G.R. No.

L-47722 July 27, 1943

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.

MORAN, J.:

Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and
corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless
imprudence and were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and two months of prison
correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this
judgment.

In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received
from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in
Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men. Defendant
corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of
the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a copy of the above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas.
They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction was given
to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene,
a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of police tried to
locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he volunteered
to go with the party. The Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private Fernandez taking
the route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living. When this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one
Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon further
inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to her own room which was very near that
occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back
towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the
gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him.
Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but
a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing, repaired to the scene
and when he asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter
brought to the provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber
revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused his death.

These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants
gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the
latter asked Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she
said that he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If
you are Balagtas, stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him.
Wounded, Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.

On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after having said, "if you are Balagtas stand up."
Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, while the latter was still lying on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted his
bullets: that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then apparently watching and
picking up something from the floor, he fired at him.

The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only because they are vitiated by a natural urge to
exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are materially contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was
apparently watching somebody in an attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that Oasis shot Tecson
while the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed
Balagtas, when the latter was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent
from these contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of the crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but
their mutual incriminating averments dovetail with and corroborate substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that,
according to Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is confirmed by
both appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit
up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying in bed. Thus corroborated,
and considering that the trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold that no error was committed
in accepting her testimony and in rejecting the exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's
testimony will show not only that her version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity. In her cross-examination,
even misleading questions had been put which were unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under
these circumstances, we do not feel ourselves justified in disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court.

The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight,
fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be Anselmo Balagtas but without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as
to his identity. And the question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson. It is
contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of their official duties, both of them believing that
Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability. Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared them guilty of the crime
of homicide through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances of the case, the crime committed by
appellants is murder through specially mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below.

In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The
maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case,
defendant therein after having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received
no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that
precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a
kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent mistake of fact
is the case of a man who was marked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol
demanded his money or life. He was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was
loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact
committed without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by
circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing.
In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to
immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to
Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they were
instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him.

Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender,
overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738),
yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest
could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable
force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention."
(Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making
an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S. vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive
from justice and a menace to the peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when in effecting his
arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although
upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242).

It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to life which he has by such notoriety
already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places his
captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the life of a
criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it
never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and
there exist no circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man, condemnation — not
condonation — should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official actuation.

The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the
injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil.,
939). In the words of Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de
dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar
un mal de tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this Court, a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232;
People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be
considered as reckless imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.

As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a
mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code.
According to such legal provision, a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender acted in the performance
of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of
such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present — appellants have acted in the
performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance
of their duty. Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through
impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom
they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69
of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.

For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance above
mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion
temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of P2,000, with
costs.
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming in toto the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime of attempted murder.

From the records, we gathered the following facts.

In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in
Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and
Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed
because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at
Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of
Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was
in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No
one was hit by the gun fire.

Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men left the premises, they
shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2

After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC), as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding that
Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an
impossible crime, citingArticle 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:

xxx xxx xxx

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions riddled it with bullets made the
crime inherently impossible.

On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible. Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute
an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder. Respondent alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to the Petition,
respondent pointed out that:

. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code),
but due to a cause or accident other than petitioner's and his accused's own spontaneous desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at
her house at that time. Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible. 3

Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the Old Penal Code where:

. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed,
employing appropriate means in order that his intent might become a reality, and finally, that the result or end contemplated shall have been
physically possible. So long as these conditions were not present, the law and the courts did not hold him criminally liable. 5

This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the
offender his formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which
prove inadequate, would constitute a felony against person or against property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such criminal
tendencies. 9

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or property because: (1) the commission of the
offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this
petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. 11 There
must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify the act an impossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. 13 Thus:

Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law;
(2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from
the intended act does not amount to a crime. 14

The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.

On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. 16 One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the
latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty. 17
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not
present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee Kong, 18 the accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired at
the spot where he thought the police officer would be. It turned out, however, that the latter was in a different place. The accused failed to hit him
and to achieve his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It held that:

The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined where he was, and where the bullet pierced the roof, renders it no
less an attempt to kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this country that where the criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished
simply because of an obstruction in the way of the thing to be operated upon, and these facts are unknown to the aggressor at the time, the
criminal attempt is committed.

In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the victim because the latter did not pass by the place
where he was lying-in wait, the court held him liable for attempted murder. The court explained that:

It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only became impossible by reason of the extraneous circumstance that Lane
did not go that way; and further, that he was arrested and prevented from committing the murder. This rule of the law has application only where
it is inherently impossible to commit the crime. It has no application to a case where it becomes impossible for the crime to be committed, either
by outside interference or because of miscalculation as to a supposed opportunity to commit the crime which fails to materialize; in short it has no
application to the case when the impossibility grows out of extraneous acts not within the control of the party.

In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if there was nothing to rob. In disposing of the case,
the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:

It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his criminal intent, no one can seriously doubt that the protection of
the public requires the punishment to be administered, equally whether in the unseen depths of the pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was
really present or not. The community suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended (attempted) as a crime and what is
done is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried out, the incipient act which the law of
attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed.

In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking that the latter was inside. However, at that
moment, the victim was in another part of the house. The court convicted the accused of attempted murder.

The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make this Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder
against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference between the Philippine and the
American laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.

In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and made the punishable. Whereas, in the
United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the crimes
enumerated in the said Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to an attempt
charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the impossibility defense into two categories: legal versus factual
impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:

. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as
the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of commission.

Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the
accused was indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into and out of prison. The law governing the matter made the act criminal if done
without knowledge and consent of the warden. In this case, the offender intended to send a letter without the latter's knowledge and consent and
the act was performed. However, unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with the warden's knowledge and consent. The lower court held
the accused liable for attempt but the appellate court reversed. It held unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility as
a defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed federal legislation, is consistent with the
overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this contention, the Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus,
following the principle of legality, no person could be criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law. Further, it said:

Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct constitutes the offense of attempt irrespective of legal
impossibility until such time as such legislative changes in the law take place, this court will not fashion a new non-statutory law of criminal
attempt.

To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment, the offender cannot escape
criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears,
therefore, that the act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand, where the offense is
legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime — neither for an attempt not for an impossible crime. The
only reason for this is that in American law, there is no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to
a crime charge — that is, attempt.

This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is
not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised
Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos.

The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And
under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause
independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be
an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which
prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and
frustrated felonies.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner
guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles
4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree of criminality shown by Petitioner,
this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and
to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188551 February 27, 2013

EDMUNDO ESCAMILLA y JUGO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

SERENO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 dated 20 August 2009. It seeks a review of the 10 June 2009 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30456, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration 3of the 10 November 2008 CA Decision4 affirming the conviction
of Edmundo Escamilla (petitioner) for frustrated homicide.

BACKGROUND

The facts of this case, culled from the records, are as follows:

Petitioner has a house with a sari-sari store along Arellano Street, Manila.5 The victim, Virgilio Mendol (Mendol), is a tricycle driver whose
route traverses the road where petitioner's store is located.6

Around 2:00 a.m. of 01 August 1999, a brawl ensued at the comer of Estrada and Arellano Streets, Manila. 7 Mendol was about to ride his tricycle
at this intersection while facing Arellano Street.8 Petitioner, who was standing in front of his store, 30 meters away from Mendol, 9 shot the latter
four times, hitting him once in the upper right portion of his chest.10 The victim was brought to Ospital ng Makati for treatment11 and survived
because of timely medical attention.12

The Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information13 dated 01 December 1999 charging petitioner with frustrated homicide. The
Information reads:

That on or about August 1, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one Virgilio Mendol, by then and there shooting the latter with a
.9mm Tekarev pistol with Serial No. 40283 hitting him on the upper right portion of his chest, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound which
is necessarily fatal and mortal, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of Homicide as a consequence,
but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes, independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said
Virgilio Mendol which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.14 During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Mendol, Joseph Velasco (Velasco)
and Iluminado Garcelazo (Garcelazo), who all positively identified him as the shooter of Mendol. 15 The doctor who attended to the victim also
testified.16 The documentary evidence presented included a sketch of the crime scene, the Medical Certificate issued by the physician, and
receipts of the medical expenses of Mendol when the latter was treated for the gunshot wound.17 In the course of the presentation of the
prosecution witnesses, the defense requested an ocular inspection of the crime scene, a request that was granted by the court. 18 On the other hand,
the defense witnesses are petitioner himself, his wife, Velasco and Barangay Tanod George Asumbrado (Asumbrado).19 The defense offered the
results of the paraffin test of petitioner and the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the court’s ocular inspection of the crime scene.20

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held that the positive testimonies of eyewitnesses deserve far more weight and credence than the defense of
alibi.21 Thus, it found petitioner guilty of frustrated homicide.22 The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Edmund Escamilla Y Jugo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide
under Articles 249 and 50 [sic] of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences the accused to suffer an indeterminate sentence of six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Accused is hereby
ordered to indemnify complainant Virgilio Mendol the sum of ₱34,305.16 for actual damages, ₱30,000.00 for moral damages.

SO ORDERED.23

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal dated 14 July 2006. 24 In the brief that the CA required him to file,25 he questioned the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses over that of the defense.26 On the other hand, the Appellee’s Brief27posited that the prosecution witnesses were credible,
because there were no serious discrepancies in their testimonies.28 Petitioner, in his Reply brief,29 said that the prosecution witnesses did not
actually see him fire the gun.30 Furthermore, his paraffin test yielded a negative result. 31

The CA, ruling against petitioner, held that the issue of the credibility of witnesses is within the domain of the trial court, which is in a better
position to observe their demeanor.32 Thus, the CA upheld the RTC’s appreciation of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses in the present
case.33 Also, the CA ruled that the victim’s positive and unequivocal identification of petitioner totally destroyed his defense of alibi. Hence, it
found no reason to disbelieve Mendol’s testimony.34 In addition, it said that a paraffin test is not a conclusive proof that a person has not fired a
gun and is inconsequential when there is a positive identification of petitioner. 35

A Motion for Reconsideration36 dated 08 December 2008 was filed by petitioner, who asserted that the defense was able to discredit the
testimony of the victim.37

In its 10 June 2009 Resolution,38 the CA denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for being without merit, because the matters discussed
therein had already been resolved in its 10 November 2008 Decision. 39

Hence, this Petition40 assailing the application to this case of the rule that the positive identification of the accused has more weight than the
defense of alibi.41 This Court resolved to require the prosecution to comment on the Petition. 42 In his Comment43 dated 15 December 2009, the
victim said that his positive identification of petitioner was a direct evidence that the latter was the author of the crime. 44 Furthermore, what
petitioner raised was allegedly a question of fact, which is proscribed by a Rule 45 petition.45 Thus, the victim alleged, there being no new or
substantial matter or question of law raised, the Petition should be denied.46

We then obliged petitioner to file a reply.47 In his Reply dated 01 March 2010,48 he assigned as an error the application by the CA of the rule that
the positive identification of the accused has more weight than the defense of alibi.49 He posits that the lower court manifestly overlooked
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, but if properly considered would justify a different conclusion.50 This Court, he said, should then admit
an exception to the general rule that the findings of fact of the CA are binding upon the Supreme Court.51

ISSUES

The questions before us are as follows:

I. Whether the prosecution established petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 52

II. Whether a defense of alibi, when corroborated by a disinterested party, overcomes the positive identification by three witnesses.53

COURT’S RULING

We deny the Petition.

I. The prosecution proved petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

A. Petitioner was positively identified by three witnesses.

Petitioner argues that there was reasonable doubt as to the identity of the shooter.54 He is wrong. As correctly held by the RTC and affirmed by
the CA, the identity of the assailant was proved with moral certainty by the prosecution, which presented three witnesses – the victim Mendol,
Velasco, and Garcelazo – who all positively identified him as the shooter.55 We have held that a categorical and consistently positive
identification of the accused, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses, prevails over denial. 56 All the three witnesses
were unswerving in their testimonies pointing to him as the shooter. None of them had any ulterior motive to testify against him.

Mendol said that he was about to ride his tricycle at the corner of Arellano and Estrada Streets, when petitioner, who was in front of the former’s
store, shot him.57 The first shot hit its target, but petitioner continued to fire at the victim three more times, and the latter then started to run
away.58

Velasco, who was also at the corner of Estrada and Arellano Streets, heard the first shot, looked around, then saw petitioner firing at Mendol three
more times.59

Lastly, Garcelazo testified that while he was buying bread from a bakery at that same street corner, he heard three shots before he turned his head
and saw petitioner pointing a gun at the direction of the victim, who was bloodied in the right chest. 60 Garcelazo was just an arm’s length away
from him.61

The three witnesses had a front view of the face of petitioner, because they were all facing Arellano Street from its intersection with Estrada
Street, which was the locus criminis.62 Although the crime happened in the wee hours of the morning, there was a street lamp five meters from
where petitioner was standing when he shot the victim, thus allowing a clear view of the assailant’s face. 63 They all knew petitioner, because they
either bought from or passed by his store.64

B. The intent to kill was shown by the continuous firing at the victim even after he was hit.

Petitioner claims that the prosecution was unable to prove his intent to kill. 65 He is mistaken. The intent to kill, as an essential element of
homicide at whatever stage, may be before or simultaneous with the infliction of injuries. 66 The evidence to prove intent to kill may consist
of, inter alia, the means used; the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; and the conduct of the malefactors before, at
the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim.67

Petitioner’s intent to kill was simultaneous with the infliction of injuries. Using a gun, 68 he shot the victim in the chest. 69 Despite a bloodied right
upper torso, the latter still managed to run towards his house to ask for help. 70Nonetheless, petitioner continued to shoot at him three more
times,71 albeit unsuccessfully.72 While running, the victim saw his nephew in front of the house and asked for help. 73 The victim was immediately
brought to the hospital on board an owner-type jeep.74 The attending physician, finding that the bullet had no point of exit, did not attempt to
extract it; its extraction would just have caused further damage. 75 The doctor further said that the victim would have died if the latter were not
brought immediately to the hospital.76 All these facts belie the absence of petitioner’s intent to kill the victim.

II. Denial and alibi were not proven.

In order for alibi to prosper, petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that, first, he was in another place at the time of the
offense; and, second, it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. 77The appreciation of the defense of alibi is pegged
against this standard and nothing else. Petitioner, as found by both the RTC and CA, failed to prove the presence of these two requisite
conditions. Hence, he was wrong in asserting that alibi, when corroborated by other witnesses, succeeds as a defense over positive
identification.78

A. Petitioner was unable to establish that he was at home at the time of the offense.

The alibi of petitioner was that he was at home asleep with his wife when Mendol was shot. 79 To support his claim, petitioner presented the
testimonies of his wife and Asumbrado.80

1. The wife of petitioner did not know if he was at home when the shooting happened.

The wife of petitioner testified that both of them went to sleep at 9:00 p.m. and were awakened at 3:00 a.m. by the banging on their
door.81 However, she also said that she did not know if petitioner stayed inside their house, or if he went somewhere else during the entire time
she was asleep.82 Her testimony does not show that he was indeed at home when the crime happened. At the most, it only establishes that he was
at home before and after the shooting. Her lack of knowledge regarding his whereabouts between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. belies the credibility of
his alibi. Even so, the testimonies of relatives deserve scant consideration, especially when there is positive identification83by three witnesses.

2. Asumbrano did not see the entire face of the shooter.

Petitioner is questioning why neither the RTC nor the CA took into account the testimony of Asumbrado, the Barangay Tanod on duty that
night.84 Both courts were correct in not giving weight to his testimony.

Asumbrado said that he was there when the victim was shot, not by appellant, but by a big man who was in his twenties. 85 This assertion was
based only on a back view of the man who fired the gun 12 meters away from Asumbrado.86 The latter never saw the shooter’s entire
face.87 Neither did the witness see the victim when the latter was hit.88 Asumbrado also affirmed that he was hiding when the riot took
place. 89 These declarations question his competence to unequivocally state that indeed it was not petitioner who fired at Mendol.

B. Petitioner's home was just in front of the street where the shooting occurred.

Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was
committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. 90 Petitioner failed to prove the physical impossibility of his being at the scene
of the crime at the time in question.

Both the prosecution and the defense witnesses referred to the front of appellant's house or store whenever they testified on the location of the
shooter. Petitioner was in front of his house when he shot the victim, according to Velasco's testimony. 91 Meanwhile the statement of Asumbrado
that the gate of the store of the petitioner was closed when the shooting happened 92 can only mean that the latter's house and store were both
located in front of the scene of the crime.1âwphi1

Petitioner proffers the alibi that he was at home, instead of showing the impossibility of his authorship of the crime. His alibi actually bolsters the
prosecution's claim that he was the shooter, because it placed him just a few steps away from the scene of the crime. The charge is further
bolstered by the testimony of his wife, who could not say with certainty that he was at home at 2:00a.m.- the approximate time when the victim
was shot.

Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the lower courts overlooked any fact that could have justified a different conclusion. Hence, the CA
was correct in affirming the R TC 's Decision that petitioner, beyond reasonable doubt, was the assailant.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED. The 10 June 2009 Resolution 93 and 10 November 2008 Decision94 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30456 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 129433 March 30, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,

vs.
PRIMO CAMPUHAN Y BELLO accused.
BELLOSILLO, J.:

On 3 April 1990 this Court in People v. Orita 1 finally did away with frustrated rape 2 and allowed only attempted rape and consummated rape to
remain in our statute books. The instant case lurks at the threshold of another emasculation of the stages of execution of rape by considering
almost every attempt at sexual violation of a woman as consummated rape, that is, if the contrary view were to be adopted. The danger there is
that that concept may send the wrong signal to every roaming lothario, whenever the opportunity bares itself, to better intrude with climactic
gusto, sans any restraint, since after all any attempted fornication would be considered consummated rape and punished as such. A mere strafing
of the citadel of passion would then be considered a deadly fait accompli, which is absurd.

In Orita we held that rape was consummated from the moment the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim since by it he attained his
objective. All the elements of the offense were already present and nothing more was left for the offender to do, having performed all the acts
necessary to produce the crime and accomplish it. We ruled then that perfect penetration was not essential; any penetration of the female organ by
the male organ, however slight, was sufficient. The Court further held that entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, even without rupture of
the hymen or laceration of the vagina, was sufficient to warrant conviction for consummated rape. We distinguished consummated rape from
attempted rape where there was no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution were performed as the offender merely
commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. 3The inference that may be derived therefrom is that complete or full penetration of
the vagina is not required for rape to be consummated. Any penetration, in whatever degree, is enough to raise the crime to its consummated
stage.

But the Court in Orita clarified the concept of penetration in rape by requiring entry into the labia or lips of the female organ, even if there be no
rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina, to warrant a conviction for consummated rape. While the entry of the penis into the lips of the
female organ was considered synonymous with mere touching of the external genitalia, e.g., labia majora, labia minora, etc.,4 the crucial doctrinal
bottom line is that touching must be inextricably viewed in light of, in relation to, or as an essential part of, the process of penile penetration, and
not just mere touching in the ordinary sense. In other words, the touching must be tacked to the penetration itself. The importance of the
requirement of penetration, however slight, cannot be gainsaid because where entry into the labia or the lips of the female genitalia has not been
established, the crime committed amounts merely to attempted rape.

Verily, this should be the indicium of the Court in determining whether rape has been committed either in its attempted or in its consummated
stage; otherwise, no substantial distinction would exist between the two, despite the fact that penalty-wise, this distinction, threadbare as it may
seem, irrevocably spells the difference between life and death for the accused — a reclusive life that is not even perpetua but only temporal on
one hand, and the ultimate extermination of life on the other. And, arguing on another level, if the case at bar cannot be deemed attempted but
consummated rape, what then would constitute attempted rape? Must our field of choice be thus limited only to consummated rape and acts of
lasciviousness since attempted rape would no longer be possible in light of the view of those who disagree with this ponencia?

On 27 May 1997 Primo Campuhan y Bello was found guilty of statutory rape and sentenced by the court a quo to the extreme penalty of
death, 5 hence this case before us on automatic review under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659. 6

As may be culled from the evidence on record, on 25 April 1996, at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of four
(4)-year old Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from the second floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for her two (2) children. At the
ground floor she met Primo Campuhan who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in the freezer located at the
second floor. Primo was a helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of Corazon. As Corazon was busy preparing the drinks, she heard one of her
daughters cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" 7 prompting Corazon to rush upstairs. Thereupon, she saw Primo Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling
before Crysthel whose pajamas or "jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees.

According to Corazon, Primo was forcing his penis into Crysthel's vagina. Horrified, she cursed the accused, "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!"
and boxed him several times. He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside when she tried to block his path. Corazon
then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase the
accused. 8 Seconds later, Primo was apprehended by those who answered Corazon's call for help. They held the accused at the back of their
compound until they were advised by their neighbors to call the barangay officials instead of detaining him for his misdeed. Physical examination
of the victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of extra-genital physical injury was noted by the medico-legal officer on Crysthel's body as
her hymen was intact and its orifice was only 0.5 cm. in diameter.

Primo Campuhan had only himself for a witness in his defense. He maintained his innocence and assailed the charge as a mere scheme of
Crysthel's mother who allegedly harbored ill will against him for his refusal to run an errand for her. 9 He asserted that in truth Crysthel was in a
playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when she suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on the floor. It was in this
fallen position that Corazon chanced upon them and became hysterical. Corazon slapped him and accused him of raping her child. He got mad
but restrained himself from hitting back when he realized she was a woman. Corazon called for help from her brothers to stop him as he ran down
from the second floor.

Vicente, Corazon's brother, timely responded to her call for help and accosted Primo. Vicente punched him and threatened to kill him. Upon
hearing the threat, Primo immediately ran towards the house of Conrado Plata but Vicente followed him there. Primo pleaded for a chance to
explain as he reasoned out that the accusation was not true. But Vicente kicked him instead. When Primo saw Vicente holding a piece of lead
pipe, Primo raised his hands and turned his back to avoid the blow. At this moment, the relatives and neighbors of Vicente prevailed upon him to
take Primo to the barangay hall instead, and not to maul or possibly kill him.
Although Primo Campuhan insisted on his innocence, the trial court on 27 May 1997 found him guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the
extreme penalty of death, and ordered him to pay his victim P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages, and the costs.

The accused Primo Campuhan seriously assails the credibility of Ma. Corazon Pamintuan. He argues that her narration should not be given any
weight or credence since it was punctured with implausible statements and improbabilities so inconsistent with human nature and experience. He
claims that it was truly inconceivable for him to commit the rape considering that Crysthel's younger sister was also in the room playing while
Corazon was just downstairs preparing Milo drinks for her daughters. Their presence alone as possible eyewitnesses and the fact that the episode
happened within the family compound where a call for assistance could easily be heard and responded to, would have been enough to deter him
from committing the crime. Besides, the door of the room was wide open for anybody to see what could be taking place inside. Primo insists that
it was almost inconceivable that Corazon could give such a vivid description of the alleged sexual contact when from where she stood she could
not have possibly seen the alleged touching of the sexual organs of the accused and his victim. He asserts that the absence of any external signs of
physical injuries or of penetration of Crysthel's private parts more than bolsters his innocence.

In convicting the accused, the trial court relied quite heavily on the testimony of Corazon that she saw Primo with his short pants down to his
knees kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas and panty were supposedly "already removed" and that Primo was "forcing his penis into
Crysthel's vagina." The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12), as provided in Art. 335,
par. (3), of the Revised Penal Code. Crysthel was only four (4) years old when sexually molested, thus raising the penalty, from reclusion
perpetuato death, to the single indivisible penalty of death under RA 7659, Sec. 11, the offended party being below seven (7) years old. We have
said often enough that in concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is
the rupture of the hymen necessary; the mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient
to constitute carnal knowledge. 10 But the act of touching should be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of
the female organ and not mere touching alone of the mons pubis or the pudendum.

In People v. De la Peña 11 we clarified that the decisions finding a case for rape even if the attacker's penis merely touched the external portions
of the female genitalia were made in the context of the presence or existence of an erect penis capable of full penetration. Where the accused
failed to achieve an erection, had a limp or flaccid penis, or an oversized penis which could not fit into the victim's vagina, the Court nonetheless
held that rape was consummated on the basis of the victim's testimony that the accused repeatedly tried, but in vain, to insert his penis into her
vagina and in all likelihood reached the labia of her pudendum as the victim felt his organ on the lips of her vulva, 12 or that the penis of the
accused touched the middle part of her vagina. 13 Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact,
stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim's vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case.
There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merely stroked the
external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. 14 As the labias, which are required to be "touched" by the penis,
are by their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of
penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes
consummated rape.

The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons pubis, labia majora,
labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence that becomes hairy after puberty, and is
instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface
and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin
which does not have any hair but has many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora. 15 Jurisprudence dictates that
the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, 16 and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a
grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent
any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no
consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.

Judicial depiction of consummated rape has not been confined to the oft-quoted "touching of the female organ," 17but has also progressed into
being described as "the introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum," 18 or "the bombardment of the drawbridge." 19 But, to our
mild, the case at bar merely constitutes a "shelling of the castle of orgasmic potency," or as earlier stated, a "strafing of the citadel of passion.

A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge its onus of proving that Primo's penis was able to
penetrate Crysthel's vagina however slight. Even if we grant arguendo that Corazon witnessed Primo in the act of sexually molesting her
daughter, we seriously doubt the veracity of her claim that she saw the inter-genital contact between Primo and Crysthel. When asked what she
saw upon entering her children's room Corazon plunged into saying that she saw Primo poking his penis on the vagina of Crysthel without
explaining her relative position to them as to enable her to see clearly and sufficiently, in automotive lingo, the contact point. It should be recalled
that when Corazon chanced upon Primo and Crysthel, the former was allegedly in a kneeling position, which Corazon described thus:

Q: How was Primo holding your daughter?

A: (The witness is demonstrating in such a way that the chest of the accused is pinning down the victim, while his right hand is
holding his penis and his left hand is spreading the legs of the victim).

It can reasonably be drawn from the foregoing narration that Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible. Not even a
vantage point from the side of the accused and the victim would have provided Corazon an unobstructed view of Primo's penis supposedly
reaching Crysthel's external genitalia, i.e., labia majora, labia minora, hymen, clitoris, etc., since the legs and arms of Primo would have hidden
his movements from Corazon's sight, not to discount the fact that Primo's right hand was allegedly holding his penis thereby blocking it from
Corazon's view. It is the burden of the prosecution to establish how Corazon could have seen the sexual contact and to shove her account into the
permissive sphere of credibility. It is not enough that she claims that she saw what was done to her daughter. It is required that her claim be
properly demonstrated to inspire belief. The prosecution failed in this respect, thus we cannot conclude without any taint of serious doubt that
inter-genital contact was at all achieved. To hold otherwise would be to resolve the doubt in favor of the prosecution but to run roughshod over
the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent.

Corazon insists that Primo did not restrain himself from pursuing his wicked intention despite her timely appearance, thus giving her the
opportunity to fully witness his beastly act.

We are not persuaded. It is inconsistent with man's instinct of self-preservation to remain where he is and persist in satisfying his lust even when
he knows fully well that his dastardly acts have already been discovered or witnessed by no less than the mother of his victim. For, the normal
behavior or reaction of Primo upon learning of Corazon's presence would have been to pull his pants up to avoid being caught literally with his
pants down. The interval, although relatively short, provided more than enough opportunity for Primo not only to desist from but even to conceal
his evil design.

What appears to be the basis of the conviction of the accused was Crysthel's answer to the question of the court —

Q: Did the penis of Primo touch your organ?

A: Yes, sir.

But when asked further whether his penis penetrated her organ, she readily said, "No." Thus —

Q: But did his penis penetrate your organ?

A: No, sir. 20

This testimony alone should dissipate the mist of confusion that enshrouds the question of whether rape in this case was consummated. It has
foreclosed the possibility of Primo's penis penetrating her vagina, however slight. Crysthel made a categorical statement denying
penetration, 27 obviously induced by a question propounded to her who could not have been aware of the finer distinctions between touching and
penetration. Consequently, it is improper and unfair to attach to this reply of a four (4)-year old child, whose vocabulary is yet as underdeveloped
as her sex and whose language is bereft of worldly sophistication, an adult interpretation that because the penis of the accused touched her organ
there was sexual entry. Nor can it be deduced that in trying to penetrate the victim's organ the penis of the accused touched the middle portion of
her vagina and entered the labia of her pudendum as the prosecution failed to establish sufficiently that Primo made efforts to penetrate
Crysthel. 22 Corazon did not say, nay, not even hint that Primo's penis was erect or that he responded with an erection. 23 On the contrary, Corazon
even narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus showing that he had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate his
victim.

Antithetically, the possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by the child's own assertion that she resisted Primo's
advances by putting her legs close together; 24 consequently, she did not feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about what Primo did to
her. 25 Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!" In cases where penetration was not fully established, the Court had
anchored its conclusion that rape nevertheless was consummated on the victim's testimony that she felt pain, or the medico-legal finding of
discoloration in the inner lips of the vagina, or the labia minora was already gaping with redness, or the hymenal tags were no longer
visible. 26 None was shown in this case. Although a child's testimony must be received with due consideration on account of her tender age, the
Court endeavors at the same time to harness only what in her story appears to be true, acutely aware of the equally guaranteed rights of the
accused. Thus, we have to conclude that even on the basis of the testimony of Crysthel alone the accused cannot be held liable for consummated
rape; worse, be sentenced to death.1âwphi1

Lastly, it is pertinent to mention the medico legal officer's finding in this case that there were no external signs of physical injuries on
complaining witness' body to conclude from a medical perspective that penetration had taken place. As Dr. Aurea P. Villena explained, although
the absence of complete penetration of the hymen does not negate the possibility of contact, she clarified that there was no medical basis to hold
that there was sexual contact between the accused and the victim. 27

In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical certificate, both should in all respects complement each other; otherwise, to rely
on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of unwarranted or
even mischievous results. It is necessary to carefully ascertain whether the penis of the accused in reality entered the labial threshold of the
female organ to accurately conclude that rape was consummated. Failing in this, the thin line that separates attempted rape from consummated
rape will significantly disappear.

Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance. All the elements of attempted rape — and only of attempted rape — are present in the instant case, hence,
the accused should be punished only for it.

The penalty for attempted rape is two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for the offense charged, which is statutory rape of a
minor below seven (7) years. Two (2) degrees lower is reclusion temporal, the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty
to be imposed upon the accused shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, which
is prision mayor, the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its periods.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused PRIMO "SONNY" CAMPUHAN Y BELLO guilty of statutory rape and
sentencing him to death and to pay damages is MODIFIED. He is instead found guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten
(10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
G.R. No. L-21860 February 28, 1974

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VIOLETO VILLACORTE, alias BONGING, et al., defendants. CRISANTO INOFERIO Y ALINDAO alias SANTE, and MARCIANO
YUSAY alias MANCING (appeal withdrawn res. of 7/10/67), defendants-appellants.

FERNANDEZ, J.:p

The charge in this case was for robbery with homicide and the penalty imposed upon the appellant Crisanto Inoferio and his co-accused Violeto
Villacorte and Marciano Yusay was reclusion perpetua and the payment of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Benito Ching in the sum of
P6,000.00. This case is now before this Court only on the appeal of Inoferio, because although the lower court convicted him and his co-accused
Villacorte and Yusay (Alfredo Handig, a fourth accused was acquitted), Villacorte did not appeal, while the appeal of Yusay was withdrawn upon
his motion which was granted by this Court on July 10, 1967.

In the evening of August 27, 1959, Benito Ching, a Chinese merchant, left his sari-sari store in the public market of Caloocan1 to go home,
bringing with him the proceeds of his sales of the day which were placed in a paper bag. He was accompanied by his two employees, Pedro
Libantino and Modesto Galvez, who acted as his bodyguards. On the way towards his home located at 133 F. Roxas, Grace Park, Caloocan,
Benito Ching and his two companions were accosted by four persons near the corner of an alley at F. Roxas street. At that time, Libantino was
some three or four meters in front of Ching, while Galvez was walking directly behind the Chinese merchant.

One of the holduppers pointed a .45 cal. pistol at Ching. Another placed his left arm around the neck of Galvez, while the third held both his
arms. The first who pointed a pistol at Ching snatched from him the paper bag containing the money. The fourth got that paper bag from the
snatcher.

Ching shouted for help, crying aloud "Pedie, Pedie"; his companion Libantino turned around to respond to his employer's call; but upon seeing
the bag snatcher pointing a pistol at Ching, Libantino fled. When Ching shouted: "Pedie, Pedie," the pistol-holder fired at him. Galvez, Ching's
other companion, was able to free himself from two of the holduppers holding him, and he too ran away. Ching fell down sprawled on the street
and the four holduppers ran away. Benito Ching, notwithstanding his wound, was able to walk, staggering towards his home. His common-law
wife immediately called for a taxicab, brought Ching to the North General Hospital in Manila where he died the following day.

Later that evening when Galvez was interrogated by police officers of Caloocan who were investigating the incident, the interrogation proved
fruitless for Galvez was able to furnish the investigators any information on the identities of the holduppers. But when investigated by the CIS,
Philippine Constabulary, at Camp Crame on September 11, 1959, Galvez declared that Ching was accosted by three persons, one of them
pointing his pistol at the right ribs of his employer. He identified the gunman as Violeto Villacorte alias Bonging and even described the shirt and
pants the gunman was then wearing. He could not identify the two other companions of Villacorte.

Libantino, when examined by the investigators of the Caloocan police department on the same night of August 27, 1959, declared that the holdup
and shooting incident took place in a dark "kalyehon" and that he could not identify the gunman nor the latter's companions. But, in his written
statement taken by the CIS at Camp Crame, Quezon City on September 11, 1959, he declared positively that he saw Violeto Villacorte alias
Bonging as the person who grabbed the paper bag containing money from Ching and fired a pistol at Ching. He further said that aside from
Villacorte he saw three other persons, two of them were holding the hands of his companion, Galvez. He admitted however, that he could not
recognize the two persons who were holding Galvez.

Villacorte who, in the meantime, had been positively identified by Galvez and Libantino as the bag snatcher and as the gunman who shot down
Ching, when interrogated by the investigators of the Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Crame on September 12, 1959 admitted that he was
the one who snatched the paper bag from Benito Ching and shot him. He identified his companions as "Roque", "Sante" and "Fred".

In the information for robbery with homicide filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal on September 12, 1959, Violeto Villacorte was so named
therein; "Roque" and "Fred" were already identified as Roque Guerrero and Alfredo Handig, respectively while "Sante" was not yet identified
and was named "John Doe alias Sante". On September 24 of the same year, the information was amended by changing the name of the accused
John Doe alias Sante to Crisanto Inoferio y Alindao; and another person, Marciano Yusay, was included among the accused. Before the trial,
upon motion, the trial court discharged Roque Guerrero to be used as a State witness.

As already above stated, the trial court, in its decision of May 15, 1963, acquitted Handig, convicted Villacorte who did not appeal, and Yusay
who appealed but who withdrew his appeal, and Inoferio who pursued his appeal.

Upon a careful review of the evidence, We hold that the accused-appellant Crisanto Inoferio should be acquitted upon the ground that although
his defense, in the nature of an alibi, is inherently a weak defense, it should be considered sufficient as in this case, to tilt the scale of justice in
favor of the accused because the evidence for the prosecution is itself weak and unconvincing and, therefore, by and large, insufficient to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Only Modesto Galvez and the State witness, Roque Guerrero, identified the appellant Inoferio as one of the holduppers. So, let us now review
and analyze their testimonies, especially insofar as they refer to Inoferio, on the one hand, and the evidence of Inoferio, on the other.

At the time he testified in Court, Modesto Galvez was 21 years old, married and unemployed. In synthesis, he declared that: In August, 1957, he
was working as a helper in the store of Benito Ching inside the market in Grace Park. Between 7 and 8 o'clock in the evening of August 27 that
year, he and another store helper, Pedro Libantino accompanied Ching in going home. While they were at F. Roxas Street, they were waylaid by
four men.2

He was able to recognize two of them, namely Villacorte and the herein appellant Crisanto Inoferio who were pointed to by him in open court.
Villacorte snatched the bag from Benito Ching and fired at him once. The bag contained money. Two persons held him. Inoferio was one of
them. He did not know the other one. Inoferio held him, Inoferio was behind and to the right of Galvez, placing his left hand over the nape of the
latter. He was able to recognize Inoferio because he looked at his left, removed his hand around the front part of his neck, and he saw tattoo on
his forearm. It was the figure of a woman with a bird. The place where they were waylaid was bright. 3

On cross examination, Galvez admitted that he saw accused-appellant Inoferio for the first time only on that night of August 27, 1959. The place
was lighted from two electric posts; one in the alley and the other east of the alley, corner of the alley and F. Roxas street. He was scared at the
time he was held up. When he was held by two persons, one at his back (by appellant Inoferio) and another at his front, he was scared. He did not
move nor run away until they released him. Inoferio was holding him with his left arm, held him tight around the neck; it was difficult to unloose
his hold; the left forearm was so close to his neck that he could hardly breathe; and immediately after being released, he ran away.4

On further cross examination, the witness testified: The morning following August 27, 1959, he went to the police station in Caloocan. Three
officers interrogated him. He was still scared and was not able to tell them anything. 5

On September 11, 1957, he was brought by some PC officers to the CIS office, Camp Crame. He was interrogated by agents Rodolfo Estevez and
Florencio Suela. They asked him to relate the details of the incident as best as he could. His statement was taken down in writing. He signed that
statement under oath before Assistant Fiscal Castillo. The last question asked of him was: "Do you have anything more to say?" And his answer
was: "No more". In that investigation, he said that he saw only three holduppers. In that sworn statement, although he did not mention the name
of Inoferio, he stated that he saw a tattoo on the arm of the person who held his neck that night. His sworn statement consisting of two pages has
been marked as Exh. "1-Inoferio".

Reading the sworn statement of Modesto Galvez (Exh. "1-Inoferio"), it appears that it was taken on September 11, 1959 but subscribed and sworn
to before Assistant Fiscal Jose Castillo on September 12, 1959. It is a fact that in this statement, he mentioned that they were held up only by
three persons. But, contrary to his statement in Court, he did not mention in this sworn statement (Exh. "1-Inoferio") that the one who held him by
the neck had a tattoo on his arm.

Let us now go to the testimony of Roque Guerrero. On direct examination, he declared: He knows the accused Violeto Villacorte. He had known
him for a long time already. He knows the accused Alfredo Handig. He also knows the accused Crisanto Inoferio alias "Sante". He came to know
him because they used to play cara y cruz in 1959. As far as he knows, Crisanto Inoferio is a Visayan. He also knows the accused Marciano
Yusay.

In July, 1959, while he was driving a tricycle, Violeto Villacorte called him and asked if he wanted to make some money by waylaying
somebody. He did not agree and he continued driving the tricycle. After two weeks, they saw each other again when he was driving a tricycle.
Villacorte again asked him if he wanted to make some money. He did not agree. Then, in the afternoon of August 29, 1959, Villacorte met him
again. His companions then were Alfredo Handig, Marciano Yusay and "Sante". Villacorte asked him if he was not really going with them. His
answer was how could he go when "Sante" did not want to tell him the person to be waylaid. Handig told him to go. "Sante" also told him that he
go with them. Yusay even pulled out his .45 caliber gun and threatened him, telling him: "Don't be afraid, this is what we are going to use."
Guerrero told them that he could not go with them because "he is my kuya," referring to Benito Ching. When Villacorte told him that they were
going to rob Ching, he left them but Alfredo Handig and "Sante" followed him. They told him that they would kill him if he would approach
anybody. He continued driving his tricycle but they followed him. They left already however at about 7 o'clock that evening. 6

On cross examination, Guerrero declared: At the time he met "Sante", he was dressed in long sleeve — he was always wearing long sleeve shirt
in the same manner that he was dressed while Inoferio was in Court at the time this witness was cross examined. 7

On the night of August 8, 1959, he was arrested in connection with an attempt to rob the store of Benito Ching. He was prosecuted for vagrancy
and he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to ten days imprisonment. Subsequently, he was charged with attempted robbery. When investigated by
the CIS agents, he did not reveal to them anything. He gave a written statement at Camp Crame on September 21, 1959. In that statement, he told
"the entire truth of what you (Guerrero) knew about the entire case."8 In this statement, Guerrero mentioned only "Sante" as among those who
talked to him, but did not mention his name Crisanto Inoferio.

The appellant Crisanto Inoferio, testifying in his defense, stated that he was 39 years old, single, house painter, and a resident of 1691 Alvarez St.,
Sta. Cruz, Manila.9 He came to know the accused Violeto Villacorte for the first time only in Camp Crame on September 12, 1959. He came to
know the accused Alfredo Handig for the first time also on September 12, 1959 but in the Caloocan Police Department. He came to know the
accused who became a State witness, Roque Guerrero, for the first time sometime before August, 1959 at Caloocan. He used to ride in his tricycle
and they often played cara y cruz together. 10
He had been to the CIS office at Camp Crame two times. The first was on September 12, 1959. In the morning of that date, he was invited by the
policemen of Caloocan to go to their headquarters. He was made to wait there because some CIS agents would come. They came at about 1 to 2
o'clock in the afternoon. The Caloocan police officers and the CIS agents talked to each other. After a while, the CIS said that they would bring
him to their headquarters. The Caloocan police officers answered that they themselves would take him to Camp Crame which they did. They
were Pat. Cadoy, Cpl. Mauricio and another police lieutenant whom he did not know. He was brought to the CIS headquarters at Camp Crame at
about 3 o'clock already that afternoon. 11

When he, Inoferio, was brought upstairs, the accused Villacorte was going down. He did not mind him because he did not know him then. Upon
reaching the office of Capt. Calderon, he was made to sit down. Later on, Villacorte and his companion came in. His companion asked Villacorte
if he knew him (Inoferio) and Villacorte answered in the negative. He was also asked if he knew Villacorte and his answer was in the negative.
Then the accused Handig was brought and in the confrontation, both of them stated that they did not know each other. 12

Then he was brought to another room by the CIS agent who said: "You are lucky you don't know those people. "After that, he told them that he
was not "Sante" because his nickname was "Santing." 13

Towards the afternoon, he was given food to eat. While he was eating, the Caloocan policemen told him not to finish eating anymore as they were
going home. And they left Camp Crame at about past 6 o'clock in the afternoon of September 12, 1959. When they reached Grace Park,
Caloocan, the Policemen told him to go home because he had no case. 14

The second time he was at Camp Crame was on September 21, 1959. At about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, some CIS agents went to his house and
upon their invitation, he went with them to Camp Crame. They arrived there at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. While they were walking at the
corridor, they saw Capt. Calderon talking with Roque Guerrero. The CIS agent asked him if he knew Guerrero and he said yes. Guerrero was
asked if he knew him and he answered in the affirmative. Then he was brought to a cell at the groundfloor. At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon,
CIS agent Morales came and brought him upstairs. He was asked if he was drinking wine and when he answered in the affirmative, wine was
brought. Morales opened the bottle and he was asked to drink. While he was drinking, Morales told him: "I want to help you but you also help
me." His answer was: "What help can I do?" And the reply was: "I'll make you a witness for the government." He asked Morales what he would
testify and the answer was: "At the trial, point to Violeto Villacorte, Alfredo Handig and Roque Guerrero as the persons who robbed the Chinese
and that they were inviting you to join them." His answer was: "That is bad Mr. Morales. I do not know anything about the case you are talking
about. I even do not know Alfredo Handig and Violeto Villacorte." Morales stood up, took him downstairs and told him to think about the matter.
He was again brought to his cell. 15

The following morning, after Inoferio had just taken his breakfast, Morales came and told him: "What about the matter we talked about last night,
have you come to think about it?" He said: "I am sorry, I cannot do what you are asking me." Then Morales replied: "You might regret, I can also
secure another witness," and he left. At about 11 o'clock that morning, Morales returned with somebody named Galvez whom he did not know.
Morales then told him to take off his clothes. After he had taken off his shirt, Morales saw the tattoo on his arms (anterior portion of his left
forearm). Morales then told him to show his arm with the tattoo to Galvez. After a few minutes, Morales and Galvez left. At about 5 o'clock in
the afternoon, Morales came, brought him out of his cell and conducted him upstairs. While they were inside a room, Morales asked him
questions which he, the latter, typed. Whenever he would not be able to answer Morales, Morales would slap him. Morales even tied his belt
around his neck and whenever he could not answer the questions, Morales would just pull the belt. After the questioning by Morales in that
afternoon of September 22, 1959, he was made to sign his statement. At that time, Capt. Calderon was passing by the corridor. Then he was
placed in his cell. 16

17
The next day, he was brought out his cell, was brought to the stockade and then afterwards, to the provincial jail in Pasig.

Inoferio categorically denied the testimony of Roque Guerrero that he was with Handig, Yusay, and Villacorte on August 27, 1959, and that
before that date, he and his companions were inviting him (Guerrero) to join them to holdup somebody. And the reason why Roque Guerrero
testified against him was that Guerrero thought that he was arrested because Inoferio pointed to him when they met at Camp Crame. But Inoferio
said that he pointed to Guerrero only when he was asked by the CIS where Guerrero was. 18

Inoferio denied the testimony of Galvez that he (Inoferio) was one of those that embraced him (Galvez) during the holdup. 19 He categorically
stated that he had not known Galvez nor have met him prior to August 27, 1959. He came to know Villacorte for the first time on September 12,
1959 when they met at the stairway of a building Camp Crame where he was interrogated. It was while he was coming up said stairway when he
met Violeto Villacorte for the first time. Villacorte was then coming down the stairs. He admitted that before August, 1959, he already knew
Roque Guerrero. 20

Violeto Villacorte, the person identified as the bag snatcher and the one who shot Benito Ching, declared: He came to know Crisanto Inoferio for
the first time when he met at Camp Crame on September 12, 1959. Before August 27, 1959, he had not yet met Inoferio. 21

Another co-accused, Alfredo Handig, testified that he came to know Crisanto Inoferio for the first time on September 12, 1959 in the municipal
building of Caloocan. He categorically declared that prior to this date, he did not know said Crisanto Inoferio. 22

By way of background to our findings of facts which justify the acquittal of appellant Inoferio, we now recapitulate the evidence against the
accused Violeto Villacorte, Marciano Yusay, and Alfredo Handig.
Violeto Villacorte was positively identified by prosecution witnesses Libantino and Galvez. And in an extrajudicial statement secured from him
by CIS investigators and which he signed and swore to before the Assistant Fiscal of Rizal in Pasig, Villacorte admitted his role as mastermind of
the plan to waylay Benito Ching and his having grabbed the paper bag containing the proceeds of the sales of the sari-sari store of the Chinaman.
He likewise admitted responsibility for firing the pistol that snuffed the life of Benito Ching.

Marciano Yusay was equally identified positively by Pedro Libantino and Modesto Galvez as one of those present when Villacorte was planning
the holdup and at the time of the holdup. And in the ante mortem statement of Benito Ching made to his wife Candida Pasion, he said that
Marciano Yusay was one of those who held him up.

Alfredo Handig, on the other hand, although mentioned by accused Villacorte as one of his companions in the planning and in the execution of
the robbery, prosecution witnesses Libantino and Galvez never identified him positively because of which he was acquitted by the trial court.

With respect to the herein appellant Crisanto Inoferio, the evidence of the prosecution to the effect that he was one of the holduppers is weak and
unconvincing.

In the investigations conducted by the Caloocan Police Department, both Modesto Galvez and Pedro Libantino never mentioned appellant
Inoferio as one of those who either planned or executed the robbery and killing although the name of Villacorte was mentioned by Libantino. In
the examination conducted by the CIS investigators at Camp Crame, again Inoferio's name was never mentioned by both prosecution witnesses
although Villacorte's and Yusay's names were now mentioned and linked to the crime.

When the accused Villacorte was subjected to a thorough investigation by the CIS agents, he admitted his part in the planning and in the
commission of the crime and named Marciano Yusay, Alfredo Handig and a certain "Sante". Again, Inoferio at this stage of the investigation had
as yet to be linked to this person called "Sante" and to the crime.

In court, Libantino never identified Inoferio. More than that, he contradicted Galvez, for while the latter testified that the man who had his arm
around his neck was Inoferio, Libantino who was the one face to face with the man who had his arm around Galvez, said that it was the accused
Marciano Yusay. 23 And Libantino declared that the place where the holdup and the shooting incident took place was in a dark "kalyehon," that
was why he could not identify the gunman nor the latter's companions. This contradicts the testimony of Galvez that the place where the holdup
and the shooting took place, was lighted from electric posts. Libantino said that these two electric posts were quite far from the scene of the
crime; they were 10 meters away.

And as we consider the testimony of Modesto Galvez, even by itself, we conclude that he was not able to see the face of the man who held him
around his neck and therefore could not possibly identify him. He was scared at the time. The one holding him by the neck was at his back. And
immediately after he was released, he ran away.

Let us now go to the telltale tattoo, the figure of a woman with a bird, on the left forearm of Inoferio. Yes, Inoferio has that tattoo. And according
to Galvez, the one who held him around his neck was Inoferio because he saw the tattoo of Inoferio when he looked at his left and tried to remove
the arm of the man holding him by his neck. But any other person could have that kind of a tattoo, the figure of a woman with a bird. But it may
be asked: How did Galvez come to know that Inoferio had that tattoo? The answer is furnished by the testimony of Inoferio. We have taken pains
to give the synthesis of his entire testimony, and we are satisfied that he told the truth, particularly on the point that when he was brought to Camp
Crame for the second time on September 21, 1959, he was told to remove his clothes and show his arm with the tattoo to Galvez.

On top of all of these, there is the testimony in open court by Galvez that as early as September 11, 1959, when he was investigated at the CIS
office in Camp Crame, he already stated and specifically in his sworn statement given on that date but subscribed and sworn to before Assistant
Fiscal Castillo the following day, that the one who held him by the neck had a tattoo on his arm. We have gone over this written sworn statement
and we do not see any mention therein by Galvez of a tattoo on the arm of person that held him.

And how could Galvez have seen the tattoo on the arm of the man who held him by the neck when according to Guerrero, "Sante" was dressed in
long sleeve in the afternoon of the holdup (the prosecution would want to prove that "Sante" is the accused Crisanto Inoferio).

Therefore, the authorities cited by the prosecution that written statements of witnesses to police authorities are usually sketchy and incomplete;
that as a matter of fact, it is natural for even material matters to be left out when a person gives a sworn statement during a criminal investigation,
do not here apply. The fact is that Galvez told a lie when he said that in his written statement he declared that the man who held him had a tattoo.

How about the testimony of Roque Guerrero, the second and the only other witness linking the appellant Inoferio to the robbery holdup in
question? He was not there at the scene of the crime. All that he said was that he was asked three times before the robbery holdup took place to go
with the holduppers. But Villacorte, Yusay and Handig denied this testimony of Guerrero. And of course, Inoferio also denied it.

But what is most significant is the fact that all along, he was referring to "Sante" as the one who was with the group when he was asked to join
them in the robbery holdup. As early as in his written statement given at Camp Crame on September 21, 1959, he referred to one of the
holduppers as "Sante"; he never mentioned therein the name of Crisanto Inoferio; and yet it is a fact, admitted by both Guerrero and Inoferio, that
they had known each other long before the robbery holdup took place on August 27, 1959. Therefore, if Inoferio was the "Sante" with the group
of the holduppers, Guerrero should have referred to him as Inoferio in his written statement of September 21, 1959.
And Crisanto Inoferio is not "Sante". He is the best witness to testify on his nickname and he said that his nickname is "Santing".

Furthermore, this witness Guerrero has very poor credentials as far as his credibility is concerned. He was, at the time he testified, 18 years old,
single and unemployed. And on cross examination, he admitted that on August 1959, he was arrested in an attempt to rob the store of Benito
Ching; he was prosecuted for vagrancy; pleaded guilty and sentenced to ten days imprisonment. Subsequently, he was charged with attempted
robbery.

And assuming that appellant Inoferio was the "Sante" who took part in the planning of the robbery holdup in question, which is not the fact in this
case, that in itself would not make him incur any criminal liability if later on there is not that sufficient evidence to prove that he actually took
part in the robbery holdup. For after taking part in the planning, he could have desisted from taking part in the actual commission of the crime by
listening to the call of his conscience. This exempts him from criminal liability whatsoever.

Against the weak and unconvincing evidence of the prosecution regarding appellant Inoferio are his testimony and those of the witnesses who
corroborated him.

At the time he testified, Inoferio was 39 years old, single, and a house painter. The flow of events as related by him in his testimony, a synopsis of
which we have already given earlier, is so natural and convincing as to set at ease the mind and the conscience of the Court that he was telling the
truth. He denied any participation in the robbery holdup in question. Moreover, that he did not know co-accused Villacorte and Handig at the time
the crime was committed on August 27, 1959. He came to know them only when these two were already arrested, a fact corroborated by
Villacorte and Handig. Even at the confrontation before police officers and CIS agents, Inoferio, on one hand, and his two co-accused, on the
other, already denied having known each other earlier.

The motive of Guerrero in testifying against Inoferio was explained by the latter, and that is, that Guerrero thought, when Inoferio pointed to him
at Camp Crame that Inoferio was implicating Guerrero in the robbery holdup. And Galvez, who never implicated Inoferio when investigated by
the Caloocan police officers in the evening of August 27, 1959 and when investigated by the CIS Camp Crame on September 11, 1959, must
have based his testimony in court, where he identified Inoferio, on the erroneous information supplied to him that "Sante" (one of the holduppers)
was Inoferio.

This is good a time as any to emphasize the fact that courts should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi. Although inherently
weak and easily fabricated, the evidence presented by an accused in support of that defense must be scrutinized with the same care that evidence
supporting other defenses deserves. When an accused puts up the defense of alibi, the court should not at once have a mental prejudice against
him. For, taken in the light of all the evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit him, as in the case of appellant Inoferio.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from convicting the accused-appellant Crisanto Inoferio is hereby reversed and he is hereby acquitted with
costs de oficio. It appearing that he is at present detained at the New Bilibid Prisons at Muntinlupa, his immediate release is hereby ordered. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-19069 October 29, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AMADEO PERALTA, ET AL., defendants,
ANDRES FACTORA, LEONARDO DOSAL, ANGEL PARUMOG, AMADEO PERALTA, FLORENCIO LUNA and GERVASIO
LARITA, defendants-review.

Assistant Solicitors General Vicente A. Torres and Antonio Ibarra for plaintiff-appellee.
J. R. Nuguid for defendants-review.

PER CURIAM:

In the decision in criminal case 7705 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,subject of the present automatic review, Amadeo Peralta, Andres
Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna (six among the twenty-two defendants1 charged therein with
multiple murder) were pronounced guilty, and all sentenced to death, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of each of the victims,
namely, Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosaand Santos Cruz, in the sum of P6,000, and each to pay his corresponding share of the costs.

The information recites:

That on or about the 16th day of February, 1958, in the municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, who are convicts confined in the New Bilibid Prisons by virtue of final
judgments, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another, with evident premeditation and treachery, all
armed with deadly weapons, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill Jose Carriego, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos
Cruz, also convicts confined in the same institution, by hitting, stabbing and striking them with ice picks, clubs and other improvised
weapons, pointed and/or sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the victims multiple serious injuries which directly caused their deaths.

That the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism is present in the commission of the crime in that the crime was committed after
the accused have been convicted by final judgments and while they are serving the said judgments in the New Bilibid Prisons.

Contrary to law with the following aggravating circumstances:

1. That the crime was committed with insult to public authorities;

2. That the crime was committed by a band;

 3. That the crime was committed by armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity;

4. That use of superior strength or means was employed to weaken the defense;

5. That as a means to the commission of the crime doors and windows have been broken;

6. That means was employed which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act;

7. That the crime was committed where public authorities were engaged in the discharge of their duties.

Upon motion of the provincial fiscal before trial, the lower court dismissed the charge against one of the accused 2for lack of evidence. After the
prosecution had rested its case, the charges against six of the accused3 were dismissed for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case
against them. One of the defendants died4during the pendency of the case. After trial, the court a quo acquitted eight5 of the remaining
defendants.

As early as in 1956, a great number of inmates confined in the national penitentiary at Muntinglupa arrayed themselves into two warring gangs,
the "Sigue-Sigue" and the "OXO", the former composed predominantly of Tagalog inmates, the latter comprised mainly of prisoners from the
Visayas and Mindanao. Since then the prison compound has been rocked time and time again by bloody riots resulting in the death of many of
their members and suspected sympathizers. In an effort to avert violent clashes between the contending groups, prison officials segrerated known
members of the "Sigue-Sigue" from those of the "OXO". Building 1 housed "Sigue-Sigue" members, while a majority of the prisoners confined
in Bldg. 4 belonged to the "OXO". Even in Bldg. 4, which is composed of four brigades, namely, 4-A and 4-B (upper floor) and 4-C and 4-D
(first floor), inmates from Visayas and Mindanao, from whom the "OXO" drew most of its members, were confined in 4-A.

It was at about 7:00 a.m. on February 16, 1958, while the inmates of the penitentiary were preparing to attend Sunday mass, that a fight between
two rival members of the "Sigue-Sigue" and "OXO" gangs occurred in the plaza where the prisoners were assembled, causing a big commotion.
The fight was, however, quelled, and those involved were led away for investigation, while the rest of the prisoners were ordered to return to their
respective quarters. Hardly had conditions returned to normal when a riot broke out in Bldg. 1, a known lair of the "Sigue-Sigue". The inmates
thereof tried to invade Bldg. 4, where many members and sympathizers of the "OXO" gang were confined. The timely arrival of the guards
forced the invading inmates to retreat and return to Bldg. 1. Moments later, another riot erupted in Bldg. 4, as the inmates of brigade 4-A
destroyed the lock of their door and then rampaged from one brigade to another. The invading prisoners from 4-A, mostly "OXO" members and
sympathizers, clubbed and stabbed to death Jose Carriego, an inmate of 4-B. Afterwards, they forcibly opened the door of 4-C and killed two
more inmates, namely, Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz.

The three victims sustained injuries which swiftly resulted in their death — before they could be brought to the hospital.

Jose Carriego: (a) lacerated wound on the lower lip, 5 cm. in length and 3 cm.in depth; (b) contusion and hematoma of the back of the neck,
about 2 inches in diameter; and (c) five punctured wounds in the chest, penetrating the lungs. Cause of death: internal hemorrhage from multiple
fatal wounds in the chest.

Eugenio Barbosa: (a) lacerated wound in the occipital region, 3 inches in length and 1 cm. in depth; (b) two penetrating wounds in the abdomen,
puncturing the intestines; (c) lacerated wounds on the right oxilla, 3 cm. in length and 2 cm. in depth; and (d) several bruises at the right and left
lower extremities. Cause of death: shock, secondary to internal hermorrhage in the abdomen.

Santos Cruz: (a) lacerated wound on the head, 2 inches in length; (b) fractured skull; (c) wound on the upper lip cutting the lip in two; (d) seven
punctured wounds in the chest, two of which were penetrating; (e) hematoma on the right hand; and (f) three punctured wounds on the left hand.
Cause of death: fractured skull.

Romeo Pineda, an inmate and first quarter-in-charge of brigade 4-B, testified that while he was taking his breakfast with Jose Carriego, who was
at the time the representative of the prisoners confined in 4-B to the inmate carcel, he "suddenly heard commotion" near the door of their brigade;
that his fellow prisoners started shouting "pinapasok na tayo," as the invading inmates from brigade 4-A stampeded into 4-B; that he and Carriego
took hold of their clubs and stood at the end of the passageway; that he saw Carriego surrender his club to Andres Factora, an "OXO" member
from 4-A; that as Carriego started to walk away, Factora clubbed Carriego on the nape causing the latter to fall; that Factora turned up the face of
his fallen victim and struck him again in the face; that while Carriego was in this prostrate position, Amadeo Peralta and Leonardo Dosal,
companions of Factora, repeatedly stabbed him.

The testimony of Pineda was corroborated in all its material points by Juanito Marayoc and Avelino Sauza, both inmates of 4-B. These two
prosecution witnesses identified Factora, Peralta and Dosal as the assailants of Carriego.

From 4-B, the invading inmates of 4-A went down and forcibly entered 4-C. According to Oscar Fontillas, an inmate of 4-C, he saw the prisoners
from 4-A rushing toward their brigade; that among the invading inmates who forced open the door of 4-C, with help from the inside provided by
Visayan prisoners confined in 4-C, were Factora, Dosal, Angel Parumog, Gervacio Larita, Ernesto Fernandez and Jose Tariman; that he saw
Factora, Larita and Fernandez kill Barbosa, while the rest of their companies instructed the Visayans to leave their cell and ordered the "Manila
boys" (Tagalogs) to remain. Antonio Pabarlan, another inmate of 4-C, declared that he saw Peralta stab Barbosa, as Dosal, Larita, Florencio
Luna, Parumog and Factora clubbed the hapless victim. Another inmate of 4-C, Jose Halili, not only corroborated the testimony of Fontillas and
Pabarlan but as well added grim details. He declared that while Barbosa was trying to hide under a cot, he was beaten and stabbed to death by
Dosal, Parumog, Factora and Fernandez, with Luna, Larita, Pedro Cogol and Eilel Tugaya standing guard, armed with clubs and sharp
instruments, in readiness to repel any intervention from the Tagalog inmates. Carlos Espino, also confined in 4-C, declared that he saw Parumog,
Peralta Factora and Larita assault and kill Barbosa.

The same witnesses for the prosecution testifies that after killing Barbosa, the invading "OXO" members and sympathizers proceeded to hunt for
Santos Cruz, another Tagalog like Carriego and Barbosa. Halili testified, that he saw Peralta, Larita, Cogol and Tugaya take Santos Cruz to 4-A
from 4-C; that Santos Cruz knelt down and pleaded for his life, saying, "Maawa kayo sa akin. Marami akong anak;" that Luna and Peralta were
unmoved as they stabbed Santos Cruz to death. Pabarlan declared that after the death of Barbosa, Santos Cruz was brought to 4-A by the invading
inmates but Cruz was able to slip back to his cell only to be recaptured by Factora, Dosal and Luna and brought to near the fire escape where he
was clubbed and stabbed to death by Parumog, Dosal, Factora and Peralta. Fontillas and Espino corroborated the declarations of Halili and
Pabarlan with respect to the killing of Santos Cruz, and both mentioned Larita as one of the assailants of Cruz.

The trial judge summarized the evidence for the prosecution, thus:

"... it clearly appears that the three killings in question were an offshoot of the rivalry between the two organizations. All those who
were killed, namely, Barbosa, Carriego and Santos Cruz, were Tagalogs and well known as members if not sympathizers of the Sigue
Sigue, while the accused so charged with their killing were mostly members if not sympathizers of the Oxo organization. These three
killings were sparked by the commotion that happened in the plaza between 8:00 and 9:00 in the morning, while the prisoners were
preparing to go the mass ... It was evident that the clash that occurred in the plaza produced a chain reaction among the members and
followers of the two organizations. The inmates of Building No. 1, known lair of the Sigue Sigues bolted the door of their cells and
tried to invade Building No. 4 where a big number of the Oxo members and their sympathizers were confined, but, however, were
forced to retreat by the timely arrival of the guards who sent them back to their building. When the members of the Oxo in Building
No. 4 learned about this, they went on a rampage looking for members of the Sigue Sigue or their sympathizers who were confined
with them in the same building. As the evidence of the prosecution shows, the accused who were confined in Brigade 4-A of Building
No. 4 led the attack. They destroyed the lock of their dormitories and with the help of their companions succeeded in bolting the door
of the different brigades, and once they succeeded in bolting the doors of the different brigades, they went inside and tried to segregate
the Tagalogs from their group; that as soon as they discovered their enemies they clubbed and stabbed them to death ...

Admitting that he was one among several who killed Jose Carriego, Peralta nevertheless claims self-defense. He testified that on the morning of
the riot he was attacked by Carriego and Juan Estrella near the door of 4-A while he was returning to his brigade from the chapel with some
companions; that Carriego clubbed him on the head; that he was able to parry the second blow of Carriego and then succeeded in squeezing
Carriego's head with his hands; that forthwith he whipped out an improvised ice pick and stabbed Carriego several times; that when he (Peralta)
was already dizzy due to the head wound he sustained from the clubbing, Carriego managed to slip away; that he then became unconscious, and
when he regained consciousness he found himself on a tarima with his head bandaged.

Peralta's declarations do not inspire belief. The impressive array of prosecution witnesses who saw him actively participate in the killing of the
three victims pointed to him as the aggressor, not the aggrieved. Pineda, Marayoc and Sauza positively identified him as one of the assailants of
Carriego. Contrary to the pretensions of Peralta, Carriego an alleged "Sigue-Sigue" member, would not have attacked him, knowing fully well
that Building No. 4 was an "OXO" lair where the "Sigue-Sigue" members were outnumbered. Anent the killing of Barbosa and Santos Cruz,
Peralta failed to offer any explicit defense to rebut the inculpatory declarations of prosecution witnesses Pabarlan and Espino who saw him
participate in the killing of Barbosa and those of Halili, Fontillas and Espino who identified him as one of the murderers of Santos Cruz.

For his part, Leonardo Dosal stated that he killed Santos Cruz, but also claims self-defense in exculpation. He declared that Santos Cruz, Jose
Carriego, Juanita Espino, Carlos Espino and Oscar Fontillas invaded 4-A where he was confined; that a free-for-all forthwith ensued; that he then
heard Santos Cruz call Carlos Espino, and advise the latter to go away as "I will be the one to kill that person (Dosal);" that with a sharp
instrument, Cruz hit him on the head and then on the nose; that as Cruz was about to hit him again, he got hold of his ice pick and stabbed Cruz
repeatedly until the latter fell.

Dosal's avowal is clearly belied by the positive testimonies of Pabarlan, Halili and Espino who saw him participate in the killing of Santos Cruz.
If it is true that Dosal killed Santos Cruz in self-defense when the latter together with his companions supposedly invaded Dosal's brigade (4-A),
why is it that the body of Santos Cruz was found at the fire escape near the pasillo between 4-C and 4-D of the first floor of Bldg. 1 instead of in
4-A which is located in the upper floor? Moreover, Dosal failed to explain why he was seen in 4-C, which he does not deny, since he was an
inmate of 4-A where he was allegedly attacked. With respect to the murder of Carriego and Barbosa with which Dosal was also charged, he did
not offer any evidence in his behalf. Hence, the testimonies of Pineda, Marayoc and Sauza identifying him as one of the killers of Carriego and
those of Pabarlan, Halili and Espino implicating him in the death of Santos Cruz, stand unrebutted.

Andres Factora declared that he clubbed Carriego and Santos Cruz under compulsion of his co-accused who threatened to kill him if he disobeyed
their order; that he did not hit Barbosa anymore because the latter was already dead; that it was his co-accused who actually killed the three
victims. Again, the declarations of the prosecution witnesses, which were accorded full credence by the trial court, expose the guilt of Factora
beyond reasonable doubt. In fact, according to Pineda, whose testimony was corroborated by Marayoc, it was Factora who started the mass
assault by clubbing Carriego treacherously. Fontillas, Halili, Pabarlan and Espino pointed to Factora as one of the killers of Barbosa, while at
least three prosecution witnesses, namely, Pabarlan, Fontillas and Espino, saw Factora participate in the slaying of Santos Cruz. The active
participation of Factora in the killing, which is clear index of voluntariness, thus negates his claim of compulsion and fear allegedly engendered
by his co-accused.
Angel Parumog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna take refuge in the exculpatory device of alibi. Parumog testified that he did not participate in
the killing of the three inmates because he stayed during that entire hapless day in the office of the trustees for investigation after the fight in
the plaza; that he was implicated in the killing by the prosecution witnesses because of his refusal to accede to their request to testify against his
co-accused; that he is not a Visayan but a Tagalog from Nueva Ecija. Larita claims that he did not know about the killing until he was informed
that three inmates had died; that on the day in question he was brought to the police trustee brigade for investigation after the incident in
the plaza; that he was escorted back to his brigade only in the afternoon. Luna likewise disclaims any knowledge of the killing and asserts that for
the entire duration of the riot he remained in his cell (brigade 4-A).

The alibis of Parumog, Larita and Luna merit no credence when set against the positive testimonies of prosecution witness identifying them as
participants in the killing of Barbosa and Santos Cruz. Pabarlan, Espino and Fontillas declared that Larita was one of the killers of Barbosa;
Espino and Fontillas declared that they saw Larita kill Santos Cruz; Pabarlan, Halili and Espino testified that they saw Parumog participate in the
murder of Barbosa; Espino, Fontillas and Pabarlan stated that Parumog took part in the killing of Santos Cruz. Pabarlan and Halili declared that
Luna participated in the fatal assault on Barbosa and Santos Cruz.

The alibis of the accused are thus sufficiently overcome by strong evidence to the contrary. The defense of alibi is generally weak since it is easy
to concoct. For this reason, courts view it with no small amount of caution, and accept it only when proved by positive, clear and satisfactory
evidence.6 In the case at bar, if Parumog and Larita were really confined in the police trustee brigade for investigation on the day of the incident,
there should have been a record of the alleged investigation. But none was presented. The testimony of Luna that throughout the riot he stayed in
his cell is quite unnatural. He claims that he did not even help his cellmates barricade their brigade with tarimas in order to delay if not prevent
the entry of the invading inmates. According to him, he "just waited in one corner."

The rule is settled that the defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification by prosecution witnesses pointing to the accused
as particeps criminis.7 Moreover, the defense of alibi is an issue of fact the resolution of which depends almost entirely on the credibility of
witnesses who seek to establish it. In this respect the relative weight which the trial judge accords to the testimony of the witnesses must, unless
patently inconsistent without evidence on record, be accepted.8 In the case at bar, the trial court, in dismissing the alibis of Parumog, Larita and
Luna, said that "their mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the witnesses who saw them participate directly in the execution
of the conspiracyto kill Barbosa, Carriego and Santos Cruz."

The killing of Carriego constitutes the offense of murder because of the presence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance: Carriego was clubbed
by Factora from behind, and as he lay prostrate and defenseless, Peralta and Dosal stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. The blow on the nape and
the penetrating chest wounds were all fatal, according to Dr. Bartolome Miraflor. Abuse of superior strength qualified the killing of Barbosa and
Santos Cruz to the category of murder. The victims, who were attacked individually were completely overwhelmed by their assailants' superiority
in number and weapons and had absolutely no chance at all to repel or elude the attack. All the attackers were armed with clubs or sharp
instruments while the victims were unarmed, as so found by the trial court. In fact, Halili testified that Barbosa was clubbed and stabbed to death
while he was trying to hide under a cot, and Santos Cruz was killed while he was on his knees pleading for his life.

The essential issue that next confronts us is whether conspiracy attended the commission of the murders. The resolution of this issue is of marked
importance because upon it depends the quantity and quality of the penalties that must be imposed upon each of the appellants.

For this purpose, it is not amiss to briefly restate the doctrine on conspiracy, with particular emphasis on the facets relating to its nature, the
quantum of proof required, the scope and extent of the criminal liability of the conspirators, and the penalties imposable by mandate of applicable
law.

Doctrine. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it.9 Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, 10 rebellion11 and sedition.12 The
crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. 13 An agreement to commit a crime is a
reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent
design, the sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed. However, when in resolute execution of
a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the
determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and
Barreto14 opined that

While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a crime unless the statute specifically
prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance,
when considered together with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the consummated crime and its
commission by the conspirators.

Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their
respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of
law the act of one is the act of all.15 The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a
criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively
contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone." 16 Although it is axiomatic
that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the
acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy."17 The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly
explained in one case18 where this Court held that
 ... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and inseparable
relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement ... The crime must
therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the ... accused, be regarded as the act of the band or
party created by them, and they are all equally responsible ...

Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony proved, collective liability of
the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of
participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who was remote from the situs of
aggression, he could be drawn within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the
conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.

In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the imputation to all of them
the act of any one of them. It is in this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing
criminal liability.

The ensnaring nature of conspiracy is projected in bold relief in the cases of malversation and rape committed in furtherance of a common design.

The crime of malversation is generally committed by an accountable public officer who misappropriates public funds or public property under his
trust.19 However, in the classic case of People vs. Ponte20 this Court unequivocally held that a janitor and five municipal policemen, all of whom
were not accountable public officers, who conspired and aided a municipal treasurer in the malversation of public funds under the latter's custody,
were principally liable with the said municipal treasurer for the crime of malversation. By reason of conspiracy, the felonious act of the
accountable public officer was imputable to his co-conspirators, although the latter were not similarly situated with the former in relation to the
object of the crime committed. Furthermore, in the words of Groizard, "the private party does not act independently from the public officer;
rather, he knows that the funds of which he wishes to get possession are in the latter's charge, and instead of trying to abstract them by
circumventing the other's vigilance he resorts to corruption, and in the officer's unfaithfulness seeks and finds the most reprehensible means of
accomplishing a deed which by having a public officer as its moral instrument assumes the character of a social crime."21 In an earlier case22 a
non-accountable officer of the Philippine Constabulary who conspired with his superior, a military supply officer, in the malversation of public
funds was adjudged guilty as co-principal in the crime of malversation, although it was not alleged, and in fact it clearly appeared, that the funds
misappropriated were not in his custody but were under the trust of his superior, an accountable public officer.

In rape, a conspirator is guilty not only of the sexual assault he personally commits but also of the separate and distinct crimes of rape perpetrated
by his co-conspirators. He may have had carnal knowledge of the offended woman only once but his liability includes that pertaining to all the
rapes committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Thus, in People vs. Villa,23 this Court held that

... from the acts performed by the defendants front the time they arrived at Consolacion's house to the consummation of the offense of
rape on her person by each and everyone of them, it clearly appears that they conspired together to rape their victim, and therefore
each one is responsible not only for the rape committed personally by him, but also that committed by the others, because each sexual
intercourse had, through force, by each one of the defendants with the offended was consummated separately and independently from
that had by the others, for which each and every one is also responsible because of the conspiracy.

The rule enunciated in People vs. Villa was reiterated in People vs. Quitain24 where the appellant Teofilo Anchita was convicted of forcible
abduction with double rape for having conspired and cooperated in the sexual assault of the aggrieved woman, although he himself did not
actually rape the victim. This Court observed:

We have no doubt all in all that Teofilo Anchita took part in the sexual assault ... the accused inserted his fingers in the woman's
organ, and widened it. Whether he acted out of lewdness or to help his brother-in-law consummate the act, is immaterial; it was both
maybe. Yet, surely, by his conduct, this prisoner conspired and cooperated, and is guilty.

With respect to robbery in band, the law presumes the attendance of conspiracy so much so that "any member of a band who is present at the
commission of a robbery by the band, shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the band, unless it be shown that he
attempted to prevent the same."25 In this instance, conspiracy need not be proved, as long as the existence of a band is clearly established.
Nevertheless, the liability of a member of the band for the assaults committed by his group is likewise anchored on the rule that the act of one is
the act of all.

Proof of conspiracy. While conspiracy to commit a crime must be established by positive evidence,26 direct proof is not essential to show
conspiracy.27 Since by it nature, conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can seldom be proved by direct evidence. 28 Consequently, competent
and convincing circumstantial evidence will suffice to establish conspiracy. According to People vs. Cabrera,29 conspiracies are generally proved
by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances which vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. If it be proved that the
defendants pursued by their acts the same object, one performing one part and another another part of the same, so as to complete it, with a view
to the attainment of the same object, one will be justified in the conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect the object." Or as
elucidated in People vs. Carbonel30the presence of the concurrence of minds which is involved in conspiracy may be inferred from "proofs of
facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole. If it is proved that two or
more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy
may be inferred though no actual meeting among to concert means is proved ..." In two recent cases, 31 this Court ruled that where the acts of the
accused, collectively and individually, clearly demonstrate the existence of a common design toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful
purpose, conspiracy is evident.

Conspiracy presupposes the existence of a preconceived plan or agreement; however, to establish conspiracy, "it is not essential that there be
proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors committed shall have acted in concert pursuant to the
same objective."32 Hence, conspiracy is proved if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors committed an offense in
furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert.

Liability of conspirators. A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators who
acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals.33 This rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring
nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil
partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be held solidarity liable.

However, in order to hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it must be established that he performed an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to move them to
executing the conspiracy. The difference between an accused who is a principal under any of the three categories enumerated in Art. 17 of the
Revised Penal Code and a co-conspirator who is also a principal is that while the former's criminal liability is limited to his own acts, as a general
rule, the latter's responsibility includes the acts of his fellow conspirators.

In People vs. Izon, et al.,34 this Court acquitted appellant Francisco Robles, Jr., who was convicted by the trial court of robbery with homicide as a
conspirator, on the ground that although he may have been present when the conspiracy to rob was proposed and made, "Robles uttered not a
word either of approval or disapproval. There are authorities to the effect that mere presence at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it,
without any active participation in the same, is not enough for purposes of conviction." In a more recent case, 35this Court, in exonerating one of
the appellants, said:

There is ample and positive evidence on record that appellant Jose Guico was absent not only from the second meeting but likewise
from the robbery itself. To be sure, not even the decision under appeal determined otherwise. Consequently, even if Guico's
participation in the first meeting sufficiently involved him with the conspiracy (as he was the one who explained the location of the
house to be robbed in relation to the surrounding streets and the points thereof through which entrance and exit should be effected),
such participation and involvement, however, would be inadequate to render him criminally liable as a conspirator. Conspiracy alone,
without the execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law, except in special instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code)
which, however, do not include robbery.

Imposition of multiple penalties where conspirators commit more than one offense. Since in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, then,
perforce, each of the conspirators is liable for all of the crimes committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Consequently, if the conspirators
commit three separate and distinct crimes of murder in effecting their common design and purpose, each of them is guilty of three murders and
shall suffer the corresponding penalty for each offense. Thus in People vs. Masin,36 this Court held:

... it being alleged in the information that three crimes were committed not simultaneously indeed but successively, inasmuch as there
was, at least, solution of continuity between each other, the accused (seven in all) should be held responsible for said crimes. This
court holds that the crimes are murder ... In view of all these circumstances and of the frequently reiterated doctrine that once
conspiracy is proven each and every one of the conspirators must answer for the acts of the others, provided said acts are the result of
the common plan or purpose ... it would seem evident that the penalty that should be imposed upon each of the appellants for each of
their crimes should be the same, and this is the death penalty ... (emphasis supplied).

In the aforesaid case, however, the projected imposition of three death penalties upon each of the conspirators for the three murders committed
was not carried out due to the lack of the then requisite unanimity in the imposition of the capital penalty.

In another case,37 this Court, after finding that conspiracy attended the commission of eleven murders, said through Mr. Justice Tuason:

Some members of this Court opine that the proper penalty is death, under the circumstances of the case, but they fall short of the
required number for the imposition of this punishment. The sentence consequently is reclusion perpetua; but each appellant is guilty
of as many crimes of murder as there were deaths (eleven) and should be sentenced to life imprisonment for each crime, although this
may be a useless formality for in no case can imprisonment exceed forty years. (Emphasis supplied.)

In People vs. Masani,38 the decision of the trial court imposing only one life imprisonment for each of the accused was modified by this Court on
appeal on the ground that "inasmuch as their (the conspirators') combined attack resulted in the killing of three persons, they should be sentenced
to suffer said penalty (reclusion perpetua) for each of the three victims (crimes)." (Emphasis supplied.)

It is significant to note that in the abovementioned cases, this Court consistently stressed that once conspiracy is ascertained, the culpability of the
conspirators is not only solidary (all co-principals) but also multiple in relation to the number of felonies committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy. It can also be said that had there been a unanimous Court in the Masin and Macaso cases, multiple death penalties would have been
imposed upon all the conspirators.
Legality and practicality of imposing multiple death penalties upon conspirators. An accused who was charged with three distinct crimes of
murder in a single information was sentenced to two death penalties for two murders,39 and another accused to thirteen (13) separate death
penalties for the 13 killings he perpetrated.40 Therefore there appears to be no legal reason why conspirators may not be sentenced to multiple
death penalties corresponding to the nature and number of crimes they commit in furtherance of a conspiracy. Since it is the settled rule that once
conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is attributable to all, then each conspirator must be held liable for each of the felonious acts
committed as a result of the conspiracy, regardless of the nature and severity of the appropriate penalties prescribed by law.

The rule on the imposition of multiple penalties where the accused is found guilty of two or more separate and distinct crimes charged in one
information, the accused not having interposed any objection to the multiplicity of the charges, was enunciated in the leading case of U.S. vs.
Balaba,41 thus: Upon conviction of two or more offenses charged in the complaint or information, the prescribed penalties for each and all of such
offenses may be imposed, to be executed in conformity with the provisions of article 87 of the Penal Code [now article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code]. In other words, all the penalties corresponding to the several violations of law should be imposed. Conviction for multiple felonies
demands the imposition of multiple penalties.

The two conceptual exceptions to the foregoing rule, are the complex crime under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and the special complex
crime (like robbery with homicide). Anent an ordinary complex crime falling under article 48, regardless of the multiplicity of offenses
committed, there is only one imposable penalty — the penalty for the most serious offense applied in its maximum period. Similarly, in special
complex crimes, there is but a single penalty prescribed by law notwithstanding the number of separate felonies committed. For instance, in the
special complex crime of robbery with hommicide the imposible penalty is reclusion perpetua to death42 irrespective of the number of homicides
perpetrated by reason or on occasion of the robbery.

In Balaba, the information charged the accused with triple murder. The accused went to trial without objection to the said information which
charged him with more than one offense. The trial court found the accused guilty of two murders and one homicide but it imposed only one death
penalty. In its review en consulta, this Court modified the judgment by imposing separate penalties for each of the three offenses committed. The
Court, thru Mr. Justice Carson (with Mr. Justice Malcolm dissenting with respect to the imposition of two death penalties), held:

The trial judge was erroneously of the opinion that the prescribed penalties for the offenses of which the accused was convicted should
be imposed in accord with the provisions of article 89 of the Penal Code. That article is only applicable to cases wherein a single act
constitutes two or more crimes, or when one offense is a necessary means for committing the other. (U.S. vs. Ferrer, 1 Phil. Rep., 56)

It becomes our duty, therefore, to determine what penalty or penalties should have been imposed upon the accused upon conviction of
the accused of three separate felonies charged in the information.

There can be no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the convict of two separate crimes of asesinato (murder) marked with the generic
aggravating circumstances mentioned in the decision of the trial judge ... It follows that the death penalty must and should be imposed
for each of these offenses ...

Unless the accused should be acquitted hereafter on appeal of one or both the asesinatos with which he is charged in the information,
it would seem to be a useless formality to impose separate penalties for each of the offenses of which he was convicted, in view of the
nature of the principal penalty; but having in mind the possibility that the Chief Executive may deem it proper to grant a pardon for
one or more of the offenses without taking action on the others; and having in mind also the express provisions of the above cited
article 87 of the Penal Code, we deem it proper to modify the judgment entered in the court below by substituting for the penalty
imposed by the trial judge under the provisions of article 89 of the Code, the death penalty prescribed by law for each of the two
separate asesinatos of which he stands convicted, and the penalty of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal (for the
separate crime of homicide) ... these separate penalties to be executed in accord with the provisions of article 87 of the Penal Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The doctrine in Balaba was reiterated in U.S. vs. Jamad43 where a unanimous Court, speaking again thru Mr. Justice Carson (with Mr. Justice
Malcolm concurring in the result in view of the Balaba ruling), opined:

For all the offenses of which the accused were convicted in the court below, the trial judge imposed the death penalty, that is to say the
penalty prescribed for the most serious crime committed, in its maximum degree, and for this purpose made use of the provisions of
article 89 of the Penal Code [now article 48 of the Revised Penal Code]. But as indicated in the case of the United States vs. Balaba,
recently decided wherein the controlling facts were substantially similar to those in the case at bar, "all of the penalties corresponding
to the several violations of law" should have been imposed under the express provisions of article 87 [now engrafted in article 70 of
the Revised Penal Code] and under the ruling in that case, the trial court erred in applying the provision of article 89 of the code.

We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below should be reversed, ... and that the following separate penalties should be
imposed upon him [the accused Jamad], to be executed in accordance with article 87 of the Penal Code: (1) The penalty of death for
the parricide of his wife Aring; (2) the penalty of life imprisonment for the murder of Labonete; (3) the penalty of life imprisonment
for the murder of Torres; (4) the penalty of 12 years and one day of cadena temporal for the frustrated murder of Taclind ...

The doctrine in Balaba was reechoed in People vs. Guzman,44 which applied the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code, where this
Court, after finding the accused liable as co-principals because they acted in conspiracy, proceeded to stress that where an "information charges
the defendants with the commission of several crimes of murder and frustrated murder, as they failed to object to the multiplicity of the charges
made in the information, they can be found guilty thereof and sentenced accordingly for as many crimes the information charges them, provided
that they are duly established and proved by the evidence on record." (Emphasis supplied.)

The legal and statutory justification advanced by the majority in Balaba for imposing all the penalties (two deaths and one life imprisonment)
corresponding to the offense charged and proved was article 87 of the old Penal Code which provided:

When a person is found guilty of two or more felonies or misdemeanors, all the penalties corresponding to the several violations of
law shall be imposed, the same to be simultaneously served, if possible, according to the nature and effects of such penalties.

in relation to article 88 of the old Code which read:

When all or any of the penalties corresponding to the several violations of the law can not be simultaneously executed, the following
rules shall be observed with regard thereto:

1. In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so that they may be executed successively
or as nearly as may be possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or penalties first imposed, or should they have
been served out.

The essence and language, with some alterations in form and in the words used by reason of style, of the above-cited provisions have been
preserved in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code which is the product of the merger of articles 87 and 88 of the old Penal Code. Article 70
provides:

When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit;
otherwise, the following rules shall be observed:

In the imposition of the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed so that they may be executed successively or
as nearly as may be possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the penalty or penalties first imposed, or should they have been
served out.

Although article 70 does not specifically command, as the former article 87 clearly did, that "all the penalties corresponding to the several
violations of law shall be imposed," it is unmistakable, however, that article 70 presupposes that courts have the power to impose multiple
penalties, which multiple penal sanctions should be served either simultaneously or successively. This presumption of the existence of judicial
power to impose all the penalties corresponding to the number and nature of the offenses charged and proved is manifest in the opening sentence
of article 70: "When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit
..." (Emphasis supplied.) Obviously, the two or more penalties which the culprit has to serve are those legally imposed by the proper court.
Another reference to the said judicial prerogative is found in the second paragraph of article 70 which provides that "in the imposition of
the penalties, the order of their respective severity shall be followed ..." Even without the authority provided by article 70, courts can still impose
as many penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses committed, since for every individual crime committed, a corresponding penalty is
prescribed by law. Each single crime is an outrage against the State for which the latter, thru the courts ofjustice, has the power to impose the
appropriate penal sanctions.

With respect to the imposition of multiple death penalties, there is no statutory prohibition or jurisprudential injunction against it. On the contrary,
article 70 of the Revised Penal Code presumes that courts have the power to mete out multiple penalties without distinction as to the nature and
severity of the penalties. Moreover, our jurisprudence supports the imposition of multiple death penalties as initially advocated in Balaba and
thunderously reechoed in Salazar where the accused was sentenced on appeal to thirteen (13) death penalties. Significantly, the Court
in Balaba imposed upon the single accused mixed multiple penalties of two deaths and one life imprisonment.

The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some as a useless formality, an exercise in futility. It is contended, undeniably enough,
that a death convict like all mortals, has only one life to forfeit. And because of this physiological and biological attribute of man, it is reasoned
that the imposition of multiple death penalties is impractical and futile because after the service of one capital penalty, the execution of the rest of
the death penalties will naturally be rendered impossible. The foregoing opposition to the multiple imposition of death penalties suffers from four
basic flaws: (1) it fails to consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to distinguish between imposition of penalty and
service of sentence; (3) it ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could be served simultaneously; and (4) it overlooks the practical merits
of imposing multiple death penalties.

The imposition of a penalty and the service of sentence are two distinct, though related, concepts. The imposition of the proper penalty or
penalties is determined by the nature, gravity and number of offenses charged and, proved, whereas service of sentence is determined by the
severity and character of the penalty or penalties imposed. In the imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does not concern itself
with the possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence, since actual service is a contingency subject to varied factors like successful
escape of the convict, grant of executive clemency or natural death of the prisoner. All that go into the imposition of the proper penalty or
penalties, to reiterate, are the nature, gravity and number of the offenses charged and proved and the corresponding penalties prescribed by law.
Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because they will have to be executed simultaneously. A cursory reading of article 70 will
show that there are only two modes of serving two or more (multiple) penalties: simultaneously or successively. The first rule is that two or more
penalties shall be served simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. In the case of multiple capital penalties, the nature of said
penal sanctions does not only permit but actually necessitates simultaneous service.

The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a useless formality, has practical importance. The sentencing of an accused to several
capital penalties is an indelible badge of his extreme criminal perversity, which may not be accurately projected by the imposition of only one
death sentence irrespective of the number of capital felonies for which he is liable. Showing thus the reprehensible character of the convict in its
real dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive clemency is justifiably reduced in no small measure. Hence, the imposition of multiple
death penalties could effectively serve as a deterrent to an improvident grant of pardon or commutation. Faced with the utter delinquency of such
a convict, the proper penitentiary authorities would exercise judicious restraint in recommending clemency or leniency in his behalf.

Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise of his constitutional power to pardon (one of the presidential prerogatives which is
almost absolute) deems it proper to commute the multiple death penalties to multiple life imprisonments, then the practical effect is that the
convict has to serve the maximum of forty (40) years of multiple life sentences. If only one death penalty is imposed, and then is commuted to
life imprisonment, the convict will have to serve a maximum of only thirty years corresponding to a single life sentence.

Reverting now to the case at bar, it is our considered view that the trial court correctly ruled that conspiracy attended the commission of the
murders. We quote with approval the following incisive observations of the court a quo in this respect:

Although, there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the Court can safely say that there are several circumstances to show that the
crime committed by the accused was planned. The following circumstances show beyond any doubt the acts of conspiracy: First, all
those who were killed, Barbosa, Santos Cruz and Carriego, were Tagalogs. Although there were many Tagalogs like them confined in
Building 4, these three were singled out and killed thereby showing that their killing has been planned. Second, the accused were all
armed with improvised weapons showing that they really prepared for the occasion. Third, the accused accomplished the killing with
team work precision going from one brigade to another and attacking the same men whom they have previously marked for
liquidation and lastly, almost the same people took part in the killing of Carriego, Barbosa and Santos Cruz.

It is also important to note that all the accused were inmates of brigade 4-A; that all were from either the Visayas or Mindanao except Peralta who
is from Masbate and Parumog who hails from Nueva Ecija; that all were either "OXO" members or sympathizers; and that all the victims were
members of the "Sigue-Sigue" gang.

The evidence on record proves beyond peradventure that the accused acted in concert from the moment they bolted their common brigade, up
until the time they killed their last victim, Santos Cruz. While it is true that Parumog, Larita and Luna did not participate in the actual killing of
Carriego, nonetheless, as co-conspirators they are equally guilty and collectively liable for in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. It is not
indispensable that a co-conspirator should take a direct part in every act and should know the part which the others have to perform. Conspiracy
is the common design to commit a felony; it is not participation in all the details of the execution of the crime. All those who in one way or
another help and cooperate in the consummation of a felony previously planned are co-principals.45 Hence, all of the six accused are guilty of the
slaughter of Carriego, Barbosa and Santos Cruz — each is guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder.

We cannot agree, however, with the trial court that evident premeditation was also present. The facts on record and the established jurisprudence
on the matter do not support the conclusion of the court a quo that evident premeditation "is always present and inherent in every conspiracy."
Evident premeditation is not inherent in conspiracy as the absence of the former does not necessarily negate the existence of the latter. 46 Unlike in
evident premeditation where a sufficient period of time must elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection for the perpetrator to
deliberate on the consequences of his intended deed, conspiracy arises at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the
felony and forthwith decide to commit it.47 This view finds added support in People vs. Custodia,48 wherein this Court stated:

Under normal conditions, where the act of conspiracy is directly established, with proof of the attendant deliberation and selection of
the method, time and means of executing the crime, the existence of evident premeditation can be taken for granted. In the case before
us, however, no such evidence exists; the conspiracy is merely inferred from the acts of the accused in the perpetration of the crime.
There is no proof how and when the plan to kill Melanio Balancio was hatched, or what time elapsed before it was carried out; we are,
therefore, unable to determine if the appellants enjoyed "sufficient time between its inception and its fulfillment dispassionately to
consider and accept the consequences." (cf. People vs. Bangug, 52 Phil. 91.) In other words, there is no showing of the opportunity of
reflection and the persistence in the criminal intent that characterize the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation (People vs.
Mendoza, 91 Phil. 58; People vs. Iturriaga, 47 Off. Gaz., [Supp to No. 12] 166; People vs. Lesada 70 Phil., 525.)

Not a single extenuating circumstance could be appreciated in favor of any of the six accused, as they did neither allege nor prove any.

In view of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism, as all of the six accused at the time of the commission of
the offenses were serving sentences49 in the New Bilibid Prison at Muntinlupa by virtue of convictions by final judgments the penalty for each
offense must be imposed in its maximum period, which is the mandate of the first paragraph of article 160 of the Revised Penal Code. Viada
observes, in apposition, that the severe penalty imposed on a quasi-recidivist is justified because of his perversity and incorrigibility.50
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is hereby modified as follows: Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal, Angel Parumog,
Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna are each pronounced guilty of three separate and distinct crimes of murder, and are each sentenced to three
death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the heirs of each of the three deceased victims in the sum of P12,000; 51 each
will pay one-sixth of the costs.