party from the
application of a . . . sovereign act.” Id. In a footnote, Justice Souter explicitly cross-referenced his
discussion of the sovereign acts doctrine, supporting the argument that Justice Souter believed the two
defenses were conceptually linked. Id. at 878 n.22; see also Schwartz, Interim Report, supra note 48,
at 1194. Justice Souter noted that because the effects of enforcement are dispositive, the particular
remedy sought is only dispositive if the effect of enforcement would be to block the exercise of a
sovereign power. Id. at 879–80. Justice Souter then described a spectrum of potential contractual
claims against the government. “At one end . . . are claims . . . that could not be recognized without
effectively limiting sovereign authority. . . . At the other end are contracts . . . [in which] no sovereign
power is limited by the Government’s promise.” Id. For example, “humdrum supply contracts” do not
limit the government’s sovereign authority. Id. at 880.
the contract does not block any sovereign powers, the unmistakability
doctrine does not apply.81
Justice Souter then argued that enforcing the contracts in Winstar
would not prevent the government from implementing the new regulations
prospectively against all thrifts. Instead, as mere risk-shifting agreements,
enforcing the contracts would merely require the government to pay
damages to those thrifts that had been promised the regulatory treatment.82
As such, awarding damages in Winstar would not amount to a limitation
on the government’s sovereign power, and the unmistakability doctrine
was not implicated.83 Finally, Justice Souter rejected the dissent’s notion
that “an unmistakably clear ‘second promise’” is required to render the
government liable.84
Justice Souter then disposed of the government’s second and third
defenses, the express delegation and reserved powers doctrines.85 The
plurality held that the reserved powers defense—that certain essential
government powers cannot be bargained away—failed, because the
contracts were risk-shifting agreements that granted no essential reserved
powers.86 The express delegation doctrine, on the other hand, requires that
any government agency’s authority to contract away the government’s
sovereign powers must be granted expressly by statute.87 The plurality
held that this defense also failed, because no sovereign power had been
81. Justice Souter also argued that this limited reading of the unmistakability doctrine, which
applies only when the government is actually or constructively enjoined from exercising its sovereign
power, is more in line with ordinary contract principles that damages are the default remedy for
breach. Id. at 885.
The Second Circuit identified such a situation in Doe v. Pataki, 481 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 2007). In
Doe, a class of registered sex offenders sued New York in federal court to prevent the enforcement of
new registration laws. Id. at 70–75. The new laws conflicted with less restrictive registration
requirements in a consent decree entered into with the class in earlier litigation. Id. Because the relief
sought by the sex offenders was an injunction prohibiting New York from enforcing the new laws, the
Second Circuit held that the unmistakability doctrine applied and defeated the sex offenders’ claims.
Id. at 79.
82. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 881. Justice Souter commented that the thrifts “seek no injunction
against application of the law to them” and that the thrifts “acknowledge that the Bank Board and
FSLIC could not bind Congress . . . not to change regulatory policy.” Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 887. Justice Souter stressed that the government had indicated that it would bear the
costs of insolvent thrifts in the first instance by insuring the thrift industry through FSLIC. Id. at 883.
He also noted that if the government were allowed to breach its contracts without being held liable for
damages, it would “compromis[e] the Government’s practical capacity to make contracts.” Id. at 884–
85.
85. Id. at 888–91.
86. Id. at 888–89.
87. Id. at 889–90.

contracted away, and that, in any event, FSLIC and the Bank Board had
ample statutory authority to make the agreements they had entered into.88
The government’s fourth and final argument was that FIRREA was a
sovereign act, and the United States cannot be held liable for its sovereign
acts.89 The plurality rejected this for two reasons. First, the sovereign acts
doctrine did not apply to the facts of Winstar, and second, even if it did
apply it would not excuse the government.90 According to the plurality, the
applicability of the sovereign acts doctrine depends on the capacity in
which the government acted when it enacted the statute rendering
performance of the contract in question legally impossible.91 If the
government acts in its capacity as a contractor in enacting the statute, the
sovereign acts defense does not apply and the government is liable.92 But
if the government acts as sovereign in enacting the statute, the sovereign
acts defense places the government in the same capacity as a private
contractor invoking the impossibility defense.93 Justice Souter94 explained
that the government acts as sovereign when it passes statutes free from
self-interest, but acts as a contractor when it passes statutes “tainted by a
governmental object of self-relief.”95 Justice Souter defined governmental
self-relief as “instances in which the Government seeks to shift the costs
of meeting its legitimate public responsibilities to private parties.”96
Because FIRREA shifted the costs of the government’s public
88. Id. at 890 (citing and explaining the statutory authority).

89. Id. at 891–92.
90. Id. at 891.
91. Id. at 895.
92. Id. at 895–96.
93. Id. at 896.
94. Id. at 896–900. Justice O’Connor did not join this portion of the opinion. See id. at 843.
95. Id. at 896.
96. Id. Justice Souter reasoned that this reflects the difference between an ordinary contractor,
whose performance is rendered impossible by government regulation, and the government, who has
the authority to render its own performance impossible by regulating. Id. at 897. Justice Souter stated
that “[t]he greater the Government’s self interest . . . the more suspect becomes the claim that its
private contracting parties ought to bear the financial burden of the Government’s own improvidence,”
and that “where a substantial part of the impact of the Government’s action rendering performance
falls on its own contractual obligations, the [impossibility] defense will be unavailable.” Id. at 898.
And even though Justice Souter noted that FIRREA was intended to breach the contracts at issue in
Winstar, it is the substantial impact of a statute, rather than Congress’s specific intent, that is relevant
in determining the government’s self-interest. Id. at 899–900; see also id. at 899 n.46 (“The difficulty,
however, of ascertaining the relative intended or resulting impacts on governmental and purely private
contracts persuades us that . . . [an intent based] test would prove very difficult to apply.”).
Even though Justice Souter seems describe a test operating whereby greater governmental self-
interest makes the sovereign acts doctrine less available to the government, at least one commentator
on Winstar seemed to identify this as a “binary mode” rather than a “sliding scale.” Schwartz, Interim
Report, supra note 48, at 1195.
responsibilities to private parties, the plurality opinion deemed it general

and not public, and tainted by governmental self-interest; consequently,
the sovereign acts doctrine did not apply to protect the government.97
The plurality then argued that even if the sovereign acts doctrine
applied, the government would still have been liable because the contracts
were merely risk-shifting agreements.98 Had the sovereign acts defense
applied, the government could have raised the common law impossibility
defense.99 But to prevail under the impossibility defense, the government
would have to show that the regulatory change rendering its performance
impossible was “contrary to the basic assumptions on which the parties
agreed.”100 Since the contracts at issue in Winstar specifically allocated the
risk of regulatory change to the government, it would be absurd to say that
the risk of regulatory change was beyond the original assumptions of the
parties.101 As such, the government could invoke neither the sovereign acts
defense nor the impossibility defense, and it was liable for breach of
contract damages. The plurality remanded to the Court of Federal Claims
to compute the damages.102
2. Justice Breyer’s Concurrence
Justice Breyer emphasized two points in his concurrence. First, as a

general rule, the government is subject to the same rules in contract cases
as ordinary (non-governmental) contracting parties.103 Justice Breyer noted
that courts ordinarily interpret contracts according to the parties’ intent.104
If the government clearly intended to be bound by a contract, then there
97. Id. at 900–04.

98. Id. at 904–10. Justice O’Connor rejoined the plurality in this part. Id. at 843.
99. Id. at 904.
100. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1993)).
101. Id. at 906. In fact, the plurality pointed out that the government, both in its brief and at oral
arguments, agreed that “FIRREA’s tightening of regulatory capital standards was ‘exactly the [type of]
event that the parties assumed might happen when they made their contracts.’” Id. at 906 n.54.
The plurality also asserted that “any government contract that not only deals with regulatory
change but allocates the risk of its occurrence will, by definition, fail the further condition of a
successful impossibility defense.” Id. at 907. Justice Souter argued these contracts were not merely
statements of regulatory policy, “but in each instance were terms in an allocation of risk of regulatory
change that was essential to the contract between the parties.” Id. at 909. Justice Souter argued that it
would have been “madness” for the thrifts to engage in these mergers without regulatory risk-shifting
agreements, as most of them would immediately have been insolvent without the supervisory goodwill
allowance. Id. at 910.
102. Id. at 910.
103. Id. at 910–14 (Breyer, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 911.

was no need to find an unmistakable promise.105 In Winstar, the intent of

the parties to shift the risk of regulatory change to the government was
sufficiently clear to render the contracts enforceable.106 Second, Justice
Breyer questioned whether the unmistakability doctrine had ever been
applied with the meaning the government argued in Winstar.107 He argued
that it was not clear whether any of the earlier Supreme Court cases
adopting the unmistakability doctrine had actually based their decision on
such an absence of contractual terms.108 Moreover, in all of these prior
cases, the relief sought by the plaintiffs would have prevented Congress
from enacting or enforcing a law.109
3. Justice Scalia’s Concurrence
Justice Scalia agreed with the plurality that the government was liable
for breach due to the passage of FIRREA,110 but disagreed with the
plurality’s characterization of the contracts as “risk-shifting agreements.”
Justice Scalia noted that the plurality’s distinction between risk-shifting
agreements and contracts was absent from precedent,111 and disputed the
plurality’s conclusion that ordinary contract law would characterize the
contracts as mere risk-shifting agreements.112 Justice Scalia argued that
105. Justice Breyer also argued that holding the government liable is necessary to preserve the
government’s credit as a contracting partner, and pointed to the Tucker Act as evidence of Congress’s
intent allow such contractual liability. Id. at 913–14. Justice Breyer granted the fact that the
government’s status as one of the interested contractors “may well change the underlying
circumstances, leading to a different inference as to the parties’ likely intent—say, making it far less
likely that they intend to make a promise that will oblige the government to hold private parties
harmless in the event of a change in the law.” Id. However, the same intent-centered analysis can be
undertaken without resorting to the unmistakability doctrine. Under this formulation, the government’s
unmistakable promise to be held liable is at least presumptively evidence of such an intent, but its
absence is not dispositive evidence of the lack of intent.
106. Id. at 913–14. Justice Breyer argued that the contracts expressly promised the government
would indemnify the thrifts if the law changed, noting that in the past the government had been liable
based only on implied promises. Id.
107. Id. at 914–18.
108. Id. at 914 (“[I]t is not clear that the ‘unmistakability’ language was determinative of the
outcome in those cases.”); see also id. at 918 (theorizing that the “doctrine” of unmistakability may
have stemmed from special circumstances that would require more to convince the Court of the
existence of an agreement than in ordinary government contract cases).
109. Id. at 916 (“A second reason to doubt the Government’s interpretation of the
‘unmistakability’ language is that, in all these cases, the language was directed at the claim that the
sovereign had made a broad promise not to legislate, or otherwise to exercise its sovereign powers.”).
Justice Breyer then distinguished a promise not to change the law from a promise to indemnify a
contracting partner in the event the law changes. Id.
110. Id. at 919 (Scalia, J., concurring).
111. Id.
112. Id.
almost every contract can be seen not as a promise of particular future

conduct, but rather as an assumption of liability in the event of
nonperformance.113 Justice Scalia also disagreed with the plurality’s
characterization of FIRREA as a non-sovereign act.114
While Justice Scalia agreed with the dissent that the unmistakability
doctrine applied, unlike the dissent, he did not think it “foreclose[d]” the
thrifts’ claims.115 Justice Scalia argued that the unmistakability doctrine is
really a matter of implied intent, a simple extension of common law
contract doctrine to determine the intent of the government.116 It would be
unreasonable to assume that the government intended to bind itself to pay
damages for its own sovereign acts unless such an intent is clearly
apparent.117 However, despite believing that the doctrine applied, Justice
Scalia determined that the thrifts met the burdens imposed by the
unmistakability doctrine as the intent to be bound was clearly apparent.118
Justice Scalia also stated, in response to the dissent, that “a further
promise” should not be required to overcome the unmistakability
doctrine.119
Justice Scalia also rejected the government’s remaining three
defenses.120 He argued first that the doctrine of reserved powers does not
apply if the private party to the government contract does not seek
injunctive relief to prevent the government’s exercise of its sovereign
power.121 Justice Scalia stated that any express delegation concerns were
“satisfied by the statutes which the principal opinion identifies.”122 Justice
113. Id.
114. Id. at 920.
115. Id. Contrary to the plurality, Justice Scalia asserted that the Court had applied the doctrine of
unmistakability to situations analogous to Winstar in the past “where a sovereign act is claimed to
deprive a party of the benefits of a prior bargain with the government.” Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 920–21. Justice Scalia noted:
When the contracting party is the government, . . . it is simply not reasonable to presume an
intent of that sort. . . . [I]t is reasonable to presume (unless the opposite clearly appears) that
the sovereign does not promise that none of its multifarious sovereign acts . . . will
incidentally disable it or the other party from performing one of the promised acts.
Id.
118. Id. The essence of the contracts—the totality of the government’s consideration—was an
unmistakable promise to indemnify the acquiring thrifts from regulatory change. Id.
119. Id. at 921.
120. Id. at 922–24.
121. Id. at 923.
122. Id. at 923. The difference between the plurality and concurrence on this point is subtle: the
plurality felt the express delegation doctrine did not apply because no sovereign act was implicated,
while the concurrence felt that the express doctrine did apply but was overcome by the statutes
granting FSLIC and the Bank Board authority to make the agreements.

Scalia concluded by arguing that the sovereign acts doctrine “adds little, if
anything at all, to the ‘unmistakability’ doctrine,” because the sovereign
acts defense would be avoided whenever unmistakability would be
avoided.123
4. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Dissent
The Chief Justice’s dissent set forward few positive statements of the
law and instead largely attacked the other three opinions.124 The Chief
Justice asserted that the plurality’s characterization of the contracts as risk-
shifting agreements was precisely what the unmistakability doctrine was
devised to guard against.125 He also argued that applying the “public and
general” test to Winstar should reach the opposite conclusion, as FIRREA
was designed to be public and general, and was not merely intended to
breach the contracts with the thrifts.126 The Chief Justice argued that it was
contradictory for Justice Scalia, despite claiming to apply the
unmistakability doctrine, to enforce an implicit promise.127 Moreover, the
government could have promised certain regulatory treatment without
further promising to pay in the event that the regulatory regime
changed.128 While the other Justices only afforded the government the
same status as a private party, the Chief Justice argued instead that “men
must turn square corners when they deal with the Government.”129 This
requirement, according to the dissent, did not arise out of ancient
sovereign privilege, “but from the necessity of protecting the federal
123. Id. at 923–24. Under this reading, both defenses would be avoided “whenever it is clear from
the contract in question that the Government was committing itself not to rely upon its sovereign acts
in asserting . . . the doctrine of impossibility, which is another way of saying that the Government had
assumed the risk of a change in its laws.” Id.
124. As such, its presentation here is greatly abbreviated. Id. at 926 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
125. Id. The Chief Justice also noted that despite the existence of the broader, harsher
unmistakability doctrine, “[t]he Government’s contracting authority has survived from the beginning
of the Nation with no diminution in bidders, so far as I am aware, without the curtailment of the
unmistakability doctrine announced today.” Id. at 929.
126. Id. at 933. He noted that FIRREA applied generally to all thrifts, not merely to those that had
contracted with the Bank Board to purchase failing thrifts. Id.
127. Id. The dissent argued that this was in fact the same rule that is applied to contracts between
private parties, and that more should be required to show that the government breached its contract
than is required under the ordinary rules of contract interpretation—a principle embodied in the
unmistakability and sovereign acts doctrines. Id.
128. Id. The Chief Justice pointed out that Justice Breyer relied on this illusory fact while noting
that “it might seem unlikely” that the government intended to “promise that . . . the Government . . .
[would] hold private parties harmless in the event of a change in the law.” Id. at 937.
129. Id. at 937 (citing Rock Island, Ark. & La. R.R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143
(1920)).
fisc—and the taxpayers who foot the bills—from . . . possible

improvidence on the part of the countless Government officials.”130
Finally, he argued that the thrifts had not met either the unmistakability or
sovereign acts tests, and the case should be reversed.131
C. Lower Court Cases Examining Winstar
Winstar has arisen in a variety of contexts.132 For Winstar to apply,

there must be a contract between the government and a private party,133 the
government must legislate to alter the terms of the agreement,134 and the
government must raise the sovereign defenses in response to a claim that
the legislation breached the agreement.135
130. Id. The dissent concluded that the unmistakability doctrine and the sovereign acts doctrine
are linked, and it would be rare for one to arise without the other, but Justice Ginsburg did not join that
portion of the dissent. Id. at 924, 937.
131. Id. at 937.
132. See, e.g., Tamarind Resort Assocs. v. Virgin Is., 138 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1998) (environmental
protection); United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (natural
resources distribution); Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 751 (Fed. Cl. 2003)
(low income housing).
133. See R.I. Bhd. Corr. Officers v. Rhode Island, 264 F. Supp. 2d 87, 96–97 (D.R.I. 2003)
(holding that statutorily created incentive pay programs were not contracts and as such Winstar did not
apply, because “[t]he dispositive fact in Winstar was the existence of a bargained-for exchange
between the regulators and the acquiring institutions”); Celtronix Telemetry, Inc. v. FCC, 272 F.3d
585, 590 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (denying plaintiff’s claim that change in FCC rules was a breach of contract
as no contract existed); First Annapolis Bancorp, Inc. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 263, 275–76 (Fed.
Cl. 2007) (Winstar-type FIRREA litigation extensively examining whether a contract was formed
between FSLIC and the acquiring thrift). See also supra note 71.
134. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 27 F. Supp. 2d. 15, 23 (D.D.C. 1998)
(holding that cooperation “between a federal agency and a private entity, wherein the government
sought to benefit from the private entity’s undertaking,” along with the allegation of “the existence of a
contractual arrangement” and the government’s exercise of “its authority as a sovereign to enact law
that had the effect of changing the alleged contractual relationship” sufficiently implicated Winstar to
deny the government’s motion to dismiss).
135. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Se., Inc. v. United States, 530 U.S. 604, 619–20 (2000)
(noting that the government did not raise unmistakability or other sovereign defenses on appeal). But
see Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109, 1138–41 (10th Cir. 2003) (Seymour, J.,
concurring) (questioning why the unmistakability doctrine was not raised by the parties, because
enforcement of the defendants’ demands that no water be taken for conservation of endangered species
amounted to an injunction against the government’s sovereign power).
At least one court has held that a prerequisite to any discussion of the sovereign defenses is that
the government must waive sovereign immunity as to that type of claim. See Research Triangle Inst. v.
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 132 F.3d 985, 989–90 (4th Cir. 1997). On the other hand,
Chief Justice Rehnquist in his Winstar dissent argued that sovereign immunity had not been waived
under the Tucker Act as to the type of claims that the plaintiff thrifts had asserted, as the government
waived sovereign immunity as to promises implied in fact. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 930–31 (“[T]he
principal opinion’s reading of additional terms into the contract so that the contract . . . insure[s] the
promisee against loss arising from the promised condition’s nonoccurrence seems the very essence of
a promise implied in law, which is not even actionable under the Tucker Act.”).

1. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. v. United States136
The first case to significantly confront Winstar was Yankee Atomic.137

Beginning in 1963, the Yankee Atomic Electric Company purchased
uranium enrichment services from the Department of Energy (DOE).138
This enrichment occurred at publicly owned DOE facilities.139 The
enrichment purchasing contracts provided that Yankee Atomic would pay
for these services based on a fixed DOE pricing schedule.140 In 1992,
however, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act (EPA), which required
collection of clean-up costs from utilities that had benefited from the
enrichment of uranium at the public facilities.141 Yankee Atomic paid $3
million in clean-up costs assessed by the DOE under the EPA, but then
sued the government in the Court of Federal Claims.142 Yankee Atomic
argued that that the contracts had a fixed price, thereby shifting all risk—
including the risk of regulatory change—onto the government.143 Since the
clean-up costs arose out of regulatory change and raised the price Yankee
Atomic had to pay under the fixed-price 1963 contract, Yankee Atomic
alleged the EPA breached the contract.144 The Court of Federal Claims
granted Yankee Atomic’s summary judgment motion,145 but the
government appealed and the Federal Circuit reversed.146
The Federal Circuit cited the Winstar plurality’s expression of the
sovereign acts doctrine as asking whether “on balance, that legislation was
designed to target prior governmental contracts.”147 If so, the court
reasoned, the government is liable for breach of the contract. Because the
136. 112 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

137. See Schwartz, Interim Report, supra note 48, at 1201 (discussing the relevance of the first
case to apply a plurality).
138. Yankee Atomic, 112 F.3d at 1572.
139. Id.
140. Id. Neither party disputed that all obligations under the original 1963 agreement had been
fulfilled. In fact, Yankee Atomic Electric Company actually ceased operations prior to the passage of
the Energy Policy Act. Id. at 1573.
141. Id. at 1572.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1573.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1582.
147. Id. at 1574–75 (citing Winstar, 518 U.S. at 891–93). But the Winstar plurality had rejected an
intent-based test; instead, the plurality measured the substantive impact of the regulatory change on the
contract obligations. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 897–899 & n.46. Had the Federal Circuit applied an effects-
based test, perhaps Yankee Atomic would have been decided the other way. The substantial effect of
the legislation at issue in Yankee Atomic was to burden the government’s contract partners, as these
were the only parties that had benefited from the uranium enrichment.
purpose of the EPA was to “solv[e] the problem of decontamination”

rather than burden the Government’s contracting partners, the court found
that the sovereign acts doctrine protected the government from liability.148
The Federal Circuit then asserted that all of the Justices in Winstar agreed
about what the unmistakability doctrine was, at least at a minimal level,149
despite having divided as to the doctrine’s applicability.150 The court noted
that the plurality would not apply the doctrine to mere risk-shifting
contracts that do not block sovereign power.151 But the court reasoned that
five Justices—three concurring and two dissenting—disagreed with the
plurality and would apply the unmistakability doctrine to all government
contracts.152 Because these five Justices would have constituted a majority,
the court applied the unmistakability doctrine, holding that the contracts
did not unmistakably surrender the government’s power to assess the
clean-up costs.153 As such, the Federal Circuit ruled in favor of the
government.154
2. United States v. Westlands Water District155
In 1963, the United States Department of the Interior, Bureau of

Reclamation, entered into a contract to sell water to Westlands Water
District.156 In 1987, Congress enacted the Reclamation Reform Act
(RRA), requiring the Secretary of the Interior to charge the “full cost” for
all water sold by the government.157 For Westlands, the “full cost”
assessed by the Secretary was higher than the 1963 contract price.158 In
1989, the United States sued Westlands for the difference between the
contract price paid and the “full cost” for the period between 1987 and
1989.159 Westlands counterclaimed that the RRA breached the 1963
148. Yankee Atomic, 112 F.3d at 1575.

149. Id. at 1578 & n.7.
150. Id. at 1578.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1578–79.
153. Id. at 1579–80 (“Based on the reasoning contained in the Winstar opinions, we conclude that
the unmistakability doctrine applies in the present case. This conclusion respects the views of the five
justices who stated that the application of the doctrine is unrelated to the nature of the underlying
contracts.”).
154. Id. at 1581–82.
155. 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1114 (E.D. Cal. 2001).
156. Id. Westlands Water District was a nongovernmental agency comprised of member
corporations, such as the Boston Ranch and Westhaven Farming Company. Id. Westlands sold the
water it purchased from the government to its member agencies. Id.
157. Id. See also 43 U.S.C. § 390ww(h) (2000).
158. Westlands, 134 F. Supp. at 1114–15.
159. Id. The ensuing litigation was lengthy and complex. See id. at 1114–28.

contract, and the government raised the sovereign acts and unmistakability
defenses.160
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
held that neither doctrine shielded the government from liability on the
counterclaim.161 Although seven Winstar Justices held the government
liable, the Eastern District pointed out that the opinions were highly
fragmented.162 The district court identified four components of the
unmistakability analysis from Winstar, counting how many Justices
supported each component.163 First, six Justices had agreed that the
unmistakability doctrine applied to all government contracts.164 Second,
six Justices had agreed that the unmistakability doctrine requires a second
promise not to legislate over the contract.165 Third, only four Justices had
agreed that the applicability of the unmistakability doctrine turns on the
implication of a sovereign power.166 Fourth, Justice Scalia had
characterized the unmistakability doctrine as the converse of the ordinary
contract presumption that parties promise not to make their own
performance impossible.167
Despite counting six Justices who had agreed that the unmistakability
doctrine applies to all government contracts, the district court did not
apply the doctrine.168 Instead, it found that the Winstar plurality and
Justice Scalia’s concurrence would have agreed about the judgment under
the facts of Westlands. According to the court in Westlands, the Winstar
plurality would not have applied the unmistakability doctrine because the
contract at issue did not implicate a sovereign power.169 Because the
contract’s essential term was the price of water, under Justice Scalia’s
160. Id. at 1144.

161. Id. at 1154. The court began by discussing the implications of not holding the government
liable for breaches of contract. Id. at 1144–46. For example, allowing the government to routinely
breach its contracts with impunity would threaten public credit and increase the government’s costs of
doing business. Id.
162. Id. at 1146–47.
163. Id. at 1147.
164. Id. The court did not state which six Justices would support this proposition. Id.
165. Id. at 1147.
166. Id. This is a reference to the plurality’s distinction between cases where enforcing a contract
either would or would not block the exercise of a sovereign power. Id. at 1146.
167. Id. at 1147. Essentially, under this reading, the government does not implicitly promise not to
make its own performance impossible.
168. Id. at 1151.
169. Id. The court likened the contract to a simple governmental supply contract, which Justice
Souter stated does not implicate sovereign power, see supra note 80, a contract, and to which the
unmistakability doctrine does not apply. See Westlands, 134 F. Supp. at 1151 (“Charging ‘full cost’ for
all water implicates a water-pricing term in a water-delivery contract, but does not implicate a
sovereign power . . . .”).
analysis the unmistakability doctrine would have been overcome even if it

applied.170 Since both the plurality’s and Justice Scalia’s tests were
satisfied, the court held that the unmistakability doctrine did not shield the
government.171
3. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority v. United States172
In 1978, Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority (Cuyahoga) and

the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
entered into an agreement for Cuyahoga to provide “Section 8” housing to
low income residents of Cleveland, Ohio.173 HUD promised, pursuant to
the Housing Act of 1937, to pay Cuyahoga the difference between the rent
which low-income residents were able to pay and a variable contract
rate.174 However, HUD began to worry that the variable contract rate was
well above the real market value of the rent.175 In 1994, Congress amended
the Housing Act to link the variable contract rates to the real market value
as determined by HUD.176 Cuyahoga sued the government in the Court of
Federal Claims, alleging the 1994 amendments breached the 1978
contract,177 and the government raised the unmistakability defense.178
The Court of Federal Claims noted that five Winstar Justices seemed to
reject the plurality’s limitation on the unmistakability doctrine’s
applicability.179 However, citing the narrowest ground method, the court
distilled four principles that all four Winstar opinions would have
supported.180 First, the application of the unmistakability doctrine hinges
on whether the challenged legislation involves the exercise of a sovereign
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1151.
172. 57 Fed. Cl. 751 (Fed. Cl. 2003).
173. Id. at 753.
174. Id. at 753–54.
175. Id. at 754. In the early 1980s, HUD commissioned “comparability studies” to determine the
rent charged at comparable housing units and amended its regulations to cap payments to Section 8
project owners—such as Cuyahoga—at the rate determined by the comparability studies. Id.
176. Id. at 757.
177. Id. at 758. The damages sought by Cuyahoga were based on the difference between the
variable contract rates and the lower rents actually paid by the government between the years 1994 and
1999, the year suit was filed.
178. Id. at 763.
179. Id. at 770. The court conducted an extremely thorough analysis of all the opinions in the
Winstar plurality and exhaustively analyzed the history of the unmistakability doctrine. See id. at 763–
69.
180. Id. at 763–69. The court argued that even Chief Justice Rehnquist hinted that certain
governmental acts might make the government liable for breach. Id. at 772 n.9.

power.181 Second, not all legislation implicates sovereign powers.182 Third,

the sovereign powers protected by the unmistakability doctrine are similar
to the sovereign acts protected by the sovereign acts doctrine.183 Finally,
the court concluded that the dispositive question is the nature of the
legislation—if the legislation targets the government’s contractual
obligations merely to obtain a better deal, neither the sovereign acts nor
the unmistakability doctrines protect the government.184 The court ruled
that the unmistakability defense was unavailable to the government
because the 1994 amendments specifically targeted contracts like
Cuyahoga’s.185 The government was therefore liable for breach.186
4. Kimberly Associates v. United States187
In 1981, Kimberly Associates, the owner of a low-income housing

project in Twin Falls, Idaho, entered into a loan agreement with the Rural
Housing Service (RHS).188 Congress had authorized RHS to make low-
interest loans to encourage construction of rural rental property.189 The
1981 loan agreement contained a number of restrictions on Kimberly,
including a cap on Kimberly’s annual profits from the project, a
prohibition on other borrowing, and a covenant to use the property as low-
income housing for twenty years even if Kimberly prepaid the loan from
the RHS.190 Kimberly executed a promissory note in the amount $620,000,
payable over fifty years, and the note contained a provision that
181. Id. at 772.

182. Id.
183. Id. The court found two indications that the unmistakability doctrine and sovereign acts
doctrine were conceptually linked in the plurality opinion. Id. at 770–71. First, the plurality hinged the
unmistakability doctrine’s applicability on whether the contract implicates sovereign powers—and the
concept of sovereign powers is similar to the concept of sovereign acts. Id. Moreover, the plurality
held that the more the government targets its contractual obligations with legislation, the less the
sovereign acts doctrine protects the government. Id. Thus, under the plurality’s reading, both the
sovereign acts doctrine and the unmistakability doctrine are limited by the manner in which the
government breached the contract. Id. The court described this link as a “leitmotif” found throughout
the three opinions concurring in judgment in Winstar. Id. at 771.
184. Id. at 773.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 777. The court also listed several other reasons for supporting this reading of the
unmistakability doctrine, including the fact that there is no logical limit to the government’s
interpretation of the doctrine. See id. at 776 (“Carried to its logical extreme, the government’s position
would transform the unmistakability doctrine from a shield into a meat axe that would allow the
Congress to reserve the choicest portions of the government’s contracts and discard the rest . . . .”).
187. 261 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2000).
188. Id. at 866.
189. Id.
190. Id.
prepayments could be made at any time without penalty.191 Congress

became concerned that the RHS loans were subject to prepayment, and if
the loans were prepaid, the properties would no longer be used as low-
income housing. Thus, the purpose of the RHS program would be
defeated.192 In response, Congress passed the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1992 (HCDA), which sought to discourage
prepayment by establishing elaborate requirements for prepaying loans
like Kimberly’s.193 Kimberly, however, went through the elaborate
procedures and tendered a payment for the remainder due on the loan in
1997.194 RHS refused to accept the payment, pointing to a regulatory
provision called the “Prepayment and Displacement Prevention”
program.195 Kimberly sued the government, and the United States District
Court for the District of Idaho ruled that the unmistakability doctrine
barred Kimberly from any contract remedies.196
Kimberly appealed and the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
unmistakability doctrine did not apply.197 The Ninth Circuit laid out a two-
part test for the unmistakability doctrine derived from the Winstar
plurality’s analysis: first, whether the government acted as sovereign when
it breached its contractual obligations; and second, if the government acted
as a sovereign, whether the contract waived sovereign rights in
unmistakable terms.198 The court found that the 1992 HCDA and
Prepayment and Displacement Prevention program were narrow and
targeted, meant only to relieve the government of its contract liability.199
As such, the government was not acting in its sovereign capacity and the
unmistakability doctrine did not apply.200
191. Id.
192. Id. at 867.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 866.
198. Id. at 869.
199. Id. at 870.
200. Id.

5. Tamarind Resort Associates v. Virgin Islands201
In 1964, the government of the United States Virgin Islands202 entered

into an agreement with the Hans Lollik Corporation. The Lollik Corp.
owned the 500-acre, uninhabited Great Hans Lollik Island.203 Through the
agreement, the Virgin Islands approved the use of the island for a resort
hotel.204 The agreement provided for construction of a hotel with no less
than 50 rooms and 150 residences.205 The agreement also contained a
clause that “the Government [of the Virgin Islands] will not adopt any
legislation impairing or limiting the obligations of this contract.”206 The
agreement was enacted as law, containing provisions described as
“contractual and proprietary in nature.”207 In 1978, however, the Virgin
Islands enacted the Coastal Zone Management Act (CMZA)208 to
harmonize environmental protection and economic development.209 Under
the CZMA, development on Great Hans Lollik Island could only be
accomplished by obtaining a permit from the Coastal Zone Management
Commission (CZMC).210 In 1990, Tamarind Resort Associates purchased
Hans Lollik Island from the Lollik Corporation.211 Tamarind developed a
plan to construct an 800-unit resort and a 150-room hotel, for which the
CZMC denied a permit.212 The CZMC denied Tamarind’s permit
application for the initial plan and a subsequent revised plan calling only
for a 675-unit resort.213
After losing an administrative appeal, Tamarind sued the government
of the Virgin Islands in federal court, alleging the CZMA breached the
201. 138 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1998).

202. Id. at 109. The fact that the government of the Virgin Islands is not the federal government
should not impact the unmistakability analysis, because, as Justice Souter noted in Winstar, the
unmistakability doctrine originated in the states. See supra note 79. Since the unmistakability doctrine
addresses the implications of sovereign authority generally under the American constitutional system,
any sovereign authority—federal, state, or territorial—with the capacity to make law and enter
contracts can theoretically raise the unmistakability defense.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 901–14 (1982).
209. Tamarind, 138 F.3d at 109.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 110. The court held that TRA was the successor-in-interest to the Hans Lollik
Corporation’s 1964 agreement. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
1964 contract.214 Tamarind argued that the absence of a provision setting a

maximum development level in the initial contract gave it unlimited
discretion in the scope of the construction.215 On appeal, the Third Circuit
noted that after Winstar it was unclear to which contracts the
unmistakability doctrine applied.216 The court held that it was clear, on the
other hand, that “one of the basic principles underlying the doctrine” is the
belief that it is unreasonable to assume that the government contracted
away its sovereign power without an express contractual waiver.217 The
Third Circuit then applied the unmistakability doctrine.218 Because the
contract did not unmistakably limit the government’s ability to set a
maximum development size, such a limitation could not be implied.219 The
court ruled in favor of the Virgin Islands.220
6. Franklin Federal Savings Bank v. United States221
Morristown Thrift became insolvent when interest rates and inflation

rose in the 1970s.222 The Bank Board suggested that Morristown seek to
merge with a healthy thrift.223 Instead, Morristown’s board of directors
formed a holding company called Franklin Financial.224 The board of
directors then submitted a proposal to the Bank Board asking that Franklin
Financial be allowed to acquire all of Morristown’s assets and treat
Morristown’s liabilities as an intangible asset.225 The Bank Board
approved this plan via an agreement with Franklin;226 however the
approval documents not only contained language incorporating then-
214. Id.
215. Id. at 112.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. For purposes of illustration, had the CZMC denied a permit for a resort at or below the
minimum level guaranteed by the contract—150 units—then a breach might have existed for which
the unmistakability doctrine would not have protected the government.
220. Id.
221. 431 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
222. Id. at 1361.
223. Id. at 1362.
224. Id.
225. Id. The intangible asset was supervisory goodwill, amortized over a twenty-five year period.
Id. at 1362–63. This scheme is similar to the accounting schemes agreed upon in Winstar. See supra
note 56 and accompanying text. But in Winstar, the defunct thrifts had been acquired by the plaintiff
thrifts, which were distinct corporate entities. In Franklin, the acquiring thrift was a new company set
up by the defunct thrift’s owners to hide its own liabilities. See id. at 1361 (“[The insolvent thrift]
prepared a business plan . . . under which [it] would be acquired by Franklin Financial, a holding
company formed by [the insolvent thrift’s own] board of directors.”).
226. Id. at 1362.

existing regulations, but also incorporated “any successor regulation . . .

[which] may increase or decrease [Franklin]’s obligation under this
Agreement.”227 Eight months after entering the agreement, Congress
enacted FIRREA, barring the treatment of liabilities as intangible assets.228
Franklin sued the government in the Court of Federal Claims, alleging
FIRREA breached the approval agreement.229 The Court of Claims agreed
that FIRREA breached the approval agreement, and the government
appealed.230
The Federal Circuit characterized the unmistakability question from
Winstar as “whether the contracts should be presumed to promise only
temporary forbearance (until regulatory change occurred) or long-term
forbearance.”231 The court explained that the plurality opinion had
required—in the absence of the unmistakability doctrine’s application—
clear language to limit a promise to temporary forbearance.232 Justice
Scalia, on the other hand, applied the unmistakability doctrine but did not
shift the risk of regulatory change to the thrifts because such a promise for
a temporary forbearance would render the contracts illusory.233 The court
then portrayed the Chief Justice’s dissent as applying the unmistakability
doctrine, yet promising only temporary forbearance.234 The court noted
227. Id. at 1363.

228. Id. at 1364. Franklin, like the thrifts in Winstar, was rendered immediately insolvent by
FIRREA. Id. But Franklin was able to avoid government seizure by recapitalization through a loan
from the board of directors to the corporation, which was repaid by a sale of stock that reduced the
board’s ownership from 100% to 62.3%. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1367.
In Winstar, a primary focus of the various Supreme Court opinions was on the
unmistakability doctrine—that is, whether the contracts should be presumed to promise only
temporary forbearance (until regulatory change occurred) or long-term forbearance. The
plurality held that the unmistakability doctrine did not apply in actions seeking to recover
monetary damages for breach of contract, and that there thus was no presumption that the
contracts promised temporary forbearance only. The particular contracts were construed as
promising long-term forbearance. But, as we shall see, the plurality agreed that clear language
in such contracts could limit the promise to temporary forbearance and shift the risk of
regulatory change to the thrift. Justice Scalia's concurrence urged that the unmistakability
doctrine applied to such contracts, but that the agreements did not shift the risk of regulatory
change to the thrifts. Justice Scalia indeed believed that a promise for temporary forbearance
was illusory, and would render the contracts unenforceable. The dissent urged that the
unmistakability doctrine applied and that the contracts should be construed as promising only
temporary forbearance even without the clear language demanded by the plurality.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
232. Id.
233. Id. The thrifts in Franklin urged the court to adopt Justice Scalia’s reasoning that a promise
for temporary forbearance is illusory, but the Federal Circuit declined. Id. at 1367–68.
234. Id. at 1367.
that Justice Souter and the Chief Justice “agreed that the parties could
have contracted only for temporary forbearance, but disagreed as to
whether a clear statement was necessary.”235 The court, citing Marks, held
that because the plurality “required a clear statement to legitimate a
temporary forbearance,” it was the narrowest and as such was binding.236
However, despite finding that the plurality from Winstar controlled, the
Federal Circuit concluded that Franklin could not recover on the contracts
because the successor regulation clause was a clear statement that shifted
the risk of regulatory change to the thrift.237
II. ANALYSIS
By examining how lower courts actually apply plurality decisions,

some conclusions can be drawn about what the law is and should be
regarding the application of plurality opinions as precedential authority.238
It is significant that all six of these courts applied Winstar—none openly
rejected the reasoning as courts are presumably entitled to do with mere
persuasive authority—even though all of these courts noted that Winstar
was merely a plurality decision.239 All of these courts applied the
substance of the statement in Texas v. Brown that, even though plurality
opinions may not be binding precedent, “as the considered opinion of four
Members of this Court it should obviously be the point of reference for
further discussion of the issue.”240 Nevertheless, only one of the six
opinions actually cited Brown in its discussion of Winstar.241 This
indicates that courts instinctively begin their analysis by considering the
235. Id. at 1368.

236. Id. (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
237. Id. at 1371–72. In Winstar, the plurality held that the contract was a risk-shifting agreement,
but the risk was shifted from the acquiring thrift to the government. See supra note 75 and
accompanying text.
238. See Chicago Study, supra note 1, at 154–55.
239. See Franklin Federal Sav. Bank v. United States, 431 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005);
Kimberly Assocs. v. United States, 261 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000); Tamarind Resort Assocs. v.
Virgin Is., 138 F.3d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1998); Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 112 F.3d
1569, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir. 1997); United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1146
(E.D. Cal. 2001); Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 751, 770 (Fed. Cl. 2003).
240. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983) (plurality opinion).
241. Cuyahoga, 57 Fed. Cl. at 772 n.29 (citing, but not quoting, Brown for the proposition that “a
plurality view that does not command a majority is not binding precedent”). The court seemed
uncertain about how much precedential weight to accord plurality opinions, citing first Marks for the
proposition that the narrowest grounds were binding precedent, then Brown as described above, and
then Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1910), for the proposition that pluralities are not
binding. Cuyahoga, 57 Fed. Cl. at 772 n.29.

rationale from plurality opinions, and suggests that lower courts accord
Winstar and other plurality opinions more than just persuasive authority.
A. How Courts Apply Plurality Opinions
1. The Marks/Narrowest Grounds Method
In Marks v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that “[w]hen a

fragmented court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”242 There are at least two
formulations of the narrowest grounds approach.243 The first identifies the
opinion supporting the judgment that is the narrowest in its scope, granting
that opinion binding precedential weight. The second searches for
rationale common to opinions that a majority of Justices joined, granting
all of these grounds binding precedential weight.
The court in Franklin explicitly applied the first formulation of the
narrowest grounds method, identifying Justice Souter’s plurality opinion
as the narrowest opinion and granting it full precedential weight.244 But at
the very least, characterizing Justice Souter’s plurality opinion as the
narrowest opinion from Winstar is open to debate, as it is not fairly
characterizable as a subset of Justice Scalia’s concurrence. Moreover,
despite applying Justice Souter’s opinion, the court in Franklin reached
the opposite conclusion about the unmistakability doctrine’s applicability
than that reached by the Winstar plurality.245
In Cuyahoga the court cited Marks and sought common grounds
among all of the Winstar opinions, nominally applying the second
formulation of the Marks test.246 The court found four grounds in common,
and based on these four common grounds, the court refused to apply the
unmistakability doctrine.247 However, there are two flaws in the court’s
application of the Marks test. First, the narrowest grounds test articulated
242. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
243. See supra notes 31–36 and accompanying text.
244. Franklin, 431 F.3d at 1368.
245. In fact, the clear statement shifting the risk of regulatory change to the thrift in Franklin
would probably have been enough to render the thrift liable, even if the unmistakability doctrine did
not apply as it did under Justice Souter’s plurality.
246. Cuyahoga, 57 Fed. Cl. at 772 n.29.
247. Id. at 777. In reaching this conclusion, the court purported to find grounds that all nine
Winstar Justices would agree with. Id.
in Marks was explicitly restricted to the opinions of those Justices

concurring in judgment. The Cuyahoga court, on the other hand, sought
grounds it asserted the dissent would also agree with. Second, it is unclear
that any of the Justices would have agreed fully with the four grounds
found by the court.
The Marks rule has been subject to criticism by courts and
commentators, and the Supreme Court has not consistently applied the
narrowest grounds rule it laid down in Marks.248 Most critics of the
narrowest grounds rule agree that it is not applicable to complex plurality
decisions in which the plurality and lead concurrence do not agree on the
reasoning but reach the same result. While there are some plurality
decisions to which the narrowest grounds rule can apply,249 the simple
reconciliation and policy space methods I propose below would
presumably provide the same result as an application of the narrowest
grounds rule in the cases in which the narrowest grounds rule can apply.
But the new methods I propose also provide an interpretive rule for
complex plurality decisions to which the narrowest grounds rule cannot
apply.
2. The Dual Majority Method
The court in Yankee Atomic applied the dual majority method in

analyzing the Winstar plurality.250 The dual majority method recognizes
binding legal rules when the dissent and one of the concurrences advocate
the same reasoning, so long as the dissent and concurrence together were
joined by at least five Justices.251 The court in Yankee Atomic noted that
five Justices, those dissenting and those joining Justice Scalia, agreed that

249. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 372 (1991) (plurality) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment) (“I agree with the plurality that we review for clear error the trial court's
finding as to discriminatory intent. . . . I write separately because I believe that the plurality opinion
goes further than it needs to in assessing the constitutionality of the prosecutor's asserted justification
for his peremptory strikes.”). In Hernandez, the plurality opinion seems clearly narrower on the issue
of the standard of review for findings of discriminatory intent.
250. Several other cases applied this method to Winstar. See, e.g., Adams v. United States, 42 Fed.
Cl. 463, 485 (Fed. Cl. 1998) (“The conclusion of this court . . . that the government did not breach the
contracts based on the unmistakability defense[] appears to reflect the views of a majority of the
members of the Winstar court”). Winstar seemingly lends itself to this type of analysis, as the
concurrence and dissent “agreed” that the unmistakability doctrine applies to all government contracts,
while the plurality argued that the unmistakability doctrine applies only when the government’s
sovereign power is implicated. However, the scope of the unmistakability doctrine is very different in
the dissent and Justice Scalia’s concurrence. See infra note 252.
251. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.

the unmistakability doctrine is universally applicable to all government

contracts.252
Although the dual majority analysis in Yankee Atomic was superficially
correct in that Justice Scalia’s concurrence and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
dissent both purported to apply the unmistakability doctrine, the
application of the dual majority method in Yankee Atomic exposes serious
problems with this method. Seven Justices in Winstar held the government
liable.253 Despite seeming to agree with the dissent about the applicability
of the sovereign acts and unmistakability defenses, Justice Scalia’s
understanding of the actual effect of the defenses was very different from
that of the Chief Justice.254 Even though Justice Scalia would have applied
the sovereign acts and unmistakability defenses in Yankee Atomic, as he
did in Winstar, he probably would have also saddled the government with
liability in Yankee Atomic despite applying these defenses.
The dual majority method often misses the differences that can fall
between concurrences and dissents. After all, if a concurrence and a
dissent truly agreed about the reasoning and rules they discussed, they
would not have reached different results.255 The dual majority method is
thus inherently unstable, and creates amalgams of propositions,
interpretations of rules, and results that none of the Justices from the
earlier no-clear-majority decision would have endorsed in their entirety.
252. Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 112 F.3d 1569, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
253. See infra note 254.
254. In Winstar, Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist used similar words to describe the
unmistakability doctrine, and both claimed to apply the doctrine. Under Justice Scalia’s application of
the sovereign acts and unmistakability defenses, the government’s liability turns on the risks it
assumes in the contract. In entering into fixed-price agreements for the sale of enrichment services, the
government probably assumed the risk of regulatory change under Justice Scalia’s analysis. Justice
Scalia felt that an implied promise was satisfactory to overcome the unmistakability doctrine if the
issue was central to the parties’ contract and the government clearly intended to assume the risk.
Justice Scalia felt that each of these conditions were satisfied in Winstar. Winstar v. United States, 518
U.S. 839, 919–24 (1996). The Chief Justice, on the other hand, felt that the unmistakability doctrine
blocked all implicit promises to shift the risk of regulatory change to the government, and that such
promises had to take the form of unmistakably clear second promises. Id. at 924–37. The Chief Justice
felt that this standard applied even to damage suits, while Justice Scalia seemed to differentiate
between suits for damages and suits to enjoin the enforcement of a law. Id. at 923, 926. These
differences between the Chief Justice’s and Justice Scalia’s conceptions of the unmistakability
doctrine make the dual majority method particularly unsuitable for Winstar analyses.
255. Kimura, supra note 1, at 1602–03. In the abstract, it is possible that the concurrence and
dissent may be using the same phrases to mean the same thing in some instances. But the likelihood
that the concurrence and dissent actually mean somewhat different things, even though they use the
same phrases in some instances (as evidenced by Yankee Atomic’s misapplication of Justice Scalia’s
use of the phrase “unmistakability doctrine”), cautions against borrowing bits and pieces of each
opinion. Nevertheless, if the dissent contains language such as “we agree with the concurrence as far
as propositions x and y, but disagree as to z, and thus reach a different result,” it may be safe to assume
that these Justices actually agree as to propositions x and y.
However, some Justices have indicated that it may be appropriate, in some

instances, to draw controlling principles of law from majorities made up of
dissenters as well as those joining plurality and concurring opinions in
plurality decisions.256
3. The Citation for Specific Result and Disavowal Methods
As of the writing of this Note, no case could be found that cited

Winstar, but refused to apply it because it was a plurality decision.257 The
closest any case came to open disavowal was Tamarind, where the court
cited Winstar as potentially controlling, but did not apply the reasoning
from any of the opinions.258 Instead, the court simply cited Justice Scalia’s
concurring opinion for a definition of the unmistakability doctrine, and
then applied that definition to reach the opposite result of both the
plurality and Justice Scalia’s concurrence.259
Despite the ambiguous precedential value of plurality opinions, the
American judiciary is hierarchical. In a hierarchical system, it would be
striking for a court to openly reject the opinion of a higher court, even if a
majority of the higher court’s members did not formally join the
256. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 685 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that a
controlling majority can be drawn from propositions supported by majorities made up of Justices who
either dissented or concurred); see also United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 65–66 (1st Cir. 2006).
257. Many cases have cited Winstar for its result only. See, e.g., Ace Prop. and Cas. Ins. v. Fed.
Crop Ins. Corp., 440 F.3d 992, 1001 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Winstar for the proposition that damages
could be awarded against a federal agency for breach of contract despite the fact that Congress
required the federal agency to breach the contract at issue).
As noted, I have not identified any cases that have explicitly rejected Winstar’s reasoning because
it was a plurality. On the other hand, one case that cited Winstar disavowed the reasoning of a different
plurality decision, holding that only the result was binding. In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United
States, 46 Fed. Cl. 29, 39–40 (Fed. Cl. 2000), the Court of Federal Claims rejected the reasoning from
Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), because the lack of common ground between the
opinions rendered the Marks test inoperative. Commonwealth Edison, 46 Fed. Cl. at 39 (“[N]o part of
the plurality’s reasoning constitutes binding precedent. The plurality [and] concurrence agree in result
and focus on similar facts, but share no common denominator in terms of legal rationale. As such, the
only part of the plurality opinion that is binding is the specific result . . . .”).
258. Tamarind Resort Assocs. v. Virgin Is., 138 F.3d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1998).
259. Admittedly, it is unclear whether the result in Tamarind would have changed had the court
applied the reasoning from Winstar. While the contract in Tamarind may not have contained
unmistakable terms limiting the government’s right to limit development, the contract did contain a
clause that the government would not change the law to impair the contract, arguably shifting the risk
of regulatory change to the government. This clause might even have been interpretable as an
unmistakably clear second promise not to change the law, satisfying even the Chief Justice’s rigorous
standards. On the other hand, the CZMA might have been a public and general act, so that even if the
unmistakability doctrine did not relieve the government from liability, the sovereign acts doctrine
might have. In any event, future courts undoubtedly would have benefited from a more detailed
analysis of these issues by the Third Circuit.

opinion.260 This might explain why there are so few disavowals or

citations for result only.
4. The Persuasive Opinion Methods
a. The Full Precedential Weight Method
In Kimberly, the court adopted the reasoning of the Winstar plurality

without commenting on any of the other opinions.261 In fact, even though
the court in Kimberly cited Winstar three times, the Kimberly opinion only
noted in reference to the third cite that Winstar was a plurality, suggesting
that the district court in Kimberly simply adopted plurality opinion from
Winstar as if it was a clear-majority decision. As such, Kimberly seems to
be an example of the full precedential weight method—the lower court
adopts the plurality opinion as binding in the same way a majority opinion
would be binding. While much is to be said for the judicial economy
afforded by this method, the full precedential weight method neglects the
complex precedential texture of plurality decisions. Even though plurality
opinions should not be dismissed as merely persuasive, they should not
automatically be adopted as binding precedent either. To do so renders
meaningless the fact that the Justices themselves thought the issues were
too important to compromise by joining a majority opinion, thereby
endorsing an interpretation of the law with which they disagree.
b. The Persuasive Effect Method
No cases were found that cited as controlling Justice Scalia’s, Justice

Breyer’s, or the Chief Justice’s opinions from Winstar without reference to
the plurality. While the Third Circuit in Tamarind explicitly cited Justice
Scalia’s concurrence for a controlling statement of the law, the discussion
of Tamarind above262 indicates that the Third Circuit did not really adopt
the Winstar concurrence’s reasoning. A true application of the persuasive
effect method would require the adoption of either the concurrence’s or
dissent’s reasoning and judgment as fully binding.
The rarity of these cases is perhaps to be expected for much the same
reason that the disavowal methods are rarely used. It would be odd for a

261. Kimberly Assocs. v. United States, 261 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000).
262. See supra notes 201–20.
court to adopt an opinion that was neither a majority nor a plurality

without some basis besides the opinion’s persuasive appeal.
B. Some Responses to the Academic Criticisms of Plurality Decisions
Critics argue that plurality decisions are complex, costing courts many
hours in analyzing the opinions.263 But not every application of a plurality
decision raises the need for such lengthy devotion of resources by the
lower court. In fact, there is only difficulty in applying a plurality if the
lower court feels that the plurality and any concurring opinions would
come to different conclusions over the facts before the lower court.264
Otherwise, the court can use the simple reconciliation method, apply both
opinions, and feel confident that the Supreme Court would have come to
the same conclusion.265
On the other hand, the complexity of plurality opinions often reflects
the underlying complexity of the normative, ethical, or moral issues
involved.266 This claim is distinct from the claim that the Supreme Court
discovers rather than makes law. The Supreme Court makes law with
every judgment it hands down.267 However, the law-making process can
be seen as an institutional response to the discovery and resolution of
normative, ethical, or moral problems. In the case of plurality opinions,
there is a disconnect between the need to address these issues and the
institutional process designed to address them. This disconnect does not
necessarily render the Supreme Court a lesser institution for not being able
to immediately and satisfactorily resolve these thorny normative problems.
263. See supra note 3. Critics of plurality opinions might point out that beyond the superficial
factual and legal complexity often found in plurality opinions, the uncertain precedential weight
inherent in plurality decisions further frustrates lower courts in attempting to apply pluralities.
Admittedly, with each application of a plurality decision, a second tier of analysis might need to be
engaged. We must not only ask how factually analogous the cases are to determine whether the
plurality is applicable, but we must also ask to what degree the plurality serves as binding authority.
264. See United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2001).
265. If the personnel on the Court has changed since the plurality, some might argue that this
analysis should take into account how the current Court, as opposed to the Court that handed down the
plurality, would resolve these issues. But this analysis could also be used in predicting the persuasive
force of clear-majority decisions, and it seems similarly inappropriate in both instances. While litigants
may want to take such changes into account in deciding whether to settle or what arguments to pursue,
for courts, at least, respect for stare decisis would require an earlier precedent to be obeyed regardless
of current changes to the higher court’s personnel. If the higher court wants to change the precedent, it
can do so on appeal from the lower court.
266. Novak, supra note 1 passim.
267. See Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 557
(2006) (discussing the difference between judicial discovery and manufacture of law).

Some argue that plurality opinions represent an abdication of the

Supreme Court’s duty to make law. But the Court is still resolving
disputes, and some commentators have argued that the primary function of
the Court is to resolve disputes.268 While I do not seek to diminish the
importance of the Supreme Court’s law-making function, it seems strange
to impose an affirmative normative duty on a lawmaker to make law in
every case. Even if there is a positive norm associated with making law, or
with preventing inefficiency by crafting broadly applicable legal rules,
there should not be a corresponding negative norm for the Supreme
Court’s “failure” to do so.269 Concerns of efficiency and fairness certainly
place an affirmative moral duty on the Supreme Court to issue binding
decisions as often as possible. However, concerns that the Supreme Court
may hand down a bad ruling—or a ruling that does not fully address all of
the issues presented in a case—suggest that the Court does not have an
affirmative moral duty to issue a binding decision in every case.
Moreover, the Court is not exactly failing to make law when it hands
down a plurality. Lower courts still internalize plurality opinions and
attempt to apply them, even if they apply them differently than clear-
majority opinions.270 If judges follow and apply plurality opinions, it
might reflect an intuition on the part of judges that they have a normative
duty to do so. Since a central identifying feature of law is application by
courts to resolve disputes, pluralities are, in some sense, law.271 If judges
are giving plurality opinions more than just persuasive weight, perhaps the
268. See West, supra note 14, at 1955 (“[T]he principal job of the Supreme Court is to decide
cases by making judgments. Coming in a strong second is the duty to issue opinions, which ‘are
simply explanations of those judgments or those votes on judgments.’”); see also Edward A. Hartnett,
Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 661 (2002) (“The
fundamental job of a court is to decide cases by issuing judgments; the fundamental job of a judge on a
multimember court is to vote on the judgment to be entered by that court. Opinions are simply
explanations of those judgments or those votes on judgments.”); Novak, supra note 1, at 757 (“The
Supreme Court performs two essential functions: it resolves the particular controversies that come
before it and provides guidance for lower courts in deciding similar cases in the future. . . . [Both] are
better served when the Court sets out a clear and persuasive rationale assented to by a majority of
Justices.”).
269. If Congress considered fifty proposed bills and passed only forty-nine of them, has Congress
abdicated its lawmaking authority? Not in a sense that renders it a normatively lesser institution. In
fact, if Congress passed every proposed bill, or enacted law covering every area of its authority under
the Constitution, it would almost certainly be a lesser institution.
270. Some have argued that there are no external constraints on judges to apply any precedent at
all. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 817 (1994). Courts and judges are not punished for not applying precedent, so the source of
obedience to precedent is internal—self-imposed by judges on themselves. Id.
legal community as a whole should recognize that plurality opinions have

an important and even valuable role to play in the law.
Critics might argue that even if we acknowledge a consensus view in
lower courts that plurality opinions have some weight, we still dodge the
real question of why we want these opinions to have precedential weight.
Once the Supreme Court has invested substantial judicial resources
addressing the divisive issues in case, even if the Court only resolves the
dispute with a plurality decision, it would be a waste of those resources to
disavow or disregard the reasoning and insight in the Court’s opinions.
Granting pluralities some measure of precedential authority will “force”
lower courts to address these issues more completely. The additional
resource investment by the lower courts can help move towards a
satisfying resolution of the law’s response to these complex issues.
Professors Kornhauser and Sager have suggested that lower court analysis
in applying the plurality might be useful to the Supreme Court when it
faces the same issue again.272
Critics also argue that plurality opinions obstruct the predictive
function of the law, rendering it more difficult for private parties to shape
their behavior in order to avoid legal liability or to reach settlement
agreements to avoid costly litigation.273 While it would seem easy to
dismiss this criticism on the grounds that there are no crystal balls in law,
lawyers do serve an important role in advising clients about how they
should do business and about the potential results of choices in litigation.
Because pluralities, by nature, are more complex than simple majorities, it
may inevitably be more difficult to predict how a court will apply a
plurality decision. On the other hand, the functional difference between
applying a plurality opinion and applying ordinary binding court decisions
need not be so great.274 In both instances, the court can simply identify
both the plurality’s and main concurrence’s views of the controlling law,
and then apply both by analogy to the new situation. Lawyers are just as
capable as judges of engaging in this analysis, and can advise their clients
accordingly. Furthermore, if the policy space method and the simple
272. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in
Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1, 45 (1993):
Given the doctrinal disarray that leads to plurality opinions of the sort we have been
considering, the participatory approach seems superior. In the face of such disarray,
predictions about future doctrinal equilibria are dicey at best, and in the face of such disarray,
lower court judgment, experience, and argument are especially useful to the high court.
274. In fact, prior to Chief Justice Marshall’s reforms doing away with seriatim opinions, this was
the dominant method of legal analysis.

reconciliation method garner more widespread acceptance, these

predictive concerns might be even more assuaged.
Finally, one critic of plurality opinions has argued that pluralities are
symptoms of substantive reasoning instead of process-based reasoning,
and as such are examples of arbitrary, pathological decision making.275 To
the extent that so-called substantive reasoning is based on reasons and
justifications linked to real-world concerns and factual distinctions, it
seems odd to characterize either plurality opinions, or any other symptom
of substantive reasoning, as “arbitrary.” It is especially unclear why
substantive reasoning would be more arbitrary than process-based
reasoning. As long as the reasons for the decision—both substantive and
procedural—exist and are announced so as to be subject to public debate,
it seems contradictory to characterize these reasons as arbitrary.
III. PROPOSAL: THE NEW METHODS
A. The Simple Reconciliation Method
The Eastern District of California in Westlands applied the

unmistakability tests articulated by the plurality and Justice Scalia.276 The
court noted that even though the tests were different, they both rendered
the same result under the facts of Westlands.277 The court in Westlands
found that Justice Scalia and Justice Souter would have come to the same
result as they had in Winstar—that the government was liable for breach.
As such, the court found the government liable.278
If the Supreme Court would have split the same way under the facts of
the new case as in the earlier plurality decision, the lower court can simply
apply the reasoning from the plurality and the lead concurrence, and reach
the same judgment as the Supreme Court reached in the plurality. Going
through the process of applying each opinion still sheds light on the ethical
and normative issues that split the Court in the first place. Moreover, even
many of the harshest critics of plurality opinions agree that the results of
plurality decisions are binding, and this method respects the binding force
of the results of no-clear-majority decisions.
275. Harvard Note, supra note 1, at 1128 (“[P]lurality decisions [are] symptomatic of a
fundamental flaw in the Supreme Court’s current approach to decisionmaking, which relies
excessively on value-laden ‘substantive reasoning.’”); see also id. at 1140–46.
276. United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1151 (E.D. Cal. 2001).
277. Id.
278. Id.
Unlike the dual majority method, this method does not apply the
reasoning of the dissent, assuming that some difference in the dissent’s
understanding of the law motivated the dissenting Justices to argue for a
different resolution. Unlike the narrowest grounds method, this method
does not seek out one controlling opinion or one set of controlling
propositions from the concurring opinions. It simply finds that these
opinions would not produce different results under the facts of the new
case, and then it reaches that result.
However, there are at least two instances where it would be
inappropriate to apply the reconciliation method. First, if the plurality and
concurring opinions would produce different results, a more thorough
analysis should be undertaken to explain why the different opinions would
reach different results. Second, if the plurality and concurrence would
reach the same result, but it is a different result than in the original
plurality decision, further analysis is again called for.279
B. The Policy Space Method
If the simple reconciliation method fails to resolve the dispute, as when

the plurality and lead concurrence would reach different results from each
other in the new case, courts can apply the policy space method. To apply
the policy space method, the court thoroughly deduces all the tests and
factors employed by the plurality opinion and lead concurrence, just as it
would using the simple reconciliation method. The results of this analysis
should reveal a “policy space,” a theoretical range between the plurality
and lead concurrence. The court must compare the facts of the new case to
the facts of the plurality opinion, and it must then determine whether the
reasoning from the plurality (suggesting one result) or the reasoning from
the concurrence (suggesting a different result) is more applicable to the
new facts.
In comparing the facts of the new case to the facts that lead to the
plurality decision, the lower court might find significant differences
suggesting that one result or the other should be reached. If the applying
court explains this process in detail, the court will not only resolve the
dispute before it, but it will also provide guidance to other courts
279. How much further analysis is necessary depends on which of these two instances is
implicated. If the plurality and lead concurrence reach different outcomes from each other in the new
case, the court should apply the greater analysis of the policy space method. If, on the other hand, the
plurality and concurrence seem to agree in the new case, but reach a different outcome from the earlier
case, the court should explain why, but need not undertake the policy space method.

struggling with the plurality decision. Provided that the court explicitly
states how and why it reached its conclusion, the policy space method
should generally increase the coherence of the law and provide guidance
to other courts confronting similar issues. If the Supreme Court revisits the
issue, it will also be framed more clearly and perhaps can be definitely
resolved. On the other hand, if courts ignore this level of analysis, the
issues that prevented the Supreme Court from writing a majority opinion
may remain confused.280 Fully engaging the plurality opinion should
clarify the underlying issues and how the law should respond.281
For example, a court applying the policy space method to Winstar’s
treatment of the unmistakability doctrine might organize the leading
opinions in order of lowest to highest standard that the plaintiff-contractor
suing the government would have to overcome.282 The lower court should
first ask whether the agreement was risk-shifting and whether it contained
an unmistakably clear second promise to shift the risk of regulatory
change onto the government. Justice Souter would not apply the
unmistakability doctrine if the contracts were risk-shifting, and he would
not require an unmistakably clear second promise if the doctrine
applied.283 Justice Scalia would apply the doctrine, even if the government
did not explicitly promise not to change the law, so long as the “sole

281. See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 272. Others have argued that “it seems more profitable
to regard [plurality] decisions as admissions of uncertainty and, in a sense, a call for help to the lower
courts.” Novak, supra note 1, at 781 (“The insight and experience of lower court judges, and the
opportunity to gain more information through feedback from the bench, bar, and general public, may
be invaluable resources for the Supreme Court to draw upon . . . .”).
Take for example case xyz before the Supreme Court. The Court issues a plurality opinion holding
h for reasons p (plurality) and c (concurrence) but not d (dissent). Later, when a lower court considers
situation wxy, it might also reach conclusion h. The court might find p particularly relevant, as well as
a new consideration, n, that has some relationship to fact w. Moreover, the court might also find a
good reason why p should not apply to w situations. Thus the lower court has held that part of the
crucial difference between w & z is the applicability of reasons p, d & n. Even though other courts
might disagree with this lower court’s assessment, its analysis nevertheless helps clarify the normative
and legal dimensions of concepts w, z, p, d and n. When the Supreme Court again takes up an xy
situation, it will be able to look to the lower court’s analysis to get a better idea about what other
factors to consider.
One might ask how this is different from a clear-majority decision. To a certain extent, pluralities
can serve the same dialectical function as majority decisions.
282. Professor Schwartz has also proposed syntheses of the different opinions in his two articles
on Winstar. See Schwartz, Ideal of Congruence, supra note 48, at 552–65; Schwartz, Interim Report,
supra note 48, at 1193–97. While the goal of the simple reconciliation and policy space method are not
to synthesize but to reconcile the opinions from a plurality decision, or at least to find the points at
which the opinions are irreconcilable, these detailed explanations of plurality opinions can be helpful
to lower courts in working through complex pluralities.
essence” of the agreement was to indemnify the thrifts in the event of

regulatory change.284
If the contract shifted the risk of regulatory change to the government
and contained an unmistakably clear promise to pay damages in the event
of regulatory change, the lower court should certainly rule in favor of the
contractor. If the contracts do not implicitly or explicitly shift the risk to
the government, or shift the risk to the contractor, then the lower court
should rule in favor of the government. But if the contracts shifted the risk
to the government, but the sole essence of the contracts was not to
indemnify against the risk of regulatory change, this places the lower court
in between the risk-shifting lower bounds and Justice Scalia’s sole-essence
upper bounds. The lower court would then have to decide whether the
facts of the new case implicated more directly the risk shifting concern of
the plurality or the sole essence concerns of the concurrence. The court
might consider, for example, how likely the party would have been to
enter into the agreement with the government without the promise of
indemnification.
Critics might argue that this method requires too much independent
decision making by the lower court, as the question how to rule on facts
between the upper and lower bounds will be left, at least before any
appeals, to the lower court’s discretion. However, courts frequently
engage in subjective decision making about the law and about how it
should apply to facts. If the court feels that some analysis should not apply
because it does not seem to fit, its ruling still helps flesh out the normative
and ethical differences that should make a difference in similar cases, as
long as the court explains the poor fit between fact and legal concept.
The policy space method can also retain a certain amount of predictive
power. Admittedly, lower courts’ reactions to facts between the upper and
lower bounds will be somewhat unpredictable. But since courts and
potential litigants draw on similar ethical and normative foundations,
potential litigants and their lawyers might be able to guess whether certain
facts will prove dispositive to a court between the upper and lower bounds.
Lawyers can look at factors identified by the different opinions in the
plurality, as well as factors identified by other courts interpreting the
plurality, and look at the facts of the case in front of them to see where the
weight of the evidence lies. The more lower courts apply the policy space
method, presumably examining how other courts have interpreted the
plurality decision, the better defined the internal conflicts and distinctions

within the plurality will become and the easier it will be for future cases to
address these issues.285
The most important goal of the policy space method is to encourage
analysis based on clearly articulated reasons. This method seeks to
combine the basic fairness concern embodied in the maxim of treating like
cases alike, the related predictive value of reliance on precedent, and the
value of explicitly articulated reasoning derived from analysis and
application of the plurality decision to new situations.286
CONCLUSION
Obedience to precedent ensures that like cases are treated alike and that
the legal system continues to function efficiently. Plurality decisions,
however, exist on the margin of the system of precedent, and are
symptoms of the normative complexities in the facts before the Court,
often arising in difficult cases with no easy answers. Should the Supreme
Court be criticized for handing down plurality decisions? No. Supreme
Court Justices should not forget their own insights or discard their own
analysis to join an opinion for the sake of apparent unanimity. If a Justice
disagrees with the reasoning of other Justices, that Justice should articulate
285. It is possible that the Court may, in some instances, intentionally issue plurality opinions. See
Davis & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 86 (considering whether the Court may have “deliberately chosen”
to issue plurality opinions). Perhaps the Justices decided that the binding legal rule that would result
from a clear majority in a specific case might have unforeseen or undesirable results in analogous
situations.
Carrying this speculation to Winstar, the Court may not have wanted to adopt a rule that would
repeatedly saddle the government with liability in other types of contract disputes. By issuing a
plurality, the Court made it less likely that lower courts would apply the anti-government precedent
without questioning whether it was the right rule in a particular circumstance. Assuming for a moment
that the Court really does issue plurality decisions intentionally, part of this motivation may be to
resolve a particular dispute without creating an ironclad rule that will not be questioned, but instead
will generate dialogue about the various reasons for adopting an opinion. This is all the more reason to
use the simple reconciliation and policy space methods, as these methods are designed to generate this
dialogue.
286. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principals of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 15 (1959) (“[T]he main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be genuinely
principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and
reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved.”); G. Edward White, The Evolution of
Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 285, 301
(1973) (describing “Reasoned Elaboration” as a “dialectical process” that places an affirmative
normative duty on judges “to give reasons for [their] decisions . . . to allow the public to evaluate the
manner in which [they were] performing [their] office”); see also In re Krynicki, 983 F.2d 74, 75 (7th
Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Judges deliberate in private but issue public decisions after public
arguments based on public records. The political branches of government claim legitimacy by election,
judges by reason. Any step that withdraws an element of the judicial process from public view makes
the ensuing decision look more like fiat . . . .”); Novak Note, supra note 1, at 758 n.9.
those reasons. Then, lower courts can take up and expand on these issues
in light of new situations. When the Court again addresses the issue, it
should have plenty of lower court analyses to review. Plurality decisions
thus initiate a type of normative dialogue between the Supreme Court and
the lower courts, one which can contribute to the development of the law
and help the law meet the demands of a changing society,
The most compelling post-Winstar results have been in cases with the
most thorough analysis, both detailing the similarities and differences
between the new facts and those of Winstar and analyzing the implications
of ruling in favor of either the government or the injured contractor. If the
plurality is applicable, lower courts should analyze how and why each of
the arguments in the plurality opinion should or should not apply. The
recognition that plurality opinions are and should be more than merely
persuasive opens the door for the kind of analysis that can best resolve the
dispute that split the Supreme Court in the first place.
James A. Bloom∗
∗ B.A. History and Philosophy (2003), Tulane University; J.D. Candidate (2008), Washington
University School of Law. I would like to thank Pauline Kim, Margo Schlanger, and Bruce LaPierre
for their insight and encouragement, as well as Eoghan Keenan, Scott Koelker, Ryan Wilkins, Lisa
DeBord, Ben Warr, Bryan Pennington, and Matt Walczewski for their comments. I am especially
grateful to Camille and my friends and family for their support.

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Washington University Law Review

Plurality and Precedence: Judicial Reasoning,

Follow this and additional works at: http://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview

Plurality decisions of the United States Supreme Court have generated

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2008] PLURALITY AND PRECEDENCE 1375

catalogues methods others have proposed for interpreting these decisions.

American courts are bound to follow two types of decisions: decisions

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generally accompanies its judgment with one or more written opinions

2008] PLURALITY AND PRECEDENCE 1377

not binding on them, as well as concurring and even dissenting opinions

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A. Academic Criticisms and Interpretive Methods for Plurality Decisions

Commentators have raised four primary criticisms of plurality

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substantive reasoning, as opposed to process-based reasoning, and as such

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particular outcome.35 If in such cases a total of five Justices joined the

2008] PLURALITY AND PRECEDENCE 1381

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B. United States v. Winstar Corp.48

The issue in Winstar was whether the federal government, as

2008] PLURALITY AND PRECEDENCE 1383

opinions was joined by a majority of five Justices.50 Justice Souter’s

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For a variety of reasons, the crisis deepened further,57 and in 1989

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Third, the government relied on the reserved powers doctrine—that certain

1. Justice Souter’s Plurality Opinion

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The government first raised the unmistakability defense, arguing that to

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88. Id. at 890 (citing and explaining the statutory authority).

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responsibilities to private parties, the plurality opinion deemed it general

2. Justice Breyer’s Concurrence

Justice Breyer emphasized two points in his concurrence. First, as a

97. Id. at 900–04.

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was no need to find an unmistakable promise.105 In Winstar, the intent of

3. Justice Scalia’s Concurrence

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almost every contract can be seen not as a promise of particular future

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4. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Dissent

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fisc—and the taxpayers who foot the bills—from . . . possible

C. Lower Court Cases Examining Winstar

Winstar has arisen in a variety of contexts.132 For Winstar to apply,

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