COVERAGES:

i. Nature of evidence
ii. Sec. 2., rule 128, Sec 4 Rule 1; applicability
 Rule 128 – Sec. II - Scope. — The rules of evidence shall be the same in all
courts and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these
rules.
 Rule 4 Sec. I - These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration,
cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein
provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient.
iii. Electronic Evidence, applicability
 Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message
constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of
an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC). - DENIED
 Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules
on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings,
and administrative proceedings. (Ang vs. Court of Appeals)
 As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity
with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to
criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person
who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3
Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other
accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages
sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal
knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them. (People vs
Enojas)
 Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject to
certain conditions. "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone
conversations, text messages, chartroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming
video, and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not
recorded or retained. It may be proven by the testimony of a person who was a
party to the communications or has personal knowledge thereof. In the present
case, we have no doubt regarding the probative value of the text messages as
evidence in considering the present case. The complainant, who was the recipient
of the text messages and who therefore has personal knowledge of these text
messages, identified the respondent as the sender through cellphone number
09175775982. The respondent herself admitted that her conversations with the
complainant had been thru SMS messaging and that the cellphone number
reflected in the complainant’s cellphone from which the text messages originated
 was hers. She confirmed that it was her cellphone number during the entrapment
operation the Imus Cavite Police conducted (Bartolome vs Maranan)

iv. Corpus delicti

 Corpus delicti is defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary
sense, refers to the fact that a crime was actually committed. As applied to a
particular offense, the term means the actual commission by someone of the
particular crime charged. The corpus delicti is a compound fact made up of two
elements, namely: the existence of a certain act or result forming the basis of the
criminal charge, and the existence of a criminal agency as the cause of the act or
result. Consequently, the State does not comply with the indispensable
requirement of proving the corpus delicti if the subject drugs are missing, or if
substantial gaps occur in the chain of custody of the seized drugs as to raise
doubts about the authenticity of the evidence presented in the trial court.
 In fine, the dangerous drug is itself the corpus delicti. The only way by which the
State could lay the foundation of the corpus delicti is to establish beyond
reasonable doubt the illegal sale or illegal possession of the dangerous drug by
preserving the identity of the drug offered as evidence against the accused. The
State does so only by ensuring that the drug presented in the trial court was the
same substance bought from the accused during the buy-bust operation or
recovered from his possession at the moment of arrest. 10 The State must see to it
that the custody of the seized drug subject of the illegal sale or of the illegal
possession was safeguarded from the moment of confiscation until the moment of
presentation in court by documenting the stages of such custody as to establish the
chain of custody, whose objective is to remove unnecessary doubts about the
identity of the incriminating evidence.
 The preservation of the corpus delicti is primordial to the success of the criminal
prosecution for illegal possession and illegal sale of the dangerous drug.
v. Murder homicide piracy etc.
The appellants interpose the defense of alibi, insisting that could not have committed the
crime because in the day in question particularly that time of the night they were
elsewhere. The trial court has analyzed the evidence in this regard and in our opinion
correctly rejected this theory of alibi and we find no profit in further discussing it. Suffice
it to say that aside from the inherent weakness of this kind of defense, the appellants were
clearly identified by no less than four witnesses as the persons who took away Sabino
from his home and liquidated him. The important point raised by counsel for the
appellants is that of corpus delicti. He claims that inasmuch as there is no conclusive
evidence of the death of the deceased, because his body was never found, neither was the
place where he was supposed to have been buried indicated corpus delicti was not
established. In a case of murder of homicide, it is not necessary to recover the body or to
show where it can be found. There are cases like death at sea, where the finding or
recovery of the body is impossible. It is enough that the death and the criminal agency
causing it be proven. There are even cases where said death and the intervention of the
criminal agency that caused it may be presumed or established by circumstancial
evidence. Wharton in his book on Criminal Evidence, Vol. 2, Sec. 871, pp. 1505-1506,
says:
. . . The rule now established by the weight of authority is that the element of death in the
corpus delicti may be established by circumstancial evidence. Hence, in the case of the
destruction of the body, or in the case of its disappearance, as in murder upon the high
seas, where the body is rarely, if ever, found, death may be proved circumstantially. To
establish the corpus delicti by circumstancial evidence, facts are admissible, to show the
impossibility of rescue, as at sea; to show the existence and extent of wounds, and
deceased's condition of health; and to show that the wound was sufficient to cause death,
and that the party was reported dead. Death is sufficiently shown by the testimony of a
witness that he saw the flash and heard the report, and that the deceased fell to the
ground, declaring he was shot, and that accused did the shooting.
Francisco in his book on Criminal Evidence, Vol. III section 27, 1517, also has the
following to say:
A conviction of murder cannot be supported unless the body has been found or there is
equivalent proof of death. The more modern rule is that the fact of death as well as the
other branch of the corpus delicti may be established by circumstancial or presumptive
evidence. Thus is held that, where the body has been destroyed or is not recovered, it is
competent to establish both elements by presumptive evidence . . .
(People vs Sasota)
Accused Aleman raises two issues:
a) Whether or not the prosecution was able to present evidence of corpus delicti; and
b) Whether or not accused Aleman’s extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence.
. Corpus delicti has been defined as the body, foundation, or substance of a crime. The
evidence of a dead body with a gunshot wound on its back would be evidence that
murder has been committed.2 Corpus delicti has two elements: (a) that a certain result
has been established, for example, that a man has died and (b) that some person is
criminally responsible for it.3 The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond
reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence.4
The defense claims that the prosecution failed to prove corpus delicti since it did not
bother to present a medical certificate identifying the remains found at the dump site and
an autopsy report showing such remains sustained gunshot and stab wounds that resulted
in death; and the shells of the guns used in killing the victim.
But corpus delicti need not be proved by an autopsy report of the dead victim’s body or
even by the testimony of the physician who examined such body.5 While such report or
testimony is useful for understanding the nature of the injuries the victim suffered, they
 are not indispensable proof of such injuries or of the fact of death.6 Nor is the
presentation of the murder weapons also indispensable since the physical existence of
such weapons is not an element of the crime of murder.7

Here, the police authorities found the remains of Cortez at the place pointed to by
accused Aleman. That physical confirmation, coming after his testimony of the gruesome
murder, sufficiently establishes the corpus delicti of the crime. Of course, that statement
must be admissible in evidence.
There is no reason for it not to be. Confession to be admissible must be
a) Voluntary;
b) Made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel;
c) Express;
d) In writing. these requirements were met here. A lawyer, not working with or was not
beholden to the police, Atty. Besinga, assisted accused Aleman during the custodial
investigation. Officer Tabucon testified that he saw accused Aleman, before the taking of
his statement, conversing with counsel at the police station. Atty. Besinga did not dispute
this claim.
Aleman alleges torture as the reason for the execution of the confession. The appellate
court is correct in ruling that such allegation is baseless. It is a settled rule that where the
defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal
or administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of
violence was presented, all these will be considered as indicating voluntariness.9 Here,
although Aleman claimed that he bore torture marks on his head, he never brought this to
the attention of his counsel, his relatives, or the prosecutor who administered his oath.
(People vs Tuniaco)
vi. Illegal possession of firearms
In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, Peralta questioned the legality of
the warrantless arrest and subsequent search made on him. According to him, there was
no reason for the police officers to arrest him without a warrant and consequently,
conduct a search incidental thereto. As such, the firearm and ammunitions purportedly
recovered from him are rendered inadmissible in evidence against him.
Evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed
tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree
In this case, records show that upon the police officers' arrival at Pantal District, Dagupan
City, they saw Peralta carrying a pistol, in plain view of everyone. This prompted the
police officers to confront Peralta regarding the pistol, and when the latter was unable to
produce a license for such pistol and/or a permit to carry the same, the former proceeded
to arrest him and seize the pistol from him. Clearly, the police officer conducted a valid
in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest on Peralta, thus, making the consequent search
incidental thereto valid as well. At this point, it is well to emphasize that the offense of
illegal possession of firearms is malum prohibitum punished by special law and, in order
 that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused
had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same,
even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent. (Peralta vs
People)
vii. Dangerous Drugs act, Sec. 5, RA 9165
Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person,
who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away
to another, distribute dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any
and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act
as a broker in any of such transactions.

The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical,
or shall act as a broker in such transactions.
If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation of
any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpires within
one hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in
every case.
For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as runners,
couriers and messengers, or in any other capacity directly connected to the dangerous
drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemical trade, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed in every case.
If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or should a
dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical involved in any
offense herein provided be the proximate cause of death of a victim thereof, the
maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed.
The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person
who organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of any of the illegal activities prescribed
in this Section.
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment
and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a
"protector/coddler" of any violator of the provisions under this Section.
viii. Dangerous Drugs act, Sec. 11, RA 9165
Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
 possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity
thereof:
(1) 10 grams or more of opium;
(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";
(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDA) or "ecstasy", paramethoxyamphetamine
(PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamine (LSD), gamma
hydroxyamphetamine (GHB), and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs
and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is
far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in
accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties
shall be graduated as follows:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty
(50) grams;
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine
ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but
less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride,
marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or
other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA,
LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives,
without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond
therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five
(hundred) 500) grams of marijuana; and
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand
pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of
opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana
resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as,
but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly
designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic
value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than
three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
ix. Dangerous Drugs – In general
x. Evidence when waived
  The best evidence rule requires that the original document be produced whenever
its contents are the subject of inquiry, except in certain limited cases laid down in
Section 3 of Rule 130. However, to set this rule in motion, a proper and timely
objection is necessary. The Court's ruling in Lorenzana v. Lelina is
instructive:The best evidence rule requires that when the subject of inquiry is (sic)
the contents of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original
document itself except in the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court. As such, mere photocopies of documents are
inadmissible pursuant to the best evidence rule. Nevertheless, evidence not
objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly considered by the court in
arriving at its judgment. Courts are not precluded to accept in evidence a mere
photocopy of a document when no objection was raised when it was formally
offered. In order to exclude evidence, the objection to admissibility of evidence
must be made at the proper time, and the grounds specified. Objection to
evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered. In case of documentary
evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the party making the offer have
testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. It is only
at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence may
be made. And when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence
at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered
as waived. This is true even if by its nature the evidence is inadmissible and
would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper time.
Moreover, grounds for objection must be specified in any case. Grounds for
objections not raised at the proper time shall be considered waived, even if
the evidence was objected to on some other ground. Thus, even on appeal, the
appellate court may not consider any other ground of objection, except those that
were raised at the proper time.
 As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. However,
the rule does admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay
evidence, then the same is admissible. The rationale for this exception is to be
found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled that it is the
opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to
by a witness are hearsay. However, the right to cross-examine may be waived.
The repeated failure of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied
waiver of such right. Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial
court to cross-examine the other party's witness. Petitioner repeatedly failed to
take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus committed by the
respondent court when it sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner had
waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party's witness. It is now too late
for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.
xi. Sec. 3, Rule 128; admissibility
 Admissibility of evidence. — Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law of these rules.
  Under the Rules of Court, evidence – as the means of ascertaining in a judicial
proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact24 – may be object,25
documentary,26 and testimonial.27 It is required that evidence, to be admissible,
must be relevant and competent.28 But the admissibility of evidence should not
be confused with its probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of
whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative
value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue.
Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight
depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of
evidence.
 Although documentary evidence may be preferable as proof of a legal
relationship, other evidence of the relationship that are competent and relevant
may not be excluded. (Tabuada vs Tabuada)

xii. Test of relevancy –

 Credibility of witnesses
It is a well-settled principle that the assessment of the credibility of a witness is
best left to the trial court, most especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals
(CA), as the trial court had the unique opportunity to observe the witness'
deportment and demeanor on the witness stand.
In assailing his conviction, appellant puts in issue the credibility of witness
Dictado in identifying him as the assailant. Appellant insists that witness Dictado
could not have seen the face of the assailant considering that she was crawling out
of the area and was wearing eyeglasses which had a prescription grade of more
than 200. Appellant likewise questions the procedure employed by the police
officers in conducting the police line-up. Appellant claims that the procedure
employed was prone to suggestiveness as the witnesses were all in the same room
when they identified him in the line-up. In addition, appellant points out lack of
motive on his part for killing the victim.
The Court is not persuaded.
The fact that witness Dictado was wearing eyeglasses with prescription grade of
more than 200 did not affect her positive identification of appellant considering
that she was only more or less two arm's length away from the victim. Moreover,
appellant seems to forget that witness Dictado was not the only witness who
positively identified him as the assailant. Aside from witness Dictado, the
prosecution also presented as witness BSDO Abendano who was the emcee
during the flag ceremony. He testified that he was only an arm's length or about a
meter away from the victim; that he saw appellant approach and point a gun at the
victim; and that the gun was fired at the victim's forehead. Thus, the Court finds
no reason to doubt the positive identification of appellant by the prosecution's
witnesses who have no ill motive to testify falsely against him. It bears stressing
that ''the positive identification of the [assailant], when categorical and consistent
and without any [ill motive] on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the
matter, prevails over alibi and denial." (People vs Ungriano)
The basic issues raised by accused-appellants are mainly factual and it is a well
settled rule that in criminal cases, factual findings of the trial court are generally
accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are
supported by substantial evidence on record. It is only in exceptional
circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant
matters, that the Court will evaluate the factual findings of the court below. More
importantly, it is an established principle ·in appellate review that the trial court's
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight of their
testimonies are accorded great respect and even conclusive effect and that these
findings and conclusions assume greater weight if they are affirmed by the CA.
Guided by the foregoing principle, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the
RTC's factual findings, as affirmed by the CA.
Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or
on occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide,
the prosecution must prove the following elements:
(1) The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation
against persons;
(2) The property belongs to another;
(3) The taking is animo lucrandi or with intent to gain;
(4) On the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in
the generic sense, was committed.
A conviction needs certainty that the robbery is the central purpose and objective
of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery.17 The intent
to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before,
during or after the robbery.
In this case, both the trial and appellate courts found Violeta's and Henry's
separate testimonies as credible. It is doctrinal that findings of trial courts on the
credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal absent a clear showing that the trial court had overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which could reverse a judgment of conviction. In fact, in many instances, such
findings are even accorded finality. This is so because the assignment of value to
a witness' testimony is essentially the domain of the trial court, not to mention that
it is the trial judge who has the direct opportunity to observe the demeanor of a
witness on the stand, which opportunity provides him the unique facility in
determining whether or not to accord credence to the testimony or whether the
witness is telling the truth or not. The foregoing doctrine finds application in the
instant case. (People vs Dillatan)
In the present case, the main evidence presented by private respondents in proving
their allegation that the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the
parties thereto is the sworn statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. The
 trial court admitted the said sworn statement as part of private respondents’
evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great probative weight to
this document.
There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the
admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.22 The
admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the
weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to
convince and persuade.23 Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible,
but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines
provided by the rules of evidence.24 It is settled that affidavits are classified as
hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements, which may
thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.25 Moreover, the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant.26 For
this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.27 The Court finds
that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement
probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as
she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value
on Daniela’s sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale
between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust
relationship was created between them.
Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove
their allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property
when she executed the subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil
cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material allegations of his
complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weakness of the evidence of the defendant.28 Aside from Daniela’s sworn
statement, private respondents failed to present any other documentary evidence
to prove their claim. Even the testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that
Daniela had a different intention when she entered into a contract of sale with
petitioner. (Tating vs Marcella)
 Probative value of evidence
The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its probative value.
Just because a piece of evidence is admitted does not ipso facto mean that it
conclusively proves the fact in dispute.
Petitioners assert that the CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits of their
witnesses, insisting that the Rule on Summary Procedure authorizes the use of
affidavits. They also claim that the failure of respondents to file their position
paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts to an admission by silence.
The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be
considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the
admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.
While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses'
respective testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto
render the facts, set forth therein, duly proven. Petitioners still bear the burden of
proving their cause of action, because they are the ones asserting an affirmative
relief.