Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Technical Report APATR20090604
by Dr Carlo Kopp, AFAIAA, SMIEEE, PEng
June 2009
Updated April, 2012
Text, Line Art © 2009 2012 Carlo Kopp
While mobility has become, since the 1980s, the principal defence employed by Surface to Air Missile batteries to
evade attack, defensive aids are being deployed increasingly as standalone components or as part of integrated
defensive packages on radars and other key IADS components. Deployed S300PMU/SA10C 5P85SU smart TEL of
the Slovakian Army (Image © Miroslav Gyűrösi).
Introduction
Defensive Aids for IADS Components
RWE1 Missile Approach Warning System
VNIIRT 34Ya6E Gazetchik E MAWS, Decoy and Countermeasures System
KBR Integrated AntiRadiation Missile Defensive Suite
Tetraedr SRTZ2TM AntiRadiation Missile Decoy System
Defense Systems KRTZ1252M AntiRadiation Missile Decoy System
AlmazAntey OU1 Relocatable Decoy for Osa AKM / SA8 Gecko
Aviakonversiya GPS/GLONASS GNSS Signal Jammers
LPPU83 Self Propelled TELAR Decoy
MKT2, MKT3 and VolchitsaKR Camouflage Netting
References/Sources
Introduction
The 1990s were a period of important changes in how Russian designers and technological
strategists viewed the problem of air defence. While mobility emerged as a design issue during
the 1980s, as the Soviet PVO moved from static semimobile SAM batteries to fully mobile
batteries with the deployment of the S300PS/PM SA10B/C Grumble, the introduction of more
comprehensive defensive aids for air defence system components became a priority after
Desert Storm.
The 1999 Allied Force air campaign was a pivotal event. Serbian 9M9 Kvadrat / SA6 Gainful
SAM batteries largely evaded destruction by use of disciplined shootandscoot tactics, and the
Serbians claimed that many AGM88 HARM antiradiation missiles were seduced by emitting
decoys.
Current Russian thinking, emulated closely by the Chinese PLA, is to construct air defence
systems with comprehensive defences to maximise the survivability of all system components.
This technological strategy is centred in several key ideas:
1. Maximum mobility for all IADS components, encompassing not only missile battery
engagement radars and TEL vehicles, but also battery and sector acquisition and
surveillance radars and passive sensors.
2. Active defence of high value IADS components such as radars by the deployment of
optimised point defence SAMs and SPAAGs, such as the Tor M2/M2E / SA15, Pantsir S1E
/ SA22 or LD2000, intended to kill inbound PGMs such as the AGM88 antiradiation
missile family, and the Paveway, JDAM, JSOW and SDB families of weapons.
3. Deployment of dedicated mobile counterISR Electronic Counter Measures equipment such
as the SPN2/3/4 and SPN30/40 systems, to defeat high resolution multimode radars in
combat aircraft.
4. Deployment of often comprehensive defensive aids suites on radars or with SAM batteries,
to frustrate terminal seekers in PGMs as well as ISR systems used to target such PGMs.
Defensive aids, whether operated individually or as part of a suite, usually comprise a mix of
decoys, camouflage, and specific countermeasures intended to disrupt or degrade the
operation of specific categories of sensor or guided weapon terminal seeker.
A broad array of products is now on offer, some as standalone components listed in catalogues,
and some as part of existing equipments. Unclassified technical literature discusses a range of
techniques for defeating ARMs and emitter locating receivers, ranging from coherent decoy
emitters to intentional distortion of the wavefront produced by a radar to introduce errors into
interferometric DF receivers.
What we are observing in IADS component protection is mirror image of the 1960s effort to
equip combat aircraft with onboard threat warning systems and defensive aids, reflecting the
reality that a modern long range SAM battery is an expensive asset, with a late model S
300PMU1/2 battery priced at US$100M to US$200M, depending on configuration.
This webpage is intended to describe many of the better documented defensive aids available
for IADS components.
Defensive Aids for IADS Components
RWE1 Missile Approach Warning System
RWE1 MAWS with its four low UHF band Yagi antennas deployed (via R.D. Fisher).
The Chinese RWE1 is a radiofrequency band active MAWS intended to protect SAM batteries
from attack by antiradiation missiles such as the AGM88 HARM/AARGM series. It is employed
to trigger emitter shutdown and activation of active emitting decoys. The manufacturer's
brochure claims a detection range of 40 km / 21.6 NMI.
DF capability is likely to be via amplitude comparison between channels, providing ~10° DF
accuracy, adequate for cueing decoys, or cueing point defence weapons like the LD2000 to
acquire, track and engage the inbound missiles.
VNIIRT 34Ya6E Gazetchik E MAWS, Decoy and Countermeasures System
The VNIIRT 34Ya6E Gazetchik E series of systems combine a MAWS and radiating decoy
capability intended to defeat seekers in antiradiation missiles, with a capability to deploy
aerosols and chaff to defeat radar and electrooptical targeting systems and guided munition
seekers.
The system provides the following capabilities:
1. Missile Approach Warning System (MAWS) to detect inbound ARMs.
2. Chaff dispenser to defeat MMWI weapon seekers.
3. Aerosol (smoke) generator to defeat electrooptical seekers / sensors.
4. Decoy emitter operating in the band of the defended emitter.
The system is keyed to emit by the radar system it is defending. To date there have been no
disclosures on whether the Gazetchik is a coherent emitter using a reference signal from the
radar, or whether it synthesizes its own decoy waveform. VNIIRT statements on the Gamma DE
would indicate a coherent capability.
A number of configurations are offered with and without dispenser capability, and with band
specific emitter capability. VNIIRT offer the system integrated with the Gamma DE series of L
band AESA radars.
Зона обзора:
Coverage:
обнаружителя ПРР:
MAWS:
по азимуту град.
Azimuth [deg] 360
по углу места, град.
Elevation [deg] +10 +90
излучения отвлекающих устройств:
Decoy Emitter:
по азимуту, град.
Azimuth [deg] 360
по углу места, град.
Elevation [deg] +10 +60
Вероятность защиты:
Pk:
от одной ПРР типа ХАРМ
не менее 0,85
Single HARM Missile
not less than 85%
от одной ПРР с тепловой, телевизионной или активной радиолокационной
головками самонаведения 0,850,95
Single ARM with heatseeking, television or active radar seeker 85% 95%
Режим боевой работы автоматической
Operating Mode automatic
Система электропитания от защищаемой РЛС
Power Supply provided by radar
Наработка на отказ, ч:
MTBF [hr]
обнаружителя ПРР
MAWS 500
отвлекающих устройств
Countermeasures 500
Среднее время восстановления, ч
0,5
MTTR [hr]
Время включения, с
30
Setup time
6090 (в зависимости от
Время свертывания (развертывания), мин. комплектации)
Stow/Deploy Time [min] Dependent on defended
system
Gazetchik E accessory components.
KBR Integrated AntiRadiation Missile Defensive Suite
The ByeloRussian KBR Integrated Defensive Suite combines a Doppler MAWS, multiple emitting
decoys and a chaff dispenser / smoke generator to provide a defensive capability against ARMs
and MMWI / EO guided PGMs.
It is intended to degrade the accuracy of airborne emitter locating systems and ARM seekers,
and provide a radar crew with early warning of an attack in progress.
Параметры Значение
Parameters Value
Зона обнаружения ПРР по азимуту
360°
MAWS Detection Azimuth
Зона обнаружения ПРР по углу места
1090°
MAWS Detection Elevation
Дальность обнаружения ПРР типа HARM c вероятностью P=0.95
7.5 км
Detection Range vs HARM Type ARM with Pd=95%
Радиальная скорость обнаруживаемых целей
200800 м/с
Radial Velocity of Detected Targets
Частотный диапазон детектора ПРР Срывает наведение ПРР
Frequency Range ARM Detector Disrupts ARM Seeker
Время сканирования (просмотра) зоны обнаружения
0.15 c
Search Volume Scan Duration [sec]
Время готовности без проверки функционирования
4 c
Startup time without BIT [sec]
Время готовности с проверкой функционирования
30 c
Startup time with BIT [sec]
Tetraedr SRTZ2TM AntiRadiation Missile Decoy System
Tetraedr in Belarus offer the SRTZ2TM AntiRadiation Missile defensive package for the
upgraded Pechora 2TM / mobile SA3 Goa SNR1252TM engagement radar. They have also
stated that derivatives are available for the S75 / SA2 Guideline and legacy S125 / SA3 Goa
SAM systems. The system is intended to defeat the AGM88A/B/C HARM, the AS.37 Martel,
MBDA ALARM, Delilah, Kh31 and Kh58, as well as loitering ARMs in the class of the AGM137
Tacit Rainbow.
The system is claimed to be effective against ARM homing seekers, ARM guidance packages
with GPS midcourse control, and is claimed to provide a capability to defeat MMWI and EO/IR
seekers. Claimed Pk is 95% for a single round HARM attack, 93% for a two round attack and
90% for a four round attack, with Ps for the SRTZ2TM cited at 93%, 92% and 90%
respectively.
Unlike competing decoys which are deployable, the SRTZ2TM is a self propelled design carried
on a MAZ6317 6 x 6 truck, with an integral 20 kW diesel generator and 5 minute shootand
scoot capability.
The design is unusual in that it employs a pair of antennas, each with pressurised waveguide
feeds, one is mounted on the roof of the truck, the other on a deployable telescoping 5 metre
boom. A phase control module is employed to create a virtual phase centre for the emitter pair,
with the decoy acting as a false target generator. The decoy receives emissions from the
defended radar via a separate receiver channel and uses these to synthesize the coherent
seduction waveform. Antenna azimuth coverage is 360° and elevation coverage between 15°
and 80°.
Tetraedr have not disclosed whether DRFM technology is used in the waveform generator, nor
have they disclosed what other countermeasures may be carried by the system.
Defense Systems KRTZ1252M AntiRadiation Missile Decoy System
KRTZ1252M OI125 Emitter Module.
The joint RussianByeloRussian Defense Systems company is producing an emitting decoy
system for their upgraded S125M Pechora M / mobile SA3 Goa system. Designated the KRTZ
1252M, the decoy was developed to protect the UNV1 Low Blow engagement radar from ARM
attacks. It has been exported to Egypt and derivative designs for other former Soviet SAM
systems are on offer[2].
The system comprises an OI125BS control unit which drives via radio link interfaces six OI
125 Emitter Modules, which are typically arranged in a ~300 metre diameter circle, with
configurations of four to twelve emitters available. The OI125BS is has cable or radio link
interfaces to the UNV1 engagement radar's UV74 synchronisation controller and UV82
missile uplink transmitter. A test set, spare parts package and mains/generator power
supply/charger are included. The OI125 emitter modules can be powered by cable or from
internal batteries. The whole system is transported by Ural4320 6 x 6 truck.
In operation, the emitters are under the control of the OI125BS which derives its timing
information for emission from the UNV1 Low Blow. Each Vpol emitter will match or exceed
the EIRP of the Low Blow transmit channels. Each emitter has an internal frequency
synthesiser which is tuned to within ±1 MHz of the UNV1 carrier frequency. The controller
monitors the status of the emitters, and if an incoming ARM destroys an emitter, automatically
reconfigures the array.
Cited Pk is ~90% for a single round ARM attack, and ~80% for a two round attack.
Defense Systems via Miroslav Gyűrösi.
The KRTZ1252M decoy system is transported by Ural4320 6 x 6 truck (Avtomobilniy Zavod Ural).
AlmazAntey OU1 Relocatable Decoy for Osa AKM / SA8 Gecko
OU1 decoy (Images © Miroslav Gyűrösi).
Revealed first at the MAKS2005 show, the OU1 is a relocatable decoy system designed for the
Osa AKM / SA8 Gecko SAM system upgrade package. It employs a circular array with twelve
paired transmit and receive antennas operating at 7.5 GHz, and each covering 30° in azimuth
and 40° in elevation. Average power is cited at 50 W with peak pulse power at 40 kW, and
power consumption is cited at 300 W.
Upgraded 9K33M3 Osa AKM / SA8 Gecko.
Aviakonversiya GPS/GLONASS GNSS Signal Jammers
Aviakonversiya high power GNSS jammer.
Aviakonversiya low power GNSS jammer.
Aviakonversiya have widely marketed their satellite navigation signal jammers, and these
devices were claimed to have been used by Saddam's regime during the 2003 OIF bombing
campaign to degrade the accuracy of US JDAMs and other GPS aided PGMs.
The Head of Aviakonversia, Dr Oleg Antonov, in a Russian media interview stated that their low
power jammer design has an EIRP of ~23 Watts and an effective range of ~50 km, and the
high power derivative has an EIRP of 20 Watts and effective range of ~150 km. The jamming
waveform has not been disclosed.
While more sophisticated CRPA antenna technology and active nulling will be effective in
rejecting the jammers, less sophisticated equipment, especially low cost man portable and
vehicular equipment is likely to be susceptible.
GPS Aided Guided Munitions [Click for more ...]
LPPU83 Self Propelled TELAR Decoy
The Belarus built LPPU83 is a self propelled decoy intended to visually emulate the 9A83
TELAR used by the S300V/V1 / SA12 Giant/Gladiator SAM systems. The decoy is built on an
extended PT76 light tank chassis, and uses actual launch tubes from expended missile rounds.
MKT2, MKT3 and VolchitsaKR Camouflage Netting
Stowed 30N61 Flap Lid engagement radar covered with camouflage netting (© Miroslav Gyűrösi).
The MKT2, MKT3 and VolchitsaKR camouflage netting are designed to conceal air defence
equipment from electrooptical/thermal imaging and microwave band ISR systems. Band
coverage includes longwave, midwave and shortwave infrared bands, and microwave radar
bands from MMW down to Lband.
Rosoboronexport Description (Cite):
Camouflage sets are designed to conceal air defence assets and installations from
reconnaissance carried out with:
optical devices against vegetation (MKT2L, MKT3L), desert/steppe (MKT2P) and snowy
(MKT2C) backgrounds;
optical and radar systems (MKT3LR);
optical, thermal imaging and radar assets (lightweight radiodispersing camouflaging
sets: VolchitsaKRL and VolchitsaKRLG – against summer vegetative, VolchitsaKRP –
desert/steppe and VolchitsaKRC – snowy backgrounds).
Typical camouflage sets consist of 612 standard 3x6m sheets joined with quickly undone
seams made of stitched cords. Standard sheets comprise a kapron netlike base with 50x50mm
mesh size, backlined with a 35mm diameter kapron cord along the perimeter.
The net base holds different items interweaved in accordance with distortionpainting pattern:
1. MKT2L (P,C,3L) 50x220mm strips/festoons made from dyed in mass and matted
polyethylene film;
2. MKT3LR festoons made from twoside conducting, dyed in mass and matted polyethylene
film;
3. VolchitsaKR 50x220mm strips or festoons from metallized twoside painted polyethylene
terephtalate film.
The above sets provide the following advantages:
resistance to water (moisture), fuel/lubricant (petrol, diesel fuel, oil) and detergent
effects;
operability in a wide temperature range from 40°C to +50°C;
selfextinguishing cover material (without residual smouldering);
adaptability to camouflaging structures of different size and configuration;
availability of spare part kits for infield repairs;
convenient deliver packages (in covered rolls with spare parts and documentation).
References/Sources
1. Manufacturer's Websites
2. Miroslav Gyűrösi, Russia Develops Decoy to Counter US HARM Missiles, Janes Missiles and
Rockets, Vol.10, No.3, March, 2006.
3. Miroslav Gyűrösi, Decoy Vehicle Can Mimic S300V Launcher, Janes Missiles and
Rockets,Vol.6, No.8, August, 2002.
4. Miroslav Gyűrösi, SRTZ2TM protection system offers antiradiation missile defence, Janes
Missiles and Rockets, Vol.11, No.11, November, 2007.
Imagery Sources: Russian MoD, Rosoboronexport, manufacturers, Miroslav Gyűrösi.
Line Artwork: © 2000 2009 Carlo Kopp