Answer To Bar Examination Questions in Civil Law (1987-2010)

2010 BAR EXAMINATION
Note:
Although the questions, as framed, do not require reasons for the “ True or
False” Answer’s, proper explanations are herein provided to aid in the evaluation of the
answers of the examinees.
True or False.
A. Under Article 26 of the Family Code, when a foreign spouse divorces

his/her Filipino spouse, the latter may re-marry by proving only that the foreign spouse
has obtained a divorce against her or him abroad. (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
False.
In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), the SC held that for a Filipino spouse
to have capacity to contract a subsequent marriage, it must also be proven that the
foreign divorce obtained by the foreigner spouse gives such foreigner spouse capacity
to remarry.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
True.
Art. 26 (2) (FC), clearly provides that the decree of divorce obtained abroad by
the foreigner spouse is sufficient to capacitate the Filipino spouse to remarry.
B. X, a widower, died leaving a will stating that the house and lot wher he
lived cannot be partitioned for as long as the youngest of his four children desires to
stay there. As coheirs and co-owners, the other three may demand partition anytime.
(1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FALSE.
The other three co-heirs may not at any time demand the partition of the house and
lot since it was expressly provided by the decedent in his will that the same cannot be
partitioned while his youngest child desires to stay there. Article 1083of the New Civil
Code allows a decedent to prohibit, by will, the partition of a property in his estate for a
period not longer than 20 years no matter what his reason may be. Hence, the
three co-heirs cannot' demand its partition at anytime but only after 20 years from the
death of their father. Even if the deceased parent did not leave a will, if the house
andlotponstituted their family home, Article 159 of the Family Code prohibits its partition
for a period often (10) yeans, or for long as there is a minor beneficiary living in the
family home.
II
Multiple choice.
A. A had a 4-storey building which was constructed by Engineer B. After

five years, the building developed cracks and its stairway eventually gave way
and collapsed, resulting to injuries to some lessees. Who should the lessees
sue for damages? (1%)
1. A, the owner
2. B, the engineer
3. both A & B
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
3. BothA&B.
The lessee may proceed against A for breach of contract, and against
Bfor tort or statutory liability.
Under Article 1654 (2, of the) New Civil Code, the lessor is obliged to make all the
necessary repairs in order to keep the leased property suitable for the use to which it
has been devoted. Consequently, under Article 1659 NCC, the proprietor of a building
or structure is resppnsiblefor the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it
is due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Under Article 1723 NCC, the engineer or architect who drew up the plans and
specifications for a building is liable for damages if within 15 years from the completion
of the structure, the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and
specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. This liability may be enforced
against the architect or engineer even by a t^ird party who has no privity of contract
with the architect or engineer under Article 2192 NCC.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No. 1. A, the owner.

The lessee can sue only the lessor for breach of contract under Article 1659 in
relation to Article 1654 NCC. The lessee cannot sue the architect or the engineer
because there was no privity of contract between them. When sued, however, the
lessor may file a third party claim against the architect or the engineer.
ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No. 2. B, the Engineer.

Under Article 1723 (NCC), the engineer or architect who drew up the pl&ns and
specifications for a building is liable for damages if within 15 years from the completion
of the structure, the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and
specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. Under Article 2192 (NCC), however,
if the damages should be the result of any ofthe defect in the construction mentioned in
Article 1723 (NCC), the third person suffering damages may proceed only against the
engineer or architect or contractor within the period fixed therein. The damages
suffered by the lessee in the problem are clearly those resulting from defects in the
construction plans or spedfications.
B. O, owner of Lot A, learning that Japanese soldiers may have buried gold
and other treasures at the adjoining vacant Lot B belonging to spouses X & Y,
excavated in Lot B where she succeeded in unearthing gold and precious stones. How
will the treasures found by 0 be divided? (1%)
1. 100% to 0 as finder
2. 50% to O and 50% to the spouses X and Y
3. 50% to O and 50% to the state
4. None of the above
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. 4. None of the above.

The general rule is that the treasure shall belong to the spouses X and Y, the
owners of Lot B. Under Article 438 (NCC), the exception is that when the discovery of a
hidden treasure is made on the property of another and by chance, one-half thereof
shall belong to the owner of the land and the other one-half is allowed to the finder. In
the problem, the finding of the treasure was not by chance because O knew that the
treasure was in Lot B. While a trespasser is also not entitled to any share, and there is
no indication in the problem whether or not O was a trespasser, O is not entitled to a
share because the finding was not “by chance”.
C. A executed a Deed of Donation in favor of B, a bachelor, covering a

parcel of land valued at PI million. B was, however, out of the country at the time. For
the donation to be valid, (1%)
1. B may e-mail A accepting the donation.

2. The donation may be accepted by B’s father with whom he lives.
3. B can accept the donation anytime convenient to him.
4. B’s mother who has a general power of attorney may accept the donation
for him.
5. None of the above is sufficient to make B’s acceptance valid.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. 5. None of the above is sufficient to make B’s acceptance valid.
Since the donation covered an inmmovable property, the donation and the
acceptance must be in a public document. An e-mail is not a public document. Hence,
No. 1 is false.
No. 2 and No. 4 are both false. The acceptance by the donee’s father alone or
mother alone, even though in a public document, is not sufficient because the father
and the mother did not have a special power of attorney for the purpose. Under Article
745 (NCC), the done must accept the4 donation personally, or through an authorized
person with a special power of attorney for the purpose; otherwise, thye donation shall
be void.
No. 3 is also false. B cannot accept the donation anytime at his convenience.
Under Article 749 NCC, the done may accept the donation only during the lifetime of the
donor.
B. A executed a 5-page notarial will before a notary public and three witnesses.
All of them signed each and every page of the will.
One of the witnesses was B, the father of one of the legatees to the will. What is
the effect of B being a witness to the will? (1%)
1. The will is invalidated

2. The will is valid and effective
3. The legacy given to B’s child is not valid
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. 3. The legacy given to B’s child is not valid.

The validity of the will is not affected by the legacy in favor of the son of an
attesting witness to the will. However, the said legacy is void under Article 823 NCC.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No. 2. The will is valid and effective.

Under Article 823 (NCC), the legacy given in favor of the son of an instrumental
witness to a will has no effect on the validity of the will. Hence, the will is valid and
effective.
Ill
Define, Enumerate or Explain. (2% each)
A. What is the difference between “guaranty” and “suretyship”?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Guaranty and Suretyship distinguished:
1) The obligation in guaranty is secondary; whereas, in suretyship, it is primary.

2) In guaranty, the undertaking is to pay if the principal debtor cannot pay;
whereas, in suretyship, the undertaking is to pay if the principal debtor does
not pay.
3) In guaranty, the guarantor is entitled to the benefit of excussion; whereas, in
suretyship the surety is not so entitled.
4) Liability in guaranty depends upon an independent agreement to pay the
obligations of the principal if he fails to do so; whereas, in suretyship, the
surety assumes liability as a regular party.
5) The Guarantor insures the solvency of the principal debtor; whereas, the
surety insures the debt.
6) In a guaranty, the guarantor is subsidiarily liable; whereas, in a Suretyship,
the surety binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor. (Art. 2047, Civil
Code)
B. Define quasi tort. Who are the persons liable under quasi torts and what are
the defenses available to them?
NOTE: It is recommended that the examiner exercise leniency and liberality in

grading the answers given to this question. The term quasi-tort is not a part of legal
developments in civil law. In Philippine legal tradition, quasi-delict has been treated
as the closest civil law equivalent of the common law tort. In fact, in a number of
Supreme Court decisions, the two terms have been considered synonymous. In
reality, however, the common law tort is much broader in scope than the civil law
quasi-delict.
In recent developments in common law, the concept of “quasi-torts” can be

considered as the closest common law equivalent of the civil law concept of quasi-
delict. This is because it is argued that the growing recognition of quasi-torts as a
source of obligation is hinged on the acceptance at common law of the civil law
principles of quasi-delict. 1
FIRST SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Quasi-tort is a legal concept upholding the doctrine that some legal duty exists that
can not be classified strictly as a personal duty (that is, resulting in a tort), nor as a
contractual duty (thus resulting in a breach of contract) but rather some other kind of
duty recognizable by the law. “Tort” or “Quasi-Tort” is an Anglo American or Common
Law concept, while “Delict” or “Quasi-Delict” is a Civil Law concept. (Wikipedia
Encyclopedia)
SECOND SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Quasi-tort is considered as the equivalent of quasidelict. Hence the rules of the

latter pertaining to persons who can be held liable and their defenses would also
apply.
Those liable for quasi-delict include:
1. The tortfeasor or the person causing damage to another through fault or

negligence (Article 2176 NCC); and
2. Persons vicariously liable under Article 2180 (NCC).
The defenses available include:
a. That the defendant was not negligent or that he exercised due diligence
(Article 2176 NCC).
b. That although the defendant is negligent, his negligence is not the proximate
cause of the injury. (Article 2179 NCC).
c. That the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause
of his injury (Article 2179 NCC).
d. That the person vicariously liable has observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage (2180 NCC).
e. That the cause of action has prescribed after the lapse of 4 years (Article
1146 NCC).
The fact that the plaintiff had committed contributory negligence is a partial
defense (Article 2179 NCC).
C. Give at least two reasons why a court may assume jurisdiction over a conflict
of laws case.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) Statute theory. There is a domestic law authorizing the local court

to assume jurisdiction.
2) Comity theory. The local court assumes jurisdiction based on the
principle of comity or courtesy.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
1. Public Order. To maintain peace and order, disputes that disturb the peace of
the forum should be settled by the courts of the forum even though the application of a
foreign law is necessary for the purpose.
2.Humanitarian Principle. An aggrieved party should not be left without remedy in

a forum even though the application of a foreign law by the courts of the forum is
unavoidable in order to extend relief.
IV
Spouses B and G begot two offsprings. Albeit they had serious personality
differences, the spouses continued to live under one roof. B begot a son by another
woman. G also begot a daughter by another man.
A. If G gives the surname of B to her daughter by another man, what can B do to

protect their legitimate children’s interests? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B can impugn the status of G’s daughter by another man as his legitimate
daughter on the ground that for biological reason he could not have been the father of
the child, a fact that may be proven by the DNA test. Having been born during the
marriage between B and G, G’s daughter by another man is presumed as the child of B
under Article 164 of the Family Code. In the same action to impugn, B can pray for the
correction of the status of the said daughter in her record of birth.
B. If B acquiesces to the use of his surname by G’s daughter by another man,

what is/are the consequence/s? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If B acquiesces and does not file the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child
within the prescriptive period for doing so in Article 170 of the Family Code, G’s
daughter by another man shall be conclusively presumed as the legitimate daughter of
B by G.
G filed on July 8, 2000 a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to B.

During the pendency of the case, the couple entered into a compromise agreement to
dissolve their absolute community of property. B ceded his right to their house and lot
and all his shares in two business firms to G and their two children, aged 18 and 19.
B also opened a bank account in the amount of P3 million in the name of the two
children to answer for their educational expenses until they finish their college degrees.
For her part, G undertook to shoulder the day-to-day living expenses and upkeep
of the children. The Court approved the spouses’ agreement on September 8, 2000.
A. Suppose the business firms suffered reverses, rendering G unable to support

herself and the children. Can G still ask for support pendente lite from B? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, G can still ask for support from B because during the pendency of the action,
the marriage between them is considered still subsisting (Article 68, Family Code).
Being considered still married to each other, B and G still have the obligation to support
each other. The compromise agreement cannot operate to waive future support when
needed (Article 2035, Civil Code).
After the compromise agreement was approved by the court and the properties of
the marriage were distributed, there remained no more common properties of B and G.
While Article 198 of the Family Code appears ' to limit the source of support to the
common properties of the said marriage in case of the pendency of an action to declare
the nullity of marriage, Article 94 and Article 121 indicate otherwise. Under the said
Articles, the spouses remain personally and solidarily liable with their separate
properties for support even though, for whatever reason, there are no more community
or partnership properties left.
The judgment based on the compromise dissolving the property relations of B and
G does not bar G from asking support pendente lite. The dissolution of the property
relations of the spouses did not terminate the obligation between them to support each
other. The declaration of the nullity of their marriage is what terminates the right of G
to be supported by B as his spouse.
B. Suppose in late 2004 the two children had squandered the P3 million fund for
their education before they could obtain their college degrees, can they ask for more
support from B? Explain. (3%)
Yes, the two children can still ask for support for schooling or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority until they shall have
finished or completed their education (Article 194, Paragraph 2, Family Code; Javier v.
Lucero, 94 Phil. 634 [1954]). Their having squandered the money given to them for
their education will not deprive them of their right to complete an education, or to
extinguish the obligation of the parents to ensure the future of their children.
Gigolo entered into an agreement with Majorette for her to carry in her womb his
baby via in vitro fertilization. Gigolo undertook to underwrite Majorette’s pre-natal
expenses as well as those attendant to her delivery. Gigolo would thereafter pay
Majorette P2 million and, in return, she would give custody of the baby to him.
After Majorette gives birth and delivers the baby to Gigolo following her receipt of
P2 million, she engages your services as her lawyer to regain custody of the baby.
A. What legal action can you file on behalf of Majorette? Explain. (2.5%)

As her lawyer, I can file a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Majorette to
recover custody of her child. Since she is the mother of the child that was born out of
wedlock, she has exclusive parental authority and custody over the child. Gigolo,
therefore, has no right to have custody of the child and his refusal to give up custody
will constitute illegal detention for which habeas corpus is the proper remedy.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action to regain custody will not prosper. In the first place Majorette can not
regain custody of the baby. As surrogate mother she merely carries the child in her
womb for its development. The child is the child of the natural parents - Gigolo and his
partner. The agreement between Gigolo and Majorette is a valid agreement.
B. Can Gigolo demand from Majorette the return of the P2 million if he returns the
baby? Explain. (2.5%)
No, he cannot. Both he and Majorette are guilty of violating the provision of the
Anti-Child Abuse Law (RA7610) on child trafficking. Being in pari delicto, the parties
shall be left where they are and Gigolo cannot demand the return of what he paid.
Yes. The agreement between Gigolo and Majorette is a valid agreement.

C. Who of the two can exercise parental authority over the child? Explain. (2.5%)
Majorette, the mother, can exercise parental authority. Since the child was born out
of wedlock, the child is illegitimate and the mother has the exclusive parental authority
and custody over the child.
Gigolo can exercise parental authority over the child. Majorette has no blood
relation to the child. She is just a “carrier” of the child.
D. Is the child entitled to support and inheritance from Gigolo? Explain. (2.5%)
If Gigolo voluntarily recognized the child as his illegitimate child in accordance with
Article 175 in relation to Article 172 of the Family Code, the child is entitled to support
and inheritance from Gigolo.
Yes, because Gigolo is the natural and biological parent of the baby.
VII
G and B were married on July 3, 1989. On March 4, 2001, the marriage, which
bore no offspring, was declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. At
the time of the dissolution of the marriage, the couple possessed the following
properties:
 a house and lot acquired by B on August 3, 1988, one third (1/3) of the
purchase price (representing down payment) of which he paid; one
third (1/3) was paid by G on February 14, 1990 out of a cash gift given
to her by her parents on her graduation on April 6, 1989; and the
balance was paid out of the spouses’joint income; and
 an apartment unit donated to B by an uncle on June 19, 1987.
A. Who owns the foregoing properties? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Since the marriage was declared void ab initio in 2001, no Absolute Community or
Conjugal Partnership was ever established between B and G. Their property relation is
governed by a “special co-ownership” under Article 147 of the Family Code because
they were capacitated to marry each other. Under that Article 147, wages and salaries
of the “former spouses” earned during their cohabitation shall be owned by them in
equal shares while properties acquired thru their work or industry shall be owned by
them in proportion to their respective contributions. Care and maintenance of the family
is recognized as a valuable contribution. In the absence of proof as to the value of their
respective contributions, they shall share equally.
If ownership over the house and lot was acquired by B on August 3,1988 at the
time he bought it on installment before he got married, he shall remain owner of the
house and lot but he must reimburse G for all the amounts she advanced to pay the
purchase price and for her one-half share in the last payment from their joint income. In
such case, the house and lot were not acquired during their cohabitation, hence, are
not co-owned by B and G.
But if the ownership of the house and lot was acquired during the cohabitation, the
house and lot will be owned as follows:
1) 1/3 of the house and lot is owned by B. He is an undivided co-owner to that

extent for his contribution in its acquisition in the form of the down payment he
made before the celebration of the marriage. The money he used to pay the
down payment was not earned during the cohabitation, hence, it is his
exclusive property.
2) 1 / 3 of the house and lot is owned by G. She is an undivided co-owner to the

extent for her contribution in its acquisition when she paid 1/ 3 of the purchase
price using the gift from her parents. Although the gift was acquired by G
during her cohabitation with B, it is her exclusive property. It did not consist of
wage or salary or fruit of her work or industry
1/3 of the house is co-owned by B and G because
the payment came from their co-owned funds,

i. e., their joint income during their cohabitation which is shared by them
equally in the absence of any proof to the contrary.
After summing up their respective shares, B and G are undivided co-owners of

the house and lot in equal shares.
As to the apartment, it is owned exclusively by B because he acquired it before
their cohabitation. Even if he acquired it during their cohabitation it will still be his
exclusive property because it did not come from his wage or salary, or from his work
or industry. It was acquired gratuitously from his uncle.
B. If G and B had married on July 3, 1987 and their marriage was dissolved in
2007, who owns the properties? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The answer is the same as in letter A. Since the parties to the marriage
which was later declared void ab initio were capacitated to marry each other, the
applicable law under the New Civil Code was Article 144. This Article is substantially
the same as Article 147 of the Family Code. Hence, the determination of ownership
will remain the same as in question A. And even assuming that the two provisions
are not the same, Article 147 of the Family Code is still the law that will govern the
property relations of B and G because under Article 256, the Family Code has
retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
under the New Civil Code or other laws. Applying Article 147 retroactively to the case
of G and B will not impair any vested right. Until the declaration of nullity of the
marriage under the Family Code, B and G have not as yet acquired any vested right
over the properties acquired during their cohabitation.
VIII.
Spouses Rex and Lea bore two children now aged 14 and 8. During the
subsistence of their marriage, Rex begot a child by another woman. He is now 10
years of age.
On Lea’s discovery of Rex’s fathering a child by another woman, she filed a

petition for legal separation which was granted.
Rex now wants to adopt his illegitimate child.
A. Whose consent is needed for Rex’s adoption of his illegitimate child? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The consent of the 14-year-old legitimate child, of the 10-year-old illegitimate

child, and of the biological mother of the illegitimate child are needed for the adoption.
(Section 7 and 9, RA 8552). The consent of Lea is no longer required because there
was already a final decree of legal separation.
If there was no legal separation, can Rex still adopt
his illegitimate child? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, he can still adopt his illegitimate child but with the consent of his
spouse, of his 14-year-old legitimate child, of the illegitimate child, and of the biological
mother of the illegitimate child (Section 7 and 9, RA 8552).
IX
Eighteen-year old Filipina Patrice had a daughter out of wedlock whom she
named Laurie. At 26, Patrice married American citizen John who brought her to live
with him in the United States of America. John at once signified his willingness to
adopt Laurie.
Can John file the petition for adoption? If yes, what are the requirements? If no,
why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, John cannot file the petition to adopt alone. Philippine law requires husband
and wife to adopt jointly except in certain situations enumerated in the law. The case of
John does not fall in any of the exceptions. (.R.A. 8552).
In 1997, B and G started living together without the benefit of marriage. The
relationship produced one offspring, Venus. The couple acquired a residential lot in
Paranaque. After four (4) years or in 2001, G having completed her 4- year college
degree as a fulltime student, she and B contracted marriage without a license.
The marriage of B and G was, two years later, declared null and void due to the
absence of a marriage license.
A. If you were the judge who declared the nullity of the marriage, to whom would
you award the lot? Explain briefly. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Since the marriage was null and void, no Absolute Community or Conjugal
Partnership was established between B and G. Their properties are governed by the
“special co-ownership” provision of Article 147 of the Family Code because both B and
G were capacitated to marry each other. The said Article provides that when a man
and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or under a void marriage: (1) their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares; and (2) property acquired
by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. In co-ownership, the parties are co-owners if they contributed something of
value in the acquisition of the property. Their share is in proportion to their respective
contributions. In an ordinary co- ownership the care and maintenance of the family is
not recognized as a valuable contribution for the acquisition of a property. In the Article
147 “special co-ownerships, however, care and maintenance is recognized as a
valuable contribution which will entitle the contributor to half.of the property acquired.
Having been acquired during their cohabitation, the residential lot is presumed
acquired through their joint work and industry under Article 147, hence, B and G are co-
owners of the said property in equal shares.
Article 147 also provides that when a party to the void marriage was in bad faith,
he forfeits his share in the co-ownership in favor of the common children or
descendants. In default of children or descendants, the forfeited share shall belong to
the innocent party. In the foregoing problem, there is no showing that one party was in
bad faith. Hence, both shall be presumed in good faith and no forfeiture shall take
place.
B. Is Venus legitimate, illegitimate, or legitimated? Explain briefly. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Venus is illegitimate. She was conceived and born outside a valid marriage. Thus,
she is considered illegitimate (.Article 165, Family Code). While Venus was legitimated
by the subsequent marriage of her parents, such legitimation was rendered ineffective
when the said marriage was later on declared null and void due to absence of a
marriage license.
Under Article 178 of the Family Code, “legitimation shall take place by a
subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable marriage
shall not affect the legitimation.” The inclusion of the underscored portion in the Article
necessarily implies
that the Article’s application is limited to voidable marriages. It follows that when the
subsequent marriage is null and void, the legitimation must also be null and void. In the
present problem, the marriage between B and G was not voidable but void. Hence,
Venus has remained an illegitimate child.
XI
The spouses Peter and Paula had three (3) children. Paula later obtained a
judgment of nullity of marriage. Their absolute community of property having been
dissolved, they delivered PI million to each of their 3 children as their presumptive
legitimes.
Peter later re-married and had two (2) children by his second wife Marie. Peter and
Marie, .having successfully engaged in business, acquired real properties. Peter later
died intestate.
A. Who are Peter’s legal heirs and how will his estate be divided among them?.
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The legal heirs of Peter are his children by the first and second marriages and his
surviving second wife.
Their shares in the estate of Peter will depend, however, on the cause of the nullity of
the first marriage. If the nullity of the first marriage was psychological incapacity of one
or both spouses, the three children of that void marriage are legitimate and all of the
legal heirs shall share the estate of Peter in equal shares. If the judgment of nullity was
for other causes, the three children are illegitimate and the estate shall be distributed
such that an illegitimate child of the first marriage shall receive half the share of a
legitimate child of the second marriage, and the second wife will inherit a share equal to
that of a legitimate child. In no case may the two legitimate children of the second
marriage receive a share less than one-half of the estate which is their legitime. When
the estate is not sufficient to pay all the
legitimes of the compulsory heirs, the legitime of the spouse is preferred and the
illegitimate children will suffer the reduction.
Computation:
A. If the ground of nullity is psychological incapacity:

3 children by first marriage ------------------ 1/6th of the estate for each
2 children by second marriage -------------- 1/6th of the estate for each
Surviving second spouse --------------------- 1/6th of the estate
B. If the ground of nullity is not psychological incapacity

2 legitimate children --------------------------- 1/4 of the estate for each of second
marriage
Surviving second spouse ---------------------1/4 of the estate
3 illegitimate children -------------------------- 1/12 of estate for each of first marriage
Note: The legitime of an illegitimate child is

supposed to be Yu the legitime of a legitimate child or 1/ 8th of the estate. But the estate
will not be sufficient to pay the said legitimes of the 3 illegitimate children, because only
Y* of the estate is left after paying the legitime of the surviving spouse which is
preferred. Hence, the remaining Y* of the estate shall be divided among the 3
illegitimate children.
B. What is the effect of the receipt by Peter’s 3 children by his first marriage of
their presumptive legitimes on their right to inherit following Peter’s death? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In the distribution of Peter’s estate, one-half of the presumptive legitime

received by the three children of the first marriage shall be collated to Peter’s estate
and shall be imputed as an advance on their respective inheritance from Peter. Only
half of the presumptive legitime is collated to the estate of Peter because the other half
shall be collated to the estate of his first wife.
XII
On May 5, 1989, 16-year old Rozanno, who was issued a student permit, drove to
school a car, a gift from his parents. On even date, as his class was scheduled to go
on a field trip, his teacher requested him to accommodate in his car, as he did, four (4)
of his classmates because the van rented by the school was too crowded. On the way
to a museum which the students were scheduled to visit, Rozanno made a wrong
maneuver, causing a collision with a jeepney. One of his classmates died. He and the
three (3) others were badly injured.
A. Who is liable for the death of Rozanno’s classmate and the injuries suffered
by Rozanno and his 3 other classmates? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
At the time the incident occurred in May 1989, Rozanno was still a minor. Being a
minor, Article 218 of the Family Code applies. Pursuant to Article 218, the school, its
administrators and teachers shall be liable for the acts of the minor Rozanno because
of the special parental authority and responsibility that they exercise over him. This
authority applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of
the school, entity or institution. The field trip, on which occasion Rozanno drove the
car, was an authorized activity, and, thus, covered by the provision. Furthermore, the
parents of Rozanno are subsidiarily liable pursuant to Article 219 (FC), and principally
liable under Article 221 (FC), if they were negligent.
B. How about the damage to the jeepney? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
With respect to the damages caused to the jeepney, only Rozanno should be held
liable because his negligence or tortious act was the sole, proximate, and immediate
cause thereof.
C. Under the same facts, except the date of occurrence of the incident, this time
in mid-1994, what would be your answer? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Since Rozanno was 16 years old in 1989, if the incident happened sometime in the
middle of 1994, Rozanno would have been 21 years old at that time. Hence, he was
already of legal age. The law reducing the age of majority to 18 years took effect in
December 1989.
Being of legal age, Articles 218, 219, and 221 of the Family Code are no longer
applicable. In such case, only Rozanno will be personally responsible for all the
consequences of his act unless the school or his parents were themselves also
negligent and such negligence contributed to the happening of the incident. In that
event, the school or his parents are not liable under Article 218, 219 or 221 of the
Family Code, but will be liable under the general provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-
delict.
Franz was the owner of Lot E which was surrounded by four (4) lots one of which
- Lot C - he also owned. He promised Ava that if she bought Lot E, he would give her
a right of way in Lot C.
Convinced, Ava bought Lot E and, as promised, Franz gave her a right of way in
Lot C.
Ava cultivated Lot E and used the right of way granted by Franz.
Ava later found gainful employment abroad. On her return after more than 10
years, the right of way was no longer available to her because Franz had in the
meantime sold Lot C to Julia who had it fenced.
A. Does Ava have a right to demand from Julia the activation of her right of
way? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Ava has the right to demand from Julia the activation of the right of way, for
the following reasons:
1) An easement of right of way is a real right which attaches to, and is

inseparable from, the estate to which it belongs.
2) The sale of the property includes the easement or servitude, even if the deed
of sale is silent on the matter.
3) The vendee of the property in which a servitude or easement exists cannot

close or put up obstructions thereon to prevent the dominant estate from
using it.
4) Ava’s working abroad for more than ten (10) years should not be construed
as non-user, because it cannot be implied from the facts that she or those
whom she left behind to cultivate the lot no longer use the right of way.
Note: Since a right of way is a discontinuous

easement, the period of 10 years of non-user shall be computed from the day it ceased
to be used under Art. 6341(2) CC.
5)Renunciation or waiver of an easement must be specific, clear, express and

made in a public instrument in accordance with Article 1358 of the New Civil
Code.
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Ava has the right to demand from Julia the activation of her right of way. A
voluntary easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only
by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. Also, like
in any other contract, an easement is generally effective between parties, their heirs
and assigns, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract
are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law (Unisource
Commercial v. Chung, 593 SCRA 530 [2009]).
B. Assuming Ava opts to demand a right of way from any of the owners of Lots A, B,
and D, can she do that? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Ava has the option to demand a right of way on any of the remaining lots of
Franz more so after Franz sold Lot C to Julia. The essential elements of a legal right of
way under Article 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code are complied with.

Yes. Ava has the option to demand a right of way from the other lots. The law
provides that whenever a piece of land acquired by sale, exchange or partition is
surrounded by other estates of the vendor, exchanger, or co-owner, he shall be
obliged to grant a right of way without indemnity (Art. 652, NCC).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No. There was merely a promise to Ava that a right of way shall be granted to her
in Lot C if Ava purchased Lot
E. The promise was not reduced into writing (Obra v. Baldria, 529 SCRA 621 [2007]).
Hence, it was not or could not have been registered as to warn buyers of Lot C about
the existence of the easement on the property. Not having been annotated on the TCT
to Lot C, the buyer acquired Lot C free from such right of way granted to Ava.
XIV
Primo owns a pet iguana which he keeps in a manmade pond enclosed by a
fence situated in his residential lot. A typhoon knocked down the fence of the pond and
the iguana crawled out of the gate of Primo’s residence. N, a neighbor who was
passing by, started throwing stones at the iguana, drawing the iguana to move toward
him. N panicked and ran but tripped on something and suffered a broken leg.
Is anyone liable for N’s injuries? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No one is liable. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the
same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be
lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force
majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage (Art. 2183,New Ciml
Code).
XV
A, B, and C entered into a partnership to operate a restaurant business. When the
restaurant had gone past break-even stage and started to gamer considerable profits,
C died. A and B continued the business without dissolving the partnership. They in fact
opened a branch of the restaurant, incurring obligations in the process. Creditors
started demanding for the payment of their obligations.
A. Who are liable for the settlement of the partnership’s obligations? Explain?
(3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The two remaining partners, A and B, are liable. When any partner dies and the
business is continued without any settlement of accounts as between him or his
estate, the surviving partners are held liable for continuing the business despite the
death of C (Articles 1841, 1785, par. 2, and 1833 of theNew Civil Code).
B. What are the creditors’ recourse/s? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Creditors can file the appropriate actions, for instance, an action for the collection
of sum of money against the “partnership at will” and if there are no sufficient funds,
the creditors may go after the private properties of Aand B (Article 816,New Civil
Code). Creditors may also sue the estate of C. The estate is not excused from the
liabilities of the partnership even if C is dead already but only up to the time that he
remained a partner (Article 1829, 1835, par. 2; NCC, Testate Estate of Mota v. Serra,
47 Phil. 464 [1925]). However, the liability of C’s individual property shall be subject
first to the payment of his separate debts (Article 1835,New Civil Code).
XVI
X was the owner of an unregistered parcel of land in Cabanatuan City. As she

was abroad, she advised her sister Y via overseas call to sell the land and sign a
contract of sale on her behalf.
Y thus sold the land to B1 on March 31, 2001 and executed a deed of absolute
sale on behalf of
X. B1 fully paid the purchase price.
B2, unaware of the sale of the land to Bl, signified to Y his interest to buy it but
asked Y for her authority from X. Without informing X that she had sold the land to Bl, Y
sought X for a written authority to sell.
X e-mailed Y an authority to sell the land. Y thereafter sold the land on May 1,
2001 to B2 on monthly installment basis for two years, the first installment to be paid at
the end of May 2001. Who between B1 and B2 has a better right over the land?
Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B-2 has a better title. This is not a case of double sale since the first sale was void.
The law provides that when a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through
an agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void
(Article 1874,New Civil Code). The property was sold by Y to Bl without any written
authority from the owner X. Hence, the sale to Bl was void.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Under the facts, B-l has a better right to the land. Given the fact that the Deed of
Sale in favor of B-1 and B- 2 are not inscribed in the Registry of Deeds, the case is
governed by Article 1544 of the New Civil Code which provides that in case of double
sales of an immovable property, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in possession and in the absence thereof to the person who presents the
oldest title, provided there is good faith.
In a case, the Supreme Court has held that in a sale of real estate the execution of
a notarial document of sale is tantamount to delivery of the possession of the property
sold. Ownership of the land therefore pertains to the lmt buyer. It may also be mentioned
that under Act 3344 no instruments or deed establishing, transmitting, acknowledging,
modifying, or extinguishing right to real property not registered under Act 496 shall be
valid between the parties. Thus, the Deed of Sale of B-2 has no binding effect on B-1.
- ooOoo -
PART I
I
TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement
is false. Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)
[a] The doctrine of “processual presumption” allows the court of the forum to
presume that the foreign law applicable to the case is the same as the local or
domestic law.
TRUE. If the foreign law necessary to resolve an issue is not proven as a fact, the
court of the forum may presume that the foreign law is the same as the law of the
forum.
[b] In reserva troncal, all reservatarios (reservees) inherit as a class and in equal
shares regardless pf their proximity in degree to the prepositus
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FALSE. Not all of the relatives within the third degree will inherit as reservatario,
and not all of those who are entitled to inherit will inherit in equal shares. The applicable
laws of intestate succession will determine who among the relatives will inherit as
reservatarios and what shares they will take, i.e., the direct line excludes the collateral,
the descending direct line excludes the ascending, the nearer excludes the more
remote, the nephews and nieces exclude the uncles and the aunts, and half blood
relatives inherit half the share of full- blood relatives.
[c] An oral partnership is valid.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
TRUE. Partnership is a consensual contract,hence, it is valid even though not in
writing.
TRUE. An oral contract of partnership is valid even though not in writing.

However, if it involves contribution of an immovable property or a real right, an oral
contract of partnership is void. In such a case, the contract of partnership to be valid,
must be in a public instrument (Art. 1771, NCC), and the inventory of said property
signed by the parties must be attached to said public instrument (Art. 1773, NCC.).
TRUE. Partnership is a consensual contract, hence, it is valid even though not in

writing. The oral contract of partnership is also valid even if an immovable property or
real right is contributed thereto. While the law^ in such a case, requires the
partnership to be in a public document, the law does not expressly declare the
contract void if not executed in the required form (Article 1409[7], NCC). And there
being nothing in the law from which it can be inferred that the said requirement is
prohibitory or mandatory (Article 5, NCC), the said oral contract of partnership must
also be valid. The interested party may simply require the contract to be made into a
public document in order to comply with the required form (Article 1357, NCC). The
purpose of the law in requiring a public document is simply to notify the public about
the contribution.
[d] An oral promise of guaranty is valid and binding.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FALSE. An oral contract of guaranty, being a special promise to answer for the
debt of another, is unenforceable unless in writing (Article 1403 [2] b, NCC).
TRUE. An oral promise of guaranty is valid and binding. While the contract is
valid, however, it is unenforceable because it is not in writing. Being a special promise
to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, the Statute of Frauds
requires it to be in writing to be enforceable (Article 1403 [2] b, NCC). The validity of a
contract should be distinguished from its enforceability.
[d] A dead child can be legitimated.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
TRUE. To be legitimated, the law does not require a child to be alive at the time
of the marriage of his/her parents (Article 177, FC). Furthermore, Art. 181 of the
Family Code which states that “[Th]e legitimation of children who died before the
celebration of marriage will benefit their descendants,” does not preclude instances
where such legitimation will benefit no one but the child’s ascendants, or other
relatives.
with his three children — one of whom is Roberto — as beneficiaries.
Marilyn is now claiming for herself and her children her husband’s share in the
estate left by Dr. Lopez, and her husband’s share in the proceeds of Dr. Lopez’s life
insurance policy. Rule on the validity of Marilyn’s claims with reasons. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As to the Estate of Dr. Lopez:
Marilyn is not entitled to a share in the estate of Dr. Lopez. For purposes of
succession, Dr. Lopez and his son Roberto are presumed to have died at the same
time, there being no evidence to prove otherwise, and there shall be no
transmission of rights from one to the other (Article 43, NCC). Hence, Roberto
inherited nothing from his father that Marilyn would in turn inherit from Roberto. The
children of Roberto, however, will succeed their grandfather, Dr. Lopez, in
representation of their father Roberto and together will receive 1/3 of the estate of
Dr. Lopez since their father Roberto was one of the three children of Dr. Lopez.
Marilyn cannot represent her husband Roberto because the right is not given by law
to a surviving spouse.
As to the proceeds of the insurance on the life of Dr. Lopez:
Since succession is not involved as regards the insurance is not involved as

regular the insurance contract, the provisions of the Rules of Court (Rule 131, Sec.
3, [jj] [5]) on survivorship shall apply. Under Rules, Dr. Lopez, who was 70 years
old, is presumed to have died ahead of Roberto, who is presumably between the
ages of 15 and 60. Having survived the insured, Roberto’s right as a beneficiary
became vested upon the death of Dr. Lopez. When Roberto died after Dr. upon the
death of Dr. Lopez. When Roberto died after Dr. Lopez, his right to receive the
insurance proceeds became part of his hereditary estate, which in turn was
inherited in equal shares by his legal heirs, namely, his spouse and children.
Therefore, Roberto’s children and his spouse are entitled to Roberto’s one-third
share in the insurance proceeds.
III
In December 2000, Michael and Anna, after obtaining a valid marriage license,
went to the Office of the Mayor of Urbano, Bulacan, to get married. The Mayor was not
there, but the Mayor’s secretary asked Michael and Anna and their witnesses to fill up
and sign the required marriage contract forms. The secretary then told them to wait,
and went out to look for the Mayor who was attending a wedding in a neighboring
municipality.
When the secretary caught up with the Mayor at the wedding reception, she
showed him the marriage contract forms and told him that the couple and their
witnesses were waiting in his office. The Mayor forthwith signed all the copies of the
marriage contract, gave them to the secretary who returned to the Mayor’s office.' She
then gave copies of the marriage contract to the parties, and told Michael and Anna
that they were already married. Thereafter, the couple lived together as husband and
wife, and had three sons.
[a] Is the marriage of Michael and Anna valid, voidable, or void? Explain your
answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage is void because the formal requisite of marriage ceremony was
absent (Art. 3, F.C. 209, Family Code).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The marriage is void because an essential requisite was absent: consent of the
parties freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer (Art. 2, FC).
[b] What is the status of the three children of Michael and Anna? Explain
your answer. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The children are illegitimate, having been born outside a valid marriage.
[c] What property regime governs the properties acquired by the couple?
Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage being void, the property relationship that governed their union is special
co-ownership under Article 147 of the Family Code. This is on the assumption that
there was no impediment for them to validly marry each other.
IV
Harry married Wilma, a very wealthy woman. Barely five (5) years into the
marriage, Wilma fell in love with Joseph. Thus, Wilma went to a small country in
Europe, became a naturalized citizen of that country, divorced j Harry, and married
Joseph. A year thereafter, Wilma and Joseph returned and established permanent
residence in the Philippines.
[a] Is the divorce obtained by Wilma from Harry-recognized in the Philippines?

Explain
your answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As to Wilma, the divorce obtained by her is recognized as valid in the

Philippines
because she is now a foreigner. Philippine personal laws do not apply to a foreigner.
However, recognition of the divorce as regards Harry will depend on the applicability to
his case of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. If it is applicable,
divorce is recognized as to him and, therefore, he can remarry. However, if it is not
applicable, divorce is not recognized as to him and, consequently, he cannot remarry.
Yes, the divorce obtained by Wilma is recognized as valid in the Philippines. At the
time she got the divorce, she was already a foreign national having been naturalized
as a citizen of that “small country in Europe.” Based on precedents established by the
Supreme Court (Bayot v. CA, 570SCRA 472 [2008]), divorce obtained by a foreigner is
recognized in the Philippines if validly obtained in' accordance with his or her national
law.
[b] If Harry hires you as his lawyer, what legal recourse would you advise him to
take? Why? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will advice Harry to:

(1) dissolve and liquidate his property relations with Wilma; and
(2) if he will remarry, file a petition for the recognition and enforcement of the
foreign judgment of divorce (Rule 39, Rules of Court).
(3) Harry tells you that he has fallen in love with another woman, Elizabeth, and
wants to marry her because, after all, Wilma is already married to Joseph.
Can Harry legally marry Elizabeth? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, he can validly marry Elizabeth, applying the doctrine laid down by the
Supreme Court in Republic v. Obrecido (427 SCRA 114 [2005]).
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, for the Filipino
spouse to have capacity to remarry, the law expressly requires the spouse who
obtained the divorce to be a foreigner at the time of the marriage. Applying this
requirement to the case of Harry, it would seem that he is not given the capacity to
remarry. This is because Wilma was a Filipino at the time of her marriage to Harry.
In Republic v. Obrecido, however, the Supreme Court ruled that a Filipino spouse
is given the capacity to remarry even though the spouse who obtained the divorce was
a Filipino at the time of the marriage, if the latter was already a foreigner when the
divorce was obtained abroad. According to the Court, to rule otherwise will violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Four children, namely: Alberto, Baldomero, Caridad, and Dioscoro, were born to
the spouses Conrado and Clarita de la Costa. The children’s birth certificates were duly
signed by Conrado, showing them to be the couple’s legitimate children.
Later, one Edilberto de la Cruz executed a notarial document acknowledging
Alberto and Baldomero as his illegitimate children with Clarita. Edilberto died leaving
substantial properties. In the settlement of his estate, Alberto and Baldomero
intervened claiming shares as the deceased’s illegitimate children. The legitimate family
of Edilberto opposed the claim.
Are Alberto and Baldomero entitled to share in the estate of Edilberto? Explain.
(4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Alberto and Baldomero are not entitled to share in Edilberto’s estate. They are
not related at all to Edilberto. They were born during the marriage of Conrado and
Clarita, hence, are considered legitimate children of the said spouses. This status is
conferred on them at birth by law.
Under Philippine law, a person cannot have more than one natural filiation. The
legitimate filiation of a person can be changed only if the legitimate father will
successfully impugn such status.
In the problem, therefore, the filiation of Alberto and Baldomero as the legitimate
children of Conrado cannot be changed by their recognition by Edilberto as his
illegitimate children. Before they can be conferred the status of Edilberto’s illegitimate
children, Conrado must first impugn their legitimacy. Since Conrado has not initiated
any action to impugn their legitimacy, they continue to be the legitimate children of
Conrado. They cannot be the illegitimate children of Edilberto at the same time. Not
being the illegitimate children of Edilberto, they have no right to inherit from him.
VI
On December 1, 2000, Dr. Juanito Fuentes executed a holographic will, wherein
he gave nothing to his recognized illegitimate son, Jay. Dr. Fuentes left for the United
States, passed the New York medical licensure examinations, resided therein, and
became a naturalized American citizen. He died in New York in 2007. The laws of
New York do not recognize holographic wills or compulsory heirs.
[a] Can the holographic will of Dr. Fuentes be admitted to probate in the Philippines?
Why or why not? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the holographic will of Dr. Fuentes may be admitted to probate in the Philippines
because there is no public policy violated by such probate. The only issue at probate
is the due execution of the will which includes the formal validity of the will. As regards
formal validity, the only issue the court will resolve at probate is whether or not the will
was executed in accordance with the form prescribed by the law observed by the
testator in the execution of his will. For purposes of probate in the Philippines, an
alien testator may observe the law of the place where the will was executed (Article
17, NCC), or the formalities of the law of the place where he resides, or according to
the formalities of the law of his own country, or in accordance with the Philippine Civil
Code (Art. 816, NCC).Since Dr. Fuentes executed his will in accordance with
Philippine law, the Philippine court shall apply the New Civil Code in determining the
formal validity of the holographic will. The subsequent change in the citizenship of Dr.
Fuentes did not affect the law governing the validity of his will. Under the New Civil
Code, which was the law used by Dr. Fuentes, the law in force at the time of
execution of the will shall govern the formal validity of the will (Article 795, NCC).
[b] Assuming that the will is probated in the Philippines, can Jay validly insist
that he be given his legitime? Why or why not? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Jay cannot insist because under New York law he is not a compulsory heir
entitled to a legitime.
The national law of the testator determines who his heirs are, the order that they
succeed, how much their successional rights are, and whether or not a testamentary
disposition in his will is valid (Article 16, NCC). Since, Dr. Fuentes was a US citizen, the
laws of New York determines who his heirs are. And since New York law does not
recognize the concept of compulsory heirs, Jay is not a compulsory heir of Dr. Fuentes
entitled to a legitime.
VII
Ramon Mayaman died intestate, leaving a net estate of .P10,000,000.00.

Determine how much each heir will receive : from the estate:
[a] If Ramon is survived by his wife, three full-blood brothers, two half-brothers,
and one nephew (the son of a deceased full-blood brother)? Explain. (3%).
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Having died intestate, the estate of Ramon shall be inherited by his wife and his
full and half blood siblings or their respective representatives. In intestacy, if the wife
concurs with no one but the siblings of the husband, all of them are the intestate heirs
of the deceased husband. The wife will receive half of the intestate estate, while the
siblings or their respective representatives, will inherit the other half to be divided
among them equally. If some siblings are of the full-blood and the others of the half
blood, a half blood sibling will receive half the share of a full-blood sibling.
1. The wife of Ramon will, therefore, receive one half of the estate or the
amount of P5,000.000.00,
2. The three (3) full-blood brothers, will, therefore, receive PI,000,000.00 each.
3. The nephewwill receive PI,000,000.00 by right of representation.
4. The two (2) half-brothers will receive P500,000.00 each.
[b] If Ramon is survived by his wife, a half-sister, and three nephews (sons of a
deceased full-blood brother)? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The wife will receive one half of the estate or P5,000,000.00. The other half
shall be inherited by (1) the full-blood brother, represented by his 3 children, and
(2) the half- sister. They will divide that other half between them such that the share
of the half-sister is just half the share of the full-blood brother. The share of the full-
blood brother shall in turn be inherited by the three (3) nephews in equal shares by
right of representation.
Therefore, the three (3) nephews will receive PI,111,111.10 each and the half-
sister will receive the sum of PI,666,666.60.
VIII
Jude owned a buiiding which he had leased to several tenants. Without informing
his tenants, Jude sold the building to Ildefonso. Thereafter, the latter notified all the
tenants that he is the new owner of the building. Ildefonso ordered the tenants to
vacate the premises within thirty (30) days from notice because he had other plans for
the building. The tenants refused to vacate, insisting that they will only do so when the
term of their lease shall have expired. Is Ildefonso bound to respect the lease
contracts between Jude and his tenants? Explain your answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Ildefonso must respect the lease contracts between Jude and his tenants.
While it is true that the said lease contracts were not registered and annotated on the
title to the property, Ildefonso is still not an innocent purchaser for value. He ought to
know the existence of the lease because the building was already occupied by the
tenants at the time he bought it. Applying the principle of caveat emptor, he should
have checked and known the status of the occupants or their right to occupy the
building before buying it.
IX
Before migrating to Canada in 1992, the spouses Teodoro and Anita entrusted all
their legal papers and documents to their nephew, Atty. Tan. Taking advantage of the
situation, Atty. Tan forged a deed of sale, making it appear that he had bought the
couple’s property in Quezon City. In 2000, he succeeded in obtaining a TCT over the
property in his name. Subsequently, Atty. Tan sold the same property to Luis, who built
an auto repair shop on the )ropertv. In 2004, Luis registered the deed of conveyance,
and title over the property was transferred in his name.
In 2006, the spouses Teodoro and Anita came to the Philippines for a visit and
discovered what had happened to their property. They immediately hire you as lawyer.
What action or actions will you institute in order to vindicate their rights? Explain fully.
(4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will institute the following actions against Atty.Tan:
(a) A civil action for damages for the fraudulent transfer of the title in his name
and to recover the value of the property;
(b) An action against the National Treasurer for compensation from the State
Assurance Fund which is set aside by law to pay those who lose their land
or suffer damages as a consequence of the operation of the Torrens system;
(c) A criminal action for forgery or falsification of public document;
(d) A complaint with the Supreme Court/Integrated Bar of the Philippines to
disbar or suspend him or other disciplinary action for violation or the Code of
Professional Ethics.
Any action against Luis will not prosper because he is an innocent purchaser for
value. The Title to the land he bought was already in the name of the person who sold
the property to him and there is nothing on the title which will make him suspect about
the fraud committed by Atty. Tan.
X
Rommel’s private car, while being driven by the regular family driver, Amado, hits
a pedestrian causing the latter’s death. Rommel is not in the car when the incident
happened.
[a] Is Rommel liable for damages to the heirs of the deceased? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Rommel may be held liable for damages if he fails to prove that he exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family (Art. 2180, par. 5, NCC) in selecting and
supervising his family driver. The owner is presumed liable unless he proves the
defense of diligence. If the driver was performing his assigned task when the incident
happened, Rommel shall be solidarily liable with the driver.
In case the driver is convicted of reckless imprudence and cannot pay the civil
liability, Rommel is subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded against the driver and
the defense of diligence is not available.
[b] Would your answer be the same if Rommel was in the car at the time of
the accident? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, my answer would be the same. Rommel, who was in the car, shall be liable
for damages if he could have prevented the misfortune by the use of due diligence in
supervising his driver but failed to exercise it (Art. 2184, NCC). In such a case, his
liability is solidary with his driver.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, my answer will be the same except that in such a case the liability of the
owner is not presumed. When the owner is inside the vehicle, he becomes liable only
when it is shown that he could have prevented the misfortune by the use of due
diligence (Article 2184, NCC). For the owner to be held liable, the burden of proving
that he could have prevented the misfortune rests on the shoulder of the victim.
PART II
XI
TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement
is false. Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)
[a] A clause in an arbitration contract granting one of the parties the power to
choose more arbitrators than the other renders the arbitration contract void.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
True. The Civil Code provides that “Any clause giving one of the parties power to
choose more arbitrators than the other is void and of no effect” (Art. 2045, NCC).
[b] If there is no marriage settlement, the salary of a “spouse” in an adulterous

marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
False. In an adulterous relationship, the salary of a married partner belongs to the

absolute community, or conjugal partnership, of such married partner with his or her
lawful spouse. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, the property relations between
married partner and his/ her paramour is governed by ordinary co-ownership where the
partners become co-owners only when they contributed to the acquisition of the
property. The paramour is deemed to have not contributed in the earning of the salary
of the married partner.
[c] Acquisitive prescription of a negative easement runs from the time the owner
of the dominant estate forbids, in a notarized document, the owner of the
servient estate from executing an act which would be lawful without the
easement.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
True. In negative easements, acquisitive prescription runs from the moment the
owner of the dominant estate forbade, by an instrument acknowledged before a notary
public, the owner of the servient estate from executing an act which would be lawful
without the easement (Art. 621, NCC).
[d] The renunciation by a co-owner of his undivided share in the co-owned property
in lieu of the performance of his obligation to contribute to taxes and expenses for the
preservation of the property constitutes dacion en pago.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
True. Under the Civil Code, a co-owner may renounce his share in the co-owned
property in lieu of paying for his share in the taxes and expenses for the preservation
of the co-owned property. In effect, there is dacion en pago because the co-owner is
discharging his monetary obligation by paying it with his non-monetary interest in the
co-owned property. The fact the he is giving up his entire interest simply means that
he is accepting the value of his interest as equivalent to his share in the taxes and
expenses of preservation.
[e] A person can dispose of his corpse through an act inter vivos.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
False. A person cannot dispose of his corpse through an act inter vivos, i.e., an
act to take effect during his lifetime. Before his death there is no corpse to dispose. But
he is allowed to do so through an act mortis causa, i.e., an act to take effect upon his
death.
XII
Emmanuel and Margarita, American citizens and employees of the U.S. State
Department, got married in the African state of Kenya where sterility is a ground for
annulment of marriage. Thereafter, the spouses were assigned to the U.S. Embassy
in Manila. On the first year of the spouses’ tour of duty in the Philippines, Margarita
filed an annulment case against Emmanuel before a Philippine court on the ground of
her husband’s sterility at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
[a] Will the suit prosper? Explain your answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the suit will not prosper. As applied to foreign nationals with respect to family
relations and status of persons, the nationality principle set forth in Article 15 of the
Civil Code will govern the relations of Emmanuel and Margarita. Since they are
American citizens, the governing law as to the ground for annulment is not Kenyan
law which Margarita invokes in support of sterility as such ground; but should be U.S.
law, which is the national law of both Emmanuel and Margarita as recognized under
Philippine law. Hence, the Philippine court will not give due course to the case based
on Kenyan law. The nationality principle as expressed in the application of national
law of foreign nationals by Philippine courts is established by precedents (Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 [1989], Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 [2001], Llorente
v. Court of Appeals 345 SCRA 92 [2000], and Bayot v. Court of Appeals 570 SCRA
472 [2008]).
The forum has jurisdiction over an action for the annulment of marriage
solemnized elsewhere but only when the party bringing the action is domiciled in the
forum. In this case, none of the parties to the marriage is domiciled in the Philippines.
They are here as officials of the US Embassy whose stay in the country is merely
temporary, lasting only during their fixed tour of duty. Fence, the Philippine courts
have no jurisdiction over
the action.
[a] Assume Emmanuel and Margarita are both Filipinos. After their wedding in
Kenya, they come back and take up residence in the Philippines. Can their
marriage be annulled on the ground of Emmanuel’s sterility? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the marriage cannot be annulled under Philippine law. Sterility is not a ground
for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code.
No, the marriage cannot be annulled in the Philippines.

• The Philippine court shall have jurisdiction over the action to annul the marriage
not only because the parties are residents of the Philippines but because they are
Filipino citizens. The Philippine court, however, shall apply the law of the place where
the marriage was celebrated in determining its formal validity (Article 26,FC; Article
17, NCC).
Since the marriage was celebrated in Kenya in accordance with Kenyan law, the
formal validity of such marriage is governed by Kenyan law and any issue as to the
formal validity of that marriage shall be determined by applying Kenyan law and not
Philippine law.
However, while Kenyan law governs the formal validity of the marriage, the legal
capacity of the Filipino parties to the marriage is governed not by Kenyan law but by
Philippine law (Article 15, NCC). Sterility of a party as a ground for the annulment of
marriage is not a matter of form but a matter of legal capacity. Hence, the Philippine
court must apply Philippine law in determining the status of the marriage on the ground
of absence or defect in the legal capacity of the Filipino parties. Since sterility does not
constitute absence or defect in the legal capacity of the parties under Philippine law,
there is no ground to avoid or annul the marriage. Hence, the Philippine court has to
deny the petition.
XIII
Rafael, a wealthy bachelor, filed a petition for the adoption of Dolly, a one-year old
foundling who had a severe heart ailment. During the pendency of the adoption
proceedings, Rafael died of natural causes. The Office of the Solicitor General files a
motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the case can no longer proceed
because of the petitioner’s death.
[a] Should the case be dismissed? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends on the stage of the proceedings when Rafael died. If he died after all
the requirements under the law have been complied with and the case is already
submitted for resolution, the court may grant the petition and issue a decree of
adoption despite the death of the adopter (Section 13, RA 8552). Otherwise, the death
of the petitioner shall have the effect of terminating the proceedings.
[b] Will your answer be the same if it was Dolly who died during the pendency of
the adoption proceedings? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, if it was Dolly who died, the case should be dismissed. Her death terminates
the proceedings (Art. 13, Domestic Adoption Law).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It depends. If all the requirements under the law have already been complied with
and the case is already submitted for resolution, the death of the adoptee should Ljot
abate the proceedings. The court should issue the decree of adoption if it will be for
the best interest of the adoptee. While RA 8552 provides only for the case where it is
the petitioner who dies before the decree is issued, it is with more compelling reason
that the decree should ! allowed in case it is the adoptee who dies because adoption
is primarily for his benefit.
XIV
Rodolfo, married to Sharon, had an illicit affair with his secretary, Nanette, a 19-
year old girl, and begot a baby girl, Rona. Nanette sued Rodolfo for damages: actual,
for hospital ! and other medical expenses in delivering the child by I caesarean section;
moral, claiming that Rodolfo promised to j marry her, representing that he was single
when, in fact, he was not; and exemplary, to teach a lesson to like-minded Lotharios.
[a] If you were the judge, would you award all the claims of Nanette? Explain.
(3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If Rodolfo’s marriage could not have been possibly known to Nanette or ther is
no gross negligence on the part of Nanette, Rodolfo could be held liable for moral
dmages.
If there is gross negligence in a suit for quasi-delict, exemplary damages could
be awarded.
[b] Suppose Rodolfo later on acknowledges Rona and gives her regular
support, can he compel her to use his surname? Why or why not? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, he has no right to compel Rona to use his surname. The law does not give him
that right simply because he gave her support (RA 9255).
Under the Family Code, an illegitimate child was required to use only the surname
of the mother. Under RA 9255, otherwise known as the Revilla law, however, the
illegitimate child is given the option to use the surname of the illegitimate father when
the latter has recognized the former in accordance with law. Since the choice belongs
to the illegitimate child, Rodolfo cannot compel Rona, if already of age, to use his
surname against her will. If Rona is still a minor, to use the surname of Rodolfo will
require the consent of Rona’s mother who has sole parental authority over her.
[c] When Rona reaches seven (7) years old, she tells Rodolfo that she
prefers to live with him, because he is better off financially than Nanette. If Rodolfo files
an action for the custody of Rona, alleging that he is Rona’s choice as custodial parent,
will the court grant Rodolfo’s petition? Why or why not? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, because Rodolfo has no parental authority over Rona. He who has the
parental authority has the right to custody. Under the Family Code, the mother alone
has parental authority over the illegitimate child. This is true even if the illegitimate
father has recognized the child and even though he is giving support for the child. To
acquire custody over Rona, Rodolfo should first deprive Nanette of parental authority if
there is a ground under the law, and in a proper court proceeding. In the same action,
the court may award custody of Rona to Rodolfo if it is for her best interest.
Sarah had a deposit in a savings account with Filipino Universal Bank in the
amount of five million pesos (P5,000,000.00). To buy a new she obtained a loan from
the same bank in the amount of P 1,200,000.00, payable in twelve monthly installments.
Sarah
[b] Suppose Rodolfo later on acknowledges Rona and gives her regular
support, can he compel her to use his surname? Why or why not? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No he has no right to compel Rona to use his surname. The law does not give
him that right simply because he gave her support (RA 9255).
Under the family code, an illegitimate child was required to use only the surname
to the mother. Under RA 9255, otherwise known as the Revilla law, however, the
illegitimate child is given the option to use the surname of the illegitimate father when
the latter has recognized the former in accordance with law. Since the choice belongs to
the illegitimate child, Rodolfo cannot compel Rona, if already of age, to use his surname
against her will. If Rona is still a minor, to use the surname of Rodolfo will require the
consent of Rona's mother who has sole parental authority over her.
[c] when Rona reaches seven (7) years old, she tells Rodolfo that she
prefers to live with him, because he is better off financially than Nanette. If Rodolfo files
an action for the custody of Rona, alleging that he is Rona's choice as custodial parent,
will the court grant Rodolfo's petition? Why or why not? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No because Rodolfo has no parental authority over Rona. He who has the
parental authority has the right to custody. Under the Family Code, the mother alone
has parental authority over the illegitimate child. This is true even if the illegitimate
father has recognize the child and even though he is giving support for the child. To
acquire custody over Rona, Rodolfo should first deprive Nanette of parental authority if
there is a ground under the law, and in a proper court proceeding. In the same action
the court may award custody of Rona to Rodolfo if it is for her best interest.
Sarah had a deposit in a savings account with Filipino Universal Bank in the
amount of five Million pesos (P5,000,000.00). To buy a new car, she obtained a loan
from the same bank in the amount of P1,200,000.00, payable in twelve monthly
installments. Sarah issued in favor of the bank in post-dated checks, each in the
amount of P100,000.00 to cover the twelve monthly installment payments. On the third,
fourth and fifth months, the corresponding checks bounced.
The bank then declared the whole obligation due, and proceed to deduct the
amount of one million pesos(P1,000,000.00) from Sarah's deposit after notice ot her
that this is a form of compensation allowed by law. Is the bank correct? Explaint (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No the bank is not correct, while the Bank is correct about the applicability of
compensation, it was not correct as to the amount compensated.
A bank deposit is a contract lof loan, where the depositor is the creditor and the
bank the debtor. Since Sarah is also the debtor of the bank with respect to the loan,
both are mutually principal debtors and creditors of each other. Both obligations are
due, demandable and liquidated but only up to the extent of P300,000(covering the
unpaid third, fourth and fifth monthly installments). The entire one million was not yet
due because the loan has no accelaration clause in case of default. And since there is
no retention or controversy commenced by third persons and communicated in due
time to the debtor, then all the requisites of legal compensation are present but only up
to the amount of P300,000. The bank, therefore, may deduct P300,000 pesos from
Sarah's bank deposit by way of compensation.
XVI
Marciano is the owner of a parcel of land through which a river runs out into the
sea. The land had been brought unber the Torrens System, and is cultivated by Ulpiano
and his family as farmworkers therein. Over the years, the river brought silt and
sediment from its source up in the mountains and forests so that gradually the land
owned by Marciano increased in area by three hectares. Ulpiano built three huts on this
additional area, where he and his two married children live. On this same area. Ulpiano
and his family planted peanuts, monggo, beans and vegetables. Ulpiano also regular
paid taxes on the land, as shown by tax declarations, for over thirty years.
When Marciano learned of the increase in the size of the land he ordered Ulpiano to
demolish the huts, and demanded that he be paid his share in the proceeds of the
harvest. Marciano claims that under the civil code, the alluvium belongs to him as a
registered riparian owner to whose land the accretion attaches, and that his right is
enforceable against the whole world.
[a] is Marciano correct? Expalain. (3%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Marciano's contention is correct. Since the accretion was deposited on his land
by the action of the waters of the river and he did not construct any structure to increase
the deposition of soil ad silt, Marciano automatically owns the accretion. His real right of
ownership is enforceable against the whole word including Ulpiano and his two married
children. Although Marciano's land is registered the 3 hectares land deposited through
accretion was not autonatically registered. As unregistered land, it is subject to
acquisitive prescription by third persons.
Although Ulpiano and his children live in the 3 hectare unregistered land owned
by Marciano, they are farmworkers; therefore they are possessors not in the concept of
owners but in the concept of more holders. Even if they possessed the land for more
than 30 years, they cannot become the owners thereof through extraordinary acquisitve
prescription, because the law requires possession in the concept of owner. Payment of
taxes and tax declaration are not enough to make their possession one in the concept
of owner. They must repudiate the possession in the concept of holder by executing
unequivocal acts of repudiatin amounting to custer of Marciano, known to Marciano and
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Only then would his possession
become adverse.
[b] what rights, if any, does Ulpiano have against Marciano? Explain (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
although Ulpiano is a possessor in bad faith, because he knew he does not own
the land, he will lose the three huts he built in bad faith and make an accounting of the
fruits he has gathered, he has the right to deduct from the value of the fruits the
expenses for production, gathering and preservation of the fruits (Article 443, NCC).
He may also ask for reimbursement of the taxes he has paid, as these are
charges on the land owned by Marciano. This obligation is based on a quasi-contract (
Article 2175, NCC).
XVII
Rosario obtained a loan of P100,000.00 from Jennifer, and pledge her diamond
ring. The contract signed by the parties stipulated and if Rosarion is unable to redeem
the ring on due date, she will execute a document in favor of Jennifer providing that the
ring shall automatically be considered full payment of the loan.
[a] Is the contract valid? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The contract is valid because Rosario has to execute a document in favor of

Jennifer to transfer the ownership of the pledged ring to the latter. The contract does not
amount to a pactum commissorium because it does not provide for the automatic
appropriation by the pledge of the thing pledged in case of default by the pledgor.
[b] Will your answer to [a] be the same if the contract stipulates that upon
failure of Rosario to redeem the ring on due date, Jennifer may immediately sell the ring
and appropriate the entire proceeds thereof for herself as full payment of the? Reasons.
(3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, my answer will be different . While the contract of pledge is valid, the
stipulation authorizing the pledge to immediately sell the thing pledgedis void under
Article 2088 of the new Civil Code which provides that: “the creditor cannot appropriate
the thimgs given by way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them x x”. Jennifer cannot
immediately sell by herself the thing pledge. It must be foreclosed by selling it at a
public auction in accordance with the procedure under Article 2112 of the New Civil
Code.
XVIII
The ifugao Arms is a condominium project in Baguio City. A strong earthquake

occurred which left huge cracks in the outer walls of the building. As a result, a number
of condominium units were rendered unfit for use. May Edwin, owner of one of the
condominium units affected, legally sue for partition by sale of the whole proect?
Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes edwin may legally sue for partition by sale of the whole condominium project
under the following conditions: (a) the damage or destruction caused by the earthquake
has rendered one-half (½) or more of the units therein untenantable, and (b) that the
condominium owners holding an aggregate of more than thirty (30%) percent interest of
the common areas are opposed to the restoration of the condominium project (Section
8[b], Republic act No. 472 “ Condominium Act”).
XIX
In 1972, Luciano de la Cruz sold to Chua Chung Chun, a Chinese citizen, a

parcel of land in Binondo, Chua died in1990 leaving behind his wife and three children,
one of whom, Julian is a naturalized Filipino citizen. Six years after Chua's death, the
heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of estate, and the parcel of land was allocated
to Julian. In 2007, Luciano filed suit to recover the land he sold to Chua, alleging that
the sale was void because it contravened the Constitution which prohibits the sale of
private lands to aliens, Julian moved to dismiss the suit on grounds of pari delicto,
laches and aquisitive prescription. Decide the case with reasons. (4%).
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The case must be dismissed. Julian, who is a naturalized Filipino citizen and to
whom the property was allocated in an extra-judicial partition of the estate, is now the
new owner of the property. The defect in ownership of the property of Julian's alien
father has already been cured by its transfer to Julian. It has been validated by the
transfer of the property to a Filipino citizen. Hence, there is no more violation of the
constitution because the subject real property is now owned by a Filipino citizen (Halili
v. CA 287 SCRA 465 [1998]). Futher, after the lapse of 35 years, laches has set in and
the motion to dismiss may be granted, for the failure of Luciano to question the
ownership of Chua before its transfer to Julian.
XX
[a] If Ligaya, a Filipino citizen residing in the United States, file a petition for
change of name before the District Court of New York, what law shall apply? Explain.
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
New York law shall apply. The petition for change of name filed in New York
does not concern the legal capacity or status of the petitioner. Moreover, it does not
affect the Registry of any other country including the country of birth of the petitioner.
Whatever judgment is rendered in that petition will have effect only in New York. The
New York court cannot, for instance, order the Civil Registrar in the Philippines to
change its records. The judgment of the New York Court allowing a change in the name
of the Petitioner will be limited to the records of the petitioner in New York and the use
of the new name in all her transactions in New York. Since the records and processes
in New York are the only ones affeted the New York Court will apply New York law in
resolving the petition.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Philippine law shall apply (Art. 15, NCC). Status, conditions, family rights and
duties are governed by Philippine laws as to Filipinos even though sojourning abroad.
If Ligaya, a Filipino, files a petition for change of name with the District Court of
New York, the laws of New York will govern since change of name is not one of those
covered by the principles of nationality.
[b] If Henry, an American citizen residing in the Philippines, files a petition for
change of name before a Philippine court, what law shall apply? Explain (2%)
SUGGESTE ANSWER:
Philippine law will apply. The petition for change of name in the Philippines will
affect only the records of the petitioner and his transactions in the Philippines. The
Philippine court can never acquire jurisdiction over the custodian in the US of the
records of the petitioner. Moreover, change of name has nothing to do with the legal
capacity or status of the alien. Since Philippine records and transations are the only
ones affected, the Philippine court may effect the change only in accordance with the
laws governing those records and transactions. That the law cannot be but Philippine
law.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
U.S. Law shall apply as it is his national law. This is pursuant to the application of
lex patriae or the nationality principle, by which his legal status is governed by national
law, the matter f change of name being included in legal status. The Supreme Court has
reiterated in several cases, that the lex partiae as provided in Article 15 of the Civil
Code is applicable to foreign nationals in determining their legal status (supra).
Ana Rivera had a husband, a Filipino citizen like her, who was among the
passengers on board a commercial jet plane which crashed in the Atlantic Ocean
ten(10) years earlier and had never been heard of ever since. Believing that her
husband had died, Ana married Adolf Cruz Staedtler, a divorced German national born
of a German father and a Filipino mother residing in Stuttgart. To avoid being required
to submit the required certificate of capacity to marry from the German Embassy in
Manila, Adolf stated in the application for marriage license that he was a Filipino citizen.
With the marriage license stating that Adolf was a Filipino, the couple got married in a
ceremony officiated by the Parish Priest of Calamba, Laguna in a beach in Nasugbu,
Batangas, as the local parish priest refused to solemnize marriages except in his
church. Is the marriage valid? Explain fully. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The issue hinges on whether or not the missing husband was dead or alive at the
time of the second marriage.
If the missing husband was in fact dead at the time the second marriage was
celebrated, the second marriage was valid. Actual death of a spouse dissolves the
marriage ipso facto whether or not the surviving spouse had knowledge of such fact. A
declaration of presumptive death even if obtained will not make the marriage voidable
because presumptive death will not prevail over the fact of death.
If the missing husband was in fact alive when the second marriage was celebrated,
the second marriage was void ab initio because of a prior subsisting marriage. Had Ana
obtained a declaration of presumptive death, the second marriage would have been
voidable.
In both cases, the fact that the German misrepresented his citizenship to avoid
having to present his Certificate of Legal Capacity, or the holding of the ceremony
outside the church or beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the solemnizing officer, are all
irregularities which do not affect the validity of the marriage.
II
At age 18, Marian found out that she was pregnant. She insured her own life and
named her unborn child as her sole beneficiary. When she was already due to give
birth, she and her boyfriend Pierto, the father of her unborn child, were kidnapped in a
resort in Bataan where they were vacationing. The military gave chase and after one
week, they were found in an abandoned hut in Cavite. Marian and Pietro were hacked
with bolos. Marian and the baby she delivered were both found dead, with the baby’s
umbilical cord already cut. Pietro survived.
a) Can Marian’s baby be the beneficiary of the insurance taken on the life of
the mother? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) An unborn child may be designated as the beneficiary in the insurance
policy of the mother. An unborn child shall be considered a person for purposes
favorable to it provided it is born later in accordance with the Civil Code. There is no
doubt that the designation of the unborn child as a beneficiary is favorable to the child.
b) Between Marian and the baby, who is presumed to have died ahead?
(1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) if the baby was not alive when completely delivered from the mother’;s
womb, it was not born as a person, then the question of who between two persons
survived will not be an issue. Since the baby had a intrauterine life of more than 7
months, it would be considered born if it was alive, at the time of its complete delivery
from the mother’s womb. We can gather from the facts that the baby was completely
delivered. But whether or not it was alive has to be proven by evidence.
If the baby was alive when completely delivered from the mother’s womb, then it
was born as a person and the question of who survived as between the baby and the
mother shall be resolved by the provisions of the Rules of Court on survivorship. This is
because the question has nothing to do with succession. Obviously, the resolution of
the question is needed just for the implementation of an insurance contract. Under Rule
13, Sec. 3, (jj), (5) as between the baby who was under 15 years old and Marian who
was 18 years old, Marian is presumed to have survived.
In both cases, therefore, the baby never acquired any right under the insurance
policy. The proceeds of the insurance will then go to the estate of Marian.
b) Will Pietro, as surviving biological father of the baby, be entitled to claim the
proceeds of the life insurance on the life of Marian? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) Since the baby did not acquire any right under the insurance contract,
there is nothing for Pietro to inherit.
Ill
Roderick and Faye were high school sweethearts. When Roderick was 18 and Faye,
16 years old, they started to live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. When Faye reached 18 years of age, her parents forcibly took her back
and arranged for her marriage to Brad. Although Faye lived with Brad after the
marriage, Roderick continued to regularly visit Faye while Brad was away at work.
During their marriage, Faye gave birth to a baby girl, laica. When Faye was 25 years
old, Brad discovered her continued liaison with Roderick and in one of their heated
arguments, Faye shot Brad to death. She lost no time in marrying her true love
Roderick, without a marriage license, claiming that they have been continuously
cohabiting formore than 5 years.
a) Was the marriage of Roderick and Faye valid? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The marriage was void because there was no marriage license. Their
marriage was not exempt from the requisite of a marriage license because Roderick
and Faye L have not been cohabiting for at least 5 continuous years j before the
celebration of their marriage. Their lovers’ tryata and brief visitations did not amount
to “cohabitation”. Moreover, the Supreme Court held that for the marriage to be
exempt from a license, there should be no impediment for them to marry each other
during the entire 5 years of cohabitation. Roderick and Faye could not have cohabited
for 5 continuous years without impediment because Faye was then legally married to
Brad.
b) What is the filiation status of Laica? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b)What is the filiation status of Laica? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) Having been born during the marriage of Faye and Brad, she is presumed
to be the legitimate child of Faye and Brad. This presumption had become conclusive
because the period of time to impugn her filiation had
already prescribed.
c) Can Laica bring an action to impugn her own status on the ground that
based on DNA results, Roderick is her biological father? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) No, she cannot impugn her own filiation. The law does not allow a child to
impugn his or her own filiation. In the problem, Laica’s legitimate filiation was accorded
to her by operation of law which may be impugned only by Brad, or his heirs in the
cases provided by law within the prescriptive period.
b) Can Laica be legitimated by the marriage of her biological parents? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) No she cannot be legitimated by the marriage of her biological parents. In
the first place she is not, under the law, the child of Roderick. In the second place,
her biological parents could not have validly married each other at the time she was
conceived and born simply because Faye was still married to Roderick at that time.
Under Article 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived or born outside of
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the child were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, may be legitimated.
IV
Gianna was bom to Andy and Aimee, who at the time of Gianna’s birth were not
married to each other. While - Andy was single at that time, Aimee was still in the
process ; of securing a judicial declaration of nullity on her marriage to her ex-husband.
Gianna’s birth certificate, which was signed by both Andy and Aimee, registered the
status of Gianna as “legitimate”, her surname carrying that of Andy’s, and that her
parents were married to each other.
a) Can a judicial action for correction of entries in Gianna’s birth
certificate be successfully maintained to:
i) Change her status from “legitimate” to “illegitimate” (1%); and
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) (i) A judicial action cannot be maintained to change the status of Gianna from
“legitimate” to “illegitimate” child of Andy and Aimee. While it is true that Gianna is the
biological daughter of Andy and Aimee conceived and born without marriage between
them. Gianna is presumed, under the law as the legitimate child of Aimee and her
husband. This filliation may be impugned only by the husband. To correct the status of
Gianna in her birth certificate form “legitimate child of Andy and Aimee” to “illegitimate
child of Andy and Aimee” will amount to indirectly impugning her filiation as the child of
Aimee’s husband. This is not allowed unless brought by Aimee’s husband in a proper
action. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
ii) Change her surname from that of Andy’s to Aimee’s maiden surname?
(1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) ii) A judicial action to change the surname of Gianna from the surname of
Andy to the maiden surname j of Aimee is also not allowed. Gianna, being presumed
to be I the legitimate child of Aimee’s husband is required by law to be registered
under the surname of Aimee’s husband.
1 While it is true that Gianna’s registered surname is I erroneous, a judicial action for
correction of entry to change the surname of Gianna to that of Aimee’s maiden
surname will also be erroneous. A judicial action to correct an entry in the birth
certificate is allowed to i correct an error and not to commit another error.
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANSWER TO IV,(i) and (ii):
It may be noted that the problems does not show whether Gianna was born while
Aimee was living with her ex husband. Neither does it show who filed the judicial action
to correct the entries.
If the problem is intended only for the purpose of determining whether factual
changes are in order, then the answers are:
(i) A change from “legitimate” to “illegitimate” is proper upon proof of lack of

marriage between Andy and Aimee.
(ii) If the child is considered illegitimate, then she should follow the surname of her
mother.
b) Instead of a judicial action, can administrative proceedings be brought for

the purpose of making the above corrections? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
b) Under R.A. 9048, only typographical errors are allowed to be corrected
administratively. The change of status from legitimate to illegitimate is not a
typographical error and even assuming that it is, its administrative correction is not
allowed under R.A. 9048. Typographical errors involving status, age, citizenship, and
gender are expressly excluded from what may be corrected administratively.
The change of the surname is also not allowed administratively. R.A. 9048
provides for an administrative procedure for change of first name only and not for
change of surname.
c) Assuming that Aimee is successful in declaring her former marriage void,

and Andy and Aimee subsequently married each other, would Gianna be legitimated?
(1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) No, Gianna will not be legitimated. While the court may have declared the
marriage void ab initio and, therefore, no marriage took place in the eyes of the law,
Gianna will still not be legitimated. This is because at the time she was conceived and
born her biological parents could not have validly married each other. For their marriage
to be valid, the court must first declare the first marriage null and void. In the problem,
Gianna was conceived and born before the court has decreed the nullity of her mother’s
previous marriage.
V
Despite several relationships with different women, j Andrew remained

unmarried. His first relationship with Brenda produced a daughter, Amy,now 30 years
old. His second, with Carla, produced two sons: Jon and Ryan. His 1 third, with Donna,
bore him two daughters: Vina and Wilma.
His fourth, with Elena, bore him no children although Elena : has a daughter Jane, from
a previous relationship. His last, with Fe, produced no biological children but they
informally adopted without court proceedings, Sandy, now 13 years old, whom they
consider as their own. Sandy was orphaned as a baby and was entrusted to them by
the midwife who attended to Sandy’s birth. All the children, including Amy, now live with
Andrew in his house.
a) Is there any legal obstacle to the legal adoption of Amy by Andrew? To

the legal adoption of Sandy by Andrew and Elena? (2%).
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) No, there is no legal obstacle to the legal adoption of Amy by Andrew.

While a person of age may not be adopted, Amy falls within two exceptions: (1) she is
an illegitimate child and she is being adopted by her : illegitimate father to improve
her status; and (2) even on the assumption that she is not an illegitimate child of
Andrew, she may still be adopted, although of legal age, because she has been
consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his own child since minority. In
fact, she has been living with him until now.
There is a legal obstacle to the adoption of Sandy by Andrew and Elena. Andrew
and Elena cannot adopt | jointly because they are not married.
b) In his old age, can Andrew be legally entitled to l] claim support from Amy,
Jon, Ryan, Vina , Wilma 1 and Sandy assuming that all of them have the 1 means to
support him? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) Andrew can claim support from them all, except from Sandy, who is not
his child, legitimate, illegitimate or adopted.
c) Can Amy, Jon, Ryan, Vina and Wilma can ask support from each other
because they are half-blood brothers and sisters, and Vina and Wilma are full-blood
sisters (Art.195 [5], Family Code), but not Sandy who is not related to any of them.
d) Can Jon and Jane legally marry? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
d) Jon and Jane can legally marry because they are not related to each
other. Jane is not a daughter of Andrew.
Alex died without a will, leaving only an undeveloped and untitled lot in Taguig City. He
is survived by his wife and 4 children. His wife told the children that she is waiving her
hare in the property, and allowed Bobby, the eldest son who was about to get married,
to construct his house on 1/4 of the lot without however obtaining the consent of his
siblings. l&After settlement of Alex’s estate and partition among the | heirs, it was
discovered that Bobby’s house was constructed on the portion allocated to his sister,
Cathy. Cathy asked Bobby to demolish his house and vacate the portion allotted to her.
In lieu of demolition, Bobby offered to purchase from Cathy the lot portion on which his
house was constructed. At that time, the house was valued at P300,000 while the
portion of the lot on which the house was constructed was valued at P350,000.
a) Can Cathy lawfully ask for demolition of Bobby’s H&- house? (3%)
MAIN SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a) Yes, Cathy can ask for the demolition of Bobby’s I house on the portion
allotted to Cathy in the partition. The lot is presumed to be community property as it
was acquired during the marriage. Upon Alex’s death there I was created a co-
ownership by operation of law among the ! widow and four children. (Art. 1078, CC)
Bobby’s share is only an undivided interest of 1/10 of the entire lot. The widow’s share
in the co-ownership is 6 /10 of the entire lot, 1/2 of the lot being her share in the
community property and 1/5 of Alex’s share in the other half, because she has the
same share as one of the four children. She has the financial majority or majority
interest of the co-ownership.
Bobby’s act of building on ¼ of the lot is an act requiring the unanimous consent
of all the co-owners since it is an act of alteration. Bobby only had the ideal share of
1/10 of the entire lot, and when he built his house on ¼ of the lot, he was arrogating
unto himself the right to partition the poverty and taking more than what he legally owns.
The consent given by the widow to Bobby’s act of building his house was legally
insufficient. As a matter of right, Cathy can ask for the demolition of the house and the
payment of damages.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
a) Art. 448 of the New Civil Code is applicable by i analogy (Concepcion

Fernandez del Campo v. Abeisa, 160 , SCRA 379 [1988]). Pursuant thereto, Cathy is
given two ^ options: (1) to appropriate the house that Bobby built, I upon payment of
indemnity; or (2) to compel Bobby to buy the land, considering that its value is not
considerably higher than the value of the house. At this stage she is not given the
option to demand demolition of the house. However, if she has chosen to sell the land
to Bobby and the latter does not or cannot buy the land, she can demand the
demolition of the house.
b) Can Bobby legally insist on purchasing the land? ' (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) No, Bobby cannot legally insist on purchasing the land. The rules on building,
planting and sowing are 1 not applicable to co-ownership. The rules applicable to co- !
ownership are acts of alteration or acts of ownership on I one hand and acts of mere
administration on the other. Even if it were applicable, Bobby acted in bad faith and
hence, demolition is one of the three options open to an J owner. It is the owner of the
land, not the builder, planter or sower who has the options, even if both acted in bad
faith or good faith.
VII
Anthony bought a piece of untitled agricultural land from Bert, Bert, in turn,
acquired the property by forging Carlo’s signature in a deed of sale over the property.
Carlo had been in possession of the property for 8 years, declared it for tax purposes,
and religiously paid all taxes due on the property. Anthony is not aware of the defect in
Bert’s title, but has been in actual physical possession of the property from the time he
bought it from Bert, who had never been in possession. Anthony has since then been in
possession of the property for one year.
a) Can Anthony acquire ownership of the property by acquisitive

prescription? How many more years does he have to possess it to acquire ownership?
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Yes, Anthony can acquire ownership of the property by ordinary

acquisitive prescription which requires just title and good faith (Art. 1117, cc). There was
just title because a deed of sale was issued in his favor even though it was forged,
which fact he was not aware of. He needs to possess the land in good faith and in the
concept of owner for a total of ten years in order to acquire ownership.
Since Anthony possessed the land for only one year, he has not completed the ten-year
period. Even if Anthony tacks the 8-year period of possession by Carlo who in the deed
of sale is supposed to be his grantor or predecessor in interest (Article 1138 [I], CC), the
period is still short of ten years.
b) if Carlo is able to legally recover his property, can he require Anthony to

account for all the fruits he has harvested from the property while in possession? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) Since Anthony is a possessor in good faith, Anthony cannot be made to

account for the fruits he gathered before he was served with summons. A possessor
in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the possession was legally
interrupted by the service of summons (Art. 544, CC). After Anthony was served with
summons, he became a possessor in bad faith and a builder, planter, sower in bad
faith. He can also be made to account for the fruits but he may deduct expenses for
production gathering and preservation of the fruits (Art. 1 443, CC).
c) If there are standing crops on the property when Carlo recovers

possession, can Carlo appropriate them? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) The value of the standing crops must be prorated depending upon the
period of possession and the period of growing and producing the fruits. Anthony is
entitled to a part of the net harvest and a part of the expenses of cultivation in proportion
to his period of possession. Carlo may appropriate the respective parts subject to
prorating the respective periods of possession. However, Carlo may allow Anthony to
gather these growing fruits as an indemnity for the expenses of cultivation. If Anthony
refuses to accept this concession, he shall lose the right to indemnity under Art. 443
(Art. 545, par. 3, CC).
VII
Adam, a building contractor, was engaged by Bias to construct a house on a lot

which he (Bias) owns. While digging on the lot in order to lay down the foundation of
the house, Adam hit a very hard object. It turned out to be the vault of the old Banco
de las Islas Filipinas. U sing a detonation device, Adam was able to open the vault
containing old notes and coins which were in circulation during the Spanish era. While
the notes and coins are no longer legal tender, they I were valued at P 100 million
because of their historical value and the coins’ silver and nickel content. The following
filed legal claims over the notes and coins:
i) Adam, as finder;
ii) Blas, as owner of the property where they were found;
iii) Bank of the Philippine Islands, as successor-in-interest of the owner of the
vault; and
iv) The Philippine Government because of their historical value.
a) who owns the notes and coins? (4%)

a) Hidden treasure is money jewelry or other precious objects the ownership of

which does not appear (Art. 439, CC). The vault of the Banco de las Islas Filipinas
has been buried for about a century and the Bank of the “Philippine Islands cannot
succeed by inheritance to the property of Banco de las Islas Filipinas. The ownership
of ;the vault, together with the notes and coins can now " legally be considered as
hidden treasure because its ownership is no longer apparent. The contractor, Adams i
is not a trespasser and therefore entitled to one-half of the hidden treasure and Bias
as owner of the property, is entitled the other half (Art. 438, CC). Since the notes and ,
coins have historical value, the government may acquire them at their just price which
in turn will be divided equally between Adam and Bias (Art. 438, par. 3, CC).
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
a) The Banco de las Islas Filipinas is the owner of the vault. The finder and
owner of the land cannot share ; in the notes and coins, because they are not buried
treasure under the law, as the ownership is known. Although under Art. 720 of the Civil
Code the finder shall be given a reward of one-tenth of the price of the thing found, as
a lost movable, on the principle of quasi-contract
However, the notes and coins may have become res nullius considering that
Banco de las Islas Filipinas is longer a juridical person and has apparently given up
looking for them and Adam, the first one to take possession with intent to possess
shall become the sole owner.
b) Assuming that either or both Adam and Bias are adjudged as owners, will
the notes and coins be deemed part of their absolute community or
conjugal partnership of gains with their respective spouses? (2%)
b) Yes. The hidden treasure will be part of the absolute community or

conjugal property, of the respective marriages (Arts. 91, 93 and 106, Family Code).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
b) It is not hidden treasure and therefore, not part, if the absolute or

conjugal partnership of the spouses. But the finder of the lost movable, then his
reward equivalent to one-tenth of the value of the vault’s contents, will form part of
the conjugal partnership. If the government wants to acquire the notes and coins, it
must expropriate them for public use as museum pieces and pay just compensation.
IX
The properties of Jessica and Jenny, who are neighbors, lie along the banks of
the Marikina River. At certain times of the year, the river would swell and as the
water recedes, soil, rocks and other materials are deposited on Jessica’s and
Jenny’s properties. This pattern of the river swelling, receding and depositing soil
and other materials being deposited on the neighbors’ properties have gone on for
many years. Knowing this pattern, Jessica constructed a concrete barrier about 2
meters from her property line and extending towards the river, so that when the
water recedes, soil and other materials are trapped within this barrier. After several
years, the area between Jessica’s property line to the concrete barrier was
completely filled with soil, effectively increasing Jessica’s property by 2 meters.
Jenny’s property, where no barrier was constructed, also increased by one meter
along the side of the river.
a) Can Jessica and Jenny legally claim ownership over the additional 2 meters
and one meter, respectively, of land deposited along their properties? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Jenny can legally claim ownership of the lands by right of accession

(accretion) under Article 457 of the Civil Code. The lands came into being over
the years through the gradual deposition of soil and silt by the natural action of
the waters of the river.
Jessica cannot claim the two meter-wide strip of land added to her
land. Jessica constructed the cement j barrier two meters in front of her
property towards the river not to protect her land from the destructive forces of
the water but to trap the alluvium. In order that the riparian owner may be entitled
to the alluvium the deposition must occur naturally without the intervention of
the riparian owner (Republic v. CA, 132 SCRA 514 [1984]).
b) If Jessica’s and Jenny’s properties are registered, will the benefit of such
registration extend to the increased area of their properties? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the registration of Jessica’s and Jenny’s adjoining property does not
automatically extend to the accretions. They have to bring their lands under the
operation of the Torrens system of land registration following the procedure
prescribed in P.D. No. 1529.
c) Assume the two properties are on a cliff adjoining the shore of
Laguna Lake. Jessica and Jenny h a hotel built on the properties. They had the earth
and rocks excavated from the properties dumped on the adjoining shore, giving rise to a
new patch of dry land. Can they validly lay claim to the patch of land? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Jessica and Jenny cannot validly lay claim to the price of dry land that
resulted from the dumping of rocks and earth materials excavated from their
properties because it is a reclamation without authority. The land is part of the
lakeshore, if not the lakebed, which is inalienable land of the public domain.
Arthur executed a will which contained only: (i) a provision disinheriting his
daughter Bernice for running off with a married man, and (ii) a provision disposing of
his share in the family house and lot in favor of his other children Connie and Dora.
He did not make any provisions in favor of his wife Erica, because as the will stated,
she would anyway get V* of the house and lot as her conjugal share. The will was
very brief and straightforward and both the above provisions were contained in page
1, which Arthur and his instrumental witness, signed at the bottom. Page 2 contained
the attestation clause and the signatures, at the bottom thereof, of the 3 instrumental
witnesses which included Lambert, the driver of Arthur; Yoly, the family cook, and
Attorney Zorba, the lawyer who prepared the will. There was a 3rd page, but this only
contained the notarial acknowledgement. The attestation clause stated the will was
signed on the same occasion by Arthur and his instrumental witnesses who all
signed in the presence of each other, and the notary public who notarized the will.
There are no marginal signatures or pagination appearing on any of the 3 pages.
Upon his death, it was discovered that apart from the house and lot, he had a P 1
million account deposited with ABC Bank.
a) Was Erica preterited? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Erica was not preterited under Art. 854 of the New Civil Code
because she was not related in the direct line. Moreover, since there is an
intestate portion in [Arthur's estate from which Erica will inherit as an intestate
heir, she was not totally excluded or omitted from the -heritance of Arthur. To be
preterited, the heir who must be a compulsory heir in the direct line should be
totally excluded from the inheritance, i.e., the heir will not receive anything by
will, or by intestacy, and has not received any advance by way of donation inter
vivos.
Even assuming that Erica was preterited, her preterition will not have any
effect on the provisions of the will. The effect of preterition is simply to annul the
institution of an heir made in the will. Legacies and devises are respected unless
they are inofficious. In the I problem, since the will contains nothing but a
devise,there is no institution that will be annulled even on the assumption that
there was preterition.
b) What other defects of the will, if any, can cause denial of probate? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
There are no other defects of the will that can cause denial of probate. Art. 805 of
the Civil Code provides that the will must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator, and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another. The driver, the cook and the lawyer who prepared the will
are credible witnesses. The testator and the instrumental] witnesses of the will, shall
also sign, each and every page, of the will proper, except the last, on the left margin,
and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each page.
It has been held, however, that the testator's signature is not necessary in the
attestation clause, and that if a will consists of two sheets, the first of which contains the
testamentary dispositions, and is signed at the bottom by the testator and the three
witnesses, and the second sheet contains the attestation clause, as in this case, signed
by 3 witnesses, marginal signatures and paging are not necessary. After all, the object
of the law is to avoid substitution of any of the sheets of the will. (Abangan v. Abangan,
40 Phil. 476 [1919]; In Re: Will of Tan Diuco, 45 Phil 807 [1924]).
c) Was the disinheritance valid? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) The fact that the daughter disinherited ran off with a married man is a
valid ground for disinheritance under the Civil Code. One ground for disinheritance of a
descendant is when the descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life (Art. 919
[7], CC]. Running away with a married man leads to a dishonorable or disgraceful life.
d) How should the house and lot, and the cash be distributed? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
d) On the assumption that the House and Lot and the Cash were all
conjugal property, the distribution will be as follows:
House and Lot
One half of the house shall be the conjugal share of Erica. The other half is
the conjugal share of Arthur which was inherited by Erica, Connie and Dora in equal
shares. Hence, Erica, Connie and Dora will be undivided co-owners of the house and lot
with Erica getting 2/3 share thereof and Connie and Dora with 1/6 share each.
Cash
The one million cash shall be divided in the same manner. ½ thereof or
500,000 shall be the conjugal share of Erica while 500,000 shall be the share of Arthur.
This amount shall be divided in 3 equal shares, or 166,666.66 per share. Erica will get
166,666.66 as her share, while Dora and Connie will get 166,666.66 each as their
inheritance. The one million cash will be distributed as follows:
Erica --------------666,666.66
Dora ---------------166,666.66
Connie ------------ 166,666.66
XI
John and Paula, British citizens at birth, acquired Philippine citizenship by
naturalization after their marriage. During their marriage the couple acquired
substantial landholdings in London and in Makati. Paula bore John three children,
Peter, Paul and Mary. In one of their trips to London, the couple executed a joint will
appointing each other as their heirs and providing that upon the death of the survivor
between them the entire estate would go to Peter 'and Paul only but the two could not
dispose of nor divide the London estate as long as they live. John and Paula died
tragically in the London Subway terrorist attack in 2005. Peter and Paul filed a petition
for probate of their parent’s will before a Makati Regional Trial Court.
a) Should the will be admitted to probate? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) No, the will cannot be admitted to probate. Joint wills are void under the
New Civil Code. And even if the joint will executed by Filipinos abroad where
valid where it was executed, the joint will is still not valid in the Philippines.
b) Are the testamentary dispositions valid? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) If a will is void, all testamentary dispositions contained in that will are also
void. Hence, all testamentary provisions contained in the void joint will are also void.
c) is the testamentary prohibition against the division of the London estate
valid? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) The testamentary prohibition against the division by Peter and Paul of the
London estate for as long as they live, is not valid. Article 494 of the New Civil Code
provides that a donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which may not
exceed twenty (20) years.
XII
Ernesto, an overseas Filipino worker, was coming home to the Philippines after
working for so many years in the Middle East. He had save P100,000 in his savings
account in Manila which he intended to use to start a business in his home country. On
his flight home, Ernesto had a fatal heart attack. He left behind his widowed mother, his
common-law wife and their twin sons. He left no will, no debts, no other relatives and
no other properties except the money in his savings account. Who are the heirs entitled
to inherit form him and how much should each receive? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If the 100,000 peso savings came form wages and salaries that Ernesto earned
during the time that he was cohabiting with his common law wife, and there was no
impediment for them to marry each other. The P100,000 shall be owned by them in
equal shares under Article 147 of the Family Code. Therefore, one half thereof, of
P50,000, shall belong to the common law wife as her share in the co-ownership, while
the other half of P50,000 shall be the share of Ernesto that will be inherited by his
mother, and two illegitimate children. The mother will get P25,000 while the two
illegitimate children will get P12,500 each. The common law wife is not a legal heir of
Ernesto because they were not legally married.
If there was an impediment for Ernesto and his common law wife to marry each
other, the P100,000 will be owned by Ernesto alone, the common law wife not having
contributed to its acquisition (Art. 148, Family Code) it shall be inherited by his mother
who will get P50,000, and his two illegitimate sons who will get 25,000 each.
XIII
Raymond, single, named his sister Ruffa in his will as I a devisee of a parcel of land
which he owned. The will I imposed upon Ruffa the obligation of preserving the land
and transferring it, upon her death, to her illegitimate daughter Scarlet who was then
only one year old. Raymond later died, leaving behind his widowed mother, Ruffa and
Scarlet.
a) Is the condition imposed upon Ruffa to preserve the property and to
transmit it upon her death to Scarlet, valid? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) When an obligation to preserve and transmit the property to Scarlet was

imposed on Ruffa, the testato Raymond intended to create a fideicommissary
substitution where Ruffa is the fiduciary and Scarlet is the fideicommissary. Having
complied with the requirements of Articles 863 and 869 (N.C.C.) the fideicommissary
substitution is valid.
b) if Scarlet predeceases Ruffa, who inherits the property? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If Scarlet predeceases Ruffa, the fideicommissary substitution is rendered null or

ineffective under Article 863 (N.C.C.) And applying Article 868 (N.C.C.), the
fideicommissary clause is disregarded without prejudice to the validity of the
institution of the fiduciary. In such case Ruffa shall inherit the devise free from the
condition.
c) If Ruffa predeceases Raymond, can Scarlet inherit the property directly

from Raymond? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) In fideicommissary substitution, the intention of the testator is to make the

second heir his ultimate heir. The right of the second heir is simply postpone by the
delivery of the inheritance to the first heir for him to enjoy the usufruct over the
inheritance. Hence, when the first heir predeceased the testator, the first heir did not
qualify to inherit and the right of the second heir to receive the inheritance will no longer
be delayed provided the second heir is qualified to inherit at the time of the testator’s
death. In fideicommissary substitution, the first and the second heirs inherit from the
testator, hence, both should be qualified to inherit from the testator at the time of his
death.
In the problem, when Ruffa predeceased Raymond, she did not qualify to receive
the inheritance to enjoy its usufruct, hence, the right of Scarlet to receive the inheritance
upon the death of the testator will no longer be delayed. However, Scarlet is not
qualified to inherit from Raymond because she is barred by Article 992 of the New Civil
Code being an illegitimate child of Raymond’s legitimate father. The devise will
therefore be ineffective and the property will be disposed of by intestacy.
XIV
Stevie was born blind. He went to school for the blind, and learned to read in
Braille language. He speaks English fluently. Can he:
a) Make a will? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Stevie may make a notarial will. A blind man is not expressly prohibited
from executing a will. In fact, Article 808 of the NCC provides for additional formality
when the testator is blind. Stevie, however, may not make a holographic will in Braille
because the writing in Braille is not a handwriting. A holographic will to be valid must be
written entirely, signed, and dated by the testator in his own handwriting.
b) Act as a witness to a will? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) A blind man is disqualified by law to be a witness to a notarial will.
c) In either of the above instances, must the will be read to him? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) In case Stevie executes a notarial will, it has to be read to him twice. First by
one of the instrumental witnesses, and second by the notary public before whom the
will was acknowledged.
XV
Eduardo was granted a loan by XYZ Bank for the purpose of improving a building which
XYZ leased from him. Eduardo, executed the promissory note (“PN”) in favor of the
bank, with his friend Recardo as cosignatory. In the PN, they both acknowledged that
they are “individually and collectively” liable and waived the need for prior demand. To
secure the PN, Recardo executed a real estate mortgage on his own property. When
Eduardo defaulted on the PN, XYZ stopped payment of rentals on the building on the
ground that legal compensation had set in. Since there was still a balance due on the
PN after applying the rentals, XYZ foreclosed the real estate mortgage over Recardo’s
property. Recardo opposed the foreclosure on the ground that he is only a co-signatory;
that no demand was made upon him for payment, and assuming he is liable, his liability
should not go beyond half the balance of the loan. Further, Recardo said that when the
bank invoked compensation between the rentals and the amount of the loan, it
amounted to a new contract or novation, and had the effect of extinguishing the security
since he did not give his consent (as owner of the property under the real estate
mortgage) thereto.
a) Can XYZ Bank validly assert legal compensation? (2%)
MAINSUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) XYZ Bank may validly assert the partial compensation of both debts, but it
should be facultative compensation because not all of the five requisites of legal
compensation are present (Article 1279,N.C.C). The payment of the rentals by XYZ
bank is not yet due, but the principal obligation of loan where both Eduardo and
Recardo are bound to pay the entire loan, is due and demandable without need of
demand. XYZ Bank may declare its obligation to pay rentals as already due and
demand payment from any of the two debtors.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
a) Legal compensation can be validly asserted between the bank, Eduardo and
Recardo. This is a case of facultative obligation, thus, the bank can assert partial
compensation. Banks have an inherent right to set off where both obligations are due
and demandable (Art. 1279, CC)
b) Can Recardo’s property be foreclosed to pay the full balance of the loan?
(2%)
MAINSUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) No, because there was no prior demand on Ricardo, depriving him of the
right to reasonably block the foreclosure by payment. The waiver of prior demand in the
PN is against public policy and violates the right to due process. Without demand, there
is no default and the foreclosure is null and void. Since the mortgage, insofar as
Ricardo is concerned is not violated, a requirement under Act 3135 for a valid
foreclosure of real estate mortgage is absent.
In the case of DBP vs. Licuanan (516 SCRA 644 [2007]), it was held that: “the
issue of whether demand was made before the foreclosure was effected is essential. If
demand was made and duly received by the respondents and the latter still did not pay,
then they were already in default and foreclosure was proper. However, if demand was
not made, then the loans had not yet become due and demandable. This meant that
respondents had not defaulted in their payment and the foreclosure was premature”.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
b) No. Although the principal obligation of loan is due and

demandable without need of further demand the foreclosure of the accessory contract
of real estate mortgage, there is a need of notice and demand.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
b) Yes. Recardo’s property can be foreclosed to pay the full balance of the
loan. He is admittedly “individually and collectively” liable. His liability is solidary. He
and Eduardo have waived notice for a prior demand as provided in the promissory note.
a) Does Recardo have basis under the Civil Code for claiming that the original
contract was novated? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) one of the three kinds of novation is applicable. There is no objective novation,

whether express or implied, because there is no change in the object or principal
conditions of the obligation. There is no substitution of debtors, either. Compensation is
considered as abbreviated or simplified payment and since Recardo bound himself
solidarily with Eduardo, any facultative compensation which occurs does not result in
partial legal subrogation. Neither Eduardo nor Recardo is a third person interested in
the obligation under Art 1302, CC.
XVI
Dux leased his house to Iris for a period of 2 years, at the rate of P25,000.00 monthly,
payable annually in advance. The contract stipulated that it may be renewed for
another2-year period upon mutual agreement of the parties. The contract also granted
Iris the right of first refusal to purchase the property at any time during the lease, if Dux
decides to sell the property at the same price that the property is offered for sale to a
third party. Twenty-three months after execution of the lease contract, Dux sold the
house to his mother for P2 million. Iris claimed that the sale was a breach of her right of
first refusal. Dux said there was no breach because the property was sold to his mother
who is not a third party. Iris filed an action to rescind the sale and to compel Dux to sell
the property to her at the same price. Alternatively, she asked the court to extend the
lease for another 2 years on the same terms.
a) Can Iris seek rescission of the sale of the property to Dux’s mother? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Iris can seek rescission because pursuant to Equatorial Realty Co. v. Mayfair
Theater (264 SCRA 483 [1996]) recission is a relief allowed for the protection of one of
the contracting parties and even third persons from all injury and damage the contract
of sale may causes or the protection of some incompatible and preferred right.
b) Will the alternative prayer for extension of the lease prosper? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) No, the extension of the lease should be upon the mutual agreement of the
parties.
XVII
Felipe borrowed $100 from Gustavo in 1998, when the Phil P - US$ exchange rate
was P56 - US$1. On March 1, 2008, Felipe tendered to Gustavo a cashier’s check in
the amount of P4,135 in payment of his US$100 debt, based on the Phil P - US$
exchange rate at that time. Gustavo accepted the check, but forgot to deposit it until
Sept. 12, 2008. His bank refused to accept the check because it had become stale.
Gustavo now wants Felipe to pay him in cash the amount of P5,600. Claiming that the
previous payment was not in legal tender, and that there has been extraordinary
deflation since 1998, and therefore, Felipe should pay him the value of the debt at the
time it was incurred. Felipe refused to pay him again, claiming that Gustavo is
estopped from raising the issue of legal tender, having accepted the check in March,
and that it was Gustavo’s negligence in not depositing the check immediately that
caused the check to become stale.
a) Can Gustavo now raise the issu e that the cashier’s check is not legal tender?
(2%)
a) No, because Gustavo is guilty of estoppel by laches. He led Felipe to believe

he could pay by cashier’s check, and Felipe relied that such cashier’s check would be
encashed thus extinguishing his obligation. Because of Gustavo’s inaction of more
than six months the check became stale and Felipe will prejudiced if he will be required
to pay $ 100 at the exchange rate of P56 to $ 1.00. The exchange should be the rate
at the time of payment.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
a) Yes. The cashier’s check is not legal tender until it is encashed. (Art.
1249,CC). the cashier’s check by itself is not legal tender. (Cuaycong v. Ruiz, 86 Phil.
170 [1950]; Belisario v. Natividad, 60 Phil. 156 [1934]).
b) Can Felipe validly refuse to pay Gustavo again? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) Yes, if the payment is valid. Since the bank considered the cashier’s
check as being stale for not having been encashed on time, then the cashier’s check
may be issued again. At any rate, non-payment of the amount to Gustavo would
constitute unjust enrichment.
c) Can Felipe compel Gustavo to receive US$100 instead? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Yes. Felipe can compel Gustavo to pay US $ 100 instead. Under the prior
law, RA 529, as amended by R.A. 4100, payment can only be in Philippine
currency as it would be against public policy, null and void and of no effect.
However, under RA 8183, payment maybe made in the currency agreed upon by
the parties, and the rate of exchange to be followed is at the time of payment.
[C.F. Sharp & Co. Inc vs. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 381 SCRA 314 [2002]).
XVIII
AB Corp. entered into a contract with XY Corp. whereby the former agreed to
construct the research and laboratory facilities of the latter. Under the terms of the
contract, AB Corp. agreed to complete the facility in 18 months, at the total contract
price ofPIO million. XY Corp. paid 50% of the total contract price, the balance to be
paid upon completion of the work. The work started immediately, but AB Corp. later
experienced work slippage because of labor unrest in his company. AB Corp.’s
employees claimed that they are not being paid on time; hence, the work slowdown.
As of the 17th month, work was only 45% completed. AB Corp. asked for extension of
time, claiming that its labor problems is a case of fortuitous event, but this was denied
by XY Corp. When it became certain that the construction could not be finished on
time, XY Corp. sent written notice canceling the contract, and requiring AB Corp. to
immediately vacate the premises.
a) Can the labor unrest be considered a fortuitous event? (1%)

a) Labor unrest is not a fortuitous event that will excuse AB Corp. from
complying with its obligation of constructing the research and laboratory facilities of XY
Corp. The labor unrest, which may even be attributed in large part to AB Corp. itself, is
not the direct cause of noncompliance by AB Corp. It is independent of its obligation. It
is similar to the failure of a DBP borrower to pay her loan just because her plantation
suffered losses due to the cadang-cadang disease. It does not excuse compliance with
the obligation (DBP vs. Vda. de Moll, 43 SCRA 82 [1972])
ADDITIONAL ANSWER:
a) The labor unrest in this case is not a fortuitous event. The requisites of
fortuitous event are: (1) the event must be independent of human will or at least of the
debtor’s will; (2) the event could not be foreseen, or if foreseen, is inevitable; (3) the
event must have rendered impossible debtor’s compliance of the obligation in a proper
manner; and (4) the debtor must not be guilty of concurrent negligence (Lasam v Smith,
45 Phils. 657 [1924]). All the requisites are absent in this case. AB Corp. could have
anticipated the labor unrest which was caused by delays in paying the laborer’s wages.
The company could have hired additional laborers to make up for the work slowdown.
b) Can XY Corp. unilaterally and immediately cancel the contract? (2%)
b) No. XY Corp cannot unilaterally and immediately cancel the contract because
there is need for a judicial action of rescission. The provisions of Art. 1191 of the Civil
Code providing for rescission in reciprocal obligations can only be invoked judicially
(Escueta v. Pando, 76 Phil. 256 [1946]; Republic v. Hospital de San Juan de Dios, 84
Phil. 820 [1949]).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
b) Yes, XY Corp. may unilaterally cancel the obligation but this is subject to the
risk that the cancellation of the reciprocal obligation being challenged in court and if AB
Corp. succeeds, then XY Corp. will be declared in default and be liable for damages
(U.P. v. de los Angeles, 35 SCRA 102 [1970]).
c) Must AB Corp. return the 50% downpayment? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) No, under the principle of quantum meruit, AC Corp. has the right to retain
payment corresponding to his percentage of accomplishment less the amount of
damages suffered by XY Corp. because of the delay or default.
XIX
Juliet offered to sell her house and lot, together with all the furniture and appliances
therein, to Dehlma. Before agreeing to purchase the property, Dehlma went to the
Register of Deeds to verify Juliet’s title. She discovered that while the property was
registered in Juliet’s name under the Land Registration Act, as amended by the
Property Registration Decree, it was mortgaged to Elaine to secure a debt of P80,000.
Wanting to buy the property, Dehlma told Juliet to redeem the property from Elaine,
and gave her an advance payment to be used for purposes of releasing the mortgage
on the property. When the mortgage was released, Juliet executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale over the property which was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds, and a
new TCT was issued in Dehlma’s name. Dehlma immediately took possession over the
house and lot and the movables therein Thereafter, Dehlma went to the Assessor’s
Office to get a new tax declaration under her name. She was surprised to find out that
the property was already declared for tax purposes in the name of XYZ Bank which
had foreclosed the mortgage on the property before it was sold to her. XYZ Bank was
also the purchaser in the foreclosure sale of the property. At that time the property was
still unregistered but XYZ Bank registered the Sheriffs Deed of Conveyance in the day
book of the Register of Deeds under Act. 3344 and obtained a tax declaration in its
name.
a) Was Dehlma a purchaser in good faith? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Yes, Dehlma is a purchaser in good faith. She learned about the XYZ tax
declaration and foreclosure sale only after the sale to her was registered. She relied on
the certificate of title of her predecessor-in-interest. Under the Torrens system, a buyer
of registered lands is not required by law to inquire further than what the Torrens
certificate indicates on its face. If a person proceeds to buy it relying on the title, that
person is considered a buyer in good faith.
The “priority in time” rule could not be invoked by XYZ Bank because the
foreclosure sale of the land in favor of the bank was recorded under Act No. 3344, the
law governing transactions affecting unregistered land, and thus, does not bind the
land.
b) Who as between Dehlma and XYZ Bank has a better right to the house and
lot? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
b) Between Dehlma and the bank, the former has a better right to the house
and lot.
c) Who owns the movables inside the house? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) Unless there is a contrary stipulation in the absolute deed of sale,

Dehlma owns the movables covered by the Deed of Sale and her ownership is
perfected by the execution and delivery of public document of sale. The delivery
of the absolute deed of sale is a symbolical delivery of the house and lot,
including the contents of the house. This is an obligation to deliver a specific
thing, which includes the delivery of the specific thing itself and all of its
accessions and accessories even though they may not have been mentioned
(Art. 1166, CC).
Distinguish the following concepts:
(a) Occupation v. possession. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Occupation can take place only with respect to property without an owner
while possession can refer to all kinds of property, whether with owner or without an
owner. Occupation itself, when proper, confers ownership but possession does not by
itself give rise to ownership (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines [1999 ed.], vol. II, p. 489).
FIRST ALTERNA TIVE ANS WER:
Occupation is an original mode of acquiring ownership (Art. 712, NCC). Things
appropriable by nature which are without an owner, such as animals that are the object
of hunting and fishing, hidden treasure and abandoned movables, are acquired by
occupation (Art. 713, NCC). However, ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired
by occupation (Art. 714, NCC).
On the other hand, possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right,
as provided in Article 523 of the New Civil Code. Possession can be in the concept of
an owner or in the concept of a holder (Art. 525, NCC).
SECOND ALTERNA TIVE ANS WER:
Occupation is a mode of acquiring dominion by the seizure of corporeal things

which have no owner, with the intention of acquiring the ownership thereof. It is an
original mode of acquiring ownership upon seizure of a res nullius by the occupant who
has the intention to become the owner thereof.
Possession, on the other hand, is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of

a right. Possession may be the real right of possession or jus possessionis or it
can be merely the right to possess or jus possidendi, which are among the basic
rights of ownership. If the real right of possession is possession in the concept
of owner, but subject to certain limitations, it may ripen into full ownership of the
thing or property right through acquisitive prescription depending on whether it is
a case of ordinary or extraordinary prescription and whether the property is
movable or immovable.
(b) Illegal and impossible conditions in a simple donation v. illegal and

impossible conditions in an onerous donation. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) Illegal and impossible conditions in a simple donation are considered

as not written. Such conditions shall, therefore, be disregarded but the donation
remains valid (Article 727, NCC).
On the other hand, illegal and impossible conditions imposed in an onerous
donation shall annul the donation (Article 1183, NCC). This is so, because
onerous donations are governed by the law on contracts (Article 733, NCC).
II
(10%)
Manila Petroleum Co. owned and operated a petroleum operation facility off
the coast of Manila. The facility was located on a floating platform made of wood
and metal, upon which was permanently attached the heavy equipment for the
petroleum operations and living quarters of the crew. The floating platform
likewise contained a garden area, where trees, plants ans flowers were planted.
The platform was tethered to a ship, the MV 101, which was anchored to the
seabed.
(a) Is the platform movable or immovable property?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The platform is an immovable property under Article 415 (9) NCC., which
provides that “docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature
and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake or coast.” Since the floating
platform is a petroleum operation facility, it is intended to remain permanently where it is
situated, even if it is tethered to a ship which is anchored to the seabed.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The platform is a movable property because it is attached to a movable property,

i.e. the vessel which was merely anchored to the seabed. The fact that the vessel is
merely anchored to the seabed only shows that it is not intended to remain at a fixed
place; hence, it remains a movable property. If the intention was to make the platform
stay permanently where it was moored, it would not have, been simply tethered to a
vessel but itself anchored to the seabed.
(b) Are the equipment and living quarters movable or immovable property?
SUGGES TED A NSWER:
(b) The equipment and living quarters of the crew are immovable property
under Article 415 (3) NCC, classifies as an immovable “everything attached to an
immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom
without breaking the material or deterioration of the object”. Both the equipment and
the living quarters are permanently attached to the platform which is also an
immovable.
The equipment can also be classified as an immovable property under Article

415 (5) NCC because such equipment are “machinery,
receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and
which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works”. It is logically,
assumed that the petroleum industry may be carried on' in a building or on a piece of
land and the platform is analogous to a building.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The equipment and living quarters of the crew are movable properties since they
are attached to a platform which is also movable property, because it is simply
attached to a vessel is likewise a movable property since it was merely anchored to
the seabed. The fact that the vessel is merely anchored on the seabed only shows
that it is not intended to remain at a fixed place; hence, it remains a movable property.
(c) Are the trees, plants and flowers immovable or movable property?
Please briefly give the reason for your answers.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The trees, plants and flowers planted in the garden area of the platform are
immovable property under Article 415 (2) NCC which classifies as an immovable
property “trees, plants and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or form
an integral part of an immovable.” The garden forms an integral part of an immovable,
the petroleum operation facility.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The trees, plants and flowers planted in the garden area of the platform are movable
property because they are not permanently attached to the land and do not form an
integral part of an immovable. The platform is not an immovable property for the same
reason already given in the Alternative Answer to Item (a) above.
III
Explain the following concepts and doctrines and give an example of each:
(a) concept of trust de son tort (Constructive trust)
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) A constructive trust is a trust not created by any word or phrase, either
expressly or impliedly, evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but is one that arises
in order to satisfy the demands of justice. It does not come about by agreement or
intention but mainly operation of law and construed as a trust against one who, by
fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which
he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold (Heirs of Lorenzo Yap v. Court of
Appeals, 371 Phil. 523 [1999]).
(b) The following are examples of constructive trust:
1. Article 1456 NCC which provides:
“If property is acquired through mistakes or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law considered a trustee of an implied trust for
the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.”

“When land passes by succession to any person and he causes the
legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is established by
implication of law for the benefit of the true owner.”

“If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure the
performance of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue
of law is established. If the fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor
when it becomes due, he may demand the reconveyance of the property to
him.”
4. Article 1455 (NCC which provides:

“When any trustee, guardian or other person holding a fiduciary
relationship uses trust funds for the purchase of property and causes the
conveyance to be made to him or to a third person, a trust is established
by operation of law in favor of the person to whom the funds belong.”
(b) doctrine of discovered peril (last clear chance) (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) The doctrine of last clear chance states that where the plaintiff was guilty of
prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the ultimate opportunity to
avoid the impending harm failed to do so, it is the defendant who is liable for all the
consequences of the accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.
An example is where a person was riding a pony on a bridge and improperly pulled the
pony to the wrong side when he saw a car coming. The driver of the car did not stop or
change direction, and nearly hit the horse, and, the frightened animal jumped to its
death. The driver of the car is guilty of negligence because he had a fair opportunity to
avoid the accident and failed to avail himself of that opportunity. He is liable under the
doctrine of last clear chance (Picartv. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 [1918]).
IV
(10%)
Bedrock Land & Property Development Corp. is a development company

engaged in developing and selling subdivisions, condominium units and industrial
estates. In order to replenish its inventories, it embarked on an aggressive land
banking program. It employed “scouts” who roam all over the Philippines to look for
and conduct investigations on prospective sites for acquisition and development,
whether developed, semi-developed or raw land. The management of Bedrock asks
you as the company counsel to prepare a manual containing a summary of the
pertinent laws and regulations relating to land registration and acquisition of title to
land. The manual should include the following items:
(a) What is the governing law?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The governing law is the Land Registration Act as amended by the Property
Registration Decree (Act No. 496 as amended by P.D. No. 1529).
[Note: It is respectfully recommended that full credit be given to examinees who
did not give the exact title or number of the law but merely stated a description of the
law.]
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
In general, the governing law relating to registration and acquisition of title to land
is Act 496 of 1902 as amended by P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree of June 11, 1978.
1. Chapter III-I governs original registration of land title under the Torrens System by
voluntary or ordinary judicial proceedings.
2. Chapter II-II governs compulsory registration of lands through cadastral
proceedings.
3. Section 103 governs registration of homestead, sales or free patent under C.A.
No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.
4. Section 104 governs registration of certificates of land transfer, emancipation
patents and Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) under the
Comprehensive Land Reform Law.
5. Chapter V governs the registration of voluntary dealings on registered land like
conveyances, transfers, mortgages, leases, powers of attorney, trusts and similar
contracts inter vivos.
6. Chapter V-II governs the registration of involuntary dealings on registered land
like attachments, adverse claims, enforcement of liens on registered land, notices
of lispendens.
7. Chapter VI governs the registration of judgments, orders and partitions,
condemnation in eminent domain proceedings, judicial and extra-judicial
settlement of estates.
8. Sections 107, 108 and 109, governs petitions and actions after original
registration like:
a) Compulsory surrender of withheld owner’s duplicate certificate of title;

b) Amendment and alteration of certificate of title;
c) Replacement of lost or destroyed owner’s duplicate certificate of title.
9. R.A. No. 26 governs judicial reconstitution of lost or destroyed originals of the

certificate of title.
10. R.A. No. 6732 governs administrative reconstitution of lost or destroyed original
certificates of title.
11. Section 113 governs the registration of instruments affecting unregistered private
lands.
12. Section 117 governs “consultas”, where the Register of Deeds refuses to
register a deed or when he is in doubt as to what action to take on an
instrument presented for registration.
(b) What properties are not registrable?
Supply this information.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) The following properties are not registrable:

1. Properties of the public dominion;
2. Properties for public use or public service;
3. Inalienable lands of the public domain;
4. Military installations, civil and quasi-public lands; and
5. All lands not classified as alienable and disposable.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
1. Properties of public dominium intended for public use, like roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads,
and the like, are incapable of private appropriation, much less registration (Article 420,
New\ Civil Code). This includes public markets, public plazas, municipal streets and
public buildings (Municipality of Antipolo v. Zapanta, 133 SCRA 820 [1986]); Martinez
vs. CA, 56 SCRA 647 [1974]; Navera v. Quicho, 5 SCRA 454 [1962]).
2. Lands proclaimed or classified as forest or timberland, mineral lands and
national parks. Under Section 2, Article XII, Constitution of the Philippines, these lands
are inalienable.
3. Lands that have been reserved by law or Presidential proclamation for military,
civil or for public or quasi-public purpose. Under Section 88, Chapter XII of the Public
Land Act, such lands shall be inalienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry,
sale, lease or other disposition.
4. In general, all lands of the public domain that have not been classified as
alienable and disposable under the Public Land Act.
5. Lands that form part of the seabed, riverbed or lakebed. These lands are not
susceptible to private appropriation.
6. Foreshore lands or that strip of land that lies between the high and low water
marks and alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide belong to the public
domain, and can only be acquired by lease if not needed by the government for public
or quasi-public purposes.
7. Lands reclaimed by the government from the sea, lakes or other bodies of water
are disposable or acquisible only by lease and not otherwise, under the Public Land
Act.
V.
(10%)
What are obligations without an agreement”? Give five examples of situations

giving rise to this type of obligation.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
“Obligations without an agreement” are obligations that do not arise from contract
such as those arising from:
1. delicts;
2. quasi-delicts;
3. solution indebiti;
4. negotiorum gestio; and
5. all other obligations arising from law.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
“Obligations without an agreement” refer to the juridical relation of quasi-contract

which arise from certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts to the end that no one
shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another. (Art. 2142, NCC)
First example of an obligation without an agreement is a case of negotiorum
gestio, whereby one who voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the
business or property of another, without any power from the latter, is obliged to
continue the same until the termination of the affair and its incidents, or to require the
person concerned to substitute him, if the owner is in a position to do so (Art. 2144,
NCC).
Second example, a case of solution indebiti may also give rise to an obligation
without an agreement. This refers to the obligation to return which arises when
something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered
through mistake (Art. 2154, NCC).
Third example, is when without the knowledge of the person obliged to give
support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall have a right to claim the same from
the former, unless it appears that he gave it out of piety and without intention of being
repaid (Art. 2164, NCC).
Fourth example, is when through an accident or other cause a person is injured or
becomes seriously ill, and he is treated or helped while he is not in a condition to give
consent to a contract, he shall be liable to pay for the services of the physician or other
person aiding him, unless the service has been rendered out or pure generosity (Art.
2167, NCC).
Fifth instance of an obligation without an agreement is when the person obliged
to support an orphan or an insane or other indigent person unjustly refuses to give
support to the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with
right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. The provisions of this
article apply when the father or mother of a child under eighteen years of age unjustly
refuses to support him (Art. 2166, NCC).
VI
(10%)
Clara, thinking of her mortality, drafted a will and asked Roberta, Hannah, Luisa
and Benjamin to be witnesses. During the day of the signing of her will, Clara fell down
the stairs and broke both her arms. Coming from the hospital, Clara insisted on
signing her will by thumb mark and said that she can sign her full name later. While
the will was being signed, Roberta experienced a stomach ache and kept going to the
restroom for long periods of time. Hannah, while waiting for her turn to sign the will,
was reading the 7lh Harry Potter book on the couch, beside the table on which
everyone was signing. Benjamin, aside from witnessing the will, also offered to
notarize it. A week after, Clara was run over by a drunk driver while crossing the street
in Greenbelt. May the will of Clara be admitted to probate? Give your reasons briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Probate should be denied. The requirement that the testator and at least three
(3) witnesses must all sign in the “presence” of one another was not complied with.
Benjamin who notarized the will is disqualified as a witness, hence, he cannot be
counted as one of the three witnesses (Cruz v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 31 [1973]). The
testatrix and the other witnesses signed the will not in the presence of Roberta
because she was in the restroom for extended periods of time. Inside the restroom,
Roberta could not have possibly seen the testatrix and the other witnesses sign the will
by merely casting her eyes in the proper direction (Jaboneta v. Gustilo, 5 Phil. 541
[1906]; Nera v. Rimando, 18 Phil. 451 [1914]). Therefore, the testatrix signed her will in
the presence of only two witnesses, and only two witnesses signed the will in the
presence of the testatrix and of one another.
It is to be noted, however, that a thumbmark intended by the testator to be his

signature in executing his last will and testament is valid (Payad v. Tolentino, 62 Phil.
848 [1936]; Matias v. Salud, L-104 Phils. 1046, 23 June [1958]). The problem,
however, states that Clara “said that she can sign her full name later”; Hence, she did
not consider her thumb-mark as her “complete” signature, and intended further action
on her part. The testatrix and the other witness signed the will in the presence of
Hannah, because she was aware of her function and role as witness and was in a
position to see the testatrix and the other witness sign by merely casting her eyes in
the proper direction.
VII
Write "TRUE'1 if the statement is true or “FALSE” if the statement is false. If the
statement is FALSE, state the reason. (2%)
1. Roberta, a Filipino, 17 years'of age. without the knowledge of his parents,

can acquire a house in Australia because Australian Laws allow aliens to acquire
property from the age of 16.
SUGGESTE ANSWER:
TRUE. Since Australian Law allows aliens to acquire property from the age of 16,
Roberta may validly own a house in Australia, following the principle of lex rei sitae
enshrined in Article 16, NCC which states: “Real property as well as personal property
is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.” Moreover, even assuming that
legal capacity of Roberta in entering the contract in Australia is governed by Philippine
law under Article 15, NCC, the contract of sale is not void but merely voidable under
the NCC. Hence, even under Philippine law, she will acquire ownership over the
property she bought until the contract is annulled.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
FALSE. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad (Art. 15, NCC). The age of majority under Philippine law is 18 years (Rep.
Act No. 6809); hence, Roberta, being only 17 years old, has no legal capacity to
acquire and own land.
2. If a man commits several acts of sexual infidelity, particularly in 2002,

2003, 2004, 2005, the prescriptive period to file for legal separation runs from
2002.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FALSE. The five-year prescriptive period for filing legal separation runs from the
occurrence of each act of sexual infidelity. Hence, the prescriptive period for the sexual
infidelity committed in 2002 runs from 2002; for the sexual infidelity committed in 2003,
the prescriptive period runs from 2003 and so on. The action for legal separation for
the last act of sexual infidelity in 2005 will prescribe in 2010.
3. An individual, while single, purchases a house and lot in 1990, and

borrows money in 1992 to repair it. In 1995, such individual gets married
while the debt is still being paid. After the marriage, the debt is still the
responsibility of such individual.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FALSE. The absolute community of property is liable for the ante-nuptial debts of
either spouse in so far as the same redounded to the benefit of the family (Art. 94[7],
Family Code).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
FALSE. The debt is already the responsibility of the community property, because
the property already constitutes absolute community of property under Art. 91 of the
Family Code which took effect in 1988 while the house and lot here involved was
purchased in 1990. There is no indication that the spouse who bought the property had
legitimate descendants by a former marriage, which would exclude the house and lot
from the community property, (Art. 92[3], Family Code). If the spouses established a
conjugal partnership, the property belongs to the individual spouse if full ownership was
vested before the marriage. (Art. 118, Family Code).
4. The day after John and Marsha got married, John told her that he was
impotent. Marsha continued to live with John for 2 years. Marsha is now estopped
from filing an annulment case against John.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FALSE. Marsha is not estopped from filing an annulment case against John on the
ground of his impotence, because she learned of his impotence after the celebration of
the marriage and not before. Physical incapability to consummate the marriage is a
valid ground for the annulment of marriage if such incapacity was existing at the time of
the marriage, continues and appears to be incurable. The marriage may be annulled on
this ground within five years from its celebration (Art. 45 [5], Family Code).
5. Amor gave birth to Thelma when she was 15 years old. Thereafter, Amor
met David and they got married when she was 20 years old. David had a son, Julian,
with his ex-girlfriend Sandra. Julian and Thelma can get married.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
True. Julian and Thelma can get married. Marriages between stepbrothers and
stepsisters are not among the marriages prohibited under the Family Code.
VIII
(10%)
In 1986, Jennifer and Brad were madly in love. In 1989, because a certain Picasso
painting reminded Brad of her, Jennifer acquired it and placed it in his bedroom. In
1990, Brad and Jennifer broke up. While Brad was mending his broken heart, he met
Angie and fell in love. Because the Picasso painting reminded Angie of him, Brad in his
will bequeathed the painting to Angie. Brad died in 1995. Saddened by Brad’s death,
Jennifer asked for the Picasso painting as a remembrance of him. Angie refused and
claimed that Brad, in his will, bequeathed the painting to her. Is Angie correct? Why or
why not?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO. Angie is not correct. The Picasso painting was not given or donated by Jennifer to
Brad. She merely “placed it in his bedroom”. Hence, she is still the owner of the
painting. Not being the owner of the Picasso painting, Brad cannot validly bequeathed
the same to Angie (Art. 930, NCC). Even assuming that the painting was impliedly
given or donated by Jennifer to Brad, the donation is nevertheless void for not being in
writing. The Picasso painting must be worth more than 5,000 pesos. Under Article 748,
NCC the donation and acceptance of a movable worth more than 5,000 pesos must be
in writing, otherwise the donation is void. The donation being void, Jennifer remained
the owner of the Picasso painting and Brad could not have validly disposed of said
painting in favor of Angie in his will.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, Angie is correct. Even assuming that there was a void donation because the
donation was not in writing, Brad, who was in uninterrupted possession of the Picasso
painting from 1989 to 1995, lasting for six (6) years prior to his death, Brad has already
acquired ownership of the painting through acquisitive prescription. Under Article 1132
of the New Civil Code, Ownership of movables prescribes through continous
possession for four (4) years in good faith and for eight (8) years without need of any
other conditions. A void donation may be the basis of possession in the concept of
owner and of just title for purposes of acquisitive prescription.
IX
Multiple choice: Choose the right answer? (2% each)
1. The parties to a bailment are the:
a) bailor;
b) bailee;
c) comodatario;
d) all of the above;
e) letters a and b
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1. e (letters a & b)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
1. d (all of the above)
2. Adeposit made in compliance with a legal obligation is:
a) an extrajudicial deposit;
b) a voluntary deposit;
c) a necessary deposit;
d) a deposit with a warehouseman;
e) letters a and b
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
2. c ( necessary deposit)
3. A contract of antichresis is always:
a) a written contract;
b) a contract with a stipulation that the debt will be paid through
receipt of the
fruits of an immovable;
c) involves the payment of interests, if owing;
d) all of the above;
e) letters a and b.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
3. d (all of the above)

4. An assignee in a proceeding under the insolvency Law does not have the
duty of:
a) suing to recover the properties of the estate of the insolvent debtor;
b) selling property of the insolvent debtor;

c) ensuring that a debtor corporation operate the business efficiency and
effectively while
the proceedings are pending.
d) collecting and discharging debts owned to the insolvent debtors.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
4. (c )
5. In order to obtain approval of the proposed settlement of the debtor in an
insolvency
proceeding:
a) the court must initiate the proposal;

b) 2/3 of the number of creditors should agree to the settlement;
c) 3/5 of the number of creditors should agree to the settlement;
d) 1/3 of the total debts must be represented by the approving creditors;
e) letters a and b.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
5. None of the choices is the correct answer. In order to obtain approval of the
proposed
settlement, 2/3 of the number of creditors representing 3/5 of the total liabilities
must
approved the same.
[Note: Items 4 fit 5 on Insolvency Law are not included within the coverage of Civil
Law but in Commercial Law. It is therefore suggested that the examinees be
given full credit for the two items regardless of their answers.]
X
(10%)
For purposes of this question, assume all formalities and procedural requirements
have been complied with.
In 1970, Ramon and Dessa got married. Prior to their marriage, Ramon had a
child, Anna. In 1971 and 1972, Ramon and Dessa legally adopted Cherry and Michelle,
respectively. In 1973, Dessa died while giving birth to Larry. Anna had a child, Lia.
Anna never married. Cherry, on the other hand, legally adopted Shelly. Larry had twins,
Hans and Gretel, with his girlfriend, Fiona. In 2005, Anna, Larry, and Cherry died in a
car accident. In 2007, Ramon died. Who may inherit from Ramon and who may not?
Give your reasons briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The following may inherit from Ramon:
1. Michelle, as an adopted child Ramon, will inherit as a legitimate child of
Ramon. As an adopted child, Michelle has all the rights of a legitimate child
(Section 18, Domestic Adoption Law).
2. Lia will inherit in representation of Anna. Although Lia is an illegitimate child,
she is not barred by Article 992, because her mother Anna is herself
illegitimate. She will represent Anna as regards Anna’s legitime under Art.
902, NCC and as regards Anna’s intestate share under Article 990, NNC.
The following may not inherit from Ramon:
1. Shelly, being an adopted child, cannot represent Cherry. This is because
adoption creates a
personal legal relation only between the adopter and the adopted. The law on
representation
requires the representative to be a legal heir of the person he is
representing and also of the person from whom the person being represented
was supposed to inherit. While Shelly is a legal heir of Cherry, Shelly is not a
legal heir of Ramon. Adoption created a purely personal legal relation only
between Cherry and Shelly.
2. Hans and Gretel are barred from inheriting from Ramon under Article 992 of the
New Civil Code. Being illegitimate children, they cannot inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate relatives of their father or mother. Since Ramon is a legitimate
relative of Larry, the illegitimate twin children of Larry are barred from inheriting
ab intestato from Ramon.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The problem expressly mentioned the dates of the adoption of Cherry and
Michelle as 1971 and 1972. During that time, adoption was governed by the New Civil
Code. Under the New Civil Code, husband and wife were allowed to adopt separately
or not jointly with the other spouse. And since the problem does not specifically and
categorically state, it is possible to construe the use of the word “respectively” in the
problem as indicative of the situation that Cherry was adopted by Ramon alone and
Michelle was adopted by Dessa alone. In such a case of separate adoption the
alternative answer to the problem will be as follows:
Only Lia will inherit from Ramon in representation of Ramon’s illegitimate daughter
Anna. Although Lia is an illegitimate child, she is not barred from inheriting from
Ramon because her mother Anna is herself illegitimate.
Shelly cannot inherit in representation of Cherry because Shelly is just an adopted

child of Cherry. In representation, the representative must not only be a legal heir of
the person he is representing but also of the decedent from from whom the
represented person is supposed to inherit. In the case of Shelly, while she is a legal
heir of Cherry by virtue of her adoption, she is not a legal heir of Ramon. Adoption
creates a personal legal relation only between the adopting parent and the adopted
child (Teotico v. Del Val, 13 SCRA 406 [1965]).
Michelle cannot inherit from Ramon, because she was adopted not by Ramon but
by Dessa. In the eyes of the law she is not related to Ramon at all. Hence, she is not a
legal heir of Ramon.
Hans and Gretel are not entitled to inherit from Ramon, because they are barred
by Article 992 NCC. Being illegitimate children of Larry, they cannot inherit from the
legitimate relatives of their father Larry. Ramon is a legitimate relative, of Larry the
legitimate father.
Under Article 213 of the Family Code, no child under 7 years of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.
(1) Explain the rationale of this provision. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The rationale of the provision is that a child below 7 years old needs the love and
care which only its mother can give. The welfare of the child is given the highest
priority and the interest of the child prevails over procedural rules.
(2) Give at least 3 examples of “compelling reasons” which justify the taking
away from the mother’s custody of her child under 7 years of age. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The following have been considered as “compelling reasons” to deprive a mother

of custody: (1) neglect, (2) abandonment, (3) unemployment, (4) immorality (Espiritu v.
CA, 242 SCRA 362 [1995D, (5) alcoholism, (6) drug addiction, (7) maltreatment, (8)
insanity, (9) highly communicable serious disease, (10) grave physical handicap, (11)
serious and credible threat by the child to harm himself if separated from his mother
(Luna v. CA, 137 SCRA 7 [19851).
II
Saul, a married man, had an adulterous relation with Tessie. In one of the trysts,
Saul’s wife, Cecile, caught them in flagrante. Armed with a gun, Cecile shot Saul in a fit
of extreme jealousy, nearly killing him. Four (4) years after the incident, Saul filed an
action for legal separation against Cecille on the ground that she attempted to kill him.
(1) If you were Saul’s counsel, how will you argue his case? 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If I were the counsel for Saul, I would argue that attempt by one spouse against the
life of the other is a valid ground for legal separation and that there is no need for
conviction in a criminal case.
(2) If you were the lawyer of Cecile. What will be your defense? 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If I were the lawyer of Cecile, I will interpose the defense that the attempt on his life
was without criminal intent but was impelled solely by passion and obfuscation. This is
the reason why under the Revised Penal Code, even killing him when caught in the act
would be justified. To be a ground for legal separation, the attempt must be intentional
and wrongful.
(3) If you were the judge, how will you decide the case?
(4)
5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As judge, I will deny the petition. A petition for legal separation may be filed only by
the aggrieved spouse. Since Saul was unfaithful and was in fact caught in flagrante by
his wife, he is not an “aggrieved” spouse entitled to the relief. He who comes to court
must come with clean hands. And even assuming that the attempt on his life by the wife
is a ground for legal separation, he is still not entitled to the relief because of his
infidelity. The law does not allow legal separation if both parties have given ground for
legal separation.
III
Ed and Beth have been married for 20 years without children. Desirous to have a
baby, they consulted Dr. Jun Canlas, a prominent medical specialist on human fertility.
He advised Beth to undergo artificial insemination. It was found that Ed’s sperm count
was inadequate to induce pregnancy. Hence, the couple looked for a willing donor.
Andy, the brother of Ed, readily consented to donate his sperm. After a series of tests,
Andy’s sperm was medically introduced into Beth’s ovary. She became pregnant and 9
months later, gave birth to a baby boy named Alvin.
(1) Who is the father of Alvin? Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Ed is the father of Alvin because Alvin was conceived and bom during the
marriage of his mother to Ed. Under the law, the child born during the marriage of the
mother to her husband is presumed to be the legitimate child of the husband
(Concepcion v. Almonte, 468 SCRA 438 [2005D- While it is true that there was no
written consent by the husband to the artificial insemination, absence of such consent
may only give the husband a ground to impugn the legitimacy of the child but will not
prevent the child from acquiring the status of legitimate child of the husband at the time
of its birth.

Ed is the father of Alvin if he gave his written consent to the artificial insemination
of his wife. Otherwise, the child is the illegitimate child of Andy. Under the Family
Code, children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm
of the husband or that of a donor or both are legitimate children of the husband and the
wife, provided that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written
instrument executed and signed by both of them before the birth of the child.
(2) What are the requirements, if any, in order for Ed to establish his paternity
over Alvin? 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
To establish Ed’s paternity over Alvin, only two requirements must concur: (1)
the fact that Ed and the mother of Alvin are validly married, and (2) the fact that Alvin
was conceived or born during the subsistence of such marriage.
To establish Ed’s paternity over Alvin, two requirements must obtain: (1) both
spouses authorized or ratified the insemination in a written document executed and
signed by them before the birth of the child; and (2) the instrument is recorded in the
civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child.
IV
Gigi and Ric, Catholics, got married when they were 18 years old. Their marriage
was solemnized on August 2, 1989 by Ric’s uncle, a Baptist Minister, in Calamba,
Laguna. He overlooked the fact that his license to solemnize marriage expired the
month before and that the parties do not belong to his congregation. After 5 years of
married life and blessed with 2 children, the spouses developed irreconcilable
differences, so they parted ways.
While separated, Ric fell in love with Juliet, a 16 year-old sophomore in a local
college and a Seventh-Day Adventist. They decided to get married with the consent of
Juliet’s parents. She presented to him a birth certificate showing she is 18 years old.
Ric never doubted her age much less the authenticity of her birth certificate. They got
married in a Catholic church in Manila a year after, Juliet gave birth to twins, Aissa and
Aretha.
(1) What is the status of marriage between Gigi and Ric - valid, voidable or void?
Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER
The marriage between Gigi and Ric is void because a minister has no authority to
solemnize a marriage between contracting parties who were both not members of the
minister’s religious sect. Under the Family Code, a minister or a priest has authority to
solemnize a marriage but only if one or both contracting parties are members of the
religious sect of the priest or minister. Since neither Ric or Gigi was a member of the
Baptist Church because both of them were Catholic, the Baptist Minister did not have
authority to solemnize their marriage.
Ric and Gigi cannot claim that they believed in good faith and that the Baptist
Minister had the authority to solemnize the marriage and invoke Article 35 (2) of the
Family Code to make the marriage valid. The provision of the Family Code applies only
to a mistake of fact, and not to a mistake of law. Hence, the fact that the Minister’s
license was expired will not affect the validity of the marriage if Ric or Gigi believed in
good faith that the Minister had a valid license. That would be a mistake of fact.
However, believing that the Minister had authority to solemnize the marriage even if
none of the contracting parties was a member of the Minister’s religious sect is a
mistake of law. This is because the law expressly provides that the Minister has
authority only if one or both contracting parties are members of the Minister’s religious
sect. A mistake of law does not excuse from noncompliance therewith.
The marriage between Ric and Gigi is valid. Assuming that the parents of Ric and
Gigi did not give their consent to the marriage, the marriage would have been voidable.
However, it was ratified when Ric and Gigi continued cohabiting for 2 years after they
attained the age of 21. It must be noted that they had 5 years of married life or until
they were 23 years old.
The fact that neither Ric nor Gigi was a Baptist would be just a mere irregularity in
the authority of the Baptist Minister to solemnize the marriage. Hence, it would have no
adverse effect on the validity thereof. Also, the fact that the license of the Baptist
Minister was expired will not have any effect on the validity of the marriage because Ric
and Gigi can be presumed to have believed in good faith that the Minister had a valid
license.
(2) What is the status of the marriage between Ric and Juliet - valid, voidable
or void? Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage between Ric and Juliet is void because Juliet was below 18 years of
age. Under the Family Code, the requisite age for legal capacity to contract marriage is
18 years old and a marriage by a party who is below 18 years old is void under all
circumstances. Hence, even though Juliet’s parents have given their consent to the
marriage and even though Ric believed in good faith that she was 18 years old, the
marriage is void.
(3) Suppose Ric himself procured the falsified birth certificate to persuade
Juliet to marry him despite her minority and assured her that everything is in order. He
did not divulge to her his prior marriage with Gigi. What action, if any, can Juliet take
against him? Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Juliet may file an action to declare her marriage to Ric null and void on the
ground that she was not of marrying age. (b) She may also file a criminal case against
Ric for bigamy because he contracted the marriage with her without a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage to Gigi. (c) She may also file a criminal case
for falsification, perjury, or illegal marriage as the case may be. (d) In case the facts and
the evidence will warrant, she may also file a criminal case for seduction. In all these
cases, Juliet may recover damages.
(4) If you were the counsel for Gigi, what action/s will y-ou take to enforce
and protect her interests? Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As counsel for Gigi, I will file an action for the declaration of nullity of Gigi’s
marriage to Ric on the ground of absence of authority of the Baptist Minister to
solemnize the marriage between Ric and Gigi who were both non-members of the
Baptist Church.

As counsel for Gigi, and on the basis of the legal presumption that her marriage to
Ric is valid, I will file the following actions: (1) Legal separation on the grounds of
subsequent bigamous marriage and sexual infidelity,
(2) Receivership of the conjugal or community property,
(3) Judicial separation of property, (4) Petition for sole administration of the
conjugal or community property, (5) Action for damages for abuse of right, and (6)
Action to declare the marriage of Ric and Juliet as null and void and to recover her
share in her community of property with Ric, consisting of the portion shared by Ric in
whatever property was commonly or jointly acquired by Ric and Juliet.
Spouses Biong and Linda wanted to sell their house. They found a prospective
buyer, Ray. Linda negotiated with Ray for the sale of the property. They agreed on a
fair price of P2 Million. Ray sent Linda a letter confirming his intention to buy the
property. Later, another couple, Bemie and Elena, offered a similar house at a lower
price of PI.5 Million. But Ray insisted on buying the house of Biong and Linda for
sentimental reason. Ray prepared a deed of sale to be signed by the couple and a
manager’s check of P2 Million. After receiving the P2 Million, Biong signed the deed of
sale. However, Linda was not able to sign it because she was abroad. On her return
she refused to sign the document saying she changed her mind. Linda filed suit for
nullification of the deed of sale and for moral and exemplary damages against Ray.
(1) Will the suit prosper? Explain. 2.5%

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The suit will prosper. The sale was void because Linda did not give her written
consent to the sale. In Jad.er-Ma.nalo v. Camaisa, 374 SCRA 498 (2002), the
Supreme Court has ruled that the sale of conjugal property is void if both spouses have
not given their written consent to it and even if the spouse who did not sign the Deed of
Sale participated in the negotiation of the contract. In Abalos v. Macatangay, 439
SCRA 649(2004), the Supreme Court even held that for the sale to be valid, the
signatures of the spouses to signify their written consent must be on the same
document. In this case, Linda, although she was the one who negotiated the sale, did
not give her written consent to the sale. Hence, the sale is void. However, Linda will not
be entitled to damages because Ray is not in anyway in bad faith.
The suit will not prosper because the contract of sale has already been perfected
and partly consummated. The contract of sale is perfected upon the meeting of the
minds of the buyer and seller on to the thing to be sold and on the price thereof. In this
case, Linda had a meeting of minds with Ray when they agreed that the property will
be sold for 2 million pesos at the conclusion of her negotiations with him, while Biong
had a meeting of minds with Ray when he signed the Deed of Sale and accepted the 2
million-peso payment by Ray. Linda is estopped from questioning the validity of the
contract she herself negotiated with Ray.
(2) Does Ray have any cause of action against Biong and Linda? Can he also
recover damages from the spouses? Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Ray has a cause of action against Linda and Biong for the return of the 2
million pesos he paid for the property. He may recover damages from the spouses, if it
can be proven that they were in bad faith in backing out from the contract, as this is an
act contrary to morals and good customs under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Assuming that the contract of sale has been perfected, Ray may file a
counterclaim against Linda and Biong for specific performance or rescission, with
damages in either case. Linda has breached the obligation created by the contract
when she filed an action for nullification of sale. On account of Linda’s bad faith or
fraud, Ray may ask for damages under Article 1170 of the Civil Code.
VI
Gemma filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Arnell on
the ground of psychological incapacity. She alleged that after 2 months of their
marriage, Amell showed signs of disinterest in her, neglected her and went abroad. He
returned to the Philippines after 3 years but did not even get in touch with her. Worse,
they met several times in social functions but he snubbed her. When she got sick, he
did not visit her even if he knew of her confinement in the hospital. Meanwhile, Amell
met an accident which disabled him from reporting for work and earning a living to
support himself.
Will Gemma’s suit prosper? Explain. 5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Gemma’s suit will not prosper. The acts of Amell complained about do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove the
commission of those acts or the existence of his abnormal behavior. It must be shown
that those acts or that behavior was manifestatioil of a serious mental disorder and
that it is the root cause why he was not able to perform the essential duties of married
life. It must also be shown that such psychological incapacity, as manifested in those
acts or that behavior, was existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. In this
case, there was no showing that Arnell was suffering from a serious mental disorder,
that his behavior was a manifestation of that disorder, and that such disorder
prevented him from complying with his duties as a married person.
VII
Marvin, a Filipino, and Shelley, an American, both residents of California, decided

to get married in their local parish. Two years after their marriage, Shelley obtained a
divorce in California. While in Boracay, Marvin met Manel, a Filipina, who was
vacationing there. Marvin fell in love with her. After a brief courtship and complying with
all the requirements, they got married in Hongkong to avoid publicity, it being Marvin’s
second marriage. Is his marriage to Manel valid? Explain. 5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the marriage of Marvin and Manel is valid. While Marvin was previously
married to Shelley, the divorce from Marvin obtained by Shelley in California
capacitated Marvin to contract the subsequent marriage to Manel under the 2 nd
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code which provides that where a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.
VIII
Alberto and Janine migrated to the United States of America, leaving behind their 4
children, one of whom is Manny. They own a duplex apartment and allowed Manny to
live in one of the units. While in the United States, Alberto died. His widow and all his
children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Alberto’s estate wherein the 2-door
apartment was assigned by all the children to their mother, Janine. Subsequently, she
sold the property to George. The latter required Manny to sign a prepared Lease
Contract so that he and his family could continue occupying the unit. Manny refused to
sign the contract alleging that his parents allowed him and his family to continue
occupying the premises.
If you were George’s counsel, what legal steps will you take? Explain. 5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As George’s counsel, I will give Manny a written demand to vacate within a definite
period, say 15 days. After the lapse of 15-day period, I will file an action for unlawful
detainer to recover the possession of the apartment from Manny. Manny’s occupation
of the premises was by mere tolerance of his parents. When all the co-heirs/co-owners
assigned the 2-door apartment to Janine in the extrajudicial partition, Janine became
the sole owner of the same. He continued to occupy it under the same familial
arrangement. Upon the sale of the property to George, Manny’s lawful occupation of
the property was terminated and Manny’s refusal to sign the lease contract and to
vacate the premises after the period to vacate lapsed made his occupation unlawful,
hence, entitling George to the remedy of unlawful detainer.
IX
A drug lord and his family reside in a small bungalow where they sell shabu and
other prohibited drugs. When the police found the illegal trade, they immediately
demolished the house because according to them, it was a nuisance per se that
should be abated. Can this demolition be sustained? Explain. 5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the demolition cannot be sustained. The house cannot be considered as

nuisance perse. To be considered per se, the act, occupation, or structure must be a
nuisance at all times and under any circumstances, regardless of location or
surrounding. Since the demolished house was not a nuisance during the times that it
was not being used for selling drugs, it cannot be considered as nuisance perse.
Moreover, in the abatement of a nuisance, whether judicially or extra-judicially, the
abatement should not inflict unnecessary damage or injury. In this case, what may be
considered as nuisance per se is not the structure of the house but the use of the
house for the selling of shabu. However, the demolition of the house is not necessary
to abate the sale of shabu in that community. To demolish the house is an
unnecessary damage and injury
The selling of shabu is not only a public nuisance but a grave threat to the welfare
of the community. As such it can be enjoined and all instruments thereof destroyed by
the law enforcers. The sale of the shabu in that community is facilitated by the house
which hides the pernicious activity from the law enforcers. This being the case, the
house may be considered as an instrument of the crime and the law enforcers are
justified in demolishing the house in the exercise of the police powers of the State.
Don died after executing a Last Will and Testament leaving his estate valued at
P12 Million to his common-law wife Roshelle. He is survived by his brother Ronie and
his half-sister Michelle.
(1) Was Don’s testamentary disposition of his estate in accordance with the law
on succession? Whether you agree or not, explain your answer. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the testamentary disposition is in accordance with the law on succession. Don
was not survived by any compulsory heir. Hence, he could will his entire estate to
anybody of his choice including a total stranger. His institution of his common-law wife
to his entire estate is valid. The disposition is not in consideration of an adulterous
relationship because both of them were not married to anyone at the time of his
making of the will and at the time of his death. Relationship between two unmarried
persons is not adulterous. The law does not prohibit testamentary dispositions in favor
of a common law spouse. What the law prohibits are donations in favor of common
law spouses under the Family Code. Such provision does not include a disposition
mortis causa such as a testamentary institution.

Article 1028 of the New Civil Code provides that prohibitions concerning donations
inter vivos shall apply to testamentary dispositions. Article 87 of he Family Code
provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses during the marriage
“shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage."
Accordingly, Don’s testamentary disposition in favor of his common law wife
Roshelle is void because it is prohibited by law.
(2) If Don failed to execute a will during his lifetime, as his lawyer, how will
you distribute his estate? Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If Don failed to execute a will, he died intestate and his estate was inherited by
his intestate heirs. His intestate heirs are Ronie and Michelle. However, Ronie will
receive double the share of Michelle because Michelle was a half-blood sister while
Ronnie was a full-blood brother. Ronie will receive 8 million pesos, while Michelle will
receive 4 million pesos.
(3) Assuming he died intestate survived by his brother Ronie, his half-sister
Michelle, and his legitimate son Jayson.
how will you distribute his estate? Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Only Jayson will inherit from Don as his compulsory heir in the direct descending
line. Jayson will exclude the collateral relatives Ronie and Michelle. In intestate
succession, the direct line excludes the collateral line.
(4) Assuming further he died intestate, survived by his father Juan, his brother
Ronie, his half-sister Michelle, and his legitimate son Jayson, how will you distribute
his estate? Explain. 1.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Only Jayson will inherit from his father Don. In intestate succession, the direct line
excludes the collateral line. But among those in the direct line, the descending
excludes the ascending. Hence, the father Juan and Jayson, who are in the direct line,
exclude the brother Ronie and the sister Michelle who are both in the collateral line.
However the son Jayson, who is in the descending line, excludes the father Juan who
is in the ascending line.
XI
Spouses Alfredo and Racquel were active members of a religious congregation.
They donated a parcel of land in favor to that congregation in a duly notarized Deed of
Donation, subject to the condition that the Minister shall construct thereon a place of
worship within 1 year from the acceptance of the donation, in an affidavit he executed
in behalf of the congregation, the Minister accepted the donation. The Deed of
Donation was not registered with the Registry of Deeds.
However, instead of constructing a place of worship, the Minister constructed a
bungalow on the property he used as his residence. Disappointed with the Minister, the
spouses revoked the donation and demanded that he vacate the premises immediately.
But the Minister refused to leave, claiming that aside from using the bungalow as his
residence, he is also using it as a place of worship on special occasions. Under the
circumstances, can Alfredo and Racquel evict the Minister and recover possession of
the property?
If you were the couple’s counsel, what action will you take to protect the interests
of your clients? 5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As counsel for the couple, I may file an action for reconveyance of the property on
the ground that the donation was not perfected. It was not perfected because although
it was made in a public document and was accepted by the donee in a separate public
document, the donee failed to notify the donor of such acceptance in an authentic form
before the donation was revoked under Article 749 of the Civil Code. Such notification
was necessary for the donation to become valid and binding.
Assuming that the donation is valid on the ground that it was an onerous donation,
and therefore, the law on contracts applied even as to its form, I may file an action for
the revocation of the donation under Article 764 of the Civil Code for noncompliance
with the condition imposed on the donation. In donating the land, the intension of the
couple was for the land to become the site of a church, or place of worship, for their
congregation. This is why the couple have imposed, as a condition of the donation, the
construction thereon of a church, or a place of worship, within 1 year from the
acceptance of the donation. The construction of a residential bungalow which is used
as a place of worship but only on special occasions is not a substantial compliance with
such condition. Hence, the donation may be revoked for failure to comply with the
condition.
Upon the filing of the case, I will file a notice of lis pendens with the Register of
Deeds for annotation on the TCT to ensure against the transfer of the land to an
innocent purchaser for value.
XII
Tony bought a Ford Expedition from a car dealer in Muntinlupa City. As payment,
Tony issued a check drawn against his current account with Premium Bank. Since he
has a good reputation, the car dealer allowed him to immediately drive home the
vehicle merely on his assurance that his check is sufficiently funded. When the car
dealer deposited the check, it was dishonored on the ground of “Account Closed”.
After an investigation, it was found that an employee of the bank misplaced Tony's
account ledger. Thus, the bank erroneously assumed that his account no longer
exists. Later, it turned out thatTony’s account has more than sufficient funds to cover
the check. The dealer however, immediately filed an action for recovery of possession
of the vehicle against Tony for which he was terribly humiliated and embarrassed.
Does Tony have a cause of action against Premium Bank? Explain. 5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Tony has a cause of action against Premium Bank. According to Art. 2176,
whoever by act or omission causes damages to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. The proximate cause of the injury
which is the dishonor of Tony’s check, was the bank’s negligence in misplacing his
account ledger. The fiduciary nature of banking requires high standards of integrity
and performance necessitating banks to treat the accounts of its depositors with
meticulous care.
XIII
Arturo sold his Pajero to Benjamin for PI Million. Benjamin took the vehicle but
did not register the sale with the Land Transportation Office. He allowed his son
Carlos, a minor who did not have a driver’s license, to drive the car to buy pan de sal
in a bakery. On the way, Carlos, driving in a reckless manner, sideswiped Dennis,
then riding a bicycle. As a result, he suffered serious physical injuries. Dennis filed a
criminal complaint against Carlos for reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries.
1. Can Dennis file an independent civil action against Carlos and his father
Benjamin for damages based on quasidelict? Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Dennis can file an independent civil action against Carlos and his father,
Benjamin. The independent civil action against Carlos can be based on Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, which states that, "whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there, being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done." The
proximate cause of the injury suffered by Dennis, was the negligent driving of Carlo.
He can thus be held personally liable by the former for said injuries.
2. Assuming Dennis' action is tenable, can Benjamin raise the defense that he
is not liable because the vehicle is not registered in his name? Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Benjamin cannot raise the defense that he is not liable because the vehicle is
not registered in his name. Had Dennis sued Benjamin based on the latter’s liability as
the owner of the vehicle, the non-registration of the vehicle in his name would have
been a valid defense. As held in the case of BA Finance Corporation v. CA (215
SCRA 715 [19921), it is the registered owner of any vehicle, who should be primarily
responsible to the public or third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle
is being driven. In this case, Arturo was not sued. If sued, Arturo should be held liable
for the injury incurred by Dennis.
However, Benjamin is not being sued based on his ownership of the registered
vehicle, but rather for his responsibility as the parent of a minor child whose negligent
act resulted to damage or injury to another. As provided in Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, as amended by Article 221 of the Family Code, the father and mother are
responsible for the damages caused by the fault and negligence of the minor children
who live in their company. This liability is imposed upon the parents on the
presumption that they have failed in their duty of supervision over their children.
Regardless of the ownership of the vehicle, Dennis, therefore, has a cause of action
against Benjamin.
XIV
Zirxthoussous delos Santos filed a petition for change of name with the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City under the administrative proceeding provided
in Republic Act No. 9048. He alleged that his first name sounds ridiculous and is
extremely difficult to spell and pronounce. After complying with the requirements of the
law, the Civil Registrar granted his petition and changed his first name Zirxthoussous
to “Jesus." His full name now reads “Jesus delos Santos.”
Jesus delos Santos moved to General Santos City to work in a multi-national
company. There, he fell in love and married Mary Grace delos Santos. She requested
him to have his first name changed because his new name “Jesus delos Santos" is the
same as that of her father who abandoned her family and became a notorious drug
lord. She wanted to forget him. Hence, Jesus filed another petition with the Office' of
the Local Civil Registrar to change his first name to “Roberto.” He claimed that the
change is warranted because it will eradicate all vestiges of the infamy of Mary Grace's
father.
Will the petition for change of name of Jesus delos Santos to Roberto delos
Santos under Republic Act No. 9048 prosper? Explain. 10%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the petition will not prosper. Under RA 9048, the extrajudicial correction of
entry or change of first name may be availed of only once.
XV
1. What entries in the Civil Registry may be changed or corrected without a
judicial order? 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER
Only clerical or typographical errors may be corrected, and only the first name or
nickname may be changed, without judicial order under RA 9048.
2. May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname
of her natural mother as her middle name? 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, an illegitimate child who is adopted by his natural father may carry the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name. The Supreme Court has ruled
that there is no law allowing or prohibiting such child from doing so. What is not
prohibited is allowed. Likewise, the use of the surname of the mother, even of
legitimate children is in accord with Filipino customs and traditions and will serve the
best interest of the child who will not be confused by wondering why he has no middle
name. (In Re: Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, 454 SCRA 541 120051).
XVI
1. Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in the
cases specified therein, several of which are enumerated below.
Choose the case wherein you cannot recover moral damages. Explain. 1.5%
a) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries
b) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries
c) Immorality or dishonesty
d) Illegal search
e) Malicious prosecution
SUGGESTED ANSWER
Moral damages may not be recovered in (c) immorality or dishonesty because it is

not included in the enumeration in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Moral damages may be recovered in all of the five instances enumerated above.
While “immorality” and “dishonesty" are not included in the ten instances enumerated in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, the same article provides that moral damages may be
recovered “in the following and analogous cases". Article 2219(10) provides and
includes: “Acts and actions referred to in Article 21...". Article 21 in turn provides: “Any
person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages.
Immorality or dishonesty is analogous to acts contrary to morals, and therefore covered
by Article 2219.
2. Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall be void.
Choose the spouse listed below who is psychologically incapacitated. Explain.
2.5%
a) nagger
b) Gay or lesbian
c) Congenital sexual pervert
d) Gambler
e) Alcoholic
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The gay or lesbian is psychologically incapacitated. Being gay or lesbian is a mental

disorder which prevents the afflicted person from performing the essential duties of
married life. He or she will not be able to perform his or her duty of sexual consortium
with his or her spouse due to his or her sexual preference for a person of the same sex.
However, the law requires that the disorder or state of being gay or lesbian
incapacitating such person must be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.
• A. Gabby and Mila got married at Lourdes Church in Quezon City on July 10. 1990.
Prior thereto, they executed a marriage settlement whereby they agreed on the regime
of conjugal partnership of gains. The marriage settlement was registered in the
Register of Deeds of Manila, where Mila is a resident. In 1992, they jointly acquired a
residential house and lot, as well as a condominium unit in Makati. In 1995, they
decided to change their property relations to the regime of complete separation of
property. Mila consented, as she was then engaged in a lucrative business. The
spouses then signed a private document dissolving their conjugal partnership and
agreeing on a complete separation of property.
Thereafter, Gabby acquired a mansion in Baguio City, and a 5-hectare agricultural

land in Oriental Mindoro, which he registered exclusively in his name.
In the year 2000, Mila’s business venture failed, and her creditors sued her for
PI0,000,000.00. After obtaining a favorable judgment, the creditors sought to execute
on the spouses' house and lot and condominium unit, as well as Gabby's mansion and
agricultural land.
a) Discuss the status of the first and the amended marriage settlements. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. 1) The first marriage settlement was valid because it was in writing, signed by
the parties and executed before the celebration of the marriage.
2) The subsequent agreement of the parties was void as a modification of

their marriage settlement. To be valid, the modification must be executed before the
celebration of the marriage. The subsequent agreement of the parties did not effect a
dissolution of their conjugal partnership and a separation of their properties because
it was not approved by the court. To be valid, an agreement by the parties to
dissolve their conjugal partnership and to separate their properties during the marriage
has to be approved by the court.
b) Discuss the effect/s of the said settlements on the properties acquired by the
spouses. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) Since the marriage settlement was binding between the parties, conjugal
partnership of gains was the regime of their property relations. Under the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains, all properties acquired by the spouses during the
marriage, jointly or by either one of them, through their work or industry are conjugal.
Therefore, the residential house and lot, and the condominium unit are conjugal
having been jointly acquired by the couple during the marriage. Inasmuch as the
subsequent agreement on dissolution of the conjugal partnership and separation of
property was invalid, conjugal partnership subsisted between the parties. Therefore,
the mansion and the agricultural land are also conjugal having been acquired by one
of the spouses during the marriage.
c) What properties may be held answerable for Mila’s obligations? Explain.

(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) The marriage settlement cannot prejudice third parties, such as the
creditors, because it was not registered with the local civil registrar where the marriage
was recorded. To bind third parties, the Family Code requires registration of the
marriage settlement not only with the proper registers of deeds but also with the local
civil registrar where the marriage was recorded. Hence, if the rules on conjugal
partnership will prejudice the creditors, the rules on absolute community will be
applied instead. However, insofar as debts contracted by one spouse without the
consent of the other are concerned, the rule is the same for both conjugal partnership
and absolute community. The partnership or community is liable for debts contracted
by one spouse but only to the extent that it benefited the family. Therefore, if the debts
contracted by Mila redounded to the benefit of the family, all the conjugal partnership
properties are liable to pay them but only to the extent the family was benefited. The
separate properties of Mila may be held answerable for Mila’s debts and obligations
that did not redound to the benefit of the family.
II
In 1985, Sonny and Lulu, both Filipino citizens, were married in the Philippines.
In 1987, they separated, and Sonny went to Canada, where he obtained a divorce in
the same year. He then married another Filipina, Auring, in Canada on January 1,
1988. They had two sons, James and John. In 1990, after failing to hear from Sonny,
Lulu married Tirso, by whom she had a daughter, Verna. In 1991, Sonny visited the
Philippines where he succumbed to heart attack.
a) Discuss the effect of the divorce obtained by Sonny

and Lulu in Canada. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The divorce obtained by Sonny in Canada was not valid because he and
his wife were both Filipino citizens. Divorce between a Filipino couple is not valid
under Philippine law even though they are living abroad. (Art. 15, Civil Code)
b) Explain the status of the marriage between Sonny and Auring. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) Since the divorce obtained by Sonny was void, his marriage to Auring is
necessarily void ab initio because of his subsisting marriage to Lulu. (Art. 41, Family
Code)
c) Explain the status of the mairiage between Lulu and Tirso. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) The marriage between Lulu and Tirso is also void ab initio because Lulu is still
validly married to Sonny.
d) Explain the respective filiation of James, John and Verna. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c)James and John are the illegitimate children of Sonny and Auring because thej r
were conceived and born outside a valid marriage. Verna is an illegitimate child of Lulu
and Tirso having been conceived and bom to the invalid marriage of Lulu and Tirso.
Verna cannot be presumed as the legitimate child of Sonny because of the
supervening marriage that was celebrated between Lulu and Tirso even though such
marriage is void ab initio.
The case of Liyao v. Liyao ____________ is not applicable
because in that case the wife begot a. child by another man during her marriage to
her estranged husband but no marriage was celebrated between the wife and the
father of the child. The child in that case was presumed to be the legitimate child of the
estranged husband.
d)Who are the heirs of Sonny? Explain. (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER:
e) The heirs of Sonny are his wife Lulu, and his 2 illegitimate children James and
John. The void remarriage of Lulu to Tirso did not incapacitate her to succeed Sonny.
Ill
Emil, the testator, has three legitimate children. Tom, Henry and Warlito; a wife
named Adette; parents named Pepe and Pilar; an illegitimate child, Ramon; brother,
Mark: and a
sister, Nanette. Since his wife Adette is well-off, he wants to leave to his illegitimate
child as much of his estate as he can legally do. His estate has an aggregate net
amount of PI,200,000.00, and all the above-named relatives are still living. Emil now
comes to you for advice in making a will.
How will you distribute his estate according to his wishes without violating the law
on testamentary succession? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In his will, Emil should give his compulsory heirs just their respective legitimes and
give all of the free portion to his illegitimate child in addition to the said child's legitime.
He should divide his estate in his will as follows:
TOM ……………….. P200,000.00 (legitime)

Henry ……………… 200,000.00 (legitime)
Warlito ……………. 200,000.00 (legitime)
Adette …………….. 200,000.00 (legitime)
Ramon …………… 400,000.00 (P100,000 as legitime,
And P 300,000.00 as free
Portion
_______________
……………….. P 1,200,000.00
IV
Steve was married to Linda, with whom he had a daughter, Tintin. Steve fathered a
son with Dina, his secretary of 20 years, whom Dina named Joey, bom on September
20, 1981. Joey’s birth certificate did not indicate the father's name. Steve died on
August 13, 1993, while Linda died on December 3, 1993, leaving their legitimate
daughter, Tintin, as sole heir. On May 16, 1994, Dina filed a case on behalf of Joey,
praying that the latter be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Steve and that
Joey be given his share in Steve's estate, which is now being solely held by Tintin.
Tintin put up the defense that an action for recognition shall only be filed during the
lifetime of the presumed parents and that the exceptions under Article 285 of the Civil
Code do not apply to him since the said article has been repealed by the Family Code.
In any case, according to Tintin. Joey’s birth certificate does not show that Steve is his
father.
a) Does Joey have a cause of action against Tintin for recognition and partition?
Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Yes, Joey has such a cause of action against Tintin. While the Family Code
has repealed the provisions of the New Civil Code on proof of filiation, said repeal did
not impair vested rights. Joey was born an illegitimate child in 1981. As an illegitimate
child, he had acquired, at birth, the right to prove his filiation in accordance with the
provisions of the New Civil Code in force at that time. Under the New Civil Code, an
illegitimate child may file an action to compel his recognition even after the death of the
putative father when the father died during the minority of the child. While the Family
Code has repealed this provision, it will not operate to prejudice Joey who has already
acquired a vested right thereto.
ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a) The Family Code governs the capacity of his heirs to inherit, since Steve died in
1993. The Family Code requires that because the illegitimate child has no documentary
proof of his filiation, the action to establish his filiation must be brought during the
lifetime of his alleged father, whose death occurred in 1993.
Hence, the illegitimate child Joey has no cause of action.

b) Are the defenses set up by Tintin tenable? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) The defenses of Tintin are not tenable. The fact that Joey's birth certificate does
not show that Steve was his father is of no moment. The law does not require such
mention. Besides, the New Civil Code provides that when the father did not sign the
birth certificate, his name should not be disclosed therein. While it is true that capacity
to inherit is determined at the time of the death of the decedent and that filiation is an
element of capacity to inherit, filiation is determined not at the time of the death of the
decedent but at the time of the birth of the child who is born with a status. Such status
may subsequently change such as in legitimation, but legitimation is deemed to
retroact to the time of birth. In the same manner, recognition when given voluntarily by
the father, or decreed by the court, retroacts to the time of the child’s birth.
c) Supposing that Joey died during the pendency of the action, should the action
be dismissed? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) If Joey filed the action and died when the New Civil Code was still in force, his
action would be dismissed because the action was not transmissible to the heirs of the
illegitimate child (Conde v. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249 [1909])). But if the action was filed after
effectivity of the Family Code, and Joey died during the pendency of the action for
recognition, it should not be dismissed. Under the present Family Code, an action
commenced by a legitimate child to claim his legitimate filiation is not extinguished by
his death. The Family Code makes this provision applicable to the action for
recognition filed by an illegitimate child. Joey has the right to invoke this provision
because it does not impair any vested rights. (Art. 175, Family Code)
In 1984, Eva, a Filipina, went to work as a nurse in the USA. There she met and
fell in love with Paul, an American citizen, and they got married in 1985. Eva acquired
American citizenship in 1987. During their sojourn in the Philippines in 1990, they filed
a joint petition for the adoption of Vicky, a 7-year-old daughter of Eva’s sister. The
government, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the petition on the
ground that the petitioners, being both foreigners, are disqualified to adopt Vicky.
a) Is the government's opposition tenable? Explain. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Yes, the position of the government is tenable. Foreigners are disqualified to
adopt unless they fall in any of the exceptions provided for in the law. Eva and Paul are
both foreigners. Eva., falls in one of the exceptions. She is qualified to adopt because
she is a former Filipino citizen who wishes to adopt a relative by consanguinity.
Unfortunately, Paul is not qualified to adopt because he does not fall in any of the
exceptions. Hence, they cannot adopt jointly. When husband and wife are adopting
jointly, both of them must be qualified to adopt in their own right. Eva cannot, alone by
herself, adopt her niece because husband ana wife must adopt jointly unless they fall
in any of the exceptions provided for in the law. They cannot adopt separately because
they do not fall in any of the exceptions. Hence, whether separately or jointly, Eva and
Paul cannot adept Vicky in the Philippines. (Domestic Adoption Law [RA 8552]
b] Would your answer be the same if they sought to adopt Eva's illegitimate
daughter? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, my answer would be different. Eva is qualified to adopt her illegitimate

daughter, because she falls in one of the exceptions that allow foreigners to adopt. She
is a former Filipino citizen adopting her relative by consanguinity. Eva can adopt
separately her illegitimate child because her case is also an exception to the rule that
husband and wife should adopt jointly.
b) Supposing that they filed the petition to adopt Vicky in the year 2000, will your
answer be the same? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) Yes, my answer will be the same. The new Law on Domestic Adoption allows
a foreigner to adopt in the Philippines if he has been residing in the Philippines for at
least 3 years prior to the filing of the petition unless the law waives that residency
requirement. Paul and Eva have not resided in the Philippines for the last 3 years.
However, Eva will qualify for waiver because she was a former Filipino citizen who
wishes to adopt a relative by consanguinity within the 4 th degree. Unfortunately Paul
will not qualify to adopt because he does not fall in any of the instances for waiver to
apply. They cannot adopt jointly because one of them is not qualified. Neither may Eva
adopt alone because she does not fall in any of the exceptions that allow husband and
wife to adopt separately.
VI
Hans Herber, a German national, and his Filipino wife, Rhoda. are permanent
residents of Canada. They desire so much to adopt Magno. an 8-year old orphaned
boy and a baptismal godson of Rhoda. Since the accidental death of Magno's parents
in 2004, he has been staying with his aunt who, however, could hardly afford to feed
her own family. Unfortunately. Hans and Rhoda cannot come to the Philippines to
adopt Magno although they possess all the qualifications as adoptive parents.
Is there a possibility for them to adopt Magno? How should they go about it? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under R.A. 8043 establishing the rules for inter-country adoption of Filipino
children, the spouses may file an application to adopt a Filipino child with the Inter-
country Adoption Board (ICAB) after they have been determined eligible and fit to
adopt by the State Welfare Agency or a licensed adoption agency in Canada. The
Canadian agency will forward the required supporting documents to the ICAB for
matching with a Filipino child. The spouses, after filing a petition with the ICAB, shall be
issued the Placement Authority and when all the travel documents of the child who is
declared legally eligible for adoption as determined by the ICAB, are ready the adoptive
parents or any one of them shall personally fetch the child in the Philippines for
adoption in the court of the foreigner’s country.
Don was the owner of an agricultural land with no access to a public road. He had
been passing through the land of Ernie with the latter's acquiescence for over 20 years.
Subsequently, Don subdivided his property into 20 residential lots and sold them to
different persons. Ernie blocked the pathway and refused to let the buyers pass
through his land.
a) Did Don acquire an easement of right of way? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Don did not acquire an easement of right of way. His passage through Ernie’s
land was by mere acquiescence or tolerance. He cannot claim to have acquired the
easement of right of way by prescription, because this easement is discontinuous
although apparent. Only continuous and apparent easements can be acquired by
prescription of 10 years of uninterrupted use and enjoyment.
VTII
State with reason whether each of the following is a nuisance, and if so, give its
classification, whether public or private.
a) A squatter’s hut (1 %)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
According to Article 694 of the Civil Code, a nuisance is any act, omission,
establishment, business condition of property, or anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or
street, or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
A nuisance may be either public or private. Under Article 685, a public nuisance
affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number or persons,
although the extent of the annoyance, danger of damage upon individuals may be
unequal. A private nuisance, on the other hand, is one that violates only private rights
and produces damage to but one or a few persons.
a) A squatter's hut, being an illegal construction, constitutes a public nuisance

per se, if it poses problems of health and sanitation. (City of Manila v. Garcia. 19
SCRA 41[1967J). If the squatter’s hut is built on a private land and hinders or impairs
the owner's use of his or her own property, then it would constitute a private nuisance.
b) Could Ernie close the pathway and refuse to let the buyers pass? Give
reasons. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) As there is no right of way existing in favor of Don's land, Ernie could close the
pathway. The lot buyers may request Don to establish a right of way as voluntary
easement by entering into a contract with Ernie, or file action to constitute a legal
easement by proving compliance with the four requisites for creating a legal easement
of right of way under Articles 649 and 650 of the new Civil code.
c) What are the rights of the lot buyers, if any? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) The lot buyers have the right to:
1) ask for a constitution of legal easement of right of way;
(2) require Don to provide for a right of way. Under Sec. 29 of PD 957, the
owner or developer of a subdivision without access to any existing road must
secure a right of way;
(3) Formally complain to the Housing and land Use of Regulatory Board
regarding Don’s failure to comply with PD 957 specifically.
(a) failure to provide for a right of way
(b) failure to convert the land from agricultural to residential
under
agrarian law
(c) failure to secure a license to sell
(4) commence criminal prosecution for violation of the penal
provisions of PD
957, Sec. 39
b) A swimming pool (1 %)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) A swimming pool is not a nuisance and is an exception to the attractive
nuisance doctrine (Hidalgo v. Guillermo, 91 Phil. 488 [1952]). It generally does not
cause an injury, harm or prejudice to an individual or the public (Article 694, par. 1).
c) A house of prostitution (1 %)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) A house of prostitution is a public nuisance because it shocks or disregards the
decency or morality of the community. (Article 694 par. 3, Civil Code)
d) A noisy or dangerous factory in a private land (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
d) A noisy or dangerous factory even if built in a private land may be
considered a nuisance if it offends the senses of the owners of the adjacent property
or poses a danger to their safety (Article 694, par. 1, Civil Code). This kind of nuisance
may be classified as a public nuisance if it affects and annoys those who come within
its sphere.
e) Uncollected garbage (1 %)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
e) Uncollected garbage can be injurious to health and even the environment. It is
thus, considered a public nuisance.
IX
Marvin offered to construct the house of Carlos for a very reasonable price of
P900.000.00, giving the latter 10 days
within which to accept or reject the offer. On the fifth day, before Carlos could make up
his mind, Marvin withdrew his offer.
a) What is the effect of the withdrawal of Marvin's offer? (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The withdrawal of Marvin’s offer is valid because there was no consideration
paid for the option. An option is a separate contract from the contract which is the
subject of the offer, and if not supported by ajpty consideration, the option contract is
not deemed perfected. Thus, Marvin may withdraw the offer at any time before
acceptance of the offer.
b) Will your answer be tire same if Carlos paid Marvin PIO.OOO.OO as
consideration for that option? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) If Carlos paid PIO.OOO.OO as consideration for that option, Marvin cannot
withdraw the offer prior to expiration of the option period. The option is a separate
contract and if founded on consideration is a perfected option contract and must be
respected by Marvin.
c) Supposing that Carlos accepted the offer before Marvin could communicate his
withdrawal thereof? Discuss the legal consequences. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) If Carlos has already accepted the offer and such acceptance has been
communicated to Marvin before Marvin communicates the withdrawal, the acceptance
creates a perfected construction contract, even if no consideration was as yet paid for
the option. If Marvin does not perform his obligations under the perfected contract of
construction, he shall be liable for all consequences arising from the breach thereof
based on any of the available remedies which may be instituted by Carlos, such as
specific performance, or rescission with damages in both cases.
X
Bemie bought on installment a residential subdivision lot from DEVLAND. After
having faithfully paid the installments for 48 months. Bemie discovered that
DEVLAND had failed to develop the subdivision in accordance with the approved
plans and specifications within the time frame in the plan. He thus wrote a letter to
DEVLAND informing it that he was stopping payment. Consequently, DEVLAND
cancelled the sale and wrote Bemie, informing him that his payments are forfeited in its
favor.
a) Was the action of DEVLAND proper? Explain (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Assuming that the land is a residential subdivision project under P.D. No.
957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree), DEVLAND’s action
is not proper because under Section 23 of said Decree, no installment payment shall be
forfeited to the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice, desists from
further payment due to the failure of the owner-developer to develop the subdivision
according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the same.
b) Discuss the rights of Bernie under the circumstances. (2%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Under the same Section of the Decree, Bemie may, at his option, be
reimbursed the total amount paid including amortization interests but excluding
delinquency interests at the legal rate. He may also ask the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board to apply penal sanctions against DEVLAND consisting of payment of
administrative fine of not more than P20.000.00 and/or imprisonment for not more than
20 years.
b) Supposing DEVLAND had fully developed the subdivision but Bemie failed to
pay further installments after 4 years due to business reverses. Discuss the rights and
obligations of the parties. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
c) Under R.A. No. 6552 (Maceda Law). DEVLAND has the right to cancel the
contract but it has to refund Bernie the cash surrender value of the payments on the
property equivalent to 50% of the total payments made.
ADDITIONAL SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) Bemie has the right to pay, without additional interest, the unpaid installments
within the grace period granted him by R.A 6552 equivalent to one-month for every
year of installment payments, or four months in this case. After the lapse of four
months DEVLAND may cancel the contract after thirty days from and after Bemie
receives a notice of cancellation or demand for rescission of the contract by notarial
act. (Sec. 4, R.A. 6552) Bemie also has the right to sell or assign his rights before the
cancellation of the contract (Sec. 5)
XI
Before he left for Riyadh to work as a mechanic, Pedro left his Adventure van with
Tito, with the understanding that the latter could use it for one year for his personal or
family use while Pedro works in Riyadh. He did not tell Tito that the brakes of the van
were faulty. Tito had the van tuned up and the brakes repaired. He spent a total
amount of PI 5.000.00. After using the vehicle for two weeks. Tito discovered that it
consumed too much fuel. To make up for the expenses, he leased it to Annabelle. Two
months later. Pedro returned to the Philippines and asked Tito to return the van.
Unfortunately, while being driven by Tito, the van was accidentally damaged by a
cargo truck without his fault.
a) Who shall bear the P15,000.00 spent for the repair of the van? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The contract between Pedro and Tito is one of commodatum. Of the
P15.000.00 spent, Pedro, the bailor, shall bear the expenses for the repair of the faulty
brakes, they being extraordinary expenses incurred due to the non-disclosure by the
bailor of the defect or fault; Tito, on the other hand, shall shoulder that part of the
P15,000.00 spent for the tune-up, said expense being ordinary for the use and
preservation of the van.
b) Who shall bear the costs for the van’s fuel, oil and other materials
while it was with Tito? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The costs for the fuel and other materials are considered ordinary
expenses, and consequently Tito, the bailee, shall shoulder them. (Art. 1941, Civil
Code)
b) Does Pedro have the right to retrieve the van even before the lapse of
one year? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
c) No, Pedro cannot demand the return of the van until after the expiration of
the one-year period stipulated. However, if in the meantime he should have urgent
need of the van, he may demand its return or temporary use.
d) Who shall bear the expenses for the accidental damage caused by the
cargo truck, granting that the truck driver and truck owner are insolvent? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
d) Both Tito and Pedro shall bear equally the costs of the extraordinary
expenses, having been incurred on the occasion of actual use of the van by Tito, the
bailee, even though he acted without fault. (Art. 1949(2), Civil Code)
XII
On July 14, 2004, Pedro executed in favor of Juan a Deed of Absolute Sale over a
parcel of land covered by TCTNo. 6245. It appears in the Deed of Sale that Pedro
received from Juan P120,000.00 as purchase price. However, Pedro retained the
owner’s duplicate of said title. Thereafter, J uan, as lessor, and Pedro, as lessee,
executed a contract of lease over the property for a period of one (1) year with a
monthly rental of PI,000.00. Pedro, as lessee, was also obligated to pay the realty
taxes on the property during the period of lease. Subsequently, Pedro filed a complaint
aqainst Juan for the reformation of the Deed of Absolute Sale, alleging that the
transaction covered by the deed was an equitable mortgage. In his verified answer to
the complaint, Juan alleged that the property was sold to him under the Deed of
Absolute Sale, and interposed counterclaims to recover possession of the property and
to compel Pedro to turn over to him the owner's duplicate of title.
Resolve the case with reasons. (6%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
An equitable mortgage arises from a transaction, regardless of its form, which

results into a security, or an offer or attempt to pledge land as security for a debt or
liability. Its essence is the intent of the parties to create a mortgage, lien or charge on
the property sufficiently described or identified to secure an obligation, which intent
must be clearly established in order that such a mortgage may exist.
Defendant's defense that he acquired the land through an Absolute Deed of Sale
and not through pacto de retro is untenable. The presumption of equitable mortgage
under Article 1602 of the Civil Code, equally applies to a contract purporting to be an
absolute sale (Article 1604, NCC). The facts and circumstances that Pedro retained
possession of the Owner's Duplicate Copy of the Certificate ofTitle; that he remained
in possession of the land as lessee; that he bound himself to pay the realty taxes
during the period of lease, are matters collectively and strongly indicating that the
Deed of Absolute Sale is an equitable mortgage. In case of doubt, the Deed of Sale
should be considered as a loan with mortgage, because this juridical relation involves
a lesser transmission of rights and interests.
If the transaction is proven to be an equitable mortgage, Pedro's prayer for

reformation of the instrument should be granted in accordance with Article 1605 of the
Civil Code. Thus, in case of non-payment, he may foreclose the mortgage and
consolidate his ownership of the land. In that event, Juan's counterclaim to recover
possession of the land and to compel Pedro to surrender the Owner’s Duplicate Copy
of the title becomes a consequential right.
XIII
Rod, the owner of an FX taxi, found in his vehicle an envelope containing TCT
No. 65432 over a lot registered in Cesar’s name. Posing as Cesar. Rod forged Cesar’s
signature on a Deed of Sale in Rod’s favor. Rod registered the said document with the
Register of Deeds, and obtained a new title in his name. After a year, he sold the lot to
Don, a buyer in good faith and for value, who also registered the lot in his name.
a) Did Rod acquire title to the land? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Rod did not acquire title to the land covered by T .C. T. No. 65432of Cesar. A
forged deed is an absolute nullity and conveys no title.
b) Discuss the rights of Don, if any, over the property. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) Don acquired a good title to the land. Under the Torrens System, a forged
deed can be the root of a good title. Since the certificate of title was already transferred
to Rod, upon the subsequent transfer thereof to Don, an innocent purchaser in good
faith, Don acquired a good title to the land. The registration of the land in the name of
Rod was conclusive notice to the whole world. Persons dealing with registered land
have the legal right to rely on the face of the Torrens title and to dispense with the need
to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing in the
certificate in the absence of facts and circumstances what would impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such inquiry. This is the “Mirror Principle” of the Torrens system.
c) In an ejectment case filed by Don against Cesar, can the latter ask for the
cancellation of Don’s title considering that he (Cesar) is the rightful owner of the lot?
Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) Cesar cannot ask for cancellation of Don's title in the ejectment case filed
by Don against him. Under Section 48 of PD 1529, the Property Registration Decree, a
Torrens title shall not be subject to collateral attack, ft cannot be altered, modified or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. The ejectment
proceeding does not provide the proper forum for the cancellation of Don’s title. While
Cesar’s counterclaim for cancellation of Don’s title may be considered a direct attack,
the same should nevertheless be denied on procedural grounds because a Municipal or
Metropolitan Trial Court is without jurisdiction to cancel a Torrens title.
XIV
Under a written contract dated December 1, 1989, Victor leased his land to Joel
for a period of five (5) years at a monthly rental of PI,000.00, to be increased to
Pl.200.00 and PI,500.00 on the third and fifth year, respectively. On January 1, 1991,
Joel subleased the land to Conrad for a period of two (2) years at a monthly rental of
PI,500.00.
On December 31. 1992, Joel assigned the lease to his compadre, Ernie, who
acted on the belief that Joel was the rightful owner and possessor of the said lot Joel
has been faithfully paying the stipulated rentals to Victor. When Victor learned on May
15,1992 about the sublease and assignment, he sued Joel, Conrad and Ernie for
rescission of the contract of lease and for damages.
a) Will the action prosper? If so, against whom? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Yes, the action for rescission of the lease will prosper because Joel
cannot assign the lease to Ernie without the consent of Victor. (Art. 1649, Civil Code).
But Joel may sublet to Conrad because there is no express prohibition (Art. 1650, Civil
Code; Alipio v. Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 441 (20001).
Victor can rescind the contract of lease with JoeJ, and the assignment of the lease
to Ernie, on the ground of violation of law and of contract. The sub-lease to Conrad
remained valid for two (2) years from January 1, 1991, dnd had not yet lapsed when
the action was filed on May 15, 1992.
b) In case of rescission, discuss the rights and obligations of the

parties. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) In case of rescission, the rights and obligations of the parties should be as

follows: At the time that Victor filed suit on May 15, 1992, the assignment had not yet
lapsed. It would lapse on December 1, 1994, the very same date that the 5-year basic
lease would expire. Since the assignment is void, Victor can get the property back
because of the violation of the lease. Both Joel and Ernie have to surrender possession
and are liable for damages. But Conrad has not yet incurred any liability on the sub-
lease which still subsisted at the time of the filing of the action on May 15, 1992.
Ernie can file a cross-claim against Joel for damages on account of the
rescission of the contract of assignment. Conrad can file a counter-claim against
Victor for damages for lack of causes of action at the time of the filing of the
suit.
XV
Under the law on quasi-delict, aside from the persons who caused injury to
persons, who else are liable under the following circumstances:
a) When a 7-year-old injures his playmate while playing with his father's rifle.
Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Under Article 221 of the Family Code, parents and other persons exercising
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts
or omissions of their unemancipated children or wards living in their company and
under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
b) When a domestic helper, while haggling for a lower price with a fish vendor in
the course of buying foodstuffs for her employer’s family, slaps the fish vendor,
causing her to fall and sustain injuries. Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
a) Under Article 2180, employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. As the domestic
helper was then in the exercise of her duties and acting within the scope of her
assigned tasks, her employer is also liable for the damage she has caused to the fish
vendor.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
a) The act of “slapping the fish vendor" is not "within the scope of the
assigned tasks" of the domestic helper. Hence, under Article 2180, the employer is not
liable for the damages caused by the domestic helper to the fish vendor.
b) A carpenter in a construction company accidentally hits the right foot of

his co-worker with a hammer. Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) His employer, the construction company, is also liable for the damages
that the carpenter caused to the latter’s co-worker. Under Article, 2176 and 2180 of the
Civil Code, liability is based on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer primarily
liable for tortious acts of its employees subject, however, to the defense that the former
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of his employees. (Franco v. IAC, 178 SCRA 331 [1989]).
d) A 15-year-old high school student stabs his classmates who is his rival for
a girl while they were going out of the classroom after their last class. Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) Under Section 218 of the Family Code, the school, its administrators and
teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special
parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
b) What defense, if any, is available to them? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) These persons identified by law to be liable may raise the defense that they
exercised proper diligence required under the circumstances. Their responsibility will
cease when they prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage. As regards the employer, if he shows to the satisfaction of the
court that in the selection and in the supervision of his employees he has exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is
relieved from liability. (Layugan v. 1AC, 167 SCRA 363 11988]).
XVI
Dr. and Mrs. Almeda are prominent citizens of the country and are frequent
travelers abroad. In 1996, they booked round-trip business class tickets for the Manila-
Hongkong-Manila route of the Pinoy Airlines, where they are holders of Gold Mabalos
Class Frequent Flier cards. On their return flight, Pinoy Airlines upgraded their tickets to
first class without their consent and, inspite of their protestations to be allowed to remain
in the business class so that they could be with their friends, they were told that the
business class was already fully booked, and that they were given priority in upgrading
because they are elite members/holders of Gold Mabalos Class cards. Since they were
embarrassed at the discussions with the flight attendants, they were forced to take the
flight at the first class section apart from their friends who were in the business class.
Upon their return to Manila, they demanded a written apology from Pinoy Airlines.
When it went unheeded, the couple sued Pinoy Airlines for breach of contract claiming
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.
Will the action prosper? Give reasons. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Pinoy Airlines breached its contract of carriage by upgrading the seat
accommodation of the Almedas without their consent. The object of their contract was
the transportation of the Almedas from Manila to Hongkong and back to Manila, with
seats in the business class section of the aircraft. They should have been consulted
first whether they wanted to avail themselves of the privilege and would consent to a
change of seat accommodation. It should not have been imposed on them over their
vehement objection. By insisting on the upgrade, Pinoy Airlines breached its contract
of carriage with the Almedas.
However, the upgrading or the breach of contract was not attended by fraud or
bad faith. They were not induced to agree to the upgrading through insidious words or
deceitful machination or through willful concealment of material facts. Bad faith does
not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty
through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
Neither is Pinoy Airlines in bad faith since Section 3 of the Economic Regulation
No.7 of the Civil Aeronautics Board provides that an overbooking that does not
exceed ten percent is not considered deliberate and therefore does not amount to bad
faith.
As a result, the Almedas are not entitled to recover moral damages. Moral
damages predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage may only be recoverable in
instances where the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith or when the mishap resulted
in the death of a passenger. Where in breaching the contract of carriage the airline is
not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to
the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation which the
parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In such a case the liability
does not include moral and exemplary damages.
It is a requisite in the grant of exemplary damages that the act of the offender be
accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent manner. Such
requisite is absent in this case. Moreover, to be entitled thereto the claimant must first
establish his right to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages. Since the Almedas
are not entitled to any of these damages, the award for exemplary damages has no
legal basis. And where the awards for moral and exemplary damages are eliminated,
so must the award for attorney’s fees.
The most that can be awarded for the breach of contract is an award for nominal
damages. Pinoy Airlines may be said to have disturbed the spouses' wish to be with
their companions at the Business Class on their flight to Manila.
(Cathay Pacific v. Spouses Vazquez, 399 SCRA 207 [2003]).

QUESTION No. I
A. Mr. ZY lost P100,000 in a card game called Russian poker, but he had no
more cash to pay in full the winner at the time session ended. He promised to pay PX,
the winner, two weeks thereafter. But he failed to do so despite the lapse of two
months, so PX filed in court a suit to collect the amount of P50.000 that he won but
remained unpaid. Will the collection suit against ZY prosper? Could Mrs. ZY file in turn
a suit against PX to recover the P 100,000 that her husband lost? Reason. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B. A1. The suit by PX to collect the balance of what he won from ZY will not
prosper. Under Article 2014 of the Civil Code, no action can be maintained by the
winner for the collection of what he has won in a game of chance. Although poker may
depend in part on ability, it is fundamentally a game of chance.
C. 2) If the money paid by ZY to PX was conjugal or community property,

the wife of ZY could sue to recover it because Article 117(7) of the Family Code
provides that losses in gambling or betting are borne exclusively by the loser-spc-use.
Hence, conjugal or community funds may not be used to pay for such losses. If the
money were exclusive property of ZY, his wife may also sue to recover it under Article
2016 of the Civil Code if she and the family needed the money for support.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER TO IA (2):
A. (2). Mrs. ZY cannot file a suit to recover what her husband lost. Art 2014 of the
Civil Code provides that any loser in a game of chance may recover his loss from the
winner, with legal interest from the time he paid the amount lost. This means that only
he can file the suit. Mrs. ZY cannot recover as a spouse who has interest in the
absolute community property or conjugal partnership of gains, because under Art.
117(7) of the Family Code, losses are borne exclusively by the loser-spouse.
Therefore, these cannot be charged against absolute community property or conjugal
partnership of gains. This being so, Mrs. ZY has no interest in law to prosecute and
recover as she has no legal standing in court to do so.
B. TX filed a suit for ejectment against BD for nonpayment of condominium

rentals amount to PI50,000. During the pendency of the case, BD offered and TX
accepted the full amount due as rentals from BD, who then filed a motion to dismiss the
ejectment suit on the ground that the action is already extinguished.
Is BD’s contention correct? Why or why not? Reason. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. BD’s contention is not correct. TX can still maintain the suit for ejectment. The
acceptance by the lessor of the payment by the lessee of the rentals in arrears even
during the pendency of the ejectment case does not constitute a waiver or
abandonment of the ejectment case. (Spouses Clutario v. CA, 216 SCRA 341 [1992]).
QUESTION No. II
A. Distinguish briefly but clearly between:
1. Mutuum and commodatum.
2. Substitute parental authority and special parental authority.
3. Civil obligation and natural obligation.
4. Inexistent contracts and annullable contracts.
5. Domiciliaiy theory and nationality theory of personal law. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. The distinctions are as follows:
1. In mutuum, the object borrowed must be a consumable thing the ownership of
which is transferred to the borrower who incurs the obligation to return the same
consumable to the lender in an equal amount, and of the same kind and quality. In
commodatum. the object borrowed is usually a non-consumable thing the ownership of
which is not transferred to the borrower who incurs the obligation to return the very
thing to the lender.
2. In substitute parental authority, the parents lose their parental authority in favor
of the substitute who acquires it to the exclusion of the parents.
In special parental authority, the parents or anyone exercising parental authority

does not lose parental authority. Those who are charged with special parental authority
exercise such authority only during the time that the child is in their custody or
supervision.
Substitute parental authority displaces parental authority while special parental

authority concurs with parental authority.
3. Civil obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do and not to do. It gives the
creditor the legal right to compel by an action in court the performance of such
obligation.
A natural obligation is based on equity and natural law. There is no legal right to
compel performance thereof but if the debtor voluntarily pays it, he cannot recover
what was paid.
Inexistent contracts are considered as not having been entered into and, therefore,
void ab initio. They do not create any obligation and cannot be ratified or validated, as
there is no agreement to ratify or validate. On the other hand, annullable or voidable
contracts are valid until invalidated by the court but may be ratified.
4. In inexistent contracts, one or more requisites of a valid contract are absent. In

anullable contracts, all the elements of a contract are present except that the consent
of one of the contracting parties was vitiated or one of them has no capacity to give
consent.
5. Domiciliary Theory posits that the personal status and rights of a person
are governed by the law of his domicile or the place of his habitual residence. The
Nationality Theory, on the other hand, postulates that it is the law of the person’s
nationality that governs such status and rights.
B. DT and MT were prominent members of the frequent travelers’ club of FX
Airlines. In Hong Kong, the couple were assigned seats in Business Class for which
they had bought tickets. On checking in, however, they were told they were upgraded
by computer to First Class for the flight to Manila because the Business Section was
overbooked.
Both refused to transfer despite better seats, food, beverage and other services in
First Class. They said they had guests in Business Class they should attend to. They
felt humiliated, embarrassed and vexed, however, when the stewardess allegedly
threatened to offload them if they did not avail of the upgrade. Thus they gave in, but
during the transfer of luggage DT suffered pain in his arm and wrist. After arrival in
Manila, they demanded an apology from FX's management as well as indemnity
payment. When none was forthcoming, they sued the airline for a million pesos in
damages.
Is the airline liable for actual and moral damages? Why or why not? Explain briefly.
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FX Airlines committed breach of contract when it upgraded DT and MT, over their
objections, to First Class because they had contracted for Business Class passage.
However, although there is a breach of contract, DT and MT are entitled to actual
damages only for such pecuniary losses suffered by them as a result of such breach. QUES
There seems to be no showing that they incurred such pecuniary loss. There is no
showing that the pain in DT's arm and wrist resulted directly from the carrier's acts
complained of. Hence, they are not entitled to actual damages. Moreover, DT could
have avoided the alleged injury by requesting the airline staff to do the luggage transfer
as a matter of duty on their part. There is also no basis to award moral damages for
such breach of contract because the facts of the problem do not show bad faith or fraud
on the part of the airline. (Cathay Pacific v. Vazquez, 399 SCRA 207 [20031). However,
they may recover moral damages if the cause of action is based on Article 21 of the
Civil
Code for the humiliation and embarrassment they felt when the stewardess
threatened to offload them if they did not avail of the upgrade.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If it can be proved that DT’s pain in his arm and wrist occasioned by the transfer
of luggage was caused by fault or negligence on the part of the airline’s stewardess,
actual damages may be recovered.
The airline may be liable for moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 (10) if the
cause of action is based on Article 21 or an act contrary to morals in view of the
humiliation suffered by DT and MT when they were separated from their guests and
were threatened to be offloaded.
QUESTION NO. III
A. RN and DM, without any impediment to marry each other had been living
together without benefit of church blessings. Their common-law union resulted in the
birth of ZMN. Two years later, they got married in a civil ceremony. Could ZMN be
legitimated? Reason. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. ZMN v/as legitimated by the subsequent marriage of RN and DM

because at the time he was conceived, RN and DM could have validly married each
other. Under the Family Code children conceived and bom outside ofwedlock of
parents who, at thetime of the former’s conception, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other are legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the
parents.
B. Dr. ALX is a scientist honored for work related to the human genome
project. Among his pioneering efforts concern stem cell research for the cure of
Alzheimer's disease. Under corporate sponsorship, he helped develop a microbe that
ate and digested oil spills in the sea.
Now he leads a college team for cancer research in MSS State. The team has
experimented on a mouse whose body cells replicate and bear cancerous tumor.
Called “oncomouse”, it is a life-form useful for medical research and it is a novel
creation. Its body cells do not naturally occur in nature but are the product of man's
intellect, industry' and ingenuity. However, there is a doubt whether local property laws
and ethics would allow rights of exclusive ownership on any life-form. Dr. ALX needs
your advice: (1) whether the reciprocity principle in private international law could be
applied in our jurisdiction; and (2) whether there are legal and ethical reasons that
could frustrate his claim of exclusive ownership over the life-form called "oncomouse”
in Manila? What will be your advice to him? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B. (1) The reciprocity principle in private international law may be applied in
our jurisdiction. Section 3 of R.A. 8293, the Intellectual Property Code, provides for
reciprocity, as follows: "Any person who is a national, or who is domiciled, or has a real
and effective industrial establishment in a country which is a party to any convention,
treaty or agreement relating to intellectual property rights or the repression of unfair
competition, to which the Philippines is also a party, or extends reciprocal rights to
nationals of the Philippines by law, shall be entitled to benefits to the extent necessary
to give effect to any provision of such convention, treaty or reciprocal law, in addition to
the rights to which any owner of an intellectual property right is otherwise entitled by
this Act. (n)” To illustrate: the Philippines may refrain from imposing a requirement of
local incorporation or establishment of a local domicile for the protection of industrial
property rights of foreign nationals (citizens of Canada, Switzerland, U.S.) if the
countries of said foreign nationals refrain from imposing said requirement on Filipino
citizens.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Reciprocity principle cannot be applied in our jurisdiction because the Philippines

is a party to the TRIPS agreement and the WTO. The principle involved is the most-
favored nation clause which is the principle of non-discrimination. The protection
afforded to intellectual property protection in the Philippines also applies to other
members of the WTO. Thus, it is not really reciprocity principle in private international
law that applies, but the most-favored nation clause under public international law.
(2) There is no legal reason why “oncomouse" cannot be protected under the
law. Among those excluded from patent protection are “plant varieties or animal
breeds, or essentially biological process for the production of plants and animals"
(Section 22.4 Intellectual Property Code, R.A. No. 8293). The “oncomouse" in the
problem is not an essentially biological process for the production of animals. It is a
real invention because its body cells do not naturally occur in nature but are the
product of man’s ingenuity, intellect and industry.
The breeding of oncomouse has novelty, inventive step and industrial application.
These are the three requisites of patentability. (Sec. 29, IPC)
There are no ethical reasons why Dr. ADX and his college team cannot be given
exclusive ownership over their invention. The use of such genetically modified mouse,
useful for cancer research, outweighs considerations for animal rights.
There are no legal and ethical reasons that would frustrate Dr. ALX’s claim of
exclusive ownership over "oncomouse". Animals are property capable of being
appropriated and owned. In fact, one can own pet dogs or cats, or any other animal. If
wild animals are capable of being owned, with more reason animals technologically
enhanced or corrupted by man’s invention or industry are susceptible to exclusive
ownership by the inventor.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The oncomouse is a higher life form which does not fall within the definition of the
term “invention". Neither may it fall within the ambit of the term “manufacture” which
usually implies a non-living mechanistic product.
The oncomouse is better regarded as a “discovery" which is the common

patrimony of man.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The “oncomouse” is a non-patentable invention. Hence, cannot be owned

exclusively by its inventor. It is a method for the treatment of the human or animal body
by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods practiced on said bodies are not
patentable under Sec. 22 of the IPC.
QUESTION No. IV
A. JV, owner of a parcel of land, sold it to PP. But the deed of sale was not
registered. One year later, JV sold the parcel again to RR, who succeeded to register
the deed and to obtain a transfer certificate of title over the property in his own name.
Who has a better right over the parcel of land, RR or PP? Why? Explain the legal
basis for your answer. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. It depends on whether or not RR is an innocent purchaser for value.
Under the Torrens System, a deed or instrument operated only as a contract

between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make the
registration. It is the registration of the deed or the instxmment that is the operative act
that conveys or affects the land. (Sec. 51, P.D. No. 1529).
In cases of double sale of titled land, it is a well- settled rule that the buyer who
first registers the sale in good faith acquires a better right to the land. (Art. 1544, Civil
Code).
Persons dealing with property covered by Torrens title are not required to go
beyond what appears on its face. (Orquiola v. CA386, SCRA301, [2002]; Domingo v.
Roces 401 SCRA 197, [2003]). Thus, absent any showing that RR knew about, or
ought to have known the prior sale of the land to PP or that he acted in bad faith, and
being first to register the sale, RR acquired a good and a clean title to the property as
against PP.
B. CX executed a special power of attorney authorizing DY to secure a loan

from any bank and to mortgage his property covered by the owner’s certificate of
title. In securing a loan from Mbank, DY did not specify that he was acting for CX in
the transaction with said bank.
Is CX liable for the bank loan? Why or why not? Justify your answer. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B. CX is liable for the bank loan, because he authorized the mortgage on his
property to secure the loan contracted by DY. If DY later defaults and fails to pay the
loan, CX is liable to pay. However, his liability is limited to the extent of the value of the
said property.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
CX is not personally liable to the bank loan because it was contracted by DY in

his personal capacity. Only the property of CX is liable. Hence, while CX has authorized
the mortgage on his property to secure the loan of DY, the bank cannot sue CX to
collect the loan in case DY defaults thereon. The bank can only foreclose the property
of CX. And if the proceeds of the foreclosure are not sufficient to pay the loan in full, the
bank cannot run after CX for the deficiency.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
While as a general rule the principal is not liable for the contract entered into by
his agent in case the agent acted in his own name without disclosing his principal, such
rule does not apply if the contract involves a thing belonging to the principal. In such
case, the principal is liable under Article 1SS3 of the Civil Code. The contract is deemed
made on his behalf (Sy-juco v. Sy-juco 40 Phil. 634 [1920]).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
CX would not be liable for the bank loan. CX’s property would also not be liable
on the mortgage. Since DY did not specify that he was acting for CX in the
transaction with the bank, DY in effect acted in his own name. In the case of Rural
Bank ofBombon v. CA, 212 SCRA, (1992), the Supreme Court, under the same
facts, ruled that “in order to bind the principal by a mortgage on real property
executed by an agent, it must upon its face purport to be made, signed and sealed in
the name of the principal, otherwise, it will bind the agent only. It is not enough
merely that the agent was in fact authorized to make the fnortgage, if he, hsis not
acted in the name of the principal. Neither is it ordinarily sufficient that in the
mortgage the agent describes himself as acting by virtue of a power of attorney, if in
fact the agent has acted in his own name and has set his own hand and seal to the
mortgage. There is no principle of law by which a person can become liable on a real
estate mortgage which she never executed in person or by attorney in fact".
QUESTION No. V
A. DPO went to a store to buy a pack of cigarettes worth P225.00 only. He
gave the vendor, RRA, a P500-peso bill. The vendor gave him the pack plus
P375.00 change. Was there a discount, an oversight, or an error in the amount
given? What would be DPO’s duty, if any, in case of an excess in the amount of
change given by the vendor? How is this situational relationship between DPO and
RRA denominated? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. There was error in the amount of change given by RRA. This is a case of
solutio indebiti in that DPO received something that is not due him. He has the
obligation to return the P100.00; otherwise, he will unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of RRA. (Art. 2154, Civil Code)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
DPO has the duty to return to RRA the excess P100 as trustee under Article
1456 of the Civil Code which provides: If property is acquired through mistake or
fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied
trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. There is, in this
case, an implied or constructive trust in favor of RRA.
B. OJ was employed as professional driver of MM Transit bus owned by Mr.

BT. In the course of his work, OJ hit a pedestrian who was seriously injured and later
died in the hospital as a result of the accident. The victim’s heirs sued the driver and
the owner of the bus for damages
Is there a presumption in this case that Mr. BT, the owner, had been negligent? If
so, is the presumption absolute or not? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B. Yes, there is a presumption of negligence on the part of the employer.
However, such presumption is rebuttable. The liability of the employer shall cease
when they prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage (Article 2180, Civil Code).
When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his
own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent,
rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family
{Metro Manila Transit v. CA, 223 SCRA 521 [1993}; Delsan Transport Lines v. CSLA
Construction, 412 SCRA 524 [2Q03D.
Likewise, if the driver is charged and convicted in a criminal case for criminal
negligence, BT is subsidiarily liable for the damages arising from the criminal act.
QUESTION No. VI
A. ABC loaned to MNO P40.000 for which the latter pledged 400 shares of stock
in XYZ Inc. It was agreed that if the pledgor failed to pay the loan with 10% yearly
interest within four years, the pledgee is authorized to foreclose on the shares of stock.
As required, MNO delivered possession of the shares to ABC with the understanding
that the shares would be returned to MNO upon the payment of the loan. However, the
loan was not paid on time.
A month after 4 years, may the shares of stock pledged be deemed owned by
ABC or not? Reason. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. The shares of stock cannot be deemed owned by ABC upon default of

MNO. They have to be foreclosed. Under Article 2088 of the Civil Code, the creditor
cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge. And even if the parties have
stipulated that ABC becomes the owner of the shares in case MNO defaults on the
loan, such stipulation is void for being a pactum commissorium.
B. As an agent, AL was given a guarantee commission, in addition to his

regular commission, after he sold 20 units of refrigerators to a customer, HT Hotel.
The customer, however, failed to pay for the units sold. AL’s principal, DRB1,
demanded from AL payment for the customer’s accountability. AL objected, on the
ground that his job was only to sell and not to collect payment for units bought by the
customer.
Is AL’s objection valid? Can DRBI collect from him or not? Reason. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. No, AL’s objection is not valid and DRBI can collect from AL. Since AL
accepted a guarantee commission, in addition to his regular commission, he agreed to
bear the risk of collection and to pay the principal the proceeds of the sale on the
same terms agreed upon with the purchaser (Article 1907, Civil Code)
QUESTION No. VH
A. PH and LV are HK Chinese. Their parents are now Filipino citizens who live in
Manila. While still students in MNS State, they got married although they are first
cousins. It appears that both in HK and in MNS State first cousins could marry legally.
They plan to reside and set up business in the Philippines. But they have been
informed, however, that the marriage of first cousins here is considered void from the
beginning by reason of Public policy. They are in a dilemma. They don’t want to break
Philippine law, much less their marriage vow. They seek your advice on whether their
civil status will be adversely
affected by Philippine domestic law? What is your advice? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. My advise is as follows:
The civil status of PH and LV will not be adversely affected by Philippine law
because they are nationals of Hong Kong and not Filipino citizens.
Being foreigners, their status, conditions and legal capacity in the Philippines are
governed by the law of Hong Kong, the country of which they are citizens. Since their
marriage is valid under Hong Kong law, it shall be valid and respected in the
Philippines.
B. In a class suit for damages, plaintiffs claimed they suffered Injuries from
torture during martial law. The suit was filed upon President EM's arrival on exile in HI,
a U.S. state. The court in HI awarded plaintiffs the equivalent of PI00 billion under the
U.S. law on alien tort claims. On appeal, EM’s Estate raised the issue of prescription. It
argued that since said U.S. law is silent on the matter, the court should apply: (1) Hi’s
law setting a two-year limitation on tort claims: or (2) the Philippine law which appears
to require that claims for personal injury arising from martial law be brought within one
year.
Plaintiffs countered that provisions of the most analogous federal statute, the
Torture Victims Protection Act, should be applied. It sets ten years as the period of
prescription. Moreover, they argued that equity could toll the statute of limitations. For
it appeared that EM had procured Constitutional amendments granting himself and
those acting under his direction immunity from suit during his tenure.
In this case, has prescription set in or not? Considering the differences in the cited
laws, which prescriptive period should be applied: one year under Philippine law, two
years under Hi’s law, ten years under U.S. federal law, or none of the above? Explain.
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. The US Court will apply US law, the law of the forum. In determining the
applicable prescriptive period. While US law is silent on this matter, the US Court will
not apply Philippine law in determining the prescriptive period. It is generally affirmed
as a principle in private international law that procedural law is one of the exceptions
to the application of foreign law by the forum. Since prescription is a matter of
procedural law even in Philippine jurisprudence, (Cadalin v. POEA/ NLRC/Brown and
Root International, 238 SCRA 721 [1994]), the US Court will apply either HI or Federal
law in determining the applicable prescriptive period and not Philippine law. The
Restatement of American law affirms this principle.
QUESTION No. VIII
A. A Filipino couple, Mr. And Mrs. BM, Jr., decided to adopt YV, an orphan from
St. Claire's orphanage In New York City. They loved and treated her like a legitimate
child for they have none of their very own. However, BM, Jr., died In an accident at
sea, followed to the grave a year later by his sick father, BM, Sr. Each left a sizable
estate consisting of bank deposits, lands and buildings in Manila. May the adopted
child, YV, inherit from BM, Jr.? May
she also Inherit from BM. Sr.? Is there a difference? Why? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. YV can inherit from BM, Jr. the succession to the estate of BM, Jr. is
governed by Philippine law because he was a Filipino when he died (Article 16, Civil
Code). Under Article 1039 of the Civil Code, the capacity of the heir to succeed is
governed by the national law of the decedent and not by the national law of the heir.
Hence, whether or not YV can inherit from BM, Jr. is determined by Philippine law.
Under Philippine law, the adopted inherits from the adopter as a legitimate child of the
adopter.
YV, however, cannot inherit, in his own right, from the father of the adopter, BM,
Sr., because he is not a legal heir of BM, Sr. The legal fiction of adoption exists only
between the adopted and the adopter. (Teotico v. Del Val 13 SCRA 406 [1965]).
Neither may he inherit from BM, Sr. by representing BM, Jr. because in representation,
the representative must be a legal heir not only of the person he is representing but
also of the decedent from whom the represented was supposed to inherit (Article 973,
Civil Code).
B. Mr. XT and Mrs. YT have been married for 20 years. Suppose the wife, YT,
died childless, survived only by her husband, XT. What would be the share of XT from
her estate as inheritance? Why? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B. Under the Civil Code, the widow or widower is a legal and compulsory heir of
the deceased spouse. If the widow is the only surviving heir, there being no legitimate
ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she gets the
entire estate.
QUESTION No. IX
A. The parties in a contract of loan of money agreed that the yearly interest rate
is 12% and it can be increased if there is a law that would authorize the increase of
interest rates. Suppose OB, the lender, would increase by 5% the rate of interest to be
paid by TY, the borrower, without a law authorizing such increase, would OB’s action
be just and valid? Why? Has TY a remedy against the imposition of the rate increase?
Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
A. OB’s action is not just and valid. The debtor cannot be required to pay the
increase in interest there being no law authorizing it, as stipulated in the contract.
Increasing the rate in the absence of such law violates the principle of mutuality of
contracts.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Even if there was a law authorizing the increase in interest rate, the stipulation is
still void because there is no corresponding stipulation to decrease the interest due
when the law reduces the rate of interest.
B. DON, an American businessman, secured parental consent for the

employment of five minors to play certain roles in two movies he was producing at
home in Makati. They worked at odd hours of the day and night, but always
accompanied by parents or other adults. The producer paid the children talent fees at
rates better than adult wages.
But the social worker, DEB, reported to OSWD that these children often missed
going to school. They sometimes drank wine, aside from being exposed to drugs. In
some scenes, they were filmed naked or in revealing costumes. In his defense. DON
contended all these were part of artistic freedom and cultural creativity. None of the
parents complained, said DON. He also said they signed a contract containing a
waiver of their right to file any complaint in any office or tribunal concerning the working
conditions of their children acting in the movies.
Is the waiver valid and binding? Why or why not? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B. The waiver Is not valid. Although the contracting parties may establish
such stipulations, clauses, terms
C. and conditions as they may deem convenient, they may not do so if such
are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy (Article 1306,
Civil Code). The parents’ waiver to file a conlplaint concerning the working conditions
detrimental to the moral well-being of their children acting in the movies is in violation of
the Family Code and Labor laws. Thus, the waiver is invalid and not binding.
D. The Child Labor Law is a mandatory and prohibitory law and the rights of the
child cannot be waived as it is contrary to law and public policy.
QUESTION No. X
A. BONI and ANNE met while working overseas. They became sweethearts and
got engaged to be married on New Year’s Eve aboard a cruise ship in the Caribbean.
They took the proper license to many in New York City, where there is a Filipino
consulate. But as planned the wedding ceremony was officiated by the captain of the
Norwegian-registered vessel in a private suite among selected friends.
Back in Manila, Anne discovered that Boni had been married in Bacolod City 5
years earlier but divorced in Oslo only last year. His first wife was also a Filipina but
now based in Sweden. Boni himself is a resident of Norway where he and Anne plan to
live permanently.
Anne retains your sendees to advise her on whether her marriage to Boni is valid
under Philippine law? Is there anything else she should do under the circumstances?
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. If Boni is still a Filipino citizen, his legal capacity is governed by Philippine Law
(Art. 15 Civil Code). Under Philippine-Law, his marriage to Anne is void because of a
prior existing marriage which was not dissolved by the divorce decreed in Oslo. Divorce
obtained abroad by a Filipino is not recognized.
If Boni was no longer a Filipino citizen, the divorce is valid. Hence, his marriage to
Anne is valid if celebrated in accordance with the law of the place where it was
celebrated. Since the marriage was celebrated aboard a vessel of Norwegian registry,
Norwegian law applies. If the Ship Captain has authority to solemnize the marriage
aboard his ship, the marriage is valid and shall be recognized in the Philippines.
As to the second question, if Boni is still a Filipino, Anne can file an action for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to him.
B. In his lifetime, a Pakistani citizen, ADIL, married three times under Pakistani
law. When he died an old widower, he left behind six children, two sisters, three
homes, and an estate worth at least 30 million pesos in the Philippines. He was bom in
Lahore but last resided in Cebu City, where he had a mansion and where two of his
youngest children now live and work. Two of his oldest children are farmers in Sulu,
while the two middle-aged children are employees in Zamboanga City. Finding that the
deceased left no will, the youngest son wanted to file intestate proceedings before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. Two other siblings objected, arguing that it should
be in Jolo before a Shari’a court since his lands are in Sulu. But Adil’s sisters in
Pakistan want the proceedings held in Lahore before a Pakistani court.
Which court has jurisdiction and is the proper venue for the intestate proceedings?
The law of which country shall govern succession to his estate? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B. In so far as the properties of the decedent located in the Philippines are

concerned, they are governed by Philippine law (Article 16, Civil Code). Under
Philippine law, the proper venue for the settlement of the estate is the domicile of the
decedent at the time of his death. Since the decedent last resided in Cebu City, that is
the proper venue for the intestate settlement of his estate.
However, the suecessional rights to the estate of ADEL are governed by

Pakistani law, his national law, under Article 16 of the Civil Code.
I
5%
It is said that “equity follows the law” What do you understand by this phrase, and
what are its basic implications?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
“Equity follows the law” means that courts exercising equity jurisdiction are
bound by rules of law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them.
(Arsenal v. IAC, 143 SCRA 40[1986]. Equity is applied only in the absence of but
never against statutory law. (Toyota Motor Phil. v. CA 216 SCRA 236 [1992]).
5%
Gene and Jane, Filipinos, met and got married in England while both were taking up
post-graduate courses there. A few years after their graduation, they decided to annul
their marriage. Jane filed an action to annul her marriage to Gene in England on the
ground of the latter’s sterility, a ground for annulment of marriage in England. The
English court decreed the marriage annulled. Returning to the Philippines, Gene asked
you whether or not he would now be free to marry his former girlfriend. What would
your legal advice be?
No, Gene is not free to marry his former girlfriend. His marriage to Jane if valid
according to the forms and solemnities of British law, is valid here (Article 17, 1 st par.,
NCC). However, since Gene and Jane are still Filipinos,although living in England, the
dissolution of their marriage is still governed by Philippine law (Article 15, NCC). Since,
sterility is not one of the grounds for the annulment of a marriage under Article 45 of the
Family Code, the annulment of Gene's marriage to Jane on that ground is not valid in
the Philippines (Article 17, par., NCC).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, Gene is free to marry his girlfriend because his marriage was validly
annulled in England. The issue of whether or not a marriage is voidable,
including the grounds therefor, is governed by the law of the place where the
marriage was solemnized (lex loci celebrationis). Hence, even if sterility is not a
ground to annul the marriage under Philippine law, the marriage is nevertheless
voidable because sterility makes the marriage voidable under English law.
Therefore, annulment of the marriage in England is valid in the Philippines.
Republic of the Philippines, 159 SCRA 593 [1988]). Since Miss Universe is still a
foreigner, despite her marriage to a Filipino doctor, she can be deported upon
expiry of her allowable stay in the Philippines.
No, the Bureau of Immigration cannot order her deportation. An alien

woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a
Filipino if she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines. (Mo Ya Lim v.
Commissioner of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292 [1971]), (Sec. 4, Naturalization Law).
All that she has to do is prove in the deportation proceeding the fact of her
marriage and that she is not disqualified to become a Filipino citizen.
It depends. If she is disqualified to be a Filipino citizen, she may be deported.

If she is not disqualified to be a Filipino citizen, she may not be deported. An
alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen becomes a Filipino citizen only when
she proves that she is not disqualified to become one. The marriage of Miss
Universe to the Filipino doctor did not automatically make her a Filipino citizen.
She still has to prove that she is not disqualified to become a citizen.
IV
5%
If a pregnant woman passenger of a bus were to suffer an abortion following a

vehicular accident due to the gross negligence of the bus driver, may she and her
husband claim damages from the bus company for the death of their unborn child?
Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the spouses cannot recover actual damages in the form of indemnity for the
loss of life of the unborn child. This is because the unborn child is not yet
considered a person and the law allows indemnity only for loss of life of persons.
The mother, however, may recover damages for the bodily injury she suffered
from the loss of the fetus which is considered part of her internal organs. The
parents may also recover damages for injuries that are inflicted directly upon
them, e.g., moral damages for mental anguish that attended the loss of the
unborn child. Since there is gross negligence, exemplary damages can also be
recovered. (Geluz v. CA, 2 SCRA 801[ 1961])
v
5%
Jo-Ann asked her close friend, Aissa, to'buy some groceries for her in the
supermarket. Was there a nominate contract entered into between Jo-Ann and Aissa?
In. the affirmative, what was it? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, there was a nominate contract. On the assumption that Aissa accepted the
request of her close friend Jo-Ann to buy some groceries for her in the
supermarket, what they entered into was the nominate contract of Agency.
Article 1868 of the New Civil code provides that by the contract of agency a
person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, they entered into a nominate contract of lease of service in the absence of
a relation of principal and agent between them (Article 1644, New Civil Code).
VI
5%
Which of the following remedies, i.e., (a) declaration of nullity of marriage, (b)
annulment of marriage, (c) legal separation, and or (d) separation of property, can an
aggrieved spouse avail himself/herself of-
(i) If the wife discovers after the marriage that her husband has “AIDS"
(ii) If the wife goes (to) abroad to work as a nurse and refuses to come home after
the expiration of her three-year contract there.
(iii) If the husband discovers after the marriage that his wife has been a prostitute
before they got married.
(iv) If the husband has a serious affair with his secretary and refuses to stop
notwithstanding advice from relatives and friends.
(v) If the husband beats up his wife every time he comes home drunk.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Since AIDS is a serious and incurable sexually- transmissible disease, the
(i)
wife may file an action for annulment of the marriage on this ground whether
such fact was concealed or not from the wife, provided that the disease was
present at the time of the marriage. The marriage is voidable even though the
husband was not aware that he had the disease at the time of marriage.
(ii) If the wife refuses to come home for three (3) months from the expiration
of her contract, she is presumed to have abandoned the husband and he may
file an action for judicial separation of property. If the refusal continues for more
than one year from the expiration of her contract, the husband may file the
action for legal separation under Art. 55 (10) of the Family Code on the ground of
abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause formore than
one year. The wife is deemed to have abandoned the husband when she leaves
the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning (Article 101, FC). The
intention not to return cannot be presumed during the 3-year period of her
contract.
(iii) If the husband discovers after the marriage that his wife was a prostitute
before they got married, he has no remedy. No misrepresentation or deceit as to
character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute fraud as legal ground
for an action for the annulment of marriage (Article 46 FC).
(iv) The wife may file an action for legal separation. The husband’s sexual
infidelity is a ground for legal separation (Article 55, FC). She may also file an
action for judicial separation of property for failure of her husband to comply
with his marital duty of fidelity (Article 135(4), 101, FC).
(v) The wife may file an action for legal separation on the ground of repeated
physical violence on her person (Article 55(1), FC). She may also file an action
for judicial separation of property for failure of the husband to comply with his
marital duty of mutual respect (Article 135(4), Article 101, FC). She may also file
an action for declaration of nullity of the marriage if the husband’s behavior
constitutes psychological incapacity existing at the time of the celebration of
marriage.
VII
5%
Lina, a former Filipina who became an American citizen shortly after her
marriage to an American husband, would like to adopt in the Philippines, jointly with her
husband, one of her minor brothers. Assuming that all the required consents have been
obtained, could the contemplated joint adoption in the Philippines prosper? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Lina and her American husband can jointly adopt a minor brother of
Lina because she and her husband are both qualified to adopt. Lina, as a former
Filipino citizen, can adopt her minor brother under Sec. 7(b)(i) of RA 8552
(Domestic Adoption Act of 1998), or under Art. 184(3}(a) of the Family Code. The
alien husband can now adopt under Sec. 7[b] of RA 8552. The Supreme Court
has held in several cases that when husband and wife are required to adopt
jointly, each one of them must be qualified to adopt in his or her own right
(.Republic v. Toledano, 233 SCRA 9 [1994I]). However, the American husband must
comply with the requirements of the law including the residency requirement of
three (3) years. Otherwise, the adoption will not be allowed.
VIII
5%
If during class hours, while the teacher was chatting with other teachers in the
school corridor, a 7-year old male pupil stabs the eye of another boy with a ballpen
during a fight, causing permanent blindness to the victim, who could be liable for
damages for the boy's injury: the teacher, the school authorities, or the guilty boy's
parents? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The school, its administrators, and teachers have special parental

authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody (Article 218, FC). They are principally and solidarity liable
forthe damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor
unless they exercised the proper diligence required under the circumstances
(Article 219, FC). In the problem, the teacher and the school authorities are liable
forthe blindness of the victim, because the student who caused it was under
their special parental authority and they were negligent. They were negligent
because they were chatting in the corridor during the class period when the
stabbing incident occurred. The incident could have been prevented had the
teacher been inside the classroom at that time. The guilty boy’s parents are
subsidiarily liable under Article 219 of the Family Code.
IX
5%
Andres is a riparian owner of a parcel of registered land. His land, however, has
gradually diminished in area due to the current of the river, while the registered land of
Mario on the opposite bank has gradually increased in area by 200-square meters.
(a) Who has the better right over the 200-square meter area that has been added to
Mario's registered land, Mario or Andres?
(b) May a third person acquire said 200-square meter land by prescription?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a. Mario has a better right over the 200 square meters increase in area by
reason of accretion, applying Article 457 of the New Civil Code, which provides
that “to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters”.
Andres cannot claim that the increase in Mario’s land is his own, because such
is an accretion and not a result of the sudden detachment of a known portion of
his land and its attachment to Mario's land, a process called ’’avulsion”. He can
no longer claim ownership of the portion of his registered land which was
gradually and naturally eroded due to the current of the river, because he had
lost it by operation of law. That portion of the land has become part of the public
domain.
b. Yes, a third party may acquire, by prescription the 200 square maters,
increase in area, because it is not included in the Torrens Title of the riparian
owner. Hence, this does not involve the imprescriptibility conferred by Section
47, P.D. No. 1529. The fact that the riparian land is registered does not
automatically make the accretion thereto a registered land. {Grande v. CA, 115
Phil. 521 [1962]; Jagualing v. CA, 194 SCRA 607 [1991]).
5%
In 1950, Dr. Alba donated a parcel cf land to Central University on condition that the
latter must establish a medical college on the land to be named after him. In the year
2000, the heirs of Dr. Alba filed an action to annul the donation and forthe
reconveyance of the property donated to them for the failure, after 50 years, of the
University to establish on the property a medical school named after their father. The
University opposed the action on the ground of prescription and also because it had not
used the property for some purpose other than that stated in the donation. Should the
opposition of the University to the action of Dr. Alba’s heirs be sustained? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The donation may be revoked. The non-establishment of the medical college

on the donated property was a resolutory condition imposed on the donation by
the donor. Although the Deed of Donation did not fix the time forthe
establishment of the medical college, the failure of the donee to establish the
medical college after fifty (50) years from the making of the donation should be
considered as occurrence of the resolutory condition, and the donation may
now be revoked. While the general rule is that in case the period is not fixed in
the agreement of the parties, the period must be fixed first by the court before
the obligation may be demanded, the period of fifty (50) years was more than
enough time for the donee to comply with the condition. Hence, in this case,
there is no more need for the court to fix the period because such procedure
would serve no other purpose but to delay compliance with the condition.
(Central Philippine University V.CA, 246 SCRA 511).
The donation may not as yet be revoked. The establishment of a medical college
is not a resolutory or suspensive condition but a “charge”, “obligation”, ora
“mode". The noncompliance with the charge or mode will give the donor the
right to revoke the donation within four (4) years from the time the charge was
supposed to have been complied with, or to enforce the charge by specific
performance within ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrued.
Inasmuch as the time to establish the medical college has not been fixed in the
Deed of Donation, the donee is not yet in default in his obligation until the period
is fixed by order of the court under Article 1197 of the New Civil Code. Since the
period has not been fixed as yet, the donee is not yet in default, and therefore the
donor has no cause of action to revoke the donation. (Dissenting opinion of
Davide, CJ, Central Philippine University v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 511 [1995])
XI
5%
Mr. Reyes executed a will completely valid as to form. A week later, however, he
executed another will which expressly revoked his first will, following which he tore his
first will to pieces. Upon the death of Mr. Reyes, his second will was presented for
probate by his heirs, but it was denied probate due to formal defects. Assuming that a
copy of the first will is available, may it now be admitted to probate and given effect?
Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the first will may be admitted to probate and given effect. When the
testator tore the first will, he was under the mistaken belief that the second will
was perfectly valid and he would not have destroyed the first will had he known
that the second will is not valid. The revocation by destruction therefore is
dependent on the validity of the second will. Since it turned out that the second
will was invalid, the tearing of the first will did not produce the effect of
revocation. This is known as the doctrine of dependent relative revocation (Molo
v. Molo, 90 Phil 37).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, the first will cannot be admitted to probate. While it is true that the first
will was not successfully revoked by the second will because the second will
was later denied probate, the first will was, nevertheless, revoked when the
testator destroyed it after executing the second invalid will. (Diaz v. De Leon, 43
Phil. 413 [1922]).
XII
5%
(a) Luis was survived by two legitimate children, two illegitimate children, his
parents, and two brothers. He left an estate of P1 million. Who are the compulsory
heirs of Luis, how much is the legitime of each, and how much is the free portion of his
estate, if any?
(b) Suppose Luis, in the preceding question (a), died intestate. Who are his
intestate heirs, and how much is the share of each in his estate?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The compulsory heirs are the two legitimate children and the two
illegitimate children. The parents are excluded by the legitimate children, while
the brothers are not compulsory heirs at all.
Their respective legitimes are:
(1) The legitime of the two (2) legitimate children is one- half (1/2) of the estate
(P500,000.00) to be divided between them equally, or P250,000.00 each.
(2) The legitime of each illegitimate child is one-half (1/2 the legitime of each
legitimate child or P125,000.00.
Since the total legitimes of the compulsory heirs is P750.000.00, the

balance of P250,000.00 is the free portion.
(b) The intestate heirs are the two (2) legitimate children and the two (2)
illegitimate children. In intestacy the estate of the decedent is divided among the
legitimate and illegitimate children such that the share of each illegitimate child
is one- half the share of each legitimate child.
Their shares are:
For each legitimate child - P333.333.33
For each illegitimate child - P166.666.66
(Article 983, New Civil Code; Article 176, Family Code)

XIII
5%
Are the following obligations valid, why, and if they are valid, when is the
obligation demandable in each case?
(a) If the debtor promises to pay as soon as he has the means to pay;
(b) If the debtor promises to pay when he likes;
(c) If the debtor promises to pay when he becomes a lawyer;
(d) If the debtor promises to pay if his son, who is sick with cancer, does not die
within one year.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The obligation is valid. It is an obligation subject to an indefinite period

because the debtor binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do so
(Article 1180, NCC). When the creditor knows that the debtor already has the
means to pay, he must file an action in court to fix the period, and when the
definite period as set by the court arrives, the obligation to pay becomes
demandable (Article 1197, NCC).
(b) The obligation “to pay when he likes” is a suspensive condition the
fulfillment of which is subjectto the sole will of the debtorand, therefore, the
conditional obligation is void. (Article 1182, NCC).
(c) The obligation is valid. It is subject to a suspensive condition, *.e. the

future and uncertain event of his becoming a lawyer. The performance of this
obligation does not depend solely on the will of the debtor but also on other
factors outside the debtor's control.
(d) The obligation is valid. The death of the son of cancer within one year is
made a negative suspensive condition to his making the payment. The
obligation is demandable if the son does not die within one year (Article 1185,
NCC).
XIV
5%
A, B, C, D, and E made themselves solidarily indebted to X for the amount of

P50,000.00. When X demanded payment from A, the latter refused to pay on the
following grounds:
(a) B is only 16 years old

(b) C has already been condoned by X.
(c) D is insolvent.
(d) E was given by X an extension of 6 months without the consent of the other four
co-debtors.
State the effect of each of the above defenses put up by A on his obligation to
pay X, if such defenses are found to be true.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) A may avail the minority of B as a defense, but only for B’s share of
P10,000.00. A solidary debtor may avail himself of any defense which personally
belongs to a solidary codebtor, but only as to the share of that co-debtor.
(b) A may avail of the condonation by X of C's share of P10.000.00. A solidary

debtor may, in actions filed by the creditor, avail himself of all defenses which
are derived from the nature of the obligation and of those which are personal to
him or pertain to his own share. With respect to those which personally belong
to others, he may avail himself thereof only as regards that part of the debt for
which the latter are responsible. (Article 1222, NCC).
(c) A may not interpose the defense of insolvency of D as a defense. Applying

the principle of mutual guaranty among solidary debtors, A guaranteed the
payment of D’s share and of all the other co-debtors. Hence, A cannot avail of
the defense of D’s insolvency.
(d) The extension of six (6) months given by X to E may be availed of by A as a

partial defense but only for the share of E. There is no novation of the obligation
but only an act of liberality granted to E alone.
XV
5%
(a) May a person sell something that does not belong to him? Explain.
(b) May a person donate something that does not belong to him? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Yes, a person may sell something which does not belong to him. Forthe
sale to be valid, the law does not require the seller to be the owner of the
property at the time of the sale. (Article 1434, NCC). If the seller cannot transfer
ownership over the thing sold at the time of delivery because he was not the
owner thereof, he shall be liable for breach of contract.
(b) As a general rule, a person cannot donate something which he cannot

dispose of at the time of the donation (Article 751, New Civil Code).
XVI
5%
X sold a parcel of land to Y on 01 January 2002, payment and delivery to be
made on 01 February 2002. It was stipulated that if payment were not to be made by Y
on 01 February 2002, the sale between the parties would automatically be rescinded. Y
failed to pay on 01 February 2002, but offered to pay three days later, which payment X
refused to accept, claiming that their contract of sale had already been rescinded. Is X's
contention correct? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER
No, X is not correct. In the sale of immovable property, even though it may
have been stipulated, as in this case, that upon failure to pay the price at the time
agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of right take place, the vendee
may pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as no demand for
rescission of the contract has been made upon him either judicially or by a
notarial act (Article 1592, New Civil Code). Since no demand for rescission was
made on Y, either judicially or by a notarial act, X cannot refuse to accept the
payment offered by Y three (3) days after the expiration of the period.
This is a contract to sell and not a contract of absolute sale, since as there has
been no delivery of the land. Article 1592 of the New Civil Code is not applicable.
Instead, Article 1595 of the New Civil Code applies. The seller has two alternative
remedies: (1) specific performance, or (2) rescission or resolution under Article
1191 of the New Civil Code. In both remedies, damages are due because of
default.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, the contract was automatically rescinded upon Y’s failure to pay on 01
February 2002. By the express terms of the contract, there is no need for X to
make a demand in order for rescission to take place. (Article 1191, New Civil
Code. Suria v. IAC 151 SCRA 661 [1987]; U.P. v. de los Angeles 35 SCRA 102
[1970]).
XVII
5%
As a result of a collision between a taxicab owned by A and another taxicab

owned by B, X, a passenger of the first taxicab, was seriously injured. X later filed a
criminal action against both drivers.
(a) Is it necessary for X to reserve his right to institute a civil action for damages
against both taxicab owners before he can file a civil action for damages against them?
Why?
(b) May both taxicab owners raise the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their drivers to be absolved from liability for damages to X? Reason.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) It depends. If the separate civil action is to recover damages arising from
the criminal act, reservation is necessary. If the civil action against the taxicab
owners is based on culpa contractual, or on quasi-delict, there is no need for
reservation.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
(a) No, such reservation is not necessary. Under Section 1 of Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, what is “deemed instituted” with the criminal
action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex
delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the New
Civil Code are no longer “deemed instituted”, and may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action
(Section 3, Rule 111, Ibid.), The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action
is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based
on these articles of the New Civil Code (Casupanan v. Laroya GR No. 145391,
August 26, 2002).
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) It depends. If the civil action is based on a quasi-delict the taxicab owners
may raise the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of the driver; if the action against them is based on culpa
contractual or civil liability arising from a crime, they cannot raise the defense.
XVIII
5%
In 1970, the spouses Juan and Juana de la Cruz, then Filipinos, bought a parcel
of unregistered land in the Philippines on which they built a house which became their
residence. In 1986, they migrated to Canada and became Canadian citizens.
Thereafter, in 1990, they applied, opposed by the Republic, for the registration of
the aforesaid land in their names. Should the application of the spouses de la Cruz be
granted over the Republic’s opposition? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the application should be granted. As a rule, the Constitution

prohibits aliens from owning private lands in the Philippines. This rule, however,
does not apply to the spouses Juan and Juana de la Cruz because at the time
they acquired ownership over the land, albeit imperfect, they were still Filipino
citizens. The application for registration is a mere confirmation of the imperfect
title which the spouses have already acquired before they became Canadian
citizens. (Republic v. CA, 235 SCRA 567 [1994]).
XIX
5%
X constructed a house on a lot which he was leasing from Y. Later, X executed a

chattel mortgage over said house in favor of Z as security for a loan obtained from the
latter. Still later, X acquired ownership of the land where his house was constructed,
after which he mortgaged both house and land in favor of a bank, which mortgage was
annotated on the Torrens Certificate of Title. When X failed to pay his loan to the bank,
the latter, being the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, foreclosed the mortgage
and acquired X’s house and lot. Learning of the proceedings conducted by the bank, Z
is now demanding that the bank reconvey to him X’s house or pay X’s loan to him plus
interests. Is Z’s demand against the bank valid and sustainable? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Z’s demand is not valid. A building is immovable or real property whether it is
erected by the owner of the land, by a usufructuary, or by a lessee. It may be treated
as a movable by the parties to a chattel mortgage but such is binding only between
them and not on third parties (Evangelista v. Alto Surety Co., Inc. 103 Phil. 401
[1958]). In this case, since the bank is not a party to the chattel mortgage, it is not
bound by it. As far as the Bank is concerned, the chattel mortgage does not exist.
Moreover, the chattel mortgage is void because it was not registered. Assuming that it
is valid, it does not bind the Bank because it was not annotated on the title of the land
mortgaged to the bank. Z cannot demand that the Bank pay him the loan Z extended to
X, because the Bank was not privy to such loan transaction.
No, Z’s demand against the bank is not valid. His demand that the bank reconvey to
him X’s house presupposes that he has a real right over the house. All that Z has is a
personal right against X for damages for breach of the contract of loan.
The treatment of a house, even if built on rented land, as movable property is

void insofar as third persons, such as the bank, are concerned. On the other hand, the
Bank already had a real right over the house and lot when the mortgage was annotated
at the back of the Torrens title. The bank later became the owner in the foreclosure
sale.
Z cannot ask the bank to pay for X’s loan plus interest. There is no privity of
contract between Z and the bank.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The answer hinges on whether or not the bank is an innocent mortgagee in good
faith or a mortgagee in bad faith. In the former case, Z’s demand is not valid. In the
latter case, Z’s demand against the bank is valid and sustainable.
Underthe Torrens system of land registration, every person dealing with

registered land may rely on the correctness of the certificate of title and the law will
not in any way oblige him to look behind or beyond the certificate in order to
determine the condition of the title. He is not bound by anything not annotated or
reflected in the certificate. If he proceeds to buy the land or accept it as a collateral
relying on the certificate, he is considered a buyer ora mortgagee in good faith. On
this ground, the Bank acquires a clean title to the land and the house.
However, a bank is not an ordinary mortgagee. Unlike private individuals, a

bank is expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings. The
ascertainment of the condition of a property offered as collateral for a loan must be a
standard and indispensable part of its operation. The bank should have conducted
further inquiry regarding the house standing on the land considering that it was
already standing there before X acquired title to the land. The bank cannot be
considered as a mortgagee in good faith. On this ground, Z's demand against the
Bank is valid and sustainable.
XX
5%
Louie, before leaving the country to train as a chef in a five-star hotel in New
York, U.S.A., entrusted to his firsi-degree cousin Dewey an application for
registration, underthe Land Registration Act, of a parcel of land located in Bacolod
City. A year later, Louie returned to the Philippines and discovered that Dewey
registered the land and obtained an Original Certificate of Title over the property in
his Dewey’s name. Compounding the matter, Dewey sold the land to Huey, an
innocent purchaser for value. Louie promptly filed an action for reconveyance of the
parcel of land against Huey.
(a) Is the action pursued by Louie the proper remedy?
(b) Assuming that reconveyance is the proper remedy, will the action prosper if the
case was filed beyond one year, but within ten years, from the entry of the decree of
registration?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) An action for reconveyance against Huey is not the proper remedy,
because Huey is an innocent purchaser for value. The proper recourse is for Louie to
go after Dewey for damages by reason of the fraudulent registration and subsequent
sale of the land. If Dewey is insolvent, Louie may file a claim against the Assurance
Fund (Heirs of Pedro Lopez v. De Castro 324 SCRA 591 [2000] citing Sps. Eduarte v.
CA, 323 Phil. 462, 467 [1996]).
(b) Yes, the remedy will prosper because the action prescribes in ten (10)
years, not within one (1) year when a petition for the reopening of the registration
decree may be filed. The action for reconveyance is distinct from the petition to reopen
the decree of registration (Grey Alba v. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49 [1910]). There is no need
to reopen the registration proceedings, but the property should just be reconveyed to
the real owner.
The action for reconveyance is based on implied or constructive trust, which
prescribes in ten (10) years from the date of issuance of the original certificate of title.
This rule assumes that the defendant is in possession of the land. Where it is the
plaintiff who is in possession of the land, the action for reconveyance would be in the
nature of a suit for quieting of title which action is imprescriptible (David v. Malay, 318
SCRA 711 [1999]).
On May 1,1375, Facundo married Petra, by whom he had a son Sotero. Petra
died on July 1,1996, while Facundo died on January 1, 2002. Before his demise,
Facundo had married, on July 1, 2000, Queries. Having lived together as husband and
wife since July 1,1990, Facundo and Querica did not secure a marriage license but
executed the requisite affidavit for the purpose.
To ensure that his inheritance rights are not adversely affected by his father’s
second marriage, Sotero now brings a suit to seek a declaration of the nullity of the
marriage of Facundo and Querica, grounded on the absence of a valid marriage
license. Querica contends that there was no need for a marriage license in view of her
having lived continuously with Facundo for five years before their marriage and that
Sotero has no legal personality to seek a declaration of nullity of the marriage since
Facundo is now deceased.
A. Is the marriage of Facundo and Querica valid, despite the absence of a

marriage license? Explain. (2%)
B. Does Sotero have the personality to seek a declaration of nullity of the marriage,
especially now that Facundo is already deceased?
Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage with Querica is void. The exemption from the requirement of a
marriage license under Art. 34, Family Code, requires that the man and woman must
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other during those five years. The cohabitation of Facundo
and Querica for six years from 1990 to July 1,1996 when Petra died was one with a
legal impediment hence, not in compliance with the requirement of law. On the other
hand, the cohabitation thereafter until the marriage on July 1, 2000, although free from
legal impediment, did not meet the 5-year cohabitation requirement.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A. The marriage of Facundo and Querica is VALID. The second marriage

was solemnized on July 1, 2000 when the Family Code was already effective. The
Family Code took effect on August 3,1988. Under the Family Code, no marriage license
is required if the parties have been cohabiting for the period of five years and there is
no legal impediment. There must be no legal impediment ONLY AT THE TIME OF THE
SOLEMNIZATION OF THE MARRIAGE, and not the whole five- year period. This is
clearly the intent of the code framers (see Minutes of the 150th joint Civil Code and
Family Law Committees held on August 9, 1986). Also, in Manzano v. Sanchez, AM
No. MT-00-129, March 8,2001, the Supreme Court said that, as one of the requisites
for the exception to apply, there must be no legal impediment at at the time of the
marriage. TheSupreme Court did notsay that the legal impediment must exist all
throughout the five-year period.
This is different from the case of Nihat v. Bayadog, (328 SCRA 122 [2000]). In
the said case, the situation occurred during the regime of the New Civil Code where
Article 76 thereof clearly provides that during the five-year cohabitation, the parties
must be unmarried. This is not so anymore in the Family Code. The change in Family
Code is significant. If the second marriage occurred before the effectivity of the Family
Code, the answer would bo that the marriage is void.
B. A void marriage may be questioned by any interested Party in any
proceeding where the resolution of the issue is material. Being a compulsory heir,
Sotero has the personality to question the validity of the marriage of Facundo and
Quen'ca. Otherwise, his participation in the estate of Facundo would be affected.
(Niria! v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 [2000]).
II
A- Give a brief definition or explanation of the term “psychological incapacity” as

a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage. (2%)
B. If existing at the inception of marriage, would the state of being of unsound mind
or the concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism
be considered indicia of psychological incapacity? Explain. (2%)
C. if drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur

only during the marriage, would these constitute grounds for a declaration of nullity or
for legal separation, or would they render the marriage voidable? (1%)
SUGGESTE ANSWER:
A. “Psychological incapacity” is a mental disorder of the most serious type showing

the incapability of one or both spouses to comply with the essential marital obligations
of love, respect, cohabitation, mutual help and support, trust and commitment. It must
be characterized by juridlcal antecedence, gravity and incurability and its root causes
must be clinically Identified or examined. (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20[1995])
B. In the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), the Supreme
Court held that being of unsound mind, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism
or homosexuality may be indicia of psychological Incapacity, depending on the degree
of severity of the disorder. However, the concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality is a ground for annulment of marriage.
C. In accordance with law, if drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they:
(1) will not constitute as grounds for declaration of nullity (Art. 36, Family Code);
(2) will constitute as grounds for legal separation (Art 55, FC); and
(3) will not constitute as grounds to render the marriage voidable (Art. 45 and 46,
FC).
III
Felipe and Felisa, Doth Filipino citizens, were married in Malolos, Bulacan on June 1,
1950. In 1960, Felipe went to the United States, becoming a U.S. citizen in 1975. In
1980, he obtained a divorce from Felisa, who was duly notified of the proceedings. The
divorce decree became final under California law. Coming back to the Philippines in
1982, Felipe married Segundina, a Filipino citizen. In 2001, Felipe, then domiciled in
Los Angeles, California, died, leaving one child by Felisa, and another one by
Segundina. He left a will which was executed in Manila, under which he left his estate
to Segundina and his two children and nothing to Felisa.
Segundina files a petition for the probate of Felipe’s will. Felisa questions the intrinsic
validity of the will, arguing that her mam'age to Felipe subsisted despite the divorce
obtained by Felipe because said divorce is not recognized in the Philippines. For this
reason, she claims that the properties left by Felipe are their conjugal properties and
that Segundina has no successional rights.
A. Is the divorce secured by Felipe in California recognizable and valid in the

Philippines? How does it affect Felipe’s marriage to Felisa? Explain. (2%)
B. What law governs the formalities of the will? Explain. (1%)
C. Will Philippine law govern the intrinsic validity of the will? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. (1) The divorce secured by Felipe in California is recognizable and valid in the
Philippines because he was no longer a Filipino at the time he secured it. Aliens may
obtain divorces abroad which may be recognized in the Philippines provided that they
are valid according to their national law (Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139
[1985]); Qurta v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 406 [1998]; Llorente v. Court of Appeals,
345 SCRA 592 [2000]).
(2) With respect to Felipe the divorce is valid, but with respect to Felisa it is not.
The divorce
will not capacitate Felisa to remarry because she and Felipe were both Filipinos at the
time of their marriage. However, in DOJ Opinion No. 134 series of 1993, Felisa is
allowed to remarry because the injustice sought to be corrected by Article 26 also
obtains in her case.
B. The foreigner who executes his will in the Philippines may observe the
formalities prescribed in:
1) the law ot the country of which he is a citizen under Article 817 of the New
Civil code, or
2) the law of the Philippines being the law of the place of execution under
Article 17 of the New Civil Code.
C. Philippine law will not govern the instrinsic validity of the will. Article 16 of the
New Civil Code provides that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall be
governed by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration.
California law will govern the intrinsic validity of the will.
IV
Antonio, Bart, and Carlos are brothers. They purchased from their parents specific
portions of a parcel of land as evidenced by three separate deeds of sale, each deed
referring to a particular lot in metes and bounds. When the deeds were presented for
registration, the Register of Deeds could not issue separate certificates of title due to
the absence of a subdivision plan. The new title had to be issued, therefore, in the
names of the brothers as co-owners of the entire property. The situation has not
changed up to now, but each of the brothers has been receiving rentals exclusively
from the lot actually purchased by him. Antonio sells his lot to a third person, with notice
to his brothers. To enable the buyer to secure a new title in his name, the deed of sale
was made to refer to an undivided interest in the property of the seller (Antonio), with
the metes and bounds of the lot sold being stated. Bart and Carlos reacted by signifying
their exercise of their right of redemption as co-owners. Antonio, in his behalf and in
behalf of his buyer, contends that they are no ionger co-owners, although the title
covering the property has remained in their names as such.
May Bart and Carlos still redeem the lot sold by Antonio? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, they may not redeem because there was no co- ownership among Antonio, Bart
and Carlos to start with. Their parents already partitioned the land in selling separate
portions to them. The situation is the same as in the case Si v. Court of Appeals, (342
SCRA 653 [2000]).
Senen and Peter are brothers. Senen migrated to Canada early while still a
teenager. Peter stayed on in Bulacan to take care of their widowed mother and
continued to work on the family farm even after her death. Returning to the country
some thirty years after he had left, Senen seeks a partition of the farm to get his share
as the only co-heir of Peter. Refer interposes his opposition, contending that
acquisitive prescription has already set in and that estoppel lies to bar the action for
partition, citing his continuous possession of the property for at least 10 years, for
almost 30 years in fact. It is undisputed that Refer has never openly claimed sole
ownership of the property. If he ever had the intention to do so, Senen was completely
ignorant of it. Will Senen’s action proper? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Senen's action wiil prosper. Article 494 of the New Civil Code provides that “no
prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-
heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. Peter has
never renounced the co-ownership nor notified Senen of his having repudiated the
same.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Senen’s action will prosper. This is a case of implied trust. (Art 1441, NCC). For
purposes of prescription, one has to have possession under the concept of an owner
(Art 540, NCC). There is no such concept here. Peferwas a co-owner, he never
claimed sole ownership of the property. He is therefore estopped under Art. 1431,
NCC.
VI.
Lauro owns an agricultural land planted mostly with fruit trees. Hernando owns
an adjacent land devoted to his piggery business, which is two (2) meters higher in
elevation. Although Hernando has constructed a waste disposal lagoon for his piggery
, it is inadequate to contain the waste water containing pig manure, and it often
overflows and inundates Lauro’s plantation. This has increased the acidity of the soil in
the plantation, causing the trees to wither and die. Lauro sues for damages caused to
his plantation. Hernando invokes his right to the benefit of a natural easement in favor
of his higher estate, which imposes upon the lower estate of Lauro the obligation to
receive the waters descending from the higher estate. Is Hernando correct? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Hernando is wrong. It is true that Lauro’s land is burdened with the natural easement
to accept or receive the water which naturally and without interruption of man descends
from a higher estate to a lower estate. However, Hernando has constructed a waste
disposal lagoon for his piggery and it is this waste water that flows downward to Lauro's
land. Hernando has, thus, interrupted the flow of water and has created and is
maintaining a nuisance. Under Art. 697 NCC, abatement of a nuisance does not
preclude recovery of damages by Lauro even for the past existence of a nuisance. The
claim for damages may also be premised on Art. 2191(4] NCC.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
Hernando is not correct Article 637 of the New Civil Code provides that the
owner of the higher estate cannot make works which will increase the burden on the
servient estate . (Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, 330 SCRA 145 [2000]). The owner
of the higher estate may be compelled to pay damages to the owner of the lower
estate.
VII.
Way back in 1948, Winda’s husband sold in favor of Verde Sports Center Corp.
(Verde) a 10-hectare property belonging to their conjugal partnership. The sale was
made without Winds's knowledge, much less consent. In 1950, Winda learned of the
sale, when she discovered the deed of sale among the documents in her husband’s
vault after his demise. Soon after, she noticed that the construction of the sports
complex had started. Upon completion of the construction in 1952, she tried but failed
to gel free membership privileges in Verde.
Winda now files a suit against Verde for the annulment of the sale on the ground
that she did not consent to the sale, in answer, Verde contends that, in accordance with
the Spanish Civil Code which was then in force, the sale In 1948 of the property did not
need her concurrence. Verde contends that in any case the action has prescribed or is
barred by laches. Winda rejoins that her Torrens title covering the property is
indefeasible, and imprescriptible.
A Define or explain the term laches/(2%)
B. Decide the case, stating your reasons for your decision.

(3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Laches means failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained

length of time, to do what, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time. (De Vera
v. CA, 305 SCRA 624 [1999])
B. While Article 1413 of the Spanish Civil Code did not require the consent of
the wife for the validity of the sale, an alienation by the husband in fraud of the wife is
void as held in Uy Coque v. Navas, 45 Phil. 430 (1923). Assuming that the alienation in
1948 was in fraud of Winda and, therefore, makes the sale to Verde void, the action to
set aside the sale, nonetheless, is already barred by prescription and laches. More than
52 years have already elapsed from her discovery of the sale in 1950.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
B. Winda’s claim that her Torrens Title covering the property is indefeasible and
imprescriptible [does not hold water] is not tenable. The rule of indefeasibllity of a
Torrens Title means that after one year from the date of Issue of the decree of
registration or if the land has fallen into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value,
the title becomes incontestible and incontrovertible. Imprescriptibility, on the other hand,
means that no title to the land in derogation of that of the registered owner may be
acquired by adverse possession or acquisitive prescription or that the registered owner
does not lose by extinctive prescription his right to recover ownership and possession
of the land.
The action in this case is for annulment of the sale executed by the husband over
a conjugal partnership property covered by a Torrens Title. Actions on contracts are
subject to prescription.
III.
By virtue of a Codicil appended to his will, Theodore devised to Divino a tract of

sugar land, with the obligation on the part of Divino or his heirs to deliver to Botina a
specified volume of sugar per harvest during Betina’s lifetime. It is also stated in the
Codicil that in the event the obligation is not fulfilled, Botina should immediately seize
the property from Divino or the latter’s heirs and turn it over to Theodoro's compulsory
heirs. Divino failed to fulfill the obligation under the Codicil. Botina brings kilt against
Divino for the reversion of the tract of land.
A. Distinguish between modal institution and substitution of heirs. (3%)

B. Distinguish between simple and fideicommissary substitution of heirs. (2%)
C. Does Botina have a cause of action against Divino? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. A modal institution is the institution of an heir made for a certain purpose or

cause (Arts. 871 and 882, NCC). Substitution is the appointment of another heir so that
he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted. (Art 857,
NCC).
B. In a simple substitution of heirs, the testator designates one or more persons to
substitute the heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should
not wish or should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance. In a fideicommissary
substitution, the testator institutes a first heir and charges him to preserve and transmit
the whole or part of the Inheritance to a second heir. In a simple substitution, only one
heir inherits. In a fideicommissary substitution, both the first and second heirs inherit.
(Art 859 and 863, NCC)
C. Botina has a cause of action against Divino. This is a case of a testamentary

disposition subject to a mode and the will itself provides for the consequence if the
mode is not complied with. To enforce the mode, the will itself gives Botina the right
to compel the return of the property to the heirs of Theodore. (Rabadilla v.
Coscolueila, 334 SCRA 522 [2000] GR113725,29 June 2000).
IX.
Stockton is a stockholder of Core Corp. He desires to sell his shares in Core Corp. in
view of a court suit that Core Corp. has filed against him for damages in the amount of
P10 million, plus attorney’s fees of PI million, as a result of statements published by
Stockton which are allegedly defamatory because it was calculated to injure and
damage the corporation’s reputation and goodwill.
The articles of incorporation of Core Corp. provide for a right of first refusal in favor
of the corporation. Accordingly, Stockton gave written notice to the corporation of his
offer to sell his shares of P10 million. The response of Core Corp. was an acceptance
of the offer in the exercise of its rights of first refusal, offering for the purpose payment
in form of compensation or set-off against the amount of damages it is claiming against
him, exclusive of the claim for attorney's fees. Stockton rejected the offer of the
corporation, arguing that compensation between the value of the shares and the
amount of damages demanded by the corporation cannot legally take effect Is
Stockton correct? Give reasons for your answer. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Stockton is correct. There is no right of compensation between his price of P10

million and Core Corp.’s unliquidated claim for damages, in order that compensation
may be proper, the two debts must be liquidated and demandable. The case for the
P10 million damages being still pending in court, the corporation has as yet no claim
which is due and demandable against Stockton.
ANOTHER MAIN ANSWER:
The right of first refusal was not perfected as a right for the reason that there was
a conditional acceptance equivalent to a counter-offer consisting in the amount of
damages as being credited on the purchase price. Therefore, compensation did not
result since there was no valid right of first refusal (Art 1475 & 1319, NCC)
ANOTHER MAIN ANSWER:
Even [if] assuming that there was a perfected right of first refusal, compensation
did not take place because the claim is unliquidated.
X.
Printado is engaged in the printing business. Suplico supplies printing paper to

Printado pursuant to an order agreement under which Suplico binds himself to deliver
the same volume of paper every month for a period of 18 months, with Printado in turn
agreeing to pay within 60 days after each delivery. Suplico has been faithfully
delivering under the order agreement for 10 months but thereafter stopped doing so,
because Printado has not made any payment at all. Printado has also a standing
contract with publisher Publico for the printing of 10,000 volumes of school textbooks.
Suplico was aware of said printing contract. After printing 1,000 volumes, Printado
also fails to perform under its printing contract with Publico. Suplico sues Printado for
the value of the unpaid deliveries under their order agreement. At the same time
Publico sues Printado for damages for breach of contract with respect to their own
printing agreement. In the suit filed by Suplico, Printado counters that: (a) Suplico
cannot demand payment for deliveries made under their order agreement until Suplico
has completed performance under said contract; (b) Suplico should pay damages for
breach of contract; and ( c ) Suplico should be liable for Printado’s breach of his
contract with Publico because the order agreement between Suplico and Printado
was for the benefit of Publico. Are the contentions of Printado tenable? Explain your
answer as to each contention. (5%)
No, the contentions of Printado are untenable.
Printado having failed to pay for the printing paper covered by the delivery
invoices on time, Suplico has the right to cease making further delivery. And the latter
did not violate the order agreement {Integrated Packaging Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, (333 SCRA 170, G.R.No. 115117. June 8. [2000]).
Suplico cannot be held liable for damages, for breach of contract, as it was not
he who violated the order agreement, but Printado.
Suplico cannot be held liable for Printado's breach of contract with Publico. He is
not a party to the agreement entered into by and between Printado and Publico. Theirs
is not a stipulation pourautrul. [Aforesaid] Such contracts do could not affect third
persons like Suplico because of the basic civil law principle of relativity of contracts
which provides that contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and it
cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such contract and has
acted with knowledge thereof. {Integrated Packaging Corporation v. CA, supra.)
XI.
Sancho and Pacifico are co-owners of a parcel of land. Sancho sold the property
to Bart. Pacifico sued Sancho and Bari for annulment of the sale and reconveyance of
the property based on the fact that the sale included his one -half pro-indiviso share.
Pacifico had a notice of lis pendens annotated on the title covering the property. After
trial, the court declared Bart the owner of the property and ordered the cancellation of
the notice of lis pendens. The notice of lis pendens could not be cancelled immediately
because the title over the property was with a bank to which the property had been
mortgaged by Bart Pacifico appealed the case. While the appeal was pending and with
the notice of lis pendens still uncancelled, Bart sold the property to Carlos, who
immediately caused the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, as well as the
issuance of a new title in his name.
Is Carlos (a) a purchaser in good faith, or (b) a transferee pendente lite? If your
answer is (a), how can the right of Pacifico as co-owner be protected? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Carlos is a buyer in bad faith. The notice of lis pendens was still annotated at the
back of the title at the time he bought the land from Bart. The uncanceiled notice of lis
pendens operates as constructive notice of its contents as well as interests, legal or
equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it
contains.
In an earlier case, it was held that a notice of an adverse claim remains effective
and binding notwithstanding the lapse of the 30 days from its inscription in the registry.
This ruling is even more applicable in a lis pendens.
Carlos is a transferee pendente lite insofar as Sancho’s share in the co-

ownership in the land is concerned because the land was transferred to him during the
pendency of the appeal.
A. Pacifico can protect his right as a co-owner by pursuing his appeal; asking the
Court of Appeals to order the re-annotation of the lis pendens on the title of Carlos', and
by invoking his right of redemption of Bart’s share under Article 1620 of the New Civil
Code.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
A. Carlos is a purchaser in good faith.
A possessor in good faith has been defined as “one who is unaware that there
exists a flaw which invalidates his acquisition of the thing” (Art 526, NCC). Good faith
consists in the possessor’s belief that the person from whom he received the thing was
the owner of the same and could convey his title. In the case [at bar], in question, while
Carlos bought the subject property from Bart while a notice of lis pendens was still
annotated thereon, there was also an existing court order cancelling the same. Hence,
Carlos cannot be considered as being "aware of a flaw which invalidates [their] the
acquisition of the thing” since the alleged flaw, the notice of lis pendens, was already
being ordered cancelled at the time of the purchase. On this ground alone, Carlos can
already be considered a buyer in good faith. (Po Lam v. Court of appeals, 347 SCRA
86, [2000]).
B. To protect his right over the subject property, Pacrfico should have timely filed an
action for reconveyance and reinstated the notice of lis pendens.
XII.
Adela and Beth are co-owners of a parcel of land. Beth sold her undivided share of
the property to Xandro, who promptly notified Adela of the sale and furnished the latter
a copy of the deed of absolute sale. When Xandro presented the deed for registration,
the register of deeds also notified Adela of the sale, enclosing a copy of the deed with
the notice. However, Adela ignored the notices. A year later, Xandro filed a petition for
the partition of the property. Upon receipt of summons, Adela immediately tendered the
requisite amount for the redemption. Xandro contends that Adela lost her right of
redemption after the expiration of 30 days from her receipt of the notice of the sale
given by him. May Adela still exercise her right of redemption? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED MAIN ANSWER:
Yes, Adela may stili exercise her right of redemption notwithstanding the
lapse of more than 30 days from notice of the sale given to her because Article
1623 of the New Civil Code requires that the notice in writing of the sale must
come from the prospective vendor or vendor as the case may be. In this case, the
notice of the sale was given by the vendee and the Register of Deeds. The period
of 30 days never tolled. She can still avail of that right.
FIRST ALTERNATIVE MAIN ANSWER:
Adela can no longer exercise her right of redemption. As co-owner, she had only
30 days from the time she received written notice of the sale which in this case took the
form of a copy of the deed of sale being given to her (Conejero v. CA, 16 SCRA 775
[196SJ). The law does not prescribe any particular form of written notice, nor any
distinctive method for notifying the redemptioner (Etcuban v. CA, 148 SCRA 507
[1987]). So long as the redemptioner was informed in writing, he has no cause to
complain (Distrito v. CA, 197 SCRA 606, 609 [1991]). In fact in Distrito, a written notice
was heid unnecessary where the co-owner had actual knowledge of the sale, having
acted as middleman and being present when the vendor signed the deed of sale.
XIII.
Felipe is a Filipino citizen. When he went to Sydney for vacation, he met a

former business associate, who proposed to him a transaction which took him
to Moscow. Felipe brokered a contract between Sydney Coals Corp. (Coals), an
Australian firm, and Moscow Energy Corp. (Energy), a Russian firm, tor Coals to
supply coal to Energy on a monthly basis for three years. Both these Firms were
not doing, and still do not do, business in the Philippines. Felipe shuttled
between Sydney and Moscow to close the contract. He also executed in Sydney
a commission contract with Coals and in Moscow with Energy, under which
contracts he was guaranteed commissions by both Firms based on a
percentage of deliveries for the three-year period, payable in Sydney and in
Moscow, respectively, through deposits in accounts that he opened in the two
cities. Both firms paid Felipe his commission for four months, after which they
stopped paying him. Felipe learned from his contacts, who are residents of
Sydney and Moscow, that the two Firms talked to each other and decided to cut
him off. He now files suit in Manila against both Coals and Energy for specific
performance.
A. Define or explain the principle of u/ex loci contractus.’' (2%)
B. Define or explain the rule of uforum non conveniens." (3%)

C. Should the Philippine court assume jurisdiction over the case? Explain. (5%) *
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Lex loci contractus may be understood in two sense, as follows:
(1) It is the law of the piace wnere contracts, wills, and otherpublic
instruments are executed and governs their “forms and solemnities”, pursuant to the
First paragraph, Article 17 of the New Civil Code; or
It is the proper law of the contract; i.e., the system of Saw intended to
govern the entire contract, including its esseoitiaS requisites, indicating the Saw
of the place with which the contract has Its closest connection or where the main
elements of the contract con verge. As illustrated by Zaiamea v. Court of Appeals
(228 SCRA 23 [1893]), it is the Saw of the place where the airline ticket was
issued, where the passengers are nationals and residents of, and where the
defendant airline company maintained its office.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A. Under the doctrine of lex loci contractus, as a general rule, the law of
the place where a contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its
nature and validity, obligation and interpretation. This has been said to be the
rule even though the place where the contract was made is different from the
place where it is to be performed, and particularly so, if the place of the making
and the place of performance are the same (United Airline v. CA, G.R. No. 124110,
April 20, 2001).
SUGGESTE ANSWER:
A. Forum non conveniens means that a court has discretionary authority to

decline jurisdiction over a cause of action when it is of the view that the action
may be justly and effectively adjudicated elsewhere.
B. No, the Philippine courts cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case of
Felipe. Firstly, under the rule of forum non conveniens, the Philippine court is not a
convenient forum as all the incidents of the case occurred Gutside the
Philippines. Neither are both Coals and Energy doing business inside the
Philippines. Secondly, the contracts were not perfected in the Philippines. Under
the principle of lex foci contractus, the law of the place where the contract is made
shaii apply. Lastly, the Philippine court has no power to determine the facts
surrounding the execution of said contracts. And even if a proper decision could
be reached, such would have no binding effect on Coals and Energy as the court
was not able to acquire jurisdiction over the said corporations. (Manila Hotel Corp.
v. NLRC, 343 SCRA 1,13- 14[2000])
XVI.
Bert offers to buy Simeon’s property underthe following terms and
conditions: P1 million purchase price, 10% option money, the balance payable in
cash upon the clearance of the property of all illegal occupants. The option
money is promptly paid and Simeon clears the property of all illegal occupants in
no time at all. However, when Berf tenders payment of the balance and asks
Simeon for the deed of absolute sale, Simeon suddenly has a change of heart,
claiming that the deal is disadvantageous to him as he has found out that the
property can fetch three times the agreed purchase price. Bert seeks specific
performance but Simeon contends that he has merely given Bert an option to buy
and nothing more, and offers to return the option money which Bert refuses to
accept.
A. Explain the nature of an option contract. (2%)
B. Will Bert’s action for specific performance prosper? Explain. (4%)
C. May Simeon justify his refusal to proceed with the sale by the fact that the
deal is financially disadvantageous to him? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. An option contract is one granting a privilege to buy or sell within an

agreed time and at a determined price. It must be supported by a consideration
distinct from the price. (Art. 1479 and 1482, NCC)
B. Bert’s action for specific performance wiil prosper because there was a
binding agreement of sale, not just an option contract. The sale was perfected
upon acceptance by Simeon of 10% of the agreed price. This 3mount is in reality
earnest money which, under Art. 1482, “shall be considered a3 part of the price
arid as proof of the perfection of the contract.” (Topacio v. CA, 211 SCRA
291[1992j; Villongco Realty v. Bormaheco, 65 SCRA 352 [1975]).
C. Simeon cannot justify his refusal to proceed with the sale by the fact that the
deal is financially disadvantageous to him. Having made a bad bargain is not a legal
ground for pulling out of a binding contract of sale, in the absence of some actionable
wrong by the other party (Vales v. Villa, 35 Phil. 769 [1916]), and no such wrong has
been committed by Bert.
XV.
Carlos sues Dino for (a) collection on a promissory note for a loan, with no
agreement on interest, on which Dino defaulted, and (b) damages caused by Dino on
his (Carlos’) priceless Michaelangelo painting on which Dino accidentally spilled acid
while transporting it. The court finds Dino liable on the promissory note and awards
damages to Carlos for the damaged painting, with interests for both awards. What rates
of interest may the court impose with respect to both awards? Explain. (5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
With respect to the collection of money or promissory note, it being a
forbearance of money, the legal rate of interest for having defaulted on the payment of
12% will apply. With respect to the damages to the painting, it is 6% from the time of
the final demand up to the time of finality of the decision and 12% of the total amount
from finality of judgment until judgment credit is fully paid. The court considers the latter
as a forbearance of money. (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA, 234 SCRA 78 [1994];
Art 2210 and 2211, CC)
XVI.
Ortillo contracts Fabricate, Inc. to supply and install tile materials in a building he
is donating to his province. Ortillo pays 50% of the contract price as per agreement. It is
also agreed that the balance would be payable periodically after every 10%
performance until completed. After performing about 93% of the contract, for which it
has been paid an additional 40% as per agreement, Fabricate, Inc. did not complete
the project due to its sudden cessation of operations. Instead, Fabricate, Inc. demands
payment of the last 10% of the contract despite its non-completion of the project.
Ortillo refuses to pay, invoking the stipulation that payment of the last amount of 10%
shall be upon completion. Fabricato, Inc. brings suit for the entire 10%, plus damages,
Ortillo counters with claims for (a) moral damages for Fabricato, Inc.’s unfounded suit
which has damaged his reputation as a philanthropist and respected businessman in
his community, and (b) attorney’s fees.
A. Does Ortillo have a legal basis for his claim for moral damages? (2%)
B. How about his claim for attorney’s fees, having hired a lawyer to defend him?
(3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. There Is no legal basis to Ortillo's claim for moral damages. It does not fall under
the coverage of Article 2219 of the New Civil Code.
B. Ortillo is entitled to attorney’s fees because Fabricato’s complaint is a case of
malicious prosecution or a clearly unfounded civil action. (Art 2208 [4] and [11], NCC).
XVII.
A van owned by Orlando and driven by Diego, while negotiating a downhill slope
of a city road, suddenly gained speed, obviously beyond the authorized limit in the
area, and bumped a car in front of it, causing severed damage to the car and serious
injuries to its passengers. Orlando was not in the car at the time of the incident. The
car owner and the injured passengers sued Orlando and Diego for damages caused
by Diego's negligence, in their defense, Diego claims that the downhill slope caused
the van to gain speed and that, as he stepped on the brakes to check the acceleration,
the brakes locked, causing the van to go even faster and eventually to hit the car in
front of it. Orlando and Diego contend that the sudden malfunction of the van’s brake
system is a fortuitous event and that, therefore, they are exempt from any liability.
A. Is this contention tenable? Explain. (2%)
B. Explain the concept of vicarious liability in quasi-delicts. (1%)
C. Does the presence of the owner inside the vehicle causing damage to a third
party affect his liability for his driver’s negligence? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. No. Mechanical defects of a motor vehicle do not constitute fortuitous event,
since the presence of such defects would have been readily detected by diligent
maintenance check. The failure to maintain the vehicle in safe running condition
constitutes negligence.
B. The doctrine of vicarious liability is that which renders a person liable for the
negligence of others for whose acts or omission the law makes him responsible on the
theory that they are under his control and supervision.
C. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is made solidarily liable with his driver if he
(the owner) was in the vehicle and could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented
the mishap. (Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai, 26 SCRA 410 [1968]). However, this question has
no factual basis in the problem given, in view of the express given fact that “Orlando
was not in the car at the time of the incident”
-End-
I
Alex was bom a Filipino but was a naturalized Canadian citizen at the time of his
death on December 25, 1998. He left behind a last will and testament in which he
bequeathed all his properties, real and personal, in the Philippines to his acknowledged
illegitimate Filipina daughter and nothing to his two legitimate Filipino sons. The sons
sought the annulment of the last will and testament on the ground that it deprived them
of their legitimes but the daughter was able to prove that there were no compulsory
heirs or legitimes under Canadian law. Who should prevail? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The daughter should prevail because Article 16 of the New Civil Code provides that
intestate and testamentary succession shallbe governedby the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration.
II.
A German couple filed a petition for adoption of a minor Filipino child with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati under the provisions of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code which allowed aliens to adopt. Before the petition could be heard, the Family
Code, which repealed the Child and Youth Welfare Code, came into effect.
Consequently, the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss the petition, on the ground
that the Family Code prohibits aliens from adopting. If you were the judge, how will you
rule on the motion? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion to dismiss the petition for adoption should be denied. The law that
should govern the action is the law in force at the time of filing of the petition. At that
time, it was the Child and Youth Welfare Code that wa3 in effect, not the Family Code.
Petitioners have already acquired a vested right on their qualification to adopt which
cannot be taken away by the Family Code. CRepublic v. Miller G.R. No. 125932, April
21, 1999, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 356)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The motion has to be granted. The new law shall govern their qualification to adopt
and under the new law, the German couple is disqualified from adopting. They cannot
claim that they have already acquired a vested right because adoption is not a right but
a mere privilege. No one acquires a vested right on a privilege.
[Note: If the examinee based his answer on the current law, RA 8552, his answer
should be considered correct. This question is based on the repealed provision of the
Family Code on Adoption.]
III.
Mike built a house on his lot in Pasay City. Two years later, a survey disclosed that
a portion of the building actually stood on the neighboring land of Jose, to the extent of
40 square meters. Jose claims that Mike is a builder in bad faith because he should
know the boundaries of his lot, and demands that tire portion of the house which
encroached on his land should be destroyed or removed. Mike replies that he is a
builder in good faith and offers to buy the land occupied by the building instead.
1) Is Mike a builder in good faith or bad faith? Why?

(3%)
2) Whose preference should be followed? Why? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) Yes, Mike is a builder in good faith. There is no showing that when

he built his house, he knew that a portion thereof encroached on Jose's lot.
Unless one is versed in the science of surveying, he cannot determine the
precise boundaries or location, of his property by merely examining his title. In
the absence of contrary proof, the law presumes that the encroachment was
done in good faith [Technogas Phils, v. CA, 268 SCRA 5, 15 (1997)].
2) None of the preferences shall be followed. The preference of Mike

cannot prevail because under Article 448 of the Civil Code, it is the owner of the
land who has the option or choice, not the builder. On the other hand, the option
belongs to Jose, he cannot demand that the portion of the house encroaching on
his land be destroyed or removed because this is not one of the options given by
law to the owner of the land. The owner may choose between the appropriation
of what was built after payment of indemnity, or to compel the builder to pay for
the land if the value of the land is not considerably more than that of the
building. Otherwise, the builder shall pay rent for the portion of the land
encroached.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
1) Mike cannot be considered a builder in good faith because he built

his house without first determining the comers and boundaries of his lot to make
sure that his construction was within the perimeter of his property. He could
have done this with the help of a geodetic engineer as an ordinary prudent and
reasonable man would do under the circumstances.
2) Jose’s preference should be followed. He may have the building

removed at the expense of Mike, appropriate the building as his own, oblige Mike
to buy the land and ask for damages in addition to any of the three options.
(Articles 449, 450, 451, CC)
IV.
For many years, the Rio Grande river deposited soil along its bank, beside the
titled larid of Jose. In time, such deposit reaehed an area of one thousand square
meters. With the permission of Jose, Vicente cultivated the said area. Ten years later,
a big flood occurred in the river and transferred the 1000 square meters to the opposite
bank, beside the land of Agustin. The land transferred is now contested by Jose and
Agustin as riparian owners and by Vicente who claims ownership by prescription. Who
should prevail,? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Jose should prevail. The disputed area, which is an alluvion, belongs by
right of accretion to Jose, the reparian owner (Art. 457 CC). When, as given in the
problem, the very same area was “transferred" by flood waters to the opposite
bank, it became an avulsion and ownership thereof is retained by Jose who has
two years to remove it (Ant. 459, CC). Vicente's claim based on prescription is
baseless since his possession was by mere tolerance of Jose and, therefore, did
not adversely affect Jose’s possession and ownership (Art. 537, CC). Inasmuch
as his possession is merely that of a holder, he cannot acquire the disputed area
by prescription.
V.
Emma bought a parcel of land from Equitable-PCI Bank, which acquired the
same from Felisa, the original owner. Thereafter, Emma discovered that Felisa had
granted a right of way over the land in favor of the land of Georgina, which had no
outlet to a public highway, but the easement was not annotated when the servient
estate was registered under the Torrens system. Emma then filed a complaint for
cancellation of the right of way, on the ground that it had been extinguished by such
failure to annotate. How would you decide the controversy? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The complaint for cancellation of easement of right of way must fall. The failure
to annotate the easement upon the title of the servient estate is not among the grounds
for extinguishing an easement under Art. 631 of the Civil Code. Under Article 617,
easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong.
Once it attaches, it can only be extinguished under Art. 631, and they exist even if they
are not stated or annotated as an encumbrance on the Torrens title of the servient
estate, (n Tolentino 326, 1987 ed.)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Under Section 44, FD No. 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate
of title pursuant to a decree of registration, and every subsequent innocent
purchaser for value, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except
those noted on said certificate. This rule, however, admits of exceptions.
Under Act 496, as amended by Act No. 2011, and Section 4, Act 3621, an
easement if not registered shall remain and shall be held to pass with the land
until cutoff or extinguished by the registration of the servient estate. However,
this provision has been suppressed in Section 44, PD No. 1529. In other words,
the registration of the servient estate did not operate to cut-off or extinguish the
right of way. Therefore, the complaint for the cancellation of the right of way
should be dismissed.
VI.
Because her eldest son Juan had been pestering her for capital to start a business,
Josefa gave him PI00,000.00. Five years later, Josefa died, leaving a last will and
testament In which she instituted only her four younger children as her sole heirs. At the
time of her death, her only property left was P900.000.00 in a bank. Juan opposed the
will on the ground of preterition. How should Josefa's estate be divided among her
heirs? State briefly the reason(s) for your answer. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
There was ao preterition of the oldest son because the testatrix donated
100,000 pesos to him. This donation is considered an advance on the sonis
inheritance. There being no preterition, the institutions in the will shall be
respected but the legitime of the oldest son has to be completed if he received
less.
After collating the donation of P100.000 to the remaining property of

P900.000, the estate of the testatrix is P100.000. Of this amount, one-half or P
P500.000, is the legitime of the legitimate children and it follows that the legitime
of one legitimate child is P100.000. The legitime, therefore, of the oldest son is PI
OO, OOO. However, since the donation given him was P100.000, he has already
received in full his legitime and he will not receive anything anymore from the
decedent. The remaining P900.000, therefore, shall go to the four younger
children by institution in the will, to be divided equally among them. Each will
receive P 225,000.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Assuming that the donation is valid as to form and substance, Juan cannot
invoke preterition because he actually had received a donation inter vivos from
the testatrix (IHTolentino 188,1992 ed.). He would only have a right to a
completion of his legitime under Art. 906 of the Civil Code. The estate should be
divided equally among the five children who will each receive P225,000.00
because the total hereditary estate, after collating the donation to Juan (Art. 1061,
CC), would be PI million. In the actual distribution of the net estate, Juan gets
nothing while his siblings will get P225.000.00 each.
VII.
Four foreign medical students rented the apartment of Thelma for a period of one
year. After one semester, three of them returned to their home country and the fourth
transferred to a boarding house. Thelma discovered that they left unpaid telephone
bills in the total amount of P80.000.00. The lease contract provided that the lessees
shall pay for the telephone services in the leased premises. Thelma demanded that the
fourth student pay the entire amount of the unpaid telephone bills, but the latter is
willing to pay only one fourth of it. Who is correct? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The fourth student is correct. His liability is only joint, hence, pro rata. There
is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states or when the law
or nature of the obligation requires solidarity (Art. 1207, CC). The contract of
lease in the problem does not, in any way, stipulate solidarity.
VIII.
To secure a loan obtained from a rural bank, Purita assigned her leasehold rights
over a stall in the public market in favor of the bank. The deed of assignment provides
that in case of default in the payment of the loan, the bank shall have the right to sell
Purita's rights over the market stall as her attorney-in-fact, and to apply the proceeds to
the payment of the loan.
1) Was the assignment of leasehold rights a mortgage or a cession? Why?
(3%)
2) Assuming the assignment to be a mortgage, does the provision giving the
bank the power to sell Purita’s rights constitute pactum commissorium or not? Why?
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1) The assignment was a mortgage, not a cession, of the leasehold rights. A

cession would have transferred ownership to the bank. However, the grant of authority
to the bank to sell the leasehold rights in case of default is proof that no such ownership
was transferred and that a mere encumbrance was constituted. There would have been
no need for such authority had there been a cession.
2) No, the clause in question is not a pactum commissorium. It is pactum

commissorium when default in the payment of the loan automatically vests ownership
of the encumbered property in the bank. In the problem given, the bank does not
automatically become owner of the property upon default of the mortgagor. The bank
has to sell the property and apply the proceeds to the indebtedness.
IX.
Samuel borrowed P300.000.00 housing loan from the bank at 18% per annum
interest. However, the promissory note contained a proviso that the bank “reserves the
right to increase interest within the limits allowed by law." By virtue of such proviso,
over the objections of Samuel, the bank increased the interest rate periodically until it
reached 48% per annum. Finally. Samuel filed an action questioning the right of the
bank to increase the interest rate up to 48%. The bank raised the defense that the
Central Bank of the Philippines had already suspended the Usury Law. Will the action
prosper or not? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action will prosper. While it is true that the interest ceilings set by the
Usury Law are ho longer in force, it has been held that PD No. 1684 and CB
Circular No. 905 merely allow contracting parties to stipulate freely on any
adjustment in the interest rate on a loan or forbearance of money but do not
authorize a unilateral increase of the interest rate by one party without the
other’s consent (PNB v. CA, 238 SCRA 20 [1994]]). To say otherwise will violate
the principle of mutuality of contracts under Article 1308 of she Civil Code. To be
valid, therefore, any change of interest must be mutually agreed upon by the
parties (Dizon v. Magsaysay, 57 SCRA 250 [1974]). In the present problem, the
debtor not having given his consent to the increase in interest, the increase is
void.
X.
On July 1, 1998. Brian leased an office space in a building for a period of five years
at a rental rate of PI.000.00 a month. The contract of lease contained the proviso that
“in case of inflation or devaluation of the Philippine peso, the monthly rental will
automatically be increased or decreased depending on the devaluation or inflation of
the peso to the dollar." Starting March 1, 2001, the lessor increased the rental to
P2.000.00 a month, on the ground of inflation proven by the fact that the exchange rate
of the Philippine peso to the dollar had increased from P25.00=$1.00 to P50.00=$1.00.
Brian refused to pay the increased rate and an action for unlawful detainer was filed
against him. Will the action prosper? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The unlawful detainer action will not prosper. Extraordinary inflation or

deflation is defined as the sharp decrease in the purchasing power of the peso. It
does not necessarily refer to the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. Whether
or not there exists an extraordinary Inflation or deflation is for the courts to
decide. There being no showing that the purchasing power of the peso had been
reduced tremendously, there could be no inflation that would justify the increase
in the amount of rental to be paid. Hence, Brian could refuse to pay the increased
rate.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The action will not prosper. The existence of inflation or deflation requires an
official declaration by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The unlawful detainer action will prosper. It is a given fact in the problem, that
there was inflation, which caused the exchange rate to double. Since the contract itself
authorizes the increase in rental in the event of an inflation or devaluation of the
Philippine peso, the doubling of the monthly rent is reasonable and is therefore a valid
act under the very terms of the contract. Brian's refusal to pay is thus a ground for
ejectment.
XI.
The sugar cane planters of Batangas entered into a longterm milling contract with the Central
Azucarera de Don Pedro Inc. Ten years later, the Central assigned its rights to the said milling contract to a
Taiwanese group which would take over the operations of the sugar mill. The planters filed ap action to
annul the sgid assignment on the ground that the Taiwanese group was not registered with the Board of
Investments. Will the action prosper or not? Explain briefly. (5%)
(Note: The question presupposes knowledge and requires the application of

the provisions of the Omnibus investment Code, which properly belongs to
Commercial law)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action will prosper not on the ground invoked but on the ground that the
farmers have not given their consent to the assignment. The milling contract
imposes reciprocal obligations on the parties. The sugar central has the
obligation to mill the sugar cane of the farmers while the latter have the
obligation to deliver their sugar cane to the sugar central. As to the obligation to
mill the sugar cane, the sugar central is a debtor of the farmers. In assigning its
rights under the contract, the sugar central will also transfer to the Taiwanese its
obligation to the sugar cane of the farmers. This will amount to a novation of the
contract by substituting the debtor with a third party. Under Article 1293 of the
Civil Code, such substitution cannot take effect without the consent of the
creditor. The farmers, who are creditors as far as the obligation to mill their
sugar cane is concerned, may annul such assignment for not having given their
consent thereto.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The assignment is valid because there is absolute freedom to transfer the credit
and the creditor need not get the consent of the debtor. He only needs to notify him.
XII.
OnJune 15,1995, Jesus sold a parcel of registered land to Jaime. On June 30. 1995, he sold the
same land to Jose. Who has a better right If:
a) the first sale is registered ahead of the second sale, with knowledge of the latter. Why?
(3%)
b) the second sale is registered ahead of the first sale, with knowledge of the latter? Why?
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The first buyer has the better right if his sale was first to be registered, even
though the first buyer knew of the second sale. The fact that he knew of the second sale
at the time of his registration does not make him as acting in bad faith because the sale
to him was ahead in time, hence, has a priority in right. What creates bad faith in the
case of double sale of land is knowledge of a previous sale.
b) The first buyer is still to be preferred, where the second sale is registered
ahead of the first sale but with knowledge of the latter. This is because the second
buyer, who at the time he registered his sale knew that the property had already been
sold to someone else, acted in bad faith. (Article 1544, C.C.)
XIII.
Joe and Rudy formed a partnership to operate a car repair shop in Quezon City. Joe provided the
capital while Rudy contributed his labor and industry. On one side of their shop, Joe opened and operated a
coffee shop, while on the other side, Rudy put up a car accessories store. May they engage in such
separate businesses? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Joe, the capitalist partner, may engage in the restaurant business because it is not
the same kind of business the partnership is engaged in. On the other hand, Rudy may
not engage in any other business unless their partnership expressly permits him to do
so because as an industrial partner he has to devote his full time to the business of the
partnership (Art. 1789, CC).
XIV.
On January 1, 1980, Nestor leased the fishpond of Mario for a period of three years at a monthly rental
of PI,000.00, with an option to purchase the same during the period of the lease for the price of
P500.000.00. After the
expiration of the three-year period, Mario allowed Nestor to remain in the leased premises at the same
rental rate. On June 15, 1983, Nestor tendered the amount of P500,000.00 to Mario and demanded that
the latter execute a deed of absolute sale of the fishpond in his favor. Mario refused, on the ground that
Nestor no longer had an option to buy the fishpond. Nestor filed an action for specific performance. Will the
action prosper or not? Why? (5%)
XV.
Richard sold a large parcel of land in Cebu to Leo for P100 million payable in annual installments over
a period of ten years, but title will remain with Richard until the purchase price is fully paid. To enable Leo to
pay the price, Richard gave him a power-of-attomey authorizing him to subdivide the land, sell the individual
lots, and deliver the proceeds to Richard, to be applied to the purchase price. Five years later, Richard
revoked the power of attorney and took over the sale of the subdivision lots himself. Is the revocation valid
or not? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The revocation is not valid. The power of attorney given to the buyer is irrevocable
because it is coupled with an interest: the agency is the means of fulfilling the
obligation of the buyer to pay the price of the land (Article 1927, CC). In other words, a
bilateral contract (contract to buy and sell the land) is dependent on the agency.
XVI.
Arturo gave Richard a receipt which states:
“Receipt
Received from Richard as down payment

For my 1995 Toyota Corolla with
plate No. XYZ-1 23 ....................... P50.000.00
Balance payable: 12/30/01 ........... P50 000.00
September 15, 2001.
(Sgd.) Arturo
Does this receipt evidence a contract to sell? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It is a contract of sale because the seller did not reserve ownership until he
was fully paid.
XVII.
Cesar bought a residential condominium unit from High Rise Co. and paid the price in
full. He moved into the unit, but somehow he was not given the Condominium
Certificate ofTitle covering the property. Unknown to him. High Rise Co. subsequently
mortgaged the entire condominium building to Metrobank as security for a loan of P500
million. High Rise Co. failed to pay the loan and the bank foreclosed the mortgage. At
the foreclosure sale, the bank acquired the building, being the highest bidder. When
Cesar learned about this, he filed an action to annul the foreclosure sale insofar as his
unit was concerned. The bank put up the defense that it relied on the condominium
certificates of title presented by High Rise Co., which were clean. Hence, it was a
mortgagee and buyer in good faith. Is this defense tenable or not? Why? (5%.)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Metrobank’s defense is untenable. As a rule, an innocent purchaser for value

acquires a good and a clean title to the property. However, It is settled that one
who closes his eyes to facts that should put a reasonable man on guard is not an
innocent purchaser for value. In the present problem the bank is expected, as a
matter of standard operating procedure, to have conducted an ocular inspection,
of the promises before granting any loan. Apparently, Metrobank did not follow
this procedure, otherwise, it should have discovered that the condominium unit
in question was occupied by Cesar and that fact should have led it to make
further inquiry. Under the circumstances, Metrobank cannot be considered a
mortgagee and buyer in good faith.
XVIII.
After working overtime up to midnight, Alberto an executive of an insurance

company drove a company vehicle to a favorite Videoke bar where he had some drinks
and sang some songs with friends to "unwind". At 2:00 a.m.. he drove home, but in
doing so, he bumped a tricycle, resulting in the death of its driver. May the insurance
company be held liable for the negligent act of Alberto? Why.? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The insurance company is not liable because when the accident occurred,
Alberto was not acting within the assigned tasks of his employment.
It is true that under Art. 2180 (par. 5), employers are liable for damages
caused by their employees who were acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks. However, the mere fact that Alberto was using a service vehicle of the
employer at the time of the injurious accident does not necessarily mean that he
was operating the vehicle within the scope of his employment. In Castilex
Industrial Corp. v. Vasquez, Jr. (321 SCRA393 [1999]), the Supreme Court held that
notwithstanding the fact that the employee did some overtime work for the
company, the former was, nevertheless, engaged in his own affairs or carrying
out a personal purpose when he went to a restaurant at 2:00 a.m. after coming
out from work. The time of the accident (also 2:00 a. m.) was outside normal
working hours.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
The insurance company is liable if Alberto was negligent in the operation of

the car and the car was assigned to him for the benefit of the insurance
company, and even though he was not within the scope of his assigned tasks
when the accident happened. In one case decided by the Supreme Court, where
an executive of a pharmaceutical company was given the use of a company car,
and after office hours, the executive made personal use of the car and met an
accident, the employer was also made liable under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code for
the injury caused by the negligent operation of the car by the executive, on the
ground that the car which caused the injury was assigned to the executive by the
employer for the prestige of the company. The insurance company was held
liable even though the employee was not performing within the scope of his
assigned tasks when the accident happened [Valenzuela v. CA, 253 SCRA 303
(1996)].
XIX
Betty and Lydia were co-owners of a parcel of land. Last January 31, 2001, when she
paid her real estate tax, Betty discovered that Lydia had sold her share to Emma on
November 10, 2000. The following day, Betty offered to redeem her share from Emma,
but the latter replied that Betty's right to redeem has already prescribed. Is Emma
correct or not? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Emma, the buyer, is not correct. Betty can still enforce her right of legal
redemption as a co-owner. Article 1623 of the Civil Code gives a co-owner 30
days from written notice of the sale by the vendor to exercise his right of legal
redemption. In the present problem, the 30-day period for the exercise by Betty
of her right of redemption had not even begun to run because no notice in
writing of the sale appears to have been given to her by Lydia.
XX
Mario sold his house and lot to Carmen for PI million payable in five (5) equal
annual installments. The sale was registered and title was issued in Carmen's name.
Carmen failed to pay the last three installments and Mario filed an. action for collection,
damages and attorneys fees against her. Upon filing of the complaint, he caused a
notice of lis pendens to be annotated on Carmen's title. Is the notice of lis pendens
proper or not? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The notice of lis pendens is not proper for the reason that the case filed by
Mario against Carmen is only for collection, damages, and attoraeyis fees.
Annotation of a lis pendens can only be done in cases involving recovery of
possession of real property, or to quiet title or to remove cloud thereon, or for
partition or any other proceeding affecting title to the land or the use or
occupation thereof. The action filed by Mario does not fall on anyone of these.
2000 BAR EXAMINATION I
a) As finance officer of K and Co., Victorino arranged a loan of P5 Million from

PNB for the corporation. However, he was required by the bank to sign a Continuing
Surety Agreement to secure the repayment of the loan. The corporation failed to pay
the loan, and the bank obtained a Judgment against it and Victorino. jointly and
severally. To enforce the judgment, the sheriff levied on a farm owned by the conjugal
partnership ofVictorino and his wife Elsa. Is the levy proper or not? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The levy is not proper there being no showing that the surety agreement executed
by the husband redounded to the benefit of the family. An obligation contracted by the
husband alone is chargeable against the conjugal partnership only when it was
contracted for the benefit of the family. When the obligation was contracted on behalf
of the family business the law presumes that such obligation will redound to the benefit
of the family. However, when the obligation was to guarantee the debt of a third party,
as in the problem, the obligation is presumed for the benefit of the third party, not the
family. Hence, for the obligation under the surety agreement to be chargeable against
the partnership it must be proven that the family was benefited and that the benefit
was a direct result oi such agreement. [Ayola Investment v. Ching. 286 SCRA 272)
b) OnAprill5, 1980, Rene and Angelina were married to each other without a
marriage settlement. In 1985, they acquired a parcel of land in Quezon City. On June
1, 1990, when Angelina was away in Baguio, Rene sold the said lot to Marcelo. Is the
sale void or voidable? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The sale is void. Since the sale was executed in 1990, the Family Code is the law
applicable. Under Article 124 of the FC, the sale of a conjugal property by a spouse
without the consent of the other is void.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The sale is voidable. The provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively
but only if such application will not impair vested rights. When Rene and Angelina got
married in 1980, the law that governed their property relations was the New Civil Code.
Under the NCC, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Heirs of Felipe v.Aldon, 100
SCRA 628 and reiterated in Heirs of Ayuste v. Malobonga, G.R. No. 118784, 2
September 1999, the sale executed by the husband without the consent of the wife is
voidable. The husband has already acquired a vested right on the voidable nature of
dispositions made without the consent of the wife. Hence. Article 124 of the Family
Code which makes the sale void does not apply.
For five years since 1989, Tony, a bank Vice-President, and Susan, an
entertainer, lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
although they were capacitated to many each other. Since Tony’s salary was more
than enough for their needs, Susan stopped working and merely “kept house". During
that period, Tony was able to buy a lot and house in a plush subdivision. However,
after five years. Tony and Susan decided to separate.
a) Who will be entitled to the house and lot ? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Tony and Susan are entitled to the house and lot as coowners in equal shares.
Under Article 147 of the Family Code, when a man and a woman who are capacitated
to marry each other lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife, the
property acquired during their cohabitation are presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares. This is
true even though the efforts of one of them consisted merely in his or her care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
b) Would it make any difference if Tony could not marry Susan because he
was previously married to Alice from whom he is legally separated ? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, it would make a difference. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, when the
parties to the cohabitation could not marry each other because of an impediment, only
those properties acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. The efforts of one of the parties in maintaining the family and
household are not considered adequate contribution in the acquisition of the properties.
Since Susan did not contribute to the acquisition of the house and lot, she has no
share therein. If Tony cohabited with Susan after his legal separation from Alice, the
house and lot is his exclusive property. If he cohabited with Susan before his legal
separation from Alice, the house said lot belongs to his community or partnership with
Alice.
III.
a) Manuel, a Filipino, and his American wife Eleanor, executed a Joint Will in
Boston, Massachusetts when they were residing in said city. The law of Massachusetts
allows the execution of joint wills. Shortly thereafter, Eleanor died. Can the said Will be
probated in the Philippines for the settlement of her estate ? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the will may be probated in the Philippines insofar as the estate of Eleanor is
concerned. While the Civil Code prohibits the execution of joint wills here and abroad,
such prohibition applies only to Filipinos. Hence, the joint will which is valid where
executed is valid in the Philippines but enly with respect to Eleanor. Under Article 819,
it is void with respect to Manuel whose joint will remains void in the Philippines despite
being valid where executed.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The will cannot be probated in the Philippines, even though valid where executed,
because it is prohibited under Article 818 of the Civil Code and declared void under
Article 819. The prohibition should apply even to the American wife because the joint
will is offensive to public policy. Moreover, it is a single Juridical act which cannot be
valid as to one testator and void as to the other.
b) Cristy and her late husband Luis had two children. Rose and Patrick. One
summer, her mother-in-law, aged 70, took the two children, then aged lOand 12, with
her on a boat trip to Cebu. Unfortunately, the vessel sank en route, and the bodies of
the three were never found. None of the survivors ever saw them on the water. On the
settlement of her mother- in-law’s estate, Cristy files a claim for a share of her estate on
the ground that the same was inherited by her children from their grandmother in
representation of their father, and she inherited the same from them. Will her action
prosper? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, her action will not prosper. Since there was no proof as to who died first, all the
three are deemed to have died at the same time and there was no transmission of
rights from one to another, applying Article 43 of the New Civil Code.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, her action will not prosper. Under Article 43 of the New Civil Code, inasmuch
as there is no proof as to who died first, all the three are presumed to have died at the
same time and there could be no transmission of rights among them. Her children not
having inherited from their grandmother, Cristy has no right to share in her mother-in-
law’s estate. She cannot share in her own right as she is not a legal heir of her mother-
in-law. The survivorship provision of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court does not apply to
the problem. It applies only to those cases where the issue involved is not succession.
IV
In his last will and testament, Lamberto 1) disinherits his daughter Wilma because
“she is disrespectful towards me and raises her voice talking to me", 2) omits entirely
his spouse Elvira, 3) leaves a legacy of P100.000.00 to his mistress Rosa and
P50,000.00 to his driver Ernie and 4) institutes his son Baldo as his sole heir. How will
you distribute his estate of PI .000,000.00? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The disinheritance of Wilma was ineffective because the ground relied upon by
the testator does not constitute maltreatment under Article 919(6) of the New Civil
Code. Hence, the testamentary provisions in the will shall be annulled but only to the
extent that her legitime was impaired. The total omission of Elvira does not constitute
preterition because she is not a compulsory heir in the direct line. Only- compulsory
heirs in the direct line may be the subject of preterition. Not having been preterited, she
will be entitled only to her legitime. The legacy in favor of Rosa is void under Article
1028 for being in consideration of her adulterous relation with the testator. She is,
therefore, disqualified to receive the legacy of 100,000 pesos. The legacy of 50,000
pesos in favor of Ernie is not inofficious not having exceeded the free portion. Hence,
he shall be entitled to receive it. The institution of Baldo, which applies only to the free
portion, shall be respected. In sum, the estate of Lamberto will be distributed as
follows:
Baldo ------------------- 450,000

Wilma ------------------ 250.000
Elvira ------------------- 250,000
Ernie -------------------- 50,000
_____________
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The disinheritance of Wilma was effective because disrespect of, and raising of voice
to, her
father constitute maltreatment under Article 919(6) of the New Civil Code. She is,
therefore, not entitled to inherit anything. Her inheritance will go to the other legal heirs.
The total omission of Elvira is not preterition because she is not a compulsory heir in
the direct line. She will receive only her legitime. The legacy in favor of Rosa is void
under Article 1028 for being in consideration of her adulterous, relation with the
testator. She is, therefore, disqualified to receive the legacy. Ernie will receive the
legacy in his favor because it is not inofficious. The institution of Baldo, which applies
only to the free portion, will be respected. In sum, the estate of Lamberto shall be
distributed as follows:
Heir LegitimeLegacyInstitution TOTAL
Baldo 500,000 200,000 700.000
Elvira 250,000 250.000
Ernie 50.000 50,000
TOTAL 750,000 50,000 200,000 1.000.000
Same answer as the first Alternative Answer except as to distribution.

Justice Jurado solved this problem differently. In his opinion, the legitime of the
heir who was disinherited Is distributed among the other compulsory heirs in
proportion to their respective legitimes, while his share in the intestate portion, if
any. is distributed among the other legal heirs by accretion under Article 1018 of
the NCC in proportion to their respective intestate shares. In sum the distribution
shall be as follows:
Heir Legitime Distribution

of Wilma’s Legacy Institution TOTAL
Baldo 250.0000 125,000 200,000 575,000
Wilma(250,000)
TOTAL 500,000 250,000 50,000 200,000 1,000,000
V.
Sometime In 1990, Sarah, bom a Filipino but by then a naturalized American citizen, and her
American husband Tom. filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, for the adoption of the minor
child of her sister, a Filipina. Can the petition be granted? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends. If Tom and Sarah have been residing In the Philippines for at least 3 years prior to the
effectlvity of RA 8552, the petition may be granted. Otherwise, the petition cannot be granted because the
American husband is not qualified to adopt.
While the petition for adoption was filed in 1990, it was considered refiled upon the effectlvity of
RA8552, the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. This is the law applicable, the petition being still pending with
the lower court.
Under the Act, Sarah and Tom must adopt jointly because they do not fall in any of the exceptions
where one of them may adopt alone. When husband and wife must adopt jointly, the Supreme Court has
held in a line of cases that both of them must be qualified to adopt. While Sarah, an alien. Is qualified to
adopt under Section 7(b)(1) of the Act for being a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within
the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity, Tom, an alien, is not qualified because he is neither a former
Filipino citizen nor married to a Filipino. One of them not being qualified to adopt, their petition has to be
denied. However, if they have been residents of the Philippines three years prior to the effectivity of the Act
and continues to reside here until the decree of adoption is entered, they are qualified to adopt the nephew
of Sarah under Section 7(b) thereof, and the petition may be granted.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Since the petition was filed before the effectlvity of the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, the Family
Code is the law applicable.
Under the FC, Sarah and Tom must adopt Jointly because they do not fall in any of the exceptions
where one of them may adopt alone. Under a long line of cases decided by the Supreme Court, when
husband and wife must adopt jointly, both of them must be qualified to adopt. While Sarah is qualified to
adopt under Article 184(3)(a) for being a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by
consanguinity, Tom is not. He Is not a former Filipino citizen and neither is he married to a Filipino. One of
them not being qualified to adopt, the petition must be denied.
VI.
The coconut farm of Federico is surrounded by the lands of Romulo. Federico seeks a right of way
through a portion of the land of Romulo to bring his coconut products to the market. He has chosen a point
where he will pass through a housing project of Romulo. The latter wants him to pass another way which Is
one kilometer longer. Who should prevail? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Romulo will prevail. Under Article 650 of the New Civil Code, the easement of right of way shall be
established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway is the shortest. In case of conflict, the criterion of least prejudice prevails over the
criterion of shortest distance. Since the route chosen by Federico will prejudice the housing project of
Romulo, Romulo has the right to demand that Federico pass another way even though it will be longer.
VII.
a) Arturo borrowed P500.000.00 from his father. After he had paid P300.000.00,
his father died. When the administrator of his father’s estate requested payment of the
balance of P200.000.00, Arturo replied that the same had been condoned by his father
as evidenced by a notation at the back of his check payment for the P300.000.00
reading: “In full payment of the loan". Will this be a valid defense in an action for
collection? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends. If the notation “in full payment of the loan" was written by Arturo's
father, there was an implied condonation of the balance that discharges the obligation.
In such case, the notation is an act of the father from which condonation may be
inferred. The condonation being implied, it need not comply with the formalities of a
donation to be effective. The defense of full payment will, therefore, be valid.
When, however, the notation was written by Arturo himself, it merely proves his
intention in making that payment but in no way does it bind his father (Yam u. CA, G.R.
No. 104726, 11 February 1999). In such case, the notation was not the act of his father
from which condonation may be inferred. There being no condonation at all, the
defense of full payment will not be valid.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the notation was written by Arturo's father, it amounted to an cocpress

condonation of the balance which must comply with the formalities of a donation to be
valid under the 2nd paragraph of Article 1270 of the New Civil Code. Since the amount
of the balance is more than 5,000 pesos, the acceptance by Arturo of the condonation
must also be in writing under Article 748. There being no acceptance in writing by
Arturo, the condonation is void and the obligation to pay the balance subsists. The
defense of full payment is, therefore, not valid. In case the notation was not written by
Arturo's father, the answer is the same as the answers above.
b) Anastacia purchased a house and lot on Installments at a housing project in

Quezon City. Subsequently, she was employed in California and a year later, she
executed a deed of donation, duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in Los
Angeles. California, donating the house and lot to her friend Amanda. The latter
brought the deed of donation to the owner of the project and discovered that Anastacia
left unpaid installments and real estate taxes. Amanda paid these so that the donation
in her favor can be registered in the project owner's office. Two months later, Anastacia
died, leaving her mother Rosa as her sole heir. Rosa filed an action to annul the
donation on the ground that Amanda did not give her consent in the deed of donation
or in a separate public instrument. Amanda replied that the donation was an onerous
one because she had to pay unpaid installments and taxes; hence her acceptance may
be implied. Who is correct? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Rosa is correct because the donation is void. The property donated was an immovable.
For such donation to be valid, Article 749 of the New Civil Code requires both the
donation and the acceptance to be in a public instrument. There being no showing that
Amanda’s acceptance was made in a public instrument, the donation is void. The
contention that the donation is onerous and. therefore, need not comply with Article 749
for validity is without merit. The donation is not onerous because it did not impose on
Amanda the obligation to pay the balance on the purchase price or the arrears in real
estate taxes. Amanda took it upon herself to pay those amounts voluntarily. For a
donation tc be onerous, the burden must be imposed by the donor on the donee. In the
problem, there is no such burden imposed by the donor on the donee. The donation not
being onerous, it must comply with the formalities of Article 749
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Neither Rosa nor Amanda is correct. The donation is onerous only as to the portion of
the property corresponding to the value of the installments and taxes paid by Amanda.
The portion in excess thereof is not onerous. The cnerous portion is governed by the
rules on contracts which do not require the acceptance by the donee to be in any form.
The onerous part, therefore, is valid. The portion which is not onerous must comply
with Article 749 of the New Civil Code which requires the donation and the acceptance
thereof to be in a public instrument in order to be valid. The acceptance not being in a
public instrument, the part which is not onerous is void and Rosa may recover it from
Amanda.
VIII.
a) Republic Act 1899 authorizes municipalities and chartered cities to reclaim

foreshore lands bordering them and to construct thereon adequate docking and harbor
facilities. Pursuant thereto, the City of Cavite entered into an agreement with the Fil-
Estate Realty Company, authorizing the latter to reclaim 300 hectares of land from the
sea bordering the city, with 30% of the land to be reclaimed to be owned by Fil-Estate
as compensation for its services. The Solicitor General questioned the validity of the
agreement on the ground that it will mean reclaiming land under the sea which is
beyond the commerce of man. The City replies that this is authorized by R.A. 1899
because it authorizes the construction of docks and harbors. Who is correct? (3%)
b)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Solicitor General is correct. The authority of the City of Cavite under RA 1899
to reclaim land is limited to foreshore lands. The Act did not authorize it to reclaim land
from the sea. The reclamation being unauthorized, the City of Cavite did not acquire
ownership over the reclaimed land. Not being the owner, it could not have conveyed
any portion thereof to the contractor.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It depends. If the reclamation of the land from the sea is necessaiy in the
construction of the docks and the harbors, the City of Cavite is correct. Otherwise, it is
not. Since RA 1899 authorized the city to construct docks and harbors, all works that
are necessary for such construction are deemed authorized, including the reclamation
of land from the sea. The reclamation being authorized, the city is the owner of the
reclaimed land and it may convey a portion thereof as payment for the services of the
contractor.
On the assumption that the reclamation contract was entered into before RA 1899
was repealed by PD 3-A, the City of Cavite is correct. Lands under the sea are “beyond
the commerce of man” in the sense that they are not susceptible of private
appropriation, ownership or alienation. The contract in question merely calls for the
reclamation of 300 hectares of land within the coastal waters of the city. Perse, it does
not vest, alienate or transfer ownership of land under the sea. The city merely engaged
the services of Fil-Estate to reclaim the land for the city.
b) Regina has been leasing foreshore land from the Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources for the past 15 years. Recently, she learned that Jorge was able to
obtain a free patent from the Bureau of Agriculture, covering the same land, on the
basis of a certification by the District Forester that the same is already “alienable and
disposable”. Moreover, Jorge had already registered the patent with the Register of
Deeds of the province, and he was issued an Original Certificate of Title for the same.
Regina fded an action for annulment of Jorge’s title on the ground that it was obtained
fraudulently. Will the action prosper? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
An action for the annulment of Jorge's Original Certificate of Title will prosper on
the following grounds:
(1) Under Chapter IX of C.A. No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.
foreshore lands are disposable for residential, commercial, Industrial, or similar
productive purposes, and only by lease when not needed by the government for public
service.
(2) If the land is suited or actually used for fishpond or aquaculture purposes,
it comes under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
(BFAR) and can only be acquired by lease. (P.D. 705)
(3) Free Patent is a mode of concession under Se ction 41, Chapter VII of
the Public Land Act, which is applicable only for agricultural lands.
(4) The certificate of the district forester that the land is already “alienable
and disposable" simply means that the land is no longer needed for forest purposes,
but the Bureau of Lands could no longer dispose of it by free patent because it is
already covered by a lease contract between BFAR and Regina. That contract must be
respected.
(5) The free patent of Jorge is highly irregular and void ab Initio, not only
because the Bureau has no statutory authority to issue a free patent over a foreshore
area, but also because of the false statements made in his sworn application that he
has occupied and cultivated the land since July 4, 1945, as required by the free patent
law. Under Section 91 of the Public Land Act, any patent, concession or title obtained
thru false representation is void ab initio. In cases of this nature, it is the government
that shall institute annulment proceedings considering that the suit carries with it a
prayer for the reversion of the land to the state. However, Regina is a party in interest
and the case will prosper because she has a lease contract for the same land with the
government.
IX
a) Demetrio knew that a piece of land bordering the beach belonged to Ernesto.
However, since the latter wa3 studying in Europe and no one was taking care of the
land, Demetrio occupied the same and constructed thereon nipa sheds with tables and
benches which he rented out to people who want to have a picnic by the beach. When
Ernesto returned, he demanded the return of the land. Demetrio agreed to do so after
he has removed the nipa sheds. Ernesto refused to let Demetrio remove the nipa sheds
on the ground that these already belonged to him by right of accession. Who is correct?
(3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Ernesto is correct. Demetrio is a builder in bad faith because he knew beforehand

that the land belonged to Emesto. Under Article 449 of the New Civil Code, one who
builds on the land of another loses what is built without right to indemnity. Emesto
becomes the owner of the nipa sheds by right of accession. Hence. Emesto is well
within his right in refusing to allow the removal of the nipa sheds.
b) In good faith, Pedro constructed a flve-door commercial building on the land of
Pablo who was also in good faith. When Pablo discovered the construction, he opted to
appropriate the building by paying Pedro the cost thereof. However, Pedro insists that
he should be paid the current market value of the building, which was much higher
because of inflation.
1) Who is correct, Pedro or Pablo ? (1%)
2) In the meantime that Pedro is not yet paid, who is entitled to the rentals of
the building. Pedro or Pablo? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Pablo is correct. Under Article 448 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 546,
the builder in good faith is entitled to a refund of the necessary and useful expenses
incurred by him, or the increase in value which the land may have acquired by reason
of the improvement, at the option of the landowner. The builder is entitled to a refund of
the expenses he incurred, and not to the market value of the improvement.
The case of Pecson v. CA, 244 SCRA 407, is not applicable to the problem. In the
Pecson case, the builder was the owner of the land who later lost the property at a
public sale due to non-payment of taxes. The Court mled that Article 448 does not
apply to the case where the owner of the land is the builder but who later lost the land;
not being applicable, the Indemnity that should be paid to the buyer must be the fair
market value of the building and not Just the cost of construction thereof. The Court
opined in that case that to do otherwise would unjustly enrich the new owner of the
land.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Pedro is correct. In Pecson u. CA, it was held that Article 546 of the New Civil
Code does not specifically state how the value of useful improvements should be
determined in fixing the amount of Indemnity that the owner of the land should pay to
the builder in good faith. Since the objective of the law is to adjust the rights of the
parties in such manner as "to administer completejustice tobothofthem in sucha
way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of that which does not
belong to him", the Court ruled that the basis of reimbursement should be the fair
market value of the building.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
2) Pablo is entitled to the rentals of the building. As the owner of the land,
Pablo is also the owner of the building being an accession thereto. However. Pedro
who is entitled to retain the building is also entitled to retain the rentals. He, however,
shall apply the rentals to the indemnity payable to him after deducting reasonable cost
of repair and maintenance.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Pablo is entitled to the rentals. Pedro became a possessor in bad faith from the
time he learned that the land belongs to Pablo. As such, he loses his right to the
building, including the fruits thereof, except the right of retention.
X
a) Ambrosio died, leaving his three daughters, Belen, Rosario and Sylvia a
hacienda which was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank. Due to the failure of
the daughters to pay the bank, the latter foreclosed the mortgage and the hacienda
was sold to it as the highest bidder. Six months later, Sylvia won the grand prize at the
lotto and used part of it to redeem the hacienda from the bank. Thereafter, she took
possession of the hacienda and refused to share its fruits with her sisters, contending
that it was owned exclusively by her, having bought it from the bank with her own
money. Is she correct or not? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Sylvia is not correct. The 3 daughters are the co-owners of the hacienda being the
only heirs of Ambrosio. When the property was foreclosed, the right of redemption
belongs also to the 3 daughters. When Sylvia redeemed the entire property before the
lapse of the redemption period, she also exercised the right of redemption of her co-
owners on their behalf. As such she is holding the shares of her two sisters in the
property, and all the fruits corresponding thereto, in trust for them. Redemption by one
co-owner Inures to the benefit of all (Adille v. CA, 157SCRA 455). Sylvia, however, is
entitled to be reimbursed the shares of her two sisters in the redemption price.
b) Felix cultivated a parcel of land and planted it to sugar cane, believing it to be

his own. When the crop was eight months old, and harvestable after two more months,
a resurvey of the land showed that it really belonged to Fred. What are the options
available to Fred? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As to the pending crops planted by Felix in good faith, Ffed has the option of
allowing Felix to continue the cultivation and to harvest the crops, or to continue the
cultivation and harvest the crops himself. In the latter option, however, Felix shall have
the right to a part of the expenses of cultivation and to a part of the net harvest, both in
proportion to the time of possession. (Art. 545 NCC).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Since sugarcane is not a perennial crop, Felix is considered a sower in good faith.
Being so. Art 448 applies. The options available to Fred are: (a) to appropriate the crop
after paying Felix the indemnity under Art. 546, or (b) to require Felix to pay rent.
XI
Eugenio died without issue, leaving several parcels of land in Bataan. He was
survived by Antonio, his legitimate brother; Martina, the only daughter of his
predeceased sister Mercedes; and five legitimate children of Joaquin, another
predeceased brother. Shortly after Eugenio’s death, Antonio also died, leaving three
legitimate children. Subsequently. Martina, the children of Joaquin and the children of
Antonio executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Eugenio, dividing it among
themselves. The succeeding year, a petition to annul the extrajudicial settlement was
filed by Antero, an illegitimate son of Antonio, who claims he is entitled to share in the
estate of Eugenio. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Antero
is barred by Article 992 of the Civil Code from inheriting from the legitimate brother of
his father. How will you resolve the motion? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion to dismiss should be granted. Article 992 does not apply. Antero is not
claiming any inheritance from Eugenio. He is claiming his share in the inheritance of his
father consisting of his father’s share in the inheritance of Eugenio (Dela Merced v.
Dela Merced, G.R. No. 126707, 25 February 1999).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It depends. If Antero was not acknowledged by Antonio, the motion to dismiss

should be granted because Antero is not a legal heir of Antonio. If Antero was
acknowledged , the motion should be denied because Article992 is not applicable. This
is because Antero is claiming his inheritance from his illegitimate father, not from
Eugenio.
XII.
In 1979, Nestor applied for and was granted a Free Patent.over a parcel of
agricultural land with an area of 30 hectares, located in General Santos City. He
presented the Free Patent to the Register of Deeds, and he was issued a
corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 375. Subsequently, Nestor sold
the land to Eddie. The deed of sale was submitted to the Register of Deeds and on the
basis thereof, OCT No. 375 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
4576 was issued in the name of Eddie. In 1986, the Director of Lands filed a complaint
for annulment of OCT No. 375 and TCT No. 4576 on the ground that Nestor obtained
the Free Patent through fraud. Eddie filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that he
was an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith and as such, he has acquired a
title to the property which is valid, unassailable and indefeasible. Decide the motion.
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion of Nestor to dismiss the complaint for annulment of O.C.T. No. 375 and
T.C.T. No. 4576 should be denied for the following reasons:
1) Eddie cannot claim protection as an innocent purchaser for value nor can he
interpose the defense of indefeasibility of his title, because his TCT is rooted on a void
title. Under Section 91 of CA No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act, statements of material facts in the applications for public land must be under
oath. Section 91 of the same act provides that such statements shall be considered as
essential conditions and parts of the concession, title, or permit issued, any false
statement therein, or omission of facts shall ipso facto produce the cancellation of the
concession. The patent issued to Nestor in this case is void ab initio not only because
it was obtained by fraud but also because it covers 30 hectares which is far beyond the
maximum of 24 hectares provided by the free patent law.
2) The government can seek annulment or the original and transfer certificates of
title and the reversion of the land to the state. Eddie’s defense is untenable. The
protection afforded by the Torrens System to an innocent purchaser for value can be
availed of only if the land has been titled thru Judicial proceedings where the issue of
fraud becomes academic after the lapse of one (1) year from the issuance of the
decree of registration. In public land grants, the action of the government to annul a title
fraudulently obtained does not prescribe such action and will not be barred by the
transfer of the title to an innocent purchaser for value.
XIII
Priscilla purchased a condominium unit in Makati City from the Citiland Corporation
for a price of P10 Million, payable P3 Million down and the balance with interest thereon
at 14% per annum payable in sixty (60) equal monthly installments of P 198,333.33.
They executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in which it is stipulated that should the
vendee fail to pay three (3) successive installments, the sale shall be deemed
automatically rescinded without the necessity of judicial action and all payments made
by the vendee shall be forfeited in favor of the vendor by way of rental for the use and
occupancy of the unit and as liquidated damages. For 46 months, Priscilla paid the
monthly installments religiously, but on the 47th and 48th months, she failed to pay. On
the 49th month, she tried to pay the installments due but the vendor refused to receive
the payments tendered by her. The following month, the vendor sent her a notice that it
was rescinding the Deed of Conditional Sale pursuant to the stipulation for automatic
rescission, and demanded that she vacate the premises. She replied that the contract
cannot be rescinded without judicial demand or notarial act pursuant to Article 1592 of
the Civil Code.
a) Is Article 1592 applicable? (3%)
b) Can the vendor rescind the contract? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Article 1592 of the Civil Code does not apply to a conditional sale. In Valarao v.
CA, 304 SCRA 155, the Supreme Court held that Article 1592 applies only to a contract
of sale and not to a Deed of Conditional Sale where the seller has reserved title to the
property until full payment of the purchase price. The law applicable is the Maceda Law.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the vendor cannot rescind the contract under the circumstances. Under the Maceda
Law, which is the law applicable, the seller on Installment may not rescind the contract
till after the lapse of the mandatory grace period of 30 days for every one year of
Installment payments, and only after 30 days from notice of cancellation or demand , for
rescission by a notarial act. In this case, the refusal of the seller to accept payment from
the buyer on the 49th month was not Justified because the buyer was entitled to 60
days grace period and the payment was tendered within that period. Moreover, the
notice of rescission served by the seller on the buyer was not effective because the
notice was not by a notarial act. Besides, the seller may still pay within 30 days from
such notarial notice before rescission may be effected. All these requirements for a
valid rescission were not complied with by the seller. Hence, the rescission is invalid.
XIV
Kristina brought her diamond ring to a jewelry shop for cleaning. The jewelry shop
undertook to return the ring by February 1, 1999. When the said date arrived, the
Jewelry shop informed Kristina that the job was not yet finished. They asked her to
return five days alter. On February 6. 1999, Kristina went to the shop to claim the ring,
but she was Informed that the same was stolen by a thief who entered the shop the
night before. Kristina filed an action for damages against the jewelry shop which put up
the defense of force majeure. Will the action prosper or not? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action will prosper. Since the defendant was already in default not having
delivered the ring when delivery was demanded by plaintiff at due date, the defendant
is liable for the loss of the thing and even when the loss was due to force majeure.
XV
a) Lolita was employed in a finance company. Because she could not account for
the funds entrusted to her, she was charged with estafa and ordered arrested. In order
to secure her release from jail, her parents executed a promissory note to pay the
finance company the amount allegedly misappropriated by their daughter. The finance
company then executed an affidavit of desistance which led to the withdrawal of the
information against Lolita and her release from jail. The parents failed to comply with
their promissory note and the finance company sued them for specific performance.
Will the action prosper or not? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action will prosper. The promissory note executed by Lolita’s parents is valid
and binding, the consideration being the extinguishment of Lolita’s civil liability and not
the stifling of the criminal prosecution.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The action will not prosper because the consideration for the promissory note was
the non-prosecution of the criminal case for estafa. This cannot be done anymore
because the information has already been filed in court and to do it is illegal. That the
consideration for the promissory' note is the stifling of the criminal prosecution is
evident from the execution by the finance company of the. affidavit of desistance
immediately after the execution by Lolita’s parents of the promissory note. The
consideration being illegal, the promissory' note is invalid and may not be enforced by
court action.
b) Pedro promised to give his grandson a car if the latter will pass the bar
examinations. When his grandson passed the said examinations, Pedro refused to give
the car on the ground that the condition was a purely potestative one. Is he correct or
not? (2%)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
No, he is not correct. First of all, the condition is not purely potestative, because it
does not depend on the sole will of one of the parties. Secondly, even if it were, it
would be valid because it depends on the sole will of the creditor (the donee) and not of
the debtor (the donor).
XVI
In an action brought to collect a sum of money based on a surety agreement, the

defense of laches was raised as the claim was filed more than seven years from the
maturity of the obligation. However, the action was brought within the ten-year
prescriptive period provided by law wherein actions based on written contracts can be
instituted.
a) Will the defense prosper? Reason. (3%)
b) What are the essential elements of laches? (2%)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
No, the defense will not prosper. The problem did not give facts from which laches
may be inferred. Mere delay in filing an action, standing alone, does not constitute
laches [Agra v. PNB, 309 SCRA 509).
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The four basic elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant
or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complainant seeks
a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had
knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of knowledge on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit
is not held to be barred.
XVII.
In 1955, Ramon and his sister Rosario inherited a parcel of land in Albay from their
parents. Since. Rosario was gainfully employed in Manila, she left Ramon alone to
possess and cultivate the land. However. Ramon never shared the harvest with
Rosario and was even able to sell one- half of the land in 1985 by claiming to be the
sole heir of his parents. Having reached retirement age in 1990 Rosario returned to the
province and upon learning what had transpired, demanded that the remaining half of
the land be given to her as her share. Ramon opposed, asserting that he has already
acquired ownership of the land by prescription, and that Rosario is barred by laches
from demanding partition and reconveyance. Decide the conflicting claims. [5%)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
Ramon is wrong on both counts: prescription and laches. His possession as co-
owner did not give rise to acquisitive prescription. Possession by a co-owner is deemed
not adverse to the other co-owners but is, on the contrary, deemed beneficial to them
(Pangan u. CA, 166 SCRA 375). Ramon’s possession will become adverse only when
he has repudiated the co-ownership and such repudiation was made known to Rosario.
Assuming that the sale in 1985 where Ramon claimed he was the sole heir of his
parents amounted to a repudiation of the co-ownership, the prescriptive period began
to run only from that time. Not more than 30 years having lapsed since then, the claim
of Rosario has not as yet prescribed. The claim of laches is not also meritorious. Until
the repudiation of the co-ownership was made known to the other co-owners, no right
has been violated for the said co-owners to vindicate. Mere delay in vindicating the
right, standing alone, does not constitute laches.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Ramon has acquired the land by acquisitive prescription, and because of laches
on the part of Rosario. Ramon’s possession of the land was adverse because he
asserted sole ownership thereof and never shared the harvest therefrom. His adverse
possession having been continuous and uninterrupted for more than 30 years, Ramon
has acquired the land by prescription. Rosario is also guilty of laches not having
asserted her right to the harvest for more than 40 years.
A foreign munufacturer of computers and a Philippine distributor entered into a

contract whereby the distributor agreed to order 1,000 units of the manufacturer’s
computers every month and to resell them In the Philippines at the manufacturer’s
suggested prices plus 10%. All unsold units at the end of the year shall be bought back
by the manufacturer at the same price they were ordered. The manufacturer shall hold
the distributor free and harmless from any claim for defects in the units. Is the
agreement one for sale or agency? (5%)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
The contract is one of agency not sale. The notion of sale is negated by the
following indicia; (1) the price is fixed by the manufacturer with the 10% mark-up
constituting the commission; (2) the manufacturer reacquires the unsold units at
exactly the same price; and (3) warranty for the units was borne by the manufacturer.
The foregoing Indicia negate sale because they indicate that ownership over the units
was never intended to transfer to the distributor.
XIX
A leased his house to B with a condition that the leased premises shall be used for
residential purposes only. B subleased the house to C who used it as a warehouse for
fabrics. Upon learning this. A demanded that C stop using the house as a warehouse,
but C ignored the demand. A then filed an action for ejectment against C. who raised
the defense that there is no privity of contract between him and A, and that he has not
been remiss in the payment of rent. Will the action prosper? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. the action will prosper. Under Article 1651 of the Civil Code, the sublessee
is bound to the lessor for all acts which refer to the use and preservation of the thing
leased in the manner stipulated between the lessor and the lessee.
b) In 1995, Mark leased the rice land of Narding in Nueva Ecija for an annual
rental of PI ,000.00 per hectare. In 1998, due to the El Nino phenomenon, the rice
harvest fell to only 40% of the average harvest for the previous years. Mark asked
Narding for a reduction of the rental to P500.00 per hectare for that year but the latter
refused. Is Mark legally entitled to such reduction? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Mark is not entitled to a reduction. Under Article 1680 of the Civil Code, the
lessee of a rural land is entitled to a reduction of the rent only in case of loss of more
than 1/2 of the fruits through extraordinary and unforeseen fortuitous events. While the
drought brought about by the “El Nino" phenomenon may be classified as extraordinary,
it is not considered as unforeseen.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, Mark is entitled to a reduction of the rent. His loss was more than 1 /2 of the fruits
and the loss was due to an extraordinary and unforeseen fortuitous event. The “El Nino"
phenomenon is extraordinary because it is uncommon; it does not occur with regularity.
And neither could the parties have foreseen its occurrence. The event should be
foreseeable by the parties so that the lessee can change the time for his planting, or
refrain from planting, or take steps to avoid the loss. To be foreseeable, the time and
the place of the occurrence, as well as the magnitude of the adverse effects of the
fortuitous event must be capable of being predicted. Since the exact place, the exact
time, and the exact magnitude of the adverse effects of the “El Nino" phenomenon are
still unpredictable despite the advances in science, the phenomenon is considered
unforeseen.
XX
a) Silvestre leased a car from Avis-Rent-A-Car Co. at the Mactan International

Airport. No sooner had he driven the car outside the airport when, due to his
negligence, he bumped an FX taxi owned and driven by Victor, causing damage to the
latter in the amount of P 100,000.00. Victor filed an action for damages against both
Silvestre and Avis, based on quasi-delict. Avis filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
against it on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Resolve the motion. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion to dismiss should be granted. AVIS is not the employer of Silvestre;
hence, there is no right of action against AVIS under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Not
being the employer, AVIS has no duty to supervise Silvestre. Neither has AVIS the duty
to observe due diligence in the selection of its customers. Besides, it was given in the
problem that the cause of the accident was the negligence of Silvestre.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The motion should be denied. Under the Public Service Law, the registered owner
of a public utility Is liable for the damages suffered by third persons through the use of
such public utility. Hence, the cause of action is based in law, the Public Service Law.
b) Despite a warning from the police that an attempt to hijack a PAL plane will be
made in the following week, the airline did not take extra precautions, such as frisking
of passengers, for fear of being accused of violating human rights. Two days later, an
armed hijacker did attempt to hijack a PAL flight to Cebu. Although he was subdued by
the other passengers, he managed to fire a shot which hit and killed a female
passenger. The victim’s parents sued the airline for breach of contract, and the airline
raised the defense of force mqjeure. Is the airline liable or not? (2%)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
The airline Is liable. In case of death of a passenger, common carriers are

presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence (Article 1756, Civil Code). The failure of the airline to
take extra precautions despite a police warning that an attempt to hijack the plane
would be made, was negligence on the part of the airline. Being negligent, it is liable for
the death of the passenger. The defense of force mqjeure is not tenable since the
shooting incident would not have happened had the airline taken steps that could have
prevented the hijacker from boarding the plane.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Under Article 1763 of the Civil Code, the common carrier is not required to observe
extraordinaiy diligence in preventing injury to its passengers on account of the willful
acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers. The common carrier, in that
case, is required to exercise only the diligence of a good father of a family; hence, the
failure of the airline to take EXTRA precautions in filsking the passengers and by
leaving that matter to the security personnel of the airport, does not constitute a breach
of that duty so as to make the airline liable. Besides, the use of irresistible force by the
hijackers was force mqjeure that could not have been prevented even by the
observance of extraordinary diligence.
Elated that her sister who had been married for five years was pregnant for the
first time, Alma donated P100,000.00 to the unborn child. Unfortunately, the baby died
one hour after delivery. May Alma recover the P100,000.00 that she had donated to
said baby before it was bom considering that the baby died? Stated otherwise, is the
donation valid and binding? Explain. (5%)
ANSWER:
The donation is valid and binding, being an act favorable to the unborn child, but
only if the baby had an intra-uterine life of not less than seven months and provided
there was due acceptance of the donation by the proper person representing said child.
If the child had less than seven months of intra-uterine life, it is not deemed born since
it died less than 24 hours following its delivery, in which case the donation never
became effective since the donee never became a person, birth being determinative of
personality.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Even if the baby had an intra-uterine life of more than seven months and the
donation was properly accepted, it would be void for not having conformed with the
proper form. In order to be valid, the donation and acceptance of personal property
exceeding five thousand pesos should be in writing. (Article 748, par. 3)
II.
Mr. and Mrs. Cruz, who are childless, met with a serious motor vehicle accident
with Mr. Cruz at the wheel and Mrs. Cruz seated beside him, resulting in the instant
death of Mr. Cruz. Mrs. Cruz was still alive when help came but she also died on the
way to the hospital. The couple acquired properties-worth One Million (PI,000,000.00)
Pesos during their marriage, which are being claimed by the parents'of both spouses
in equal shares. Is the claim of both sets of parents valid and why? (3%)
(b) Suppose in the preceding question, both Mr. and Mrs. Cruz were already dead
when help came, so that nobody could say who died ahead of the other, would you an-
swer be the same to the question as to who are entitled to the properties of the
deceased couple? (2%)
ANSWER:
(a) No, the claim of both parents is not valid. When Mr. Cruz died, he was
succeeded by his wife and his parents as his intestate heirs who will share his estate
equally. His estate was 0.5 Million pesos which is his half share in the absolute
community amounting to 1 Million Pesos. His wife, will, therefore, inherit 0.25 Million
Pesos and his parents will inherit 0.25 Million Pesos.
When Mrs. Cruz died, she was succeeded by her parents as her intestate heirs.
They will inherit all of her estate consisting of her 0.5 Million half share in the absolute
community and her 0.25 Million inheritance from her husband, or a total of 0.750 Million
Pesos.
In sum, the parents of Mr. Cruz will inherit 250,000 Pesos while the parents of Mrs.
Cruz will inherit 750,000 Pesos.
(b) This being a case of succession, in the absence of proof as to the time of
death of each of the spouses, it is presumed they died at the same time and no
transmission of rights from one to the other is deemed to have taken place. Therefore,
each of them is deemed to have an estate valued at P500,000.00, or one-half of their
conjugal property of PI million. Their respective parents will thus inherit the entire P1
Million in equal shares, or P500,000.00 per set of parents.
III
What is the status of the following marriages and why?

(a) A marriage between two 19-year olds without parental consent. (2%)
(b) A marriage between two 21-year olds without parental advice. (2%)
(c) A marriage between two Filipino first cousins in Spain where such marriage is
valid. (2%)
(d) A marriage between two Filipinos in Hong kong before a notaiy public. (2%)
(e) A marriage solemnized by a town mayor three towns away from his jurisdiction.
(2%)
ANSWER:
(a) The marriage is voidable. The consent of the parties to the marriage was
defective. Being below 21 years old, the consent of the parties is not full without the
consent of their parents. The consent of the parents of the parties to the marriage is
indispensable for its validity.
(b) Between 21-year olds, the marriage is valid despite the absence of
parental advice, because such absence is merely an irregularity affecting a formal
requisite—i.e., the marriage license-and does not affect the validity of the marriage
itself. This is without prejudice to the civil, criminal, or administrative liability of the party
responsible therefor.
c) By reason of public policy, the marriage between Filipino first cousins is

void [Art. 38, par. (1), Family Code], and the fact that it is considered a valid marriage in
a foreign country in this case, Spain—does not validate it, being an exception to the
general rule in Art. 26 of said Code which accords validity to all marriages solemnized
outside the Philippines x x x and valid there as such.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The marriage is void. Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a marriage valid where
celebrated is valid in the Philippines except those marriages enumerated in said Article
which marriages will remain void even though valid where solemnized. The marriage
between first cousins is one of those marriages enumerated therein, hence, it is void
even though valid in Spain where it was celebrated.
By reason of Art. 15 in relation to Article 38 of the Civil Code, which applies to

Filipinos wherever they are, the marriage is void.
(d) It depends. If the marriage before the notary public is valid under Hong
kong Law, the marriage is valid in the Philippines. Otherwise, the marriage that is in-
valid in Hong kong will be invalid in the Philippines.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the two Filipinos believed in good faith that the Notary Public is authorized to
solemnize marriage, then the marriage is valid.
(e) Under the Local Government Code, a town mayor may validly solemnize a
marriage but said law is silent as to the territorial limits for the exercise by a town
mayor of such authority. However, by analogy, with the authority of members of the
judiciary to solemnize a mar riage, it would seem that the mayor did not have the
requisite authority to solemnize a marriage outside of Eva now wants to know what
action or actions she can file against Ben. She also wants to know if she can likewise
marry again. What advice can you give her? (5%)
ANSWER:
Considering that Art. 26(2nd par.) contemplates a divorce between a foreigner
and a Filipino, who had such respective nationalities at the time of their marriage, the
divorce in Europe will not capacitate the Filipino wife to remarry. The advice we can
give her is either to file a petition for legal separation, on the ground of sexual infidelity
and of contracting a bigamous marriage abroad, or to file a petition to dissolve the
conjugal partnership or absolute community of property as the case maybe.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Eva may file an action for legal separation on the grounds of sexual infidelity of
her husband and the contracting by her husband of a bigamous marriage abroad.
She may remarry. While a strict interpretation of Article 26 of the Family Code
would capacitate a Filipino spouse to remarry only when the other spouse was a
foreigner at the time of the marriage, the DOJ has issued an opinion (Opinion 134 s. of
1993) that the same injustice sought to be cured by Article 26 is present in the case of
spouses who were both Filipino at the time of the marriage but one became an alien
subsequently. Said injustice is the anomaly of Eva remaining married to her husband
who is no longer married to her. Hence, said Opinion makes Article 26 applicable to
her case and the divorce obtained abroad by her former Filipino husband would
capacitate her to remarry. To contract a subsequent marriage, all she needs to do is
present to the civil registrar the decree of divorce when she applies for a marriage
license under Article 13 of the Family Code.
his territorial jurisdiction. Hence, the marriage is void, unless it was contracted with
either or both parties believing in good faith that the mayor had the legal authority to
solemnize this particular marriage [Art. 35, par. (2), Family Code].
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The marriage is valid. Under the Local Government Code, the authority of a mayor
to solemnize marriages is not restricted within his municipality implying that he has the
authority even outside the territory thereof. Hence, the marriage he solemnized outside
his municipality is valid. And even assuming that his authority is restricted within his
municipality, such marriage will, nevertheless, be valid because solemnizing the
marriage outside said municipality is a mere irregularity applying by analogy the case of
Navarro v. Domagtoy, 259 SCRA 129. In this case, the Supreme Court held that the
celebration by a judge of a marriage outside the jurisdiction of his court is a mere
irregularity that did not affect the validity of the marriage notwithstanding Article 7 of the
Family Code which provides that an incumbent member of the judiciary is authorized to
solemnize marriages only within the court’s jurisdiction.
The marriage is void because the mayor has no authority to solemnize marriage
outside his jurisdiction.
IV.
Ben and Eva were both Filipino citizens at the time of their marriage in 1987. When
their marriage turned sour, Ben went to a small country in Europe, got himself natural-
ized there, and then divorced Eva in accordance with the law of that country. Later, he
returned to the Philippines with his new wife.
What do you understand by “presumptive legitime”, in what case or cases must

the parent deliver such legitime to the children, and what are the legal effects in each
case if the parent fails to do so? (5%)
ANSWER
Presumptive legitime is not defined in the law. Its definition must have been taken
from Act 2710, the Old Divorce Law, which required the delivery to the legitimate
children of “the equivalent of what would have been due to them as their legal portion if
said spouse had died intestate immediately after the dissolution of the community of
property.” As used in the Family Code, presumptive legitime is understood as the
equivalent of the legitimate children’s legitimes assuming that the spouses had died
immediately after the dissolution of the community of property.
Presumptive legitime is required to be delivered to the common children of the

spouses when the marriage is annulled or declared void ab initio and possibly, when
the conjugal partnership or absolute community is dissolved as in the case of legal
separation. Failure of the parents to deliver the presumptive legitime will make their
subsequent marriage null and void under Article 53 of the Family Code.
VI
(a) Two (2) months aiter the death of her husband who was shot by unknown
criminal elements on his way home from office, Rose married her childhood boyfriend,
and seven (7) months aiter said marriage, she delivered a baby. In the absence of any
evidence from Rose as to who is her child’s father, what status does the law give to
said child? Explain. (2%)
(b) Nestor is the illegitimate son of Dr. Perez. When Dr. Perez died, Nestor
intervened in the settlement of his father’s estate, claiming that he is the illegitimate son
of said deceased, but the legitimate family of Dr. Perez is denying Nestor’s claim. What
evidence or evidences should Nestor present so that he may receive his rightful share
in his father’s estate? (3%)
ANSWER:
1(a) The child is legitimate of the second marriage under Article 168(2) of the
Family Code which provides that a “child bora after one hundred eighty days following
the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived
during such marriage, even though it be bora within three hundred days after the
termination of the former marriage.”
(b) To be able to inherit, the illegitimate filiation of Nestor must have been
admitted by his father in any of the following: (1) the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, (2) a final judgment, (3) a public document signed by the father, or (4) a
private handwritten document signed by the father (Article 175 in relation to Article 172
of the Family Code).
VII
(a) Mr. Cruz, widower, has three legitimate children, A, B and C. He executed
a Will instituting as his heirs to his estate of One Million (PI,000,000.00) Pesos his two
children A and B, and his friend F. Upon his death, how should Mr. Cruz’s estate be
divided? Explain. (3%)
(b) In the preceding question, suppose Mr. Cruz in stituted his two children A
and B as his heirs in his Will, but gave a legacy of P 100,000.00 to his friend F. How
should the estate of Mr. Cruz be divided upon his death? Explain. (2%)
ANSWER:
(a) Assuming that the institution of A, B and F were to the entire estate, there
was preterition of C since C is a compulsory heir in the direct line. The preterition will
result in the total annulment of the institution of heirs. Therefore, the institution of A, B
and F will be set aside and Mr. Cruz’s estate will be divided, as in intestacy, equally
among A, B and C as follows: A - P333,333.33; B - P333,333.33; and C - P333,333.33.
(b) On the same assumption as letter (a), there was preterition of C.

Therefore, the institution of A and B is annulled but the legacy of P 100,000.00 to F
shall be respected for not being inofficious. Therefore, the remainder of P900,000.00
will be divided equally among A, B and C.
VIII.
Mr. Palma, widower, has three daughters D, D-l and D-2. He executes a Will
disinheriting D because she married a man he did not like, and instituting daughters D-
1 and D-2 as his heirs to his entire estate of P 1,000,000.00. Upon Mr. Palma's death,
how should his estate be divided? Explain. (5%)
(b.) Mr. Luna died, leaving an estate of Ten Million (P10,000,000.00) Pesos. His
widow gave birth to a child four months after Mr. Luna’s death, but the child died five
hours after birth. Two days after the child’s death, the widow of Mr. Luna also died
because she had suffered from difficult childbirth. The estate of Mr. Luna is now being
claimed by his parents, and the parents of his widow. Who is entitled to Mr. Luna’s
estate and why? (5%)
ANSWER:
This is a case of ineffective disinheritance because marrying a man that the father did
not approve of is not a ground for disinheriting D. Therefore, the institution of D-l and
D-2 shall be annulled insofar as it preju dices the legitime of D, and the institution of D-
1 and D- 2 shall only apply on the free portion in the amount of P500.000.00.
Therefore, D, D-l and D-2 will get their legitimes of P500,000.00 divided into three
equal parts and D-l and D-2 will get a reduced testamentary disposition. of
P250,000.00 each. Kence, the shares will be:
D - P166,666.66
D-l - P166.666.66 + P250,000.00
D-2 - P16’6,666.66 + P250.000.00
(b.) Half of the estate of Mr. Luna will go to the parents of Mrs. Luna as their
inheritance from Mrs. Luna, while the other half will be inherited by the parents of Mr.
Luna as the reservatarios of the reserved property inherited by Mrs. Luna from her
child.
When Mr. Luna died, his heirs were his wife and the unborn child. The unborn child
inherited because the inheritance was favorable to it and it was born alive later though
it lived only for five hours. Mrs. Luna inherited half of the 10 Million estate while the
unborn child inherited the other half. When the child died, it was survived by its mother,
Mrs. Luna. As the only heir, Mrs. Luna inherited, by operation of law, the estate of the
child consisting of its 5 Million inheritance from Mr. Luna. In the hands of Mrs. Luna,
what she inherited from her child was subject to reserva troncal for the benefit of the
relatives of the child within the third degree of consanguinity and who belong to the
family of Mr. Luna, the line where the property came from.
When Mrs. Luna died, she was survived by her parents as her only heirs. Her
parents will inherit her estate consisting of the 5 Million she inherited from Mr. Luna.
The other 5 Million she inherited from her child will be delivered to the parents of Mr.
Luna as beneficiaries of the reserved property. In sum, 5 Million Pesos of Mr. Luna’s
estate will go to the parents of Mrs. Luna, while the other 5 Million Pesos will go to the
parents of Mr. Luna as reservatarios.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the child had an intra-uterine life of not less than 7 months, it inherited from the
father. In which case, the estate of 10M will be divided equally between the child and
the widow as legal heirs. Upon the death of the child, its share of 5M shall go by
operation of law to the mother, which shall be subject to reserva troncal. Under Art.
891, the reserva is in favor of relatives belonging to the paternal line and who are within
3 degrees from the child. The parents of Mr. Luna are entitled to the reserved portion
which i3 5M as they are 2 degrees related from child. The 5M inherited by Mrs. Luna
from Mr. Luna will be inherited from her by her parents.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the child had an intra-uterine life of not less than 7 months, it inherited from the
father. In which case, the estate of 10M will be divided equally between the child and
the widow as legal heirs. Upon the death of the child, its share of 5M shall go by
operation of law to the mother, which shall be subject to reserva troncal. Under Art.
891, the reserva is in favor of relatives belonging to the paternal line and who are within
3 degrees from the child. The parents of Mr. Luna are entitled to the reserved portion
which i3 5M as they are 2 degrees related from child. The 5M inherited by Mrs. Luna
from Mr. Luna will be inherited from her by her parents.
However, if the child had intra-uterine life of less than 7 months, half of the estate
of Mr. Luna, or 5M, will be inherited by the widow (Mrs. Luna), while the other half, or
5M, will be inherited by the parents of Mr. Luna. Upon the death of Mrs. Luna, her
estate of 5M will be inherited by her own parents.
IX.
(a) Because of confusion as to the boundaries of the adjoining lots that they
bought from the same subdivision company, X constructed a house on the adjoining lot
of Y in the honest belief that it is the land that he bought from the subdivision company.
What are the respective rights of X and Y with respect to X’s house? (3%).
(b) Suppose X was in good faith but Y knew that X was constructing on his
(Y’s) land but simply kept quiet about it, thinking perhaps that he could get X’s house
later. What are the respective rights of the parties over X’s house in this case? 12%)
ANSWER:
(a)The rights of Y, as owner of the lot, and of X, as builder of a house thereon, are
governed by Art. 448 of the Civil Code which grants to Y the right to choose between
two remedies: (a) appropriate the house by indemnifying X for its value plus whatever
necessary expenses the latter may have incurred for the preservation of the land, or (b)
compel X to buy the land if the price of the land is not considerably more than the value
of the house. If it is, then X cannot be obliged to buy the land but he shall pay
reasonable rent, and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms of the lease.
(b) Since the lot owner Y is deemed to be in bad faith (Art. 453), X as the
party in good faith may (a) remove the house and demand indemnification for damages
suffered by him, or (b) demand payment of the value of the house plus reparation for
damages (Art. 447, in relation to Art. 454). Y continues as owner of the lot and
becomes, under the second option, owner of the house as well, after he pays the sums
demanded.
The spouses X and Y mortgaged a piece of registered land to A, delivering as well

the OCT to the latter, but they continued to possess and cultivate the land, giving 1/2 of
each harvest to A in partial payment of their loan to the latter. A, however, without the
knowledge of X and Y, forged a deed of sale of the aforesaid land in favor of himself,
got a TCT in his name, and then sold the land to B, who bought the land relying on A’s
title, and who thereafter also got a TCT in his name. It was only then that the spouses X
and Y learned that their land had been titled in B’s name. May said spouses file an
action for reconveyance of the land in question against b? Reason. (5%)
ANSWER:
The action of X and Y against B for reconveyance of the land will not prosper
because B has acquired a clean title to the property being an innocent purchaser for
value.
A forged deed is an absolute nullity and conveys no title. The fact that the forged
deed was registered and a certificate of title was issued in his name, did not operate to
vest upon A ownership over the property of X and Y. The registration of the forged
deed will not cure the infirmity. However, once the title to the land is registered in the
name of the forger and title to the land thereafter falls into the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value, the latter acquires a clean title thereto. A buyer of a registered
land is not required to explore beyond what the record in the registry indicates on its
face in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right which may subsequently defeat his
right thereto. This is the “mirror principle” of the Torrens system which makes it pos-
sible for a forged deed to be the root of a good title.
Besides, it appears that spouses X and Y are guilty of contributory negligence
when they delivered this OCT to the mortgagee without annotating the mortgage
thereon. Between them and the innocent purchaser for value, they should bear the
loss.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the buyer B, who relied on the seller A’s title, was not aware of the adverse
possession of the land by the spouses X and Y, then the latter cannot recover the
property from B. B has in his favor the presumption of good faith which can only be
overthrown by adequate proof of bad faith. However, nobody buys land without seeing
the property, hence, B could not have been unaware of such adverse possession. If
after learning of such possession, B simply closed his eyes and did nothing about it,
then the suit for reconveyance will prosper as the buyer’s bad faith will have become
evident.
XI
In 1997, Manuel bound himself to sell Eva a house and lot which is being rented by
another person, if Eva passes the 1998 bar examinations. Luckily for Eva, she passed
said examinations.
(a) Suppose Manuel had sold the same house and lot to another before Eva
passed the 1998 bar examinations, is such sale valid? Why? (2%)
(b) Assuming that it is Eva who is entitled to buy said house and lot, is she entitled
to the rentals collected by Manuel before she passed the 1998 bar examinations?
Why? (3%)
ANSWER:
(a) Yes, the sale to the other person is valid as a sale with a resolutory condition
because what operates as a suspensive condition for Eva operates a resolutory
condition for the buyer.
FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, the sale to the other person is valid. However, the buyer acquired the property
subject to a resolutory condition of Eva passing the 1998 Bar Examinations. Hence,
upon Eva’s passing the Bar, the rights of the other buyer terminated and Eva acquired
ownership of the property.
SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The sale to another person before Eva could buy it from Manuel is valid, as the
contract between Manuel and Eva is a mere promise to sell and Eva has not acquired a
real right over the land assuming that there is a price stipulated in the contract for the
contract to be considered a sale and there was delivery or tradition of the thing sold.
(a) No, she is not entitled to the rentals collected by Manuel because at the time
they accrued and were collected, Eva was not yet the owner of the property.
Assuming that Eva is the one entitled to buy the house and lot, she is not entitled
to the rentals collected by Manuel before she passed the bar examinations. Whether it
is a contract of sale or a contract to sell, reciprocal prestations are deemed imposed A
for the seller to deliver the object sold and for the buyer to pay the price. Before the
happening of the condition, the fruits of the thing and the interests on the money are
deemed to have been mutually compensated under Article 1187.

Under Art. 1164, there is no obligation on the part of Manuel to deliver the fruits
(rentals) of the thing until the obligation to deliver the thing arises. As the suspensive
condition has not been fulfilled, the obligation to sell does not arise.
XII
In 1950, the Bureau of Lands issued a Homestead patent to A. Three years later,
A sold the homestead to B. A died in 1990, and his heirs filed an action to recover the
homestead from B cn the ground that its sale by their father to the latter is void under
Section 118 of the Public Land Law. B contends, however, that the heirs of A cannot
recover the homestead from him anymore because their action has prescribed and that
furthermore, A was in pan delicto. Decide. (5%)
ANSWER;
The sale of the land by A to B 3 years after issuance of the homestead patent,
being in violation of Section 118 of the Public Land Act, is void from its inception.
The action filed by the heirs of B to declare the nullity or inexistence of the contract and
to recover the land should be given due course.
B’s defense of prescription is untenable because an action which seeks to declare

the nullity or inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. (Article 1410; Banaga vs.
Soler, 2 SCRA 755)
On the other hand, B’s defense of pari delicto is equally untenable. While as a
rule, parties who are in pari delicto have no recourse against each other on the
principle that a transgressor cannot profit from his own wrongdoing, such rule does not
apply to violations of Section 118 of the Public Land Act because of the underlying
public policy in the said Act “to conserve the land which a homesteader has acquired
by gratuitous grant from the government for himself and his family”. In keeping with this
policy, it has been held that one who purchases a homestead within the five-year
prohibitory period can only recover the price which he has paid by filing a claim against
the estate of the deceased seller (Labrador vs. Delos Santos 66 Phil. 579) under the
principle that no one shall enrich himself at the expense of another. Applying the pari
delicto rule to violation of Section 118 of the Public Land Act, the Court of Appeals has
ruled that “the homesteader suffers the loss of the fruits realized by the vendee who in
turn forfeits the improvement that he has introduced into the land.” (Obot vs.
Sandadillas, 62 OG, April 25, 1966)
The action to declare the nullity of the sale did not prescribe (Art. 1410), such sale
being one expressly prohibited and declared void by the Public Lands Act [Art. 1409,
par. (7)]. The prohibition of the law is clearly for the protection of the heirs of A such
that their recovering the property would enhance the public policy regarding ownership
of lands acquired by homestead patent (Art. 1416). The defense of pari delicto is not
applicable either, since the law itself allows the homesteader to reacquire the land even
if it has been sold.
Prescription does not arise with respect to actions to declare a void contract a
nullity (Article 1410). Neither is the doctrine of pari delicto applicable because of public
policy. The law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff so as to enhance the public
policy of the Public Land Act to give land to the landless.
If the heirs are not allowed to recover, it could be on the ground of laches
inasmuch as 40 years had elapsed and the owner had not brought any action against B
especially if the latter had improved the land. It would be detrimental to B if the plaintiff
is allowed to recover.
XIII.
What are the so-called “Maceda” and “Recto” laws in connection with sales on
installments? Give the most important features of each law. (5%)
ANSWER:
The Maceda Law (R.A. 655) is applicable to sales of immovable property on

installments. The most important features are(Rillo v. CA, 247 SCRA 461):
(1) After having paid installments for at least two years, the buyer is entitled to a
mandatory grace period of one month for every year of installment payments ntade, to
pay the unpaid installments without interest.
If the contract is cancelled, the seller shall refund to the buyer the cash surrender
value equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of the total payments made, and after five years
of installments, an additional five percent (5%) every year but not to exceed ninety
percent (90%) of the total payments made.
(2) In case the installments paid were less than 2 years, the seller shall give the
buyer a grace period of not less than 60 days. If the buyer fails to pay the installments
due at the expiration of the grace period, the seller may cancel the contract after 30
days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or demand for rescission by
notarial act.
The Recto Law (Art. 1484) refers to sale of movables payable in installments and
limiting the right of seller, in case of default by the buyer, to one of three remedies:
(a) exact fulfillment;
(b) cancel the sale if two or more installments have not been paid;
(c) foreclose the chattel mortgage on the things sold, also in case of default of two
or more installments, with no further action against the purchaser.
XIV.
(a) May a lessee sublease the property leased without the consent of the lessor,
and what are the respective liabilities of the lessee and sub-lessee to the lessor in case
of such sublease? (3%)
(b) Under what circumstances would an implied new lease oi a tacita

reconduccion arise? (2%)
ANSWER:
(a) Yes, provided that there is no express prohibition against subleasing. Under
the law, when in the contract of'Iease of things there is no express prohibition, the
lessee may sublet the thing leased without prejudice to his responsibility for the
performance of the contract toward the lessor. (Art. 1650)
In case there is a sublease of the premises being leased, the sublessee is bound
to the lessor for all the acts which refer to the use and preservation of the thing leased
in the manner stipulated between the lessor and the lessee. (Art. 1651)
The sublessee is subsidiarily liable to the lessor for any rent due from the lessee.
However, the sublessee shall not be responsible beyond the amount of the rent due
from him. (Art. 1652)
As to the lessee, the latter shall still be responsible to the lessor for the rents;
bring to the knowledge of jthe lessor every usurpation or untoward act which any third
person may have committed or may be openly preparing to carry out upon the thing
leased; advise the owner the need for all repairs; to return the thing leased upon the
termination of the lease just as he received it, save what has been lost or impaired by
the lapse of time or by ordinary wear and tear or from an inevitable cause; respon-
sible for the deterioration or loss of the thing leased, unless he proves that it took place
without his fault.
(b) An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion arises if at the end of the
contract the lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for 15 days with the ac-
quiescence of the lessor, and unless a notice to the contrary by either parties has
previously been given (Art. 1670). In short, in order that there may be tacita
reconduccion there must be expiration of the contract; there must be continuation of
possession for 15 days or more; and there must be no prior demand to vacate.
XV.
(a) X appoints Y as his agent to sell his products in Cebu City. Can Y
appoint a sub-agent and if he does, what are the effects of such appointment? (5%)
(b) A granted B the exclusive right to sell his brand of Maong pants in
Isabela, the price for his merchandise payable within 60 days from delivery, and
promising B a commission of 20% on all sales. After the delivery of the merchandise to
B but before he could sell any of them, BOs store in Isabela was completely burned
without his fault, together with all of A’s pants. Must B pay A for his lost pants? Why?
(5%)
ANSWER:
a. Yes, the agent may appoint a substitute or subagent if the principal has not
prohibited him from doing so, but he shall be responsible for the acts of the substitute:
(1) when he was not given the power to appoint one;
(2) when he was given such power, but without designating the person, and
the person appointed was notoriously incompetent or insolvent.
(a) The contract between A and B is a sale not an agency to sell because the
price is payable by B upon 60 days from delivery even if B is unable to resell it. If B
were an agent, he is not bound to pay the price if he is unable to resell it.
As a buyer, ownership passed to B upon delivery and, under Art. 1504 of the Civil
Code, the thing perishes for the owner. Hence, B must still pay the price.
XVI.
(a) Distinguish a contract of chattel mortgage from a contract of pledge. (2%)
(b) Are the right of redemption and the equity of redemption given by law to a
mortgagor the same? Explain. (2%)
(c) X borrowed money from Y and gave a piece of land as security by way of
mortgage. It was expressly agreed between the parties in the mortgage contract that
upon nonpayment of the debt on time by X, the mortgaged land would already belong
to Y. If X defaulted in paying, would Y now become the owner of the mortgaged land?
Why?. (3%)
(d) Suppose in the preceding question, the agreement between X and Y was that
if X failed to pay the mortgage debt on time, the debt shall be paid with the land
mortgaged by X to Y. Would your answer be the same as in the preceding question?
Explain. (3%)
ANSWER:
(a) In a contract of chattel mortgage possession belongs to the creditor,

while in a contract of pledge possession belongs to the debtor.
A chattel mortgage is a formal contract while a pledge is a real contract.
A contract of chattel mortgage must be recorded in a public instrument to bind

third persons while a contract of pledge must be in a public instrument containing
description of the thing pledged and the date thereof to bind third persons.
(b) The equity of redemption is different from the right of redemption. Equity
of redemption is the right of the mortgagor after judgment in a judicial foreclosure to
redeem the property by paying to the court the amount of the judgment debt before the
sale or confirmation of the sale. On the other hand, right of redemption is the right of
the mortgagor to redeem the property sold at an extra-judicial foreclosure by paying to
the buyer in the foreclosure sale the amount paid by the buyer within one year from
such sale.
(c) No, Y would not become the owner of the land. The stipulation is in the
nature of pactum commissorium which is is prohibited by law. The property should
be sold at public auction and the proceeds thereof applied to the indebtedness. Any
excess shall be given to the mortgagor.
(d) No, the answer would not be the same. This is a valid stipulation and does
not constitute pactum commissorium. In pactum commissorium, the acquisition is
automatic without need of any further action. In the instant problem another act is
required to be performed, namely, the conveyance of the property as payment (dacion
en pago).
Juan is a Filipino citizen residing in Tokyo. Japan. State what laws govern:
1. His capacity to contract marriage in Japan. [ 1%)
His successional rights as regards his deceased Filipino father's property in

2.
Texas, U.SA [1%]
3. The extrinsic validity of the last will and testament which Juan executed while
sojourning in Switzerland. [2%]
4. The intrinsic validity of said will. [1%]
Answer
1. Juan's capacity to contract marriage la governed by Philippine law - i.e.,

the Family Code - pursuant to Art. 15, Civil Code, which provides that our laws relating
to, among others, legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines
even though living abroad.
Answer
2. By way of exception to the general rule of lex rel sitae prescribed by the
first paragraph of Art. 16, Civil Code, a person's successional rights are governed by
the national law of the decedent (2nd par.. Art. 16). Since Juan's deceased father was
a Filipino citizen, Philippine law governs Juan's successional rights.
Another Answer:
2. Juan's successional rights are governed by Philippine law, pursuant to Article

1039 and the second paragraph of Article 16, both of the Civil Code. Article 1039, Civil
Code, provides that capacity to succeed shall be governed by the “law of the nation" of
the decedent,
i. e.. his national law. Article 16 provides in paragraph
two that the amount of successional rights, order of succession, and intrinsic
validity of testamentary succession shall be governed by the “national law" of
the decedent who Is identified as a Filipino in the present problem.
Answer:
3. The extrinsic validity of Juan's will Is governed by (a) Swiss law, it being
the law where the will was made (Art. 17, 1st par. Civil Code), or (b) Philippine
law, by implication from the provisions of Art. 816, Civil Code, which allows even
an alien who is abroad to make a will in conformity with our Civil Code.
Answer
The intrinsic validity of his will is governed by Philippine law, it being his
4.
national law. (Art. 16, Civil Code)
II.
Francis Albert, a citizen and resident of New Jersey. U.S.A., under whose law he
was still a minor, being only 20 years of age, was hired by ABC Corporation of Manila
to serve for two years as its chief computer programmer. But after serving for only four
months, he resigned to join XYZ Corporation, which enticed him by offering more
advantageous terms. His first employer sues him in Manila for damages arising from
the breach of his contract of employment. He sets up his minority as a defense and
asks for annulment of the contract on that ground. The plaintiff disputes this by alleging
that since the contract was executed in the Philippines under whose law the age of
majority is 18 years, he was no longer a minor at the time of perfection of the contract.
1. Will the suit prosper? (3%)
2. Suppose XYZ Corporation is impleaded as a codefendant. what would be the

basis of its liability, if any? [2%]
Answers
1. The suit will not prosper under Article 15, Civil Code. New Jersey law
governs Francis Albert's capacity to act, being his personal law from the
standpoint of both his nationality and his domicile. He was, therefore, a minor at
the time he entered Into the contract.
Alternative answer:
1. The suit will not prosper. Being a U.S. national, Albert's capacity to enter
into a contract is determined by the law of the State of which he Is a national,
under which he is still a minor. This is in connection with Article 15 of the Civil
Code which embodies the said nationality principle of lex patriae. While this
principle intended to apply to Filipino citizens under that provision, the Supreme
Court in Recto v. Harden is of the view that the status or capacity of foreigners is
to be determined on the basis of the same provision or principle, i.e., by U.S. law
in the present problem.
Plaintiffs argument does not hold true, because status or capacity is not
determined by lex loci contractus but by lex patriae.
Another Answer;
1. Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the forms and solemnities
of contracts, wills and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of
the country in which they are executed.
Since the contract of employment was executed in Manila, Philippine law
should govern. Being over 18 years old and no longer a minor according to
Philippine Law, Francis Albert can be sued. Thus, the suit oi ABC Corporation
against him for damages will prosper.
Answer:
2. XYZ Corporation, having enticed Francis Albert to break his contract
with the plaintiff, may be held liable for damages under Art. 1314, Civil Code.
Alternative Answer;
2. The basis of liability of XYZ Corporation would be Article 28 of the Civil
Code which states that:
“Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial, or industrial enterprises or

in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any
other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of
action by the person who thereby suffers damage."
Another Answer:
1. No liability arises. The statement of the problem does not in any way
suggest intent, malice, or even knowledge, on the part of XYZ Corporation as to
the contractual relations between Albert and ABC Corporation.
III
Jaime, who is 65, and his son, Willy, who is 25, died in a plane crash. There is no
proof as to who died first. Jaime’s only surviving heir is his wife, Julia, who is also
Willy’s mother. Willy's surviving heirs are his mother, Julia and his wife, Wilma.
1. In the settlement of Jaime’s estate, can Wilma successfully claim that her late
husband, Willy had a hereditary share since he was much younger than his father and,
therefore, should be presumed to have survived longer? [3%]
2. Suppose Jaime had a life insurance policy with his wife, Julia, and his son, Willy,
as the beneficiaries. Can Wilma successfully claim that one-half of the proceeds should
belong to Willy’s estate? [2%]
Answer;
1. No, Wilma cannot successfully claim that Willy had a hereditary share in
his father's estate. Under Art. 43, Civil Code, two persons “who are celled to
succeed each other" are presumed to have died at the same time, in the absence
of proof as to which of them died first. This presumption of simultaneous death
applies in cases involving the question of succession as between the two who
died, who in this case are mutual heirs, being father and son.
Answer:
1. Yes, Wilma can invoke the presumption of survivorship and claim that
one-half of the proceeds should belong to Willy’s estate, under Sec. 3 (jj) par. 5
Rule 131, Rules of Court, as the dispute does not involve succession. Under this
presumption, the person between the ages of 15 and 60 years is deemed to have
survived one whose age was over 60 at the time of their deaths. The estate of
Willy endowed with juridical personality stands in place and stead of Willy, as
beneficiary.
IV
Using a falsified manager’s check. Justine, as the buyer, was able to take delivery
of a second hand car which she had Just bought from United Car Sales, Inc. The sale
was registered with the Land Transportation Office. A week later, the seller learned
that the check had been dishonored, but by that time, Justine was nowhere to be
seen. It turned out that Justine had sold the car to Jerico, the present possessor who
knew nothing about the falsified check. In a suit by United Car Sales, Inc. against
Jerico for recovery of the car. plaintiff alleges it had been unlawfully deprived of its
property through fraud and should, consequently, be allowed to recover it without
having to reimburse the defendant for the price the latter had paid. Should the suit
prosper? (5%)
Answer
The suit should prosper as to the recovery of the car. However, since Jerico
was not guilty of any fraud and appears to be an Innocent purchaser for value,
he should be reimbursed for the price he paid. This Is without prejudice to United
Car Sales, Inc. right of action against Justine. As between two innocent parties,
the party causing the Injury should suffer the loss. Therefore, United Car Sales,
Inc. should suffer the loss.
Alternative Answer:
Yes, the suit will prosper because the criminal act of estafa should be
deemed to come within the meaning of unlawful deprivation under Art. 559, Civil
Code, as without it plaintiff would not have parted with the possession of its car.
Another Answer:
No, the suit will not prosper. The sale is valid and Jerico is a buyer in good faith.
Another Answer:
Under the law on Sales, when the thing sold is delivered by the seller to the buyer
without reservation of ownership, the ownership is transferred to the buyer. Therefore in
the suit of United Car Sales, Inc. against Jerico for the recovery of the car, the plaintiff
should not be allowed to recover the car without reimbursing the defendant for the price
that the latter paid. (EDCA Publishing and Distributing Corp. vs. Santos. 184 SCRA
614, April 26, 1990)
V
In 1973, Mauricio, a Filipino pensioner of the U.S. Government, contracted a
bigamous marriage with Erlinda, despite the fact that his first wife, Carol, was still
living. In 1975, Mauricio and Erlinda jointly bought a parcel of riceland, with the
title being placed jointly in their names. Shortly thereafter, they purchased
another property (a house and lot) which was placed in her name alone as the
buyer. In 1981. Mauricio died, and Carol promptly filed an action against Erlinda
to recover both the riceland and the house and lot. claiming them to be conjugal
property of the first marriage. Erlinda contends that she and the late Mauricio
were co- owners of the riceland; and with respect to the house and lot. she
claims she is the exclusive owner. Assuming she fails to prove that she had
actually used her own money in either purchase, how do you decide the case?
[5%)
Answer:
Carol's action to recover both the riceland and the house and lot is well-founded. Both
are conjugal property, in view of the failure of Erlinda, the wife in a bigamous marriage,
to prove that her own money was used in the purchases made. The Supreme Court in a
case applied Art. 148, Family Code, despite the fact that the husband's death took
place prior to the effectivity of said law. However, even under Art. 144, Civil Code, the
same conclusion would have been reached in view of the bigamous nature of the
second marriage.
Another Answer:
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, only
the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common In proportion to their
respective contributions. Moreover, if one of the parties is validly married to another,
his share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community/conjugal
partnership existing in such valid marriage.
Thus, in this case, since Erlinda failed to prove that she used her own money to
buy the riceland and house and lot, she cannot claim to be the co-owner of the
riceland nor the exclusive owner of the house and lot. Such properties are Mauriclo's.
And since his share accrues to the conjugal partnership with Carol, Carol can validly
claim such properties to the exclusion of Erlinda. (Art. 144, Civil Code).
VI.
In 1970. Bob and Issa got married without executing a marriage settlement.
In 1975, Bob Inherited from his father a residential lot upon which, in 1981, he
constructed a two- room bungalow with savings from his own earnings. At that
time, the lot was worth P800.000.00 while the house, when finished cost
P600.000.00. In 1989, Bob died, survived only by his wife, Issa and his mother,
Sofia. Assuming that the relative values of both assets remained at the same
proportion:
1. State whether Sofia can rightfully claim that the house and lot are
not conjugal but exclusive property of her deceased son. {3%}
2. Will your answer be the same if Bob died before August 3, 1988?
[2%]
•The original name printed in the question appears as "Issa". however, it was
corrected to read as Sofia, which correction was announced in all the examination
rooms.
Another Answer:
1. Since Bob and Sofia got married in 1970, then the law that governs is the New
Civil Code (Persons), in which case, the property relations that should be applied at
regards the property of the spouses is the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains (Article 1.19, Civil Code). By conjugal partnership of gains, the
husband and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and
the income from their work or industry (Article 142, Civil Code). In this instance, the lot
inherited by Bob in 1975 is his own separate property, he having acquired the same by
lucrative title (par. 2, Art. 148, Civ1! Code). However, the house constructed fro... his
own savings in 1981 during the subsistence of his marriage with Issa is conjugal
property and not exclusive property in accordance with the principle of “reverse
accession” provided for in Art. 158, Civil Code.
Another Answer:
1. Sofia, being her deceased son's legal heir concurring with his surviving spouse
(Arts. 985, 986 and 997, Civil Code), may rightfully claim that the house and lot are not
conjugal but belong to the hereditary estate of Bob. the value of the land being more
than the cost of the improvement (Art. 120, Family Code).
Answer:
2. Yes, the answer would still be the same. Since Bob and Issa contracted their
marriage way back in 1970, then the property relations that will govern is still the
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains (Article 119, Civil Code). It will not
matter if Bob died before or after August 3, 1988 (effectivity date of the Family Code),
what matters is the date when the marriage was contracted. As Bob and Issa
contracted their marriage way back in 1970, the property relation that governs them is
still the conjugal partnership of gains. (Art. 158, Civil Code)
Another Answer:
2. If Bob died before August 3. 1988, which is the date the Family Code took
effect, the answer will not be the same. Art. 158, Civil Code, would then apply. The land
would then be deemed conjugal, along with the house, since conjugal funds were used
In constructing it. The husband's estate would be entitled to a reimbursement of the
value of the land from conjugal partnership funds.
VII
Juan and his sister Juana inherited from their mother two parcels of farmland with
exactly the same areas. For convenience, the Torrens certificates of title covering both
lots were placed in Juan’s name alone. In 1996, Juan sold to an innocent purchaser
one parcel in its entirety without the knowledge and consent of Juana, and wrongfully
kept for himself the entire price paid.
1. What rights of action, if any, does Juana have against and/or the buyer? (3%]
2. Since the two lots have the same area, suppose Juana files a complaint to have
herself declared sole'-owner of the entire remaining second lot. contending that her
brother had forfeited his share thereof by wrongfully disposing of her undivided share in
the first lot, will the suit prosper? (2%)
1. When, for convenience, the Toxrens title to the two parcels of land were
placed in Juan's name alone, there was created an implied trust (a resulting trust) for
the benefit of Juana with Juan as trustee of one-half undivided or ideal portion of each
of the two lots. Therefore, Juana can file an action for damages against Juan for having
fraudulently sold one of'the two parcels which he partly held in trust for Juana's benefit.
Juana may claim actual or compensatory damage for the loss of her share in the land;
moral damages for the mental anguish, anxiety, moral shock and wounded feelings she
had suffered; exemplary damage fey way of example for the common good, and
attorney’s fees.
Juana has no cause of action against the buyer who acquired the land for value and in
good faith, relying on the transfer certificate of title showing that Juan is the registered
owner of the land.
Another Answer:
1. Under Article 476 of the Civil Code, Juana can file an action for quieting of title
as there is a cloud in the title to the subject real property. Second, Juana can also file
an action for damages against Juan, because the settled rule is that the proper
recourse of the true owner of the property who was prejudiced and fraudulently
dispossessed of the same is to bring an action for damages against those who caused
or employed the same. Third, since Juana had the right to her share in the property by
way of Inheritance, she can demand the partition of the thing owned in common, under
Article 494 of the Civil Code, and ask that the title to the remaining property be
declared as ezclusively hers.
However, since the farmland was sold to an innocent purchaser for value, then
Juana has no cause of action against the buyer consistent with the established rule
that the rights of an innocent purchaser for value must be respected and protected
notwithstanding the fraud employed by the seller in securing his title. (Eduorte vs. CA,
253 SCRA 391)
Additional Answer:
1. Juana has the right of action to recover (a) her one-half share in the proceeds
of the sale with legal interest thereof, and (b) such damages as she maybe able to
prove as having been suffered by her, which may include actual or compensatory
damages as well as moral and exemplary damages due to the breach of trust and bad
faith (Imperial vs. CA, 259 SCRA65). Of course, if the buyer knew of the co-ownership
over the lot he was buying, Juana can seek (c) reconvenyance of her one-half share
instead but she must implead the buyer as codefendant and allege his bad faith in
purchasing the entire lot. Finally, consistent with the ruling in Imperial vs. CA, Juana
may seek instead (d) a declaration that she is now the sole owner of the entire
remaining lot on the theory that Juan has forfeited his one-half share therein.
Additional Answer:
1. Juana can file an action for damages against Juan for having fraudulently
sold one of the two parcels which he partly held in trust for Juana's benefit. Juana may
claim actual or compensatory damage for the loss of her share in the land; moral
damages for the mental anguish, anxiety, moral shock and wounded feelings she had
suffered; exemplary damage by way of example for the common good, and attorney's
fees.
Juana has no cause of action against the buyer who acquired the land for value
and in good faith, relying on the transfer certificate showing that Juan is the registered
owner of the land.
Answer:
1. Juana's suit to have herself declared as sole owner of the entire remaining area
will not prosper because while Juan's act in selling the other lot was wrongful, it did not
have the legal effect of forfeiting his share In the remaining lot. However, Juana can file
an action against Juan for partition or termination of the co-ownership with a prayer that
the lot sold be adjudicated to Juan, and the remaining lot be adjudicated and
reconveyed to her.
Another Answen
2. The suit will prosper, applying the ruling in Imperial vs. CA cited above. Both
law and equity authorize such a result, said the Supreme Court.
Strictly speaking, Juana's contention that her brother had forfeited his share in the
second lot is incorrect. Even if the two lots have the same area, it does not follow that
they have the same value. Since the sale of the first lot on the Torrens title in the name
of Juan was valid, all that Juana may recover is the value of her undivided interest
therein, plus damages. In addition, she can ask for partition or reconveyance of her
undivided interest in the second lot, without prejudice to any agreement between them
that in lieu of the payment of the value of Juana's share in the first lot and damages, the
second lot be reconveyed to her.
Alternative Answer:
2. The suit will not prosper, since Juan's wrongful act of pocketing the
entire proceeds of the sale of the first lot is not a ground for divesting him of his
rights as a co- owner of the second lot. Indeed, such wrongdoing by Juan does
not constitute, for the benefit of Juana, any of the modes of acquiring ownership
under Art. 712, Civil Code.
VIII
On July 27, 1997, Pedro mailed in Manila a letter to his brother, Jose, a resident of
Iloilo City, offering to donate a vintage sports car which the latter had long been
wanting to buy from the former. On August 5, 1997, Jose called Pedro by cellular
phone to thank him for his generosity and to inform him that he was sending by mail his
letter of acceptance. Pedro never received that letter because it was never mailed.
OnAugust 14. 1997, Pedro received a telegram from Iloilo informing him that Jose had
been killed in a road accident the day before (August 13, 1997)
1. Is there a perfected donation? (2%]
2. Will your answer be the same if Jose did mail his acceptance letter but it was
received by Pedro in Manila days after Jose’s death? [3%)
Answer
1. None. There is no perfected donation. Under Article 748 of the Civil Code, the
donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing. If the value of the personal
property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall
be made in writing. Assuming that the value of the thing donated, a vintage sports car,
exceeds P5.000.00, then the donation and the acceptance must be in writing. In this
instance, the acceptance of Jose was not in writing, therefore, the donation is void.
Upon the other hand, assuming that the sports car costs less than P5.000.00, then the
donation may be oral, but still, the simultaneous delivery of the car is needed and there
being none, the donation was never perfected.
Answer
1. Yes, the answer is the same. If Jose's mail containing his acceptance of
the donation was received by Pedro after the former's death, then the donation
Is still void because under Article 734 of the Civil Code, the donation is
perfected the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. The
death of Jose before Pedro could receive the acceptance indicates that the
donation was never perfected. Under Article 746 acceptance must be made
during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee.
IX.
Ernesto donated in a public instrument a parcel of land to Demetrio. who accepted

it in the same document. It Is there declared that the donation shall take effect
immediately, with the donee having the right to take possession of the land and
receive its fruits but not to dispose of the land while Emesto is alive as well as for ten
years following his death. Moreover. Emesto also reserved In the same deed his right
to sell the property should he decide to dispose of it at any time - a right which he did
not exercise at all. After his death, Ernesto’s heirs seasonably brought an action to
recover the property, alleging that the donation was void as it did not comply with the
formalities of a will. Will the suit prosper? [5%]
Answer:
Yes, the suit will prosper as the donation did not comply with the formalities
of a will. In this instance, the fact that the donor did not intend to transfer
ownership or possession of the donated property to the donee until the donor's
death, would result in a donation mortis causa and in this kind of disposition, the
formalities of a will should be complied with, otherwise, the donation is void. In
this instance, donation mortis causa embodied only in a public instrument
without the formalities of a will could not have transferred ownership of
disputed property to another.
Alternative Answer:
One of the essential distinctions between a donation inter tdvos and a donation
mortis causa is that while the former is irrevocable, the latter is revocable. In the
problem given, all the clauses or conditions mentioned in the deed of donation, except
one, are consistent with the rule of Irrevocability and would have sustained the view
that the donation is inter vivos and therefore valid. The lone exception is the clause
which reserves the donor's right to sell the property at any time before his death. Such
a reservation has been held tp render the donation revocable and, therefore, becomes
a donation mortis causa (Puig vs. Penaflorida, 15 SCRA 276, at p. 286). That the
right was not exercised is immaterial; its reservation was an implied recognition of the
donor's power to nullify the donation anytime he wished to do so. Consequently, it
should have been embodied in a last will and testament. The suit for nullity will thus
prosper.
X.
In a 20-year lease contract over a building, the lessee is expressly granted a right
of first refusal should the lessor decide to sell both the land and building. However, the
lessor sold the property to a third person who knew about the lease and in fact agreed
fo respect it. Consequently, the lessee brings an action against both the lessor-seller
and the buyer
(a) to rescind the sale and (b) to compel specific performance of his right of first refusal
in the sense that the lessor should be ordered to execute a deed of absolute sale
in.favor of the lessee at the same price. The defendants contend that the plaintiff can
neither seek rescission of the sale nor compel specific performance of a “mere" right of
first refusal. Decide the case. [5%1
Answer:
The action filed by the lessee, for both rescission of the offending sale and specific
performance of the right of first refusal which was violated, should prosper. The ruling
fn Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. vs. Mayfair Theater, Inc. (264 SCRA 483). a
case with similar facts, sustains both rights of action because the buyer in the
subsequent sale knew the existence of right of first refusal, hence in bad faith.
Another Answer:
The action to rescind the sale and to compel the right to first refusal will
not prosper. (Any Yu Asuncion vs. CA, 238 SCRA 602). The Court ruled in a
unanimous en banc decision that the right of first refusal is not founded upon
contract but on a quasi-delictual relationship covered by the principles of human
relations and unjust enrichment (Art. 19, et seq. Civil Code). Hence the only
action that will prosper according to the Supreme Court is an "action for
damages in a proper forum for the purpose."
XI.
Tessie died survived by her husband Mario, and two nieces. Michelle and Jorelle,
who are the legitimate children of an elder sister who had predeceased her. The only
property she left behind was a house and lot worth two million pesos, which Tessie
and her husband had acquired with the use of Mario’s savings from his income as a
doctor. How much of the property or its value, if any, may Michelle and Jorelle claim
as their hereditary shares? [5%]
Answer:
Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides, “Should brothers and sisters or their
children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-
half ®f the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
half."
Tessie's gross estate consists of a house and lot acquired during her
marriage, making it part of the community property. Thus, one-half of the said
property would have to be set aside as Mario's conjugal share from the
community property. The other half, amounting to one million pesos, is her
conjugal share (net estate), and should be distributed to her intestate heirs.
Applying the above provision of law, Michelle and Jorelle, Tessie's nieces, are
entitled to one-half of her conjugal share worth one million pesos, or 500,000
pesos, while the other one-half amounting to P500.000 will go to Mario, Tessie's
surviving spouse. Michelle and Jorelle are then entitled to P250.000 pesos each
as their hereditary share.
XII
Enrique died, leaving a net hereditary estate of PI.2 million. He is survived by his
widow, three legitimate children, two legitimate grandchildren sired by a legitimate child
who predeceased him, and two recognized illegitimate children. Distribute the estate in
intestacy. [5%]
ANSWER:
Under the theory of Concurrence, the shares are as follows:
A (legitimate child) = P200.000
B (legitimate child) = P200.000
C (legitimate child) = P200.000
D (legitimate child) = 0 (predeceased]
E (legitimate child of D) = P100.000 - by right of representation
F (legitimate child of D) » P100.000 - by right of representation
G (illegitimate child) * PI00,000 - 1/2 share of a legitimate child
H (illegitimate child) = PI00,000 - 1/2 share of a legitimate child
W (Widow) = P200,000 - same share as legitimate child
ANOTHER ANSWER:
Under the theory of Exclusion the free portion (P300,000), is distributed only
among the legitimate children and is given to them in addition to their legitime.
All other intestate heirs are entitled only to their respective legitimes. The
distribution is as follows:
Legitime Free Portion Total

A (Legitimate child) P150,000 + P 75,000 = P225,000
B (Legitimate child) P150,000 + P150,000 = P225,000
C (Legitimate child) P150,000 + P 75,000 = P225,000
D (Legitimate child) 0 + 0 = 0
E (Legitimate child of D) P 75,000 + P 35,500 = P 112,000
F (Legitimate Child of D) P 75,000 + P 37,500 = P 112,500
G (Illegitimate Child) P 75,000 + 0 = P 75,000
H (Illegitimate Child) P 75,000 + 0 = P 75,000
W (Widow) P 150,000 + 0 = P 150,000
XIII.
A Galant driven by John and owned by Art, and a Corolla driven by its owner,
Gina, collided somewhere along Adrlatlco Street. As a result of the accident, Gina had
a concussion. Subsequently, Gina brought an action for damages against John and
Art. There is no doubt that the collision is due to John’s negligence. Can Art, who was
in the vehicle at the time of the accident, be held solidarlly liable with his driver. John?
[5%]
ANSWER:
Yes. Art may be held solidary liable with John, if it was proven that the former
could have prevented the misfortune with the use of due diligence. Article 2184 of
the Civil Code states: “In motor mishaps, the owner is solidary liable with his
driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due
diligence, prevented the misfortune, x x x"
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
1. It depends. The Supreme Court In Chapman us. Underwood (27 Phil 374),
held: “An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver
to continue in a violation of law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has
had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease
therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts, x x x On the other hand, if
the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a
reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or
violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at
the time the act was committed is not responsible, either civilly or criminally,
therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner
for such a length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver’s
act hie own."
XIV.
1. Define compensation as a mode of extinguishing an obligation, and

distinguish it from payment. [2%]
2. X, who has a savings deposit with Y Bank In the sum of P1.000.000.00.

incurs a loan obligation with the said Bank in the sum of P800.000.00 which has
become due. When X tries to withdraw his deposit. Y Bank allows only P200.000.00 to
be withdrawn, less service charges, claiming that compensation has extinguished its
obligation under the savings account to the concurrent amount of X’s debt. X contends
that compensation is improper when one of the debts, as here, arises from a contract of
deposit. Assuming that the promissory note signed by X to evidence the loan does not
provide for compensation between said loan and his savings deposit, who is correct?
13%}
ANSWER:
1. Compensation is a mode of extinguishing to the concurrent amount, the

obligations of those persons who In their own right are reciprocally debtors and
creditors of each other (Tolentino, 1991 ed.,p. 365, citing 2 Castan 560 and Francia
vs. LAC, 162 SCRA 753). It involves the simultaneous balancing of two obligations in
order to extinguish them to the extent in which the amount of one is covered by that of
the other. (De Leon, 1992 ed., p. 221, citing 6 Manresa 401).
Payment means not only delivery of money but also performance of an obligation
(Article 1232, Civil Code). In payment, capacity to dispose of the thing paid and
capacity to receive payment are required for debtor and creditor, respectively: in
compensation, such capacity is not necessary, because the compensation operates by
law and not by the act of the parties. In payment, the performance must be complete;
while in compensation there may be partial extinguishment of an obligation (Tolentino.
supra)
ANSWER:
Y bank is correct. Art. 1287, Civil Code, does not apply. All the requisites of Art. 1279,
Civil Code are present. In the case of Gullas vs. PNB (62 Phil. 519), the Supreme
Court held: “The Civil Code contains provisions regarding compensation (set off) and
deposit. These portions of Philippine law provide that compensation shall take place
when two persons are reciprocally creditor and debtor of each other. In this connection,
it has been held that the relation existing between a depositor and a bank is that of
creditor.and debtor, x x x As a general rule, a bank has a right of set off of the deposits
in its hands for the payment of any indebtedness to it on the part of a depositor."
Hence, compensation took place between the mutual obligations of X and Y bank.
XV
Joey. Jovy and Jojo are solidary debtors under a loan obligation of P300.000.00
which has fallen due. The creditor has. however, condoned Jojo’s entire share in the
debt. Since Jovy has become insolvent, the creditor makes a demand on Joey to pay
the debt.
1. How much, if any. may Joey be compelled to pay? [2%]
2. To what extent, if at all. can Jojo be compelled by Joey to contribute to
such payment? (3%)
ANSWER
1. Joey can be compelled to pay only the remaining balance of P200.000, in

view of the remission of Jojo's share by the creditor. (Art. 1219, Civil Code)
ANSWER:
2. Jojo can be compelled by Joey to contribute P50,000. Art. 1217, par. 3,
Civil Code provides, "When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insol-
vency, reimburse his share to the debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be
borne by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the debt of each."
Since the Insolvent debtor's share which Joey paid was P100,000, and there are
only two remaining debtors - namely Joey and Jojo - these two shall share equally the
burden of reimbursement. Jojo may thus be compelled by Joey to contribute
P50,000.00.
XVI.
Distinguish between:
1. Continuous and discontinuous easements; [2%J
2. Apparent and non-apparent easements; and [2%]
3. Positive and negative easements. (1%)
Answer:
1. Continuous easements are those the use of which is or maybe Incessant,

without the Intervention of any act of man, while discontinuous easements are those
which are used at Intervals and depend upon the acts of man. (Art. 615, Civil Code)
Answers
2. Apparent easements are those which are made known and are continually kept
in view by external signs that reveal the use and enjoyment of the same, while non-
apparent easements are those which show no external indication of their existence.
(Art. 615, Civil Code)
Answer;
3. Positive easements are those which impose upon the owner of the servient
estate the obligation of allowing something to be done or of doing it himself, while
negative easements are those which prohibit the owner of the servient estate from
doing something which he could lawfully do if the easement did not exist. (Art. 615, Civil
Code)
XVII
Dielle, Karlo and Una are general partners in a merchandising firm. Having
contributed equal amounts to the capital, they also agree on equal distribution of
whatever net profit is realized per fiscal period. After two years of operation. however,
Una conveys her whole interest in the partnership to Justine, without the knowledge
and consent of Dielle and Kaflo.
1. Is the partnership dissolved? [2%j

2. What are the rights of Justine, if any, should she desire to participate in the
management of the partnership and in the distribution of a net profit of P360.000.00
which was realized after her purchase of Una’s interest? [3%]
ANSWER:
1. No, a conveyance* by a partner of his whole interest in a partnership does not of
itself dissolve the partnership In the absence of an agreement. (Art. 1813, Civil Code)
Answer:
2. Justine cannot interfere or participate in the management or administration of
the partnership business or affairs. She may. however, receive the net profits to which
Una would have otherwise been entitled. In this case, P120,000 (Art. 1813, Civil Code)
XVIII.
1. Distinguish usufruct from commodatum and state whether these may be
constituted over consumable goods. [2%]
2. Distinguish consensual from real contracts and name at least four (4) kinds of
real contracts under the present law. (3%)
Answer:
1. Usufruct is a right given to a person (usufructuary) to enjoy the property of
another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance. (Art. 562, Civil Code)
On the other hand, commodatum is a contract by which one of the parties (bailor)
delivers to another (bailee) something not consumable so that the latter may use it for a
certain time and return it.
in usufruct the usufructuary gets the right to the use and to the fruits of the same, while
in commodatum, the bailee only acquires the use of the thing loaned but not its fruits.
Usufruct may be constituted on the whole or a part of the fruits of the thing. (Art.
564, Civil Code). It may even be constituted over consumables like money (Altman v.
Veloso, 52 Phil. 545). On the other hand, in commodatum, consumable goods maybe
subject thereof only when the purpose of the contract is not the consumption of the
object, as when it is merely for exhibition. (Art. 1936, Civil Code)
Another Answer:
1. There are several points of distinction between usufruct and commodatum.
Usufruct is constituted by law, by contract, by testamentary succession, or by
prescription (Art. 1933, Civil Code). Usufruct creates a real right to the fruits of
another's property, while commodatum creates only a purely personal right to use
another's property, and requires a stipulation to enable the bailee to “make use” of the
fruits (Arts. 1939 & 1940, Civil Code). Usufruct may be onerous while commodatum is
always or essentially gratuitous (Arts. 1933 &: 1935, Civil Code). The contract
constituting usufruct is consensual, while commodatum is a real contract (perfected
only by delivery of the subject matter thereof). However, both involve the enjoyment by
a person of the property of another, differing only as to the extent and scope of such
enjoyment [jus jruendi in one and jus utendi in the other); both may have as subject
matter either an immovable or a movable; and, both may be constituted over
consumable goods (Arts. 574 & 1936, Civil Code).
A consumable thing may be the subject-matter of an abnormal usufruct but in a
normal usufruct, the subject- matter maybe used only for exhibition. A commodatum of
a consumable thing may be only for the purpose of exhibiting, not consuming it.
ANSWER:
2. Consensual contracts are those which are perfected by mere consent (Art.
1315, Civil Code). Real contracts are those which are perfected by the delivery of the
object of the obligation. (Art. 1316, Civil Code)
Examples of real contracts are deposit, pledge, commodatum and simple loan
(mutuum).
XIX.
Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. concerning adverse claims on

registered land, provides a 30-day period of effectivity of an adverse claim, counted
from the date of its registration. Suppose a notice of adverse claim based upon a
contract to sell was registered on March 1, 1997 at the instance of the BUYER but on
June 1, 1997, or after the lapse of the 30-day period, a notice of levy on execution in
favor of a JUDGMENT CREDITOR was also registered to enforce a final Judgment for
money against the registered owner. Then, on June 15. 1997 there having been no
formal cancellation of his notice of adverse claim, the BUYER pays to the seller-owner
the agreed purchase price in full and registers the corresponding deed of sale.
Because the annotation of the notice of levy is carried over to the new title in his name,
the BUYER brings an action against the JUDGMENT CREDITOR to cancel such
annotation, but the latter claims that his lien is superior because it was annotated after
the adverse claim of the BUYER had ipso facto ceased to be effective. Will the suit
prosper? [5%1
Answer:
The suit will prosper. While an adverse claim duly annotated at the back of a title
under Section 70 of P.D. 1529 is good only for 30 days, cancellation thereof is still
necessary to render it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription thereof will remain
annotated as a lien on the property. While the life of adverse claim is 30 days under
P.D. 1529, it continuous to be effective until it is canceled by formal petition filed with
the Register of Deeds.
The cancellation of the notice of levy is justified under Section 108 of P.D. 1529
considering that the levy on execution can not be enforced against the buyer whose
adverse claim against the registered owner was recorded ahead of the notice of levy
on execution.
XX
In 1965, Renren bought from Robyn a parcel of registered land evidenced by a

duly executed deed of sale. The owner presented the deed of sale and the owner’s
certificate of title to the Register of Deeds. The entry was made in the day book and
corresponding fees were paid as evidenced by official receipt. However, no transfer of
certificate of title was issued to Renren because the original certificate of title in
Robyn’s name was temporarily misplaced after fire partly gutted the Office of the
Register of Deeds. Meanwhile, the land had been possessed by Robyn’s distant
cousin. Mikaelo, openly, adversely and continuously in the concept of owner since
1960. It was only in April 1998 that Renren sued Mikaelo to recover possession.
Mikaelo invoked a) acquisitive prescription and b) laches, asking that he be declared
owner of the land. Decide the case by evaluating these defenses. 15%)
Answer:
a) Renren's action to recover possession of the land will prosper. In 1965, after
buying the land from Robyn, he submitted the Deed of Sale to the Registry of Deeds for
registration together with the owner’s duplicate copy of the title, and paid the
corresponding registration fees. Under Section 56 of P.D. No. 1529, the Deed of Sale
to Renren is considered registered from the time the sale was entered in the Day Book
(now called the Primary Entry Booh).
For all legal Intents and purposes, Renren is considered the registered owner
of the land. After all, it was not his fault that the Registry of Deeds could not issue the
corresponding transfer certificate of title.
Mikaelo's defense of prescription can not be sustained. A Torrens title is
Imprescriptible. No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered
owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. (Section 47. P.D. No.
1529)
The right to recover possession of registered land likewise does not prescribe
because possession is Just a necessary incident of ownership.
b) Mikaelo's defense of laches, however, appears to be more sustainable. Renren
bought the land and had the sale registered way back in 1965. From the facts, it
appears that it was only in 1998 or after an inexplicable delay of 33 years that he took
the first step asserting his right to the land. It was not even an action to recover
ownership but only possession of the land. By ordinary standards, 33 years of neglect
or inaction is too long and maybe considered unreasonable. As often held by the
Supreme Court, the principle of Imprescriptibility sometimes has to yield to the
equitable principle of laches which can convert even a registered land owner's Maim
into a stale demand.
Mikaelo's claim of laches, however, is weak insofar as the element of equity is
concerned, there being no showing in the facts how he entered into the ownership and
possession of the land.
-end-
Question No. 1:
How would you compare the Civil Law system In Its governance and trend with that
of the Common Law system?
Answer:
As regards "governance":
Governance in Civil Law is codal. statutory and written law. It is additionally derived
from case law. Common law is basically derived from case law.
As regards "trend":
Civil law is now tending to rely more and more on decisions of the courts explaining
the laws. Common law is now codifying laws more and more. So they are now merging
towards similar systems.
Additional Answers:
1. Common law refers to the traditional part of the law as distinct from legislation: it
refers to the universal part of law as distinct from particular local customs (Encyclopedia
Americana, Vol. 7).
On the other hand, civil law is understood to be that branch of law governing the
relationship of persons in respect of their personal and private interests as
distinguished from both public and international laws.
In common law countries, the traditional responsibility has for the most part been
with the Judges; in civil law countries, the task is primarily reposed on the lawmakers.
Contemporary practices, however, so indicate a trend towards centralizing that function
to professional groups that may. indeed, see the gradual assimilation in time of both
systems. (Vltug, Civil Law and Jurisprudence. p. XX]
In Civil Law. the statutes theoretically take precedence over court decisions
interpreting them; while in Common Law. the court decisions resolving specific cases
are regarded as law rather than the statutes themselves which are, at the start, merely
embodiments of case law. Civil Law is code law or written law. while Common Law is
case law. Civil Law adopts the deductive method - from the general to the particular,
while the Common Law uses the inductive approach - from the particular to the
general. Common Law relies on equity. Civil Law anchors itself on the letter of the law.
The civilists are for the judge-proof law even as the Common Law is judge-made law.
Civil Law judges are merely supposed to apply laws and not interpret them.
Question No. 2:
In 1977. Mario and Clara, both Filipino citizens, were married in the Philippines.
Three years later, they went to the United States of America and established their
residence in San Francisco, California. In 1987, the couple applied for, and were
granted. U.S. citizenship. In 1989, Mario, claiming to have been abandoned by Clara,
was able to secure a decree of divorce in Reno, Nevada. U.S.A.
In 1990, Mario returned to the Philippines and married Juana who knew well
Mario's past life.
(a) Is the marriage between Mario and Juana valid?
(b) Would the renvoi doctrine have any relevance to the case?
Answer:
(a) Yes. In relation to Art. 15 of the Civil Code, Conflict of Laws provides that
the recognition of an absolute divorce granted in another State rests on the citizenship
of the parties at the time the divorce was granted (Paras, PhiL Conflict of Laws. p.
259). Applied in this case, the divorce decree issued to Clara and Mario will be
recognized as valid here considering that at the time the foreign decree was granted,
both Clara and Mario are citizens of the U.S_A., a country which grants/allows absolute
divorce. Since the marriage between Mario and Clara has been validly terminated,
Mario and Juana can freely marry each other.
(b) No. The renvoi doctrine is relevant in cases where one country applies the
domiciliary theory and the other the nationality theory, and the issue involved is which
of the laws of the two countries should apply to determine the order of succession, the
amount of successional rights, or, the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions. Such
issue is not involved in this case.
Alternative Answer:
Yes. "Renvoi" - which means "referring back" is relevant because here, we are
applying U.S. law to Mario, being already its citizen, although the formalities of the
second marriage will be governed by Philippine law under the principle of lex loci
celebrationis.
Question No. 3:
In the context that the term is used in Civil Law, state the (a) concept, fb) requisites
and (c) consequences of a prejudicial question.
Answer:
(a) Concept
A prejudicial question is one which must be decided first before a criminal action
may be instituted or may proceed because a decision therein is vital to the Judgement
in the criminal case. In thecase of People vs. AdeloAragonl L-5930, Feb. 17, 1954),
the Supreme Court defined it as one which arises in a case, the resolution of which
question is a logical antecedent of the issues involved in said case and the cognizance
of which pertains to another tribunal (Paras. Vol. 1, Civil Code Annotation, 1989 ed. p.
194).
(b) Requisites
1. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court.
2. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
Additional Answer:
1. The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action, and
2. the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
(c) Consequences
The criminal case must be suspended. Thus, in a criminal case for damages to
one's property, a civil action that involves the ownership of said property should first be
resolved [Dc Leon vs. Mabanag, 38 Phil. 202)
Question No. 4.
Luis and Rizza, both 26 years of age and single, live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Luis is gainfully employed. Rizza
is not employed, stays at home, and takes charge of the household chores.
After living together for a little over twenty years, Luis was able to save from his
salary earnings during that period the amount of P200.000.00 presently deposited in a
bank. A house and lot worth P500,000.00 was recently purchased for the same amount
by the couple. Of the P500.000.00 used by the common-law spouses to purchase the
property, P200.000.00 had come from the sale of palay harvested from the hacienda
owned by Luis and P300.000.00 from the rentals of a building belonging to Rizza. In
fine, the sum of P500.000.00 had been part of the fruits received during the period of
cohabitation from their separate property. A car worth P 100,000.00, being used by the
common-law spouses, was donated just months ago to Rizza by her parents.
Luis and Rizza now decide to terminate their cohabitation, and they ask you to
give them your legal advice on the following:
(a) How. under the law, should the bank deposit of P200.000.00, the house
and lot valued at P500.000.00 and the car worth P 100.000.00 be allocated to them?
(b) What would your answer be (to the above question) had Luis and Rizza
been living together all the time, Le.. since twenty years ago, under a valid marriage?
ANSWER:
Art. 147 of the Family Code1 provides In part that when a man and a woman who
are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries
shall be owned by them In equal shares and the property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules of co- ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their Joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them In equal shares. A party who did not participate
in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed Jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formeris efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Thus:
1) the wages and salaries of Luis in the amount of P200,000.00 shall be
divided equally between Luis and Rizza.
2) the house and lot valued at P500.000.00 having been acquired by both of
them through work or industiy shall be divided between them in proportion
to their respective contribution, in consonance with the rules on co-
ownership. Hence, Luis gets 2\5 while Rizza gels 3\5 oi P500.000.00.
3) the car worth P100,000.00 shall be exclusively owned by Rizza. the same
having been donated to her by her parents.
The property relations between Luis and Rizza, their marriage having been celebrated
20 years ago (under the Civil Code) shall be governed by the conjugal partnership of
gains, underwhich the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds,
products, fruits and Income from their separate properties and those acquired by either
or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and upon dissolution of I he
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both
spouse shall be divided equally between them (Art. 142, Civil Code).
Thus:
1) The salary of Luis deposited in the bank in the amount of P200.000.00
and the house and lot valued at P500.000.00 shall be divided equally
between Luis and Rizza.
2) However, the car worth P 100.000.00 donated to Rizza by her parents
shall be considered to her own paraphernal property, having been
acquiredbylucrativetitle(par.2,Art. 148, Civil Code).
Question No. 15:
Under what conditions, respectively, may drug addiction be a ground, if at all. (a)
for a declaration of nullity of marriage, (b) for an annulment of the marriage contract,
and
(b) for legal separation between the spouses?
Answer:
(a) Declaration of nullity of marriage:

1. The drug addiction must amount to psychological incapacity to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage;
2. It must be antecedent (existing at the time of marriage), grave and

incurable;
3. The case must be filed before August 1, 1998. Because if they got
married before August 3, 1998. it must be filed before August 1, 1998.
(b) Annulment of the Marriage Contract:

1. The drug addiction must be concealed;
2. It must exist at the time of marriage:
3. There should be no cohabitation with full knowledge of the drug
addiction;
4. The case is filed within five (5) years from discovery.
(c) Legal Separation:
1. There should be no condonation or consent to the drug addiction:

2. The action must be filed within five (5) years from the occurrence of the
cause.
3. Drug addiction arises during the marriage and not at the time of marriage.
Question No. 16:
Pedro is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Malolos, Bulacan. In

1973, he mortgaged the land to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a loan of
P 100,000.00. For Pedro's failure to pay the loan, the PNB foreclosed on the mortgage
in 1980, and the land was sold at public auction to PNB for being the highest bidder.
PNB secured title thereto in 1987.
In the meanwhile, Pedro, who was still in possession of the land, constructed a
warehouse on the property. In 1988, the PNB sold the land to Pablo. The Deed of Sale
was amended in 1989 to include the warehouse.
Pedro, claiming ownership of the warehouse, files a complaint to annul the

amended Deed of Sale before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where he
resides, against both the PNB and Pablo. The PNB filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint for improper venue contending that the warehouse is real property under
Article 415(1} of the Civil Code and therefore the action should have instead been filed
in Malolos, Bulacan. Pedro claims otherwise. The question arose as to whether the
warehouse should be considered as real or as personal property.
If consulted, what would your legal advice be?
Answer:
The warehouse which is a construction adhered to the soil is an immovable by

nature under Art. 415 (1), and the proper venue of any case to recover ownership of the
same, which is what the purpose of the complaint to annul the amended Deed of Sale
amounts to, should be the place where the property is located, or the KTC of Bulacan.
Additional Answer:
1. Buildings are always immovable property, and even in the Instances

where the parties to a contract seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the
land on which it stood in no wise does it change its character as immovable property. A
building is an immovable even if not erected by the owner of the land. The only
criterion is union or incorporation with the soil. [Ladera vs. Hodges (CA) 48 O.G. 4374)
(Reyes andPuno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law. Vol. 2. p.7)
2. The warehouse built by Pedro on the mortgaged property is real property

within the context of Article 415 of the New Civil Code. Although it was built by Pedro
after the foreclosure sale without the knowledge and consent of the new owner which
makes him a builder in bad faith, this does not alter the character of the warehouse as
a real property by incorporation. It is a structure which cannot be removed without
causing injury to the land. So, my advice to Pedro is to file the case with the RTC of
Bulacan, the situs of the property.
(Note: If the examinee does not mention that the
structure was built by a builder in bad faith, it should be given full credit).
Question No. 7:
Marcelino, a treasure hunter as Just a hobby, has found a map which appears to
indicate the location of hidden treasure. He has an idea of the land where the treasure
might possibly be found. Upon inquiry, Marcelino learns that the owner of the land,
Leopoldo, is a permanent resident of Canada. Nobody, however, could give him
Leopoldo's exact address. Ultimately, anyway, he enters the land and conducts a
search. He succeeds.
Leopoldo. learning of Marcellno's "find", seeks to recover the treasure from Marcelino
but the latter is not willing to part with it. Falling to reach an agreement, Leopoldo sues
Marcelino for the recovery of the property. Marcelino contests the action.
How would you decide the case?

Answer:
I would decide in favor of Marcelino since he is considered a finder by chance of
the hidden treasure, hence, he is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the hidden treasure. While
Marcelino may have had the intention to look for the hidden treasure, still he is a finder
by chance since it is enough that he tried to look for it. By chance in the law does not
mean sheer luck such that the finder should have no intention at all to look for the
treasure. By chance means good luck, implying that one who intentionally looks for the
treasure is embraced in the provision. The reason is that it is extremely difficult to find
hidden treasure without looking for it deliberately.
Marcelino is not a trespasser since there is no prohibition for him to enter the
premises, hence, he is entitled to half of the treasure.
Alternative Answers:
1. Marcelino did not find the treasure by chance because he had a map. he knew
the location of the hidden treasure and he intentionally looked for the treasure, hence,
he is not entitled to any part of the treasure.
2. Marcelino appears to be a trespasser and although there may be a question of

whether he found it by chance or not. as he has found the hidden treasure by means of
a treasure map, he will not be entitled to a finder's share. The hidden treasure shall
belong to the owner.
3. The main rule is that hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land, building
or other property on which it is found. If it is found by chance by a third person and he is
not a trespasser, he is entitled to one-half (1/2). If he is a trespasser, he loses
everything.
Question No. 8:
On 1 January 1980, Minerva, the owner of a building granted Petronila a usufruct

over the property until 01 June 1998 when Manuel, a son of Petronila, would have
reached his 30th birthday. Manuel, however, died on 1 June 1990 when he was only
26 years old.
Minerva notified Petronila that the usufruct had been extinguished by the death of
Manuel and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and deliver the same to the
former.
Petronila refused to vacate the place on the ground that the usufruct in her favor
would expire only on 1 June 1998 when Manuel would have reached his 30th birthday
and that the death of Manuel before his 30th birthday did not extinguish the usufruct.
Whose contention should be accepted?
Answer:
Petronila's contention is correct. Under Article 606 of the Civil Code, a usufruct
granted for the time that may elapse before a third person reaches a certain age shall
subsist for the number of years specified even if the third person should die unless
there is an express stipulation in the contract that states otherwise. In the case at bar,
there is no express stipulation that the consideration for the usufruct is the existence of
Petronila's son. Thus, the general rule and not the exception should apply in this case.
Alternative Answer:
This is a usufruct which is clearly intended for the benefit of Manuel until he
reaches 30 yrs. of age, with Petronila serving only as a conduit, holding the property in
trust for his benefit. The death of Manuel at the age of 26, therefore, terminated the
usufruct.
Question No. 9:
Distinguish between "possession" and "occupation" as these terms are

(a)
commonly used in Book II and Book III of the Civil Code.
(b)Are the effects of illegal and immoral conditions on simple donations the same
as those effects that would follow when such conditions are imposed on donations con
causa onerosa?
Answer:
(a) Possession is a real right, while occupation is one oi the original modes of
acquiring ownership and other real rights. Possession, the holding of a thing or the
exercise of a right, does not in itself constitute ownership. Whereas, occupation is a
mode of acquiring ownership. There can be possession without ownership.
Additional Answer:
Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right (Art. 532, CC). It
can refer to all kinds of property whether with or without an owner while occupation can
take place only.with respect to property without an owner (Articles 531 & 713).
Occupation in itself, when proper, confers ownership but possession does not by itself
give rise to ownership.
Answer:
(b) No, they don't have the same effect. Illegal or impossible conditions in simple
and remuneratoiy donations shall be considered as not imposed. Hence the donation is
valid. The donation will be considered as simple or pure. The condition or mode is
merely an accessory disposition, and its nullity does not affect the donation, unless it
clearly appears that the donor would not have made the donation without the mode or
condition.
Donations con causa onerosa is governed by law on obligations and contracts,

under which an impossible or illicit condition annuls the obligation dependent upon the
condition where the condition is positive and suspensive. If the impossible or illicit
condition is negative, it is simply considered as not written, and the obligation is
converted into a pure and simple one. However, in order that an illegal condition may
annul a contract, the impossibility must exist at the time of the creation of the obligation;
a supervening impossibility does not affect the existence of the obligation.
Additional Answer:
No. In simple or pure donation, only the illegal or impossible condition is

considered not written but the donation remains valid and becomes free from
conditions. The condition or mode being a mere accessory disposition, its nullity does
not affect the donation unless it clearly appears that the donor would not have made
the donation without the mode or condition. On the other hand, onerous donation is
governed by the rules on contracts. Under Article 1183, impossible or illegal conditions
shall annul the obligation which depends upon them. In these cases, both the
obligation and the condition are void.
Question No. 10:
Johnny, with no known living relatives, executed a notarial will giving all his estate
to his sweetheart. One day. he had a serious altercation with his sweetheart. A few
days later, he w’as introduced to a charming lady who later became a dear friend.
Soon after, he executed a holographic will expressly revoking the notarial will and so
designating his new friend as sole heir. One day when he was clearing up his desk.
Johnny mistakenly burned, along with other papers, the only copy of his holographic
will. His business associate, Eduardo, knew well the contents of the will which was
shown to him by Johnny the day it was executed. A few days after the burning incident,
Johnny died. Both wills were sought to be probated in two separate petitions.
Will either or both petitions prosper?
Answer:
The probate of the notarial will will prosper. The holographic will cannot be
admitted to probate because a holographic will can only be probated upon evidence of
the will itself unless there is a photographic copy. But since the holographic will was
lost and there was no other copy, it cannot be probated and therefore the notarial will
will be admitted to probate because there is no revoking will.
Additional Answers:
1. In the case of Gan vs. Yap (104 Phil 509), the execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who
have seen or read such will. The will itself must be p resented otherwise it shall produce
no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity.
Moreover, in order that a will may be revoked by a subsequent will, it Is necessary that
the latter will be valid and executed with the formalities required for the making of a will.
The latter should possess all the requisites of a valid will whether it be ordinary or a
holographic will, and should be probated in order that the revocatory clause thereof
may produce effect. In the case at bar, since the holographic will itself cannot be
presented, it cannot therefore be probated. Since it cannot be probated, it cannot
revoke the notarial will previously written by the decedent.
1. On the basis of the Rules of Court, Rule 76, Sec. 6. provides that no will shall
be proved as a lost or destroyed will ••• unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly
proved by at least two (2) credible witnesses. Hence, if we abide strictly by the two-
witness rule to prove a lost or destroyed will, the holographic will which Johnny
allegedly mistakenly burned, cannot be probated, since there is only one witness.
Eduardo, who can be called to testify as to the existence of the will. If the holographic
will, which purportedly, revoked the earlier notarial will cannot be proved because of the
absence of the required witness, then the petition for the probate of the notarial will
should prosper.
Question No. 11:
"T" died intestate on 1 September 1997. He was survived by M (his mother), W (his
widow), A and B (his legitimate children), C (his grandson, being the legitimate son of
B), D (his other grandson, being the son of E who was a legitimate son of, and who
predeceased, ’T’), and F (hisgrandson, being the son of G. a legitimate son who
repudiated the inheritance from 'T'). His distributable net estate Is PI20.000.00.
How should this amount be shared in intestacy among the surviving heirs?
Answer:
The legal heirs are A, B, D, and W. C is excluded by B who is still alive. D inherits in
representation of E who predeceased. F is excluded because of the repudiation of G.
the predecessor. M is excluded by the legitimate children of T. The answer may be
premised on two theories: the Theoiy of Exclusion and the Theoiy of Concurrence.
Under the Theory of Exclusion the legitimes of the heirs are accorded them and
the free portion will be given exclusively to the legitimate descendants. Hence under
the Exclusion Theory:
A will get P20.000.00, and P 13,333.33 (1/3 of the free portion)

B will get P 20,000.00, and P13,333.33 (1/3 of the free portion)
D will get P20.000.00. and P13,333.33 (1/3 of the free portion)
W, the widow is limited to the legitime of P20,000.00
Under the Theory of Concurrence, in addition to their legitimes, the heirs of A, B. D

and W will be given equal shares in the free portions:
A: P20.000.00 plus PI0.000.00 (1 /4of the free portion) B: P20.000.00plus

PI0.000.00 (1/4 of the free portion) C: P20,000.00 plus P10,000.00 (1 /4 of the free
portion) W: P20,000.00 plus P10,000.00(1/4 of the free portion)
Alternative Answer:
Shares in intestacy
T - decedent Estate: PI20,000.00
Survived by:
M - Mother...................... .......... None

W - Widow................................. P 30,000.00
A - Son ...................................... P 30.000.00
B - Son ...................................... P 30.000.00
C - Grandson (son of B) ............ None
D - Grandson (son of E who
predeceased T) .............. P 30,000.00
F - Grandson (son of G who
repudiated the inheritance
from’T*) ........................... None
1) The mother (M) cannot inherit from T because under Art. 985 the ascendants
shall inherit in default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased.
2) The widow's share is P30.000.00 because under Art. 996 it states that if the
widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse
has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children.
3) C has no share because his father is still alive hence succession by

representation shall not apply (Art. 975).
4) D inherits P30.000 which is the share of his father E who predeceased T by

virtue of Art. 981 on the right of representation.
5) F has no share because his father G repudiated the inheritance. Under Article
977 heirs who repudiate their share may not be represented.
Question No. 12;
"X". the decedent, was survived by W (his widow). A (his son). B (a

granddaughter, being the daughter of A) and C and D (the two acknowledged
illegitimate children of the decedent). "X' died this year (1997) leaving a net estate of
P180,000.00. All were willing to succeed, except A who repudiated the inheritance from
his father, and they seek your legal advice on how much each can expect to receive as
their respective shares in the distribution of the estate.
Give your answer.

Answer:
The heirs are B, W. C and D. A inherits nothing because of his renunciation. B

inherits a legitime of P90.000.00 as the nearest and only legitimate descendant,
inheriting in his own right not by representation because of A’s renunciation. W gets a
legitime equivalent to one-half (1 /2) that of B amounting to P45.000. C and D each
gets a legitime equivalent to one- half (1/2) that of B amounting to P45.000.00 each.
But since the total exceeds the entire estate, their legitimes would have to be reduced
correspondingly to P22.500.00 each (Art. 895. CO). The total of all of these amounts to
P180.000.00.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
INTESTATE SUCCESSION
ESTATE : P180,000.00
W- (widow gets 1/2 share) P90.000.00 (Art.998,'

A- (son who repudiated his
inheritance) None (Art. 977)
B - (Granddaughter) None
C - (Acknowledged
illegitimate child) P45.000.00 (An.998)
D - (Acknowledged
Illegitimate child) P45.000.00 (Art. 998)
The acknowledged illegitimate child gets 1/2 of the share of each legitimate child.
Question No, 13:
On 01 January 1980. Redentor and Remedios entered into an agreement by

virtue of which the former was to register a parcel of land in the name of Remedios
under the explicit covenant to reconvey the land to Remigio. son of Redentor. upon the
son's graduation from college. In 1981. the land, was registered in the name of
Remedios.
Redentor died a year later or in 1982. In March 1983, RemJgio graduated from
college. In February 1992, Remigio accidentally found a copy of the document so
constituting Remedios as the trustee of the land. In May 1994. Remigio filed a case
against Remedios for the reconveyance of the land to him. Remedios. in her answer,
averred that the action already prescribed.
How should the matter be decided?
Answer:
The matter should be decided in favor of Remigio (trustee) because the action
has not prescribed. The case at bar involves an express trust which does not prescribe
as long as they have not been repudiated by the trustee {Diaz us. Gorricho. 103 Phil.
261).
Question No. 14:
In two separate documents signed by him, Juan Valentino "obligated" himself each
to Marla and to Perla, thus –
'To Marla, my true love, I obligate myself to give you my one and only
horse when I feel like it."
- and –
To Perla, my true sweetheart, I obligate myself to pay you the

P500.00 I owe you when I feel like it."
Months passed but Juan never bothered to make good his promises. Maria and
Perla came to consult you on whether or not they could recover on the basis of the
foregoing settings.
What would your legal advice be?
Answer:
I would advise Maria not to bother running after Juan for the latter to make good
his promise. [This is because a promise is not an actionable wrong that allows a party
to recover especially when she has not suffered damages resulting from such promise.
A promise does not create an obligation on the part of Juan because it is not something
which arises from a contract, law, quasl-contracts or quasi-delicts (Art. 1157)]. Under
Art. 1182, Juan's promise to Maria is void because a conditional obligation depends
upon the sole will of the obligor.
As regards Perla. the document is an express acknowledgment of a debt, and the

promise to pay what he owes her when he feels like it is equivalent to a promise to pay
when his means permits him to do so. and is deemed to be one with an indefinite
period under Art. 1180. Hence the amount is recoverable after Perla asks the court to
set the period as provided by Art. 1197, par. 2.
Question No. 15:

State the basic difference (only in their legal effects) –
(a) Between a contract to sell, on the one hand, and a contract of sale, on
the other;
(b) Between a conditional sale, on the one hand, and an absolute sale, on
the other hand.
Answer:
(a) In a contract of sale, ownership is transferred to the buyer upon delivery

of the object to him while in a contract to sell, ownership is retained by the seller until
the purchase price is fully paid. In a contract to sell, delivery of the object does not
confer ownership upon the buyer. In a contract of sale, there is only one contract
executed between the seller and the buyer, while in a contract to sell, there are two
contracts, first the contract to sell (which is a conditional or preparatory sale) and a
second, the final deed of sale or the principal contract which is executed after full
payment of the purchase price.
(b) A conditional sale is one where the vendor is granted the right to
unilaterally rescind the contract predicated on the fulfillment or non-fulfillment, as the
case may be, of the prescribed condition. An absolute sale is one where the title to the
property is not reserved to the vendor or if the vendor is not granted the right to rescind
the contract based on the fulfillment or non-fulfillment, as the case may be, of the
prescribed condition.
Question No. 16:
AB sold to CD a motor vehicle for and in consideration of P120,000.00, to be paid

in twelve monthly equal installments of P 10,000.00, each installment being due and
payable on the 15th day of eaclrmonth starting January 1997.
To secure the promissory note, CD (a) executed a chattel mortgage on the subject
motor vehicle, and (b) furnished a surety bond Issued by Philamlife. CD failed to pay
more than two (2) Installments
AB went after the surety but he was only able to obtain three-fourths (3/4) of the
total amount still due and owing from CD. AB seeks your advice on how he might. If at
all, recover the deficiency.
How would you counsel AB?
Answer:
Yes, he can recover the deficiency. The action of AB to go after the surety bond
cannot be taken to mean a waiver of his right to demand payment for the whole debt.
The amount received from the surety is only payment pro tanto, and an action may be
maintained for a deficiency debt.
Question No. 17:

Stating briefly the thesis to support your answer to each of the following cases, will
the death -
(a) of the lessee extinguish the lease agreement?
(b) of a partner terminate the partnership?
(c) of an agent end an agency?
Answer:
a) No. The death of the lessee will not extinguish the lease agreement, since lease
is not personal in character and the right is transmissible to the heirs. (Heirs
o/Dimaculangan VS. LAC. 170 SCRA 393).
(b) Yes. The death of a partner will terminate the partnership, by express
provision of par. 5, Art. 1830 of the Civil Code.
(c) Yes. The death of an agent extinguishes the agency, by express provision of
par.
3. Art 1919 of the Civil Code '
Question No. 18:
In order to secure a bank loan, XYZ Corporation surrendered its deposit certificate, with
a maturity date of 01 September 1997 to the bank. The corporation defaulted on the
due repayment of the loan, prompting the bank to encash the deposit certificate. XYZ
Corporation questioned the above action taken by the bank as being a case of pactum
commtssorium. The bank disagrees.
What is your opinion?
Answer:
We submit that there is no pactum commtssorium here. Deposits of money in

banks and similar institutions are governed by the provisions on simple loans (Art.
1980, Civil Code). The relationship between the depositor and a bank is one of creditor
and debtor. Basically this is a matter of compensation as all the elements of
compensation are present in this case [BPI vs. CA, 232 SCRA 302).
Additional Answer:
Where the security for the debt is also money deposited in a bank, it is not illegal
for the creditor to encash the time deposit certificates to pay the debtor's overdue
obligation. (Chu vs. CA, et aL, G.R. 78519. September 26, 1989).
Question No. 19:
(a) When would an employer's liability for damage, caused by an employee

in the performance of his assigned tasks, be primary and when would it be subsidiary
.in nature?
(b) Would the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
the employee be available to the employer in both instances?
Answer:
(a) The employer's liability for damage based on culpa aqutliana under Art. 2176
and 2180 of the Civil Code is primary, while that under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal
Code is subsidiary.
(b) The defense of diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is available only to those primarily liable
thereunder, but not to those subsidiarily liable under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code (Yumul vs. Juliano, 72 Phil. 94).
© there can be no easement over another easement for The same reason as in (a). An
easement, although it is a real right over an immovable* is not a corporeal right. There
is a Roman maxim which says that: There can be no servitude over another servitude.
Question No. 2:
While in Afghanistan, a Japanese by the name of Sato sold to Ramoncito, a

Filipino, a parcel of land situated in the Philippines which Sato inherited from his Filipino
mother.
1.What law governs the formality in the execution of the contract of sale? Explain
your answer and give its legal basis.
Answer:
Under Art. .16 par. 1, NCC, real property is subject to the law of the country where
it is situated.. Since the property is situated in the Philippines, Philippine law applies.
The rule of lex rei sitae in Article 16 prevails over lex loci contractus in Article 17 of the
NCC.
Alternative Answer:
Afghanistan law governs the formal requirements of the contract since the
execution is in Afghanistan. Art. 17 of the Civil Code provides that the forms and
solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the
laws of the country in which they are executed. However, if the contract was executed
before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in
Afghanistan, Philippine law shall apply.
2.What law governs the capacity of the Japanese to sell the land? Explain your
answer and give its legal basis.
Answer:
Japanese law governs the capacity of the Japanese to sell the land being his
personal law on the basis of an interpretation of Art. 15. NCC.
Alternative Answer:
a) Since capacity to contract is governed by the personal law of an

individual, the Japanese seller's capacity should be governed either by his national law
(Japanese law) or by the law of his domicile, depending upon whether Japan follows
the nationality or domiciliary theory of personal law for its citizens.
b) Philippine law governs the capacity of the Japanese owner in selling the
land. While as a general rule capacity of persons is governed by the law of his
nationality, capacity concerning transactions involving property is an exception. Under
Article 16 of the NCC, the capacity of persons in transactions involving title to property
is governed by the law of the country where the property is situated. Since the property
is in the Philippines, Philippine law governs the capacity of the seller.
3.What law governs the capacity of the Filipino to buy the land? Explain your
Answer:
Philippine law governs the capacity of the Filipino to buy the land. In addition to the
principle of lex rei sitae given above. Article 15 of the NCC specifically provides that
Philippine laws relating to legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines no matter where they are.
Question No. 3:
In 1980 spouses Felisa and George, both Filipino citizens. migrated to the United
States. Six years later they became American citizens. In 1989 they jointly filed a
petition before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon seeking to adopt Gilda, the 10-year
old daughter of Helen, Felisa's younger sister. The government opposed the petition on
the ground that Felisa and George Were disqualified since they were already American
citizens.
1. How will you resolve the petition? Explain

2. Will your answer be the same if George were a natural-born American
citizen? Explain.
3. Will your answer be the same if Felisa were the illegitimate parent of
Gilda? Explain.
4. Going back to the basic facts, suppose Felisa acquired her American
citizenship during the pendency of the petition for adoption, will your answer be the
same as in Question No. 1?
Explain.
Answer:
1. The petition should be denied because George is not qualified to adopt.

As husband and wife, they have to adopt jointly under Article 185 of the Family Code.
Their case does not fall in any of the exceptions where a spouse may adopt alone. In
Republic v. Toledano, (233 SCRA 9), the Court ruled that both spouses must be
qualified to adopt when required by law to adopt jointly. Being aliens, Felisa and
George are, as a rule, disqualified to adopt under Art. 184 of the FC. While Felisa falls
in one of the exceptions to this rule, being a former Filipino who seeks to adopt a
relative by consanguinity, George does not. He does not seek to adopt his relative by
consanguinity, or a legitimate child of his spouse and neither is his spouse a Filipino.
One of the spouses being disqualified to adopt, the petition has to be denied.
Alternative Answer:
Since the adopters are former Filipino citizens and the child sought to be adopted
is a relative by consanguinity of one of them, and since the rule of joint adoption by
spouses is duly complied with, the petition should be granted.
2. The answer will be the same if George were a natural-born American. He

will still not fall in any of the exceptions to the disqualification of aliens.
Alternative Answer:
No, my answer will be different because in that case, while Felisa is qualified to
adopt, the petition for joint adoption cannot be granted. It should be converted into a
petition only by Felisa. It cannot be granted as a joint petition but can be granted as an
individual petition.
3. No, the answer will be different. In such a case. Felisa may adopt alone. Her case
falls under the exception to the rule in Art. 185 requiring husband and wife to adopt
jointly, because she seeks to adopt her own illegitimate child. She is .qiialified to adopt
alone under Art. 184 because she is a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative by consanguinity. Hence, the court may decree the adoption of Gilda by Felisa.
4. Yes, the answer will be the same as in No. 1. The adopter must be qualified to adopt
not only on the date of filing of the case, but also on the date of judgment.
Question No.. 4:
Rommel was issued a certificate of title over a parcel of land in Quezon City. One
year later Rachelle, the legitimate owner of the land, discovered the fraudulent
registration obtained by Rommel. She filed a complaint against Rommel for
reconveyance and caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the certificate of
title issued to Rommel. Rommel now invokes the indefeasibility of his title considering
that one year has already elapsed from its issuance. He also seeks the cancellation of
the notice of lis pendens.
1. Will Rachelle’s suit for reconveyance prosper? Explain.
2. May the court cancel the notice of lis pendens even before final judgment
is rendered? Explain.
Answer:
1.Yes, Rachelle’s suit will prosper because all elements for kn action for
reconveyance are present, namely:
a. Rachelle is claiming dominical rights over the same land.

b. Rommel procured his title to the land by fraud.
T
c. The action was brought within the statutory period of four (4) years from
discovery of the fraud and not later than ten (10) years from the date of
registration of Rommel’s title.
d. Title to the land has not passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser
for value.
Rommel can invoke the indefeasibillty of his title if Rachelle had filed a petition to
reopen or review the decree of registration. But Rachelle instead filed an ordinary
action in personam for reconveyance. In the latter action, indefeasibility is not a valid
defense because, in filing such action, Rachelle is not seeking to nullify nor to impugn
the indefeasibility of Rommel’s title. She is only asking the court to compel Rommel to
reconvey the title to her as the legitimate owner of the land.
Alternative Answer:
Yes. The property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real owner by the
person in whose name it is registered. The Torrens system was not designed to shield
one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds the title in bad faith.
[WaLstromv.Mapa, Jr., (G.R. 38387. 29 Jan. 1990) as cited in Martinez, D., Summary
of SC Decisions, January to June, 1990. p. 3591.
2. A notice of lis pendens may be canceled even before final judgment upon
proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting or harassing the adverse
party or that the notice of lis pendens is not necessary to protect the right of the party
who caused it to be registered. (Section 77, P.D. No. 1529)
In this case, it is given that Rachelle is the legitimate owner of the land in question.
It can be said, therefore, that when she filed her notice of lis pendensher purpose was
to protect her interest in the land and not just to molest Rommel. It is necessary to
record the lis pendens to protect her interest because if she did not do it, there is a
possibility that the land will fall into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value and in
that event, the court loses control over the land making any favorable judgment thereon
moot and academic. For these reasons, the notice of lis pendens may not be canceled.
Question No. 5:
Olivia owns a vast mango plantation which she can no longer properly
manage due lo a lingering illness. Since she is indebted to Peter in the amount of
P500.000.00 she asks . Peter to manage the plantation and apply the harvest to
the payment of her obligation to him, principal and interest, until her
Indebtedness shall have been fully paid. Peter agrees.
1. What kind of contract is entered into between Olivia and Peter? Explain.
2. What specific obligations are imposed by law on Peter as a consequence

of their contract?
3. Does the law require any specific form for the validity of their contract?
Explain
4. May Olivia re-Require the plantation before her entire indebtedness shall
have been fully paid? Explain.
Answer:
1. A contract of antichresis was entered into between Olivia and Peter.
Under Article 2132 of the New Civil Code, by a contract of antichresis the creditor
acquires the right to receive the fruits of an immovable of his debtor, with the
obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, and thereafter to the principal
of his credit.
2. Peter must pay taxes and charges upon the land and bear the necessaiy
expenses for preservation and repair which he may deduct from the fruits. (Art. 2135,
NCC)
3. The amount of the principal and interest must be specified in writing,

otherwise the antichresis will be void. (Art. 2134, NCC)
4. No. Art. 2136 specifically provides that the debtor cannot re-acquire the
enjoyment of the immovable without first having totally paid what he owes the creditor.
However, it is potestative on the part of the creditor to do so in order to exempt him
from his obligation under Art. 2135, NCC. The debtor cannot re-acquire the enjoyment
unless Peter compels Olivia to enter again the enjoyment of the property^
Question No. 6;
On 10 September 1988 Kevin, a 26-ycar old businessman, married Karla, a
winsome lass of 18. Without the knowledge of their parents or legal guardians, Kevin
and Karla entered into an antenuptial contract the day before their marriage stipulating
that conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their marriage. At the time of their
marriage Kevin’s estate was worth 50 Million while Karla’s was valued at 2 Million.
A month after their marriage Kevin died in a freak helicopter accident. He left no
will, no debts, no obligations. Surviving Kevin, aside from Karla, are his only relatives:
his brother Luis and first cousin Lilia.
1. What property regime governed the marriage of Kevin and Karla?

Explain.
2. Determine the value of the estate of Kevin.
3. Who are Kevin’s heirs?
4. How much is each of Kevin’s heirs entitled to inherit?
Answer:
1. Since the marriage settlement was entered into without the consent and
without the participation of the parents (they did not sign the document), the marriage
settlement is invalid applying Art. 78, F.C. which provides .that a minor who according
to law may contract marriage may also enter into marriage settlements but they shall
be valid only if the person who may give consent to the marriage are made parties to
the agreement. (Karla was still a minor at the time the marriage settlement was
executed in Septem- , ber 1988 because the law, R.A. 6809, reducing the age of
majority to 18 years took effect on 18 December 1989). The marriage settlement being
void, the property regime governing the marriage is, therefore, absolute community of
property, under Art. 75 of the FC.
2. All the properties which Kevin and Karla owned at the time of marriage became
community property which shall be divided equally between them at dissolution. Since
Kevin owned 50 Million and Karla, 2 Million, at the time of the marriage, 52 Million
constituted their community properly. Upon the death of Kevin, the community was
dissolved and half of the 52 Million oi 26 Million is his share in the community. This 26
Million therefore is his estate.
3. Karla and Luis are the intestate heirs of Kevin.
4. They are entitled to share the estate equally under Article 1001 of the
NCC. Therefore, Karla gets 13 Million and Luis gets 13 Million.
Question No, 7:
Abraham died intestate on 7 January 1994 survived by his son Braulip. Abraham’s
older son Carlos died on 14 February 1990.
*
Darrilo who claims to be an adulterous child of Carlos , intervenes in the
proceedings for the settlement Of the estate of Abraham in representation of Carlos.
Danilo was legally adopted on 17 March 1970 by Carlos with the consent of the latter’s
wife.
1. Under the Family Code, how may an illegitimate filiation be proved?

Explain.
2. As lawyer for Danilo. do you have to prove Danilo’s illegitimate filiation?

Explain.
3. Can Daiiilo inherit from Abraham in representation of his father Carlos?

Explain.
Answer;
1. Under Art. 172 in relation to Art. 173 and Art, 175 of the FC, the filiation of
illegitimate children may be established in the same way and by the same evidence as
legitimate children. Art. 172 provides that the filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following: (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final Judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence Tof
the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and
Continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child: or (2) any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
2. No. Since Danilo has already been adopted by Carlos, he ceased to be

an illegitimate child. An adopted child acquires all the rights of a legitimate child under
Art. 189 of the FC.
3. No. he cannot. Danilo cannot represent Carlos as the latter’s adopted

child in the inheritance of Abraham because adoption did not make Danilo a legitimate
grandchild of Abraham. Adoption is personal between Carlos and Danilo. He cannot
also represent Carlos as the latter’s illegitimate child because in such case he is
barred by Art. 992 of the NCC from inheriting from his illegitimate grandfather
Abraham.
Alternative Answer:
An adopted child’s successional rights do not include the right to represent his
deceased adopter in the inheritance of the latter’s legitimate parent, in view of Art. 973
which provides that in order that representation may take place, the representative
must himself be capable of succeeding the decedent. Adoption by itself did not render
Danilo an heir of 'the adopter’s legitimate parent. Neither does his being a grandchild of
Abraham render him an heir of the latter because as an illegitimate child of Carlos, who
was a legitimate child of Abraham, Danilo is incapable of succeeding Abraham under
Art. 992 of the Code.
Question No. 8:
Pauline, Patricia and Priscilla formed a business partnership for the purpose of
engaging in neon advertising for a term of five (5) years. Pauline subsequently
assigned to Philip her interest in the partnership. When Patricia and Priscilla learned of
the assignment, they decided to dissolve the partnership before the expiration of its
term as they had an unproductive business relationship with Philip in the past. On the
other hand, unaware of the move of Patricia and Priscilla but sensing their
negative.reaction to his acquisition of Pauline’s interest, Philip simultaneously
petitioned for the dissolution of the partnership.
1. Is the dissolution done by Patricia and Priscilla without the consent of Pauline
or Philip valid? Explain.
2. Does Philip have any right to petition for the dissolution of the partnership
before the expiration of its specified term? Explain.
Answer:
1. Under Art. 1830 (1) (c) of the NCC. the dissolution by Patricia and
Priscilla is valid and did not violate the contract of partnership even though Pauline and
Philip did not consent thereto. The consent of Pauline is not necessary because she
had already assigned her interest to Philip, The consent of Philip is not also necessary
because the assignment to him of Pauline’s interest did not make him a partner, under
Art. 1813 of the NCC.
Alternative Answer:
*
Interpreting Art. 1830 (1) (c) to mean that if one of the partners had assigned his
interest on the partnership to another the remaining partners may not dissolve the part-
nership, the dissolution by Patricia and Priscilla without the consent of Pauline or Philip
is not valid.
2. No, Philip has no right to petition for dissolution because he does not
have the standing of a partner (Art. 1813 NCC).
Question No. 9:
Tim came into possession of an old map showing where a purported cache of
gold bullion was hidden. Without any authority from the government Tim conducted a
relentless search and finally found the treasure buried in a new river bed formerly part
of a parcel of land owned by spouses Tirso andTessie. TTie did river which used to cut
through the land of spouses Ursula and Urbito changed its course through natural
causes.
Suppose Tirso and Tessie were married on 2 August 1988 without executing any
antenuptial agreement. One year after their marriage, Tirso while supervising the
clearing of Tessie’s inherited land upon the latter’s request, accidentally found the
treasure not in
properly of Tessie. To whom shall the treasure belong? Explain.
Answer:
1. The treasure was found In a property of public dominion, the new river bed.
Since Tim did not have authority from the government and, therefore, was a trespasser,
he is not entitled to the one-half share allotted to a finder of hidden treasure. All of it will
go to the State. In addition, under Art. 438 of the NCC, in order that the finder be
entitled to the 1/2 share, the treasure must be found by chance, that is by sheer luck. In
this case, since Tim found the treasure not by chance but because he relentlessly
searched for it, he is not entitled to any share in the hidden treasure.
Alternative Answer:
The law grants a one-half share to a finder of hidden treasure provided he is not a
trespasser and the finding is by chance. It is submitted that Tim is not a trespasser
despite his not getting authority from the government, because the new river bed where
he found the treasure is property for public use (Art. 420 NCC), to which the public has
legitimate access. The question, therefore, boils down to whether or not the finding was
by chance in view of the fact that Tim “conducted a relentless search" before finding the
treasure. The strict or literal view holds that deliberate or intentional search precludes
entitlement to the one-half share allotted by law to the finder since the phrase “by
chance" means “by accident", meaning an unexpected discovery. The liberal view,
however, would sustain Tim's right to the allocated share interpreting the phrase in
question as meaning “by a stroke of good fortune", which does not rule out deliberate
or intentional search. It is submitted that the liberal view should prevail since in practical
reality, hidden treasure is hardly ever found without conscious effort to find it, and the
strict view would tend to render the codal provision in question illusory.
2. Since Tirso and Tessie were married before the efiectivity of the Family Code,
their property relation is governed by conjugal partnership of gains. Under Art. 54 of the
Civil Code, the share of the hidden treasure which the law
awards to the finder or the proprietor belongs to the conj ugal partnership of gains. The
one-half share pertaining to Tessie as owner of the land, and the one-half share
pertaining to Tirso as finder of the treasure, belong to the conjugal partnership of gains.
Question No. 10:
On 8 December 1991 Vanessa purchased from the Manila office of Euro-Aire an

airline ticket for its Flight No. 710 from Dallas to Chicago on 16 January 1992. Her flight
reservation was confirmed. On her scheduled departure Vanessa checked in on time at
the Dallas airport. However, at the check-in counter she discovered that she was
waitlisted with some other passengers because of intentional overbooking, a Euro-Aire
policy and practice. Euro-Aire admitted that Vanessa was not advised of such policy
when she purchased her plane ticket. Vanessa was only able to fly two days later by
taking another airline.
Vanessa sued Euro-Aire in Manila for breach of contract and damages. Euro-Aire
claimed that it cannot be held liable for damages because its practice of overbooking
passengers was allowed by the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. Vanessa on the
other hand contended that assuming that the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations
allowed intentional overbooking, the airline company cannot invoke the U.S. Code on
the ground that the ticket was purchased in Manila, hence, Philippine law should apply,
under which Vanessa can recover damages for breach of contract of carriage.
Decide. Discuss fully.
Answer:
Vanessa can recover damages under Philippine law for breach of contract of
carriage. Philippine law should govern as the law of the place where the plane tickets
were bought and the contract of carriage was executed. In Zalamea v. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 104235. Nov. 10. 1993) the Supreme Court applied Philippine law in
recovery of damages for breach of contract of carriage for the reason that it is the law
of the place where the contract was executed.
If the violation of the contract was attended with bad faith, there is a ground to
recover moral damages. But since there was a federal regulation which was the basis
of the act complained of, the airline cannot be in bad faith. Hence, only actual damages
can be recovered. The same is true with regards to exemplary damages.
Question No. 11:
Armando owns, a row of residential apartments in San Juan, Metro Manila, which
he rents out to tenants. On 1 April 1991 he left for the United States without appointing
any administrator to manage his apartments such that uncollected rentals accumulated
for three (3) years. Amparo, a niece of Armando, concerned with the Interest of her
uncle, took it upon herself to administer the property. As a consequence, she incurred
expenses in collecting the rents and in some instances even spent for necessary
repairs to preserve the property.
. 1. What juridical relation between Amparo and Armando, if any, has resulted from
Amparo’s unilateral act of assuming the administration of Armando’s apartments?
Explain.
2. What rights and obligations, if any, does Amparo have under the
circumstances? Explain.
Answer:
1. Negotiorum gestio existed between Amparo and Armando. She voluntarily took
charge of the agency or management of the business or property of her uncle without
any power from her uncle whose property was neglected. She is called the gestor
negotiorum or officious manager. (Art. 2144, NCC)
2. It is recommended by the Committee that an enumeration of any two (2)

obligations and two (2) rights as enumerated in Arts. 2145 to 2152, NCC, would entitle
the examinee to full credit.
Art. 2145. The officious manager shall perform his duties with all the diligence of a
good father of a family, and pay the damages which through his fault or negligence may
be suffered by the owner of the property or business under management.
The courts may, however, increase or moderate the indemnity according to the
circumstances of each case.
Art. 2146. If the officious manager delegates to another person all or some of his
duties, he shall be liable for the acts of the delegate, without prejudice to the direct
obligation of the latter toward the owner of the business.
The responsibility of two or more officious managers shall be solidary, unless

management was assumed to save the thing or business from imminent danger.
Art. 2147. The officious manager shall be liable for any fortuitous event:
(1) If he undertakes risky operations which the owner was not accustomed to
embark upon:
(2) If he has preferred his own interest to that of the owner;
(3) If he fails to return the property or business after demand by the owner;
(4) If he assumed the management in bad faith.
Art. 2148. Except when the management was assumed to save the property or
business from imminent danger, the officious manager shall be liable for fortuitous
events
(1) If he is manifestly unfit to cany on the management;
(2) If by his intervention he prevented a more competent person from taking

up the management.
Art. 2149. The ratification of the management by the owner of the business
produces the effects of an express agency, even if the business may not have been
successful.
Art. 2150. Although the officious management may not have been expressly ratified, the
owner of the property business who enjoys the advantages of the same shall be liable
for obligations Incurred In his interest, and shall reimburse the officious manager for the
necessary and useful expenses and for the damages which the latter may have suffered
in the performance of his duties.
The same obligation shall be incumbent upon him when, the management had for
its purpose the prevention of an imminent and manifest loss, although no benefit may
have been derived.
Art. 2151. Even though the owner did not derive any benefit and there has been
no imminent and manifest danger to the property or business, the owner is liable as
under the first paragraph of the preceding article, provided:
(1) The officious manager has acted in good faith, and
(2) The property or business is intact, ready to be returned to the owner.
Art. 2152. The officious manager is personally liable for contracts which he has
entered into with third persons, even though he acted in the name of the owner, and
there shall be no right of action between the owner and third persons.. These
provisions shall not apply:
(1) If the owner has expressly or tacitly ratified the management, or
(2) When the contract refers to things pertaining to the owner of the
business.
(NOTE: It is recommended by the Committee that an enumeration of any two (2)

obligations and any two (2) rights as enumerated in Arts. 2145 to 2152. NCC would
entitle thfe examinee to full credit.)
Question No, 12:
In 1983 PHILCREDIT extended loans to Rivett-Strom Machineries. Inc. (RIVETT-

STROM), consisting of US$10 Million for the cost of machineries imported and directly
paid by PHILCREDIT. and 5 Million in cash payable in installments over a period of ten
(10) years on the basis of
computed at the rate of exchange of the U.S. dollar vis-a-vis the Philippine peso at the
time of payment.
RIVETT-STROM made payments on both loans which if based on the rate of

exchange in 1983 would have fully settled the loans.
PHILCREDIT contends that the payments on both loans should be based on the
rate of exchange existing at the time of payment, which rate of exchange has been
consistently increasing, and for which reason there would still be a considerable
balance on each loan.
Is the contention of PHILCREDIT correct? Discuss fully.

.*
Answer;
As regards the loan consisting of dollars, the contention of PHILCREDIT is

correct. It has to be paid in Philippine currency computed on the basis of the exchange
rate at the time of payment.of each installment, as held in Kalalo v. Luz, 34 SCRA 337.
As regards the P5 Million loan in Philippine pesos, PHILCREDIT is wrong. The
payment thereof cannot be measured by the peso-dollar exchange rate. That will be
violative of the Uniform Currency Act (R.A. 529) which prohibits the payment of an
obligation which, although to be paid in Philippine currency, is measured by a
foreign.currency. (Palanca v. CA, 238 SCRA 593).
Question No. 13:
Salvador, a timber concessionaire, built on his lot a warehouse where he

processes and stores his timber for shipment. Adjoining the warehouse is a furniture
factory qwned by NARRAMIX of which Salvador is a majority stockholder. NARRAMIX
leased space in the warehouse where it placed its furniture-making machinery.
1. How would you classify the furniture-making machinery as property under
the Civil Code? Explain.
2. Suppose the lease contract between Salvador and NARRAMIX stipulates that at the
end of the lease the machinery shall become the property of the
Answer:
1. The furniture-making machinery is movable property because it was not installed

by the owner of the tenement. To become immovable under Art. 415 (5) of the NCC,
the machinery must be installed by the owner of the tenement.
Alternative Answer:
It depends on the circumstances of the case. If the machinery was attached in a

fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated from the tenement without
breaking the material or causing deterioration thereof, it is Immovable property [Art. 415
(3), NCC]. However, if the machinery can be transported from place to place without
impairment of the tenement to which they were fixed, then it is movable property. [Art.
416 (4), NCC}
2. It Is immovable property. When there is a provision in the lease contract making

the lessor, at the end of the lease, owner of the machinery installed by the lessee, the
said machinery is considered to have been installed by the lessor through the lessee
who acted merely as his agent. Having been Installed by the owner of the tenement;
the machinery became immovable under Art. 415 of the NCC. (Davao Sawmill v.
Castillo, 61 Phil. 709)
Question No. 14:
Yvette was found to be positive for HIV virus, considered sexually transmissible,
serious and incurable. Her boyfriend Joseph was aware of her condition and yet
married her. After two (2) years of cohabiting with Yvette, and in his belief that she
would probably never be able to bear him a healthy child, Joseph now wants to have his
marriage with Yvette annulled. Yvette opposes the suit contending that Joseph is
estopped from seeking annulment of their marriage since he knew even before their
marriage that she was afflicted with HIV virus.
Can the action of Joseph for annulment of his marriage with Yvette prosper?
Discuss fully.
Answer:
No. Joseph knew that Yvette was HIV positive at the time of the marriage. He is.
therefore, not an injured party. The FC gives the right to annul the marriage only to an
injured party. [Art. 47 (5). FC)
Alternative Answer:
The action for annulment can prosper because the prescriptive period of five (5)
years has riot yet lapsed. [Art. 45 (6), FC):
Question No. 15:
Michelle, the French daughter of Penreich, a German national, died In Spain

leaving real properties in the Philippines as well as valuable personal properties in
Germany.
1. What law determines who shall succeed the deceased? Explain your
2. What law regulates the distribution of the real properties in the

Philippines? Explain your answer and give its legal basis.
3. What law governs the distribution of the personal properties in Germany?

Explain your answer and give its legal basis.
Answer:
Assuming that the estate of the decedent is being settled in the Philippines)
1. The national law of the decedent (French law) shall govern in determining who
will succeed to his estate. The legal basis is Art. 16 par. 2, NCC.
Alternative Answer:
French law shall govern the distribution of his real properties in the Philippines
except when the real property is land which may be transmitted to a foreigner only by
hereditary succession
2. The distribution of the real properties in the Philippines shall be governed by

French law. The legal basis is Art. 16. NCC).
3.The distribution of the personal properties in Germany shall be governed by

French law. The legal basis is Art. 16. NCC).
Question No. 16:
Lawrence, a retired air force captain, decided to go into the air transport business.
He purchased an aircraft in cash except for an outstanding balance of P500,000.00. He
incurred an indebtedness of P300.000.00 for repairs with an aircraft repair company.
He also borrowed PI Million from a bank for additional capital and constituted a chattel
mortgage on the aircraft to secure the loan.
While on a test flight the aircraft crashed causing physical injuries to a third party
who was awarded damages of P200.000.00.
Lawrence’s insurance claim for damage to the aircraft was denied thus leaving him
nothing else but the aircraft which was then valued only at PI Million. Lawrence was
declared insolvent.
Assuming that the aircraft was sold for PI Million, give the order of preference of
the creditors of Lawrence and distribute the amount of PI Million.
Answer:
Assuming that the aircraft was sold for P1 Million, there is no order of preference.
The P1 Million will all go to the bank as a chattel mortgagee because a chattel
mortgage under Art. 2241 (4) NCC, defeats Art. 2244 (12) and (14). Art. 2241 (3) and
(5) are not applicable because the aircraft is no longer in the possession of the creditor.
Question No. 17:
In 1980. Maureen purchased two lots in a plush subdivision registering Lot 1 in her
name and Lot 2 in the name of her brother Walter with the latter’s consent. The idea
was to circumvent a subdivision policy against the acquisition of more than one lot by
one buyer. Maureen constructed a house on Lot 1 with an extension on Lot 2 to serve
as a guest house. In 1987, Walter who had suffered serious business losses demanded
that Maureen remove the extension house since the lot on which the extension was
built was his property. In 1992, Maureen sued for the reconveyance to her of lit 2
asserting that a resulting trust was created when she had the lot registered in Walter’s
name even if she paid the purchase price. Walter opposed the suit arguing. that assum-
ing the existence of a resulting trust the action of Maureen has already prescribed since
ten years have already elapsed from the registration of the title in his name.
Decide. Discuss fully
Answer:
This is a case of an implied resulting trust. If Walter claims to have acquired

ownership of the land by prescription or if he anchors his defense on extinctive
prescription, the ten year period must be reckoned from 1987 when he demanded that
Maureen remove the extension house on Lot No. 2 because such demand amounts to
an express repudiation of the trust and it was made known to Maureen. The action for
reconveyance filed in 1992 is not yet barred by prescription. (Spouses Huang u. Court
of Appeals. Sept. 13, 1994).
Question No. 18:

Isidro and Irma. Filipinos, both 18 years of age, were passengers of Flight No. 317 of
Oriental Airlines. The plane they boarded was of Philippine registry. While en route from
Manila to Greece some passengers hijacked the plane, held the chief pilot hostage at
the cockpit and ordered him to fly instead to Libya. During the hijacking Isidro suffered a
heart attack and was on the verge of death . Since Irma was already eight months
pregnant by Isidro, she pleaded to the hijackers to allow the assistant pilot to solemnize
her marriage with Isidro. Soon after the marriage, Isidro expired. As the plane landed in
Libya Irma gave birth. However, the baby died a few minutes after complete delivery.
Back in the Philippines Irma immediately filed a claim for inheritance. The parents of
Isidro opposed her claim contending that the marriage between her and Isidro void ab
initio on the following grounds: (a) they had not given their consent to the marriage of
their son; (b) there was no marriage license: (c) the solemnizing officer had no authority
to perform the marriage: and, (d) the solemnizing officer did not file an affidavit of
marriage with the proper civil registrar.
1.
Resolve each of the contentions ([a] to (d)) raised by the parents of Isidro.
Discuss fully.
2. Does. Irma have any successional rights at all? Discuss fully.
Answer;
1. (a) The fact that the parents of Isidro and of Irma did
not give their consent to the marriage did not make the marriage void ab
initio. The marriage is merely voidable under Art 45 of the FG.
(b) Absence of marriage license did not make the marriage void ab initio. Since
the marriage was solemnized in articulomortis, it was exempt from the
license requirement under Art. 31 of the FC.
(c) On the assumption that the assistant pilot was acting for and in behalf of
the airplane chief who was under disability, and by reason of the extra-
ordinary and exceptional circumstances of the case (le. hostage situation),
the marriage was solemnized by an authorized officer under Art. 7
(3) and Art. 31, of the FC.
(d) Failure of the solemnizing officer to file the affidavit of marriage did not
affect the validity of the marriage. It is merely an irregularity which may
subject the solemnizing officer to sanctions.
Alternative Answer:
Considering that the solemnizing officer has no authority to perform the marriage
because under Art. 7 the law authorizes only the airplane chief, the marriage is void,
hence, a, c, and d are immaterial.
2. Irma succeeded to the estate of Isidro as his surviving spouse to the estate of
her legitimate child. When
Isidro died, he was succeeded by his surviving wife lima, and his legitimate unborn
child. They divided the estate equally between them, the child excluding the parents of
Isidro. An unbom child is considered bom for all purposes favorable to it provided it is
bom later. The child was considered bom because, having an intra-ulerine life of more
than seven months, it lived for a few minutes after its complete delivery. It was
legitimate because it was bom within the valid marriage of the parents. Succession is
favorable to it. When the child died, Irma inherited the share of the child. However, the
share of the child in the hands of Irma is subject to reserva troncal for the benefit of the
relatives of the child within the third degree of consanguinity and who belong to the line
of Isidro.
Alternative Answer:
If the marriage is void. Irma has no successional rights with respect to Isidro but
she would have successional rights with respect to the child.
1994 Bar Examination
Question No. 1:
In Private International Law (Conflict of Laws) what is:

1) Cognovit? •
2) A borrowing statute?
3) Characterization?
1) a) Cognovit is a confession of judgment whereby a portion of the complaint is

confessed by the defendant who denies the rest thereof (.Philippine law Dictionary, 3rd
Ed.) (Ocampo v. Florenciano, L-M 13553, 2/23/50).
b) Cognovit is a “statement of confession". Oftentimes, it is referred to as a

“power of attorney" or simply as a “power", it is the written authority of the debtor and
his direction to the clerk of the district court, or justice of the peace to enter Judgment
against the debtor as stated therein. (Words and Phrases, vol. 7, pp. 115-166).
c) Cognovit is a plea in an action which acknowledges that the defendant

did undertake and promise as the plaintiff in its declaration has alleged, and that it
cannot deny that it owes and unjustly detains from the plaintiff the sum claimed by him
in his declaration, and consents that judgment be entered against the defendant for a
certain sum. (Words and Phrases, vol. 7, pp. 115-166).
d) Cognovit is a note authorizing a lawyer for confession of judgment by

defendant.
2) “Borrowing Statute" - Laws of the state or jurisdiction used by another slate in

deciding conflicts questioned
involved in the choice of law (Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed. 1979).
3)a) “Characterization" is otherwise called “classification” or “qualification." It is

the process of assigning a disputed question to its correct legal category (Private Inter-
national Law, Salonga).
b) “Characterization" is a process in determining under what category a certain

set of facts or rules fall. (Paras, Conflict of Laws, p. 94, 1984 ed.)
Question No. 2:
1) What is the doctrtne of forum non conveniens?

2) What is a “long arm statute"?
1) a) Forum non conveniens is a principle in Private International Law that where

the ends of justice strongly indicate that the controversy may be more suitably tried
elsewhere, then jurisdiction should be declined and the parties relegated to relief to be
sought in another forum. (Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, p. 254; 1982 ed.).
b) Where in a broad sense the ends of justice strongly indicate that the
controversy may be more suitably tried elsewhere, thenjurisdiction should be declined
and the parties relegated to relief to be sought in another forum. (Handbook on Private
International Law, Aruego).
c)Forum non conveniens means simply that a court may resist imposition
upon its jurisdiction even whenjuris- diction is authorized by the letter of a general
venue statute. (Salonga. Private International Law, p. 51, 1967 ed.)
d) Forum non conveniens is a doctrine whereby a court of law having full

jurisdiction over a case brought in a proper venue or district declines to determine the
case on its merits because justice would be better served by the trial over the case in
another jurisdiction. (Webster's Dictionary)
(2) a) Long arm statute is a legislative act which provides for personal Jurisdiction,
via substituted service or process, over persons or corporations which are non-
residents of the state and which voluntarily go into the state, 1 directly or by agent or
communicate with persons in the state for limited purposes, in actions which concern
claims relating to performance of execution of those purposes [Black’s Law Dictionary,
5th Ed. 1979).
b) Long arm statute refers simply to authorized substituted service.
Question No, 3:
1) What is the procedure of consulta when an instrument is denied registration?
2)Distinguish the Torrens system of land registration from the system of recording
of evidence of title.
3) How do you register now a deed of mortgage of a parcel of land originally

registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law?
1) a ) (1) The Register of Deeds shall notify the interested party in writing, setting
forth the defects of the instrument or the legal ground relied upon for denying the reg-
istration, and advising that if he is not agreeable to such ruling, he may, without
withdrawing the documents from the Registry , elevate the matter by Consulta to the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA).
(2) Within five (5) days from receipt of notice of denial, the party in
interest shall file his Consulta with the Register of Deeds concerned and pay the
consulta fee.
3) After receipt of the Consulta and of the corresponding fee, the Register
of Deeds makes an annotation of the pending consulta at the back of the
certificate of title.
(4)The Register of Deeds then elevates the case to the LRA Administrator
with certified records thereof and a summary of the facts and issues involved.
(5) The LRA Administrator then conducts hearings after due notice or may
just require parties to submit their memoranda.
(6) After hearing, the LRA Administrator issues an order prescribing the
step to be taken or the memorandum 16 be made. H is resolution in consulta
shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds unless reversed on
appeal by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court. (Section 117. P.D.
1529).
b) The procedure of consulta is a mode of appeal from denial by the

Register of Deeds of the registration of the instrument to the Commissioner of Land
Registration.
c) Within five days from receipt of the notice of denial, the interested party
may elevate the matter by consulta to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall
enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. Resolution
in consulta shall be binding upon all Registers of Deeds provided that the party in
interest may appeal to the Court of Appeals within the period prescribed (Sec. 117. P.D.
1529).
2) a) The Torrens system of land registration is a system for the registration of title
to the land. Thus, under this system what is entered in the Registry of Deeds, is a
record of the owner’s estate or interest in the land, unlike the system under the Spanish
Mortgage Law or the system under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code as
amended by Act 3344 where only the evidence of such title is recorded. In the latter
system, what is recorded is the deed of conveyance from hence the owner's title
emanated—and not the title itself.
b) Torrens system of land registration is that which is prescribed in Act 496

(now PD 1529), which is either judicial or quasi-judicial. System or recording of
evidence of title is merely the registration of evidence of acquisitions of land with the
Register of Deeds, who annotates the same on the existing title, cancels the old one
and issues a new title based on the document presented for registration.
3) a) After the Spanish Mortgage Law was abrogated by P.D. 892 on February
16,1976, all lands covered by Spanish titles that were not brought under the torrens
system within six (6) months from the date thereof have been considered as
“unregistered private lands."
Thus, a deed of mortgage affecting land originally registered under the Spanish
Mortgage Law is now governed by the system of registration of transactions or
instruments affecting unregistered land under Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3344. Under this law, the instrument pr
transaction affecting unregistered land is entered in a book provided for the purpose
but the registration thereof , is purely voluntary and does not adversely affect third
persons who have a better right.
b) By recording and registering with the Register of Deeds of the place where
the land is located, in accordance with Act 3344. However, P.D. 892 required holders
of Spanish title to bring the same under the Torrens System within 6 months from its
effectivity on February 16,1976.
Question No. 4:
1) Are decisions of the Court Of Appeals considered laws?
2)What are the binding effects of an obiter dictum and a dissenting opinion?
3) How can a decision of the Supreme Court be set aside?
Alternative Answers;
1) a) No. but decisions of the Court of Appeals may serve as precedents for
inferior courts .on points of law not covered by any Supreme Court decision, and a
ruling of the Court of Appeals may become a doctrine. (Miranda v. Imperial 77 Phil.
1066).
b) No. Decisions of the Court of Appeals merely have persuasive, and

therefore no mandatory effect. However, a conclusion or pronouncement which covers
a point of law still undecided may still serve as judicial guide and it is possible that the
same maybe raised to the status of doctrine, if after it has been subjected to test in the
crucible of analysis, the Supreme Court should find that it has merits and qualities
sufficient for its consideration as a rule of jurisprudence [Civil Code. Paras).
2) None. Obiter dictum and opinions are not necessary to the determination
of a case. TTiey are not binding and cannot have the force of official precedents. It is
as if the Court were turning aside from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects:
a dissenting opinion affirms or overrules a claim, right or obligation. It neither disposes
nor awards anything it merely expresses the view of the dissenter. (Civil Code, Paras)
3) A decision of a division of the Supreme Court may be set aside by the
Supreme Court sitting en banc, a Supreme Court decision may be set aside by a
contrary ruling of the Supreme Court itself or by a corrective legislative act of
Congress, although said laws cannot adversely affect those favored prior to the
Supreme Court decision. (Civil Code, Paras).
Question No. 5:
1) Can a husband and wife form a limited partnership to engage in real estate
business, with the wife being a limited partner?
2) Can two corporations organize a general partnership under the Civil Code of the
Philippines?
3) Can a corporation and an individual form a general partnership?
1)a) Yes. The Civil Code prohibits a husband and wife from constituting a
universal partnership. Since a limited partnership is not a universal partnership, a
husband and wife may validly form one.
b) Yes. While spouses cannot enter into a universal partnership, they can enter
into a limited partnership or be members thereof (CIR v. Suter, et at., 27 SCRA 152).
2) a) No. A corporation is managed by its board of directors. If the corporation

were to become a partner, co-partners would have the power to make the corporation
party to transactions in an irregular manner since the partners are not agents subject to
the control of the Board of Directors. But a corporation may enter into a Joint venture
with another corporation as long as the nature of the venture is in line with the business
authorized by its charter. (Thdson & Co., Inc. v. Bolano, 95 Phil. 106).
b)
As a general rule a corporation may not form a general partnership with
another corporation or an Individual because a corporation may not be bound by
persons who are. neither directors nor officers of the corporation.
However, a corporation may form a general partnership with another corporation or

an individual provided the following conditions are met:
1) The Articles of Incorporation of the corporation expressly allows the

corporation to enter into
partnerships;
2) The Articles of Partnership must provide that all partners will manage the
partnership, and they shall be jointly and severally liable; and
3) In case of a foreign corporation, it must be licensed to do business in the

Philippines.
c)No. A corporation may not be a general partner because the principle of

mutual agency in general partnership allowing the other general partner to bind the
corporation will violate the corporation law principle that only the board of directors may
bind the corporation.
#
3) No, for the same reasons given in the Answer to Number 2 above.
Question No. 6:
Paulita left the conjugal home because of the excessive drinking of her husband,
Alberto. Paulita, out of her own endeavor, was able to buy a parcel of land which she
was able to register under her name with the addendum “widow." She also acquired
stocks in a listed corporation registered in her name. Paulita sold the parcel of land to
Rafael, who first examined the original of the transfer certificate of title.
1) Has Alberto the right to share in the shares of stock acquired by Paulita?
2) Can Alberto recover the land from Rafael?
1. a) Yes. The Family Code provides.that all property acquired during the
marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered
in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be absolute community property
unless the contrary is proved. marriage despite the fact that those shares were
registered only in her name. Alberto's right to claim his share will only arise, however,
at dissolution.
b)The presumption is still that the shares of stock are owned Ln common.
Hence, they will form part of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership
depending on what the property regime is.
c) Since Paulita acquired the shares of stock by onerous title during the
marriage, these are part of the conjugal or absolute community property as the case
may be (depending on whether the marriage was celebrated prior to, or after, the
effectivity of the Family Code). Her physical separation from her husband did not
dissolve the community of property. Hence, the husband has a right to share iri the
shares of stock.
2) a) Under a community of property, whether absolute or relative, the disposition

of property belonging to such community is void if done by Just one spouse without the
consent of the other or authority of the proper court. However, the land was registered
in the name of Paulita as “widow". Hence, the buyer has the right to rely upon what
appears in the record of the Register of Deeds and should, consequently, bie protected.
Alberto cannot recover the land from Rafael but would have the right of recourse
against his wife.
b) The parcel of land is absolute community property having been acquired

during the marriage and through Paulita’s industry despite the registration being only in
the name of Paulita. The land being community property, its sale to Rafael without the
consent of Alberto is void. However, since the land is registered in the name of Paulita
as widow, there is nothing in the title which would raise a suspicion for Rafael to make
inquiry. He, therefore, is an innocent purchaser for value from whom the land may no
longer be recovered.
c) No. Rafael is an innocent purchaser in good faith who, upon relying on the
correctness of the certificate of title, acquires rights which are to be protected by the
courts.
Under the estalished principles of land registration law, the presumption is that
the transferee of registered land is not aware of any defect in the title of the property he
purchased. (See Tajonera v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 467). Moreover, the person
dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of its certificate of title
and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the
condition of the property. {Director of Lands v. Abache, et al., 73 Phil. 606). No strong
considerations of public policy have been presented which would lead the Court to
reverse the established and sound doctrine that the buyer in good faith of p registered
parcel of land does not have to look beyond the Torrens Title and search for any
hidden defect or inchoate right which may later invalidate or diminish his right to what
he purchased. (Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 271)
b)The parcel of land is absolute community property having been acquired

during the marriage and through Paulita’s Industry despite registration only in the name
of Paulita. The land being community property, its sale to Rafael without the consent of
Alberto is void.
Question No, 7:
In 1975, Carol begot a daughter Bing, out of wedlock. When Bing was ten years
old. Carol gave her consent for Bing’s legal adoption by Norma and Manuel, which was
granted by the court in 1990. In 1991, Carol learned that Norma and Manuel were
engaged in a call-girl-ring that catered to tourists. Some of the girls lived with Norma
and Manuel. Carol got Bing back, who in the first place wanted to return to her natural
mother.
1) Who has a better right to the custody of Bing. Carol or Norma?
2) Aside from taking physical custody of Bing, what legal actions can Carol
lake to prolecl Bing?
1) a) It depends on whether or not Bing was at least 18 years old at the time
Carol asserts the prerogative to take custody of Bing. If she was at least 18 years old.
then she is no longer under parental authority and neither Carol nor Norma can assert
the prerogative to take custody. However, if she was less than 18 years old, then
Norma has a better right since the adoption by Norma of Bing terminates the parental
authority of Carol over Bing. ,
bj The natural mother, Carol, should have the better right in light of the
principle that the child’s welfare is the paramount consideration in custody rights.
Obviously, Bing’s continued stay in her adopting parents’ house; where interaction with
the call1 girls is inevitable, would be detrimental to her moral and spiritual development.
This could be the reason for Bing’s expressed desire to return to her natural mother. It
should be noted, however, that Bing is no longeF a minor, being 19 years of age now.
It is doubtful that a court can still resolve the question of custody over one who is
suiJuris and not otherwise incapacitated.
2) a) On the assumption that Bing is still a minor or otherwise incapacitated,
Carol may petition the proper court for resolution or rescission of the decree of
adoption on the ground that the adopting parents have exposed, or are exposing, the
child to corrupt influence, tantamount to giving her corrupting orders or examples. She
can also ask for the revesting in her of parental authority over Bing. If, however, Bing is
already 19 years of age and therefore no longer a minor, it is not Carol but Bing herself
who can petition the court for Judicial rescission of the adoption, provided she can
show a ground for disinheritance of an ascendant.
Carol may file an action to deprive Norma of parental authority under Article 231 of the
Family Code or file an action for the rescission of the adoption under in relation to
Article 231 (2) of the Family Code
Question No. 8:
In January 1993, Four-Gives Corporation leased the entire twelve floors of the
GQS Towers Complex, for a period of ten years at a monthly rental of P3.000,000.00.
There Is a provision in the contract that the monthly rentals should be paid within the
first five days of the month. For the month of March, May, June, October and
December 1993. the rentals were not paid on time with some rentals being delayed up
to ten days. The delay was due to the heavy paper work involved in processing the
checks.
Four-Gives Corporation also subleased five of the twelve floors to wholly-owned

subsidiaries. The lease contract expressly prohibits the assignment of the lease
contract or any portion thereof. The rental value of the building has' increased by 50%
since its lease to Four-Gives Corporation.
1) Can the building owner eject Four-Gives Corporation on grounds of the

repeated delays in the payment of the rent?
2) Can the building owner ask for the cancellation of the contract for
violation of the provision against assignment?
a) The “repeated delays" in the payment of rentals would, at best, be a slight or casual
breach which does not furnish a ground for ejectment especially because the delays
were only due to heavy paper work. Note that there was not even a demand for
payment obviously because the delay lasted for only-a few days (10 days being the
longest), at the end of which time payments were presumably made and were accepted.
There was, therefore, no default. Note also that there was no demand made upon the
lessee to vacate the premises for non-payment of the monthly rent.” -There is.
Therefore no cause of action for ejectment arising from the “repeated
b) The buildipg owner cannot eject Four-Gives Corporation on the ground of repeated
delays in the payment of rentals. The delay In the payment of the rentals is minimal and
cannot be made the basis of an ejectment suit. The delay was due to the heavy paper
work involved in processing the checks. It would be otherwise if the lease contract
stated that in the payment of rentals within the first five days of the month, time is of the
essence or that the lessee will be indelay if he fails to pay within the agreed period
without need of demand. In this case he can judicially eject the tenant on the ground of
lack of payment of the price stipulated after a demand to vacate. (Article 1673(2), New
Civil Code).
c) No. Resolution of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach, but
only for such substantial and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the
parties in making the agreement. (Zepeda v. CA, 216 SCRA 293). The delay of ten (10)
days is not such a substantial and fundamental breach to warrant the resolution of the
contract of lease specially so when the delay was due to the heavy paperwork In
processing the checks.
2) a) No. Sublease is different from assignment of lease. Sublease, not being

prohibited by the contract of lease is therefore allowed and cannot be invoked as a
ground to cancel the lease.
b) No, the lessor cannot have the lease cancelled for alleged violation of the
provision against assignment. The lessee did not assign the lease, or any portion
thereof, to the subsidiaries. It merely subleased some floors to its subsidiaries. Since
the problem does not state that the contract of lease contains a prohibition against
sublease, the sublease is lawful, the rule being that in the absence of an express
prohibition a lessee may sublet the thing leased, in whole or in part, without prejudice to
his/its responsibility to the lessor for the performance of the contract.
Question No. 9:
1) The complete publication of the Family Code was made on August 4.
1987. On September 4. 1987, Junior Cruz and Gemma Reyes were married before a
municipal mayor. Was the marriage valid?
2) Suppose the couple got married on September 1, 1994 at the Manila

Hotel before the Philippine Consul General to Hongkong* who was on vacation in
Manila. The couple executed an affidavit consenting to the celebration, of the marriage
at the Manila Hotel. Is the marriage valid?
Answer:
P
1) a) Yes, the marriage is valid. The Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988. At the time of the marriage on September 4, 1987, municipal mayors were
empowered to solemnize marriage under the Civil Code of 1950.
2) a) The marriage is not valid. Consuls and vice- consuls are empowered to
solemnize marriages between Philippine citizens abroad in the consular office of the
foreign country to which they were assigned and have no power to solemnize marriage
on Philippine soil.
b) A Philippine consul is authorized by law to solemnize marriages abroad

between Filipino citizens. He has no authority to solemnize a marriage in the
Philippines. Consequently, the marriage in question is void, unless either or both of
the contracting parties believed in good faith that the consul general had authority
to solemnize their marriage in which case the marriage is valid.
Question No. 10:
On his deathbed. Vicente was executing a will. In the room were Carissa,
Carmela, Comelio and Atty. Cimpo, a notary public. Suddenly, there was a street brawl
which caught Comelio’s attention, prompting him to look out the window. Comelio did
not see Vicente sign a will. Is the will valid?
a) Yes. The will is valid. The law does not require a witness to actually see
the testator sign the will. It is sufficient if the witness could have seen the act of signing
had he chosen to do so by casting his eyes to the proper direction.
b) Yes, the will is valid. Applying the “test of position", although Comelio did
not actually see Vicente sign the will, Comelio was in the proper position to see Vicente
sign if Comelio so wished.
Question No. 11:
In 1978, Bobby borrowed P 1,000,000.00 from Chito payable in two years. The
loan, which was evidenced by a promissory note, was secured by a mortgage on real
property. No action was filed by Chito to collect the loan or to foreclose the mortgage.
But in 1991, Bobby, without receiving any amount from Chito, executed another
promissory note which was worded exactly as the 1978 promissory note, except for the
date thereof, which was the date of its execution.
1) Can Chito demand payment on the 1991 promissory note in 1994?
2) Can Chito foreclose the real estate mortgage if Bobby fails to make good his
obligation under the 1991 promissory note?
Answer:
1)Yes, Chito can demand payment on the 1991 promissory note in 1994.
Although the 1978 promissory note for PI million payable two years later or in 1980
became a natural obligation after the lapse of ten (10) years, such natural obligation
can be a valid consideration of a novated promissory note dated in 1991 and payable
two years later, or in 1993.
All the elements of an implied real novation are present:

a) an old valid obligation;
b) a new valid obligation;
c) capacity of the parties;
d) animus novandi or intention to novate; and
e) The old and the new obligation should be incompatible with each other on
all material points (Article 1292). The two promissory notes cannot stand
together, hence, the period of prescription of ten (10) years has not yet
lapsed.
2) No. The mortgage being an accessory contract prescribed with the loan. The
novation of the loan, however, did not expressly include the mortgage, hence, the
mortgage is extinguished under Article 1296 of the NCC. The contract has been
extinguished by the novation or extinction of the principal obligation insofar as third
parties are concerned.
Question No. 12:
Rosa and Ariel were married in the Catholic Church of Tarlac, Tarlac on January 5,
1988. In 1990, Ariel went to Saudi Arabia to work. There, after being converted Into
Islam, Ariel married Mystica. Rosa learned of the second marriage of Ariel on January
1. 1992 when Ariel returned to the Philippines with Mystica. Rosa filed an action for
legal separation on February 5. 1994.
1) Does Rosa have legal grounds to ask for legal separation?
2) Has the action prescribed?
Alternative Answer:
a) Yes, the abandonment of Rosa by Ariel for more than one (1) year is a ground
for legal separation unless upon returning to the Philippines, Rosa agrees to
cohabit with Arief which is allowed under the Muslim Code. In this case, there is
condonation.
b)
Yes. The contracting of a subsequent bigamous marriage whether in the
Philippines or abroad is a ground for legal separation under Article 55(7) of the Family
Code. .Whether the second marriage is valid or not, Ariel having converted into Islam,
is immaterial.
1) No. Under Article 57 of the Family Code, the aggrieved spouse must file
the action within five (5) years from the occurrence or the cause. The subsequent
marriage of Ariel could not have occurred earlier than 1990, the time he went to Saudi
Araibia. Hence, Rosa has until 1995 to bring the action under the Family Code.
Question No. 13;
In 1991, Victor established judicially out of conjugal property, a family home in

Manila worth P200,000.00 and extrajudicially a second family home in Tagaytay worth
P50,000.00. Victor leased the family home in Manila to a foreigner. Victor and his
family transferred to another house Of his in Pasig.
Can the two family homes be the subject of execution on a judgment against
Victor’s wife for non-payment of the purchase in 1992 of household appliances?
Answer:
The two (2) so-called family homes can be the subject of execution. Neither of the
abodes are considered family homes because for purposes of availing the benefits
under the Family Code, there can only be one (1) family home which is defined as the
“dwelling house” where the husband and the wife and their family actually “reside" and
the land on which it is situated. (Arts. 152 and 161, Family Code)
Question No. 14:
On January 5, 1992, Nonoy obtained a loan of PI,000,000.00 from his friend Rally.
The promissory note did not stipulate any payment for interest. The note was due on
January 5, 1993 but before this date the two became political enemies. Nonoy, out of
spite, deliberately defaulted in paying the note, thus forcing Raffy to sue him.
1) What actual damages can Rafly recover?

2) Can Raffy ask for moral damages from Nonoy?
3) Can Raffy ask for nominal damages?
4) Can Raffy ask for temperate damages?
5) Can Raffy ask for attorney’s fees?
Answer:
1) Raffy may recover the amount of the promissory note of PI million,
together with interest at the legal rate from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.
In addition, however, inasmuch as the debtor is in bad faith, he is liable for all damages
which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. (Art.
2201(2), NCC).
2) Yes. under Article 2220, NCC moral damages are recoverable in case of
breach of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
3) Nominal damages may not be recoverable in this case because Raffy

may already be indemnified of his losses with the award of actual and compensatory
damages. Nominal damages are adjudicated only in order that a right of the plaintiff,
which has been violated or invaded by the defendant may be vindicated or recognized,
and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
4) Raffy may ask for. but would most likely not be awarded temperate
damages, for the reason that his actual damages may already be compensated upon
proof thereof with the promissory note. Temperate damages may be awarded only
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. (Article 2224, Civil Code)
5) Yes, under paragraph 2, Article 2208 of the Civil Code, considering that
Nonoy's act or omission has compelled Raffy to litigate to protect his interests.
Furthermore, attorneys’ fees may be awarded by tne court when it is Just and
equitable. (Article 2208(110) Civil Code).
Question No. 15:
Vini constructed a building on a parcel of land he leased from Andrea. He chattel

mortgaged the land to Felicia. When he could not pay Felicia, Felicia initiated
foreclosure proceedings. Vini claimed that the building he had constructed on the
leased land cannot be validly foreclosed because the building was, by law, an
immovable.
Is Vini correct?
a) The Chattel Mortgage is void and cannot be foreclosed because the

building is an immovable and cannot be an object of a chattel mortgage.
b) It depends. If the building was intended and is built of light materials, the
chattel mortgage may be considered as valid as between the parties and it may be
considered in respect to them as movable property, since it can be removed from one
place to another. But if the building is of strong material and is not capable of being
removed or transferred without being destroyed, the chattel mortgage is void and
cannot be foreclosed.
c) If it was the land which Vini chattel mortgaged, such mortgage would be
void, or at least unenforceable, since he was not the owner of the land.
If what was mortgaged as a chattel is the building, the chattel mortgage is valid as
between the parties only, on grounds of estoppel which would preclude the mortgagor
from assailing the contract on the ground that its subject-matter is an immovable.
Therefore Vini's defense is untenable, and Felicia can foreclose the mortgage over the
building, observing, however, the procedure prescribed for the execution of sale of
ajudgment debtor's immovable under Rule 39, Rules of Court, specifically, that the
notice of auction sale should be published in a newspaper of general circulation.
d) The problem that Vini mortgaged the land by way of a chattel mortgage is
untenable. Land can only be the subject matter of a real estate mortgage and only an
absolute owner of real property may mortgage a parcel of land. (Article 2085 (2) Civil
Code). Hence, there can be no foreclosure.
But on the assumption that what was mortgaged by way of chatlel mortgage was
the building on leased land, then the parties are treating the building as chattel. A
building that is not merely superimposed on the ground is an immovable property and
a chattel mortgage on said building is legally void but the parties cannot be allowed to
disavow their contract on account of estoppel by deed. However, if third parties are
involved such chattel mortgage is void and has no efTect.
Question No. 16:
Johnny Maton’s conviction for homicide was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and.
in addition, although the prosecution had not appealed at all. the appellate court
increased the indemnity for death from P30.000.00 to P50.000.00. On his appeal to the
Supreme Court, among the other things Johnny Maton brought to the high court’s
attention, was the increase of indemnity imposed by the Court of Appeals despite the
clear fact that the People had not appealed from the appellate court’s judgment.
Is Johnny Maton correct?
a) In Abejam v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court said that even if the issue
of damages were not raised by the appellant in the Court of Appeals but the Court of
Appeals in its findings increased the damages, the Supreme Court will not disturb the
findings of the Court of Appeals.
b) No, the contention of the accused is not correct because upon appeal to the
Appellate Court, the court acquired jurisdiction over the entire case, criminal as well as
civil. Since the conviction of homicide had been appealed, there is no finality in the
amount of indemnity because the civil liability arising from the crime and the judgment
on the crime has not yet become final.
c) Yes. Since the civil indemnity is an award in the civil action arising from the
criminal offense, the rule that a party cannot be granted affirmative relief unless he
himself has appealed should apply. Therefore, it was error for the Court of Appeals to
have expanded the indemnity since the judgment on the civil liability had become final.
d)No. Courts can review matters not assigned as errors. (Hydro Resource vs. CA ,
204 SCRA 309).
Question No. 17:
Dino sued Ben for damages because the latter had failed to deliver the antique
Marcedes Benz car Dino had purchased from Ben, which was—by agreement—due for
delivery on December 31. 1993. Ben, in his answer to Dino's complaint, said Dino's
claim has no basis for the suit, because as the car was being driven to be delivered to
Dino on January 1. 1994, a reckless truck driver had rammed into the Mercedes Benz.
The trial court dismissed Dino's complaint, saying Ben's obligation had, indeed, been
extinguished by force majeure.
Is the trial court correct?
a) No. Article 1262, New Civil Code provides, “An obligation which consists
in the delivery of a determinate thing shall be extinguished if it should be lost or
destroyed without the fault of the debtor, and before he has incurred in delay.
b) The judgment o'f the trial court is incorrect. Loss of the thing due by
fortuitous events or force majeure is a valid defense for a debtor only when the debtor
has not incurred delay. Extinguishment of liability for fortuitous event requires that the
debtor has not yet incurred any delay. In the present case, the debtor was in delay
when the car was destroyed on January 1, 1993 since it was due for delivery on
December 31, 1993. (Art. 1262 Civil Code)
It depends whether or not Ben, the seller, was already in default at the time of
c)
the accident because a demand for him to deliver on due date was not complied with
by him. That fact not having been given in the problem, the trial court erred in
dismissing Dino's complaint. Reason: There is default making him responsible for
fortultuous events including the assumption of risk or loss.
If on the other nand Ben was not in default as no demand has been sent to him
prior to the accident, then we must distinguish whether the price has been paid or not.
If it has been paid, the suit for damages should prosper but only to enable the buyer to
recover the price paid. It should be noted that Ben. the seller, must bear the loss on
the principle of res peril domino. He cannot be held answerable for damages as the
loss of the car was not imputable to his fault or fraud. In any case, he can recover the
value of the car from the party whose negligence caused the accident. If no price has
been paid at all, the trial court acted correctly in dismissing the complaint.
Question No. 18:
Prime Realty Corporation appointed Nestor the exclusive agent in the sale of lots
of its newly developed subdivision. Prime Realty told Nestor that he could not collect or
receive payments from the buyers. Nestor was able to sell ten lots to Jesus and to
collect the downpayments for said lots. He did not turn over the collections to Prime
Realty. Who shall bear the loss for Nestor's defalcation, Prime Realty or Jesus?
Alternative Answer:
a) The general rule is that a person dealing with an agent must inquire into the
authority of that agent. In the present case, if Jesus did not inquire into that authority,
he is liable for the loss due to Nestor’s defalcation unless Article 1900, Civil Code
governs, in which case the developer corporation bears the loss.
Art. 1900 Civil Code provides: “So far as third persons are concerned, an act is
deemed to have been performed within the scope of the agent’s authority, if such act is
within the terms of the power of attorney, as written, even if the agent has in fact
exceeded the limits of his authority according to an understanding between the
principal and the agent.
However, if Jesus made due inquiiy and he was not Informed by the principal
Prime Realty of the limits of Nestor’s authority. Prime Realty shall bear the loss.
b) Considering that Prime Realty Corporation only “told" Nestor that he could not
receive or collect payments, it appears that the limitation does not appear in his written
authority or power of attorney. In this case, insofar as Jesus, who is a third person, is
concerned, Nestor’s acts of collecting payments is deemed to have been performed
within the scope of his authority (Article 1900, Civil Code). Hence, the principal is liable.
However, if Jesus was aware of the limitation of Nestor's power as an agent, and
Prime Realty Corporation does not ratify the sale contract, then Jesus shall be liable
(Article 1898, Civil Code).
Question No. 19:
In 1982, Steve borrowed P400.000.00 from Danny, collateralized by a pledge of

shares of stock of Concepcion Corporation worth P800.000.00. In 1983, because of
the economic crisis, the value of the shares pledged fell to only P 100,000.00. Can
Danny demand that Steve surrender the other shares worth P700.000.00?
a) No. Bilateral contracts cannot be changed unilaterally. A pledge is only a

subsidiary contract, and Steve is still indebted to Danny for the amount of P400.000.00
despite the fall in the value of the stocks pledged.
b) No. Danny’s right as pledgee is to sell the pledged shares at a public sale and
keep the proceeds as collateral for the loan. There is no showing that the fall in the
value of the pledged property was attributable to the pledger’s fault or fraud. On the
contrary, the economic crisis was the culprit. Had the pledgee been deceived as to the
substance or quality of the pledged shares of stock, he would have had the right to
claim another thing in their place or to the immediate payment of the obligation. This is
not the case here.
Question No. 20:
Able, a corporation domiciled in State A, but, doing business in the Philippines,

hired Eric, a Filipino engineer, for its project in State B. In the contract of employment
executed by the parties in State B, it was stipulated that the contract could be
terminated at the company's will, which stipulation is allowed in State B. When Eric
was summarily dismissed by Able, he sued Able for damages in the Philippines.
Will the Philippine court apply the contractual stipulation?
a) Using the “significant relationships theory", there are contacts significant to the
Philippines. Among these are that the place of business is the Philippines, the
employee concerned is a Filipino and the suit was filed in the Philippines. thereby
Justifying the application of Philippine law. In the American Airlines case the Court held
that when what is involved is paramount state interest such as the protection of the
rights of Filipino laborers, the court can disregard choice of forum and choice of law.
Therefore the Philippine Court should not apply the stipulation in question.
b) No. Lex/orishould be applied because the suit is filed in Philippine courts and
Eric was hired in the Philippines. The Philippine Constitution affords full protection to
labor and the stipulation as to summary dismissal runs counter to our fundamental and
statutory laws.
Question No. 1:
A and B. both 18 years old, were sweethearts studying in Manila. On August 3.
1988, while in first year college. they eloped. They stayed in the house of a mutual
friend in town X. where they were able to obtain a marriage license. On August 30,
1988, their marriage was solemnized by the town mayor of X in his office. Thereafter,
they returned to Manila and continued to live separately in their respective boarding
houses, concealing from their parents, who wero living in the province what they had
done. In 1992. after graduation from college. A and B decided to break their relation
and parted ways. Both went home to their respective towns to live and work.
Was the marriage of A and B solemnized on August 30, 1988 by the town
1)
mayor of X in his office a valid marriage? Explain your answer.
Answer:
The marriage of A and B is void because the solemnizing officer had no legal
authoiity to solemnize the marriage. But if either or both parties believed in good faith
that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so. the marriage is voidable
because the marriage between the parties, both below 21 years of age, was
solemnized without the consent of the parents. (Art. 35. par. (2) and Art. 45 par. (1).
Family Code)
Can either or both of them contract marriage with another person without
2)
committing bigamy? Explain your answer.
Answer:
Either or both of the parties cannot contract marriage in the Philippines with
another person without committing bigamy, unless there is compliance with the require-
ments of Article 52 Family Code, namely: there must be a judgment of annulment or
absolute nullity of the marriage, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses and the delivery of their children’s presumptive legitimate which shall be
recorded in the appropriate Civil Registry and Registry of Property, otherwise the same
shall not aiTect third persons and the subsequent marriage shall be null and void. (Arts.
52 and 53. Family Code)
Alternative Answer:
Yes, they can. The subsequent marriage contracted by one of the parties will not
give rise to bigamy even in the absence of a court declaration of nullity of the first
marriage. The subsistence of a prior valid marriage is an indispensable element of the
crime of bigamy. The prior court declaration of nullity of the first marriage is required by
the Family Code only for the purpose of the validity of the subsequent marriage, not as
an element of the crime of bigamy.
Question No. 2:
A is the acknowledged natural child of B who died when A was already 22 years
old. When B’s full blood brother, C, died he (C) was survived by his widow and four
children of his other brother, D. Claiming that he is entitled to inherit from his father’s
brother, C. A brought suit to obtain his share in the estate of C.
Will his action prosper?
Answer:
No, the action of A will not prosper. On the premise that B, C and D are legitimate
brothers, as an illegitimate child of B, A cannot inherit in intestacy from C who is a
legitimate brother of B. Only the wife of C in her own right and the legitimate relatives of
C (i.e. the children of D as C’s legitimate nephews inheriting as collateral relatives) can
inherit in intestacy. fArts. 992, 1001. 1005 and 975, Civil Code)
Alternative Answer:
The action of A will not prosper. Being an illegitimate. he is barred by Article 992 of
the Civil Code from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate relatives of his father.
Question No. 3:
A. a Filipino, executed a will in Kuwait while there as a contract worker. Assume
that under the laws of Kuwait, It is enough that the testator aiTix his signature in the
presence of two witnesses and that the will need not be acknowledged before a notary
public.
May the will be probated in the Philippines?
Answer:
Yes. Under Articles^SlS and 17 of the Civil Code, the formality of the executio’n of
a will is governed by the law of the place of execution. If the will was executed with the
formalities prescribed by the laws of Kuwait and valid there as such, the will is valid
and may be probated in the Philippines.
Question No. 4:
In 1937, A obtained a loan of P20.000.00 from the National City Bank of New
York, an American-owned bank doing business in the Philippines. To guarantee
payment of his obligation, A constituted a real estate mortgage on his 30-hectare
parcel of agricultural land. In 1939, before he could pay his obligation, A died intestate
leaving three children. B, a son by a first marriage, and C and D, daughters by a
second marriage. In 1940, the bank foreclosed the mortgage for non-payment of the
principal obligation. As the only bidder at the extrajudicial foreclosure sale, the bank
bought the properly and was later issued a certificate of sale. The war supervened in
1941 without the bank having been able to obtain actual possession of the property
which remained with As three children who appropriated for themselves the income
from it. In 1948, B bought the properly from the bank using the money he received as
backpay lrom the U. S. Government, and utilized the same in agri-business. In 1960,
as B's business flourished. C and D sued B for partition and accounting of the income
of the properly, claiming that as heirs of their father they were co-owners thereof and
offering to reimburse B for whatever he had paid in purchasing (he properly from ihe
bank.
In brief, bow will you answer the complaint of C and D, if you were engaged by B
as bis counsel?
Answer:
As counsel of B. 1 shall answer the complaint as follows: When B bought the

property, it was not by a right of redemption since the period therefore had already
expired. Hence, B bought the property in an independent unconditional sale-. C and D
are not co-owners with B of the property. Therefore, the suit of C and D cannot
prosper.
Alternative Answer:
As counsel of B, I shall answer the complaint as follows: From the facts described,
it would appear that the Certificate of sale has not been registered. The one-year
period of redemption begins to run from registration. In this case, it has not yet even
commenced. Under the Rules of Court, the properly may be released by the Judgment
debtor or his successor in interest. (Sec-. 29. Rule 27). It has been held that this
includes a joint owner. (Ref. Magno vs.Ciola. 61 Phil. 80).
Question No. 5:
A, about to leave the country on a foreign assignment, entrusted to B his brand

new car and its certificate of registration. Falsifying A's signature. B sold A's car to C for
P200.000.00. C then registered the car in his name. To complete the needed amount,
C borrowed P 100,000.00 from the savings and loan association in his office, consti-
tuting a chattel mortgage on the car. For failure of C to pay the amount owed, the
savings and loan association filed in the RTC a complaint for collection with application
for issuance of a writ of replevin to obtain possession of the vehicle so that the chattel
mortgage could be foreclosed. The RTC issued the writ of replevin. The car was then
seized from C and sold by the sheriff at public auction at which the savings and loan
association was the lone bidder. Accordingly, the car was sold to it. A few days later. A
arrived from his foreign assignment. Learning of what happened to his car, A sought to
recover possession and ownership of it from the savings and loan association.
Can A recover his car from the savings and loan association? Explain your
answer.
Answer:
Under the prevailing rulings of the Supreme Court, A can recover the car from the
Savings and Loan Association provided he pays the price at which the Association
bought the car at a public auction. Under that doctrine, there has been an unlawful
deprivation by B of A of his car and. therefore, A can recover It from any person in
possession thereof.. But since it was bought at a public auction in good faith by the
Savings and Loan Association, he must reimburse the Association at the price for
which the car was bought.
Alternative Answer:
Yes. A can recover his car from the Savings and Loan Association. In a Chattel
Mortgage, the mortgagor must be the absolute owner of the thing morgaged. Further-
more. the person constituting the mortgage must have the free disposal of the
property, and in the absence thereof, must be legally authorized for the purpose. In the
case at bar, these essential requisites did not apply to the mortgagor B. hence the
Chattel Mortgage was not valid.
Question No. 6:
On January 2, 1986, A executed a deed of donation Inter vivos of a parcel of land
to Dr. B who had earlier constructed thereon a building in which researches on the
dreaded disease AIDS were being conducted. The deed, acknowledged before a
notary public, was handed over by A to Dr. B who received it. A few days after, A flew
to Davao City. Unfortunately, the airplane he was riding crashed on landing killing
him. Two days after the unfortunate accident. Dr. B, upon advice of a lawyer,
executed a deed acknowledged before a notary public accepting the donation.
Is the donation effective? Explain your answer.
Answer:
No, the donation is not effective. The law requires that the separate acceptance of
the donee of an immovable must be done in a public document during the lifetime of
the donor (Art. 746 & 749, Civil Code) In this case, B executed the deed of acceptance
before a notary public after the donor had already died.
Question No. 7:
Maria, to spite her husband Jorge, whom she suspected was having an affair with
another woman, executed a will, unknown to him, bequeathing all the properties she
inherited from her parents, to her sister Miguela. Upon her death, the will was
presented for probate. Jorge opposed probate of the will on the ground that the will was
executed by his wife without his knowledge, much less consent, and that it deprived
him of his legitime. After all, he had given her no cause for disinheritance, added Jorge
in his opposition.
How will you rule on Jorge’s opposition to the probate of Maria’s will, if you were
the Judge?
Answer:
As Judge, I shall rule as follows: Jorge’s opposition should be sustained in part
and denied in part. Jorge’s omiss'ion as spouse of Maria is not preterition of a compul-
sory heir in the direct line. Hence, Art. 854 of the Civil Code does not apply, and the
institution of Miguela as heir is valid, but only to the extent of the free portion of one-
hay. Jorge is still entitled to one-half of the estate as his legitime. (Art. 1001, Civil
Code)
a) As Judge, I shall rule as follows: Jorge’s opposition should be sustained in part
and denied in part. This is a case of ineffective disinheritance under Art. 918 of the Civil
Code, because the omission of the compulsory heir Jorge by Maria was intentional.
Consequently, the institution of Miguela as heir is void only insofar as the legitime of
Jorge is prejudiced. Accordingly. Jorge is entitled to his legitime of one-half of the
estate, and Miguela gets the other half.
b) As Judge. I shall rule as follows: Jorge’s opposition should be sustained.

This is a case of preterition under Article 854 Civil Code. The result of the omission of
Jorge as compulsory heir having the same right equivalent to a legitimate child “in the
direct line" is that total intestacy will arise, and Jorge will inherit the entire estate.
c)As Judge, I shall rule as follows: the opposition should be denied since it is
predicated upon causes not recognized by law as grounds for disallowance of a will, to
wit:
1) that the will was made without his knowledge.
2) that the will was made without his consent; and
3) that it has the effect of depriving him of his legitime, which is a ground
that goes into the intrinsic validity of the will and need not be resolved
during the probate proceedings. However, the opposition may be
entertained for the purpose of securing to the husband his right to the
legitime on the theoiy that the will constitutes an ineffective disinheritance
under Art. 918 of the Civil Code.
d) As Judge, I shall rule as follows: Jorge is entitled to receive his legitime

from the estate of his wife. He was not disinherited in the will even assuming that he
gave ground for disinheritance, hence', he is still entitled to his legitime. Jorge,
however, cannot receive anything from the free portion. He cannot claim preterition as
he is not a compulsory heir in the direct line. There being no preterition, the institution
of the sister was valid and the only right of Jorge is to claim his legitime.
Question No. 8:
LT applied with.BPI to purchase a house and lot in Quezon City, one of its
acquired assets. The amount offered was PI,000.000.00 payable, as follows:
P200.000.00 down payment, the balance of P800.000.00 payable within 90 days from
June 1, 1985. BPI accepted the offer, whereupon LT drew a check for P200.000.00 in
favor of BPI which the latter thereafter deposited in its account. On September 5,
1985, LT wrote BPI requesting extension until October 10, 1985, within which to pay
the balance, to which BPI agreed. On October 5, 1985, due to the expected delay in
the remittance of the needed amount by his financier from the United States, LT wrote
BPI requesting a last extension until October 30. 1985. within which to pay the
balance. BPI denied LTs request because another had offered to buy the same
property for PI,500,000.00, cancelled its agreement with LT and offered to return to
him the amount of P200,200.00 that LT had paid to it. On October 20. 1985, upon
receipt of the amount of P800.000.00 from his US financier, LT offered to pay the
amount by tendering a cashier’s check therefor but which BPI refused to accept. LT
then filed a complaint against BPI in the RTC for specific performance and deposited
in court the amount of P800.000.00.
Is BPI legally correct in cancelling its contract with LT?
Answer:
BPI is not correct in cancelling the contract with LT. In Lina Topacio v. Court of
Appeals and BPI Investment (G. R. No. 102606, July 3. 1993, 211 SCRA 291). the
Supreme Court held that the earnest money is part of the purchase price and is proof
of the perfection of the contract. Secondly, notarial or judicial rescission under Art.
1592 and 1991 of the Civil Code is necessary (Taguba v. de Leon, 132 SCRA 722.)
Alternative Answer:
BPI is correct in cancelling its contract with LT but BPI must do so by way of
judicial rescission under Article 1191 Civil Code. The law requires a judicial action, and
mere notice of rescission is insufficient if it is resisted. The law also provides that slight
breach is not a ground for rescission (Song Fo & Co. vs. Hawaiian Ph.iL Co., 47
Phils. 821). Delay in the fulfillment of the obligation (Art. 1169, Civil Code) is a ground
to rescind, only if time is of the essence. Otherwise, the court may refuse the
rescission if there is a just cause for the fixing of a period.
Question No. 9:
A is the owner of a lot on which he constructed a building in the total cost of P

10.000,000.00. Of that amount B contributed P5.000,000.00 provided that the building
as a whole would be leased to him (B) for a period of ten years from January 1, 1985 to
December 31, 1995 at a rental of PI00.000.00 a year. To such condition, A agreed. On
December 20. 1990, the building was totally burned. Soon thereafter, A’s workers
cleared the debris and started construction of a new building. B then served notice
upon A that he would occupy the building being constructed upon completion, for the
unexpired portion of the lease term, explaining that he had spent partly for the
construction of the building that was burned. A rejected B’s demand.
*
Did A do right in rejecting B’s demand?
Answer:
Yes, A was correct in rejecting the demand of B. As a result of the total destruction
of the building by fortuitu- ous event, the lease was extinguished. (Art. 1655, Civil
Code.)
Question No. 10:
A, B and C formed a partnership for the purpose of contracting with the

Government in the construction of one of its bridges. On June 30, 1992, after
completion of the project, the bridge was turned over by the partners to the
Government. On August 30, 1992, D. a supplier of materials used in the project sued A
for collection of the indebtedness to him. A moved to dismiss the complaint against him
on the ground that it was the ABC partnership that is liable for the debt. D replied that
ABC partnership was dissolved upon completion of the project for which purpose the
partnership was formed.
Will you dismiss the complaint against B if you were the judge?
Answer:
As Judge. I would not dismiss the complaint against

A. because A is still liable as a general partner for his pro
rata share of 1/3 (Art. 1816, C. C.). Dissolution of a partnership caused by the termination
of the particular undertaking specified in the agreement does not extinguish obligations,
which must be liquidated during the “winding up" of the partnership affairs (Articles
1829 and 1830, par. 1-a, Civil Code).
Question No. 11:

In 1971, Able Construction, Inc. entered into a contract with Tropical Home
Developers, Inc. whereby the former would build for the latter the houses within its
subdivision. The cost of each house, labor and materials included, was P 100,000.00.
Four hundred units were to be constructed within five years. In 1973, Able found that it
could no longer continue with the job due to the Increase in the price of oil and its
derivatives and the concomitant worldwide spiralling of prices of all commodities,
including basic raw materials required for the construction of the houses. The cost of
development had risen to unanticipated levels and to such a degree that the conditions
and factors which formed the original basis of the contract had been totally changed.
Able brought suit against Tropical Homes praying that the Court relieve it of its
obligation.
Is Able Construction entitled to the relief sought? Answer:
Yes, the Able Construction, Inc. is entitled to the relief sought under Article 1267,
Civil Code. The law provides: “When the service has become so difficult as to be
manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties, the obligor may also be released
therefrom, in whole or in part."
Question No. 12:

On January 2, 1980, A and B entered into a contract whereby A sold to B a parcel
of land for and in consideration of P 10,000.00, A reserving to himself the right to
repurchase the same. Because they were friends, no period was agreed upon for the
repurchase of the property.
1) Until when must A exercise his right of repurchase?
2) If A fails to redeem the property within the allowable period, what would you
advise B to do for his better protection?
Answer:
1) A can exercise his right of repurchase within four (4) years from the date of the
contract (Art. 1606, Civil Code).
2) I would advise B to file an action for consolidation of title and obtain a judicial
order of consolidation which must be recorded in the Registry of Property (Art. 1607,
Civil Code).
Question No. 13: *

In September, 1972, upon declaration of martial rule in the Philippines, A, together
with his wife and children, disappeared from his residence along A. Mabini Street.
Ermita, Manila. B. his immediate neighbor, noticing that mysterious disappearance of
A and his family, closed the doors and windows of his house to prevent it from being
burglarized. Years passed without B hearing from A and his family. B continued taking
care of A's house, even causing minor repairs to be done at his house to preserve it. In
1976, when business began to perk up in the area, an enterprising man, C,
approached B and proposed that they build stores at the ground floor of the house and
convert its second floor into a pension house. B agreed to C’s proposal and together
they spent for the construction of stores at the ground floor and the conversion of the
second floor into a pension house. While construction was going on. fire occurred at a
nearby house. The houses at Hie entire block, including A's. were burned. After the
EDSA revolution in February 1986. A and his family returned from the United Stales
where they took refuge in 1972. Upon learning of what happened to his house. A sued
B for damages. B pleaded as a defense that he merely look charge of his house under
the principle of neqoliorwn yeslio. He was not liable as the burning of the house is a
fortuitous event.
Is B liable to A for damages under the foregoing circumstances?
Answer
No, B is not liable for damages, because he is a gestor in negotiorum gestio (Art.
2144, Civil Code)
Furthermore, B is not liable to A because Article 2147 of the Civil Code is not
applicable.
B did not undertake risky operations which the owner was not accustomed to
embark upon:
a) he has not preferred his own interest to that of the owner:
b) he has not failed to return the property or business after demand by the owner;
and
c) he has not assumed the management in bad faith.
Alternative Answer:
He would be liable under Art.2147 (1) of the Civil Code, because he used the
property for an operation which the operator is not accustomed to, and in so doing, he
exposed the house to increased risk, namely the operation of a pension house on the
second floor and stores on the first floor.
Question No. 14:

Peter Co, a trader from Manila, has dealt business with Allied Commodities in
Hongkong for five years. All through the years. Peter Go accumulated an indebtedness
of P500,000.00 with Allied Commodities. Upon demand by its agent in Manila, Peter Co
paid Allied Commodities by check the amount owed. Upon deposit in the payee’s
account in Manila, the check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. For and in
consideration of PI.00, Allied Commodities assigned the credit to Hadji Butu who
brought suit against Peter Co in the RTC of Manila for recoveiy of the amount owed.
Peter Co moved to dismiss the complaint against him on the ground that Hadji Butu
was not a real party in interest and. therefore, without legal capacity to sue and that he
had not agreed to a subrogation of creditor.
Will Peter Co’s defense of absence of agreement to a subrogation of creditor

prosper?
Answer:
No, Co’s defense will not prosper. This is not a case of subrogation, but an
assignment of credit. Assignment of credit is the process of transferring the right of the
assignor to the assignee. The assignment may be done either gratuitously or
onerously, in which case, the assignment has an effect similar to that of a sale {Nyco
Sales Corp.v.BA Finance Corp. G.R. No.71694, Aug. 16, 1991 200 SCRA 637). As a
result of the assignment, the. plaintiff acquired all the rights of the assignor including
the right to sue in his own. name as the legal assignee. In assignment, the debtor’^
consent is not essential for the validity of the assignment (Art. 1624; 1475, CC;
Rodriguez v. CA, et al, G. R No. 84220. March 25, 1992 207 SCRA 553).
Alternative Answer:
No, the defense of Peter Co will not prosper. Hadji Butu validly acquired his right
by an‘assignment of credit under Article 1624 of the Civil Code. However, the provi-
sions on the contract of sale (Article 1475 Civil Code) will apply, and the transaction is
covered by the Statute of Frauds. (Art. 1403 par. (2) Civil Code)
Question No. 15:
Julio and Lea, both 18 years old, were sweethearts. At a party at the house of a
mutual friend. Lea met Jake, also 18 years old, who showed interest in her. Lea
seemed to entertain Jake because she danced with him many times. !n a fit of
jealousy, Julio shot Jake with his father’s 38 caliber revolver which, before going to the
party he was able to get from the unlocked drawer inside his father’s bedroom. Jake
died as a result of the lone gunshot wound he sustained. His parents sued Julio’s
parents for damages arising from quasi-delict. At the time of the incident, Julio was 18
years old living with his parents. Julio’s parents moved to dismiss the complaint
against them claiming that since Julio was already of majority age, they were no longer
liable for his acts.
1) Should the motion to dismiss be granted? Why*?

2) What is the liability of Julio’s parents to Jake’s parents? Explain your
answer.
Answer:
1) No, the Motion to Dismiss should not be granted. Article 236 of the
Family Code as amended by Republic Act 6809, provides in the third paragraph that
“nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of
parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years or age
mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code”.
The liability of Julio’s parents to Jake’s parents arises from quasi-delict (Arts.
2176 and 2180 Civil Code) and shall cover specifically the following:
a) P50.000.00 for the death of the son;

b) such amount as would correspond to lost earning capacity; and
c) moral damages.
Question No. 16:
Tomas Encamacion’s 3,000 square meter parcel of land, where he has a plant
nursery, is located just behind Aniceta Magsino’s two hectare parcel land. To enable
Tomas to have access to the highway, Aniceta agreed to grant him a road right of way
a meter wide through which he could pass. Through the years Tomas’ business flour-
ished which enabled him to buy another portion which enlarged the area of his plant
nursery. But he was still landlocked. He could not bring in and out of his plant nursery a
jeep or delivery panel much less a truck that he needed to transport his seedlings. , He
now asked Aniceta to grant him a wider portion of her property, the price of which he
was willing to pay, to enable him to construct a road to have access to his plant
nursery. Aniceta refused claiming that she had already allowed him a previous road
right of way.
Is Tomas entitled to the easement he now demands from Aniceta?

Answer:
Art. 651 of the Civil Code provides that the width of the easement must be
sufficient to meet the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly change from
time to time. It is the need of the dominant estate which determines the width of the
passage. These needs may vary from time to time. As Tomas' business grows, the
need for use of modem conveyances requires widening of the easement.
Alternative Answer:
The facts show that the need for a wider right of way arose from the increased
production owing to the acquisition by Tomas of an additional area. Under Art. 626 of
the Civil Code, the easement can be used only for the immovable originally
contemplated. Hence, the increase in width is justified and should have been granted.
Question No. 17:
Joaquin Reyes bought from Julio Cruz a residential lot of 300 square meters in
Quezon City for which Joaquin paid Julio the amount of P300,000.00. When the deed
was about to be prepared Joaquin told Julio that it be drawn in the name of Joaquina
Roxas, his acknowledged natural child. Thus, the deed was so prepared and executed
by Julio. Joaquina then built a house on the lot where she, her husband and children
resided. Upon Joaquin’s death, his legitimate children sought to recover possession
and ownership of the lot, claiming that Joaquina Roxas was but a trustee of their father.
Will the action against Joaquina Roxas prosper? Answer:
Yes, because there is a presumed donation in favor of Joaquina under Art. 1448 of
the Civil Code (De los Santos v. Reyes. 27 January 1992. 206 SCRA 437). However,
the donation should be collated to the hereditary estate and the legitime of the other
heirs should be preserved.
Alternative Answer:
Yes, the action against Joaquina Roxas will prosper, but only to the extent of the
aliquot hereditaiy rights of the legitimate children as heirs. Joaquina will be entitled to
retain her own share as an illegitimate child. (Arts. 1440 and 1453. Civil Code; Art. 176,
F. C.)
Question No, 18:

A, upon request, loaned his passenger Jeepney to B to enable B to bring his sick
wife from Paniqui. Tarlac to the Philippine General Hospital in Manila for treatment. On
the way back to Paniqui, after leaving his wife at the hospital. people stopped the
passenger jeepney. B stopped for them and allowed them to ride on board, accepting
payment from them just as in the case of ordinary passenger jeepneys plying their
route. As B was crossing Bamban, there was an onrush of lahar from Mt. Pinatubo. The
jeep that was loaned to him was wrecked.
1) What do you call the contract that was entered into by A and B with
respect to the passenger jeepney that was loaned by A to B to transport the latter’s sick
wife to Manila?
2) Is B obliged to pay A for the use of the passenger jeepney?

3) Is B liable to A for the loss of the jeepney? Answer;
1) The contract is called “commodatum”. (Art. 1933, Civil Code)
2) No, B is not obliged to pay A for the use of the passenger jeepney
because commodatum is essentially gratuitous. (Art. 1933, Civil Code)
3) Yes, because B devoted the thing to a purpose different from that for
which it has been loaned (Art. 1942, par. 2, Civil Code)
Alternative Answer:
No, because an obligation which consists in the delivery of a determinate thing

shall be extinguished if it should be lost or destroyed without the fault of the debtor, and
before he has incurred in delay. (Art. 1262, Civil Code)
Question No, 19:
Maria and Luis, both Filipinos, were married by a Catholic priest in Lourdes
Church, Quezon City in 1976. Luis was drunk on the day of his wedding. In fact, he
slumped at the altar soon after the ceremony. After marriage, Luis never had a steady
Job because he was drunk most of the time. Finally, he could not get employed at all
because of drunkenness. Hence, it was Maria who had to earn a living to support
herself and her child begotten with Luis. In 1986, Maria filed a petition in the church
matrimonial court in Quezon City to annul her marriage with Luis on the ground of
psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligation. Her petition was granted
by the church matrimonial court.
1) Can Maria now get married legally to another man under Philippine laws
after her marriage to Luis was annulled by the church matrimonial court? Explain.
2) What must Maria do to enable her to get married lawfully to another man
under Philippine laws?
Answers:
1) No, Maria cannot validly contract a subsequent marriage without a court
declaration of nullity of the first marriage. The law does not recognize the church
declaration of nullity of a marriage.
2) To enable Maria to get married lawfully to another man, she must obtain
a Judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage under Article 36 Family Code.
Question No. 20:
On June 30. 1986, A filed in the RTC of Abra an application for registration of title
to a parcel of land under P. D. No. 1529, claiming that since June 12. 1945, he has
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of said
parcel of land of the public domain which was alienable and disposable, under a bona
fide claim of ownership. After issuance of the notice of initial hearing and publication,
as required by law, the petition was heard on July 29, 1987. On the day of the hearing
nobody but the applicant appeared. Neither was there anyone who opposed the
application. Thereupon, on motion of the applicant, the RTC issued an order of general
default and allowed the applicant to present his evidence. That he did; On September
30, 1989, the RTC dismissed A’s application for lack of sufficient evidence. A appealed
to the Court of Appeals.
The appellant urged that the RTC erred in dismissing his application for
registration and in not ordering registration of his title to the parcel of land in question
despite the fact that there was no opposition filed by anybody to his application.
Did the RTC commit the error attributed to it?

/
Answer:
No, the RTC did not commit the error attributed to it. In an application for Judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title to public agricultural land under Section 48
of the Public Land Act, the lack of opposition and the consequent order of default
against those who did not answer or show up on the date of Initial hearing, does not
guarantee the success of the application. It is still incumbent upon the applicant to
prove with well nigh incontrovertible evidence that he has acquired a title to the land
that is fit for registration. Absent such registrable title, it is the clear duty of the Land
Registration Court to dismiss the application and declare the land as public land.
An application for land registration is a proceeding in rem. Its main objective is to

establish the status of the res whether It is still part of our public domain as presumed
under the Regalian doctrine or has acquired the character of a private property. It is
the duty of the applicant to overcome that presumption with sufficient evidence.
Question No. 1:
In 1989, Maris, a Filipino citizen, married her boss Johnson, an American citizen,
in Tokyo in a wedding ceremony celebrated according to Japanese laws. One year
later, Johnson returned to his native Nevada, and he validly obtained in that state an
absolute divorce from his wife Maris.
After Maris received the final judgment of divorce, she married her childhood
sweetheart Pedro, also a Filipino citizen, in a religious ceremony in Cebu City
celebrated according to the formalities of Philippine law. Pedro later left for the United
States and became naturalized as an American citizen. Maris followed I*edro to the
United States, and after a serious quarrel, Maris filed a suit and obtained a divorce
decree issued by the court in the state of Maryland.
Maris then returned to the Philippines and in a civil ceremony celebrated in Cebu
City according to the formalities of Philippine law, she married her former classmate
Vincent likewise a Filipino citizen.
a) Was the marriage of Maris and Johnson valid when celebrated? Is their
marriage still validly existing now? Reasons.
b) Was the marriage of Maris and Pedro valid when celebrated? Is their
marriage still valid existing now? Reasons.
c) Was the marriage of Maris and Vincent valid when celebrated? Is their
marriage still validly existing now? Reasons.
d) At this point in time, who is the lawful husband of Maris? Reasons.
Answer:
(a)
The marriage of Marts and Johnson was valid when celebrated because all
marriages solemnized outside the Philippines (Tokyo) in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they are solemnized (Japan), and valid there as such, are
also valid in the Philippines.
Their marriage no longer validly subsists, because it has been dissolved by the
absolute divorce validly obtained by Johnson which capacitated Maris to remarry (Art.
26. Family Code).
(b) The marriage of Maris and Pedro was valid when celebrated because the
divorce validly obtained by Johnson in Manila capacitated Maris to marry Pedro.
The marriage of Maris and Pedro is still validly existing, because the marriage has
not been validly dissolved by the Maryland divorce (Art. 26, Family Code).
(c) The marriage of Maris and Vincent is void ab initio because it is a

bigamous marriage contracted by Maris during the subsistence of her marriage with
Pedro (Art. 25 and 41, Family Code).
The marriage of Maris and Vincent does not validly exist because Article 26 does
not apply. Pedro was not a foreigner at the time of his marriage with marts and the
divorce abroad (in Maryland) was initiated and obtained not by the alien spouse, but by
the Filipino spouse. Hence, the Maryland divorce did not capacitate Maris to marry
Vincent.
(d) At this point in time, Pedro is still the lawful husband of Maris because
their valid marriage has not been dissolved by any valid cause (Art. 26, Family Code).
Question No. 2:
In 1989, Rico, then a widower forty (40) years of age, cohabited with Cora, a widow
thirty (30) years of age. While living together, they acquired from their combined
earnings a parcel of riceland.
After Rico and Cora separated, Rico lived together with Mabel, a maiden sixteen
(16) years of age. While living together, Rico was a salaried employee and Mabel kept
house for Rico and did full-time household chores for him. During their cohabitation, a
parcel of coconut land was acquired by Rico from his savings.
After living together for one (1) year, Rico and Mabel separated. Rico then met and
married Letty, a single woman twenty-six (26) years of age. During the marriage of Rico
and Letty. Letty bought a manago orchard out of her own personal earnings.
a) Who would own the riceland, and what property regime governs the
ownership? Explain.
b) Who would own the coconut land, and what property regime governs the
ownership? Explain.
c) Who would own the mango orchard, and what property regime governs
the ownership? Explain.
Answer:
(a) Rico and Cora are the co-owners of the riceland. The regime is that of
co-ownership (Art. 147, Family Code, first paragraph).
(Optional Addendum: However, alter Rico’s marriage to Letty. the half interest of
Rico in the riceland will then become absolute community property of Rico and Letty.)
(b) Rico is the exclusive owner of the coconut land. The regime is a
sole/single proprietorship (Art. 148, Family Code, first paragraph is applicable, ahd not
Art. 147 Family Codek
(Optional Addendum: However, alter Rico's marriage to Letty, the coconut land of
Rico will then become absolute community property of Rico and Letty.)
(c) Rico and Letty are the co-owners. The regime is the Absolute Community
of Property (Arts. 75,90 and 91, Family Code).
Question No. 3:
In June 1988, X obtained a loan from A and executed with Y as solidary co-maker a
promissory note in favor of A for the sum of P200.000.00. The loan was payable at
P20,000.00 with interest monthly within the first week of each month beginning July
1988 until maturity in April 1989 To secure the payment of the loan, X put up as
security a chattel mortgage on his car, a Toyota Corolla sedan. Because of failure of X
and Y to pay the principal amount of the loan, the car was extrajudlcially foreclosed. A
acquired the car at A’s highest bid of PI20.000.00 during the auction sale.
After several fruitless letters of demand against X and Y, A sued Y alone for the
discovery of P80.000.00 constituting the deficiency.
Y resisted the suit raising the following defenses:

a) That Y should not be liable at all because X was not sued together with Y.
b) That the obligation has been paid completely by A ?s acquisition of the car
through “dacion en pago" or payment by cession.
c) That Y should not be held liable for the deficiency of P80.000.00 because he
was not a co-mortgagor in the chattel mortgage of the car. which contract was executed
by X alone as owner and mortgagor.
d)That assuming that Y is liable, he should only pay the proportionate sum of
P40.000.00.
Decide each defense with reasons.
Answer:
(a) This first defense of Y is untenable. Y is still liable as solidary debtor. The
creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors. The demand against one
does not preclude further demand against the others so long as the debt is not fully
paid.
(b) The second defense of Y is untenable. Y is still liable. The chattel

mortgage is only given as a security and not as payment for the debt in case of failure
to pay. Y as a solidary co-maker is not relieved of further liability on the promissory note
as a result of the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage.
(c) The third defense of Y is untenable. Y is a surety of X and the

extrajudicial demand against the principal debtor is not inconsistent with a judicial
demand against the surety. A suretyship may co-exist with a mortgage.
(a)The fourth defense of Y iis untenable. Y is liable for the entire prestation since
Y incurred a solidary obligation with X.
(Arts. 1207. 1216, 1252 and 2047 Civil Code; Bicol Savings and Loan Associates
vs. Guinhawa 188 SCRA 642)
Question Number 4:
A owns a parcel of residential land worth P500.000.00 Unknown to A, a residential

house costing P 100.000.00 is built on the entire parcel by B who claims ownership of
the land. Answer all the following questions based on the premise that B is a builder in
good faith and A is a landowner in good faith.
a) May A acquire the house built by B? If so, how?
b) If the land increased in value to P500.000.00 by reason of the building of

the house thereon, what amount should be paid by A in order to acquire the house
from B?
c) Assuming that the cost ofthe house wasP900.000.00 and not P

100,000.00, may A require B to buy the land?
d) If B voluntarily buys the land as desired by A, under what circumstances

may A nevertheless be entitled to have the house removed?
In what situation may a “forced lease" arise between A and B, and what terms
e)
and conditions would govern the lease?
Give reasons for your answers.
Answer:
(a)Yes, A may acquire the house build by B by paying indemnity to B. Article 448
of the Civil Code provides that the owner of the land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works,
sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 545
of the Civil Code.
1. A undertook the repair of the foundation of the house, then tilting to one side, to
prevent the house from collapsing.
2. B and C mortgaged the house and lot to secure a
loan.
3. B engaged a contractor to build a concrete fence all around the lot.
4. C built a beautiful grotto in the garden.

5. A and C sold the land to X for a very good price.
a)
Is A's sole decision to repair the fou ndation ofthe house binding on B and
C? May A require B and C to contribute their 2/3 share of the expense? Reasons.
b) What is the legal effect of the mortgage contract executed by B and C?

Reasons.
c) Is B’s sole decicion to build the fence binding upon A and C? May B
require A and C to contribute their 2/ 3 share of the expense? Reasons.
d) Is C’s sole decision to build the grotto binding upon A and B? May C
require A and B to contribute their 2/ 3 share of the expense? Reasons.
e) What are the legal effects of the contract of sale executed by A. C and X?
Reasons.
Answer:
(a) Yes. A’s sole decision to repair the foundation is binding upon B and C must
contribute 2/3 of the expense. Each co-owner has the right to compel the other co-
owners to contribute to the expense of preservation of the thing (the house) owned in
common in proportion to their respective interests (Arts. 485 and 488, Civil Code).
(b)The mortgage shall not bind the 1/3 right and interest of A and shall be deemed to
cover only the rights and interests of B and C in the house and lot. The mortgage shall
be limited to the portion (2/3) which may be allocated to B and C in the partition (Art.
493, Civil Code).
(a) B’s sole decision to build the concrete fence is not binding upon A and C.
Expenses to improve the thing owned in common must be decided upon by a majority
of the co- owners who represent the controlling interest (Arts. 489 and 492, Civil
Code).
(b) C’s sole decision to build the grotto is not binding upon A and B who
cannot be required to contribute to the expenses for the embellishment of the thing
owned in common if not decided upon by the majority of the co-owners who represent
the controlling interest (Arts. 489 and 492, Civil Code).
(c) The sale to X stfall not bind the 1/3 share of B and shall be deemed to
cover only the 2/3 share of A arid C in the land (Art. 493, Civil Code). B shall have the
right to redeem the 2/3 share sold to X by A and C since X is a third person (Art. 1620,
Civil Code).
Question Number 7:
A owned a parcel of unregistered land located on the Tarlac side of the boundary
between Tarlac and Pangasinan. His brother B owned the adjoining parcel of
unregistered land on the Pangasinan side. *
A sold the Tarlac parcel to X in a deed of sale executed as a public instrument by

A and X. After X paid in full the price of the sale, X took possession of the Pangasinan
parcel in the belief that it was the Tarlac parcel covered by the deed of sale executed
by A and X.
After twelve (12) years, a controversy arose between B andX on the issue of the
ownership of the Pangasinan parcel.
B claims a vested right of ownership over the Pangasinan parcel because B never
sold that parcel to X or to anyone else.
On the other hand, X claims a vested right of ownership over the Pangasinan
parcel by acquisitive prescription, because X possessed this parcel for over ten (10)
years under claim of ownership.
Decide on this claims, giving your reason
Question Number 8:
A as principal appointed B is his agent granting him general and unlimited
management over A's propeities, stating that A withholds no power from B and that the
agent may execute such acts as he may consider appropriate.
Accordingly, B leased A's parcel of land in Manila to C for four (4) years at
P60.000.00 per year, payable annually in advance.
B leased another parcel of land of A in Caloocan City to D without a fixed term at

P3,000.00 per month payable monthly.
B sold to E a third parcel of land belonging to A located in Quezon City for three (3)
times the price that was listed in the inventory by A to B.
All those contracts were executed by B while A was confined due to illness in the
Makati Medical Center.
Rule on the validity and binding ellect of each of the above contracts upon A the
principal. Explain your answers
Answer:
The agency couched in general terms comprised only acts of administration (Art.
1877, Civil Code). The lease contract on the Manila parcel is not valid, not enforceable
and not binding upon A. For B to lease the property to C, for more than one (1) year,
Amust provide B with a special power of attorney (Art. 1878, Civil Code).
The lease of the Caloocan City property to D is valid and binding upon A. Since
the lease is without a fixed term, it is understood to be from fnonth to month, since the
rental is payable monthly (Art. 1687, Civil Code).
The sale of the Quezon City parcel to E is not valid and not binding upon A. B
needed a special power of attorney to validly sell the land (Arts. 1877 and 1878. Civil
Code). The sale of the land at a very good price does not cure the defect of the
contract arising from lack of authority.
Question Number 9:
XandY staged a daring bank robbery in Manila at 10:30
A. M. in the morning of a regular business day, and escaped with their loot of two (2)
bags, each bag containing P50.000.00.
During their flight to elude the police. X and Y entered the nearby locked house of
A, then working in his Quezon City office. From A's house. X and Y stole a box
containing cash totalling P50.000.00 which box A had been keeping in deposit for his
friend B.
In their hurry, X and Y left in A's bedroom one (1) of the bags which they had
taken from the bank.
With X and Y now at large and nowhere to be found, the bag containing
P50.000.00 is now claimed by B, by the Mayor of Manila, and by the bank.
B claims that the depository. A, bv force maieure had obtained the bag of money in
place of the box of money deposited by B.
The Mayor of Manila, on the other hand, claims that the bag of money should be
deposited with the Office of the Mayor as required of the finder by the provisions of the
Civil Code.
The bank resists the claims of B and the Mayor of Manila.
To whom should A deliver the bag of money? Decide with reasons.

Answer:
B would have no rignt to claim the money. Article 1990 of the Civil Code is not
applicable. The law refers to another thing received in substitution of the object
deposited and is predicated upon something exchanged.
The Mayor of Manila cannot invoke. Article 719 of the Civil Code which requires
the finder to deposit the thing with the Mayor only when the previous possessor is
unknown.
In this case, a must return the bag of money to the bank as the previous possessor
and known owner (Arts. 719 and 1990 Civil Code).
Question Number 10:
As the result of a collision between a public service passenger bus and a cargo
truck owned by D. X sustained physical injuries and Ydied. Both X and Y were
passengers of the bus. Both drivers were at fault, and so X and Z, the only heir and
legitimate child of the deceased Y, sued the owners of both vehicles.
a) May the owner ofthe bus raise the defense of having exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family?
b) May D raise the same defense?

c) May X claim moral damages from both defendants?
d) May Z claim moral damages from both defendants? Give reasons for all your
answers.
Answer:
(a) No. The owner of the bus cannot raise the defense because the carrier's
liability is based on breach of contract.
(a) Yes. D can raise the defense because his liability is based on a quasi-
delict.
(b) Because X suffered physical injuries, X can claim moral damages against
D. But as against the owner of the bus, X can claim moraUdamages only if X proves
reckless negligence of the carrier amounting to fraud.
(c) Z can claim moral damages against both defendants because the rules
on damages arising from death due to a quasi-delict are also applicable to death of a
passenger caused by breach of contract by a common carrier (Arts. 1755. 1756, 1764,
2206 and 2219. Civil Code).
Question Number 11:
What are the essential requisites or elements for the allowance of the reopening
or review of a decree of registration?
Answer:
The essential elements are: (1) that the petitioner has a real or dominical right; (2)
that he has been deprived thereof through fraud; (3) that the petition is filed within one
(1) year from th'e issuance of the decree; and (4) that the property has not yet been
transferred to an innocent purchaser (Rublico vs. Orellana 30 SCRA 511; Libudan vs.
Gil 45 SCRA 17).
Optional extended answer;
Petition for review of the Decree of Registration. A remedy expressly provided in

Section 32 of P. D. No. 1529
(formerly Section 38, Act 496), this remedy has the following elements:
a~ The petition must be filed by a person claiming dominical or other real rights to
the land registered in the name of respondent.
b. The registration of the land in the name of respondent was procured by means
of actual, (not just constructive) fraud, which must be extrinsic, Fraud is actual if the
registration was made through, deceit or any other intentional act of downright
dishonesty to enrich oneself at the expense of another. It is extrinsic when it is
something that was not raised, litigated and passed upon in the main proceedings.
c. The petition must be filed within one (1) year from the date of the issuance of
the decree.
d. Title to the land has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value (Libudan vs.
Gil, 45 SCRA 27, 1972), Rublico vs. Orrelana, 30 SCRA 511, 1969); RP vs. CA, 57 G.
R. No. 40402, March 16, 1987).
1. The buyer in good faith of a registered parcel of land does not have to. look
beyond the torrens title in search for any hidden defect or inchaote right which may
later invalidate or diminish his right to what he purchased (Lopez vs. CA, G. R. 49739,
January 20, 1989).
Question Number 12:
W, X, Y and Z organized a general partnership with W and X as industrial partners

and Y and Z as capitalist partners. Y contributed P50.000.00 and Z contributed
P20.000.00 to the common fund. By a unanimous vote of the partners, W and X were
appointed managing partners, without any specification of their respective powers and
duties.
A applied for the position of Secretary and B applied for the position of Accountant
of the partnership.
The hiring of A was decided upon by W and X, but was opposed by Y and Z.
The hiring of B was decided upon by W and Z, but was opposed by X and Y.
Who of the applicants should be hired by the partnership? Explain and give your
reasons.
Answer:
A should be hired as Secretary. The decision for the hiring of A prevails because it
is an act of administration which can be performed by the duly appointed managing
partners, W and X.
B cannot be h ired, because in case of a tie in the decision of the managing

partner^, the deadlock must be decided by the partners owning the controlling interest.
In this case, the opposition of X and Y prevails because Y owns the controlling interest
(Art. 1801, Civil Code).
Question Number 13:
In fear of repraisals from lawless elements besieging his barangay, X abandoned

his fishpond, fled to Manila and left for Europe. Seeking that the fish in the fishpond
were ready for harvest, Y, who is in the business of managing fishponds on a
commission basis, took possession of the property, harvested the fish and sold the
entire harvest to Z.
Thereafter, Y borrowed money from W and used the money to buy new supplies of
fish fry and to prepare the fishpond for the next crop.
a) What is the Juridical relation between X and Y during X’s absence?
b) Upon the return of X to the barangay, what are the obligations of Y to X

as regards the contract with Z?
c) Upon X’s return, what are the obligations of X as regards Y’s contract with W?
d) What legal effects will result If X expressly ratifies Ys management and

what would be the obligations ofX in favor of Y?
Answer:
(a) The juridical relation is that of the quasi-contract of “negotiorum gestio". Y
Is the “gestor" or “officious manager" and X is the “owner" (Art. 2144, Civil Code).
(b) Y ihust render an account of his operations and deliver to X the price he
received for the sale of the harvested fish (Art. 2145, Civil Code).
(c) X must pay the loan obtained by Y from W because X must answer for
obligations contracted with third persons in the interest of the owner (Art. 2150, Civil
Code).
(d) Express ratification by X provides the effects of an express agency and X

is liable to pay the commissions habitually received by the gestor as manager (Art.
2149, Civil Code).
Question Number 14:
X and Y entered into a contract in Australia, whereby it was agreed that X would
build a commercial building for Y in the Philippines, and in payment for the construction,
Y will transfer and convey his cattle ranch located in the United States in favor of X.
What law would govern:
a) The validity of the contract?
b) The performance of the contract?
c) The consideration of the contract?
Answer:
(a) The validity of the contract will be governed by Australian law, because the
validity refers to the element of the making of the contract in this case:
(Optional Addendum: “ . . . unless the parties agreed to be bound by another law".)
(b) The performance will be governed by the law of the Philippines where the
contract is to be performed.
(c)The consideration will be governed by the law of the United States where the
ranch is located.
(Optional Addendum: In the foregoing cases, when the foreign law would apply, the
absence of proof of that foreign law would render Philippine law applicable under the
“eclectic theory".)
Question Number 1:
A. How does the 1987 Consitution strengthen the family as an institution?
B. Do the Constitutional policy on the family and the provision that marriage is the
foundation ofthe family and shall be protected by the State bar Congress from enacting
a law allowing divorce in the Philippines?
Answer:
A. Sec. 2, Article II of the Constitution provides that:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall wqually protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unbom from conception. The natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Section I, Article XV, further provides that:
The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
• (Note: The Committee recommends that a citation of either one of the provisions be
credited as a Complete answer).
Answer:
B. No, the Constitutional policy, as well as the support - ing provision, does not
amount to a prohibition to Congress to enact a law on divorce. The Constitution only
meant to help the marriage endure, to “strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development."
Alternative Answer:
B. Yes, Congress is barred from enacting a law allowing divorce, since Section 2
of Article XV provides:
“Sec. 2 Marriage, as an inviolable social institution is the foundation of the family

and shall be protected by the State”
Since marriage is inviolable, it cannot be dissolved by an absolute divorce.
Question Number 3:
Bar Candidates Patricio Mahigugmaon and Rowena Amor decided to marry
each other before the last day of the 1991 Bar Examinations. They agreed to
execute a Marriage Settlement. Rowena herself prepared the document in her own
handwriting. They agreed on the following: (1) a
conjugal partnership of gains; (2) each donates to the other fifty percent (50%) of his/her
present property; (3) Rowena shall administer the conjugal partnership property; and
(4) neither may bring an action for the annulment or declaration of nullity of their
marriage. Both signed the agreement in the presence of two (2) witnesses. They did
not. however, acknowledge it before a notary public.
As to form, is the Marriage Settlement valid? May it be registered in
(a)
the registry of property? If not. what steps must be taken to make it
registerable?
(b) Are the stipulations valid?
(c)If the Marriage Settlement is valid as to form and the above
stipulations are likewise valid, does it now follow that said Marriage
Settlement is valid and enforceable?
Answer:
A. Yes. it is valid as to form, because it is in writing.
No. it cannot be registered in the registry of property because it is not a
public document. To make it registerable. it must be reformed and has to be
notarized.
B. Stipulations (1) ana (3) are valid because they are not contrary to law.
Stipulation (4) is void because it is contrary to law. Stipulation (2) is valid up to 1/5 of
their respective present properties but void as to the excess (Art. 84, Family Code).
C. No, on September 15, 1991, the marriage settlement

is not yet valid and enforceable until the celebration of the
marriage, to take place before the last day of the' 1991 bar Examinations.
A. Yes, it is valid as between the parties but not as against third persons.
No, because it is not a public document. To make it registerable, it must be reformed
and has to be notarized.
B. It depends. As between the parties, stipulations (1) and (3) are valid
because they are not contrary to law. Stipulation (2) is void because it is contrary to
law. Stipulation (2) is valid up to 1/5 of their respective present properties but void as
to the excess (Art. 84, Family Code).
Question Number 4:
A. One of the grounds for annulment of marriage is that either party, at the
time of their marriage was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease, found to be
serious and appears incurable. Two (2) years after their marriage .which took place on
10 October 1988. Bethel discovered that her husband James has a sexually-
transmissible disease which he contracted even prior to their marriage although James
did not know it himself until he was examined two (2)years later when a child was
already bom to them. Bethel
sues James for annulment of their marriage. James opposes the annulment on the ground
that he did not even know that he had such a disease so that there was no fraud or
bad faith on his part.
Decide.
B.Suppose that both parties at the time of their marriage were similarly afflicted
with sexually-transmissible diseases, serious and incurable, and both knew of their
respective infirmities, can Bethel or James sue for annulment of their marriage?
Answer
A. The marriage can be annulled, because good faith is not a defense
when the ground is based upon sexually- transmissible disease on the part of either
party.
B. Yes, the marriage can still be annulled because the fact that both of
them are afflicted with sexually-transmissible diseases does not efface or nullity the
ground.
C.
Alternative Answer:
A. No, the marriage can no longer be annulled, because the fact that both were
afflicted and that both knew of their respective infirmities constitutes a waiver of that
ground.
Question Number 5:
In June 1985, James married Mary. In September 1988, he also married
Ophelia with whom he begot two (2) children, A and B. In July 1989, Mary died. In July
1990. he married Shirley and abndoned Ophelia. During their union, James and
Ophelia acquired a residential lot worth P300.000.00.
Ophelia sues James for bigamy and prays that his marriage with Shirley be
declared null and void. James, on the other hand, claims that since his marriage to
Ophelia was contracted during the existence of his marriage with Mary, the former is
not binding upon him. the same being void ab initio; he further claims that his
marriage to Shirley is valid and binding as he was already legally capacitated at the
time
he married her.
(a) Is the contention of James correct?
What property regime governed the union of James and Ophelia?
(b)
(c) Is the estate of Maiy entitled to a share in the residential lot acquired by
James and Ophelia?
Answer
A Yes. His marriage to Ophelia is void ab initio because of his subsisting prior
marriage to Mary. His marriage to Shirley, after Mary’s death, is valid and
Alternative Answer:
A. No. The contention of James is not correct.
Art. 40, Family Code, provides that the “absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void." It can be said, therefore, that the marriage of
James to Shirley is void since his previous marriage to Ophelia, although itself void,
had not yet been judicially declared void.
Alternative Answer:
A.No. The contention of James is not correct. He cannot set up as a defense his
own criminal act or wrongdoing.
Answer:
A. The provisions of Art 148 of the Family Code, shall govern:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only
the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
B. It should be distinguished when the property was acquired.
If it was acquired before Mary’s death, the estate of Mary is entitled to 1/2 of
the share of James.
If it was acquired after Mary's death, there will be no share at all for the estate
of Mary.
Question Number 6:
(a) For purposes of succession, when is death deemed to occur or take
place?
(b) May succession be conferred by contracts or acts inter uiuos? Illustrate.
(c) Is there any law which allows the delivery to compulsory heirs of their
presumptive legitimes during the lifetime of their parents? If so, in what instances?
Answer:
A. Death as a fact is deemed to occur when it actually takes place. Death is
presumed to take place in the circumstances under Arts. 390-391 of the Civil Code.
The time of death is presumed to be at the expiration of the 10-year period as
prescribed by Article 390 and at the moment of disappearance under Article 391.
B. Under Art. 84 ofthe Family Code amending Art, 130 of the Civil Code,
contractual succession is no longer possible since the law now requires that donations
of future property be governed by the provisions on the testamentary succession and
formalities of wills.
Alternative Answer:
A. In the case of Coronado vs. CA(191 SCRA81), it was ruled that no property
passes under a will without its being probated, but may under Article 1058 of the Civil
Code of 1898, be sustained as a partition by an act inter vivos (Many- Oy vs. CA 144
SCRA 33).
And in the case of Chavez vs. LAC (191 SCJRA 211), it was ruled that while
the law prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the partition by the parent, as
provided in Art. 1080, is a case expressly authorized by law. A person has two options
in making a partition of his estate: either by an act inter vivos or by will. If the partition
is by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in accordance with the
provisions of the law on wills; if by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or
written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided the legitime is not prejudiced.
“Where several sisters execute deeds of sale over their 1/6 undivided share of
the paraphernal property of their mother, in favor of another sister, with their
mother not only giving her authority . thereto but even signing said deeds, there
is a valid partition inter vivos between the mother and her children which cannot
be revoked by the mother.
Said deeds of sale are not contracts entered into with respect to future
inheritance.
“It would be unjust for the mother to revoke the sales to a son and to
execute a simulated sale in favor of a daughter who already benefited by the
partition."
Answer:
A. Yes, under Arts. 51 and 52 ofthe New Family Code, in case of legal separation,
annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and the automatic termination
of a subsequent marriage by the reapperance of the absent spouse, the common or
community property of the spouses shall be dissolved and liquidated.
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common
children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be
delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual
agreement, judicially approved, had' already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the tru stee of their property, may ask for the
enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way

prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of
either or both of the parents; but the value of the properties already
Art. 52. The judgmennt of annulment or of absolute nullity ofthe marriage, the partition rece
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children’s nullit
presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of legit
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third
Question Number 7:
A. The Japan Air Lines (JAL). a foreigner corporation licensed to do business in

the Philippines, executed in Manila a contract of employment with Maritess Guapa
under which the latter was hired as a stewardess on the aircraft plying the Manila-
Japan-Manila route. The contrast specifically provides that (1) the duration of the
contract shall be two (2) years, (2) notwithstanding the above duration, JAL may
terminate the agreement at any time by giving her notice in writing ten (10) days iri
advance, and (3) the contract shall be construed as governed under and by the laws
of Japan and only the court in Tokyo, Japan shall have the jurisdication to consider
any matter arising from or relating to the contract.
JAL dismissed Maritess on the fourth month of her employment without giving her
due notice. Maritess then filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for reinstatement,
backwages and damages. The lawyer of JAL contends that neither the Labor Arbiter
nor any other agency or court in the Philippines has jurisdiction over the case in view
ofthe above provision (3) of the contract which Maritess voluntarily signed. The
contract is the law between her and JAL.
Decide the issue.

B. Where under a State’s own conflicts rule that domestic law of another State
should apply, may the courts of the former nevertheless refuse to apply the latter? If
so, under what circumstance?
Answer:
A. Labor Legislations are generally intended as expressions of public policy on
employer*employee relations. The contract therefore, between Japan Air Lines (JAL)
and Maritess may apply only to the extent that its provisions are not inconsistent with
Philippine labor laws intended particularly to protect employees.
Under the circumstances, the dismissal of Maritess without complying with
Philippine Labor law would be invalid and any stipulation in the contract to the contrary
is considered void . Since the law of the forum in this case is the Philippine law, the
issues should be resolved in accordance with Philippine law.
B. The third paragraph of Art. 17 of the Civil Code provides that:
“Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those

which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.”
Accordingly, a state’s own conflict of laws rule may, exceptionally be inapplicable,

given public policy considerations by the law of the forum.
Going into the specific provisions of the contract in question, I would rule as
follows:
1. The duration of the contract is not opposed to Philippine law and it can
therefore be valid as stipulated;
2. The second provision to the effect that notwithstanding duration, Japan

Air Lines (JAL) may terminate her employment is invalid, being inconsistent with our
Labor laws;
3. - That the contract shall be construed as governed under and by the laws
of Japan and only the courts of Tokyo, Japan shall have jurisdiction, is invalid as clearly
opposed to the aforecited third paragraph of Arts. 17 and 1700 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
“Art. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely
contractuals. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts
must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the
special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts,
closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects."
Alternative Answer:
A. When a contract has a foreign element such as in the factual setting stated in
the problem where one of the parties is a foreign corporation, the contract can be
sustained as valid particularly the stipulation expressing that the contract is governed
by the laws of the foriegn country. Given this generally accepted principle of
international law, the contract between Maritess and JAL is valid and it should
therefore be enforced.
Question Number 8:
Jacob, a Swiss national, married Lourdes, a Filipina, in Berne, Switzerland. Three

years later, the couple decided to reside in the Philippines. Jacob subsequently
acquired several properties in the Philippines with the money he inherited from his
parents. Forty years later, Jacob died intestate, and is survived by several legitimate
children and duly recognized illegitimate daughter Jane, all residing in the Philippines.
(a) Suppose that Swiss law does not allow illegitimate children to inherit, can
Jane, who is a recognized illegitimate child, inherit part of the properties of Jacob
under Philippine law?
(b) Assuming that Jacob executed a will leaving certain properties to Jane as
her legitime in accordance with the law of succession in the Philippines, will such
testamentary disposition be valid?
Answer:
A. Yes. As stated in the problem, Swiss law does not allow illegitimate children to
inherit. Hence, Jane cannot inherit the property of Jacob under Philippine law.
B. The testamentary disposition will not be valid if it would contravene Swill law;
otherwise, the disposition would be valid. Unless the Swiss law is proved, it would be
presumed to be the same as that of Philippine law under the doctrine of processual
presumption.
Question Number 9:
Roland, a basketball star, was under contract for one year to play-for-play
exclusively for Lady Love. Inc. However, even before the basketball season could open,
he was offered a more attractive pay plus fringes benefits by Sweet Taste, Inc. Roland
accepted the offer and transferred to Sweet Taste. Lady Love sues Roland and Sweet
Taste for breach of contract. Defendants claim that the restriction to play for Lady Love
alone is void, hence, unenforceable, as it constitutes an undue interference with the
right of Roland to enter into contracts and the impairment of his freedom to play and
enjoy basketball.
Can Roland be bound by the contract he entered into with Lady Love or can he
disregard the same? Is he liable at all? How about Sweet Taste? Is it liable to Lady
Love?
Answer:
Roland is bound by the contract he entered into with Lady Love and he cannot
disregard the same, under the principles of obligatoriness of contracts. Obligations
arising from contractis have the force of law between the parties.
Yes. Roland is liable under the contract as far as Lady Love is concerned.
He is liable for damages under Article 1170 of the Civil Code since he contravened
the tenor of his obligation. Not being a contracting party. Sweet Taste is not bound by
the contract but it can be held liable under Art. 1314. The basis of its liability is not
prescribed by contract but is founded on quasi-delict, assuming that Sweet Taste knew
of the contract. Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides that any third person who
induces Another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to fhe other
contracting party.
Alternative Answer
It is assumed that Lady Love knew of the contract.
Neither Roland nor SweetTaste would be liable, because the restriction in the
contract is violative of ARticle .1306 as being contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy.
Question Number 10:
On 20 December 1970, Juliet, a widow, borrowed'from Romeo P4.000.00 and, as

security therefore, she executed a deed of mortgage over one of her two (2) registered
lots which has a market value of P4 5,000.00. The document and the certificate of title
of the property were delivered to Romeo.
On 2 June 1971, Juliet obtained an additional sum of P3,000.00 from Romeo. On

this date, however, Romeo caused the preparation of a deed of absolute sale of the
above property, to which Juliet affixed her signature without first reading the
document. The consideration indicated is P7.000.00. She thought that this document
was similar to the first she signed. When she reached home, her son X, after reading
the duplicate copy of the deed, informed her that what she signed was not a mortgage
but a deed of absolute sale. On the following day, 3 June 1971, Juliet, accompanied
by X, went back to Romeo and demanded the reformation it, Romeo prepared and
signed a document wherein, as vendee in the deed of sale above mentioned, he
obligated and bound himself to resell the land to Juliet or her heirs and successors for
the same consideration as reflected in the deed of sale (P7.000.00) within a period of
two (2) years, or until 3 June 1973. It is further stated therein that should the Vendor
(Juliet) fail to exercise her right to redeem within the said period, the conveyance shall
be deemed absolute and irrevocable. Romeo did not take possession of the property.
He did not pay the taxes thereon.
Juliet died in January 1973 without having repurchased the property. Her only
surviving heir, her sonX, failed to repurchase the property on or before 3 June 1973.
in 1975, Romeo sold the property to Y for P50.000.00. Upon learning of the sale, X
filed an action for the nullification of the sale and for the recovery of the property on
the ground
that the so-called deed of absolute sale executed by his mother was merely an
equitable mortgage, taking into account the inadequacy of the price and the failure of
Romeo to take possession of the property and to pay the taxes thereon. Romeo and Y
maintain that there was a valid absolute sale and that the document signed by the
former-on 3 June 1973 was merely a promise to sell.
(a) If you were the Judge, would you uphold the theory of X?
(b) If you decide in favor of Romeo and Y, would you uphold the validity of
the promise to sell?
Answer:
A. I will not uphold the theory of X for the nullification of the sale and for the
recovery of the property on the ground that the so-called sale was only an equitable
mortgage. An equitable mortgage may arise only if, in truth, the sale was one with the
right of repurchase. The facts of the case state that the right to repurchase was granted
after the absolute deed of sale was executed. Following the rule in Cruzo vs. Carriaga
(174 SCRA 330), a deed of repurchase executed independently of the deed of sale
where the two stipulations are found in two instruments instead of one document, the
right of repurchase would amount only to one option granted by the buyer to the seller.
Since the contract cannot be upheld as a contract of sale with the right to repurchase,
Art. 1602 of the Civil Code on equitable mortgage will not apply. The rule could have
been different if both deeds were executed on the same occasion or date, in which
case, Cinder the ruling in spouses Claravall v. CA (190 SCRA 439), the contract may
still be sustained as an equitable mortgage, given the circumstances expressed in Art.
1602. The reserved right to repurchase is then deemed an original intention.
B. If I were to decide in favor oi Romeo and Y. I would not uphold the validity
of the promise to sell, so as to enforce it by an action for specific performance. The
promise to sell would only amount to a mere offer and, therefore, it is not enforceable
unless it was sought to be exercised before a withdrawal or denial thereof.
Even assuming the facts given at the end of the case, there would have been no
separate consideration for such promise to sell. The contract would at most amount to
an option which again may not be the basis for an action for specific performance.
Question Number 11:
A is the lessee of an apartment owned by Y. A allowed his married but employed

daughter B, whose husband works in Kuwait, to occupy it. The relationship between Y
and A soured. Since he has no reason at all to eject A, Y, in connivance with the City
Engineer, secured from the latter an order for the demolition of the building. A
immediately filed an action in the Regionaf Trial Court to annul the order and to enjoin
its enforcement. Y and A were able to forge a compromise agreement under which A
agreed to a twenty percent (20%) increase in the monthly rentals. They further agreed
that the lease will expire two (2) years later and that in the event that Y would sell the
property, either A or his daugther B shall have the right of first refusal. * The
Compromise Agreement was approved by the court. Six (6) months before the
expiration of the lease, A died. Y sold the property to the Visorro Realty Corp. without
notifying B. B then filed an action to rescind the sale in favor of the corporation and to
compel Y to sell the property to her since under the Compromise Agreement, she was
given the right of first refusal which, she maintains, is a stipulation pour atrui under
Article 1311 of the Civil Code.
Is she correct?
Answer:
B is not correct. Her action cannot prosper. Article 1311 requires that the third
person intended to be benefited must communicate his acceptance to the obligor
before the revocation. There is no showing that B manifested her acceptance to Y at
any time before the death of A and before the sale. Hence, B cannot enforce any right
under the alleged stipulation pour atrui.
Question Number 12:
Maria Enriquez failed to pay the realty taxes on her unregistered agricultural land
located in Magdugo, Toledo City. In 1989, to satisfy the taxes due, the City sold it at
public auction to Juan Miranda, an employee at the Treasurer’s Office of said City,
whose bid at PI0,000.00 was the highest. In due time, a final bill of sale was executed
in his favor.
Maria refused to turn-over the possession of the property to Juan alleging that (1)
she had been, in the meantime, granted a free patent and on the basis thereof an
Original Certificate of Title was issued to her, and (2) the sale in favor of Juan is void
from the beginning in view of the provision in the Administrative Code of 1987 which
prohibits officers and employees of the government from purchasing directly or
indirectly any property sold by the government for nonpayment of any tax, fee or other
public charge.
(a) Is the sale to Juan valid? If so. what is the effect of the issuance of the
Certificate of Title to Maria?
(b) If the sale is void, may Juan recover the P 10,000.00? If not, why not?
(c) If the sale is void, did it not nevertheless, operate to divent Maria of her
ownership? If it did, who then is the owner of the property?
Answer:
A. The sale of the land to Juan is not valid, being contrary to law. Therefore, no
transfer of ownership of the land was effected from the deliquent taxpayer to him. The
original certificates pf title obtained by Maria thru a free patent grant from the Bureau of
Lands (under Chapter VII, CA 141) is valid but in view of her delinquency, the said title
is subject to the right of the City Government to sell the land at public auction. The
issuance of the OCT did not exempt the land from the tax sales. Section 44 of P.D. No.
1529 provides that every registered owner receiving a Certificate of Title shall hold the
same free from all encumbrances, subject to certain exemptions.
A. Juan may recover because he was not a party to the violation of the law.
B. No. the sale did not divest Maria of her title precisely because the sale is
void. It is as good as if no sale ever took place.
In tax sales, the owner is divested of his land initially upon award and issuance of a
Certificate of Sale, and finally after the lapse of the 1 year period from date of
registration, to redeem, upon execution by the treasurer of an instrument sufficient in
form and effects to convey the property. Maria remained owner of the land until another
tax sale is to be performed in favor of a qualified buyer.
Question Number 13:
In a deed of sale of a realty, it was stipulated that the buyer would construct a
commercial building on the lot while the seller would construct a private passageway
bordering the lot. The building was eventually finished but the seller failed to complete
the passageway as some of the squatters, who were already known to be there at the
time they entered into the contract, refused to vacate the premises. In fact, prior to its
execution, the seller filed ejectment cases against the squatters.
The buyer now sues the seller for specific performance with damages. The
defense is that the obligation to construct the passageway should be with a period
which, incidentally, had not been fixed by them, hence, the need for fixing a judicial
period.
Will the action for specific performance of the buyer against the seller prosper?
Answer:
No, the action for specific performance filed by the buyer is premature under Art.
1197 of the Civil Code. If a period has not been fixed although contemplated by the
parties, the parties themselves should fix that period, failing in which, the Court maybe
asked to fix it taking into consideration the probable contemplation of the parties.
Before the period is fixed, an action for specific performance is premature.
Alternative answer
It has been held in Borromeo vs. CA (47 SCRA 69). that the Supreme Court
allowed the simultaneous filing of action to fix the probable contemplated period of the
parties where none is fixed in the agreement, if this would avoid multiplicity of suits. In
addition, technicalities must be subordinated to substantial justice.
Alternative answer
The action for specific performance will not prosper. The filing of the ejectment suit by
the seller was precisely in compliance with his obligations and should not. therefore, be
faulted if no decision has yet been reached by the Court on the matter.
Question Number 14:
Spouses Michael and Linda donated a 3-hectare residential land to the City of
Baguio on the condition that the city government would build thereon a public park with
a boxing arena, the construction of which shall commence within six (6) months from
the date the parties ratify the donation. The donee accepted the donation and the title to
the property was transferred in Its name. Five years elapsed but the public park with the
boxing arena was never started. Considering the failure of the donee to comply with the
condition of the donation, the donor-spouses sold the property to Ferdinand who then
sued to recover the land from the city government.
Will the suit prosper?
Answer:
Ferdinand has no right to recover the land. It is true that the donation was
revocable because of breach of the conditions. But until and unless the donation was
revoked, it remained valid. Hence, Spouses Michael and Linda had no right to sell the
land to Ferdinand. One cannot give what he does not have. What the donors should
have done first was to have the donation annulled or revoked. And after that was
done, they could validly have disposed of the land in favor of Ferdinand.
Alternative Answer:
A. Until the contract of donation has been resolved or rescinded under
Article 1191 of the Civil Code or revoked under Art. 764 of the Civil Code, the donation
stands effective and valid. Accordingly, the sale made by the donor to Ferdinand
cannot be said to have conveyed title to Ferdinand, who, thereby, has no cause of
action for recovery of the land acting for and in his behalf.
B. The donation is onerous. And being onerous, what applies is the law on
contracts, and not the law on donation (De Luna us. Abrigo, 81 SCRA 150).
Accordingly, the prescriptive period for the filing of such an action would be the
ordinary prescriptive period for contacts which may either be six or ten depending
upon whether it is verbal or written. The filing of the case five years later is within the
prescriptive period and, therefore, the action can prosper.
Alternative Answer:
The law on donation lays down a special prescriptive period in the case of breach
of condition, which is four years from non-compliance thereof (Article 764 Civil Code).
Since the action has prescribed, the suit will not prosper.
Question Number 15:
Bruce as the registered owner, of a parcel of land with a building thereon and is in
peaceful possession thereof. He pays the real estate taxes and collects the rentals
therefrom. Later, Catalino, the only brother of Bruce, filed a petition where he,
misrepresenting to be the attorney-in-fact of Bruce and falsely alleging that the
certificate of title was lost, succeeded in obtaining a second owner’s duplicate copy of
the title and then had the same transferred in. his name through a simulated deed of
sale in his favor. Catalino then mortgaged the property to Desiderio who had the
mortgage annotated on the title. Upon learning of the fraudulent transaction, Bruce
filed a complaint against Catalino and
Desiderio to have the title of Catalino and the mortgage in favor of Desiderio declared
null and void.
Will the complaint prosper, or will the title of Catalino and the mortgage to
Desiderio be sustained?
Answer:
The complaint for the annulment of Catalino’s Title will prosper. In the first place,
the second owner’s copy of the title secured by him from the Land Registration Court is
void ab initio, the owner's copy thereof having never been lost let alone the fact that
said second owner’s copy of the title was fraudulently procured and improvidently
issued by the Court. In the second place, the Transfer Certificate of Title procured by
Catalino is equally null and void, it having been issued on the basis of a simulated or
forged Deed of Sale. A forged deed is an absolute nullity and conveys no title.
The mortgage in favor of Desiderio is likewise null and void because the mortgagor
is not the owner of the mortgaged property. While it may be true that under the “Mirro
Principle" of the Torrens System of Land Registration, a buyer or mortgagee has the
right to rely on what appears on the Certificate of Title, and in the absence of anything
to excite suspicion, is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate
the mortgagor’s title, this rule does not find application in the case at hand because
here, Catalino’s title suffers from two fatal infirmities, namely:
1. The fact that it emanated from a forged deed of a simulated sale;
2.
The fact that it was derived from a fraudulently procured or improvidently issued
second owner's copy, the real owner’s copy being still intact and in the possession of
the true owner, Bruce.
The mortgage to Desiderio should be cancelled without prejudice to his right to go

after Catalino and/or the government for compensation from the assurance fund.
Question no. 16
Romano was bumped by a minivan owned by the Solomon School of Practical

Arts (SSPA). The mlnivan was driven by Peter, a student assistant whose assignmerit
was to clean the school passageways daily one hour before and one hour after regular
classes, in exchange for free tuition. Peter was able to drive the school vehicle after
persuading the regular driver, Paul, to turn over the wheel to him (Peter). Romano
suffered serious physical injuries. The accident happened at night when only one
headlight of the vehicle was functioning and Peter only had a student driver’s permit.
As a consequence, Peter was convicted in the criminal case. Thereafter. Romarjo

sued for damages against Peter and SSPA.
(a) Will the action for damages against Peter and SSPA prosper?
(b) Will your answer be the same if, Paul, the regular driver, was impleaded
as party defendant for allowing Peter to drive the minivan without a regular driver's
license.
(c) Is the exercise of due diligence in the selection and supervision of Peter
and Paul a material issue to be resolved in this case?
Answer:
A, Yes. It will prosper (Art. 2180) because at the time he drove the vehicle,
he was not performing his assigned tasks as provided for by Art. 2180. With respect to
SSPA, it is not liable for the acts of Peter because the latter was not an employee as
held by Supreme Court in Filamer Christian Institute vs. CA, (190 SCRA 485).
Peter belongs to a special category of students who render service to the school
in exchange for free tuition fees.
B. I would maintain the same answer because the incident did not occur
while the employee was in the performance of his duty as such employee. The
incident occured at night time, and, in any case, there was no indication in the
problem that he was performing his duties as a driver.
C. In the case of Peter, if he were to be considered as employee, the exercise of

due diligence in the selection and supervision of peter would not be a material issue
since the conviction of Peter would result in a subsidiary liability where the defense
would not be available by the employer.
In the case of Paul, since the basis of subsidiary liability is the paterfamilias
rule under Art. 2180, the defense of selection and supervision of the employee would
be a valid defense.
Alternative Answer:
A. In the case of Peter, if he were to be considered an employee, the exercise of
due diligence in the selection and supervision of Peter would not be a material issue
since the conviction of Peter would result in a subsidiary liability where the defense
would not be available by the employer.
In the case of Paul, since he was in the performance of his work at the time the
incident occured, the school may be held subsidiarily liable not because of the
conviction of Peter, but because of the negligence of Paul under Art. 2180.
Question Number 17:
Pablo sold his car to Alfonso who isssued a postdated check in full payment
therefor. Before the maturity of the check. Alfonso sold the car to Gregorio who later
sold it to Gabriel. When presented for payment, the check issued by Alfonso was
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason that he, Alfonso, had already closed his
account even before he issued his check.
Pablo sued to recover the car from Gabriel alleging that he (Pablo) had been
unlawfully deprived of it by reason of Alfonso’s deception.
Will the suit prosper?
Answer:
No. The suit will not prosper because Pablo was not unlawfully deprived of the car
although he was unlawfully
deprived of the price. The perfection of the sale and the delivery of the car was enough
to allow Alfonso to have a right of ownership over the car, which can be lawfully
transferred to Gregorio. Art. 559 applies only to a person who is in possession in good
faith of the property, and not to the owner thereof. Alfonso, in the problem, was the
owner, and, hence, Gabriel acquired the title to the car.
Non-payament of the price in a contract of sale does not render ineffective the
obligation to deliver.
The obligation to deliver a thing is different from the obligation to pay its price.
EDCA Publishing Co. v. Santos (1990)
1990 Bar Examination
Question Number I:
A vacant lot several blocks from the center of the town was leased by its owner to
a young businessman B. for a term of fifteen (15) years renewal upon agreement of the
parties. After taking possession of the lot, the lessee built thereon a building of mixed
materials and a store. As the years passed, he expanded his business, earning more
profits. By the tenth (10th) year of his possession, he was.able to build a three (3)-
storey building worth at least P300,000.00. Before the end of the term of the lease, B
negotiated with the landowner for its renewal, but despite their attempts to do so, they
could not agree on the new conditions for the renewal. Upon the expiration of the term
of the lease, the landowner asked B to vacate the premises and remove his building
and other improvements. B refused unless he was reimbursed for necessary and
useful expenses. B claimed that he was a possessor and builder in good faith, with
right of retention. This issue is now before the court for resolution in a pending
litigation.
a) What are the rights of B?
b) What are the rights of the landowner?
Answer:
a) B has the right to remove the building and other improvements unless the
landowner decides to retain the building at the time of the termination of the lease and
pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time. The lessee may
remove the building even though the principal thing may suffer damage but B should
not cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessaiy. The claim
of B that he was a possessor and builder in good faith with the right of retention is not
tenable. B is not a builder in good faith, because as lessee he does not claim
ownership Over the property leased.
b) The landowner/lessor may refuse to reimburse 1 /2 of the value of the

improvements and require the lessee tc remove the improvements. (Article 1678. Civil
Code).
Question number 2
In 1950’s, the Government acquired a big landed estate in Central Luzon from the
registered owner for subdivision into small farms and redistribution of bona fide
occupants. F was a former lessee of a parcel of land, five hectares in. area. After
completion of the resurvey and subdivision. F applied to buy the said land in
accordance with the guidelines of the implementing agency. Upon full payment of the
price in 1957, the corresponding deed of absolute sale was executed in his favor and
was registered, and in 1961, a new title was issued in his name. In 1963, F sold the
said land to X; and in 1965 X sold it to Y. New titles were successively issued in the
names of the* said purchasers.
In 1977, C filed an action to annul the deeds of sale to F, X and Y and their titles,
on the ground that he (C) had been in actual physical possession of the land, and that
the sale to F and the subsequent sales should be set aside on the ground of fraud.
Upon motion of defendants, the trial court dismissed the complaint, upholding their
defenses of their being innocent purchasers for value, prescription and laches. Plaintiff
appealed.
(a) Is the said appeal meritorious? Explain your answer.
(b) Suppose the government agency concerned joined C in filing the said
action against the defendants, would that change the result of the litigation? Explain.
Answer:
(a)
The appeal is not meritorious. The trial court ruled correctly in granting
defendant's motion to dismiss for the following reasons:
1.While there is the possibility that F, a former lessee of the land was aware of
the fact that C was the bona fide occupant thereof and for this reason his transfer
certificate of title may be vulnerable, the transfer of the same land and the issuance of
new TCT’s to X and Y who are innocent purchasers for value, render the latters’ titles
indefeasible. A person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness
of the certificate of title and the law will not in any
way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property in
search for any hidden defect or inchaote right which may later invalidate or diminish his
right to the land. This is the mirror principle of the Torrens System of land registration.
2. The action to annul the sale was instituted in 1977 or more than ten (10) years
from the date of execution thereof in 1957. hence, it has long prescribed.
Under Section 45 of Act 496, “the entry of a certificate of title shall be regarded
3.
as an agreement running with the land, and binding upon the applicant and all his
successors in title that the land shall be and always remain registered land. A title
under Act 496 is indefeasible and to preserve that character, the title is cleansed anew
with every transfer for value. (De Jesus u. City of Manila: 29 Phil. 73; Laperal v. Citu of
Manila, 62 Phil. 313, Penullar v. PNB 120 SCRA 111).
(b)
Even if the government joins C, this will not alter the outcome of the case
so much because of estoppel as an express provision in Section 45 of Act 496 and
Section 31 of P.D. No. 1529 that a decree of registration and the certificate of title
issued in pursuance thereof “shall be conclusive upon and against all persons,
including the national government and all branches thereof, whether mentioned by
name in the application or notice, or not.”
Question Number 3:
B donated to M a parcel of land in 1980. B made the deed of donation, entitled

“Donation Inter Vivos," in a public instrument and M accepted the donation in the same
document. It was provided in the deed that the land donated shall be immediately
delivered to M and that M shall have the right to enjoy the fruits fully. The deed also
provided that B was reserving the right to dispose of said land during his (B’s) lifetime,
and that M shall not register the deed oi donation until after B’s death. Upon B’s death,
W, B’s widow and sole heir, filed an action for the recovery of the donated land,
contending that the donation made by B is a donation mortis causa and not a donation
inter vivos. Will said action prosper? Explain your answer.
Answer
Yes, the action will proper. The donation is a donation mortis causa because the
reservation is to dispose of all the property donated and, therefore, the donation is
revocable at will. Accordingly, the donation requires the execution of a valid will, either
notarial or holgraphic. (Arts 755, 728 Civil Code)
Question Number 3:
Mr. and Mrs. R own a bumed-out building, the firewall of which collapsed and
destroyed the shop occupied by the family of Mr. and Mrs. S, which resulted in injuries
to said couple and the death of their daughter. Mr. and Mrs. S had been warned by Mr.
Mrs. R to vacate the shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former
failed to do so.
Mr. and Mrs. S filed against Mr. and Mrs. R an action for recovery of damages the
former suffered as a result of the collapse of the firewall. In defense, Mr. and Mrs. Rrely
on the doctrine of “last clear chance" alleging that Mr. and Mrs. S had the last clear
chance to avoid the accident if only they heeded the former’s warning to vacate the
shop, and therefore Mr. and Mrs. R’s prior negligence should be disregarded.
If you were the Judge, how would you decide the case? State your reasons.
Answer:
I would decide in favor of Mr. and Mrs. S. The proprietor of a building or structure
is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be
due to the lack of necessary repairs. (Article 2190, Civil Code).
As regards the defense of Mr. and Mrs. R relying on the doctrine of “last clear
chance.” the same is not tenable because according to the Supreme Court in one case
(DeRoy v. Court of Appeals. G. R. L-80718. January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 757) the
doctrine of “last clear chance” is not applicable to instances covered by Art. 2190, Civil
Code
Further, in Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court {G.R. L-

65295, March 10, 1987. 148 SCRA 353). the Supreme Court held that the role of the
common law "last clear chance” doctrine in relation to Article 2179 of the Civil Code is
merely to mitigate damages within the context of contributory negligence.
Question Number 5:
D sold a second-hand car to E for PI50,000.00 The agreement between D and E

was that half of the purchase price, or P75.000.00, shall be paid upon delivery of the
car to E and the balance of P75,000.00 shall be paid in five equal monthly installments
of PI5,000.00 each. The car was delivered to E, and E paid the amount of P75.000.00
to D. Less than one month thereafter, the car was stolen from E’s garage with no fault
on E’s part and was never recovered. Is E legally bound to pay the said unpaid balance
of P75.000.00? Explain your answer.
Answer:
Yes, E is legally bound to pay the balance of P75,000.00. The ownership of the car
sold was acquired by E from the moment it was delivered to him. Having acquired
ownership, E bears the risk of the loss of the thing under the doctrine of res perit
domino. (Articles 1496, 1497, Civil Code).
Question Number 6:
A leased a parcel of land to B for a period of two years. The lease contract did not
contain any express prohibition against the assignment of the leasehold or the
subleasing of the leased premises. During the third year of the lease, B subleased the
land to C. In turn, C, without A’s consent, assigned the sublease to D. A then filed an
action for the rescission of the contract of lease on the ground that B has violated the
terms and conditions oLthe lease agreement. If you were the judge, how would you
decide the case, particularly with respect to the validity of:
(a) B’s sublease to C? and
(a) C's assignment of the sublease to D?
Explain you answer
Answer:
(a) B’s sublease to C is valid. Although the original period of two years for
the lease contract has expired, the lease continued with the acquiescence of the lessor
during the third year. Hence, there has been an implied renewal of the contract of
lease. Under Art. 1650 of the Civil Code, the lessee may sublet the thing leased, in
whole or in part, when the contract of lease does not contain any express prohibition.
(Articles 1650, 1670 Civil Code). A’s action for rescission should riot prosper on this
ground.
(b) C’s assignment of the sublease to D is not valid. Under Art. 1649, of the
Civil Code, the lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor,
unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. There is no such stipulation in the contract.
If the law prohibits assignment of the lease without the consent of the lessor, all the
more would the assignment of a sublease be prohibited without such consent. This is a
violation of the contract and is a valid ground for rescission by A.
Question Number 7:
X was the owner of a 10,000 square meter property. X married Y and out of their
union, A, B and C were bom. After the death of Y, X married Z and they begot as
children, D, E and F. After the death of X, the children of the first and second
marriages executed an extrajudicial partition of the aforestated property on May 1,
1970. D, E and F were given a one thousand square meter portion of the property.
They were minors at the time of the execution of the document. D was 17 years old, E
was 14 and F was 12; and they were made to believe by A, B and C that unless they
sign the document they will not get any share. Z was not presesnt tl\en. In January
1974, D,E and F filed an action in court to nullify the suit alleging they discovered the
fraud only in 1973.
(a)
Can the minority of D, E and F be a basis to nullify the partition? Explain your
answer.
(b) How about fraud? Explain your answer.
Answer:
(a) Yes, minority can be a basis to nullify the partition because D, E and F
were not properly represented by their parents or guardians at the time they contracted
the extrajudicial partition. (Articles 1327, 1391, Civil Code).
(b) In the case of fraud, when through insidious words or machinations of

one party the other is induced to enter into the contract without which he would not
have agreed to, the action still prosper because under Art. 1391 of the Civil Code, in
case of fraud, the action for annulment may be brought within four years from the
discovery of the fraud.
Question Number 8:
B and G (college students, both single and not disqualified to marry each other)
had a romantic affair. G was seven months in the family way as of the graduation of B.
Right after graduation B went home to Cebu City. Unknown to G, B had a commitment
to C (his childhood sweetheart) to marry her after getting his college degree. Two
weeks after B marriage in Cebu City. G gave birth to a son E in Metro Manila.
After ten years of married life in Cebu, B became a widower by the sudden death
of C in a plane crash. Out of the union of B and C, two children, X and Y, were bom.
Unknown to C, while on weekend trips to Manila during the last 5 years of their
marriage, B invariably visited G and lived at her residence and as a result of which,
they renewed their relationship. A baby girl F was bom to B and G two years before the
death of C. Bringing his family later to Manila, B finally married G. Recently, G died.
What are the rights of B’s four children: X and Y of his first marriage: and E and F.
his children with G? Explain your answer.
Answer
Under the facts stated, X and Y are legitimate children of B and G. E is the
legitimate children of B and G. E is the legitimated child of B & G. F is the illegitimate
child of B and
C. As legitimate children of B and C, X and Y have the following rights:
(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the
provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames;
(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants. and in

proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of the Family
Code on Support; and*
(3) To be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights granted to

them by the Civil Code. (Article 174, Family Code). E is the legitimated child of B and
G. Under Art. 177 of the Family Code, only children conceived and bom outside of
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the concepcion of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. E will have the
same rights as X and Y. F is the illegitimate child of B and G. F has the right to use the
surname of G, her mother, and is entitled to support as well as the legitime consisting
of 1/2 of that of each of X, Y and E. (Article 176, Family Code)
Question Number 9:
H died leaving a last will and testament wherein it is stated that he was legally
married to W by whom he had two legitimate children A and B. H devised to his said
forced heirs the entire estate except the free portion which he gave to X who was living
with him at the time of his death.
In said will he explained that he had been estranged from his wife W for more than
20 years and he has been living with X as man and wife since his separation from his
legitimate family.
In the probate proceedings, X asked for the issuance of letters testamentary in

accordance with the wll wherein she is named sole executor. This was opposed by
and her children.
(a) Should the will be admitted in said probate proceedings?
(b) Is the said devise to X valid?
(c) Was it proper for the trial court to consider the intrinsic validity of the provisions
of said will? Explain your answers.
Answer:
(a) Yes, the will may be probated if executed according to the formalities prescribed
by law.
(b) The institution giving X the free portion is not valid, because the
prohibitions under Art. 739 of the Civil Code on donations also apply to testamentary
dispositions (Article 1028, Civil Code). Among donations which are considered void are
those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of
the donation.
(c) As a general rule, the will should be admitted in probate proceedings if all the
necessary requirements for its extrinsic validity have been met, and the court should
not consider the intrinsic validity of the provisions of said will. However, the exception
arises when the will in effect contains only one testamentary disposition. In effect, the
only testamentary disposition under the will is the giving of the free portion to X, since
legitimes are provided by law. Hence, the trial court may consider the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of said will. (Nuguid u. Nuguid, etai. No. L-23445, June 23. 196$, 17
SCRA; Nepomucenov. CA. L-62952, 9 October 1985, 139 SCRA 206).
Question Number 10:
The marriage of H and W was annu lied by the competent court. Upon finality of the
judgment of nullity, H began looking for his prospective second mate. He fell In love
with a sexy woman S who wanted to be married as soon as possible, i.e.,. after a few
months of courtship. As a young lawyer, you were consulted by H.
(a) How soon can H be joined in lawful wedlock to his girlfriend S? Under
existing laws, are there certain requisites that must be complied with before he can
remarry? What advice would you give H?
(b) Suppose that children were bom from the union of H and W, what would
be the status of said children? Explain your answer.
(c) If the subsequent marriage of H to S was contracted before compliance

with the statutory condition for its validity, what are the rights of the children of the first
marriage (i.e., of H and W) and of the children of the subsequent marriage (of H and
S)?
Answer:
(a) H, or either spouse for that matter, can marry again after complying with the
provisions of Article 52 of the Family Code, namely, there must be a partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children’s
presumptive legitimes, which should be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and
registries of property. H should be so advised.
Alternative Answer: for (a)
The following are the requisites prescribed by law and the advice to H is to comply
with them, namely:
(1) If either spouse contracted the marriage in bad faith, his or her share of
the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty
spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(2) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the
donee contracted the marriage in b^d faith, such donations made to said donee are
revoked by operation of law;
(3) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified
to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession;
(4) If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith all
donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of
the other are revoked by opeiation of law.
(5) The judgment of annulment of the marriage, the partition and distribution
of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children’s presumptive
legitimes shall he recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registers of property.
(Articles 53, 52. 43, 44. Family Code)!
(b)
The children bom from the union of H and W would be legitimate children if
conceived or bom before the decree of annulment of the marriage (under Art. 45 of the
Family Code) has become final and executory (Art. 54, Family Code).
(c) The children of the first marriage shall be considered legitimate children if
conceived or bom before the judgment of annulment of the marriage of H and W has
become final and executory. Children conceived or bom of the subsequent marriage
shall likewise be legitimate even if the marriage of H and S be null and void for failure to
comply with the requisites oCArticle 52 of the Family Code (Article 53, Family Code).
As legitimate children, they have the following rights:

(1) To bear the surnames of the father ana the mother in conformity with the
provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames:
(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper
cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on
Support: and
(3) To be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights granted to

them by the Civil Code (Article 174, Family Code).
Question Number 11:
(1) If a will is executed by a testator who is a Filipino
citizen, what law will govern if the will is executed in the Philippines? ,What law will
govern if the will is executed in another country? Explain your answers.
(2) If a will is executed by a foreigner, for instance, a Japanese, residing in the

Philippines, what law will govern if the will is executed in the Philippines? And what law
will govern if the will is executed in Japan, or some other country, for instance, the U.S.
A.? Explain your answers.
Answer:
1) a. If the testator who is a Filipino citizen executes his will in the Philippines,
Philippine law will govern the formalities, 0
b. If said Filipino testator executes his will in another country, the law of the
country where he may be or Philippine law will govern the formalities. (Article 815, Civil
Code)
2) a. If the testator is a foreigner residing in the Philippines and he executes his will in
the Philippines, the law of the country of which he is a citizen or Philippine law will
govern the formalities.
b. If the testator is a foreigner and executes his will in a foreign country, the law
of his place of residence or the law of the country of which he is a citizen or the law of
the place of execution, or Philippine law will govern the formalities (Articles 17, 816,
817, Civil Code
Possible Additional Answers:

a. In the case of a Filipino citizen, Philippine law shall govern substantive validity
whether he executes his will in the Philippines or in a foreign country.
b. In the case of a foreigner, his national law shall govern substantive validity
whether he executes his will in the Philippines or in a foreign country.
In I960, an unregistered parcel ofland was mortgaged by owner O to M, a family

friend, as collateral for a loan. O acted through his attorney-in-fact, son S. who was duly
authorized by way of a special power of attorney, wherein O declared that he was the
absolute owner of the land, that the tax declarations/receipts were all issued in his
name, and that he has been in open, continuous and adverse possession in the
concept of owner.
As O was unable to pay back the loan plus interest for the past five (5) years, M
had to foreclose the mortgage. At the foreclosure sale, M was the highest bidder. Upon
issuance of the sheriffs final deed of sale and registration in January, 1966, the
mortgage property was turned over to M’s possession and control. M has since then
developed the said property. In 1967, O died, survived by sons S and P.
In 1977, after the tenth (10th) death anniversary of his father O, son P filed a suit
to annul the mortgage deed and subsequent sale of the property, etc.. on the ground of
fraud. He asserted that the property in question was conjugal in nature actually
belonging, at the time of the mortgage, to O and his wife, W, whose conjugal share
went to their sons (S and P) and to O.
(a) Is the suit filed by P barred by prescription? Explain your answer.
(b) After the issuance of the sheriffs final deed of sale in 1966 in this case,
assuming that M applied for registration under the Torrens System and was issued a
Torrens Title to the said property in question, would that added fact have any significant
effect on your conclusion? State your reason.
Answer:
(a) Under Art. 173 of the Civil Code, the action is barred by prescription because
the wife had only ten (10) years from the transaction and during the marriage to file a
suit for the annulment of the mortgage deed.
Alternative Answers to (a)

First Alternative Answer:
(a) The mortgage contract executed by O, if at all, is only a voidable contract since
it involves a conjugal partnership property. The action to annul the same instituted in
1977, or eleven years after the execution of the sheriffs final sale, has obviously
prescribed because:
1. An action to annul a contract on the ground of fraud must be brought

within four (4) years from the date of discovery of the fraud. Since this is in essence an
action to recover ownership, it must be reckoned from the date of execution of the
contract or from the registration of the alleged fraudulent document with the assessor’s
office for the purpose of transferring tlfe tax declaration, this being unregistered land,
(Bael v. Intermediate Appellate Court G. R. L- 74423 Jan.30. 1989 169 SCRA 617).
2.If the action is to be treated as an action to recover ownership of land, it

would have prescribed just the same because more than 10 years have already
elapsed since the date of the execution of the sale.
Second Alternative Answer:

(a) The action to recover has been barred by acquisitive prescription lii favor
of M considering that M has possessed the land under a claim of ownership for ten (10)
years with a just title.
(b) If M had secured a Torrens Title to the land, all the more S and P could
not recover because if at all their remedies would be:
1.A Petition to Review the Decree of Registration. This can be availed of

within one (1) year from the entry thereof, but only upon the basis of “actual fraud."
There is no showing that M committed actual fraud in securing.his title to the land; or
2. An action in personam against M for the reconveyance of the title in their

favor. Again, this remedy is available within four years from the date of the discovery of
the fraud but not later than ten (10) years from the date of registration of the title in the
name of M.
Question number 13
B and G. age 20 and 19. respectively, and both single, eloped and got married to
each other without parental consent in the case of G. a teenaged student of an
exclusive college for girls. Three years later, her parents wanted to seek judicial
annulment on that ground. You were consulted and asked to prepare the proper
complaint. What advice would you give G's parents? Explain your answer.
Answer:
G himself should file the complaint under Article 45 of the Family Code, and no
longer the parents because G is already 22 years of age.
Question Number 14:
After a devastating storm causing widespread destruction in four Central Luzon

provinces, the executive and legislative branches of the government agreed to enact a
special law appropriating PI billion for purposes of relief and rehabilitation for the
provinces. In view of the urgent nature of the legislative enactment, it is provided in its
effeclivity clause that it shall take effect upon approval and after completion of
publication in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. The law was passed by the Congress on July 1. 1990, signed into law by
the President on July 3. 1990, and published in such newspaper of general circulation
on July 7. 1990 and in the Official Gazette on July 10, 1990.
(a) As to the publication of said legislative enactment, is there sufficient

observance or compliance with the requirements for a valid publication? Explain your
answer.
(b) When did the law take effect? Explain your answer.
(c) Can the executive branch start releasing and disbursing funds
appropriated by the said law the day following its approval? Explain your answer.
Answer
(a) Yes. there is sufficient compliance. The law itself prescribes the requisites of
publication for its effectivity, and all requisites have been complied with. (Article 2. Civil
Code)
(b) The law takes effect upon compliance with all the conditions for
effectivity, and the last condition was complied with on July 10. 1990. Hence, the law
became effective on that date.
No. It was not yet effective when it was approved by Congress on July 1. 1990
(c)
and approved by the President on July 3. 1990. The other requisites for its effectivity
were not yet complete at the time.
Question No. 1:
(1)Robert and Evelyn, both Filipinos, met in Los Angles, California. They
agreed to get married on June 10, 1989. On June 7, 1989, Robert flew to New York
due to an urgent business matter but intended to return to Los Angeles on June
9, 1989, in time for the wedding. The business emergency of Robert, however,
lasted longer than he expected so that he failed to Teturn to Los Angeles as
planned. In order not to postpone the wedding, Robert immediately called his
brother Val who was also residing at Los Angeles to stand as his proxy at the
wedding, which the latter did. Is the marriage of Robert and Evelyn valid in the
Philippines? Give your reasons.
Answer:
If the marriage was performed in accordance with the laws of California and
valid there, then the marriage is likewise valid in the Philippines.
Alternative Answer:
Since the problem does not state the California law on marriage by proxy, the
presumption in Private International Law is that the California law is the same as
the Philippine law. Therefore, the marriage would be void.
(2)While “X”, an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, was vacationing

in Cebu City, he was requested to solemnize the marriage of Serge and Joan in
the residence of Serge’s parents. “X” could not refuse the request of both the
parents of the couple because they were his relatives. On the
day set for the wedding, there were so many visitors at the residence of
Serge’s parents so that “X” decided to solemnize the marriage at the kiosk of the
public plaza located nearby. Is the marriage of Serge and Joan valid? Give your
reasons.
Answer:
Yes because the requirement that the marriage be solemnized in a public
place is not an essential requisite of the law.
Question No. 2:
(1) Paul, a 17-year old Filipino and a permanent resident in the United
States, married Jean, a 16-year old American in Las Vegas, Nevada. The parents
of both gave their consent to the marriage. The marriage is valid in Nevada. Is
its also valid in the Philippines? Give your reasons.
Answer:
No, the marriage is not valid. Under the Family Code, the law requires that
the contracting parties are at least eighteen (18) years of age.
Alternative Answer:
If the marriage took place before the effectivity of the Family Code, the
marriage will be valid since under the provisions of the Civil Code a marriage
valid in the place of celebration is valid in the Philippines except bigamous,
polygamous, and incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law. The
minimum age under the old law was sixteen (16) for the male and fourteen (14)
for the female.
(2)Cesar and Baby contracted marriage on June 15, 1983. A year later,
Baby bore a child, “X” The following year, the couple acquired a car and a
residential lot in Metro
Manila. On September 1, 1988, the marriage was declared void from the
beginning by a competent court because Cesar was below 16 years of age at the
time of the marriage. Sometime in December, 1988, Cesar met Rosa with whom
he fell in love. Gesar married Rosa on January 15, 1989. On September 1, 1989,
Rosa gave birth prematurely to a child, “Y”. Is the marriage of Cesar and Rosa
valid? What is the status of the child “Y?” Give your reasons.
Answer:
If there was a liquidation of the properties of the first marriage and the
presumptive legitime of “X” was duly delivered, the second marriage is valid. If
there was no such compliance, then the marriage is void. The child is legitimate
since “Y” was born a full year after the termination of the first marriage and
during the second marriage.
Alternative Answers:.
A. The Family Code requires the registration of the judgment of nullity, the
partition of the properties and the delivery of the legitimes to be made with the
appropriate civil registry and registries of property. It further provides that failure
to comply with the said requirement shall render the marriage null and void. If
there was such a recording, the marriage is valid. Otherwise, the marriage is
void. Nevertheless, child “Y” is a legitimate child because it was born during the
marriage of Cesar and Rosa.
B. Since the problem does not state that there was compliance with the
requirements as to recording of judgment of nullity and the liquidation and
delivery of the presumptive legitime of the child “X”, the marriage of Cesar and
Rosa is void. However, the child “Y" is legitimate because it was born during the
marriage of Cesar and Rosa.
QUESTION NO. 3
(1) What properties are excluded from the regime of absolute community of
property between spouses?
Answer:
The following shall be excluded from the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either
spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly
provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the
community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however,
jewelry shall form part of the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has
legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the
income, if any, of such property.
(2) When should the property relations of the spouses be mandatorily
governed by the regime of complete separation of property?
Answer:
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without
complying with the requirement that the community or conjugal property be
liquidated judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the
deceased spouse, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall
govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
Question No. 4:
(1) Cadio and Corona contracted marriage on June 1,
1982. A few days after the marriage, Corona discovered that Cadio was a
homosexual. As homosexuality was not a ground for legal separation under the
Civil Code, there was nothing that Corona could do but bear with her problem.
The couple, however, stated to live separately. With the enactment of the Family
Code, Corona decided to be legally separated from Cadio based on the new
ground of homosexuality. Corona brought her action for legal separation on
September 15, 1988. Will the action prosper? Give your reasons.
Answer:
Yes, the action will prosper because the “cause” arose only on August 3,
1988, the effectivity of the Family Code, and the action had not yet prescribed.
Alternative Answer:
The action will prosper. The offense of homosexuality as a continuing
offense can be a ground for legal separation. The prescriptive period of five
years will apply only when the offense has a fixed period of time and, therefore,
the date of its occurrence can be computed.
(2) What is “Family Home” and when is it deemed constituted? Who are the
beneficiaries thereof?
Answer:
The “Family Home” is the dwelling house where the husband, the wife, and
their family including the unmarried head of the family reside and the land on
which it is situated.
The “Family Home” is deemed constituted on a house .and lot from the time
it is occupied as a family residence.
The beneficiaries of a family home are:
(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a
family; and
(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters,
whether the relationship be legitimate or
illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon, the
head of the family for legal support.
Question No. 5:
(1) What are the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of a child?
Answer:
Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:
(a) the physical incapacity of the. husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such
a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented
sexual intercourse:
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the
child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in
the second paragraph of Art. 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination,
the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
(2) Felix, a Filipino doctor of medicine, married Monique, an Italian nurse, in
1985. It was later discovered that Monique cannot bear a child so that the couple
decided
to adopt one. Can they jointly adopt Marie, the 19-year old niece of Monique?
Explain.
Answer:
Since the child to be adopted is an Italian citizen, the joint adoption cannot
be effected. Had the child been a relative by consanguinity of the Filipino spouse,
the adoption would have been valid under the Philippine law.
Question No. 6:
(1) What is USUFRUCT? How is usufruct extinguished?
Answer:
Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of
preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law
otherwise provides. Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly
appears;
(2) By the expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the
fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;
(7) By prescription.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMITTEE:
An enumeration of four (4) should be given full credit
(2)Spouses “A” and “B” are registered owners of lot “1” consisting of
20,000 square meters while spouses “C” and “D” are owners of lot “2”. These
lots are separated by a river. For a period of more than 40 years, the river
overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the spouses “C” and “D”
gradually received deposits of soil from the effects of the current of the river so
that an alluvial deposit of 29,000 square meters was added to their lot, 11,000
square meters of which used to be part of lot “1.” Spouses "A” and “B” contend
that accretion should not extend to registered land because to allow the
spouses “C” and “D” to acquire title over the accretion will be in derogation of
the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title of spouses “A” and “B”. Is this contention
correct? Explain.
Answer:
No, the contention of A and B is not correct because the • registration under
the Torrens Law does not protect the owner against the diminution of his land
through gradual changes due to the effects of the current of the river. The
accretion will benefit C and D.
Question No. 7:
(1)“X” mortgaged his land to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a
promissory note. He defaulted in the payment of the loan so that the land was
sold at public auction on January 20, 1960, for P3,500 with the PNB as the
highest bidder. On January 20, 1970, “X” offered to redeem the property in the
amount of P3,500. He enclosed a postal money order for PI,000 as partial
payment and stated that the balance is to be paid in 12 monthly installments.
The PNB then discovered that the sheriffs certificate of sale prepared after the
public auction of the land was not registered so that it cause the same to be
registered on January 30, 1970. The PNB refused the offer of “X"
contending that the offer to redeem was beyond the one-year period
provided under Act No. 3135 and that it was not accompanied by an actual and
simultaneous tender of the entire repurchase price. In view of the refusal of the
PNB, “X” filed an action to repurchase on February 20, 1970. Will the action
prosper? Give your reasons.-
Answer:
Yes, the action should prosper. The one (1) year period of redemption is
Counted from the registration of the sheriffs certificate of sale hence the action
has not yet prescribed. However, there need not be a tender of the redemption
price because the filing of the judicial action to enforce the right of redemption
within the redemption period suffices.
(2) Subsequent to the original registration of a parcel of land bordering a
river, its area was increased by accession. This additional area was not included
in the technical description appearing on the Torrens Certificate of Title having
been acquired subsequent to the registration proceedings. May such additional
area be acquired by third persons thru prescription? Give your reasons.
Answer:
The Land Registration Law provides that no title in derogation of the
registered owner may be acquired by adverse possession or acquisitive
possession. Since the law refers to registered lands, the accession mentioned in
this question may be acquired by a third person through adverse possession or
acquisitive possession.
Alternative Answer:
If the accession is manmade, then it cannot be considered as private
property. It belongs to the public domain, and, therefore, cannot be acquired by
adverse possession or acquisitive possession.
QUESTION NO. 8
(1) Distinguish an implied contract from a quasi- contract.
Answer:
Any of the following answers should be given full credit:

A. An implied contract requires consent of the parties. A quasi-
contract is not predicated on consent, being a unilateral act.
B. The basis of an implied contract is the will of the parties. The basis
of a qdasi-contract is law to the end that there be no unjust situation.
(2) What is dation in payment and how is it distinguished from assignment
of property?
Answer:
Dation in payment is a special form of payment whereby property is
alienated to the creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money.
Assignment of property, or payment by cession, is a special form of
payment whereby the debtor cedes or assigns his property to his creditors so
that the proceeds thereof will be applied in payment of his debts.
Alternative Answer:
In dation in payment whereby property is given by the debtor to the creditor
in payment of a debt in money, there is only one creditor. In assignment of
property, there are several creditors.
In the former, the debtor may be solvent. In the latter, there may be partial
insolvency.
In the former, particular property is ceded.'In the latter, all the property of
the debtor is ceded.
In the former, the particular obligation is extinguished in whole or in part as

agreed upon. In the latter, it releases the debtor from the net proceeds only,
unless otherwise agreed or intended.
Question No. 9:
(1) If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, to whom
shall the ownership be transferred?
Answer:
If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership
shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in
good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be an inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person
who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the
person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
(2) “X” used his savings from his salaries amounting to a little more than
P2,000 as capital in establishing a restaurant. “Y” gave the amount of P4,000 to
“X” as “financial assistance” with the understanding that “Y” would be entitled
to 22% of the annual profits derived from the operation of the restaurant. After
the lapse of 22 years, “Y” filed a case demanding his share in the said profits.
“X” denied that there was a partnership and raised the issue of prescription as
“Y” did not assert his rights anytime within ten (10) years from the start of the
operation of the restaurant. Is “Y” a partner of “X” in the business? Why? What
is the nature of the right to demand one’s share in the profits of a partnership?
Does this right prescribe?
Answer:
Yes, because there is an agreement to contribute to a common fund and

an intent to divide profits. It is founded upon an express trust. It is
imprescriptible unless repudiated.
Alternative Answer:
No, “Y” is not a partner because the amount is extended in the form of a
financial assistance arid therefore it is a loan, and the mere sharing of profits
does not establish a partnership. The right is founded upon a contract of loan
whereby the borrower is bound to pay principal and interest like all ordinary
obligations. Yes, his right prescribes in six or ten years depending upon
^whether the contract is oral or written.
Question No. 10:

(1) What are the characteristics of a will?
Answer:
A will is —
1. Personal
2. Unilateral
3. Formal or Solemn
4. Ambulatory or revocable
5. Individual, not joint
6. Free and voluntary
7. Mortis causa

Since this is not a codal provision, it is recommended that an answer of
three (3) be given full credit.
“X”, a Spanish citizen and a resident of Los Angeles, California,
(2)
executed a will in Tokyo. Japan. May such will be probated in the Philippines?
May his estate located in the Philippines be distributed in conformity with the
provisions of the said will? Give your reasons.
Answer:
A Yes, it may be made according to the formalities of Spanish law, California
law, Japanese law, or Philippine law.
B. Yes, provided that the provisions conform to the order of succession and
the amount of successional rights as regulated by Spanish law.
Question No. IX:
(1)The probate of the will of Nicandro is contested on the ground that the
notary public before whom the will, was acknowledged was also one of the three
instrumental witnesses. If you were the probate judge, how would you decide the
contest? Give your reasons.
Answer:
The will is void. The acknowledging officer cannot serve as attesting witness
at the same time. In effect there are only two witnesses since the notary cannot
swear before himself.
(2) Jose and Ana are husband and wife. On January 10, 1980, Jose learned
that Ana was having illicit relations with Juan. In fact, Jose personally saw his
wife and Juan leaving a motel on one occasion. Despite all the evidence he had
at hand, Jose did not bring any action for legal separation against Ana. Instead,
Jose simply prepared a will wherein he disinherited Ana for her acts of infidelity.
The validity of the disinheritance was questioned by Ana upon Jose’s death. If
you were the judge, how would you resolve this question? Give your reasons.
Answer:
The disinheritance is valid. Under the Civil Code, the legal ground for
disinheriting a spouse is that the spouse has given cause for legal separation.
Therefore, a final judgment is not needed.
Alternative Answer:
The disinheritance is not valid. The facts indicate that there was
condonation by Jose of Ana’s illicit relationship with Juan since they appear to
have continued to live together.
Question No. 12:
(1)Distinguish between a.contract of real estate mortgage and a contract
of sale with right of repurchase.
Answer:
1. Real estate mortgage is an accessory contract. A contract of sale
with right of repurchase is a principal contract.
2. Real estate mortgage involves no transfer of title. A contract of sale
involves a conditional transfer of title.
3. Real estate mortgage involves no transfer of possession. A
contract of sale involves a conditional transfer of possession.
4. In a real estate mortgage the creditor has no rights to the fruits. In a
contract of sale, the vendee is entitled to the fruits.
5.In a real estate mortgage, upon default the creditor is not the owner. In a
contract of sale, upon consolidation, the vendee is the owner.
Any three (3) of the foregoing distinctions should be given full credit.
(2) Does an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage affecting registered

land under the Torrens System prescribe? Give your reasons.
Answer:
Even if the property given as collateral is covered by a Torrens Title, the right
to foreclose a real estate mortgage thereon prescribes. This is really an action to
enforce collection of the loan.
Question No. 13:
(1)“X” offered to buy the house and lot of “Y” for P300,000. Since “X” had
only P200,000 in cash at the time, he proposed to pay the balance of P1(J)0,000
in four (4) equal monthly installments. As the title to the property was to be
immediately transferred to the buyer, “X”, to secure the payment of the balance
of purchase price, proposed to constitute a first mortgage on the property in
favor of “Y”. “Y” agreed to the proposal so that on April 15, 1987, the contract of
sale in favor of “X” was executed and on the same date (April 15, 1987), “X”
constituted the said first mortgage. When the first installment became due. “X”
defaulted in the payment thereof. “Y” now brings an action to rescind the
contract of sale, which “X” opposed. How would you decide the conflict? Give
your reasons.
Answer:
Either of the following answers should be given full credit:

A. “Y” cannot rescind. The relationship is no longer that of buyer and seller
because the sale was already perfected and consummated. The relationship is
already that of mortgagor and mortgagee. Rescission is not a principal action
retaliatory in character but a subsidiary one available only in the absence of any
other legal remedy. Foreclosure is not only a legal but a contractual remedy. The
debtor must pay and, in case of breach, the mortgagee may foreclose.
B. “Y” can rescind. Specific performance and rescission are
alternative remedies in breach of reciprocal obligations. The contract is only
partly consummated. The price is not fully paid. The mortgage is an accessory
contract of guarantee arid can be waived by the creditor who can avail of his
remedies in the principal contract.
C. Considering that the default covers only P25,000.00 and the sum of
P2OO,OOO.0O has already been paid, there is only, a slight or casual breach
negating the right of the seller to rescind the contract of sale.
D. Rescission is available provided that the vendor give the vendee the
60-day period as required by the Maceda Law or the Realty Installment Buyers
Law.
(2)“X” came across an advertisement in the “Manila Daily Bulletin” about

the rush sale of three slightly used TOYOTA cars, Model 1989 for only P200,000
each. Finding the price to be very cheap and in order to be sure that he gets one
unit ahead of the others, “X” immediately phoned the advertiser “Y” and place
an order for one car. “Y” accepted the order and promised to deliver the ordered
unit on July 15, 1989. On the said date, however, “Y” did not deliver the unit. “X”
brings an action to compel “Y” to deliver the unit. Will such action prosper?
Give your reasons.
Answer:
The contract in this case has been perfected. However, the contract is
unenforceable under the statute of frauds. The action will prosper if there is no
objection to the oral evidence, which amounts to a waiver of the statute of
frauds.
Question No. 14:
(1) What do you understand by ANTICHRESIS? How is it distinguished

from pledge and mortgage?
Answer:
Antichresis is a contract whereby the creditor acquires the right to receive

the fruits of an immovable of his debtor with the obligation to apply them to the
payment of interest if owing and thereafter to the principal.
Pledge is an accessory and real contract whereby the debtor delivers to the
creditor movable property as security for the performance of a principal
obligation upon the fulfilment of which the thing pledged shall be returned to the
debtor.
A real estate mortgage is an accessory contract whereby the debtor
guarantees the performance of the principal obligation by subjecting real
property or real right as security for the performance of such obligation.
Alternative Extended Answer:
By the contract of antichresis the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits .of
an immovable of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the
interest, if owing* and thereafter to the principal of his credit.
Antichresis distinguished from pledge:

1. Antichresis is consensual, pledge is a real contract.
2. Antichresis involves real property, pledge involves personal property.
3. In antichresis, the principal and the interest must be provided in writing for
validity. In pledge, the date and description of the pledge must be in a public instrument
to affect third persons.
Antichresis distinguished from mortgage:

1. In antichresis the fruits that are applied to .the interest and thereafter to the
principal. In mortgage the fruits are not applied to the principal obligation.
2. In antichresis, the creditor is in possession. In mortgage, the debtor is in
possession.
3. The principal and interest must be in writing tor validity. In mortgage, registration
is required to bind third persons.
4. In antichresis, the creditor pays the taxes. In mortgage, taxes are not imposed
on the creditor.
If the above alternative answer is given, two (2) distinctions for each should be
given full credit.
(2) A diamond ring and a female cow were pledged to secure a loan in the amount
of P100,000. The pledge appeared in a public instrument. A month later, the cow gave
birth. When the amount of the loan was not paid upon its maturity date, the pledged
caused to be sold at a public auction the ring, the cow and the cow’s offspring and the
amount of P150,000. as realized. The pledgor, upon learning of the sale, demanded
from the pledgee the excess in the price over and above the amount of the principal
obligation, claiming that he is entitled to the excess and that the offspring was not
included in the pledge. The pledgee refused to comply with the demand. How would
you decide this conflict? Give your reasons.
Answer:
Debtor/pledgor is not entitled to the excess unless the contrary is agreed upon.
The offspring shall pertain to the pledgor but is subject to the pledge if there is no
stipulation to the contrary.
Question No. 15:
(1) What do you understand by ESTOPPEL? What are the different kinds of
estoppel? Explain.
Answer:
The Civil Code enumerates only two (2) kinds of estoppel: estoppel .in pais or, by
conduct and estoppel by deed. Estoppel in pais or by conduct arises when one by his
act, representation, oral admission or by his silence induces another to believe certain
facts to exist and the other realize an act on such belief.
Estoppel by deed is that by virtue of which a party to a deed and his privies are
precluded from asserting as against the other party any right or title in derogation of the
deed or any fact asserted therein.
Alternative Extended Answer:

The Civil Code gives two (2) kinds of estoppel, namely: estoppel in pais and
estoppel by deed; and jurisprudence gives a third, namely: estoppel by laches.
Estoppel in pais or by conduct arises when one by his act, representation, oral
admission or by his silence induces another to believe certain facts to exist and the
other realize an act on such belief.
Estoppel by deed is that by virtue of which a party to a deed and his privies are
precluded from asserting as against the other party by which any right or title in
derogation of the deed or any fact asserted therein.
Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time giving

rise to the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
(2) How is a civil obligation distinguished from a natural obligation? Give an
example of a natural obligation.
Answer:
Civil obligations give a right of action to compel their performance. Natural

obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant
a right of action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the
obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been delivered on rendered by reason
thereof.
Example ot a natural obligation (one example out of any of the following):

1. When a right to sue upon a civil obligation has lapsed by extinctive prescription,
the obligor who voluntarily performs the contract cannot recover what he has delivered
or the value of the service he has rendered.
2. When without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor a third person
pays a debt which the obligor is not legally bound to pay because the action thereon
has prescribed, but the debtor later voluntarily reimburses the third person, the obligor
cannot recover what he has paid.
3. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age who has entered
into a contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, after the annulment of
the contract voluntarily returns the whole thing or price received, notwithstanding the
fact that he has not been benefited thereby, there is no right to demand the thing or
price thus returned.
4. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one* years of age, who has entered
into a contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, voluntarily pays a sum of
money or delivers a fungible thing in fulfillment of the obligation, there shall be no right
to recover the same from the obligee who has spent or consumed it in good faith.
5. When, after an action to enforce a civil obligation has failed, the defendant
voluntarily performs the obligation, he cannot demand the return of what he has
delivered or the payment of the value of the service he has rendered.
6. When a testate or intestate heir voluntarily pays a debt of the decedent
exceeding the value of the property which he received by will or by the law of intestacy
from the estate of the deceased, the payment is valid and cannot be rescinded by the
payer.
7. When a will is declared void because it has not been executed in accordance
with the formalities required by law, but one of the intestate heirs, after the settlement of
the debts of the deceased, pays a legacy in compliance with, a clause in the defective
will, the payment is effective and irrevocable.
Question No. 16:
(1) May the owner of a building constructed on an unregistered land

belonging to another apply for the registration of such building under the Land
Registration Act and P.D. 1529? What should he do to protect his rights in case the
owner of the land applied for registration thereof? Give your reasons.
Answer:
The Land Registration Act and PD 1529 apply to registration of land only. It may
include the building as an accessory but the building cannot be registered independent-
ly of the land because registration contemplated under this Act refers only to ownership
of land.
The owner of the building should file an opposition or answer to the application for
registration and ask the court that his right to the building be annotated in the decree
and later in the certificate of title.
(2) “A” is the owner of a registered land. The Torrens Title is entrusted to “B”,
his clerk secretary, who forges ‘‘AY’ signature on a deed of sale of said land in his (B’s)
favor. A new title is issued in the name of “B,’r upon registration. Does “B” have a valid
title over the land? If “B” sells the property to “C”, does the latter acquire a valid title
over it?
Answer:
A forged deed is an absolute nullity and conveys no title but it can be the root of a
title. If title to the land has been transferred to a party based upon a forged deed, and
later on after the issuance of such title the property is transferred to another who is an
innocent purchaser for value, then the latter acquires a valid title.
1988 BAR QUESTIONS
Question No. 1:
(a) What is a prejudicial question? What are its elements? What is its effect
upon a criminal action?
(b) Mojar, a passenger in a bus operated by Times Transit Co., suffered
serious physical injuries as a result of a vehicular accident. An information was filed
against Ailes, driver of the bus, for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Ailes was, however, acquitted on the merits of the case because,
according to the judgment of acquittal, he was not negligent. Subsequently, Mojar
instituted an action against Times Transit Co., to recover damages. Will the action
prosper? Give your reasons.
(c) As a rule, once the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action
for damages arising from the offense charged shall be suspended until the final
termination of the criminal action. What are the exceptions to said rule as provided by
the Civil Code?
Answer:
(a) A prejudicial question is a question which arises in a case, the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal (People vs. Aragon 94 Phil. 357; Jimenez vs. Aceria
22SCRA 1380).
It has two elements. They are: First, that it must be determinative of the guilt or
innocense of the accused in the criminal case; and second, jurisdiction to try said
question must be lodged in another tribunal (Ibid.)
Its effect upon a criminal case i$ to suspend it if one has already been commenced
(Article 36, CC). This is of course,
the reverse of the ordinary rule of procedure. The reason for this is that the resolution
of the question is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.
(b) If Mojar can prove the negligence of Ailes by preponderance of evidence,
the action will prosper. He can still recover damages from the operator of the bus even
if the driver had been acquitted in the criminal action, because it is clear that the action
to recover is based on culpa contractual and not on the act or omission complained of
as a felony (Bernaldez vs. Bohol Trans. Co. 7 SCRA 276). According to article 31 of
the Civil Code, when the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act
or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
(c) The exceptions are as follows:
(1) Where the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such as when the basis of the civil action is culpa
contractual, culpa aquiliana, etc. (Arts. 31, 2177, CC).
(2) Where the law grants to the injured party the right to institute a civil action
which is entirely separate and independent from the criminal action, such as when the
action is based on (a) interferences by public officers or employees or by private
individuals with civil rights and liberties; (b) defamation; (c) fraud; (d) physical injuries;
or (e) refusal or neglect of a city or municipal police officer to render aid or protection in
case of danger to life or property (Arts. 32, 33, 34, CC).
(3) Where the question to be resolved in the civil action is prejudicial to the
criminal action (Art. 36, CC).
Alternative Answers to: No. 1 (a) and (b)

A prejudicial question is a question which arises in a civil suit, the resolution
(a)
of which is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Its essential elements, as prescribed by Section 5 of Rule 111 are: (a) the civil
action involves an issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Its effect upon a criminal case is to suspend the criminal case if one has already
been commenced.
(b) Considering that the acquittal is not based on reasonable doubt but on a
positive finding of innocence (he was not negligent) the civil action can no longer
prosper.
The civil liability arising from the act complained of as a felony is barred by the
finding of innocence. However, the civil action for damages based on an obligation
ex-contractu is not deemed barred because of article 31 of the Civil Code.
Question No, 2:
(a) Distinguish co-ownership from partnership.
(b) Is the lease of the entire community property in co- ownership an act of
administration or an act of ownership or alteration? Explain, in relation to the need of
consent of the co-owners.
(c) Since 1935* Janice possessed alone a parcel of land which she co-
owned with Lenny. In 1970, with the knowledge of Lenny, Janice obtained a torrens title
over the land in her own name alone. On August 1, 1988, Lenny brought an action
against Janice for reconveyance of her share. Janice set up the defense of laches. Will
the defense prosper? Reasons.
Answer:
(a) Co-ownership is distinguished from an ordinary partnership in the following
ways:
(1) As to creation: Whereas co-ownership may be created by law, contract,

succession, fortuitous event, or occupancy, partnership is always created by
contract.
(1) As to purpose: Whereas the purpose of co-ownership is the common
enjoyment of the thing or right owned in common, the purpose of a partnership is to
obtain profits.
(2) As to personality: Whereas a co-ownership has no juridical personality
which is separate and distinct from that of the owners, a partnership has.
(3) As to duration: Whereas an agreement not to divide the community
property for more than ten years is not allowed by law* such an agreement would
be perfectly valid in the case of partnerships. This is so, because under the l£w,
there is no limitation upon the duration of partnerships.
(4) As to power of members: Whereas a co-owner has no power to
represent the co-ownership* unless there is an agreement to that effect, a partner
has the power to represent the partnership, unless there is a stipulation to the
contrary.
(5) As to effect of disposition of shares: If a co-owner transfers his share to a
third person, the latter becomes automatically a co-owner, but if a partner transfers
his share to a third person, the latter does not become a partner, unless agreed
upon by all of the partners.
(6) As to division of profits: Whereas in co-ownership the division of the
benefits and charges is fixed by law, in a partnership the division of profits arid
losses may be subject to the agreement of the partners.
(7) As to effect of death: Whereas the death of a coowner has no effect upon
the existence of the co-ownership, the death of a partner shall result in. the dissolu-
tion of the partnership.
(b) Lease of personal property is a mere act of administration, and, therefore,

requires the resolution of the majority of the co-owners. However, lease of real property
may be an act of administration or an act of alteration de-pending upon the
circumstances of each particular case. (1) If the lease is recorded in the Registry of
Property, whatever may be the duration thereof, it is an act of ownership, and therefore,
requires the unanimous consent of all the co- owners, since under the law, a special
power of attorney is required (See Art. 1647, CC). (2) If the lease is not recorded in the
Registry of Property, but the duration thereof is more than one year, it is also an act of
ownership, and therefore, requires the unanimous consent of all the co-owners, since,
again, under the law, a special power of attorney is required (See Art. 1878 No. 8, CC).
(3) If the lease, however, is not recorded in the Registry of Property and the duration
thereof is only one year or less, it is an act of administration, and therefore, merely
requires the resolution of the majority of the co-owners.
(a) It is submitted that the defense of laches will prosper. As held by the Supreme
Court in several notable decisions, in order that the doctrine of laches or “stale
demands” can be applied, the following elements must concur: (1) Conduct on the part
of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which
complaint is made arid for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting
the complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the de-
fendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit (3) lack of
knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the
right on which he bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the
event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred (Miguel
vs. Catalino, 26 SCRA 234). All ot these elements are present in the instant case. As a
matter of fact, the doctrine was applied to a case wherein co-heir and another were
able, through fraud, to register a tract of land in their names. According to the Supreme
Court, the action for reconveyance brought by the other co-heirs more than twenty
years later is now barred not only by extinctive prescription but also by laches. (Fabian
vs. Fabian, 22 SCRA 231).
Committee’s Recommendation Re: No. 2 (a):

(a) It is recommended that a mention of three distinctions should merit a full
credit for this question.
Question No. 3:
(a) How are easements acquired?
(b) In acquiring easement by prescription, how shall the period of possession be
computed?
(c) About fifteen years ago, Adelaida constructed a house on her lot at
Quezon City adjoining a lot owned by Bernie. She provided it'with several windows
overlooking Bernie’s lot half a meter away from the boundary line. A month ago,
Bernie brought an action against Adelaida for the closure of the windows alleging that
they violate the law on distances.
1. Has Adelaida acquired an easement of light and
view by prescription?
2. Will the action of Bernie prosper?
3. If the action will not prosper, will that not be tantamount to saying that
Adelaida has already acquired an easement of light and view?
Answer:
(a) Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a
title or by prescription of ten years (Art. 620, CC), while continuous nonapparent
easements and discontinuous easements whether apparent or nonapparent, can
only be acquired by virtue of a title (Art. 622, CC).
(b) In order that an easement may be acquired by prescription, the time of possession
shall be computed thus: In positive easements, from the day on which the owner of the
dominant estate, or the person who may have made use of the easement, commenced
to exercise it upon the servient estate; and in negative easements, from the day on
which the owner of the dominant estate forbade, by an instrument acknowledged before
a notary public, the owner of the servient estate, from executing an act which would be
lawful without the easement. (Art. 621, CC.)
(c) (1) Adelaida has not acquired an easement of light and view by prescription
after ten years. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, there w'as no formal
prohibition as required by law'. This should have been done by means of an instrument
acknowledged before a notary public w'herein she should have prohibited Bernie from
obstructing his light and view. She did not. In the second place, she did not observe the
legal requirement that there should be a distance of at least two meters betw'een the
window's and Bernie’s lot, since the view is direct. According to the Civil Code, non-
observance of this distance does not give rise to prascription.
(2) The action will not prosper because more than ten years has already
elapsed from the time of the opening of the windows. Bernie’s right of action has
already prescribed.
(3) This is not tantamount to saying that Adelaida has already acquired an
easement of light and view. Under the Civil Code, nobody can prevent Bernie from
obstructing Adelaida’s light and view' by constructing a building on his lot or by raising
a wall thereon contiguous to the windows of Adelaida.
Question No. 4:
(a) What is meant by "law” as a mode of acquiring ownership? What are the
different instances under the Civil Code whereby there is an acquisition of ownership
by operation of law'? State at least three.
(b) A donated to X a parcel of land in 1975. The donation w'as made in a
public instrument, w'hile the acceptance made by X w-as embodied in the same public
instrument. The Deed of Donation was entitled "Donation Inter Vivos. ” There is
however a provision in the deed to the effect that, although the land donated shall be
delivered immediately to X upon the perfection of the donation with full right to enjoy all
of the fruits thereof, "title shall pass to the donee only upon the donor’s death.” Upon
the death of A, his widow and only heir, B. brought an action for the recovery of the
property on the ground that the donation is a donation mortis causa and not a donation
inter vivos. Will the action prosper? Give your reasons.
Answer:
(A) When the Civil Code speaks of law as a distinct mode of acquiring
ownership, it refers to those instances where the law, independently of the other
modes of acquiring ownership, automatically and directly vests the ownership of the
thing in a certain individual once the prescribed requisites or conditions are present
or complied with. Examples of this are:
(1) Land which belongs exclusively to either of the spouses where a building
is constructed with conjugal funds. Here, the ownership of the land is vested
automatically in the conj ugal partnership once the condition that its value has
been reimbursed to the owner has been
complied with (Art. 158, par. 2, CC.)
(2) Hidden treasure which a stranger discovers by chance on another’s
property. Here, one-half of the treasure belongs by right of occupation to the
stranger, while the other half belongs by operation of law to the
proprietor. (Art. 438, par. 2, CC.)
(3) Abandoned beds, when a river or stream suddenly changes its course to
traverse private lands. The former owners of the new bed shall be the owners of the
abandoned bed in proportion to the area lost by each. (Art. 58, P.D. No. 1067.)
(4) Fruits naturally falling from a tree upon adjacent land. Here, the ownership of the
fruits is vested automatically in the owner of the adjacent land. (Art. 681, CC.)
(b) Yes, the action will prosper. In Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, and Howard vs.
Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court declared that in order that a donation will be
considered a disposition post mortem, it should reveal any or all of the following
characteristics:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the
ownership, full or naked, and control the property while alive;
(2) That before his death the transfer should be revocable by the transferor
at will, ad nutum; but revo- cability may be provided for indirectly by means of a
reserved power in the donor to dispose of the property conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.
It is clear from the facts stated in the problem that the donation reveals the first
characteristic. Hence, it is a disposition, post mortem. Therefore, in order that the
donation can take effect it is essential that it must be made in a will executed in
accordance with all of the formalities prescribed by law (Art. 728, CC) Since this
requisite has not been complied with, the donation in the instant case is void or
inexislent.
Committee’s Recommendations Re: No. 4 (a) and (b)

(a) It is recommended that the following be likewise considered as instances
whereby there is acquisition of ownership by operation of law:
(1) The acquisition of property in co-ownership under a marriage governed by
tfie absolute community regime.
(2) Estoppel under article 1434 of the Civil Code which provides that:
“When a person who is not the owner of a thing^ells or alienates and delivers it,
and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation
of law to the buyer or grantee”.; and
(3) Registration of land under Act 496 where the applicant is not the real
owner.
(b)It is recommended that the mention of the first characteristic of the three
mentioned above, should merit a full credit for this question.
Question No. 5:
•
(a) In probate proceedings, what are the only questions which a probate
court can determine?
(b) A presented for probate a will purporting to be the last will and testament
of his deceased wife. The will was admitted to probate without any opposition. Sixteen
months later, the brothers and sisters of the deceased discovered that the will was a
forgery. Can A now be prosecuted for the criminal offense of forgery? Give your
reasons.
Answer:
(a)Under our law, there are only three possible ques tions which can be
determined by the probate court. They are:
(1) Whether or not the instrument which is offered for probate is the last will
and testament of the decedent; in other words, the question is one of identity.
(2) Whether or not the will has been executed in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law; in other words, the question is one of due execution.
(3) Whether or not the testator had the necessary testamentary capacity at
the time of the execution of the will; in other words, the question is one of capacity.
Consequently, the probate court cannot inquire into the intrinsic validity of
testamentary dispositions.
(b) A can no longer be prosecuted for the criminal offense of forgery. This is so
because, according to the last paragraph of Art. 838 of the.Civil Code, subject to the
right of appeal the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after
his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution. Since sixteen months have
already elapsed from the allowance of the will to the time when the forgery was
discovered, there is now no possible remedy of impugning the validity of the will. Even
a petition to set aside a judgment or order of a Court of First Instance on the ground of
fraud in accordance with Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is no longer
possible because more than six months from the time of the promulgation of the judg-
ment or order have already elapsed. (Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil. 215.)
Committee’s Recommendation Re: No. 5 (a)

It is recommended that a mention of numbers (2) or (3) should merit a full
(a)
credit for this question.
Suggested Alternative Answer To: No. 5 (b):
The criminal action can still prosper because the question of probate is a civil
law matter while the question of forgery is a penal matter. That does not preclude
the determination of guilt of the forger because the two are founded on different
legal bases. Besides, in a crimi7 nal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
required while in civil cases, only preponderance of evidence is required.
Question No. 6:
(a) What is preterition? What are its requisites? What is its effect?
(b) What are the different limitations imposed by law upon fideicommissary
substitutions?
(c) Who are compulsory heirs?
Answer:
Preterition or pretermission, as it is sometimes called may be defined as the

omission in the testator’s will of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
testator (Art. 854, CC). Stated in another way, it consists in the omission in the
testator’s will of the compulsory heirs in the diret line, or of anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heir nor expressly disinherited (Neri vs. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185; Nugu.id vs.
Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449). Its requisites are:
(1) The heir omitted must be a compulsory heir in the direct line;
(2) The ommission must be total and complete; and
(3) The omitted heir must survive the testator.
The effect is to annul entirely the institution of heirs but legacies and devises shall
be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. (Art. 854, CC.)
(b) There are four limitations. They are:
(1) The substitution must not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted (Art. 863, CC).
(2) ' The fiduciary and the fideicommissary must be living at the time of the
death of the testator (Ibid).
(3) The substitution must not burden the legitime of compulsory heirs (Art.
864, CC).
(4) The substitution must be made expressly (Art. 865, par. 1, CC.)
(c) In general, compulsory heirs are those for whom the law has reserved a
portion of the testator’s estate which is known as the legitime.
In particular, the following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;'
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with
respects to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate childen referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in numbers 3,4, and 5 are not excluded by those in
numbers 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in numbers 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in

numbers 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the classes mentioned shall inherit
from them in the manner and to the extent established by the Civil Code. (Art. 887,
CC.)
Committee’s Recommendation Re; No. 6 (c);

(c) It is recommended that an enumeration of numbers one to five without the
mention of the additional last three paragraphs should merit full credit for this
question.
Question No. 7;
(a) When does the right of representation take place?
(b) Suppose that the beneficiary in a will is the wife of the minister of the
gospel who rendered aid to the testator during the latter’s last illness, would she be
disqualified from inheriting from the testator? Explain.
(c)
Answer;
The right of representation shall take place in the following cases:
(1) Intestamentary succession:

(a) In case a compulsory heir in the direct descending line dies before the
testator survived by his children or descendants (Art. 85.6, CC).
(b) In case a compulsory heir in the direct descending line is incapacitated to
succeed from the testator and he has children or descendants. (Arts. 856,1035,
CC).
(c) In case a compulsory heir in the direct descending line is disinherited and
he has children or descendants. (Art. 923, CC).
(2) In intestate succession:
(a) In case a legal heir in the direct descending line dies before the decedent
survived by his children or descendant (Arts. 98lj 982, CC), or in the absence of
other heirs who can exclude them from the succession, a brother or sister dies
before the decedent survived by his or her own children. (Ars. 972, 975, CC).
(b) In case a legal heir in the direct descending line is incapacitated to
succeed from the decedent and he has children or descendants (Art. 1035, CC)* or
in the absence of other heirs who can exclude them from the succession, a brother
or sister is incapacitated to succeed from the decedent and he or she has children.
(Arts. 972,975,1035, CC).
(b) We believe that the wife of the minister would not be disqualified from inheriting from
the testator. Under No. 2 of Art. 1027 of the Civil Code, the law extends the disquali-
fication of priests and ministers of the gospel tp their relatives within the fourth degree
as well as to the church, order, chapter, community, organization or iastitlition to which
they may belong. The spouse is not included. Consequently, Such spouse is not
disqualified. Otherwise, we would be reading into the law what is not found there.
Besides, capacity to succeed is the general rule, while incapacity to succeed is the
exception. Hence, the rules on incapacity must always be strictly construed.
Suggested Alternative Answer To: No. 7(b):

(b) If the testamentary disposition was actually intended to favor the Minister as a
disqualified person and was ostensibly made thru an intermediary, namely, the
wife, then the Minister is considered disqualified as the real and intended heir.
Question No. 8:
(a) Mario received from Edgar a pendant with diamonds valued at P5,000.00 to be
sold on commission basis or to be returned on demand. In the evening of August 31,
1987, while he was walking home, two men snatched his clutch bag containing the
pendant and ran away. Subsequently, the snatchers were apprehended and charged.
During the pendency of the criminal case, Edgar brought an action against Mario for the
recovery of the pendant or its value and damages. Mario interposed the defense of
fortuitous event but Edgar contends—
(1) That the defense of fortuitous event is untenable because there was
negligence on the part of the defendant; and
(2) That if the defense is untenable, there must be a prior conviction of
robbery before it can be availed of. Decide the case.
(b) Distinguish between the effects of suspensive and resolutory conditions
upon ail obligation.
Answer:
(a) The factual setting of the above problem is identical to that of Austria vs. Court
of Appeals (39 SCRA 527). In that case the Supreme Court held that defendant is not
liable.
To constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a person from responsibility, it is
necessary (1) that the event must be independent of the will of the debtor; (2) that it
must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (3) that the occurrence must render it
impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and (b) that the
debtor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor.
All of the above requisites or conditions are present in this case. It is undeniable
that in order to completely exonerate the debtor by reason of a fortuitous event, such
debtor must, in addition into the causes itself, be free of any concurrent or contributory
fault or hegligence. We believe, however, that her act in travelling alone in the evening,
carrying jewelry of considerable value, cannot be considered as either concurrent or -
contributory negligence, While it may be so considered now, we are not persuaded
that the same rule should obtain ten years previously when the robbery in question
took place, for at that time criminality had not by far reached the levels attained in the
present day.
There is likewise no merit in the contention that to allow the fact of robbery to be
recognized in this case before conviction is secured in the criminal action, would
prejudice the latter case, or would result in' inconsistency should the accused obtain
an acquittal or should the criminal case be dismissed. It must be realized that a court
finding that a robbery has happened would not necessarily mean that those accused in
the criminal action would be found guilty of the crime; nor would a ruling that those
actually accused did not commit the robbery be inconsistent with a finding that a
robbery did take place. The evidence to establish these facts would not necessarily be
the same.
(a) It is evident that a resolutory condition affects the obligation to which it is
attached in a manner which is diametrically opposed to that of a suspensive condition.
If the suspensive condition is fulfilled, the obligation arises or becomes effective if the
resolutory condition is fulfilled, the obligation is extinguished. If the first is not fulfilled,
the juridical relation is created; if the second is not fulfilled, the juridical relation is
consolidated. In other words, in the first, rights are not yet acquired, but there is a hope
or expectancy that they will soon be acquired; in the second, rights are already
acquired, but subject to the threat of extinction (8 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 311.)
Suggested Alternative Answers to No. 8(a):

(a) (1) We would like to call attention to the fact that the question says "contends.”
So perhaps we should make a distinction if negligence is proven and if negligence
is not proven. If the negligence of the defendant is not proven as Edgar contends,
then the defense of fortuitous event is tenable. However, if negligence is proven to
be present then the defense of fortuitous event is not tenable here and the
defendant will be liable.
(2) 'There is no need of prior conviction in either case.
Question No. 9:
Define alternative and facultative obligations.
(a)
(b) Define joint and solidary obligations.
(c) A, B, and C borrowed PI2,000 from X. This debt is evidenced by a promissory
note wherein the three bound themselves to pay the debt jointly and severally.
However, according to the note, A can be compelled to pay only on June 15, 1962, B
can be compelled to pay only on June 15, 1964, while C can be compelled to pay only
on June 15 1966. On June 15, 1962, X made a demand upon A to pay the entire
indebtedness but the latter aid only P4,000.00. Subsequently, because of A’s refusal to
pay the balance, X brought an action against him for collection of the amount. Will such
an action prosper? Reasons.
Answer:
(a) Alternative obligations rgfer to those juridical relations which comprehend
several objects or prestations which are due, but the payment or performance of one of
them would be sufficient. On the other hand, facultative obligations refer to those
juridical relations where only one object or prestation has been agreed upon by the
parties to the obligation, but the obligor may deliver or render another in substitution.
(a) When there is a concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors
in one and the same Obligation, such obligation may be either joint (obligacion man-
comunada) or solidary (obligacion solidaria). A joint obligation may be defined as an
obligation where there is a concurrence of several creditors or .several* debtors, or of
several creditors and debtors* by virtue which each of the creditors has a right t6
demand, while each of debtors is bound to render compliance with his proportionate
part of the prestation which constitutes the object of the obligation. In other words, each
of the creditors is entitled to demand the payment of only a proportionate part of the
credit, while each of the debtors is liable for the payment of only a proportionate part of
the debt. A solidary obligation, on the other hand, may be defined as an obligation
where there is a concurrence of several creditors, or several debtors, or of several
creditors and debtors, by virtue which each of the creditors has a right to demand,
while each of the debtors is bound to render entire compliance with the prestation
which constitutes the object of the obligation. In other words, each of the creditors is
entitled to demand the payment of the entire credit, while each of the debtors is liable
for the payment of the entire debt. (See Art. 1207, CC; 3 Castan, 7th Ed., pp. 65-66.)
(b) For the present, the action will not prosper. It is of course true that the
obligation here is solidary and that its solidary character is not destroyed by the fact that
the debtors are bound by different periods for payment is expressly provided for in Art.
1211 of the Civil Code. However, in solidary obligations of this type, the right of the
creditor is limited to the recovery of the amount owed by the debtor whose obligation
has already matured, leaving in suspense his right to recover the shares corresponding
to the other debtors whose obligations have not yet matured. This restriction upon the
creditor’s right does not destroy the solidary character of the obligation, because
ultimately, he can still compel one and the same debtor, if that is his wish, to pay the
entire obligation; Therefore, in the instant case, X shall have to wait for June 15, 1964,
when B’s obligation shall have matured, and for June 15, 1966, when C’s obligation
shall have also matured. On June 15, 1966, he can collect P4,000 from either A or B.
On June 15, 1966, he can again collect another P4,000 from either A or B or C. (See
Ynchaustivs. Yulo, 34 Phil. 978.)
Suggested Alternative Answer To: No. 9 (c):
(b) It now being 1988, the action can no longer prosper because it has already
prescribed. Actions upon written contracts prescribe in 10 years. '
Question No. 10:

(a) Under the Civil Code, what are the different special forms of payments?
(b) What are the special requisites of consignation in order that it shall
produce the effect of payment?
(c) A treasury warrant payable to Rosenne and indorsed by Boni was cashed at the
Philippine National Bank. The warrant was subsequently dishonored by the Philippine
Treasury. The Bank then applied the deposit of Boni to the payment of the amount paid
for the warrant. Is the action of the Bank in accordance with law? Reasons.
Answer:
(a) Under the Civil Code, there are actually four special forms of payment. They are
(1) application of payment (Arts. 1252-1254); (2) dation in payment (Art.
1245); (3) payment by cession (Art. 1255); and (4) tender of

payment and consignation (Arts. 1256-1261). Strictly
speaking, however, application of payment, by its very
nature, is not a special form of payment.
(a) In order that consignation shall produce the effect
of payment, it is not only essential that it must conform with
all of the requisites of payment, but it is also essential that
certain special requirements prescribed by law must be
complied with. The debtor must show:
(1)That there is a debt due;
(2) That the consignation has been made either be-
cause the creditor to whom tender of payment was
made refused to accept the payment without just cause,
or because any of the cause stated by law for effective
consignation without previous tender of payment
exists (Art. 1256, CC);
(3) The previous notice of the consignation had been
given to the persons interested in the fulfillment of the
obligation (Art. 1256, CC);
(4) That the thing or amount due had been placed at
the disposal of judicial authority (Art. 1258, par. 1,
CC); and
(5) That after the consignation had been made, the
persons interested in the fulfillment of the obligation had
been notified thereof (Art. 1258, par. 2, CC).
(b) Yes, the action of the Bank is in accordance with
law. The facts stated in the above problem are exactly the
same as those in the case of Gullas vs. National Bank, 62
Phil. 519, where the Supreme Court held that a bank has a
right of set-off of the deposit in its hands for the payment of
any indebtedness to it on the part of the depositor. When-a
person deposits his money at a bank, whether such deposit is fixed, savings or current,
a relationship of creditor and debtor is established between the depositor and bank. ^ It
therefore, evident that all of the requisites for compensation are present in this case.
Committee’s Recommendation Re; No. 10(a):

The committee recommends that if application for payment is not mentioned by
(a)
the examinee, full credit must likewise be given.
Question No. 11:

(a) Suppose that under an obligation imposed by a final judgment, the
liability of the judgment debtor is to pay the amount of P6,000.00 but both the judgment
debtor and the judgment creditor subsequently entered into a contract reducing the
liability of the former to only P4,000.00, is there an implied novation which will have the
effect of extinguishing the judgment obligation and creating a modified obligatory
relation? Reasons.
(b) Merle offered to sell her automobile to Violy for P60,000.00. After
inspecting the automobile, Violy offered to buy it for P50,000.00. This offer was
accepted by Merle. The next day, Merle offered to deliver the automobile, but Violy
being short of funds, secured postponement of the delivery, promising to pay the price
“upon arrival of the steamer, Helena”. The steamer however never arrived because it
was wrecked by a typhoon and sank somewhere off the Coast of Samar,
(1) Is there a perfected contract in this case? Why?

(2) Is the promise to pay made by Violy conditional or with a term? Why?
(3) Can Merle compel Violy to pay the purchase price and to accept the
automobile? Why?
Answer;
There is no implied novation in this case. We see no valid objection to the

judgment debtor and the judgment creditor in entering into an agreement regarding the
monetary obligation of. the former under the judgment referred to. The payment by the
judgment debtor of the lesser amount of P4,000, accepted by the creditor without any
protest or objection and acknowledged by the latter as in full satisfaction of the money
judgment, completely extinguished the judgment debt and released the debtor from
his pecuniary liability. Novation results in two stipulations—one to extinguish an

existing obligation, the other to substitute a new one in its place. Fundamental it is that
novation effects a substitution or modification of an obligation by another or an
extinguishment of one obligation by the creation of another. In the case at hand, we fail
to see what new or modified obligation arose out of the payment by judgment debtor of
the reduced amount of P4,000 to the creditor. Additionally, to sustain novation
necessitates thjit the same be so declared in unequivocal terms clearly and
unmistakably shown by the ex-, press agreement of the parties or by acts of equivalent
import—or that there is complete and substantial incompatibility between the two
obligations. (Sandico vs. Piguing, 42SCRA 322.)
(b) (1) Yes, there is a perfected contract because there is already a concurrence
between the offer and the acceptance with respect to the object and the cause
which shall constitute the contract. Such concurrence is manifested by the
acceptance made by Merle of the offer
made by Violy.
(2) I submit that the promise to pay made by Violy is not conditional, but with
a term. The promise is to pay the P50,000 upon arrival in this port of the steamer,
Helena* not if the steamer Helena shall arrive in this port. Hence, the promise is
with regard to the date of arrival and not with regard to the fact of arrival.
(3) Yes, Merle can compel Violy to pay the purchase * price and to accept
the automobile. She will, however,
have to wait for the date when the steamer, Helena, would have arrived were it
not for the shipwreck. After all, there is already a perfected contract. lesser
amount of P4,000, accepted by the creditor without any protest or objection and
acknowledged by the latter as in full satisfaction of the money judgment,
completely extinguished the judgment debt and released the debtor from his
pecuniary liability.
Novation results in two stipulations—one to extinguish an existing obligation, the

other to substitute a new one in its place. Fundamental it is that novation effects a
substitution or modification of an obligation by another or an extinguishment of one
obligation by the creation of another. In the case at hand, we fail to see what new or
modified obligation arose out of the payment by judgment debtor of the reduced
amount of P4,000 to the creditor. Additionally, to sustain novation necessitates thjit
the same be so declared in unequivocal terms clearly and unmistakably shown by the
ex-, press agreement of the parties or by acts of equivalent import—or that there is
complete and substantial incompatibility between the two obligations. (Sandico vs.
Piguing, 42SCRA 322.)
(c)(1) Yes, there is a perfected contract because there is already a concurrence
between the offer and the acceptance with respect to the object and the cause
which shall constitute the contract. Such concurrence is manifested by the
acceptance made by Merle of the offer
made by Violy.
(4) I submit that the promise to pay made by Violy is not conditional, but with
a term. The promise is to pay the P50,000 upon arrival in this port of the steamer,
Helena* not if the steamer Helena shall arrive in this port. Hence, the promise is
with regard to the date of arrival and not with regard to the fact of arrival.
(5) Yes, Merle can compel Violy to pay the purchase * price and to accept
the automobile. She will, however,
have to wait for the date when the steamer, Helena, would have arrived were it
not for the shipwreck. After all, there is already a perfected contract.
Suggested Alternative Answers To: No. 11(a) and (b):

(a)(1) There remains an obligation on the basis of the facts given. There is no
showing in the facts that the P4,000 has been paid so it created a modified
obligatory obligation no longer based on the judgment but based on the novatory
agreement.
(2) There is no implied novation. Instead there has been a partial remission
in the amount of P2,000 leaving P4,000 still enforceable under the judgment.
(3) It can amount to a compromise. A final judgment which has not yet been
fully satisfied may be the subject of a compromise. The compromise partakes the
nature of a novation. Article 204; provides that:
“If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other
party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist
upon his original demand.”
(Gatchalian vs. Arlegui 75 SCRA 234; Dormitorio vs. Fernandez 72 SCRA 388). '
(2) The promise to pay is subject to a term. When there is a pre-existing

(b)
obligation and the “condition” affects only the time of payment such “condition” can
be considered as a period. In other words, the parties must be deemed to have
contemplated a period.
(3) Yes Merle can compel Violy to pay the purchase price and to accept the
automobile but only after the t parties would have fixed the period. Failing in that, the
courts may be asked to fix the period. Article 1180 provides that:
“When the debtor binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do
so, the obligation shall be deemed to be one with a period, subject to the
provisions of article 1197.”
Question No. 12: s
(a) Pursuant to private international law or conflict of laws, to what law is

real property as well as personal property subject? Are there any exceptions to the
rule? If there are, name them,
(b) What are the four aspects of succession which are governed by the
national law of the decedent if he is a foreigner?
(c) A, a citizen of California, U.S.A. but domiciled in the Philippines, died
testate in Manila, survived by two acknowledged natural children, B and G. In his will,
he left more than P500,000.00 to B and only P3,000.00 to C. It is admitted that under
tlje Civil Code of California, the domiciliary law of the decedent shall govern questions
involving the validity of testamentary provisions. C, who is contesting the validity of
the. disposition in favor of B now contends that the Philippine laws with respect to
succession are applicable. Is this Correct? Give your reasons.
Answer:
(a) Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated (Art. 16, par. 1, CC). There are, however, two exceptions to
this rule. They are: (1) under the second paragraph of Art. 16, which declares that,
testamentary and intestate succession, both with respect to the order of succession,
the amount of successional rights and the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions
shall be regulated by the national law of the decedent; and (2) under No. 2 Art. 124,
which declares that if the husband is a foreigner and the wife is a Filipino, their
property relationsshall be governed by the husband’s national law, without prejudice to
the provisions of the Civil Code with regard to immovable property.
(b) The four aspects of succession which are governed by the national law of the
decedent if he is a foreigner are: first, the order of succession; second, the amount of
successional rights; third, the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions; and fourth, the
capacity to succeed. (Arts. 16, par. 2, 1039, CC; see Beilis vs. Beilis, 20 SCRA 358.)
(c) Yes, this is correct. The doctrine of renvoi is applicable in the instant case.
Although the Civil Code in Art. 16 states that the intrinsic validity of testamentary pro-
visions shall be regulated by the decedent’s national law, nevertheless, the Civil Code
of California declares that the decedent’s domiciliary law shall govern. Hence, the
question shall be referred back to the decedent’s domicile. In other words, the laws of
the Philippines with respect to succession shall govern. Consequently, in the partition of
the estate, C shall be given a share which must not be less than his legitime. (Aznarvs;
Garcia, 7 SCRA 95).
Question No. 13:

(a) A sold to B a house and lot for P50,000.00 payable 30 days after the execution
of the deed of sale. It was expressly agreed in the deed that the sale would ipso facto
be of no effect upon the buyer’s failure to pay as' agreed. B failed to pay on maturity,
and A sued to declare the contract of no force and effect. If B tendered payment before
the action was filed, but subsequent to the stipulated date of payment, would the action
prosper? Why?
(b) In 1950, A executed a power of attorney authorizing B to sell a parcel of
lancl consisting of more than 14 hectares. A died in 1954. In 1956, his four childen sold
more than 12 hectares of the land to C. In 1957, B sold. 8 hectares of the same land to
D. It appears that C did not register the sale executed by the children. D, who was not
aware of the previous sale, registered the sale executed by B, whose authority to sell
was annotated at the back of the Original Certificate of Title.
(1) What was the effect of the death of A upon B’s authority to sell the land?
(2) Assuming that B still had the authority to sell the land—who has a better right
over the said land, C or D?
(1) What are the requisites in order that the defendant can be held liable for damages in a
quasi-delict case?
Answer:
(a) The action would not prosper in such a case. According to the law, “in the sale
of immovable property, even though it may have been stipulated that upon failure to
pay the price at the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of right take
place, the vendee may pay, even after the expiration of the period, so long as no
demand for the rescission of the contract has been made upon him either judicially or
by notarial act. After the demand, the court may not grant him a new term.” (Art. 1592,
CC.) Here, at the time B tendered payment of the purchase price, there was still no
demand made upon him by A for the payment of said purchase price either judicially or
by notarial act.
(b) {1) While the death of the principal in 1954 ended the authority of the agent to
sell the land, it has not been shown that he was aware of his principal s demise.
Hence, the act of such agent is valid and shall be fully effective with respect to
third persons which may have contracted with him in good faith in conformity with
Art. 1931 of the Civil Code. (Buason vs. Panuyas, 105 Phil. 795, Herrera vs. Luy,
110 Phil. 1020.)
(2) As the case at bar is a case of double sale of registered land he who
recorded the sale in good faith has a better right in conformity with Art. 1544 of
the Civil Code. Since D was not aware of the previous sale, he had to rely on the
face of the certificate of title of the registered owner. Hence, he now has a better
right to the land. (Buason vs. Panuyas, supra.)
(c) In actions based on quasi-deliets, before the person injured can recover
damages from the defendant, it is
necessary that he must be able to prove the following facts:
(1) The fault or negligence of the defendant;
(2) The damages suffered or incurred by the plaintiff; and
(3) The relation of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. (Taylor vs. Manila Electric Co.,
16 Phil. 8.) '
Alternative Answer to: No. 13 (b):

(b)(1) The agency is terminated upon the death of either the principal or agent.
Exceptionally, a transaction entered into by the agent with a third person where
both had acted in good faith is valid. Article 1930 of the Civil Code provides that:
“The agency shall remain in full force and effect even after the death of
the principal, if it has been constituted in the common interest of the latter
and of the agent, or in the interest of a third person who has accepted the
stipulation in his favor.”
and Article 1931 provides that:
“Anything done by the agent, without knowledge of the death of the
principal or of any other cause which extinguishes the agency, is valid and
shall be fully effective with respect to third persons who may have
contracted with him in good faith.”
Question No. 14:
(a) 1) Is title to registered land subject to prescription?

Explain your answer.
How about the right of the registered owner to recover possession, is it equally
2)
imprescriptible? Why? on the imprescriptibility of Torrens Title? Explain.
(b) In passing upon the registrability of a document sought to be registered, what
formal requisites is the Register of Deeds charged to determine, under his
responsibility, whether or not they have been complied with?
Answer:
(a) 1) No because under Section 47, P.D. 1529, no title to registered land in
derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. A similar provision is found in the Civil Code. The reason is
that once a piece of land is registered under the Torrens System, it operates as a
notice to the whole world. All persons are bound by it. No one can plead ignorance
of the registration.
(2) The right to recover the land from another person holding it is equally
imprescriptible, the reason being that possession is a mere consequence of
ownership.
(3) While a Torrens Title is imprescriptible, under certain exceptional
circumstances, it may yield to the equitable principle of laches. In other words, certain
circumstances such as inaction or utter neglect on the part of the owner and the
intervention of rights by third parties may, for reasons of equity, convert the claim of
imprescriptibility into a stale demand. (Mejia vs. Gam- ponia,. 100 Phil. 277; Miguel vs.
Catalino, G.R. L-23072, Nov. 29, 1968; Heirs of Batiog Lacarnen vs. Heirs of Laruan,
G.R. L-27058, July 31, 1985).
(b) To be registerable, a voluntary document affecting registered land must be

sufficient in law. (Section 51, P.D. 1529) Sufficiency refers to both substance and form.
As to form, it is the ROD’s responsibility to check such items as the full name and
signature of vendor or grantor, the marital consent of the wife if the land sold is
conjugal, the full name, nationality, the civil status, the name of spouse, if married, the
resident and postal address of the grantee. If the grantee is a corporation, the deed
must be accompanied with the Articles of Incorporation, a board resolution authorizing
the corporation to buy and another resolution of the Board naming the corporate officer
authorized to execute and sign the contract. This is not to mention the proper
observance of the requirements in the acknowledgment portion of the deed.
Question No. 15:

(a) Suppose that in an oral contract, which by its terms is not to be
performed within one year from the execution thereof, one of the contracting parties
has aleady complied within the year with the obligations imposed upon him by said
contract, can the other party avoid fulfillment of those incumbent upon him by invoking
the Statute of Frauds?
(b) One-half of a parcel of land belonging to A and B was sold by X to Y for
the amount of PI ,500.00. The sale was executed verbally. One year later, A and B sold
the entire land to X. Is the sale executed verbally by X to Y valid and binding? Reasons.
(c) Distinguish between a contract of sale and a contract to sell.
Answer:
(a) No, he cannot. This is so, because the Statute of Frauds aims to prevent and
not to protect fraud. It is well- settled that when the law declares that an agreement
which by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof is
unenforceable by action, unless the same* or some note or memorandum thereof, be in
writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent, it refers only to an
agreement which by its terms is not to be performed on either side within a year fom
the execution thereof. Hence.
one which has already been fully performed on one side within a year is taken out of
the operation of the statute. (Phil. Nat. Bank vs. Phil. Vegetable Oil Co., 49 Phil. 857;
Shoemaker vs. La Tondena, 68 Phil. 24.)
(b) The sale, although not contained in a public instrument or formal writing,
is nevertheless valid and binding.for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal
contract of sale qf real estate produces legal effects between the parties. In the
premises, Art. 1434 or the Civil Code, which declares that when a person who is not
the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor ac-
quires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee, is
applicable. (Bucton vs. Gabar, 55 SCRA 499.)
(c) The two may be distinguished from each other in the following ways:
(1) In the first, title passes to the vendee upon delivery of the thing sold,
whereas in the second, by agreement, ownership is reserved in the vendor and is
not to pass until full payment of the price.
(2) In the first, nonpayment is a negative resolutory condition, whereas in the
second, full payment is a positive suspensive condition.
(3) In the first, the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership until and
unless the Contract is resolved or rescinded, whereas in the second, title remains
in the vendor, and when he seeks to eject the vendee because of noncompliance
by such vendee with the suspensive condition stipulated, he is enforcing the con-
tract and not resolving the same. (Santos vs. Santos, CA, 47 Off. Gaz; 6372.)
Suggested Alternative Answers To: No. 15 (b):

(b) 1) The contract of sale is valid and enforceable in view of the payment of the
price of PI,500 But there is no showing the problem that there was delivery of the
(c) land. Accordingly, Article 1434 does not apply. However, Y can compel under
Article 1357 to observe the proper form of a deed of sale involving real property and
simultaneously compel specific performance to deliver.
(d) 2) The verbal sale of land is unenforceable since there is no statement in the
problem that the agreed price of PI,500 was paid, nor was the land delivered. Being,
Article 1434 will not apply since it is predicated on a valid or enforceable contract of
sale.

Question No. 1:
Alma, a Filipino citizen went to the United States on a tourist visa. Wanting to
legalize her stay and obtain permanent employment, she married John, an American
citizen, for a fee, with the understanding that after a year, John would divorce her. As
agreed upon the two obtained a divorce in Reno, Nevada.
(a) Suppose that after the divorce Alma consults you on the question of how
she can now marry her childhood sweetheart Rene, in tf»e Philippines preferably, or if
that cannot be done, in some other country where Alma and Rene are prepared to go
so that they can be joined in wedlock and live the life they had dreamed about. What
advice will you give Alma. Explain.
(bi Suppose on the other hand that Alma and John decided to give their marriage
a try. They had seven years of marriage. Alma eventually became an American
citizen, but the marriage soured, and ended up in a divorce, just the same.
This time Alma wants a marriage for keeps, so she comes back to the
Philippines to Rene who, ever faithful, has waited for seven long years. Can she and
Rene contract a valid marriage? Explain.
• Answer:
(First Assumption)
a. Assuming that the marriage of Alma and John is valid, then the divorce
obtained by them is void because of Article 15 of the Civil Code, Hence a
marriage between Alma and Rene in the Philippines
or elsewhere will be bigamous. The advice to Alma, therefore, is for her not to
marry Rene.
b. Since Alma became an American citizen and presumably she had that
citizenship at the time of the divorce, if the divorce is valid under the American
law or the law of her nationality at that time, then she would be released from
her marriage with John. Alma and Rene can contract a valid marriage when she
comes back to the Philippines.
(Second Assumption)
a. Assuming that the marriage of Alma and John is fictitious, there having been no
real intent to enter into the marriage, and there having been no consent at all
since Alma’s intention was merely to legalize her stay and obtain permanent
employment, the marriage between Alma and John is Yoid. On this premise, my
advice to Alma would be that she can now marry her childhood sweetheart
Rene in the Philippines or in any other country for that matter.
b. Assuming, upon the other hand, that Alma and John did intend to marry and
give their marriage a try, and Alma eventually became an American citizen, the
divorce would be valid. Hence, she and Rene can contract a valid marriage
upon her return to the Philippines
Question No. 2:
Ato was the registered owner of a passenger jeepney, which was involved in a
collision accident with a vegetable truck, resulting in the death of four passengers and
injuries to three. At the time of the accident, Ato was legally married to Maria but was
cohabiting with Tonia in a relationship akin to that of husband and wife.
Could the heirs of the dead passengers and tire injured

Person recover damages from?
(a) Ato?
(b) Maria?
(c) Tonia?
Explain each case.

Answer:
a. Ato — Yes. Insofar as the dead passengers are concerned, the heirs can
recover damages on the basis of culpa contractual. If the injured persons are
also passengers, Ato is Jikewise liable on the same basis of culpa contractual.
However, if the injured persons are not passengers, then the liability for
damages of Ato will be on the basis of a quasi-delict.
b. Maria — In view of the ruling in Juaniza v. Jose (89 SCRA 306) that the
passenger jeepney acquired by the husband during an illicit cohabitation with
the paramour is conjugal property, Maria is liable to the same extent as Ato
insofar as the conjugal property in the marriage between Ato and Maria could
be answerable. But as regards her paraphernal property, Maria cannot be held
answerable.
c. Tonia — No. In Juaniza v. Jose the paramour of the owner of the passenger
jeepney that figured in an accident was held to be not a coowner, and therefore
not liable for damages. Article 144 is inapplicable.
Question No. 3:
Celso Lim would like to correct an allegedly wrong entry in the birth certificate of
one of his sons, Celso Jr., describing the latter as a Chinese national and not as a
Filipino. Among the evidence Celso Lim had are his own birth certificate describing
him as a Filipino, the birth certificate of his other children, all describing them as
Filipinos and a court decision describing his father (Celso, Jr.’s grandfather) as a
Filipino.
(a) What action must Celso Lim take to ensure the effective correction of the
allegedly wrong entry in his son’s birth certificate?
(b) Who should be made parties to such action or proceeding?
Answer:
a. Celso must file a petition in an adversary proceeding to correct the erroneous

entry. In the case of Republic v. Valencia, (L-32181, March 5, 1986), it was ruled that
not only clencal errors can be the subject-matter of the petition, but even the
controversial entries can be corrected.
b. Under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, he should notify the Civil Registrar and all
the persons affected or who have an interest in the subject matter of the petition, in-
cluding the Solicitor General.
Question No. 4:
Angel died intestate leaving considerable properties accumulated during 25 years
of marriage. He is survived by his widow, a legally adopted son, the child of a deceased
legitimate daughter, two illegitimate children duly recognized by Angel before his death
and his ailing 93-year old mother who has wholly dependent on him.
How would you distribute the estate indicating by fractions the portions of the
following who claim to be entitled to inherit:
(a) the widow?

(b) the adopted son?
(c) the child of the deceased legitimate daughter?
(d) the two recognized illegitimate children?
(e) The mother
Answer:
a. the widow — 1/4

b. the adopted son - 1/4
c. the child of the deceased legitimate daughter — 1/4
d. the two “recognized illegitimate children” - v/e must distinguish:
Assuming that the two recognized illegitimate children are natural children, then
each of them will get 1/8.
Upon the other hand, if they are recognized spurious children then each of them
will get 2/5 of 1/4 of the estate. The remaining 1/5 of 1/4 will be distributed as follows:
Under the theory of concurrence, that 1/5 of 1/4 will be divided equally among the
widow, the adopted son and the child of the deceased legitimate daughter.
Under the theory of exclusion that 1/5 of 1/4 will be divided equally between the
adopted son and the child of the deceased legitimate daughter.
e. the mother - will get nothing.
Question No. 5:
Tomas, Rene and Jose entered into a partnership under the firm name “Manila
Lumber.” Subsequently, upon mutual agreement, Tomas withdrew from the
partnership and the partnership was dissolved. However, the remaining partners,
Rene and Jose, did not terminate the business of “Manila Lumber.” Instead of winding
up the business of the partnership and liquidating its assets, Rene and Jose
continued the business in the name of “Manila Lumber” apparently without objection
from Tomas. The withdrawal of Tomas from the partnership was not published in the
newspapers.
Could Tomas be held liable for any obligation or indebtedness Rene and Jose
might incur while doing business in the name of “Manila Lumber” after his withdrawal
from the partnership? Explain.
Answer:
Yes. Tomas can be held liable under the doctrine of estoppel. But as regards the
parties among themselves, only Rene and Jose are liable. Tomas cannot be held liable
since there was no proper notification or publication.
In the event that Tomas is made to pay the liability to third person, he has the right
to seek reimbursement from Rene and Jose (Articles 1837 to 1840; Goquiolay vs.
Sycip, 9 SCRA 663).
Question No. 6:
M/S Philippines, operated by United Shipping Lines, loaded in Japan for shipment
to Manila 50 crates of pipes consigned to Standard Blooming Mills. The shipment was
insured againts marine risks with Marine Insurance Company. Enroute, the ship caught
fire resulting in the total loss of ship and cargo. The insurance company paid the
consignee and thereafter sought recovery and reimbursement from the United Shipping
Lines as subrogee unto the rights of the insured. Evidence was presented establishing
the fact that from the time the goods were stored in the ship’s hatch, no regular
inspection was made during the voyage such that the fire must have started 24 hours
before it was noticed.
Could the insurance company claim reimbursement of the amount it had paid its
insured from the United Shipping Lines? Explain.
Answer:
Yes. Under Article 2207, the insurer is subrogated to the rights of the insured
against the wrongdoer or the person
who violated the contract when the insurer pays or indemnifies the insured for the injury
or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of. There being a
breach of contract of carriage in view of total loss of the cargo insured, Marine
Insurance Company may claim reimbursement of the amount paid the insured from the
United Shipping Lines.
Question No. 7;
Fred sold to Juan a parcel of land, belonging to his minor son, Lino, then under
his guardianship, without judicial approval. After the sale, Juan immediately took pos-
session of the land, built a house and religiously paid the taxes thereon. Nine years
thereafter, Lino, no longer a minor, rented the ground floor of the house built by Juan.
Lino paid the rent for the first month, then stopped paying. Two years thereafter, when
pressed for payment of the accrued rent. Lino refused, claiming ownership over the
property, alleging that the sale of the property to Juan while he was a minor without the
approval of the guardianship court rendered the sale null and void.
Is the claim of Lino valid and meritorious? Explain. Answer:
No, Lino’s claim is not valid and not meritorious because Lino is in estoppel. A
lessee cannot assail the right and title of the lessor and cannot claim ownership as
against the lessor. The fact that the sale was made while Lino was a minor is of no
moment because he recognized and ratified the contract after he was already of
majority age.
Answer:
No, Lino’s claim is not valid and not meritorious because Juan had already
become the owner of the land by ordinary acquisitive prescription through adverse
possession of the land for over ten (10) years.
Answer
No, Lino's claim is not valid and not meritorious. Lino can no longer recover the
land because of laches.
Question No. 8:
Miguel, Carlos and Lino are neighbors. Miguel owned a piece of registered land
which both Carlos and Lino wanted to buy. Miguel sold the land to Carlos. The sale
was not registered upon the request of Miguel. Later on, the same property was sold
by Miguel to Lino. Miguel told Carlos about the second sale. Carlos immediately tried
to see Lino to discuss the matter and inform him of the previous sale to him (Carlos) of
the same property but Lino refused to see Carlos. Thereupon Carlos annotated in the
Registry of Property his adverse claim on the property. A week later, Lino registered
the sale on his favor and had a new transfer certificate of title issued in his name.
However, the adverse claim of Carlos was duly annotated in the title. Notwithstanding,
Lino took possession of the property and built a small bungalow thereon.
(a) Who is the rightful owner of the property? Explain.

(b) To whom would the bungalow built by Lino on the property belong?
Explain.
Answer:
In double sales, under Article 1544 the land sold belongs to the first registrant in
a.
good faith. If none, it belongs to the first possessor in good faith. If none it belongs to
the person with the oldest title, provided there is good
faith. Carlos, who has the oldest title, is therefore the rightful owner of the property,
because there was no registration in good faith by Lino.
b. The bungalow built by Lino belongs to Carlos. Lino is a builder in bad

faith. Article 449 provides that he who builds in bad faith on the land of another loses
what it built without right to indemnity
Question No. 9:
Rita owned a valuable painting which was stolen from her house. The theft was
duly reported to the authorities. A year after, Rita saw the painting hanging in the office
of Mario. When queried, Mario said that he bought the painting in a gallery auction.
The painting was positively identified as the one stolen from the house of Rita.
(a) Could Rita recover the painting? If so, would Mario be entitled to
reimbursement of the amount he paid for the painting? Explain.
(b) Supposing Mario bought the painting from a friend, would your answer be
the same? Explain.
Answer:
Yes, Rita could recover the paintings but Mario is not entitled to reimbursement
a.
because a gallery auction is a public sale (Article 559).
Yes, insofar as recovery of the painting is concerned. Rita can recover it. No, as
b.
regards reimbursement, because the painting was not bought at a public sale as
provided under Article 559 of the Civil Code. Mario is entitled to reimbursement.
Question No. 10.

Lino entered into a written agreement for the repair of his priv-ate plane with Airo
Repair Works, Inc. for P500,000. Additional work was done upon the verbal request
and authority of a duly recognized representative of Lino. Lino refused to pay for the
additional work, interposing as a defense the absence of a written contract for the
additional work done.
Is the defense put up by Lino valid? Explain?
Answer:
The defense put up by Lino is valid under Article 1724 of the Civil Code. The
change must have been authorized by the proprietor in writing, and the additional price
to be paid the contractor must have been determined in writing by both parties.
Answer:
It appearing that the additional work was done upon verbal request and authority
of a duly authorized representative of Lino, and the benefits have been received by
Lino in consequence of the actual repair and the additional work, the defense put up by
Lino is not valid on the ground that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another.
Question No. 11:
Ana rented a safety deposit box at the Alto Bank, paid the rental fee and was
given the key. Ana put her jewelry and gold coins in the box. Days after, three armed
men gained entry into the Alto Bank, opening its vault and several safety deposit
boxes, including Ana’s and emptied them -of their contents.
Could Ana hold the Alto Bank liable for the loss of the contents of her deposit box?
Explain
Answer:
No, because under Article 1990 of the Civil Code, if the depository by force
majeure loses the thing and receives money or another thing in its place, he shall
deliver the sum or other thing to be depositor. There being no showing that there was
anything received in place of the things deposited the Alto Bank is not liable foi the
contents of the safety box.
Answer
The Alto Bank is not liable because the contract is not a deposit but a rental of
the safety deposit box. Hence, the Alto Bank is not liable for the loss of the contents of
the box.
Question No. 12:
Spouses Martin and Tecla bought a parcel of land on installment. At the time the
total sale price was paid, Martin had left the conjugal abode and was cohabiting with
Tina. Notwithstanding such separation, Tecla religiously paid the installments as they
fell due out of her earnings from a small saivsari store. After the "total purchase price
had been paid, Martin had the property titled in the name of “Martin married to Tina.”
Tecla died and her two children by Martin demanded partition of the property and their
mother’s share. Martin and Tina refused, claiming that the property belonged to their
“conjugal partnership.” No proof was presented that Martin married Tina during or
after the death of Tecla,
To whom does the property titled in the name of “Martin married to Tina” belong?
How would the property be divided among Martin, the two children of Martin and Tecla
and Tina? Explain.
Answer:
The property is conjugal property.- 1/2 belongs to Martin and the other half of
Tecla. However, 1/2 belonging to Tecla will be divided among Martin and the two
children, each of them getting 1/3 of that 1/2.
Question No. 13:
Lilia and Nelia arc relatives, Lilia being the grandniece of Nelia. They had a
common ancestor, Bonong, father of Nelia and great-grandfather of Lilia. Bonong had
a sister, Rosa, who donated gratuitously a parcel of land to her niece.
Mely, sister of Nelia and grandmother of Lilia. Mely died intestate, leaving
aforementioned parcel of land, survived by her husband Jose and their two children,
Rico and Nina. Bonong died intestate survived by his legitimate grand^ children, Rico
and Nina. In the adjudication of his estate, the portion pertaining to Mely, who had
predeceased her father, went to her two legitimate children, Rico and Nina. Rico died
instestate, single , and without any issue, leaving his share in the inheritance to his
father, Jose, subject to a reserva troncal duly annotated on the title. Thereafter Nina
died intestate and her rights and interests were inherited by her only legitimate child,
Lilia. Thereafter, Jose died intestate survived by his only descendant, Lilia. Nelia, aunt
of Rico, would like to lay claim as reservatario to a portion of the one-half pro indiviso
share of the property inherited by Jose from his son Rico.
How should the estate of Jose, including the property subject to reserva troncal be
adjudicated? Explain.
Answer:
This is a proper case of reserva troncal. The prepositus is Rico, the reservista is
Jose and the reservatarios are Lilia (a niece) and Nelia (an aunt), both of them being
relatives within the 3rd degree of Rico (the prepositus) and belonging to the maternal
line represented by Mely. Accordingly, Nelia as reservatario cannot claim any portion of
the pro-indiviso share of the property inherited by Jose from Rico. Lilia alone should
inherit because in reserva troncal, the successional rights of relatives who are
reservatarios are determined by the rules of intestate succession. In intestacy,
nephews and nieces exclude uncles and aunts. Hence, Lilia the niece, excludes Nelia,
the aunt, from the reservable property (De Papa vs. Camacho 144 SCRA 281).
The rest of Jose’s estate, not subject to reserva, will be inherited by his
granddaughter Lilia as sole intestate heir.
This is a proper case of reserva troncal. The prepositus is Rico, the reservista and
the reservatarios are Lilia and Nelia, both of them being relatives within the 3rd degree
computed from Rico and belonging to the maternal line* represented by Mely. Under
the doctrine of “reserva integral” all the reservatarios in the nearest degree will inherit
in equal shares the reservable portion of the pro-indiviso share of the property inherited
by Jose from Rico. The properties transmitted to Jose by Rico are the following:
Firstly, the property which Rico obtained from Mely consisted of his share in Mely’s
interest as donee of Rosa’s land. The interest acquired by Rico was 1/3, because 1/3
thereof was inherited by Jose and 1/3 by Nina. So the property that was obtained by
Jose from Rico is the latter’s 1/3 interest of the land.
In the case of Bonong’s estate, the share of Mely was 1/2 and Nelia’s was the
other half. Out of Mely’s share, 1/2 belonged to Rico and the other half belonged to
Nina, both inheriting by right of representation.
Summarizing the reservable estate is the 1/3 share of Rico in Rosa’s land which
was donated to Mely, and the 1/2 interest of Rico in Mely’s share of the estate of
Bonong. These reservable properties should be divided equally between Nelia and Lilia
(Article 891).
Question No. 14:
Lina married Hugo in a church ceremony. Hugo discovered that five years before,
Lina married Six to in a ciyil ceremony. Lina however, did not know at the time she
married Sixto that the latter was already married. Upon learning that Sixto was already
married Lina immediately left Sixto and since then had not seen nor heard from him.
Lina, however, did not take any step to have her marriage with Sixto annuled before
she married Hugo.
Could Hugo successfully sue for a declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lina 7
Explain.
Answer:
No, Hugo cannot sue for a declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lina. The
marriage of Lina with Sixto was void, so the marriage of Hugo with Lina is valid. There
was no need for a prior court action to declare the marriage with Sixto as void (Yap vs.
Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229).
Answer:
Yes, because the marriage of Hugo with Lina is not valid, for the reason that there
was no prior judicial declaration that the marriage with Sixto is void. Such judicial
declaration is required by law (Wiegel vs. Sempio Dy 143 SCRA 49 9 L
Question No. 15:
The X Electric Cooperative, services a small town where the roads are lined with
lush acacia trees. Normally these trees are pruned before the onset of the rainy season
by the cooperative itself since the power lines of the cooperative are not infrequently
affected by falling branches. This year, for financial reasons, the electric cooperative
omitted the pruning in spite of reminders from the townspeople. In August this year a
strong typhoon hit the town and live wires fell to the ground. While the cooperative
made a preliminary survey of the damages, it did not immediately take precautionary
measures against possible harm. Thus, the attention of one of its employees was.
called to the fallen wire in the center of the town. Before the cooperative could make
the necessary repairs, a four-year old boy crossed the street and was electrocuted by
the live wire.
His parents sued the electric cooperative for damages.
(a) If you were counsel for the parents, what argu
ments would you advance to support your claim for damages and how much damages
would you demand?
(b) If you were counsel for the electric cooperative, what defenses would you
offer?
(c) If you were judge, how would you decide the case?
Answer:
a. The damages that can be claimed by the parents are the following:
1. civil indemnity for death - P30,000.00,

The People of the Philippines v. Leopoldo Tray a, L-48065, Jan. 29, 1987-;
2. actual and compensatory damages;
3. moral damages for mental anguish;
4. exemplary or corrective damages.
b. As counsel for the electric cooperative, I would offer the defense of “fortuitous
event,” because the strong typhoon could not be foreseen and even if foreseen, could
not be avoided.
c. As judge, I would rule for the parents. The attention of the cooperative through
its employee was called to the fallen live wire. If there had been care and diligence, the
death could have been avoided. The cooperative could have made the necessary
repairs before the 4 year old boy crossed the street and was electrocuted by the live
wire. It failed to do so, hence it is liable.
Question No. 16:
Manny and Nita, husband and wife, decided to separate by mutual agreement.
They had a contract prepared, signed it and had it notarized, providing for their
separation and for the extra-judicial liquidation of their conjugal assets. They likewise
agreed to live separately and that if either spouse should find a more compatible
partner, the other would raise no objection and would refrain from taking any judicial
action against the other.
Determine the validity of each of the provisions of the agreement. Explain briefly.
Answer:
1. The provision for their separation is void.

2. The provision for the extra-judicial liquidation of their conjugal assets is void.
3. The agreement to live separately is void.
4. The agreement that should either spouse find a more compatible partner, the
other would raise no objection and would refrain from taking any judicial action
against the other is void.
The aforementioned stipulations are all void because they are contrary to law,
morals, good custom, public order and public policy. The specific provision of law is
Article 221 of the Civil Code.

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2010 BAR EXAMINATION

A. Under Article 26 of the Family Code, when a foreign spouse divorces

A. A had a 4-storey building which was constructed by Engineer B. After

No. 1. A, the owner.

ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

No. 2. B, the Engineer.

No. 4. None of the above.

C. A executed a Deed of Donation in favor of B, a bachelor, covering a

1. B may e-mail A accepting the donation.

1. The will is invalidated

No. 3. The legacy given to B’s child is not valid.

No. 2. The will is valid and effective.

Define, Enumerate or Explain. (2% each)

A. What is the difference between “guaranty” and “suretyship”?

Guaranty and Suretyship distinguished:

1) The obligation in guaranty is secondary; whereas, in suretyship, it is primary.

NOTE: It is recommended that the examiner exercise leniency and liberality in

In recent developments in common law, the concept of “quasi-torts” can be

FIRST SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Quasi-tort is considered as the equivalent of quasidelict. Hence the rules of the

Those liable for quasi-delict include:

1. The tortfeasor or the person causing damage to another through fault or

The defenses available include:

1) Statute theory. There is a domestic law authorizing the local court

2.Humanitarian Principle. An aggrieved party should not be left without remedy in

A. If G gives the surname of B to her daughter by another man, what can B do to

B. If B acquiesces to the use of his surname by G’s daughter by another man,

G filed on July 8, 2000 a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to B.

A. Suppose the business firms suffered reverses, rendering G unable to support

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Yes. The agreement between Gigolo and Majorette is a valid agreement.

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A. Who owns the foregoing properties? Explain. (5%)

1) 1/3 of the house and lot is owned by B. He is an undivided co-owner to that

2) 1 / 3 of the house and lot is owned by G. She is an undivided co-owner to the

1/3 of the house is co-owned by B and G because

the payment came from their co-owned funds,

After summing up their respective shares, B and G are undivided co-owners of

On Lea’s discovery of Rex’s fathering a child by another woman, she filed a

The consent of the 14-year-old legitimate child, of the 10-year-old illegitimate

If there was no legal separation, can Rex still adopt

his illegitimate child? Explain. (2.5%)

B. Is Venus legitimate, illegitimate, or legitimated? Explain briefly. (3%)

A. If the ground of nullity is psychological incapacity:

B. If the ground of nullity is not psychological incapacity

Note: The legitime of an illegitimate child is

In the distribution of Peter’s estate, one-half of the presumptive legitime

B. How about the damage to the jeepney? Explain. (2%)

1) An easement of right of way is a real right which attaches to, and is

3) The vendee of the property in which a servitude or easement exists cannot

Note: Since a right of way is a discontinuous

5)Renunciation or waiver of an easement must be specific, clear, express and

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