VITness Leadership Summit 2018

UNGA - DISEC
“Reviewing the Role of Research, Development
and Production of Ballistic Missile Systems in
the current context of International Peace,
security and deterrence”
t

Ayush R Tanmay Rout Suhas R Vaidya

Chairperson Vice- Chairperson Director
 ABOUT DISEC
The United Nations Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC)
was created as the first of the Main Committees in the General Assembly when
the charter of the United Nations was signed in 1945. Thus, DISEC is often
referred to as the First Committee. The birth of DISEC responded to the perceived
need for an international forum to discuss issues of peace and security among
members of the international community.

The First Committee deals with disarmament, global challenges and threats to
peace that affect the international community and seeks out solutions to the
challenges in the international security regime. It considers all disarmament and
international security matters within the scope of the Charter or relating to the
powers and functions of any other organ of the United Nations; the general
principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security,
as well as principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments;
promotion of cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening
stability through lower levels of armaments.

The Committee works in close cooperation with the United Nations Disarmament
Commission and the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament. It is the only
Main Committee of the General Assembly entitled to verbatim records coverage.

The First Committee sessions are structured into three distinctive stages:

 General debate
 Thematic discussions
 Action on drafts
The specific mandate of DISEC is different from the other committees of the
General Assembly in that it places its focus on the ―disarmament and related
international security questions‖ faced by the international community. In this
way, many of the United Nations conventions on disarmament and on the use of
weapons have originated in DISEC. For example, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty ratified in 1968, as well as the creation of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), followed the suggestion of United States President Eisenhower to
the General Assembly to facilitate the safe development of nuclear technology.

Many of the states, as members of DISEC, have been instrumental in the

introduction and adoption of the aforementioned treaties and other agreements.
Moving forward, DISEC will continue to face complex issues in which the security
of the international community is at stake. DISEC will continue to make
recommendations to both the General Assembly and the Security Council as it
pursues disarmament, peace, and security initiatives to the fullest extent of its
mandate.
 AGENDA
Reviewing the role of research,
development and production of ballistic
missile systems in the current context of
international peace, security and
deterrence
INTRODUCTION
In modern language, a missile is a self-propelled precision guided munitions system, as opposed
to unguided self-propelled munitions, referred to as a rocket (although these too can also be
guided). Missiles have four system components: targeting and/or missile guidance, flight
system, engine, and warhead. Missiles come in types adapted for different purposes: surface to
surface and air to surface missiles (ballistic, cruise, anti-ship, antitank, etc.), surface to air
missiles (and antiballistic), air to air missiles, and anti-satellite weapons. All known existing
missiles are designed to be propelled during powered flight by chemical reactions inside a
rocket engine, jet engine, or other type of engine. Non self-propelled airborne explosive devices
are generally referred to as shells and usually have a shorter range than missiles.

Guided missiles have a number of different system components:

 Targeting and/or missile guidance
 Flight system
 Engine
 Warhead

Missiles are generally categorized by their launch platform and intended target. In broadest
terms, these will either be surface (ground or water) or air, and then subcategorized by range
and the exact target type (such as antitank or anti-ship).
Many weapons are designed to be launched from both surface and the air, and a few are
designed to attack either surface or air targets (such as the ADATS missile). Most weapons
require some modification in order to be launched from the air or surface, such as adding
boosters to the surface launched version.

SURFACE TO SURFACE/AIR TO SURFACE

 Ballistic
 Cruise Missile
 Anti-ship
 Anti-tank
SURFACE TO AIR
 Anti-aircraft
 Anti-ballistic
 Air to air
 Anti-satellite

INTRODUCTION TO BALLISTIC MISSILES

Ballistic missiles are powered by rockets initially but then they follow an unpowered, freefalling
trajectory toward their targets. Ballistic missiles are used to deliver nuclear, chemical, biological
or conventional warheads in a ballistic flight trajectory. They are classified by the maximum
distance that they can travel, which is a function of how powerful the missile’s engines (rockets)
are and the weight of the missile’s payload. To add more distance to a missile’s range, rockets
are stacked on top of each other in a configuration referred to as staging.

There are four general classifications of ballistic missiles:

Short-range ballistic missiles, traveling less than 1,000 kilometers (approximately 620 miles);

Medium-range ballistic missiles, traveling between 1,000–3,000 kilometers

(Approximately 620-1,860 miles)

Intermediate-range ballistic missiles, traveling between 3,000–5,500 kilometers

(Approximately 1,860-3,410 miles)

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), traveling more than 5,500 kilometers

Short- and medium-range ballistic missiles are referred to as theatre ballistic missiles, whereas
ICBMs or long-range ballistic missiles are described as strategic ballistic missiles.

Missiles are often classified by fuel-type: liquid or solid propellants. Missiles with solid fuel
require less maintenance and preparation time than missiles with liquid fuel because solid
propellants have the fuel and oxidizer together, whereas liquid-fuelled missiles must keep the
two separated until right before deployment.

Ballistic missiles are largely used for land attack missions. Although normally associated with
nuclear weapons, some conventionally armed ballistic missiles are in service, such as MGM140
ATACMS. The V2 had demonstrated that a ballistic missile could deliver a warhead to a target
city with no possibility of interception, and the introduction of nuclear weapons meant it could
efficiently do damage when it arrived.
The accuracy of these systems was fairly poor, but postwar development by most military
forces improved the basic inertial navigation system concept to the point where it could be
used as the guidance system on Intercontinental ballistic missiles flying thousands of
kilometers. Today, the ballistic missile represents the only strategic deterrent in most military
forces. However, some ballistic missiles are being adapted for conventional roles, such as the
Russian Iskander or the Chinese DF21D antiship ballistic missile. Ballistic missiles are primarily
surface launched from mobile launchers, silos, ships or submarines, with air launch being
theoretically possible with a weapon such as the cancelled Skybolt missile.

INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES

An intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is a guided ballistic missile with a minimum range of
5,500 km (3,400 mi) primarily designed for nuclear weapons delivery (delivering one or more
thermonuclear warheads). Similarly, conventional, chemical, and biological weapons can also
be delivered with varying effectiveness, but have never been deployed on ICBMs. Most modern
designs support multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), allowing a single
missile to carry several warheads, each of which can strike a different target.

Modern ICBMs typically carry multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), each
of which carries a separate nuclear warhead, allowing a single missile to hit multiple targets.
MIRV was an outgrowth of the rapidly shrinking size and weight of modern warheads and the
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties which imposed limitations on the number of launch vehicles
(SALT I and SALT II).

It has also proved to be an "easy answer" to proposed deployments of ABM systems—it is far
less expensive to add more warheads to an existing missile system than to build an ABM system
capable of shooting down the additional warheads. Hence, most ABM system proposals have
been judged to be impractical. The first operational ABM systems were deployed in the U.S.
during the 1970s. Safeguard ABM facility was located in North Dakota and was operational from
1975 to 1976.

The USSR deployed its ABM1 Galosh system around Moscow in the 1970s, which remains in
service. Israel deployed a national ABM system based on the Arrow missile in 1998,[28] but it is
mainly designed to intercept shorter ranged theater ballistic missiles, not ICBMs. The Alaska
based United States national missile defense system attained initial operational capability in
2004.
ICBMs can be deployed from multiple platforms:
In missile silos: which offer some protection from military attack (including, the designers hope,
and some protection from a nuclear first strike)

On submarines: submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), most or all SLBMs have the long
range of ICBMs (as opposed to IRBMs)

On heavy trucks: this applies to one version of the Topol which may be deployed from a self-
propelled mobile launcher, capable of moving through roadless terrain, and launching a missile
from any point along its route mobile launchers on rails, this applies, for example, to
РТ23УТТХ "Молодец" (RT23UTTH "Molodets"— SS24 "Sсаlреl")

Early ICBMs had limited precision (circular error probable) that allowed them to be used only
against the largest targets such as cities. They were seen as a "safe" basing option, one that
would keep the deterrent force close to home where it would be difficult to attack. Attacks
against (especially hardened) military targets, if desired, still demanded the use of a more
precise manned bomber.

This is due to the inverse square law, which predicts that the amount of energy dispersed from
a single point release of energy (such as a thermonuclear blast) dissipates by the inverse of the
square of the distance from the single point of release. The result is that the power of a nuclear
explosion to rupture hardened structures is greatly decreased by the distance from the impact
point of the nuclear weapon. So a near direct hit is generally necessary, as only diminishing
returns are gained by increasing bomb yield.

Second and third generation designs (e.g., the LGM118 Peacekeeper) dramatically improved
accuracy to the point where even the smallest point targets can be successfully attacked.
ICBMs are differentiated by having greater range and speed than other ballistic missiles:
intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), short
range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs). Short and medium range
Ballistic missiles are known collectively as theatre ballistic missiles.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS
A nuclear weapon is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear
reactions, either fission (fission bomb) or a combination of fission and fusion (thermonuclear
weapon). Both reactions release vast quantities of energy from relatively small amounts of
matter. Since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons have been
detonated on over two thousand occasions for the purposes of testing and demonstration.
Only a few nations possess such weapons or are suspected of seeking them.
NON PROLIFERATION TREATY
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-
Proliferation Treaty or NPT, is an international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread
of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and
complete disarmament.

The treaty recognizes five states as nuclear-weapon states: the United States, Russia, the
United Kingdom, France, and China (these are also the five permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council). Four other states are known or believed to possess nuclear weapons:
India, Pakistan, and North Korea have openly tested and declared that they possess nuclear
weapons, while Israel is deliberately ambiguous regarding its nuclear weapons status.

The NPT is often seen to be based on a central bargain:

“The NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT
nuclear-weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology
and to pursue nuclear disarmament aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear
arsenals.”
The treaty is reviewed every five years in meetings called Review Conferences of the Parties to
the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Even though the treaty was originally
conceived with a limited duration of 25 years, the signing parties decided, by consensus, to
extend the treaty indefinitely and without conditions during the Review Conference in New
York City on 11 May 1995.

At the time the NPT was proposed, there were predictions of 25–30 nuclear weapon states
within 20 years. Instead, over forty years later, five states are not parties to the NPT, and they
include the only four additional states believed to possess nuclear weapons. Several additional
measures have been adopted to strengthen the NPT and the broader nuclear nonproliferation
regime and make it difficult for states to acquire the capability to produce nuclear weapons,
including the export controls of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the enhanced verification
measures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol.

Critics argue that the NPT cannot stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons or the motivation to
acquire them. They express disappointment with the limited progress on nuclear disarmament,
where the five authorized nuclear weapons states still have 22,000 warheads in their combined
stockpile and have shown a reluctance to disarm further. Several high-ranking officials within
the United Nations have said that they can do little to stop states using nuclear reactors to
produce nuclear weapons.

DETTERENCE
Deterrence theory gained increased prominence as a military strategy during the Cold War with
regard to the use of nuclear weapons. It took on a unique connotation during this time as an
inferior nuclear force, by virtue of its extreme destructive power, could deter a more powerful
adversary, provided that this force could be protected against destruction by a surprise attack.
Deterrence is a strategy intended to dissuade an adversary from taking an action not yet
started, or to prevent them from doing something that another state desires.

A credible nuclear deterrent must be always at the ready, yet never used. Nuclear weapons give
nations the potential to not only destroy their enemies but humanity itself without drawing
immediate reprisal because of the lack of a conceivable defence system and the speed with
which nuclear weapons can be deployed. A nation's credible threat of such severe damage
empowers their deterrence policies and fuels political coercion and military deadlock, which in
turn can produce proxy warfare.

Historical analysis of nuclear weapons deterrent capabilities has led modern researchers to the
concept of the stability-instability paradox, whereby nuclear weapons confer large scale
stability between nuclear weapon states, as in over 60 years none have engaged in large direct
warfare due primarily to nuclear weapons deterrence capabilities, but instead are forced into
pursuing political aims by military means in the form of comparatively smaller scale acts of
instability, such as proxy wars and minor conflicts.
PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE
In nuclear strategy, a first strike is a pre-emptive surprise attack employing overwhelming force.
First strike capability is a country's ability to defeat another nuclear power by destroying its
arsenal to the point where the attacking country can survive the weakened retaliation while the
opposing side is left unable to continue war. The preferred methodology is to attack the
opponent's strategic nuclear weapon facilities (missile silos, submarine bases, and bomber
airfields), command and control sites, and storage depots first. The strategy is called
counterforce.

SECOND STRIKE
In nuclear strategy, a second-strike capability is a country's assured ability to respond to a
nuclear attack with powerful nuclear retaliation agains t the attacker. To have such an ability
(and to convince an opponent of its viability) is considered vital in nuclear deterrence, as
otherwise the other side might attempt to try to win a nuclear war in one massive first strike
against its opponent's own nuclear forces.

The possession of second-strike capabilities counters a first-strike nuclear threat and can
support a no first use nuclear strategy. Reciprocal second-strike capabilities usually cause a
mutual assured destruction defence strategy, though one side may have a lower level minimal
deterrence response.

Second-strike capabilities can be further strengthened by implementing fail-deadly

mechanisms. These mechanisms create a threshold and guaranteed consequences if that
threshold is breached. For instance, a threshold may be for an allied nation not to be attacked.
If a rival nation then breaches this threshold by attacking the allied nation, then the
predetermined consequences for this action go into effect. These predetermined consequences
could include a wide range of responses, including a retaliatory nuclear second strike.

MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION

Mutual assured destruction or mutually assured destruction (MAD) is a doctrine of military
strategy and national security policy in which a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two or
more opposing sides would cause the complete annihilation of both the attacker and the
defender (see pre-emptive nuclear strike and second strike). It is based on the theory of
deterrence, which holds that the threat of using strong weapons against the enemy prevents
the enemy's use of those same weapons. The strategy is a form of Nash equilibrium in which,
once armed, neither side has any incentive to initiate a conflict or to disarm
NUCLEAR TRIAD
A nuclear triad refers to the nuclear weapons delivery of a strategic nuclear arsenal which
consists of three basic components: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
strategic bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The purpose of having a
three-branched nuclear capability is to significantly reduce the possibility that an enemy could
destroy all of a nation's nuclear forces in a first-strike attack; this, in turn, ensures a credible
threat of a second strike, and thus increases a nation's nuclear deterrence.

While traditional nuclear strategy holds that a nuclear triad provides the best level of
deterrence from attack, in reality, most nuclear powers do not have the military budget to
sustain a full triad. Only the United States and Russia have maintained nuclear triads for most of
the nuclear age. Both the US and the Soviet Union composed their triads along the same lines,
including the following components:
1. Bomber aircraft capable of delivering nuclear bombs (carrier-based or land-based; usually
armed with long-range missiles).
2. Land-based missiles (MRBMs or ICBMs).
3. Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Nuclear missiles launched from ships or submarines.
Although in early years the US Navy sea leg was carrier aircraft based with a very short period
using sub launched cruise missiles such as the Regulus before SLBMs were ready to be
deployed.

ANTI -BALLISTIC WEAPONS

An anti-ballistic missile (ABM) is a surface-to-air missile designed to counter ballistic missiles.
Ballistic missiles are used to deliver nuclear, chemical, biological or conventional warheads in a
ballistic flight trajectory. The term "anti-ballistic missile" is a generic term conveying a system
designed to intercept and destroy any type of ballistic threat, however it is commonly used for
systems specifically designed to counter intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)

There are only two systems in the world that can intercept ICBMs. Besides them, many smaller
systems exist (tactical ABMs), that generally cannot intercept intercontinental strategic missiles,
even if within range—an incoming ICBM simply moves too fast for these systems.

The Russian A-35 anti-ballistic missile system, used for the defense of Moscow, whose
development started in 1971. The currently active system is called A-135. The system uses
Gorgon and Gazelle missiles with nuclear warheads to intercept incoming ICBMs.
The U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD; previously known as National Missile
Defense – NMD) system has reached initial operational capability. Instead of using an explosive
charge, it launches a kinetic projectile.

The George W. Bush administration accelerated development and deployment of a system

proposed in 1998 by the Clinton administration. The system is a dual purpose test and
interception facility in Alaska, and in 2006 was operational with a few interceptor missiles. The
Alaska site provides more protection against the nuclear threat from North Korean missiles or
launches from Russia or China, but is likely less effective against missiles launched from the
Middle East.

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

Negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union as part of the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks, the now-defunct Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was signed on May 26,
1972 and entered into force on October 3, 1972. The treaty, from which the United States
withdrew on June 13, 2002, barred Washington and Moscow from deploying nationwide
defences against strategic ballistic missiles. In the treaty preamble, the two sides asserted that
effective limits on anti-missile systems would be a "substantial factor in curbing the race in
strategic offensive arms."

The treaty originally permitted both countries to deploy two fixed, ground-based defence sites
of 100 missile interceptors each. One site could protect the national capital, while the second
could be used to guard an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) field. In a protocol signed July
3, 1974, the two sides halved the number of permitted defences.

The Soviet Union opted to keep its existing missile defence system around Moscow, while the
United States eventually fielded its 100 permitted missile interceptors to protect an ICBM base
near Grand Forks, North Dakota. Moscow's defence still exists, but its effectiveness is
questionable. The United States shut down its permitted ABM defence only months after
activating it in October 1975 because the financial costs of operating it were considered too
high for the little protection it offered.

The United States and the Soviet Union negotiated the ABM Treaty as part of an effort to
control their arms race in nuclear weapons. The two sides reasoned that limiting defensive
systems would reduce the need to build more or new offensive weapons to overcome any
defence that the other might deploy. Without effective national defences, each superpower
remained vulnerable, even at reduced or low offensive force holdings, to the other's nuclear
weapons, deterring either side from launching an attack first because it faced a potential
retaliatory strike that would assure its own destruction.
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME
Established in April 1987, the voluntary Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) aims to limit
the spread of ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems that could be used for
chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks. The regime urges its 35 members which include most
of the world's key missile manufacturers, to restrict their exports of missiles and related
technologies capable of carrying a 500-kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers or delivering
any type of weapon of mass destruction.

Since its inception, the MTCR has been credited with slowing or stopping several missile
programs by making it difficult for prospective buyers to get what they want or stigmatizing
certain activities and programs. Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq abandoned their joint Condor II
ballistic missile program. Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan also shelved or
eliminated missile or space launch vehicle programs. Some Eastern European countries, such as
Poland and the Czech Republic, destroyed their ballistic mis siles in part to better their chances
of joining MTCR. The regime has further hampered Libyan and Syrian missile efforts.

Each MTCR member is supposed to establish national export control policies for ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, space launch vehicles, drones, remotely
piloted vehicles, sounding rockets, and underlying components and technologies that appear
on the regime's Material and Technology Annex. Members can add items to or subtract them
from the annex through consensus decisions.

The MTCR identifies five factors that members should take into account when evaluating a
possible export of controlled items:
 Whether the intended recipient is pursuing or has ambitions for acquiring weapons of
mass destruction
 The purposes and capabilities of the intended recipient's missile and space programs
 The potential contribution the proposed transfer could make to the intended recipient's
development of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction
 The credibility of the intended recipient's stated purpose for the purchase
 Whether the potential transfer conflicts with any multilateral treaty