1. US v.

Ah Chong
G.R. No. 5272
19 March 1910

Facts:

Ah Chong was a cook and Pascual was a houseboy at Officers' quarters No. 27 at Fort
Mc Kinley. They were occupying a small room toward the rear of the building. Robbery and
theft were rampant in the area and since the door of the room doesn’t have any locks or
any form of security, as a measure, they used a hook and a chair placed at the door to keep
it closed. Ah Chong also kept a knife under his pillow for safety purposes. They also had an
agreement because of the ongoing robberies in the area that whoever comes home first will
lock the door and when the other comes home he will knock and introduced himself.

Pascual went out with his friends. It was around 10 pm when Ah Chong was
awakened by a loud noise banging the door of the room. Thinking that it was a robber, he
sat up and asked “Who is it?” and no one answered. He was then convinced it was a robber
trying to enter the room, he made a warning by saying “if you enter the room, I will kill
you”.

Ah Chong was hit by the chair placed behind the door and immediately assumed he
was being attacked. In the darkness and confusion, he struck the intruder with the knife
that he kept under his pillow, which eventually turns out to be Pascual.

Pascual ran out, screaming in pain due to his wounds. The moment Ah Chong
recognized Pascual, he hurriedly asked for help and attended to Pascual’s wounds. Pascual
was brought to the hospital, however, he died eventually.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ah Chong is criminally liable by reason of mistake of fact.

RULING:

No. Ah Chong is not criminally liable by reason of mistake of fact. The Supreme
Court ruled out that no criminal liability when one commits an offense or act due to
ignorance of facts provided that it was not due to negligence or bad faith. Such ignorance of
the fact is sufficient to negative the particular intent which under the law, is an essential
element to the crime of murder charged cancels the presumption of intent and works for an
acquittal. In this case, Ah Chong struck Pascual thinking it was a robber, on which he
thought was after him and his belongings. There was also no negligence on his part because
he warned many times before acting. It is clear that he acted in good faith with no
negligence and without criminal intent and was exercising his right to self defense. Hence,
Ah Chong is not criminally liable by reason of mistake of fact and was acquitted.

2. People v. Oanis,
G.R. No. 47722,
27 July 1943,

Facts:

A message was sent to the provincial inspector of Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija. The
message is as follows: "Information received: escaped criminal Anselmo Balagtas with
bailarina Irene. Get him dead or alive."

Two of the five who showed up at the Provincial Inspector's office were the
defendant, corporal Galanta and police chief Oanis. Each provided a copy of the telegram
and a picture of Balagtas. They were told to detain Balagtas and, if defeated, to execute the
telegram's instructions (dead or alive). Oanis, Galanta, and their group of defendants went
to the alleged residence of Irene. When Oanis approached Brigida Mallare, she indicated
Irene's room and informed them that Irene was having an affair with her partner at the
time.
Defendants Oanis and Galanta then entered Irene's room and fired their respective
upon spotting a man sleeping with his back to the door where they were. 32 and .45 caliber
revolvers at him in rapid succession. Irene was awakened by the gunfire and saw her lover
already injured. She then looked at the door from which the shots had come and saw the
defendants continuing to shoot at him. Later, it was discovered that it was Serapio Tecson,
Irene's lover and not known criminal Anselmo Balagtas.
The charges against Oanis and Galanta included murder. The trial court determined
that the appellants had committed homicide by reckless imprudence. It is argued that they
are not criminally liable because the appellants believed Tecson to be Balagtas while acting
honestly in their official duties. The appellants cite the U.S. v. Ah Chong case.

ISSUE: 
1. Whether or not Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable.
2. Whether or not the mistake of fact is a valid defense in this case. 

RULING:
1. Yes, Oanis and Galanta are criminally liable. When someone acts while performing a
duty or in the legal exercise of a right or office, they are not criminally liable. Two
elements must be present for this to be justified: (1) the offense was committed
while the offender was performing a duty or exercising a right or office legally; and
(2) the harm or offense was a necessary result of the proper discharge of that duty
or the legal exercise of that right or office. Only the first requirement is met in this
instance. Therefore, both are criminally liable.
2. No, the mistake of fact cannot be used as a defense in this case. A defendant may be
absolved from criminal liability under Article III of the Revised Penal Code for
ignorance or mistake of fact. One requirement was that the accused must not have
been negligent or carelessly on the part of the accused. Since the accused's fault or
negligence caused the error, ignorantia facti excusat is unsuitable in this situation.
The accused could find no position to force them to take urgent action. Due to the
victim's unarmed status and the fact that he was sleeping at the time, the appellants
had plenty of time and opportunity to identify him without risk. They could have
even made a bloodless arrest if they had made a reasonable effort in that direction.
Hence, the mistake of fact is not applicable. 
3. Garcia v. CA,
G.R. No. 157171
14 March 2006
484 SCRA 617

FACTS:

Aquilino Pimentel, a candidate for the Senate, filed a complaint alleging that
elections officer Arsenia Garcia willfully reduced the number of votes received by Pimentel
from 6,988—clearly disclosed in the total number of votes cast in the 159 precincts of the
statement of votes by precincts of a said municipality—to 1921—a difference of 5,077. Due
to a lack of evidence, all of the accused were declared not guilty, apart from Arsenia, who
was found guilty of the crime specified in Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b), for lowering
Senator Pimentel's total number of votes from 5,034 to 4,034 and in connection with BP
Blg. 881. However, it was argued on appeal that he acted in good faith and lacked criminal
intent. On the other hand, the respondent argues that good faith is not a defense and that
breaking an election law is a mala prohibita.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under
mala in se.
2. Whether or not good faith is a valid defense.
RULING:
1. Yes, Violation of Sec 27 (b) of RA 6646 is mala in se. Mala in se offenses are usually
described and punished in the Revised Penal Code. However, even if a special law
sanctions the alleged behaviors, they are considered mala in se when they are
fundamentally immoral. Intentionally increasing or decreasing a candidate's vote
total is morally wrong because it is done to harm another person. Unless evidence to
the contrary emerges, the individual who commits an act that the law punishes is
believed to have criminal intent. As it relates to the case, the total number of votes
 cast for Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the private complaint, was 1,921 as opposed to
6,921, or 5,000 fewer votes than the total number of votes the private complainant
obtained. The Certificate of Canvass (COC) No. 436156, signed by the petitioner,
Romero, and Viray, likewise has this inaccuracy. Therefore, Arsenia is guilty of a mal
in se offense.
2. No. The actions forbidden by Section 27(b) are mala in se.  Errors and
miscalculations are inevitable given the number of votes that must be counted and
canvassed in a short time. However, consciously altering the number of votes a
candidate receives is morally wrong because it is done to harm another person.
There is a presumption of criminal intent on the part of unless something to the
contrary is shown, the person who does an act that the law punishes. Therefore, the
burden of proof rests with the party asserting good faith as a defense.

4. Intod v. CA,
G.R. No. 103119,
21 October 1992,
215 SCRA 525
Facts:
Sulpicio Intod and three other men went to Salvador Mandaya's house to ask him to
go with them to the place of Bernardina Palangpangan. The group met with Aniceto
Dumalagan, who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a
land dispute and that Mandaya should accompany the four men; otherwise, he would
die. At 10:00 p.m. that same day, Intod and companions, all armed with firearms,
arrived at Palangpangan's house. After that, the petitioner fired at the said room. It
turned out that Palangpangan was in another city, and her son-in-law and his family
then occupied her home. No one was in the room when the accused fired. The gunfire
hit no one.
Intod was found guilty of attempted murder by the RTC. Intod demands a
reconsideration of the ruling on the grounds that he is only accountable for an
impossible crime under Article 4 (2). Palangpangan's absence from her room the night
he and his friends shot it, according to Intod, rendered the crime inherently impossible.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Intod is only guilty of an impossible crime and not attempted
murder.

RULING:
Yes, Intod is only guilty of an impossible crime. The case at the bar belongs to the
factual impossibility category. The Petitioner shoots where he thought his victim would
be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place, and thus, the
Petitionerpetitioner failed to accomplish his end. In the Philippines, RPC, Art. 4(2),
expressly provided for impossible crimes and made them punishable. The impossibility
of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense but an act penalized by
itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" found in Article 4(2) of the
Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and
legal impossibility. The actual situation in the case at bar presents a physical
impossibility that rendered the intended crime impossible. Such is
sufficient to make the act an impossible crime. The petition is with this grant; the
respondent Court of Appeals' decision to hold the petitioner guilty of Attempted
murder is now MODIFIED. As a result, CA decided that the petitioner was guilty of an
impossible crime.

5. US v. Hicks,
G.R. No. 4971,
23 September 1909,
14 Phil. 217

FACTS:
 Agustina Sola was the mistress of Augustus Hicks, an Afro-American. They lived
together for about 5 years until Sola decided to leave Hicks. Sola found another Afro-
American lover in Wallace Current. When Hicks learned about this he went to Current’s
house to confront the two. While conversing, Hicks said “God damn, I’ve made up my
mind” as he was about to grab his revolver. Current got hold of Hicks’ hand but the
latter slapped it away. Current ran inside a room just as Hicks drew his revolver and
shot
Sola, who was close by in the sala of the house, on the left side of the breast. Sola died.
Hicks was charged and found guilty of murder, sentenced to death.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there a mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation?

RULING:
No, there is no mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. No mitigating
circumstance is present not even that mentioned in par 7 Art 9 of the RPC, to wit loss of
reason and self-control produced by jealousy as alleged by the defense, inasmuch as the
only causes which mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are
such as originate from legitimate feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy,
and immoral passions. All the foregoing circumstance conclusively proved that the
accused, deliberately and after due reflection had resolved to kill the woman who had
left him for another man, and in order to accomplish his intention safety, when he
appeared in the house, he appeared to be in a proper manner, doubtless in order to
successfully accomplish his criminal design, behaving himself properly as he had
planned to do beforehand. Hence, Hicks is guilty without any mitigating circumstance.

6. Valenzuela v. People,
G.R. No. 160188,
21 June 2007
 FACTS:
Valenzuela and Calderon were charged in an information with the crime of theft.
The two were sighted outside the Super Sale Club (a supermarket within SM North
EDSA) by security guard Lago. Valenzuela, wearing a Receiving Dispatching Unit ID, was
seen hauling a push cart with cases of Tide (twice) and unloading these cases in an open
parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Valenzuela then called a cab and the two
loaded the cartoons of Tide and boarded the vehicle. Lago tried to stop them by asking
for a receipt, but the two reacted by fleeing on foot, prompting Lago to fire a warning
shot. Valenzuela and Calderon were apprehended and 4 cases of Tide Ultramatic, 1 case
of Ultra 25 grams and 3 cases of detergent were recovered. The trial court convicted
both Valenzuela and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed
before the Court of Appeals, arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft
since he was not able to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The CA affirmed the trial
court’s decision; thus, the Petition for Review was filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of frustrated theft.
RULING:
No, the petitioner is not guilty of frustrated theft. Article 6 of the RPC provides that a
felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the following elements should be
present – (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to
another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without
the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of
violence against or intimidating of persons or force upon things. The court held that theft is
produced when there is deprivation of personal property by one with intent to gain. Thus,
it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose the property stolen
since he has already committed all the acts of execution and the deprivation from the
owner has already ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage,
and can only be attempted or consummated.
7. Ortega v. People
G.R. No. 151085
20 August 2008

FACTS:
Joemar Ortega, a minor raped AAA, the daughter of FFF who was a close friend of his
mother.
The first incident happened when the petitioner was 10 years old and AAA was only
6 years old, MMM, mother of AAA, left AAA and son BBB at the petitioner’s house. At
nighttime, while AAA was sleeping in a separate room, the petitioner went to the room and
raped her. The second incident occurred the following day still at the petitioner’s house.
AAA was warned by the petitioner not to tell her parents otherwise he will spank her. AAA
did not tell her parents.
The third and last incident happened in AAA’s house. The petitioner went to the
house of AAA to watch the television. While everyone was busy, the petitioner called AAA
to come to the room. AAA obeyed. It happened behind the room’s door in a standing
position. BBB saw them naked waist down in an act of having sexual intercourse. BBB
immediately told the petitioner to and he hurriedly ran away. BBB reported it to his
mother.
The next day, MMM confronted Luzviminda and demandedthat AAA should be
brought to a doctor for examination. MMM, together with Luzviminda, brought AAA to Dr.
Lucifree Katalbas(Dr. Katalbas), the Rural Health Officer of the locality who examined AAA
and found no indication that she was molested. efusing to accept such findings, on
December 12, 1996, MMM went to Dr. Joy Ann Jocson (Dr. Jocson), Medical Officer IV of the
Bacolod City Health Office. Dr. Jocson made an unofficial written report showing that there
were "abrasions on both right and left of the labia minora and a small laceration at the
posterior fourchette." She also found that the minor injuries she saw on AAA's genitals
were relatively fresh; and that such abrasions were superficial and could disappear after a
period of 3 to 4 days. Dr. Jocson, however, indicated in her certification that her findings
required the confirmation of the Municipal Health Officer of the locality.
The RTC finds the accused Joemar Ortega Y Felisario GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as Principal by Direct Participation of the crime of RAPE as charged in Criminal Cases
Nos. 98-19083 and 98-19084 and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance,
he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Two (2) Reclusion Temporal in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused shall be imprisoned for each case
for a period of Six (6) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fifteen (15)
years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. The accused is condemned to pay the offended
party AAA, the sum of P100,000.00 as indemnification for the two (2) rapes (sic).
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. The OSG argued that
Ortega is no longer covered by the provisions of Section 64 of RA 9344 since as early as
1999, Ortega was convicted by the RTC and the conviction was affirmed by the CA in 2001.
RA 9344 was passed into law in 2006, and with Ortega now approximately 25 years old, he
no longer qualifies as a child as defined by RA 9344. Moreover, the OSG claimed that the
retroactive effect of Section 64 of RA 9344 is applicable only if the child-accused is still
below 18 years old as explained under Sections 67 and 68 thereof.

ISSUE:
Should RA 9344 apply retroactively to Ortega’s case?

RULING:
Yes. RA 9344 shall be applied retroactively. A retroactive application of RA 9344
should be given to Ortega pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in criminal law -
favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the
accused are given retroactive effect. Furthermore, the deliberations of the Senate with
regard to RA 9344 show an intent for it to apply retroactively. As stated by Senator
Santiago “even after final conviction if, in fact, the offender is able to prove that at the time
of the commission of the offense he is a minor under this law, he should be given the
benefit of the law.” Senator Pimentel concurred with this statement. Ortega was only 13
years old at the time of the
commission of the alleged rape. This was duly proven by the certificate of live birth, by his
testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore, his age was never assailed in
any of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA. As such, Ortega, at the time of the
commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age. Therefore, under R.A. No. 9344, he is
exempted from criminal liability. However, this does not mean that he is exempted from
civil liability.

8. People v. Ulep,
G.R. No. 132547,
20 September 2000

Facts:
On Dec 22 1995, Wapili, having a high fever and insensibly talking to
himself, was acting strangely in his home. Wapili run out naked and chased his brother in
law, Leydan. Leydan and neighbours tried to tie him with rope but to no avail so he got
loose in the village. Leydan went to a policewoman to report the incident and while this
was happening, Wapili turned up in front of the policewoman’s house to bang her vehicle
so she called for assistance. Later on, SPO1 Ulep and 2 other police officers went to the
scene where they saw Wapili armed with a bolo and a rattan stool. But according to the
statements of Wapili’s relatives, there was no bolo at that time. Ulep fired a warning shot
but Wapili charged towards them so Ulep shot him. Wapili fell to the ground. Ulep came
closer then pumped another bullet to his head, literally blowing his brains out. Ulep argued
that it was self-defense and fulfilment of a duty.

Issue:
Whether or not Ulep is liable for the death of Wapili?
Ruling:
 Yes, Ulep is liable for the death of Wapili. The Court ruled out that the accused
Ernesto Ulep is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, the accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of Death, to indemnify the heirs of
Buenaventura Wapili the amount of ₱50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Before the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of a duty under Art. 11, par. 5, of
The Revised Penal Code may be successfully invoked, the accused must prove the presence
of two (2) requisites, namely, that he acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or an office, and that the injury caused or the offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right
or office. The second requisite is lacking in the instant case.

9. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ARMANDO RODAS and JOSE RODAS, SR.
G.R. No. 175881,
28 August 2007
FACTS:
The two accused-appellants were charged together with 2 others who pleaded
guilty to homicide before the prosecution could rest its case. Jose Rodas, Sr. with his 3
children, co-appellant Armando Rodas, Charlito Rodas and Jose Rodas, Jr., were charged for
murdering victim Titing Asenda. Titing Asenda was at a benefit dance near the presence of
Alberto Asonda and Ernie Anggot, the two eyewitnesses to the crime. The two
eyewitnesses testified that they saw the Rodas family suddenly surround Titing Asenda.
Charlito stabbed Titing in the back. Then Armando clubbed Titing with a chako (nun
chucks) causing him to fall. Then Jose Sr. handed Jose Jr. with a bolo which Jr. used to hack
Titing in the elbow. The eyewitnesses tried to help Titing but Armando pointed a gun at
them. The Rodas Family left and when the eyewitnesses approached Titing he was already
dead.
The defense of Appellants Jose Sr. and Armando was alibi. That they were not present in
the dance and it was only Charlito and Jose Jr. who killed Titing, the two who pleaded
guilty. Despite the alibi, the RTC convicted appellant Jose Sr. and Armando of murder
qualified by Treachery.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of nighttime can be considered.
2. Whether or not the aggravating circumstance abuse of superior strength can be
considered.
3. Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery can be considered.
4. Whether or not evident premeditation can be appreciated.

RULING:
1. No, nighttime cannot be considered in this case. This circumstance is considered
aggravating only when it facilitated the commission of the crime, or was especially sought
or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose of impunity. Although the offense was
committed at night, nocturnity does not become a modifying factor when the place is
adequately lighted and, thus, could no longer insure the offender’s immunity from
identification or capture.
In this case, the prosecution failed to show that nighttime facilitated the commission
of the crime, or was especially sought or taken advantage of by the accused for the purpose
of impunity. The crime scene was sufficiently lighted by a Petromax which led to the
identification of all the accused. Hence, nighttime as an aggravating circumstance was not
considered.

2. Yes, abuse of superior strength is considered in this case. There was glaring
disparity of strength between the victim and the four accused. The victim was unarmed
while the accused were armed with a hunting knife, chako and bolo. It is evident that the
accused took advantage of their combined strength to consummate the offense.
In this case, it was not considered separately because it was absorbed in treachery.

3. Yes, treachery is considered in this case. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any
real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the
aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim
In the case under review, the victim was completely unaware that he was going to
be attacked. He was not forewarned of any danger to himself as there was no altercation or
disagreement between the accused and the victim. If treachery may be appreciated even
when the victim was forewarned, more so should it be appreciated when the victim was
not, as in the case at bar. The suddenness of the attack, the number of the accused and their
use of weapons against the unarmed victim prevent the possibility of any defense or
retaliation by the victim. The fact that the victim was already sprawled on the ground and
still Jose Jr. hacked him with a bolo clearly constitutes treachery.

4. No, evident premeditation was not appreciated in this case. For evident
premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be established: (1) the time
when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that
he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between decision and
execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The essence of
premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.
In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to show any presence of the elements.

10 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAFAEL SAYLAN alias PAEL,

L-36941,
130 SCRA 159
29 June 1984,

FACTS:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental in Criminal Case No. 52-M which imposed the death penalty.
 RAFAEL SAYLAN was accused of the crime of rape in the sworn complaint of
Eutropia Agno said to have been committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of January, 1972, at more or less 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, at Sitio Craser, Malinao, Jingo City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with deliberate intent to have sexual
intercourse, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally with the use of a dagger,
force and intimidate Eutropia Agno y Arcay, to remove her pantie and to lay down on the
ground and with the use of a dagger, force and intimidation succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with Eutropia Agno y Arcay, a woman of good reputation and against her will.
That the commission of the foregoing offense was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of: abuse of superior strength, nighttime, uninhabited place, ignominy and
reiteracion.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength can be
considered.
2. Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of nighttime can be considered.
3. Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place can be
considered.
4. Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of ignominy can be considered.
5. Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of reiteracion can be considered.

RULING:
1. No, superior strength cannot be considered in this case. The trial court disregarded
superiority because it "is inherent in the crime of rape or is absorbed in the element of
force."

2. No, nighttime cannot be considered in this case. The trial court did not consider
nighttime in this case because "there being no evidence that the accused purposely sought
it to facilitate the commission of this rape."
3. Yes, uninhabited place was considered by the trial court. Despoblado was present
according to the trial court because The accused dragged the offended party, at the point of
a dagger, to the carabao trail, about 10 meters from the junction, but 40 to 50meters below
to better attain his purpose withoutinterference, and to better secure himself from
detection
and punishment. Even the junction where the two children were left is already 400 meters
from the nearest house. While there maybe occasional passersby, this does not destroy its
being an uninhabited place.

4. Yes, ignominy was considered by the trial court. The trial court held that there was
ignominy because the appellant used not only the missionary position, i.e. male superior
female inferior, but also "The same position as dogs do" i.e., entry from behind.

5. No, reiteracion was not considered by the trial court. The trial court also held that
"there is no reiteracion because one of the offenses, namely Robbery in Band, for which the
accused has been penal was committed after the commission of this rape case, and the
penalty imposed on the other offense of Frustrated Homicide, is lighter than the penalty for
rape."