General Assembly First

Committee
Topic A: The illicit trade in small
arms and light weapons in all its
aspects
Background

There are an estimated 875 million small arms in circulation

around the world and more than 1,000 companies producing
small arms in more than 100 countries. 1 The annual trade of small arms
and light weapons (SALW) is worth approximately $6 US billion. 2
Although there is no universal definition, SALW have been described
as weapons that are portable by individuals. 3Small arms are
designed for personal use and light weapons are designed for use
by several people.4 Governments employ SALW to maintain order and the
rule of law.5 The illicit trade of SALW leads to instability, conflict, and
human rights violations, with armed violence having been
recognized as both a cause and consequence of
underdevelopment.6 Proliferation of illicit SALW endangers
international peace and human security. 7

The illicit trade in SALW has been linked to rape, enforced

disappearances, torture, sexual violence against women, child
soldiers, and human trafficking.8 SALW account for approximately
100,000 deaths each year,9and many more deaths indirectly through
exacerbating armed conflict. Armed conflicts are fed by the illicit
trade in SALW creating poverty, food insecurity, and hampering
economic growth. 10 Because of all these atrocities, SALW have been
described as the “true” weapons of mass destruction. 11 There is,
however, a lack of information on the illicit trade and the number of
SALW in global circulation.12

Recent international efforts have focused on coordinating

strategies and exchanging information. The international
community has examined many issues in an attempt to combat
the illicit trade in SALW. The issues include production, marking
and tracing, brokering, stockpiles, border controls, and
destruction of SALW.13

Programme of Action

In 2001, the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade of

Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects reached
consensus on the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and
Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All
Its Aspects (PoA).14 The PoA established a global framework of
measures at the national, regional, and global levels. These
measures include destruction of confiscated, seized, or collected
weapons; ensuring effective controls of legally-produced SALW;
small arms brokering; managing and securing stockpiles;and
international cooperation and assistance to strengthen the ability
of States in identifying andtracing illicit small arms and light
weapons.15 The PoA is not legally binding, but rather serves to
strengthen and develop norms and measures at the national,
regional, and international levels to reinforce and further
coordinate efforts.16 An important part of the PoA was the
emphasis placed on regional cooperation. Regional organizations
have supplemented the United Nations (UN) Small Arms process
through formulation of regional priorities and regional
initiatives.17 Regional organizations have also been instrumental
in promoting trans-border customs cooperation and fostering
information exchange between law enforcement agencies of
different States. The PoA has engaged the World Customs
Organization and the International Criminal Police Organization in
assisting States to prevent the SALW from entering illicit markets.
The PoA has also served to focus international efforts in
combating the illicit trade in SALW through UN and many of its
specialized agencies. In 2006, the UN held a Review Conference
on progress made and challenges in implementing the PoA.
Another Review Conference is scheduled to take place from
August 27th to September 7th, 2012.

UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms

The UN has many specialized agencies that work to support and

implement goals of the PoA. Because of all the crosscutting
concerns with illicit SALW, the UN has established
the Coordinating Action in Small Arms (CASA) to improve the UN’s
ability to work in delivering effective policy, programming, and
advice to Member States on curbing the uncontrolled proliferation
and misuse of SALW.18 CASA has been responsible for monitoring
and supervising the work of more than 20 specialized agencies
since 1998. CASA has supported the implementation of the PoA
through analysis of national reports, capacity-building, weapons
collection and destruction, research on the impact of small arms
on children, gender mainstreaming, and the promotion of a
culture of peace.19

Arms Trade Treaty

In response to the UN Small Arms Process, the international

community has begun efforts at establishing an Arms Trade Treaty
(ATT). In 2009, the Open-Ended Working Group Towards an Arms
Trade Treaty: establishing common international standards for the
import, export, and transfer of conventional arms (OEWG), met
twice and discussed the feasibility of an ATT. After two meetings,
the General Assembly adopted resolution 64/48 entitled “The
arms trade treaty” and decided to convene a UN Conference on
the Arms Trade Treaty.20 The UN Conference on the ATT met July
2-27, 2012, in New York City. The OEWG has served as the
Preparatory Committee for the UN Conference on the ATT and has
held four meetings from 2010-2012.

International Tracing Instrument

The International Tracing Instrument was first recommended in

the PoA and was meant to build on commitments to mark, trace,
and record keeping called for in the UN Firearms Protocol.21 In
response to the recommendations in the PoA, a Group of
Governmental Experts on Tracing Illicit SALW (GGE) was created
and met from 2002-2003.22 The GGE concluded an international
tracing instrument was desirable and feasible.23 However, the
GGE reported the legal nature of the instrument would be decided
in the course of negotiations. In December of 2005, the
UN General Assembly adopted the

International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in

a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light
Weapons(ITI).24

The ITI has set out a comprehensive, detailed list of global

customs and norms in marking, tracing, and record-keeping the
trade in SALW. The ITI is not a legally binding document, but relies
on State implementation of the recommended actions. Thus,
capacity building is of great importance for the ITI. Many states
require logistical, technical, and financial assistance in order to
develop the means to effectively mark SALW and train law
enforcement officials in the proper SALW tracing procedures and
techniques.25

Current Issues

Marking

Despite successful negotiations in forming the ITI, many

provisions have been left unaddressed. States have still been
hesitant to require mandatory marking of SALW, although, the ITI
did use language from the UN Firearms Protocol to highlight that
the marking of SALW, at the time of import, was of critical
importance. However, the UN Firearms Protocol is legally binding
and requires import marking of all unmarked SALW. The ITI
instead chose to expand the number of different instances when
States should mark SALW, especially when under State custody.
The ITI also stresses that States use a “unique marking” providing
all the necessary information for tracing illicit SALW.

Record-keeping

The ITI requires tracing of SALW and proper record keeping;

however, there is no standard for the tracing and record keeping
of SALW transfers. National reporting and record keeping
have both been recent concerns of the international community.
States have requested that national reports use a standard
developed by the UN Secretariat. National reporting has mostly
coincided with the Biennial Meeting of States, which reviews
implementation of the PoA. Record-keeping of SALW transfers are
established as a national prerogative in the ITI. This results in
confusion and inefficient information exchange between States.

Ammunition

One of the more significant issues being discussed is how

ammunition should be treated in regards to the illicit trade in
SALW. SALW and Ammunition are complementary issues
that require both to be addressed if any progress is to be made in
reducing armed violence.26 The type of ammunition demanded
may be determined based on the availability of certain SALW.27
As well, when ammunition is in surplus, SALW also become in
demand.28 The availability of ammunition for SALW also has an
effect on armed violence conducted by non-state armed
groups.29 When ammunition is scarce, armed groups will ration
ammunition among members and prefer to use weapons that do
not require ammunition, such as machetes used in the Rwandan
genocide of 1994.30 The ITI does not address the marking and
tracing of ammunition and explosives. States were hesitant to
include ammunition and explosives in the ITI since they were not
addressed in the GGE’s report on the feasibility of the ITI. States
were also concerned about the technical difference and
challenges in marking and tracing ammunition and explosives.
Instead, States have agreed to address ammunition and
explosives as part of a separate UN Small Arms process.31 Many
states have addressed ammunition concerns domestically by
regulating the availability of ammunition through licensing. Some
licensing systems have also limited the type of
ammunition available to licensees. The availability of ammunition
is always a concern for non-state armed groups and is reflected in
the intensity and rate of armed violence. Destruction of
surplus ammunition was made a goal under the PoA to be
achieved at the national level.32 Other international and regional
agreements have also supported the idea of marking and
tracing ammunition.33

Stockpiles

Stockpiles of SALW have also been an issue addressed by many

States. In the last three years, there have been more than fifty
recorded unplanned explosions at munitions depots in 34
countries.34 The severity of these incidents is evidenced by an
accidental military arsenal explosion in Lagos, Nigeria in 2002.
The stockpile explosion was in a highly populated area and killed
more than 1,000 people. The explosion caused much animosity
towards the Nigerian government and military.35 The ways in
which States manage the safety and security of stockpiles has
been a major concern in the international community.
The reasons for unplanned ordinance explosions are varied. The
number of unplanned, stockpile explosions has not decreased
despite past efforts. Most stockpile explosions could be
avoided with better technical education and training. Weapon and
ammunition stockpiles have several chemical and explosive
components that require routine, periodic, physical testing
and surveillance. Furthermore, poor storage practices and poor
infrastructure results in stockpiles being exposed to varying levels
of heat and humidity that degrade chemical and
explosive components, causing instability.

Many States may have few regulations or policies concerning

stockpiles and are unaware of the risks and dangers of
mismanaged stockpiles. The PoA has emphasized a national
approach to improving stockpile management. Stockpile
management goals include proper inventory and accounting
controls, staff training for the safety and security in the handling
of weapons and ammunition, safe locations for stockpiles, and
adequate physical security measures. Some regional
organizations have begun implementing measures under the PoA,
providing support and assistance to States. Also, the UN Office for
Disarmament Affairs has supported States through development
of best practices and guidelines for stockpile management.36

Future Outlook

There has been progress made in implementing the PoA. But

more needs to be done to accomplish its goals. States have been
concerned recently with addressing trans-border
customs cooperation and other border controls, implementing the
ITI, and international cooperation and assistance.37 States have
continued to find ways to enhance and support national law
enforcement agencies at the sub-regional, regional, and
international levels. Increasing information exchange and
promoting harmonization of national legislation, efforts to
prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW will
continue to strengthen and decrease armed violence,
transnational organized crime, and foster economic growth.
Marking and tracing norms are becoming more accepted and
utilized by States to track down the multitude of ways
SALW become illicit. International cooperation and assistance will
also serve as a basis in achieving the many UN Small Arms goals.
Sharing of expertise and best practices is needed at the national,
regional, and international levels. The role of the UN will be crucial
in coordinating and supervising the international community’s
agreements to fight the illicit trade in SALW.

Topic B: Prohibitions or restrictions

on the use of certain conventional
weapons which may be deemed to
be excessively injurious or have
indiscriminate effects
Background

The evolution of weapons technology has created devices capable

of causing indiscriminate harm to modern combatants and non-
combatants that is superfluous to reasonable military objectives.
Civilians are now subjected to conventional weapons with
indiscriminate effects both during and after conflict. Beginning in
the mid-nineteenth century with the Geneva Conventions,
international humanitarian law has been established with
substantial input from the International Committee for the Red
Cross (ICRC) to either ban or restrict the usage of certain
conventional weapons against civilians.

The Convention on Conventional Weapons

Adopted in October of 1980 and entering into force in December

of 1983, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)
was created to “ban or restrict the use of specific types of weapons that
are considered to cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to
combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately,” also serving as an
annex to the Geneva conventions.1

In its current form, the CCW contains five protocols, each of which
restricts the use of a specific category of weapon. The first three
protocols originally adopted in 1980 concern the use of
“nondetectable fragments,” “mines, booby traps and other
devices,” and “incendiary weapons,” respectively. Upon the first
review conference in 1995, a fourth protocol addressing “blinding
laser weapons” was added. A fifth protocol addressing “explosive
remnants of war” was adopted in 2003 by a meeting of states
party to the convention.

Protocol I: Non-Detectable Fragments

Protocol I prohibits the use of weapons which are designed to

wound or kill by utilizing small fragments of materials which
cannot be detected by X-rays and other medical imaging
technologies, making them excessively difficult to removed and
render an injured individual incapable of fully recovering.
Materials that fall under this category include glass, wood, or
plastics. This particular protocol was adopted with minimal
contention due to a lengthy history of previous agreements and
inclusions in the Laws of Armed Conflict of many of the states
party to the convention.2

Protocol II: Mines, Booby Traps, and Other Devices

Protocol II was adopted as an annex of the original convention in

1980, but was further amended in 1996.3The use of mines, booby traps,
and other devices is restricted to that of specific military purpose and their
use may not be directed towards civilian populations or be
allowed to harm civilians through indiscriminate use. Protocol II
established stringent standards for the use of these weapons as
well as the recording of their placement and their
removal/neutralization upon the cessation of hostilities. 4

The amendment in 1996 granted special attention to remotely

delivered mines and also required that anti-personnel (APLs)
mines be outfitted with self-deactivation capabilities that would
render them inert after a specified time period. 5 Mines produced are
also required to be “detectable by common mine detection
equipment” for ease of post-conflict removal. 6

Protocol III: Incendiary Weapons

The drafting of Protocol III was in reaction to concerns raised by

the use of napalm in Vietnam, but the initial importance of this
protocol faded in later years as incendiary weapons have rarely
used.7 The protocol failed to ban the use of incendiary weapons, but instead
delineated the areas that were off-limits to military targeting, such as
civilian populations or forested areas that were not military
objectives. Military forces could also not be attacked via
incendiary weaponry if such objectives were within a
concentration of civilians.

The use of incendiary weapons has once again come back to the
forefront of debate pertaining to conventional weapons due to the
use of white phosphorous and cluster munitions by the Israeli
Defense Forces in Gaza.8

Protocol IV: Blinding Laser Weapons

The drafting of Protocol IV stems from earlier assertions by both

Sweden and Switzerland in the First Committee meetings during
the 41st and 42nd sessions of the General Assembly that laser technology had
developed to a point which would yield anti-personnel capabilities
on the battlefield through the permanent blinding of individuals. 9
Concerns over blinding lasers went unnoted during these sessions due to
the science fiction connotations of lasers-weapons. However, it
soon became apparent that several states had blinding laser
programs,10 which had yielded potent devices capable of battlefield
deployment.11 The revelation that blinding laser weapons were a reality
led to the adoption of Protocol IV by the first review conference of
the CCW on 13 October 1995. While non-lethal, blinding lasers
cause injury, which can outlast the conflict. The effect of injuries
of blinding lasers is therefore inhumane in regards to the disability
it incurs post-combat.

Protocol V: Explosive Remnants of War

Protocol V was drafted as the fifth annex to the convention in

2003. Protocol V is intended to make the CCW inclusive of other
forms of unexploded ordinance (UXO) left behind on the
battlefield, which would endanger civilians after cessation of
conflict. UXO include uncleared land mines, abandoned explosive
weapons such as mortar or artillery shells, and undetonated
cluster munitions.12 The addition of a protocol addressing
explosive remnants of war was spurred by the increased use of
cluster munitions in recent decades. 13 Each cluster munition is capable of
dispersing up hundreds of explosive sub-munitions over a wide area,
a percentage of which fail to detonate and become as dangerous
as anti-personnel mines.14 The protocol establishes technical
standards that weapons capable of becoming explosive remnants
of war must meet in order to be legal in their use against military
targets only. The bulk of the articles within the protocol create
responsibility and assistance mechanisms for the clearance of
explosive remnants of war.

Current Issue

New Weapons Technologies for Consideration Both Protocol IV & V

were adopted in accordance to Article 2 Section 8 of the
convention which states that: At any time after the entry into
force of this Convention any High Contracting Party may propose
additional protocols relating to other categories of conventional
weapons not covered by the existing annexed Protocols. One of
the inherent strengths of the CCW is the flexibility is has to
include new and developing weapons and adapt to changes they
bring in the conduct of warfare.15 There have been several proposals
made for introducing new protocols that would regulate small
caliber bullets, antivehicle mines, and cluster munitions. 16 Other
technologies are emerging now which have the potential to be
included within the CCW. Unmanned systems, both remotely
operated and autonomous, are some of the fastest developing
weapons.17 The advent of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) has produced
changes in how States engage in conflict in the past decade alone. 18
At this point in time over forty States haveaccess to UAV drones capable of
firing weapons through remote operation. 19
In 2010 Phillip Alston, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial or
arbitrary executions, submitted a report the United Nations
Human Rights Council which detailed the use of UAVs in targeted
killing operations.20According to the report, the manner in which UAVs are
used in recent conflicts has pushed and possibly exceeded the
boundaries of International Humanitarian Law. Alston further
warns of fostering a “PlayStation” mentality for combat as the
personnel operating UAVs are geographically distanced from
combat operations. While legal issues remain unresolved for
unmanned systems that have a “human in the loop” to control
them, several States are moving forward with increasing the
autonomy of these weapons.21Increasing autonomy will decrease the
amount of human input required for operating robotic weapons and thereby
reduce manpower to conduct military operations. 22 The concern for
experts in the field such as P.W. Singer, author of Wired for War, is
that the levels of autonomy given to unmanned weapons systems will
eventually lead to indiscriminate effects on civilians.

One such tragedy occurred in 1988 when the semi-autonomous

missile system of the USS Vincennes misidentified Iranian Air
Flight 655 as an enemy fighter and encouraged the human
operators to allow it to shoot it down. The total loss of life was
290 civilians.23 Such incidences are likely to increasingly occur as
more and more unmanned weapons systems are deployed. 24

Related Treaties

Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM)

The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) was adopted on 30

May 2008 in Dublin, Ireland and signed on 3 December 2008 in
Oslo. Currently, there are 77 states party to the Convention and it
is considered binding international law.25 The treaty completely bans the
use, development, procurement, transfer, or stockpiling of cluster
munitions. Weapons permitted under the Convention must
contain no more than ten sub-munitions, each weighing 4
kilograms. Each sub-munition must be capable of seeking
individual targets and deactivating themselves in case of failure. 26

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production

and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction
(Ottawa Treaty)

The Ottawa Treaty was adopted in Oslo in September of 1997 and

signed in Ottawa on 3 December 1997. The Ottawa Treaty was
drafted in order to satisfy states that deemed the incomplete ban
of anti-personnel mines in the CCW unsatisfactory. 27 The Ottawa
Treaty calls for a complete ban of anti-personnel mines and for the
destruction of currently held stockpiles within a four-year
timeframe from signing the treaty. States are also required to
clear mines from their territory within a ten-year period from
signing.