1. G.R. No.

212731 September 6, 2017

SPOUSES FIRMO S. ROSARIO AND AGNES ANNABELLE DEAN-ROSARIO vs
PRISCILLA P. ALVAR

Remedial Law; Doctrine of Conclusiveness of Judgment: There is conclusiveness of judgement when all the elements are
present, to wit: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment
on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, but not identity of causes
of action.

DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Agnes Rosario borrowed a certain amount of money from the respondent and
secured real estate mortgages over two parcels of land owned by the former. Thereafter, the
mortgages were discharged. Petitioner executed Deed of Absolute Sale over two lots in favor of
respondent’s daughter Evangeline who later sold the lots to respondent Priscilla. Respondent sent a
demand letter to spouses Rosario asking to vacate Lot 1. However, petitioner filed with the RTC a
complaint for the nullity of the contract of sale and mortgage alleging that she was deceived by
respondent in signing the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Evangeline. Respondent then filed a
complaint for recovery of the possession

RTC granted Respondent Priscilla’s complaint and denied that of the petitioner spouses
Rosario. On appeal CA reversed the RTC decision. Since the parties did not file a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal, the CA decision became final and executory. Respondent Priscilla then
sent a demand letter to petitioner spouses for the payment of her outstanding obligation. Upon
failure or refusal of petitioner spouses, respondent filed a Complaint for Judicial Foreclosure of Real
Estate Mortgage. Petitioner spouses moved for dismissal of complaint but it was denied. On appeal,
CA dismissed the petition of petitioner spouses. The Supreme Court also denied the Petition for
Review on Certiorari. Meanwhile, respondent filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default for
the failure of petitioner spouses Rosario to file an answer within the reglementary period, which the
RTC granted. Aggrieved, petitioner spouses Rosario appealed to the CA but the latter affirmed with
modification the RTC decision. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner spouses Rosario are estopped from raising issues that were
already adjudged in the November 15, 2006 Decision

HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The Court ruled that there is conclusiveness of judgment as to the
issues pertaining to the existence of the loan and the legal personality of Priscilla to file a case for
judicial foreclosure. There is res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment when all the elements are
present, to wit: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be as between the first
and second action, identity of parties, but not identity of causes of action.

In the case at bar, all the elements are present: first, the November 15, 2006 Decision has
attained finality; second, the said decision was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; third, the said decision disposed of the case on the merits; and fourth,
there is, as between the previous case and the instant case, an identity of parties. Hence, petitioner
spouses Rosario are estopped from raising issues that were already adjudged in the November 15,
2006 Decision as "the dictum laid down in the earlier final judgment is conclusive and continues to
be binding between the parties, their privies and successors-in-interest, as long as the facts on which
that judgment was predicated continue to be the facts of the case or incident before the court in a
later case”.
2. G.R. No. 201271 September 20, 2017
ROBERTO A. TORRES, IMMACULADA TORRES-ALANON, AGUSTIN TORRES,
AND JUSTO TORRES, JR. vs ANTONIA F. ARUEGO

Remedial Law; Doctrine of Immutability of Final Judgments: When a final judgment is executory, it becomes
immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it. The
doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments
must become final at some definite point in time.

Remedial Law; Exceptions to the Doctrine of Immutability of Final Judgments: The only recognized exceptions to the
general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so called nunc pro tune entries which cause no prejudice to any party,
void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust
and inequitable.

DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS: Antonia and Evelyn Aruego are illegitimate children of deceased Jose Aruego who left
several properties. Thereafter, as represented by their mother and guardian, Luz Fabian, they filed an
action for compulsory acknowledgment and participation in said inheritance. The trial court
rendered a decision declaring only Antonia Aruego as the illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and
hereby ordered to deliver her share in the estate of the deceased.

Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration but it was denied by lower court.
Subsequently, the defendants (now petitioners) filed with CA a petition but it was denied. The court
a quo issued a Writ of Execution of its decision. Petitioners filed a Verified Complaint with the RTC
seeking to nullify the Deed of Absolute Sale which was executed by the respondent in favor of
Sharon Cuneta, Inc. Respondent filed anew a Motion for Partition praying for the implementation
of the June 15, 1992 Decision of the court a quo.
In view of the pendency of Civil Case, the court a quo resolved to defer the resolution of
respondent's Motion for Partition on the ground that the controversy involved in the RTC case
would constitute a prejudicial question to the issue involved in the Motion for Partition. Finding that
no prejudicial question existed between the two cases involved, the CA granted the Petition for
Certiorari. CA’s decision became final and executory for failure of petitioners to appeal therefrom.
Thereupon, respondent moved that her Motion for Partition be given due course.
Petitioners opposed the motion arguing in the main that the partition of the estate of Aruego
could not take place by virtue of respondent's mere motion considering that there was no conclusive
adjudication of the ownership of the properties declared as constituting the estate of Jose M. Aruego
and that all the identities of his heirs had yet to be determined. Unsatisfied, petitioners filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the CA but it was denied. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari
filed by petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the June 15, 1992 Decision of the court a quo, which attained finality more
than 20 years ago, may still be subject to review and modification by the Court

HELD: NEGATIVE. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Nothing is more
settled in the law than that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable
and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by the highest
court of the land. The only recognized exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical
errors, the so called nunc pro tune entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments,
and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust
and inequitable.

As correctly held by the court a quo in its Order dated July 23, 2009, "the question as to
what properties have been deemed included in the estate of Jose Aruego, Sr. has already been settled
when the court finally resolved the main controversy on June 15, 1992 and declared, inter alia, that
plaintiff, Antonia Aruego, is entitled to one-half of the share of the legitimate children of Jose
Aruego, Sr.".
3. G.R. No. 211966 August 7, 2017
JOSE AUDI ABAGATNAN, ET AL. vs SPOUSES JONATHAN CLARITO AND ELSA
CLARITO

Remedial Law; Prior conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat before the filing of a complaint
in Court: Section 412(a) of the LGC requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the
Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a pre-condition to the filing of a complaint in court. The LGC
further provides that "the lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties
actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes," subject to
certain exceptions, to wit: in cases where the dispute involves parties who actually reside in
barangays of different cities or municipalities, unless said barangay units adjoin each other and the
parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon.

DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS: The herein petitioners are the owners of the questioned parcel of land. Sometime in 1990,
respondents allegedly approached Wenceslao to ask for permission to construct a residential house
in the subject land and the latter agreed. The petitioners decided to sell portions of the lot and so a
demand letter was sent to the respondents to vacate the land but the latter refused. Thereafter,
petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages against respondents. However,
the respondents argued that prior barangay conciliation is a mandatory requirement that cannot be
dispensed with.

MTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to remove the
structures erected on the subject property and to vacate the same. On appeal of the respondents, the
RTC denied the same for lack of merit. CA granted the petition of the respondents and dismissed
petitioners’ complaint for lack of prior referral to the Katarungang Pambarangay. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, petitioners filed the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not failure to comply with the prior barangay conciliation requirement under
Section 412 of the LGC warrants the dismissal of complaint filed by the petitioners

HELD: NEGATIVE. Section 412(a) of the LGC requires the parties to undergo a conciliation
process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a pre-condition to the filing of a complaint in
court. The LGC further provides that "the lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring
together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
disputes," subject to certain exceptions, to wit: in cases where the dispute involves parties who
actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, unless said barangay units adjoin
each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon.

In the case at bar, the complaint filed before the MTCC specifically alleged that not all the
real parties in interest in the case actually reside in Roxas City. Jimmy resided in Poblacion, Siniloan,
Laguna, while Jenalyn resided in Brgy. de La Paz, Pasig City. As such, the lupon has no jurisdiction
over their dispute, and prior referral of the case for barangay conciliation is not a precondition to its
filing in court. This is true regardless of the fact that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already authorized their
sister and co-petitioner, Josephine, to act as their attorney-in-fact in the ejectment proceedings
before the MTCC. As previously explained, the residence of the attorney-in-fact of a real party in
interest is irrelevant in so far as the "actual residence" requirement under the LGC for prior
barangay conciliation is concerned.
4. G.R. No. 226679 August 15, 2017
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. Y ASUELA VS HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 3, LEGAZPI CITY, ALBAY
AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Remedial Law; Supreme Court’s Rule-Making Power vis-a vis Plea bargaining: The power to promulgate rules
of pleading, practice and procedure is now the Supreme Court’s exclusive domain and no longer
shared with the Executive and Legislative departments. Further, the separation of powers among the
three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of Supreme Court.
The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively
repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court. The prohibition on
plea bargaining under Section 23 of RA No. 9165 therefore is an encroachment on the exclusive
constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.

DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Estipona was criminally charged for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 or for the possession of dangerous drugs. Petitioner then filed a motion to allow him to
enter into a plea bargaining agreement. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the
intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the
Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of
separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government. The prosecution moved
for the denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which is said to be
justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining.
Respondent Judge Lobrigo of the RTC issued an Order denying Estipona's motion. Hence, the
present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached
upon the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate Rules of Procedure

HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is now their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the
Executive and Legislative departments. The Court further held that the separation of powers among
the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the
power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this
Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that
effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.

In the present case, the prohibition on plea bargaining under Section 23 of RA No. 9165 is
an encroachment on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of
procedure. The contention of the accused is correct as it is only the Rules of Court promulgated by
the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional rule-making power that breaths life to plea
bargaining. It cannot be found in any statute.