People vs. Macal, G.R. No.

211062, January 13, 2016

FACTS:
For allegedly killing his spouse, Auria Ytac Macal, Manuel Macal y Bolaso was charged
and convicted with the crime of parricide. Angeles, the mother of the victim, testified that at
around 1:20 in the morning of February 12, 2003, she, her children Catherine, Jessica, Auria, and
Arvin were walking home after playing bingo at a local peryahan. Along the way, her group met
Auria's husband. The latter joined them in walking back to their house. When they arrived at the
house, the group proceeded to the living room except for Auria and the accused-appellant who
went straight to their bedroom. Shortly thereafter, Angeles heard her daughter Auria
shouting, "mother help me I am going to be killed." Upon hearing the plea for help, Angeles and
company raced towards the bedroom but they found the door of the room locked. Arvin kicked
open the door of the bedroom and there they all saw a bloodied Auria on one side of the room.
Auria was immediately taken to a hospital, but was pronounced dead on arrival. Erwin
corroborated Angeles' testimony that Auria was killed by the accused-appellant. Erwin claimed
that he was part of the group that went to Angeles' residence on that fateful morning. The
accused-appellant did not refute the factual allegations of the prosecution that he stabbed his
wife, resulting in the latter's death, but seeks exoneration from criminal liability by interposing
the defense that the stabbing was accidental and not intentional.

ISSUE
Whether the court a quo erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide.

RULING
NO. All the Essential Elements of Parricide defined in Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code are present in this case and were duly Established and Proven by the Prosecution. Parricide
is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the
deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. Among the three
requisites, the relationship between the offender and the victim is the most crucial. This
relationship is what actually distinguishes the crime of parricide from homicide. In parricide
involving spouses, the best proof of the relationship between the offender and victim is their
marriage certificate. Oral evidence may also be considered in proving the relationship between
the two as long as such proof is not contested. Thus the conviction must be sustained.
People vs. Subano, G.R. No. 48143, Sept.30, 1942

Facts:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance finding the accused
Pilus Subano guilty of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased. Pilus Subano and his wife Bankalot had quarrels in two
separate occasions. When the wife refused to accompany him in the river to catch fish, Subano
dragged her and killed her. It appears that Subano has three wives.

Issue:
Whether or not Subano is guilty of Parricide.

Ruling:
No. The crime committed is homicide and not parricide. From the testimony of Ebol
Subano, father of the deceased, it appears that the Subano has three wives and that the deceased
was the last in point of time. Although the practice of polygamy is approved by custom among
these non-Christians, polygamy, however, is not sanctioned by the Marriage Law which merely
recognizes tribal marriage rituals. The deceased, under our law, is not thus the lawful wife of the
defendant and this precludes conviction for the crime of parricide. With the modification that the
accused, be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from eight years of prision mayor to fifteen
years of reclusion temporal, the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
People vs. Sukarno, G.R. No. L-63154, June 19, 1984

Facts:
Sukarno Mawallil and Sophia Sera were married. Two days after a serious fight, the two went
out supposedly to eat, Sukarno was to take her out to have dinner at the barbecue stand on Cawa-
Cawa Boulevard, now R. T. Lim Boulevard. At around past nine o’clock on that Sunday night,
the Sera family heard over the radio that the dead body of Sophia was at the funeral parlor. She
was allegedly the victim of a holdup. At the crime scene, the police found a bloodstained
Batangas knife about six feet from the victim’s body. It was the same knife with which Sukarno
used to threaten Sophia when they quarrel. The police also found his "Citron" wristwatch of
which Sukarno denied ownership although at first, he had told the police that he was robbed of a
watch and money.
The court convicted Sukarno of Parricide. His counsel, on appeal, argued that the crime is
not parricide since Sukarno and Sophia were not married in accordance with article 17 of
Presidential Decree No. 1083, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and neither
was Sophia divorced in accordance with the said Code

Issue:
Whether or not Sukarno is guilty of parricide

Ruling:
Yes. Sophia was divorced in her first marriage in accordance with the Muslim customs as
authorized under Presidential Decree No. 793, officiated by the same Muslim leader who
officiated their marriage. A year later, Sophia eloped with Sukarno. They were married after
Sophia’s parents gave their consent and accepted the dowry. The marriage was in conformity
with Muslim customs. Sukarno admitted the marriage and spoke of Sophia in his testimony as
his wife. Hence, the rule of semper praesumitur pro matrimonio applies in this case. Every
intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage (Art. 220, Civil Code).
Sukarno’s killing of Sophia must be regarded as parricide within the meaning of article 246 of
the Revised Penal Code.
People vs. Maramara, G.R. No. 110994, October 22, 1999

Facts:
A benefit dance sponsored by the Calpi Elementary School Parents-Teachers Association
of which Crescenciano Maramara is the president was held in the yard of accused-appellant’s
house in Barangay Calpi, Claveria, Masbate on the evening of November 18, 1991. At about 12
midnight, while Ricardo Donato was dancing with a certain Rowena del Rosario, one Dante
Arce, a friend of the accused-appellant, approached Ricardo and boxed him on the chest.
Frightened, Rowena ran away while Ricardo scampered toward the fence for safety. Miguelito
Donato was about two meters away from where Ricardo stayed at the fence. Not for long, the
accused-appellant took his handgun tucked in his waist and fired at the victim, hitting the him on
the left breast. Ricardo Donato tried to help his brother but somebody struck Ricardo’s head with
an iron bar which knocked him out for about three (3) minutes. When Ricardo regained
consciousness, he hurried home and informed his parents of what happened to their son
Miguelito. Miguelito died early in the morning of the next day. Before Miguelito expired,
Regarder Donato, his father, asked who shot him and Miguelito replied that it was Maramara.

Issue:
Whether the death of the victim was under the circumstance of tumultuous affray.

Ruling:
No. The Elements of Art 251 Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray are as follows:
1. That there are several persons;
2. That they do not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and
attacking each other reciprocally;
3. That the several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous
manner;
4. That someone was killed in the course of the affray;
5. That it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and
6. That the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be
identified.

In the present case, it cannot apply because prosecution witnesses Ricardo and Regarder Donato
positively identified the accused-appellant as Miguelito Donato’s killer.
Dado vs. People, G.R. No. 131421, November 18, 2002

Facts
Petitioner Geronimo Dado and accused Francisco Eraso were charged with murder. Accused,
armed with firearms, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shot Silvestre Balinas with the
use of the afore-mentioned weapons, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the latter which
caused his instantaneous death. The trial court convicted petitioner and accused Eraso of the
crime of homicide.

Issue
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Petitioner acted in conspiracy with
accused Francisco Eraso.

Ruling
Yes. In the case at bar, petitioner and accused Eraso’s seemingly concerted and almost
simultaneous acts were more of a spontaneous reaction rather than the result of a common plan
to kill the victim. Even if conspiracy was sufficiently alleged in the information, the same cannot
be considered against the petitioner. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Although the
agreement need not be directly proven, circumstantial evidence of such agreement must
nonetheless be convincingly shown. Indeed, like the offense itself, conspiracy must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held that neither joint nor simultaneous action is per
se sufficient proof of conspiracy. In conspiracy, there should be a conscious design to perpetrate
the offense. The conviction of petitioner for the crime of homicide is SET ASIDE and petitioner
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Dungo vs. People, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015

Facts:
Marlon Villanueva was a neophyte of Alpha Phi Omega Theta Chapter Fraternity. Dungo
and Sibal together with the other fraternity members, officers and alumni, brought and
transported Villanueva and 2 other neophytes to Villa Novaliches Resort at Brgy Pansol
Calamba for the final initiation rites. Due to the injuries sustained by Villanueva the fraternity
members and 2 neophytes haphazardly left the resort, while Dungo and Sibal boarded a tricycle
and brought the lifeless body of Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital. Dungo and Sibal were charged
and convicted with Violation of RA 8049.

ISSUE:
1. WHETHER the prosecution failed to establish the fact of conspiracy
2. WHETHER the petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable of the crime charged based on
circumstantial evidence?

RULING:
1 No. Section 4, paragraph 6 of R.A. 8049 provides that the presence of any person
during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation as principal unless he prevented the
commission of the punishable acts. In this case, there was prima facie evidence of the petitioners'
participation in the hazing because of their presence in the venue. It was shown that they
performed an overt act in the furtherance of the criminal design of hazing. Also, not only did
they induce the victim to attend the hazing activity, the petitioners also actually participated in it
based on the prima facie evidence. These acts are sufficient to establish their roles in the
conspiracy of hazing.
2. Yes. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment
is highly probable. Needless to state, the crime of hazing is shrouded in secrecy and bearing in
mind the concealment of hazing, it is only logical and proper for the prosecution to resort to the
presentation of circumstantial evidence to prove it. To justify a conviction upon circumstantial
evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the
mind as to the criminal liability of the accused. The Court agrees with the CA and the R TC that
the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was overwhelming enough to establish
the guilt of the petitioners beyond a reasonable doubt. The unbroken chain of events laid down
by the CA leaves the court no other conclusion other than the petitioners' participation in the
hazing. They took part in the hazing and, together; with their fellow fraternity officers and
members, inflicted physical injuries to Villanueva as a requirement of his initiation to the
fraternity.
Go-Tan vs. Tan, G.R. No. 168852, Sept. 30, 2008

FACTS:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari Go-Tan and Steven Tan were married. Out of this union, two
female children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six
years into the marriage, petitioner Go-Tan filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing
verbal, psychological, and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e) (2)
(3) (4), (h) (5) and (i) of Republic Act No. 9262.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents-spouses, Perfecto and Juanita, parents-in-law of Sharica, may be
included in the petition for the issuance of a protective order, in accordance with RA 9262.

RULING:
Yes, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. While the provisions of RA 9262 provides that the
offender be related to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship,
it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. In Section 47
of RA 9262, it has expressly provided for the suppletory application of the RPC. Hence, legal
principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes
punished under special laws, such as RA 9262 in which the special law is silent on a particular
matter.
Dinamling vs. People, G.R. No. 199522, June 22, 2015

Facts:
The petitioner/accused, a PNP member, was married to the victim who suffered abuse at the
hands of the former. Their coverture was marred by violent quarrels where the wife would she
sustain contusions and injuries on her body. After a brutal attack from her husband, the pregnant
wife was brought to the hospital where she died after suffering severe beatings and traumatic
physical violence resulting in intracranial hemorrhage which caused her death.

Issue:
WON the accused is guilty of violating RA 9262?

Ruling:
YES. Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or
emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the
perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by
the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is
necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar
such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony
of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party. All of this was complied with in the
case at bar. For his crime, pregnancy or the presence of the woman's child are aggravating
circumstances which increase the imposable penalty, thus, they must be alleged and proven with
competent evidence for the penalty to be properly imposed.
Ang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010

Facts:
Irish Sagud and Rustan Ang became "on-and-off" sweethearts until Irish decided to break
up with Rustan after learning that he had taken a live‐in partner whom he had gotten pregnant.
Before Ang got married, he tried to convince Sagud to elope with him. However, Sagud rejected
his proposal. On or about June 5, 2005, Ang sends an obscene (Sagud’s head superimposed on
another naked woman’s body) photoshopped picture to his former girlfriend. After she got the
obscene picture, she got other text messages from him. He boasted that it would be easy for him
to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. He also threatened to spread the picture through
the internet. The trial court found Ang guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision and denied Ang’s motion for reconsideration.

Issues:
1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is
defined in R.A. 9262?
2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this
case, already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262?

Ruling:
1. YES. Section 3 (e) of R.A. 9262 taken together with Sec 5(h) indicate that the
elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are: (a) the offender has or
had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman; (b) the offender, by himself or
through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and (c) the
harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her. Section 3(a)
of RA 9262 provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where the parties are
romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship.

2. Yes. The provision punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence
against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would
be enough. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.
Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and bearing Irish's head and face,
was clearly an obscene picture which is a revolting and offensive one. Certainly, any woman
would be scandalized and hurt if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further
terrifying is that, as Sagud testified, Ang sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for
all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.
Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, Feb.11,2014
Facts:
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. But all is not
well with the system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want
to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. Petitioners claim that the means adopted
by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights. Also, petitioners raise constitutionality of related articles 353, 354, 361 and
362 of the Revised Penal Code on the crime of libel.
Issue
Whether or not the provisions of the cybercrime law claimed by petitioners that related
articles on the crime of libel under the RPC are unconstitutional.
Ruling
No, the Supreme Court held that articles 353, 354, 361 and 362 of the Revised Penal Code on the
crime of libel are valid and constitutional. However, Section 4 (c) (4) that penalizes online libel
in the Cybercrime Law is valid and constitutional with respect to the author of the post but void
and unconstitutional with respect to others who simply receive and react to it.
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech
and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed,
cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal
code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c) (4) above merely affirms that online defamation
constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.
But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the
libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the
penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is
distinct from that of print.