Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-37052 November 29, 1973

EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
NATIONAL STUD FARM; BOARD OF TRUSTEES, NATIONAL STUD FARM; PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB, INC.:
and BOARD OF STEWARDS PHILIPPINE, RACING, INC., defendants-appellees.

F. Reyes Cabigao and Associates Law Office for plaintiff-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Jaime M. Lantin and Solicitor
Reynato S. Puno for defendants-appellees National Stud Farm and Board of Trustees.

Odon Nabong for defendants-appellees Philippine Racing Club, Inc., etc.

FERNANDO, J.:

In this case certified to us by a resolution of the Court of Appeals1 on the ground that the appeal from an order of
dismissal by the lower court "is beyond[its] competent jurisdiction ... considering that, as correctly pointed out by
defendants-appellees National Stud Farm and its Board of Trustees in their comment ... "what is involved here is a
pure legal question", and that is whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing appellant's complaint for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies."2 Such a principle is, of course, of compelling force in this jurisdiction.3 But there
are exceptions, one of them being the invocation of the due process clause which is precisely the basis from the
judicial review sought by plaintiff before the lower court. While his stand was put forth with vigor and plausibility in
the memorandum of his counsel,4 still the point-by-point refutation of his arguments by Solicitor General Estelito P.
Mendoza5 and deference to controlling principles of administrative law in terms of primary jurisdiction and ripeness
of review call for the affirmance of the appealed judgment. So we rule.

The basis for the complaint by plaintiff, now appellant, Eduardo Quintos, Jr., before the lower court6 was set forth
therein thus. "2. That Plaintiff is the legitimate owner of a race horse named "King's Toss" which was duly and
officially registered on February 17, 1970 with defendant National Stud Farm and which certificate of Registration
No. 002426 was issued by said defendant for said race horse, thereby acknowledging it to participate in horse races
and sweepstakes draws that were held and are being held in legally authorized racing, clubs or tracks ...; 3. That the
race horse "King's Toss" by virtue of its official registration as such, has since participated or taken part in horse
races and sweepstakes draws starting with its debut on March 15, 1970 up to June 11, 1972; 4. That in line with the
standard operating procedure and usual racing practices for horse owners to apply for and submit the names of race
horses for inclusion in a particular race at least three days, the plaintiff on June 13, 1972 applied for and submitted
the name of his race horse "King's Toss" to the defendant Philippine Racing Club, Inc., at Makati, Rizal, for either
the races programmed for June 17, or 18, 1972, which application was duly accepted [and] approved by said
defendant, consequent to which race horse "King's Toss" was declared eligible to participate [and] take part in the
actual race that was conducted on June 17, 1972, more particularly in Race No. 15 thereof, resulting in the inclusion
of said race horse in the racing list or program "Lucky Choice" for the scheduled race on June 17, 1972 ...; 5. That
on June 17, 1972, the very day when plaintiff's race horse "King's Toss" was scheduled to participate in race No. 15
at the racing tracks of defendant Philippine Racing Club, Inc., an announcement was made through the public
address system before the start of Race 13 that plaintiff's race horse "King's Toss" is being scratched or excluded
from taking part in Race 15 where it is supposed to run that racing day ... ."7

Page 1 of 66
It was then alleged that such withdrawal or cancellation of the certificate of registration of plaintiffs race horse was
arbitrary and oppressive, due process being denied him in the absence of a formal investigation or inquiry prior
thereto.8 Such actuation was characterized by plaintiff as not only amounting to defendant National Stud Farm and
its Board of Trustees gravely abusing its discretion, but also exceeding "its legitimate function and authority [thus
resulting in] lack of jurisdiction, ... ."9 There was an answer filed on behalf of the aforesaid defendants by the Solicitor
General wherein the special defenses of immunity from suit as well as the lack of cause of action and the failure to
exhaust administrative remedies were interposed. As noted at the outset, the lower court, in its order of October 9,
1972, dismissed the complaint primarily on the ground of lack of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus: "The
Court is convinced that Quinto's instant complaint was prematurely instituted. His administrative remedy is to ask
the Board of Trustees of National Stud Farm to reconsider its resolution cancelling the certificate of registration of
"King's Toss" and in case the reconsideration is denied, to appeal to the Games and Amusements Board or to the
Office of the President of the Philippines." 10

As noted at the outset, the order of dismissal based on non exhaustion of administrative remedies is invulnerable to
attack. We therefore affirm.

1. Plaintiff is not unaware of the impress of authoritativeness affixed to the basic principle of administrative remedies
having to be fully utilized before resort to courts is allowable. Nonetheless, he would seek its operation in the case at
hand by the invocation of the alleged denial of due process. It is to be admitted that under certain circumstances,
such a plea would not go unheeded because of the inadequacy of the remedy that could be supplied
administratively. Before its invocation, however, is to be accorded a degree of plausibility, it must first be ascertained
whether from the standpoint of what still could be done by the higher authorities in the Executive branch, plaintiff
would really have a valid cause for complaint. The Solicitor General, in his comment certainly disputed such a claim.
He would hit a grave inaccuracy in the allegation that there was lack of notice of the investigation conducted by
defendant National Stud Farm, there being two letters requiring him to answer the complaint of a certain Mr. Elwick
Jr. sent to him, one by regular mail on December 18, 1970 and the other by registered mail on February 5, 1971.
With the presumption that the sending thereof ordinarily is followed by their receipt, the assertion, as he pointed out,
was far from persuasive. 11 Plaintiff, moreover, did know of the cancellation of the registration papers of his race
horse on June 17, 1970, but he next moved for a reconsideration thereof prior to his going to court on June 21 of
that year. 12 Even without according due weight to the allegation that protection of public interest did require such
cancellation, a step that can be taken without a hearing, the additional argument offered in such comment as to the
exhaustion of administrative remedies not being procedurally impossible does commend itself for approval thus:
"Appellant's allegation that he could not have appealed to the Executive Secretary at the time he filed his complaint
in the lower court on June 21, 1972 is also inaccurate. There is no question that on June 17, 1972, appellant already
had knowledge of the revocation of the certificate of registration of his race horse. This is admitted in paragraph 5 of,
the Complaint of appellant, ... . Despite this knowledge on June 17, 1972, appellant did not appeal the resolution in
question to the Executive Secretary. Instead he premature instituted a suit in court for damages. The reason for this
short circuiting of administrative processes is not explained by appellant. He gives no reason for his failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Indeed there is none." 13 The order of dismissal therefore, cannot considered as
being in derrogation of the due process guarantee.

2. What further lends support to the decision now on appeal is that the failure to apply such a basic concept as
exhaustion of administrative remedies would be attended with consequences adverse to such equally well-settled
postulates in administrative law of primary jurisdiction and ripeness of review. It is true that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction 14 or prior resort 15 goes no further than to determine whether it is the court or the agency that should
make the initial decision. 16 Parker, in his text, would put the matter thus: "The fact that a governmental authority is
empowered to deal with a given type of matter gives rise to a presumption that it has exclusive jurisdiction over the
matter. If the law delegates A to make decisions this means that in dubio B is not so delegated." 17 Davis clarifies the
point in this wise: "The precise function of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining
whether the court should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined
some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court." 18 The important thing is
that the dispute be determined according to the judgment, in the language of an American Supreme Court decision,
"of a tribunal appointed by law and informed by experience." 19 In this particular case, as pointed out by the Solicitor
General even prior to the Executive Secretary, the question could have been resolved in a manner satisfactory to
the parties if the Games and Amusements Board which certainly had the necessary qualifications to view its
manifold aspects were appealed to. When, therefore, as was likewise adverted to by the Solicitor General, the

Page 2 of 66
judicial forum was sought by plaintiff, there was in effect an unwarranted disregard of the concept of primary
jurisdiction. In the traditional language of administrative law, the stage of ripeness for judicial review had not been
reached. 20 As so well put by another authoritative treatise writer, Jaffe, that would be to ignore factors not
predetermined "by formula but by seasoned balancing [thereof] for and against the assumption of jurisdiction." 21 All
that had been said so far would seem to indicate that under such a test, the lower court's insistence on the
observance of the fundamental requirement of exhausting administrative remedies is more than justified.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of the lower court of October 9, 1972 is affirmed. With costs against plaintiff-
appellant.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-52282-R by a division headed by Justice Hermogenes

Concepcion, Jr., with Justices Ramon C. Fernandez and Emilio A. Gancayco as members. It was
dated May 16, 1973.

2 Ibid, 4.

3 Cf. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources v. De los Angeles, L-30216, February 29,
1972, 43 SCRA 494, citing 43 other cases.

4 Attorney F. Reyes Cabigao.

5 He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Jaime M. Lantin and Solicitor Reynato S. Puno.

6 Civil Case No. 87436 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

7 Petition, pars. 2-5.

8 Ibid, par. 7.

9 Ibid, par. 9.

10 Order of the lower court, Record on Appeal 150.

11 Comment of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, 2 and 3.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid, 6-7.

14 Cf. Public Utilities Commission v. United States, 355 US 534 (1958); United States v. Western
Pac. R. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956).

15 Cf. Stason, Cases and Other Materials on Administrative Terminals First Ed. 541 (1937).

16 Cf. 3 Davis on Administrative Law Treatise 2 (1958).

17 Parker on Administrative Law, 114 (1952).

Page 3 of 66
 18 Davis, op. cit. 3.

19 Cf. Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 US 412 (1951).

20 Cf. Phil. Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, L-24321, July 21, 1967 SCRA 727.

21 Jaffe Judicial Control of Administrative Action, 396 (1965).

SECOND DIVISION
MARJORIE B. CADIMAS, G.R. No. 180394
by her Attorney-In-Fact,
VENANCIO Z. ROSALES,
Petitioner, Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
MARITES CARRION and
GEMMA HUGO, Promulgated:
Respondents.
September 29, 2008
x -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
assailing the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98572.
The appellate court set aside two orders[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
85, Quezon City issued in Civil Case No. Q-04-53581 on the ground that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case.

Page 4 of 66
The instant petition stemmed from the complaint[5] for accion reivindicatoria and damages filed
by petitioner Marjorie B. Cadimas, through her attorney-in-fact, Venancio Z. Rosales,
against respondents Marites Carrion and Gemma Hugo. The complaint was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-04-53581 and raffled to Branch 85 of the RTC of Quezon City.

In the complaint, petitioner averred that she and respondent Carrion were parties to a
Contract To Sell dated 4 August 2003, wherein petitioner sold to respondent Carrion a town
house located at Lot 4-F-1-12 No. 23 Aster Street, West Fairview Park
Subdivision, Quezon City for the sum of P330,000.00 to be paid in installments. According to
petitioner, Carrion had violated paragraph 8 of said contract when she transferred ownership of
the property to respondent Hugo under the guise of a special power of attorney, which
authorized the latter to manage and administer the property for and in behalf of respondent
Carrion. Allegedly, petitioner asked respondent Carrion in writing to explain the alleged
violation but the latter ignored petitioners letter, prompting petitioner to demand in writing that
Carrion and Hugo vacate the property and to cancel the contract.[6]

On 28 October 2004, petitioner filed a Motion To Declare Defendant Marites Carrion In

Default,[7] alleging that despite the service of summons and a copy of the complaint, respondent
Carrion failed to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period.

Respondent Hugo filed a Motion To Dismiss[8] on her behalf and on behalf of respondent
Carrion on 18 November 2004, citing the grounds of lack of jurisdiction to hear the case on the
part of the RTC and estoppel and/or laches on the part of petitioner. Respondent Hugo argued
that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) has jurisdiction over the complaint
because ultimately, the sole issue to be resolved was whether petitioner, as the owner and
developer of the subdivision on which the subject property stood, was guilty of committing
unsound real estate business practices.

Page 5 of 66
 In the same motion, respondent Hugo averred that the RTC had not acquired jurisdiction
over the person of respondent Carrion for not complying with Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court on the proper service of summons on a non-resident defendant. However, attached to
the motion was a special power of attorney, whereby respondent Carrion had authorized
respondent Hugo, among others, to manage and administer the subject property and to
prosecute and defend all suits to protect her rights and interest in said property. [9]

After petitioner filed a comment on the motion to dismiss, the RTC issued an Omnibus
[10]
Order on 21 March 2005, which denied the motion to dismiss. The RTC held that the courts
jurisdiction is not determined by the defenses set up in the answer or the motion to dismiss.

In the same omnibus order, the RTC ruled that summons was served properly, thus, the
court had acquired jurisdiction over respondent Carrion. The RTC noted that respondent Hugos
failure to disclose at the outset that she was equipped with a special power of attorney was an
act constitutive of misleading the court. Thus, the RTC declared respondent Carrion in default,
directed petitioner to present evidence ex-parte against respondent Carrion, and respondent
Hugo to file an answer.

On 18 April 2005, respondent Hugo filed an answer on her behalf and as the attorney-in-
fact of respondent Carrion.[11] The answer pleaded a compulsory counterclaim for damages. The
following day, petitioner presented evidence ex-parteagainst respondent Carrion. Thus, on 22
April 2005, respondent Hugo sought a reconsideration of the omnibus order, praying for the
dismissal of the complaint, the cancellation of the presentation of evidence ex-parte, the lifting
of the order of default against respondent Carrion and the issuance of an order directing the
extraterritorial service of summons on respondent Carrion.[12]

On 17 January 2007, the RTC issued an order, upholding its jurisdiction over petitioners
complaint. Citing the interest of substantial justice, the RTC lifted the order of default against
respondent Carrion and set the pre-trial conference of the case.[13]

However, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for
certiorari, praying that the Omnibus Order dated 21 March 2005 and Order dated 17 January
2007 issued by Judge Teodoro T. Riel be reversed and set aside and that the complaint in Civil
Case No. Q-04-53581 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Page 6 of 66
 On 27 September 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision granting
respondents petition for certiorari. The appellate court set aside the assailed orders of the RTC
and ordered the dismissal of petitioners complaint for lack of jurisdiction. In its Resolution
dated 9 November 2007, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the instant petition, raising the following arguments: (1) based on the allegations
in the complaint, the RTC has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-04-53581; (2) in any case,
respondents have expressly submitted to or recognized the jurisdiction of the RTC by filing an
answer with counterclaim; and (3) respondents erroneously availed of a Rule 65 petition instead
of filing a timely appeal from the order denying their motion to dismiss.[14]

Essentially, petitioner argues that based on the allegations in the complaint and
the reliefs sought, the RTC has jurisdiction over the matter. In any case, the compulsory
counterclaim pleaded in the answer of respondents was an express recognition on their part of
the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for accion reivindicatoria, petitioner adds.

The petition is meritorious.

The nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material
allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of
the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by
the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or nature of an action.[15]

An examination of Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.

1344,[16] which enumerates the regulatory functions of the HLURB,[17]

readily shows that its quasi-judicial function is limited to hearing only the following specific
cases:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business
and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

Page 7 of 66
 B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or
salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by
buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer or
salesman.

The aforequoted provision must be read in the light of the statutes preamble or the
introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for its enactment or the contextual
basis for its interpretation. The scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in the National
Housing Authority (NHA) [now HLURB] is indicated in the second and
third preambular paragraphs of the statute which provide:

WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners,
developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to
provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting
systems and other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home
and lot buyers;

WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent
manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators,
such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to
pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent
purchasers for value .[18]

The boom in the real estate business all over the country resulted in more litigation
between subdivision owners/developers and lot buyers with the issue of the jurisdiction of the
NHA or the HLURB over such controversies as against that of regular courts. In the cases that
reached this Court, the ruling has consistently been that the NHA or the HLURB has
jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the
lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual
and statutory obligations to make the subdivision a better place to live in.[19]

We agree with the ruling of the RTC that it has jurisdiction over the case based on the
allegations of the complaint. Nothing in the complaint or in the contract to sell suggests that
petitioner is the proper party to invoke the jurisdiction of the HLURB. There is nothing in the
Page 8 of 66
allegations in the complaint or in the terms and conditions of the contract to sell that would
suggest that the nature of the controversy calls for the application of either P.D. No. 957 or P.D.
No. 1344 insofar as the extent of the powers and duties of the HLURB is concerned.

Note particularly paragraphs (b) and (c) of Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1344 as worded, where
the HLURBs jurisdiction concerns cases commenced by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyers. As to paragraph (a), concerning unsound real estate practices, the logical complainants
would be the buyers and customers against the sellers (subdivision owners and developers or
condominium builders and realtors), and not vice versa.[20]

The complaint does not allege that petitioner is a subdivision lot buyer. The contract to
sell does not contain clauses which would indicate that petitioner has obligations in the capacity
of a subdivision lot developer, owner or broker or salesman or a person engaged in real estate
business. From the face of the complaint and the contract to sell, petitioner is an ordinary seller
of an interest in the subject property who is seeking redress for the alleged violation of the
terms of the contract to sell. Petitioners complaint alleged that a contract to sell over a
townhouse was entered into by and between petitioner and respondent Carrion and that the
latter breached the contract when Carrion transferred the same to
[21]
respondent Hugo without petitioners consent. Thus, petitioner sought

the cancellation of the contract and the recovery of possession and ownership of the town
house. Clearly, the complaint is well within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

In Javellana v. Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30, Manila,[22] the Court affirmed the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for accion publiciana and sum of money on the
ground that the complaint did not allege that the subject lot was part of a subdivision project but
that the sale was an ordinary sale on an installment basis. Even the mere assertion that the
defendant is a subdivision developer or that the subject lot is a subdivision lot does not
automatically vest jurisdiction on the HLURB. On its face, the complaint must sufficiently
describe the lot as a subdivision lot and sold by the defendant in his capacity as a subdivision
developer to fall within the purview of P.D. No. 957 and P.D. No. 1344 and thus within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.[23]

In their comment, respondents cite Antipolo Realty Corp. v. National Housing

Authority,[24] to bolster the argument that the HLURB has jurisdiction over controversies
Page 9 of 66
involving the determination of the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a subdivision
lot. Antipolo Realty is not squarely applicable to the instant controversy. The issue in said case
called for the determination of whether the developer complied with its obligations to complete
certain specified improvements in the subdivision within the specified period of time, a case
that clearly falls under Section 1, paragraph (c) of P.D. No. 1344.

In the instances where the jurisdiction of the HLURB was upheld, the allegations in the
complaint clearly showed that the case involved the determination of the rights and obligations
of the parties in a sale of real estate under P.D. No. 957,[25] or the complaint for specific
performance sought to compel the subdivision developer to comply with its undertaking under
the contract to sell,[26] or the claim by the subdivision developer would have been properly
pleaded as a counterclaim in the HLURB case filed by the buyer against the developer to avoid
splitting causes of action.[27]

The statement in Suntay v. Gocolay[28] to the effect that P.D. No. 957 encompasses all
questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums, which was cited by the Court of Appeals
in the assailed decision, is a mere obiter dictum. As a matter of fact, the Court
in Suntay nullified the orders issued by the HLURB over the action for the annulment of an
auction sale, cancellation of notice of levy and damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
P.D. No. 957 and P.D. No. 1344 were not the applicable laws because the action was brought
against a condominium buyer and not against the developer, seller, or broker contemplated
under P.D. No. 1344. The action likewise involved the determination of ownership over the
disputed condominium unit, which by its nature does not fall under the classes of disputes
cognizable by the HLURB under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1344.

The Court of Appeals held that the provision in the contract to sell mandating
membership of the buyer of the housing unit in a housing corporation was a strong indication
that the property purchased by respondent Carrion from petitioner was part of a tract of land
subdivided primarily for residential purposes. Thus, the appellate court concluded that the
HLURB has jurisdiction over the controversy because the property subject thereof was part of a
subdivision project.

Not every controversy involving a subdivision or condominium unit falls under the
competence of the HLURB[29] in the same way that the mere allegation of relationship between
the parties, i.e., that of being subdivision owner/developer and subdivision lot buyer, does not
automatically vest jurisdiction in the HLURB. For an action to fall within the exclusive
Page 10 of 66
jurisdiction of the HLURB, the decisive element is the nature of the action as enumerated in
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1344.[30] Notably, in Spouses Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals,[31] the Court
upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for cancellation of the contract to sell of a
subdivision house and lot because the case did not fall under any of the cases mentioned in
Section 1, P.D. No. 1344. In interpreting said provision, the Court explained, thus:

On this matter, we have consistently held that the concerned administrative agency, the National
Housing Authority (NHA) before and now the HLURB, has jurisdiction over complaints aimed
at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.

For their part, respondents claim that the resolution of the case ultimately calls for the
interpretation of the contract to sell and the determination of whether petitioner is guilty of
committing unsound real estate business practices, thus, the proper forum to hear and decide the
matter is the HLURB. The argument does not impress.

It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary
consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in
the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the
nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments
in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted. [32]Thus,
the allegations in respondents motion to dismiss on the unsound real estate business practices
allegedly committed by petitioner, even if proved to be true, cannot serve to oust the RTC of its
jurisdiction over actions for breach of contract and damages which has been conferred to it by
law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED and the
Decision dated 27 September 2007 and Resolution dated 9 November 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98572 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders dated 21
March 2005 and 17 January 2007 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City in Civil
Case No. Q-04-53581 are REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to resume
the proceedings in and decide Civil Case No. Q-04-53581 with deliberate speed. Costs against
respondents.

Page 11 of 66
 SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

Page 12 of 66
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo, pp. 10-27.
[2]
Dated 27 September 2007 and penned by J. Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal and concurred in by JJ. Jose C. Reyes, Jr., Acting
Chairperson of the Special 8th Division, and Japar B. Dimaampao; id. at 53-62.
[3]
Dated 9 November 2007; id. at 70.
[4]
Id. at 48-52.
[5]
Records, pp. 2-13.
[6]
Id. at 1.
[7]
Id. at 34-36.
[8]
Id. at 50-65.

Page 13 of 66
 [9]
Id. at 66-67.
[10]
Rollo, pp. 48-50.
[11]
Records, pp. 189-199.
[12]
Id. at 258-276.
[13]
Rollo, pp. 51-52.
[14]
Id. at 16.
[15]
Laresma v. Abellana, G.R. No. 140973, 11 November 2004, 442 SCRA 156, 169.
[16]
P.D. No. 1344, Section 1. In the exercise of its business functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in
addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices;
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
[17]
Arranza v. B.F. Homes, Inc., 389 Phil. 318, 329 (2000) traces the antecedent laws creating and transferring the regulatory
functions of the HLURB, to wit:

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree) was
issued on 12 July 1976 in answer to the popular call for correction of pernicious practices of subdivision owners
and/or developers that adversely affected the interests of subdivision lot buyers. x x x

xxx

Section 3 of P.D. No. 957 empowered the National Housing Authority (NHA) with the exclusive jurisdiction
to regulate the real estate trade and business. On 2 April 1978, P.D. No. 1344 was issued to expand the jurisdiction
of the NHA to include the following:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its
powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:

A. Unsound real estate business practices;

B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

Thereafter, the regulatory and quasi-judicial functions of the NHA were transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission (HSRC) by virtue of Executive Order No. 648 dated 7 February 1981. Section 8 thereof specifies the functions of the
NHA that were transferred to the HSRC including the authority to hear and decide cases on unsound real estate business practices;
claims involving refund filed against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers or salesmen and cases of specific performance.
Executive Order No. 90 dated 17 December 1986 renamed the HSRC as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
[18]
Antipolo Realty Corp. v. National Housing Authority, No. L-50444, 31 August 1987 153 SCRA 399, 408.
[19]
Arranza v. B.F. Homes, Inc., 389 Phil. 318, 330 (2000).
[20]
Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 439 Phil. 966, 978 (2002).
[21]
The essential averments in the complaint read:
Page 14 of 66
 III. Plaintiff is an owner of a parcel of land with existing improvements consisting of several residential units
located at Aster St., West Fairview Park Subdivision, Fairview, Quezon City[,] copy of her title, Transfer Certificate
Title No. N-251570 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City is hereto attached and made part hereof, as Annex
B;

IV. Sometime in August 2003, the defendant MARITES CARRION (defendant CARRION, for brevity)
offered to buy one of the plaintiffs residential units located at #23 Aster St., West Fairview Park Subdivision,
Fairview, Quezon City designated as, Lot 4-F-1-12 and covered by said TCT No. 251570, copy of the Contract to Sell
which the plaintiff and defendant CARRION entered into on August 4, 2003 is hereto attached and made part hereof, as
Annex C;

V. Under paragraph 8 of the Contract to Sell[,] Annex C hereof, it is expressly provided that defendant
CARRION cannot sell, mortgage, cede and/or transfer the rights conferred upon her in the contract unless with
the written consent of the plaintiff, thus,

xxxx

Despite the express provision of paragraph 8 of the Contract to Sell[,] Annex C hereof, defendant CARRION
without the knowledge and/or consent (in writing) of the plaintiff, alienated/transferred the ownership of the property
subject hereof, in favor of defendant GEMMA HUGO (defendant HUGO for brevity) under the guise of allegedly
being defendant CARRIONS attorney-in-fact when in truth and in fact, the latter is not;

xxxx

X. Despite the plaintiffs [advice] and demands, defendant CARRION failed and refused to vacate and surrender the
possession and ownership of the subject premises thus, the plaintiff through Rosales (again) addressed defendant
CARRION a letter under date April 26, 2004 reiterating her previous demand to vacate and surrender the possession of
the premises, failing which, she has no other alternative but to resort to the remedies provided by law copy of said letter
is hereto attached and made part hereof, as Annex F, however despite demand(s), defendant CARRION and all persons
claiming rights under her, particularly defendant HUGO failed and refused to vacate and surrender the possession and
ownership of the subject property which lawfully belonged to the plaintiff by reason of the cancellation of the contract
to sell Annex C hereof.

[22]
G.R. No. 139067, 23 November 2004, 443 SCRA 497, 506-510.
[23]
Lacson Hermanas, Inc. v. Heirs of Cenon Ignacio, G.R. No. 165973, 29 June 2005, 462 SCRA 290, 295-296.
[24]
No. L-50444, 31 August 1987, 153 SCRA 399.
[25]
HLC Construction and Development Corporation v. EHSHA, 458 Phil. 392 (2003).
[26]
Siasoco v. Narvaja, 373 Phil. 766 (1999).
[27]
Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip, G.R. No. 154684, 8 September 2005, 469 SCRA 424.

[28]
G.R. No. 144892, 23 September 2005, 470 SCRA 627.
[29]
Lacson Hermanas Inc. v. Heirs of Cenon Ignacio, supra note 23.
[30]
Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 439 Phil. 966, 976 (2002).
[31]
G.R. No. 151298, 17 November 2004, 442 SCRA 492.
[32]
Serdoncillo v. Spouses Benolirao, 358 Phil. 83, 94-95 (1998).

Page 15 of 66
 SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45273 April 10, 1939

LUNETA MOTOR CO., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FEDERICO ABAD, defendant-appellee.

Jose Agbulos for appellant.

Valle and Valle for appellee.

MORAN, J.:

Plaintiff sought recovery of the sum of P2,674.05 with accrued stipulated interest and attorney's fees for balance
due on four promissory notes executed by the defendant on March 12, 1931. The complaint sued for a writ of
attachment which was issued. Defendant, in his answer, petitioned, for reasons therein stated, that the attachment
be lifted, and to that effect a counterbond was tendered by the terms of which the sureties "jointly and severally bind
themselves in the sum of P2,600, under the condition that in case the plaintiff recovered judgment in the action the
defendant will on demand redeliver the attached property so released to the other court to be applied to the payment
of the judgment or in default thereof that the defendant and sureties will on demand pay the plaintiff the full value of
the property released." The lower court granted this petition and issued an order for the dissolution of the writ.
Thereafter, defendant died; whereupon, his attorney moved for the dismissal of the case. The trial court acceded to
this motion, and plaintiff's motion for reconsideration thereof having been denied, the instant appeal was taken.

The case was rightly dismissed in accordance with section 119 of Act No. 190, the action being for money, and
pending when defendant died. It is contended by plaintiff-appellant that this provision is not applicable, for a writ of
attachment has been issued on property of the defendant, and the lien was transferred to the counterbond filed for
the dissolution of the writ. This contention is disposed of unfavorably to appellant by the provision of section 700 of
Act No. 190 which reads as follows:

All actions commenced against the deceased person, for the recovery of money, debt, or damages, and
pending at the time the committee are appointed, shall be discontinued, and the property, if any, therein
attached, shall be discharged from the attachment, and the claim embraced in such action may be
presented to the committee, . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

Besides, the obligation of the sureties, under the counterbond, is subject to the condition that when the plaintiff
recovered judgment, they shall deliver the property so released to the officer of the court for the payment of said
judgment or in default thereof, pay its full value to the plaintiff. This condition has become a legal impossibility, for no
judgment can be recovered by the plaintiff in the case which should be dismissed under section 119
aforementioned. Therefore, the obligation dependent upon this condition must be deemed extinguished, according
to article 1116 of our Civil Code.

Judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellant.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

Page 16 of 66
G.R. No. L-26681 May 29, 1970

JOSE CALACDAY, PEDRO CALACDAY, JUAN CALACDAY, JULIO CALACDAY, MANUEL CALACDAY,
MARCELO CALACDAY and BENITO CALACDAY, petitioners,
vs.
MARTINIANO P. VIVO, as Acting Commissioner of Immigration, THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS of the
Bureau of Immigration and THE DEPORTATION OFFICER of the Bureau of Immigration, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

Vivo v. Montesa1 supplies the law of the case for this prohibition proceeding filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila on May 14, 1965.2 Petitioner3 would enjoin the then Acting Commissioner of Immigration, Martiniano P.
Vivo,4from taking them into custody of conducting deportation proceedings against them or cancelling their
identification certificates on the assumption that the previous decisions of the Board of Inquiry, affirmed by the Board
of Immigration Commissioners declaring them Filipino citizens, had become final and conclusive respondent Vivo
being thus devoid of any authority to take steps to deport them under the appropriate provisions of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.5 Petitioners were successful in the lower court notwithstanding the special
and affirmative defense interposed by respondent Vivo that the remedy of prohibition would not lie as the action thus
far taken was within his lawful competence, judicial review not being available until after a decision by the Board of
Commissioners on the deportation proceeding before it. The lower court in its order of September 19, 1966 found
abuse, if not lack of jurisdiction, and ordered respondents "to desist and refrain from arresting or causing the arrest
and deportation of petitioners ..."6 That is the order now on appeal before us.

Included in its dispositive portion was a declaration that the writ of preliminary injunction issued was made
permanent. In the meanwhile, however, the preliminary injunction issued by the lower court as far back as May 27,
1965 was the object of a certiorari and prohibition petition with us in the aforesaid Vivo v. Montesa decision filed on
the very next day, May 28, 1965. Petitioner Vivo premised such an action on what he categorically asserted to be
the controlling doctrine that the lower court did assert jurisdiction over a matter which by clear mandate of the law
was beyond his competence.

Such a contention was upheld by us. There is this categorical pronouncement in our decision rendered on July 29,
1968, the opinion being penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes: "It is well to note here that when the petition for certiorari
and prohibition (the respondent judge considered it as such) was filed, deportation proceedings had been started
against the respondents (petitioners below) but had not been completed. In view of the non-completion of the
proceedings, the Board of Commissioners has not rendered as yet any decision. The respondents Calacdays,
therefore, are not being deported. Before the Board reaches a decision, it has to conduct a hearing where the main
issue will be the citizenship or alienage of the respondents. Therefore, there is nothing so far for the courts to
review."7 It is clear, therefore, that the appealed order of September 19, 1966 should be reversed, the lower court
being devoid of jurisdiction to act on the petition before it.

1. In thus ruling, as we did in Vivo v. Montesa, we reaffirm the principle followed with undeviating regularity in earlier
decisions.8 One of them, Miranda v. Deportation Board,9 traces such a doctrine to a 1916 decision, Laurencio v.
Collector of Customs, 10 which in turn found support in two opinions of Justice Holmes of the United State Supreme
Court. 11 A qualification announced in Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board 12 is not to be lost sight of however. In the
language of Justice Labrador, who spoke for the court: "There is also no question that a respondent who claims to
be a citizen and not therefore subject to deportation has the right to have his citizenship reviewed by the courts,
after the deportation proceedings. When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the
right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation
proceedings." 13 There is nothing in this petition for prohibition, however, that called for the judiciary taking over from

Page 17 of 66
respondent Commissioner of Immigration. The conclusion reached by us in Vivo v. Montesa was thus irresistible. As
expressed in its dispositive portion: "[In view of the foregoing], the writ prayed for is hereby granted, the order issued
in Civil Case No. 60906 of the Court of First Instance of Manila is set aside, and the proceedings ordered
discontinued."

2. There is another reason why a reversal of the appealed order is called for. The then Solicitor General, Antonio P.
Barredo, now a member of this Court, on behalf of respondent Commissioner of Immigration, assigned as one of the
errors the failure of the lower court to make findings of facts therein. An examination of the three-paragraph order of
September 19, 1966, two of which were found in the dispositive portion thereof, will readily disclose that the lower
court addressed itself solely to the legal question which it believed was the crucial point of inquiry. No reference
whatsoever was made as to the facts of such controversy. All that it stated was that petitioner did agree to submit
the case before it for decision on the pleadings. That is not to comply with the constitutional provision which reads:
"No decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and
the law on which it is based." 14

We have ruled previously that orders or rulings on motions before the final disposition of the case are not covered
by such a requirement. The decision which falls within the terms of the above constitutional provision is the
judgment rendered after the previous presentation of the proof in an ordinary civil or criminal case, or upon a
stipulation of facts upon which the determination of the case depends. 15 The order now on appeal is thus the
decision to which the Constitution makes reference. On its face, it is undoubted that there was a failure to yield
obedience to the Constitution. That cannot be denied. The constitutional mandate is not subject to misinterpretation.
It is plain and unambiguous. It speaks categorically. It does not only require a statement of the facts but that they be
expressed "clearly and distinctly." The lower court was deaf to such a command.

3. One last point. The Vivo v. Montesa decision likewise includes in its opinion the following: "Nevertheless, we are
of the opinion that the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration, solely for purposes of
investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section 1, of Article III (Bill
of Rights) of our Constitution, providing: '3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."' There was thus a reaffirmation of the view first given expression in Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation
Board, 16followed in subsequent cases, 17 the latest of which is Neria v. Vivo. 18

WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court of September 19, 1966 is reversed and set aside and the writ of
prohibition prayed for denied. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., took no part.

Castro, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 L-24576, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155.

2 Civil Case No. 60906.

3 Petitioners are Jose Calacday, Pedro Calacday, Juan Calacday, Julio Calacday, Manuel Calacday,
Marcelo Calacday and Benito Calacday.

Page 18 of 66
4 The other respondents named were the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration and the
deportation officer thereof.

5 The provisions referred to read as follows: "Section 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and
deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien: (1) Any alien
who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or
without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry; (2) Any alien
who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of
entry; ..."

6 Order of September 19, 1966, Annex B, Brief for Respondent-Appellant p. 43.

7 Vivo v. Montesa, L-24576, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155.

8 Cf. Lianco v. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 370 (1954); Miranda v. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531 (1954);
Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board, 96 Phil. 665 (1965); Porta Perez v. Board,
L-9236, May 29, 1957.

9 94 Phil. 531 (1954).

10 35 Phil. 37.

11 United States v. Ju Toy, 198 US 253 (1905); Chin Yow v. United States, 208 US 8 (1908).

12 96 Phil. 665 (1955).

13 Ibid., p. 617.

14 Art. VIII, Section 12, Constitution.

15 Soncuya v. National Loan & Investment Board, 69 Phil. 602 (1940).

16 L-10280, September 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 27.

17 Dalamal v. Deportation Board, L-16812, October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 382 and Morano v. Vivo,
L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 562.

18 L-26611-12, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 701.

Page 19 of 66
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 93891 March 11, 1991

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD, petitioner

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION, respondents.

Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for petitioner.

Leonardo A. Aurelio for respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corp.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

Petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board ("Board") asks us to review the Decision and Resolution promulgated on 7
February 1990 and 10 May 1990, respectively, by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G R. No. SP 18821 entitled "Solar
Textile Finishing Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board." In that Decision and Resolution, the Court of Appeals
reversed an order of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-89-2287 dismissing
private respondent Solar Textile Finishing Corporation's ("Solar") petition for certiorari and remanded the case to the
trial court for further proceedings.

On 22 September 1988, petitioner Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist
from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into
a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The Order signed by Hon. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., as
Board Chairman, reads in full as follows:

Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation with plant and place of business at 999 General Pascual
Avenue, Malabon, Metro Manila is involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater of
about 30 gpm. being directly discharged untreated into the sewer. Based on findings in the Inspections
conducted on 05 November 1986 and 15 November 1986, the volume of untreated wastewater discharged
in the final out fall outside of the plant's compound was even greater. The result of inspection conducted on
06 September 1988 showed that respondent's Wastewater Treatment Plant was noted unoperational and
the combined wastewater generated from its operation was about 30 gallons per minute and 80% of the
wastewater was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River by
means of a by-pass and the remaining 20% was channelled into the plant's existing Wastewater Treatment
Plant (WTP). Result of the analyses of the sample taken from the by-pass showed that the wastewater is
highly pollutive in terms of Color units, BOD and Suspended Solids, among others. These acts of
respondent in spite of directives to comply with the requirements are clearly in violation of Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section 103 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982
Effluent Regulations.

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 7 of P.D. 984 and Section 38 of its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, respondent is hereby ordered to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source
installation and discharging its untreated wastewater directly into the canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros

Page 20 of 66
 River effective immediately upon receipt hereof and until such time when it has fully complied with all the
requirements and until further orders from this Board.

SO ORDERED.1

We note that the above Order was based on findings of several inspections of Solar's plant:

a. inspections conducted on 5 November 1986 and 12 November 1986 by the National Pollution Control
Commission ("NPCC"), the predecessor of the Board ;2 and

b. the inspection conducted on 6 September 1988 by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources ("DENR").

The findings of these two (2) inspections were that Solar's wastewater treatment plant was non-operational and that
its plant generated about 30 gallons per minute of wastewater, 80% of which was being directly discharged into a
drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The remaining 20% of the wastewater was being channeled
through Solar's non-operational wastewater treatment plant. Chemical analysis of samples of Solar's effluents
showed the presence of pollutants on a level in excess of what was permissible under P.D. No. 984 and its
Implementing Regulations.

A copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 26 September 1988. A Writ of Execution issued by the Board
was received by Solar on 31 March 1989.

Meantime, Solar filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal with prayer for stay of execution of the Order dated 22
September 1988. Acting on this motion, the Board issued an Order dated 24 April 1989 allowing Solar to operate
temporarily, to enable the Board to conduct another inspection and evaluation of Solar's wastewater treatment
facilities. In the same Order, the Board directed the Regional Executive Director of the DENR/ NCR to conduct the
inspection and evaluation within thirty (30) days.

On 21 April 1989, however, Solar went to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, on petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction against the Board, the petition being docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2287.

On 21 July 1989, the Regional Trial Court dismissed Solar's petition upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not
certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of Execution was the proper remedy, and that
the Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and
academic.

Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals which, in the Decision here assailed, reversed the Order
of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of
Appeals declared the Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the Court of Appeals said in the dispositive
portion of its Decision that:

. . .. Still and all, this decision is without prejudice to whatever action the appellee [Board] may take relative
to the projected 'inspection and evaluation' of appellant's [Solar's] water treatment facilities.3

The Court of Appeals, in so ruling, held that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may
result in great and irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic, "larger issues"
demanded that the question of due process be settled. Petitioner Board moved for reconsideration, without success.

The Board is now before us on a Petition for Review basically arguing that:

1. its ex parte Order dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution were issued in accordance with
law and were not violative of the requirements of due process; and

2. the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of a petition for certiorari.
Page 21 of 66
The only issue before us at this time is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the
ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board.

Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to
suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is
discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by
the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges
of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the
1982 Effluent Code.

Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue
only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and
plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that
Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.

The Court is not persuaded by Solar's contention. Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to
issue ex parte cease and desist orders under the following circumstances:

P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides:

(a) Public Hearing. . . . Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the
discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or
plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner may issue an ex-
parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation of operation
of the establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior public
hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and shall remain in force until said
establishment or person prevents or abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or modified or
nullified by a competent court. (Emphasis supplied)

We note that under the above-quoted portion of Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease and desist order
may be issued by the Board (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to
life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed
"the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." On the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that an
"immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease
and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable
standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by
the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an
establishment exceeding such allowable standards. Where, however, the effluents or discharges have not yet been
the subject matter of allowable standards set by the Commission, then the Board may act on an ex parte basis when
it finds at least prima facie proof that the wastewater or material involved presents an "immediate threat to life,
public health, safety or welfare or to animal or plant life." Since the applicable standards set by the Commission
existing at any given time may well not cover every possible or imaginable kind of effluent or waste discharge, the
general standard of an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life" remains
necessary.

Upon the other hand, the Court must assume that the extant allowable standards have been set by the Commission
or Board precisely in order to avoid or neutralize an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to
animal or plant life.''

Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 19824 sets out the maximum permissible levels of physical and chemical
substances which effluents from domestic wastewater treatment plants and industrial plants" must not exceed
"when discharged into bodies of water classified as Class A, B, C, D, SB and SC in accordance with the 1978
NPCC Rules and Regulations." The waters of Tullahan-Tinejeros River are classified as inland waters Class D
under Section 68 of the 1978 NPCC Rules and Regulations5 which in part provides that:

Page 22 of 66
 Sec. 68. Water Usage and Classification. — The quality of Philippine waters shall be maintained in a safe
and satisfactory condition according to their best usages. For this purpose, all water shall be classified
according to the following beneficial usages:

(a) Fresh Surface Water

Classification Best usage

xxx xxx xxx

Class D For agriculture, irrigation, livestock watering
and industrial cooling and processing.
xxx xxx xxx

(Emphases supplied)

The reports on the inspections carried on Solar's wastewater treatment facilities on 5 and 12 November 1986 and 6
September 1988 set forth the following Identical finding:

a. For legal action in [view of] implementing rules and regulations of P.D. No. 984 and Section 5 of the
Effluent Regulations of 1982.6

Placing the maximum allowable standards set in Section 5 of the Effluent Regulations of 1982 alongside the findings
of the November 1986 and September 1988 inspection reports, we get the following results:

"Inland November September

Waters 1986 1988
(Class C & D7 Report8 Report9
Station 1 Station 1
a) Color in 100 a) Color units 250 125
platinum (Apparent
cobalt Color)
units
b) pH 6-8.5 b) pH 9.3 8.7
c) Tempera- 40 c) Temperature
ture in °C (°C)
d) Phenols in 0.1 d) Phenols in
mg.1 mg./1.
e) Suspended 75 e) Suspended 340 80
solids in solids in
mg./1. mg./1.
f) BOD in 80 f) BOD (5-day) 1,100 152
mg./1. mg./1
g) oil/Grease 10 g) Oil/Grease
in mg./1. mg./1.
h) Detergents 5 h) Detergents 2.93
mg./1." mg./1. MBAS
i) Dissolved 0
oxygen, mg./1.
j) Settleable 0.4 1.5
Matter, mg./1.
k) Total Dis 800 610
Page 23 of 66
 solved Solids
mg./1.
l) Total Solids 1,400 690
m) Turbidity NTU / ppm, SiO3 70

The November 1986 inspections report concluded that:

Records of the Commission show that the plant under its previous owner, Fine Touch Finishing Corporation,
was issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing same to cease and desist from conducting
dyeing operation until such time the waste treatment plant is already completed and operational. The new
owner Solar Textile Corporation informed the Commission of the plant acquisition thru its letter dated March
1986 (sic).

The new owner was summoned to a hearing held on 13 October 1986 based on the adverse findings during
the inspection/water sampling test conducted on 08 August 1986. As per instruction of the Legal Division a
re- inspection/sampling text should be conducted first before an appropriate legal action is instituted; hence,
this inspection.

Based on the above findings, it is clear that the new owner continuously violates the directive of the
Commission by undertaking dyeing operation without completing first and operating its existing WTP. The
analysis of results on water samples taken showed that the untreated wastewater from the firm pollutes our
water resources. In this connection, it is recommended that appropriate legal action be instituted
immediately against the firm. . . .10

The September 1988 inspection report's conclusions were:

1. The plant was undertaking dyeing, bleaching and rinsing operations during the inspection. The combined
wastewater generated from the said operations was estimated at about 30 gallons per minute. About 80% of
the wastewater was traced directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros river
by means of a bypass. The remaining 20% was channeled into the plant's existing wastewater treatment
plant (WTP).

2. The WTP was noted not yet fully operational- some accessories were not yet installed. Only the sump pit
1âwphi1

and the holding/collecting tank are functional but appeared seldom used. The wastewater mentioned
channeled was noted held indefinitely into the collection tank for primary treatment. There was no effluent
discharge [from such collection tank].

3. A sample from the bypass wastewater was collected for laboratory analyses. Result of the analyses show
that the bypass wastewater is polluted in terms of color units, BOD and suspended solids, among others.
(Please see attached laboratory resul .)11

From the foregoing reports, it is clear to this Court that there was at least prima facie evidence before the Board that
the effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical
substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and
desist order issued by the Board. It is also well to note that the previous owner of the plant facility Fine Touch
Finishing Corporation had been issued a Notice of Violation on 20 December 1985 directing it to cease and refrain
from carrying out dyeing operations until the water treatment plant was completed and operational. Solar, the new
owner, informed the NPCC of the acquisition of the plant on March 1986. Solar was summoned by the NPCC to a
hearing on 13 October 1986 based on the results of the sampling test conducted by the NPCC on 8 August 1986.
Petitioner Board refrained from issuing an ex parte cease and desist order until after the November 1986 and
September 1988 re-inspections were conducted and the violation of applicable standards was confirmed. In other
words, petitioner Board appears to have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable
standards vis-a-vis Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated,
pollutive effluents into the Tullahan- Tinerejos River, presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its
Wastewater Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an operating condition.
Page 24 of 66
In this connection, we note that in Technology Developers, Inc. v. Court of appeals, et al.,12 the Court very recently
upheld the summary closure ordered by the Acting Mayor of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, of a pollution-causing
establishment, after finding that the records showed that:

1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is a
pollution of the environment that requires control if not prohibition of the operation of a business is
essentially addressed to the then National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of Human
Settlements, now the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect its
inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a permit to
operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to control and/or
avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from the emission in the operation of the
business.

2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February l6, 1989, called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted
by the fumes of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health
of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders and it
was required to bring the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Region III-Department of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution permit. (Annex A-2,
petition)

3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong,
Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels (Annex A-B, petition).. . .

4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina
who in her report of December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes emitted by the plant of petitioner goes
directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed. (Annex A-9,
petition)

xxx xxx xxx

6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National Pollution Control
Commission on December 15,1987, the permit was good only up to May 25,1988 (Annex A-12, petition).
Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device to control
the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community."

In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a local government official but by the
Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the
effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and
regulatory provisions.

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented
precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other
inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or
propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar
has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing
regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety,
health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly
designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of
police power. The Board's ex parte Order and Writ of Execution would, of course, have compelled Solar temporarily
to stop its plant operations, a state of affairs Solar could in any case have avoided by simply absorbing the bother

Page 25 of 66
and burden of putting its WTP on an operational basis. Industrial establishments are not constitutionally entitled to
reduce their capitals costs and operating expenses and to increase their profits by imposing upon the public threats
and risks to its safety, health, general welfare and comfort, by disregarding the requirements of anti- pollution
statutes and their implementing regulations.

It should perhaps be made clear the Court is not here saying that the correctness of the ex parte Order and Writ of
Execution may not be contested by Solar in a hearing before the Board itself. Where the establishment affected by
an ex parte cease and desist order contests the correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must
hold a public hearing where such establishment would have an opportunity to controvert the basis of such ex
parteorder. That such an opportunity is subsequently available is really all that is required by the due process clause
of the Constitution in situations like that we have here. The Board's decision rendered after the public hearing may
then be tested judicially by an appeal to the Court of Appeals in accordance with Section 7(c) of P.D. No. 984 and
Section 42 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations. A subsequent public hearing is precisely what Solar should
have sought instead of going to court to seek nullification of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution and instead of
appealing to the Court of Appeals. It will be recalled the at the Board in fact gave Solar authority temporarily to
continue operations until still another inspection of its wastewater treatment facilities and then another analysis of
effluent samples could be taken and evaluated.

Solar claims finally that the petition for certiorari was the proper remedy as the questioned Order and Writ of
Execution issued by the Board were patent nullities. Since we have concluded that the Order and Writ of Execution
were entirely within the lawful authority of petitioner Board, the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's
petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as
Solar did in fact appeal.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review is given DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7
February 1990 and its Resolution dated 10 May 1990 in A.C.-G.R. No. SP 18821 are hereby SET ASIDE. The Order
of petitioner Board dated 22 September 1988 and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court
dated 21 July 1989, are hereby REINSTATED, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of
the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Rollo, pp. 17-18.

2
Section 19 of Executive Order No. 192, dated 10 June 1987, abolished the NPCC and transferred its
powers and functions relating to the adjudication of pollution cases under R.A. No. 3931 and P.D. No. 984 to
the Board.

3
Rollo, p. 33.

4
78 Official Gazette No. 1, p. 52 (4 January 1982).

5
74 Official Gazette No. 23, p. 4453 (5 June 1978).

6
Rollo, pp. 64 and 66.

7
78 Official Gazette No. 1, p. 53 (4 January 1982).

8
Rollo, p. 68.

Page 26 of 66
 9
Id., P. 66.

10
Rollo, p. 67; emphases supplied.

11
Id., p. 65; emphases supplied.

12
G.R. No. 94759, promulgated 21 January 1991.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and

NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.

Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.

LAUREL, J.:

The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a
motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal
conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:

1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para
una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo
fijado para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;

2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con
ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro
forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;

3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin
tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros
que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la
sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba
a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado
deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.

The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by
the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and
avers:

1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG
TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is
entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native
dealers in leather.
Page 27 of 66
 2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine
Army.

3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of
leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite
the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.

4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by
Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed
memorandum, p. 25.)

5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective
representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)

6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and
continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the
salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always
been the rule.

7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the
National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.

8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of
Industrial Relations.

9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their
admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent National
Labor Union, Inc.

In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of
the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for
reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent
labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this
nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of
the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed
in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the
Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89
laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during
the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic
conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel
have no evidentiary value.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties
litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes
between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between,

Page 28 of 66
and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of
prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of
tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees,
laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted
to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the
Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealth with by
the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of
such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement.
(Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all
industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and
adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or
rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to
voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose,
or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine
specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of
executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental
powers.

In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we
had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13,
1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical
rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall
not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just
and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or
demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision
any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or
of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy,
appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently
promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court
of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that
it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected
even in proceedings of this character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes,
in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen
shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice
Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court
in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the
part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom
the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."

(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when
directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental is
contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R.
No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial."
Page 29 of 66
 (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S.
Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate
to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d
985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater
Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this
and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the
mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate
the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48
Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct.
185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.)
But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not
constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206,
83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S.
88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed
to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not,
however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the
authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the
controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in
any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.)
The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its
consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any
public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate
to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may
deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers.
(Section 10, ibid.)

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to
decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment
of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the right to
appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged
agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and
does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.

This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National
Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme
adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this
avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of
Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or
employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further
alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible
to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them
and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of
such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal
Page 30 of 66
of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the
petition. By and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice
would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his
motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the
Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is
not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should
be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise
proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19180 October 31, 1963

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,

vs.
THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.

Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioners-appellees.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellant.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

The National Development Company which is engaged in the shipping business under the name of "Philippine
National Lines" is the owner of steamship "S.S. Doña Nati" whose local agent in Manila is A. V. Rocha. On August
4, 1960, the Collector of Customs sent a notice to C.F. Sharp & Company as alleged operator of the vessel
informing it that said vessel was apprehended and found to have committed a violation of the customs laws and
regulations in that it carried an unmanifested cargo consisting of one RCA Victor TV set 21" in violation of Section
2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Inserted in said notice is a note of the following tenor: "The above article was
being carried away by Dr. Basilio de Leon y Mendez, official doctor of M/S "Doña Nati" who readily admitted
ownership of the same." C.F. Sharp & Company was given 48 hours to show cause why no administrative fine
should be imposed upon it for said violation.

C.F. Sharp & Company, not being the agent or operator of the vessel, referred the notice to A. V. Rocha, the agent
and operator thereof, who on August 8, 1960, answered the notice stating, among other things, that the television
set referred to therein was not a cargo of the vessel and, therefore, was not required by law to be manifested.
Rocha stated further: "If this explanation is not sufficient, we request that this case be set for investigation and
hearing in order to enable the vessel to be informed of the evidence against it to sustain the charge and to present
evidence in its defense."

The Collector of Customs replied to Rocha on August 9, 1960 stating that the television set in question was a cargo
on board the vessel and that he does not find his explanation satisfactory enough to exempt the vessel from liability
for violating Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code. In said letter, the collector imposed a fine of P5,000.00
on the vessel and ordered payment thereof within 48 hours with a threat that he will deny clearance to said vessel
and will issue a warrant of seizure and detention against it if the fine is not paid.

And considering that the Collector of Customs has exceeded his jurisdiction or committed a grave abuse of
discretion in imposing the fine of P5,000.00 on the vessel without the benefit of an investigation or hearing as
requested by A. V. Rocha, the National Development Company, as owner of the vessel, as well as A. V. Rocha as
Page 31 of 66
agent and operator thereof, filed the instant special civil action of certiorari with preliminary injunction before the
Court of First Instance of Manila against the official abovementioned. The court, finding the petition for injunction
sufficient in form and substance, issued ex parte the writ prayed for upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P5,00.00.

Respondent set up the following special defenses: (1) the court a quo has no jurisdiction to act on matters arising
from violations of the Customs Law, but the Court of Tax Appeals; (2) assuming that it has, petitioners have not
exhausted all available administrative remedies, one of which is to appeal to the Commissioner of Customs; (3) the
requirements of administrative due process have already been complied with in that the written notice given by
respondent to petitioner Rocha clearly specified the nature of the violation complained of and that the defense set
up by Rocha constitute merely a legal issue which does not require further investigation; and (4) the investigation
conducted by the customs authorities showed that the television set in question was unloaded by the ship's doctor
without going thru the custom house as required by law and was not declared either in the ship's manifest or in the
crew declaration list.

On the basis of the stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, the court a quo rendered decision setting aside the
ruling of respondent which imposes a fine of P5,000.00 on the vessel Doña Nati payable within 48 hours from
receipt thereof. The court stated that said ruling appears to be unjust and arbitrary because the party affected has
not been accorded the investigation it requested from the Collector of Customs.

Respondent interposed the present appeal.

When the customs authorities found that the vessel Doña Nati carried on board an unmanifested cargo consisting of
one RCA Victor TV set 21" in violation of Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code, respondent sent a written
notice to C. F. Sharp & Company, believing it to be the operator or agent of the vessel, and when the latter referred
the notice to A. V. Rocha, the real operator of the vessel, for such step as he may deem necessary to be taken the
latter answered the letter stating that the television set was not cargo and so was not required by law to be
manifested, and he added to his answer the following: "If this explanation is not sufficient, we request that this case
be set for investigation and hearing in order to enable the vessel to be informed of the evidence against it to sustain
the charge and to present evidence in its defense. "Respondent, however, replied to this letter saying that said
television was a cargo within the meaning of the law and so he does not find his explanation satisfactory and then
and there imposed on the vessel a fine of P5,00.00. Respondent even went further. He ordered that said fine be
paid within 48 hours from receipt with a threat that the vessel would be denied clearance and a warrant of seizure
would be issued if the fine will not be paid. Considering this to be a grave abuse of discretion, petitioners
commenced the present action for certiorari before the court a quo.

We find this action proper for it really appears that petitioner Rocha was not given an opportunity to prove that the
television set complained of is not a cargo that needs to be manifested as required by Section 2521 of the Tariff and
Customs Code. Under said section, in order that an imported article or merchandise may be considered a cargo that
should be manifested it is first necessary that it be so established for the reason that there are other effects that a
vessel may carry that are excluded from the requirement of the law, among which are the personal effects of the
members of the crew. The fact that the set in question was claimed by the customs authorities not to be within the
exception does not automatically make the vessel liable. It is still necessary that the vessel, its owner or operator, be
given a chance to show otherwise. This is precisely what petitioner Rocha has requested in his letter. Not only was
he denied this chance, but respondent collector immediately imposed upon the vessel the huge fine of P5,000.00.
This is a denial of the elementary rule of due process.

True it is that the proceedings before the Collector of Customs insofar as the determination of any act or irregularity
that may involve a violation of any customs law or regulation is concerned, or of any act arising under the Tariff and
Customs Code, are not judicial in character, but merely administrative, where the rules of procedure are generally
disregarded, but even in the administrative proceedings due process should be observed because that is a right
enshrined in our Constitution. The right to due process is not merely statutory. It is a constitutional right. Indeed, our
Constitution provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law", which
clause epitomize the principle of justice which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial. That this principle applies with equal force to administrative proceedings was well
elaborated upon by this Court in the Ang Tibay case as follows:
Page 32 of 66
 ... The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable case coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an
administrative character.

... There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first
of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to
present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation
to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support its decision. No only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or
at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any
of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of
Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. (Ang Tibay, et al. v. The
Court of Industrial Relations, et al., 40 O.G., No. 11, Supp. p. 29).

There is, therefore, no point in the contention that the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the present case because
what is here involved is not whether the imposition of the fine by the Collector of Customs on the operator of the
ship is correct or not but whether he acted properly in imposing said fine without first giving the operator an
opportunity to be heard. Here we said that he acted improvidently and so the action taken against him is in
accordance with Rule 67 of our Rules of Court.

Another point raised is that petitioners have brought this action prematurely for they have not yet exhausted all the
administrative remedies available to them, one of which is to appeal the ruling to the Commissioner of Customs.
This may be true, but such step we do not consider a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law as would prevent petitioners from taking the present action, for it is undisputed that respondent collector has
acted in utter disregard of the principle of due process.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal,
JJ.,concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 95122-23 May 31, 1991

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL

INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO,
ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL
INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Branch 29, WILLIAM T.
GATCHALIAN,respondents.

Page 33 of 66
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), BOARD OF SPECIAL
INQUIRY, COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JORGE V. SARMIENTO,
ACTING ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER REGINO R. SANTIAGO, MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF SPECIAL
INQUIRY, ESTANISLAO CANTA, LEO MAGAHOM and BENJAMIN KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TERESITA DIZON CAPULONG, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DEE HUA
T. GATCHALIAN, SHERWING T. GATCHALIAN, KENNETH T. GATCHALIAN, REXLON T. GATCHALIAN, and
WESLIE T. GATCHALIAN, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 95612-13 May 31, 1991

WILLIAM T. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,

vs.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION), et al., respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioners.

edesma, Saludo & Associates for respondent William Gatchalian.
Cervo and Tanay Law Office for respondent T.D. Capulong, D.H.T. Gatchalian, et al.

BIDIN, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the Solicitor General seeking 1) to set aside the
Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated September 7, 1990, issued by respondent Judge de la Rosa in Civil
Case No. 90-54214 which denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and restrained petitioners from commencing or
continuing with any of the proceedings which would lead to the deportation of respondent William Gatchalian,
docketed as D.C. No. 90-523, as well as the Order of respondent Judge Capulong dated September 6, 1990 in Civil
Case No. 3431-V-90 which likewise enjoined petitioners from proceeding with the deportation charges against
respondent Gatchalian, and 2) to prohibit respondent judges from further acting in the aforesaid civil cases.

On October 23, 1990, respondent Gatchalian filed his Comment with Counter-Petition, docketed as G.R. Nos.
96512-13, alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of respondent Board of Commissioners, et al., over his person with
prayer that he be declared a Filipino citizen, or in the alternative, to remand the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.

On December 13, 1990, petitioners filed their comment to respondent Gatchalian's counter-petition. The Court
considers the comment filed by respondent Gatchalian as answer to the petition and petitioners' comment as
answer to the counter-petition and gives due course to the petitions.

There is no dispute as to the following facts:

On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana Gatchalian
(Annex "1", counter-petition). Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board, Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has five
(5) children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian, Elena
Gatchalian and Benjamin Gatchalian (Annex "2", counter-petition).

On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with
Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian. They had with them Certificates of Registration and
Identity issued by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the then
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens. Gloria and Francisco are
the daughter and son, respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian; while William and Johnson are the sons of Francisco.

Page 34 of 66
After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961, admitting William
Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens (Annex "C", petition). As a consequence thereof, William
Gatchalian was issued Identification Certificate No. 16135 by the immigration authorities on August 16, 1961 (Annex
"D", petition).

On January 24, 1962, the then Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions purporting
to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of decisions of the
Board of Special Inquiry. The same memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to review all cases where
entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among those cases was that of William
and others.

On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu proprio of the proceedings had in the Board
of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of, among others, respondent
Gatchalian (Annex "E", petition). A warrant of exclusion also dated July 6, 1962 was issued alleging that "the
decision of the Board of Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now become final and executory (Annex "F",
petition).

The actual date of rendition of said decision by the Board of Commissioners (whether on July 6, 1962 or July 20,
1962) became the subject of controversy in the 1967 case of Arocha vs. Vivo (21 SCRA 532) wherein this Court
sustained the validity of the decision of the new Board of Commissioners having been promulgated on July 6, 1962,
or within the reglementary period for review.

Sometime in 1973, respondent Gatchalian, as well as the others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion,
filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry where the deportion case against them was assigned.

On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry recommended to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda the
reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners and the recall of the warrants of arrest
issued therein (Annex "5", counter-petition).

On March 15, 1973, Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board
of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant of arrest
issued against him (Annex "6", counter-petition).

On June 7, 1990, the acting director of the National Bureau of Investigation wrote the Secretary of Justice
recommending that respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by the warrant of exclusion
dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation of Sec. 37 (a), pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45 (c), and (d) and (e)
of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, also known as the Immigration Act of 1940 (Annex "G", petition).

On August 1, 1990, the Secretary of Justice indorsed the recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner of
Immigration for investigation and immediate action (Annex "20", counter-petition).

On August 15, 1990, petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation * issued
a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian (Annex "18", counter-petition). The latter
appeared before Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was released on the same day upon posting
P200,000.00 cash bond.

On August 29, 1990, William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-
54214.

On September 4, 1990, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 90-54214 alleging that respondent judge
has no jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent
judge dela Rosa issued the assailed order dated September 7, 1990, denying the motion to dismiss.

Page 35 of 66
Meanwhile, on September 6, 1990, respondent Gatchalian's wife and minor children filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Br. 172, presided by respondent judge Capulong Civil Case No. 3431-V-90 for
injunction with writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged, among others, that petitioners acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in the institution of deportation proceedings against William. On the same day, respondent
Capulong issued the questioned temporary restraining order restraining petitioners from continuing with the
deportation proceedings against William Gatchalian.

The petition is anchored on the following propositions: 1) respondent judges have no jurisdiction over petitioners
(Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the subject matter of the case, appellate jurisdiction being vested by BP 129
with the Court of Appeals; 2) assuming respondent judges have jurisdiction, they acted with grave abuse of
discretion in preempting petitioners in the exercise of the authority and jurisdiction to hear and determine the
deportation case against respondent Gatchalian, and in the process determine also his citizenship; 3) respondent
judge dela Rosa gravely abused his discretion in ruling that the issues raised in the deportation proceedings are
beyond the competence and jurisdiction of petitioners, thereby disregarding the cases of Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo
vs. Arca (supra), which put finality to the July 6, 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners that respondent
Gatchalian is a Chinese citizen; and 4) respondent judge Capulong should have dismissed Civil Case No. 3431-V-
90 for forum-shopping.

In his counter-petition, William Gatchalian alleges among others that: 1) assuming that the evidence on record is not
sufficient to declare him a Filipino citizen, petitioners have no jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case until
the courts shall have finally resolved the question of his citizenship; 2) petitioners can no longer judiciously and fairly
resolve the question of respondent's citizenship in the deportation case because of their bias, pre-judgment and
prejudice against him; and 3) the ground for which he is sought to be deported has already prescribed.

For purposes of uniformity, the parties herein will be referred to in the order the petitions were filed.

Petitioners argue that under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies, boards or commissions, such as the Board
of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry.

Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioners are not quasi-judicial agencies and are not in equal rank
with Regional Trial Courts.

Under Sec. 21 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with this
Court and the Court of Appeals to issue "writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpusand
injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions, . . ." Thus, the RTCs are vested with the
power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.

It is true that under Sec. 9 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals is vested with —

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, order, or awards of
Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, board or commission, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of this Act, and of sub-paragraph (1) of the third paragraph of and sub-paragraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

It does not provide, however, that said exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals extends to all quasi-
judicial agencies. The quasi-judicial bodies whose decisions are exclusively appealable to the Court of Appeals are
those which under the law, Republic Act No. 5434, or their enabling acts, are specifically appealable to the Court of
Appeals (Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 348 [1989]; Lupangco vs.
Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848 [1988]). Thus, under Republic Act No. 5434, it is specifically provided that the
decisions of the Land Registration Commission (LRC), the Social Security Commission (SSC), Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB), the Patent Office and the Agricultural Invention Board are appealable to the Court of Appeals.

Page 36 of 66
In the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (supra), this Court clarified the matter when We ruled:

Under our Resolution dated January 11, 1983:

. . . The appeals to the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) from quasi-judicial
bodies shall continue to be governed by the provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 insofar as the same
is not inconsistent with the provisions of B.P. Blg. 129.

The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 5434 are as follows:

Sec. 1. Appeals from specified agencies.— Any provision of existing law or Rules of Court to the
contrary notwithstanding, parties aggrieved by a final ruling, award, order, or decision, or judgment
of the Court of Agrarian Relations; the Secretary of Labor under Section 7 of Republic Act Numbered
Six hundred and two, also known as the "Minimum Wage Law"; the Department of Labor under
Section 23 of Republic Act Numbered Eight hundred seventy-five, also known as the "Industrial
Peace Act"; the Land Registration Commission; the Social Security Commission; the Civil
Aeronautics Board; the Patent Office and the Agricultural Inventions Board, may appeal therefrom to
the Court of Appeals, within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal
involves questions of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, or questions of law, or all three kinds of
questions. From final judgments or decisions of the Court of Appeals, the aggrieved party may
appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court as provided under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Because of subsequent amendments, including the abolition of various special courts, jurisdiction over
quasi-judicial bodies has to be, consequently, determined by the corresponding amendatory statutes. Under
the Labor Code, decisions and awards of the National Labor Relations Commission are final and executory,
but, nevertheless, reviewable by this Court through a petition for certiorari and not by way of appeal.

Under the Property Registration Decree, decision of the Commission of Land Registration, en consulta, are
appealable to the Court of Appeals.

The decisions of the Securities and Exchange Commission are likewise appealable to the Appellate Court,
and so are decisions of the Social Security Commission.

As a rule, where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain administrative bodies to the
Court of Appeals, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts, in terms of rank and
stature, and logically, beyond the control of the latter. (Emphasis supplied)

There are quasi-judicial agencies, as the National Labor Relations Commissions, whose decisions are directly
appealable to this Court. It is only when a specific law, as Republic Act No. 5434, provides appeal from certain
bodies or commissions to the Court of Appeals as the Land Registration Commission (LRC), Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and others, that the said commissions or boards may be considered co-equal with the
RTCs in terms of rank, stature and are logically beyond the control of the latter.

However, the Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among those quasi-judicial agencies specified by law whose
decisions, orders, and resolutions are directly appealable to the Court of Appeals. In fact, its decisions are subject to
judicial review in accordance with Sec. 25, Chapter 4, Book VII of the 1987 Administrative Code, which provides as
follows:

Sec. 25. Judicial Review.—(1) Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with this
chapter and applicable laws.

xxx xxx xxx

(6) The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified in the statute or, in the absence thereof, in any
court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.
Page 37 of 66
Said provision of the Administrative Code, which is subsequent to B.P. Blg. 129 and which thus modifies the latter,
provides that the decision of an agency like the Bureau of Immigration should be subject to review by the court
specified by the statute or in the absence thereof, it is subject to review by any court of competent jurisdiction in
accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court.

B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank of the RTC except those
specifically provided for under the law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC,
its decisions may be appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by, the RTC
(Sec. 21, (1) BP 129).

True, it is beyond cavil that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear
cases against an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their citizenship (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals,
180 SCRA 756 [1989]). And a mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its
jurisdiction in deportation proceedings (Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil. 531 [1954]).

However, the rule enunciated in the above-cases admits of an exception, at least insofar as deportation proceedings
are concerned. Thus, what if the claim to citizenship of the alleged deportee is satisfactory? Should the deportation
proceedings be allowed to continue or should the question of citizenship be ventilated in a judicial proceeding?
In Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665 [1955]), this Court answered the question in the affirmative, and
We quote:

When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review
should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen is
entitled to live in peace, without molestation from any official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a
deportation proceeding, he has the unquestionable right to resort to the courts for his protection, either by a
writ of habeas corpus or of prohibition, on the legal ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen
and evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation proceedings to
continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation of his undesirability.

. . . And if the right (to peace) is precious and valuable at all, it must also be protected on time, to prevent
undue harassment at the hands of ill-meaning or misinformed administrative officials. Of what use is this
much boasted right to peace and liberty if it can be availed of only after the Deportation Board has unjustly
trampled upon it, besmirching the citizen's name before the bar of public opinion? (Emphasis supplied)

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners Board of Commissioners over deportation proceedings is,
therefore, not without exception (Calacday vs. Vivo, 33 SCRA 413 [1970]; Vivo vs. Montesa, 24 SCRA 155 [1967]).
Judicial intervention, however, should be granted only in cases where the "claim of citizenship is so substantial that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed only
on sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra; Co. vs.
Deportation Board, 78 SCRA 107 [1977]). It appearing from the records that respondent's claim of citizenship is
substantial, as We shall show later, judicial intervention should be allowed.

In the case at bar, the competent court which could properly take cognizance of the proceedings instituted by
respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless be the Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals in view of Sec.
21 (1), BP 129, which confers upon the former jurisdiction over actions for prohibition concurrently with the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court and in line with the pronouncements of this Court in Chua Hiong and Co cases.

Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the Regional Trial Court. But not in the case at bar. Considering
1âwphi 1

the voluminous pleadings submitted by the parties and the evidence presented, We deem it proper to decide the
controversy right at this instance. And this course of action is not without precedent for "it is a cherished rule of
procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or
branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this case is remanded to the trial
court only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and from there to this Court" (Marquez vs.
Marquez, 73 Phil. 74; Keramic Industries, Inc. vs. Guerrero, 61 SCRA 265 [1974]) Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals (135 SCRA 37 [1985]), citing Gayos vs. Gayos (67 SCRA 146 [1975]).

Page 38 of 66
In Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 357 [1988]), We also stated:

Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the court is
in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the
public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of
remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be
subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case or
where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties (Quisumbing vs. CA, 112 SCRA
703; Francisco, et al., vs. The City of Davao, et al., supra; Republic vs. Security Credit & Acceptance Corp.,
et al., 19 SCRA 58; Samal vs. CA, supra; Republic vs. Central Surety & Insurance Co., 25 SCRA 641).

Likewise in Tejones vs. Gironella (159 SCRA 100 [1988]), We said:

Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to
the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez vs. Garcia,
92 Phil. 592, 297). A marked characterstic of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so
demand . . . the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality (Li Siu Liat vs. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039,
1046, citingSamal vs. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and US vs. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74.) (Beautifont, Inc. vs. Court of
appeals, et al., Jan. 29, 1988; See also Labo vs. Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA 1 [1989]).

Respondent Gatchalian has adduced evidence not only before the Regional Trial Court but also before Us in the
form of public documents attached to his pleadings. On the other hand, Special Prosecutor Renato Mabolo in his
Manifestation (dated September 6, 1990; Rollo, p. 298, counter-petition) before the Bureau of Immigration already
stated that there is no longer a need to adduce evidence in support of the deportation charges against respondent.
In addition, petitioners invoke that this Court's decision in Arocha vs. Vivo and Vivo vs. Arca (supra), has already
settled respondent's alienage. Hence, the need for a judicial determination of respondent's citizenship specially so
where the latter is not seeking admission, but is already in the Philippines (for the past thirty [30] years) and is being
expelled (Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board, supra).

According to petitioners, respondent's alienage has been conclusively settled by this Court in
the Arocha and Vivocases, We disagree. It must be noted that in said cases, the sole issue resolved therein was the
actual date of rendition of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then board of Commissioners, i.e., whether the decision
was rendered on July 6, 1962 or on July 20, 1962 it appearing that the figure (date) "20" was erased and over it was
superimposed the figure "6" thereby making the decision fall within the one-year reglementary period from July 6,
1961 within which the decision may be reviewed. This Court did not squarely pass upon any question of citizenship,
much less that of respondent's who was not a party in the aforesaid cases. The said cases originated from a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus filed on July 21, 1965 by Macario Arocha in behalf of Pedro Gatchalian. Well settled is
the rule that a person not party to a case cannot be bound by a decision rendered therein.

Neither can it be argued that the Board of Commissioners' decision (dated July 6, 1962) finding respondent's claim
to Philippine citizenship not satisfactorily proved, constitute res judicata. For one thing, said decision did not make
any categorical statement that respondent Gatchalian is a Chinese. Secondly, the doctrine of res judicata does not
apply to questions of citizenship (Labo vs. Commission on Elections (supra); citing Soria vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, 37 SCRA 213; Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 42 SCRA 561 [1971]; Sia Reyes vs. Deportation
Board, 122 SCRA 478 [1983]).

In Moy Ya Lim vs. Commissioner of Immigration (41 SCRA 292 [1971]) and in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration
(supra), this Court declared that:

(e)verytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,

whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion
may demand.

An exception to the above rule was laid by this Court in Burca vs. Republic (51 SCRA 248 [1973]), viz:

Page 39 of 66
 We declare it to be a sound rule that where the citizenship of a party in a case is definitely resolved by a
court or by an administrative agency, as a material issue in the controversy, after a full-blown hearing with
the active participation of the Solicitor General or his authorized representative, and this finding or the
citizenship of the party is affirmed by this Court, the decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof
of such party's citizenship in any other case or proceeding. But it is made clear that in no instance will a
decision on the question of citizenship in such cases be considered conclusive or binding in any other case
or proceeding, unless obtained in accordance with the procedure herein stated.

Thus, in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:
1) a person's citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party; 2) the
Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and 3) the finding or
citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Gauged by the foregoing, We find the pre-conditions set forth in Burca inexistent in the Arocha and Vivo cases
relied upon by petitioners. Indeed, respondent William Gatchalian was not even a party in said cases.

Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the arrest of respondent follows as a matter of consequence based
on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962, coupled with the Arocha and Vivo cases (Rollo, pp. 33), the
Court finds the same devoid of merit.

Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act of 1940, reads:

Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or
of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner
of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioner of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien. (Emphasis supplied)

From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as
deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the
alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the
sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional (Ang
Ngo Chiong vs. Galang, 67 SCRA 338 [1975] citing Po Siok Pin vs. Vivo, 62 SCRA 363 [1975]; Vivo vs. Montesa,
24 SCRA 155; Morano vs. Vivo, 20 SCRA 562; Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 [1963]; Ng Hua
To vs. Galang, 10 SCRA 411; see also Santos vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 74 SCRA 96 [1976]).

As We held in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (supra), "(t)he constitution does not distinguish warrants
between a criminal case and administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having committed a crime is
entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of
an administrative nature deserve less guarantee?" It is not indispensable that the alleged alien be arrested for
purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of
probable cause, surely, it cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec. 2, Art. III,
Constitution).

A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest (dated August 15, 1990; Rollo, p. 183, counter-petition) issued by
the Commissioner of Immigration, clearly indicates that the same was issued only for purposes of investigation of
the suspects, William Gatchalian included. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the mission order directs the Intelligence
Agents/Officers to:

xxx xxx xxx

1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Sec. 5, for violation of the
Immigration Act, Sec. 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative Code;

Page 40 of 66
 xxx xxx xxx

3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately conduct custodial interrogation, after
warning the suspect that he has a right to remain silent and a right to counsel; . . .

Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of respondent was based, ostensibly, on the July 6, 1962 warrant of
exclusion has obviously no leg to stand on. The mission order/warrant of arrest made no mention that the same was
issued pursuant to a final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion.

But there is one more thing that militates against petitioners' cause. As records indicate, which petitioners
conveniently omitted to state either in their petition or comment to the counter-petition of respondent, respondent
Gatchalian, along with others previously covered by the 1962 warrant of exclusion, filed a motion for re-hearing
before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973.

On March 14, 1973, the Board of Special Inquiry, after giving due course to the motion for re-hearing, submitted a
memorandum to the then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda (Annex "5", counter-petition) recommending 1 the
reconsideration of the July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961
decision of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and 2 the lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against
applicants. The memorandum inferred that the "very basis of the Board of Commissioners in reversing the decision
of the Board of Special Inquiry was due to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, . . ., which
was dispatched to the Philippine Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the registration of applicants as P.I. citizens."
The Board of Special Inquiry concluded that "(i)f at all, the cablegram only led to the issuance of their Certificate(s)
of Identity which took the place of a passport for their authorized travel to the Philippines. It being so, even if the
applicants could have entered illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines entitles them to remain
in the country."

On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an Order (Annex "6", counter-petition) which affirmed
the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting respondent Gatchalian and others as
Filipino citizens; recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest and revalidated their Identification Certificates.

The above order admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the government on the basis of
which respondent William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present.
Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent William Gatchalian.

There should be no question that Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, is a Filipino citizen. As a
matter of fact, in the very order of the BOC of July 6, 1962, which reversed the July 6, 1961 BSI order, it is an
accepted fact that Santiago Gatchalian is a Filipino. The opening paragraph of said order states:

The claim to Filipino citizenship of abovenamed applicants is based on the citizenship of one Santiago
Gatchalian whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an Order dated July
12, 1960. (Annex "37", Comment with Counter-Petition).

Nonetheless, in said order it was found that the applicants therein have not satisfactorily proven that they are the
children and/or grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian as a Filipino was reiterated
in Arocha and Arca (supra) where advertence is made to the "applicants being the descendants of one Santiago
Gatchalian, a Filipino." (at p. 539).

In the sworn statement of Santiago Gatchalian before the Philippine Consul in Hongkong in 1961 (Annex "1" to the
Comment of petitioners to Counter-Petition), he reiterated his status as a Philippine citizen being the illegitimate
child of Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian, the latter being a Filipino; that he was born in Manila on July 25,
1905; and that he was issued Philippine Passport No. 28160 (PA-No. A91196) on November 18, 1960 by the
Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila. In his affidavit of January 23, 1961 (Annex "5", counter-petition), Santiago
reiterated his claim of Philippine citizenship as a consequence of his petition for cancellation of his alien registry
which was granted on February 18, 1960 in C.E.B. No. 3660-L; and that on July 20, 1960, he was recognized by the
Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino and was issued Certificate No. 1-2123.

Page 41 of 66
The dissenting opinions of my esteemed brethrens, Messrs. Justices F.P. Feliciano and H.G. Davide, Jr., proposing
to re-open the question of citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian at this stage of the case, where it is not even put in
issue, is quite much to late. As stated above, the records of the Bureau of Immigration show that as of July 20,
1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino citizen. It is a final decision that forecloses a re-
opening of the same 30 years later. Petitioners do not even question Santiago Gatchalian's Philippine citizenship. It
is the citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian that is in issue and addressed for determination of the Court in
this case.

Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the fact that respondent's arrest came twenty-eight (28) years
after the alleged cause of deportation arose. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation "shall not
be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of
deportation arises." In Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065 [1953]), We laid down the consequences of such
inaction, thus:

There is however an important circumstance which places this case beyond the reach of the resultant
consequence of the fraudulent act committed by the mother of the minor when she admitted that she gained
entrance into the Philippines by making use of the name of a Chinese resident merchant other than that of
her lawful husband, and that is, that the mother can no longer be the subject of deportation proceedings for
the simple reason that more than 5 years had elapsed from the date of her admission. Note that the above
irregularity was divulged by the mother herself, who in a gesture of sincerity, made an spontaneous
admission before the immigration officials in the investigation conducted in connection with the landing of the
minor on September 24, 1947, and not through any effort on the part of the immigration authorities. And
considering this frank admission, plus the fact that the mother was found to be married to another Chinese
resident merchant, now deceased, who owned a restaurant in the Philippines valued at P15,000 and which
gives a net profit of P500 a month, the immigration officials then must have considered the irregularity not
serious enough when, inspire of that finding, they decided to land said minor "as a properly documented
preference quota immigrant" (Exhibit D). We cannot therefore but wonder why two years later the
immigration officials would reverse their attitude and would take steps to institute deportation proceedings
against the minor.

Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we believe that much as the attitude of the mother would be
condemned for having made use of an improper means to gain entrance into the Philippines and acquire
permanent residence there, it is now too late, not to say unchristian, to deport the minor after having allowed
the mother to remain even illegally to the extent of validating her residence by inaction, thus allowing the
period of prescription to set in and to elapse in her favor. To permit his deportation at this late hour would be
to condemn him to live separately from his mother through no fault of his thereby leaving him to a life of
insecurity resulting from lack of support and protection of his family. This inaction or oversight on the part of
immigration officials has created an anomalous situation which, for reasons of equity, should be resolved in
favor of the minor herein involved. (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, petitioners' alleged cause of action and deportation against herein respondent arose in 1962.
However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner Domingo only on August 15, 1990 — 28
long years after. It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed and by their inaction could not
now be validly enforced by petitioners against respondent William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion
dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification certificate of respondent, among others, was
revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner Nituda.

It is also proposed in the dissenting opinions of Messrs. Justices Feliciano and Davide, Jr., that the BOC decision
dated July 6, 1962 and the warrant of exclusion which was found to be valid in Arocha should be applicable to
respondent William Gatchalian even if the latter was not a party to said case. They also opined that under Sec. 37
(b) of the Immigration Act, the five (5) years limitation is applicable only where the deportation is sought to be
effected under clauses of Sec. 37 (b) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and that no period of limitation is
applicable in deportations under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12.

The Court disagrees. Under Sec. 39 of the Immigration Act, it is reiterated that such deportation proceedings should
be instituted within five (5) years. Section 45 of the same Act provides penal sanctions for violations of the offenses
Page 42 of 66
therein enumerated with a fine of "not more than P1,000.00 and imprisonment for not more than two (2) years and
deportation if he is an alien." Thus:

Penal Provisions

Sec. 45. Any individual who—

(a) When applying for an immigration document personates another individual, or falsely appears in the
name of deceased individual, or evades the immigration laws by appearing under an assumed name;
fictitious name; or

(b) Issues or otherwise disposes of an immigration document, to any person not authorized by law to receive
such document; or

(c) Obtains, accepts or uses any immigration document, knowing it to be false; or

(d) Being an alien, enters the Philippines without inspection and admission by the immigration officials, or
obtains entry into the Philippines by wilful, false, or misleading representation or wilful concealment of a
material fact; or

(e) Being an alien shall for any fraudulent purpose represent himself to be a Philippine citizen in order to
evade any requirement of the immigration laws; or

(f) In any immigration matter shall knowingly make under oath any false statement or representations; or

(g) Being an alien, shall depart from the Philippines without first securing an immigration clearance
certificates required by section twenty-two of this Act; or

(h) Attempts or conspires with another to commit any of the foregoing acts, shall be guilty of an offense, and
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than one thousand pesos, and imprisoned for not more than
two years, and deported if he is an alien. (Emphasis supplied)

Such offenses punishable by correctional penalty prescribe in 10 years (Art. 90, Revised Penal Code); correctional
penalties also prescribe in 10 years (Art. 92, Revised Penal Code).

It must be noted, however, that under Sec. 1, Act No. 3326 [1926], as amended, (Prescription for Violations
Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances) "violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . .c) after eight years for those punished by
imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; . . ."

Consequently, no prosecution and consequent deportation for violation of the offenses enumerated in the
Immigration Act can be initiated beyond the eight-year prescriptive period, the Immigration Act being a special
legislation.

The Court, therefore, holds that the period of effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant of exclusion
based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of prescription.
Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss of the rights of the State to prosecute the offender after the lapse of a
certain time, while prescription of the penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the government of the right to execute the
final sentence after the lapse of a certain time (Padilla, Criminal Law, Vol. 1, 1974, at p. 855).

"Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it
is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the
constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of
the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings." (Lao Gi vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). Under Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a final judgment may not be executed after the lapse
Page 43 of 66
of five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. Thereafter, it may be
enforced only by a separate action subject to the statute of limitations. Under Art. 1144 (3) of the Civil Code, an
action based on judgment must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.

In relation to Sec. 37 (b) of the Immigration Act, the rule, therefore, is:

1. Deportation or exclusion proceedings should be initiated within five (5) years after the cause of deportation or
exclusion arises when effected under any other clauses other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 and of paragraph (a)
of Sec. 37 of the Immigration Act; and

2. When deportation or exclusion is effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of Sec. 37, the
prescriptive period of the deportation or exclusion proceedings is eight (8) years.

In the case at bar, it took petitioners 28 years since the BOC decision was rendered on July 6, 1962 before they
commenced deportation or exclusion proceedings against respondent William Gatchalian in 1990. Undoubtedly,
petitioners' cause of action has already prescribed. Neither may an action to revive and/or enforce the decision
dated July 6, 1962 be instituted after ten (10) years (Art. 1144 [3], Civil Code).

Since his admission as a Filipino citizen in 1961, respondent William Gatchalian has continuously resided in the
Philippines. He married Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973 (Annex "8", counter-petition) with whom he has four (4) minor
children. The marriage contract shows that said respondent is a Filipino (Annex "8"). He holds passports and earlier
passports as a Filipino (Annexes "9", "10" & "11", counter-petition). He is a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila where he has long resided and exercised his right of suffrage (Annex 12, counter-petition). He engaged in
business in the Philippines since 1973 and is the director/officer of the International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman
International Corp. as a Filipino (Annexes, "13" & "14", counter-petition). He is a taxpayer. Respondent claims that
the companies he runs and in which he has a controlling investment provides livelihood to 4,000 employees and
approximately 25,000 dependents. He continuously enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship and discharged his
responsibility as such until petitioners initiated the deportation proceedings against him.

"The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is
a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public
good and domestic tranquility of the people" (Lao Gi vs. Court of Appeals, supra). How could one who has helped
the economy of the country by providing employment to some 4,000 people be considered undesirable and be
summarily deported when the government, in its concerted drive to attract foreign investors, grants Special Resident
Visa to any alien who invest at least US$50,000.00 in the country? Even assuming arguendo that respondent is an
alien, his deportation under the circumstances is unjust and unfair, if not downright illegal. The action taken by
petitioners in the case at bar is diametrically opposed to settled government policy.

Petitioners, on the other hand, claim that respondent is an alien. In support of their position, petitioners point out that
Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father of William)
Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China, were not supported by any evidence other than their own self-
serving testimony nor was there any showing what the laws of China were. It is the postulate advanced by
petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this country, it should have been shown that they were valid by
the laws of China wherein the same were contracted. There being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid
marriages cannot be considered valid. Hence, Santiago's children, including Francisco, followed the citizenship of
their mother, having been born outside of a valid marriage. Similarly, the validity of the Francisco's marriage not
having been demonstrated, William and Johnson followed the citizenship of their mother, a Chinese national.

After a careful consideration of petitioner's argument, We find that it cannot be sustained.

In Miciano vs. Brimo (50 Phil. 867 [1924]; Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472; Yam Ka Lim vs.
Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46 [1915]), this Court held that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign
laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar, there being
no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine
law.

Page 44 of 66
The lack of proof of Chinese law on the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian much more on respondent
William Gatchalian who was then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate, Santiago was not
pressed by the Citizenship Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to marriage, having been content
with the testimony of Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of
China. Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's testimony subjected to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry.
Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and
immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth and relationship to each other are not self-serving but are
admissible in evidence as statements or declarations regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree
(Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furtheremore, this salutary rule of evidence finds support in substantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of
the Civil Code provides:

Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status,
legitimate filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (See
also Art. 172 of the Family Code)

Consequently, the testimonies/affidavits of Santiago Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian aforementioned are not
self-serving but are competent proof of filiation (Art. 172 [2], Family Code).

Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where celebrated
is valid everywhere. Referring to marriages contracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26 of the Family
Code) provides that "(a)ll marriages performed outside of the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country . . ." And any doubt
as to the validity of the matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far the validity of such marriage may be extended
to the consequences of the coverture is answered by Art. 220 of the Civil Code in this manner: "In case of doubt, all
presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of
marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during
marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in
case of unlawful aggression." (Emphasis supplied). Bearing in mind the "processual presumption" enunciated
in Miciano and other cases, he who asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden of proof to
present the foreign law.

Having declared the assailed marriages as valid, respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father
Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter. Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino being the legitimate
child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order dated July 12, 1960.

Finally, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV
of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. . . .

This forecloses any further question about the Philippine citizenship of respondent William Gatchalian.

The Court is not unaware of Woong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo (13 SCRA 552 [1965]) relied upon by petitioners. The ruling
arrived thereat, however, cannot apply in the case at bar for the simple reason that the parties therein testified to
have been married in China by a village leader, which undoubtedly is not among those authorized to solemnize
marriage as provided in Art. 56 of the Civil Code (now Art. 7, Family Code).

Premises considered, the Court deems it unnecessary to resolve the other issues raised by the parties.

WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby GRANTED and
respondent William Gatchalian is declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby permanently enjoined from
continuing with the deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90-523 for lack of jurisdiction over respondent
Page 45 of 66
Gatchalian, he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases No. 90-54214 and 3431-V-90 pending before respondent judges
are likewise DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Gancayco, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., and Narvasa, J., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring-dissenting:

I can easily agree with the summary of antecedent facts in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bidin and the reiteration
therein of the established doctrine that the Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try
and hear cases against alleged aliens, and in the process, determine also their citizenship, and that "a mere claim of
citizenship cannot operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation proceedings." I also
agree with the conclusion that the petitioners in G.R. No. 95122-23, the Board of Commissioners and Board of
Special Inquiry, hereinafter referred to as the Boards, are quasi-judicial bodies.

However, I cannot go along with the view that the case of William Gatchalian should be treated as an exception to
that doctrine and, above all, to the law which vests upon the Court of Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
the Boards. Neither can I have solidarity with his opinion that this Court should, in this instance, rule on the
citizenship of Mr. Gatchalian instead of remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court. To grant him these benefits
would do violence to the law, liberally stretch the limits of the exceptions or misapply the exceptionary rule, and to
unduly pollute the settled doctrine. No fact or circumstance exists to justify the application of the exceptions for the
benefit of Mr. Gatchalian. On the contrary, substantial facts exist to render immutable the unqualified application of
the law and the doctrine.

To my mind, the questioned acts of the Boards were done absolutely within their quasi-judicial functions. Therefore,
the rule laid down in Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25) and Lupangco vs. Court of
Appeals (160 SCRA 848) does not apply.

Consequently, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, and Our resolutions of 15
September 1987 and 2 April 1990 in G.R. No. 79635 (Commissioner of Customs vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al.)
and G.R. No. 80320 (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al.), respectively, and Our
decisions of 16 March 1989, 22 December 1989, and 6 June 1990 in G.R. No. 83578 (Presidential Anti-Dollar
Salting Task Force vs. Court of Appeals, et al.), 171 SCRA 348, G.R. No. 86625 (Development Bank of the
Philippines vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al.), 180 SCRA 609, 617, and in G.R. No. L-48113 (Yang vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.), respectively, the Gatchalians should have invoked the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals for appropriate redress instead of filing petitions for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Civil Case No. 90-54214) and before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila (Civil Case No. 3431-V-90). The trial courts should have dismissed the cases. In issuing the questioned
orders, respondents Judge Dela Rosa and Judge Capulong clearly acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion.

As to why William Gatchalian filed his petition before the former court and his wife and minor children filed a
separate complaint before the latter has not been explained. It is to be noted that he is a registered voter of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and exercised his right of suffrage (Annex 12, Counter-
Petition). Therefore, he should have filed his petition with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela. His wife and minor
children are not parties to the case before the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Their causes of action
are based mainly on their claim that the acts of the Boards against William tend to deprive plaintiff mother
consortium and connubium and the plaintiffs minors protection and support. At once, the viability of their causes of
Page 46 of 66
action is doubtful; however, if indeed they have valid causes of action, they could have been joined as co-plaintiffs in
the case filed by William. It appears then that their filing of a separate complaint before another court was part of a
strategy to frustrate the proceedings before the Boards. As correctly maintained by the petitioning Boards, we have
here a clear case of forum-shopping, especially considering the fact that on September 4, 1990, or two days before
the filing of the case before the Valenzuela court the government filed a motion to dismiss the case before the
Manila court. Forum-shopping has long been condemned and proscribed. In People vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (101
SCRA 450, 463), promulgated on 28 November 1980, this Court held that a party "should not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in two different forums." In the Resolution of 31 July 1986 in E. Razon Inc., et al. vs.
Philippine Port Authority, et al., G.R. No. 75197, this Court held:

The acts of petitioners constitute a clear case of forum-shopping, an act of malpractice that is proscribed
and condemned as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It is improper conduct that tends to
degrade the administration of justice. (See also Buan vs. Lopez, Jr., 145 SCRA 34; Palm Avenue Realty
Development Corp. vs. PCGG, 153 SCRA 591; Minister of Natural Resources, et al. vs. Heirs of Orval
Hughes, et al., 155 SCRA 566; Limpin vs. IAC, 161 SCRA 98; Collado vs. Hernando, 161 SCRA 639;
Villanueva, et al. vs. Adre, et al., 172 SCRA 877; Danville Maritime, Inc. vs. COA, 175 SCRA 717;
Crisostomo vs. SEC, 179 SCRA 154; Adlawan vs. Tomol, 179 SCRA 42; and Alonto vs. Memoracion, 185
SCRA 73).

William Gatchalian did not stop in his forum-shopping in the regional trial courts. Under the guise of a counter-
petition, he is now before this Court in an active offensive role. This is a very clever, albeit subtle, ploy to bang
directly to this Court the issue of his deportation and to divest the Boards of their original jurisdiction thereon. He
could have done this at the first instance; he did not. He and his wife and minor children deliberately chose, instead,
to separately go to the wrong court, evidently to delay the proceedings before the Boards, which they accomplished
when the two judges separately issued orders restraining said Boards from commencing or continuing with any of
the proceedings which would lead to the deportation of William Gatchalian (Civil Case No. 90-54214) and from
proceeding with the deportation charges against William Gatchalian (Civil Case No. 3431-V-90).

Chua Hiong vs. Deportation Board (96 Phil. 665) cited in the ponencia as another authority which allows William
Gatchalian to enjoy the protective mantle of the exceptionary rule affecting the exclusive power of the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation to try and hear cases against aliens and in the process also determine their
citizenship is either not applicable or is mis-applied. This case laid down the principle that "when the evidence
submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized
and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. . . . If he is a citizen and evidence thereof is
satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation proceedings to continue, granting him the
remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation of his undesirability. . . ." (emphasis supplied). The
word courts should not now be interpreted to mean or to include the regional trial courts because, as stated above,
said courts do not have any appellate jurisdiction over the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, the Board
of Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry. This case was decided in 1955 yet, or twenty-six years before
the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

The condition sine qua non then to an authorized judicial intervention is that the evidence submitted by a respondent
is conclusive of his citizenship, or as stated in Co vs. Deportation Board, (78 SCRA 104, 107), the claim of
citizenship is so substantial that there are no reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct.

The facts before this Court do not constitute, or even show, a conclusive or substantial evidence that William
Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen. On the contrary, very serious doubts surround such a claim from the beginning. His
initial entry into the Philippines was made possible through a Certificate of Identity (as Filipino) which was issued on
the basis of a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Then on 6 July 1962 the then new Board of
Commissioners promulgated a written decision in I.C. Cases Nos. 61-2108-C to 61-2116-C inclusive (Application for
admission as Philippine citizens of Jose, Elena, Benjamin, Juan, Pedro, Gloria, Francisco, William and Johnson, all
surnamed Gatchalian) reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 of 6 July 1961 and ordering the
exclusion of William Gatchalian and the others as aliens not properly documented. Accordingly, a warrant of
exclusion, also dated 6 July 1962, was issued by the Commissioners commanding the deportation officer to exclude
William Gatchalian, and others, and to cause their removal from the country on the first available transportation in

Page 47 of 66
accordance with law to the port of the country of which they were nationals. The pertinent portion of the Decision
reads as follows:

The claim to Philippine citizenship of above-named applicants is based on the citizenship of one Santiago
Gatchalian whose Philippine citizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an Order, dated
July 12, 1960. It is alleged that applicants JOSE GATCHALIAN, FRANCISCO GATCHALIAN, ELENA
GATCHALIAN and BENJAMIN GATCHALIAN are the legitimate children of Santiago Gatchalian with one
Chiu Gim Tee. Except for the self-serving testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and his alleged children, there
has not been submitted any evidence of Santiago Gatchalian's marriage to Chiu Gim Tee and the birth of
the alleged children of the couple. The personal records of Santiago Gatchalian on file with this office do not
reflect the names of applicants as his children, and while two names listed in his Form 1 (ACR application),
Jose and Elena, bear the same name as two of herein applicants, the difference in the ages of said
applicants, casts serious doubt on their identity. Apropos, the applicants JOSE GATCHALIAN, GLORIA
GATCHALIAN, FRANCISCO GATCHALIAN, ELENA GATCHALIAN and BENJAMIN GATCHALIAN, not
having satisfactorily proved as the children of Santiago Gatchalian, determination of the citizenship of the
other applicants, JUAN GATCHALIAN, PEDRO GATCHALIAN and JOHNSON GATCHALIAN, whose right
to Filipino citizenship are merely drawn from their fathers, Jose Gatchalian and Francisco Gatchalian, is
unnecessary. (Decision, Annex "E" of Petition).

Looking back to the case of Santiago, William's alleged grandfather, I cannot find sufficient credible evidence to
support his claim of Filipino citizenship. For a long time before 20 July 1960 he considered himself a Chinese
citizen. The "conclusion" of the Bureau of Immigration that Santiago is a Filipino citizen is based on totally
questionable and insufficient evidence which cannot inspire belief. The Order itself, signed by Associate
Commissioner Felix Talabis, supports this conclusion. It reads in full as follows:

This is a petition for the cancellation of an alien registry of SANTIAGO GATCHALIAN, registered as Chinese
and holder of ACR No. A-219003 issued at Manila on 13 February 1951 and ICR No. 7501 dated 3 May
1946. He is alleged to be the son of Filipino parents who were not lawfully married.

It is alleged that the petitioner was born in Binondo, Manila, on 25 July 1905, to Pablo Pacheco and
Marciana Gatchalian. It is noted that in his application for alien registration filed with this Office on 13
January 1951, Santiago Gatchalian stated that his deceased parents were Pablo Pacheco and Marciana. He
was identified by his only brother, Joaquin Pacheco, who insisted that he and petitioner are illegitimate. It is
true that, on record, there is a certificate signed on 26 October 1902 by Maxima Gatchalian, their maternal
grandmother, giving consent to the marriage of Marciana Gatchalian to Pablo Pacheco (Exh. B), but Joaquin
said that his parents did not actually get married. In proof of this, the baptismal record of the petitioner
expressly states that Santiago Gatchalian was born on 25 July 1905 and baptized on 6 October 1905, being
the son of Marciana Gatchalian, "filipina", and an unknown father (verbatim copy dated 22 June 1907,
Parish Priest of Binondo, Manila).

The petitioner, apparently not completely certain about his civil status, has been interchangeably using his
paternal and maternal surnames. In school he was known as Santiago Pacheco (Class card for 1920-21,
Meisic, Manila; Certificates of completion of third and fourth grades, Meisic Primary School); but in his
residence certificate dated 17 September 1937, and in Tax Clearance Certificate issued on 2 October 1937,
he is referred to as Santiago Gatchalian; and in a communication dated 6 June 1941, he was addressed to
as Santiago Pacheco by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes office.

Considering, however, the positive assertion by his elder brother who is better informed about their origin,
the incontestable entry in his baptismal record that he is illegitimate and the entry in the marriage contract of
his elder brother wherein the father's name is omitted and the mother, Marciana Gatchalian, is described as
Filipina (marriage contract dated 29 November 1936) there is sufficient evidence to establish that Santiago
Gatchalian is really Filipino at birth, being the legitimate child of a Filipino woman.

WHEREFORE, the herein petition to cancel his alien registration is granted, petitioner shall henceforth be
shown in the records of this office as a citizen of the Philippines and the issuance to him of the appropriate

Page 48 of 66
 Identification certificate showing his correct status is hereby authorized. (Order of 12 July 1960, Annex "1" of
Comment with Counter-Petition).

As to his alleged marriage to Chu Gim Tee, and their five children, we only have his self-selling oral testimony, thus:

Q What is the name of your wife?

A Her name is Chu Gim Tee.

Q Is she still alive?

A No, she died in 1951, in Amoy.

Q Do you have children with her, if so, mention their names, ages and sexes?

A Yes. I have five children, all of them alive and they are as follows:

Jose Gatchalian, born on Jan. 2, 1927 in Amoy; Gloria Gatchalian, born February 20, 1929 in Amoy;
Francisco Gatchalian, born on March 3, 1931 in Amoy; Elena Gatchalian, born on April 4, 1933 in Amoy;
Benjamin Gatchalian, born on 31 March 1942 in Amoy.

Q Where are they living now?

A All of them are now living in Macao, with my sister-in-law by the name of Chu Lam Tee. (p. 4, Transcript of
the proceedings before the Citizen Evaluation Board on 12 February 1960, Annex "2" of Comment with
Counter-Petition).

If indeed Santiago's parents, Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian, were married, what was his reason for
insisting, through his brother Joaquin, that he, is an illegitimate son? The only possible reason is that Pablo Pacheco
is a Chinese citizen, in which case Santiago would follow the citizenship of Marciana, a "filipina." But to give full faith
and credit to the oral insistence of illegitimacy is to do violence to the presumptions of validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds and the legitimacy of children. (Art. 220, Civil Code). These are among the
presumptions which the ponencia precisely applied when it rejected the petitioners' claim that Santiago failed to
establish his claimed marriage to Chu Gim Tee and Francisco's (father of William) claimed marriage to Ong Chiu
Kiok, both of which were allegedly celebrated abroad. I cannot find any valid justification why these presumptions
should be liberally applied in favor of claimed marriages allegedly celebrated abroad but denied to purported
marriages celebrated in the Philippines.

Interestingly, Santiago used the surname Pacheco during such proceedings and when he testified, he gave his
name as Santiago Gatchalian Pacheco. This is an incontrovertible proof that he recognized the legitimate union of
his father and mother.

On 18 February 1960, Santiago was recalled to be confronted re his claim as to the number of his children; he
testified thus:

Q In your testimony on February 12, this year, you named as your children the following: Jose, Gloria,
Francisco, Elena and Benjamin, all born in Amoy, arranged according to the order of their ages. However, in
your Form 1 when you secured your ACR in 1951, you mentioned only Jose Gatchalian and Elena
Gatchalian. Why, what is the reason why in this form that you filled up in 1951, you mentioned only Jose and
Elena?

A That form I am not the one who filled it because that is not my handwriting. It is the handwriting of my
broker or the clerk of my broker. However, when they prepared that I mentioned my children named Jose,
Gloria, Francisco, Elena in a piece of paper which I gave to him, except Benjamin.

Page 49 of 66
 Q Why did you not mention Benjamin in the list?

A Because he was not yet baptized then. (Transcript, p. 7, Annex "2" of Comment with Counter-Petition).

The explanation is very flimsy and does not deserve the respect of a passing glance.

There is no showing that Gatchalian took any immediate definite positive step against the 6 July 1962 decision and
the warrant of exclusion.

It was only sometime in 1973, or eleven years after, that he and others covered by the warrant of expulsion filed a
motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special Inquiry. There has been no explanation for the unreasonable delay in
the filing of the motion. It may be surmised that it was due to his minority, considering that he was allegedly only
twelve years old when he arrived in Manila from Hongkong on 27 June 1961. But, such minority was no obstacle to
the filing of any remedial action for and in his behalf.

The action taken by and the recommendation of the Board of Special Inquiry of 14 March 1973 to the then Acting
Commissioner Victor Nituda for the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners were not
only highly anomalous, irregular and improper, it was done without any semblance of authority. The Board of
Special Inquiry did not have the power to review, modify or reverse a Decision of the Board of Commissioners
rendered about eleven years earlier. Then Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda, acting alone, did not likewise have
the power or authority to approve the recommendation of said Board, to revive and/or reaffirm the July 6, 1961
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, to reverse, and nullify, the Decision of 6 July 1962 of the Board of
Commissioners, and to order the admission of William Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen. Pursuant to Sec. 26 (b) of
C.A. No. 613, as amended (The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940), only the Board of Commissioners can act on
the recommendation, if at all it was legally and validly done. The Board of Commissioners is composed of the
Commissioner of Immigration and the two Deputy Commissioners. In the absence of any member of the Board, the
Department Head shall designate an officer or employee in the Bureau of Immigration to serve as member thereof.
In any case coming before it, the decision of any two members shall prevail. (Sec. 8, C.A. No. 613 as amended).
The Department Head referred to is the Secretary of Justice since the Commission is, for administrative purposes,
under the supervision and control of the Department of Justice.

The decision then of Acting Commissioner Nituda was void and invalid ab initio. In view thereof, the rationalization in
the ponencia that the issue could be re-opened since the decision of the Board of Commissioners of 6 July 1962 did
not constitute res judicata is irrelevant. But even if it is to be conceded that the 6 July 1962 decision did not
constitute res judicata, I find it both strange and illogical to give full faith and credit to the unilateral action of Mr.
Nituda and to use it to bar the Boards from exercising its power and jurisdiction over William Gatchalian.

Assuming that indeed William is the grandson of Santiago, I find it rather strange why Santiago did not mention him
in his testimony before the Citizenship Evaluation Board. At that time William was already eleven years old. It is
logical to presume that the proceeding initiated by Santiago was principally for the benefit of his alleged children and
grandchildren. It was, as subsequent events proved, intended to prepare the legal basis for their entry into the
country as Filipino citizens. Thus, eleven months after he obtained a favorable decision from the Board, and on two
successive dates, his alleged children and grandchildren entered the country. On 25 June 1961 his alleged children
Jose, Elena, Benjamin, and his alleged grandchildren Pedro and Juan arrived from Hongkong. On 27 June 1961, his
alleged daughter Gloria and son Francisco with his alleged children William and Johnson also arrived from
Hongkong. (pp. 4-5, Petition).

That he has continuously resided in the Philippines since 1961; he is married to Ting Dee Hua on July 1, 1973, and
his marriage contract shows that he is a Filipino citizen; he holds passports and earlier passports as a Filipino; he is
a registered voter of Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and exercised his right of suffrage; he is
engaged in business in the Philippines since 1973, and is a director/officer of the International Polymer Corp. and
Ropeman International Corp. as a Filipino, and that the companies he runs and in which he has a controlling
investment provided a livelihood to 4,000 employees and approximately 25,000 dependents; he is a taxpayer; and
he has continuously enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship, discharged his responsibility as such until petitioning
Boards initiated the deportation proceedings against him, are not of any help to William Gatchalian. For, they neither
confer nor strengthen his claim of Filipino citizenship since they are all rooted on the illegal and void decision of then
Page 50 of 66
Acting Commissioner Victor Nituda of 15 March 1973. A decision which is void and invalid ab initio cannot be a
source of valid acts. Neither can such substantive infirmity be cured by salutary acts that tend to confirm the status
conferred by the void decision.

In the light of the foregoing, it follows that the warrant of exclusion issued against William Gatchalian pursuant to
and by virtue of the 6 July 1962 Decision of the Board of Commissioners subsists and remains valid and
enforceable.

I disagree with the view advanced in the ponencia that the State can no longer enforce the warrant of exclusion
because it is already barred by prescription considering that Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that
deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years
after the cause of deportation arises."

Said paragraph (b) of Section 37 reads in full as follows:

(b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 paragraph (a) of this section at any time
after entry, but shall not be effected under any other clause unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings
is made within five years after the cause of deportation arises. Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not
be effected if the court or judge thereof, when sentencing the alien, shall recommend to the Commissioner
of Immigration that the alien be not deported. (As amended by Sec. 13, R.A. No. 503). (Emphasis supplied).

Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of the Section. In
respect to clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12, the limitation does not apply. These clauses read as follows:

(2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully admissible
at the time of entry;

xxx xxx xxx

(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he was
admitted as a non- immigrant;

(8) Any alien who believes in, advises, advocates or teaches the overthrow by force and violence of the
Government of the Philippines, or of constituted law and authority, or who disbelieves in or is opposed to
organized government, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the assault or assassination of public officials
because of their office, or who advises, advocates, or teaches the unlawful destruction of property, or who is
a member of or affiliated with any organization entertaining, advocating or teaching such doctrines, or who in
any manner whatsoever lends assistance, financial or otherwise, to the dissemination of such doctrines;

xxx xxx xxx

(11) Any alien who engages in profiteering, hoarding, or black-marketing, independent of any criminal action
which may be brought against him;

(12) Any alien who is convicted of any offense penalized under Commonwealth Act Numbered Four
Hundred and Seventy-Three, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Laws of the Philippines, or any
law relating to acquisition of Philippine citizenship;

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Gatchalian is covered by clause (2); besides, the warrant for his exclusion was issued within a period of five
years following his entry.

Lam Shee vs. Bengzon (93 Phil. 1065) is not applicable to Mr. Gatchalian. In issue in that case was the deportation
of a minor whose mother fraudulently entered the Philippines by using the name of a resident Chinese merchant
Page 51 of 66
who is not her lawful husband but against whom no deportation proceedings was initiated within five years following
her entry. Said mother did in fact acquire permanent residence status. Furthermore, the minor's mother never
claimed to be a Filipino citizen.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I vote to GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 95122-23, SET ASIDE the
questioned orders of respondents Judge Joselito Dela Rosa and Judge Teresita Dizon Capulong as having been
issued beyond their jurisdiction, ORDER the DISMISSAL of Civil Case Nos. 90-54214 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila and 3431-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila and to DISMISS for lack of merit the
COUNTER-PETITION.

FELICIANO, J., dissenting:

I regret I am unable to join the opinion written by my distinguished brother in the Court, Mr. Justice A.A. Bidin, and I,
therefore, undertake to submit this separate opinion.

For convenience, the following is a precis of the matters discussed in detail below.

1. I agree that the Warrant of Arrest dated 14 August 1990 is defective in its language. The surrounding facts,
however, make quite clear that an amended warrant of arrest or mission order, or a new one correctly worded, may
be issued by Immigration Commissioner Domingo for the purpose of carrying out an existing and valid Warrant of
Exclusion covering respondent William Gatchalian and his co-applicants for admission.

2. The 6 July 1962 Decision of the Board of Commissioners ("BOC") and Warrant of Exclusion remain valid and
effective and enforceable against respondent William Gatchalian, and his co-applicants for that matter. That
Decision reversed a 6 July 1961 decision of the Board of Special Inquiry ("BSI") and held that respondent William
Gatchalian and his co-applicants failed to subtantiate and prove their claim to Philippine citizenship in 1961.
Respondent William Gatchalian does not claim Philippine citizenship by any mode of entitlement subsequent to his
application for entry as a citizen of the Philippines in 1961, i.e., by any act or circumstance subsequent to his birth
and supposed filiation as a legitimate son of Francisco Gatchalian, also a supposed citizen of the Philippines.

3. In its Decision in Arocha vs. Vivo,1 the Supreme Court upheld the validity and legal effect of the 6 July 1962
Decision of the BOC and the Warrant of Exclusion not only against Pedro Gatchalian, the particular Gatchalian who
was taken into custody by immigration authorities in 1965, but also against Pedro's co-applicants, which include
respondent William Gatchalian. The validity of the claim to Philippine citizenship by Pedro Gatchalian, as a
supposed descendant of Santiago Gatchalian, allegedly a natural born citizen of the Philippines, was directly placed
in issue in the 1961-1962 proceedings before the BSI and the BOC, and by the Solicitor General and Pedro
Gatchalian in Arocha vs. Vivo (supra). In upholding the validity and legal effect of the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision that
the Gatchalian applicants had not substantiated their claim to Philippine citizenship, this Court in effect ruled that the
Gatchalian applicants were not Philippine citizens, whatever their true nationality might be.

4. Should this Court now determine to examine once more the claim to Philippine citizenship of respondent William
Gatchalian, a detailed examination of the facts, including the supposed status of Santiago Gatchalian as a natural
born Philippine citizenship, shows that those claims to Philippine citizenship were indeed not proven by respondent
William Gatchalian and his co-applicants. Since respondent William Gatchalian does not claim to have been
naturalized as a Philippine citizen after rendition of the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision, he must accordingly be held to be
not a Philippine citizen.

5. Should the legal results thus reached seem harsh to some, I respectfully submit that the remedy lies not with this
Court which is charged with the application of the law as it is in fact written, but with the political branches of the
Government. It is those departments of Government which must consider the desirability and wisdom of enacting
legislation providing for the legalization of the entry and stay of aliens who may be in the same situation as
respondent William Gatchalian and his co-applicants.
Page 52 of 66
 I

1. Petitioner argues that respondent William Gatchalian's arrest follows as a matter of "consequence" of the Warrant
of Exclusion issued by the BOC on 6 July 1962. This is opposed by respondent Gatchalian upon the ground that the
Mission Order or Warrant of Arrest does not mention that it is issued pursuant to a final order of deportation or
Warrant of Exclusion.

The Mission Order or Warrant of Arrest dated 14 August 1990 issued by petitioner Commissioner Domingo, CID,
reads in part as follows:

Intelligence Officers/Agents: All Teams

Team No.

Subject: William, Juan, Francisco, Jose, Benjamin, Jonathan, Pedro, Gloria, Elena, all surnamed Gatchalian

Address: Bgy. Canumay, Valenzuela, M.M.

xxx xxx xxx

1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Section 5, for violation of the
Immigration Act, Section 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative Code;

2. Make a warrantless search as an incident to a lawful arrest under Rule 125, Section 12.

3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately conduct custodial interrogation, after
warning the suspect that he has a right to remain silent and a right to counsel;

4. Prepare and file an affidavit of arrest with the Special Prosecutor's Office and, in case of a search,
prepare and file an inventory of the properties seized, verified under oath following Office Memorandum
Order No. 45

xxx xxx xxx

The above Mission Order merely referred to Section 37 (a) of the Immigration Act, as amended, and to Sections 45
and 46 of the Administrative Code (should be Immigration Law), and that its wording suggests that the arrest is
sought to be carried out for the purpose of carrying out a preliminary investigation or custodial interrogation rather
than for the purpose of enforcing a final order of deportation or warrant of exclusion. More specifically, the Mission
Order failed to mention the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision and Warrant of Exclusion. At the same time, there is no
gainsaying the fact that the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision and Warrant of Exclusion do exist and became final and, as
discussed in detail below, remain valid and effective.

It should be noted also that by 6 September 1990, Special Prosecutor Mabolo had filed a Manifestation or Motion
before the Bureau of Immigration explicitly referring to the Warrant of Exclusion issued against respondent William
Gatchalian and his original co-applicants for admission in 1961, which had been passed upon in Arocha vs.
Vivo(supra), and argued that there was, therefore, no longer any need to adduce evidence in support of the charges
against respondent William Gatchalian.

Thus it appears to me that the Warrant of Arrest or Mission Order dated 15 August 1990, ineptly worded as it is,
may be amended so as to refer explicitly to the mentioned Warrant of Exclusion, or a new warrant of arrest or
mission order issued similarly explicitly referring to the Warrant of Exclusion.

2. It is indispensably necessary to refer to the Warrant of Exclusion of 6 July 1962 which read as follows:

Page 53 of 66
 WHEREAS, upon review, motu proprio of the proceedings had on the application for admission as Philippine
citizens of JOSE GATCHALIAN, ELENA GATCHALIAN, BENJAMIN GATCHALIAN, JUAN GATCHALIAN,
PEDRO GATCHALIAN, GLORIA GATCHALIAN, FRANCISCO GATCHALIAN, WILLIAM GATCHALIAN, and
JOHNSON GATCHALIAN, the Board of Commissioners found them not entitled to admission as Filipinos in
a Decision, dated July 6, 1962, and ordered their exclusion as persons not properly documented;

AND WHEREAS, the Decision of the Board of Commissioners, dated 6 July 1962, ordering the exclusion of
above-named applicants, has now become final and executory.

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in the undersigned by law, you are hereby ordered to
exclude the aforenamed individuals and cause their removal from this country to the port where they came
or to the port of the country of which they are nationals, on the first available transportation, in accordance
with law. (Emphasis supplied)

It should be noted that respondent William Gatchalian was a party to the 1961-1962 proceedings before the Bureau
of Immigration which proceedings culminated in the 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC and the aforequoted Warrant
of Exclusion.

It is, however, insisted by respondent William Gatchalian that the Warrant of Exclusion may no longer be executed
or implemented as against him in view of the passage of approximately twenty-eight (28) years since the issuance
of such Warrant. Respondent Gatchalian here relies upon Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act which states that:

Sec. 37 (b). Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 3, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of the Par. (a) of this Section at
any time after entry, but shall not be effected under any other clauses unless the arrest in the deportation
proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause for deportation arises . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Examination of the above quoted Section 37 (b) shows that the five (5) year-limitation is applicable only where
deportation is sought to be effected under clauses of Section 37 (a) other than clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12; that
where deportation or exclusion is sought to be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8 11 and 12 of Section 37 (a), no period
of limitation is applicable; and that, to the contrary, deportation or exclusion may be effected "at any time after
entry."

Examination of contemporaneous facts shows that the Government has sought to effect the exclusion and
deportation of respondent William Gatchalian upon the ground that he had entered the country as a citizen of the
Philippines when he was not lawfully admissible as such at the time of entry under Section 37 (a) (2), since the BOC
had held him and the other Gatchalians there involved as not properly documented for admission, under Section 29
(a) (17) of the Immigration Act, as amended. On 7 July 1990, the Acting Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation ("NBI") initiated the proceedings immediately before us by writing to the Secretary of Justice
recommending that respondent William Gatchalian, and his co-applicants covered by the Warrant of Exclusion
dated 6 July 1962, be charged with: "Violation of Section 37 (a), paragraphs 1 and 2, in relation to Section 45 (c), (d)
and (e) of Commonwealth Act 613 as amended, also known as the Immigration Act of 1940." The Secretary of
Justice endorsed this recommendation to Immigration Commissioner Domingo for investigation and immediate
action. On 20 August 1990, Special Prosecutor Mabolo filed a charge sheet against respondent William Gatchalian
which specified the following charges:

The respondent is an alien national who unlawfully gained entry into the Philippines without valid travel
document in violation of the Immigration Act; Sec. 37 par. a, sub pars. (1) and (2);

That respondent being an alien misrepresented himself as Philippine Citizen by false statements and
fraudulent documents in violation of the Immigration Act, Sec. 45, par. (c), (d) and (e).

That respondent being an alien national is an undocumented person classified as excludable under
the Immigration Act, Sec. 29 (a) sub par. (17).

xxx xxx xxx

Page 54 of 66
 (Emphasis supplied)

Section 37 (a) (1) and (2), of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, provides as follows:

Sec. 37 (a). The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or
of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner
of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for
deportation as charged against the alien.

(1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this act by means of false and misleading
statements or without inspection and admission by the Immigration authorities at a designated port of entry
or at any place other than at a designated port of entry; (As amended by Republic Act No. 503).

(2) An alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this act, who was not lawfully admissible at
the time of entry.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Section 37 (a) (2), quoted above, relates back to Section 29 (a) of the Immigration Act, as amended, which lists the
classes of alien excluded from entry in the Philippines, as follows:

Sec. 29. (a). The following classes of aliens shall be excluded from entry into the Philippines;

xxx xxx xxx

(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may be required under the provisions of this act.
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in the instant case, the net result is that no time limitation is applicable in respect of the carrying out of the
Warrant of Exclusion issued in 1962.

A little reflection suffices to show why this must be so. What was involved in 1961 when the supposed children and
grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian first descended upon the Philippines, was the right of a person claiming to be
a Philippine citizen to enter for the first time and reside in the Philippines. On the part of the Government, what was
at stake was the right to exclude from the country persons who had claimed the right to enter the country as
Philippine citizens but who had failed to substantiate such claimed status. Aliens seeking entry into the Philippines
do not acquire the right to be admitted into the country by the simple passage of time. Exclusion of persons found
not to be entitled to admission as Philippine citizens, must be distinguished from the deportation of aliens, who, after
having been initially lawfully admitted into the Philippines, committed acts which rendered them liable to deportation.

Normally, aliens excluded are immediately sent back to their country of origin.2 This is so in cases where the alien
has not yet gained a foothold into the country and is still seeking physical admittance. However, when the alien had
already physically gained entry but such entry is later found unlawful or devoid of legal basis, the alien can be
excluded any time after it is found that he was not lawfully admissible at the time of his entry. Technically, the alien
in this case is being excluded; however, the rules on deportation can be made to apply to him in view of the fact that
the cause for his exclusion is discovered only after he had gained physical entry.

It is worth noting at this point that in Arocha vs. Vivo (supra), this Court upheld the 6 July 1962 Order of the BOC
and the application of the Warrant of Exclusion, in respect of Pedro Gatchalian, even though more than five (5)
years had elapsed by the time the Court's Decision was promulgated on 26 October 1967.

Though respondent William Gatchalian is physically inside the country, it is the government's basic position that he
was never lawfully admitted into the country, having failed to prove his claim of Philippine citizenship, and hence the
Page 55 of 66
Warrant of Exclusion of 6 July 1962, or a new Warrant of Exclusion for that matter, may be executed "at any time"
under Section 37 (b). It is the correctness of that basic position which must be ascertained and in that
ascertainment, the mere passage of time is quite peripheral in relevance considering the express language of
Section 37 (b).

My distinguished brother, Bidin, J., finally invokes Act No. 3326, and on the basis of Section 1 thereof, would hold
that where the arrest for purpose of deportation is made more than five (5) years after the cause for deportation
arose, the prescriptive period of eight (8) years should be applied. Act No. 3326 which took effect on 4 December
1926, establishes prescriptive periods in respect of criminal prosecutions for violations penalized not by the Revised
Penal Code but rather by special acts which do not otherwise establish a period of prescription. In other words, Act
No. 3326 establishes a statute of limitations for the institution of criminal proceedings. It is, however, quite settled
that deportation proceedings cannot be assimilated to criminal prosecutions for violation either of the Revised Penal
Code or of special statutes.3 Moreover, Act No. 3326 purports to be applicable only where the special act itself has
not established an applicable statute of limitations for criminal proceedings. It cannot, however, be said that Article
37 (b) of the Immigration Act (quoted earlier) has not established an applicable statute of limitations. For, precisely,
Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that deportation may be effected under certain clauses of Section 37 (a)
"at any time after entry." One of those instances is, precisely, deportation upon the ground specified in Clause (2) of
37 (a) which relates to "any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this act, who was not lawfully
admissible at the time of entry." Thus, the Immigration Act, far from failing to specify a prescriptive period for
deportation under Section 37 (a) (2), expressly authorizes deportation under such ground "at any time after entry." It
is, thus, very difficult to see how Act No. 3326 could apply at all to the instant case.

Finally, we must recall once more that what is actually involved in the case at bar is exclusion, not deportation.

3. It is urged by the government that Arocha vs. Vivo (supra) has already resolved the claim to Philippine citizenship
of respondent William Gatchalian adversely to him and that such ruling constitutes res judicata. Upon the other
hand, respondent William Gatchalian vehemently argues that neither the 6 July 1962 BOC's Decision
nor Arochadefinitely settled the question of his citizenship.

My respectful submission is that respondent William Gatchalian's argument constitutes a highly selective reading of
both the BOC Decision and the Decision in Arocha Written by J.B.L. Reyes, J. for a unanimous court. The 6 July
1962 Decision of the BOC, in its dispositive portion, reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Board finds and hereby holds that the
applicants[Jose Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian, Benjamin Gatchalian, Juan Gatchalian, Pedro Gatchalian,
Gloria Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian, William Gatchalian and Johnson Gatchalian] herein have not
satisfactorily proved their claim to Philippine citizenship and therefore the Decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry, dated July 6, 1961 admitting them as Filipinos is hereby reversed, and said applicants should be, as
they are hereby ordered excluded as persons not properly documented.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)

Since respondent William Gatchalian and his co-applicants in 1961 claimed the right to enter the country as
Philippine citizens, determination of their right to enter the Philippines thus indispensably involved the resolution of
their claim to Philippine citizenship. In other words, the determination of that citizenship in the instant case was not a
mere incident of the case; it was rather the central and indeed the only issue that had to be resolved by the BOC.
Review of the 1961 proceedings before the BSI shows that the sole issue before it was the supposed Philippine
citizenship of the applicants. Thus, the very same issue of claimed Philippine citizenship was resolved by the BOC
when it reversed the 6 July 1961 decision of the BSI. This case may be distinguished from other types of cases,
e.g., applications for public utility franchises, petitions for change of name, applications for registration as voter, filing
of certificates of candidacy for an elective position, etc., where the central issue is not citizenship although resolution
of that issue requires a determination of the citizenship of the applicant, candidate or petitioner.

The ruling of the BOC that respondent William Gatchalian and his co-applicants for admission as Philippine citizens
had not satisfactorily proved their claim to Philippine citizenship, can only be reasonably read as a holding that
respondent William Gatchalian and his co-applicants were not Philippine citizens, whatever their true nationality or
Page 56 of 66
nationalities might be. Thus, it appears to be merely semantic play to argue, as respondent William Gatchalian
argues, that the 1962 BOC Decision did not categorically hold him to be an "alien" and that the BOC had merely
held him and his co-applicants as "not properly documented." The phrase "not properly documented" was strictly
and technically correct. For William Gatchalian and his co-applicants had presented themselves as Philippine
citizens and as such entitled to admission into the country. Since the BOC rejected their claims to Philippine
citizenship, William Gatchalian and his co-applicants were non-Filipinos "not properly documented for admission"
under Section 29 (a) (17), Immigration Act as amended.

4. In Arocha vs. Vivo (supra), the Supreme Court had before it the following items:

1. The 6 July 1961 Decision of the BSI which allowed the entry of respondent Gatchalian and his co-
applicants as citizens of the Philippines;

2. A split BOC Decision approving the 6 July 1961 BSI decision, which had been "noted" by two (2)
Commissioners but rejected by Commissioner Galang on 14 and 26 July 1961 and 21 August 1961,
respectively;

3. The 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC in which the BOC had reviewed motu proprio the Gatchalian
proceedings before the BSI and reversed the BSI decision of 6 July 1961;

4. The Warrant of Exclusion dated 6 July 1962 issued pursuant to the 6 July 1962 Decision of the BOC; and

5. A decision of the Manila Court of First Instance dated 31 July 1965, rendered in a habeas
corpusproceeding brought to effect the release of Pedro Gatchalian who had been taken into custody by
immigration officials pursuant to the 6 July 1962 Warrant of Exclusion.

The Court of First Instance ("CFI") decision ordered Pedro Gatchalian's release upon the ground that the 6 July
1962 BOC Decision had been issued beyond the one (1) year period for review of the BSI decision of 6 July 1961.
The CFI decision was reversed and nullified by the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court held that the BOC Decision of 6 July 1962 had not been antedated and that it was valid and
effective to reverse and nullify the BSI order granting admission to the Gatchalians as citizens of the Philippines.

The Court also held that the split BOC decision of July-August 1961 did not operate to confirm and render final the
BSI decision of 6 July 1961, the split decision being null and void because it had not been rendered by the BOC as
a body.

The Court further rejected Pedro Gatchalian's argument that he was not bound by the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision:

It is argued for the appellee that the minutes in Exh. 5-A refer only to the cases of Gloria, Francisco and
Benjamin Gatchalian. But the designation of the case is "Gloria Gatchalian, et al." No reason is shown why
the case of these three should be considered and voted upon separately, considering that the claims to
citizenship and entry of all were based on the same circumstances, applicants being the descendants of one
Santiago Gatchalian, a Filipino and that all their applications for entry were in fact jointly resolved by the
Board of Inquiry in one single decision (Annex 1, petition, G.R. No. L-24844).4

I respectfully submit that the above-quoted ruling in Arocha disposes of the contention here being made by
respondent William Gatchalian that he is not bound by the Decision in Arocha vs. Vivo, Arocha held that the 1962
BOC Decision was valid and effective and William was certainly one of the applicants for admission in the
proceedings which began in 1961 before the BSI.

Respondent William Gatchalian contends that the Court in Arocha did not find him nor any of his co-applicants to
be aliens and that all the Court did was to hold that the 6 July 1962 Board of Commissioners decision had not been
antedated. This contention cannot be taken seriously. As has already been pointed out several times, the 1962
Board of Commissioners decision held that William Gatchalian and his eight (8) other co-applicants for
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admission had not proved their claim to Philippine citizenship; not being Filipinos, they must have been aliens, to be
excluded as persons not properly documented. Moreover, a review of the Rollo in Arocha vs. Vivo shows that the
parties there had expressly raised the issue of the citizenship of Pedro Gatchalian in their pleadings. The Solicitor
General, in his fifth assignment of error, argued that the Court of First Instance had erred in declaring Pedro
Gatchalian a Filipino, and simultaneously urged that the 6 July 1962 decision of the Board of Commissioners was
quite correct. Pedro Gatchalian, upon the other hand, contended that precisely because he was a Filipino, the
Bureau of Immigration had no jurisdiction to exclude him.5

The Court also said in Arocha:

Finally, it is well to note that appellee did not traverse the allegation of appellant Commissioners in their
return to the writ of Habeas Corpus that appellee Pedro Gatchalian gained entry on the strength of a forged
cablegram, purportedly signed by the former Secretary of Foreign Affairs Felixberto Serrano, and apparently
authorizing appellee's documentation as a Filipino (par. 3[a] of Return, C.F.I. Rec., pp. 15-16). Such failure
to deny imports admission of its truth by the appellee, establishes that his entry was irregular. Neither has he
appealed the decision of the Commissioners of Immigration to the Department Head.6

Since the physical entry of Pedro Gatchalian was effected simultaneously with that of Francisco and William
Gatchalian, on exactly the same basis and on the strength of the same forged cablegram allegedly from then
Secretary of Foreign Affairs Felixberto Serrano, it must follow that the entry of Francisco and William Gatchalian was
similarly irregular. The applications for admission of the nine (9) Gatchalians were all jointly resolved by the BSI on 6
July 1961 on the identical basis that they were all descendants of Santiago Gatchalian, a supposed natural born
Philippine citizen.

5. The purported reversal of the 1962 BOC Decision by Commissioner Nituda in 1973, cannot be given any effect. A
close examination of the same reveals that such purported reversal was highly irregular.

Respondent William Gatchalian alleges that Mr. Nituda, being in 1973 Acting Commissioner of Immigration, had the
authority to reverse the BOC Decision of 6 July 1962, since he (Nituda) had immediate control, direction and
supervision of all officers, clerks and employees of the Bureau of Immigration. Control means, respondent
Gatchalian continues, the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.7

Respondent Gatchalian's view is obviously flawed. The Commissioner's power of control over the officers and
employees of the Bureau of Immigration cannot be compared to the power of control and supervision vested by the
Constitution in the President of the Philippines (which was what Ham was all about), for the Commissioner's general
power of control cannot be said to include the power to review and set aside the prior final decision reached by the
BOC. The Commissioner of Immigration, acting alone, cannot be regarded as an authority higher than the BOC
itself (constituted by the Commissioner and the two [2] Associate Commissioners), in respect of matters vested by
the governing statute in such Board itself. One of these matters is precisely the hearing and deciding of appeals
from decisions of the BSI, and the motu proprio review of the entire proceedings of a case within one (1) year from
the promulgation of a decision by the BSI.8

Respondent Gatchalian points to Section 29 (b) of the Immigration Act as amended, as empowering Nituda to
reverse the 1962 BOC Decision. Section 29 (b) reads as follows:

Section 29. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the Commissioner of Immigration, in his discretion, may
permit to enter (sic) any alien properly documented, who is subject to exclusion under this section, but who
is —

(1) an alien lawfully resident in the Philippines who is returning from a temporary visit abroad;
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 (2) an alien applying for temporary admission.

It is difficult to understand respondent's argument. For one thing, Section 29 (b) relates to an "alien properly
documented" while respondent Gatchalian precisely claims to be a citizen of the Philippines rather than a
resident alien returning from a temporary visit abroad or an alien applying for temporary admission.

It should be recalled that Nituda's 1973 Decision approved a ruling rendered by a Board of Special Inquiry in
1973 that respondent Gatchalian was properly documented, a ruling which was precipitated by a "Petition for
Rehearing" filed by respondent Gatchalian and his co-applicants in 8 March 1972 before the BSI. There are
a number of obvious defects in the action of the BSI. Firstly, the motion for rehearing was filed way out of
time.Rule 3, B 22 of the Immigration Rules and Regulations of 1 January 1941 provides as follows:

At any time before the alien is deported, but not later than seven days from the date he receives
notice of the decision on appeal of the Board of Commissioners, the applicant or his attorney or
counsel may file a petition for rehearing only on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Such
petition shall be in writing and shall set forth the nature of the evidence discovered and the reason or
reasons why it was not produced before. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Gatchalian's and his co-applicants' motion for rehearing was filed, not seven (7) days but
rather ten (10) years after notice of the 1962 BOC Decision had been received by them. Secondly, Rule 3, B
25 of the Immigration Rules and Regulations prescribed that any motion for rehearing shall be filed only with
the Board of Commissioners; the Gatchalians' motion for rehearing was filed with the BSI which then
purported to reopen the case "without first securing the consent in writing of the Commissioner of
Immigration" as required by Rule 2, D 20.

Furthermore, the purported reversal of the 1962 BOC Decision was made not by the duly constituted BOC in
1973, but only by its Chairman, then Acting Commissioner Nituda. Mr. Nituda's action flew in the face of
Rule 3, B 22 of the Immigration Rules and Regulation, which mandates that the decision of any two (2)
members of the BOC shall prevail. It thus appears that Mr. Nituda purported to act as if he were the entire
BOC. Indeed, even the BOC itself in 1973 could not have lawfully reversed a final decision rendered by the
BOC ten (10) years ago.9

We must, finally, not lose sight of the ruling in Arocha vs. Vivo (supra) where the Supreme Court expressly outlined
the procedure to be followed by the BOC in resolving cases before them. This court was very explicit in holding
that individual actions of members of the BOC are legally ineffective:

. . . [T]he former Immigration Commissioners appeared to have acted individually in this particular instance
and not as a Board. It is shown by the different dates affixed to their signatures that they did not actually
meet to discuss and vote on the case. This was officially made to record by the Secretary of Justice in his
Memorandum Order No. 9, on January 24, 1962, wherein he stated.

that for the past several years, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration has not met collectively
to discuss and deliberate in the cases coming before it. [Citation omitted]

Individual action by members of a board plainly renders nugatory the purpose of its constitution as a Board.
The Legislature organized the Board of Commissioners precisely in order that they should deliberate
collectively and in order that their views and Ideas should be exchanged and examined before reaching a
conclusion (See Ryan vs. Humphrise, LRA 1915F 1047). This process is of the essence of a board's action,
save where otherwise provided by law, and the salutary effects of the rule would be lost were the members
to act individually, without benefit of discussion.

The powers and duties of boards and commissions may not be exercised by the individual members
separately. Their acts are official only when done by the members convened in sessions, upon a
concurrence of at least a majority and with at least a quorum present. [Citation omitted]

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 Where the action needed is not of the individuals composing a board but of the official body, the
members must be together and act in their official capacity, and the action should appear on the
records of the board. [Citation omitted]

Where a duty is entrusted to a board, composed of different individuals, that board can act officially
only as such, in convened sessions, with the members, or a quorum thereof, present. [Citation
omitted]10 (Emphasis supplied)

The act of Mr. Nituda of reversing the 1962 Decision of the BOC could not hence be considered as the act of
the BOC itself.

The pretended act of reversal 0of Mr. Nituda must, therefore, be stricken down and disregarded for having
been made in excess of his lawful authority. The 1973 order of Nituda was ineffective to vest any right upon
respondent Gatchalian who, it is worth nothing, did not pretend to submit any newly discovered evidence to
support their claim to Philippine citizenship already rejected by the 1962 BOC. In essence, Mr. Nituda
purported not merely to set aside the 1962 BOC Decision but also the 1967 Decision of this Court in Arocha
vs. Vivo.

II

I turn to an examination of the underlying facts which make up the basis of the claim of William Gatchalian to
Philippine citizenship. The most striking feature of this claim to Philippine citizenship is that it rests upon a
fragile web constructed out of self-serving oral testimony, a total lack of official documentation whether
Philippine or foreign, of negative facts and of invocation of presumptions without proof of essential factual
premises. Put in summary terms, the claim of William Gatchalian to Philippine citizenship rests upon three
(3) premises, to wit:

a. that Santiago Gatchalian was a Philippine citizen;

b. the supposed filiation of Francisco Gatchalian as a legitimate son of Santiago Gatchalian, which
leads to the intermediate conclusion that Francisco was a Philippine citizen; and

c. the supposed filiation of William Gatchalian as a legitimate son of Francisco Gatchalian leading to
the final conclusion that William Gatchalian is a Philippine citizen.

I respectfully submit that a careful examination of the facts made of record will show that the correctness
and factual nature of each of these layered premises are open to very serious doubt, doubts which can only
lead to the same conclusion which the BOC reached on 6 July 1962 when it reversed the BSI, that is, that
there was failure to prove the Philippine citizenship of William Gatchalian and of his eight (8) alleged uncles,
aunts and brother in 1961 when they first arrived in the Philippines.

1. The supposed Philippine citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian must be considered first. Santiago was
allegedly born in Binondo, Manila, on 25 July 1905 to Pablo Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian. The records
do not disclose anything about Pablo Pacheco but everyone, including William Gatchalian, assumes that
Pablo Pacheco was a Chinese subject and never became a citizen of the Philippine Islands. The basic claim
of Santiago was that his mother Marciana Gatchalian was a Philippine citizen and that Marciana was not
lawfully married to Pablo Pacheco and that consequently, he (Santiago) was an illegitimate son of Marciana
Gatchalian.

The first point that should be made in respect of Santiago's claim was that he had always regarded himself
as a Chinese citizen until around 1958 or 1960, that is, when he reached the age of 53 or 55 years.
Santiago, by his own testimony, lived the bulk of his adult life in China where he went in 1924 at age 19 and
where he stayed for about 13 years returning to the Philippines for the first time in 1937. He returned in the
same year to China, stayed there for another nine (9) years, and then came back to the Philippines again in
1946. He once more left the Philippines for China on 14 April 1947 and returned on 14 June 1947. Upon his
Page 60 of 66
second return to the Philippines in 1946, he documented himself as a Chinese national: he was holder of
ICR No. 7501 dated 3 May 1946. He continued to be documented as such, the record showing that he was
also holder of an ACR No. A-219003 dated 13 January 1951. Santiago, again by his own statement, married
in China a Chinese woman. This Chinese wife, however, Santiago never brought or attempted to bring to the
Philippines and she allegedly died in China in 1951, or four (4) years after Santiago had permanently
returned to the Philippines.

In 1958, when he was 53 years of age, Santiago obtained a residence certificate where for the first time he
described himself as a Filipino. It was also only in 1960, that is, when Santiago was 55 years of age, that he
filed a petition for cancellation of his ACR obviously upon the theory that he had always been a Philippine
citizen. It was at the hearing of his petition for cancellation of his ACR that Santiago made his oral
statements concerning the supposed circumstances of his birth, parentage and marriage. Santiago's petition
to cancel his ACR was apparently made in preparation for efforts to bring in, the succeeding year, a whole
group of persons as his supposed descendants.

The second point that needs to be made in respect of Santiago's claim of citizenship resting on his
supposed status as an illegitimate son of a Filipina woman, is that no birth certificate bearing the name of
Santiago Gatchalian was ever presented.

Instead, a baptismal certificate bearing the name Santiago Gatchalian was presented showing the name of
Marciana Gatchalian, Filipina, as mother, with the name of the father unknown. There was also presented a
marriage certificate dated 1936 of Joaquin Pacheco, alleged brother of Santiago Gatchalian, also showing
Marciana Gatchalian as mother with the name of the father similarly left blank. These two (2) pieces of
paper, together with Santiago's own statements to the Citizenship Evaluation Board as well as the
statements of Joaquin Pacheco to the same Board, constituted the sum total of the evidence supporting
Santiago's claim to Philippine citizenship and on the basis of which an Order dated 12 July 1960, signed by
Felix S. Talabis, Associate Commissioner, granted the petition to cancel Santiago's alien registry.

In so issuing his Order granting cancellation of Santiago's ACR, Commissioner Talabis disregarded
Santiago's failure to present a birth certificate, in obvious violation of rules of the Bureau of Immigration
which expressly require the submission of a birth certificate, or a certified true copy thereof, in proceedings
brought for cancellation of an ACR upon the ground that the petitioner is an illegitimate son of a Filipina
mother.11 It is well-settled that a baptismal certificate is proof only of the administration of baptism to the
person named therein, and that such certificate is not proof of anything else and certainly not proof
of parentage nor of the status of legitimacy or illegitimacy.12

That Order also casually disregarded a number of other things, one of which was a document dated 1902
signed by Maxima Gatchalian, the mother of Marciana Gatchalian, stating that Maxima —

. . . residing in the City of Manila, mother of Marciana Gatchalian, unmarried, of 18 years of age, her
father being dead, do hereby freely consent to her marriage with Pablo C. Pacheco, of Manila, and
that I know of no legal impediment to such marriage. (Emphasis supplied)

Such parental consent indicated that a marriage ceremony would have taken place shortly thereafter as a
matter of course; otherwise, the consent would have been totally pointless. Even more importantly,
Commissioner Talabis' Order disregarded the testimony of Santiago Gatchalian himself in the same
cancellation proceedings that he (Santiago) believed that his parents had been married by the Justice of the
Peace of Pasig, Rizal.13 In his Order, Commissioner Talabis referred to the fact that Santiago Gatchalian had
been "interchangeably using his parental and maternal surnames. In school, he was known as Santiago
Pacheco (Class Card for 1920-1921, Meisic Manila; Certificates of Completion of Third and Fourth Grades,
Meisic Primary School). But in his Special Cedula Certificate No. 676812 dated 17 September 1937, and in
tax clearance certificate issued on 2 October 1937, he is referred to as Santiago Gatchalian; and in a
Communication dated 6 June 1941, he was addressed to as Santiago Pacheco by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office." At the very least, such use of both paternal and maternal surnames indicated that
Santiago was uncertain as to his supposed illegitimacy. In our case law, moreover, the use of a paternal

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surname may be regarded as an indication of possession of the status of a legitimate or acknowledged
natural child.14

Perhaps the most important aspect of Commissioner Talabis Order granting cancellation of Santiago's ACR,
is that such Order failed to give any weight to the presumption in law in favor of marriage, a presumption
significantly reinforced by the parental consent given by Maxima Gatchalian to the marriage of her daughter
Marciana Gatchalian to one Pablo C. Pacheco. A related presumption is that in favor of the legitimacy of
offspring born of a man and woman comporting themselves as husband and wife.15 I respectfully submit that
these presumptions cannot be successfully overthrown by the simple self-serving testimony of Santiago and
of his alleged brother Joaquin Pacheco and by the two (2) pieces of paper (the baptismal certificate of
Santiago and the marriage certificate of Joaquin Pacheco). It seems relevant to point out that Joaquin
Pacheco, too, was unable to present any birth certificate to prove his supposed common parentage with
Santiago Gatchalian; Joaquin was allegedly born in 1902, the same year that Maxima Gatchalian gave her
consent to the marriage of Marciana Gatchalian and Pablo C. Pacheco.

The third point that needs to be underscored is that Santiago Gatchalian did nothing to try to bring into the
Philippines his supposed sons and daughters and grandchildren since 1947, when he returned permanently
to the Philippines, and until 1960. The story given by the nine (9) supposed descendants of Santiago when
they first arrived in the Philippines was that they had left the People's Republic of China and had gone to
Macao in 1952 and there they stayed until they moved to Hongkong in 1958. It should also be noted that the
youngest supposed child of Santiago, Benjamin Gatchalian, was said to have been born in China in 1942
and was consequently only five (5) years old when Santiago returned permanently to the Philippines in
1947. In other words, Santiago Gatchalian behaved as if the nine (9) supposed descendants did not exist
until 1960 when Commissioner Talabis' Order cancelling Santiago's ACR was issued.

It may also be noted that Santiago's 1951 ACR application mentioned only two (2) children of Santiago: Jose
and Elena. In 1961, however, Santiago stated before the immigration investigator that he had a total of five
(5) children: Jose, Elena, Francisco, Gloria and Benjamin. Santiago's explanation strongly echoes a
common lawyer's excuse for failure to seasonably file some pleading, and, it is respectfully submitted, is
equally contrived and unpersuasive; that he had his clerk fill up the ACR; that he gave his clerk four (4)
names (not five [5]); that the clerk had simply failed to fill up the ACR correctly. In its 6 July 1962 Decision,
the BOC noted that "while the two (2) names listed in [Santiago's] [ACR application] Jose and Elena, bear
the same names as two of the [9] applicants, the difference in the ages of said persons compared to the said
applicants, casts serious doubts on their Identity."16

It is suggested in the majority opinion that the question of citizenship of Santiago Gatchalian is a closed
matter which cannot be reviewed by this Court; that per the records of the Bureau of Immigration, as of 20
July 1960, Santiago Gatchalian had been declared to be a Filipino citizen and that this forecloses re-opening
of that question thirty (30) years later. I must, with respect, disagree with this suggestion. The administrative
determination by the Bureau of Immigration as of 20 July 1960 certainly does not constitute res
adjudicatathat forecloses this Court from examining the supposed Philippine citizenship of Santiago
Gatchalian upon which private respondent William Gatchalian seeks to rely. The Court cannot avoid
examining the Philippine nationality claimed by Santiago Gatchalian or, more accurately, claimed on his
behalf by William Gatchalian, considering that one of the central issues here is the tanability or untenability
of the claim of William Gatchalian to Philippine citizenship and hence to entry or admission to the Philippines
as such citizen.

2. The second of the three (3) premises noted in the beginning of this section is: that Francisco Gatchalian
was the legitimate son of Santiago Gatchalian and therefore followed the supposed Philippine citizenship of
Santiago. This premise has in fact two (2) parts: (a) the physical filiation of Francisco Gatchalian as the son
of Santiago Gatchalian; and (b) that Santiago Gatchalian was lawfully married to the Chinese mother of
Francisco Gatchalian. This premise is remarkable for the total absence of documentary support for either of
its two (2) parts. Francisco was born in Amoy, China in 1931, according to Santiago. The sum total of the
evidence on this premise consists of Francisco Gatchalian's own statement and that of Santiago. No birth
certificate or certified true copy thereof, or comparable documentation under Chinese law, was submitted by

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 either Santiago or by Francisco. No secondary evidence of any kind was submitted. No testimony of a
disinterested person was offered.

Santiago Gatchalian claimed to have been married in China in 1926 to a Chinese woman, Chua Gim Tee,
out of which marriage Francisco was allegedly born. No documentary proof of such marriage in China,
whether primary or secondary, was ever submitted. Neither was there ever presented any proof of the
contents of the Chinese law on marriage in 1926 and of compliance with its requirements.

It is firmly settled in our jurisdiction that he who asserts and relies upon the existence of a valid foreign
marriage must prove not only the foreign law on marriage and the fact of compliance with the requisites of
such law, but also the fact of the marriage itself. In Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales,17 the issue before the Court
was whether the marriage of petitioner Yao Kee to the deceased Sy Kiat in accordance with Chinese law
and custom had been adequately proven. In rendering a negative answer, this Court, speaking through
Cortes, J., said:

These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However,
the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law and
custom.

Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced)
as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory." The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a
fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code]. On this score the Court had
occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice
unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca vs.
Orato, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907)]. The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be
required of a foreign custom.

The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states that:

Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as determined by
Philippine law.

Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two
things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the
alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49
(1922).18(Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, there was absolutely no proof other than Santiago's bare assertion that a marriage ceremony
between Santiago and Chua Gim Tee had taken place in China in accordance with Chinese law. The contents of the
relevant Chinese law on marriage at the time of the supposed marriage, was similarly not shown. Should it be
assumed simply that the requirements of the 1926 Chinese law on marriage are identical with the requirements of
the Philippine law on marriage, it must be pointed out that neither Santiago nor Francisco Gatchalian submitted
proof that any of the requirements of a valid marriage under Philippine law had been complied with.

I respectfully urge, therefore, that the reliance in the majority opinion upon our conflicts rule on marriage embodied
in Article 71 of the Civil Code (now Article 26 of the Family Code; then Section 19 of Act No. 3630) is unwarranted.
The rule that a foreign marriage valid in accordance with the law of the place where it was performed shall be valid
also in the Philippines, cannot begin to operate until after the marriage performed abroad and its compliane with the
requirements for validity under the marriage law of the place where performed, are first shown as factual matters.
There is, in other words, no factual basis for a presumption that a lawful marriage under Chinese law had taken
place in 1926 in China between Santiago Gatchalian and Chua Gim Tee.

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It must follow also that Francisco Gatchalian cannot simply rely upon a presumption of legitimacy of offspring of a
valid marriage. As far as the record here is concerned, there could well have been no marriage at all in China
1âwphi 1

between Santiago Gatchalian and Chua Gim Tee (just as Santiago had insisted that his father and mother had
never married each other) and that consequently Francisco Gatchalian could just as well have followed the
nationality of his admittedly Chinese mother.

3. The last premise noted earlier is the supposed filiation of William Gatchalian as a legitimate son of Francisco
which resulted in William's following the supposed Philippine citizenship of Francisco Gatchalian. William was,
according to Santiago Gatchalian, born in Amoy, China in 1949. Here again, just in the case of Francisco
Gatchalian, there is a complete absence of contemporaneous documentary evidence of the supposed filiation of
William Gatchalian as a legitimate son of Francisco Gatchalian.19 The only support ever presented for such alleged
filiation consisted of the oral statements of Santiago Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian and William Gatchalian. It is
difficult to resist the impression that there took place here a pyramiding of oral statements, each resting upon
another oral statement and all going back to the supposed bastardy of Santiago, a status suddenly discovered or
asserted by Santiago in his 55th year in life. No birth certificate, or comparable documentation under Chinese law,
exhibiting the name of William Gatchalian was submitted.

Francisco Gatchalian stated that he had married a Chinese woman, Ong Siu Kiok, in Amoy in 1947 according to
Chinese custom. Once again, we must note that there was no proof submitted that a marriage ceremony satisfying
the requirements of "Chinese custom" had ever taken place in China between Francisco and Ong Siu Kiok; neither
was there any proof that a marriage "according to Chinese custom" was valid and lawful under Chinese law in 1947
and of factual compliance with the requirements of the law and custom in China concerning marriage.20 Ong Siu Kiok
was alleged to have died in Macau and never came to the Philippines. It must then follow, once again, that no
presumption of a lawful marriage between Francisco Gatchalian and his alleged Chinese wife can be invoked by
William Gatchalian. It follows still further that William Gatchalian cannot invoke any presumption of legitimacy in his
own favor. As in the case of his putative father Francisco, William could as well have followed the nationality of his
concededly Chinese mother.

One final note: it might be thought that the result I have reached is unduly harsh considering the prolonged physical
stay of William Gatchalian in the country. But this Court must apply the law as it is in fact written. I respectfully
submit that the appropriate recourse of respondent William Gatchalian, should he feel that he has some
humanitarian claim to a right to stay in the Philippines, is to the political departments of Government. Those
departments of Government may then consider the wisdom and desirability, in the light of the interests of the
country, of legislation permitting the legalization of the entry and stay in the Philippines of respondent William
Gatchalian and those similarly situated. Unless and until such legislation is enacted, this Court really has no choice
save to apply and enforce our immigration law and regulations and our law on citizenship.

Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. Nos. 95122-23, and to SET ASIDE
the Resolution/Temporary Restraining Order dated 7 September 1990 issued by respondent Judge Dela Rosa in
Civil Case No. 90-5214, as well as the Order of respondent Judge Capulong dated 6 September 1990 in Civil Case
No. 3431-V-90; and to RE-AFFIRM that respondent William Gatchalian is not a Philippine citizen.

Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Regalado, JJ., concur

Footnotes

* Renamed Bureau of Immigration as per Executive Order No. 292.

FELICIANO, J.: dissenting:

1
21 SCRA 532 (1967); 128 Phil. 566 (1967).

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2
Section 36, Commonwealth Act No. 613 as amended, or Immigration Law.

3
Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commission of Immigration and the Director of National Bureau of
Investigation, 104 Phil. 949 (1958); La Tang Bun vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 683 (1948).

4
21 SCRA at 539.

5
Rollo of G.R. No. 24844, p. 32 (Brief for the Respondents-Appellants, p. 28); Rollo of G.R. No. 24844, p. 41
(Brief for the Petitioner-Appellee, p. 8).

6
21 SCRA at 541.

7
Citing Ham vs. Bachrach, 109 Phil. 949 (1968).

8
Section 27 (d), Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended.

9
See Commissioner of Immigration vs. Hon. Fernandez, et al., 120 Phil. 178 (1964).

10
21 SCRA at 540.

11
Memorandum Circular, Department of Justice, dated 28 August 1958; Administrative Memorandum,
Bureau of Immigration, dated 17 March 1952, cited in E.F. Hernandez and O.A. Domingo, Philippine
Immigration Law and Procedure, (1970 ed.,) p. 437.

12
See, e.g., People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349 (1984); Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73
(1980); Fortus vs. Novero, 23 SCRA 1331 (1968); Cid vs. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434 (1968); Vidaurraza vs.
Court of Appeals, 91 Phil. 492 (1952); and Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135 (1907).

13
The transcript of the investigation conducted on 12 February 1960 in CEB No. 3860-R, In Re Petition to
Cancel Alien Registry, Santiago Gatchalian, petitioner, Annex "2" of private respondent Gatchalian's
"Comment with Counter-Petition" in G.R. Nos. 95612-13 states:

"[Immigration Investigator]

Q It says here, "this is to certify that I, the undersigned, residing in the City of Manila, mother of
Marciana Gatchalian, unmarried, of 18 years of age, her father being dead, do hereby freely consent
to her marriage with Pablo C. Pacheco, of Manila, and that I know of no legal impediment to such
marriage." Was your father, Pablo C. Pacheco, and mother, Marciana Gatchalian, ultimately or
eventually married because of this consent of your grandmother?

[Santiago Gatchalian]

A Yes, I was informed by my brother Joaquin Pacheco that our parents were married by the justice
of the peace of Pasig, Rizal." (Emphasis supplied)

In his subsequent testimony in the same proceedings, Joaquin Pacheco, and a singularly
accommodating immigration investigator who posed obviously leading questions, sought to soften
the impact of Santiago's admission that his parents were married:

"[Immigration Investigator]

Q Or is it because [Santiago] was ashamed to admit that he was a legitimate child and that is the
reason why he said your parents were married?

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 [Joaquin Gatchalian]

A It may be also that he is ashamed to make it be known that he is a legitimate child that is why he
said our parents are married." (Annex "B-9" of private respondent Gatchalian's "Comment with
Counter-Petition" in G.R. Nos. 95612-13)

14
E.g., In Re Mallare, 59 SCRA 45 (1974); and Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil. 350 (1912).

15
See, in this connection, Rule 131, Section 5 (cc) and (dd) of the Rules of Court.

16
Annex "37" of Comment with Counter-Petition, G.R. Nos. 95612-13.

17
167 SCRA 736 (1988).

18
167 SCRA at 743-744.

William Gatchalian presented his own marriage contract executed in 1973, which showed as his parents
19

Francisco Gatchalian and Ong Siu Kiok. This, of course, has no probative value for present purposes.

20
Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales, supra.

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