SECTION 6 – LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with
did not act arbitrarily or with grave
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS [177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO. 88211;
15 SEPT 1989]
Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition
asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos
and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to
return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,
specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is
without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law.
Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has
authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return
to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the
Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.
Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is
not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or
within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar
is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to
travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to
freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the
right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as
separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the
"right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of
each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right
to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and
the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such
rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national
security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights
of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be
arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe
the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same
context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to
travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to
travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may
be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International
Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former
Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the
destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe
away the gains achieved during the past few years after the
Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore
prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED.
MANOTOC VS. COURT OF APPEALS [142 SCRA 149; G.R. NO.
L-62100; 30 MAY 1986]
Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail.
Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled,
"motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground
therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his
business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution
opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges
denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the
orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and
Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel
abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ
commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the
Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for
departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of
right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities
and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his
liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to
travel.
Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been
violated.
Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail
from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of
the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon
petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to
travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines
without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of
the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel
abroad. There is no indication that the business transactions
cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf.
SILVERIO VS CA
RICARDO C. SILVERIO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch IX, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 94284 April 8, 1991
Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the
Revised Securities Act in Criminal Case of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty.
More than two (2) years after the filing of the Information,
respondent People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte
Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure
Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone
abroad several times without the necessary Court approval
resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled
hearings.
Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order
directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner’s
passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission
on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This
order was based primarily on the Trial Court’s finding that since the
filing of the Information, “the accused has not yet been arraigned
because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled
for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad
without the knowledge and permission of this Court”. Petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Issue: Whether or not the right to travel may be impaired by order
of the court
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the foregoing condition
imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times
whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction of his right to travel. A person facing criminal charges
may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if
abroad, compelled to return. So it is also that “An accused
released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a
warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior
permission of the Court where the case is pending.
Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987
Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts to curtail the liberty
of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the
allowable impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of
interest of national security, public safety or public health, as
compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions.
SECTION 7 – RIGHT TO INFORMATION
VALENTIN L. LEGASPI vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Facts: The fundamental right of the people to information on
matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil action for
mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the
Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied
Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of
certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department
of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy
and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil
service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for
sanitarians.
Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian
Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution,
and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to
acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent
Commission to disclose said information.
The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to give due
course to this Petition. He challenges the petitioner's standing to
sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any clear
legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of the
government employees concerned. He calls attention to the
alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in
securing this particular information. He further argues that there is
no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the
petitioner with the information he seeks.
Issues: a. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is obliged
to produce the information regarding the eligibilities of certain
persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of
Cebu City?
b. Whether or not the petitioner has a standing to assert the right to
information?
Ruling: a. This question is first addressed to the government
agency having custody of the desired information. However, as
already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any
discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the
government agency has the burden of showing that the information
requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that
the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the
guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional
right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an
advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against
release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard
the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government
agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the
proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public
concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public
concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition.
Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public
may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives,
or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to
determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of
interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
b. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims
of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the
Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know
who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial
notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service
examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations
for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is
nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually
possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor
unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government
employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public,
through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities
from the Civil Service Commission.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern,
and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon
access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the
duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil
service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes
imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its
register of eligibles for the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or
deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano
Agas, for said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as
requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.
Valmonte vs Belmonte
FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with
preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that
respondent be directed: (a) to furnish petitioners the list of the
names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos;
and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow
petitioners access to the public records for the subject information
On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of
the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy
General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another
letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now
considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within
the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public
interest."
ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and
taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by
the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.
HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS
the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of
this petition. His position is apparently based merely on
considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues.
The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law
should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are
within the domain of the political branches of the government, and
of the people themselves as the repository of all State power. The
concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose
to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they
were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been
granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they
generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially
those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more
limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their
actions being subject to closer public scrutiny The "transactions"
used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both
steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract,
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which,
though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive,
and considering further that government-owned and controlled
corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental
functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced
that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-
controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the
ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the
constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and,
pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the
Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of
official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like
in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were
scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral
Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of
2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the
petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish
them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit
the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public
consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from
signing the same.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of
the MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to
information on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a
state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160
(Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE)
as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision
not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform
to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act
No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the
respondents to consult the local government units or communities
affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their
mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents exceeded
their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the
Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any
branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of
paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the
Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with
the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act
. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the
law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our
constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x
settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the
courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate
ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the
Constitution involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III)
under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under
RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the
people to demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of
officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The
complete and effective exercise of the right to information
necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure
derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable
safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public
concern involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring
that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations
leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds
no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character
of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing
consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal
forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular
dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and
recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of
society.
3. a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
(BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that
the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated
state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is
recognized under our laws as having an “associative” relationship
with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers
that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any
local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the
associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine
State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to
prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded
version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM.
Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a
state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a
capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily
sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it –
which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association –
runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the
national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the
present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific
provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE
are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more
of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is
covered by the term “autonomous region” in the constitutional
provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform
to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD
requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come
into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon
effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying
an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD.
This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment
of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her
oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such
presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to
change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed
amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to
recommending these changes and submits to the proper
procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere
recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the
above-discussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the President’s authority to propose
constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third
party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place,
nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is
submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or
the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act
No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is “the birthright of all
Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify
themselves and be accepted as ‘Bangsamoros.’” It defines
“Bangsamoro people” as the natives or original inhabitants of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their
descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their
spouses.
Thus, the concept of “Bangsamoro,” as defined in this strand of the
MOA-AD, includes not only “Moros” as traditionally understood
even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its
adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice of
indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of
choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD
proceeds to refer to the “Bangsamoro homeland,” the ownership of
which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of
their prior rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD
acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form part of the
public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and
delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things,
the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the
statute does not grant the Executive Department or any
government agency the power to delineate and recognize an
ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of
1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations
beforeany project or program critical to the environment and
human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a
particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented
therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally
and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result
to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants
from their total environment.
CONCLUSION: In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to
carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O.
No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The
furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted
runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts
to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic
exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution
and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept
underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned
between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the
concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and
implies that the same is on its way to independence.
ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE G.R. NO. 132601,
JANUARY 19, 1999
Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the
execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same
day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the
issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only
violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the
power of the executive to grant reprieve.
Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the case
becomes final and executory, still has jurisdiction over the case
Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the SC has lost
all its powers or the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the
SC loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.
Even after the judgment has become final, the SC retains its
jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.
The power to control the execution of the SC’s decision is an
essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of
substantial subtraction for the Constitution vests the entirety of
judicial power in one SC and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. The important part of a litigation, whether civil
or criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where
supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties
and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants
to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforeseen,
supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the
inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and
orders to make them comform to law and justice.
The Court also rejected public respondent’s contention that by
granting the TRO, the Court has in effect granted reprieve which is
an executive function under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In
truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still
possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the
appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who becomes
insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a state
of insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is
indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of
the presidential power of reprieve though its effects are the same
as the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict.
In the same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any
time amend the Death Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of
death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like
that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise of Congress of
its plenary power to amend laws cannot be considered as a
violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences
of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each
other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the
right to life. To contend that only the Executive can protect the right
to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the
principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the 3 branches of
the government.
CHAVEZ vs PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT
Facts: -Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as taxpayer,
citizen and a former government official) initiated this original
action seeking
(1) to prohibit and “enjoin respondents [PCGG and its chairman]
from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any
agreement with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos
. . . relating to and concerning the properties and assets of
Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad —
including the so-called Marcos gold hoard"; and (2) to “compel
respondent[s] to make public all negotiations and agreement, be
they ongoing or perfected, and all documents related to or relating
to such negotiations and agreement between the PCGG and the
Marcos heirs."
-Chavez is the same person initiated the prosecution of the
Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of
the public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's
economy; he says that what impelled him to bring this action were
several news reports 2 bannered in a number of broadsheets
sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the
alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited
in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the reported
execution of a compromise, between the government (through
PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share these
assets.
-PETITIONER DEMANDS that respondents make public any and
all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's task of
recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any
compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an
issue of "paramount public interest," since it has a "debilitating
effect on the country's economy" that would be greatly prejudicial
to the national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in
general have a right to know the transactions or deals being
contrived and effected by the government.
-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that they do not deny forging a
compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim, though,
that petitioner's action is premature, because there is no showing
that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the
Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled
to make any disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions
of the Agreements have not become effective and binding.
-PETITIONER INVOKES
Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on matters
of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that the above constitutional
provisions refer to completed and operative official acts, not to
those still being considered.
Issue: Whether or not the Court could require the PCGG to
disclose to the public the details of any agreement, perfected or
not, with the Marcoses.
Ruling: “WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General
and Supplemental Agreement dated December 28, 1993, which
PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared
NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution.
Respondent PCGG, its officers and all government functionaries
and officials who are or may be directly ot indirectly involved in the
recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their
associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of
any proposed compromise settlment, as well as the final
agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in accordance
with the discussions embodied in this Decision. No pronouncement
as to cost.”
RD: - The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in the
subject provisions of the Constitution have as yet no defined scope
and extent. There are no specific laws prescribing the exact
limitations within which the right may be exercised or the
correlative state duty may be obliged. However, the following are
some of the recognized restrictions:
(1) national security matters and intelligence information
- there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with
respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
national security matters. 24 But where there is no need to protect
such state secrets, the privilege may not be invoked to withhold
documents and other information, 25 provided that they are
examined "in strict confidence" and given "scrupulous protection."
(2) trade secrets and banking transactions
-trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property
Code 27 and other related laws) as well as banking transactions
(pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act 28) are also
exempted from compulsory disclosure
(3) criminal matters
- Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such as
those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and the
detention of criminals, which courts neither may nor inquire into
prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution. Efforts at effective
law enforcement would be seriously jeopardized by free public
access to, for example, police information regarding rescue
operations, the whereabouts of fugitives, or leads on covert
criminal activities.
(4) other confidential information.
- The Ethical Standards Act 31 further prohibits public officials and
employees from using or divulging "confidential or classified
information officially known to them by reason of their office and
not made available to the public." Other acknowledged limitations
to information access include diplomatic correspondence, closed
door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of
Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme
Court.
- In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., the Court emphasized that the
information sought must be "matters of public concern," access to
which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state policy of full public
disclosure extends only to "transactions involving public interest"
and may also be "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law."
- As to the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public
concern," the Court, in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,
elucidated: “In determining whether or not a particular information
is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. “
“Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact
definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which
the public may want to know, either because these directly affect
their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the
interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the
courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at
issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the
public.”
-As to whether or not the above cited constitutional provisions
guarantee access to information regarding ongoing negotiations or
proposals prior to the final agreement, this same clarification was
sought and clearly addressed by the constitutional commissioners
during their deliberations,
MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should be
distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever,
does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the
consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract
itself?
MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here, I suppose, is generic
and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and
already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading
to the consummation of the transaction?
MR. OPLE. Yes, subject to reasonable safeguards on the national
interest.
- Considering the intent of the Constitution, the Court believes that
it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other
government representatives, to disclose sufficient public
information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take
up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth.
Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of
the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when
common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or
are in the "exploratory" stage. There is a need, of course, to
observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in
general, as discussed above— such as on matters involving
national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and
other classified information.
RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS,
LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA
SHEET ORCURRICULUM VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE
SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE
JUDICIARY. A. M. No. 09-8-6-SC, June 13, 2012.
Facts: Rowena Paraan, Research Director of the PCIJ, sought
copies of the SALN of the Justices of the Supreme Court for the
year 2008. She also requested for copies of the Personal Data
Sheet of the Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating their
database of information on government officials.
Issue #1: Can the SALN of justices be accessed via the right to
information?
Ruling: Yes. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the
public service
Issue #2: What are the limitations on the constitutional right to
information?
Ruling: The right to information is not absolute. It is further subject
to such limitations as may be provided by law. Jurisprudence has
provided the following limitations to that right:(1) national security
matters and intelligence information;(2) trade secrets and banking
transactions;(3) criminal matters; and(4) other confidential
information such as confidential or classified information officially
known to public officers and employees by reason of their office
and not made available to the public as well as diplomatic
correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive
sessions of either house of Congress, and the internal
deliberations of the Supreme Court.
AKBAYAN VS AQUINO
FACTS: Petition for mandamus and prohibition was filed by the
petitioners, as congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers,
requesting respondents to submit to them the full text of the Japan-
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA).
Petitioner emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose
the said agreement violates there right to information on matters of
public concern and of public interest. That the non-disclosure of
the same documents undermines their right to effective and
reasonable participation in all levels of social, political and
economic decision making.
Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the
ground that the matter sought involves a diplomatic negotiation
then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right to
information and the policy of full disclosure of matters that are of
public concern like the JPEPA. That diplomatic negotiation are
covered by the doctrine of executive privilege.
Issue: Whether or not the petition has been entirely rendered moot
and academic because of the subsequent event that occurred?
Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public
concern and are still covered by the doctrine of executive
privilege?
Held: On the first issue, the Supreme Court ruled that t]he principal
relief petitioners are praying for is the disclosure of the contents of
the JPEPA prior to its finalization between the two States parties,”
public disclosure of the text of the JPEPA after its signing by the
President, during the pendency of the present petition, has been
largely rendered moot and academic.
The text of the JPEPA having then been made accessible to the
public, the petition has become moot and academic to the extent
that it seeks the disclosure of the “full text” thereof.
The petition is not entirely moot, however, because petitioners
seek to obtain, not merely the text of the JPEPA, but also the
Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.
Moving on to the second issue, The Supreme Court Ruled that
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in
this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception.
It bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only
presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of
information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered
privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context
in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public
interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information,
strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.
The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus,
Wherein petitioners were seeking information from the President’s
representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations of
the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The Court denied the
petition, stressing that “secrecy of negotiations with foreign
countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom
of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to
information.
IDEALS VS PSALMS
FACTS: PSALM is a GOCC created by virtue of the EPIRA law.
Said law mandated PSALM to manage privatization of NPC. When
PSALM commenced the privatization an invitation to bid was
published and the highest bidder K-Water was identified. The sale
to K-Water was sought to be enjoined by petitioners who contend
that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when, in the conduct of
the bidding it violated the people’s right to information without
having previously released to the public critical information about
the sale.
ISSUES:
1. Can the bid documents, etc. used in the on-going negotiation for
the privatization and sale of Angat hydro plant be accessed via the
right to information?
2. Is the duty to disclose information the same with the duty to
permit access to information on matters of public concern?
HELD:
1. Yes. The court reiterated that the constitutional right to
information includes official information on on-going negotiations
before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute
definite propositions by the government and should not cover
recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and
diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security
and public order.
2. No. Unlike the disclosure of information which is mandatory
under the Constitution, the other aspect of the people’s right to
know requires a demand or request for one to gain access to
documents and paper of the particular agency. Moreover, the duty
to disclose covers only transactions involving public interest, while
the duty to allow access has a broader scope of information which
embraces not only transactions involving public interest, but any
matter contained in official communications and public documents
of the government agency
SECTION 8 – RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATIONS
SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987,
the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded
the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from
reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the
SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the
strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a
result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to
return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay
damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the
union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the
old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of
union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and
holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6)
months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and
their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to
other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's
allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from
the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of
discrimination and unfair labor practices.
Issue: Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS)
have the right to strike.
Held: The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to
self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law"
[Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in
understanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the
proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government
employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the
formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to
strike.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces
all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180
where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government
employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled
corporation with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No.
1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R.
Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil
Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the
case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
BENJAMIN VICTORIANO VS ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS’ UNION
FACTS: 1. Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a
member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in
the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
Company) since 1958.
2. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers'
Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which had with the Company a
collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which
reads as follows:
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment
for all permanent employees workers covered by this Agreement.
3. The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was
renewed the following day, March 4, 1964.
4. Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its
amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded
"from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a
condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is
the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however,
Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to —
paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as
follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization".
5. Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its
members with any labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation
to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action was taken thereon, he
reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union
wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee
from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as
a member.
6. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his
counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement
with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from
the service. This prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the Court of First Instance of Manila
to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee. 1 In its
answer, the Union invoked the "union security clause" of the collective
bargaining agreement; assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
3350; and contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e).
CFI - Manila: enjoining the defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from
dismissing the plaintiff from his present employment and sentencing the
defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to pay the plaintiff P500 for
attorney's fees and the costs of this action
Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law.
ISSUE/S: WON RA 3350 introducing an amendment to paragraph (4)
subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but
such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization" is
unconstitutional
WON RA 3350 infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful
associations when it "prohibits all the members of a given religious sect
from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their
members thereto" 5 ; and, consequently, deprives said members of their
constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or organizations
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III,
Section 1 (6) of the 1935 Constitution
RULING: 1. NO. R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional on all counts. It must be
pointed out that the free exercise of religious profession or belief is
superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore,
yield to the former.
2. No. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said
religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even
when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that
in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects
cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole
ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union.
If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious
sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference
and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the
law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from
joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join.
Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional
provision on freedom of association.
DISPOSITIVE: Benjamin Victoriano Won (Plaintiff)
Appeal is dismissed.
DOCTRINE: The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior
to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must yield to the former.
If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they
can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law
prohibit them from joining, and neither may the employer or labor union
compel them to join.
IN THE MATTER OF THE IBP MEMBERSHIP DUES DELINQUENCY OF
ATTY. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO.
MDD-1), PETITIONER
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing
Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to
the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the
provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section
24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP,
payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-
condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to
which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the
rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence,
the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of
the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay
his membership fee to the IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer
must be a member of as distinguished from bar associations in
which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are
subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar
including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements.
The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not
in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does
not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the
State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory program – the
lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the
State. The right to practice law before the courts of this country should be
and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to
impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary.
Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation
as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus
the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their
annual dues.
IN THE MATTER OF THE IBP MEMBERSHIP DUES DELINQUENCY OF
ATTY. MARCIAL A. EDILLION
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing
Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to
the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the
provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section
24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP,
payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-
condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to
which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the
rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence,
the respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of
the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his
membership fee to the IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer
must be a member of as distinguished from bar associations in which
membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to
comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including
payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules
of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation
of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel
the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the
meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the
State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory program – the
lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the
State. The right to practice law before the courts of this country should be
and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power to
impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary.
Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation
as part of its inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court
may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.
SECTION 10 – NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
RUTTER VS. ESTEBAN [93 PHIL 68; NO.L-3708; 18 MAY 1953]
Monday, February 09, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land
situated in the Manila for P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid outright, and
the balance was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or before August 7,
1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with interest at the rate of
7 percent per annum. To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a
first mortgage has been constituted in favor of the plaintiff. Esteban failed
to pay the two installments as agreed upon, as well as the interest that
had accrued and so Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance due,
the interest due and the attorney's fees. The complaint also contains a
prayer for sale of the properties mortgaged in accordance with law.
Esteban claims that this is a prewar obligation contracted and that he is a
war sufferer, having filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage
Commission for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last
war; and that under section 2 of RA 342(moratorium law), payment of his
obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of eight years. The
complaint was dismissed. A motion for recon was made which assails the
constitutionality of RA 342.
Issue: Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on non-impairment clause
grounds.
Held: Yes. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations
decreed by the state through the medium of the courts or the legislature.
Its essence is the application of police power. The economic interests of
the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective
power notwithstanding interference with contracts. The question is not
whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or
indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and
the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end.
However based on the President’s general SONA and consistent with
what the Court believes to be as the only course dictated by justice,
fairness and righteousness, declared that the continued operation and
enforcement of RA 342 at the present time is unreasonable and
oppressive, and should not be prolonged should be declared null and void
and without effect. This holds true as regards Executive Orders Nos. 25
and 32, with greater force and reason considering that said Orders contain
no limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards the suspension of the
enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations.
ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO., defendant-appellee.
Facts: Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling
lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA.
On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla and Natividad
Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on
installments over two parcels of land of the Subdivision. On July 19, 1962,
the said vendees transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid
lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the
purchase price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in
favor of Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment) and
the deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that:
1. The parcel of land shall be used exclusively for residential purposes,
and she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it
or any other lots belonging to the Seller.
2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be
constructed at any time in said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and
properly painted, (b) provided with modern sanitary installations connected
either to the public sewer or to an approved septic tank, and (c) shall not
be at a distance of less than two (2) meters from its boundary lines.
Eventually a resolution was issued and within the resolution it declared the
said lots has to be a commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution No.
27, dated February 4, 1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong,
Rizal. 9 It alleges that plaintiff-appellant 'completely sold and transferred
to third persons all lots in said subdivision facing Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue" 10 and the subject lots thereunder were acquired by it "only on
July 23, 1962 or more than two (2) years after the area had been declared
a commercial and industrial zone
Now the petitioner assails that the said resolution violates the impairment
clause provided by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the said Resolution violated the impairment clause
provided by the Constitution
Held: It was held that the said resolution is a valid exercise of police power
thus must yield to the impairment clause provided by the Constitution
The said resolution was obviously passed by the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to safeguard or
promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the
people in the locality, Judicial notice may be taken of the conditions
prevailing in the area, especially where lots Nos. 5 and 6 are located. The
lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and commercial
complexes have flourished about the place. EDSA, a main traffic artery
which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila
area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise
and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the
residents in its route. Having been expressly granted the power to adopt
zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality of
Mandaluyong, through its Municipal 'council, was reasonably, if not
perfectly, justified under the circumstances, in passing the subject
resolution.
GANZON V INSERTO; G.R. NO. L-56450; 25 JUL 1983; 123 SCRA 713
FACTS: Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon executed a deed of absolute sale of a
parcel of land in favor of private respondents. Several months later, a
deed of real estate mortgage was executed between the same parties to
secure the payment by the private respondents of a promissory not in
favor of petitioner. Private respondents filed a civil action against
petitioners after Ganzon initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the said mortgage.
Respondent judge ordered the substitution of the mortgage lien with a
surety bond.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not the order of respondent judge violates the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution.
RULING: YES. Substitution of the mortgage with a surety bond to ensure
the payment of a loan would in effect change the terms and conditions of
the mortgage contract. Even before trial on the very issues affecting the
contract, the respondent court has directed a deviation from its terms,
diminished its efficiency and dispensed with a primary condition.
Instant petition si GRANTED. Orders of the trial court are SET ASIDE.
SECTION 12 – CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
GAMBOA V CRUZ 162 SCRA 642 (1988)
Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a
line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was identified by a
complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was
charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the
conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence of his
counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due
process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the
petition.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s right to counsel and due process
violated.
Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest,
hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. He
had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment
there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit
admissions or confessions or even plain information which may
appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he
should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the
right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of
this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by
a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to
present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not
to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution
had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of
opportunity to be heard.
PEOPLE VS. MACAM [238 SCRA 306; G.R. NOS. 91011-12; 24
NOV 1994]
Facts: Prosecution’s version: On Aug 18,1987, Eduardo Macam,
Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan Jr., Danilo Roque and Ernesto
Roque went to the house of Benito Macam (uncle of Eduardo Macam)
located at 43 Ferma Road QC. Upon the arrival of the accused, Benito
invited the former to have lunch. Benito asked his maid Salvacion
Enrera to call the companions of Eduardo who were waiting in a
tricycle outside the house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan and D. Roque entered
the house while E. Roque remained in the tricycle. After all the
accused had taken their lunch, Eduardo Macam grabbed the clutch
bag of Benito Macam and pulled out his uncle’s gun then declared a
hold-up. They tied up the wife (Leticia Macam), children, maid
(Salvacion) and Nilo Alcantara and brought them to the room upstairs.
After a while Leticia was brought to the bathroom and after she
screamed she was stabbed and killed by A. Cedro. Benito, Nilo and
Salvacion was also stabbed but survived. The total value of the items
taken was P536, 700.00.
Defense’s version: Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver
drove the 4 accused to Benito’s house for a fee of P50.00. Instead of
paying him, he was given a calling card by Eduardo Macam so that he
can be paid the following day. Upon arriving, he went with the accused
inside the house to have lunch. Thereafter he washed the dishes and
swept the floor. When Eugenio Cawilan pulled a gun and announced
the hold-up, he was asked to gather some things and which he abided
out of fear. While putting the said thins inside the car of Benito (victim)
he heard the accused saying “kailangan patayin ang mga taong yan
dahil kilala ako ng mga yan”. Upon hearing such phrase he escaped
and went home using his tricycle. He also testified that his brother
Ernesto Roque has just arrived from the province and in no way can
be involved in the case at bar. On the following day, together with his
brother, they went to the factory of the Zesto Juice (owned by the
father of Eduardo Macam) for him to get his payment (50.00) . He and
his brother was suddenly apprehended by the security guards and
brought to the police headquarters in Q.C. They were also forced to
admit certain things.
After which, he together with all the accused, in handcuffs and bore
contusions on their faces caused by blows inflicted in their faces
during investigation, was brought to the QC General Hospital before
each surviving victims and made to line-up for identification. Eugenio
Cawilan was also charged with Anti-fencing Law but was acquitted in
the said case.
Issue: Whether or Not their right to counsel has been violated. WON
the arrest was valid. WON the evidence from the line-up is admissible.
Held: It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical
stages of prosecution even before trial. A police line-up is considered
a “critical” stage of the proceedings. Any identification of an
uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible.
HOWEVER, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding
appellant’s identification at the line-up. The witnesses identified the
accused again in open court. Also, accused did not object to the in-
court identification as being tainted by illegal line-up.
The arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. HOWEVER, they
are estopped from questioning the legality of such arrest because they
have not moved to quash the said information and therefore voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a
plea of not guilty and participating in trial.
The court believed the version of the prosecution. Ernesto Roque,
while remaining outside the house served as a looked out.
Wherefore, decision of lower court is Affirmed. Danilo Roque and
Ernesto Roque is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as co-
conspirators of the other accused to suffer reclusion perpetua.
Things taken: 2 toygun, airgun riffle, CO2 refiller, TV, betamax tapes,
betamax rewinder, Samsonite attache case, typewriter, chessboard,
TOYOTA Crown Car Plate No. CAS-997, assorted jewelry. .22 gun
and money.
JESALVA VS PEOPLE
WHAT IS CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION?
Custodial investigation refers to “any questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”
WHAT DOES CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION PRESUPPOSE?
This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed a crime
and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession
from him.

WHEN DOES THE RULE ON CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BEGIN
TO APPLY?
The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is
aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and
to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions which
tend to elicit incriminating statements.
SUPPOSE THE SUSPECT WENT TO THE POLICE STATION AND
NARRATED EVENTS FREELY? IS HE CONSIDERED UNDER
POLICE INVESTIGATION?
No. The assailed statements herein were spontaneously made by
petitioner and were not at all elicited through questioning. It was
established that petitioner, together with his cousin Fiscal Jayona,
personally went to the police station and voluntarily made the
statement that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle at around 12:30 a.m.
of September 9, 1992. The RTC and the CA did not, therefore, err in
holding that the constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is
not applicable in the instant case.
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE AYSON
Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine
Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. It was alleged that he was
involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL
management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That
investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of
Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement
signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association
(PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos
stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of
the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused
proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling
said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue.
Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos.
Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained
Ramos’ written admission and statement, to which defendants argued
that the confession was taken without the accused being represented
by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that
accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the
prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making
inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement of accused.
Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right
against self-incrimination (only to witnesses other than accused,
unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not
present in case at bar).
This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether
voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or
administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a
witness against himself.” It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer
incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can
be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character,
is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It
does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to
appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify
altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must
claim it and could be waived.
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona:
the rights of the accused include:
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and
agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such rights
and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against
him.
PEOPLE V PINLAC 165 SCRA 675 (1988)
Facts: The accused was convicted for two separate criminal cases for
robbery and robbery with homicide. He assailed his conviction on the
contention that the court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession
as evidence which was taken by force, violence, torture, and
intimidation without having appraised of his constitutional rights and
without the assistance of counsel.
Issue: Whether or not due process was observed during the custodial
investigation of the accused.
Held: The court find it meritorious to declare that the constitutional
rights of the accused was violated in the failure of the authorities in
making the accused understand the nature of the charges against him
without appraising him of his constitutional right to have a counsel
during custodial investigation. Moreover the prosecution merely
presented the extrajudicial confession of the accused which is
inadmissible as evidence and the other evidences provided therein are
merely circumstantial and subject for rebuttal. The court acquitted the
accused.
PEOPLE VS. BOLANOS
Facts: Oscar Pagdalian was murdered in Marble Supply, Balagtas
Bulacan. According to Pat. Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao,
deceased was with two companions on the previous night, one of
whom the accused who had a drinking spree with the deceased. When
they apprehended the accused they found the firearm of the deceased
on the chair where the accused was allegedly seated. They boarded
accused along with Magtibay, other accused on the police vehicle and
brought them to the police station. While in the vehicle Bolanos
admitted that he killed the deceased. RTC convicted him hence the
appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not accused-appellant deprived of his constitutional
right to counsel.
Held: Yes. Being already under custodial investigation while on board
the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station where formal
investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been
informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution, more particularly par. 1 and par. 3.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs PABLITO ANDAN
Rights of Suspects under Custodial Investigation
Confessions given to a Municipal Mayor
FACTS: Marianne Guevarra, a second-year nursing student at Fatima
was on her way to her school dormitory in Valenzuelal, Metro Manila
when Pablito Andan asked her to check the blood pressure of the
grandmother of Andan’s wife but there was nobody inside the house.
She was punched in the abdomen by Andan and was brought to the
kitchen where he raped her. She was left in the toilet until it was dark
and was dragged to the backyard. It was when Andan lifted her over
the fence to the adjacent vacant lot where she started to move. Andan
hit her head with a concrete block to silence her and dragged her body
to a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it.
The death of Marianne drew public attention which prompted Baliuag
Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form a team of police officers to solve the
case. Apart from the vacant lot, they also searched Andan’s nearby
house and found evidences linked to the crime. The occupants of the
house were interviewed and learned that accused-appellant was in
Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. A police team lead by Mayor
Trinidad located Andan and took him to the police headquarters where
he was interrogated where he said that Dizon killed the girl. The three
were then brought to Andan’s house where he showed the police
where the bags of Marianne were hidden. They were then brought
back to the police station while waiting for the result of the
investigation.
The gruesome crime attracted the media and as they were gathered at
the police headquarters for the result of the investigation, Mayor
Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing
the mayor, appellant approved him and whispered a request that they
talk privately to which the mayor agreed. They went to another room
and there, the Andan agreed to tell the truth and admitted that he was
the one who killed Marianne. The mayor opened the door of the room
to let the public and the media representatives witness the confession.
Mayor Trinidad first asked for a lawyer to assist the appellant but since
no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed
and recorded in video. In the presence of the media and his relatives,
Andan admitted to the crime and disclosed how he killed Marianne
and that he falsely implicated Larin and Dizon because of ill-feelings
against them.
However, appellant entered a plea of “not guilty” during his
arraignment. He provided an alibi why he was at his father’s house at
another barangay and testified that policemen tortured and coerced
him to admit the crime but the trial court found him guilty and
sentenced him to death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the admission of Andan to the mayor without
the assistance of counsel is in violation of the constitution and cannot
be admitted as evidence in court.
RULING: Under these circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the
appellant’s confession before the mayor is inadmissible. A municipal
mayor has “operational supervision and control” over the local police
and may be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of
applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution.
However, Andan’s confession to the mayor was not made in response
to any interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question
appellant at all and no police authority ordered the appellant to talk to
the mayor. It was the appellant who spontaneously, freely and
voluntarily sought the mayor for a private meeting. The mayor acted as
a confidant and not as a law enforcer and therefore did not violate his
constitutional rights.
Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally
admitted having committed the crime. What the constitution bars is the
compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confession. Hence, we
hold that appellant’s confession to the mayor was correctly admitted
by the trial court.
Andan was found guilty of the special complex crime of rape with
homicide.
NAVALLO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [234 SCRA 177; G.R. NO.
97214; 18 JUL 1994]
Facts: Accused was the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the
Numancia National Vocational School, which school is also located at
del Carmen, Surigao del Norte. His duties included the collection of
tuition fees, preparation of vouchers for salaries of teachers and
employees, and remittance of collections exceeding P500.00 to the
National Treasury. An information for malversation of public funds was
filed. A warrant of arrest was issued, but accused-petitioner could not
be found. on 10 December 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took
effect creating the Sandiganbayan and conferring on it original and
exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers
embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. On 15 November
1984, Navallo was finally arrested. He was released on provisional
liberty upon the approval of his property bail bond. When arraigned by
the RTC on 18 July 1985, he pleaded not guilty. Upon motion of the
prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records
to the Sandiganbayan. Special Prosecutor Luz L. Quiñones-Marcos
opined that since Navallo had already been arraigned before the case
was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue
taking cognizance of the case. The matter was referred to the Office of
the Ombudsman which held otherwise. The information was then
docketed with the Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's arrest
was issued by the Sandiganbayan. The warrant was returned with a
certification by the RTC Clerk of Court that the accused had posted a
bail bond. Navallo filed a motion to quash, contending (1) that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense and the person of
the accused and (2) that since the accused had already been
arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to prosecute him before the
Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy. However this was
denied and trial ensued and he was found guilty.
Issue: Whether or Not the constitutional right against double jeopardy
and in custodial investigations in favor of the accused violated.
Held: No. Double jeopardy requires the existence of the following
requisites:
(1) The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case;
(3) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge;
and
(4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed
without his express consent.
The RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment
of the accused which by then had already been conferred on the
Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with
conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed.
No. Appellant is not in custodial investigation. A person under a
normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit
examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement
officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of
his having been "pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared
by Dulguime (examined cash, as ordered by Espino, the provincial
auditor) appears to be belied by his own testimony.
PEOPLE VS. DY [158 SCRA 111; G.R. 74517; 23 FEB 1988]
Facts: Pat. Padilla reported along with Benny Dy, with caliber .38 as
suspect to the shooting incident at "Benny's Bar," at Sitio Angol,
Manoc-Manoc Malay, Aklan (Boracay) situated on the Island which
caused the death of Christian Langel Philippe, tourist, 24 years old
and a Swiss nationale. He was charged with the Murder With the Use
of Unlicensed firearms. Appellant alleges that he carried the victim to
the shore to be brought to the hospital to save the latter, and who
facilitated the surrender to Pat. Padilla a gun which his helper found
the following morning while cleaning the bar. Accused posted bail
which was granted. The accused denied having made any oral
confession alleging that he went to Pat. Padilla not to report the
incident but to state that a boy helper in the bar had found a gun on
the sand floor while cleaning and that Pat. Padilla picked up the gun
from the bar at his request. The Accused argues that even if he did
make such a confession, the same would be inadmissible in evidence.
He was found guilty in the RTC. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the lower court correct in saying that the
constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in
the instant case.
Held: YES. Appellant's assertion that the gun he had surrendered was
merely found by a boy helper while cleaning the bar deserves no
credence for, if it were so, it would have been absurd for him to have
placed himself under police custody in the early morning after the
incident. Sworn Complaint for "Murder with Use of Unlicensed
Firearm" signed by the Chief of Police also attests to Appellant's oral
confession. That Complaint forms part of the record of the proceedings
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga, Aklan, and is
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Appellant's voluntary
surrender implies no violation as "no warrant of arrest is issued for the
apprehension of the accused for the reason that he is already under
police custody before the filing of the complaint." What was told by the
Accused to Pat, Padilla was a spontaneous statement not elicited
through questioning, but given in ordinary manner. No written
confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of
formal custodial investigation.
PEOPLE VS. ALICANDO
Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of
Khazie Mae Penecilla, a minor, four years of age, choking her with his
right hand. The incident happened after appellant drank liquor. A
neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago found the victim’s body and the parents
and police were informed. Appellant was living in his uncle's house
some five arm's length from Penecilla's house. Appellant was arrested
and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt
without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled
verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to
know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green
slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a
stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the
prosecution. He was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio
Antiquiera of the PAO. Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTC convicted
him. Hence an automatic review for the imposition of death penalty.
Issue: Whether or Not the death penalty proper.
Held: No. The records do not reveal that the Information against the
appellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. The
Information against the appellant is written in the English language. It
is unknown whether the appellant knows the English language.
Neither is it known what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is
there any showing that the Information couched in English was
translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt.
The RTC violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the
constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. It also denied appellant his
constitutional right to due process of law. It is urged that we must
presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly
conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable
presumption. There could be no presumption. The court must be sure.
The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea
of guilt of the appellant. Said section requires that the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove
his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also
present evidence in his behalf. The trial court simply inquired if
appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the
appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he
was interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and
after his interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late
body marks of maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical
abuse alone.
Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped.
These consists of a pillow with bloodstains in its center 14 and the T-
shirt 15 of the accused colored white with bloodstains on its bottom.
These physical evidence are evidence of the highest order. They
strongly corroborate the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was
raped.These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3
Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial interrogation
where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the benefit of
counsel.
Rights under Section 12: origins and rationale -----
1. Magtoto v. Manguera
– murder; admissibility of confession – A confession obtained from a
person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not
been informed of his right to silence and right to counsel is
INADMISSIBLE as evidence; Miranda and Escobedo
----- When the rights become available -----
2. People v. Taylaran
– “accidental killing”
– Right to silence and to counsel NOT applicable where no written
confession was to be presented in evidence as a result of a formal
custodial investigation
3. Galman v. Pamaran
– assassination of Ninoy; Agrava Commission – The fact that the framers
of the Constitution did not use the word “custodial investigation” shows
that it did not entirely adopt the Miranda Doctrine; The accused are also
entitled to be admonished of their constitutional right to remain silent, to
counsel and be informed that any or all statements given by them may be
used against them; This also applies in other cases, not just those criminal
in nature
4. People v. Ayson
– irregularity in the sale of plane tickets – Right against self incrimination is
accorded to every person
who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena
in any proceeding. The right is NOT to be compelled to be a witness
against himself and NOT a prohibition of inquiry; The right can only be
claimed when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually
put to the witness; It does not give the right to refuse a subpoena. This
right must be claimed, it is not automatically operational | Miranda rights |
Custodial investigation – questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken away into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any
way; A defendant on a trial or preliminary investigation is NOT under
custodial investigation; “Accused”
RIGHTS: BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT
(or with public prosecutor for preliminary investigation; taken into custody)
a. right to remain silent
b. right to counsel
c. right to be informed
d. right to have evidence obtained in violation of those above rejected
RIGHTS: AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT
a. right to refuse to be a witness
b. not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him because of such
refusal
c. right to testify in his own behalf , subject to cross examination by the
prosecution
d. while testifying: to refuse to answer an specific question which tends to
incriminate him for some crime other that which he is being prosecuted
----- Police line-ups; paraffin test; signature -----
5. Gamboa v. Cruz
– vagrancy – The right to counsel attaches at the start of the investigation
(when investigating officers elicit information/ admission/ confession.
Police line-up not part of the inquest.
6. People v. Dimaano
– robbery with homicide – A police line-up is not part of the custodial
inquest so at this stage, they have no right to counsel yet. They are not
being held to answer for criminal offense for which they are being charged
or convicted.
----- Right to counsel -----
7. Estacio v. Sandiganbayan
- estafa thru falsification – When the waiver of the right to remain silent
and assistance by counsel was not made in the presence of counsel, the
defect was cured when the lawyer arrived at the closing stage of the
interrogation, read the statement and talked to the accused before the
latter signed it.
8. People v. De Jesus
– robbery with homicide – Right to counsel attaches upon the start of the
investigation; Custodial investigation is the stage where the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
began to focus on the particular suspect who had been taken into custody;
questions initiated when a person is taken into custody and deprived of his
freedom of action
9. People v. Lucero
– extrajudicial confession; lawyer was away when accused gave his
uncounselled confession - doctrine same as above
----- Right to be informed -----
10. People v. Pinlac
– robbery – The constitutional right of the accused to be informed of his
rights to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the transmission of
meaningful information and not just a mere ceremonial and perfunctory
recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. Police officer is duty bound
not just to recite
the rights; he must explain it as well; Waiver MUST BE MADE in the
presence of counsel
----- Waiver -----
11. People v. Rous
– robbery with homicide
– A confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it
was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward
of leniency; Presumption that a confession was made
deliberately and knowingly.