Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle

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The MIRV U.S. Peacekeeper missile, with the re-entry vehicles highlighted in red.

Technicians secure a number of Mk21 re-entry vehicles on a Peacekeeper MIRV bus.

LGM-118A Peacekeeper MIRV at the National Museum of the United States Air Force.

A Trident II missile, operated exclusively by the US Navy and Royal Navy. Each
missile can carry up to 14 warheads.[1]
A multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) is an exoatmospheric
ballistic missile payload containing several warheads, each capable of being aimed
to hit a different target. The concept is almost invariably associated with
intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying thermonuclear warheads, even if not
strictly being limited to them. By contrast, a unitary warhead is a single warhead
on a single missile. An intermediate case is the multiple reentry vehicle (MRV)
missile which carries several warheads which are dispersed but not individually
aimed.[citation needed] Only China, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, France
and India are currently confirmed[by whom?] to possess functional MIRV missile
systems. Israel is suspected to possess or be in the process of developing MIRVs.
[citation needed]

The first true MIRV design was the Minuteman III, first successfully tested in 1968
and introduced into actual use in 1970.[2][3][4] The Minuteman III held three
smaller W62 warheads of about 170 kilotons of TNT (710 TJ) each in place of the
single 1.2 megatons of TNT (5.0 PJ) W56 used in the earlier versions of this
missile. From 1970 to 1975, the United States would remove approximately 550
earlier versions of the Minuteman ICBM in the Strategic Air Command's (SAC) arsenal
and replace them with the new Minuteman IIIs outfitted with a MIRV payload,
increasing their overall effectiveness.[3] The smaller power of the warhead was
offset by increasing the accuracy of the system, allowing it to attack the same
hard targets as the larger, less accurate, W56. The MMIII was introduced
specifically to address the Soviet construction of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
system around Moscow; MIRV allowed the US to overwhelm any conceivable ABM system
without increasing the size of their own missile fleet. The Soviets responded by
adding MIRV to their R-36 design, first with three warheads in 1975, and eventually
up to ten in later versions. While the United States phased out the use of MIRVs in
2014 to comply with New START,[5] Russia continues to develop new missile designs
using the technology.[6]

The introduction of MIRV led to a major change in the strategic balance.

Previously, with one warhead per missile, it was conceivable that one could build a
defence that used missiles to attack individual warheads. Any increase in missile
fleet by the enemy could be countered by a similar increase in interceptors. With
MIRV, a single new enemy missile meant that multiple interceptors would have to be
built, meaning that it was much less expensive to increase the attack than the
defence. This cost-exchange ratio was so heavily biased towards the attacker that
the concept of mutual assured destruction became the leading concept in strategic
planning and ABM systems were severely limited in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty in order to avoid a massive arms race.

Contents
1 Purpose
2 Mode of operation
3 MRV
4 MIRV-capable missiles
5 See also
6 References
7 External links
Purpose
The military purpose of a MIRV is fourfold:

Enhance first-strike proficiency for strategic forces.[7]

Providing greater target damage for a given thermonuclear weapon payload. Several
small and lower yield warheads cause much more target damage area than a single
warhead alone. This, in turn, reduces the number of missiles and launch facilities
required for a given destruction level - much the same as the purpose of a cluster
munition.[8]
With single-warhead missiles, one missile must be launched for each target. By
contrast, with a MIRV warhead, the post-boost (or bus) stage can dispense the
warheads against multiple targets across a broad area.
Reduces the effectiveness of an anti-ballistic missile system that relies on
intercepting individual warheads.[9] While a MIRV attacking missile can have
multiple warheads (3-12 on United States and Russian missiles, or 14 in a maximum
payload shorter-range configuration of the Trident II now barred by START),
interceptors may have only one warhead per missile. Thus, in both a military and an
economic sense, MIRVs render ABM systems less effective, as the costs of
maintaining a workable defence against MIRVs would greatly increase, requiring
multiple defensive missiles for each offensive one. Decoy re-entry vehicles can be
used alongside actual warheads to minimize the chances of the actual warheads being
intercepted before they reach their targets. A system that destroys the missile
earlier in its trajectory (before MIRV separation) is not affected by this but is
more difficult, and thus more expensive to implement.
MIRV land-based ICBMs were considered destabilizing because they tended to put a
premium on striking first.[10] The world's first MIRV�US Minuteman III missile of
1970�threatened to rapidly increase the US's deployable nuclear arsenal and thus
the possibility that it would have enough bombs to destroy virtually all of the
Soviet Union's nuclear weapons and negate any significant retaliation. Later on the
US feared the Soviet's MIRVs because Soviet missiles had a greater throw-weight and
could thus put more warheads on each missile than the US could. For example, the US
MIRVs might have increased their warhead per missile count by a factor of 6 while
the Soviets increased theirs by a factor of 10. Furthermore, the US had a much
smaller proportion of its nuclear arsenal in ICBMs than the Soviets. Bombers could
not be outfitted with MIRVs so their capacity would not be multiplied. Thus the US
did not seem to have as much potential for MIRV usage as the Soviets. However, the
US had a larger number of Submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which could be
outfitted with MIRVs, and helped offset the ICBM disadvantage. It is because of
their first-strike capability that land-based MIRVs were banned under the START II
agreement. START II was ratified by the Russian Duma on 14 April 2000, but Russia
withdrew from the treaty in 2002 after the US withdrew from the ABM treaty.

Mode of operation
In a MIRV, the main rocket motor (or booster) pushes a "bus" (see illustration)
into a free-flight suborbital ballistic flight path. After the boost phase the bus
manoeuvres using small on-board rocket motors and a computerised inertial guidance
system. It takes up a ballistic trajectory that will deliver a re-entry vehicle
containing a warhead to a target and then releases a warhead on that trajectory. It
then manoeuvres to a different trajectory, releasing another warhead, and repeats
the process for all warheads.

Minuteman III MIRV launch sequence: 1. The missile launches out of its silo by
firing its first-stage boost motor (A). 2. About 60 seconds after launch, the
first-stage drops off and the second-stage motor (B) ignites. The missile shroud
(E) is ejected. 3. About 120 seconds after launch, the third-stage motor (C)
ignites and separates from the second-stage. 4. About 180 seconds after launch, the
third-stage thrust terminates and the post-boost vehicle (D) separates from the
rocket. 5. The post-boost vehicle maneuvers itself and prepares for re-entry
vehicle (RV) deployment. 6. While the post-boost vehicle backs away, the RVs,
decoys, and chaff are deployed (this may occur during ascent). 7. The RVs and chaff
reenter the atmosphere at high speeds and are armed in flight. 8. The nuclear
warheads detonate, either as air bursts or ground bursts.
The precise technical details are closely guarded military secrets, to hinder any
development of enemy counter-measures. The bus's on-board propellant limits the
distances between targets of individual warheads to perhaps a few hundred
kilometres.[11] Some warheads may use small hypersonic airfoils during the descent
to gain additional cross-range distance. Additionally, some buses (e.g. the British
Chevaline system) can release decoys to confuse interception devices and radars,
such as aluminized balloons or electronic noisemakers.

Testing of the Peacekeeper reentry vehicles: all eight (of a possible ten) were
fired from only one missile. Each line shows the path of an individual warhead
captured on reentry via long-exposure photography.
Accuracy is crucial because doubling the accuracy decreases the needed warhead
energy by a factor of four for radiation damage and by a factor of eight for blast
damage. Navigation system accuracy and the available geophysical information limits
the warhead target accuracy. Some writers believe[weasel words] that government-
supported geophysical mapping initiatives and ocean satellite altitude systems such
as Seasat may have a covert purpose to map mass concentrations and determine local
gravity anomalies, in order to improve accuracies of ballistic missiles.[citation
needed] Accuracy is expressed as circular error probable (CEP). This is simply the
radius of the circle that the warhead has a 50 percent chance of falling into when
aimed at the center. CEP is about 90�100 m for the Trident II and Peacekeeper
missiles.[12]

MRV
A multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV) system for a ballistic missile deploys multiple
warheads above a single aimpoint which then drift apart, producing a cluster bomb-
like effect. These warheads are not individually targetable. The advantage of an
MRV over a single warhead is the increased effectiveness due to the greater
coverage, this increases the overall-damage produced within the centre of the
pattern making it far greater than the damage possible from any single warhead in
the MRV cluster; this makes for an efficient area attack weapon and makes
interception by anti-ballistic missiles more challenging due to the number of
warheads being deployed at once.[3]

Improved warhead designs allow smaller warheads for a given yield, while better
electronics and guidance systems allow greater accuracy. As a result, MIRV
technology has proven more attractive than MRV for advanced nations. Multiple-
warhead missiles require both a miniaturised physics package and a lower mass re-
entry vehicle, both of which are highly advanced technologies. As a result, single-
warhead missiles are more attractive for nations with less advanced or less
productive nuclear technology. The United States first deployed MRV warheads on the
Polaris A-3 SLBM in 1964 on the USS Daniel Webster. The Polaris A-3 missile carried
three warheads each having an approximate yield of 200 kilotonnes of TNT (840 TJ).
This system was also used by the Royal Navy who also retained MRV with the
Chevaline upgrade, though the number of warheads in Chevaline was reduced to two
due to the ABM counter-measures carried.[3] The Soviet Union deployed 3 MRVs on the
R-27U SLBM and 3 MRVs on the R-36P ICBM. Refer to atmospheric re-entry for more
details.

MIRV-capable missiles

This list is incomplete; you can help by adding missing items. (August 2020)
China
DF-5B (active, 3-8 warheads)
DF-5C (active, 10 warheads)
DF-16 (active, 3 warheads)[13]
DF-31A (active, 3-5 warheads)
DF-31B (active, unknown warheads)
DF-41 (active, 10-12 warheads)
JL-2 (active, 3-8 warheads)
JL-3 (under development)
France
M4 (retired, 6 warheads)
M45 (active, 6 warheads)
M51 (active, 6-10 warheads)
India
Agni-V (planned MIRV capability, allegedly tested indirectly)[14]
Agni-VI (under development)[15][16]
K-5 (under development, MIRV capability not demonstrated)[16]
Iran
Khorramshahr missile (under development, announced optional capability)[17][18]
Israel
Jericho 3 (active, suspected capability, not announced)[19]
Pakistan
Ababeel (not operational[citation needed], 3-8 warheads[citation needed])[20]
Soviet Union/ Russian Federation

RSD-10 Pioneer MIRV at the National Air and Space Museum

R-36 mod 4 (active, 10-14 warheads)
R-36 mod 5 (active, 10 warheads)
R-29R (active, 3 warheads)
R-29RK (active, 7 warheads)
MR-UR-100 Sotka (retired, 4 warheads)
UR-100N mod 3 (active, 6 warheads)
RSD-10 Pioneer (retired, 3 warheads)
R-39 Rif (retired, 10 warheads)
R-29RM Shtil (retired, 4 warheads)
RT-23 Molodets (retired, 10 warheads)
R-29RMU Sineva (active, 4 or 10 warheads)
RS-24 Yars (active, 3-6 warheads)
R-29RMU2 Layner (active, 4 or 12 warheads)
RSM-56 Bulava (active 6-10 warheads)
RS-28 Sarmat (active, 10-15 warheads)
RS-26 Rubezh (under development, 4 warheads)
BZhRK Barguzin (under development, 4-16 warheads)
US UK
UGM-133 Trident II (active, number of warheads classified)
US
LGM-30 Minuteman III (active, 1-3 warheads, currently carries one warhead)
UGM-73 Poseidon (retired, 10 or 14 warheads)
UGM-96 Trident I (retired, 8 warheads)
LGM-118 Peacekeeper (retired, 10 warheads)
UGM-133 Trident II (active 8-14 warheads)
See also
Comparison of ICBMs
DARPA Falcon Project
List of ICBMs
Maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MARV or MaRV)
Missile Command�1980s video game in which MIRVs must be intercepted
Multiple Kill Vehicle
References
Notes
Parsch, Andreas. "UGM-133". Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles.
Archived from the original on 2011-01-29. Retrieved 2014-06-13.
"Military says Minuteman missiles ready". Lewiston Morning Tribune. (Idaho).
Associated Press. July 20, 1970. p. 1.
Polmar, Norman; Norris, Robert S. (1 July 2009). The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal: A
History of Weapons and Delivery Systems since 1945 (1st ed.). Naval Institute
Press. ISBN 978-1557506818. LCCN 2008054725. OCLC 602923650. OL 22843826M.
"Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2019-01-18. Retrieved 2017-09-17.
"Last Malmstrom ICBM reconfigured under treaty". Great Falls Tribune. Retrieved
2018-09-08.
"Putin has touted an 'invincible' nuclear weapon that really exists � here's how
it works and why it deeply worries experts". Business Insider. Archived from the
original on 2018-09-08. Retrieved 2018-09-08.
Buchonnet, Daniel (1 February 1976). "MIRV: A BRIEF HISTORY OF MINUTEMAN and
MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES". gwu.edu. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. United States
Department of Defense. Archived from the original on 15 September 2019. Retrieved
24 November 2019. The idea of multiple warheads dates back to the mid-1960s, but
the key year in the history of the MIRV concept was 1962 when several of
technological developments made it possible for scientists and engineers to
conceive of multiple, separately targeted warheads that could hit a growing list of
Soviet nuclear threat targets. One important innovation was that the weapons
laboratories had designed small thermonuclear weapons, a necessary condition for
deploying multiple reentry vehicles on the relatively small Minuteman.
The best overall printed sources on nuclear weapons design are: Hansen, Chuck.
U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History. San Antonio, TX: Aerofax, 1988; and the
more-updated Hansen, Chuck, "Swords of Armageddon: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Development
since 1945 Archived 2016-12-30 at the Wayback Machine" (CD-ROM & download
available). PDF. 2,600 pages, Sunnyvale, California, Chukelea Publications, 1995,
2007. ISBN 978-0-9791915-0-3 (2nd Ed.)
Robert C. Aldridge (1983). First Strike!: The Pentagon's Strategy for Nuclear War.
South End Press. pp. 65�. ISBN 978-0-89608-154-3. Archived from the original on 16
July 2014. Retrieved 26 February 2013.
"Archived copy". Archived from the original on 2017-12-01. Retrieved 2017-12-01.
"Question Re Mirv Warheads � Military Forum | Airliners.net". Archived from the
original on 2007-10-16. Retrieved 2008-07-02.
Cimbala, Stephen J. (2010). Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in
Crisis and War. Penn State Press. p. 86. ISBN 978-0-271-04126-1. Archived from the
original on 26 April 2016. Retrieved 3 May 2013.
"DF-16 cruise missile short medium range technical data sheet specifications".
Archived from the original on 2017-02-07. Retrieved 2017-02-07.
Karnad, Bharat (2015). "Military Infirmities and Strengths". Why India is Not a
Great Power (yet). Oxford University Press. pp. 375�376. ISBN 9780199459223.
"Agni-V with China in range tested; next in line is Agni-VI, with multiple
warheads". TOI. 27 December 2016. Archived from the original on 31 May 2017.
Retrieved 17 March 2019.
"Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: India". January 2018. Archived from the
original on 24 September 2018. Retrieved 17 March 2019.
"Iran Defies Donald Trump as it Test-Fires Khoramshahr Missile With Range 2000 km;
Can Carry Several Types of Warheads". India News. September 23, 2017. Archived from
the original on September 23, 2017. Retrieved September 23, 2017.
"Iran New Khorramshahr ballistic missile unveiled during military parade". Army
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2017-09-23.
"Jericho 3". Missile Threat. Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Retrieved 4 April 2020.
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