Legaspi vs. City of Cebu, G.R. No.

159110 December 10, 2013

VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, Petitioner, v. CITY OF CEBU, T.C. (TITO) SAYSON AND

RICARDO HAPITAN,Respondents.

FACTS:

On January 27, 1997 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No.
1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating
the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in the Traffic Code of Cebu City.

On July 29, 1997, Atty. Bienvenido Jaban (Jaban,Sr.) and his son Atty. Bienvenido Douglas Luke
Bradbury Jaban (Jaban,Jr.) brought suit in the RTC against the City of Cebu, then represented by
Hon. Alvin Garcia, its City Mayor, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cebu City and its Presiding
Officer, Hon. Renato V. Osme, and the chairman and operatives or officers of the City Traffic
Operations Management (CITOM),seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as
unconstitutional for being in violation of due process and for being contrary to law, and damages.

Their complaint alleged that on June 23, 1997, Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car in a paying
parking area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain records and documents from his office
and after less than 10 minutes, he had found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp. His car
was impounded for three days, and was informed at the office of the CITOM that he had first to
pay P4,200.00 as a fine to the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car but such
imposition the fine was without any court hearing and without due process of law. He was also
compelled to payP1,500.00 (itemized as P500.00 for the clamping andP1,000.00 for the
violation) without any court hearing and final judgment;

That on May 19, 1997, Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very secluded place where there was no sign
prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM operative and that he was
compelled to pay the total sum ofP1,400.00 for the release of his car without a court hearing and
a final judgment rendered by a court of justice.

On August 11, 1997, Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the City of Cebu,
demanded the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of the Traffic Code of Cebu
City, and damages.

He averred that on the morning of July 29, 1997, he had left his car occupying a portion of the
sidewalk and the street outside the gate of his house to make way for the vehicle of the
anayexterminator, upon returning outside, his car was towed by the group even if it was not
obstructing the flow of traffic.

The cases were consolidated. The RTC rendered its decision declaring Ordinance No. 1664 as
null and void

The City of Cebu and its co-defendants appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the
RTC declaring the Ordinance No. 1664 valid.
Upon the denial of their respective motions for reconsideration the Jabans and Legaspi came to
the Court via separate petitions for review on certiorari. The appeals were consolidated.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 1664 is valid and constitutional.

HELD: The Court of Appeals decision is sustained.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - Tests for a valid ordinance

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005the Court restates the tests of a
valid ordinance thusly:

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government
unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4)
must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy;
and (6) must not be unreasonable.

As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was
enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with
the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the
conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well
as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy).

InMetropolitan Manila Development Authorityv. Bel-Air Village Association,Inc., G.R. No.

135962, March 27, 2000the Court cogently observed that police power is lodged primarily in the
National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing
legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President
and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are
conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. (emphasis supplied)

In the present case, delegated police power was exercised by the LGU of the City of Cebu.

The CA opined, and correctly so, that vesting cities like the City of Cebu with the legislative
power to enact traffic rules and regulations was expressly done through Section 458 of the LGC,
and also generally by virtue of the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the LGC.

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power
cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a
qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription
of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it
bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the intrinsic
validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.

Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law, the
contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance
No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the
limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness
and reason, and its consistency with public policy.

The subject of Ordinance No. 1664 is to ensure "a smooth flow of vehicular traffic in all the
streets in the City of Cebu at all times".

To reiterate, the clamping of the illegally parked vehicles was a fair and reasonable way to
enforce the ordinance against its transgressors; otherwise, the transgressors would evade liability
by simply driving away. DENIED.
City of Manila vs. Prieto, 2019

FACTS:

On January 19, 2004

City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8070 that authorized the City Mayor to acquire
certain parcels of land belonging to respondents

Prieto... to be used for

Land-For-The-Landless Program... petitioner attempted to acquire the subject lots by negotiated

sale... amount of P2,000.00 per square meter... respondents refused... their respective properties
are worth more than that... petitioner filed a Complaint

September 3, 2004... asserting its authority to expropriate the subject lots for its project.

Instead of the general provisions on expropriation under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the RTC
applied the provisions of

LGC... mandating the deposit of 15% of the fair market value of the properties subject of
expropriation, for petitioner's immediate possession thereof

Petitioner deposited the amount of P425,519.00

RTC issued a Writ of Possession... there was an ordinance passed by the City Council of Manila
to expropriate the subject lots for public purpose. The requirement that it should be for public use
was... satisfied by the fact that the properties were sought to be expropriated pursuant to the
petitioner's "Land for the Landless and Onsite Development Programs.

despite "privately-owned lands" being last in the list of priorities in land acquisition under
Section 9 of

R.A.) No. 7279 or the Urban Development Housing Act of 1992

RTC dispensed with said list, subscribing to petitioner's allegation that an on-site development is
more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries

CA found the records lacking... to support petitioner's claim that an on-site development program
is the most practicable and advantageous for the beneficiaries, to justify the non-applicability of
the list of priorities in land acquisition under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7279.

CA ruled that bare and unsupported assertions that the lots sought to be expropriated are blighted
lands to be the proper subject of an on-site development program, and that on-site development
is the most practical, advantageous, and beneficial to the beneficiaries, should not suffice to
justify the mandatory provisions of R.A. No. 7279
CA further found petitioner to have failed to exhaust other modes of acquisition before it
resorted to expropriation in violation of Section 10 of R.A. No. 7279.

CA found that the intended beneficiaries of petitioner's socialized housing program are not
"underprivileged and homeless," in violation of Section 8... of R.A. No. 7279

CA

REVERSED

petitioner's argument... assertion of its power to expropriate and its claim that it had complied
with the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws in the exercise thereof

ISSUES:

whether or not the CA erred in finding that petitioner failed to prove that it complied with
pertinent laws in the exercise of its power of eminent domain

RULING:

The exercise of the power of eminent domain drastically affects a landowner's right to private
property, which is as much a constitutionally-protected right necessary for the preservation and
enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty.

Therefore, the exercise of such power must undergo painstaking scrutiny.

Such scrutiny is especially necessary when... local government unit has no inherent power of
eminent domain

Such power is essentially lodged in the legislature although it may be validly delegated to local
government units, other public entities and public utilities.

national legislature delegated the power of eminent domain to the local government units.

SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose[,] or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of
eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made
to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit
may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of
the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
property.

requisites... before a local government unit can exercise the power of eminent domain

(1) an ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive,
in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property; (2) the power of eminent domain is
exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless; (3)
there is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws; and (4) a valid and definite offer has been previously
made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted...
the exercise of such delegated power should be pursuant to the Constitution and pertinent laws

R.A. No. 7279... governs the local expropriation of properties for purposes of urban land reform
and housing... the rules and limitations set forth therein cannot be disregarded

SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. - Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in
the following order:(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle
lands;(d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program
sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been
acquired;(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not
yet been acquired; and(f) Privately-owned lands.Where [on-site] development is found more
practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall
not apply. The local government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of
government lands.SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. - The modes of acquiring lands for
purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land
assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture agreement,
negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted
to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided, further, That where
expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted
for purposes of this Act: x x x

RTC... sweepingly concluded that petitioner had met all the aforecited requisites.

courts have a duty to judiciously scrutinize and determine whether the local government's
exercise of the delegated power of eminent domain is in accordance with the delegating law...
bare allegations and unsupported generalizations do not suffice, considering the drastic effect of
the exercise of such power to constitutionally-protected rights

In the case of Estate or Heirs of the Late Ex-Justice Jose B.L. Reyes v. City of Manila...
provisions are strict limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local
government units,... with respect to: (1) the order of priority in acquiring land for socialized
housing; and (2) the resort to expropriation proceedings as a means of acquiring it.
Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of
oftentimes helpless owners of private property against what may be a tyrannical violation of due
process when their property is forcibly taken from them allegedly for public use.

Petitioner... alleges that it conducted a study and observed the order of priority in land acquisition
for expropriation under Section 9... and found that on-site development is the most practicable
and advantageous to the prospective beneficiaries... however, no evidence was presented to
prove such claim

There was no showing that any attempt was made to first acquire the lands listed in Section 9(a)
to (e) before proceeding to expropriate respondents' private lands... there was no evidence
presented showing that the subject properties were those contemplated under R.A. 7279 to be
proper subjects of on-site development

R.A. No. 7279 provides for a detailed description of specific areas which are the proper subjects
of on-site development... as defined under Section 3(1), in relation to Section 3(c)

It is... incumbent upon petitioner to show that the areas they sought to expropriate for socialized
housing and urban development are those contemplated under the law... there was... no evidence
presented to show that the prospective beneficiaries of the expropriation are the "underprivileged
and homeless" contemplated under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7279... records show that the
prospective beneficiaries are not such "underprivileged and homeless."... said purported
"underprivileged and homeless" beneficiaries were able to put up a substantial amount to
complete the additional deposit ordered by the court for the petitioner to satisfy.

petitioner failed to establish that the other modes of acquisition under Section 10... were first
exhausted... in cases of land acquisitions by the government, when the property owner rejects the
offer but hints for a better price, the government should renegotiate by calling the property owner
to a conference.

This finds further legal basis in Article 35 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, which reads:

ART. 35. Offer to Buy and Contract of Sale, (a) The offer to buy private property for public use
or purpose shall be in writing. It shall specify the property sought to be acquired, the reasons for
its acquisition, and the price offered.x x x x(c) If the owner or owners are willing to sell their
property but at a price higher than that offered to them, the local chief executive shall call them
to a conference for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the selling price. The chairman of
the appropriation or finance committee of the sanggunian, or in his absence, any member of the
sanggunian duly chosen as its representative, shall participate in the conference. When an
agreement is reached by the parties, a contract of sale shall be drawn and executed.

it is undisputed that after respondents rejected petitioner's offer of P2,000.00 per square meter...
for being too low compared to the fair market value of their properties... petitioner readily
instituted the present expropriation suit without bothering to renegotiate its offer.
there is no valid and definite offer made by petitioner before it filed the expropriation complaint.

The intent of the law is for the State or the local government to make a reasonable offer in good
faith, not merely & pro forma offer to acquire the property

Principles:

the exercise of such delegated power should be pursuant to the Constitution and pertinent laws

R.A. No. 7279... governs the local expropriation of properties for purposes of urban land reform
and housing... the rules and limitations set forth therein cannot be disregarded... local
government units do not have an unbridled authority to exercise such formidable power in
seeking solutions to such problem.

such formidable power greatly affects a citizen's fundamental right to property, hence, there is a
need to strictly comply with the conditions and restrictions set forth in the Constitution and
pertinent laws to assure that every right is protected and every mandate is properly discharged.
Secretary of Defense vs. Manalo, 2008

FACTS:

appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19[1] of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and
law, the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals.

Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)[2] filed before this
Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners
(therein respondents) and/or their... officers and agents from depriving them of their right to
liberty and other basic rights.

While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on
October 24, 2007.

filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition as Amparo Petition

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners
(herein respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads

PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.

Hence, this appeal.

Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past
noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their
house and roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother,... Ester Manalo, replied
that he was Raymond, not Bestre.

The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being
blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity,
he learned their names. The one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie

Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who
entered his house and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old.
Another one of his abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30...
years old

The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit
beside Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the
person beside him as his brother Reynaldo's. The van stopped several times until they finally...
arrived at a house.

The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New People's Army. Each time he said he was
not, he was hit with the butt of their guns. He was... questioned where his comrades were, how
many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had helped. Each time he
answered none, they hit him

The following night, Raymond attempted to escape.

Fort Magsaysay.

. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They poured gasoline
on him. Then a so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called, saying that she wanted to see
Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he... was returned inside Fort
Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained

Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by
steel bars. He stayed all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything
there, including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He... counted that
eighteen people[22] had been detained in that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and
himself.[23]

For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay.

In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan
told him. As they were afraid, Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents
that if they continued to... join human rights rallies, they would never see their children again.
The respondents were then brought back to Sapang.

After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other
captives, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room
with "Allan" whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or
"commander"... by his men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in
the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten
up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were...
threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed.

They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity.[45]

Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they
related to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their
house on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he was... blindfolded with
his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained.
When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely beaten up and
told that they were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond escaped.

Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action
Group, an organization handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases where
torture... was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical examinations on the
respondents after their escape. He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the
physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent
with... their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on
August 15, 2007, two days after respondents' escape, and the results thereof were reduced into
writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul

Protocol in conducting the examination.[47]

Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture.

Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner)
Secretary of National Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and
was thus unaware of the Manalo brothers' alleged abduction. H

Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC)
PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994, another amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan,
Empeño and Merino, which averred among others,... Lt. Col. Jimenez was directe... investigate
the alleged abduction... of the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely

He was directed to determine: (1)... the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo by the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative liability of
said auxiliaries, if any.[

Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and
Rudy Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their
statements was interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May

30, 2006, but the jurats of their statements indicated that they were signed on May 29, 2006.[66]
When the Sworn Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation
report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and... finished it on June 1,
2006.[67] He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of Personnel.[68]

Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula

Subject vehemently denied any participation or involvement on the abduction of said victims.

That subject CAA vehemently denied any participation about the incident and claimed that they
only implicated him because he is a member of the CAFGU.

He claims further that the only reason why they implicated him was due to the fact that his
mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother Rolando

Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his father and for that reason
they implicated him in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any
involvement on the abduction of said Manalo brothers.
He claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his father and he was
living witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the
abduction of the Manalo brothers.

That he vehemently denied any participation of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and
learned only about the incident when rumors reached him by his barrio mates. He claims that his
implication is merely fabricated... because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his
brothers.

He claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the
abductors and he considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains loyal
to his... service to the government as a CAA member.

alleged charges of abduction committed by the above named respondents has not been
established in this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them for any administrative
punishment and/or criminal liability. It... is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the
charge.

The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
(Amparo Rule).

ISSUES:

whether there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security.

RULING:

Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in
Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were
continuously detained until they escaped on

August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated
by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner.

We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners
were either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking
for Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners.

Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was
aware of the petitioners' captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In
fact, he or any other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that... he
(Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted
them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparan's direct and personal role in the
abduction might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of the... petitioners
during their long captivity at the hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his
indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the abduction
of civilians without due process of law and without probable cause.

It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced disappearance of
the petitioners was established. The participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata,
Cabalse and Caigas, among others, was similarly established.

We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not
corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of evidence.[102] Raymond's affidavit
and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo

Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the
pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents,[103] also corroborate
respondents' accounts of the torture they endured while in... detention. Respondent Raymond
Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his
testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit,"[104] firms up
respondents' story that they were... detained for some time in said military facility.

based on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding
her ordeal.[106] These statements were supported by her recognition of portions of the route they
took when she was being driven out of the military installation where she was detained.

There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while
respondents... admit that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that
they are not "free in every sense of the word"[109] as their "movements continue to be restricted
for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the...
case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people
are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to
threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and security."[110] (emphasis supplied) Respondents
claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which
constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.[111]

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue... except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge...

At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her
person - houses, papers, and effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the
state's power over a person's home and possessions, but more importantly,... protects the privacy
and sanctity of the person himself.
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or
security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's
body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant.[128] Physical injuries inflicted in
the context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or
invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful
physical intrusion.

When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate
incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity
as... the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of
the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz:

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense).
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other... similar forms of detention are
prohibited.

Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now
determine whether there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security.

The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in
detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they
have surfaced and implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own... abduction
and torture, but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared such as Sherlyn
Cadapan, Karen Empeño, and Manuel Merino, among others.

since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens
because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they
are forced to limit their movements or activities.[149] Precisely because respondents are being
shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction,... These constitute threats to their liberty,
security, and life,... actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo.

The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He
merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and
civilians whom he met in the investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation...
when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not propound a single
question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other
witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the... family or neighbors
of the respondents.

is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of respondents' right to
security as a guarantee of protection by the government.

In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by
the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a
guarantee of protection by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective... investigation
and protection on the part of the military.

With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by
respondents partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the
requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be complied with prior to... the grant of the
production order, namely: (1) the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search
warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there
exists probable cause with one specific offense; and (4) the... probable cause must be personally
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.

disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald
Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and
detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents... by avoiding their areas of territorial
jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be served
with notices and court processes in relation to any investigation and action for violation of the
respondents' rights. The list of medical... personnel is also relevant in securing information to
create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical interventions, when
applicable and necessary.

In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are
snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of amparo
is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret... walls.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.

PRINCIPLES:

As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal... killings"
and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two
instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process
of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial... proceedings."[75] On the other hand, "enforced
disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction
of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the
direct or... indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty
which places such persons outside the protection of law."[76]

"Amparo" literally means "protection" in Spanish.

In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of amparo,
several of the above amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of
Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse
Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."

The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation
of impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it... facilitates the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent
investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to
deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced... disappearances.

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty
and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of... a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis
supplied)

Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:

Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their
claims by substantial evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the
court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate;
otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.

(emphases supplied)

The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to
prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the
security of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or... judicial sanction and to
give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. (

First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want... has been
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people."... individual international human
right.

26] (emphasis supplied)

In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz:
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
arrest or detention.
Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the
right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987

Constitution and the right to security of person (as free... it was intended to narrow the concept of
the right to security only to situations of... formal deprivation of liberty

It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known threats to the life of
persons under their jurisdiction, just because that... he or she is not arrested or otherwise
detained. States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to
protect them.
Lagcao vs. Labra, 2004
FACTS:

the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu.

One of these lots was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City, with an area of 4,048 square
meters... petitioners purchased Lot 1029 on installment basis.

But then, in late 1965, the 210 lots,... including Lot 1029, reverted to the Province of Cebu.

Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of Cebu to the
petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific performance and damages in
the then

Court of First Instance.

the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu to execute the final
deed of sale in favor of petitioners.

the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was
already occupied by squatters.

petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters.

The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1,... Cebu City, rendered a decision on
April 1, 1998, ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC's
decision and issued a writ of execution and order of demolition.

when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote
two letters[4] to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the
City was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters.

Acting on the mayor's request, the MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition for a
period of 120 days

Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of
Cebu City passed a resolution which... identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant
to RA 7279.

Then,... the SP of Cebu City passed Ordinance No. 1772[6] which included Lot 1029 among the
identified sites for socialized housing.

Ordinance No. 1843[7] was enacted by the SP of Cebu City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City
to initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 which was registered in the
name of petitioners. The intended acquisition was to be used... for the benefit of the homeless
after its subdivision and sale to the actual occupants thereof.

petitioners filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for
being unconstitutional.

The trial court... dismissing the complaint... petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is
unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the purpose of selling it to
the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the concept of "public use" contemplated in the
Constitution.

ISSUES:

validity of the City of Cebu's Ordinance No. 1843,... whether or not the intended expropriation
by the City of Cebu of a 4,048-square-meter parcel of land owned by petitioners contravenes the
Constitution and applicable laws.

RULING:

Under Section 48 of RA 7160,[9] otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,[10]
local legislative power shall be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the city. The
legislative acts of the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the... exercise of its lawmaking authority are
denominated ordinances.

Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only
when expressly authorized by the legislature.

Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners' lot was enacted by the SP
of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the homeless and low-income residents of the
City.

local government units do not possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent
domain in seeking solutions to this problem.

There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws;[12] and (2) private property... shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.

The exercise of the power of eminent domain drastically affects a landowner's right to private
property, which is as much a constitutionally-protected right necessary for the preservation and
enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights to life and... liberty.

Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be
expropriated. In this case, there was no... showing at all why petitioners' property was singled out
for expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or
selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no reason for the choice of petitioners' property as the site
of a socialized housing... project.

This is depriving a citizen of... his property for the convenience of a few without perceptible
benefit to the public.

We have found nothing in the records indicating that the City of Cebu complied strictly with
Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners' property
without any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279.

Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA
7279 were first exhausted. Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no
evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners' property as required by

Section 19 of RA 7160.[20] We therefore find Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm

for being violative of the petitioners' right to due process.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

Principles:

By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local government units the power to expropriate.
Ordinance No. 1843 was... enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160:

SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just... compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws xxx.

In De Knecht vs. Bautista,[16] we said:

It is obvious then that a land-owner is covered by the mantle of protection due process affords. It
is a mandate of reason. It frowns on arbitrariness, it is the antithesis of any governmental act that
smacks of whim or caprice. It negates state power to act in an... oppressive manner.

RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for purposes of urban land
reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 thereof provide:

SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in
the following order:

(a) by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including

government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;

(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;

(d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites,
and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;

(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS which have not yet been
acquired; and

(f) Privately-owned lands.

Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the
priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall give
budgetary priority to on-site development of government lands. (Emphasis supplied).

SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act
shall include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or
consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated...
purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only
when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided further, That where
expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted
for... purposes of this Act: xxx.

limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government... units,
especially with respect to (1) the order of priority in acquiring land for socialized housing and (2)
the resort to expropriation proceedings as a means to acquiring it.

Compliance with these conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards of
oftentimes helpless owners of private property against what may be a tyrannical... violation of
due process when their property is forcibly taken from them allegedly for public use.
City of Manila vs. Laguio, 2005

FACTS:

Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged

in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses.[5] It built and opened
Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly... accredited with the
Department of Tourism as a hotel.[6] On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order[7]
(RTC Petition)... with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of
Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City
Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes
motels and inns as... among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.[8]

Enacted by the City Council[9] on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30
March 1993, the said Ordinance is entitled-

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF

BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT,
SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.[10]

The Ordinance

Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no person,
partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area... ursuant to P.D. 499 be
allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing certain forms of
amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in
entertainment and which... tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely
affect the social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not limited to:

Sauna Parlors Super Clubs

Massage Parlors Discotheques

Karaoke Bars Cabarets

Beerhouses Dance Halls

Night Clubs Motels

Day Clubs Inns

The City Mayor, the City Treasurer... are prohibited from issuing permits, temporary or
otherwise, or from granting licenses and accepting payments for the operation of business
enumerated in the preceding... section.

Owners and/or operator of establishments... are hereby given three (3) months from the date of
approval of this ordinance within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any...
place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business
allowable within the area

RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its
enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court
considering that these were not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment"... and they
were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did they use women as "tools for
entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants" or
"adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community."

MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following
reasons: (1) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a)
4 (iv)[12] of the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code)... grants to the City Council only
the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments; (2) The Ordinance is void as it
is violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.

499[13] which specifically declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone
with certain restrictions; (3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power
as the compulsory closure of the motel business has no... reasonable relation to the legitimate
municipal interests sought to be protected; (4) The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by
punishing the operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate business prior to its enactment;
(5) The Ordinance... violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and
constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's property rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as
a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially...
destroy it; and (6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no
reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments, and for prohibiting... said business in the
Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area.

City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had the power to "prohibit certain
forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community"

Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to
protect the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as
found in Article III, Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409,[19] otherwise known as the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila (Revised Charter of Manila)

Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of validity; hence, private
respondent had the burden to prove its illegality or unconstitutionality.
Petitioners also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and the Ordinance
as the latter simply disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area
to remain a commercial zone.

After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision,...
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 778[3], Series of 1993, of
the City of Manila null and void, and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction that
had been issued by this Court against the defendant. No... costs.

ISSUES:

pivotal issue in this Petition[1] under Rule 45 (then Rule 42) of the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure seeking the reversal of the Decision[2] in Civil Case No. 93-66511 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,... Branch 18 (lower court),[3] is the validity of Ordinance No. 7783
(the Ordinance) of the City of Manila.[4]

Petition

RULING:

The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the

Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.

first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and
to the laws.[38] The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test
of constitutionality and the test of... consistency with the prevailing laws.

The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that
local government units are able to... legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power,
a delegation of legislative power from the national legislature.

The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter.

A. The Ordinance infringes... the Due Process Clause

The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. . . ."

Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must
follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.

Requisites for the valid exercise... of Police Power are not met
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights[62] -a violation of the due process clause.

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and
moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the
Ordinance are within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means... employed for
the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.

The problem, it needs to be pointed out, is not the establishment, which by its nature cannot be
said to be injurious to the health or comfort of the community and which in itself is amoral, but
the deplorable human activity that may occur within its premises. While a motel may... be used
as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be
classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked
assumption. If that were so and if that were allowed, then the

Ermita-Malate area would not only be purged of its supposed social ills, it would be extinguished
of its soul as well as every human activity, reprehensible or not, in its every nook and cranny
would be laid bare to the estimation of the authorities.

The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality.

In the instant case, there is a clear invasion of personal or property rights,... personal in the case
of those individuals desirous of owning, operating and patronizing those motels and property in
terms of the investments made and the salaries to be paid to those therein employed. If the City
of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication... and other social ills, it can instead
impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of
the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their
licenses for these... violations;[67] and it may even impose increased license fees. In other
words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.

Means employed are... constitutionally infirm

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its
purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a
person's fundamental right to liberty and property.

Modality employed is... unlawful taking

In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the

respondent of the beneficial use of its property.[77] The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids
the running of the enumerated businesses in the

Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business

operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses. An
ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any...
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property
without just compensation.[78] It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of
individuals.

Further, the Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the petitioners' actions. It in
no way controls or guides the discretion vested in them. It provides no definition of the
establishments covered by it and it fails to set forth the conditions when the... establishments
come within its ambit of prohibition. The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to close down establishments.

B. The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not
be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly... discriminate against
others

Failing the test of constitutionality, the Ordinance likewise failed to pass the test of consistency
with prevailing laws.

C. The Ordinance is repugnant... to general laws; it is ultra vires

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government
units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

Conclusion... the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs
personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm

Police power legislation of such character deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary "we...
reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance has
no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City
Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated... establishments under Section 1
thereof or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of
due process and equal protection of laws "not even under the guise of police power.

PRINCIPLES:

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory" taking occurs when
the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when
the government's regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the... property.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRE MARTI, G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991

FACTS:

Andre Marti, was charged with violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act. Marti, with his common-law wife, went to Manila Packing and Export Forwarders to send
four (4) parcels of boxes alleged to contain books, cigars, and gloves for his friend Waltier Fierz
living in Zurich, Switzerland. The husband of attendant Anita Reyes, Mr. Job Reyes, opened the
boxes for inspection as part of the SOP before delivery to the Bureau of Customs. Reyes
discovered bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves allegedly marijuana.

Reyes reported to the NBI and requested a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted
from the cellophane wrapper. The Narcotics Section of the NBI submitted the dried leaves to the
Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were
marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist

The trial court convicted Marti for violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4,
Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act.

In his appeal, Marti argues the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in
violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, 1987 Constitution) and therefore argues that the same
should be held inadmissible in evidence

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Bill of rights may be invoked against the acts of a private individual.

RULING:

It may only be invoked against the acts of the State. In the absence of governmental interference,
the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.

The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern is
not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed.

In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
be invoked against the State. As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:

“This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure)refers to the immunity of
one’s person, whether citizen or alien, from interference by government, included in which is
hisresidence, his papers, and other possessions. xxx
“xxx There, the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his
castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to
refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. xxx” (Cf.
Schermerber v.California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US616 [1886];
Italics supplied).

In Bureau v. McDowell (256 US 465(1921), 41 S Ct. 574; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in
construing the right against unreasonable searches and seizures declared that:

“(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown
in previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly
show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not
intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies: as against such authority it
was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested
occupation of his dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by
process duly served.”
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR
TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON,
ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO
MUNSOD, vs.PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

FACTS:

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate

labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,
with the officers and members of the petitioner Uuion.

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be
participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the
regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively);
and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.

The parties stipulated that the company, after learning the mass demonstration, informed the
union panel that they even if the demonstration is an inalienable right granted by the
Constitution, it should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company. As such, they
warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who
without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present
who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following
morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing
CBA (collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees)
particularly Article XXIV: NO LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE’; and, therefore, would be
amounting to an illegal strike.

Because the petitioners and their members proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of
the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the
demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the
demonstration, respondent Company charged the petitioners with a “violation of Section 4(a)-6
in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the
CBA providing for ‘No Strike and No Lockout.’ ”

In their answer, petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave
the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said
mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the
alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration
of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm.

After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin
M. Salvador, in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of
bargaining in bad faith and herein petitioners, as directly responsible for perpetrating the said
unfair labor practice were considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent
Company.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents’ act of concluding that the petitioners acted in bad faith for proceeding
with the demonstration and expelling them from the company is unconstitutional.

HELD:

No. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the
absence of its employees is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such
apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm
or its owners or its management.

While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are “delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society” and the “threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently
as the actual application of sanctions,” they “need breathing space to survive,” permitting
government regulation only “with narrow specificity.”

In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of
petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein
private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded
them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The
condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a
matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families.
Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being
broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms.

The primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances — over property rights has to be sustained.

There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the
request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the
Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which
is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.

The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the
part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass
demonstration against alleged police abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the respondent
firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right “to engage in concert activities for … mutual aid or
protection”; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere
with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three.” The
insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and regular shift
should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore
stated, “a potent means of inhibiting speech.”

Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the
right to petition for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal constitutes a denial of
social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of
Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State “the promotion of social justice to insure the
well-being and economic security of all of the people,” which guarantee is emphasized by the
other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that “the State shall afford
protection to labor …”. Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is
under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in
favor of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of
“meaningless constitutional patter.” Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial
Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law “to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest
by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for
the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic
well-being.” It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial
Relations, the very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and
failed to keep faith with its avowed mission — its raison d’etre — as ordained and directed by
the Constitution.

Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of
sympathetic understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to
indignities by the local police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or
profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their freedoms and security against alleged
petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such opportunism and
expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its
employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.

If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism such as in
the Republic Savings Bank vs CIR, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the
bank president no less, such recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly and right
to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the
mass demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers.

WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:

(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated
September 15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the
date of their separation from the service until re instated, minus one day’s pay and whatever
earnings they might have realized from other sources during their separation from the service.

With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.

Barroso vs. COA, GR No. 253253, April 27, 2021
Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations,69 Phil. 635, 642-644 ( I 940).
FACTS:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to an alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his
employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay
off as it averred that the said employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of the
rival labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a
company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won.
Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right to a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. The Court granted a new trial. Thus, the Solicitor General, arguing
for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the National Labor Union (respondent) is entitled to a new trial.

HELD:
YES. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU,
which they attached to their petition with the Supreme Court, were evidence so inaccessible to
them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that
their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered
(said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which
were not previously accessible but already existing).
The Supreme Court also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly
bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply with the requirements of due
process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the
following:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present
his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision.
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons
for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
Therefore, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire
record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it
reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in
accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove.
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 565 Phil. 731, 740 (2007)
FACTS:
The late Ms. Delmo became the Treasurer of the student organization.As the organization
treasurer, she had the power to disburse the organization fund for financial-aid of the students.
The said act violated school rules and regulations and then later penalized by being dropped from
the membership of the club and that she was not a candidate for any award or citation from the
school.
Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the decision but the petitioner denied it. Delmo, thus,
appealed to the Office of the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools.
Preliminary investigation revealed that Violeta Delmo was the treasurer of the Student
Leadership Club, an exclusive student organization; that pursuant to Article IX of the of the
Constitution and By-Laws of the club, it passed Resolution No. 2, authorizing the treasurer to
disburse funds of the Club to student for financial aid and other humanitarian purposes.
There were several instances that Director Bernardino directed the petitioner not to deprive Miss
Delmo the honors due her. But the petitioner made his efforts not to follow his directives and
made her graduate as a regular student. But eventually the petitioner finally instructed the
Registrar of the school to enter into the scholastic records of Delmo the honor, “Magna Cum
Laude.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.

HELD:
Yes, the petitioner’s failure to graduate Ms Delmo with the honor due to her and blatant
disobedience to the orders of Director Bernardino because of his embarrassment clearly shows
neglect of duty without a cause. His action makes him liable for damages under Article 27 of the
Civil Code.
Imbong vs. Ochoa, GR No. 204819
FACTS:
The increase of the country’s population at an uncontrollable pace led to the executive and the
legislative’s decision that prior measures were still not adequate. Thus, Congress enacted R.A.
No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and
information to the full range of modern family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective
to provide for the peoples’ right to reproductive health be achieved. Stated differently, the RH
Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception,
women’s health and population control
Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of society moved to assail the constitutionality of
RH Law. Meanwhile, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect. The
Court then issued a Status Quo Ante Order enjoining the effects and implementation of the
assailed legislation.
Petitioners question, among others, the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title rule.
According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed
legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent – to
act as a population control measure. On the other hand, respondents insist that the RH Law is not
a birth or population control measure, and that the concepts of “responsible parenthood” and
“reproductive health” are both interrelated as they are inseparable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title rule under the Constitution

RULING:
NO. Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the
reduction of the country’s population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and
children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law
emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access
to information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family
planning methods, natural or modern, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of
pregnancy. For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the
number of births in the country. The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners’ contention that the
whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law.
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
In Cawaling, Jr. v. COMELEC, it was written: It is well-settled that the “one title-one subject”
rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.
The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the
general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are
informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover,
this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not
to cripple or impede legislation.”
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive
health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to
control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right
to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so
uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the
enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting
any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood”
which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as
stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to
deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
The Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to
certain provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante Order
issued by the Court is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have
been herein declared as constitutional.
People vs. Jalosjos, February 3, 2000

FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and
acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion
asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first
instance of a non-bailable offense.

ISSUE:
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under law by
reason of the “mandate of the sovereign will”.

RULING:
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws.”, this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike
both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the
people” are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to
the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same
class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.