officers. The then incumbent president of the USTFU was Atty.
Eduardo
CASE DIGEST BATCH 1
1. General Santos Coca-Cola Plant Free Workers Union Tupas v.
Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils. Inc
Facts: Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil., Inc. (CCBPI) experienced
a significant decline in profitability due to the Asian economic crisis,
thus to curb the negative effects on the company, it implemented three
(3) waves of an Early Retirement Program.
An inter-office memorandum was also issued mandating to put on hold
“all requests for hiring to fill in vacancies in both regular and temporary
positions in [the] Head Office and in the Plants.”
Faced with the “freeze hiring” directive, CCBPI Gen San engaged the
services of JLBP Services Corporation (JLBP), a manning agency.
Petitioner then filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB) a Notice of Strike on the ground of alleged unfair labor practice
committed by CCBPI Gen San for contracting-out services regularly
performed by union members.
In a Resolution, the NLRC ruled that CCBPI was not guilty of unfair
labor practice for contracting out jobs to JLBP.
Issue: WON CCBPI’s contracting-out of jobs to JLBP amounted to
unfair labor practice.
Ruling: The CA squarely addressed the issue of job contracting in its
assailed Decision and Resolution. The CA itself examined the facts and
evidence of the parties and found that, based on the evidence, CCBPI
did not engage in labor-only contracting and, therefore, was not guilty
of unfair labor practice.
The NLRC found – and the same was sustained by the CA – that the
company’s action to contract-out the services and functions performed
by Union members did not constitute unfair labor practice as this was
not directed at the members’ right to self-organization.
Both the NLRC and the CA found that petitioner was unable to prove
its charge of unfair labor practice. It was the Union that had the burden
of adducing substantial evidence to support its allegations of unfair
labor practice,17 which burden it failed to discharge.
2. UST Faculty Union v. UST
Facts: On September 21, 1996, the University of Santo Tomas Faculty
Union (USTFU) wrote a letter to all its members informing them of a
General Assembly (GA) that was to be held on October 5, 1996. The
letter contained an agenda for the GA which included an election of
J. Mariño, Jr. On October 2, 1996, Fr. Rodel Aligan, O.P., Secretary
General of the UST, issued a Memorandum allowing the request of the
Faculty Clubs of the university to hold a convocation on October 4, 1996.
Members of the faculties of the university attended the convocation,
including members of the USTFU, without the participation of the
members of the UST administration. Also during the convocation, an
election for the officers of the USTFU was conducted by a group called
the Reformist Alliance. Upon learning that the convocation was
intended to be an election, members of the USTFU walked out.
Meanwhile, an election was conducted among those present, and Gil
Gamilla and other faculty members (Gamilla Group) were elected as
the president and officers.
Issue: WON UST is guilty of ULP and thus the CBA is void.
Ruling: No. In no way can the contents of this memorandum be
interpreted to mean that faculty members were required to attend the
convocation. Not one coercive term was used in the memorandum to
show that the faculty club members were compelled to attend such
convocation. And the phrase "we are allowing them to hold a
convocation" negates any idea that the UST would participate in the
proceedings. In other words, the Memorandum dated October 2, 1996
does not support a claim that UST organized the convocation in
connivance with the Gamilla Group. The fact of the matter is, the
Gamilla Group represented itself to respondents as the duly elected
officials of the USTFU.
3. Skylanders Inc. v. NLRC
Facts: In November 1993 the Philippine Skylanders Employees
Association (PSEA), a local labor union affiliated with the Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), won in the certification
election conducted among the rank and file employees of Philippine
Skylanders, Inc. (PSI). Its rival union, Philippine Skylanders Employees
AssociationWATU (PSEA-WATU) immediately protested the result of
the election before the Secretary of Labor. Several months later, PSEA
sent PAFLU a notice of disaffiliation. PSEA subsequently affiliated itself
with the National Congress of Workers (NCW), changed its name to
Philippine Skylanders Employees Association – National Congress of
Workers (PSEA-NCW), and to maintain continuity within the
organization, allowed the former officers of PSEA-PAFLU to continue
occupying their positions as elected officers in the newly-formed PSEA-
NCW. On 17 March 1994 PSEA-NCW entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with PSI which was immediately registered with
the Department of Labor and Employment. Meanwhile, apparently
oblivious to PSEA’s shift of allegiance, PAFLU Secretary General
Serafin Ayroso wrote Mariles C. Romulo requesting a copy of PSI’s
audited financial statement. On 30 July 1994 PSI through its personnel
manager Francisco Dakila denied the request citing as reason PSEA’s
disaffiliation from PAFLU and its subsequent affiliation with NCW.
Issue: WON PSEA’s disaffiliation is legitimate
Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that the right of local unions to separate
from their mother federation on the ground that as separate and
voluntary associations, local unions do not owe their creation and
existence to the national federation to which they are affiliated but,
instead, to the will of their members. Yet the local unions remain the
basic units of association, free to serve their own interests subject to
the restraints imposed by the constitution and by-laws of the national
federation, and free also to renounce the affiliation upon the terms laid
down in the agreement which brought such affiliation into existence.
4. Tropical Hut Employee’s Union v. Tropical Hunt Foot Market Inc
Facts: The rank and file workers of the Tropical Hut Food Market
Incorporated (respondent company) organized a local union called the
Tropical Hut Employees Union (THEU) and immediately sought
affiliation with the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU). The
NATU accepted the THEU application for affiliation. The CBA between
respondent company and THEU-NATU contains a union security
clause. Later on, NATU received a letter jointly signed by the incumbent
officers of the local union informing the NATU that THEU was
disaffiliating from the NATU federation. The employees were dismissed
because, as respondent company contended, they violated the union
security clause.
Issue: Was the disaffiliation of the local union from the national
federation valid?
Ruling: Yes. The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother
federation is well-settled. A local union, being a separate and voluntary
association, is free to serve the interest of all its members including the
freedom to disaffiliate when circumstances warrant. This right is
consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association
The inclusion of the word NATU after the name of the local union THEU
in the registration with the Department of Labor is merely to stress that
the THEU is NATU’s affiliate at the time of the registration. It does not
mean that the said local union cannot stand on its own. Neither can it
be interpreted to mean that it cannot pursue its own interests
independently of the federation. A local union owes its creation and
continued existence to the will of its members and not to the federation
to which it belongs.
5. Purefoods Corp. v. Nagkakaisang Samahang Mangagawa ng
Purefoods Rank and File
Facts: NAGSAMA-Purefoods manifested to petitioner corporation its
desire to re-negotiate the CBA then due to expire. Together with its
demands and proposal, the organization submitted to the company its
General Membership Resolution approving and supporting the union’s
affiliation with PULO, adopting the draft CBA proposals of the federation,
and authorizing a negotiating panel which included among others a
PULO representative. While Purefoods formally acknowledged receipt
of the union’s proposals, it refused to recognize PULO and its
participation, even as a mere observer, in the negotiation.
In the meantime, STFWU and PGFWU also submitted their respective
proposals for CBA renewal, and their general membership resolutions
which, among others, affirmed the two organizations’ affiliation with
PULO. Consistent with its stance, Purefoods refused to negotiate with
the unions should a PULO representative be in the panel. The parties
then agreed to postpone the negotiations indefinitely.
However, the petitioner company concluded a new CBA with another
union in its farm in Malvar, Batangas. 5 days thereafter, 4 company
employees facilitated the transfer of around 23,000 chickens from the
poultry farm in Sto. Tomas, Batangas (where STFWU was the exclusive
bargaining agent) to that in Malvar. The following day, the regular rank-
and-file workers in the Sto. Tomas farm were refused entry in the
company premises; and later, 22 STFWU members were terminated
from employment. The farm manager, supervisors and electrical
workers of the Sto. Tomas farm, who were members of another union,
were nevertheless retained by the company in its employ.
Issue: Was there ULP in this case?
Ruling: It is crystal clear that the closure of the Sto. Tomas farm was
made in bad faith. Badges of bad faith are evident from the following
acts of the petitioner: it unjustifiably refused to recognize the STFWU’s
and the other unions’ affiliation with PULO; it concluded a new CBA
with another union in another farm during the agreed indefinite
suspension of the collective bargaining negotiations; it surreptitiously
transferred and continued its business in a less hostile environment;
and it suddenly terminated the STFWU members, but retained and
brought the non-members to the Malvar farm. Petitioner presented no
evidence to support the contention that it was incurring losses or that
the subject farm’s lease agreement was pre-terminated. Ineluctably,
the closure of the Sto. Tomas farm circumvented the labor
organization’s right to collective bargaining and violated the members’
right to security of tenure.
6. De la Salle University v. DLSUEA-NAFTEU
Facts: DLSUEA-NAFTEU entered into a five-year CBA with De La
Salle University (DLSU). The Aliazas faction wrote a letter to DLSU
requesting it to place in escrow the union dues and other fees deducted
from the salaries of employees pending the resolution of the intra-union
conflict. DLSUEA-NAFTEU filed a complaint for unfair labor practice in
the NLRC alleging that DLSU violated Article 248(a) and (g) of the
Labor Code. DLSUEA-NAFTEU asserted that that the creation of
escrow accounts was not an act of neutrality as it was influenced by the
Aliazas factionss letter and was an act of interference with the internal
affairs of the union. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for unfair
labor practice.
DLSUEA-NAFTEU sent a letter to DLSU requesting for the
renegotiation of the economic terms for the fourth and fifth years of the
then current CBA. DLSU denied the request prompting DLSUEA-
NAFTEU to file a notice of strike. The Secretary of Labor assumed
jurisdiction and found DLSU guilty of unfair labor practice.
Consequently, DLSUEA-NAFTEU reiterated its demand on DLSU to
bargain collectively pursuant to the aforementioned Decision of the
Secretary of Labor. Again, DLSU declined the request. Thus, DLSUEA-
NAFTEU filed another notice of strike. The Secretary of Labor cited his
earlier decision and ruled that DLSU is guilty of unfair labor practice. In
accordance with the said decision, DLSU turned over to DLSUEA-
NAFTEU the collected union dues and agency fees from employees
which were previously placed in escrow.
Issue: Whether the petitioner’s refusal to bargain amount to unfair labor
practice under the Labor Code.
Ruling: Yes. Petitioner erred in unilaterally suspending negotiations
with respondent since the pendency of the intra-union dispute was not
a justifiable reason to do so. The continued refusal by the University to
negotiate amounts to unfair labor practice. The non-proclamation of the
newly elected union officers cannot be used as an excuse to fulfill the
duty to bargain collectively.
7. MSMG-UWP v. Ramos
Facts: The petitioners were terminated by the company but the NLRC
upheld the dismissal. Later on, the SC reversed the decision and
ordered all of them reinstated and paid full backwages but it also held
that the officers of the company shouldn’t be held liable. This is the
subject of this motion for partial record as the union argues that it was
the officers who made the decision to terminate the employees.
Petitioners further contend that while the case was pending, the
company began removing its machineries and equipment from its plant
and began diverting jobs intended for the regular employees to its sub-
contractor/satellite branches.
Issue: WON the officers should be held liable for the illegal dismissed.
Ruling: The SC ruled that the officers cannot be held liable because a
crop has a personality separate and distinct from those acting in its
behalf. The rule is that obligations incurred by the corp, through
its directors, officers and employees are its sole liabilities. In labor
cases, corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with the
corporation for the termination of employment or corporate employees
done with malice or in bad faith. Bad faith does not connote bad
judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose of some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a known
duty thru some motive or interest or will; it partwages of the nature of
fraud. In this case, there is nothing on record to show that the officers
acted in patent bad faith or were guilty of gross negligence in
terminating the services of petitioners so as to warrant personal liability.
8. Alabang Country Club v. NLRC
Facts: Petitioner Alabang Country Club Inc. (ACCI), is a stock, non-
profit corporation that operates and maintains a country club and
various sports and recreational facilities for the exclusive use of its
members. Sometime in 1993, Francisco Ferrer, then President of ACCI,
requested its Internal Auditor, to conduct a study on the profitability of
ACCI’s Food and Beverage Department (F & B Department).
Consequently, report showed that from 1989 to 1993, F & B
Department had been incurring substantial losses.
Realizing that it was no longer profitable for ACCI to maintain its own F
& B Department, the management decided to cease from operating the
department and to open the same to a contractor, such as a
concessionaire, which would be willing to operate its own food and
beverage business within the club. Thus, ACCI sent its F & B
Department employee’s individual letters informing them that their
services were being terminated and that they would be paid separation
pay. The Union in turn, with the authority of individual respondents, filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Issue: Whether or not the club’s right to terminate its employees for an
authorized cause, particularly to secure its continued viability and
existence is valid.
Held: When petitioner decided to cease operating its F & B Department
and open the same to a concessionaire, it did not reduce the number
of personnel assigned thereat. It terminated the employment of all
personnel assigned at the department.
Petitioner’s failure to prove that the closure of its F & B Department was
due to substantial losses notwithstanding, the Court finds that individual
respondents were dismissed on the ground of closure or cessation of
an undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses,
which is allowed under Article 283 of the Labor Code.
The closure of operation of an establishment or undertaking not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses includes both the
complete cessation of operations and the cessation of only part of a
company’s activities.
9. GMC v. CA
Facts:
GMC and the General Milling Corporation Independent Labor Union c
oncluded a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which included the
issue of representation effective for a term of three years. A day befor
e the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, wit
h a request that a counter-
proposal be submitted within ten (10) days. However, before that, GM
C had received collective and individual letters from workers who stat
ed that they had withdrawn from their union membership, on grounds
of religious affiliation and personal differences. Believing that the unio
n no longer had standing to negotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any c
ounter-
proposal. On this matter, the union officers disclaimed any massive di
saffiliation or resignation from the union and submitted a manifesto, si
gned by its members, stating that they had not withdrawn from the uni
on.
Issue: WON an employer is guilty of ULP when it refuses to submit
counter – proposal on the proposed CBA a day before its expiration
considering that the agreed term of which is only for 3 years.
Ruling:
Yes. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court said that the law mandate
s that the representation provision of a CBA should last for five years.
The relation between labor and management should be undisturbed u
ntil the last 60 days of the fifth year. Hence, it is indisputable that whe
n the union requested for a renegotiation of the economic terms of the
CBA on the day before the expiration, it was still the certified collectiv
e bargaining agent of the workers, because it was seeking said reneg
otiation within five (5) years from the date of effectivity of the CBA. Th
e union’s proposal was also submitted within the prescribed 3-
year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA, albeit just before th
e last day of said period. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason
to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union. For refusing to sen
d a counter-
proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of t
he CBA, the company committed an unfair labor practice under Article
248(g) of the Labor Code.
10. Hacienda Fatima v. NFSW Food and General Trade
Facts: The petitioner disfavored the fact that the private respondent
employees have formed a union. When the union became the collective
bargaining representative in the certification election, the petitioner
refused to sit down to negotiate a CBA. Moreover, the respondents
were not given work for a month amounting to unjustified dismissal. As
a result, the complainants staged a strike to protest but was settled
through a memorandum of agreement which contained a list of those
considered as regular employees for the payroll.
Issue: WON the employees are regular workers
Ruling: Yes, they are regular and not seasonal employees. For them
to be excluded as regulars, it is not enough that they perform work
that is seasonal in nature but they also are employed for the duration
of one season. The evidence only proved the first but not the second
requirement.
The ruling in Mercado v. NLRC is not applicable since in that case, the
workers were merely required to perform phases of agricultural work for
a definite period of time, after which, their services are available to other
employers. The management's sudden change of assignment reeks of
bad faith, it is likewise guilty of ULP.
11. John Colleges Inc. v. John Academy Faculty and Employees
Union
Facts: The CBA between SJCI and the Union was set to expire on May
31, 1997. During the ensuing collective bargaining negotiations, SJCI
rejected all the proposals of the Union for an increase in worker’s
benefits. This resulted to a bargaining deadlock which led to the holding
of a valid strike by the Union on November 10, 1997.In order to end the
strike, SJCI and the Union, through the efforts of the NCMB, agreed to
refer the labor dispute to the Secretary of Labor and Employment
(SOLE) for assumption of jurisdiction.After which, the strike ended and
classes resumed. Subsequently, the SOLE issued an Order dated
January 19, 1998 assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute pursuant
to Article 263 of the Labor Code. The parties were required to submit
their respective position papers. Pending resolution of the labor dispute
before the SOLE, the Board of Directors of SJCI approved on February
22, 1998 a resolution recommending the closure
of the high school which was approved by the stockholders on even
date. Thereafter, SJCI informed the DOLE, DECS, parents, students
and the Union of the impending closure of the high school which took
effect on March 31, 1998. Subsequently, some teaching and non-
teaching personnel of the high school agreed to the closure. Some 51
employees had received their separation compensation package while
25 employees refused to accept the same. Instead, these employees
conducted a protest action within the perimeter of the high school. The
Union filed a notice of strike. Thereafter SJCI filed a petition
to declare the strike illegal before the NLRC. It claimed that the strike
was conducted in violation of the procedural requirements for holding a
valid strike under the Labor Code. Subsequently, the 25 employees
filed a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP), illegal dismissal and
non-payment of monetary benefits against
SJCI before the NLRC, alleging that the closure of the high school was
done in bad faith in order to get rid of the Union and render useless any
decision of the SOLE on the CBA deadlocked issues.
Issue: WON SJCI closed the high school in good faith.
Ruling: No. SJCI is liable for ULP and illegal dismissal.
Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, the following requisites must
concur for a valid closure of the business:
(1) serving a written notice on the workers at least one (1) month before
the intended date thereof;
(2) serving a notice with the DOLE one month before the taking effect
of the closure;
(3) payment of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month or at least
one half (1/2) month pay for every year of
service, whichever is higher, with a fraction of at least six (6) months to
be considered as a whole year; and
(4) cessation of the operation must be bona fide.
It is not disputed that the first two requisites were satisfied. The third
requisite would have been satisfied were it not for the refusal of the
herein private respondents to accept the separation compensation
package. The instant case, thus, revolves around the fourth requisite,
i.e., whether SJCI closed the high school in good faith.
In sum, the SC held that the timing of, and the reasons for the closure
of the high school and its reopening after only one year from the time it
was closed down, show that the closure was done in bad faith for the
purpose of circumventing the Union’s right to collective bargaining and
its members’ right to security of tenure.
12. Central Azucarera De Bais Employees Union NFL v. Central
Azucarera De Bais Inc.
FACTS: CABEU-NFL is a registered labor union and the bargaining
agent of Respondent CAB. CABEU-NFL proposed a collective
bargaining agreement which was rejected by CAB. With no common
ground, the petitioner filed a notice of strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). CAB issued a letter stating
that the petitioner is no longer the bargaining agent of CAB because
90% of its rank and file employees left the union for another one. This
was not acted upon by the NCMB, which led to the filing of Unfair Labor
Practice with the Labor Arbiter. The LA dismissed the complaint, but
the NLRC reversed the decision upon appeal. CAB elevated the matter
to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the NLRC. Thus
prompting the filing of the instant petition.
ISSUE: Was there unfair labor practice?
HELD: Article 247 of the Labor Code provides that "Unfair labor
practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to
self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor
and management, including their right to bargain collectively and
otherwise deal with each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual
respect, disrupt industrial peace and hinder the promotion of healthy
and stable labor-management relations."
For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that
CAB was motivated by ill will, "bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to
labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public
policy, and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings or
grave anxiety resulted x x x"in suspending negotiations with CABEU-
NFL.Notably, CAB believed that CABEU-NFL was no longer the
representative of the workers.It just wanted to foster industrial peace by
bowing to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of its rank and file
workers and by negotiating and concluding in good faith a CBA with
CABELA."Such actions of CAB are nowhere tantamount to anti-
unionism, the evil sought to be punished in cases of unfair labor
practices.
13. UFE-DFA-KMU v. Nestle Phils. Inc.
Facts: As the CBA between Nestlé and UFE-DFA-KMU, the Presidents
of the Alabang & Cabuyao Divisions of the union, through a Letter of
Intent, informed Nestlé of their intent to open Collective Bargaining
Negotiation for 2001-2004. Nestlé acknowledged receipt and informed
the union that it was preparing its own counter-proposal and proposed
ground rules to govern the conduct of CB Negotiations. It later
underscored the position that "unilateral grants, one-time company
grants, company-initiated policies and programs, which include, but are
not limited to the Retirement Plan, Incidental Straight Duty Pay and
Calling Pay Premium, are by their very nature not proper subjects of
CBA negotiations and therefore shall be excluded therefrom. "The
Cabuyao Division later became the sole bargaining unit involved in
negotiations with the closure of the Alabang Plant.
Nestlé, claiming to have reached impasse in dialogue, requested
NCMB to conduct preventive mediation proceedings; despite 15
meetings, however, the parties failed to reach any agreement on the
proposed CBA. Conciliation proceedings proved ineffective. UFE-DFA-
KMU filed a Notice of Strike complaining of bargaining deadlock (on
economic issues). It later filed another Notice of Strike predicated on
Nestlé's alleged ULP (bargaining in bad faith --> setting pre-conditions
in the ground rules by refusing to include issue of Retirement Plan in
the CBA negotiations) Astrike vote conducted was met with
overwhelming approval.
Nestlé filed with DOLE a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction,
pursuant to LC 263 (g), effectively enjoying any impending strike.
SOLE Sto. Tonas ordered any strike or lockout to be enjoined and the
parties to cease and desist from committing any act that might lead to
the further deterioration of the current labor relations situation. The
parties were further directed to meet and convene for the discussion of
the union proposals and company counter-proposals before the NCMB.
MR filed by UFE denied.
ISSUE: WON Nestlé violated its duty to bargain collectively when it
purportedly imposed a precondition (refusing to include the issue of the
Retirement Plan in the CBA negotiations) to its agreement to discuss
and engage in collective bargaining negotiations with UFE-DFA-KMU.
Ruling: No. The duty to bargain collectively is mandated by Articles
252 and 253 of the Labor Code, as amended. Obviously, the purpose
of collective bargaining is the reaching of an agreement resulting in a
contract binding on the parties; but the failure to reach an agreement
after negotiations have continued for a reasonable period does not
establish a lack of good faith. The statutes invite and contemplate a
collective bargaining contract, but they do not compel one. The duty to
bargain does not include the obligation to reach an agreement.
In the case at bar, Nestle never refused to bargain collectively with
UFE-DFAKMU. The corporation simply wanted to exclude the
Retirement Plan from the issues to be taken up during CBA
negotiations, on the postulation that such was in the nature of a
unilaterally granted benefit. It is but natural that at negotiations,
management and labor adopt positions or make demands and offer
proposals and counter-proposals. The management's 􀀹rm stand
against the issue of the Retirement Plan did not mean that it was
bargaining in bad faith. It had a right to insist on its position to the point
of stalemate.
14. Malayang Mangagawa ng Stayfast v. NLRC
Facts: The Med-Arbiter who supervised the certification election issued
an Order certifying NLMS-Olalia as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all rank and file employees of Stayfast. On appeal to the
Secretary, it affirmed the MA’s decision. The matter was elevated via
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Pending, when the
company refused to bargain, it staged a strike which was restrained.
Then, it filed a Notice of Strike to the NCMB. The company opposed
and contended that the union lack personality to file notice of strike.
During the conciliation-mediation, the union withdrew its notice of strike.
However, the Union’s members staged a “sit-down strike” to dramatize
their demand for a fair and equal treatment as respondent company
allegedly continued to discriminate against them. Respondent company
issued a memorandum requiring the alleged participants in the “sit-
down strike” to explain within 24 hours why they should not be
terminated or suspended from work for infraction of company rules and
regulations pertaining to unauthorized work stoppage, acts inimical to
company interest, and disregard of instruction of immediate supervisor
to perform assigned task. As no one complied with the memorandum
within the 24-hour deadline, respondent company promptly terminated
the service of the participants in the “sit-down strike”. Consequently the
day after, the union staged a strike and filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice, union busting and illegal lockout against respondent company
and its General Manager, Maria Almeida, in the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not a union may file a notice of strike considering it
is not the exclusive bargaining agent.
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter which ruled that, while union may file a notice of strike on behalf
of its members, petitioner failed to cite any instance of discrimination or
harassment when it filed its notice of strike and the incidents mentioned
as discriminatory occurred after the filing of the said notice. Moreover,
assuming the strike was legal at the beginning, it became illegal when
petitioner committed acts prohibited under Article 264(e) of the Labor
Code, such as acts of violence, coercion and intimidation and
obstruction of the free ingress to and egress from respondent
company’s premises. Also, petitioner was supposed to have made a
self-imposed prohibition to stage a strike when it submitted its labor
dispute with respondent company for compulsory arbitration. Yet,
petitioner continued with its strike. Besides, union filed no new notice
of strike that could have supported its charges of discriminatory acts
and unfair labor practice. Moreover, no evidence was presented to
establish such charges
The “sit-down strike” made by union’s officers and members was in
violation of respondent company’s rules, and petitioner’s officers and
members ignored the opportunity given by respondent company for
them to explain their misconduct, which resulted in the termination of
their employment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the said findings
were supported by substantial evidence.
15. Holy Child Catholic School v. SOLE
FACTS: A petition for certification election was filed by private
respondent Pinag-Isang Tinig at Lakas ng Anakpawis – Holy Child
Catholic School Teachers and Employees Labor Union (HCCS-
TELUPIGLAS). Holy Child Parochial School raised that members of
private respondent do not belong to the same class; it is not only a
mixture of managerial, supervisory, and rank-and-file employees – as
three (3) are vice-principals, one (1) is a department head/supervisor,
and eleven (11) are coordinators – but also a combination of teaching
and non-teaching personnel – as twenty-seven (27) are non-teaching
personnel. It insisted that, for not being in accord with Article 24510 of
the Labor Code, private respondent is an illegitimate labor organization
lacking in personality to file a petition for certification election The Med-
Arbiter denied the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certification election is dismissible
on the ground that the labor organization’s membership allegedly
consists of supervisory and rank-and-file employees.
RULING: No. Before, when the 1989 Rules was still in application,
mingling will prevent an otherwise legitimate and duly registered labor
organization from exercising its right to file a petition for certification
election. But then, the 1989 Amended Omnibus Rules was further
amended by Department Order No. 9, series of 1997 (1997 Amended
Omnibus Rules). Specifically, the requirement under Sec. 2(c) of the
1989 Amended Omnibus Rules – that the petition for certification
election indicate that the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees has
not been mingled with supervisory employees – was removed.
Petitioner argued that, in view of the improper mixture of teaching and
non-teaching personnel in private respondent due to the absence of
mutuality of interest among its members, the petition for certification
election should have been dismissed on the ground that private
respondent is not qualified to file such petition for its failure to qualify as
a legitimate labor organization, the basic qualification of which is the
representation of an appropriate bargaining unit. The Supreme Court
disagreed and said that the concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor
organization are different from, but related to, the concept of a
bargaining unit.
In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the
proper procedure for an employer like petitioner is to directly file a
petition for cancellation of the union’s certificate of registration due to
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances
enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended. To reiterate,
private respondent, having been validly issued a certificate of
registration, should be considered as having acquired juridical
personality which may not be attacked collaterally.
16. SACORU v. CCBPI
FACTS: On May 29, 2009, the private respondent company, Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines., Inc. ("CCBPI") issued notices of termination to
twenty seven (27) rank-and-file, regular employees and members of the
San Fernando Rank-and-File Union ("SACORU"), collectively stated as
"union members", on the bottom of redundancy because of the ceding
out of two selling and distribution systems, the standard Route System
("CRS") and Mini Bodega System ("MB") to the Market Execution
Partners ("MEPS"), better referred to as "Dealership System". The
union members were also granted individual separation packages,
which twenty-two (22) of them accepted, but under protest.
To SACORU, the new, reorganized selling and distribution systems
adopted and implemented by CCBPI would end in the diminution of the
union membership amounting to union busting and to a violation of the
talks Agreement (CBA) provision against contracting out of services or
outsourcing of standard positions; hence, they filed a Notice of Strike
with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on the
bottom of ground of unfair labor practice, among others. CCBPI, for its
part, argued that the new business scheme is essentially a
management prerogative designed to boost the system of selling and
distributing products so as to achieve more consumers at a lesser cost
with fewer manpower complement, but leading to greater returns to
investment.
SACORU maintained that that the termination will seriously affect the
union membership because out of 250 members, only 120 members
are going to be left upon plan implementation; that there's no
redundancy because the sales force still exists except that job positions
are going to be contracted dead set a sales contractor using company
equipment for the aim of minimizing labor costs because contractual
employees don't enjoy CBA benefits; that the contractualization
program of the corporate is against the law because it'll render the
union inutile in protecting the rights of its members as there'll be more
contractual employees than regular employees; which the redundancy
program will lead to the displacement of standard employees which
could be a clear case of union busting.
ISSUE: Whether or not CCBPI committed unfair labor practices.
RULING: No. To prove the existence of unfair labor practice,
substantial evidence has got to be presented. SACORU didn't proffer
any proof that CCBPI acted in an exceedingly malicious or arbitrarily
manner in implementing the redundancy program which resulted within
the dismissal of the 27 employees, which CCBPI engaged instead the
services of independent contractors. As no credible, countervailing
evidence had been put forth by SACORU with which to challenge the
validity of the redundancy program implemented by CCBPI, the alleged
unfair labor practice acts allegedly perpetrated against union members
might not be simply swallowed. SACORU was unable to prove its
charge of unfair labor practice and support its allegations that the
termination of the union members was through with the end-in-view of
weakening union leadership and representation. There was no showing
that the redundancy program was motivated by ill will, bad faith or
malice, or that it had been conceived for the aim of interfering with the
employees' right to self-organize. The Court accordingly affirms these
findings of the NLRC and also the CA that SACORU did not present
any evidence to prove that the redundancy program interfered with their
right to self-organize.
17. SWOFLU v. Universal Robina Corp
Facts: SWOFLU was the exclusive bargaining agent of Robina. The
two parties executed a CBA on 200 on certain benefits. Years later,
there was another election and SWOFLU won again. Petitioner imitated
negotiation for another CBA, but Robina refused. Instead, Robina
increased the wages and offered benefits on the condition that the
employees sign a waiver for CBA negotiations. The employees signed
the waiver, except for a couple of members of SWOFLU. The
employees, who did not sign the waiver, were not included in the
benefits.
Issue: WON there was unfair labor practice enrich themselves by benefiting from employment conditions
negotiated by the bargaining union. In the present case, PEU-
Ruling: Yes. There were three violations committed under the Labor NUWHRAIN’s right to collect agency fees is not disputed.
Code. Robina interfered with the exercise of the right to self –
organization, discrimination of wages to discourage membership in any
labor organization and violate the duty to bargain collectively. Robina
refused to meet and bargain with SWOFLU. This is an obligation of the
employer. Refusal to meet, negotiate, and bargain with the Labor
Organization constitutes unfair labor practice.

18. PEU v. Esquivel

Facts: On December 13, 2007, Peninsula Employees Union’ (PEU)
Board of Directors passed Local Board Resolution No. 12, series of
20078 authorizing, among others, the affiliation of PEU with
NUWHRAIN, and the direct membership of its individual members
thereto. On the same day, the said act was submitted to the general
membership, and was duly ratified by 223 PEU members. Beginning
January 1, 2009, PEU-NUWHRAIN sought to increase the union
dues/agency fees from one percent (1 % ) to two percent (2%) of the
rank and file employees’ monthly salaries, brought about by PEU’s
affiliation with NUWHRAIN, which supposedly requires its affiliates to
remit to it two percent (2%) of their monthly salaries.
The non-PEU members objected to the assessment of increased
agency fees arguing that: (a) the new CBA is unenforceable since no
written CBA has been formally signed and executed by PEU-
NUWHRAIN and the Hotel; (b) the 2% agency fee is exorbitant and
unreasonable; and (c) PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the
mandatory requirements for such increase.

Issue: Whether PEU-NUWHRAIN has right to collect the increased

agency fees.

Ruling: Yes. The recognized collective bargaining union which

successfully negotiated the CBA with the employer is given the right to
collect a reasonable fee called “agency fee” from non-union members
who are employees of the appropriate bargaining unit, in an amount
equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by union members, in case
they accept the benefits under the CBA. While the collection of agency
fees is recognized by Article 259 (formerly Article 248) of the Labor
Code, as amended, the legal basis of the union’s right to agency fees
is neither contractual nor statutory, but quasi-contractual, deriving from
the established principle that non-union employees may not unjustly

CASE DIGEST BATCH 2
1. Phil Diamond Hotel and Resort Inc. v. Manila Diamond Hotel
Employees Union
Facts:The Union filed a petition for certification election seeking
certification as the exclusive bargaining representative of its members.
It was denied as it failed to comply with legal requirements and was
seen to fragment the employees of petitioner. Despite of such denial,
the Union sent a letter to the Company expressing its intention to
negotiate a CBA for its members. The Company refused to bargain
since it was not certified by the SOLE as the exclusive bargaining
agents of its employees. The union clarified that it sought to bargain
"for its members only," and declared that Company’s refusal to bargain
would prompt the union to engage in concerted activities to protect and
assert its rights under the Labor Code.
Thereafter, the Union filed a notice of strike before the NCMB for the
alleged unfair labor practice of the employer for refusing to bargain.
Conciliation conferences were immediately conducted. In the meantime,
the Union demanded the holding of a consent election to which the
Hotel interposed no objection, provided the union followed the
procedure under the law. The parties agreed to hold the consent
election on December 1, 1997, however, on November 20, 1997, the
union suddenly went on strike. As a result thereof, the company filed a
TRO enjoin the union members from staging a strike.
Notwithstanding the TRO, they continued the strike and refused to
dismantle the tent they put up at the employee’s entrance to the Hotel,
prompting the Hotel’s security guards to dismantle the same during
which the strikers as well as the guards were hit by rocks coming from
the direction of the construction site resulting to physical injuries to
some of them. Thus, the Hotel filed a petition to declare the strike illegal.
Issue: WON the union officers and members should be dismissed from
participating the illegal strike.
Ruling: The strike is illegal. This Court notes that Union violated Article
264 which proscribes the staging of a strike on the ground of ULP during
the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike.
Thus, the union officers should be dismissed for staging and
participating in the illegal strike. Under Article 264 of the Labor Code,
any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status. An ordinary striking worker cannot, thus be dismissed for mere
participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed
illegal acts during a strike, unlike a union officer who may be dismissed
by mere knowingly participating in an illegal strike and/or committing an
illegal act during a strike. This Court found no convincing and
substantial proof, however, that the strikersmembers of respondent
who participated in the illegal strike committed illegal acts.
Consequently, they cannot be terminated from service for their
participation in an illegal strike. Despite the photographs and list of
names submitted by the Company, the list failed to specifically identify
the ones who actually committed illegal acts.
2. Sukhothai Cuisine and Restaurant v. CA
Facts: The majority of the employees of the petitioner organized
themselves into a union which affiliated with the Philippine Labor
Alliance Council (PLAC), and was designated as PLAC Local 460
Sukhothai Restaurant Chapter (Union). The Union filed a Notice of
Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on
the ground of unfair labor practice, and particularly, acts of harassment,
fault-finding, and union busting through coercion and interference with
union affairs. In a conciliation conference, the representatives of the
petitioner agreed and guaranteed that there will be no termination of
the services of private respondents during the pendency of the case,
with the reservation of the management prerogative to issue memos to
erring employees for the infraction, or violation of company policies. On
the following day, a Strike Vote was conducted and supervised by
NCMB personnel, and the results of the vote were submitted to the
NCMB. The petitioner and the Union entered into a Submission
Agreement, thereby agreeing to submit the issue of unfair labor practice
— the subject matter of the foregoing Notice of Strike and the Strike
Vote — for voluntary arbitration with a view to prevent the strike.
During the pendency of the voluntary arbitration proceedings, the
petitioner, dismissed Eugene Lucente, a union member, due to an
alleged petty quarrel with a coemployee. Union filed with the NLRC a
complaint for illegal dismissal. Another union member was relieved
from his post, and his employment as cook, terminated. Union staged
a "wildcat strike."
Notice of Strike was re-filed by the private respondents and the protest
and was converted into a "sit-down strike." On the next day, or on June
26, 1999, the same was transformed into an "actual strike."
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal strike, seeking to declare the strike
illegal, and to declare respondents, who participated in the commission
of illegal acts, to have lost their employment status. Labor Arbiter ruled
in favor of petitioner. However, NLRC overruled Labor Arbiter and held
that the petitioner is guilty of union busting; that the petitioner violated
the Submission Agreement.
Issue: WON the employment of the respondents may be terminated
due to the commission of illegal acts during the strike.
Ruling: The undisputed fact, however, is that at the time the strike was
staged in June 1999, voluntary arbitration between the parties was
ongoing by virtue of the January 21 , 1999 Submission Agreement. The
issue to be resolved under those proceedings pertained to the very
same issues stated in the Notice of Strike of December 3, 1998: the
commission of unfair labor practices, such as acts of harassment, fault-
finding, and union busting through coercion and interference with union
affairs.
This Court has held that strikes staged in violation of agreements
providing for arbitration are illegal, since these agreements must be
strictly adhered to and respected if their ends are to be achieved. The
rationale of the prohibition under Article 264 is that once jurisdiction
over the labor dispute has been properly acquired by competent
authority, that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the
application of the coercive processes of a strike. Indeed, it is among the
chief policies of the State to promote and emphasize the primacy of free
collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration,
mediation, and conciliation, as modes of settling labor, or industrial
disputes
The alleged dismissals of Lucente and respondent Lanorias, both union
members, which allegedly triggered the wildcat strike, are not sufficient
grounds to justify the radical recourse on the part of the private
respondents.
3. Biflex Phils. Inc. Labor Unions v. Filflex Industrial Manufacturing
Corporation
Facts:The labor sector staged a welga ng bayan to protest the
accelerating prices of oil. Petitionerunions, led by their officers, herein
petitioners, staged a work stoppage which lasted for several days,
prompting respondents to file a petition to declare the work stoppage
illegal for failure to comply with procedural requirements. Subsequently,
respondents resumed their operations. Petitioners, claiming that they
were illegally locked out by respondents, assert that aside from the fact
that the welga ng bayan rendered it difficult to get a ride and the
apprehension that violence would erupt between those participating in
the welga and the authorities, respondents’ workers were prevented
from reporting for work. On their putting up of tents, tables and chairs
in front of the main gate of respondents’ premises, petitioners, who
claim that they filed a notice of strike on explain that those were for the
convenience of union members who reported every morning to check
if the management would allow them to report for work
ISSUE: Was the strike illegal?
HELD: Yes, it was illegal. Stoppage of work due to welga ng bayan is
in the nature of a general strike, an extended sympathy strike. It affects
numerous employers including those who do not have a dispute with
their employees regarding their terms and conditions of employment.
Employees who have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on
a day they are scheduled to work, refuse to work and instead join a
welga ng bayan commit an illegal work stoppage. There being no
showing that petitioners notified respondents of their intention, or that
they were allowed by respondents, to join the welga ng bayan, their
work stoppage is beyond legal protection
4. Ramirez v. Polyson Industries
Facts: Polyson met with the officers of Obrero Pilipino, the union of its
employees, led by the union president, herein petitioner Ramirez.
Obrero asked that it be voluntarily recognized by Polyson as the
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Polyson,
but the latter refused and opted for a certification election. Polyson
received a rush order from one of its clients. The supervisors
approached the operators but were told that they would be unable to
work overtime because they have other commitments. This resulted in
the delay in delivery of the client's order and eventually, the cancellation
thereof by reason of such delay. The management then conducted an
investigation where Visca and Tuting, two of their workers, claimed that
petitioners were the ones who pressured them to desist from rendering
overtime work. The management informed petitioners of their
termination on the ground that they instigated an illegal concerted
activity resulting in losses to the company.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners are guilty of an illegal act and, if so, whether
such act is a valid ground for their termination

RULING: YES; YES The evidence on record clearly establishes that
herein [petitioners] resorted to an illicit activity. The act of inducing
and/or threatening workers not to render overtime work, given the
circumstances surrounding the instant case, was undoubtedly a
calculated effort amounting to 'overtime boycott' or 'work slowdown.'
[Petitioners], in their apparent attempt to make a statement — as a
response to [Polyson's] refusal to voluntarily recognize Obrero as the
sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-and-file
employees, unduly caused [Polyson] significant losses.
5. St. Lukes Medical Center Inc. v. Notario
Facts: Facts: Estrelito Notario was assigned to work from 6PM-6AM to
monitor the video camera. Justin Tibon reported that he was attending
to his daughter who was admitted to the cardiovascular unit of the
hospital and that his mint green traveling bag containing 2 airline tickets,
passports and some clothes was missing. The Security Department
conducted an investigation and check the CCTV of the hospital and it
was found that the cameras failed to record any incident of theft that
happened in the room of Tibon because it focused on the Old Maternity
Unit and New Maternity Unit. Notario was asked to explain why he
shouldn’t be disciplined for such. Notario explained that he was the only
personnel on duty and that he focused on the Old and New Maternity
Unit because these places have high incidence of theft. Not satisfied,
he was dismissed. Notario filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Issue: WON he was dismissed for a just cause.
Ruling: No, he was not dismissed for a just cause. Under the Labor
Code, an employer may terminate an employee for gross and habitual
neglect of duties. Neglect of duty, to be a ground for dismissal, must be
both gross and habitual. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the
performance of one’s duties. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure
to perform one’s duties for a period of time, depending upon the
circumstances. A single or isolated act of negligence does not
constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee. Here, Notario
exercised his best judgment in monitoring the CCTV cameras so as to
ensure the security within the hospital premises. Assuming that
respondent was negligent, although this Court finds otherwise, the
lapse or inaction could only be regarded as a single or isolated act of
negligence that cannot be categorized as habitual and, hence, not a
just cause for his dismissal. Also, the argument of St. Luke’s that even
a single or isolated act of negligence by respondent constitutes a just
cause for his dismissal as it engendered the possibility of a legal action
that may be taken against them by the owner of the lost items is purely
speculative. In fact, the police stated that there was no incident of theft
that was reported by the management. Therefore, it cannot be said that
St. Luke’s incurred actual loss or damage.
6. Distribution and Control Products Inc. v. Santos
Facts: Herein Private Respondent Santos in this case was the
company driver of Petitioner Distribution and Control Products Inc.
having worked with the company since 2005. In Dec. 2010 he received
a notice informing him that he was being preventively suspended for a
period of 30 days, because of the suspicion of his participation in the
loss of a circuit breaker and several other electrical products from the
petitioner’s warehouse amounting to 602,000php. This was discovered
after an audit conducted by the Petitioner. Respondent Santos was the
only other person who had free access to the warehouse other than the
warehouseman, and Petitioner theorized that the theft could only have
been done by no less than two persons- on of them being Santos.
Santos supposedly inquired with the Human Resources Department
why he was being suspended as he was never given an opportunity to
explain his side, but he was not offered any. Instead he was no longer
accepted at work after the lapse of the preventive suspension.
Thereafter, Santos filed an action for constructive illegal dismissal and
payment of separation pay.
Issue: Whether the dismissal was legal
Ruling: NO. In determining whether an employee's dismissal had been
legal, the inquiry focuses on whether the dismissal violated his right to
substantial and procedural due process. An employee's right not to be
dismissed without just or authorized cause as provided by law, is
covered by his right to substantial due process. Compliance with
procedure provided in the Labor Code, on the other hand, constitutes
the procedural due process right of an employee
In this case in particular, all the courts and bodies a quo uniformly ruled
that the petitioner had failed to afford Santos with procedural due
process as nothing therein indicated that he was required nor was given
the opportunity to explain his side, considering that he was being
implicated in the theft of the subject circuit breakers and other electrical
products. It is true that petitioners conducted their own investigation but
the same was made without the participation of respondent. Petitioners
allege that they did not terminate respondent from his employment and
that it was the latter who actually decided to abandon his job, but the
same was not upheld by the lower courts and bodies. This being the
case, the Court found no cogent reason to depart from the rulings a quo.
7. Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management
Facts: Petitioner was employed as an electrician of the vessel, M/T
SEASCOUT by Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its
principal, Vulture Shipping Limited. The contract was for 12 months.On
23 August 2001,Yapboarded M/T SEASCOUT and commenced his job
as electrician. However, on or about 08 November 2001, the vessel
was sold.
Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along
with the scrapping bonus. However, he insisted that he was entitled to
the payment of the unexpired portion of his contract since he was
illegally dismissed from employment. He alleged that he opted for
immediate transfer but none was made.
Respondents contended that Yap was not illegally dismissed.They
further alleged that Yaps contract was validly terminated due to the sale
of the vessel and no arrangement was made for Yaps transfer to
Thenamaris other vessels.
Thus, Yap brought the issue before the Labor Arbiter (LA) which ruled
that petitioner was illegally dismissed; that respondents acted in bad
faith when they assured petitioner of re-embarkation but he was not
able to board; and that petitioner was entitled to his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his contract for a period of nine months
(US$12,870.00), P100,000 for moral damages, and P50,000 for
exemplary damages with 10% of the same for Attys fees.
Respondents sought recourse from the NLRC which modified the
award of salaries from that corresponding to nine months to only three
months (US$4,290.00) pursuant to Section 10 R.A. No. 8042.
Issue: Whether Section 10 of R.A. 8042, to the extent that it affords an
illegally dismissed migrant worker the lesser benefit of "salaries for [the]
unexpired portion of his employment contract for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" is constitutional
Ruling: The petition is impressed with merit.
We have previously declared that the clause "or for three months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" is unconstitutional
for being violative of the rights of (OFWs) to equal protection. Moreover,
the subject clause does not state any definitive governmental purpose,
hence, it also violates petitioner's right to substantive due process.
Generally, an unconstitutional act is not a law. An exception to this is
the doctrine of operative fact applied when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law. This case should not be included in the
exception. It was not the fault of petitioner that he lost his job due to an
act of illegal dismissal committed by respondents.
Also, we cannot subscribe to respondents postulation that the tanker
allowance of US$130.00 should not be included in the computation of
the lump-sum salary. First, fair play, justice, and due process dictate
that this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal, pass upon this
question. Second, the allowance was encapsulated in the basic salary
clause.
8. Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association v. NLRC
Facts: Union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB based on Toyota’s
refusal to bargain. Union officers and members failed to render the
required overtime work, and instead marched to and staged a picket in
front of the BLR office. Toyota experienced acute lack of manpower
resulting in huge losses. Toyota filed a petition to declare the strike
illegal with the NLRC and prayed that the erring Union officers, directors,
and members be dismissed. After the DOLE Secretary assumed
jurisdiction over the Toyota dispute, the Union again staged strikes. The
NLRC found the strikes illegal as they violated Art. 264 of the Labor
Code which proscribes any strike or lockout after jurisdiction is
assumed over the dispute by the President or the DOLE Secretary.
Issue: WON the mass actions committed by the Union on different
occasions are illegal strikes.
Ruling: Yes. The Union failed to comply with the following
requirements: (1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before
the intended date of strike, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice;
(2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in
the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting
called for that purpose; and (3) notice given to the DOLE of the results
of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. These
requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply with
them renders the strike illegal.
9. Bristol Myers Squibb Inc. v. Haban
Facts: Petitioner Bristol Myers Squibb Philippines, Inc. hired
respondent Richard Nixon A. Baban as district manager of the company.
He was assigned to handle the company's clients in Cagayan de Oro-
Northern Mindanao area and its immediate vicinities. His duties
included the promotion of nutritional products of petitioner to medical
practitioners, sale to drug outlets and the supervision of territory
managers detailed in his district. While conducting a field audit in
Mindanao, petitioner's auditor, Sheela Torreja, found twenty (20) packs
of "Mamacare" samples in the baggage compartment of a company car
with an accompanying note with political overtones: "Even if I've lost
(sic) thank you so much for the support. Bidding you farewell for 36
years of public service. Will continue to help for the good of the city of
Zamboanga. Atty. Ricardo S. Baban, Jr." Atty. Ricardo S. Baban, Jr.,
referred to in the note, is respondent's father who had served as
councilor in Zamboanga City for thirty-six (36) years but lost in his bid
for the vice-mayoralty post in the May 11, 1998 elections. Apparently,
respondent's father was thanking supporters through distribution of
company sample products. The auditor reported the incident,
prompting the company's Medical Sales Director, Ferdinand Sarfati, to
issue a Memorandum requiring respondent to explain in writing within
seventy-two (72) hours from notice why he should not be terminated for
the infraction. Respondent admitted that he had caused the attachment
of the notes to the product samples. He argued that there was no
unauthorized distribution of the samples since he intended to give them
only to doctors who requested them. Respondent then received under
protest the company's memorandum dismissing him from employment.
Questioning the validity of his dismissal, respondent filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal.
Issue: WON Baban was illegally dismissed
Ruling: NO. It is clear that Article 282(c) of the Labor Code allows an
employer to terminate the services of an employee for loss of trust and
confidence. The right of employers to dismiss employees by reason of
loss of trust and confidence is well established in jurisprudence.
Respondent's act of stapling a thank you note from his father warrants
the loss of petitioner's trust and confidence. As the supervisor of fellow
medical representatives, he had the duty to set a good example to his
colleagues. A higher standard of confidence was reposed in him. There
is no doubt that respondent willfully breached the trust and confidence
reposed in him by not asking for permission before using company
property for his own or another's benefit, as required in the Company
Standards of Business Conduct. Moreover, when respondent failed to
turn over the samples left in his care and stapled the political "thank
you" note with the intention of distributing them to his father's
supporters, he had, in effect appropriated company property for
personal gain and benefit.
10. Nacar v. Gallery Frames
Facts: Nacar filed a complaint for Constructive Dismissal before the
NLRC against Gallery Frames. LA ruled in his favor and ordered he be
paind backawages and separation pay of P158, 919. 92. During
execution, he filed a Motion for Correct Computation praying that his
backwages be computed from the date of his dismissal on January 24,
1997 up to the finality of the Resolution of the Supreme Court on May
27, 2002. Further, petitioner posits that he is also entitled to the
payment of interest from the finality of the decision until full payment by
the respondents.
Issue: WON the petitioner is entitled to interest from the finality of the
decision until full payment by the respondents and at what rate.
Ruling: YES. the old case of Eastern Shipping Lines vs CA is already
modified by the promulgation of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Circular No. 799 Series of 2013 effective July 1, 2013, which lowered
the legal rate of interest from 12% to 6% per annum. However, with
regard to those judgments that have become final and executory prior
to July 1, 2013, said judgments shall not be disturbed and shall continue
to be implemented applying the rate of interest fixed therein. Nacar is
entitled to interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum of the total
monetary awards, computed from May 27, 2002 to June 30, 2013 and
six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until their full satisfaction.
11. Bani Rural Bank Inc. v. De Guzman
The respondents were employees of Bani Rural Bank, Inc. and ENOC
Theatre I and II who filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the
petitioners. The complaint was initially dismissed by the LA but the
NLRC reversed LAs decision. The NLRC, in its resolution dated March
17, 1995, ordered that respondents be reinstated with payment of
backwages from the time of their dismissal until their actual
reinstatement. Such decision has become final and executory.
Computation of backwages was referred to Labor Arbiter Gambito.
Petitioners appealed the computation of the backwages with the
NLRC. In a decision dated July 31, 1998, the NLRC modified the terms
of the March 17, 1995 resolution insofar as it clarified the phrase less
earnings elsewhere. The NLRC additionally awarded the payment of
separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement on account of the strained
relations between the parties.
As explained in the assailed Decision, what is controlling for
purposes of the backwages is the NLRC’s Resolution dated 17 March
1995 which decreed that private respondents are entitled to backwages
from the time of their dismissal (constructive) until their actual
reinstatement; and considering that the award of reinstatement was set
aside by the NLRC in its final and executory Decision dated 3 July 1998
which ordered the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement to
be computed up to the finality on 29 January 1999 of said Decision
dated 3 July 1998, then the computation of the backwages should also
end on said date, which is 29 January 1999.
Issue: Whether or not NLRC erred in ruling how the backwages are to
be computed.
Ruling: No. CA decision affirming NLRC ruling sustained.
The computation of backwages depends on the final awards
adjudged as a consequence of illegal dismissal.
First, when reinstatement is ordered, the general concept under
Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, computes the backwages
from the time of dismissal until the employees reinstatement. The
computation of backwages (and similar benefits considered part of the
backwages) can even continue beyond the decision of the labor arbiter
or NLRC and ends only when the employee is actually reinstated.
Second, when separation pay is ordered in lieu of reinstatement
(in the event that this aspect of the case is disputed) or reinstatement
is waived by the employee (in the event that the payment of separation
pay, in lieu, is not disputed), backwages is computed from the time of
dismissal until the finality of the decision ordering separation pay.
Third, when separation pay is ordered after the finality of the
decision ordering the reinstatement by reason of a supervening event
that makes the award of reinstatement no longer possible (as in the
case), backwages is computed from the time of dismissal until the
finality of the decision ordering separation pay.
As the records show, the contending parties did not dispute the
NLRC s order of separation pay that replaced the award of
reinstatement on the ground of the supervening event arising from the
newly-discovered strained relations between the parties. The parties
allowed the NLRC s July 31, 1998 decision to lapse into finality and
recognized, by their active participation in the second computation of
the awards, the validity and binding effect on them of the terms of the
July 31, 1998 decision.
Under these circumstances, while there was no express
modification on the period for computing backwages stated in the
dispositive portion of the July 31, 1998 decision of the NLRC, it is
nevertheless clear that the award of reinstatement under the March 17,
1995 resolution (to which the respondents backwages was initially
supposed to have been computed) was substituted by an award of
separation pay. As earlier stated, the awards of reinstatement and
separation pay are exclusive remedies; the change of awards (from
reinstatement to separation pay) under the NLRC s July 31, 1998 not
only modified the awards granted, but also changed the manner the
respondents backwages is to be computed. The respondents
backwages can no longer be computed up to the point of reinstatement
as there is no longer any award of reinstatement to speak of.
Thus, the computation of the respondents' backwages must be
from the time of the illegal dismissal from employment until the finality
of the decision ordering the payment of separation pay. It is only when
the NLRC rendered its July 31, 1998 decision ordering the payment of
separation pay (which both parties no longer questioned and which
thereafter became final) that the issue of the respondents' employment
with the petitioners was decided with finality, effectively terminating it.
The respondents' backwages, therefore, must be computed from the
time of their illegal dismissal until January 29, 1999, the date of finality
of the NLRC's July 31, 1998 Decision.
12. Villena v. Batangas II Electric
Facts: In 1978, Petitioner Concepcion Villena was hired by respondent
Batangas II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BATELEC II) as bookkeeper.
She was promoted as Finance Manager in 1985. In 1994, she was
demoted to the position of Auditor, which caused her to file a complaint
for constructive dismissal before the LA. After the case passed through
LA and NLRC, the CA ruled that Villena was illegally dismissed and she
was entitled among others to any other benefits pertaining to the
position of Finance Manager at the time she was removed therefrom
up to the date of her actual reinstatement. The case was remanded to
the NLRC for the computation of the total amount due.
Issues: (1) Is Villena entitled to the award of retirement pay? NO.
(2) Is Villena entitled to the award of representation, transportation, and
cellular phone usage allowances? YES.

RULING:
(1) NO. In order for her retirement pay claim to be considered, Villena’s
complaint should have contained substantial allegations which would
show that: (a) She had applied for the same, (b) Her application
squares with the requirements of entitlement under the terms of the
company’s retirement plan. However, based on the records, what she
sought for in her illegal dismissal complaint were the reliefs of
reinstatement, payment of salary differentials, all benefits and
allowances that she may have received as Finance Manager, attorney’s
fees, and damages (which does not include retirement pay). Verily, the
Court is not unaware of its rulings wherein it pronounced that retirement
pay and separation pay are not mutually exclusive (unless there is a
specific prohibition in the collective bargaining agreement or retirement
plan against the payment of both benefits); however, with Villena’s
entitlement to retirement pay not included as an issue in an illegal
dismissal case which had already been finally decided, it is quite absurd
for Villena to submit a "contemporaneous" claim for retirement pay on
the execution phase of these proceedings. In fine, the plea to include
retirement pay in the execution under the phrase "other benefits,"
cannot be granted.
(2) YES. It is clear from BATELEC II’s pleadings and submissions that
representation allowance, transportation allowance, and cellular phone
usage allowance are given to the Finance Manager/Department
Manager as part of their benefits, unlike the separate entitlement to
retirement pay which may be recovered only upon a meritorious
subsequent application when the employee decides to retire.
Consequently, these allowances ought to be included in the "other
benefits pertaining to the position of Finance Manager" to which Villena
is entitled to and which were awarded to her under the final and
executory CA Decision and NLRC Resolution. Hence, the claim of
Villena is granted.
13. Sangwoo Phils. v. SangWoo Philippines Employees Union
Facts: During the CBA between Sangwoo and its Union, the former
filed with the DOLE a letter – notice of temporary suspension of its
operation for 1 month due to lack of orders from its buyers. Negotiations
on the CBA, however, continued. Thereafter, the parties signed a
handwritten MOA stating among others the wages and benefits for the
next 2 years, and that in the event of a temporary shutdown, all
machineries and raw materials would not be taken out of the SPI
premises.
The temporary suspension was extended, thus, a complaint for
unfair labor practice, illegal closure and illegal dismissal was filed by
the members of the Union. The company offered separation benefits of
½ month pay for every year of service to each of its employees. 234
employees accepted the offer and executed quitclaims. However,
minority employees did not claim said checks and refused to execute
quitclaims
Issue: Whether or not the minority employees are entitled to separation
pay.
Ruling: No. The employer is generally required to give separation
benefits to its employees, unless the closure is due to serious business
losses. Article 298 of the Labor Code does not obligate an employer to
pay separation benefits when the closure is due to serious losses.
In this case, the LA, NLRC, and the CA all consistently found
that SPI indeed suffered from serious business losses which resulted
in its permanent shutdown and accordingly, held the company’s closure
to be valid. As such, SPI should not be directed to give financial
assistance amounting toP15,000.00 to each of the minority employees
based on the Formal Offer of Settlement. If at all, such formal offer
should be deemed only as a calculated move on SPIs part to further
minimize the expenses that it will be bound to incur should litigation
drag on, and not as an indication that it was still financially sustainable.
However, since SPEU chose not to accept, said offer did not ripen into
an enforceable obligation on the part of SPI from which financial
assistance could have been realized by the minority employees