People of the Philippines v.

Romeo Lintag
September 6, 2016
G.R. No. 219855 

Facts:

A buy-bust operation conducted by the PNP resulted in the arrest of Lintag and the
seizure of 2 plastic sachets containing a crystalline substance. The arresting officer
marked the seized goods after the arrest and had custody of the items until it was
handed over to SP02 Gonzales upon arrival at the police station. The items were
thereafter delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination which tested positive
for containing metamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Lintag was accused of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized under
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. He was convicted by the RTC on appeal the decision
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

The defense contends that as per the receiving stamp of the crime laboratory, the
request for the laboratory examination, and presumably the sachets of shabu, were
delivered by one SP03 Valdez not SP02 Gonzales.

Issue: Whether the chain of custody rule was complied with.

No. There is a gap in the recording of the authorized movement of the seized item; there
is a question of how P02 Valdez gained possession over the sachets. The prosecution
did not explain the gap either through testimonial or documentary evidence.

Thus, absent any adequate explanation on the matter, there arises a substantial gap in
the chain of custody of the plastic sachets seized from Lintag. Undoubtedly, this
compromises the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti of the crime
charged.

It is settled that in criminal prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the presentation of the
drugs which constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of proving
with moral certainty that they are the same seized items. Failing in which, the acquittal of
the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt becomes a matter of right, as in this
case.

The accused was acquitted.

Elmer “Tamer” Sindac v. People of the Philippines
September 6, 2016
GR No. 220732

Facts:

Police officers monitored the alleged illegal drug trade activites of Elmer Sindac. One
day, police officers followed Sindac and observed his meeting with Allan Canon along
the national road of Real, Quezon City inside their police mobile. Suspecting that the
transaction concerned illegal drugs, they approached the duo and introduced
themselves as police officers. Canon escaped but Sindac was apprehended. He was
frisked and in his wallet, a transparent plastic pack which contained 0.4 grams of shabu
was found.

Sindac was charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs, ·defined and penalized
under Section 11, Article II of RA 9I65. The trial court ruled that all the elements of the
offense were present, namely (a)that Sindac possessed a sachet of shabu; (b) that he
was not authorized by law to do so; and (c) that he freely and consciously possessed the
said drug. Sindac was convicted since the prosecution’s allegations that a warrantless
arrest in flagrante delicto was conducted which made the subsequent warrantless
seizure valid.

Sindac now appeals his conviction to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether there was a valid warrantless arrest justifying the warrantless seizure.

Ruling:

No, the warrantless arrest was illegal.

A warrant must be issued before a valid search. One of the recognized exceptions to the
need for a warrant before a search is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made- the process
cannot be reversed.

Warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected when there is (a) an arrest of a suspect in
flagrante delicto; (b) an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the
arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime
which had just been committed; and ( c) an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from
custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In the instant case, the Court finds that there could have been no lawful warrantless
arrest. Based on the records, the arresting officer admitted that he was about five (5) to
ten (10) meters away from Sindac when the latter allegedly handed a plastic sachet to
Canon. Considering that the officers were at a considerable distance away from the
alleged criminal transaction, not to mention the atomity or miniscule character of the
object thereof, the Court finds it highly doubtful that said arresting officer was able to
reasonably ascertain that any criminal activity was afoot so as to prompt him to conduct
a lawful in flagrante delicto arrest and, thereupon, a warrantless search.
The officers proceeded to apprehend Sindac solely on account of information retrieved
from previous surveillance operations conducted on Sindac' s alleged drug dealing
activities. But jurisprudence provides that "reliable information" alone - even if it was a
product of well-executed surveillance operations - is not sufficient to justify a warrantless
arrest.

The shabu obtained from Sindac is treated as inadmissible evidence. His conviction
must be reversed.
People of the Philippines v. Mercury Dela Cruz
September 7, 2016
G.R. No. 212171

In a buy-bust operation, Mercury Dela Cruz sold to P01 Reales a small sachet of shabu.
Upon consummation of the offense, the police officers rushed to the scene. Dela Cruz
yelled and resisted the arrest of the officers. Dela Cruz was able to run away. A neighbor
blocked the policemen from apprehending Dela Cruz and a crowd started to gather
around them. The police officers fired a warning shot and arrested the neighbor for
obstruction of justice to pacify the crowds.

On their way to the police station, P01 Reales handed the shabu to P03 Barbalonos.
They marked the seized item only when they arrived at the police station.

Dela Cruz was later apprehended through a warrant of arrest. He was found guilty of
illegal sale of shabu under Sections 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. All the
elements of the crime were proven, namely the ( 1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and its payment. Dela Cruz contends that she can not be convicted since the drugs
allegedly obtained from her were marked not at the place where she was apprehended
but at the police station; moreso, that there was no physical inventory made on the
seized item nor was it photographed.

Issue: Whether the absence of the marking or a physical inventory of the seized items at
the place of apprehension would immediately lead to the acquittal of the accused for
non-compliance with the chain of custody rule.

Ruling:

No. Non-compliance with the chain of custody rule is not fatal, provided it is shown by
the prosecution that the apprehending officers properly preserved the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drugs.

Although ideally the prosecution should offer a perfect chain of custody in the handling of
evidence, "substantial compliance with the legal requirements on the handling of the
seized item" is sufficient. This Court has consistently ruled that even if the arresting
officers failed to strictly comply with the requirements under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165,
such procedural lapse is not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in
evidence.

In the instant case, the failure to strictly comply with the requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 was satisfactorily explained by the apprehending officers. The arresting
officers alleged that the people who gathered around them were already aggressive
prompting them to decide to immediately proceed to the police station for their safety.

The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there is a
showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with. This was
not overcome by the defense.

Considering the foregoing, Dela Cruz’ conviction is affirmed.

People of the Philippines v. Darwin Gito
September 14, 2016
G.R. No. 199397

Facts:

AAA, 14 year old girl was sleeping beside her partner, Alexander Arabaca in the house
of AAA’s grandmother when she was awoken by Jonery Arabaca and Darwin Gito. She
tried to wake up Alexander, but he was passed out from drinking. AAA was pulled
outside the house and was pushed to the ground. She was raped by Jonery and
subsequently by Darwin, using a knife to threaten her while Darwin’s long fingernail
prickled her skin. After the bestial act, they fled. AAA went back to the room and woke
up Alexander. She told him what happened but Alexander did not believe her. She
eventually cried herself to sleep.

A criminal charge was thereafter filed. The credibility of the victim’s testimony was
questioned on the ground that AAA had a grudge against Darwin. In addition, Alexander
testified that on the night of the purported crime AAA was sound asleep beside him.
Moreso, he testified that a love letter of AAA to Jonery was presented to him and that it
was in AAA’s handwriting.

Alibi and denial were also raised by the defense. In addition to the foregoing, they raise
the incredulities of AAA’s statements such as 1. failure of AAA to shout for help, 2.failure
of Alexander to wake up to rush to her aid, and 3. the fact that AAA’s relatives noticed
nothing that night despite the fact that it was committed near their house.

Issue: Whether the Darwin Gito and Jonery Arabaca could be convicted for rape.

Ruling:

Yes, they must be convicted for the rape.

Where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, the findings of
the trial court are not to be disturbed unless the consideration of certain facts of
substance and value, which have been plainly overlooked, might affect the result of the
case. There is no need to overturn this doctrine in this case since the victim’s
testimonies were categorical and positive, moreso it coincided with the physical and
other testimonial evidence.

The sweetheart theory can no longer be given credence. Being sweethearts does not
negate the commission of rape because such fact does not give appellant license to
have sexual intercourse against her will, and will not exonerate him from the criminal
charge of rape. Being sweethearts does not prove consent to the sexual act.

The alleged inconsistencies of AAA’s statements were explained fully. The threat to her
life through the use of the knife prevented her from shouting for help. The state of
intoxication of Alexander prevented him from waking up upon AAA’s call for help. Lastly,
lust is not a respecter of time nor place. Rape may even be committed in the same room
family members slept.
Conspiracy was present since there was intentional participation and a community of
design to perform the unlawful act inferred from the acts of the accused.

Accused is convicted of Rape.

People v. Beverly Villanueva
September 30, 2016
G.R. No. 210798

Facts:

AAA ran away from home learning that she was adopted and being scolded by her
mother. Friends of AAA informed the mother that she was working in On Tap Videoke
Bar as a G.R.O.; The mother enlisted the help of the TV program “XXX” to regain
custody of AAA. The operation was conducted and AAA was retrieved. Five employees
and the accused in this case were apprehended.

Accused was charged by the prosecutor with the violation of Section 6 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act for she recruited and exploited
AAA, a 13-year old minor, to work as a GRO in her bar by taking advantage of her
vulnerability as a child, instead of a criminal charge for the violation of Special Protection
of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act (RA 7610).

AAA was committed to the DSWD, where she later absconded and therefore her
testimony was not taken. Witnesses testified that AAA was not a G.R.O. but was merely
permitted to stay in the Videoke bar after she ran away from home and that she would
usually stay in the back washing glasses. These witnesses were the employees and the
brother of the accused.

The RTC convicted the accused and the CA concurred.

Issue: Whether the accused could be convicted for Qualified Trafficking in Persons.

Ruling:

No. She must be acquitted.

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation shall still be considered "trafficking in persons" even if it does not involve any
of the means set forth in the first paragraph of Sec. 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208.

The elements of trafficking in persons are:

1. The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer,

maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders”

2. The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of
the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person;" and

3. purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other

forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or
sale of organs."
The first element is not complied with. The prosecution alleges that Villanueva, must
have necessarily committed the aforementioned acts since she is the registered owner
of the establishment. The argument is not impressed with merit. Recruiting, harboring, or
maintaining a person for the purpose of exploitation are acts performed by persons who
may or may not be registered owners of establishments. Prosecution must have alleged
or proven specific acts which made the accused liable for the crime.

The third element of the offense was also not proven. Exploitation could not be deduced
from the mere presence of AAA in the Videoke bar. It was the first time the prosecution
witnesses saw AAA in the bar and no evidence as to the nature of her job was
presented.

The circumstantial evidence presented in this case do not constitute a violation of the
law for trafficking in persons. That AAA wore skimpy clothes similar to the GROs could
be explained by the fact that she borrowed these clothes from the women in the bar
since she ran away from home.

The court applied the maxim, “it is he who asserts and not he who denies who must
prove” to acquit the accused.
People of the Philippines v. Esmael Zacarias
October 6, 2016
G.R. No. 214238

Facts:

Acting as poseurs-buyers, police officers conducted a buy-bust operation against

Zacarias Upon showing the money, Zacarias gave the officers a sachet of shabu. The
policemen immediately called for their back up, Zacarias was able to hail a taxi, but was
later on apprehended. He was arrested and in his possession, another sachet of shabu
was found.

In the trial of the crime, Zacarias alleged that there are inconsistencies in some of the
statements of the apprehending police officers. In addition, there was no immediate
inventory made, no laboratory testing nor photographs taken in the presence of
Zacarias.The following were only conducted two days after the arrest.

Issue: Whether the inconsitencies in their statements and the failure to comply with the
required procedure deviate substantially from the requirement under Section 21 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act so as to justify the acquittal of the accused.

Ruling:

No.

The conduct of the inventory, laboratory testing and the photograph taking was done
beyond 24 hours from arrest only because the operation was carried out on a day
preceding Saturday and Sunday. As such no DOJ representative could be met. The
arresting officers failed to strictly comply with Section 21 however the seized items were
marked and kept to preserve their integrity before their inventory. There is nothing to
indicate that the seized items were tampered with.

The accused should be charged with Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs.

As correctly held by the lower courts, the elements of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 or sale of illegal drugs: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it, are present.
Also, the prosecution adequately established the existence of all the elements of the
offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of the same
Act, to wit: ( 1) the accused is in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or
regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely
and consciously possessed the said drug.
People of the Philippines v. Menardo Bombasi
GR No. 211608
September 7, 2016

Facts:

Bombasi was convicted of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165
or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

In a buy-bust operation, Bombasi in consideration of money gave the police officer

poseur-byuer 1 sachet of shabu.

During trial, the testifying arresting officer stated that she marked the drug sachet with
the initials - “M. B.”. However the sachet of drugs presented in court was marked “MB.
B.”. It was not presented to the witness for identification.

Issue: Was the corpus delicti sufficiently established.

Ruling:

No.

The drugs presented in court was the very drug subjected to laboratory testing which
gave positive results for shabu. Explanation was not given as to the discrepancy in the
markings.

In drugs cases it is important that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the
suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit.

The accused was acquitted.

People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo Abayon
GR No. 204891
September 14, 2016

Facts:

Abayon quarreled with his wife who was berating him outside their rented residence. He
was pacified by his neighbors. His wife and children were were invited to stay at the
neighbor’s apartment unit within the same building.

He bought matches from the store and categorically stated that he was to burn
something to the vendor. A witness positively identified that Abayon leaked gas from an
LPG tank outside his family’s apartment unit and that he was carrying matches and an
unlit cigarrette.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Abayon of Arson with Homicide. The CA upheld the
conviction.

Issue: Whether a crime of Arson with Homicide exists.

Ruling:

There is no complex crime of arson with homicide because the crime of arson
absorbs the resultant death or is a separate crime altogether.

Abayon is charged with the crime of arson because his intent was merely to destroy his
family's apartment through the use of fire. The resulting deaths that occurred, therefore,
should be absorbed by the crime of arson and only increases the imposable penalty to
reclusion perpetua to death, pursuant to Section 5 of P.D. No. 1613.
People of the Philippines v. Ronnie Librias
GR No. 208067
September 14, 2016

Facts:

Librias was lighting a candle near a church when he met the victim AAA. They flirted with
each other in the Plaza. Librias hailed a taxi and they went to Hidden Lounge hotel
where they had carnal relations. When Librias woke up he was shocked when AAA
asked him for money. AAA left.

Days later, barangay tanods arrested Librias based on a complaint filed by AAA that
Librias forcibly abducted her from Mandaue Plaza and raped her.

The RTC found Librias guilty of the crime of forcible abduction with rape.

Issue: Whether the conviction for forcible abduction with rape must be upheld.

Ruling:

No.

The testimony of the accused was not credible enough to establish moral certainty that
the crime occured.

First, the forcible taking of AAA by the accused while in Mandaue Plaza is unlikely since
it was an open space and absent any proof that a weapon was used to coerce her to
accede, such testimony cannot be appreciated.She could have shouted or ran, or asked
for help considereing the plaza was not deserted.

The equipoise doctrine applied in this circumstance shows that AAA went with Librias
because she wanted to go with him.

Second, she did not ask help from the taxi driver. She lied about being tied up while
being coerced to ride the taxi.

Third, she testified that she was raped while her legs were pinned down. The court
considers this position highly unlikely to produce the act since the woman’s legs would
have been restrained from opening.

In this instance the court finds it appropriate to disturb the findings of the lower court and
acquit the accused.
People of the Philippines v. Edmund Balauitan
GR No. 218891
September 19, 2016

Facts:

Pursuant to a valid search warrant, the police assisted by the local barangay officials
conducted a search in Edmund Balauitan’s home. Balauitan was not home at the time,
but the police presenting his daughter with the warrant, searched his room where they
found 3 plastic sachets of drugs. The daughter was not allowed inside the accused’s
room but was interrogated in the living quarters while search was effected; neither did
the barangay officials witnessed the search because they were outside the accused’s
residence.

Balauitan was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, for violating Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 5 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002." The RTC believed that Balauitan had constructive possession of the
shabu which was under his exclusive dominion and control. Further, the presumption of
regularity must applywhen there is lack of proof to show otherwise.

Issue: Whether there was a lawful search.

Ruling:

Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and
seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree.

The law provides that no search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made
except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in
the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the
same locality.

Under this provision, a search under the strength of a warrant is required to be

witnessed by the lawful occupant of the premises sought to be searched. It must be
stressed that it is only upon their absence that their presence may be replaced by two
(2) persons of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.

In the instant case, the search was effected without the presence of the accused, neither
did they comply with the rules governing situations in the absence of the person upon
whom search will be effected.

He must be acquitted.
People of the Philippines v. Jester Mabunot
GR No. 60459
September 19, 2016

Facts:

One morning in Butigue National High School, Paracelis, Mountain Province, a group of
high school students were sewing when Mabunot, under the influence of alcohol arrived.
He traded punches with some of the students and later on boxed Shiva Baguiwat, 14
years old, the victim in this case. Her rib was fractured and she lost her consciousness.

The petitioner was convicted of violation of Section 10( a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, a
special law.

Mabunot argues that his act was not intentional or deliberate. Mabunot was trading
punches with the other students and therefore he could not have adopted the design or
plan to injure Shiva. In addition, he raises the issue that RA 7610 should only be applied
in cases not covered by the Revised Penal Code.

Issue:
Whether the character of the act as intentional or not affects the conviction of the
accused.

Whether RA 7610 should not apply when the crime constitutes physical injuries in the
RPC.

Ruling:

Intention is material.

While the general rule is that offenses against special laws do not factor in intent, acts
which are inherently immoral are still mala in se despite being punished under a special
law.

The petitioner was convicted of violation of Section 10( a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, a
special law. However, physical abuse of a child is inherently wrong, rendering material
the existence of a criminal intent on the part of the offender.

Intention is not wanting in this case. He swung his arm, clearly with the intention of
harming another person. Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

The second argument does not convince.

The RPC punishes physical injuries in general, whereas RA 7610 was intended to
specially protect children from physical or psychological child abuse. Being a child, she
is under the protective mantle of R.A. No. 7610, which punishes maltreatment of a child,
whether the same be habitual or not.
People of the Philippines v. Leonardo Roco
GR No. 205200
September 21, 2006

Facts:

AAA, a 13 year old child was at school for a dance rehearsal. Her godfather and piano
instructor, Leonardo Roco, fetched her in the guise of having a pictorial. She was
brought to a motel and forced to strip. She was forced to have sex with the accused.

Leonardo Cruz was convicted of Rape under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code.

Roco questions on appeal the conviction of rape since during the witness testimonies,
AAA did not categorically state that the victim knew or saw his penis penetrate the
accused’s organ. In addition to the claim that her testimonies were unbelievable and
insufficient specifically since there were testimonies that 1.) there were no classes on
date of the Rape, 2.) No reported incident requiring police investigation on th date was
known by the officer of the motel and 3.) healed lacerations contradict finding of rape.

Issue: Whether the testimonies of AAA is sufficient to establish the allegation of Rape.

Ruling:

Yes. The testimonies of AAA is sufficient.

Although she did not know or categorically state whether it was the penis which
penetrated her, her subsequent testimony that the accused was on top of her, his organ
being directly in front of where her organ is, leads to the rational conclusion that it was
the penis that penetrated her.

The testimonies presented by the defense are not inconsistent with the testimonies of
AAA. School can be suspended, but a rehearsal may continue. Lack of knowledge of
any case needing a police report, does not essentially equate to the fact that AAA was
raped.

The conviction of Cruz must be affirmed and the appeal should be dismissed.
People of the Philippines v. Renato Pangan
GR No. 193837
September 21, 2016

Facts:

The victim was last seen with Pangan by a witness. Three days later, the decomposing
body of Pangan was found in his home. In the possession of the accused was the
victim’s Nokia 3310 cellphone.

Pangan was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide because of the circumstantial evidence.

Relying on the presumption of law that a person found in possession of a thing taken in
the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act, the appellate
court affirmed judgment.

Issue: Whether the circumstantial evdence justifies conviction.

Ruling:

No. For circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, the following are the guidelines:
(1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is as such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In criminal cases, presumptions should be taken with caution especially in light of

serious concerns that they might water down the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. As special considerations must be given to the right of the accused to
be presumed innocent, there should be limits on the use of presumptions against an
accused.

Pangan must be acquitted because the possession of the cellphone does not
conclusively prove that his intention was to rob and that the killing was done on the
occassion of the robbery.
People of the Philippines v. Belban Sic-Open
G.R. No. 211680
September 21, 2016

Facts:

A buy-bust operation was planned and subsequently executed, when an informant-

middleman who wishes to change his life, went to the police station and reported Belban
Sic-Open as a notorious marijuana seller.

During the buy-bust operation in Kibungan, Benguet, Sic-Open sold 15 blocks of

Marijuana to the police officers. The officers marked the items there and then. Only a
preliminary inventory was made in the place since it was dark and the officers feared for
their safety. A full inventory and taking of photographs was done in the police station
with the attendance of the accused, special prosecutor, a representative from the media
and a local barangay official.

Belban Sic-open was charged with the illegal sale of drugs, a violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.

Sic-open questions the lapses of procedure since inventory should be made by the
officers where the crime was committed.

Issue: Whether the chain of custody was broken.

Ruling:

No. As long as the integrity and evidentiary value of an illegal drug were not
compromised, non-compliance with R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR may be excused.

For a successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, 11

Article II of R.A. 9165, the following elements must be satisfied: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-
buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money consummate the illegal
transaction. All of which were proven during trial.
People of the Philippines v. Efren Leynes
GR No. 224804
September 21, 2016

Facts:

A violation of Section 94, R.A. No. 8550 otherwise known as the "Philippine Fisheries
Code of 1998" was filed against petitioner Efren R. Leynes for cutting mangrove trees
and for excavating, constructing a dike, and installing an outlet in the mangrove forest
without a fishpond lease agreement.

Leynes argues that he did not convert the forest since it was already a fishpond from the
time he was a child when his grandfather owned it. He argues that his acts merely
rehabilitated and improved the forests.

In addition he claims that a Certificate of Non-Coverage was issued to him by the DENR
and that the tax declarations he has shows ownership over the property.

Issue: Whether there was conversion of the mangrove forest to justify the conviction of
the accused.

Ruling:

His acts are tantamount to a conversion. Efren’s acts altered the natural structure of the
mangrove forest. Despite having knowledge that the same is a mangrove area, he
continued his use of the same and introduced improvements.

The Certificate of Non-Coverage does not amount to a fishpond license agreement nor
an exemption from the compliance with applicable environmental laws.

The tax declarations are not taken to prove his innocence since it is undisputed that the
lands are not classified as alienable and disposable.

The accused’s conviction is affirmed.

People of the Philippines v. Ruel Tuano
GR No. 205871
September 28, 2016

Tuano was charged with violation of Article II, Section 11(3) of Republic Act No. 9165.

As in Civil Actions, death of the defendant must be reported by defendant’s counsel to

the court within 30 days therefrom.

Considering accused's death pending appeal extinguishes his criminal liability and civil
liability ex delicto, the criminal action must be dismissed since there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused.
People of the Philippines v. Rodrigo Rusco
GR No. 212157
September 28, 2016

Facts:

While grazing her brother’s carabao, AAA was boxed in the chest. She lost
consciousness and she woke up already undressed with Rusco, on top of her. She felt
pain in her vagina.

Rusco was convicted of Rape under Article 266-A of the RPC.

During trial, AAA made several inconsistent statements such as she did not know who
boxed her, when she woke up Rusco was beside him, and that pain in the vagina does
not constitute rape.

Moreover, the medical findings do not conclusively prove rape since lacerations could
have been obtained through other sexual acts.

Issue: Whether the inconsistencies in AAA’s statements warrant dismissal of the case.

Ruling:

No.

The crime of rape is usually unwitnessed and therefore the testimony of the victim is of
great importance. If a victim's testimony is straightforward, convincing and consistent
with human nature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or
significant inconsistency, it passes the test of credibility and the accused may be
convicted solely on the basis thereof.

In the case at bar the trivial and immaterial inconsistencies in AAA’s statements do not
warrant dismissal of the case. The victim is not expected to remember every detail of the
painful and traumatic ordeal.

The prosecution has proved that the unbroken chain of the established circumstances
led to no other logical conclusion except the guilt of Rusco.

The evidence for the prosecution has successfully established that first, AAA positively
identified that appellant was the one who boxed her on the chest; second, appellant was
the last person whom AAA saw before she fell unconscious; third, when she regained
consciousness, AAA found herself naked from waist down; and fourth, the medical
findings support sexual assault. These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain of
events which inevitably points to appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.
The Medical Examination is not material for purposes of proving rape, but it is merely
corroborative, it can be dispensed of.

Jerwin Dorado v. People of the Philippines

GR No. 216671
October 3, 2016

Facts:

Dorado, a 16 year old minor, Ramos and Confessor were found guilty of the crime of
Frustrated Murder (qualified by evident premeditation) and violation of RA 7610, or the
Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.

Dorado’s group of friends attacked the victim, Ronald and his friends. Throwing bottles
and stones, the altercation escalated and forced Ronald’s group to retreat. Ronald went
out from hiding and was hit by Dorado with a sumpak in the forehead. He was
hospitalized and operated on, he lost vision in one eye. The doctors testified that the
injuries sustained by Roland was life-threatening.

The case was filed 2 years before the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act took effect.

Issue: Whether a CICL’s discernment can be presumed.

Whether evident premeditation qualified the frustrated murder
charge.

R.A. 9344 should be given a retroactive effect in this case since it is favorable to the
accused.

Unlike intent, discernment could not be presumed from the acts of a minor person. It
must be proven by the prosecution through evidence. In the case at bar, there was no
effort to prove that Dorado had the mental capacity to know what is right from wrong.

Being above 15 but below 18 years of age, not having acted with discernment since no
proof of such fact was given, he is exempted from criminal liability.

In addition, the prosecution was unable to establish the element of evident premeditation
to qualify the crime to frustrated murder. A charge for merely for frustrated homicide was
proper.

For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following must be proven beyond

reasonable doubt: ( 1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2)
an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient
lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
circumstances of his act.

In the case at bar, the fact that Dorado was seen with a sumpak at the commencement
of the attack does not establish that he earlier devised a deliberate plot to murder
Ronald. Moreso, as the lapse of time between the determination until the execution of
the unlawful deed was unclear, it cannot be established that Dorado had sufficient time
to reflect on his actions.

In view of the foregoing Dorado is exempted from criminal liability.

People of the Philippines v. Charito Fenrandez, Eddie Olazo, Miguel Corbis, Eddie
Fernandez Dionesia Lasconia and Rogelio Lasconia
October 3, 2016
G.R. No. 220761

Facts:

Charito and his cohorts hatched a plan to steal from and to kill the master of Dionesia
Lasconia, a househelp. On two separate days they tried, but failed to execute their
crime. At the first meeting Charito was not present, but in the second meeting he
attended the planning. On the third attempt, through Dionesia’s act of opening the
spouses Vallecera’s gates, the accused Eddie Fernandez, Corbis and Lasconia entered
the house, hogtied the spouses (and Dionesia) and through intimidation stole cash and
jewelry from the spouses.

Later on, Erlinda Vallecera was taken to the comfort room and the accused slashed her
neck. Not contented, Lasconia went in the CR and stabbed Erlinda in the neck several
times.

Charito Fernandez and his cohorts were charged with the crime of Robbery with
Homicide. Due to lack of evidence implicating the accused Corbis and Olazo, they were
acquitted by the Court of Appeals.

Charito, having participated in the planning of the crime, accompanying them in their
hasty getaway and providing payment to the getaway vehicle with a corresponding
threat to their driver if he would “squeal”, was found by the CA to be complicit in the
crime.

Charito appeals his conviction.

Issues:
(1)Whether Charito is criminally liable despite the marked difference in his participation
in committing the crime;
(2) Whether evident premeditation can be appreciated in the crime of Robbery with
Homicide.

Ruling:

Yes, Charito is criminally liable for Robbery with Homicide.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct evidence is not indispensable in
proving conspiracy as its existence may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during, and after the commission of the crime.

Article 294( 1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, imposes the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death when by reason or on occasion of the crime of Robbery with
violence against or intimidation of persons, the crime of Homicide is committed.

The imposable penalty fo Robbery with Homicide consists of two (2) indivisible penalties
(i.e., death and reclusion perpetua), Article 63 of the RPC therefore finds application. It
provides that the following rules:

1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.

2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances

in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

Evident premeditation is inherent in Robbery. In the case at bar however, evident

premeditation was appreciated with regard to the Homicide that attended the Robbery.
The theree different attempts of the accused to commit the crime was a result of
"meditation, calculation, reflection, or persistent attempt". In addition, the Supreme Court
appreciated the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength.

Applying the rules the penalty to be imposed is death, but in view of 9346, reclusion
perpetua will be imposed in lieu thereof.
Rustia v. People of the Philippines
October 5, 2016
G.R. No. 208351

Facts:
Benjamin Rustia Jr. And his father and Faustino Rustia went to the Barangay Captain’s
office to settle a land dispute with the victim Ambrosio Cristin. The Barangay Captain
was not present. An altercation ensued, invectives were uttered and as Ambrosio drew
his gun, the Rustia’s grappled with him and brought him down. They got hold of his
weapon and shot the victim despite his pleas.

Accused Rustia Jr. is found guilty of the crime of murder qualified by treachery by the
RTC while his father and Faustino were found guilty as accomplices. Defense appealed
the case arguing self-defense and that treachery was not properly appreciated.

Issue: Whether treachery can be appreciated merely because the victim was unable to
defend himself.

Ruling:

No.

In a criminal prosecution for murder qualified by the attendant circumstance of treachery,

the means, method, or form of the attack must be shown to have been consciously and
deliberately adopted by the offender before the same can be considered to qualify the
killing. Otherwise, the killing amounts only to homicide.

In the instant, the crime committed in the heat of the moment, the subsequent advantage
that the Rustias had over the victim occured by pure happenstance and not by deliberate
adoption of such means. It was not the Rustia’s who brought a gun to the meeting
revealing that they had no plans to employ such method of attack.

Self-defense must fail. The mere drawing of a gun is not an actual or immediately
impending injury constituting unlawful aggression. Its absence will not allow the accused
to avail of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense.

The accomplices are acquitted of the crime. The cooperation that the law punishes is the
assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered that cannot exist without previous
cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. In the instant case, they could
not have known the criminal design of Benjamin since it happened in the heat of the
moment, the act lacking any preconceived plan.

Benjamin is guilty of Homicide.

Avelino Angeles v. People of the Philippines
GR No. 212562
October 12, 2016

Facts:

Jacqueline and her househelper Sheryl were in a videoke session with friends. The
accused and Jacqueline were acquaintances, kissing, flirting, drinking and dancing with
each other. Jacqueline asked the accused if he can make her happy that night.
Jacqueline removed her bra while dancing. She invited the accused to her home, but he
refused.

The victim and her maid Sheryl went home. Jacqueline slept in her bed wearing only a
towel. In the middle of the night she awoke only to see the accused inside her room.
Jacqueline insists that he was mounting her and sucking on her breasts while Angeles
maintains that he merely lied beside her. Surprised, she left the room berating the
accused. Angeles repeatedly apologized and maintained that he interpreted her actions
in a different way.

Avelino Angeles was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Acts of

Lasciviousness penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.

Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness.

Ruling:

The accused must be acquitted for failure to establish the Acts of Lasciviousness
committed.

To secure a conviction, the confluence of the following elements must be established by

the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt: ( 1) that the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; and (2) that it is done under any of the following
circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation; (b) when the offended woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) when the offended party is under
twelve (12) years of age.

On the first element, the prosecution failed to show that nay act of lewdness was
committed. The equipoise doctrine was applied since merely conflicting testimonies were
presented, evidence being of equal weight the scales of justice must be tilted to favor the
accused.

The doctrine in Rape cases that "the lone uncorroborated testimony of the offended
victim, so long as the testimony is clear, positive, and probable, niay prove the crime as
charged." should not apply in cases where there is another person who could shed light
on the incident. The doctrine applies in Rape cases mainly because without it it would be
nearly impossible to convict anyone charged with Rape. Rape being a crime committed
in the presence of only two persons- the victim and the perpetrator.

Moreso, lewdness is criminal only according to the circumstances. In this case the
previous amorous advances and the invitation to sexual tryst, would not produce in the
mind of Alvarez that his acts are illegal. That accused did not wake her up is of no
consequence. Different preliminaries for sexual intercourse are recognized and are not
contrary to human experience. Upon waking and immediate revocation of the invitation,
Alvarez even apoloogized for his mistake.

Alvarez was acquitted.

Yolanda Luy v. People of the Philippines
October 12, 2016
GR No. 200087

Facts:

Yolanda tried to smuggle shabu inside a jail facility to her detained husband by hiding it
in a plastic jar filled with strawberry juice and cracked ice. A lady guard suspicious of the
container asked her to transfer its contents, to which the accused refused to do. The
arresting officer immediately upon finding the sachets reported her to the jail warden.
She marked the csachets with her initials and upon order of the jail warden caused the
laboratory examination of the confiscated items.

The accused was found guilty of illegal possession of transparent plastic sachets of
shabu.

The accused contends that the requirement under Section 21 of R.A. 9165 was not
complied with since the packets of shabu were not satisfactorily proved to be the same
ones taken from her, that despite being the alleged officer who delivered these to the
crime laboratory the officer failed to mention the person who received it and that no
inventory nor pictures were taken at the point of arrest.

Issue: Whether the Chain of Custody Rule has been complied with.

Ruling:

Yes, the requirement was complied with. The court gives credence to the findings of the
trial court.

Illegal possession of drugs is committed when ( 1) the accused is in possession of an

item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (2) her possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) she freely and consciously possessed the drug. All of which attend this case.

On the issue of the non-compliance with the Chain of Custody Rule, the accused has
bound herself with her statements. Apparently, during cross-examination the following
facts were obtained: after she had been arrested in flagrante delicto, she admitted that
she indeed possessed the illegal articles but merely because a friend, Melda asked her
to give it to her husband in the facility as well. Her animus possidendi - constitutes the
crime. Her admission renders her defense inconsequential and irrelevant.

The error of the lower court was in the imposition of a straight penalty of 12 years and 1
day and mandating subsidiary imprisonment for the fine of P300 000.

As prescribed by Section 11(3), R.A. No. 9165 the correct penalty was an indeterminate
sentence whose minimum should not be less than the minimum of 12 years and one day
and whose maximum should not exceed the maximum of 20 years. To comply with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law the penalty should be 12 years and one day, as minimum,
to 14 years, as maximum.

In addition, subsidiary imprisonment cannot be imposed on the petitioner because her

principal penalty, was higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years.

Mariano Lim v. People of the Philippines

GR No. 211977
October 12, 2016

Facts:

Heavy equipment namely a Komatsu Road Grader was allegedly stolen by Pedro
Banosing from an ongoing road improvement project in Cotabato. The same was
reported to be found at Basco Metal Supply under its proprietor Mariano Lim. Lim
countered that Banosing sold the same to him and executed a duly accomplished
Affidavit of Ownership.

Lim was found guilty of violating Presidential Decree No. 1612 (PD 1612), otherwise
known as the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979.

Lim assails the decision. He avers that fencing cannot be committed because theft has
not been proven in court as the criminal is still at large and that the ownership of the
Komatsu Road Grader has not been established.

Issue: Whether Lim was liable for violation of PD 1612.

He is not liable for fencing.

The following are the essential elements of the crime of fencing:

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or
anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;
and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.

While the lower courts correctly ruled that conviction of the principal in the crime of theft
is not necessary for an accused to be found guilty of the crime of fencing, the
prosecution has not proved the DPWH’s ownership of the Komatsu Grader. The DPWH,
a government agency, should have a database of all equipments and materials it uses,
but such information was not sufficiently alleged by the prosecution. Moreso, the
allegation of theft is at most hearsay since it was based merely on the testimony of the
district engineer.

Even arguing that theft was committed, the third element is not present. The lower courts
argue that Lim should not have relied on the Affidavit of Ownership since it was self-
serving; but the trial courts failed to consider that the document, being duly notarized,
enjoys a presumption of regularity and can only be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence.
The lower courts argue that in compliance with Section 6 of PD 1612, the accused
should have checked the clearance or permit from the police since he was dealing with
an unlicensed dealer or supplier. The SC said that such requirement was not necessary
since 1. he is not in the business of buy and sell and 2. he did not offer to sell it to the
public.
People of the Philippines v. Tess Valeriano
G.R. No 199480
October 12, 2016

Facts:

Valeriano is charged with the violation of Section 255, in relation to Section 253(d) and
Section 256, of the 1997 NIRC. The Assitant City Prosecutor failed to present that
certification that the filing of the criminal cases was with the consent of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and not merely a Regional Director in compliance
with the 1997 NIRC. The failure to obey led to the dismissal of the cases.

Issue: Whether certification from the Commissioner is required before criminal cases
regarding violations of the NIRC may proceed.

Ruling:

No. The determination of the validity of the criminal complaint by the Regional Director is
sufficient.

The approval of filing of a criminal action is a delegable function of the Commissioner.

As previously stated, the petitioner had earlier submitted a written recommendation from
the Regional Director to file the instant case against Valeriano. Therefore, the
recommendation of the RD to file the instant case constitutes compliance with the
requirement under Section 220 of the 1997 NIRC.
People of the Philippines v. Ariel Layag
GR No. 214875
October 17, 2016

Facts:

The accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one ( 1) count of Qualified
Rape by Sexual Intercourse, two (2) counts of Qualified Rape by Sexual Assault, and
one ( 1) count of Acts of Lasciviousness. He died prior to the promulgation or finality of
the final judgment.

Issue: Whether death extinguished criminal and civil liability.

Ruling:

Upon Layag's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that Layag's civil
liability in connection with his acts against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources
other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action against the estate
of Layag, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.
People of the Philippines v. Placido Goco
GR No. 219584
October 17, 2016

Facts:

A buy-bust operation was conducted upon an informant’s tip. Goco handed P02 Emano,
as poseur-buyer sachets of a white crystalline substance. The officers arrested Goco
and he was turned over to the PDEA investigators. The specimens recovered were not
marked and merely submitted to the investigators. The unidentified persons caused the
laboratory examination which resulted positive for shabu.

Goco was convicted of the violation of RA 9165, particularly for sale and possession of
dangerous drugs respectively. He appeals his conviction on the ground that the
prosecution failed to adduce that the drugs presented in court is the same as that seized
from him.

Issue: Whether the chain of custody rule was complied with.

Ruling:

No. Article 21 has not been complied with.

In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, the prosecution must establish the following: (a) the identities of the buyer, seller,
object, and consideration; and ( b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it.
What remains material for conviction is proof that the transaction took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. On the other hand, in order to convict
an accused for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove that:
(a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a dangerous drug;
( b) such possession was not authorized by law; and ( c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug.

In both instances the corpus delicti, the very drugs possessed or sold, must be
presented to the court through strict compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 to justify
conviction .

Prosecution failed to show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
were preserved. Neither was the police officers' non-compliance with Section 21 of RA
9165 shown to be justified. Resultantly, the integrity and identity of the items purportedly
seized from Goco are put into question.

Goco should be acquitted.

Helen Edith Lee Tan et. al v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 218902
October 17, 2016

Facts:

The municipality of Maasin, IloIlo City through the municipal mayor and sanggunian
officers of Maasin, particularly Mondejar, passed resolutions requesting Tan, as the
proprietor of International Builders Corporation (IBC) to rechannel Tigum River, the latter
having the necessary equipment to undertake the task. However not long after, criminal
cases for falsification were commenced on the ground that resolutions were not passed
in accordance with the prescribed procedure and that the minutes of the session wherein
said resolutions were passed were merely forged in order for Tan to engage in a MoA
with the Municipality.

They are found guilty for the violation of Section 3( e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,
as amended. Each of them was meted with the penalty of imprisonment of six ( 6) years
and one ( 1) month, as minimum, to 10 years, as maximum, as well as perpetual
disqualification to hold public office.

Issue: Whether Tan, a private individual, violated RA 3019.

Ruling:

She should not be convicted of the crime.

The elements of a violation of Section 3e of the Act are: (1) the accused must be a
public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) that the accused
must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and (3) the action of the accused caused undue injury to any party, including
the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of the functions of the accused.

There is no question as to the first element. The doctrine of Imputed Liability shall be
applied to convict persons who are not similarly situated with the principal offender.
Private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if
found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 ofR.A. 3019, including
(e) thereof.

For the conspiracy to be proven however, it must be founded upon facts and not mere
inferences or presumptions. In this case, the Tan admitted that she signed the MoA on a
date consistent with the resolutions authorizing IBC to enter into contracts with the
Municipality.

The prosecution failed to prove conspiracy. Particularly they failed to show that petitioner
Tan (1) has knowledge that Resolution No. 30-B was a product of a falsified document,
i.e., Minutes of the Regular Session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin, Iloilo City,
and that Mondejar has no authority to enter into a MOA with her; and that (2) despite
knowledge thereof, still entered into a MOA with Mondejar.

Since petitioner Tan's conviction was based on the presence of conspiracy, which the
prosecution was not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt, her conviction of the
offense charged must be reversed.
People of the Philippines v. Aurelio Guillergan
G.R. No. 218592
October 19, 2016

Facts: PDEA officers along with members of the media and Brgy. Captain, on the
strength of a search warrant proceeded to search Aurelio Guillergan’s home. They found
a bottle containing 39 plastic sachets of shabu and four sachets of shabu wrapped in
aluminum foil. They laid them in the table in the living room and conducted an inventory.
The seized articles were given to SP04 Gafate of the PDEA who kept it in the office for
safekeeping. No photographs were taken of the items seized.

The next day, in the presence of police officer Capasao, they marked the exhibits.

They then presented it to the Iloilo City Prosecution Office where they conducted another
inventory of the items. The barangay officials, media representative, and Guillergan all
signed the inventory document. The seized items were also photographed in said office.
The seized items were returned to the PDEA.

After the inventory in the prosecutor’s office, the laboratory test was conducted which
confirmed that the subtance inside the sachets was shabu.

Accused in this case contends that there were procedural deviations from the mandatory
requirements of Article 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Issue: Whether slight deviations from the procedural requirement warrants dismissal of
the case.

Ruling:

No. The same provision contains the saving clause that “ non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items."

The chain of custody has been sufficiently observed by the PDEA officers. The
prosecution through evidence have sufficiently established that the drugs seized were
the same items presented in evidence as part of the corpus delicti.

The conviction of the accused was correctly upheld.

People of the Philippines v. Jehar Reyes
G.R. No. 199271
October 19, 2016

Facts:

After conducting surveillance operations over the illicit drug pushing activities of Jehar
Reyes, police officers conducted a buy-bust operation. Jehar Reyes delivered to poseur-
buyer 1 sachet of shabu. He was arrested and searched, in his possession was found 2
more sachets of shabu. The items were marked in the police station without the
presence of the accused. No representative from the media, the local officials nor the
DOJ was present despite having conducted surveillance for two weeks prior to the
operation. No inventory nor any photographs were taken of the items.

Accused was convicted for the illegal sale of the three sachets of shabu.

Issue: Whether the accused was properly charged.

Whether the arresting officers complied with the requirements of the
Chain of Custody.

Ruling:

No, he should have been charged with illegal sale of shabu and a separate charge of
illegal possession of shabu.

The elements for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs are (1) proof that the transaction or
sale took place; and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as
evidence.

The 2nd and 3rd packet of shabu was obtained by the arresting officers after the
pretended sale as a result of a search; thus, no delivery was made by the accused to the
poseur-buyer with regards to the latter sachets of drugs. Delivery is essential in the sale
of dangerous drugs. He should have been charged with illegal possession instead with
respect to the 2nd and 3rd packets.

Notwithstanding the following facts, Reyes must be acquitted for non-compliance of the
arresting officers with the Chain of Custody Rule.

The arresting officers committed serious lapses that put into grave doubt the integrity of
the evidence presented against the accused. In this case, the presumption of regularity
in the performance of duty in favor of the arresting officers did not prevail over the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.

Jehar Reyes is acquitted of the charge.

People of the Philippines v. Mary Joy Cilot and Orlando Brigole.

Facts:
AAA was forced by Mary Joy Cilot inside her house and was detained there for two
weeks, being constantly intimidated through the use of a gun and a grenade. During the
ordeal, Brigole, Cilot’s live-in partner woke AAA one night and dragged her to their bed.
Cilot removed AAA’s bra and touched her breast. She proceeded to insert her finger in
the victim’s vagina. Brigole inserted his penis into the victim’s vagina two times.

AAA was released to her relatives. Soon after, Cilot and Brigole were arrested.

Several separate informations against the accused were filed namely:

A.)1 count of Rape by Sexual Intercourse against Brigole;
B.)1 count of Rape by Sexual Assault against Cilot;
C) 1 count of Kidnapping;
D)1 count of illegal possession of explosives.

The trial court acquitted the accused in A, B and D but convicted Cilot and Brigole of the
special complex crime of kidnapping with rape.

Issue: Whether the trial court was correct when it decided to impose a special complex
crime in lieu of the separate charges filed.

Ruling:

No, it was incorrect.

The information should contain or allege every element constituting the offense. In
charging the commission of a complex crime, the information must allege each element
of the component offenses with the same precision that would be necessary if they were
made the subject of a separate prosecution.

Considering that the existing Informations do not contain the essential and material
ingredients for the commission of kidnapping with rape, appellants cannot be convicted
for that special complex crime. Appellants can only be convicted of the separate
offenses of kidnapping and rape, both of which were duly proven.

However the trial court acquitted the accused based on its flawed reliance to an
information which it thought was sufficient to charge and convict appellants of the crime
of kidnapping with rape. The judgment of acquittal in favor of an accused necessarily
ends the case in which he is prosecuted and the same cannot be appealed nor
reopened because of the doctrine that nobody may be put twice in jeopardy for the same
offense.

Therefore, considering the circumstances the accused may only be convicted of

kidnapping despite the fact that rape was proved beyond reasonable doubt during the
trial.
NOVEMBER 2016

PP v. Hon. Edmar P. Castillo

G.R. No. 204419; November 7, 2016

Doctrine:

A search warrant may be issued by any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and the resultant case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction
over the offense committed. What is controlling is that, a search warrant is merely a
process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a
criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Thus, in
certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court may issue a search
warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed, provided
that all the requirements for the issuance of such warrant are present

Facts:

On the basis of the Search Warrant No. 45 issued by Judge Marcelo Cabalbag of
the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan, an Information was filed against private respondent
Rabino for violation of section 11 of RA No. 9165. Before the case was set for
arraignment, Rabino filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and for Suppression of
Illegally acquired evidence. The motion was granted. The Search Warrant was ordered
quashed and all the evidence obtained in the execution of said warrant is ordered
suppressed. Thus, the information is hereby dismissed. The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the present petition.

Issue: WN MTC has the authority to issue a search warrant involving an offense in which
it has no jurisdiction.
Ruling: Yes.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides that:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the
judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts
personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized. Necessarily, a motion to quash a search warrant
may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the place
searched or the property seized are not those specified or described in the search
warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.

The respondent RTC judge, in this case, quashed the search warrant and eventually
dismissed the case based merely on the fact that the search warrant was issued by the
MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan proceeding from a suspected violation of R.A. 9165 or The
Dangerous Drugs Act, an offense which is beyond the jurisdiction of the latter court. It is
therefore safe to presume that the other grounds raised by the private respondent in his
motion to quash are devoid of any merit. By that alone, the respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion in quashing the search warrant on a basis other than the accepted
grounds. It must be remembered that a search warrant is valid for as long as it has all
the requisites set forth by the Constitution and must only be quashed when any of its
elements are found to be wanting.

The SC has provided rules to be followed in the application for a search warrant.
Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:

Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for
search warrant shall be filed with the following: (a) Any court within whose territorial
jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or
any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be
made in the court where the criminal action is pending. In the case at bar, the application
for a search warrant was filed within the same judicial region where the crime was
allegedly committed. For compelling reasons, the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan has the
authority to issue a search warrant to search and seize the dangerous drugs stated in
the application thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a place that is within the same judicial region.
The fact that the search warrant was issued means that the MTC judge found probable
cause to grant the said application after the latter was found by the same judge to have
been filed for compelling reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was
duly complied with.

From the abovementioned rule, it does not provide that the court issuing a search
warrant must also have jurisdiction over the offense. A search warrant may be issued by
any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and the resultant case
may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction over the offense committed. What
controls here is that a search warrant is merely a process, generally issued by a court in
the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a
court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Thus, in certain cases when no criminal action
has yet been filed, any court may issue a search warrant even though it has no
jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed, provided that all the requirements for
the issuance of such warrant are present.
PP V. DANDITO LASTROLLO Y DOE +
GR NO. 212631; November 7, 2016

Facts:

An Information was filed charging Dandito of the crime of rape defined and
penalized by Article 335 of the RPC. Upon arraignment, Dandito pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged. During pre-trial, the parties made the following stipulations: (1) That
accused Dandito is the same accused who was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the
crime as charged; (2) That the victim and the accused are residents of the same
barangay; and (3) That the wife of the accused and the father of the private complainant
are siblings.

AAA was only 17 years old when she testified in court. According to her
mother, AAA has abnormalities. She only attended one (1) day in the first (1st) grade
because she was teased for being "abnormal". When brought to a mental hospital for
psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Escuadra issued a medical certificate stating that AAA had
"Moderate Mental Retardation (Mental age 7 to 8 years old). In 2003, AAA was playing
at the back of their house and as she was picking banana blossoms, her uncle Dandito,
with bolo, pulled down her pants. Dandito threatened AAA and made her lie down.
Thereafter, he inserted his penis inside AAA's vagina. Danditio told AAA not to tell her
mother about what happened, otherwise he would kill her. Dandito raped AAA for the
second time. On both occasions, Dandito was armed with a bolo and AAA did not shout
or move away from him out of fear. She did not also tell her ordeal to her mother, until it
was discovered that she was already pregnant. Dandito interposed the defense of denial
and alibi, but was convicted by the RTC of one count of simple rape. CA agreed with the
RTC’s finding on AAA’s credibility and held that rape was sufficiently proven by AAA's
testimony. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: WN Dandito is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

Ruling: Yes.

The SC affirmed Dandito’s conviction. Under Article 266-A of the RPC, rape is
committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances, one of which is through force, threat or intimidation. For a
charge of rape under the to prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) Dandito had
carnal knowledge of AAA; and (2) he accompanied such act by force, threat or
intimidation.

The Court agrees with the findings of both the RTC and CA that carnal knowledge
through threat or intimidation was established beyond reasonable doubt by the lone
testimony of the victim herself. AAA positively identified Dandito as the man who pulled
down her pants, let her lie down and inserted his penis to her vagina; that Dandito was
carrying a bolo and threatened to kill AAA if she would tell her mother of what happened.
Dandito, in turn, failed to point to any significant fact which would justify the reversal of
the findings on AAA's credibility. AAA's deportment after the rape does not impair her
credibility nor does it negate the occurrence of the crime. There is no established
singular reaction to rape by all victims of this crime. As decided by the SC in the case of
People v. Pareja, victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act within
reason or in accordance with society's expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a
standard rational reaction to an irrational experience, especially from a young victim.
One cannot be expected to act as usual in an unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to
predict the workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress. Moreover, it is
wrong to say that there is a standard reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of
rape since each of them had to cope with different circumstances. It is judicially settled
that delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an indication of fabrication and does not
necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant. This is because the victim
may choose to keep quiet rather than expose her defilement to the harsh glare of public
scrutiny. Only when the delay is unreasonable or unexplained may it work to discredit
the complainant.

It must be remembered here that AAA was raped by her own uncle, and threatened
that she would be killed if she told her mother about what happened. A rape victim's
actuations are often overwhelmed by fear rather than by reason. It is from this fear that
the perpetrator builds a climate of extreme psychological terror which effectively numbs
the victim to silence.  Here, the fear instilled upon AAA by Dandito's threats to her life is
even more magnified by the moral ascendancy that he has over her; not to mention the
proximity of their homes, which make such threat imminent and real. Thus, delay in
reporting the incident is justified in this case.

All told, the CA did not err in affirming the RTC's decision finding Dandito guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

As for the imposable penalty, Article 266-B of the RPC provides that the crime of
simple rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua but death penalty shall be imposed
"when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim."

In the instant case, while Dandito admitted that AAA is his niece, the Information
failed to allege that they are relatives within the third civil degree of affinity. As ruled out
in People v. Libo-on, such attendant circumstances are in the nature of qualifying
circumstances. These attendant circumstances are not ordinary aggravating
circumstances which merely increase the period of the penalty. Rather, these are special
qualifying circumstances which must be specifically pleaded or alleged with certainty in
the information; otherwise, the death penalty cannot be imposed.

In this regard, we have previously held that if the offender is merely a relation — not
a parent, ascendant, step-parent, or guardian or common-law spouse of the mother of
the victim — it must be alleged in the information that he is "a relative by consanguinity
or affinity (as the case may be) within the third civil degree." Thus, in the instant case,
the allegation that accused-appellant is the uncle of private complainant is not specific
enough to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance of relationship. The relationship by
consanguinity or affinity between appellant and complainant was not alleged in the
information in this case. Even if it were so alleged, it was still necessary to specifically
allege that such relationship was within the third civil degree.

As regards AAA's minority, while the Information sufficiently alleged AAA's minority,
records are devoid of any proof of AAA's age at the time of the incident.
 In the case People v. Buado, Jr., the Court reiterated the following guidelines in
appreciating age as an element of the crime or as an aggravating or qualifying
circumstance:

1.The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2.In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as
baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would
suffice to prove age.
3.If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or
destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's
mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to
testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances:

a.If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old;
b.If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old;
c.If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 18 years old.

4.In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will
suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5.It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The
failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be
taken against him.
6.The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

Here, the prosecution did not offer in evidence AAA's birth certificate or any
authentic document showing her birth date; neither did the prosecution present any
witness to testify on AAA's age at the time of the commission of the crime. While AAA
stated that she was 17 years old at the time of the taking of her testimony, the same will
not suffice because it was not clearly and expressly admitted by the accused.

In sum, considering that the qualifying circumstances of minority and third degree
relationship were not duly established, the RTC and the CA were correct in convicting
Dandito of simple rape and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appeal is
dismissed.

PP v. ANTONIO DACANAY Y TUMALABCAB

G.R. No. 216064; November 7, 2016

Doctrine:

An extrajudicial confession, where admissible, must be corroborated by evidence

of corpus delicti in order to sustain a finding of guilt. Extrajudicial confessions are
presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved.

Facts:

Antonio Dacanay’s wife, Norma was found lifeless with several puncture wounds on
the bathroom floor of their home. Their son, Quinn observed that the rest of the house
was in disarray, with the clothes and things of Norma scattered on the floor, as if
suggesting that a robbery had just taken place. At that time, Antonio had already left for
work after having allegedly left the house at around six in the morning. Quinn proceeded
to the workplace of Antonio to report the matter. Both proceeded back to their house and
were met by some police officers who were then already conducting an investigation on
the incident.

Antonio was interviewed and informed the police that money and pieces of jewelry
were missing. After the inspection of the crime scene, Antonio was invited to the precinct
to formalize his statement. While at the precinct, Antonio informed the Police that he was
willing to confess to killing Norma. PO3 Santos then proceeded to contact a lawyer from
the Public Attorney's Office. In the meantime, PO3 Santos apprised Antonio of his
constitutional rights. Antonio nonetheless confessed to the crime before the media
representatives, who separately interviewed him without PO3 Santos. The RTC gave
weight to the extrajudicial confession of Antonio and found him guilty of the crime of
Parricide. Aggrieved, Antonio timely filed a Notice of Appeal. The CA affirmed the
RTC in toto and dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, on the ground that Antonio failed
to overcome the presumption of voluntariness attended by his extrajudicial confession.

Issue: WN Antonio is guilty of the crime of Parricide on the basis of his extrajudicial
confession.
Ruling: Yes

Antonio had already admitted in his Appellant's Brief that he was not under custodial
investigation at the time he gave his extrajudicial confession. Although he was not under
custodial investigation, note must be taken that Antonio Dacanay was inside a detention
cell with two (2) or three (3) other detainees when he allegedly confessed before the
media. Accused's admission to the crime was unfortunately perpetuated by media men
who published articles on his resigned fate. It is found that accused's media confession
reels with the spontaneity of his admission for which reason he should be made
responsible for the culpable act of having stabbed his wife 26 repeated times.  Nestor
Etolle was particularly certain that accused talked in a candid and straightforward
manner with no trace of fear, intimidation or coercion in him.

As decided in the case of People v. Andan, a confession made before news

reporters, absent any showing of undue influence from the police authorities, is sufficient
to sustain a conviction for the crime confessed to by the accused. Clearly, appellant's
confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the
police authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed
appellant. They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were
there to check appellant's confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant
them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked his
permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did
appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He
even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime, and consented to its
reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and
other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the
news reporters.

The appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12
(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with
the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the
relationship between the individual and the State. 

Notably, while Antonio's testimony is replete with imputations of violence and

coercion, no other evidence was presented to buttress these desperate claims. Neither
was there any indication that Antonio instituted corresponding criminal or administrative
actions against the police officers allegedly responsible. It is well-settled that where the
accused fails to present evidence of compulsion; where he did not institute any criminal
or administrative action against his supposed intimidators for maltreatment; and where
no physical evidence of violence was presented, all these will be considered as factors
indicating voluntariness.

All told, absent any independent evidence of coercion or violence to corroborate

Antonio's bare assertions, no other conclusion can be drawn other than the fact that his
statements were made freely and spontaneously, unblemished by any coercion or
intimidation.

Under Article 246 of the RPC, the crime of Parricide is committed when: (1) a
person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or
other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. Undoubtedly, all elements
are present in this case. To begin with, the fact that Norma was the spouse of Antonio
was sufficiently proven by the prosecution through their Marriage Contract.

As a rule, an extrajudicial confession, where admissible, must be corroborated by

evidence of corpus delicti in order to sustain a finding of guilt. In this connection,
extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved.
Considering that Antonio failed to rebut such presumption of voluntariness regarding the
authorship of the crime, coupled with the fact of death of his wife, Norma, the SC find
Antonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Parricide.

PP v. BIYAN MOHAMMAD Y ASDORI A.K.A. "BONG BIYAN" and LADJAHASAN

G.R. No. 213221; November 9, 2016

Doctrine:

A strict compliance on the chain of custody rule is not required nor absolute and that the
arrest of an accused will not be invalidated and the items seized from him rendered
inadmissible on the sole ground of non-compliance with Sec. 21, Art. II of RA No.
9165.The most important factor in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.

Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner in which the offense
was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such acts
point to a point purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interests.

Facts:
A male civilian informant appeared before the Philippine National Police and
reported to SPO3 Bunac that a certain "Bong Biyan," was selling shabu at ASY Pension
House in City. A briefing for a buy-bust operation was then conducted. After which,
SPO3 Bunac’s group proceeded to the target area at Room 103 of ASY Pension House.
Upon arrival at the area, the members of the buy-bust team conducted another briefing.
The members then went to the said room and when they reached the room, the group
knocked and told the accused that they wanted to buy shabu. After handing the shabu,
the accused asked for the payment. Right after the door was closed, the team executed
the pre-arranged signal. The group arrested the accused and they were brought to the
Police station. PO1 Santiago marked the sachet of suspected and the drug
paraphernalia. The RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating
Section 5, Article II of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No.
9165). Appeal was resorted to but wad denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WN the accused are guilty of the crime charged.

Held:
The circumstances warrant that an inescapable conclusion that both accused
Mohammad and Ladjahasan were animated by a common purpose of engaging in drug
trafficking. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when
such acts point to a point purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interests.

No other logical conclusion would follow from the concerted action of both
Mohammad and Ladjahasan except that they had a common purpose and community of
interest. Their modus operandi was for Ladjahasan to screen the buyer while
Mohammad does the actual sale. Conspiracy having been established, Ladjahasan is
liable as co-principal regardless of her participation. Also, strict compliance on the chain
of custody rule is not required nor absolute and that the arrest of an accused will not be
invalidated and the items seized from him rendered inadmissible on the sole ground of
non-compliance with Sec. 21, Art. II of RA No. 9165.The most important factor in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused is the preservation of the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items. Here, the prosecution was able to establish
with moral certainty and prove to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the illegal
drugs (and drug paraphernalia) presented to the trial court as evidence are the same
items confiscated from the accused, tested and found to be positive for dangerous
substance.

PP v. Jhun Villalon y Ordono

G.R. No. 215198; November 9, 2016

Doctrine:

When it comes to the credibility of the witness in rape or sexual assault cases, there is
no standard form of reaction for a woman, much more a minor, when confronted with a
horrifying experience such as sexual assault. The actions of children who have
undergone traumatic experience should not be judged by the norms of behavior
expected from adults when placed under similar circumstances. People react differently
to emotional stress and rape victims are no different from them.

Facts:

Jhun Villalon was charged with raping his cousin, AAA. AAA testified that Jhun
raped her when she was merely 14 years old. AAA narrated that Villalon went to their
house in La Union and asked Villalon if he could harvest mangoes for her. Afterwards,
both left the house with the knowledge of AAA’s mother. Villalon asked AAA to go to the
higher part of the mountain. Thereafter, Villalon invited his cousin to have sexual
intercourse with him so she could experience it. AAA became nervous and wanted to
leave but Villalon held her hands and removed her lower garments. She struggled to free
herself, but Villalon overpowered her. Villalon placed himself on top of her and was able
to fulfill his bestial desires. AAA told to her mother, BBB what Villalon did to her. AAA
and BBB went to the barangay captain to report the incident. The case was then brought
to the court. Villalon’s mother and wife brought AAA and BBB to the office of the defense
counsel to sign an affidavit of assistance. AAA refused to sign but was forced to. After
signing, her mother was instructed to submit it to the Prosecutor’s office. The RTC
convicted Villalon in Family Court, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape. Villalon appealed arguing that the court gravely erred in convicting him
despite the victim’s lack of credibility. The CA, however, affirmed the decision of the
RTC. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WN Villalon is guilty of the crime charged.

Held: Yes.

The Court finds that the prosecution has successfully proved Villalon’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Even if the victim did not shout for help, such could not and would not
diminish her credibility. It must be emphasized that there is no standard form of reaction
for a woman, much more a minor, when confronted with a horrifying experience such as
sexual assault. The actions of children who have undergone traumatic experience
should not be judged by the norms of behavior expected from adults when placed under
similar circumstances. People react differently to emotional stress and rape victims are
no different from them.

AAA testified in a candid, vivid, and straightforward manner, and remained firm and
unswerving even on cross-examination. It has been consistently held that when it comes
to credibility of witnesses, the findings of a trial court on such matter will not be disturbed
unless the lower court had clearly misinterpreted certain facts. The credibility of the
witnesses is best addressed by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such
question, having heard them and observed their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under
grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of
witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.
Also, there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution were influenced by ill
motive, thus the testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.

MARLON CURAMMENG Y PABLO v. PP

G.R. No. 219510; November 14, 2016

Doctrine:

The highest Court cannot allow a man to be incarcerated without his conviction being
reviewed due to the negligence of his counsel. The appellate court must make a full
review of the factual and legal bases of the conviction considering the attendance of all
other modificatory circumstances.

Facts:

An information was filed charging Curammeng of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in

Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 365 of the RPC. The prosecution alleged
that a De Leon bus going to Ilocos Norte being driven by Franco was traversing the
northbound lane of the national highway along La Union, when its rear left tire blew out
and caught fire. This prompted Franco to immediately park the bus and unloaded the
cargoes. An RCJ bus bound for Manila being driven by Curammeng traversed the
southbound lane of the road where the stalled bus was parked and hit Franco, resulting
in the latter's death. The MTC found Curammeng guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged. The RTC affirmed Curammeng’s conviction in toto. The CA dismissed
outright Curammeng’s petition, finding that the accused violated the Rules of Procedure
as he failed to attach a certification of non-forum shopping as well as material portions of
the record. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WN the CA correctly dismissed Curammeng's petition for review based on

procedural grounds.
Held: Yes.
Appeals of cases decided by the RTCs in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
are taken by filing a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Section 2,
thereof, provides that such petitions shall be accompanied by material portions of the
record which would support the allegations of said petitions as well as a certification of
non-forum shopping. A party who seeks to avail of the right must comply with the
requirements of the rules, failing which the right to appeal is invariably lost.
In the instant case, the Court notes that the dismissal of Curammeng's appeal is
based solely on his counsel's negligence in failing to attach a certification of non-forum
shopping as well as material portions of the record. The Court cannot simply allow a
man to be incarcerated without his conviction being reviewed due to the negligence of
his counsel. The CA should have disregarded the rules and proceeded to make a full
review of the factual and legal bases of Curammeng's conviction, including the
attendance of modificatory circumstances, if any, pursuant to the principle that an appeal
in criminal cases opens the entire case for review. The petition is granted.

ANTONIO GAMBOA Y DELOS SANTOS v. PP

G.R. No. 220333; November 14, 2016

Doctrine:

To secure conviction in illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must be

able to establish that (a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified as
a dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

Facts:

An information was filed charging Antonio Gamboa and Elizabeth of violating the RA
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Police officers received
information from a confidential informant that a certain Jun Negro was engaged in illegal
drug activity. The Deputy Chief then formed a buy-bust team, one of which acted as the
poseur buyer and was provided with 2 P100 bills as buy-bust money. Upon arrival at the
target area, the team and the agent encountered Negro. The team proceeded to the
target area. The agent approached him and told Negro that he wanted to buy P200
worth of shabu. With the sale consummated, the agent executed the pre-arranged
signal. Negro, however, sensed that something was afoot and ran into a nearby house.
Inside the house, the team discovered Gamboa and Elizabeth seated by a table which
had shabu paraphernalia on top. The police frisked Elizabeth and recovered one (1)
plastic sachet containing shabu residue from her pockets and confiscated one (1) plastic
sachet of shabu from Gamboa. They were then brought to the police station together
with the seized items. The police properly marked the sachet subject of the sale, and the
seized items were delivered to the crime laboratory. The RTC found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating secion 11, article II of RA 9165 for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. Aggrieved, Gamboa elevated his conviction before CA
to which the latter affirmed the RTC ruling.

Issue: WN Gamboa's conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs defined and
penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.
Held: No.

In order to secure the conviction of an accused charged with illegal possession of

dangerous drugs, the prosecution must prove that: (a) the accused was in possession of
an item or object identified as a dangerous drug; (b) such possession was not authorized
by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

It is essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond

reasonable doubt. In order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the
dangerous drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the
same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous
drug, from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of
the corpus delicti.

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the
procedure police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to preserve
its integrity and evidentiary value. Under the said section, the apprehending team
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom
the items were seized, his representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs
must be turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from
confiscation for examination. 

As a general rule, the apprehending team must strictly comply with the procedure
laid out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR. However, their failure to do so
does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid
if: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved.

The aforementioned saving clause in Section 21, Article II of the IRR of RA 9165
applies only where the prosecution has recognized the procedural lapses on the part of
the police officers or PDEA agents, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds;
after which, the prosecution must show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items have been preserved.

The breaches of the procedure contained in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165

committed by the police officers, left unacknowledged and unexplained by the State,
militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. Case law
states that, the procedure enshrined in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of
substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or
worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects For indeed,
however, noble the purpose or necessary the exigencies of our campaign against illegal
drugs may be, it is still a governmental action that must always be executed within the
boundaries of law.

The Court finds petitioner's acquittal in order.

PP v. MARDAN AMERIL
G.R. No. 203293; November 14, 2016

Doctrine:
To secure conviction in illegal drugs cases, the prosecution must establish all the
elements of the offenses charged and the corpus delicti or the dangerous drug itself

Facts
A confidential informant reported to the office of the Criminal Investigation and
Intelligence Bureau (CIIB) that Ameril was going to sell him three (3) packs
of shabu worth ₱9,000.00 each. Thereafter, PO3 Pandong formed and dispatched a
buy-bust team. After the necessary preparations and coordination with the PDEA,
Pandong’s team and the informant proceeded to the target area. The informant acted as
the poseur-buyer. During their conversation, the informant showed Ameril the boodle
money and the latter gave 3 packs of shabu. The informant then gave the pre-arranged
signal. Ameril attempted to flee by entering his apartment but was caught. The police
officers informed Ameril of his constitutional rights and the reason for his arrest. The
seized items were marked and the team brought Ameril, together with the seized
evidence, to the CIIB and the necessary records were entered in the police blotter. The
RTC convicted the accused beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
as the testimonies of the police officers clearly established all its elements.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The appellate court examined the
evidence on record and concluded that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
drugs had been preserved. It also stressed that such evidence is presumed to have
been preserved in the absence of any showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the
evidence has been tampered with. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: WN Ameril is guilty of the crime charged.

Held: No.

The SC reversed and set aside the CA’s decision and acquitted Ameril on grounds
of reasonable doubt. For an accused to be convicted in illegal drug cases, the
prosecution must establish all the elements of the offenses charged, as well as
the corpus delicti or the dangerous drug itself. In cases involving illegal sale of drugs, the
prosecution must establish the following elements:
(1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is material is the proof that the
transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the
prohibited or regulated drug or the corpus delicti.
The corpus delicti is established by proof that the identity and integrity of the subject
matter of the sale - the prohibited or regulated drug - has been preserved. Evidence
must show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually
recovered from the accused. If the prosecution fails to discharge this burden, it fails to
establish an element of the offense charged and thus, an acquittal should follow.
The prosecution failed to discharge this duty in this case.
BONIFACIO NIEVA Y MONTERO v. PP
G.R. No. 188751; November 16, 2016

Doctrine:

To invoke the defense of accident, as one of the exempting circumstances provided

under Art. 12 of the RPC, the accused must be able to show that the following
circumstances are present: (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3)
he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) he had no fault in or intention
of causing the injury.

Facts:

An information was filed charging Bonifacio Nieva of the crime of Frustrated Murder.
In 2005, Luna and Raymundo were doing carpentry works for Judy and the latter was
supervising the construction of her nipa hut when Nieva arrived and approached her.
Nieva suddenly shouted at Judy and cursed her. He then drew a .357 caliber revolver.
Overwhelmed with fear, Judy clung to Luna's back and used him as a shield against
Nieva.

The accused pointed his gun at Judy and fired several times but the gun jammed.
Raymundo, who was at the roof of the nipa hut, jumped from the hut to help her aunt,
Judy. However, before Raymundo reached Judy, he heard a gunshot and saw Judy fall
to the ground. Judy was brought to the Manila Central University (MCU) Hospital and Dr.
Serrano stated she suffered a gunshot wound at her right leg, which caused a bone
fracture at her right tibia and lacerated wound at the left thigh. He confirmed that Judy's
gunshot wound could have led to her death if not for the timely medical attention. Later,
the police arrested Nieva to which the latter had invoked the exempting circumstance of
accident The RTC, however, convicted Nieva of Frustrated Homicide. He appealed but
the CA affirmed Nieva’s conviction. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WN Nieva is guilty of the crime charged.

Held: Yes.

Nieva cannot invoke the exempting circumstance of accident to free him from
criminal liability. The accused commits a crime The basis for exemption is the complete
absence of negligence and intent. The accused commits a crime but there is no criminal
liability. An accident is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event
happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the
circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens. It is an
affirmative defense which the accused is burdened to prove by clear and convincing
evidence.

To successfully claim the defense of accident, the accused must show that the
following circumstances are present: (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due
care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) he had no fault in or
intention of causing the injury. None of the circumstances are present in the case.

In the case at bar, Nieva was not performing a lawful act when he drew a gun and
pointed it at Judy. This clearly shows that Nieva intentionally and persistently performed
the act complained of in order to successfully maim Judy. Intent to kill may be proved by:
(a) the means used by the malefactors; (b) the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by the victim; (c) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or
immediately after the killing of the victim; (d) the circumstances under which the crime
was committed; and (e) the motives of the accused.

The circumstances showing the weapon used, the nature of the wound sustained by
Judy, and the conduct of Nieva before and during the incident, manifest Nieva's intent to
kill Judy.

In fine, the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the elements of

frustrated homicide, which are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested
by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained a fatal or mortal
wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the
qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is present.
DECEMBER 2016

ZENAIDA P. MAAMO AND JULIET O. SILOR, v. PP

G.R. No. 201917; December 1, 2016

DOCTRINE:
The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can only be
overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt, that is, that degree of proof that produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Hence, where the court entertains a reasonable doubt as to
the guilt of the accused, it is not only the right of the accused to be freed; it is the court's
constitutional duty to acquit them.

Facts:
Petitioner Zenaida P. Maamo (Maamo), former Mayor of the Municipality of Lilo-an,
Southern Leyte and petitioner Juliet O. Silor (Silor), then Assistant Municipal Treasurer  herein
were accused of Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents in a Letter-Complaint
filed with the OMB detailing a series of acts allegedly committed by them. The OMB found
probable cause against the Petitioners for Malversation through Falsification of Public Documents
and recommended the filing of the necessary informations against them with the SB. Accordingly,
nine (9) separate informations were filed before the SB namely Criminal Case Nos. 27117,
27118, 27119, 27120, 27121, 27122, 27123, 27124, and 27125. The common issue in the
consolidated cases is the alleged falsification of public documents consisting of Time Books and
Payrolls representing different time periods. Allegedly, fictitious laborers were made to appear as
laborers in the said documents, which enabled the Petitioners to collect sums of money and
misappropriate them for their personal use.

The SB convicted the Petitioners for the crime of Malversation through Falsification of

Public/Official Document under Criminal Case Nos. 27117, 27118, 27119 and 27124, and at the
same time acquitted the Petitioners in Criminal Case Nos. 27120, 27121, 27122, 27123 and
27125 for failure of the Prosecution to establish the culpability of the Petitioners.

Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that  the absence of a
name as shown by the blanks in the Time Book and Payroll corresponding to the signatures did
not conclusively prove beyond reasonable doubt that there was a ghost employee in the roll and
that since the Time Books and Payrolls passed audit, it followed that they were in order.

Issue: WN the petitioners are guilty of the crime of Malversation through Falsification by feigning
a signature.
Held: No.

SB erred in finding Petitioners guilty of the crime of Malversation through Falsification by

feigning a signature. The accused are acquitted.

It appears that the Prosecution relied only on the following facts to hold the Petitioners
liable: (i) that there were blanks next to the signatures in the Time Books and Payrolls, and
(ii) that there was no road directly connecting Barangay San Isidro and Barangay Gud-an.
To the Court, the evidence is severely insufficient and inconclusive to establish the guilt of
the Petitioners beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged. Outside of the foregoing
facts, the SB resorted to only surmises to arrive at its conclusions.
The crime of Malversation of Public Funds is punished under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code:

Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property Presumption of malversation. - Any

public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public
funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or
shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to
take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

xxxx

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer,
shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal uses. (Emphasis supplied)

In the first place, as correctly argued by the Petitioners, nowhere was the fact of
demand shown in any of the documentary exhibits or testimonies of the witnesses of the
Prosecution. Such failure is underscored by the fact that the Prosecution itself admitted in
its Comment dated January 17, 2013 that no demand for the alleged malversed funds had
been made.

Thus, considering that the Prosecution never established such material fact, the burden of
evidence was never shifted to the Petitioners to prove their innocence, there being no prima
facie presumption of misappropriation under the facts obtaining. Thus, the Prosecution had the
additional burden to prove Malversation by direct evidence, which, as stated at the outset, it had
failed to do.

In any case, assuming without conceding that the defenses raised by the Petitioners were
not credible, such fact did not lessen the burden of the Prosecution to prove Malversation through
Falsification through competent and conclusive evidence. As already discussed above, the
conviction of the Petitioners must not rest on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of
the prosecution. Mere speculations and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required to
establish the guilt of an accused.

All told, we cannot subscribe to the conclusion of the SB that the blanks next to the
signatures are, by themselves alone, enough to prove that Petitioners committed Malversation
through Falsification by feigning the said signatures. This Court is not prepared to deprive
Petitioners of their liberty with finality simply on the basis of a superficial deficiency in Time Books
and Payrolls.

As a final note, the Court takes this occasion to reiterate that the overriding consideration in
criminal cases is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it
entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt - if there exists even one iota of doubt, this Court is
"under a long standing legal injunction" to resolve the doubt in favor of the accused.

Hence, if the evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the accused must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the evidence insufficient to establish guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, Petitioners are hereby ACQUITTED.
PP v. DR. DAVID A. SOBREPEÑA, SR., ET AL.
G.R. NO. 204063; December 5, 2016

DOCTRINE:

In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is controlling is the determination of

whether the evidence of guilt is strong which is a matter of judicial discretion that
remains with the judge.

Facts:
 Respondents are officers and employees of Union College of Laguna, an
educational institution in Santa Cruz, Laguna. They were charged in several informations
for allegedly committinng Estafa and Large Scale Illegal Recruitment before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna. By reason thereof, respondents were
incarcerated. Invoking the provisions of Section 13, Article III of the Constitution and
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and in their belief that the evidence of their
guilt is not strong, respondents filed a Petition for Bail.

The RTC denied the Petition to Bail finding that there is evident proof against all the
accused. This Court holds that the evidence of guilt for all the accused is STRONG. The
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents was denied in an Order dated
October 18, 2010. The CA was convinced that the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering the assailed Orders.
According to the CA, there is doubt as to whether there is strong evidence against
respondents for the charge of estafa or large scale illegal recruitment; that the evidence
available on record merely showed that Union College provided the venue and the
English language training course; that the trial court failed to appreciate the fact that the
prosecution purposely took out of context the statement appearing in the flyer i.e.,
“INVEST IN YOUR FUTURE GET THE SKILLS YOU NEED TO WORK, EARN, AND
LIVE IN CANADA”; that there were no statements to the effect that Union College is
acting as a job placement agency; that there is no direct evidence to show that
Carandang was illegally enticed by respondents to enroll at Union College; that there is
no direct evidence showing that respondents overtly represented that they have the
power to send the trainees abroad for employment; and finally, there is no evidence that
respondents are flight risk. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied per
Resolution dated October 3, 2012. Thus, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari for the reversal and setting aside of the January 31, 2012 CA Decision and its
October 3, 2012 Resolution and likewise prayed that the impugned Orders of the RTC
be reinstated.

Issue: WN the denial by the RTC of the Petition to Bail is valid.

Held: Yes, denial by the RTC of the Petition to Bail is valid

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court also states that no person charged with
a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
shall be admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of
the criminal action.

Thus from the above-cited provisions and in cases involving non-bailable offenses,
what is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong which is
a matter of judicial discretion that remains with the judge. The judge is under legal
obligation to conduct a hearing whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the
court to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it against the accused to
enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the
parties. "The court's grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence of
the prosecution on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's own conclusion
on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused."

In the present case, the RTC held a summary hearing and based on the summary of
evidence, formulated its conclusion in denying the Petition to Bail. Respondents
impugned said finding through a Petition for Certiorari.  The Court stressed that "a writ
of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It does
not include correction of the trial court's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings
thereon. It does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and
to weigh the probative value thereof." No such circumstances exist in this case as to
justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari by the CA. On the contrary, the RTC acted in
complete accord with law and jurisprudence in denying bail in favor of respondents.

PP vs VALLAR
GR No. 196256, 2016; December 5, 2016

Facts:
According to the prosecution, the robbery incident occurred around seven o’clock in
the evening of 21 June 1989. At the time, Cipriano Opiso was sitting on a bench
alongside the store of Eufracio Bagabaldo, when the following persons arrived, all
wearing masks: Willy, Danny, Oracleo and Edgardo. Willy pointed his M14 rifle to the left
side of the body of Opiso and said, “Don’t move because this is a robbery.” The latter
managed to stand up, hold the muzzle of the gun and raise it upward, after which it
exploded hitting the top of his head. Opiso continued to grapple for possession of the
rifle and, in the process, unmasked Willy. Suddenly, accused Oracleo moved toward
Opiso and stabbed the latter in the stomach. Willy pushed Opiso, who fell to the bench,
pleading “Do not kill me because I will die with this wound already.” Willy and Danny left
Opiso and proceeded into the store. Edgardo and Oracleo remained on the roadside and
served as lookouts.

Once inside, Danny and Willy pointed their weapons at the spouses Eufracio and
Pedrita Bagabaldo. Danny fired his pistol into the air and declared, “Money, this is a
robbery.” Meanwhile, Pedrita begged for their lives and placed P15,000 cash on the
table upon which Danny put the cash inside a bag.

RTC found Willy, Danny, Oracleo, and Edgardo guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide and frustrated homicide attended by the aggravating circumstance of
employment of disguise and commission of the crime by a band. CA found accused-
appellants guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide only, attended by the
aggravating circumstances of employment of disguise and abuse of superior strength.
Issue: WN there is proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of the crime of
robbery with homicide, attended by the aggravating circumstances of employment of
disguise and abuse of superior strength.

Held: Appellants were properly convicted of robbery with homicide.

Concerning the legal characterization of the crime, the Court finds that its proper
designation is not robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide, as inaccurately
labelled by the prosecution and unwittingly adopted by the trial court, but is simply one of
robbery with homicide. It has been jurisprudentially settled that the term homicide in
Article 294, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code is to be used in its generic sense,
to embrace not only acts that result in death, but all other acts producing any bodily
injury short of death. It is thus characterized as such regardless of the number of
homicides committed and the physical injuries inflicted.

We also agree with the CA when it corrected the trial court’s appreciation of the
aggravating circumstances present at that time. While both lower courts properly
appreciated the aggravating circumstance of employment of disguise, the commission of
a crime by a band was not established because only Willy, Danny and Oracleo were
proven to have carried arms. Nevertheless, the CA properly appreciated the aggravating
circumstance of superior strength, considering the number of malefactors and the kind of
weapons used in facilitating the commission of the crime.

PP v. SUSAN TAMANO AND JAFFY GALMATICO

G.R. No. 208643; December 5, 2016

Facts:

Susan Tamano and Jaffy Gulmatico were charged for violation of Section 5, 11,12 of RA.
9165. Both pleaded not guilty.During the trial, the prosecution presented that Tamano and
Galmatico were arrested during a buy-bust operation. The appellants presented a different
version on the day of the arrest.Tamano narrated she was helping her aunt in her carenderia
while waiting for Galmatico because they agreed to visit their friend Joel Amihan. At that time,
Tamano’s friend Gigi requested her to bring to Gigi’s boyfriend pieces of clothing in a plastic bag.
When Galmatico arrived, they proceeded to the house of Joel Amihan but Tamano got suspicious
of the bag and let Galmatico carry it. They reached the house of Joel Amihan and after some
conversations, they decided to leave the place. While leaving, they were accosted and searched
by the police officers. Shabu and shabu paraphernalia were recovered from the plastic bag of
Gigi which was being carried by Galmatico. RTC rendered a decision finding both the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of all the charges. CA affrimed in toto.

Issues: WN the buy-bust operation is valid and WN the chain of custody rule was complied.
Ruling:

Yes. The appellants who were caught in flagrante delicto were positively identified by the
prosecution witnesses as the same persons who sold the crystalline substance. The sachet of
shabu was presented in court which was identified to be the same object sold by the appellants.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were established how the transaction happened
from the moment PO3 Gepaneca, the poseur-buyer, handed to appellant Tamano 500 bill and in
turn, Galmatico handed the suspected shabu, thus consummating the transaction between them.
The collective evidence presented adequately established that a valid buy-bust operation was
conducted.

Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory for
safekeeping to the presentation in court for destruction. In this case, PO1 Aguenido immediately
searched the appellants and recovered plastic sachets of shabu. The seized items were brought
to the police officers’ office and were marked and turned over to PDEA Exhibit Custodian. The
following day, the items were inventoried and submitted to PNP Crime Laboratory for examination
and identified to content of shabu. The police officers testified for the prosecution. The subject
specimens were presented in court. From the foregoing, the prosecution demonstrated the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs had not been compromised because it
established crucial link in the chain of custody from the time it was first discovered until it was
brought to court for examination.

PP v. CHRISTOPHER ELIZALDE
G.R. No. 210434; December 5, 2016

Doctrine:

Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the
killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or
homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall
be punished as a special complex crime under Art 267 of the RPC.

Facts:

An Information was filed against accused-appellants Christopher Elizalde and Allan Placente
charging them with the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide as defined
and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) for detaining and depriving,
with the use of firearms and threats, Letty Tan y Co of her liberty and against her will, for the
purpose of extorting a P20,000,000.00 ransom as a condition for her release, by shoving her
inside a red Toyota Lite Ace van, then later transferring her to a jeepney where she was
eventually found dead with gunshot wounds after an armed encounter with police operatives.

Issue: WN the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime charged.

Ruling: Yes
 The Court sustains the findings of the trial court, as positively affirmed by the appellate court,
insofar as the existence of conspiracy is concerned. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. When
conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual,
rendering all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective
participations. Accordingly, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it can be
presumed from and proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design,
concerted action, and community of interests. As aptly held by the CA, the community of criminal
design by the appellants and their cohorts is evident as they each played a role in the
commission of the crime. While appellant Placente and companions pointed their guns at
Antonio, Elizalde and companions simultaneously dragged Letty into their van. Thereafter, they
demanded ransom money as a condition for her release, which, however, never materialized due
to a shootout that sadly led to her death. Consequently, therefore, appellants are equally liable for
the crime charged herein.

In this respect, Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of   reclusion
perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer;

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose
of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is

subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. The rule is,
where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the
killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or
homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall
be punished as a special complex crime under Art 267 of the RPC.

As clearly proved by the prosecution, appellants succeeded in executing their common

criminal design in abducting the victim herein, demanding for the payment of money for her
release, and thereafter, killing her as a result of the encounter with the police officers.
Accordingly, the Court affirms the lower court's imposition of the penalty of  reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole, which should have been death, had it not been for the passage of
Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the
Philippines" prohibiting the imposition thereof.
PP v. SAMSON BERK BAYOGAN
G.R. No. 204896; December 7, 2016

Facts:

Samson Berk Bayogan was charged before the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan, with murder. The
testimony of the victim’s daughter established that in 2007, the victim Clarita Disu and her
daughter Marbie were tending their neighbourhood variety store in Sual, Pangasinan with Loreto,
when two (2) men on board a motorcycle arrived. One dismounted the vehicle and bought a
cigarette from Marbie while the other stayed on the vehicle. The man who bought the cigarette
suddenly pulled a gun and pointed it to Clarita and shot her four (4) times. The police authorities
invited Marbie the police station to identify whether the gunman had been among those whom
they arrested. Of three (3) persons in the prison cell, Marbie pointed to appellant. She identified
appellant in open court as the victim's assailant. The RTC gave credence to the eyewitness
accounts of Marbie and found the accused guilty beyonf reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
Aggrieved, he elevated the matter to the CA but the latter affirmed the ruling of the RTC. Hence,
this petition.

Issue: WN the accused is guilty of the crime charged.

Ruling: Yes.

In the prosecution of the crime of murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), the following elements must be established by the prosecution: (1) that a person
was killed; (2) that the accused killed that person; (3) that the killing was attended by treachery;
and (4) that the killing is not infanticide or parricide. In the case at bar, all the elements were
clearly met. The prosecution ably established the presence of the element of treachery as a
qualifying circumstance. The shooting of the unsuspecting victim was sudden and unexpected
which effectively deprived her of the chance to defend herself or to repel the aggression, insuring
the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor and without any provocation on the part
of the victim.
PP v. NAPOLEON BENSURTO
G.R. No. 216061; December 7, 2016

Doctrine:

Article 266-A of RPC enumerates at least four other circumstances under which rape may be
committed: (1) by taking advantage of a person's deprived reason or unconscious state; (2)
through fraudulent machination; (3) by taking advantage of a person's age (12 years of age) or
demented status; and (4) through grave abuse of authority.

Article 266-A recognizes that rape can happen even in circumstances when there is no
resistance from the victim, especially when the victim is unconscious, deprived of reason,
manipulated, demented, or young either in chronological age or mental age.

Facts:

AAA, 9 years old, was sleeping in her room when appellant entered thereat with a rope in his
hand. AAA was awakened by the presence of her father who proceeded to tie her feet. Appellant
then pulled AAA's underwear to her feet and immediately laid on top of her. Thereafter, appellant
undressed himself and then forced his penis into AAA's vagina. After appellant satisfied his carnal
desires, he threatened AAA not to tell anyone about the incident or else he would kill her and her
mother. Fearing for her life, as well as her mother, AAA never told anyone about the incident. The
said incident, however, was repeated. AAA was only able to relate the incident to her mother a
few months after. 2000. The RTC convicted the appellant on both counts of (Qualified) Rape. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: WN Bensurto is guilty of the crime charged.

Ruling: Yes

Under paragraph 1 (a) of Article 266-A of the RPC, the elements of rape are: (1) that the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act was accomplished through
force, threat, or intimidation. However, when the offender is the victim's father, as in this case,
there need not be actual force, threat or intimidation because when a father commits the odious
crime of rape against his own daughter who was also a minor at the time of the commission of the
offenses, his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence and
intimidation. 

All the elements, therefore, are present. The clear and straightforward testimony of AAA, as
corroborated by the medical findings show beyond reasonable doubt that AAA was already in a
non-virginal state after she was raped. When the victim's testimony is corroborated by the
physical findings of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the
essential requisite of carnal knowledge.
Hence, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code does not simply say that rape is committed when
a man has carnal knowledge with or sexually assaults another by means of force, threat, or
intimidation. It enumerates at least four other circumstances under which rape may be committed:
(1) by taking advantage of a person's deprived reason or unconscious state; (2) through
fraudulent machination; (3) by taking advantage of a person's age (12 years of age) or demented
status; and (4) through grave abuse of authority. Article 266-A recognizes that rape can happen
even in circumstances when there is no resistance from the victim.

Resistance, therefore, is not necessary to establish rape, especially when the victim is
unconscious, deprived of reason, manipulated, demented, or young either in chronological age or
mental age.
PP v. ROSARIO MAHINAY
GR No. 210656; December 7, 2016

Doctrine:

In the seizure of dangerous drugs and its custody, what is of primordial importance is the
untainted integrity and preserved evidentiary value of the seized articles as such would
determine the innocence or guilt of the accused.

Facts:
While on duty at the police station at Cebu, Senior Police Officer 4 Reynaldo Vitualia
received an information from his unnamed asset that one Rosario Bayot Mahinay is
allegedly engaged in the sale of marijuana. Vitualia and his team conducted a briefing on
the intended buy-bust operation against Mahinay. A civilian asset designated as poseur
buyer proceeded to the subject while the team positioned 15 meters away from the
accused-appellant to monitor the transaction. The team witnessed that the poseur buyer
handed over the marked P100 bill to the accused-appellant and the latter handed over
sticks of marijuana. The poseur buyer signaled and the team immediately rushed
towards the accused-appellant to arrest him. The accused-appellant attempted to run
but was apprehended. The marked P100.00 bill and 10 sticks of marijuana cigarettes
were recovered and Mahinay was apprised of the charge against him and was recited of
his constitutional rights. Virtulia marked all the marijuana cigarette sticks and made the
necessary labels. The marked articles were offered in evidence.

The trial court rendered a decision finding Mahinay guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165. It ruled that the prosecution has
sufficiently satisfied all the elements to convict an accused; that there is a presumption
of regularity in the performance of the functions of the police officers in answer to the
allegation of the accused that there is an ill-motive on the part of the police officers
manifested by the planting evidence on the accused. CA affirmed in toto said ruling.

The appellate court expounded that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
articles have been preserved as evidenced by the unbroken link in the chain of custody
of the seized illegal drugs from the commencement of the buy-bust operation, to the
seizure of the subject articles and recovery of marked money and the forensic
examination conducted until the submission of the same to the court. Such uninterrupted
series of events is enough to determine the guilt of the accused.

CA held that non-compliance with the procedural requirements as regards the

inventory and taking of photographs is not fatal to the admissibility of evidence so long
as there are justifiable grounds for non-compliance and that its integrity is preserved, the
elements are sufficiently shown in the present case.

Issue: WN Mahinay is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

Ruling: Yes.
 There are links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
situation, namely: (1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2), the turnover of the illegal
drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3), the turnover by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and (4) the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from
the forensic chemist to the court.

CA has elaborated the unbroken links in the chain of custody of the seized articles
from herein accused-appellant. The first and second links in the chain of custody are the
seizure and marking of the seized items and its turnover to the investigation officer.
The third link in the chain is the turnover by the apprehending officers of the marked
illegal drugs to the laboratory examination. The fourth link in the chain is the turnover
and submission of the marked illegal drugs from the forensic chemist to the court. In the
seizure of dangerous drugs and its custody, what is of primordial importance is the
untainted integrity and preserved evidentiary value of the seized articles as such would
determine the innocence or guilt of the accused.

In the present case, as contrary to the claim of appellant, the totality of the evidence
presented by the prosecution leads to an unbroken chain of custody of the confiscated
item from appellant. Though there were deviations from the required procedure, i.e.,
making physical inventory and taking photograph of the seized item, still, the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the dangerous drug seized from appellant were duly proven
by the prosecution to have been properly preserved; its identity, quantity and quality
remained untarnished.  As previously stated, non-compliance with the rigid procedural
rules of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 does not obliterate the fact of the illegal transaction
between the accused-appellant and the poseur buyer. Well-established is the rule that in
order for the prosecution to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs, the identity of the buyer and the seller must first be established,
followed by the object and consideration of the sale and finally the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor. Accordingly, what is of utmost importance is the proof of
the consummation of the sale or whether the transaction indeed transpired.

For an accused to be convicted of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous

drugs, the following must be shown: (1) the accused is in possession of all item or object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. As culled from the
facts, the marijuana cigarette sticks were given by the accused-appellant to the poseur
buyer and was subsequently turned over by the latter to SPO4 Vitualia, thus,
establishing accused-appellant's possession of the subject article.

The SC affirmed the decision of CA affirming in toto the decision of the court a quo
finding mahinay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegally selling dangerous drugs in
violation of Section 5, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165.

***Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution

and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless
of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ROQUE DAYADAY

G.R. NO. 213224; January 16, 2017
FACTS: At 10 o’clock in the evening, the victim named Basilio and his son, Alex, were
walking home when suddenly Roque shot the victim at the back for four times. Alex
recognized Roque because the place was well-lit and about 10 meters away from the
latter where he fired the gun. Alex ran due to fear for his life. Postmortem report showed
that the victim suffered four gunshot wounds and one stab wound.
Roque denied the accusations and interposed an alibi that he was helping with the
cooking for a wedding celebration.
RTC and CA convicted Roque. CA added that the alibi of Roque did not render him
physically impossible to be at the scene of the crime. Despite the failure to prove evident
premeditation, treachery was patent for the victim was shot at the back.
ISSUE: W/n CA erred in affirming the conviction of murder.
RULING: No. Murder is committed when: (1) a person is killed, (2) the accused killed
him, (3) the killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances
enumerated under Art. 248, and (4) the killing neither constitute parricide nor infanticide.
All elements of murder have been established. Through the testimony of Alex, the victim
was killed and Roque killed him. The qualifying circumstances of treachery attended the
killing. Here the attack, which came from behind, was sudden, deliberate, and
unexpected. The victim being unaware of any threat to his life and the use of a firearm
showed deliberate intent to kill Basilio.
As to penalty, under Art. 248 of the RPC, the penalty for murder qualified by treachery is
reclusion perpetua to death. Even though evident premeditation and illegal possession
of firearms that were alleged in the Information were not duly proven, treachery was
proven. So the RTC correctly held the proper imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt for murder.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JEFFREY HIRANG

G.R. NO. 223528; January 11, 2017
FACTS: Hirand was charged with the crime of qualified trafficking in persons under R.A.
9208.
AAA, BBB, CCC and DDD testified that they were all recruited by Hirang to be sex
workers for foreigners. AAA narrated that she was paid to engage into sexual activities
with foreigners and earned her commission from doing it. Although she had to stop to
deliver her baby, she returned to Hirang and was again employed by the latter. The
other minors also narrated how they were recruited by Hirang. As part of their testimony,
they described the events that took place before arrest of Hirang.
Hirang, on the other hand, pleaded not guilty and denied dealing with sexual trade. He
alleged that there was an instigation on the part of the apprehending officers because he
only agreed to bring the girls to the Korean poseur-customer upon order of one of his
friends, who was alleged as a drug addict. He claimed that he was ordered to convince
the Koreans to hire the girls so that he could receive P5,000.00 commission per girl. He
although admitted receiving the money before the arrest which was supposed to be a
payment for the minor victims.
RTC and CA found Hirang guilty of human trafficking.
ISSUE:
1.W/N the prosecution was able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2.W/N Hirang should be acquitted in view of failure of arresting officers to observe R.A.
7438.
RULING:
1.Yes. The elements of trafficking in persons are: (a) the act of recruitment,
transportation, transfer or harbouring or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders; (b) the means used which
include “threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception,
abuse of power or position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another; and, (3) the purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes
“exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labor or services, slavery, servitude or removal or sale of organs.”
The Information sufficiently alleged the recruitment and transportation of the minor
victims for sexual activities and exploitation with the offender taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the young girls through the guarantee of a good time and financial gain. It
was qualified because it was committed in a large scale and his four victims were under
18 years old.
2.No. The alleged failure of the apprehending police officers to inform Hirang of the
Miranda rights upon his arrest, is not sufficient to acquit him because such defect was
cured by his voluntary act of entering a plea and participating in the trial without raising
the issue.
VAN CLIFFORD TORRES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 206627; January 18, 2017
FACTS: During a conciliation proceeding between Torres and AAA’s uncle, Torres was
infuriated with AAA’s meddling. Torres whipped AAA on the neck using his wet t-shirt.
Torres continued to hit AAA causing the latter to fall down from the stairs. It was clearly
stated in the allegations that Torres his AAA with his wet t-shirt three times.
Torres, on the other hand, said for his defense that he got angry with AAA because he
abruptly interrupted the heated discussion between him and AAA’s uncle. Torres told
AAA to stop or he would be forced to whip him. AAA called Torres’ bluff which provoked
Torres. He attempted to hit AAA but was stopped by the timely intervention of his uncle.
Torres further argued that if he did whip AAA, it should not be considered a child abuse
because the law requires intent to abuse. He maintains that he merely disciplined and
retrained the child. He also pointed out that his act was justified because AAA harassed
and vexed him. He further argues that he could not be convicted of child abuse without
proof that the victim’s development had been prejudiced. He should only be convicted of
slight physical injuries.
RTC and CA found Torres guilty of violating R.A. 7610.
ISSUE: W/N the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING: No. The victim was a child when the incident occurred. AAA is entitled to
protection under RA 7610. Under said law child abuse includes any act by deed or
words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as
a human being.
Thus, the petitioner’s intention to debase and degrade the intrinsic worth and dignity
of the child can be inferred from the manner of committing the act complained of. Torres
used a wet t-shirt to whip the child three times. Hitting a sensitive body part, such as the
neck, with a wet t-shirt would cause extreme amount of pain especially when done
several times. Indeed, if his only intention is to discipline, he could have resorted to other
less violent means.
Lastly, being smacked several times in a public place is a humiliating and
traumatizing experience for all persons regardless of age.
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of conviction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE v. GREGORIO QUITA

G.R. NO. 212818; January 25, 2017
FACTS: In 2002, Paquito, father of the victim, Roberto, heard that his son was having a
drinking session. On his way to fetch Roberto, he saw three persons fighting and when
he went near them, he saw Gregorio holding his son’s hand at the back while he was
being stabbed by Fleno. Paquito shouted and ran after the offenders but he was not able
to catch them. He was able to bring Roberto to the hospital but he was already dead.
Gregorio denied the charge and that he never knew the victim. He said that he attended
a birthday celebration that night of the incident and had drank liquor. Then suddenly, a
“Berto” arrived and was angry with the owner of the house. To avoid trouble, he and his
companions left but “Berto’s” group was waiting for them along the road. A fight erupted
but it was later on pacified. After this incident, he left the place. However, in 2007,
someone told him that a warrant of arrest was waiting for him in Paranaque, where the
incident happened. He went back to clear his name but was later on charged of Murder.
The RTC convicted Gregorio of Murder for the killing was qualified with treachery
because both hands of the victim were held back by Gregorio while being stabbed by
Fleno. With this situation, the victim was deprived of any chance to fight back and
defend himself. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in convicting Gregorio.
RULING: No. When CA’s finding unite with RTC, the SC is not at liberty to reject or
disturb the factual finding of both lower courts.
The RTC and CA mentioned that the prosecution has established the elements of
murder: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him; (3) that the killing
was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248 of RPC; and
(4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
The fact of death was established by the death certificate. There was treachery in
holding the hands of the victim to his back while he was being stabbed. This rendered
him defenseless against the perpetrators thereby insuring the execution of the crime
without rest to the offenders of any defense that the victim might make.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUDIGARIO BELEN
G.R. NO. 215331; January 23, 2017
FACTS: Belen was charged with qualified rape for raping AAA, who was 8 years old
during the commission of the crime. Belen was living together with AAA’s mother. In
1999, Belen called AAA inside the house and poked her with a knife while ordering her
to remove her clothes and to bend over. Due to fear, AAA did was she was told and
Belen was able to insert his penis in her vagina. AAA recounted another similar incident
when Belen was able to rape her for the second time. It was only in 2005, when AAA
told her mother about the incident which prompted the latter to transfer AAA to her uncle.
During the trial, the prosecution presented a birth certificate but it was lacking the
authentication of the National Statistics Office.
Belen denied the charges and instead pointed out that the charges were made so
that the mother of AAA can get his properties.
The RTC and CA both charged Belen with two counts of simple rape.
ISSUE: W/N Belen is guilty of qualified rape.
RULING: No. Belen is guilty of simple rape. It was clearly established that the first rape
incident was accomplished with the use of a knife which proved Belen employed threat
in AAA’s life. As to the second rape, while there was no force and intimidation used by
Belen on AAA, the fact that he is the live-in partner of her mother established his moral
ascendancy and physical superiority over AAA which substitute for threat and
intimidation. It is doctrinally settled that moral ascendancy of an accused over the victim
renders it unnecessary to show physical force and intimidation since, in rape committed
by a close kin, such as the victim’s father, stepfather, uncle or the common-law spouse
of her mother, moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation.
It is only 2 counts of simple rape because rape is qualified when the victim is under
18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim. In order to consider such qualifying circumstance, they must be
alleged in the Information and duly proven. Unfortunately, the birth certificate of AAA
was not authenticated so it could not be given any probative value.
Guilty of two counts of simple rape.

People of the Philippines Vs. Kusain Amin y Ampuan a.k.a. "Cocoy"

G.R. No. 215942. January 18, 2017
Facts:
A buy-bust operation was conducted which led to the arrest of the accused.
One (1) small heated-sealed transparent plastic sachet of white crystalline substance
locally known as shabu was seized by the police.
In convicting appellant of the crimes charged, the CA, affirming the decision of the RTC,
disregarded his position that there was no valid buy-bust operation, because the
arresting team had not coordinated the matter with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA). The appellate court maintained that neither R.A. 9165 nor its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) required PDEA's participation in any buy-
bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is "just a form of an inflagrante arrest sanctioned by
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court [sic], which police authorities may rightfully
resort to in apprehending violators x x x. A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere
non-coordination with the PDEA."
On accused-appellant's contention that the prosecution's failure to present the poseur-
buyer weakened the arresting team's testimonies, the CA held that the non-presentation
of the poseur-buyer is fatal only if there is no other eyewitness to the illicit transaction, as
held in People v. Berdadero. In any case, the testimonies of SP02 Dacara and P/Insp.
Ramas, who were both within clear seeing distance, "presented a complete picture,
providing every detail of the buy-bust operation."
Issue:
Whether presentation of the poseur-buyer is necessary.
Held:
Yes. Non-presentation of the poseur-buyer is fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
People v. Andaya is not applicable in this case. In People v. Andaya, there is a "need to
hide the poseur-buyers’ identities and preserve their invaluable service to the police"
because "poseur-buyer and the confidential informant were one and the same.

Manny Ramos, et al. Vs. People of the Philippines/People of the Philippines Vs.
Manny Ramos, et al.
G.R. No. 218466/G.R. No. 221425. January 23, 2017
Facts:
Between 9:00 to 10:00 o'clock in the evening, eyewitness Reynaldo was walking towards
the store of Leonida Fabrigas when he chanced upon accused-appellants having an
altercation with the victim, Rolando. From his vantage point, Reynaldo heard Ramos
yell, "Okinam patayan ka!" (Son of a bitch! I will kill you!) and saw accused-appellant’s
chase and eventually surround Rolando at an area around seven (7) meters away from
where Reynaldo was hiding. Reynaldo then heard four (4) successive gunshots, making
him hide under the trunk of the duhat tree for fear of being hit. It was on the sound of the
fourth shot when Reynaldo witnessed Rolando fall face down on the ground. To ensure
Rolando's demise, Ramos approached Rolando and shot him again. Thereafter,
accused-appellants fled the scene.
The accused was convicted of the crime of Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed
Firearm.
Issue:
Whether the accused is liable for the crime of Murder with the use of unlicensed firearm.
Held:
No. The accused is only liable for simple Murder. Under Section 1 of RA 8294, "[i]f
homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance." here are two
(2) requisites to establish such circumstance, namely: (a) the existence of the subject
firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have
the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence. The onus probandi
of establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies with the prosecution.
In this case, it is unclear from the records of the case whether the firearm was recovered
and if recovered, whether said firearm was licensed.
People of the Philippines Vs. Ludigario Belen y Marasigan
G.R. No. 215331. January 23, 2017
Facts:
AAA testified that she was 8 years old in 1999 and that appellant is the husband of her
mother but they were not married; and that they were all then living together. At 4pm
July 1999, she was playing outside their house when she was called by appellant to go
inside the house. Once inside, appellant locked the door and poked a knife at her and
ordered her to remove her clothes to which she complied. Appellant instructed her to
bend over and he inserted his penis into her vagina.
At 7pm of the second week of July 1999, while her mother was at work and she was
then sitting at home, appellant entered the house and told her to undress to which she
complied as he threatened her not to make noise or tell her mother. Appellant asked her
to bend and inserted his penis into her vagina then she was told to lie down and
appellant went on top of her and inserted his penis in her vagina and started moving up
and down. Appellant raped her several times more which only stopped when her
grandmother took her to her uncle's house.
Issue:
Whether moral ascendancy may substitute force and intimidation.
Held:
Yes.
Regarding the second rape, while there was no force and intimidation used by appellant
on AAA, the fact that appellant is the live-in partner of her mother and with whom she
had been living with since she was 2 years old, established his moral ascendancy as
well as physical superiority over AAA. Appellant's moral ascendancy and influence over
AAA substitutes for threat and intimidation which made AAA submit herself to appellant's
bestial desire. It is doctrinally settled that the moral ascendancy of an accused over the
victim renders it unnecessary to show physical force and intimidation since, in rape
committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-
law spouse of her mother, moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or
intimidation.

People of the Philippines Vs. Gregorio Quita alias "Greg"

G.R. No. 212818. January 25, 2017
Facts:
Paquito testified that the deceased victim in this case, Roberto, was his eldest son. He
claimed that he had known Gregorio and Fleno for about a year prior to the killing of
Roberto, because these two were the ones who delivered water in their locality; that on
November 17, 2002 at around 8:30pm he was at home having just arrived from work,
when his daughter told him that Roberto was having a drinking session nearby; that
while on his way to fetch Roberto, he saw three persons fighting; that when he went near
the trio he saw Gregorio holding Roberto's hand at the back while Roberto was being
stabbed by Fleno; that when he shouted, his son's assailants took to their heels; and that
he ran after them, but when the two reached a dark alley he no longer pursued them. He
then went back to where Roberto was lying, and with the help of his neighbors, brought
the stricken Roberto to the hospital. But when they arrived at the hospital the doctor told
him that Roberto was already dead. He spent about P40,000.00 for Roberto's funeral
and burial expenses, but only the expenses amounting to 25,000.00 were covered by
receipts. Paquito claimed that Roberto's death was very painful to him.
Issue:
Whether treachery was employed.
Held:
There is treachery when 'the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.' These means or methods are made in the form of a swift,
deliberate and unexpected attack, without any warning and affording the victim, which is
usually unarmed and unsuspecting, no chance at all to resist or escape the impending
attack.
Holding the hands of the victim to his back while he was being stabbed rendered him
defenseless against the perpetrators thereby insuring the execution of the crime without
risk to the offenders of any defense that the victim might make.

People of the Philippines Vs. Michael Palanay y Minister

G.R. No. 224583. February 1, 2017
Facts:
The evening of August 30, 2010, AAA was sleeping in her room when she was suddenly
awakened by someone removing her short pants and panty. She awoke to find accused
Palanay, her uncle and brother of her mother, lying beside her and removing his own
short pants. Thereafter, he kissed AAA' s lips, touched her breasts, and inserted his
penis into her vagina. After satisfying his bestial desires, Palanay slept by AAA's side.
AAA put her clothes on, went to the comfort room, and cried in silence. By early
morning, AAA went to the house of her elder sister, BBB, and narrated her tragic
experience. Upon learning of the incident, BBB went to her elder sister, CCC, to relay
what happened to AAA.
On appeal, Palanay makes much of her failure to offer resistance to his advances to
discount the occurrence of rape to discredit AAA.
Issue:
Whether lack of resistance from the victim may be used as a defense in rape.
Held:
No.
The assertion of lack of resistance on the part of AAA is utterly trivial in nature and does
not affect the merits of the case. It bears to stress that in rape cases, the law does not
impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance because it is not an element of
rape.
People of the Philippines Vs. Romeo D. Calinawan
G.R. No. 226145. Feburary 13, 2017
Facts:
At around midnight on September 26, 2007, Marigor Silan (Marigor), Janice's seven (7)-
year old daughter, saw Calinawan stabbing her mother in their kitchen. Thereafter,
Calinawan quickly fled the scene. Meanwhile, Jonathan Nevado (Jonathan), Janice's
brother and neighbor, was awakened by shouts coming from his sister's house. He
rushed to her house and saw her children crying. After bringing her children to his
house, he went looking for Janice whom he saw outside a neighbor's house pleading for
help. Seeing her bloodied, he carried her and asked her who stabbed her, and she
answered it was Calinawan who did it. Then, Jonathan brought Janice to the hospital.
When Darwin Silan, Janice's husband, arrived at the hospital, he also asked her who
stabbed her and she reiterated that it was Calinawan. After three (3) days, Janice died in
spite of the medical treatment at the hospital.
Calinawan argues that Marigor's identification of him was unreliable because she
admitted she never saw the face of her assailant as it was covered by a black hood and
that she closed her eyes during the commotion. He claims that treachery was not
established and that the trial court merely made a general assumption that the victim
was defenseless because it was night time. He insists that there was no evidence to
show that he consciously and deliberately adopted the means, method or form of attack.
Issues:
(1) Whether Calinawan was positively identified as the assailant.
(2) Whether the killing of Janice was attended with treachery.
Held:
(1) Yes.
In People v. Caliso, the Court explained that in criminal prosecution, the identity of the
accused must be established with moral certainty, but this did not necessarily require
that the witness must have seen the face of the accused.
It suffices that the witness recognized the accused through identifying marks which
would make the latter unmistakably stand out from other individuals. In the case at
bench, Marigor's family and Calinawan had been neighbors for a long time. Hence, she
was very familiar with the latter's unique physical characteristics, particularly his
amputated fingers. Through this distinct physical feature of Calinawan, Marigor was able
to identify him in open court as the one who stabbed her mother. Thus, her identification
of him was credible, even if she was not able to clearly see his face, but saw the notable
feature of his hand, which set him apart from others.
(2) No.
Other than Marigor's first-hand account, no other witness actually saw the stabbing
incident. Obviously, her narration of the events that unfolded was crucial in determining
how the killing was perpetrated because she was the only one who actually saw its
execution. Her testimony, however, was lacking in details; thus, it is insufficient to
conclude that the killing was attended with treachery.
Absent clear and convincing evidence on how the attack was perpetrated, the
conclusion that there was treachery is nothing more but an assumption. It is unfortunate
that the particular means, manner or method of attack was never clearly illustrated in her
testimony leaving the evidence for murder wanting.
Medel Arnaldo B. Belen Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 211120. February 13, 2017
Facts:
Petitioner filed a case of estafa against his uncle. In order to afford himself the
opportunity to fully present his cause, petitioner requested for a clarificatory hearing.
Without acting on the request, ACP Sufiega-Lagman dismissed petitioner's complaint in
a Resolution dated July 28, 2004. Aggrieved by the dismissal of his complaint, petitioner
filed an Omnibus Motion (for Reconsideration & Disqualify), the contents of which
became the subject of this libel case.
On the absence of the element of publication, petitioner contends that in serving and
filing the Omnibus Motion enclosed in sealed envelopes, he did not intend to expose it to
third persons, but only complied with the law on how service and filing of pleadings
should be done. He asserts that the perusal of the said motion by Michael, the duly
authorized representative and son of the respondent in the estafa case, as well as the
two staff of the OCP -Flores and Enseo -did not constitute publication within the meaning
of the law on libel because they cannot be considered as "third persons to whom copies
of the motion were disseminated." With respect to Flores and Enseo, petitioner insists
that they were both legal recipients as personnel in the OCP where the motion was
addressed and had to be filed. Stating that the absence of publication negates malice,
petitioner posits that he could not have intended to injure the reputation of ACP Sufiega-
Lagman with the filing of the Omnibus Motion since it was never published, but was sent
to its legal recipients.
Issues:
(1) Whether defamatory matters contained in the Omnibus motion is considered
published.
(2) Whether there is publication when defamatory matters are communicated to an
agent of the defamed person.
(3) Whether there is publication as to Flores and Enseo.
Held:
(1) Yes.
Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known
to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. A communication of the
defamatory matter to the person defamed alone cannot injure his reputation though it
may wound his self-esteem, for a man's reputation is not the good opinion he has of
himself, but the estimation in which other hold him. In the same vein, a defamatory letter
contained in a closed envelope addressed to another constitutes sufficient publication if
the offender parted with its possession in such a way that it can be read by person other
than the offended party. If a sender of a libelous communication knows or has good
reasons to believe that it will be intercepted before reaching the person defamed, there
is sufficient publication. The publication of a libel, however, should not be presumed from
the fact that the immediate control thereof is parted with unless it appears that there is
reasonable probability that it is hereby exposed to be read or seen by third persons.
Then being a lawyer, petitioner is well aware that such motion is not a mere private
communication, but forms part of public record when filed with the government office.
(2) No.
The requirement of publication of defamatory matters is not satisfied by a
communication of such matters to an agent of the defamed person. In this case,
however, the defamatory statement was published when copy of the Omnibus Motion
was furnished to and read by Michael, the son and representative of respondent Nezer
in the estafa complaint, who is clearly not an agent of the defamed person, ACP
Sufiega-Lagman.
 (3) Yes.
Petitioner then argues that there is no publication as to Flores and Enseo, the staff of the
OCP of San Pablo City, who had read the contents of the Omnibus Motion. In support
thereof, he cites the settled rule that "when a public officer, in the discharge of his or her
official duties, sends a communication to another officer or to a body of officers, who
have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the communication, such
communication does not amount to publication." Petitioner's argument is untenable. As
mere members of the administrative staff of the OCP of San Pablo City, Flores and
Enseo cannot be said to have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of his
motion, which is to seek reconsideration of the dismissal of his Estafa complaint and to
disqualify ACP Sufiega-Lagman from the preliminary investigation of the case. Their
legal duty pertains only to the clerical procedure of transmitting the motions filed with the
OCP of San Pablo City to the proper recipients.
People of the Philippines Vs. Juan Richard Tionloc y Marquez
G.R. No. 212193. February 15, 2017
Facts:
"AAA," 24 at the time, testified that at around 9:30 p.m. of September 29, 2008, she was
having a drinking session with appellant and Meneses in the house of appellant. After
some time, she felt dizzy so she took a nap. At around 11:00 p.m., she was roused from
her sleep by Meneses who was mounting her and inserting his penis into her vagina.
She felt pain but could only cry in silence for fear that the knife which they used to cut
hotdog and now lying on top of a table nearby would be used to kill her if she resisted.
Meneses left after raping her. While still feeling dizzy, afraid and shivering, appellant
approached her and asked if he could also have sex with her. When she did not reply
appellant mounted and raped her. Appellant stopped only when she tried to reposition
her body. "AAA" then left appellant's house and immediately returned to the house she
shared with her live-in partner.
Issue:
Whether should resistance be made.
Held:
No. The prosecution failed to prove force, threat, or intimidation as an element of rape.
Even assuming in the nil possibility that Meneses was able to force or instill fear in
"AAA's" mind, it should be noted that he was already gone when appellant asked "AAA"
for a sexual favor. In other words, the source of the feigned force, threat or intimidation
was no longer present when appellant casually asked his friend, "AAA," if she "can do it"
one more time. "AAA" did not respond either in the affirmative or in the negative.

Resistance Should be Made Before the Rape is Consummated.

"AAA" could have resisted right from the start.
"AAA's" degree of dizziness or "shivering" was not that grave as she portrays it to be.
"AAA" is used to consuming liquor. And if it is true that the gravity of her "shivering" at
that time rendered her immobile such that she could not move her head to signal her
rejection of appellant's indecent proposal or to whisper to him her refusal, then she
would have been likewise unable to stand up and walk home immediately after the
alleged rape.
People of the Philippines Vs. Salim Ismael y Radang
G.R. No. 208093. February 20, 2017
Facts:
A buy-bust operation was conducted by the Culianan Police. It was then agreed that
SPO1 Santiago would act as poseur buyer with SPO1 Rodriguez as back-up. 
An exchange was made between SPO1 Santiago and the accused. Upon seeing the
exchange, SPO1 Rodriguez arrested appellant[.] SPO1 Rodriguez made a precautionary
search of appellant's body for any concealed weapon, and found none. Instead, SPO1
Rodriguez found, tucked inside [appellant's left front pocket the P100.00] marked money
and two (2) more plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance wrapped in a
golden cigarette paper.
The police officers then brought appellant to the Culianan Police Station [in Zamboanga
City] with SPO1 Santiago keeping personal custody of the items confiscated from [him].
At the [police] station, the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance subject of
the buy-bust operation, the two (2) plastic sachets also containing white crystalline
substance[, and the P100.00] marked money bearing Serial No. M419145 recovered
from appellant's left pocket, were respectively turned over by SPO1 Santiago and SPO1
Rodriguez to the Desk Officer, PO3 Floro Napalcruz [PO3 Napalcruz], who likewise
turned [these over] to the Duty Investigator, [PO2 Tan]. PO2 Tan then placed his initial
"RDT” on the items recovered from appellant.
Issue:
Whether the chain of custody was complied with.
Held:
No.
Aside from the failure to mark the seized drugs immediately upon arrest, the arresting
officers also failed to show that the marking of the seized drugs was done in the
presence of the appellant. This requirement must not be brushed aside as a mere
technicality. It must be shown that the marking was done in the presence of the accused
to assure that the identity and integrity of the drugs were properly preserved. Failure to
comply with this requirement is fatal to the prosecution's case.
People of the Philippines Vs. Adalton Arce y Camargo
G.R. No. 217979. February 22, 2017
Facts:
A buy-bust operation conducted by the PNP resulted in the arrest of Lintag and the
seizure of seven (7) matchboxes containing Marijuana.
Issue:
Whether there is compliance with the rule on the preservation of the integrity of the
confiscated items.
Held:
Yes.
The records also reveal that there was compliance with the rule on the preservation of
the integrity of the confiscated items allegedly sold and possessed by accused-
appellant. PO1 Maquinta testified that he had placed the markings on the confiscated
items; had made an inventory; and had taken pictures of these items right after the
arrests and in the presence of the representatives of the media, the DOJ, PDEA, and
a barangay official. On the same day, he forwarded these items, along with the letter-
request signed by Police Chief Inspector (PCI) Errol Texon Garchitorena, Jr., to PCI
Josephine Suico Llena, forensic chemist of the crime laboratory. The items were
received and examined by the latter who kept them in the crime laboratory until the test
result, together with the items, was submitted to the court.
People of the Philippines Vs. Rodrigo Macaspac y Isip
G.R. No. 198954. February 22, 2017
Facts:
At around 8:00 in the evening of July 7, 1988, Macaspac was having drinks with Ricardo
Surban, Dionisio Barcomo alias Boy, Jimmy Reyes, and Jebulan on Pangako Street,
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. In the course of their an argument ensued between
Macaspac and Jebulan. It became so heated that, Macaspac uttered to the group:
Hintayin nyo ako d'yan, wawalisin ko kayo, and then left. After around three minutes
Macaspac returned wielding a kitchen knife. He confronted and taunted Jebulan, saying:
Ano? Jebulan simply replied: Tama na. At that point, Macaspac suddenly stabbed
Jebulan on the lower right area of his chest, and ran away. Surban and the others
witnessed the stabbing of Jebulan. The badly wounded Jebulan was rushed to the
hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.
Issue:
Whether treachery and evident premeditation should be appreciated.
Held:
When the accused was alerted to the impending lethal attack due to the preceding
heated argument between him and the accused, with the latter even uttering threats
against the former, treachery cannot be appreciated as an attendant circumstance.
When the resolve to commit the crime was immediately followed its execution, evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated. Hence, the crime is homicide, not murder.
Aquilina B. Granada, et al. Vs. People of the Philippines/Venancio R. Nava Vs. The
Honorable Justices Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada, et al./Jesusa Dela Cruz Vs.
People of the Philippines/Aquilina B. Granada Vs. People of the
Philippines/Susana B. Cabahug Vs. People of the Philippines and Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 184092/G.R. No. 186084/G.R. No. 186272/G.R. No. 186488/G.R. No. 186570.
February 22, 2017
Facts:
The Special Audit Report disclosed that the various school forms and construction
materials purchased by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, now
Department of Education, Division Office of Davao for the Elementary School Building
Program were priced above the prevailing market prices, leading to a loss of
P613,755.36 due to overpricing. The auditors recommended the refund of the excess
amount, and the filing of a criminal or administrative action against the public officials
who participated in the transactions.
Issues:
(1) Whether the prosecution sufficiently proved conspiracy.
(2) Whether private persons may be held liable as conspirators with public officers.
Held:
(1) Yes.
The series of acts of the accused in signing all the documents to effect the release of the
funds for the purchase of construction supplies and materials spelled nothing but
conspiracy. The signatures of all the accused appearing in the documents indicate
accused's common design in achieving their one goal to the damage and prejudice of
the government.
(2) Yes.
Private persons acting in conspiracy with public officers may be indicted and if found
guilty, be held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019.
This supports the "policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and
private persons alike [which constitute] graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead
thereto."

Ramon Amparo y Ibañez Vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 204990. February 22, 2017
Facts:
Ignacio testified that he was riding a jeepney when two (2) men boarded the jeepney.
One of them sat beside him, pointed a knife at him and declared a hold-up. He was
ordered to take his necklace off and hand over his mobile phone.
A warning shot was fired by the police causing the robbers to be rattled and drop their
knives on the jeepney bench. Four (4) men, later identified as Alcubar, Guarino, Salmeo,
and Amparo, were arrested.
Ignacio identified Alcubar as the man who poked a knife at him, and Guarino as the one
who announced the hold-up. He also identified Salmeo and Amparo as the ones who sat
in the front seat beside the driver. He admitted that he did not know what Salmeo and
Amparo were doing at the time of the incident. However, he testified that he saw them
place their knives on the jeepney bench when the police fired the warning shot.
Issue:
Whether the crime of robbery with a band was committed.
Held:
Yes.
Even if the crime is committed by several malefactors in a motor vehicle on a public
highway, the crime is still classified as robbery in band, not highway robbery or
brigandage under Presidential Decree No. 532. It is highway robbery only when it can be
proven that the malefactors primarily organized themselves for the purpose of
committing that crime.
In this instance, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
petitioner was guilty of robbery in band.
Anita Capulong Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 199907. February 27, 2017
Facts:
De Guzman, who was a relative and neighbor of the Spouses Capulong, testified that,
on August 7, 1990, the accused obtained from her an amount of P700,000.00. As
stipulated in the Promissory Note, the spouses would pay by June 7, 1991. As a security
for the loan, the Spouses Capulong executed a Chattel Mortgage with Power of Attorney
over their ten-wheeler Isuzu cargo truck, the original Official Receipt and Certificate of
Registration (OR-CR) of which were likewise delivered to De Guzman. On December 10,
1990, Anita requested to borrow the OR-CR for a week, excusing that she would apply
for the amendment of the registration certificate to increase the weight or load capacity
of the truck and show it to a prospective buyer. De Guzman was hesitant at first since
the chattel mortgage was not yet registered, but she later on acceded. She gave the OR-
CR in Cabanatuan City, where the same were being kept in a bank's safety deposit box.
As proof of receipt, Anita issued a handwritten note. Despite the expiration of the one-
week period and De Guzman's repeated demands, the documents were not returned by
Anita who countered that the loaned amount was already paid.
Issue:
Whether Anita committed the crime of estafa.
Held:
Estafa may be committed by any person who shall defraud another by removing,
concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any court record, office files, document or
any other papers.
In this case, Anita contends that there is no competent proof that she actually removed,
concealed or destroyed any of the papers contemplated in Article 315, paragraph 3 (c) of
the RPC. Allegedly, pursuant to Tan Jenjua, Kilayko, and Dizon, the document removed,
concealed or destroyed must contain evidence of indebtedness so as to cause
prejudice, and the OR-CR are not of this nature.
Contrary to Anita's supposition, neither Article 315, paragraph 3 (c) of the RPC nor
Article 535, paragraph 9 of the old penal code requires that the documents or papers are
evidence of indebtedness. Notably, while the old provision broadly covered "any
process, record, document, or any other paper of any character whatsoever," the new
provision refers to "documents or any other papers." Indeed, there is no limitation that
the penal provision applies only to documents or papers that are evidence of
indebtedness.
Norma C. Gamaro and Josephine G. Umali Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 211917. February 27, 2017
Facts:
Fineza entrusted petitioner Gamaro with the pieces of jewelry amounting to P2,292,5
l9.00 on the condition that the same will be sold for profit. Petitioner Gamaro was under
obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sale to Fineza. However, instead of complying
with the obligation, she pawned the pieces of jewelry to M. Lhuillier Pawnshop where
petitioner Umali worked as Branch Manager and kept the proceeds thereof to the
damage and prejudice of Fineza.
Issue:
Whether Gamaro is committed the crime of estafa.
Held:
Yes.
The accused is liable for estafa committed by misappropriating or converting to the
prejudice of another money, goods, or any other personal property received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though that obligation
be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money,
goods, or other property.
People of the Philippines Vs. Eddie Barte y Mendoza
G.R. No. 179749. March 1, 2017

Facts:
Eddie Barte, after a surveillance operation was caught in a valid buy-bust operation.
Several lapses in the chain of custody were violated. No explanations were given. But on
the strength of the presumption of regularity, the trial court convicts the accused.

Issue: Whether the presumption can override the conviction.

Ruling:

No.

This presumption can be overturned if evidence is presented to prove either of two

things, namely: ( 1) that they were not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they
were inspired by any improper motive.

In the case at bar it is apparent that they were not performing their duties.

Non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements would not automatically

render the seizure and custody of the contraband invalid, however that is true only when
there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved.
People of the Philippines Vs. Enrile Donio y Untalan
G.R. No. 212815. March 1, 2017

Facts:

Enrile Donio stabbed the victim and took his tricycle. When the Highway Patrol group
apprehended him, he pretended to be the victim.

He was charged with a violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539, otherwise known as
Anti-Camapping Act of 1972.

Accused-appellant Enrile Donio was convicted of the special complex crime of qualified
carnapping in its aggravated form.

Issue: Whether the wrong designation in the information is ground for dismissal.
Whether the presumption on robbery of authorship of aggression may be applied in
carnapping cases.

Ruling:

No.

While it is necessary that the statutory designation be stated in the information, a

mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating the correct name of the offense is
not a fatal defect as it is not the designation that is controlling but the facts alleged in the
information.

The presumption that a person found in possession of the personal effects belonging to
the person robbed and killed is considered the author of the aggression, the death of the
person, as well as the robbery committed, has been invariably limited to cases where
such possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered
implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto. The said principle may
be applied in this case. The concept of carnapping, theft and robbery are the same.

Conviction is upheld.
Capistrano Daayata, et al. Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 205745. March 8, 2017

Facts:

Daayata, Salisi, and Malacat, Jr. were charged with frustrated murder.

During a basketball game, the victim caused a foul injuring the teammate of the
accused. An altercation resulted and threats were made by the victim, he was even
restrained to desist a fight. As a result of which correlative aggression from the accused
was made. Later on in the afternoon, the accused allegedly blocked the path of the
victim and hit him on the forehead with a rock. Upon admission to the hospital, he lied
and told the doctor that the injury was due to an accident. He had an operation to treat
the wound.

Issue: Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the accused of frustrated murder.

Ruling:

No. The confluence of Bahian's admissions of a prior altercation, his self-issued threat,
how he was constrained to desist, and his own account to Dr. Mata of how he sustained
his injury, as well as the glaring dissonance noted by the defense and backed by
physical evidence, demonstrate how the prosecution has fallen far too short of
discharging its burden of proving petitioners' guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
People of the Philippines Vs. Puyat Macapundag
G.R. No. 225965. March 13, 2017

Facts: Upon the tip of an informant, a buy-bust operation was conducted arresting Puyat
Macapundag for illegal sale of ephidrine. He was convicted for illegal sale and illegal
possession under the Dangerous Drugs Act. An inventory was not conducted and
photographs were not taken immediately after the arrest.

Issue: Whether the chain of custody was duly proven.

Ruling:

In the present case, the prosecution did not even bother to explain why the inventory
and photograph of the seized evidence were not made either in the place of seizure and
arrest or at the police station, as required by the IRR in case of warrantless arrests, or
why the marking of the seized item was not made at the place of seizure in the presence
of Macapundag. It was also silent on the absence of a representative from the DOJ, the
media and an elected public official to witness the inventory and receive copies of the
same. Similarly unexplained was the lack of inventory and photographs of the seized
items.40 Accordingly, the plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by the police
officers, unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti had been compromised.

It has been repeated in jurisprudence that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a

matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug
suspects.
Medel Coronel y Santillan, et al. Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 214536. March 13, 2017

Coronel, Permejo, Villafuerte and Olivarez were found by a raiding team of the PDEA
who were enforcing a valid search warrant in a suspected drug den. Inside, they found
shabu, money and paraphernalia for using illegal drugs. A drug test was conducted and
they all tested positive.

The lower court convicted them of violating Section 7 (penalizing the crime of act of
knowingly visiting a drug den) and Section 15 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. 9165.

The defense argues that the accused did not voluntarily visit the drug den and thus they
should be acquitted.

Issue: Whether testing positive for drugs constitutes evidence to prove that the accussed
could be charged of Section 7 of 9165.

Ruling:

No.

Before a person may be convicted under Section 7, it must be shown that he or she
knew that the place visited was a drug den, and still visited the place despite this
knowledge.

In the case at bar, the trial courst merely relied on the results of the drug tests.

There was however no showing of how long petitioners were at the alleged drug den, or
how long the drugs had been in their system. In other words, there is no basis to assume
that petitioners used drugs at the moment immediately before arrest, and thus, at the
location of the arrest. There was no attempt either to show that petitioners knew the
nature of the alleged drug den, or even that they used drugs in the premises.

The elements of the crime should not be taken lightly and be presumed to exist
considering that it is punishable by imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. For
the violation of Section 7, they must be acquitted.

They were correctly convicted however of using dangerous drugs.

People of the Philippines Vs. Alberto Alejandro and Joel Angeles
G.R. No. 225608. March 13, 2017

Facts:

Angelo and Angeles beat up and stabbed BBB. AAA who saw the crime being
committed was then restrained and raped by the accused, taking turns in restraining and
raping the victim. She was hit by a piece of wood and fell unconcious. Upon waking in
the hospital she positively identified the accused.

Three separate charges were filed. One charging Angeles of rape, another charging
Alejandro of rape and a seprate charge of homicide for BBB’s death.

The information for rape was consolidated charging both Angeles and Alejandro,
mutually helping and conspiring each other with 1 count of rape.

Angelo and Angeles are charged and convicted of the separate crimes of Simple Rape
and Homicide. In the CA, they were convicted of two counts of rape.

Alejandro withdrew his appeal while this case was pending in this Court.

Issue: Whether or not the conviction for simple rape was proper.

Ruling:

No.

First, the CA erred in convicting them with two counts of rape since the information
clearly states that only one count of rape was charged.

Second, they should be convicted of Qualified Rape. The law states that if the act is
committed either with the use of a deadly weapon or by two (2) or more persons, the
crime will be Qualified Rape, necessitating the imposition of a higher penalty.

However since Alejandro had already withdrawn his appeal, ony Angeles is the only one
who may be convicted of the crime.
People of the Philippines Vs. Cyrus Villanueva y Isorena alias "Tutoy" and Alvin
Sayson y Esponcilla alias "Alvin Talangka"
G.R. No. 226475. March 13, 2017

Facts:

Villanueva and Sayson were convicted of the crime of Murder.

A mauling and stabbing incident occured near a tricyclye station whereby Villanueva,
Sayson and Valencia punched, hit with a rock and stabbed the victim twice in the
armpit.The victim upon reaching the hospital was declared dead on arrival.

The RTC convicted the accused of the crime of murder qualified by the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

Issue: Whether the Murder charge was proper.

Ruling:

No.

The conclusion of the Trial Court is baseless. The fact that the accused-appellants and
Valencia, armed with a knife and a stone, ganged up on Enrico does not automatically
merit the conclusion that the latter's killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance
of abuse of superior strength.

The prosecution failed to present evidence as regards the relative disparity in age, size,
strength or force between the accused-appellants and Valencia, on one hand, and the
victim. Mere superiority in number does not ipso facto mean superior strength.

He can only be charged with Homicide.

People of the Philippines Vs. Jessie Gabriel
G.R. No. 213390. March 15, 2017

Facts:

In th boarding house of the accused, AAA and her cousin BBB were accused of stealing
merchandise from Gabriel’s store. AAA was called into Gabriel’s room where she was
allegedly forcefull made to lie down and raped. She did not forcefully resist, but cried the
entire time. Medico-legal findings show that her vagina had fresh lacerations.

Gabriel was convicted of the crime of rape.

Issue: Whether the testimony of AAA was enough to convict Gabriel.

Ruling:

Yes.

In the 1901 case of United States v. Ramos,14 this Court had already declared that "[ w ]
hen a woman testifies that she has been raped she says, in effect, that all that is
necessary to constitute the commission of this crime has been committed. It is merely a
question then, whether or not this court accepts her statement." Jurisprudence has clung
with unrelenting grasp to this precept.

The trial court's findings bearing on the credibility of witnesses on these matters are
invariably binding and conclusive upon the appellate court unless of course,there is a
showing that the trial court had overlooked, misapprehended or misconstrued some fact
or circumstance of weight or substance, or had failed to accord or assign such fact or
circumstance its due import or significance.

The damages however must be modified.

In People v. Jugueta, the awards for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary
damages should be upgraded to P75,000.00 each.
People of the Philippines Vs. Nestor M. Bugarin
G.R. No. 224900. March 15, 2017

The Bugarin’s and Postanars’ have held a long grudge against each other. One day, an
altercation escalated. Bugarin alleges that upon seeing the Esmeraldo Postanar
weillding three guns, he went out and shot him twice, shot Cristito Postanar who he
claimed was about to get a gun, shot Paolo Postanar who was throwing stones at him
anfdshot Maria Glen who he alleges to be holding a pipe.

Bugarin admits the shooting of the victims, but he claims he only did so in self-defense.

Bugarin was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of double murder and
attempted murder.

Issue: Did Bugarin act in self-defense?

Ruling:

No.

Bugarin miserably failed to discharge the burden or proving self-defense.

No unlawful aggression was proved. Maria Glen Postanar’s testimony that Bugarin
started shooting them unprovoked, was given merit by the court.

Moreover treachery attended the shooting of Cristito and Maria Glen. The 72 year old
father in law was in no position to defend himself and was shown to be begging for his
life when he was shot point blank by Bugarin. The same was true for Maria Glen since
they were both sudden and unexpected, however she escaped death by reason of
causes independent of Bugarin’s will.
Nicolas Velasquez and Victor Velaquez Vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 195021. March 15, 2017

Facts:

The victim allegedly went berserk and started hacking the door of one of the accused. In
defense of their houses, the mauled the victim and caused him serious physical injuries.
According to the victim’s version he shouted invectives at one of the accused for defiling
his home. He chased him out and later on that day, he was brutalized by the accused
and six others.

The accused calim self-defense and further point out Jesus’ inconsistent testimonies.

Issue: Whether self-defense should justify the crime commited.

Ruling:

No.

He who pleads a justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code
admits to the commission of acts, which would otherwise engender criminal liability.
However, he asserts that he is justified in committing the acts. In the process of proving
a justifying circumstance, the accused risks admitting the imputed acts, which may justify
the existence of an offense were it not for the exculpating facts. Conviction follows if the
evidence for the accused fails to prove the existence of justifying circumstances.

In the instant case, the defense’s assertions are sorely wanting. Aside for self-serving
testimonies, the defense failed to show proof that there was an unlawful aggression.
Moreso, that seven people could not have restrained one person running amok and
decided instead to beat him up fails to inspire belief. It was glaringly in excess of the
force to be used to pacify him.

In the matter of Jesus’ alleged inconsistent statements, a witness' recollection of crime

need not be foolproof. This is especially true of a victim's recollection of his or her own
harrowing ordeal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v PALA TOUKYO
G.R. No. 225593, March 20, 2017
FACTS:
A buy-bust operation was conducted against appellant upon. When the transaction
was consummated, appellant was arrested. The agents immediately marked the seized
marijuana at the place of the arrest. Upon reaching the PDEA-CAR field office, they
turned over the backpack containing the seized marijuana to Agent Dayao, who in turn,
executed the proper documentation and delivered the seized item to the Crime
Laboratory. A qualitative examination reveals that the backpack indeed contains one (1)
kilogram/1,000 grams of marijuana.
Appellant invoked denial and frame up.
RTC convicted appellant.
CA modified. There was no valid buy-bust operation. Agent Peralta prematurely
executed the pre-arranged signal upon seeing the marijuana, hence there is no
consummated transaction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:
During the pendency of appeal, appellant died. Therefore, the criminal case against
Toukyo, including the instant appeal, is hereby dismissed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v CHRISTOPHER MEJARO ROA,
G.R. No. 225599, March 22, 2017

FACTS:
The appellant is known to have suffered mental disorder prior to the commission of
the crime charged due to excessive use of the prohibited drugs. He even underwent
treatment for schizophrenia. He was given antipsychotic drugs which he never however,
not able to continue taking due to financial constraints.
On the day of the incident, the appellant was unusually silent, refused to take a bath
and even quarreled with his mother. Eliseo (+) then passed by the appellant when
suddenly, the latter struck him with a bolo.
When the police arrived, the appellant voluntarily surrendered who said nothing
when queried about what happened.
RTC found appellant guilty of murder. The defense of insanity was insufficiently
proven. CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant may invoke the defense of insanity.

HELD:
The defense failed to present any convincing evidence of accused-appellant's
mental condition when he committed the crime
In this jurisdiction, it had been consistently and uniformly held that the plea of
insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance. Hence, the accused is tried on the
issue of sanity alone, and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered
without any trial on the issue of guilt, because the accused had already admitted
committing the crime. This
Court had also consistently ruled that for the plea of insanity to prosper, the accused
must present clear and convincing evidence to support the claim.
Insanity as an exempting circumstance is not easily available to the accused as a
successful defense. It is an exception rather than the rule on the human condition. The
testimony or proof of an accused's insanity must relate to the time immediately
preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged.
MARTIN VILLAMOR and VICTOR BONAOBRA v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 200396, March 22, 2017

FACTS:
An informant called the authorities telling that an illegal numbers game is being
conducted in the house of Bonaobra. Thereby, the police went to the area and caught
them in action. Villamor was charged as a collector in an illegal numbers game and
Bonaobra was charged as a manager and operator.
Petitioners denied the act charged.
RTC found petitioners guilty. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
The Court finds that the right of the petitioners against unreasonable searches and
seizures was violated by the arresting officers when they barged into Bonaobra's
compound without a valid warrant of arrest or a search warrant. While there are
exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant for a valid search and seizure, none applies in
the case at bar. Consequently, the evidence obtained by the police officers is
inadmissible against the petitioners, the same having been obtained in violation of the
said right.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ANASTACIO HEMENTIZA,
G.R. No. 227398, March 22, 2017

FACTS:
>A buy-bust operation against appellant was conducted.
>Appellant denied allegation.
>RTC convicted appellant. RTC held that the failure of the prosecution to show that
the
police officers conducted the required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence
confiscated did not automatically render accused-appellant's arrest illegal or the items
seized from him as inadmissible for it was shown that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items were preserved by the apprehending officers.
>CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
WHETHER THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIMES CHARGED HAS
BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

HELD:
The elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs
are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment. Similarly, it is essential that the
transaction or sale be proved to have actually taken place coupled with the presentation
in court of evidence of corpus delicti which means the actual commission by someone of
the particular crime charged.
On the other hand, to successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs, the following elements must be established: (1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the drug.
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/ confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of
movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the
person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as
evidence, and the final disposition.
In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to demonstrate substantial compliance
by the apprehending officers with the safeguards provided by R.A. No. 9165 as regards
the rule on chain of custody.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v JOSE BELMAR UMAPAS,
G.R. No. 215742, March 22, 2017

FACTS:
>Appellant mauled his wife Gemma (+) and with the use of alcohol intended for
coleman or lantern, doused her with it and set her on fire.
>The officers were able to get her testimony while in the hospital. Though she spoke
slowly with eyes closed, Gemma was said to be coherent and even identified her
husband (appellant) as her assailant.
>Gemma was asked if she felt that she was dying and she said “yes”.
>A nurse was present when her statement was present and signed as a witness.
>Appellant interposed alibi and denial
> RTC convicted appellant of Parricide. CA affirmed

ISSUE:
Whether or not the statements of Gemma in the hospital were dying declarations.

HELD:
While witnesses in general can only testify to facts derived from their own
perception, a report in open court of a dying person's declaration is recognized as an
exception to the rule against hearsay if it is "made under the consciousness of an
impending death that is the subject of inquiry in the case." It is considered as "evidence
of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of his
impending death would make a careless and false accusation."
Four requisites must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible,
thus: (1) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant's death. (2) at the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under
the consciousness of an impending death. (3) the declarant is competent as a witness.
(4) the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide,
in which the declarant is the victim.
In the instant case, all of the four requisites were complied with.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ARIEL MENDOZA,
G.R. No. 224295, March 22, 2017

FACTS:
>AAA, 5 years old is the daughter of the appellant. AAA recalled that she was raped
by her own father when their own house was being demolished.
>Appellant successfully consummated the crime when AAA’s grandfather arrived
>AAA’s testimony during the trial was a reiteration of her narration of the incident in
her sworn statement
>RTC convicted appellant. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:
The appeal lacks merit.
There is no question that all of the foregoing elements were duly established by the
prosecution in the instant case. AAA consistently and categorically stated during the trial
that the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her against her will. Even at her
tender age, she was able to clearly relay the incident in a vernacular familiar to her and
even demonstrated how she was violated.
The elements of minority and relationship were also duly established during the trial
by the admission of the parties and the presentation of AAA’s certificate of live birth,
where the accused-appellant was identified as the father and also verified that the victim
was only 5 years old at the time of the incident.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v MYRNA GAYOSO,
G.R. No. 206590, March 27, 2017

FACTS:
>Police officers conducted surveillance on appellant after receiving reports that she
was peddling prohibited drugs and they were able to confirm that she is really engaged
in illegal drug activities.
>A search warrant was issued, however, prior to the implementation of the search
warrant, some officers conducted a “confirmation test-buy” wherein one of them acted as
a poseur-buyer with marked money.
>when the transaction was completed, they read the content of the search warrant.
>they invited barangay officials and the media to witness the search
>several sachets of drugs and drug paraphernalia were seized
>Appellant interposed denial and frame-up
> RTC convicted appellant. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the search warrant was issued after finding a probable cause.

HELD:
Probable cause for a valid search warrant is defined "as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched." The probable cause must be "determined
personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized." Probable cause does not mean actual and
positive cause, nor does it import absolute certainty.
The determination of the existence of probable cause is concerned only with the
question of whether the affiant has reasonable wounds to believe that the accused
committed or is committing the crime charged.
Here, the records reveal that the trial court issued the search warrant after deposing
two witnesses. The deposition of the witness shows that he had personal knowledge of
appellant's drug pushing activities which served as basis for the finding of probable
cause for the issuance of the search warrant.
The "test-buy" operation conducted by the police officers is not prohibited by law.
It does not amount to instigation. As in this case, the solicitation of drugs from appellant
by the poseur buyer merely furnishes evjdence of a course of conduct.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v JESUSANO ARCENAL,
G.R. No. 216015, March 27, 2017

FACTS:
>Alvin(+), a tricycle driver, was waiting for his turn in the tricycle terminal.
> Alvin went ahead with his lone passenger and passenger who is the appellant.
> 15 minutes later, Flores(another tricycle driver) was en route to the terminal after
dropping his passenger when he saw Appellant driving speedily Alvin's tricycle alone
coming from the direction of Forest Park Subdivision
>In the morning, Alvin’s body was found dead at the Forest Park
>Alvin’s tricycle was found in another barangay
>RTC convicted appellant of carnapping with homicide. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution has successfully proven beyond reasonable doubt that
Arcenal is guilty of the crime of carnapping with homicide.

HELD:
In every criminal conviction, the prosecution is required to prove two things beyond
reasonable doubt: (1) the fact of the commission of the crime charged, or the presence
of all the elements of the offense; and (2) the fact that the accused was the perpetrator
of the crime.
To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be
proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original
criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
The pieces of circumstantial evidence presented are consistent with one another,
thus, establishes Arcenal 's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial, indirect or
presumptive evidence, if sufficient, can replace direct evidence to warrant the conviction
of an accused, provided that: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all these
circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others,
is the one who committed the crime.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v JUANITO ENTRAMPAS
G.R. No. 212161, March 29, 2017

FACTS:
>Entrampas(appellant) and BBB(AAA’s mother) are in a common-law relationship
for 8 years, hence, AAA (11-yr old victim), who lived with them considered appellant his
adoptive father
>Appellant repeatedly raped AAA since most of the time BBB (mother) is on the
beach collecting shrimps and shells for a living.
>BBB observed some changes in AAA’s body and months after, her belly had
become noticeably bigger
>BBB brought AAA to the hospital and there, they found out that AAA was pregnant
>Appellant admitted to BBB that he is the father of the child of AAA
>During the hearing, he denied having raped the victim because was in the ricefield
most of the time
>RTC convicted appellant. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 2 counts of statutory
rape.

HELD:
The alleged inconsistencies "are collateral and minor matters which do not at all
touch upon the commission of the crime nor affect the minor victim's credibility." AAA's
inability to recall the precise date and time of the rape is immaterial as these are not
elements of the crime. Moreover, "rape victims are not expected to cherish in their
memories an accurate account of the dates, number of times and manner they were
violated.
Inconsistencies on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance,
truth, or weight of the victim's testimonies.
Lastly, her failure to resist the sexual aggression and to immediately report the
incident to the authorities or to her mother did not undermine her credibility. The silence
of the rape victim does not negate her sexual molestation or make her charge baseless,
untrue, or fabricated.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v KING REX AMBATANG
G.R. No. 205855, March 29,2017

FACTS:
>In Vidal’s house, they heard a barrage of stones hurled at their house. When they
peeped outside, they saw appellant with a companion
>They called the barangay tanods who then went to appellant’s house
>Tanods saw appellant sharpening a knife, then suddenly, he was nowhere to be
found
>Appellant went to the house of Ely Vidal(+), 60 years old and stabbed him to death
>Appellant ran but was apprehended by the tanods
>There were eyewitnesses and the wife of the victim even testified that before Ely(+)
died, he embraced her and told her “si King Rex sinaksak ako ng sinaksak.”
>Appellant denied allegations against him
>RTC convicted appellant of murder. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
It is settled that "factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the credibility
of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal, unless the trial court is shown to have overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance. " An examination of the
records shows there is nothing that would warrant the reversal of the Decisions of the
Regional Trial Court and of the Court of Appeals.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v TIRSO SIBBU
G.R. No. 214757, March 29, 2017

FACTS:
>Byan (complainant) and his family were in the azotea of their house when he saw a
man wearing a camouflage uniform with a long firearm approaching their house. Prior to
the firing incident, Bryan saw the gunman fixed his bonnet, allowing him to recognize
that it was appellant as there were Christmas lights hanging around.
>appellant fired at the house killing 3 of the family members
>The appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi.
>RTC convicted appellant of murder and multiple murder. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not eyewitness Bryan positively saw appellant as the assailant to convict
him of the crime charged.

HELD:
The appeal is unmeritorious.
We uphold the findings of the RTC, which were affirmed by the CA, that Bryan
positively identified appellant as the person who shot at him and killed Warlito, Ofelia,
and Trisha. We have consistently ruled that factual findings of trial courts, especially
when affirmed by the appellate court, are entitled to respect and generally should not be
disturbed on appeal unless certain substantial facts were overlooked which, if
considered, may affect the outcome of the case.
We find that Bryan was able to identify the appellant as the assailant in the shooting
as he was only five meters away from the appellant when the shooting incident
happened.; there is no reason to doubt his positive testimony.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v CARLITO CLARO
G.R. No. 199894, April 5, 2017

FACTS:
>AAA, a housemaid received a text message from appellant, who is a security
guard near AAA’s work place, asking her if they could meet, with which the former
granted.
>They ate in Jollibee and thereafter, appellant brought her to a nearby house which
was later known to be “Aroma Motel”
>AAA refused to enter the motel but appellant pulled her.
>AAA entered the toilet and called her cousin who is a policeman but failed to tell
him her exact location
>appellant forcefully undressed her and succeeded in consummating the crime.
>After which, AAA immediately went out of the room but was compelled to ride with
him in the same passenger jeepney because she did not know her way back
>Upon arriving home, she promptly reported the incident to German (police cousin),
who instructed her to contact the accused and agree to meet with him again so that they
could apprehend him. Appellant was thereafter caught and was brought to NBI
>AAA was subjected to a medical examination which confirmed the presence of
fresh deep hymenal lacerations
>Appellant denied allegations
> RTC convicted appellant. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Did the R TC and the CA correctly find and pronounce the accused guilty of rape
beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD:
The Court acquits the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.
It is noticeable that the versions of AAA and the accused ultimately contradicted
each other on whether rape or consensual sex had transpired between them. Their
contradictions notwithstanding, the circumstances - whether based on her recollection or
on his - indicated that she had willingly met with him in order to go on a lovers' date.
The sweetheart defense is not usually regarded with favor in the absence of strong
corroboration. This is because the mere fact that the accused and the victim were lovers
should not exculpate him from criminal liability for rape.
To be noted first and foremost is that he and AAA were adults capable of consenting
to the sexual intercourse. The established circumstances - their having agreed to go on
a lovers' date; their travelling together a long way from their meeting place on board the
jeepney; their alighting on Rizal Avenue to take a meal together; their walking together to
the motel, and checking in together at the motel without the complainant manifesting
resistance; and their entering the designated room without protest from her - indicated
beyond all doubt that they had consented to culminate their lovers' date in bed inside the
motel.
ROBERTO FUENTES v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 186421, April 17, 2017

FACTS:
>Valenzuela, owns Triple A Ship Chandling and General Maritime Services (Triple
A) who operates from 1993-2001 through a business permit issued by the LGU
>In 2002, appellant, then Mayor of the municipality refused to sign Triple A’s permit
despite compliance with all other requirements.
>Triple A was still able to temporarily operate because of a permit issue by the BOC
and Port Management Office.
>Triple A’s operation was shut down by BOC when the latter received an
unnumbered Memorandum alleging that Valenzuela was involved in smuggling and drug
trading
>For his part, appellant allege that prior to 2002, he has been hearing rumors about
the illegal transactions of Triple A but it was only in 2002 that he received written reports
confirming the said illegal activities; hence, he did not allow the issuance of a business
permit.
>Fuentes maintained that if he went on with the approval of such permit and the
rumors turned out to be true, many will suffer and will be victimized; on the other hand, if
the rumors were false, then only one stands to suffer.
>Sandiganbayan found appellant guilty

ISSUE:
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the Sandiganbayan
correctly convicted Fuentes of the crime of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

HELD:
The petition is without merit.
The elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 are as follows: (a) that the
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions
(or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public officers); (b) that he acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his
action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the discharge of his
functions.
In the instant case, Fuentes's acts were not only committed with manifest partiality,
but also with bad faith.
EDUARDO QUIMVEL v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017

FACTS:
>Appellant is the caretaker of the ducks of the grandmother of AAA (7-yr old victim)
who was just living meters away from AAA’s house
>One night, YYY (father) went out of the house to buy kerosene since there was no
electricity. While YYY was away, Quimvel arrived bringing a vegetable viand from AAA's
grandfather. AAA and her siblings then requested the appellant to stay since they were
afraid of the dark.
> AAA and siblings went to sleep when AAA was awakened when she felt
appellant’s right leg on top of her and sensed that he was inserting his right hand inside
her panty and felt that he was touching her vagina. AAA removed his hand
>XXX (mother) arrived from work and asked her children what they were doing while
she was away. BBB (sibling) told her that appellant touched their ate.
> They immediately proceeded to the barangay and narrated the crime committed.
>Appellant denied the allegations
>RTC found appellant guilty of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Assuming without admitting that he is guilty hereof, he may be convicted only of acts
of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and not in relation to
Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.

HELD:
We affirm the CA' s Decision finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Acts of Lasciviousness as penalized under Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610.
According to appellant, to be held liable under the latter law, it is necessary that
the victim is involved in or subjected to prostitution or other sexual abuse, and that the
failure to allege such element constituted a violation of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and the cause of accusation against him. His argument fails to
persuade.
Case law dictates that the allegations in the Information must be in such form as
is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged and enable the court to know the proper judgment. The
Information must allege clearly and accurately the elements of the crime charged. The
facts and circumstances necessary to be included therein are determined by reference
to the definition and elements of the specific crimes
The main purpose of requiring the elements of a crime to be set out in the
Information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense because he is
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v GEORGE GACUSAN
G.R. No. 207776, April 26, 2017

FACTS:
>Appellant and BBB (AAA’s mother) were common law partners. AAA (15 years old)
and BBB then went to live with appellant.
>After 8 months of common law relationship, BBB died, leaving AAA an orphan and
left under appellants care
>When BBB was still alive, AAA sleeps in a separate room but after her demise,
AAA would sleep beside appellant for fear of ghosts
>AAA was trying to sleep when she felt the hand of appellant touching her private
parts inside her shorts which she did not remove because she was used to it. DDD
(Appellant’s 19-yr old son) was also in the room sleeping in a folding bed.
>While trying to sleep, appellant insisted on inserting his penis into AAA’s vagina.
AAA did not make any noise despite the pain for fear of the appellant and for fear of
losing a family with whom she depended for support.
>AAA confided with her teacher. They brought her to a hospital for medical
examination
> Appellant denied the allegations
>RTC convicted appellant of simple rape. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
The sole issue for resolution is whether appellant's guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt despite the alleged failure of the prosecution to prove that appellant
employed force, threat, or intimidation in raping AAA.

HELD:
The appeal lacks merit.
The issue regarding the need to prove actual force or intimidation becomes
superfluous since it was already established that appellant was the common-law partner
of AAA's deceased mother, hence, the appellant has moral ascendency over the victim.
Moral ascendancy replaces violence or intimidation in rape committed by a close-kin as
cited in People v. Corpuz.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v. PORFERIO CULAS y RAGA

June 5, 2017
G.R. No. 211166

Porferio Culas was convicted of statutory rape under paragraph 1 (d), Article 266-A
in relation to 266-B (1) of the RPC sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole, with MODIFICATIONS as to the amounts of civil
indemnity and damages awarded. Thus, [accused-appellant] is ordered to pay the
following amounts: (a) ₱l 00,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) ₱l 00,000.00 as moral
damages; and (c) ₱l00,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus legal interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum on the monetary awards from the dated of the finality of this
judgment until fully paid.

Before an Entry of Judgment could be issued, the Court received a Letter from the
Bureau of Corrections informing the Court of accused-appellant's death on February 8,
2014.

Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant's death prior to his

final conviction by the Court renders dismissible the criminal case against him.

 Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability
is totally extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit:

Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is

totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary

penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment;

DOCTRINE: DEATH: EXTINGUISHMENT OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY

- the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only
the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

- the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARLON SORIANO y NARAG

June 5, 2017
G.R. No. 216063

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

MARLON SORIANO, armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill and with
evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there Willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, stab to death victim PERFECTO NARAG inflicting upon him mortal stab
wounds which caused his untimely death.

The crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, and in
disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of his age, being an old
man.

Soriano arrived at Narag’s house and asked where Perfecto was. Ederlina asked
appellant why he was looking for Perfecto. Instead of replying to her query, Soriano
barged into their house and proceeded to Perfecto' s room. Seeing that appellant was
carrying a bladed weapon, Ederlina shouted to Perfecto to close the door to his room.

While Perfecto was attempting to close the door to his room, Soriano grabbed his
neck and immediately stabbed him at the right chest while uttering the words "I will kill
you." Ederlina tried to stop Soriano from stabbing her husband but he pushed her away
and stabbed her instead at the right wrist and forehead. She pleaded with Soriano to
stop stabbing his uncle; Perfecto but appellant did not heed her plea. Perfecto also
pleaded with him to stop his stabbing frenzy, but he paid no attention to his pleas.

Villamor, the tricycle driver in their employ, came in and forced appellant out of
Perfecto's room. However, Soriano was able to return inside the room and stabbed
Perfecto at the back again, Ederlina added that after Soriano left their house, she saw
him and his brother Martin Soriano at the street, with Soriano himself yelling "Winner."

The RTC of Tuguegarao City convicted the accused and ruled that the fact that
Ederlina Narag was able to shout at the victim to close his room does not rule out the
presence of treachery. It has been ruled that while a victim may have been warned of
possible danger to his person, this doctrine for the victim had no opportunity to defend
himself precisely because it was simply unexpected to be the subject of an attack right
inside his own abode and he was unarmed, with no opportunity to put up a defense.

Prosecution failed to show that there was evident premeditation, such that (a) the
time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating
that the offender clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (c) a sufficient
interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act.

Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime was committed in the dwelling of
the offended party, if the latter has not given provocation or if the victim was killed inside
his house. The victim was killed not merely in his house but in his own room; thus the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be appreciated against the accused.

The Court is also convinced that the offense was committed in disregard of the
respect due to the age of the victim. The accused knew fully well that the victim was
already old because he is his uncle. The accused perpetrated the act against his ageing
uncle knowing that by himself, said victim's physical condition due to old age would not
allow him to sufficiently defend himself anymore.

Aggrieved, appellant sought recourse before the Court of Appeals but the appeal
was denied, thus the case was brought to the Supreme Court which then upheld the
decision of the RTC based on the following grounds:

Treachery: Duly Established; Qualified the Killing to Murder

By ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the
slightest provocation on the part of the victim, the qualifying circumstance of treachery
ought to and should be appreciated. Verily, what is decisive is that the attack was
executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate.
It was established that Marlon purposely sought the unsuspecting Perfecto with intent to
inflict mortal wound on him. Perfecto was unarmed at that time and there was no means
of escape because he was trapped inside his room. In fact, Perfecto was about to close
the door to his room when Marlon suddenly and swiftly stabbed him. Lastly, Marlon
aimed at Perfecto's head, chest and back ensuring that he would not have a chance to
retaliate. Obviously, the way it was executed made it impossible for the victim to respond
or defend himself. He just had no opportunity to repel the sudden attack, rendering him
completely helpless.

The fact that Ederlina Narag was able to shout at the victim to close his room
does not rule out the presence of treachery. It has been ruled that while a victim may
have been warned of possible danger to his person, in treachery what is decisive is that
the attack was executed in such a manner as to make it impossible for the victim to
retaliate. The case at bar typifies this doctrine for the victim had no opportunity to defend
himself precisely because it was simply unexpected to be the subject of an attack right
inside his own abode and he was unarmed, with no opportunity to put up a defense. It
must also be noted that the victim was already old and that his reflexes could have been
worn down by age so he could not have been in a position to swiftly and sufficiently ward
off the attack.
June 5, 2017
G.R. No. 216937
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. TITO AMOC y MAMBATALAN
TIJAM, J:
According to the facts, it was established that Tito Amoc y Mambatalan, by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of one AAA, his step-daughter, a thirteen (13) year old minor,
against her will.
AAA narrated her tragic experience which happened in April 2009 at around 6
o'clock in the morning, when she was only thirteen years old. Amoc brought her into their
bedroom, took off all her clothes, tied her legs with a rope, undressed himself, and
proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her. Amoc covered AAA's mouth to prevent her
from asking help, he pointed a knife at her and tried to stab her. AAA could not tell her
mother what happened because accused-appellant was always tailing her.
AAA also testified that the second sexual abuse happened on July 12, 2009.
Amoc even warned AAA not to say anything about the incident.
AAA's mother, BBB, noticed that AAA's stomach had a slight bulge and
conducted a pregnancy test, which yielded a positive result. AAA later on divulged that
accused-appellant had been raping her and that he is the father of her baby. AAA gave
birth to a baby girl sometime in December 2009.
Amoc admitted that he had sexual congress with AAA but argued that the same
was consensual. Accused-appellant claimed that it was an accepted practice among the
Ata-Manobo, an indigenous cultural group, to take one's daughter as a second wife.
Amoc appealed before the CA but the same was denied thus, the case was brought
before the Supreme Court, where he argued that: 1) that the prosecution failed to
prove the element of force and intimidation; and, 2) that his admission of carnal
knowledge of AAA does not amount to rape.
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative and held that there is no cogent reason to
deviate from the CA ruling affirming the RTC's factual finding that the accused-appellant
is guilty of two counts of rape.
For a charge of rape under the above-mentioned provision to prosper, the
following elements must be present: (1) accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of
AAA; and, (2) he accompanied such act by force, threat or intimidation.
The first element of carnal knowledge is present because accused-appellant, in fact,
admits that he had carnal knowledge of AAA. The point of contention is whether there
was force, or intimidation, or threat in the said act.
The evidence on record sufficiently established that the accused-appellant
employed force, intimidation and threat in carrying out his sexual advances on AAA. The
CA correctly found that the accused-appellant employed force upon the person of AAA.
Accused-appellant tied AAA's legs with a rope, climbed on top of her, and covered her
mouth to prevent her from asking for help. Amoc also threatened AAA when he pointed
a knife at her and tried to stab her. Clearly, contrary to the accused-appellant's
contention, the element of force and intimidation is present in this case.
And even assuming arguendo that AAA failed to resist, the same does not
necessarily amount to consent to accused-appellant's criminal acts. It is not
necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; as moral influence or
ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation. Jurisprudence holds that
the failure of the victim to shout for help does not negate rape. Even the victim's
lack of resistance, especially when intimidated by the offender into submission, does not
signify voluntariness or consent. The Court in some cases, acknowledged that even
absent any actual force or intimidation, rape may be committed if the malefactor has
moral ascendancy over the victim. Considering that Amoc was the common-law spouse
of AAA's mother, and as such, he was exercising parental authority over AAA. Indeed, in
this case, moral ascendancy is substituted for force and intimidation.
Lastly, the Court noted that the Amoc being the common-law spouse of AAA's
mother, the aggravating circumstance of relationship cannot be appreciated, as a
qualifying circumstance for it was not specifically alleged in the information. The
circumstances of relationship and minority must be both alleged in the
information and proved during trial, to be convicted of the crime of qualified rape.
June 5, 2017
G.R. No. 218942
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROLANDO BISORA y LAGONOY
TIJAM, J:

Rolando Bisora, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation employed
upon the person of one AAA, 16 years old, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said minor complainant against her will and
without her consent, thereby subjecting the said minor complainant to sexual abuse
which debased, degraded and demeaned her intrinsic worth and dignity as a human
being.

AAA, the complainant, testified that she was raped by accused-appellant twice:

on September 9, 2011 and May 23, 2012. AAA declared that Rolando Bisora started
courting her in September 2011, and they became sweethearts one month thereafter.
AAA and Rolando Bisora relationship remained a secret as AAA was afraid of her
parents.

AAA narrated that she was requested by her grandmother to call her uncle at the
billiard hall. Rolando Bisora, who was also at the same place, asked AAA if they could
talk. Bisora then brought AAA to the restroom where he forced her to have sexual
intercourse with him. Fearing that her parents would know what happened between her
and Rolando Bisora, AAA went away and stayed with her aunt in Cavite. Nevertheless,
AAA's parents learned about the incident. AAA alleged that she wanted to file a
complaint then but she did not know Rolando’s surname.

Meanwhile, AAA was again raped on May 23, 2012, at around 2 o'clock in the
afternoon. AAA was then at her house when Bisora invited her to talk. Accused-
appellant brought AAA to the neighbor's comfort room. While inside, Bisora told AAA to
remove her shorts. Fearing Bisora, AAA complied. Bisora then inserted his penis inside
AAA's vagina, while in a standing position.

Through their neighbors, AAA's parents had learned what happened. AAA's
parents then brought her to the police station where she executed a written statement
regarding the incident. AAA declared in open court that she was a minor when she was
raped by accused-appellant.
Bisora, on the other hand, denied that he raped AAA. He stated that he was
merely introduced to AAA by a common friend, after which they became sweethearts.
He admitted to being in the billiard hall and seeing AAA therein on May 23, 2012, when
AAA was allegedly raped, but denied that he had a sexual encounter with her.

RTC rendered judgment, finding Bisora guilty of rape. The said decision was
assailed before the Court of Appeals but was denied, thus it was brought before the
Supreme Court which denied the subjected appeal and averred that, for conviction in the
crime of rape, the following elements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that
the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished
(a) through the use of force or intimidation, or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is
demented.

In this case, Bisora’s argument that the prosecution failed to establish force or
intimidation was without merit.

AAA's failure to shout or to tenaciously resist accused-appellant should not be

taken against her since such negative assertion would not ipso facto make voluntary her
submission to Bisora’s criminal act. In rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in
the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the
crime. As already settled in our jurisprudence, not all victims react the same way. Some
people may cry out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while
others may appear to yield to the intrusion. Some may offer strong resistance while
others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all. Moreover, resistance is not
an element of rape. A rape victim has no burden to prove that she did all within her
power to resist the force or intimidation employed upon her. As long as the force or
intimidation is present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point.

The Court held that Bisora employed force upon AAA when he forcibly held AAA
by the hand as he led her to the comfort room. The Court also find that intimidation
facilitated the commission of the offense, considering accused-appellant's persistent
threats to AAA in saying “subukan mong magsumbong sa magulang mo”.  AAA, was
then a 16-year old girl who heavily feared her parents, while Bisora was a 42-year old
man. Evidently, it is not unreasonable to discern that AAA was cowed to surrendering to
accused-appellant's bestial desires. We note that in AAA's direct testimony, she narrated
that she felt afraid when accused-appellant uttered the said statement.7

As to Bisora ‘s claim that he and AAA were sweethearts, such fact does not
necessarily negate AAA's lack of consent to the sexual encounter with accused-
appellant. As has been consistently ruled, "a love affair does not justify rape, for the
beloved cannot be sexually violated against her will. Love is not a license for lust."

The level, of healing of AAA's hymen does not cast any doubt to the conclusion
that she was raped. The essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman against
her consent. A freshly broken hymen is not the possibility of rape cannot be ruled out.
Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or
laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a conviction for rape. To repeat, rupture of
the hymen or laceration of any part of the woman's genitalia is not indispensable to a
conviction for rape.10
In sum, the prosecution was able to establish accused-appellant's guilt of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.
June 5, 2017
G.R. No. 216987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WILFREDO PACAYRA y MABUTOL
TIJAM, J:
AAA was born on February 28, 1993 to parents BBB and herein appellant
Wilfredo Pacayra.
When AAA was in the first grade and was about seven (7) years old, BBB gave
birth to a child named CCC. The family was then living in Samar. Pacayra told AAA to
stop going to school so that she can attend to her household chores including taking
care of CCC. AAA' siblings still went to school so that she was often left alone at home
taking care of CCC.
One day, AAA was about to change CCC's clothes when Pacayra suddenly
arrived at home, took her hand, placed himself on top of her, and used his weight to
immobilize her. BBB called her downstairs and asked her what she and her father were
doing upstairs. AAA replied that she was merely changing CCC's diaper and that her
father was not doing anything. Pacayra then took off AAA's shorts and panties. While on
top of her, he also took off his pants, took out his penis and inserted it into her vagina.
AAA felt immense pain and kept crying during the entire ordeal. AAA did not tell her
mother about appellant’s bestial acts for fear that they would quarrel.
The following day, AAA left their house and went to her friend's house. She did
not go home until around five o'clock in the afternoon. When she arrived, Pacayra
scolded her and asked her where she went and why she was roaming around when she
had to take care of her sibling. Pacayra took out a broom and hit her. BBB was not at
home at the time since she was out gambling.
Pacayra raped AAA a second time less than a year after the first incident and
while they were still living in Samar. Thereafter, due to the financial difficulties they were
facing, Pacayra decided to bring his family to his mother's house in YYY, Samar.
One evening, BBB went out to see a benefit dance. Pacayra asked for BBB's
whereabouts and upon learning that she was at a benefit dance, ordered AAA to fetch
her. When BBB arrived at the house, she and appellant Pacayra after which she went
back to the dance and left appellant alone at the house with their children - AAA, DDD
and CCC. Once DDD and CCC fell asleep, appellant removed AAA's shorts and panties.
Pacayra’s actions awakened DDD and CCC but he simply kicked DDD and pushed CCC
away. Pacayra then placed himself on top of AAA and inserted his penis into her vagina.
AAA could not bear the pain but she was unable to do anything but cry. AAA did not tell
her grandmother about the incident because she was afraid that the latter would quarrel
with appellant.
Thereafter, Pacayra and his family moved to Pacayra's brother's house also
located in YYY, Samar. At one point during their stay there, Pacayra was left alone at
the house with AAA, DDD and CCC because BBB went to XXX, Samar to attend the
town fiesta. Appellant and his three children slept in the same room. That night, Pacayra
told AAA to sleep beside him because it was cold. As AAA was about to go to sleep,
Pacayra suddenly placed himself on top of her, removed her short pants, and inserted
his penis into her vagina. Pacayra held AAA and used his weight to render her immobile.
Afraid that her parents would fight because of her, AAA did not tell her mother about her
father's most recent dastardly deeds but she did relate the incidents to her older sister,
EEE. Who did not do anything to help her.
AAA eventually told her mother BBB, about the sexual abuse that she suffered at
the hands of Pacayra, but BBB refused to believe her. She got angry, scolded AAA, and
accused her of lying. BBB turned her back on her child and chose to side with appellant.
Sometime in January 2006, AAA went to Gloria Tacad, their neighbor in XXX,
Samar, to ask for help. AAA told Tacad that she was being sexually molested by her
father. Tacad asked her why she did not immediately report the abuse and AAA replied
that it was because she was afraid that appellant would kill her. Tacad brought AAA to
the Barangay Captain of XXX, Samar to file a complaint. Afterwards, Tacad took AAA to
the office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in
Hinabangan, Samar.
Subsequenty, AAA was brought to the Eastern Visayas Regional Center in
Tacloban City where she was examined. The medical examination revealed that AAA
had incomplete, old hymenal lacerations at 3 and 9 o'clock positions. The attending
physician prepared a Medico-Legal Report which states that the physical injuries found
on AAA's body were compatible with the alleged date of infliction, i.e., within the last five
years.
The RTC convicted Pacayra with counts of rape, which was then appealed and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, thus the case went up to the Supreme Court and
convicted Pacayra for four counts of Qualified Rape upholding that all of the elements
of rape under Article 266-A 1(a) of the RPC are present: 1) that the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman; and 2) that such act was accomplished through force, threat or
intimidation.
The Supreme Court further noted that when the offender is the victim's father, there
need not be actual force, threat or intimidation because the moral and physical dominion
of the father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires.
People of the Philippines v. Henry Bentayo
G.R. No. 216938. June 5, 2017
PERALTA, J.:
Facts:

AAA, the victim, was born on November 11, 1991 to spouses BBB and CCC. When
AAA was 7 years old, her father died and, thereafter, her mother re-married. Her new
husband, Henry Bentayo was then a carpenter and charcoal maker upon whom she had
two children.

One morning, the victim's mother CCC told the former to accompany Bentayo, to
the farm at Lagao, Lambayong, Sultan Kudarat to help the latter in making charcoal. The
same day, Bentayo and AAA arrived at the farm and, thereafter, Bentayo told AAA to
cook food while appellant was making charcoal. Afterwards, Bentayo suddenly held the
hands of AAA, then covered her mouth, and dragged her. Bentayo warned AAA not to
shout otherwise he would hack her. AAA tried to resist but was overpowered by
appellant's strength. Bentayo then laid her on the ground, undressed her, removed her
pants and underwear, showed his penis, and masturbated. Thereafter, Bentayo mounted
on top of AAA, spread her legs, inserted his penis into her vagina, and made several
coitus movements, all the while oblivious of AAA's pleas.

One evening, Bentayo raped AAA again at their kubo in the farm. While AAA was
sleeping, she felt Bentayo, who was armed with a bolo, touch her face, her breast and
then her vagina. Bentayo proceeded to undress her, kissed her private parts, and then
threatened to kill her if she shouted. Bentayo then mounted on top of AAA and inserted
his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, Bentayo further threatened AAA that he will kill her,
her mother and her siblings if she told anyone what happened.

Cordero, a neighbor of AAA, heard the latter crying, thus, she immediately went to
AAA's house to peep inside and saw Bentayo beating AAA. When Cordero went near
the door, a Bentayo stopped beating AAA and immediately went out of the house and
walked away. It was then that AAA confided to Cordero that appellant was forcing her to
go with him to the farm where appellant intends to rape her again. Cordero relayed the
matter to AAA's mother. Cordero, thereafter, accompanied AAA to the police station. The
medical examination conducted on AAA showed that she has "old, healed lacerations of
vagina at 1 o'clock, 3 o'clock; 5 o'clock; 7 o'clock and 11 o'clock."

A case was filed, particularly Article 266-A paragraph 1 in relation to Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code of the Philippines and Republic Act No. 7610.

Bentayo pleaded not guilty but was later on convicted.

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Bentayo appealed before the Supreme
Court, thus this case.

Under paragraph 1 (a) of Article 266-A of the RPC, the elements of rape are: (1)
that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act was
accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation. However, when the offender is the
victim's father (in this case tho, a stepfather), as in this case, there need not be actual
force, threat or intimidation because when a father commits the odious crime of rape
against his own daughter, who was also a minor at the time of the commission of the
offenses, his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence and
intimidation. Thus, all the elements are present.
June 5, 2017
G.R. No. 218114
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SALVADOR AYCARDO
PERALTA, J:
In 2007, private complainant AAA, then 11 years old, was residing in Manito,
Albay, at the house of her Tiya Tess and the latter’s husband “Tiyu Buddy”, as AAA’s
mother, BBB, who was based in Batangas, entrusted her to Tiya Tess, BBB’s sister.
AAA was in a room inside the house of Aycardo, when the latter entered,
attempted to remove her shorts and panties and tried to insert his finger into her vagina.
Aycardo failed to undress AAA because she resisted his advances, but Aycardo was
able to touch her vagina with his finger. AAA then ran to the house of her cousin Joy.
Later in the evening that same day, Aycardo came by to fetch her, telling her she
needed to prepare his and Tiya Tess’ meal. AAA yielded and returned to Aycardo’s
house.
AAA prepared supper as instructed and had dinner with Aycardo and his son
Bongbong, his cousin. After supper, AAA sought Aycardo’s permission to spend the
night at the house of Tiya Ening (another sister of her mother) but Aycardo denied her
request. As told, AAA just went to the sala to watch TV, and thereafter, slept on a mat
where Bongbong lay between her and Aycardo. In the middle of the night, AAA was
roused from her sleep when she felt somebody removing her panties and shorts, who
turned out to be Aycardo. AAA resisted but Aycardo told her he would do it slowly.
Aycardo then undressed and inserted his penis into her vagina. Gripped with fear, she
just wept, with Aycardo warning to kill her if she tells anyone of the incident.
One night, while sleeping with her mother BBB, AAA yelled in her sleep “Enough
Tiyo Buddy! I do not want anymore!” Alarmed, BBB immediately asked the latter why
she mentioned Aycardo’s name in her dream, but AAA did not respond. The following
day, BBB again asked AAA why the latter uttered Aycardo’s name in her dream and this
time, AAA told BBB that Aycardo had raped her.
BBB and AAA reported the incident to the barangay then to the police station,
after which she was medically examined by forensic physician, trial ensued and Aycardo
was convicted ot the crimes of Acts of Lasciviousness and Qualified Rape.
Aggrieved by the RTC decision, Aycardo filed an appeal before the CA, arguing
that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him of the crimes of Acts of Lasciviousness and
Rape, despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but
the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC, until the case was appealed before the
Supreme Court where Aycardo further contended that he cannot be convicted of rape
because AAA’s testimony shows that his private part touched her vagina slightly only;
thus, it did not enter the labia of the pudendum of the female organ. He also noted that
the forensic physician who examined AAA did not clearly say that it was his penis, which
caused the findings in the medico-legal report that showed that there is a markedly
dilated and redundant flesh-type hymen and a sign of blunt vaginal penetrating trauma.
He then stressed that no laceration was found on AAA’s vagina, and that her medical
examination was conducted six (6) months after the alleged sexual abuse, hence, the
possibility that she had sexual experience with someone else cannot be discounted.
 The Supreme Court convicted Aycardo citing People of the Philippines v. Padit,
where the Court explained why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia
consummates the rape. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual
bodily connections with a woman; as such, a mere touching of the external genitalia by
the penis capable of consummating the sexual act already constitutes consummated
rape.
It is not disputed that accused-appellant failed to completely undress AAA on that
occasion since she was unable to fend off his advances. This, however, does not
necessarily negate accused-appellant’s act of having successfully touched AAA’s vagina
with his finger in his struggle to remove her clothes.
G.R. No. 217459
June 7, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALBERTO FORTUNA ALBERCA
TIJAM, J:
Questioned in this appeal is the Decision 1 dated July 16, 2014 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01071, which sustained accused-appellant's conviction for
two counts of Qualified Rape by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25 in Maasin
City, Southern Leyte, in its Decision2 dated June 15, 2009 in Criminal Case Nos. 2304
and 2305.
AAA way home from her grandmother's house, Alberca, her mother's live-in
partner, waylaid her and dragged her towards the forest. Upon reaching the Mabaguhan
trees, Alberca removed his short pants and then undressed AAA, she tried to resist but
he threatened to kill her with the long firearm that he was carrying at that time. Alberca
then made her lie down, held her hands together, placed himself on top of her, inserted
his penis into her vagina and made rapid push and pull movements. Thereafter, AAA
went home and did not tell anybody about the incident as Alberca threatened to kill her
and her family.
Another rape incident happened as when AAA was on her way to school with her
brother and classmates when they saw Alberca who told AAA to go with him to the forest
and ordered her brother and classmates to go ahead and leave her. AAA refused but
Alberca held her hands and made her walk ahead of him. When they reached the forest,
he dragged her inside the hut, took his short pants off, undressed her, made her lie
down, inserted his penis into her vagina, and made repeated push and pull movements.
Thereafter, he told her to go to school. AAA's brother and classmates told her mother
that Alberca brought AAA to the forest. This prompted CCC to bring AAA to the police
station to report the incident and to the hospital for an examination, where it was found
out that AAA was no longer a virgin.
AAA was re-examined and found out that she was about four months pregnant.
The child was, however, delivered prematurely at seven months and died.
RTC gave full faith and credit to AAA's testimony, being a girl in her tender years,
pursuant to the principle that youth and immaturity, especially in a rape case, are
generally badges of truth and sincerity.
The RTC took into consideration the special qualifying circumstance of the
Alberca relationship to the victim, the same being properly alleged in the amended
information and proven during the trial, thus convicted Alberto Fortuna Alberca guilty of
two counts of qualified rape committed against AAA.
Aggrieved by the decision of the RTC, Alberca appealed to the CA which
sustained his conviction.
Alberca’s brought the case before the Supreme Court, hence, this appeal.
The Supreme Court, upheld the correctness of the Ruling made by the RTC
and CA, and expounded further that the absence of hymenal laceration is of no
moment. Contrary to the Alberca's theory, the same does not negate the fact of rape, as
a broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. The Supreme Court further cited
that in a previous case, it affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape despite the
absence of laceration on the victim's hymen since medical findings suggest that it is
possible for the victim's hymen to stay intact despite repeated sexual intercourse.
Lastly, the absence of hymenal fluid or spermatozoa is not a negation of
rape. The presence or absence thereof is immaterial since it is penetration, not
ejaculation, which constitutes the crime of rape.
G.R. No. 219615
June 7, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAFAEL AGUDO y DEL VALLE
TIJAM, J:
AAA, born on May 18, 1992, is Agudo's youngest daughter. Their family lived in a
small hut with merely a curtain as a makeshift door. Their small hut could not
accommodate all of them so AAA slept inside the hut while her parents stayed on a
bamboo bed outside.
Sometime in 2005, Agudo sexually abused AAA, who was 13 years old then.
Early morning, AAA was awakened by Agudo when he entered their hut and climbed
under the mosquito net where AAA slept. Surprised, she shouted and called her mother,
BBB, telling her that her father was inside their hut. BBB was awakened and asked why
Agudo was inside their hut at that time of the day. Agudo responded that he was just
looking for something and then went back to bed. Several moments later, Agudo went
back inside their hut and this time, succeeded in placing his hands inside AAA's
underwear to touch her vagina. Agudo was also able to lift AAA's shirt, hold her breasts,
and also insert his penis inside AAA's vagina, which caused her pain. AAA pleaded to
her father saying “Papa, huwag po, papa, huwag po” but this did not stop accused-
appellant from continuing with his bestial act. AAA did not tell her mother about the
incident as the Agudo threatened to kill her and her mother if she did so.
The incident happened several more times when they moved to a new house
adjacent to their hut. AAA testified that she was repeatedly raped by her father inside her
room on different occasions. Despite the door being closed, Agudo managed to enter
her room through the opening above the door or by climbing through the window.
AAA narrated the rape incident on September 11, 2008. She was still asleep
early morning when she felt someone pulling down her shorts. She saw Agudo and
started crying. Agudo started licking her vagina.
Another rape incident happened on September 15, 2008. Again, AAA was asleep
in her room when Agudo entered therein to sexually abuse his daughter. She cried for
help but Agudo was still able to consummate the bestiality. The next morning, AAA's
aunt, who lived nearby, went to AAA and asked her what happened last night as she
heard cries for help. Her mother likewise asked AAA about what happened that night.
AAA then revealed to them that her father had been sexually abusing her. They
immediately accompanied AAA to Barangay Captain Luis Famanilay to report the
same. BBB and AAA's aunt testified to corroborate this narration.
A case was filed and the RTC convicted Agudo of qualified rape, the case was
appealed before the CA.
In its assailed Decision, the CA upheld Agundo’s conviction, the case was
brought before the Supreme Court for Appeal, thus this case which sustained the
conviction and stated that the elements for the crime of rape under Article 266-A (1)(a) of
the Revised Penal Code, were proved by the prosecution, to wit: (1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished this act through force, threat, or
intimidation, which were qualified by the relation between Agudo and AAA, her daughter.
G.R. No. 220143
June 7, 2017
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JONATHAN BAAY y FALCO
TIJAM, J:
Facts:
AAA, a mental retardate was drying palay when the Baay invited her to go to the forest.
Upon arrival thereat, the Baay pulled down her shorts and underwear, then inserted his
penis in her vagina and started a pumping motion. It lasted quite long, after which, a
white liquid came out of the penis of the accused-appellant. Thereafter, she went home.
After the incident, AAA got pregnant.
Baay denied the allegations against him, and testified that AAA's house is about
500 meters away from their house and that he knew that AAA is mentally retarded. He
averred that he could not have, raped AAA in July 2005 because from May 15 to August
30, 2005, he was working on the farm of a pertain Motet Monajan which is about one
kilometer away from the forested area where the alleged crime took place. He stayed in
a hut beside the said farm and bought his needs at a store near the place. He further
averred that AAA's family accused him of rape because of the trees he planted beside
the pigpen owned by AAA's family.
Despite the alibi presented by Baay, the RTC convicted him of the crime rape under
Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph I of the Revised
Penal Code.
The decision of the RTC was raised before the CA which affirmed the judgment of
the trial court. Hence, this appeal.
The Court's Ruling
We find the appeal unmeritorious albeit We modify the designation of the crime
committed, as well as the indemnities awarded.
For the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must prove that (1) the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished such act through force or
intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she
was under 12 years of age or was demented.
The SC found it erroneous for the RTC and the CA to convict Baay of Statutory
Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
gravamen of the offense of statutory rape under the said, provision is the carnal
knowledge of a woman below 12 years old. To convict an accused of the crime of
statutory rape, the prosecution must prove: first, the age of the victim; second, the
identity of the accused; and last but not the least, the carnal knowledge between the
accused and the victim.
In the case, it is not disputed that AAA was already 22 years old when she was
raped albeit she has a mental age of 4-5 years old, however, no longer be debatable
that rape of a-mental retardate falls under paragraph 1(b), not Section 1(d), of the said
provision as the same, precisely, refers to a rape of a female “deprived of reason”.
The Supreme Court, moreover averred that the term statutory rape should
only be confined to situations where the victim of rape is a person less than 12
years of age. If the victim of rape is a person with mental abnormality, deficiency, or
retardation, the crime committed is simple rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) as
she is considered “deprived of reason” notwithstanding that her mental age is equivalent
to that of a person under 12. In short, carnal knowledge with a mental retardate
whose mental age is that of a person below 12 years, while akin to statutory rape
under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d), should still be designated as simple rape
under paragraph 1(b).
Considering the circumstances of this case, the Court found that Baay should be held
liable for simple rape.
Kevin Belmonte y Goromeo vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 224143
June 28, 2017

FACTS:
Ominga coordinated a buybust team. 16 Ominga contacted Gumba and ordered for
₱2,000.00 worth of marijuana. Thereafter, Ominga prepared four (4) ₱500.00 bills as
buy-bust money, marked them with her initials, and proceeded with the rest of the buy-
bust team to the public cemetery of San Gabriel, La Union, the designated place for the
transaction. 17

When the three (3) men reached Ominga's group, one of Gumba's companions,
who turned out to be Belmonte, 20 asked if they were the buyers. 21 The agent
confirmed this, after which Gumba asked for the money from Cafiero. 22

 Ominga hand the marked money to Gumba’s companion, Costales, 23 took

it.24 Gumba then took a bundle of suspected dried marijuana leaves from the black bag
he was carrying and handed it to Ominga. 25  Thereafter, Ominga declared that they were
PDEA agents.26 

Ominga then took a knife and slashed a small portion of each brick to see the
contents. Satisfied that it was marijuana, she placed her initials "SOB," signature, and
the date of confiscation on the outside of each bundle, including the bundle earlier sold
to them. 31 Ominga's group then prepared an inventory, photographed the activity, and
asked the PNP and barangay officials to sign the inventory.32

Thereafter, Ominga's group returned to the PDEA office in San Fernando, La

Union where Ominga prepared the request for laboratory examination 33 dated
November 23, 2010, among other necessary documents. 34 Ominga then delivered the
seized items to the PDEA for crime laboratory examination. 35 In her report, PDEA
Regional Officer 1 Chemist Lei-Yen Valdez (Valdez), the chemist who conducted the
quantitative and qualitative examination on the seized drugs, confirmed that the seized
bricks and bundle contained marijuana. 36

Aggrieved, Belmonte, Gumba, and Costales elevated their conviction to the

CA,64 arguing that the chain of custody of the seized items was not established
because the markings and inventory were done in San Gabriel, La Union, while the
signing of the Certificate of Inventory 65 by the representatives from the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media took place in Carlatan, San Fernando City,
La Union.

ISSSUE:Whether or not appeal is meritorious.

Ruling:

The appeal has no merit.

 In order to convict an accused charged with illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution must prove the: (a) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (b) delivery of the thing sold and the payment. 74

In order to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the identity of the dangerous

drugs, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the same. ,

The strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA

9165 may not always be possible. 87 What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 

The Court is convinced that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
marijuana confiscated from the accused were preserved, and any deviation from the
chain of custody procedure was adequately justified.

Records bear that the bricks and bundle of marijuana confiscated from the
accused were immediately marked, photographed, and inventoried upon the arrest
of Belmonte and Gumba, and that the markings were done by Ominga herself who
placed her initials, signature, and the date of confiscation thereat in the presence of
Belmonte, Gumba, the back-up officers from the PDEA and the PNP, and the Barangay
Captain of Poblacion, San Gabriel. 79After the inventory and photography at the arrest
site, Ominga and her team returned to the PDEA office where Ominga personally
prepared the crime laboratory examination request which she delivered to the PDEA
chemist, Valdez, together with the bricks and bundle of marijuana confiscated from the
accused. 80

Notably, the absence of media representatives at the time Ominga prepared the
inventory was sufficiently explained by her during her cross-examination when she
testified that when contacted, the media representatives told them that they were still far
from the area and would not be able to arrive on time. 85 

As regards the absence of the DOJ representative, Eulogio Gapasin, the DOJ
clerk who signed the inventory. Verily, under varied field conditions, the strict
compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not
always be possible. 87 What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized
in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 

Furthermore, the Court also agrees with the finding that there was conspiracy
among the accused. As aptly observed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, conspiracy
among them is evident as Belmonte even asked if Ominga and her team were the
buyers. Indeed, there is no other explanation for Belmonte's question aside from the
fact that he knew why they were there, i.e., for the sale of the marijuana.
P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 208001, 19 June 2017

Facts: At around 7 :00 a.m. of September 15, 2010, Granados was fatally shot by
Bautista in front of his home in Tacloban City. After the shooting, Bautista attempted to
flee the crime scene but was unsuccessful because his getaway motorcycle failed to
start its engine. A neighbor of the victim, Butch Price, came to the rescue and shot and
wounded Bautista. Granados was immediately rushed to the hospital but was declared
dead. Bautista was also brought to the hospital.
On the same day, SP02 Norman Loy Fevidal interviewed Bautista while the latter
was still confined. Bautista executed an extrajudicial confession implicating Pfleider as
the mastermind of the assassination claiming that Pfleider induced him by means of a
price of P60,000 for the hit.
An Information for Murder was filed with the RTC of Tacloban but the judge
dismissed the case for lack of probable cause. However, the OSG filed a certiorari with
the CA which was granted. Hence, this petition questioning the reversal of the CA of the
finding of lack of probable cause by the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the determination of the presence of probable cause may be
made by the Supreme Court.

Ruling: NO. It must be emphasized that the SC is not a trier of facts. The determination
of probable cause is and will always entail a review of the facts of the case. The CA, in
finding probable cause, did not exactly delve into the facts of the case but raised
questions that would entail a more exhaustive review of the said facts. It ruled that,
"Questions remain as to why, among all people, Ryan would implicate Pfelider as the
inducer and why the other witnesses would associate Pfleider to the crime." From this
query, the CA has raised doubt.
In this case, the judge of the RTC, not finding the existence of probable cause,
outrightly dismissed the case. The contrasting findings of the CA and the RTC is well
noted and from the very provision of the Rules of Court, the remedy, in case of doubt, is
for the judge to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence. Therefore, the SC
finds it appropriate to remand the case to the trial court for its proper disposition, or for a
proper determination of probable cause based on the evidence presented by the
prosecution.

Note: Because of the demise of P/C Supt. Edwin A. Pfleider, instead of remanding the
case to the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban city for the determination of probable
cause, the criminal action is DISMISSED, there being no defendant to stand as
accused.
People of the Philippines v. Demetrio Sabida y Sadiwa
G. R. No. 208359, 19 June 2017

Facts: On July 7, 2009, at 6:30 a.m., Richard Pimentel and the victim, MacArthur
Mawac, were walking to attend to their own errands when Sabida unexpectedly emerged
from the road and repeatedly stabbed and hacked Mawac with a bolo. Afterwards,
Sabida turned to Pimentel and uttered, "Isa ka pa, " prompting the latter to run away.
Sabida run after him but he failed to catch him. Pimentel immediately reported the
incident to Brgy. Captain Hintay, who in turn reported the incident to the police station of
Pinamalayan.
Sabida admitted killing Mawac and invoked self-defense. He said that he had a
misunderstanding with Mawac and the latter's wife because the couple accused his
domestic animals of destroying their palay. He alleged that the couple retaliated by
poisoning and stealing his chickens and other farm. He said that on the day of the
incident, he saw Pimentel and Mawac walking by and heard Pimentel warning Mawac to
be careful as he was nearby to which Mawac allegedly responded, "Sige, unahan mo na.
" This prompted him to confront the two and ask why Mawac was intending to kill him
when what he merely wanted to know is where his chicken went. He said that Mawac
tried to draw out the bolo tucked under his waist but Sabida was able to defend himself
so they struggled and fought off each other. He said that he left Mawac lying on the
ground, who, even then, was still taunting him to continue fighting.
The RTC rendered judgment convicting him of murder qualified by treachery. A
MR was filed but was denied. His appeal with the CA was likewise denied. Hence, this
petition.

Issue: Whether the guilt of Sabida for the crime of murder has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

Ruling: YES. In attempting to escape liability, Sabida invokes self-defense. Upon

invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, Sabida assumed the burden of
proving the justification of his act with clear and convincing evidence. Having admitted
the killing, Sabida is required to rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the
weakness of the prosecution's evidence, which even if it were weak, could not be
disbelieved in view of his admission.
However, based on the records and the evidence adduced by both parties, it is
indisputable that Sabida failed to show that Mawac exhibited unlawful aggression
against him. Being the party initiating the attack and armed with a deadly weapon,
Sabida cannot successfully claim that there was unlawful aggression. Sabida's self-
serving claim of self-defense coupled with the fact that he did not sustain any injury from
his supposed attacker fails to support any claim of unlawful aggression.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. WILTON ALACDIS y ANATIL a.k.a. “WELTON”,
DOMINGO
G.R. No. 220022
June 19, 2017

Facts:
Accused-appellant and Domingo Lingbanan (Lingbanan) and Pepito Anatil
Alacdis (Alacdis) were charged for the illegal sale, delivery and transport of 65 bricks of
varying sizes and thickness, and with the weight of 110 kilograms, of dried marijuana
leaves. An entrapment operation was carried out where accused-appellant was arrested.

Seeking redress, accused-appellant points out that to sustain a conviction for the
delivery of dangerous drugs, knowledge on the part of an accused is a requisite; and
that the prosecution was unable to establish that he intentionally and knowingly
delivered the marijuana, either as a conspirator in the sale of the dangerous drugs, or in
any other capacity. He further points out that the absence of the marked money negates
his participation in the sale between SPO2 Agbayani and the other two accused.
Accused-appellant also questions the validity of the buy-bust operation which he insists
was an instigation rather than a valid buy-bust operation.

Issue: Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty for the illegal sale of drugs.

Held:
The appeal is partly meritorious. The RTC and the CA both convicted accused-
appellant for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 for the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. However, in the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the delivery of the illicit
drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money consummate
the illegal transaction. Inarguably, consideration/ payment is one of the essential
elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, without which, accused-appellant's
conviction for said crime cannot stand.
In this case, the sale of the dangerous drugs cannot be said to have been consummated
because the accused-appellant did not receive consideration.
Be that as it may, accused-appellant is not absolved of criminal liability and may
still be held liable under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 for the delivery and transport of
marijuana.To sustain a conviction for the illegal delivery of dangerous drugs, it must be
proven that: (1) the accused passed on possession of a dangerous drug to another,
personally or otherwise, and by any means; (2) such delivery is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused knowingly made the delivery. Worthy of note is that the delivery may
be committed even without consideration. Based on the charges against and the
evidence presented by the prosecution, accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal delivery and transportation of marijuana under Article II, Section 5 of RA
9165.
NESTOR GUELOS, RODRIGO GUELOS, GIL CARANDANG and SPO2 ALFREDO
CARANDANG y PRESCILLA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 177000
June 19, 2017

Facts:
On or about the 4th day of June, 1995, at about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, at
Barangay Boot, Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas, Philippines, the
accused, Nestor while armed with an Armalite Rifle, feloniously attack, assault and shoot
SPO2 Estelito Andaya, a bonafide member of the Philippine National Police assigned at
Tanauan Police Station, while engaged in the performance of his official duties as peace
officer, and while the latter is being held from the back by Giland other companions,
whose identities and whereabouts are still unknown, thereby hitting and inflicting upon
the said SPO2 Estelito Andaya gunshot wounds on his body which caused his
instantaneous death. On December 5, 1995, two separate Informations were filed with
the RTC against the petitioners for Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in
Authority with Homicide.

For the defense, petitioners Nestor, Alfredo and Rodrigo took the witness stand
and denied the accusations contending that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
were uncorroborated by evidence sufficient to establish the petitioners’ guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Specifically, the petitioners allege that there is no direct assault of a
person in authority to speak of because the group of P/C Insp. Camacho was not in the
performance of their duties. The prosecution failed to present the alleged mission order
supporting the intelligence operation conducted by P/C Insp. Camacho and his men in
Barangay Boot. Further, while the police officers were in civilian attire (shorts, slippers
and t-shirts) to go undercover, they were carrying rifles that were not concealed/
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of the crime charged.

HELD:
While the elements constituting the crime of Homicide were properly alleged in
the two Informations and were duly established in the trial, the said Informations,
however, failed to allege all the elements constitutive of the applicable form of direct
assault. To be more specific, the Informations do not allege that the offenders/
petitioners knew that the ones they were assaulting were agents of a person in authority,
in the exercise of their duty. In the course of the trial, the evidence presented sufficiently
established the fact that the petitioners came to know that the victims were agents of a
person in authority, as the latter introduced themselves to be members of the PNP.
Nevertheless, the establishment of the fact that the petitioners came to know that the
victims were agents of a person in authority cannot cure the lack of allegation in the
Informations that such fact was known to the accused which renders the same defective.
In addition, neither can this fact be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance
under paragraph 3 of Article 14 of the RPC for acts committed with insult or in disregard
of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank to justify the imposition of
an increased penalty against the petitioners.

It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked
was a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties, because the accused
must have the intention to offend, injure, or assault the offended party as a person in
authority or agent of a person in authority. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires that every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or
information so as to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. Corollarily,
qualifying circumstances or generic aggravating circumstances will not be
appreciated by the Court unless alleged in the Information.
PO1 CELSO TABOBO VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 220977
June 19, 2017

FACTS:
On January 20, 2005 at Police Station 9, PO2 De Leon was interviewing suspect Victor
Martin when the latter requested to remove his handcuffs to answer the call of nature.
When PO2 De Leon removed the handcuffs, Martin suddenly grabbed his service
firearm. A scuffle ensued and the gun went off. PO1 Tabobo, who was then at the
ground floor, heard the gunshot and proceeded to the second floor. After seeing PO2 De
Leon almost subdued by Martin, the petitioner fired his gun twice and hit Martin on the
chest which caused the latter’s death. The petitioner was charged with the crime of
Homicide. The petitioner interposed the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger.
PO2 De Leon initially took the witness stand for his direct examination. However, he was
not able to complete his testimony prompting the RTC to order his direct testimony to be
stricken off the records.
In so ruling, the RTC held that the petitioner failed to prove that all the elements of
justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger. The petitioner alleged that his counsel’s
gross mistake and negligence deprived him of his right to due process. The case was
appealed to the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA reasoned that the
prosecution need not prove the elements of homicide considering that the burden of
proof in this case has shifted to the petitioner for interposing the justifying circumstance
of defense of a stranger.21 However, it concurred with the findings of the RTC that the
defense failed to prove the existence of all the elements of defense of a stranger.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the petitioner’s conviction for the crime of
homicide.
RULING:
The petition is partly meritorious.
The CA held that the petitioner admitted shooting Martin as stated in his Sworn
Statement dated January 26, 2006, Counter-Affidavit dated March 21, 2006 and Joint
Rejoinder dated April 25, 2006. It further noted that in his Appellant’s Brief, the petitioner
relied on the “defense of a stranger” as justification for his act. Thus, the CA concluded
that the petitioner admitted that he killed the victim.28
However, the fact that the petitioner may have admitted shooting Martin in the said
documents does not necessarily establish his guilt for the crime charged. An admission
of fact is starkly different from, and is not tantamount to, a confession of guilt. 
In criminal cases, an admission is something less than a confession. It is but a
statement of facts by the accused, direct or implied, which do not directly involve
an acknowledgment of his guilt or of his criminal intent to commit the offense with
which he is bound, against his interests, of the evidence or truths charged. It is an
acknowledgment of some facts or circumstances which, in itself, is insufficient to
authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish the ultimate facts of guilt.
A confession, on the other hand, is an acknowledgment, in express terms, of his
guilt of the crime charged (People of the Philippines v. Buntag)
In this case, the Court notes that while the Sworn Statement, Counter-Affidavit, and
Joint Rejoinder may be considered as the petitioner’s admission as to the fact of
the killing, the same were never identified by the petitioner in court since he never
took the witness stand, and is thus, hearsay as regards to him.
The RTC, therefore, should not have readily relied on the said documents to establish
the petitioner’s admission of the killing, more so when the admission was not
corroborated by evidence, except for the Crime Report.
The Court observes that the petitioner pleaded not guilty to the killing during arraignment
and invoked the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger under Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code. One who invokes self-defense admits responsibility for the
killing. Accordingly, the burden of proof shifts to the accused who must then
prove the justifying circumstance. He must show by clear and convincing
evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense, or in defense of a relative or a
stranger. With clear and convincing evidence, all the following elements of self-
defense must be established: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense.
Thus, the petitioner must establish with clear and convincing evidence that the killing
was justified, and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. However, the petitioner
was deprived of such opportunity to effectively present his evidence and to
defend himself due to the gross and palpable negligence and incompetence of his
counsel. Such deprivation amounts to a denial of the petitioner’s due process,
vitiating the integrity of the proceedings before the trial court.
RTC and CA decision reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to the RTC for new
trial.
PEOPLE VS. ROBERTO ESPERANZA
G.R. No. 227306
June 19, 2017
FACTS:
On September 16, 2007, at around 1:00 a.m., Ortigosa, his cousin Renato B. Flores
(Flores) and Manny Boy Ditche were drinking in Dupax Street, Old Balara, Quezon City.
Later, they decided to go to a store to buy cigarettes.8 On their way to the store, Flores
noticed accused-appellant standing in a comer near the store and staring at them. Then,
accused-appellant walked away and disappeared. Later, accused-appellant reappeared,
accompanied by Menieva and Ilaw, and followed Ortigosa and his group to the
store.9 When accused-appellant and his companions were already in front of Ortigosa,
Menieva uttered, “Nel, ano ba van?” and proceeded to stab Ortigosa twice with an
icepick. Menieva stabbed Ortigosa first on the right portion of his chest, then on his left
armpit. As Menieva stabbed Ortigosa, Ilaw pointed a sumpak at Ortigosa while accused-
appellant pointed at Ortigosa’s group and left.
A warrant of arrest was issued against accused-appellant, Menieva and Ilaw. 6 However,
only accused-appellant was arrested. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged.
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 80 rendered a Decision holding that accused-appellant
conspired with Menieva and Ilaw to kill Ortigosa. CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE:
W/N there was conspiracy among the accused Menieva and Ilaw.
HELD:
NO CONSPIRACY.
In this case, we find that the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant
conspired with Menieva and Ilaw in committing the crime of murder.
Conspiracy is said to exist where two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of
conspiracy is the unity of action and purpose. Its elements, like the physical acts
constituting the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy for it may be deduced from the
acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime charged,
from which it may be indicated that there is a common purpose to commit the
crime.27 It is not sufficient, however, that the attack be joint and simultaneous for
simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will or unity
of action and purpose which are the bases of the responsibility of the assailants. It is
necessary that the assailants be animated by one and the same purpose.28 We held:
“To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he
need not even take part in every act xxx. Each conspirator may be assigned separate
and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact,
constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal objective.
Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise
extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the
conspirators are principals.”29
To determine if accused-appellant conspired with Menieva and Ilaw, the focus of the
inquiry should necessarily be the overt acts of accused-appellant before, during and
after the stabbing incident.31
Accused-appellant’s act of pointing to the victim and his group is not an overt act
which shows that accused-appellant acted in concert with his co-accused to cause the
death of Ortigosa. We stress that mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act,
without the cooperation and the agreement to cooperate, is not enough to establish
conspiracy. Even if the accused were present and agreed to cooperate with the
main perpetrators of the crime, their mere presence does not make them parties to
it, absent any active participation in the furtherance of the common design or
purpose.35 Likewise, where the only act attributable to the other accused is an apparent
readiness to provide assistance, but with no certainty as to its ripening into an overt act,
there is no conspiracy.36 In this case, while accused-appellant’s presence and act of
pointing at the victim and his group may mean he approved of the crime or that he was
ready to assist his co-accused, absent any other overt act on his part, there is no
conspiracy.
Neither can accused-appellant be considered a principal by indispensable
cooperation nor an accomplice in the crime of murder. The cooperation that the
law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered which cannot
exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed.
Thus, to be liable either as a principal by indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice,
the accused must unite with the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation.40 In this case, nothing in the records shows that accused-appellant knew
Menieva was going to stab Ortigosa, thus creating a doubt as to accused-appellant’s
criminal intent.
CA decision reversed and set aside. ACQUITTED.
PEOPLE VS. NICOLAS TUBILLO
G.R. No. 220718
June 21, 2017

FACTS:
On February 1, 2006, at around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, HGE (13 years old) was
sleeping at home alone, while AAA was working as a beautician at a salon. Suddenly,
she was awakened when Tubillo, her neighbor, entered their house by breaking the
padlock of the door.
Upon entry, Tubillo went directly to HGE and then he removed her clothes and his own.
He then forcibly inserted his penis in her vagina by pushing his body towards her. HGE
felt pain, but she did not resist as Tubillo was poking a knife at her neck. The incident
lasted for about thirty (30) seconds.
RTC found Tubillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape, defined
under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). CA affirmed Tubillo’s conviction
with modifications. The CA opined that as HGE was more than twelve (12) years old,
Tubillo could be charged with either rape under the RPC or child abuse under R.A. No.
7610. The CA found that Tubillo committed the crime of rape against HGE, then a 13-
year-old minor. Nevertheless, it opined that he must be convicted under Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610 because it was the crime alleged in the information.
ISSUE:
W/N accused should be penalized under Art 266-A of the RPC or Section 5(b), Article III
of R.A. No. 7610.
RULING:
To reiterate, the elements of rape under Section 266-A of the RPC are: (1) the offender
had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or
intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when
the victim is under twelve years of age.11
On the other hand, the elements of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, are: (1) the accused
commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with
a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child,
whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. It is also stated there that children
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse are those children, whether male or
female, who, for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct.
In People v. Abay,14 the Court was faced with the same predicament. In that case, both
the elements of Section 266-A of the RPC and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 were
alleged in the information. Nevertheless, these provisions were harmonized, to wit:
Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual
abuse is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse
but for statutory rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) of the Revised Penal Code and
penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or
older, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5 (b)
of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1 [d]) of the Revised
Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act
because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be
subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be
complexed with a violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised
Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape)
cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
Here, the evidence of the prosecution unequivocally focused on the force or intimidation
employed by Tubillo against HGE under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the RPC. The
prosecution presented the testimony of HGE who narrated that Tubillo unlawfully
entered the' house where she was sleeping by breaking the padlock. Once inside, he
forced himself upon her, pointed a knife at her neck, and inserted his penis in her
vagina. She could not resist the sexual attack against her because Tubillo poked a
bladed weapon at her neck. Verily, Tubillo employed brash force or intimidation to carry
out his dastardly deeds.
In fine, Tubillo should be found guilty of rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the RPC with
a prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua, instead of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.
RICHARD ESCALANTE VS. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 218970
June 28, 2017

FACTS:
Around midnight of December 24, 2006, AAA accompanied his classmate Mark in going
home. On his way back from Mark’s house, AAA was called by Escalante and was
pulled into a comfort room at the Divine School in Parada, Valenzuela City. Once inside,
Escalante pulled down AAA’s shorts and sucked the latter’s penis for about ten (10)
minutes. Shortly thereafter, he forcibly inserted AAA’s penis into his anus.
The defense presented Escalante, his father Nicomedes Escalante, and their neighbor
Josephine Salada (Salada). Their combined testimonies tended to establish that at
around midnight of December 24, 2006, Escalante was in Salada’s house celebrating
Christmas Eve; that the celebration started at 10:00 o’clock in the evening and lasted
between 1:00 o’clock and 3:00 o’clock the following morning; that he could not have
been in the school because he never left Salada’s house as he was tasked with passing
around shots of liquor; and that Salada’s house was only a thirty (30)-minute ride away
from the place where the incident occurred.
RTC found Escalante guilty of violating Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610. It ruled that the
totality of the prosecution’s evidence was sufficient to establish that he physically and
sexually abused AAA. The RTC did not give credence to Escalante’s alibi as it found
AAA’s identification of the accused as his assailant credible.
Escalante appealed before the CA. In his Appellant’s Brief,6 he contended that he was
not positively identified by AAA as his abuser; that AAA only identified the supposed
culprit by a mere photograph which had not been authenticated and its origins as well as
its processing were never established.
ISSUE:
Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the decision of the regional trial court
finding herein petitioner guilty despite reasonable doubt owing to the fact that the
petitioner was not really positively identified by the private complainant.
RULING:
Escalante was sufficiently and appropriately identified
In People v. Pineda,12 the Court laid down the guidelines in identifications of accused
through photographs, to wit:
The first rule in proper photographic identification procedure is that a series of
photographs must be shown, and not merely of that of the suspect. The second rule
directs that when a witness is shown a group of pictures, their arrangement and display
should in no way suggest which one of the pictures pertains to the suspect.
The said guidelines are necessary considering that the out-of-court identification of an
accused is susceptible to suggestiveness. These paramaters are in place to make the
identification of the accused as objective as possible.
In the case at bench, there is no reason to doubt AAA’s identification of Escalante. It is
noteworthy that the identification was done in open court. Further, the trial court adopted
a similar manner with out-of-court identifications through photographs. As culled from the
records, AAA was presented with several pictures in open court from which he was
asked to pinpoint who was his abuser. He was able to identify Escalante without any
leading question which clearly suggests that the picture identified was that of the latter.
Escalante was convicted by the RTC of child abuse under Section 10(a) of R.A. No.
7610. The correct provision, however, should be Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, which
imposes a higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua. Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 reads:
Sec. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female,
who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of
any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:
xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: xxx
As can be gleaned from the above-mentioned provisions, Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
specifically applies in case of sexual abuse committed against children; whereas,
Section 10(a) thereof punishes other forms of child abuse not covered by other
provisions of R.A. No. 7610. Parenthetically, the offense will not fall under Section 10(a)
of R.A. No. 7610 if the same is specifically penalized by a particular provision of the law
such as Section 5(b) for sexual abuse.
In People v. Larin,19 the Court stated that the elements of sexual abuse under Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 are as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or
female, is below 18 years of age. It further ruled:
It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation in which a child is abused for
profit, but also in which a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any
lascivious conduct. Hence, the foregoing provision penalizes not only child prostitution,
the essence of which is profit, but also other forms of sexual abuse of children. All of the
foregoing elements are present in the case at bench.
In addition, the Court, in Caballo considered the age disparity between an adult and a
minor as indicia of coercion or influence. In the case at bench, AAA was only twelve (12)
years old at the time of the sexual abuse. The records, on the other hand, disclosed that
Escalante was twenty (20) years old at the time of the commission of the crime. The
disparity of eight (8) years between them placed Escalante in a stronger position over
AAA to exert his will upon the latter. In addition, AAA testified in open court that he could
not resist because he feared Escalante as the latter was taller and bigger than him.
Further, the fact that the sexual encounter between Escalante and AAA occurred only
once does not remove it from the ambit of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. In Quimvel v.
People,23 the Court expounded that sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
includes sexual maltreatment of the child, whether habitual or not.  
AAA’s minority was sufficiently established. As shown by his birth certificate, he was only
twelve (12) years old at the time the alleged sexual assault occurred. All in all, it is clear
that Escalante, an adult with all his influence and power over the minor AAA, coerced
the latter into satiating his sexual urges at the expense of his youth, innocence and
purity. Surely, such perverse actions warrant the harsher penalty under R.A. No. 7610 in
consonance with the State’s policy to protect children from all forms of abuse or
exploitation
PEOPLE VS. RODOLFO DENIEGA
G.R. No. 212201
June 28, 2017

FACTS:
AAA3 was a young lass suffering from mental retardation. Around 7 o’clock in the
evening of May 2, 2007, AAA who, was then sixteen years old 4 but with a mental
capacity of a six (6)-year-old child, went out of their house with some neighbors to watch
a basketball game in a nearby basketball court. Upon returning home at approximately
11 o’clock in the evening of the same date, BBB, AAA's mother noticed that the latter's
pants were wet. When BBB asked AAA what caused the wetting of her pants, the latter
simply dismissed her mother's query and said that it was nothing (wala lang). Prompted
by suspicion, BBB asked AAA to remove her pants, thereupon, she smelled her
underwear which emitted the scent of semen. When quizzed by her mother, AAA
eventually admitted that herein accused-appellant, whom she calls Dodong, and who
was known to them as a delivery boy in their neighborhood, invited her to go to another
basketball court where they could talk with each other but, instead, upon arriving at the
said place, he undressed her and made her lie down. Upon acquiring such information,
BBB put AAA's underwear in a plastic bag and immediately reported the incident to
the barangay authorities. AAA later revealed that, at the said basketball court, accused-
appellant undressed her, made her lie down, removed his pants and underwear, went on
top of her, inserted his penis in her vagina and made “up-and-down” movements.”
Accused was charged with the crime of statutory rape before the RTC of San Pedro,
Laguna. Both RTC and CA found the accused GUILTY.
ISSUE:
W/N the accused is guilty of statutory rape.
RULING:
This Court has consistently held that rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of
committing rape.20What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a
woman below twelve (12) years old.21 Thus, force, intimidation and physical
evidence of injury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is
the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. 22 The law
presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her
tender years; the child’s consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to
discern good from evil.23
It is also a settled rule that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate,
with a mental age below 12 years old, constitutes statutory rape. In People v.
Quintos,25 this Court held that if a mentally-retarded or intellectually-disabled person
whose mental age is less than 12 years is raped, the rape is considered committed
under paragraph 1(d) and not paragraph 1(b), Article 266-A of the RPC. In holding as
such, this Court differentiated the term “mentally-retarded” or “intellectually disabled”
from the terms “deprived of reason” and “demented” as used under Article 266-A,
paragraphs 1(b) and 1(d) of the RPC. The Court ruled that:
xxx
The term, "deprived of reason," is associated with insanity or madness. A person
deprived of reason has mental abnormalities that affect his or her reasoning and
perception of reality and, therefore, his or her capacity to resist, make decisions, and
give consent.
The term, "demented," refers to a person who suffers from a mental condition called
dementia. Dementia refers to the deterioration or loss of mental functions such as
memory, learning, speaking, and social condition, which impairs one’s independence in
everyday activities.
We are aware that the terms, “mental retardation” or “intellectual disability,” had been
classified under “deprived of reason.” The terms, “deprived of reason” and “demented”,
however, should be differentiated from the term, “mentally retarded” or “intellectually
disabled.” An intellectually disabled person is not necessarily deprived of reason or
demented. This court had even ruled that they may be credible witnesses. However, his
or her maturity is not there despite the physical age. He or she is deficient in general
mental abilities and has an impaired conceptual, social, and practical functioning relative
to his or her age, gender, and peers. Because of such impairment, he or she does not
meet the “sociocultural standards of personal independence and social responsibility.”
Thus, a person with a chronological age of 7 years and a normal mental age is as
capable of making decisions and giving consent as a person with a chronological age of
35 and a mental age of 7. Both are considered incapable of giving rational consent
because both are not yet considered to have reached the level of maturity that gives
them the capability to make rational decisions, especially on matters involving sexuality.
Decision-making is a function of the mind. Hence, a person’s capacity to decide
whether to give consent or to express resistance to an adult activity is determined
not by his or her chronological age but by his or her mental age. Therefore, in
determining whether a person is “twelve (12) years of age” under Article 266-A(1)
(d), the interpretation should be in accordance with either the chronological age of
the child if he or she is not suffering from intellectual disability, or the mental age
if intellectual disability is established

In the present case, it is true that based on the medical and psychiatric evaluation of
AAA, she has moderate mental retardation and that she has the mental age of a six-
year-old child. Accused-appellant makes much of this fact to discredit the testimony of
AAA. This Court has, nonetheless, held that competence and credibility of mentally
deficient rape victims as witnesses have been upheld where it is shown that they can
communicate their ordeal capably and consistently. 33 Rather than undermine the gravity
of the complainant's accusations, it even lends greater credence to her testimony, that,
someone as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on
the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of the
accused.34 The basic rule is that when a victim’s testimony is credible and
sufficiently establishes the elements of the crime, it may be enough basis to
convict an accused of rape.35
What makes the case stronger for the prosecution is that the testimony of AAA is
corroborated by the medical findings of the presence of a “deep healing laceration” in
her hymen which was caused by a blunt object.36 Such medico-legal findings bolsters the
prosecution's testimonial evidence. Together, these pieces of evidence produce a moral
certainty that accused-appellant indeed raped the victim.
Accused-appellant also questions AAA's credibility by contending that it is very hard to
believe that no one could have seen or noticed him having sexual intercourse with AAA
in the nearby basketball court, considering that AAA herself testified that the said
basketball court, was near the one where people were watching the ongoing game.
The Court is not persuaded. There is no evidence to show that there were people
present at the basketball court where the crime was committed. Moreover, it is probable
that people did not notice accused-appellant having sexual intercourse with AAA
because there was then an ongoing basketball game at another court and the attention
of the persons present were directed at the said game. Besides, as testified by the
victim, it only took a minute for accused-appellant to consummate his carnal desire, after
which they immediately went back.37 In any case, as correctly cited by the OSG, this
Court has held that lust is no respecter of time and place and that rape can be
committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside,
within school premises, inside a house where there are other occupants and even
in the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping.
In the instant case, as discussed above, the victim, AAA, is considered below twelve
(12) years old at the time of the commission of the crime. Moreover, it was alleged in the
Information and established by the prosecution that accused-appellant had knowledge of
her mental disability. In fact, accused-appellant never denied knowledge of such fact.
Thus, because of the presence of this qualifying circumstance, the imposable penalty is
death. However, the passage of Republic Act No. 9346 42 prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty without, nonetheless, declassifying the crime of qualified rape as heinous.
Thus, the trial court correctly reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERCEDITAS MATHEUS DELOS REYES
G.R. No. 198795
June 7, 2017

FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged with six counts of Estafa underArticle 315 (2)
(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and one count of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment
under RA 8042. Accused-appellant willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Thelma
Suratos by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation which they
made to her to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ
Thelma Suratos for employment abroad wherein the latter being induced gave them
P55,000.00 which amount once in possession, with intent to defraud Thelma Suratos
misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of said Thelma Suratos.

Also, the said accused conspiring together, confederating with another person whose
true name, identity
and personal circumstances have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping
each other, by representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and
recruit workers for employment abroad, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to Thelma
Sura Tos Y Narag; Glenda Guillarte Y Rondilla; Merl Y Ala Yon Y Oro; Celso Baga Y Y
Jorge, Jr.; Doriza Gloria Y Pujeda; And Rogelio Duldulao Y Le, without first securing the
required license and authority from the Department of Labor and Employment, in
violation of said law. That the crime described above is committed in large scale as the
same was perpetrated against three or more persons individually or as a group.

The RTC rendered its Decision,convicting accused-appellant of the crime of large scale
illegal recruitment and five counts of estafa which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa.

RULING: No. The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following elements:
1. The person charged undertook any recruitment activity as defined under Section
6 of RA 8042;
2. Accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment of workers; and
3. Accused committed the same against three or more persons individually or as a
group.
These elements are obtaining in this case. First, the RTC found accused-appellant to
have undertaken recruitment activity when she promised the private complainants
overseas employment for a fee and this factual finding was affirmed by the CA.Second,
the Certification issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
unmistakably reveals that the accused-appellant neither had a license nor authority to
recruit workers for overseas employment. Third, it was established that there were five
complainants, i.e., Suratos, Guillarte, Alayon, Bagay, Jr., and Duldulao.

In addition, the court affirms the conviction of the accused for five counts of estafa under
Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC. It is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be
convicted separately of illegal recruitment under RA 8042 or the Labor Code, and estafa
under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC.

The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence
or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. Here, the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that accusedappellant deceived private complainants into believing
that she had the authority and capability to send them abroad for employment, despite
her not being licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.
Because of the assurances given by accused-appellant, the private complainants parted
with their hard-earned money for the payment of the agreed placement fee, for which
accused-appellant issued petty cash vouchers and used fictitious names evidencing her
receipt of the payments.
MARIO VERIDIANO y SAPI v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200370
June 7, 2017

FACTS: Veridiano was charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
When was arraigned, he pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. During trial, the
prosecution presented PO 1 Guillermo Cabello and POI Daniel Solano testified that a
concerned citizen called a certain P03 Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan
Police Station, informing him that a certain alias "Baho," who was later identified as
Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs. P03 Esteves
immediately relayed the information to PO I Cabello and P02 Alvin Vergara who were
both on duty. Chief of Police June Urquia instructed POI Cabello and P02 Vergara to set
up a checkpoint.At around I 0:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger
jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. They flagged down the jeepney and asked the
passengers to disembark. The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-
shirts to check for possible concealed weapons and to remove the contents of their
pockets. The police officers recovered from Veridiano a tea bag containing what
appeared to be marijuana. POI Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his
initials. Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights. He was then
brought to the police station. At the police station, PO 1 Cabello turned over the seized
tea bag to PO 1 Solano, who also placed his initials. PO 1 Solano then made a
laboratory examination request, which he personally brought with the seized tea bag to
the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory.The contents of the tea bag tested
positive for marijuana.

For his defense, Veridiano testified that he went to the fiesta. After participating in the
festivities, he decided to go home and took a passenger jeepney bound for Nagcarlan.
When the jeepney reached Barangay Buboy, Nagcarlan, the motorcyclists followng them
flagged down the jeepney and two armed men boarded the jeepney and frisked
Veridiano. However, they found nothing on his person. Still, Veridiano was accosted and
brought to the police station where he was informed that illegal drug was found in his
possession.

The Regional Trial Court found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
illegal possession of marijuana which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals stating that
he was caught in flagranrte delicto.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner.

HELD: The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion
requirement in stop and frisk searches. A "stop and frisk" search is defined as "the act of
a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s)
or contraband." Thus, the allowable scope of a "stop and frisk" search is limited to a
"protective search of outer clothing for weapons.

Although a "stop and frisk" search is a necessary law enforcement measure specifically
directed towards crime prevention, there is a need to safeguard the right of individuals
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Law enforcers do not have unbridled
discretion in conducting "stop and frisk" searches. While probable cause is not required,
a "stop and frisk" search cannot be validated on the basis of a suspicion or hunch. Law
enforcers must have a genuine reason to believe, based on their experience and the
particular circumstances of each case, that criminal activity may be afoot. Reliance on
one suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot produce a reasonable search.

Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent

to the warrantless search. Although the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures may be surrendered through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that the
waiver was executed with clear and convincing evidence. Consent to a warrantless
seracha nd seizure must be "unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and unattended by
duress or coercion. The validity of a consented warrantless search is determined by the
totality of the circumstances.

Hence, the Court of Appeals' decision was reversed and set aside.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AMBROSIO OHAYAS
G.R. No. 207516
June 19, 2017

FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged with murder. Upon arraignment, accused-

appellant pleaded not guilty.

The testimonies offered by the prosecution stated that the 12-year old·victim, Armando
Kyamko, Jr. was with his friends, 15- year old Sany and 18-year old Lou relaxing and
conversing under a kalachuchi tree along ·the national road in Sitio Bonbon,
Pinamungajan, Cebu. Aside from the three lads, there were several persons in the
vicinity including the father of the victim, Armando, Sr., who was then at the opposite
side of the road.
Suddenly, both Sany and Lou saw accused-appellant, Ohayas, a balut vendor in their
place, with three other persons coming from Sitio Campo. Accused-appellant, together
with his companions, walked towards the place where the three lads were conversing.
Lou noticed that accused-appellant had in his hands a shotgun while his companions
were carrying torches. When accused-appellant's group was only seven arms' length
away from the victim's group, accused-appellant suddenly, and without any warning,
shot. Armando Jr. who was hit in his right abdomen. Not contented, accused- appellant
continued to fire at the victims who were shocked by the tum of events. Sany was hit on
his right finger, while Lou, although not directly hit, nevertheless suffered injuries when
the bullets ricocheted. After being hit,Armando Jr. managed to call his father for help
before he fell to the ground. On the other hand, Sany and Lou ran to their respective
houses to seek refuge.

On his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he was fishing at sea. At around 8

o'clock in the evening, he heard gunshots coming from Sitio Bonbon, Pinamungajan,
Cebu. He felt afraid, so he stopped · fishing and went home. On the way home, he was
told by SP03 Bancog that someone died in the shooting incident, and that accused-
appellant was the one to be blamed. SP03 Bancog further advised accused-appellant to
take precautionary measures because the victim's relatives might retaliate against him.
He decided to take refuge at the house of his neighbor. Accused-appellant further
claimed that he was cooking fish when SP03 Bancog and other policemen went to his
house to investigate. He was not arrested but was advised to leave the place. His house
was further searched for a shotgun, but the policemen did not find any.

He was found guilty, hence, the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable for murder.

HELD: Yes. The elements of the crime of murder are: (I) a person was killed; (2) the
accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any ·of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4) the
killihg is not parricide or infanticide. 4 In this case, these requisites have been
established by the prosecution.

Here, that the prosecution's witnesses were in unison in identifying accused-appellant as

the person who shot Armando, Jr. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, when
referring only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the substance of their
declarations or the veracity or the weight of their testimonies. Although there may be
inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses
where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification
of the accused.

As to the presence of treachery, it was sufficiently established its existence in the

commission of the crime. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend to directly and specially insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation
on the part of the victim. That alevosia or treachery attended the killing of the victim was
apparent from the suddenness of the attack. Armando, Jr., the 12-year old victim, who
was merely talking to his friends, was suddenly shot by the accused-appellant. The
shooting in this case was deliberate, swift and sudden, denying the victim the
opportunity to protect or defend himself. He was unarmed and unaware of the harm
about to happen to him.

In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that: (1) Armando, Jr. was shot
and killed; (2) the accused-appellant was the person who killed him; (3) Armando, Jr.'s
killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery; and (4) the killing of
Armando, Jr. was neither parricide nor infanticide.

Hence, the appeal is dismissed.

ANTHONY DE SILVA CRUZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 210266
June 7, 2017

FACTS: Cruz was charged with violation of Section 9(a) and (e) of Republic Act No.
8484 by having feloniously in his possession and control a counterfeit access device
(Citibank Visa Card with No. 4539 7207 8677 7008) in violation of the said law. He used
the counterfeit Citibank Visa Card in buying from complainant Duty Free Philippines
represented by Redentor M. Quejada, one pair of Ferragamo shoes and two bottles of
perfume to the damage and prejudice of the complainant.

Accordinb to the prosecution, Cruz allegedly tried to purchase two bottles of Calvin Klein
perfume from Duty Free Philippines Fiesta Mall. Danilo Wong, the cashier at the
Perfume Section, testified that Cruz paid for the purchase using a Citibank Visa credit
card. The transaction was approved, although Wong doubted the validity of the credit
card since the number at the back was not aligned. Also, Cruz allegedly tried to
purchase a pair of Ferragamo shoes. Cruz paid for the purchase using a Citibank Visa
credit card bearing the name "Gerry Santos. When Lim asked for Cruz's Duty Free
shopping card, Cruz presented a shopping card with the name of Rodolfo Garcia. Lim
asked for another identification card, and Cruz gave her a driver's license bearing the
name "Gerry Santos. Lim proceeded to the mall's Electronic Section to swipe the credit
card for approval. The card was approved, but she noticed that the last four digits of the
card were not properly embossed and its validity date started in November 2006. She
called Citibank to verify the credit card.

Upon verification, Citibank informed Lim that the credit card was counterfeit and that the
real Gerry Santos was the Head of Citibank's Fraud Risk Management Division. He was
then found guilty both by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD: Yes. A counterfeit access device is "any access device that is counterfeit,
fictitious, altered, or forged, or an identifiable component of an access device or
counterfeit access device. Under Section 9(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 8484, the
possession and use of an access device is not illegal. Rather, what is prohibited is the
possession and use of a counterfeit access device. Therefore, the corpus delicti of the
crime is not merely the access device, but also any evidence that proves that it is
counterfeit.

Petitioner was found in possession of Citibank Visa which bore the name "Gerry Santos.
He used the said credit card to purchase Ferragamo shoes which was later proven to be
a counterfeit access device.

Hence, the petition is denied.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ELMER AVANCENA Y CABANELA, JAIME
POPIOCO Y CAMBAYA and NOLASCO TAYTAY Y CRUZ
G.R. No. 200512
June 7, 2017

FACTS: Two (2) Information were filed charging the accused with the crimes of
Kidnapping for Ransom and Robbery/Extortion. First, they kidnapped and deprived
Rizaldo Policarpio y Legaspi for purposes of extorting money in the amount of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand (Pl50,000.00) as a condition for his release and was in fact only
released after he was illegally detained for almost seven hours and after his father had
paid the amount of P4,000.00. Second, the accused took from Alfonso Policarpio the
amount of P6,000.00 against his will and to his damage and prejudice.

During trial, Rizaldo Policarpio testified that at when he boarded his Tamaraw FX going
to a convenience store to buy a sandwich, he noticed a vehicle tailing him; it was a gray
Isuzu Crosswind with no headlights and plate number. Rizaldo decided to head to the
nearest police precinct on Evangelista Street. Upon alighting from his vehicle, he heard
someone call his name. A man, whom he later identified as Avancena, alighted from the
gray Isuzu Crosswind across the street. Avancena told Rizaldo that one of his
companions in the Isuzu Crosswind noticed that Rizaldo received illegal drugs. Rizaldo
denied Avancena's accusations. Avancena instructed Rizaldo that they should board
Rizaldo's vehicle. Rizaldo could not complain because Avancena had a gun. Avancena
drove to the PDEA. Upon arriving at the PDEA parking lot, Avancena told Rizaldo that
they would release him if his father would pay them Pl 50,000.00. Rizaldo replied that his
father did not have that amount of money and asked what it was for, since he did not do
anything illegal. Avancena removed his handcuffs and they alighted from the vehicle to
have coffee on the sidewalk. After having coffee, Avancena commanded Rizaldo to call
his father through a mobile phone. Rizaldo spoke to his father and told him to come over
to the PDEA since there were people demanding Pl50,000.00 for his release even
though he did not do anything wrong. Alfonso brought a borrowed amount of P6,000.00
to the PDEA.

Avancena, on his part, denied that there was kidnapping since Rizaldo knew him and
voluntarily went with them in their PDEA office.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
and robbery under Article 294(5) of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD: Article 26760 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
1. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is
any of the parents, female or a public officer. x x x
In kidnapping for ransom, the prosecution must be able to establish the following
elements: first, the accused was a private person; second, he kidnapped or detained or
in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; third, the kidnapping or detention
was illegal; and fourth, the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom.

It was proven that accused-appellants were not in any manner connected with PDEA.
Also, the were not agents of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. Nonetheless,
even if they were employed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, detaining any
private person for the purpose of extorting any amount of money could not, in any way,
be construed as within their official functions. If proven, they can be guilty of serious
illegal detention. Their badges or shields do not give them immunity for any criminal act.

Accused-appellants also told Rizaldo that he would only be released if Alfonso paid them
PI50,000.00. The act of holding a person for a proscribed purpose necessarily implies an
unlawful physical or mental restraint against the person's will, and with a willful intent to
so confine the victim. If Rizal do was indeed free to leave, there would have been no
reason for Alfonso to come rushing to his son's aid. Rizaldo was also able to come home
only after Alfonso negotiated his release. Taken together, the prosecution was able to
establish the elements of kidnapping for ransom, which is punishable under the Revised
Penal Code with death. Considering the suspension of the death penalty, the proper
penalty is reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

Accused-appellants, however, were also charged with robbery under Article 294(5) of the
Revised Penal Code. The elements of simple robbery are a) that there is personal
property belonging to another; b) that there is unlawful taking of that property; c) that the
taking is with intent to gain; and d) that there is violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things.

In this instance, there was a taking of personal property belonging to Alfonso by means
of intimidation. Taking is considered complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing, even if the offender has no opportunity to dispose of the thing.

Hence, the appeal is dismissed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERCEDITAS MATHEUS DELOS REYES
G.R. No. 198795
June 7, 2017

FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged with six counts of Estafa underArticle 315 (2)
(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and one count of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment
under RA 8042. Accused-appellant willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Thelma
Suratos by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation which they
made to her to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ
Thelma Suratos for employment abroad wherein the latter being induced gave them
P55,000.00 which amount once in possession, with intent to defraud Thelma Suratos
misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of said Thelma Suratos.

Also, the said accused conspiring together, confederating with another person whose
true name, identity
and personal circumstances have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping
each other, by representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and
recruit workers for employment abroad, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to Thelma
Sura Tos Y Narag; Glenda Guillarte Y Rondilla; Merl Y Ala Yon Y Oro; Celso Baga Y Y
Jorge, Jr.; Doriza Gloria Y Pujeda; And Rogelio Duldulao Y Le, without first securing the
required license and authority from the Department of Labor and Employment, in
violation of said law. That the crime described above is committed in large scale as the
same was perpetrated against three or more persons individually or as a group.

The RTC rendered its Decision,convicting accused-appellant of the crime of large scale
illegal recruitment and five counts of estafa which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa.

RULING: No. The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following elements:
4. The person charged undertook any recruitment activity as defined under Section
6 of RA 8042;
4. Accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment of workers; and
5. Accused committed the same against three or more persons individually or as a
group.
These elements are obtaining in this case. First, the RTC found accused-appellant to
have undertaken recruitment activity when she promised the private complainants
overseas employment for a fee and this factual finding was affirmed by the CA.Second,
the Certification issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
unmistakably reveals that the accused-appellant neither had a license nor authority to
recruit workers for overseas employment. Third, it was established that there were five
complainants, i.e., Suratos, Guillarte, Alayon, Bagay, Jr., and Duldulao.

In addition, the court affirms the conviction of the accused for five counts of estafa under
Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC. It is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be
convicted separately of illegal recruitment under RA 8042 or the Labor Code, and estafa
under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC.

The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence
or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. Here, the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that accusedappellant deceived private complainants into believing
that she had the authority and capability to send them abroad for employment, despite
her not being licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.
Because of the assurances given by accused-appellant, the private complainants parted
with their hard-earned money for the payment of the agreed placement fee, for which
accused-appellant issued petty cash vouchers and used fictitious names evidencing her
receipt of the payments.
MARIO VERIDIANO y SAPI v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200370
June 7, 2017

FACTS: Veridiano was charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
When was arraigned, he pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. During trial, the
prosecution presented PO 1 Guillermo Cabello and POI Daniel Solano testified that a
concerned citizen called a certain P03 Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan
Police Station, informing him that a certain alias "Baho," who was later identified as
Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs. P03 Esteves
immediately relayed the information to PO I Cabello and P02 Alvin Vergara who were
both on duty. Chief of Police June Urquia instructed POI Cabello and P02 Vergara to set
up a checkpoint.At around I 0:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger
jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. They flagged down the jeepney and asked the
passengers to disembark. The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-
shirts to check for possible concealed weapons and to remove the contents of their
pockets. The police officers recovered from Veridiano a tea bag containing what
appeared to be marijuana. POI Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his
initials. Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights. He was then
brought to the police station. At the police station, PO 1 Cabello turned over the seized
tea bag to PO 1 Solano, who also placed his initials. PO 1 Solano then made a
laboratory examination request, which he personally brought with the seized tea bag to
the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory.The contents of the tea bag tested
positive for marijuana.

For his defense, Veridiano testified that he went to the fiesta. After participating in the
festivities, he decided to go home and took a passenger jeepney bound for Nagcarlan.
When the jeepney reached Barangay Buboy, Nagcarlan, the motorcyclists followng them
flagged down the jeepney and two armed men boarded the jeepney and frisked
Veridiano. However, they found nothing on his person. Still, Veridiano was accosted and
brought to the police station where he was informed that illegal drug was found in his
possession.

The Regional Trial Court found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
illegal possession of marijuana which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals stating that
he was caught in flagranrte delicto.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner.

HELD: The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion
requirement in stop and frisk searches. A "stop and frisk" search is defined as "the act of
a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s)
or contraband." Thus, the allowable scope of a "stop and frisk" search is limited to a
"protective search of outer clothing for weapons.

Although a "stop and frisk" search is a necessary law enforcement measure specifically
directed towards crime prevention, there is a need to safeguard the right of individuals
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Law enforcers do not have unbridled
discretion in conducting "stop and frisk" searches. While probable cause is not required,
a "stop and frisk" search cannot be validated on the basis of a suspicion or hunch. Law
enforcers must have a genuine reason to believe, based on their experience and the
particular circumstances of each case, that criminal activity may be afoot. Reliance on
one suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot produce a reasonable search.

Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent

to the warrantless search. Although the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures may be surrendered through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that the
waiver was executed with clear and convincing evidence. Consent to a warrantless
seracha nd seizure must be "unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and unattended by
duress or coercion. The validity of a consented warrantless search is determined by the
totality of the circumstances.

Hence, the Court of Appeals' decision was reversed and set aside.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AMBROSIO OHAYAS
G.R. No. 207516
June 19, 2017

FACTS: Accused-appellant was charged with murder. Upon arraignment, accused-

appellant pleaded not guilty.

The testimonies offered by the prosecution stated that the 12-year old·victim, Armando
Kyamko, Jr. was with his friends, 15- year old Sany and 18-year old Lou relaxing and
conversing under a kalachuchi tree along ·the national road in Sitio Bonbon,
Pinamungajan, Cebu. Aside from the three lads, there were several persons in the
vicinity including the father of the victim, Armando, Sr., who was then at the opposite
side of the road.
Suddenly, both Sany and Lou saw accused-appellant, Ohayas, a balut vendor in their
place, with three other persons coming from Sitio Campo. Accused-appellant, together
with his companions, walked towards the place where the three lads were conversing.
Lou noticed that accused-appellant had in his hands a shotgun while his companions
were carrying torches. When accused-appellant's group was only seven arms' length
away from the victim's group, accused-appellant suddenly, and without any warning,
shot. Armando Jr. who was hit in his right abdomen. Not contented, accused- appellant
continued to fire at the victims who were shocked by the tum of events. Sany was hit on
his right finger, while Lou, although not directly hit, nevertheless suffered injuries when
the bullets ricocheted. After being hit,Armando Jr. managed to call his father for help
before he fell to the ground. On the other hand, Sany and Lou ran to their respective
houses to seek refuge.

On his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he was fishing at sea. At around 8

o'clock in the evening, he heard gunshots coming from Sitio Bonbon, Pinamungajan,
Cebu. He felt afraid, so he stopped · fishing and went home. On the way home, he was
told by SP03 Bancog that someone died in the shooting incident, and that accused-
appellant was the one to be blamed. SP03 Bancog further advised accused-appellant to
take precautionary measures because the victim's relatives might retaliate against him.
He decided to take refuge at the house of his neighbor. Accused-appellant further
claimed that he was cooking fish when SP03 Bancog and other policemen went to his
house to investigate. He was not arrested but was advised to leave the place. His house
was further searched for a shotgun, but the policemen did not find any.

He was found guilty, hence, the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable for murder.

HELD: Yes. The elements of the crime of murder are: (I) a person was killed; (2) the
accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any ·of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4) the
killihg is not parricide or infanticide. 4 In this case, these requisites have been
established by the prosecution.

Here, that the prosecution's witnesses were in unison in identifying accused-appellant as

the person who shot Armando, Jr. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, when
referring only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the substance of their
declarations or the veracity or the weight of their testimonies. Although there may be
inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses
where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification
of the accused.

As to the presence of treachery, it was sufficiently established its existence in the

commission of the crime. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend to directly and specially insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation
on the part of the victim. That alevosia or treachery attended the killing of the victim was
apparent from the suddenness of the attack. Armando, Jr., the 12-year old victim, who
was merely talking to his friends, was suddenly shot by the accused-appellant. The
shooting in this case was deliberate, swift and sudden, denying the victim the
opportunity to protect or defend himself. He was unarmed and unaware of the harm
about to happen to him.

In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that: (1) Armando, Jr. was shot
and killed; (2) the accused-appellant was the person who killed him; (3) Armando, Jr.'s
killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery; and (4) the killing of
Armando, Jr. was neither parricide nor infanticide.

Hence, the appeal is dismissed.

ANTHONY DE SILVA CRUZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 210266
June 7, 2017

FACTS: Cruz was charged with violation of Section 9(a) and (e) of Republic Act No.
8484 by having feloniously in his possession and control a counterfeit access device
(Citibank Visa Card with No. 4539 7207 8677 7008) in violation of the said law. He used
the counterfeit Citibank Visa Card in buying from complainant Duty Free Philippines
represented by Redentor M. Quejada, one pair of Ferragamo shoes and two bottles of
perfume to the damage and prejudice of the complainant.

Accordinb to the prosecution, Cruz allegedly tried to purchase two bottles of Calvin Klein
perfume from Duty Free Philippines Fiesta Mall. Danilo Wong, the cashier at the
Perfume Section, testified that Cruz paid for the purchase using a Citibank Visa credit
card. The transaction was approved, although Wong doubted the validity of the credit
card since the number at the back was not aligned. Also, Cruz allegedly tried to
purchase a pair of Ferragamo shoes. Cruz paid for the purchase using a Citibank Visa
credit card bearing the name "Gerry Santos. When Lim asked for Cruz's Duty Free
shopping card, Cruz presented a shopping card with the name of Rodolfo Garcia. Lim
asked for another identification card, and Cruz gave her a driver's license bearing the
name "Gerry Santos. Lim proceeded to the mall's Electronic Section to swipe the credit
card for approval. The card was approved, but she noticed that the last four digits of the
card were not properly embossed and its validity date started in November 2006. She
called Citibank to verify the credit card.

Upon verification, Citibank informed Lim that the credit card was counterfeit and that the
real Gerry Santos was the Head of Citibank's Fraud Risk Management Division. He was
then found guilty both by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD: Yes. A counterfeit access device is "any access device that is counterfeit,
fictitious, altered, or forged, or an identifiable component of an access device or
counterfeit access device. Under Section 9(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 8484, the
possession and use of an access device is not illegal. Rather, what is prohibited is the
possession and use of a counterfeit access device. Therefore, the corpus delicti of the
crime is not merely the
access device, but also any evidence that proves that it is counterfeit.

Petitioner was found in possession of Citibank Visa which bore the name "Gerry Santos.
He used the said credit card to purchase Ferragamo shoes which was later proven to be
a counterfeit access device.

Hence, the petition is denied.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ELMER AVANCENA Y CABANELA, JAIME
POPIOCO Y CAMBAYA and NOLASCO TAYTAY Y CRUZ
G.R. No. 200512
June 7, 2017

FACTS: Two (2) Information were filed charging the accused with the crimes of
Kidnapping for Ransom and Robbery/Extortion. First, they kidnapped and deprived
Rizaldo Policarpio y Legaspi for purposes of extorting money in the amount of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand (Pl50,000.00) as a condition for his release and was in fact only
released after he was illegally detained for almost seven hours and after his father had
paid the amount of P4,000.00. Second, the accused took from Alfonso Policarpio the
amount of P6,000.00 against his will and to his damage and prejudice.

During trial, Rizaldo Policarpio testified that at when he boarded his Tamaraw FX going
to a convenience store to buy a sandwich, he noticed a vehicle tailing him; it was a gray
Isuzu Crosswind with no headlights and plate number. Rizaldo decided to head to the
nearest police precinct on Evangelista Street. Upon alighting from his vehicle, he heard
someone call his name. A man, whom he later identified as Avancena, alighted from the
gray Isuzu Crosswind across the street. Avancena told Rizaldo that one of his
companions in the Isuzu Crosswind noticed that Rizaldo received illegal drugs. Rizaldo
denied Avancena's accusations. Avancena instructed Rizaldo that they should board
Rizaldo's vehicle. Rizaldo could not complain because Avancena had a gun. Avancena
drove to the PDEA. Upon arriving at the PDEA parking lot, Avancena told Rizaldo that
they would release him if his father would pay them Pl 50,000.00. Rizaldo replied that his
father did not have that amount of money and asked what it was for, since he did not do
anything illegal. Avancena removed his handcuffs and they alighted from the vehicle to
have coffee on the sidewalk. After having coffee, Avancena commanded Rizaldo to call
his father through a mobile phone. Rizaldo spoke to his father and told him to come over
to the PDEA since there were people demanding Pl50,000.00 for his release even
though he did not do anything wrong. Alfonso brought a borrowed amount of P6,000.00
to the PDEA.

Avancena, on his part, denied that there was kidnapping since Rizaldo knew him and
voluntarily went with them in their PDEA office.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
and robbery under Article 294(5) of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD: Article 26760 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
4. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
2. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
5. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is
any of the parents, female or a public officer. x x x
In kidnapping for ransom, the prosecution must be able to establish the following
elements: first, the accused was a private person; second, he kidnapped or detained or
in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; third, the kidnapping or detention
was illegal; and fourth, the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom.

It was proven that accused-appellants were not in any manner connected with PDEA.
Also, the were not agents of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. Nonetheless,
even if they were employed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, detaining any
private person for the purpose of extorting any amount of money could not, in any way,
be construed as within their official functions. If proven, they can be guilty of serious
illegal detention. Their badges or shields do not give them immunity for any criminal act.

Accused-appellants also told Rizaldo that he would only be released if Alfonso paid them
PI50,000.00. The act of holding a person for a proscribed purpose necessarily implies an
unlawful physical or mental restraint against the person's will, and with a willful intent to
so confine the victim. If Rizal do was indeed free to leave, there would have been no
reason for Alfonso to come rushing to his son's aid. Rizaldo was also able to come home
only after Alfonso negotiated his release. Taken together, the prosecution was able to
establish the elements of kidnapping for ransom, which is punishable under the Revised
Penal Code with death. Considering the suspension of the death penalty, the proper
penalty is reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

Accused-appellants, however, were also charged with robbery under Article 294(5) of the
Revised Penal Code. The elements of simple robbery are a) that there is personal
property belonging to another; b) that there is unlawful taking of that property; c) that the
taking is with intent to gain; and d) that there is violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things.

In this instance, there was a taking of personal property belonging to Alfonso by means
of intimidation. Taking is considered complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing, even if the offender has no opportunity to dispose of the thing.

Hence, the appeal is dismissed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MICHELLE DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 214500
June 28, 2017
FACTS: MICHELLE DELA CRUZ recruited Aguilar-Uy to work in South Korea as
domestic helper. She was told that she will receive P50,000.00 for eight hours of work
and an overtime pay totalling to P80,000.00 per month. 7 Appellant informed her that she
has twelve (12) visas with her and still needed two more persons to go to South
Korea.8 Appellant required her to submit the requirements that will be sent to South
Korea for authentication.
Appellant gave them a stub9 which purported to be coming from the Embassy of the
Republic of South Korea. However, when they presented the same to the Korean
Embassy, they were told that all their documents were fake. Aguilar-Uy then lodged a
complaint against the appellant before the Presidential Task Force Anti-Illegal
Recruitment Agency. Appellant promised them that she would pay them back but failed
to do so. Aguilar-Uy identified the appellant in open court.
Rosalina Rosales of the Licensing Division of the POEA who confirmed that
appellant is not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment.
Appellant avers that she cannot be held criminally liable for illegal recruitment
because she merely assisted private complainants in processing their travel
documents without any promise of employment. She asserts that the prosecution failed
to establish whether she actually undertook any recruitment activity or any
prohibited practice enumerated under Art. 13 (b) or Art. 34 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: a. Whether or not the appeal and appelants contention are meritorious.
b. Whether or not the accuse may be charged of illegal recruitment and estafa
Ruling: 1. Yes. She is liable for illegal recruitment.
The following are elements illegal recruitment:
(1) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of
"recruitment and placement" under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or any of the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code (now Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 8042) and
(2) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him
to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers. In the case of illegal
recruitment in large scale, as in this case, a third element is required: that the offender
commits any of the acts of recruitment and placement against three or more persons,
individually or as a group.
In the instant case, appellant committed the acts enumerated in Section 6 of R.A.
8042. As testified to by Aguilar-Uy, Reformado and Lavaro, appellant gave them an
impression that she is capable of sending them to South Korea as domestic
helpers. Appellant received monies from private complainants.
To recapitulate: First, appellant engaged in recruitment when she represented
herself to be capable of deploying workers to South Korea upon submission of the
pertinent documents and payment of the required fees; Second, all three (3) private
complainants positively identified appellant as the person who promised them
employment as domestic helpers in Korea for a fee; and Third, appellant is not licensed
or authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. Clearly, the existence of the
offense of illegal recruitment in large scale was duly proved by the prosecution.
2. It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and
convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa.
The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction. In the second, such intent is imperative.
In the instant case, the prosecution has established that appellant defrauded
private complainants by leading them to believe that she has the capacity to send them
to South Korea for work as domestic helpers, even as she does not have a license or
authority for the purpose.
As a consequence of appellant’s false pretenses, the private complainants
suffered damages as the promised employment abroad never materialized and the
money they paid were never recovered. All these representations were actually false
and fraudulent and thus, the appellant must be made liable under par. 2 (a), Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code.
In estafa, damage is essential, the same is not an essential element in the crime
of illegal recruitment. It is the lack of the necessary license or authority, not the fact of
payment that renders the recruitment activity of appellant unlawful. 54 As long as the
prosecution is able to establish through credible testimonial evidence that the accused-
appellant has engaged in illegal recruitment, a conviction for the offense can very well be
justified.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BILLIE GHER TUBALLAS y FAUSTINO
G.R. No. 218572
June 19, 2017

AAA testified that on November 12, 2009, she had a drinking spree with Arjay, Mary, the
accused Bryan, Salvador Sanidad, a certain Renerio at the house of ZZZ. AAA got drunk
and when she became dizzy she was taken by Arjay and ZZZ to a room where she was
told to sleep it off. She awakened when she felt somebody touching her breast and saw
that it was ZZZ. ZZZ was inside her in a pumping movement. She tried to move but
somebody was pinning her hand down. She saw Bryan standing beside the sofa bed
and accused-appellant, Billie, taking a video of her and ZZZ with his mobile phone.
When they noticed that she was awake, ZZZ stopped what he was doing and stood up.
He was replaced by another man whom AAA did not know. He too had carnal
knowledge with her. Sometime around 1 :00 o'clock p.m. Mary awakened her and
helped her fix herself with Arjay following to take her home. A case of Rape under Par 1
art. 266-A of the RPC was filed against Billie, Bryan and ZZZ a minor who is 17 years of
age.
AAA's testimony was substantially corroborated by her friend Mary and Arjay. The
physical examination showed that there were lacerations in AAA’s genitalia which could
have been caused by a blunt object or force or trauma that was inserted in the area like
an erect penis. Billie denied raping AAA and taking a video of her while she was being
raped.
The RTC ruled that Billie, Bryan and ZZZ conspired in raping the victim AAA.
Billie appealed the decision of the RTC claiming that the RTC erred in finding that a
conspiracy existed between accused-appellant, ZZZ and Florencio.
Issues:
1. WON the accused may be convicted for Rape solely on the basis of the testimony of
the victim.
2.WON a conspiracy existed
Ruling:
1. YES
In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by three principles, to wit: ( 1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of
the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the
prosecution . must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. Credibility of the complainant becomes the
single most important issue. If the testimony of the victim is credible, convincing and
consistent with human nature, and the normal course of things, the accused may be
convicted solely on the basis thereof.
When there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the
complainant to testify against the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission
of the crime, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and
credence.
When a woman, especially a minor, alleges rape, she says in effect all that is
necessary to mean that she has been raped. When the offended party is of tender age
and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired,
considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be
exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity. A young girl's revelation that she had been
raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and willingness to
undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give out the details of an assault
on her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as mere concoction.
2. YES. To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.
Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular
purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and
growing out of the purpose intended. To establish the existence of conspiracy, direct
proof is not essential. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are
indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest.
The act of Billie in preventing Arjay from coming to the aid of AAA when she was
being sexually abused by ZZZ revealed that he was acting in confederation with ZZZ.
And later when he saw that Bryan too was sexually abusing the unconscious AAA did
nothing to stop him. This action of accused-appellant, Billie, showed his concurrence in
the criminal design of Bryan. Not to be forgotten is the fact that both AAA and Mary saw
him taking a video of ZZZ raping AAA.
With the finding that conspiracy exists between ZZZ, Florencio and accused-appellant,
the latter i's 1iable as a co-principal to the two counts of rape.
Virgilio Labandria Awas v People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 203114
June 28, 2017

FACTS: AAA, a Grade III pupil declared that [petitioner] is the boyfriend of her sister.
Sometime in January 2010, petitioner was in their house in Valenzuela City. Petitioner
called her and brought her inside the room. Petitioner touched her vagina. Petitioner
made her lie down beside him and again touched her vagina. Thereafter, petitioner put
on his shoes and warned her not to tell her mother and father about the incident. AAA
was wearing leggings and panty at the time of the incident. Petitioner never removed
anything from her when he touched her. At the time of the incident, they were the only
person inside the room. Her father and other siblings were then asleep in another room
while his brother was downstairs.

AAA’s brother come know about the incident when he saw her crying in a corner of
their house. Her brother told her mother about the incident. Her mother called a police
and pertitioner was later apprehended.

The petitioner argues that the circumstancesthe surrounding alleged lascivious

conduct committed against AAA were not in accord with human experience; that it was
quite strange that she did not shout for help although the room had no door, and there
were then other persons in the house; and that she neither protested nor offered any
resistance during the entire time she was being molested,lasted which for quite a time.

ISSUE: Whether or not the argument of the accused is meritoriuos.

Ruling: The appeal lacks merit.

The failure of AAA to shout during the incident would not exculpate the
petitioner. There is no standard behavior for a victim of a crime against chastity.
Behavioral psychology teaches that people react to similar situations dissimilarly. 13
AAA could have been submissive due to her tender age, but the fact that she did
cry after the incident was a true indication, indeed, that she had felt violated.
Worthy to note is that her own brother, upon noticing her crying, inquired why she
was crying, and she then told him that the petitioner had touched her vagina.

Also, his insistence that he did not exert any force or perform any act of
intimidation lacks persuasion because the absence of force or intimidation was
immaterial if AAA as the victim of the acts of lasciviousness was then below 12
years of age.

The acts committed by the petitioner AAA against constituted acts of

lasciviousness.
The elements of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code are, to wit: ( 1) the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) the act is done under any of the following
circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation, or (b) when the offended party
is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious ( c) when theoffended party
is under years of age; and (3) the offended party is12 another person of either
sex.
Such acts are punished as sexual abuse under Republic Act No. No. 7
610, whose elements under Section 5 of the law are namely: ( 1) the accused
commits the acts of sexual intercourse as sexual abuse under Republic Act No.
7610, whose elements under section 5 of the law are namely: 1) the accused
commits the acts of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;2) the act is
performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse
and (3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years ofage.

Section 2(h) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of

Republic Act No. No. 7610 defines lascivious conduct as:

The intentional touching, either directly or through

clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia,
anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,
degrade or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals
or pubic area of a person.
 Marlon Bacerra y Tabones Vs. People of the Philippines.
G.R. No. 204544. July 3, 2017
The identity of the perpetrator of a crime and a finding of guilt may rest solely on
the strength of circumstantial evidence.

Facts: Bacerra was charged with violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1613.
He claimed that he went to Fernandez's house, which was located one (1) kilometer
away. The RTC found him guilty of the crime of Simple Arson.
According to Bacerra, he cannot be convicted based on circumstantial evidence,
which, being merely based on conjecture, falls short of proving his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Petitioner argues in the alternative that the mitigating circumstances
of intoxication and voluntary surrender are present.

Held: The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.

(1) The probative value of direct evidence is generally neither greater than nor superior
to circumstantial evidence. The Rules of Court do not distinguish between "direct
evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may
be inferred."
The commission of a crime, the identity of the perpetrator, and the finding of guilt
may all be established by circumstantial evidence. The determination of whether
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt is a qualitative test not a
quantitative one. The proven circumstances must be "consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt."
The stoning incident and the burning incident cannot be taken and analyzed
separately. Instead, they must be viewed and considered as a whole. Circumstantial
evidence is like a "tapestry made up of strands which create a pattern when
interwoven."103 Each strand cannot be plucked out and scrutinized individually because
it only forms part of the entire picture. The events that transpired prior to the burning
incident cannot be disregarded. Petitioner's threat to bum occurred when he stoned
private complainant's house.
(2) For intoxication to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the intoxication of the
accused must neither be "habitual nor subsequent to the plan to commit a felony."
Moreover, it must be shown that the mental faculties and willpower of the accused were
impaired in such a way that would diminish the accused's capacity to understand the
wrongful nature of his or her acts.
Voluntary surrender, as a mitigating circumstance, requires an element of
spontaneity. The accused's act of surrendering to the authorities must have been
impelled by the acknowledgment of guilt or a desire to "save the authorities the trouble
and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture."
 Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation and Ruther Batuigas Vs. Victor A.
Domingo and the People of the Philippines.
G.R. No. 170341. July 5, 2017

Facts: Batuigas wrote an article in his Bull's Eye column in Tempo titled "Crucial task for
JoeCon's successor." The article dealt with the letter-complaint of the Waray employees
of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Region VIII on the "mismanagement, low
morale, improper decorum, gross inefficiency, nepotism, etc." in the office. One of the
public officials complained of was petitioner Regional Director Domingo who was
accused of dereliction of official duties, among others. The "JoeCon" referred to was the
outgoing DTI Secretary, Jose Concepcion. Batuigas again wrote in his column "A
challenge to Sec. Garrucho" about the alleged "lousy performance of Regional Director
R.D. Domingo in DTI Region 8," among others.
Domingo filed a libel case against Batuigas. The accused claimed that as the chief
reporter and a columnist of Tempo, he described his work as an expose, a product of
investigative work. He wrote the questioned articles because he found the complaints to
be of public interest as these involved the shenanigans committed by Domingo in his
office.

Held: Criminal libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime or of a vice
or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance
tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead. The following are the requisites:
(a) it must be defamatory- if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the
possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status
or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which
tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
(b) it must be malicious- ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to
injure the reputation of the person defamed.
(c) it must be given publicity- if the material is communicated to a third person. It is not
required that the person defamed has read or heard about the libelous remark. What is
material is that a third person has read or heard the libelous statement.
(d) the victim must be identifiable- it must be shown that at least a third person or a
stranger was able to identify him as the object of the defamatory statement.

The Court held that the first article was not defamatory. The article was merely a
factual report which, to stress, were based on the letter of the Waray employees
reiterating their earlier complaints against Domingo and other co-workers at the DTI
Region VIII. Although, based on these pieces of evidence, the complaints against
Domingo had already been dismissed by the CSC and the Office of the Ombudsman,
the fact remains that there were actual complaints against him.
Jurisprudence provides for the additional exceptions to the privileged
communications, viz: in Borja! v. Court of Appeals, 84 where it was held that in view of
the constitutional right on the freedoms of speech and of the press, fair commentaries on
matters of public interest are privileged. A privileged communication may be classified as
either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged.
The qualifiedly privileged communications are those which contain defamatory
imputations but which are not actionable unless found to have been made without good
intention or justifiable motive, and to which "private communications" and "fair and true
report without any comments or remarks" belong.
 When confronted with libel cases involving publications which deal with public
officials and the discharge of their official functions, this Court is not confined within the
wordings of the libel statute; rather, the case should likewise be examined under the
constitutional precept of freedom of the press. But if the utterances are false, malicious,
or unrelated to a public officer's performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of
public interest involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil
liability. In contrast, where the subject of the libelous article is a private individual, malice
need not be proved by the plaintiff.
The statements on the "lousy performance" and "mismanagement" of Domingo are
matters of public interest as these relate to his moral conduct. Thus, actual malice is
required to be actionable. There is "actual malice" or malice in fact when the offender
makes the defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not (Disini v. The Secretary of Justice, 27 Phil. 28,
113, 2014).
Batuigas merely expressed his opinion based on the fact that there were complaints
filed against Domingo, among others. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based
on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as
long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
In order to constitute malice, ill will must be personal. The absence of personal ill will
of Batuigas against Domingo disavows actual malice and buttresses the finding that
Batuigas was prompted by a legitimate or plausible motive in writing the articles.
For sure, the words "lousy performance" and "mismanagement" had caused hurt or
embarrassment to Domingo and even to his family and friends, but it must be
emphasized that hurt or embarrassment even if real, is not automatically equivalent to
defamation; words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per
se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious,
whether written or spoken, do not constitute bases for an action for defamation in the
absence of an allegation for special damages.
 People of the Philippines Vs. Alex Amar y Montano.
G.R. No. 223513. July 5, 2017

Facts: Montano was charged for the crime of rape of his daughter. Montano appealed
and denied the accusations. He also claimed that the victim’s failure to immediately
report the rape incident is not the normal behavior of a minor girl who had been
previously sexually assaulted.
Held: In rape committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or
the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or
intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or
intimidation.
The following are the requisites of rape under Art. 266-A (par.1,subparagraph a)
(1) that the offender is a man;
(2) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
(3) that such act is accomplished by using force, (threat) or intimidation.
It is jurisprudentially settled that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be
convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing
and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. It has been
previously held that it is against human nature for a young girl to fabricate a story that
would expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime of shame, especially when her
charge could mean the death or lifetime imprisonment of her father.
Under Article 266-B of the RPC, the death penalty shall be imposed when the victim
of rape is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. The death penalty cannot, however, be
imposed in view of Republic Act No. 9346. In lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole shall be imposed.
 People of the Philippines Vs. Rommel Diputado.
G.R. No. 213922. July 5, 2017

Facts: Diputado was found guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Accused-appellant claims that the seized illegal drug was not marked immediately
after his arrest at the scene of the crime, neither was it marked at the house of the
barangay captain where the seized illegal drug. Allegedly, it was only marked at the
office of the Regional Special Anti-Crime Task Force.

Held: The SC ruled that the prosecution failed to preserve the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized dangerous drugs.
What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that
the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti. The identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to
have been preserved. This requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drug's unique
characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to
tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise.
Section 21 of R.A. No 9165 provides for the procedure that ensures that what was
confiscated is the one presented in court.
Chain of Custody is the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory
equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory, to safekeeping and the presentation in court for identification and destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and
time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in
court as evidence, and the final disposition.
In this case the seized item was not marked immediately at the place where
accused-appellant was arrested. Neither was it marked in the house of the barangay
captain where the seized item and the buy-bust money were recorded and listed by PO1
Mayores. The seized item was marked only after the recording/listing and only at the
RSAC-TF. Therefore, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item was already
compromised. The prosecution was not able to establish an unbroken chain of custody.
 People of the Philippines Vs. Luther Sabado, et al.
G.R. No. 218910. July 5, 2017

Facts: Accused was convicted of Qualified Theft committed against his employer,
Diamond Pawnshop. A witness narrated that he saw accused-appellant coming out of
the pawnshop, as well as two unidentified men standing near the pawnshop. He saw
accused-appellant unlock the steel gate and called one of the men who entered the
pawnshop. When the other man came out of the pawnshop, the accused followed but
tied up and with a packing tape plastered to his mouth. He claimed that he was robbed.
Accused claimed that he was held at gunpoint to go inside the pawnshop. His hands
and feet were tied and his mouth was covered with a tape. Then the two unidentified
men took all the contents of the vault and fled.
Held: Elements of the crime of theft are as follows:
(1) that there be taking of personal property;
(2) that said property belongs to another;
(3)that the taking be done with intent to gain or animus lucrandi;
(4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
(5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things.
It is qualified when:
(1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant;
(2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence- must be the result of the
relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the accused-
appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between
them which the accused-appellant abused;
(3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle;
(4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation;
(5) the property stolen· is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and
(6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
The CA correctly appreciated conspiracy between accused-appellant and the other
accused. Here, conspiracy is inferred from the conduct of accused-appellant and the
other accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime.
 People of the Philippines Vs. Marlon Belmonte y Sumagit, et al.
G.R. No. 220889. July 5, 2017

Facts: Accused-appellant and his co-accused, namely, Marvin Belmonte (Marvin), Enrile
Gabay (Enrile ), and Noel Baac (Noel) were charged with Robbery with Rape.

Held: Robbery with Rape is a special complex crime under Article 294 of the RPC. It
contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent
to gain, personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion
thereof or as an accompanying crime.
While the evidence directly points to Noel as AAA's rapist, accused-appellant had
the opportunity but did not endeavor to stop accused Noel from raping AAA. Once
conspiracy is established between several accused in the commission of the crime of
robbery, as in the present case, they would all be equally culpable for the rape
committed by anyone of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless anyone of them
proves that he endeavored to prevent the others from committing rape.
 People of the Philippines Vs. Ricky Primavera y Remodo.
G.R. No. 223138. July 5, 2017

Facts: Accused-appellant was charged with rape.

Held: The following are the elements of rape which must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt, to wit:
(1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and
(2) that said act was accomplished:
(a) through the use of force and intimidation, or
(b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
(c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or is demented.
The close proximity of relatives at the scene of the rape does not negate the
commission of the crime, contrary to the accused-appellant's argument. It has always
been held that rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in
parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there are other
occupants, and even in the same room where other members of the family are also
sleeping. This Court further ruled that, as it has consistently ruled, the presence of
lacerations or injuries in the victim's sexual organ is not necessary to prove the crime of
rape and its absence does not negate the fact of rape. 25 In fact, a medical report is not
indispensable in a prosecution of rape.

People of the Philippines Vs. Alfredo Gunsay y Tolentino. G.R. No. 223678.
July 5, 2017
TIJAM, J.:
Facts: On their way home, the victim and her companion met the accused-appellant,
who punched the victim on her abdomen and put grass in her mouth, then dragged her
to the corn plantation. The accused succeeded in raping the victim while pointing a knife
at her.
Accused-appellant was convicted of Rape by the trial court.
Held: The Court believes in the testimony of AAA, which was corroborated by the result
of the medical examination. AAA's credibility is further strengthened by her prompt report
of the incident to her mother and authorities.
The Supreme Court further held that rape is no respecter of time or place as it can
be committed in small, confined places or in places which many would consider as
unlikely and inappropriate, or even in the presence of other family members.
 People of the Philippines Vs. Marcial D. Pulgo.
G.R. No. 218205. July 5, 2017

Facts: The accused approached them and suddenly pulled out a knife and stabbed
Romeo which caused the latter’s death. He was convicted by the trial court. On appeal,
the CA and the SC affirmed his conviction.
Held: Under oath, eyewitness Aurelio positively and unequivocally identified accused-
appellant as Romeo's assailant.
In this case, the SC also affirmed that the killing was qualified by treachery. To
establish treachery, two elements must concur:
(1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself,
and
(2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means of attack employed.
These elements have been established in this case.
In this case, neither Aurelio nor Romeo was aware of the impending assault from
accused-appellant. Both Aurelio and Romeo were also unarmed. This made them all the
more vulnerable and defenseless in the face of accused-appellant's sudden attack.
The essence of treachery is the unexpected and sudden attack on the victim which
renders the latter unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness
and severity of the attack. This criterion applies, whether the attack is frontal or from
behind. Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an
unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it. In fact,
treachery may still be appreciated even when the victim was forewarned of the danger to
his person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the
victim to defend himself or to retaliate.

People of the Philippines Vs. Rolly Dizon y Tagulaylay. G.R. No. 217982.
July 10, 2017

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Facts: Dizon allegedly raped the victim who was 8 years old. The victim’s sister, 6 years
old, saw the incident. Dizon was convicted with rape through sexual assault and
statutory rape by the trial court.
The SC affirmed his conviction.
For a charge of rape through sexual intercourse to prosper, the prosecution must
prove the following elements:
(1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and
(2) he accomplished such act through force, threat, or intimidation, or when she was
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, by means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.
Sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years of age is statutory rape.

As to the charge of rape by sexual assault, the same contemplates either of the
following situations:
(1) a male offender inserts his penis into the mouth or anal orifice of another person,
whether a man or a woman, under any of the attendant circumstances in paragraph 1 of
Article 266-A; or
(2) a male or female offender inserts any instrument or object into the genital or anal
orifice of another person, whether a man or a woman, under any of the attendant
circumstances in paragraph 1 of Article 266-A.

The accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of one count of

statutory rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Applying the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610, the Court, as held in People v.
Chingh, ruled that instead of applying the penalty prescribed therein, which is prision
mayor, considering that VVV was below 12 years of age, and considering further that
Armando's act of inserting his finger in VVV's private part undeniably amounted to
lascivious conduct, the appropriate imposable penalty should be that provided in Section
S (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
Hence, as the accused-appellant is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of one
count of rape by sexual assault, the proper penalty is the indeterminate penalty of twelve
(12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
Roble Barbosa and Ramdy Barbosa v. Pp
G.R. No. 207193; July 24,2017
Facts:
At 2:45 p.m. on May 16, 1998, Arnem Betita (Betita) was inside their family home
when she heard her father, the victim, mumbling the words: "Nagsalig Zang na sila, kay
mahisaon nga mga tawo" (They are confident of themselves, and they are envious
people). Minutes later, she heard a man outside their house shouting "Get out". Her
father responded to the challenge and stepped out of their house. Three gunshots
erupted, which prompted Betita to investigate. When she went outside, she saw
petitioner Ramdy running away with a gun in his hand. She also noticed petitioner Roble
on the terrace of his house holding a long firearm. Betita rushed towards her wounded
father who was slumped on the floor. She knelt and embraced him, then shouted to
Roble "tama na, tama na" (that's enough, that's enough). The victim's mother and
neighbors arrived and brought him to the hospital where he was pronounced "dead on
arrival". The autopsy on the cadaver of the victim revealed that his death was due to a
gunshot wound in his left eyebrow caused by a bullet fired from a caliber .25 firearm.
The RTC ruled that there was conspiracy between the accused and convicted them
for the crime of robbery. CA affirmed RTC’s ruling hence the petition.
Contention of the accused:
Petitioners contend that there was no conspiracy between them since nobody actually
saw the commission of the crime.

Issue: Whether or not conspiracy was properly appreciated by the lower court and that
Betita’s testimony should be given merit.

Ruling:
The Petition lacks merit.
The RTC and the CA were correct in ruling that petitioners were in conspiracy in
killing the victim. The circumstantial evidence showed that petitioners are father and son,
and both carried firearms when they confronted the victim. During the confrontation,
three gunshots were heard, which made it possible that both of them fired a gun.
Petitioner Roble was at the terrace of his house while petitioner Ramdy sought cover at
the wall which was closer to the
victim. Their assault ceased after the victim's daughter pleaded for them to stop. After
shooting the victim, Ramdy fled while Roble sought refuge inside his house instead of
lending assistance to the victim. They clearly acted in unison to achieve the common
objective of killing the victim.
There is also nothing in the records that would show that Betita was actuated by
improper motive, and absent any compelling reason to conclude otherwise, her
testimony will be given full faith and credence. Her positive identification of petitioners as
the persons last seen with the victim immediately after the commission of the crime
combined with other pieces of circumstantial evidence were sufficient to establish that
petitioners fatally shot the victim.
Pp v. Gilda Abellanosa;
G.R. No. 214340; July 19,2017

Facts:
Accused appellant Gilda Abellanosa went to Iloilo and represented herself to several
private complainants as a recruiter and promised employment and their deployment to
Brunei after receipt of processing and placement fees; and that despite all these, the
private complainants were not given work abroad and their placement/processing fees
were not reimbursed.
The RTC convicted the accused of illegal recruitment committed in a large scale
which the CA affirmed and so she elevated the case to the Supreme Court.\
Contention of the accused:
She denied meeting the complainants and that her purpose in going to Iloilo was
only to assist a certain Shirley in processing the latter's business license.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that her guilt for the crime charged had
been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement, viz.: [A ]ny act of
canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers,
and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, That any person or entity which, in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Corollary to the provisions under the Labor Code Section 6 of RA 8042 defines
illegal recruitment.
The trial court and the CA correctly ruled that the prosecution was able to establish
that appellant was engaged in illegal recruitment in large scale. It was proved that
appellant was a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to recruit workers for deployment
abroad; she offered or promised employment abroad to private complainants; she
received monies from private complainants purportedly as placement or processing fees;
that private complainants were not actually deployed to Brunei; that despite demands,
appellant failed to reimburse or refund to private complainants their monies; and that
appellant committed these prohibited acts against three or more persons, individually or
as a group.
Finally, appellant recruited seven persons, or more than the minimum of three persons
required by law, for illegal recruitment to be considered in large scale.
Verily, the RTC and the CA correctly found the appellant guilty of large scale illegal
recruitment
Pp v. NOMERTO NAPOLES y BAJAS;
G.R. No. 215200; July 26, 2017

Facts:
"AAA" was 19 years old when her stepfather, herein appellant, began raping her in
November 2000.
She narrated that Sometime in November 2000, while at home and listening to a
radio program, appellant suddenly grabbed her by the arm, covered her mouth and
poked her with a knife. She tried to get away but appellant punched her stomach and
pushed her to the bed. While "AAA' s" hands were tied over her head, appellant started
to undress her, placed himself on top of "AAA" and inserted his penis into her vagina.
Such incidents were repeated for 6 times in different occasions within the period of
November to April 2001.
Medico legal examinations showed that the victim had successive penetrations
because of the old healed lacerations and was impregnated during the rape incidents.
As a result the victim gave birth on November 11, 2011.
The RTC convicted accused of six counts of rape and the CA affirmed the former’s
ruling.

Contention of the accused:

He denied having raped the victim and interposed the defense that during those
times, he was either away from home or that family members were home. However he
admitted having sexual intercourse with AAA but the same were consensual and the
same does not constitute rape as there was even no resistance from the victim.

Issue:
Whether or not the silence of the victim, or the victim’s failure to resist the rape
incidents negate criminal liability of the accused.
Ruling:

Upon perusal of the records of the case, there is no reason to reverse or modify the
findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA on the credibility of the testimony of the victim
"AAA."
In his bid for acquittal, appellant contends that from the testimony of '"AAA," there was
no showing that she defended her honor and dignity with utmost courage and
determination. He avers that "AAA' s" silence and lack of showing of any outrage place
her story in grievous doubt.
Appellant's arguments deserve scant consideration. The Court has declared repeatedly
that "failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make voluntary the victim's
submission to the perpetrator's lust. Besides, physical resistance is not an element of
rape." Moreover, a rape
victim is oftentimes controlled by fear rather than reason. The use of a knife and bolo
and the threat of death posed by appellant constituted sufficient force and intimidation to
cow "AAA" into submission. Furthermore, appellant, who is "AAA's" stepfather,
undoubtedly exerted a strong moral influence over "AAA," which may even substitute for
actual physical violence and intimidation.
Appellant further maintains that he and "AAA" have a romantic relationship. He
proffers the "sweetheart theory" as a defense. In People v. Bayrante the Court "has
decreed that even if the alleged romantic relationship were true, this fact does not
necessarily negate rape for a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancée
and worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love because love is not a license
for lust."
In light of appellant's positive identification by "AAA" that he raped her on the alleged
dates which assertion was corroborated by Dr. Virginia B. Mazo' s Medical findings, the
denial of appellant must fail.
The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are: (1) that the accused
had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) that said act was accomplished (a) through
the use of force or intimidation or (b) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious or ( c) when the victim is under 12 years of age or demented. It is apparent
from the records of this
case that appellant had carnal knowledge of "AAA" because his penis penetrated her
vagina. That the carnal knowledge was accomplished through force and intimidation was
likewise established in view of "AAA's" straightforward testimony that she was
threatened with death; furthermore, he used a bolo and knife, as well as physical
violence to accomplish his
bestial acts.
All told, we find no compelling reason to doubt the veracity of and deviate from the
findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA. We agree that the prosecution, with
testimonial and medical evidence, effectively discharged its burden of proving appellant's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Pp v. MARK GAMBAy NISSORADA;
G.R. No. 215332; July 24, 2017

Facts:

At around 1 :00a.m. of June 2, 2006, appellant and three unidentified men boarded a
public utility jeepney. When the vehicle was traversing along Tejeron comer Paco
Roman Streets, Sta. Ana, Manila, they announced a "hold-up". Appellant and one of his
companions pulled out their guns and divested Esteban Sandagan y Tampos
(Sandagan) of his cash and possessions in the amount oLPl,100.00. John Mark Cerbito
(Cerbito), the passenger who was seated beside the driver, refused to give his
cellphone, hence appellant kicked him three to four times. As a result, Cerbito fell off the
jeepney whereupon appellant shot him twice, hitting him in his chest and abdomen.
Thereafter, appellant and his three companions ran away with their loot. Cerbito died
due to his gunshot wounds. Two days later, police officers brought Sandagan to a
hospital where he saw appellant, who was gunned down in the course of another
robbery incident. Sandagan duly identified appellant as likewise the perpetrator of the
June 2, 2006
robbery-homicide. Thus, appellant was arrested.

Accused was convicted by the RTC for the crime of complex crime of robbery with
homicide as affirmed by the CA. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Was the conviction for complex crime of robbery with homicide proper?

Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.
The elements of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide are: "(1) the taking
of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of
violence or intimidation against a person; (4) on the occasion or by reason of the
robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. x x x The
robbery is the [main] purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely
incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the
killing may occur before, during or
after the robbery."
The prosecution successfully established these elements. Appellant, together with his
three companions, boarded the public utility jeepney and declared a "hold-up". The
passengers, including Sandagan, were forced at gunpoint to turnover their cash and
possessions. When Cerbito refused to be divested of his cellphone, appellant kicked him
three or four times with such force that he fell off the jeepney. Still dissatisfied with the
violence he vented on
Cerbito, appellant fired at him twice, hitting him in his chest and abdomen resulting in his
untimely death. Appellant and his three cohort." then fled together with their loot.
Undoubtedly, their main objective was to rob the passengers of the jeepney; the fatal
shooting of Cerbito was merely incidental, resulting by reason of or on the occasion of
the robbery.
Appellant therefore committed the crime of robbery with homicide as charged in the
information.
Pp v. Agapito Dimaala y Arela
G.R. No. 225054; July 17, 2017

Facts:
In a decision dated May 8, 2012, accused was convicted by the RTC for the crime of
murder affirmed by the CA. He filed a Notice of Appeal but later on filed a Motion to
Withdraw Appeal with prayer for Immediate Issuance of Entry of Judgment. Meanwhile,
the court received a letter from the Bureau of Corrections informing the accused-
appellant had died on August 23, 2016 at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital. In view of this
development, the criminal action, as well as the civil action for the recovery of the civil
liability ex delicto, is ipso facto extinguished.

Ruling:
It is settled that the death of accused-appellant prior to his final conviction by the Court
renders dismissible the criminal case against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code provides that the criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the
accused, to wit: Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished -Criminal liability is
totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as
to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment; xx xx In People v. Culas, citing People v. Layag,
the Court explained the effects of the death of an accused pending appeal on his
liabilities, as follows:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado,
in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only
the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
x x x.
xx xx
In this relation, the Court stresses that accused-appellant's civil liability based on
sources other than the subject delict survives, and the victim may file a separate civil
action against the estate of accused appellant, as may be warranted by law and
procedural rules.
PP v. ROSARIO BALADJAY;
G.R. No. 220458; July 26, 2017

Facts:
Accused Rosario and more than 5 other more who are allegedly counselor’s or
agents of a certain dummy company named Multinational Telecom Investors
Corporation (Multitel) made representation to private complainants in this case
concerning the telecommunication business they are in. Accordingly they encouraged
private complainants that they are engaged in a legitimate business of investment and
assured them of the profitability. Only to learn later on that Multitel was not issued a
secondary license by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to deal in
securities and solicit investments from the general public. In fact, per an SEC Advisory,
the company and its conduits were not duly registered and had no juridical personality
and authority to engage in any activity, let alone investment-taking. In their effort to
recover the money they have invested prompted the filing of the complaint.
The RTC convicted accused of syndicated estafa as affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court gravely erred in affirming the accused-appellant's
conviction for Syndicated Estafa.

Ruling:
We find no merit in the instant appeal. All the elements of Syndicated Estafa are
present in the instant case.
The elements of Syndicated Estafa, therefore, are as follows: (a) Estafa or other
forms of swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the
Estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and ( c) the
defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or
members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers' associations,
or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public. The gravamen
of the offenses charged in all the afore-mentioned cases is the employment of fraud or
deceit to the damage or prejudice of another.
In the case at bar, it can be observed that Multitel engaged in a modus operandi that
does not deviate far from those practiced in the above-cited cases. The similarity of the
pattern is uncanny. Here, using Multitel as their conduit, Baladjay and her more than five
(5) counselors employed deceit and falsely pretended to have the authority to solicit
investments from the general public when, in truth, they did not have such authority. The
deception continued when Baladjay's counselors actively solicited investments from the
public, promising very high interest returns starting at five percent (5%) per month.
Convinced of Baladjay's and her counselors' promise of lucrative income, the private
complainants were then enticed to invest in Multitel. However, unknown to them, the
promised high-yielding venture was unsustainable, as Multitel was not really engaged in
any legitimate business. Eventually, Baladjay and her cohorts ran away with the private
complainants' money causing them damage and prejudice.
Clearly, all the elements of Syndicated Estafa obtain in this case, considering that: (a)
more than five (5) persons are involved in Multitel's grand fraudulent scheme, including
Baladjay and her co-accused – who employed deceit, false pretenses and
representations to the private complainants regarding a supposed lucrative investment
opportunity with Multitel in order to solicit money from them~ (b) the said false pretenses
and representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud;
( c) relying on the false promises and misrepresentations thus employed, private
complainants invested their hard-earned money in Multitel; and ( d) Baladjay and her co-
accused defrauded the private complainants, obviously to the latter's prejudice.
Pp v. DOMINADOR LADRA
G.R. No. 221443; July 17, 2017

Facts:
Sometime between 2000 and 2001, private complainant together with her siblings
stayed in the house of the accused who is a relative of their mother. On one occasion,
accused ordered them to sleep only to be awakened when she felt accused on top of her
who then and there forced his penis into her vagina. The sexual abuse ceased in 2002
when she left the house.
Years later, or on the evening of April 16, 2008, AAA - who was already twelve
(12) years old at the time - was surprised when she saw accused-appellant in their
kitchen. To her shock, accused-appellant squeezed her vagina and told her that they
were going to visit his house. Scared, AAA cried and told her cousin, DDD, about the
incident. She also told DDD about the first rape incident and the subsequent ones
committed by accused appellant. Eventually, AAA told BBB about her traumatic
experiences in the hands of accused-appellant when she was five (5) years old.
Together, they reported the incident to the barangay and thereafter, had the incident
recorded in the police blotter. 12 Later, AAA filed criminal cases against accused-
appellant, who was subsequently arrested.
The RTC convicted the accused of rape and unjust vexation and the CA affirmed in
toto.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming accused-appellant's conviction for Rape
and Unjust Vexation.

Ruling:
The appeal has no merit.
The CA correctly disregarded accused-appellant's argument that he could not have
committed the crime in the presence of AAA’s younger brother, who slept beside her. It
cannot be denied that the presence of AAA’s brother in the room does not negate the
commission of the crime. "Rape can be committed even in places where people
congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house where
there are other occupants, and even in the same room where other members of the
family are also sleeping. It is not impossible or incredible for the members of the victim's
family to be in deep slumber and not to be awakened while a sexual assault is being
committed. It is settled that lust is not a respecter of time or place and rape is known to
happen in the most unlikely places."
The Court disagrees with the CA's affirmance of the RTC's finding that accused-
appellant can only be held guilty of Unjust Vexation. Conviction for acts of lasciviousness
requires the concurrence of the following elements: (a) that tp.e offender commits any
act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (b) that it is done under any of the following
circumstances: (i) through force, threat, or intimidation, (ii) when the offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, (iii) by means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority, and (iv) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of
age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present; and ( c) that the offended party is another person of either sex.
Before an accused can be held criminally liable for lascivious conduct under Section
5 (b) of RA 7610, the requisites of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness as penalized
under Article 336 of the RPC above-enumerated must be met in addition to the
requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, as follows: (1) the accused
commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed
with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) that the
child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
A judicious examination of the records reveals that all the elements of the crime
of Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC and lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of
RA 7610 has been sufficiently established. The prosecution was able to prove AAA's
minority at the time of the incident through the presentation of her Certificate of Live Birth
showing that she was born on September 3, 1995. At the time of the commission of the
lascivious act, AAA was then 12 years old. It was likewise established that accused-
appellant, an adult who exercised influence on AAA, committed a lascivious act by
"squeezing" her vagina.

After a careful evaluation, the Court finds that the mere fact of "squeezing" the
private part of a child - a young girl 12 years of age – could not have signified any other
intention but one having lewd or indecent design. It must not be forgotten that several
years prior, accused-appellant had raped AAA in the same house, for which act he was
appropriately convicted. Indeed, the law indicates that the mere touching - more so,
"squeezing," in this case, which strongly suggests that the act was intentional - of AAA's
genitalia clearly constitutes lascivious conduct. It could not have been done merely to
annoy or vex her, as opined by the courts a quo. That AAA was fully clothed at that time,
which led the courts a quo to believe that accused-appellant could not have intended to
lie with her, is inconsequential. "'Lewd' is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, and
lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that
which is carried on a wanton manner." As such, accused appellant's act of squeezing
AAA's vagina was a lewd and lascivious act within the definitions set by law and
jurisprudence.