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CASE DOCTRINES ON RULES

34, 35, 36, 37 and 40 to 45

RULE 34
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

RULE 35
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

REPUBLIC v. SHELL PETROLEUM CORP.

GR No. 209324 December 9, 2015
1) Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted
to in order to avoid long drawn-out litigations and useless
delays. When the pleadings on file show that there are no
genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to
obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment, that
is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to
decide the case summarily by applying the law to the
material facts. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to
raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and
admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then
summary judgment as prescribed by the Rules must ensue
as a matter of law. The determinative factor, therefore, in a
motion for summary judgment, is the presence or absence
of a genuine issue as to any material fact.
For a full-blown trial to be dispensed with, the party
who moves for summary judgment has the burden of
demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact,
or that the issue posed is patently insubstantial as to
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constitute a genuine issue. Genuine issue means an issue of

fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived.

2) Any review by the appellate court of the propriety

of the summary judgment rendered by the trial court based
on these pleadings would not involve an evaluation of the
probative value of any evidence, but would only limit itself
to the inquiry of whether the law was properly applied
given the facts and these supporting documents. Therefore,
what would inevitably arise from such a review are pure
questions of law, and not questions of fact, which are not
proper in an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, but should be
raised directly to the SC by way of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45.

COMGLASCO CORP. vs. SANTOS CAR

CHECK CENTER CORP.
G.R. No. 202989 March 25, 2015
1) A judgment on the pleadings may properly be
rendered if the answer admits the material allegations in the
complaint and invokes an affirmative defense that the court
may rule upon without the presentation of evidence because
it does not raise genuine factual issues.
A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the
facts as pleaded, and is based exclusively upon the
allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the
accompanying annexes. It is settled that the trial court has
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the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the

pleadings filed by the plaintiff if there is no controverted
matter in the case after the answer is filed. A genuine issue
of fact is that which requires the presentation of evidence,
as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false
issue.
PHIL. BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS vs. GO
G.R. No. 175514               February 14, 2011

1) Rule 35 provides that when there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, summary
judgment may be rendered. Summary or accelerated
judgment is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out
sham claims or defenses at an early stage of litigation
thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a
trial.

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no

genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation of
evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the
pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits,
depositions and admissions show that such issues are not
genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the
Rules must ensue as a matter of law. The determinative
factor, therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is
the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any
material fact.
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2) A "genuine issue" is an issue of fact which requires

the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as
pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no
real or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and
summary judgment is called for.

3) The party who moves for summary judgment has

the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any
genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the
complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a
genuine issue for trial.

4) In this case, the SC ruled that the trial court erred in

rendering summary judgement because the defendant’s
answer properly denied some material facts alleged in the
complaint thereby tendering genuine issues as to material
facts that would require a full-blown trial where the parties
could present evidence to prove their conflicting versions
of certain material facts.
ADOLFO vs. ADOLFO
G.R. No. 201427 March 18, 2015
1) Judgment on the pleadings is proper “where an
answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading.”
Summary judgment, on the other hand, will be granted “if
the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and
admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of
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damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.”
2) The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in
the pleadings, on the one hand, and their sham or fictitious
character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case
for summary judgment from one for a judgment on the
pleadings.  In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings,
there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of
the defending party’s answer to raise an issue.  On the other
hand, in the case of a summary judgment, issues apparently
exist -i.e. facts are asserted in the complaint regarding
which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or
qualification; or specific denials or affirmative defenses are
in truth set out in the answer but the issues thus arising
from the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not genuine, as
shown by affidavits, depositions, or admissions.
3) An answer would “fail to tender an issue” if it
“does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or
admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s
pleadings by confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or
omitting to deal with them at all. Now, if an answer does in
fact specifically deny the material averments of the
complaint and/or asserts affirmative defenses (allegations
of new matter which, while admitting the material
allegations of the complaint expressly or impliedly, would
nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff), a
judgment on the pleadings would naturally be improper.”
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On the other hand, “whether x x x the issues raised by

the Answer are genuine is not the crux of inquiry in a
motion for judgment on the pleadings.  It is so only in a
motion for summary judgment.  In a case for judgment on
the pleadings, the Answer is such that no issue is raised at
all.  The essential question in such a case is whether there
are issues generated by the pleadings.” 47 “A ‘genuine issue’
is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of
evidence as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived
or false claim.  When the facts as pleaded appear
uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine
issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is
called for.”

RULE 36
JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDERS
& ENTRY THEREOF
FASAP vs. PAL
IN RE: LETTERS OF ATTY. MENDOZA RE: G.R.
NO. 178083
G.R. No. 178083 March 13, 2018

1) The requirement for the Court to state the legal and

factual basis for its decisions is found in Section 14, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based.
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The constitutional provision clearly indicates that it

contemplates only a decision, which is the judgment or
order that adjudicates on the merits of a case. This is clear
from the text and tenor of Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules
of Court, the rule that implements the constitutional
provision, to wit:
Section 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A
judgment or final order determining the merits of the
case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by
the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the
clerk of court.
The October 4, 2011 resolution did not adjudicate on
the merits of G.R. No. 178083. We explicitly stated so in
the resolution of March 13, 2012. What we thereby did was
instead to exercise the Court's inherent power to recall
orders and resolutions before they attain finality. In so
doing, the Court only exercised prudence in order to ensure
that the Second Division was vested with the appropriate
legal competence in accordance with and under the Court's
prevailing internal rules to review and resolve the pending
motion for reconsideration. We rationalized the exercise
thusly:
2) The Supreme Court, whether sitting En Banc or in
Division, acts as a collegial body. By virtue of the
collegiality, the Chief Justice alone cannot promulgate or
issue any decisions or orders. In Complaint of Mr. Aurelio
Jndencia Arrienda Against SC Justices Puno, Kapunan,
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Pardo, Ynares Santiago, the Court has elucidated on the

collegial nature of the Court in relation to the role of the
Chief Justice, viz.:
The complainant’s vituperation against the Chief
Justice on account of what he perceived was the latter's
refusal "to take a direct positive and favorable action" on
his letters of appeal overstepped the limits of proper
conduct. It betrayed his lack of understanding of a
fundamental principle in our system of laws. Although the
Chief Justice is primus inter pares, he cannot legally decide
a case on his own because of the Court's nature as a
collegial body. Neither can the Chief Justice, by himself,
overturn the decision of the Court, whether of a division or
the en banc.
There is only one Supreme Court from whose
decisions all other courts are required to take their bearings.
While most of the Court's work is performed by its three
divisions, the Court remains one court - single, unitary,
complete and supreme. Flowing from this is the fact that,
while individual justices may dissent or only partially
concur, when the Court states what the law is, it speaks
with only one voice. Any doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the court may be modified or reversed only by the
Court en banc
3) When a second motion for reconsideration based on
a valid ground is allowed, the running of the period for
appeal from the date of the filing of the motion until such
time that the same is acted upon is
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suspended. Correspondingly, granting the motion for leave

to file a second motion for reconsideration has the effect
of preventing the challenged decision from attaining
finality. This is the reason why a second motion for
reconsideration should present extra-ordinarily persuasive
reasons.
By granting PAL’s motion for leave to file a second
motion for reconsideration, the Court effectively averted
the July 22, 2008 decision and the October 2, 2009
resolution from attaining finality.
REMEDIES VS. FINAL JUDGMENTS
RULE 37
NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION

MENDEZONA vs. OZAMIZ

G.R. No. 143370               February 6, 2002

1) A motion for new trial upon the ground of newly

discovered evidence is properly granted only where there is
concurrence of the following requisites, namely:
(a) the evidence had been discovered after trial;
(b) the evidence could not have been discovered and
produced during trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence; and
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(c) the evidence is material and not merely

corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of such
weight that if admitted, would probably alter the result.
The requirement of reasonable diligence has not been
met by the movant-plaintiff. As early as the pre-trial of the
case at bar, the name of the purported new witness has
already cropped up as a possible witness for the adverse
party. Neither can the purported new witness’s testimony in
another case be considered as newly discovered evidence
since the facts to be testified to by him which were existing
before and during the trial, could have been presented by
the movant-plaintiffs at the trial below.
2) Lack of diligence is exhibited where the newly
discovered evidence was necessary or proper under the
pleadings, and its existence must have occurred to the party
in the course of the preparation of the case, but no effort
was made to secure it; there is a failure to make inquiry of
persons who were likely to know the facts in question,
especially where information was not sought from co-
parties; there is a failure to seek evidence available through
public records; there is a failure to discover evidence that is
within the control of the complaining party; there is a
failure to follow leads contained in other evidence; and,
there is a failure to utilize available discovery procedures.
3) Factual findings of the appellate court are generally
conclusive on the Supreme Court which is not a trier of
facts. It is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze
or weigh evidence all over again. However, this rule is not
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without exception. If there is a showing that the appellate

court’s findings of facts complained of are totally devoid of
support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous
as to constitute grave abuse of discretion, this Court must
discard such erroneous findings of facts.
4) A notarized document duly acknowledged before a
notary public has in its favor the presumption of regularity,
and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with
respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity and is entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face.
5) Whosoever alleges the fraud or invalidity of a
notarized document has the burden of proving the same by
evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant.
PEOPLE vs. LI KA KIM
G.R. No. 148586             May 25, 2004

1) The requisites of newly discovered evidence in

order to justify a new trial are that - (a) the evidence is
discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have
been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted, would
likely change the judgment.
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PADILLA-RUMBAUA vs. RUMBAUA

G.R. NO. 166738 August 14, 2009

1) In an appeal by certiorari, it is improper for the

petitioner to ask the SC to remand the case to the RTC for
further reception of evidence citing as a ground the
inadequacy of her evidence due to the fault of her former
counsel. Such remand of the case to the RTC for further
proceedings would amount to the grant of a new trial that is
not procedurally proper at the time when the case is already
on appeal at the SC.
Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party
may move the trial court to set aside a judgment or final
order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the
period for taking an appeal on any of the following
grounds:
(1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence
that could not have been guarded against by ordinary
prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved party's
rights during the trial have probably been impaired; or
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, the aggrieved party could not have discovered
and produced at the trial, and that would probably alter the
result if presented.
Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the
proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance,
inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as
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a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid

reasons for re-opening cases, there would never be an end
to litigation so long as a new counsel could be employed to
allege and show that the prior counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned.
CHUA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 196853 July 13, 2015

1) Under the Rules of Court, the requisites for newly

discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered
after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been
discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable
diligence; and (c) it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if
admitted, will probably change the judgment.

The question of whether evidence is newly discovered

has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the
evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when
should or could it have been discovered. It is to the latter
that the requirement of due diligence has relevance. In
order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly
regarded as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is
essential is not so much the time when the evidence offered
first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to
the knowledge of the party submitting it; what is essential
is that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence
in seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but
had nonetheless failed to secure it.
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The phrase “reasonable diligence” is often equated

with "reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the
movant.” In other words, the concept of due diligence has
both a time component and a good faith component. The
movant for a new trial must not only have acted in a timely
fashion in gathering evidence before or during the trial, he
must also have acted reasonably and in good faith as well.
Due diligence contemplates that the defendant acts
reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in light
of the totality of the circumstances and the facts known to
him.
2) Jurisprudence dictates that there is a ‘question of
law’ when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is on a certain set of facts or circumstances; on the other
hand, there is a ‘question of fact’ when the issue raised on
appeal pertains to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
The test for determining whether the supposed error was
one of ‘law’ or ‘fact’ is not the appellation given by the
parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing
court can resolve the issues raised without evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise,
it is one of fact. In other words, where there is no dispute as
to the facts, the question of whether or not the conclusions
drawn from these facts are correct is a question of law.
However, if the question posed requires a re-evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of
surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each
other, the issue is factual."
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SENIT vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 192914 January 11, 2016

1) The accused’s motion for new trial may properly be

denied if his failure to present evidence during the trial of
the case was due to his own fault and negligence.
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered
evidence may be granted only if the following requisites
are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b)
that said evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of
such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the
judgment.
It is essential that the offering party exercised
reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence
before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it." A
new trial may not be had on the basis of evidence which
was available during trial but was not presented due to the
movant’s negligence. New trial is likewise unavailing when
the purported errors and irregularities committed in the
course of the trial against the substantive rights of the
accused do not exist.
RULES 40 – 45 (APPEALS)

A. Appeals from MTC to RTC (R40)

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DE VERA vs. SANTIAGO

G.R. No. 179457               June 22, 2015

1) The second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 40 of the

Rules of Court provides as follows:
xxx
If the case was tried on the merits by the
lower court without jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall
not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction
thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance
with the preceding section (shall try the case on
the merits as if the case was originally filed with
it), without prejudice to the admission of
amended pleadings and additional evidence in the
interest of justice.
The first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 40 contemplates
an appeal from an order of dismissal issued without trial of
the case on the merits, while the second paragraph deals
with an appeal from an order of dismissal but the case was
tried on the merits. Both paragraphs, however, involve the
same ground for dismissal, i.e., lack of jurisdiction.
In the instant case, the CA erred when it annulled the
decisions of both the MTC and the RTC for the reason that
the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case which was later
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reviewed on appeal by the RTC. The CA should have not

annulled the decision of the RTC but should have reviewed
the same as if it was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction in accordance with the second
paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 40.
2) In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
only questions of law may be raised by the parties and
passed upon by this Court. In certain exceptional cases,
however, the Court may probe and resolve factual issues,
viz.:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts;
(e) When the findings of facts are conflicting;
(f) When in making its findings the CA went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and
the appellee;
(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to those
by the trial court;
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(h) When the findings are conclusions without

citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition, as well
as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs, are not
disputed by the respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; or
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.
B. Appeal from RTC to CA (R41)

HEIRS OF ARTURO GARCIA vs. MUN. OF IBA

GR No. 162217 Jul 22, 2015
1) A judgment rendered by the RTC granting a
petition for certiorari filed by an aggrieved party to set
aside the order of the MTC denying due course to his
notice of appeal is appealable to the Court of Appeals by
notice of appeal under Section 2(a) of Rule 41.

2) The distinctions between the various modes of

appeal cannot be taken for granted, or easily dismissed, or
lightly treated. The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule
41 is a matter or right, but the appeal by petition for review
under Rule 42 is a matter of discretion. An appeal as a
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matter of right, which refers to the right to seek the review

by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial
court, exists after the trial in the first instance. In contrast,
the discretionary appeal, which is taken from the decision
or final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its
primary appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the
superior court in its discretion.

3) The procedure taken after the perfection of an

appeal under Rule 41 also significantly differs from that
taken under Rule 42. Under Section 10 of Rule 41, the
clerk of court of the RTC is burdened to immediately
undertake the transmittal of the records by verifying the
correctness and completeness of the records of the case; the
transmittal to the CA must be made within 30 days from
the perfection of the appeal. This requirement of transmittal
of the records does not arise under Rule 42, except upon
order of the CA when deemed necessary.

C. Petition for Review from RTC to CA (R42)

MARAVILLA vs. RIOS
G.R. No. 196875 August 19, 2015
1) Under Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure (1997 Rules), a petition for review shall be
accompanied by, among others, copies of the pleadings
and other material portions of the record as would
support the allegations of the petition.
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Section 3 of the same rule states that failure of the

petitioner to comply with any of the requirements regarding
the contents of and the documents which should
accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof.
In Galvez v. Court of Appeals, it was held that there
are three guideposts in determining the necessity of
attaching pleadings and portions of the record to petitions
under Rules 42 and 65 of the 1997 Rules, to wit:
First, not all pleadings and parts of case
records are required to be attached to the
petition. Only those which are relevant and
pertinent must accompany it. The test of
relevancy is whether the document in question
will support the material allegations in the
petition, whether said document will make out
a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as
to convince the court to give due course to the
petition.

Second, even if a document is relevant and

pertinent to the petition, it need not be
appended if it is shown that the contents
thereof can also [be] found in another
document already attached to the petition.
Thus, if the material allegations in a position
paper are summarized in a questioned judgment,
it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the
judgment is attached.
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Third, a petition lacking an essential

pleading or part of the case record may still be
given due course or reinstated (if earlier
dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later
submitted the documents required, or that it
will serve the higher interest of justice that the
case be decided on the merits.

D. Appeals from QJA to CA (R43)

GALINDEZ vs. FIRMALAN
G. R. No. 187186 June 6, 2018
Leonen

1) As a rule, courts should accord respect, if not

finality, to findings of fact of administrative agencies, such
as the DENR, which have acquired expertise because of
their jurisdiction. Findings of fact of administrative bodies
charged with specific fields of expertise are to be afforded
great weight in the absence of substantial showing that such
findings are patently erroneous or tainted with abuse of
discretion.
In Solid Homes v. Payawal, it was explained that
administrative agencies are considered specialists in the
fields assigned to them; hence, they can resolve problems
in their respective fields "with more expertise and dispatch
than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of
justice." Thus, the SC has consistently accorded respect and
even finality to the findings of fact of administrative
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bodies, in recognition of their expertise and technical

knowledge over matters falling within their jurisdiction.

Moreover, Rule 43, Section 10 of the Rules of Civil

Procedure provides that findings of fact of a quasi-judicial
agency, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be
binding on the Court of Appeals.
E. Procedure for ordinary appeals in CA (R44)
DE LOS SANTOS vs. LUCENIO
G.R. No. 215659, March 19, 2018
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Section 15 of Rule 44 embodies the settled principle

that, on appeal, the parties are not allowed to change their
"theory of the case,". In other words, an issue not alleged in
the complaint nor raised before the trial court cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal as this goes against the
basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process. In the
same way, a defense not pleaded in the answer cannot also
be raised for the first time on appeal.
In Peña v. Spouses Tolentino, it was held that “x x x a
party cannot change his theory of the case or his cause of
action on appeal. This rule affirms that 'courts of justice
have no jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in
issue.' Thus, a judgment that goes beyond the issues and
purports to adjudicate something on which the court did not
hear the parties is not only irregular but also extrajudicial
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and invalid. The legal theory under which the controversy

was heard and decided in the dial, court should be
the same theory under which the review on appeal is
conducted. Otherwise, prejudice will result to the adverse
party. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not
adequately brought to the attention of the lower court will
not be ordinarily considered by a reviewing court,
inasmuch as they cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. This would be offensive to the basic rules of fair
play, justice, and due process.
F. Appeal by certiorari (R45)
MENDOZA vs. PALUGOD
G.R. No. 220517 June 20, 2018
CAGUIOA, J.:
1) As a rule, the factual findings of the CA affirming
those of the RTC are final and conclusive, and they cannot
be reviewed by the Supreme Court which has jurisdiction
to rule only on questions of law in Rule 45 petitions to
review.

A question of fact requires the Court to review the

truthfulness or falsity of the allegations of the parties. This
review includes assessment of the "probative value of the
evidence presented.” There is also a question of fact when
the issue presented before the Court is the correctness of
the lower courts' appreciation of the evidence presented by
the parties.
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There are, however, recognized exceptions where the

Court may review questions of fact. These are: (1) when
the factual conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the
inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
when there is abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings
of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA went beyond the
issues of the case in making its findings, which are further
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the CA's findings are contrary to those
of the trial court; (8) when the conclusions do not cite the
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents;
(10) when the CA's findings of fact, supposedly premised
on the absence of evidence, are contradicted by the
evidence on record; or (11) when the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.

KENSONIC v. UNI-LINE MULTI-RESOURCES

GR Nos. 211820-21 Jun 06, 2018
1) In an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, the SC
may only resolve questions of law, not questions of facts.
This is so because the SC is not a trier of fact. As a rule, the
SC will accord great weight and respect to the finding of
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facts of administrative agencies on matters within their

field of competence.

The distinction between a question of law and a

question of fact is well defined. In Tongonan Holdings and
Development Corporation v. Escaño, Jr., it was held that “a
question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts.

For a question to be one of law, the same must not

involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear
that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the
question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a
question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given
to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is
whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised
without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which
case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of
fact.

G. Dismissal of appeal (R50)

VALDERAMA vs. ARGUELLES
G.R. No. 223660, April 02, 2018
 26

1) Under Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,

there are three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC,
to wit:

Section 2. Modes of appeal. –

(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the

Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of
appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No
record on appeal shall be required except in
special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where law on these Rules so
require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall
be filed and served in like manner.

(b) Petition for review. - The appeal to the

Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for
review in accordance with Rule 42.

(c) Appeal by certiorari. - In all cases

where only questions of law are raised or
involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme
Court by petition for review on certiorari in
accordance with the Rule 45. 
 27

Moreover, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules provide that

an appeal to the CA raising only questions of law shall be
dismissed outright, thus:

Section 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to

the Court of Appeals. - An appeal under Rule 41
taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court
of Appeals raising only questions of law shall be
dismissed, issues purely of law not being
reviewable by said court. Similarly, an appeal by
notice of appeal instead of by petition for review
from the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial
Court shall be dismissed.

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of

Appeals shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright. 

2) Failure to perfect an appeal within the period

provided by law renders the appealed judgment or order
final and immutable. However, this rule is not without
exceptions. In some cases, the SC has relaxed the rules and
taken cognizance of a petition for review on certiorari after
an improper appeal to the CA "in the interest of justice and
in order to write finis to the controversy or resolve
important questions involved in a the case.

3) A subsequent annotation of a notice of lis pendens

on a certificate of title does not necessarily render a
 28

pending petition for cancellation of adverse claim on the

same title moot and academic.

H. Fresh period rule

FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE vs. COA
G.R. No. 213525 November 21, 2017

1) The Fresh Period Rule applies only to appeals in

civil and criminal cases, and in special proceedings filed
under Rule 40, Rule 41, Rule 42, Rule 43, Rule 45, and
Rule 122. It does not apply to a petition for certiorari filed
under Rule 64.

2) Section 2, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court prohibits a

second motion for reconsideration by the same party.
Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court echoes the prohibition, providing thusly:
Section 3. Second motion for
reconsideration. - The Court shall not entertain a
second motion for reconsideration, and any
exception to this rule can only be granted in the
higher interest of justice by the Court en banc
upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual
membership. There is reconsideration "in the
higher interest of justice" when the assailed
decision is not only legally erroneous, but is
likewise patently unjust and potentially capable
of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury
 29

or damage to the parties. A second motion for

reconsideration can only be entertained before the
ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by
operation of law or by the Court's declaration.
In the Division, a vote of three Members
shall be required to elevate a second motion for
reconsideration to the Court En Banc.
A second motion for reconsideration, albeit prohibited,
may be entertained in the higher interest of justice, such as
when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous but
also patently unjust and potentially capable of causing
unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the
moving party.
3) The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all
courts, and need not be specifically granted by statute. It
lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system.
Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have the
power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence,
respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their
lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their
officers from the approach and insults of pollution.
The power to punish for contempt essentially exists
for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for
the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the
courts, and, consequently, for the due administration of
justice. The reason behind the power to punish for
contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the
 30

stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the

institution of the courts would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.